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Introduction Sex trafficking is a state crime. Nevertheless, it is also a federal crime when it involves conducting the activities of a sex trafficking enterprise in a way that affects interstate or foreign commerce or that involves travel in interstate or foreign commerce. Section 1591 of Title 18 of the United States Code outlaws the activities of sex trafficking enterprise that affects interstate or foreign commerce, including patronizing such an enterprise. The Mann Act outlaws sex trafficking activities that involve travel in interstate or foreign commerce. Section 1591(a)(1) : Divided into elements, §1591(a)(1) declares that (1) Whoever (2) knowingly (3)(a) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or (b) within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, (4)(a) recruits, (b) entices, (c) harbors, (d) transports, (e) provides, (f) obtains, (g) advertises, (h) maintains, (i) patronizes, or (j) solicits by any means (5) a person; (6)(a) knowing, or (b) in reckless disregard of the fact, (7)(a) that (A)(i) means of force, (ii) threats of force, (iii) fraud, (iv) coercion ... , or (v) any combination of such means (B) will be used to cause the person to (C) engage in a commercial sex act, or (b) that (A) the person has not attained the age of 18 years and (B) will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, (8) shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). Subsection 1591(b) makes violations punishable by imprisonment for any term of years not less than 15 years or for life (not less than 10 years imprisonment, if the victim is 14 years of age or older and the offender is less than 18 years of age, provided neither force nor deception was used). In the case of sex trafficking, any property derived from or used to facilitate a trafficking offense is subject to civil forfeiture. Mann Act Section 1591 and the various sections of the Mann Act overlap. Where §1595 outlaws commercial sexual enterprises operated in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce that use underage or coerced victims, the Mann Act outlaws prostitution and unlawful sexual activities that involve interstate or foreign travel. The Mann Act consists of three principal substantive sections. Section 2421 proscribes interstate or foreign transporting someone for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual activity. Section 2422 condemns coercing or enticing another person to travel in interstate or foreign commerce for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual activity, using a means of interstate communication to coerce or entice a child to engage in such conduct. Violation of §2421 is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years, for not more than 20 years if the defendant is a repeat offender, and by a fine of not more than $250,000. The offender may be ordered to pay the victim restitution. Section 2423 (Transportation Involving Children) : Section 2423 outlaws four distinct offenses: (1) §2423(a)—transportation of a child in interstate or foreign commerce for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual purposes; (2) §2423(b)—interstate or foreign travel for purposes of unlawful sexual abuse of a child; (3) §2423(c)—foreign travel and subsequent unlawful sexual abuse of a child; and (4) §2423(d)—arranging, for profit, the travel outlawed in any of these offenses. Violation of §2423(b) is punishable by imprisonment for more than 30 years (not more than 60 years for repeat offenders); a mandatory term of supervised release of not less than 5 years; a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for an organization); and unless indigent, to a special assessment of $5,000.

Sex trafficking is a state crime. Federal law, however, makes it a federal crime to conduct the activities of a sex trafficking enterprise in a way that affects interstate or foreign commerce or that involves travel in interstate or foreign commerce. Section 1591 of Title 18 of the United States Code outlaws sex trafficking activities that affect interstate or foreign commerce. The Mann Act outlaws sex trafficking activities that involve travel in interstate or foreign commerce. The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 (Victims Justice Act; P.L. 114-22/S. 178) amended both §1591 and the Mann Act. Section 1591 now provides in part the following: "Whoever knowingly in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion ... , or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act," shall be imprisoned not less than 15 years (not less than 10 years, if the victim is 14 years of age or older and the offender is less than 18 years of age). The Mann Act outlaws prostitution and unlawful sexual activities that involve interstate or foreign travel. It consists of three principal substantive sections. Section 2421 proscribes the interstate or foreign transportation of someone for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual activity; misconduct which is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years. Section 2422 condemns coercing or enticing another person to travel in interstate or foreign commerce to engage in prostitution or unlawful sexual activity, or using interstate communications to coerce or entice a child to engage in such conduct. The communications offense is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years; the travel offense by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Section 2423 outlaws four distinct offenses: (1) §2423(a)—transportation of a child in interstate or foreign commerce for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual purposes; (2) §2423(b)—interstate or foreign travel for purposes of unlawful sexual abuse of a child; (3) §2423(c)—foreign travel and subsequent unlawful sexual abuse of a child; and (4) §2423(d)—arranging, for profit, the travel outlawed in any of these offenses. The first is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years, each of the others by imprisonment for not more than 30 years. An offender also faces the prospect of a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for an organization); unless indigent, to a special assessment of $5,000; a term of supervised release of not less than five years; an order to pay the victim restitution; and the confiscation of any property derived from, or used to facilitate commission of, any of the offenses. This report is available in an abridged version without the footnotes and most of the citations to authority found here under the title CRS Report R43598, Sex Trafficking: An Abbreviated Overview of Federal Criminal Law.

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International Donors Conference The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and theEuropean Union co-sponsored an International Donors Conference on Haiti in Washington, D.C.,on July 19- 20, 2004. The sponsors held the conference to garner financial support for the international assistance strategy,known as the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), which the interim Haitian governmentdeveloped in conjunction with the four sponsoring organizations. (1) The ICF, released in July2004, outlines Haiti's priority needs and programs for 2004-2006. (For more information on Aristide's terms and the interim government, see CRS Report RL32294 , Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current CongressionalConcerns, by [author name scrubbed].) Congressional concerns about its implementation centeraround the rate at which funds are being disbursed, and the effectiveness of the assistance provided. The Interim Cooperation Framework establishes priority needs and projects that fall underfour broad categories, or "axes": political governance and national dialogue; economic governanceand institutional development; economic recovery; and access to basic services. For each of thesefour strategic axes, the Framework provides a strategy, priority objectives, and monitoring indicators. Water and sanitation. Current law related to funding of U.S. assistance to Haiti under the InterimCooperation Framework includes the following: the U.S. 108-25 ); the ForeignOperations Appropriations Act for FY2004 ( P.L. 108-324 ); the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-13 ). Pending legislation related to funding of U.S. assistance to Haiti includes the following: the Haiti Economic andInfrastructure Reconstruction Act ( H.R. 1213 / S. 704 ); the FY2006 and 2007 Foreign Relations AuthorizationAct ( H.R. Progress to Date(10) According to the World Bank and other sources, some progress has beenmade toward the objectives outlined in the Interim Cooperation Framework, althoughmuch work remains to be done. Access to Basic Services. The main congressional concerns expressed regarding the DonorsConference strategy is the rate at which funds are being disbursed and theeffectiveness of the aid being provided. Near the mid-point ofthe Donors Conference time-frame, a little less than half of the pledged funding hadbeen disbursed, an estimated $400 million as of May, and a tentative estimate of$500 million as of July 2005. Pledges were madeto be disbursed not all at once, but over a period of just more than two years, fromJuly 2004 through September 2006, the end of Haiti's fiscal year, and eight monthsinto a new administration, if elections proceed according to schedule. At the halfway mark, the United States has disbursed abouthalf of its pledged funds, and Canada more than half.

Haiti and its multilateral and bilateral donors developed an international assistance strategy,known as the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), to address Haiti's short-term needs between thecollapse of the government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004 and the initialphase of a new government scheduled to be inaugurated in February 2006. The World Bank, theInter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union co-sponsored theInternational Donors Conference on Haiti in Washington, D.C., on July 19-20, 2004. The objectiveof the conference was to garner international financial support for the ICF, which outlines Haiti'spriority needs and programs for 2004-2006. The Interim Cooperation Framework establishes priority needs and projects that fall underfour broad categories, or "axes": political governance and national dialogue; economic governanceand institutional development; economic recovery; and access to basic services. For each of thesefour strategic axes, the Framework provides a strategy, priority objectives, and monitoring indicators. Many congressional concerns regarding Haitian development are addressed by the prioritiesand programs outlined in the Interim Cooperative Framework. The main congressional concernsexpressed regarding the Donors Conference strategy is the rate at which funds are being disbursedand the effectiveness of the aid being provided. International organizations and governmentspledged $1.085 billion, to be disbursed over a two and a half-year period, from July 2004 throughSeptember 2006, eight months into a new administration, if elections proceed according to schedule. Initial disbursement was slow. According to the World Bank, however, the rate ofdisbursement began to improve after about six months. At just under the halfway point of theDonors Conference time-frame, a little less than half of the pledged funding had been disbursed, atentative estimate of $500 million as of July 2005. Disbursement has been uneven among donors. The United States has disbursed about half of its pledged funds. Some progress has been made toward the objectives outlined in the Interim CooperationFramework, including voter registration, improvements in fiscal transparency, jobs creation, andbroader access to clean water and other services. Current law related to funding of U.S. assistance to Haiti includes P.L. 108-25 , P.L. 108-199 , P.L. 108-324 , P.L. 108-447 , and P.L. 109-13 . Pending legislation related to funding of U.S.assistance to Haiti includes H.R. 611 , H.R. 945 , H.R. 1130 , H.R. 1213 / S. 704 , H.R. 2601 , H.R. 3057 , and S. 600 . See also CRS Report RL32294 , Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 andCurrent Congressional Concerns, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL32733 , LatinAmerica and the Caribbean: Issues for the 109th Congress, [author name scrubbed], Coordinator. Thisreport will be updated as warranted.

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Background and Definitions The admission of refugees to the United States and their resettlement here are authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980. The INA defines a refugee as a person who is outside his or her country and who is unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. In special circumstances, a refugee also may be a person who is within his or her country and who is persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Refugee Ceiling and Regional Allocations Under INA Section 207, the maximum annual number of refugee admissions (refugee ceiling) and the allocation of these numbers by region of the world are set by the President after consultation by Cabinet-level representatives with members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. From October 1, 2010, through August 31, 2016, the United States admitted a total of 12,623 Syrian refugees. Role of the Department of State The Department of State's (DOS's) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) is responsible for coordinating and managing the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Prospective refugees can be referred to the U.S. program by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a U.S. embassy, or a designated nongovernmental organization (NGO), or in some cases, as described below, can access the U.S. refugee program directly. PRM generally arranges for an NGO, an international organization, or U.S. embassy contractors to manage a Resettlement Support Center (RSC) that assists in refugee processing. The RSCs assist applicants in completing documentary requirements and schedule refugee eligibility interviews with the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The USCIS officer must determine whether the applicant is qualified under one of the processing priorities, meets the INA definition of a refugee, is not firmly resettled in another country, and is admissible to the United States under the INA. Refugee applicants must clear all required checks before their applications can receive final approval. Refugee Resettlement Refugees of all nationalities who are accepted for U.S. resettlement are placed in communities throughout the United States. Regardless of where refugees are initially resettled, however, they are free to relocate at any time. Once admitted to the United States, refugees are eligible for initial and longer-term resettlement assistance. FY2016 Syrian Refugee Placement by State As of August 31, 2016, 10,740 Syrian refugees have arrived in the United States in FY2016.

The admission of Syrian refugees to the United States has generated public controversy, with opponents citing concerns chiefly about terrorism and national security. As of August 31, 2016, the United States has admitted 10,740 Syrian refugees in FY2016, meeting the Obama Administration's fiscal year goal. These new arrivals have been placed in 40 states. From October 1, 2010, through August 31, 2016, the United States admitted a total of 12,623 Syrian refugees. The admission of refugees to the United States and their resettlement here are authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980. The INA defines a refugee as a person who is outside his or her country and who is unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. In special circumstances, a refugee also may be a person who is within his or her country and who is persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The maximum annual number of refugee admissions (refugee ceiling) and the allocation of these numbers by region of the world are set by the President after consultation by Cabinet-level representatives with members of the House and the Senate Judiciary Committees. The Department of State's (DOS's) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) is responsible for coordinating and managing the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Prospective refugees can be referred to the U.S. program by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a U.S. embassy, or a designated nongovernmental organization (NGO), or in some cases, they can access the U.S. refugee program directly. PRM generally arranges for an NGO, an international organization, or U.S. embassy contractors to manage a Resettlement Support Center (RSC) that assists in refugee processing. The RSCs assist applicants in completing documentary requirements and schedule refugee eligibility interviews with the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which adjudicates refugee applications. The USCIS officer must determine whether the applicant is qualified under one of the refugee processing priorities, meets the INA definition of a refugee, is not firmly resettled in another country, and is admissible to the United States under the INA. Refugee applicants must clear all required security checks before their applications can receive final approval. Refugees who are accepted for U.S. resettlement are placed in communities throughout the United States. Regardless of where refugees are initially resettled, they are free to relocate at any time. Once admitted to the United States, refugees are eligible for initial resettlement assistance through the DOS Reception and Placement Program and longer-term resettlement assistance through the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).

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Most Recent Developments On December 26, 2007, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( H.R. 2764 ) into law ( P.L. This act includes the FY2008 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations bill, as well as 10 other appropriations bills, in addition to emergency military funding for Iraq and Afghanistan. Congressional leaders opted to use the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Appropriations bill, 2008 ( H.R. In an exchange of amendments between the Senate and House, Congress completed action on H.R. 2764 during December 17-19, 2007. 110-161 ), Congress has provided $54.637 billion in CJS appropriations, a 3.4% increase over the FY2007 enacted level and a 2.2% increase over the Administration's request. FY2008 Request By comparison, Table 2 shows that the Administration's FY2008 request included $53.45 billion for the Departments of Commerce and Justice, certain science agencies, and related agencies, or about a 1.1% increase over amounts appropriated by Congress for FY2007. The requested appropriation included $6.596 billion for the Department of Commerce (a 0.4% decrease compared to the FY2007 enacted level), $22.348 billion for the Department of Justice (a 3.7% decrease), $23.744 billion for science agencies (a 6.9% increase), and $762.5 million for related agencies (a 4.8% decrease). In addition to these amounts, in February 2008, the Administration has requested another $146.7 million for Justice as part of the FY2008 Global War on Terror Supplemental. House Action The House Appropriations Committee ordered reported an FY2008 CJS appropriations bill ( H.R. 3093 (amended) on July 26, 2007. By comparison, the House bill would have provided a 5.9% increase over the FY2007 enacted level, and a 4.7% increase over the Administration's FY2008 request, but $1.1% less than the Senate mark. For the Department of Commerce, the House-passed bill would have provided $7.018 billion, or $393.7 million more than the FY2007 enacted level (an increase of 5.9%) and $422.6 million more than the FY2008 request (an increase of 6.4%). For the Department of Justice, the House-passed bill would have provided $23.974 billion, or $763.8 million more than the FY2007 enacted level (an increase of 3.3%) and $1.626 billion more than the FY2008 request (an increase of 7.3%). 3093 on October 16, 2007. 3093 would have provided $56.7 billion in FY2008 CJS appropriations. This amount included $1 billion in emergency funding for NASA's return to flight initiative. The Senate bill would have provided a 7.3% increase over the FY2007 enacted level and a 6.1% increase over the Administration's request. 2764 as the legislative vehicle for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-161 . A hearing on H.R. H.R. The Senate-passed bill would have provided $25.019 billion, or $2.812 billion more than the FY2007 amount (a 12.7% increase). NASA requested $17.309 billion for FY2008, a 6.3% increase over its FY2007 appropriation.

This report monitors actions taken by the 110th Congress for the FY2008 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations bill. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), Congress has provided $54.637 billion in CJS appropriations, a 3.4% increase over the FY2007 enacted level and a 2.2% increase over the Administration's request. This amount includes $6.857 billion for the Department of Commerce (a 3.5% increase over the FY2007 enacted level), $23.592 billion for the Department of Justice (a 1.6% increase), $23.38 billion for science agencies (a 5.3% increase) and $808.8 million for related agencies (a 1.0% increase). The Administration's FY2008 request included $53.450 billion for those departments and agencies funded through the CJS appropriation, or about a 1.1% increase over the FY2007 appropriation ($52.843 billion). The request included $6.596 billion for Commerce (a 0.4% decrease compared to the FY2007 enacted level), $22.348 billion for Justice (a 3.7% decrease), $23.744 billion for science agencies (a 6.9% increase), and $762.5 million for related agencies (a 4.8% decrease). In addition to these amounts, the Administration has requested another $146.7 million for Justice as part of the FY2008 Global War on Terror Supplemental. The House passed an FY2008 CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 3093) on July 26, 2007. The House bill would have provided $55.965 billion for FY2008, or a 5.9% increase over the FY2007 appropriation and a 4.7% increase over the FY2008 request. The House amount would have provided Commerce with $7.018 billion (a 5.9% increase over the FY2007 enacted level), Justice with $23.974 billion (a 3.3% increase), science agencies with $24.127 billion (an 8.6% increase), and related agencies with $845.7 million (a 5.6% increase). The Senate passed an FY2008 CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 3093, as amended) on October 16, 2007. The Senate bill would have provided $57.7 billion, or a 9.2% increase over the FY2007 appropriation and an 8.0% increase over the FY2008 request. The Senate amount would have provided Commerce with $7.289 billion (a 10.0% increase over the FY2007 enacted level), Justice with $24.493 billion (a 5.5% increase), science agencies with $25.019 billion (an increase of 12.7%), and related agencies with $899.7 million (a 12.4% increase). The Senate bill included $1 billion in emergency funding for NASA's return to flight initiative. Conference negotiations on H.R. 3093 broke down, however. In lieu of further action on that bill, congressional leaders opted to use the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Appropriations bill, 2008 (H.R. 2764) as a vehicle for the CJS appropriations, as well as the other 10 remaining appropriations bills, in addition to emergency spending for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. On December 17-19, 2007, Congress completed action on H.R. 2764 through an exchange of amendments between the two chambers. The President signed H.R. 2764 into law on December 26, 2007 (P.L. 110-161). This report will not be updated.

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The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement ( P.L. 108-78 ) went into effect on January 1, 2004. This report provides an overview of the major trade and economic developments following the FTA over the five years ending in January 2010. It also includes selected information on key provisions of the agreement. The U.S.-Singapore FTA has taken on new importance in trade policy because the United States is engaged in negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP negotiations are the first major market-opening initiative of the Obama Administration. On December 14, 2009, United States Trade Representative Ron Kirk notified Congress of the intent to enter into the TPP negotiations. The objective is to shape a high-standard, broad-based regional free trade agreement with Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The first round of negotiations began March 15, 2010, in Sydney, Australia. The FTA has provided greater access for U.S. companies, has been instrumental in increasing bilateral trade, and has provided reassurance to Singaporeans of U.S. interest in the country at a time when many in the region perceived that the United States had been focused on the Middle East and "neglecting" Asia. As a city-state, Singapore operates as an entrepot and shipping center and basically has free trade with almost all countries. Under the FTA, Singapore made concessions that dealt mainly with providing greater access for American service providers (particularly financial services) and with strengthening the business environment in areas such as the protection of intellectual property rights and access to government procurement. In 2009, the United States ran a $6.6 billion surplus in its balance of merchandise trade with Singapore, up from $1.4 billion in 2003, but down from the $12.0 billion in 2008. U.S. exports of goods to Singapore surged from $16.6 billion in 2003 to a peak of $27.9 billion in 2008 before declining to $22.3 billion in 2009. Even with this rapid increase in U.S. exports to Singapore, however, the U.S. share of Singapore's imports has declined from 16% in 2003 to 12% in 2009. The main reason for this is that Singapore's overall trade is booming. The U.S. balance of trade in services with Singapore declined from a surplus of $4.0 billion in 2001 to $1.2 billion in 2005 but rose to $4.2 billion in 2008. A significant increase has been in income from U.S. direct investments in Singapore. U.S. access to the Singaporean market for multinational corporations seems to have been enhanced considerably under the FTA. U.S. income from assets in Singapore rose from $6.7 billion in 2003 to $21.1 billion by 2008. On the U.S. import side (Singapore's exports), a noteworthy development is that U.S. imports of pharmaceuticals from Singapore have risen dramatically from $0.09 billion in 2003 to $3.0 billion in 2007 before declining to $2.0 billion in 2008. This apparently was partly triggered by provisions in the FTA that required Singapore to strengthen its intellectual property protection. For details on the content of the FTA, see CRS Report RL31789, The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement , by [author name scrubbed]. Still, Singapore imports more from the United States ($28.5 billion) than from China ($26.0 billion).

The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (P.L. 108-78) went into effect on January 1, 2004. This report provides an overview of the major trade and economic effects of the FTA over the three years ending in 2006. It also includes detailed information on key provisions of the agreement and legislative action. The U.S.-Singapore FTA has taken on new importance in trade policy because the United States is engaged in negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP negotiations are the first major market-opening initiative of the Obama Administration. On December 14, 2009, United States Trade Representative Ron Kirk notified Congress of the intent to enter into the TPP negotiations. The objective is to shape a high-standard, broad-based regional free trade agreement with Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The first round of negotiations began March 15, 2010, in Sydney, Australia. The U.S.-Singapore FTA has provided greater access for U.S. companies, has been instrumental in increasing bilateral trade, and has provided reassurance to Singaporeans of U.S. interest in the country. As a city-state, Singapore operates as an entrepot with essentially free trade. Under the FTA, concessions dealt mainly with providing greater access for American service providers and with strengthening the business environment in areas such as the protection of intellectual property rights and access to government procurement. In 2009, the United States ran a $6.6 billion surplus in its balance of merchandise trade with Singapore, up from $1.4 billion in 2003, but down from the $12.0 billion in 2008. U.S. exports of goods to Singapore surged from $16.6 billion in 2003 to a peak of $27.9 billion in 2008 before declining to $22.3 billion in 2009. Even with this rapid increase in U.S. exports to Singapore, the U.S. share of Singapore's imports has declined from 16% in 2003 to 12% in 2009. The main reason for this is that Singapore's overall trade is booming. Still, Singapore imports more from the United States ($28.5 billion) than from China ($26.0 billion).The U.S. balance of trade in services with Singapore declined from a surplus of $4.0 billion in 2001 to $1.2 billion 2005 but has risen to $4.2 billion in 2008. A significant increase has been in income from U.S. direct investments in Singapore. U.S. access to the Singaporean market for multinational corporations seems to have been enhanced considerably under the FTA. U.S. income from assets in Singapore rose from $6.7 billion in 2003 to $21.1 billion by 2008. On the U.S. import side (Singapore's exports), a noteworthy development is that U.S. imports of pharmaceuticals from Singapore have risen from $0.09 billion in 2003 to $3.0 billion in 2007 before declining to $2.0 billion in 2008. Singapore has developed as a regional center for multinational pharmaceutical companies. This apparently was partly triggered by provisions in the FTA that required Singapore to strengthen its intellectual property protection. Negotiations for the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement were launched under the Clinton Administration in December 2000. The FTA became the fifth such agreement the United States has signed and the first with an Asian country. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

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This report examines recent trade statistics to ascertain the initial effects of the end of quotas on U.S. clothing and textile trade with China and the rest of the world. Safeguard Measures Second, the ATC's impact is mitigated because it does not prevent countries from utilizing "safeguard measures," as well as antidumping and countervailing duty cases, to block imports. Prognostications for Post-ATC Trade Not surprisingly, there were a number of studies done to predict what would happen to the international trade in clothing and textiles after the elimination of quotas prior to the termination of the ATC on January 1, 2005. Analysts generally agreed that: global trade in clothing and textiles would grow more quickly after the removal of quotas; China and India would increase their market shares for both clothing and textile exports, but there was no consensus on the amount of this increase, estimates for China varied from 3% to 10%; The United States would import more of its clothing and textiles from China, ranging from one-third two-thirds of its imports; U.S. clothing and textile manufacturers would reduce their operations, shut down factories and lay off workers due to increased competition from China, India and other suppliers; one study estimated up to 630,00 job losses due to Chinese imports; Preferential trade arrangements may buffer the impact of the quota removal for clothing and textile manufacturers in the Caribbean, South and Central America, the Middle East, and Africa; There is a possibility that the United States, the EU, and other WTO members may impose trade remedies in response to the increase in imports from China, India and other Asian suppliers. Table 5 also implies that the United States did not experience a major surge in clothing and textile imports as a consequence of the termination of the ATC quotas. For clothing, there was a sharp increase in clothing imports from China in 2005, seemingly at the expense of Mexico. First, U.S. clothing imports grew faster than textile imports over the last 10 years. Clothing and Textile Industry Besides the potential effect on the U.S. international trade balance, any increase in clothing and textiles imports brought about by the termination of the ATC could have an impact on the U.S. clothing and textile industry. Anecdotal Evidence While the international trade data and domestic industry data provide rather ambiguous results on the possible impact of quota elimination on the U.S. clothing and textile industry, there is a fairly extensive pool of anecdotal evidence that the recent increase in clothing and textile imports have had a deleterious effect on U.S. manufacturers. For example, while there has been the expected market growth, both in the global and U.S. market, the foreseen major shifts in production have not occurred. Similarly, U.S. clothing and trade data and industry figures for the U.S. clothing and textile industry present a mixed picture of the impact of the end of the ATC quotas on U.S. clothing and textile production and employment. One final prediction that proved to be comparatively accurate was the use of trade remedies by the United States. Implications for Congress The termination of ATC quotas in 2005 and the ensuing growth of clothing and textile imports, regardless of any causal relationship between the two events, have added clothing and textile trade to growing list of bilateral trade issues between the United States and China. With several of these trade preference programs coming up for renewal—and a number of free trade agreements possibly coming up for ratification—Congress may wish to consider the case of the clothing and textile industry in the post-ATC era as part of their deliberations.

The elimination of the last set of quotas of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) on January 1, 2005, ostensibly brought about the end of decades of quantitative restrictions on the international exchange of clothing and textiles. Trade analysts around the world expected that the final lifting of import limits would foster increased growth in clothing and textile trade, as well as a restructuring of clothing and textile production. In particular, some market watchers predicted a dramatic shift of clothing and textile production to China at the expense of many other nations. For the U.S. domestic market, the end of the ATC quotas was expected to bring about three major changes. First, there would be a sharp increase in U.S. clothing and textile imports. Second, there would be a major shift in sourcing clothing and textile imports to China. Third, the influx of clothing and textile imports was expected to have a deleterious effect on the U.S. clothing and textile industry. Fourth, because of the anticipated negative impact on the U.S. clothing and textile industry, there was a belief that the U.S. government would make use of various trade remedies to fend off the rising tide of clothing and textile imports. The events of the first two years of post-ATC quotas—2005 and 2006—both confirmed and contradicted the experts' predictions. The global clothing and textile market did grow faster over the last two years than before, but there has not been the anticipated sharp shift in production to China. Similarly, while U.S. clothing and textile imports continued to grow in 2005 and 2006, it is unclear if the end of the ATC quotas was the main cause of that growth. In addition, while anecdotal evidence from the U.S. clothing and textile industry indicates greater competition from China, trade data and industry production levels do not reveal clear evidence that the termination of the ATC was a major contributing factor to the recent loss of employment in the U.S. clothing and textile industry. One major factor complicating analysis of post-ATC clothing and textile trade was the decision by the United States (and the European Union) to utilize available trade remedies to forestall the impact of end of quantitative restrictions on clothing and textile trade. After the United States imposed safeguard measures in 2004 and 2005, China and the United States negotiated a "memorandum of understanding" that continued quotas on selected items until 2008. For Congress, post-ATC clothing and textile trade has raised several issues it may choose to consider. First, Congress may consider modifying current trade remedy laws, particularly those dealing with safeguard measures and countervailing duties. Second, Congress may wish to examine in more detail the impact of the end of the ATC quotas on the U.S. clothing and textile industry. Third, Congress may also consider examining the effectiveness of various trade preference programs, especially as they relate to clothing and textiles. This report will be updated as circumstances require.

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Consideration of Resolutions to Change Standing Rules Several elements of the rules governing proceedings on a resolution to amend the Standing Rules of the Senate are especially important in determining how the Senate can consider such a resolution when it is controversial: (1) the Senate can adopt the resolution by a simple majority vote; (2) a supermajority vote may be needed in order to limit the time for consideration and ensure that the Senate can reach the point of voting on the resolution; (3) if this supermajority vote to limit consideration is adopted, amendments to the resolution will be limited to those that are germane and have been filed in advance; (4) a supermajority vote also may be required to limit the time for consideration of a motion to take up the resolution; and (5) in practice, the resolution could become available for consideration at all only if it had either been reported from committee or the order of business for its consideration was reached in a "morning hour." First, like any other measure under the general Rules of the Senate, a resolution to change Senate Rules is debatable. When a measure is amendable, Senate Rules impose no general restrictions on the subject matter of amendments that may be offered; the Senate may impose such restrictions only by unanimous consent or through cloture. For changes in the Standing Rules, cloture can be invoked only by vote of two-thirds of Senators voting, with a quorum present. A precise statement would reflect this understanding: in cases in which opponents are willing to carry on a filibuster , it can become necessary to obtain supermajority support (by two-thirds of Senators present and voting) in order to bring the Senate to the point at which it can vote on a proposal to amend Senate Rules. An ordinary simple majority of Senators voting can then adopt the proposal itself. A simple majority can adopt a motion to proceed, but a motion to proceed to consider a proposal to change Standing Rules is always debatable, and therefore can itself be filibustered. As a result, it might become necessary to obtain a (two-thirds supermajority) vote to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed to consider a rules change resolution in order to reach a (simple majority) vote on that motion, and then to invoke cloture again (by a two-thirds supermajority) to limit debate on the resolution itself (which can be adopted by a simple majority). If a provision in a bill or joint resolution directed a change in the Standing Rules, the measure as a whole (and, presumably, any motion to proceed to its consideration) would become subject to the requirement for two-thirds of Senators present and voting for cloture, but if the provision established some other form of procedural regulation, such as a standing order, the requirement of three-fifths of the full membership of the Senate would apply. This notice requirement would apparently not be applicable for an amendment proposing a standing order or other form of procedural regulation. Such a proceeding might result either in a ruling that directly establishes an altered practice or in one that permits a simple majority to bring the Senate to a vote on a change in rules. Opponents would be able to filibuster the procedural question, potentially rendering the Senate unable to reach a vote by which a simple majority could establish the desired precedent unless a supermajority vote could be secured for cloture on the procedural proposition. The proposed proceeding would be based on the argument that, to make effective the constitutional power of the Senate to determine its own procedures, it is requisite that a simple majority be able to bring to a close the consideration of a proposal to establish or amend Senate rules. Implementing a "Nuclear" or "Constitutional" Option Under the line of argument described in the preceding sections, supporters of change in the rules would pursue a "nuclear option" during the beginning of a new Congress by raising some point of order whose settlement would permit a majority to close debate on a pending rules change proposal (or on a pending motion to proceed to its consideration), perhaps on the basis that the Constitution requires that this action be possible. In these circumstances, as a result, opponents of change could attempt to prevent the establishment of the new precedent by filibustering the vote on the appeal.

This report discusses procedures and related issues involved in considering changes to Senate rules. The Constitution empowers each house of Congress to determine its own rules. The Senate normally considers changes to its Standing Rules in the form of a simple resolution, which (like any ordinary measure) can be adopted by a majority of Senators voting, a quorum being present ("simple majority"). Like most measures, however, such a resolution is debatable. Senate rules place no general limits on how long consideration of a measure may last, and allow such limits to be imposed only by a supermajority vote for cloture. As a result, opponents may be able to prevent the resolution from coming to a vote by filibustering. For changes in Standing Rules, the supermajority requisite for cloture is two-thirds of Senators voting, with a quorum present. Except by unanimous consent, moreover, the Senate can normally take up a resolution changing rules (or any other measure) only by adopting a motion to proceed to consider. A simple majority can adopt this motion, but the motion is itself debatable, so that in order to reach a vote, it may be necessary to obtain a two-thirds supermajority to invoke cloture first on the motion to proceed, then also on the measure itself. For these reasons, in cases in which opponents are willing to filibuster, it can become necessary, in practice, to obtain supermajority support in order to bring the Senate to the point at which it can vote on a proposal to amend Senate Rules, even though a simple majority can then adopt the proposal itself. Changes to Standing Rules could also be included in other forms of resolution, or in bills, but any motion to consider a measure containing such provisions is still always debatable, and a two-thirds supermajority is still required for cloture. Procedural changes could also be established as standing orders, or as certain other kinds of procedural regulation. A motion to proceed to consider a measure establishing procedural regulations in any such form would also be debatable, but cloture on such a measure would require three-fifths of the full membership of the Senate. Finally, the Senate may also change its procedures by establishing new precedents that interpret existing rules or other standards differently from before. This might be achieved either by a ruling that directly establishes an altered practice or by one that permits a simple majority to bring the Senate to a vote on a change in rules. If a point of order asserts a new interpretation, the chair will normally overrule it on the basis of existing precedents, but if that decision is appealed to the full Senate, a simple majority could establish the new interpretation by voting to reverse the decision. Appeals are normally debatable, however, so that opponents may be able to prevent any vote to overturn the ruling by filibustering the appeal, unless a supermajority would vote for cloture. Proceedings that would permit the Senate to reinterpret rules without requiring a supermajority vote in the process have been called the "nuclear option," or, if implemented through raising a point of order on constitutional grounds, the "constitutional option." It is not clear that any such form of proceeding can be proposed that would not require violations of existing rules in the process of changing them. Some of the proceedings proposed would require the chair to make a ruling contrary to precedent, or else to submit to the decision of the Senate a settled procedural question on which the chair would routinely rule. Others would require the Senate to entertain a novel motion through which a simple majority could close debate, or would involve disposing of a motion through proceedings that would be in order only if the Senate were already to have approved the motion.

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Geopolitical Considerations From December 2011 to January 2012, some Iranian government officials openly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, a major artery of the global oil market, if sanctions are imposed on Iran's oil exports. Context and Possible Causes of Iran's Threats Iran's threats occurred as it faced increasing likelihood that multilateral sanctions would be adopted that could reduce Iran's oil export earnings. As a result of the EU decision, some Iranian leaders immediately reiterated the threat to the Strait. Since 2006, Iran has negotiated with six countries—the so-called "P5+1," permanent U.N. Security Council members plus Germany—to identify steps that could assure the international community that Iran's nuclear program is purely peaceful. Potential Military Response U.S. On January 13, 2012, it was reported that "The Obama Administration is relying on a secret channel of communication to warn Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, that closing the Strait of Hormuz is a 'red line' that would provoke an American response...." Although U.S. statements have addressed Iran's threat to close the Strait outright, it is widely assumed by experts and observers that the United States will act against Iranian efforts to harass or interfere with the free flow of commerce in the Strait in such scenarios discussed above. But they could also find themselves sparking a punishing—if perhaps short-lived—regional conflict from which they could emerge the primary losers.... Few believe Tehran could keep the straits closed for long—perhaps no more than a handful of days...." A December 29, 2011, press report states that "Iran can disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz but probably cannot completely shut down the world's most important oil route, military analysts say.... What the Iranians can do ... is harass traffic through the Gulf—anything from stopping tankers to outright attacks. The United States imports little LNG. A disruption of oil through the Strait of Hormuz could significantly affect global oil prices. Risk of damage to oil production and export facilities in the Persian Gulf would also be of concern. Given limited bypass options, outright closure of the Strait would represent an unprecedented disruption to global oil supply and would likely cause a substantial increase in oil prices. The increased perception of risk could contribute to higher oil prices without requiring military action, though this is only effective in contributing to oil prices as long as and to the degree that global oil market participants take such threats seriously. In the event of a disruption, consumer countries could release strategic stocks to offset the impact on oil supply. The United States currently holds 696 million barrels of crude oil in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), a publicly held stockpile of crude oil to be used to offset supply disruptions. The United States coordinates use of its SPR with other members of the International Energy Agency (IEA), which include Japan, Germany, South Korea, and other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Iran has the option of harassing tanker traffic through the Gulf as it has in the past, though that also runs the risk of military retaliation and alienating customers. However, it is possible that Iranian action becomes relatively more likely as more countries reduce or refuse Iranian exports. Alternatively, Iran may choose to continue making threatening statements without actually acting and/or to seek a diplomatic solution to curb oil sanctions through renewing international talks on its nuclear program. To some degree a disruption could be offset by release from the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve and similar reserves in other countries. The Convention states: Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans … Believing that the codification and progressive development of the law of the sea achieved in this Convention will contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, cooperation and friendly relations among all nations in conformity with the principles of justice and equal rights … [and] Affirming that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law… Parties to the Convention agreed to the adoption of the comprehensive international treaty after nine years of negotiations.

Some officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have recently renewed threats to close or exercise control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's threats appear to have been prompted by the likely imposition of new multilateral sanctions targeting Iran's economic lifeline—the export of oil and other energy products. In the past, Iranian leaders have made similar threats and comments when the country's oil exports have been threatened. However, as in the past, the prospect of a major disruption of maritime traffic in the Strait risks damaging Iranian interests. U.S. and allied military capabilities in the region remain formidable. This makes a prolonged outright closure of the Strait appear unlikely. Nevertheless, such threats can and do raise tensions in global energy markets and leave the United States and other global oil consumers to consider the risks of another potential conflict in the Middle East. This report explains Iranian threats to the Strait of Hormuz, and analyzes the implications of some scenarios for potential U.S. or international conflict with Iran. These scenarios include Outright Closure. An outright closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a major artery of the global oil market, would be an unprecedented disruption of global oil supply and contribute to higher global oil prices. However, at present, this appears to be a low probability event. Were this to occur, it is not likely to be prolonged. It would likely trigger a military response from the United States and others, which could reach beyond simply reestablishing Strait transit. Iran would also alienate countries that currently oppose broader oil sanctions. Iran could become more likely to actually pursue this if few or no countries were willing to import its oil. Harassment and/or Infrastructure Damage. Iran could harass tanker traffic through the Strait through a range of measures without necessarily shutting down all traffic. This took place during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Also, critical energy production and export infrastructure could be damaged as a result of military action by Iran, the United States, or other actors. Harassment or infrastructure damage could contribute to lower exports of oil from the Persian Gulf, greater uncertainty around oil supply, higher shipping costs, and consequently higher oil prices. However, harassment also runs the risk of triggering a military response and alienating Iran's remaining oil customers. Continued Threats. Iranian officials could continue to make threatening statements without taking action. This could still raise energy market tensions and contribute to higher oil prices, though only to the degree that oil market participants take such threats seriously. If an oil disruption does occur, the United States has the option of temporarily offsetting its effects through the release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Such action could be coordinated with other countries that hold strategic reserves, as was done with other members of the International Energy Agency after the disruption of Libyan crude supplies in 2011. Iran's threats suggest to many experts that international and multilateral sanctions—and the prospect of additional sanctions—have begun to affect its political and strategic calculations. The threats have been coupled with a publicly announced agreement by Iran to resume talks with six countries on measures that would assure the international community that Iran's nuclear program is used for purely peaceful purposes. Some experts believe that the pressure on Iran's economy, and its agreement to renewed talks, provide the best opportunity in at least two years to reach agreement with Iran on curbing its nuclear program.

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20 , P.L. 110-5 ). The Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution provides $32.7 billion for the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) for FY2007, a $14.7 million increase over the President's request and $3.3 billion above the FY2006 enacted amount (see Table 1 ). 5385 ). Background The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits and services to veterans who meet certain eligibility rules, including disability compensation and pensions, education, training and rehabilitation services, hospital and medical care, home lone guarantees, and death benefits that cover burial expenses. VHA operates the nation's largest integrated direct health care delivery system. The House passed H.R. H.R. The Administration requested $32.7 billion for VHA, an 11.3% increase over the FY2006 enacted amount of $29.3 billion, and a 10% increase over FY2005 enacted amount of $29.7 billion (see Table 5 ). House Action On May 10, 2006, the House Committee on Appropriations approved by voice vote its version of the Military Construction, Military Quality of Life, and Veterans Affairs Appropriations bill (MilCon-Qual-appropriations bill) for FY2007 ( H.R. 5385 , H.Rept. 109-464 ). 5385 on May 19, 2006. 5385 provided $32.7 billion for VHA, a $3.4 billion (11.4%) increase over the FY2006 enacted amount of $29.3 billion, and about the same as the President's request. H.R. 5385 ; S.Rept. 109-286 ). On November 14, the Senate passed H.R. 5385 , as amended, by voice vote. Unlike the House-passed version of H.R. The MilCon-VA appropriations bill for FY2007 did not include any fee increases as requested by the Administration's budget proposal for VHA for FY2007, and the Senate Appropriations Committee strongly expressed its displeasure about the Administration's fee proposals: The [VA] continues to assume congressional approval of its policy and legislative proposals before the Congress has done so.... Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007 By the end of the 109 th Congress, Congress had not passed the MilCon-VA appropriations bill for FY2007 and funded most government agencies, including the VA, through a series of Continuing Appropriations Resolutions ( P.L. 110-5 provides $32.7 billion for VHA for FY2007. The President's budget request includes three major policy proposals: assess an annual enrollment fee of $250 for all Priority 7 and 8 veterans; increase pharmaceutical copayments from $8 to $15 (for each 30-day prescription) for all enrolled veterans in Priority Groups 7 and 8; and bill veterans receiving treatment for nonservice-connected conditions for the entire copayment amount.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility rules. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital and medical care. VA provides these benefits to veterans through three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through an integrated health care system. The President's FY2007 budget proposal to Congress requested $32.7 billion for VHA, an 11.3% increase over the FY2006 enacted amount of $29.3 billion, and a 10% increase over the FY2005 enacted amount of $29.7 billion. As in previous budget proposals, the President's FY2007 budget request also includes a set of legislative proposals. The Administration is requesting authorization from Congress to assess an annual enrollment fee of $250 for all Priority 7 and 8 veterans, increase veterans' share of pharmaceutical copayments from $8 to $15 (for each 30-day prescription) for all enrolled veterans in Priority Groups 7 and 8, and bill veterans receiving treatment for nonservice-connected conditions for the entire copayment amount. On May 19, 2006, the House passed the Military Construction, Military Quality of Life, and Veterans Affairs Appropriations bill for FY2007 (H.R. 5385, H.Rept. 109-464). H.R. 5385 provides $32.7 billion for VHA for FY2007, an 11.4% increase over the FY2006 enacted amount. On November 14, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 5385 (S.Rept. 109-286). H.R. 5385, as amended by the Senate, provided $32.7 billion for VHA, about the same as the House-passed amount and the President's request. Neither version of H.R. 5385 included any provisions that would have given VA the authority to implement fee increases as requested by the President's FY2007 budget proposal. The 109th Congress did not enact H.R. 5385 and funded most federal government agencies through a series of Continuing Resolutions. The 110th Congress passed the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007 (H.J.Res. 20, P.L. 110-5) providing funding for the VHA for the rest of FY2007. P.L. 110-5 provides $32.7 billion for the VHA for FY2007, a $14.7 million increase over the President's request and $3.3 billion above the FY2006 enacted amount. This report will not be updated.

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Most Recent Developments Before adjourning sine die in December 2006, Congress passed legislation to reauthorize the Clean Water Act's Lake Pontchartrain Basin program ( H.R. 6121 ). Two other bills reported by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee dealt with security of wastewater treatment facilities ( S. 2781 ), and incentives to promote remediation of inactive and abandoned hardrock mines ( S. 1848 ). Authorizations for wastewater treatment funding expired in FY1994. Criticism also has come from developers and property rights groups who contend that federal regulations (particularly the act's wetlands permit program) are a costly intrusion on private land-use decisions. Congress passed a bill to strengthen protection of coastal recreation waters through upgraded water quality standards and coastal waters monitoring programs ( P.L. Congress also passed a bill ( P.L. The House passed H.R. 109-166 ), to reauthorize Section 221 of the act and provide $1.5 billion over six years for sewer overflow projects (identical to H.R. 109-167 ), to extend Section 220 of the act, authorizing a pilot program for alternative water source projects. Other bills concerned with specific CWA programs received attention; two were enacted. 109-137 ). 109-392 ). Other bills were considered but not enacted. In particular, S. 1709 , passed by the Senate on September 27, 2005, would have modified the revolving loan provisions of the Clean Water Act to provide favorable treatment (such as forgiveness of loan principal and extended repayment) for sewage treatment repair or rebuilding projects in Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. Several bills with provisions intended to do so were introduced ( S. 1711 , S. 1765 / S. 1766 ) but received no further congressional consideration. H.R. For some time, efforts to comprehensively amend the act have stalled as interests have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. These factors partly explain why Congress has recently favored focusing legislative attention on narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, rather than taking up comprehensive proposals. These include a general reluctance by most Members of Congress to address controversial environmental issues in view of the slim majorities held by political parties in the House and the Senate; lack of presidential initiatives on clean water issues (neither the Clinton nor the Bush Administration proposed CWA legislation); and, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, more prominent congressional focus on security, terrorism, and Iraq war issues than on many other topics, including environmental protection. At issue today is how the federal government will assist states and cities, especially in view of the high projected funding needs that exist. Legislative Responses Congress has actively considered water infrastructure funding issues since the 107 th Congress, when House and Senate committees approved bills to extend the act's SRF program through FY2007 and increase federal assistance ( H.R. A report on H.R. In addition, separate bills to reauthorize funding for sewer overflow grants (CWA Section 221) were introduced ( H.R. The bill was similar to S. 2550 in the 108 th Congress; it would have authorized $20 billion for grants to capitalize the Clean Water Act SRF program and $15 billion for Safe Drinking Water Act SRFs through FY2010. 1356 / S. 912 , the Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2005). Other legislation to narrow the definition of "waters of the United States" also was introduced ( H.R. 2658 , the Federal Wetlands Jurisdiction Act of 2005). It was a free-standing bill and would not have amended any of these laws.

Legislative initiatives to comprehensively amend the Clean Water Act (CWA) have stalled for some time as interested parties have debated whether and exactly how to change the law. Congress has instead focused legislative attention on narrow bills to extend or modify selected CWA programs, but not any comprehensive proposals. In the 109th Congress, two such bills were enacted: a bill extending authorizations for the Long Island Sound program (H.R. 3963, P.L. 109-137), and another concerning the Lake Pontchartrain Basin (H.R. 6121, P.L. 109-392). The House also passed H.R. 1721, a bill to reauthorize coastal water quality programs, and several other CWA bills were reported by House and Senate committees (including H.R. 4126, concerning the Chesapeake Bay; and S. 2781, concerning wastewater facility security). A free-standing bill intended to promote remediation of abandoned hardrock mines (S. 1848), which would have affected CWA requirements for such projects, also was reported but not passed. Following Gulf Coast hurricanes in 2005, the Senate passed legislation to streamline delivery of funds to repair storm-damaged sewage treatment plants (S. 1709). Other bills intended to simplify environmental review of recovery and rebuilding projects also were introduced (S. 1711, S. 1765/S. 1766). None of these was enacted. For several years, the most prominent legislative water quality issue has concerned financial assistance for municipal wastewater treatment projects. At issue is how the federal government will assist states and cities in meeting needs to rebuild, repair, and upgrade wastewater treatment plants, especially in light of capital costs that are projected to be as much as $390 billion over the next two decades. In the 109th Congress, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee approved S. 1400, a bill authorizing $20 billion in federal grants to capitalize state clean water infrastructure loan programs. A House committee approved bills to reauthorize other Clean Water Act programs: H.R. 624 would have provided $1.5 billion in grants over six years for sewer overflow projects; and H.R. 1359 would have extended a pilot program for alternative water source projects. None of these bills was passed. Other Clean Water Act issues have received attention from numerous stakeholders, but were not considered by the 109th Congress. In particular, programs that regulate activities in wetlands, especially CWA Section 404, have been criticized by landowners for intruding on private land-use decisions and imposing excessive economic burdens. Environmentalists view these programs as essential for maintaining the health of wetland ecosystems. These groups are concerned about a 2001 Supreme Court decision, the SWANCC case, that narrowed regulatory protection of wetlands, a 2006 Court ruling that also addressed the regulatory jurisdiction of Section 404, and related administrative actions, including 2003 policy guidance intended to interpret the SWANCC case. Legislation to reverse the SWANCC ruling (H.R. 1356/S. 912, the Clean Water Authority Restoration Act), and another bill to narrow the government's regulatory jurisdiction (H.R. 2658, the Federal Wetlands Jurisdiction Act), were introduced but were not enacted.

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Overview Securing foreign contributions to the military effort in Iraq, and the follow-on stabilization and reconstruction effort, has been a major priority for U.S. policymakers since before the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. International participation has been sought to support the initial major combat operations, the follow-on stabilization operations, the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, and the provision of financial support to reconstruction efforts. The outcome of the U.S.-Iraqi negotiations is likely to shape the size, structure, and focus of the U.S. military presence in Iraq. The report will be updated as events warrant. Financial Contributions2 In October 2003, the World Bank and United Nations Development Group (UNDG), in conjunction with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), estimated that the potential cost of Iraqi reconstruction needs would amount to $55 billion over a four year period from 2003 through 2007. According to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, $1.766 billion of the pledged assistance has been channeled to the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund and UNDG Iraq Trust Fund. Multi-National Force Contributions Four countries participated directly and openly in the major combat phase of operations in Iraq: the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland. Currently, the largest non-U.S. troop contributors to MNF-I are the United Kingdom, Georgia, Australia, South Korea, and Poland. All of these countries' major deployments are currently in some state of flux: The United Kingdom, under the leadership of new Prime Minister [author name scrubbed] since June 2007, is in the process of drawing down from a force of about 5,500 last summer, to 2,500 by spring 2008. Number of Coalition Troops on the Ground Public discussions about the extent of the coalition force presence in Iraq have been marked by some confusion. Countries may deploy troops to Iraq to one of several different organizations: the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I); the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I); or the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). Training Contributions Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, coalition forces in Iraq have made contributions to efforts to train and equip Iraqi security forces. Other Training Contributions Other countries including Germany, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan (see below) have committed funding, personnel, and facilities for the training of Iraqi security forces on a bilateral or multilateral basis.

U.S. policymakers have made securing and maintaining foreign contributions to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq a major priority since the preparation period for the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. This report highlights and discusses important changes in financial and personnel contributions from foreign governments to Iraq since 2003. To date, foreign donors have pledged an estimated $16.4 billion in grants and loans for Iraq reconstruction, with most major pledges originating at a major donors' conference in Madrid, Spain, in October 2003. However, only a small part of the pledges have been committed or disbursed to the World Bank and United Nations Development Group Trust Funds for Iraq. The largest non-U.S. pledges of grants have come from Japan, the European Commission, the United Kingdom, Canada, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, Japan, and Saudi Arabia have pledged the most loans and export credits. Currently, 33 countries including the United States have some level of troops on the ground in Iraq or supporting Iraq operations from nearby locations. Those forces are working under the rubric of one of several organizations—the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I); or the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). Currently, the largest troop contributors, in addition to the United States, are the United Kingdom, Georgia, Australia, South Korea, and Poland. Some of these key contributors have announced their intention to reduce or withdraw their forces from Iraq during 2008. The total number of non-U.S. coalition troop contributions has declined since the early stabilization efforts, as other countries have withdrawn their contingents or substantially reduced their size. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003, a number of coalition, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other countries have contributed personnel, equipment, and/or facilities to the training of Iraqi security forces. Supporting the establishment of effective Iraqi security forces is a core element of the Administration's current strategy for Iraq, "the New Way Forward," and several of the congressionally mandated benchmarks for Iraq refer to these efforts. Planned U.S.-Iraqi negotiation aimed at achieving a "strategic framework agreement" to replace the current United Nations mandate for U.S. military operations in Iraq may have implications for the future participation of coalition members in stabilization and training efforts. This report will be updated to reflect important developments. For a broader review of foreign support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by [author name scrubbed].

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Introduction This report provides technical and logistical information on how the Chained Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U) is constructed and reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). For information on programs indexed to the CPI, see CRS Report R42000, Inflation-Indexing Elements in Federal Entitlement Programs , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. For information on how Social Security benefits could be affected by using the C-CPI-U to compute annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), see CRS Report R42086, Using a Different Cost-of-Living Measure for Social Security Beneficiaries: Some Policy Considerations , by [author name scrubbed]. The CPI is probably the most important measure of inflation developed by the federal government because it is used to make automatic adjustments that affect both outlays and revenues. The Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) is the basis for adjusting Social Security retirement benefits and the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) is the basis for adjusting personal income tax brackets to keep up with inflation, for example. Changing the government's basis for indexing these among other federal programs and tax provisions from the CPI-W and CPI-U could have substantial effects on the budget deficit. (Hereinafter in this report, the CPI-W and CPI-U will be referred to collectively as the standard CPI.) In April 2013, a modified version of the Chained CPI-U proposal was included in President Obama's Fiscal Year 2014 Budget. As prices change over time, consumers will tend to buy more of those goods and services whose prices are rising slower than average and fewer of those goods and services whose prices are rising faster than average. So-called substitution bias causes the standard CPI to overstate the effect of inflation on consumer well-being. This makes it attractive for calculating COLAs. The C-CPI-U In an effort to better estimate the effect of consumer substitution on the CPI, BLS introduced a supplemental measure known as the Chained Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U). The aim of the C-CPI-U is to produce a measure of change in consumer prices that is free of upper-level substitution bias. The interim release for 2009 indicated a larger increase in the cost of living than either the CPI-U or CPI-W, but the final estimate was revised downward by 1.3 percentage points, which produced an increase in the C-CPI-U that was smaller than the increase in the standard CPI. If the C-CPI-U is a better measure of changes in the cost of living, and the goal of indexing is strictly to reflect changes in the cost of living, then the C-CPI-U might be considered as a measure on which to base those adjustments. As previously discussed, however, a major complication of switching to the C-CPI-U is that final data are not available for up to two years after the reference period.

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes two important measures of inflation: the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) and the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). (Hereinafter in this report, the CPI-W and CPI-U will be referred to collectively as the standard CPI.) The standard CPI might seem like just another economic indicator, but it is a powerful policy lever. Because the CPI-W is used to calculate annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) to Social Security retirement benefits and the CPI-U is used to calculate annual inflation adjustments to personal income tax brackets, for example, changing the basis of the adjustments could substantially affect outlays and revenues. Since August 2002, BLS has published a supplemental measure known as the Chained Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U). The aim of the C-CPI-U is to produce a measure of change in consumer prices that is free of substitution bias. One of the difficulties in estimating cost-of-living changes is that consumers often alter their buying patterns in response to changing relative prices. In other words, consumers tend to buy more of the goods and services whose prices are rising slower than average and fewer of the goods and services whose prices are rising faster than average. Substitution is believed to insulate consumers from the full effect of rising prices on maintaining their standard of living. Because the CPI-W and CPI-U do not entirely account for substitution, they overstate the impact of inflation on consumer well-being. As a result of better reflecting consumer substitution, the C-CPI-U has typically increased to a lesser extent than either the CPI-U or CPI-W. This relationship has prompted calls for switching to the C-CPI-U when calculating automatic adjustments to inflation-indexed federal programs and individual tax provisions to slow growth in the budget deficit. The 2010 "Simpson-Bowles" report recommended government-wide replacement of the CPI-W and CPI-U with the chained CPI, for example. In April 2013, a modified version of the Chained CPI-U proposal was included in President Obama's Fiscal Year 2014 Budget. The CPI-W and CPI-U are final upon being issued, making them attractive for use in calculating cost-of-living adjustments. In comparison, the C-CPI-U is subject to two revisions after its first release. If the two indexes were replaced by the C-CPI-U, cost-of-living adjustments would either have to wait until the final number was available or rely on preliminary estimates that could change up to two years after the fact. This report provides technical and logistical information on how the C-CPI-U is constructed and reported by the BLS. For information on programs indexed to the CPI, see CRS Report R42000, Inflation-Indexing Elements in Federal Entitlement Programs, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. For information on how Social Security benefits could be affected by using the Chained CPI-U to compute annual COLAs, see CRS Report R42086, Using a Different Cost-of-Living Measure for Social Security Beneficiaries: Some Policy Considerations, by [author name scrubbed].

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T his report provides an overview of statutory inspectors general (IGs) in the federal government, including their structure, functions, and related issues for Congress. Establishment of Statutory IGs Statutory inspectors general (IGs) are intended to be independent, nonpartisan officials who prevent and detect waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement within federal departments and agencies. To execute their missions, IGs lead offices of inspector general (OIGs) that conduct audits, investigations, and other evaluations of agency programs and operations and produce recommendations to improve them. Issues for Congress Statutory IGs play a key role in government oversight, and Congress plays a key role in establishing the structures and authorities to enable that oversight. The structure and placement of IGs in government agencies allows OIG personnel to develop the expertise necessary to conduct in-depth assessments of agency programs. Further, IGs' dual reporting structure—to both agency heads and Congress—positions them to advise agencies on how to improve their programs and policies and to advise Congress on how to monitor and facilitate such improvement. Congress, therefore, may have an interest in ensuring that statutory IGs possess the resources and authorities necessary to fulfill their oversight roles. As the federal government continues to evolve, so too does the role of IGs in government oversight. Agency programs and operations have increased in breadth, complexity, and interconnectedness. Consequently, IGs may face increasing demand to complete statutorily mandated reviews of programs and operations that require (1) a broader focus on program performance and effectiveness in addition to waste, fraud, and abuse; (2) analysis of specialty or technical programs, possibly in emerging policy areas; and (3) use of more complex analytical methods and tools. Congress may consider several options regarding IG structures, functions, and coordination as the role of IGs in government oversight evolves.

This report provides an overview of statutory inspectors general (IGs) in the federal government, including their structure, functions, and related issues for Congress. Statutory IGs—established by law rather than administrative directive—are intended to be independent, nonpartisan officials who aim to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in the federal government. To execute their missions, IGs lead offices of inspector general (OIGs) that conduct various reviews of agency programs and operations—including audits, investigations, inspections, and evaluations—and provide findings and recommendations to improve them. IGs possess several authorities to carry out their respective missions, such as the ability to independently hire staff, access relevant agency records and information, and report findings and recommendations directly to Congress. Statutory IGs play a key role in government oversight, and Congress plays a key role in establishing the structures and authorities to enable that oversight. The structure and placement of IGs in government agencies allows OIG personnel to develop the expertise necessary to conduct in-depth assessments of agency programs. Further, IGs' dual reporting structure—to both agency heads and Congress—positions them to advise agencies on how to improve their programs and policies and to advise Congress on how to monitor and facilitate such improvement. Congress, therefore, may have an interest in ensuring that statutory IGs possess the resources and authorities necessary to fulfill their oversight roles. As the federal government continues to evolve, so too does the role of IGs in government oversight. Agency programs and operations have increased in terms of breadth, complexity, and interconnectedness. Consequently, IGs may face increasing demand to complete statutorily mandated reviews of programs and operations that require (1) a broader focus on program performance and effectiveness in addition to waste, fraud, and abuse; (2) analysis of specialty or technical programs, possibly in emerging policy areas; and (3) use of more complex analytical methods and tools. Congress may wish to consider several options regarding IG structures, functions, and coordination as the role of IGs in government oversight evolves.

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The results of scientific studies are used in making many governmental policy decisions. While the studies are often published, the data on which they are based may not be, even for federally funded research. To implement the new requirement in 1999, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) had to reconcile potentially competing public interests. The P.L. 105-277 provision, commonly referred to as the Shelby amendment, mandated OMB to modify Circular A-110 "to require Federal agencies to ensure that all data produced under an award will be made available to the public through the procedures established under the Freedom of Information Act." They alleged that the data they sought were agency records because (1) they were records of the grantee, which received its funds from a federal agency and was subject to some supervision in the use of those funds; (2) the federal agency had authority under its grant agreement to have obtained the data had it chosen to do so; and (3) the data formed the basis of the grantee's reports which were relied upon by the agency. It expected grantees to share data consonant with the principles of scientific exchange and replication in scientific research. FOIA does not require the requester of information to give a reason for the request. The final revision was released on September 30, 1999, and published in the Federal Register on October 8, 1999. For instance, the supplementary information attached to the second proposed revision said, [In preparing the proposed revision,] OMB has used its discretion to balance the need for public access to research data with protections of the research process. Two attempts to repeal the Shelby Amendment failed. The issues raised by the amendment and the OMB revisions to Circular A-110 can be divided into four categories: whether the revision of Circular A-110 has made the desired information available to the public, whether the procedures established adequately protect proprietary information and the privacy of human subjects, what the benefits and costs of fulfilling the provisions are, and how the changes affect the research process. While the amendment called for access to all data produced under a federal award, the final revision to Circular A-110 limits access to selected kinds of federally funded "research data relating to published research findings produced under an award that were used by the Federal Government in developing an agency action that has the force and effect of law." This version is more restrictive than the proposed language of the first revision, which would have limited release to federally funded research data relating to published research findings that were used in developing federal policy or rules, but less restrictive than the proposed language of the second revision, which would have limited applicability to published research findings that were cited in or used by the government in developing a regulation. Thus, a grantee would not be required to submit excluded records to the funding agency. Some observers have argued that limiting public access to data from federally funded research may create imbalances in public debate about federal actions that fall under the Shelby Amendment in those cases where research funded by industries and other private-sector entities is also used. In addition, the continuing broad movement toward increasing public access to research data may eventually make the circular revision largely obsolete. One is the "transparency" argument—that the public should have access to the data, since it was funded with taxpayer dollars. Some opponents of the amendment said that FOIA is an inappropriate vehicle because its exemptions would not provide adequate protections for research data that should not be made public. It explained a process that agencies might use and said that OMB would consider revising Circular A-21 if the process did not work.

The results of scientific studies are often used in making government policy decisions. While the studies are often published, traditional federal research funding policies did not require the data on which they are based to be made available publicly. Such policies did, however, generally require researchers to share data and physical samples with other scientists after publication of the research. A rider, often called the Shelby Amendment or Data Access Act, that was attached to the Omnibus Appropriations Act for FY1999, P.L. 105-277, mandated the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to amend Circular A-110 to require federal agencies to ensure that "all data produced under a [federally funded] award will be made available to the public through the procedures established under the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA]." The amendment authorizes user fees. OMB was required to make changes and release a revised circular; subsequently, agencies that chose to do so issued their own conforming rules. The final revision was published in the Federal Register on October 8, 1999, and has not been changed in subsequent updates to the circular. The Shelby Amendment originated from disputes about access to research information used in federal regulations. It was a significant change from traditional practice, since, while permitted, federal agencies typically did not require grantees to submit research data and, pursuant to a 1980 Supreme Court decision, agencies did not have to give the public access under FOIA to research data they did not possess as part of agency records. To balance the need for public access while protecting the research process, OMB's revision limits the kinds of data that will be made accessible (it excludes personal and business-related confidential data) and limits applicability to federally funded data relating to published research findings produced under a federal award and used in developing an agency action that has the force and effect of law. Opponents of the amendment said that FOIA is an inappropriate vehicle to allow wider public access, since it would harm the traditional process of scientific research; human subjects would believe that the federal government might obtain access to confidential information; researchers would have to spend additional time and money putting data into a form required by the government, thereby interfering with ongoing research; and private sector cooperation and funding for government/university/industry partnerships would be jeopardized. Proponents of the amendment said that accountability and transparency are paramount: The public should have a right to review scientific data underlying research funded by government taxpayers. Some proponents argued that the amendment would result in significant savings. Some also believed that the OMB revision narrowed the scope of public access to research data contrary to congressional intent. Senator Shelby said the final revision, "while still narrow in scope, is a good first step.... " Legislative efforts both to repeal the provision and withhold funding for its implementation failed. The data available for this report suggest that the provision has not been commonly invoked in FOIA requests. To the extent that is the case, it supports the assessment that neither the benefits nor the concerns raised have materialized to a significant degree. That might change if usage increased, but the continuing movement toward increased public access to the results of federally funded research that has occurred independently of the 1999 revision to Circular A-110 may make its use in FOIA requests increasingly unnecessary.

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The federal courts havenonetheless developed a "common law" experimental use privilege using their judicial powers. (46) Asexplained in numerous judicial opinions, the experimental use exception applies only to uses donefor amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity or for strictly philosophical inquiry. Tests,demonstrations, and experiments of such nature are intended uses of the infringing aircraftmanufactured for the defendant and are in keeping with the legitimate business of the using agency.Experimental use is not a defense in the present litigation. The Court of Appeals characterized the experimental use privilege as "very narrow and strictlylimited." (55) Inparticular, the Federal Circuit observed that the experimental use privilege "does not immunize anyconduct that is in keeping with the alleged infringer's legitimate business, regardless of commercialimplications." This report summarizes these competing views. (87) It is also important to remember that the patent law may, in certain circumstances, provideresearchers with the ability to use products even though they have been patented by others. This step would be an act of patent infringement, however, because the rightto make a patented invention is exclusive to the patent owner. However, it should be noted that the PatentAct of 1952 includes a limited statutory experimental use privilege for patents on pharmaceuticals,medical devices, and certain other products regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This provision, enacted as part of 1984 legislation known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, (91) applies to firms seekingto market generic equivalents of brand-name products. In addition, Congress has enacted otherintellectual property legislation that incorporates provisions shielding researchers from infringementliability. (123) Legislative Issues and Alternatives Should congressional interest continue in this area, a variety of options are available. If thecurrent scope of the common law experimental use privilege is deemed to be appropriate, then noaction need be taken. Alternatively, Congress could enact legislation confirming the narrowlycabined view of the experimental use privilege as set forth in Madey v. Duke University andpredecessor cases. If reform of the experimental use privilege is deemed prudent, however, another possibilityis the introduction of some additional form of the experimental use privilege into the Patent Act of1952. A limited experimental use privilege may best encouragetechnological advancement by rewarding successful researchers with patent rights that are not easilycircumvented. However, some commentators believe that the circumscribed nature of theexperimental use privilege may in fact restrict researcher access to state-of-the-art technologies andthus discourage further technological development.

Congress has identified research and development (R&D) as important contributors totechnological progress. The performance of R&D may have intellectual property ramifications,however. To the extent that researchers use patented inventions without authorization, they may faceinfringement liability. Although the courts recognize an exception to patent infringement known asthe "experimental use privilege," this judicially created doctrine has been described as very narrowand rarely applied. In particular, the experimental use privilege applies only to uses done foramusement, to satisfy idle curiosity or for strictly philosophical inquiry. This doctrine does notexcuse uses that are in keeping with the accused infringer's business objectives. In 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit applied these principles in the caseof Madey v. Duke University . The court held that the experimental use privilege does not apply toactivities that are "in keeping with the alleged infringer's legitimate business" -- even though thebusiness of the defendant, Duke University, was nonprofit research. This ruling has raised concernsamong some representatives of universities and research institutions, who fear that their basic R&Dactivities will subject them to patent infringement lawsuits. Competing views have arisen over the significance of the Madey v. Duke University case. Some commentators believe that a limited experimental use privilege may best encouragetechnological advancement by rewarding successful researchers with robust patent rights. Othersargue that the restricted nature of the experimental use privilege may in fact limit researcher accessto state-of-the-art technologies and thus discourage further technological development. Still othersassert that this issue is not of great practical importance, as few patent owners will likely file costlyand time-consuming lawsuits against researchers who are not making commercially important usesof patented inventions. The judicially created, "common law" experimental use privilege is complemented by alimited statutory experimental use privilege for patents on pharmaceuticals, medical devices, andcertain other products regulated by the Food and Drug Administration. This provision, enacted aspart of the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, applies to firms seeking to market generic equivalents ofbrand-name products. In addition, Congress has enacted other intellectual property legislation thatincorporates provisions shielding researchers from infringement liability. Should congressional interest continue in this area, a variety of options are available. If thecurrent scope of the common law experimental use privilege is deemed to be appropriate, then noaction need be taken. Alternatively, Congress could enact legislation confirming the limitedexperimental use privilege recognized in Madey v. Duke University and predecessor cases. Introduction of a broader form of the experimental use privilege into U.S. patent law is an additionalpossibility. The report will be updated if events warrant such action.

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Beginning in the mid-1990s, for example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) required its grant recipients to provide information about the homeless clients they served. In July 2009, HUD released results of its fourth analysis of HMIS data—the fourth Annual Homeless Assessment Report (AHAR). This CRS report describes the development of HMIS, the results of the four AHARs, and previous attempts to count homeless individuals. HUD is implementing the HMIS initiative through local "Continuums of Care" (CoCs), which acquire and process data from all participating local service providers. Two types of organizations are required to participate in HMIS: those that receive funding through the Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) program and those that receive Homeless Assistance Grants. 101-625 ) provides housing and supportive services for persons living with HIV/AIDS. HUD's Continuing Role in Collecting Information About Homeless Persons Even prior to the congressional directive to implement HMIS (described in the next section of this report, " Development of the HMIS Network "), HUD began efforts to collect information about homeless clients served in the communities that receive HUD Homeless Assistance Grants. The 2005 HUD point-in-time count of homeless persons marked the first time that HUD required all CoCs to conduct a count of both sheltered and unsheltered homeless individuals, and to do it at a particular time of year. Congress provided further direction to HUD in the HUD Appropriations Act for FY2001 ( P.L. 106-377 ). Congress has continued to allocate funds for homeless data collection in spending bills from FY2002 to FY2009. In an initial report, dated August 2001, HUD stated that it would help CoCs collect homelessness data through four means: flexibly implementing the new Homeless Management Information System (HMIS) eligible activity under the Supportive Housing Program in the 2001 McKinney-Vento competition; initiating a comprehensive technical assistance program to help local jurisdictions collect unduplicated client-level data by 2004; developing an approach to obtaining meaningful data for an Annual Homeless Assessment Report from a nationally representative sample of jurisdictions; and analyzing the most viable approaches to obtaining homeless client-level reporting. The first aspect is whether a data collection system has been established at the CoC level, and the second is the degree to which homeless service providers within a CoC are participating in the system. From 2005 to 2006, the percentage of CoCs that had decided to implement an HMIS but were still in the planning stages decreased from 20% to 9%, and the percentage that were not yet planning an HMIS dropped from 7% to 1%. Local CoCs may use one central HMIS, into which all service providers input client information. Estimates of the Number of People Who Are Homeless Since the 1980s, a number of attempts have been made to estimate the total number of homeless persons in the country as well as to describe their characteristics. These include CoC point-in-time counts that take place at least every two years, estimates in the four AHARs using HMIS data, and previous estimates from the 1980s and 1990s. Since then, HUD has released three more AHARs; in the last two, HUD estimated the number of people who were homeless during a 12-month period. For each of the four AHARs, researchers relied on HMIS data collected from a sample of communities during a period of time and used these data to derive national-level estimates of the number of homeless persons.

In 1998, Congress directed the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to develop a process for collecting data about homeless persons. Together with local communities, HUD began in 2001 to implement a series of Homeless Management Information Systems (HMIS). Two categories of federal fund recipients are required to participate in HMIS: organizations that receive grants through the Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) program and organizations that receive HUD Homeless Assistance Grants. The HOPWA program provides housing and supportive services for persons living with HIV/AIDS, while the Homeless Assistance Grants fund transitional and permanent housing, as well as services, for homeless individuals. Local jurisdictions called "Continuums of Care" (CoCs)—typically cities, counties, or combinations of both—are the entities that implement HMIS. Homeless service providers in these CoCs collect and store information about homeless individuals they serve, and the information is aggregated in computer systems at the CoC level. The data in these systems are being used by some CoCs to assess client needs and to better direct their services. Congress initially allocated funds for data collection regarding homeless persons in the FY2001 HUD Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-377), and has continued to allocate funds in all HUD spending bills from FY2002 through FY2009. Local communities can then apply to HUD for available funds that they may use to implement HMIS. The last time that HUD reported to Congress about the progress of HMIS (in 2007), community implementation of the data systems had increased. According to HUD, 91% of local CoCs were implementing HMIS in 2006 (compared to 72% in 2005), meaning that they had established systems into which data are entered. Because more CoCs were implementing HMIS in 2006, the percentage that were only in the planning stage had decreased from 20% in 2005 to approximately 9%. As of 2006, only 1% of CoCs were not yet planning an HMIS (compared to 7% in 2005). HUD released its fourth analysis of data from a sample of participating HMIS jurisdictions—the fourth Annual Homeless Assessment Report (AHAR)—in July 2009. The fourth AHAR used HMIS data from a sample of 222 communities (compared to 98 in the previous AHAR) to derive a national-level estimate of the number of homeless persons from October 2007 through September 2008. The fourth AHAR is the second report in which HUD used data from an entire 12-month period to estimate the number of people who were homeless (the first and second AHARs used three months and six months, respectively). For the first time, then, an entire year's worth of data can be compared to that from the previous year. In addition to the AHAR estimates using HMIS data, local CoCs conduct point-in-time counts of homeless individuals on one day in January at least every two years. HUD has published these results as part of each AHAR. This report describes the development of HMIS, reports on the continuing progress of HMIS, summarizes information released in the four AHARs, and describes previous attempts to estimate the number of people who are homeless. It will be updated as events warrant.

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As has been the case with most of the world's economies, the Russian economy has been hit hard by the global financial crisis and resulting recession that became readily apparent in the last quarter of 2008. The crisis brought an abrupt end to about a decade (1999-2008) of impressive Russian economic growth that helped to raise the Russian standard of living and brought economic stability that Russia had not experienced for more than two decades. This success was a major factor in the popular support that former President (now Prime Minister) Putin and the current president, Dmitrij Medvedev enjoyed, and it was also arguably a factor in the boldness with which the Russian leadership reasserted Russia's status as a world power, challenging the United States, Europe, the other former Soviet states, including its military confrontation with Georgia in August 2008. Many European countries and former Soviet states are highly dependent on Russian natural gas. Russia is a significant player on a number of issues critical to the United States, such as nuclear proliferation by Iran and North Korea. Russia's perceived national interests do not always match those of the United States, creating an environment for disagreement if not conflict. While U.S. exports to Russia are still relatively small, Russia is an important market to U.S. exporters of poultry, energy equipment, and technology.. Russia is also an important supplier of a number of raw materials that are critical to U.S. manufacturers. These links have drawn the attention of some Members of Congress. Congress may consider whether to pass legislation to extend permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to Russia. During the period, Russia lost close to 30% of its real gross domestic product (GDP), a decline reminiscent of the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States. However, Russia had also incurred its own foreign obligations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian GDP declined 7.9% in 2009. The trends in overall economic growth are reflected in the standard of living of the average Russian citizen. The issue still remains a challenge for the government. In 2008, oil, natural gas, and other fuels accounted for 68.6% of Russian exports. One indicator of the decline in economic reforms is the measure of the business environment in Russia. However, it is highly likely that Russia's continued dependence on oil and the world price of oil will be a dominant factor in Russia's economic prospects for foreseeable future.

Until recently, the Russian economy was one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The growth brought an improvement in the standard of living of the average Russian citizen and also brought economic stability that Russia had not experienced in at least a decade. This strong economic performance had been a major factor in the popular support that the Russian leadership enjoyed and was also arguably a factor in the boldness with which that leadership reasserted Russia's status as a world power, challenging the United States, Europe, the neighboring former Soviet states in economic and national security areas. However, as has been the case with most of the world's economies, the Russian economy has been hit hard by the global financial crisis and recession. The crisis brought an abrupt end to the decade's long (1999-2008) economic growth with real gross domestic product (GDP) increasing 6.9% annually on average. Russian GDP then declined 7.9% in 2009 and is expected to increase only modestly in 2010. Other economic indicators showed problems in other parts of the economy. The high oil prices were a major factor in the economic success Russia enjoyed, especially in the early and middle parts of this decade; however, the collapse of world prices for oil and other commodities in 2008 exposed the downside of Russia's dependence on the production and export of oil, gas, and other natural resources. The failure of Russia to complete important economic reforms and the government's penchant for re-asserting its control over key economic sectors loom among the possible roadblocks to a return to high economic growth rates down the road. Although its influence has been greatly diminished since the Soviet period, Russia remains a formidable force on the global stage, and its influence seems to be growing. Russia's economy is large enough to influence global economic conditions. Many European countries and former Soviet states are highly dependent on Russian natural gas. Russia is a significant player on a number of issues critical to the United States, for example, nuclear proliferation by Iran and North Korea. Russia's perceived national interests do not always match those of the United States, creating an environment for disagreement if not conflict. While U.S. exports to Russia are still relatively small, it is an important market for U.S. exporters of poultry, energy equipment, and technology. Russia is also an important supplier of a number of raw materials that are critical to U.S. manufacturers. These links have drawn the attention of some Members of Congress. Congress may consider in the near future whether to extend permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to Russia, among other issues.

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4089 While hunting and fishing are permitted on the majority of federal lands, some believe that those recreational activities are unnecessarily restricted by the planning processes of federal land management agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Forest Service, the National Park Service (NPS), and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The Sportsmen's Heritage Act of 2012 ( H.R. 4089 ) would "open" almost all federal lands and waters to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting, and establish criteria for land management agencies to close lands to those activities. Titles III through VI of H.R. 4089 address issues related to hunting, fishing, or federal lands, such as issuing permits to allow the import of polar bear parts by certain applicants; continuing the use of lead shot and lead sinkers; opening the Kisatchie National Forest in Louisiana for dog-deer hunting; and limiting the President's ability to establish national monuments under the Antiquities Act of 1906. 4089 . It is also possible that the bill could slow the planning process; it appears to add steps to the land management processes already in place, such as new criteria, reporting requirements, and public notices. 1558 , which concerns regulating the use of lead shot and sinkers by the Environmental Protection Agency. Title V is similar to H.R. Finally, a portion of Title VI, which would limit the President's ability to establish national monuments, is similar to H.R. 4089 , the Recreational Fishing and Hunting Heritage and Opportunities Act, is intended to create an "open until closed" management policy for federal lands, according to the House committee report on H.R. Title I describes the factors a land management agency must consider to justify closing federal lands to fishing, hunting, or recreational shooting. Senate bill S. 2066 is almost identical to Title I of H.R. 4089 , which passed the House on April 17, 2012. However, in light of the definition of federal public land (see below), the scope could be broader, including any agency that owns lands. However, the House committee report refers to H.R. Additional Criteria Established in S. 2066 It appears S. 2066 would require additional criteria for determining when lands may be closed to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting. While this may slow the decision making as compared to H.R. 4089 , however, appears to allow any activity related to fishing, hunting, recreational shooting, or wildlife conservation in wilderness areas. That existing law would be changed by Section 104(e). 4089 . S. 2066 may more clearly restrict motorized uses. All administrative closures under Title II are temporary. For example, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) imposes duties on an agency to protect listed species. Title III—Polar Bear Conservation and Fairness Act of 2012 Title III would amend the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) to authorize between 41 and 44 hunters with legally hunted polar bear remains from Canada to import those trophies to the United States. S. 1066 would do the same. The law would apply only to bears legally killed prior to May 15, 2008. 1558 , and S. 838 . Under Section 601, a President could still identify lands for protection, but the proclamation would not become valid until both the governor and legislature of the affected state approved.

The Sportsmen's Heritage Act of 2012 (H.R. 4089) is intended to create an "open until closed" management policy for federal lands, according to the House committee report. It describes the criteria for federal land management agencies to consider in order to close federal lands to fishing, hunting, or recreational shooting, and directs that management is subject to existing law. However, some ambiguities may lead to different, perhaps unintended results. H.R. 4089 passed the House on April 17, 2012. Hunting and fishing are already allowed on the majority of federal lands. Because H.R. 4089 would change land management practices and would require additional or different analyses, reports, and notices, the bill would alter federal land management by adding or changing steps in the planning process. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that Title II of H.R. 4089, for example, would cost $12 million over the first four years. Title I establishes the processes for federal land management agencies to close federal lands to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting, and is almost identical to Senate bill S. 2066. Title II addresses recreational shooting in Bureau of Land Management (BLM) national monuments. While the associated House committee report refers to H.R. 4089 affecting lands managed by BLM and the Forest Service almost exclusively, the bills' broad definition of federal public lands could lead to portions of H.R. 4089/S. 2066 extending to all agencies that own land. Wilderness areas may be most altered by the bills. While the Wilderness Act already allows hunting and fishing, H.R. 4089/S. 2066 would appear to allow any activity related to those activities, as well as to recreational shooting. This may mean that structures could be built in wilderness areas or mechanized transport could be allowed, which are activities that are banned under current law; however, this is not clear since another provision appears to continue to ban motorized access. Titles III through VI address issues related to hunting, fishing, or federal lands. Title III would reverse the administrative rule in place since May 15, 2008, which banned the import of sport-hunted polar bears from Canada. It would allow the import of polar bear trophies by applicants who sought an import permit prior to that date, when the polar bear was listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Senate bills S. 2066 and S. 1066 would also direct issuance of those permits. However, in 2011, a federal court rejected a suit to allow such imports. Title IV of H.R. 4089 would prevent the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from regulating lead shot and lead sinkers, as would S. 838. EPA, however, denies it has the authority to take such action, while state laws could still restrict the use of lead shot and sinkers. Reversing a 2012 Forest Service decision, Title V would allow deer hunters in the Kisatchie National Forest in Louisiana to use hunting dogs without restriction. Title VI would limit the President's ability to establish national monuments under the Antiquities Act of 1906 by requiring both the governor and legislature of the affected state to approve designations.

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FY2016 Syria Train and Equip Proposals Proposed FY2016 defense authorization and appropriations legislation under consideration in Congress as of June 2015 ( H.R. 2685 , H.R. For example: Proposed reporting and certification requirements in the House and Senate versions of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, H.R. In the Administration's June 2014 amended request for war funding, President Obama requested authority and funding from Congress to begin an overt "train and equip" program for vetted Syrians for the following purposes: defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime, facilitating the provision of essential services, and stabilizing territory controlled by the opposition; defending the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria; and, promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria. 113-291 ) and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ('Counterterrorism Partnership Fund' and Section 9016 of P.L. 113-235 ) provided further authority and funding guidance for the program. As of June 2015, several hundred U.S. military training personnel and a similar number of support personnel have deployed in support of the Syria Train and Equip Program. According to Administration officials, the program intends to field a force of approximately 3,000 vetted Syrians in 2015 and 5,400 others per year in 2016 and, if authorized, in 2017. Congressional Action The Administration's FY2016 defense appropriations request seeks $600 million in additional U.S. funding for the program. 1735 and S. 1376 ) would authorize that level of funding on different terms (see "Funding Source" in Table 1 ), and would create new reporting and certification requirements relative to the provision of U.S. support to U.S.-trained fighters in the event of their attack by pro-Asad or Islamic State forces (see " What degree of post-training support or protection should the U.S. government provide to Syrian trainees and on what terms? " Should the authorized purposes of U.S. assistance be modified? 1735 ) would amend the underlying program authority in Section 1209 of the FY2015 NDAA to make approval of future program funding contingent on a new certification that: a required amount of support, including support provided by United States Armed Forces and enablers, has been or will be provided by the United States to the elements of the Syrian opposition that are to be trained and equipped under this section to ensure that such elements are able to defend themselves from attacks by ISIL and Government of Syria forces consistent with the purposes [of the program] Defense Department Position Defense Department officials have stated that the main focus of U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State remains on operations in Iraq, and they have acknowledged ongoing consideration of what types of post-training support to provide Syrian participants in the train and equip program. What congressional notification and reporting of oversight information is required? The FY2015 NDAA ( P.L. With what implications for U.S. policy goals in Syria or more broadly? What support or protection, if any, should the United States provide to trainees upon their return to Syria? With what implications for its potential success and for U.S. policy toward Syria? For further analysis of proposals related to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force relative to the Islamic State, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Issues and Current Proposals in Brief , by [author name scrubbed].

In 2014, Congress for the first time provided the President with authority and funds to overtly train and lethally equip vetted members of the Syrian opposition for select purposes. These purposes include supporting U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria and setting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria's civil war. The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 113-291) and the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) provided that up to $500 million could be transferred from the newly-established Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) to train and equip such Syrian forces. Additional funding could be provided from other sources for the Syrian Train and Equip Program, including from foreign contributions, subject to the approval of the congressional defense committees. As of June 2015, the defense committees have approved the transfer of $500 million in FY2015 CTPF funds for the program and an additional $80 million in Defense Working Capital Funds for related U.S. government operations. Several hundred U.S. military training personnel and a similar number of support personnel have deployed in support of the program. According to Administration officials, the intention is for the program to field a force of approximately 3,000 vetted Syrians in 2015 and 5,400 others per year in 2016 and, if authorized, in 2017. The authority provided in the FY2015 NDAA expires after December 31, 2016. In FY2016, the Administration is requesting $600 million in a new, separate Syria Train and Equip account that, if authorized and appropriated as requested, would not require advance notification and approval by the four defense committees. Current debate over the program—as expressed in congressional consideration of proposed FY2016 defense authorization and appropriations legislation (H.R. 2685, H.R. 1735, S. 1376) centers on: The amounts, alignment, and terms associated with FY2016 funding for the program. The extent and type of U.S. support or protection, if any, that may be provided to Syrian trainees upon their return to Syria, especially in the event of attack by pro-Asad or other forces in Syria. The size, scope, and effectiveness of the Syria Train and Equip Program as currently implemented; its purposes relative to overarching U.S. strategy toward Syria; and its integration with U.S.-led coalition efforts to combat the Islamic State organization. The content and scope of requested strategy and reporting requirements. For more information on the Islamic State crisis and U.S. policy, see CRS Report R43612, The "Islamic State" Crisis and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] et al., and CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. For analysis of proposals related to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force relative to the Islamic State, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Issues and Current Proposals in Brief, by [author name scrubbed].

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The most recent notable development has been the December28, 2001 signing into law ( P.L. All action on the 451 installations scheduled to be closed and realigned by the 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC commissions was completed by the end of FY2001, as scheduled. (2) Ninety-seven installations were major military bases. According to the most recent estimates, theseBRAC closures and realignments have produced net savings of about $16.7 billion, and annualrecurring savings thereafter of about $6.6 billion. Despite the lack of broad support on Capitol Hill, senior DOD officials, as well as the President, continued to press for new rounds of base closures in the near future. In hisendorsement of the panel's findings, Secretary of Defense Cohen emphasized, as he had in the past,the importance of two additional BRAC rounds as a means of financing and accelerating thetransformation of U.S. military capabilities. The 1995 base closure commission had recommended theclosing of two of the Air Force's five major maintenance depots: at McClellan Air Force Base (CA)and Kelly Air Force Base (TX). (13) Resentment among some Members over President Clinton's 1995 intervention persisted until the end of his second term. On October 28, the House passed the conference report by a vote of 286 to 123. Other significant features of the base closure report included (1)a recommendation by DOD to apply the model of previous independent base closure commissionsfor the two rounds proposed for 2001 and 2005; and (2) a statement touting the successful economicrecovery from base closures of many impacted communities. Senator John McCain and Senator Carl Levin, principal co-sponsors of newBRAC legislation the previous year (as well as in 1997), indicated that they were prepared, however,to seek support for passage of a floor amendment during Senate consideration of the FY1999 defenseauthorization bill ( S. 2057 / S. 2060 ). On February 27, 2001, Senator CarlLevin and Senator John McCain introduced a bill ( S. 397 ) to authorize two new roundsof base closures in 2003 and 2005. They ultimately agreed upon, and recommended, a series of provisions incorporating elements of both. Meeting in closed session onSeptember 6, 2001, the committee voted 17 to 8 for a new round. On September 25, 2001, the full Senate approved a new round of base closures and realignments in 2003 by a margin of 53 to 47 -- after an effort by Senator Jim Bunning to shelve theproposal failed. It was, for the Senate proponents of base closure, their first success in five years ofeffort. (34) No base-closing language was included in the House of Representatives FY2002 defense authorization bill. 107-107 ) on December 28, 2001. 3001) (1) Extend the authority of the 1990 base closure and realignment act to authorize one new round in 2005 Secretary of Defense (Sec. In 2001, however, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld succeeded in winningapproval from Congress for a new round.

Ninety-seven major military bases were recommended for closure and realignment by the 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 base realignment and closure (BRAC) commissions. Action on all 451installations (major and minor) from the first four rounds was completed by the end of FY2001, asscheduled. The U.S. General Accounting Office has estimated that these closures and realignmentsproduced net savings of about $16.7 billion as of the end of FY2001 and will continue to producean estimated annual recurring savings thereafter of about $6.6 billion. In mid-1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen called for two new rounds of base closures and realignments. He explained that, while four previous rounds had achieved significant savings,it was important to continue the process of closing underutilized facilities. Despite DOD pressure,most Members of Congress were reluctant to support authorization of new base closure legislation,at least for the foreseeable future. The reasons given included, among others, grass-roots oppositionfrom communities likely to be affected and President Clinton's "intervention" in the 1995 baseclosure commission's recommendations regarding McClellan and Kelly air force bases. Of the twochambers, the House of Representatives expressed the stronger and more united opposition. In theSenate, proponents of new base closure rounds have attempted to attach amendments to each year'sdefense authorization bill since 1997, achieving success only toward the end of 2001. The principal advocates in Congress for new base closures have been Senator John McCain and Senator Carl Levin. On February 27, 2001, they introduced legislation ( S. 397 ) toauthorize two new closure rounds in 2003 and 2005. On August 3, 2001, the Secretary of Defensesubmitted his own proposal to Congress, calling for one additional round in 2003. On September6, 2001, the Senate's defense panel incorporated elements of both proposals and passed the measureby a vote of 17 to 8. Later, in Senate floor debate (September 24, 2001), the Levin/McCain initiativepassed by a margin of 53 to 47. However, many Members of the House were reluctant to support S. 397 , thus creating an impasse in the conference phase that delayed final passage of the FY2002 defenselegislation. Finally, on December 12, 2001, the conferees reached a compromise. They agreed toauthorize one new round of base closures in 2005. They also added language that revised variousaspects of previous base closure law -- the most notable of which, perhaps, will be the enhancedrole and influence of the Secretary of Defense in the base closure selection process. President Bushsigned the defense authorization bill into law ( P.L. 107-107 ) on December 28, 2001. This report will be updated as warranted.

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Approximately one-third of this is for intramural research and development (R&D) by federal laboratories (including support for Federally Funded Research and Development Centers). Technology transfer is a process by which technology developed in one organization, in one area, or for one purpose is applied in another organization, in another area, or for another purpose. The government requires certain goods and services to operate. However, the government has neither the mandate nor the capability to commercialize the results of the federal R&D effort. At other times, alterations in technical products and processes may be necessary for application in the state and local environment. Current Federal Efforts to Promote Technology Transfer Over the years, legislative initiatives have fostered the transfer of technology from the federal government to state and local jurisdictions and to the private sector. Several practices have been established and laws enacted that are aimed at encouraging the private sector to utilize the knowledge and technologies generated by the federal R&D endeavor. Funding for commercialization of the results is expected from the private sector. Because a significant portion of the laboratories are involved in defense research, questions arise as to whether or not the technologies in these institutions can be transferred in such a way as to be useful to commercial companies. The results of legislative activity are open to discussion. CRADAs, in particular, are a means to take this government-funded basic research from the federal laboratory system and move it to the industrial community for commercialization to meet both agency mission requirements and other national needs associated with the economic growth which comes from new products and processes.

The federal government spends approximately one-third of its annual research and development (R&D) budget for intramural work to meet mission requirements in over 700 government laboratories (including Federally Funded Research and Development Centers). The technology and expertise generated by this endeavor may have application beyond the immediate goals or intent of federally funded R&D. These applications can result from technology transfer, a process by which technology developed in one organization, in one area, or for one purpose is applied in another organization, in another area, or for another purpose. It is a way for the results of the federal R&D enterprise to be used to meet other national needs, including the economic growth that flows from new commercialization in the private sector; the government's requirements for products and processes to operate effectively and efficiently; and the demand for increased goods and services at the state and local level. Congress has established a system to facilitate the transfer of technology to the private sector and to state and local governments. Despite this, use of federal R&D results has remained restrained, although there has been a significant increase in private sector interest and activities over the past several years. Critics argue that working with the agencies and laboratories continues to be difficult and time-consuming. Proponents of the current effort assert that while the laboratories are open to interested parties, the industrial community is making little effort to use them. At the same time, state governments are increasingly involved in the process. At issue is whether incentives for technology transfer remain necessary, if additional legislative initiatives are needed to encourage increased technology transfer, or if the responsibility to use the available resources now rests with the private sector.

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Allocation and Assignment The allocation and assignment of radio frequency spectrum are managed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for commercial and other nonfederal uses and by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) for federal government use. The FCC also allocates spectrum for designated purposes, such as Wi-Fi, without assigning a license to a specific owner (unlicensed spectrum). Title VI of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ) addresses spectrum allocation and assignment in its provisions and is often referred to as the Public Safety and Spectrum Act, or the Spectrum Act. A third auction required by the act, the Broadcast Incentive Auction, began on March 29, 2016. Additional auction revenues in excess of the projected amount are to be applied to deficit reduction. Proceeds from the sale of licenses of repurposed federal spectrum identified in the Spectrum Act are to be directed first to the Spectrum Relocation Fund, to cover costs of moving federal users, with the balance going to the Public Safety Trust Fund. Proceeds from the auction of new licenses created by the release of television broadcasting spectrum are to go to cover costs specified in the act, with the balance to the Public Safety Trust Fund. Completed Auctions (H Block and AWS-3) The Spectrum Act requires the FCC and the NTIA to identify specific bands for auction from spectrum designated for commercial advanced wireless services and for federal use, and in most cases to commence the auction process within three years. For the results of a forward auction to be valid, auction proceeds must at a minimum cover (1) payments to broadcasters that relinquished spectrum for auction, (2) the costs to the FCC of conducting the auctions, and (3) the estimated costs for relocation of other broadcasters, which are not to exceed $1,750 million, deposited in a TV Broadcaster Relocation Fund for relocation costs. Spectrum Pipeline Act of 2015 The Spectrum Pipeline Act of 2015 passed as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-74 , Title X). To facilitate the transfer of spectrum rights to commercial purchasers from the agencies relinquishing spectrum, the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act of 2004 ( P.L. The Spectrum Pipeline Act added specific criteria for the Technical Panel to consider in approving plans, including whether a plan will "increase the net expected auction proceeds in an amount not less than the time value of the amount of the payment.... " Making Federal Spectrum Available for Commercial Use In 2010, the NTIA, with input from the Policy and Plans Steering Group (PPSG), has produced a 10-year plan and timetable that identifies bands of spectrum that might be available for commercial wireless broadband service. Future actions are likely to release additional segments of the band. Beginning in 2001, spectrum policy placed increased emphasis on promoting spectrum and market efficiency. Issues for the 114th Congress: Planning for Future Needs The Spectrum Act and the Spectrum Pipeline Act focus on three key policy tools for increasing the availability of radio frequency spectrum for wireless broadband: allocating additional spectrum through competitive auctions; reassigning federal spectrum for commercial use; and opening up spectrum for unlicensed use. Overall, the provisions of the MOBILE NOW Act appear to provide leeway for accommodating new technology in its requirements for licensed, unlicensed, and shared use of spectrum resources. The DIGIT Act The Developing Innovation and Growing the Internet of Things Act, or DIGIT Act ( S. 2607 ), and its companion bill ( H.R. The DIGIT Act would direct the FCC to prepare a report assessing spectrum needs required to support the Internet of Things. These recommendations would focus on how to plan for, and encourage, the growth of the Internet of Things in the United States. In other words, 5G is seen by many as including IoT solutions outside mobile broadband.

As innovation advances wireless communications from the business of providing mobile broadband to consumers into new businesses built around the Internet of Things, the need to revisit spectrum policy may gain in legislative importance. Many policy decisions since the 1990s that deal with spectrum assignment and allocation have focused on assuring the "highest and best use" for spectrum rights by assigning them through competitive auctions. To facilitate the transfer of federal spectrum to commercial wireless services, Congress, in 2004, created the Spectrum Relocation Fund to reimburse federal agencies for costs incurred in vacating spectrum. In recent legislation, the 2012 Spectrum Act (Title VI, Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, P.L. 112-96) includes provisions to increase the amount of spectrum licenses available for auction and to improve management of the Spectrum Relocation Fund. The Spectrum Pipeline Act of 2015 (Title X, Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, P.L. 114-74) has a similar focus on providing new spectrum licenses for auction but takes a somewhat broader approach to meeting spectrum needs, offering more support for spectrum sharing and for federal research to improve spectrum and network efficiency. Both acts also include provisions to provide unlicensed spectrum (typically allocated for Wi-Fi applications). Additionally, the Spectrum Act (sometimes referred to as the Public Safety and Spectrum Act) establishes a process for television broadcasters to release spectrum licensed to them to be auctioned as commercial licenses for mobile broadband (Broadcast Incentive Auctions). The act also includes provisions to apply spectrum-license auction revenues toward deficit reduction; to establish a planning and governance structure to deploy public safety broadband networks, using some auction proceeds for that purpose; and to assign additional spectrum resources for public safety communications. Two auctions required by the Spectrum Act have been completed. The final auction required by the Spectrum Act is the Broadcast Incentive Auction, which began in March 2016 and may conclude by year-end. The Spectrum Pipeline Act requires the release of 130 MHz of federal and commercial spectrum in three phases, with the process beginning in 2022. Licenses for exclusive use and shared spectrum as well as allocations for unlicensed spectrum are allowed uses for repurposed federal spectrum. The act gives priority to using auction proceeds deposited in the federal Spectrum Relocation Fund for research programs that improve spectrum efficiency. A number of bills concerning spectrum policy may be considered during the second session of the 114th Congress. These are likely to include the MOBILE NOW Act (S. 2555); and the DIGIT Act (S. 2607) and its companion bill (H.R. 5117). In brief, MOBILE NOW might be described as meeting the needs for growth within the existing wireless industry, and the DIGIT Act as expanding the availability of spectrum to meet the needs of the industries developing products and services for the Internet of Things. Both of these bills reaffirm the role of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in directing spectrum policy. The FCC, meanwhile, is moving forward with a "Spectrum Frontiers" ruling to make additional spectrum available for new technologies. As in past proceedings regarding the allocation and assignment of spectrum rights, the FCC appears to be basing many decisions on enhancing mobile broadband services for consumers as the "best use." However, the consumers of wireless access to the Internet of Things, by most accounts, will include many other categories of users. The customers of wireless carriers have in the past been drivers of industry growth; in the future, substantial growth is expected from industry and other business sector demand for wireless access to the Internet of Things.

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Introduction The changing structure of U.S. agriculture has generated concerns about reduced competition in a wide variety of agricultural product markets, including dairy. Two primary areas of concern in the dairy industry are consolidation—the shift to fewer and larger firms—and industry concentration—the extent to which a small number of firms control most of the sales. On August 5, 2009, the Administration announced that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Justice would hold several public workshops to consider competition issues affecting agriculture and the appropriate role for antitrust and regulatory enforcement. A workshop on the dairy industry is scheduled for June 25, 2010, in Madison, WI. Dairy Industry Structure Consolidation has been a long-term trend in agriculture. Across the industry, including the dairy sector, rising productivity has led to fewer and larger operations along the production and marketing chain, including farms, cooperatives, processors, and retailers. Larger operations tend to have lower per-unit costs. As firms reduce their costs, they become more competitive and can increase sales and market share at the expense of less profitable firms. As a result, fewer dairy farms are needed to produce the same amount of milk. Firm size is a limiting factor for growth, however, once the gains to economies of scale have been exhausted. At the farm level, the number of operations continues to decline, although at a much slower pace during the last decade than in previous periods. Consolidation at the cooperative and processor level has followed a similar path, in order to offset potential market power of large retailers and to satisfy demands from retailers to serve them more efficiently. Nearly all segments of the dairy industry have become more concentrated over time. Effects of Concentration in the Dairy Industry The primary concern many have with concentration is that it could reduce competition in the marketplace for agricultural and food products and result in market power (i.e., the ability of a firm to influence prices), putting at a disadvantage some segment of the population, such as producers or consumers. However, concentration may also result in efficiency gains, whereby cost savings are passed on to consumers through lower retail prices, which in turn can result in additional demand for commodities and benefit farmers. GAO concluded that most of the studies it reviewed found either no evidence of market power, or efficiency effects that were larger than the market power effects of concentration. However, the agency said, experts generally agreed that concentration is likely to increase in the future, potentially raising greater concerns about market power and the manipulation of commodity or food prices. Concerns About Dairy Pricing28 Another concern is how concentration affects price transparency in markets for dairy products and milk. Antitrust Law32 U.S. antitrust laws (including other statutes applicable to antitrust issues) are concerned with competition in markets and not the protection of any individual competitor. These laws proscribe unlawful mergers and business practices in general terms, leaving courts to decide which are illegal based on the facts of each case. The two basic antitrust laws in the United States are the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. The ongoing case against Dean Foods highlights the economics of consolidation in the U.S. dairy industry.

The changing structure of U.S. agriculture has generated concerns about reduced competition in a wide variety of agricultural products markets, including dairy. Two primary areas of concern in the dairy industry are consolidation—the shift to fewer and larger firms—and industry concentration—the extent to which a small number of firms control most of the sales. On August 5, 2009, the Obama Administration announced that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Justice would hold several public workshops to consider competition issues affecting agriculture and the appropriate role for antitrust and regulatory enforcement. A workshop on the dairy industry is scheduled for June 25, 2010, in Madison, WI. Consolidation has been a long-term trend in agriculture. Across the industry, including the dairy sector, rising productivity has led to fewer and larger operations along the production and marketing chain, including farms, cooperatives, processors, and retailers. Larger operations tend to have lower per-unit costs. As firms reduce their costs, they become more competitive and can increase sales and market share at the expense of less profitable firms. As a result, fewer dairy farms are needed to produce the same amount of milk. Firm size is a limiting factor for growth, however, once the gains to economies of scale have been exhausted. At the farm level, the number of farms continues to decline, although at a much slower pace during the last decade than in previous periods. Consolidation at the cooperative and processor levels has followed a similar path, in order to offset market power of large downstream entities and to satisfy demands from retailers to serve them more efficiently. Concentration has also been increasing in the dairy industry. Nearly all segments of the industry have become more concentrated over time. The primary concern many have with concentration is that it may reduce competition in the marketplace for agricultural and food products and result in market power (i.e., the ability of a firm to influence prices), putting at a disadvantage some segment of the population, such as producers or consumers. However, concentration may also result in efficiency gains, whereby cost savings are passed on to consumers through lower retail prices, which in turn can generate additional demand for commodities and benefit farmers. Another concern is how concentration affects price transparency in markets for dairy products and milk. In summarizing research findings for several agricultural industries, including the dairy industry, the Government Accountability Office concluded that most of the studies it reviewed found either no evidence of market power, or efficiency effects that were larger than the market power effects of concentration. However, the agency said experts generally agreed that concentration is likely to increase in the future, potentially raising greater concerns about market power and the manipulation of commodity or food prices. U.S. antitrust laws (specifically the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act) are concerned with competition in markets and not the protection of any individual competitor. These laws proscribe unlawful mergers and business practices in general terms, leaving courts to decide which are illegal based on the facts of each case. Two current court cases against Dean Foods, the largest fluid milk processor in the United States, highlight the ongoing concern about consolidation in the U.S. dairy industry.

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Background In January 2002, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, was established in Geneva, Switzerland. The Fund is an independent foundation, and its board of directors consists of representatives of seven donor countries and seven developing countries. The Global Fund's efforts are intended to mitigate the impact of infectious disease on countries in need and thus to contribute to a reduction in poverty. Global Fund documents emphasize that it is a financing instrument complementing existing programs and that it is intended to attract, manage, and disburse additional resources, rather than re-channel existing resources. The Global Fund is not a United Nations agency, although it works closely with U.N. agencies, as well as with other aid agencies and NGOs involved in the struggle against the three diseases. Origins The concept of an independent funding mechanism to fight infectious disease has a number of roots. In October 2001, a Transitional Working Group (TWG) was convened, which included representatives of developing and donor countries, NGOs, the private sector, and the United Nations. However, the Board decided to approve the remaining 37 grants as the money became available in 2006. Final approvals for Round 5 grants were made at its final board meeting in December 2005. The Global Fund will make grants only if it has funds on hand to cover the first two years of the proposed projects—an approach known as the Comprehensive Funding Policy. The policy is designed to avoid disruptions to projects due to funding shortages. This is regarded as a particularly important consideration with respect to antiretroviral therapy, since interruptions in treatment can lead to the emergence of resistant strains of HIV and to the deaths of patients. Funding for the third through fifth years of the projects is dependent on new contributions to the Global Fund by donors. The Global Fund has approved 107 projects for Phase 2 funding totaling $1.1 billion. For more information on programs not approved for Phase 2 funding see CRS Report RL33396, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Progress Report and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed], The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Progress Report and Issues for Congress .

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, is an independent foundation intended to attract and rapidly disburse new resources in developing countries for the struggle against infectious disease. The Fund is a financing vehicle, not a development agency, and its grants are intended to complement existing efforts rather than replace them. The origins of the concept of an independent funding mechanism to fight AIDS and other diseases lie partly in a French proposal made in 1998, in ideas developed in the 106th Congress, and in recommendations made by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in April 2001. President Bush made the "founding pledge" of $200 million for a disease fund in May 2001. The Global Fund was established in January 2002, following negotiations involving donor and developing country governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and the United Nations. As of March 31, 2006, the Global Fund has approved more than 350 grants totaling nearly $5.2 billion for projects in more than 131 countries, of which about $2.1 billion has been disbursed in 127 countries. To date there have been five "rounds" of funding, with the Board approving proposals in April 2002, January 2003, October 2003, June 2004, and September 2005. However, in September 2005, due to a lack of available funding from donors, only a portion of proposals recommended for approval in Round 5 were officially approved. The remaining tentatively approved proposals received final approval in December 2005 after additional contributions were made. The Global Fund will make grants only if it has funds on hand to cover the first two years of the proposed projects—an approach known as the Comprehensive Funding Policy. The policy is designed to avoid disruptions to projects due to funding shortages. This is regarded as a particularly important consideration with respect to antiretroviral therapy, since interruptions in treatment can lead to the emergence of resistant strains of HIV and to death. Funding for the third through fifth years of the projects is dependent on new contributions to the Global Fund by donors. This report will not be updated. Instead, for up-to-date information on the Fund refer to CRS Report RL33396, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Progress Report and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed], The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Progress Report and Issues for Congress.

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Introduction During the past two decades, Members of Congress have demonstrated an interest in U.S. participation in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (popularly known as the World Heritage Convention). Under the Convention, which entered into force in 1973, countries agree to protect and preserve natural and cultural sites of exceptional ecological, scientific, or cultural importance through the World Heritage List and the List of World Heritage in Danger (Danger List). The World Heritage List includes 936 natural and cultural sites in 153 countries. Thirty-five sites from 28 countries are on the Danger List. In July 2010, Papahānaumokuākea in Hawaii became the most recent U.S. addition to the list. The report also addresses issues that the 112 th Congress may wish to take into account when considering U.S. participation in and funding of the Convention, including the possible impact of the Convention on U.S. sovereignty; the role of Congress in nominating U.S. sites; and the implications of including U.S. sites on the World Heritage Lists. The Convention's purpose is to identify and help protect worldwide sites of such exceptional ecological, scientific, or cultural importance that their preservation is a global responsibility. A site must be on the World Heritage List to be considered for inclusion on the Danger List. Countries that are party to the Convention agree to protect listed sites and monuments within their borders and refrain from actions that might harm such sites in other countries. Participation The United States generally supports the World Heritage Convention. On June 24, 2009, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar announced that the Administration was taking steps to include Everglades National Park on the Danger List. (The Bush Administration had removed the site from the List in 2007, arguing that the United States had made considerable progress in conserving the park.) The National Park Service administers the U.S. World Heritage program, processing U.S. nominations and handling other daily program operations. It administers sites with funds appropriated by Congress, except for several sites that are owned by states, private foundations, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or Native American tribes. Congress and the World Heritage Convention In 1973, the Senate provided advice and consent to ratification of the World Heritage Convention, and until the mid-1990s, Members of Congress from both parties generally supported U.S. participation in the Convention. In 1995, when Yellowstone National Park was added to the World Heritage List in Danger, some Members expressed concern that UNESCO designation of World Heritage sites on U.S. land would infringe on national sovereignty. Ultimately, however, U.S. participation in the Convention does not give UNESCO or the United Nations authority over U.S. World Heritage sites or related land-management decisions. Role of the Legislative Branch in Selecting U.S. World Heritage Sites In the past, some Members of Congress have expressed concern with what they view as the limited role of Congress in nominating U.S. World Heritage Sites. 96-515 , the National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Congress is involved in the nomination process only to the extent that the Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks is required to notify the House Committee on Natural Resources and the Senate Committee on Energy and National Resources regarding which sites he or she plans to nominate for the List. Procedures and Criteria for Adding and Removing Sites from the World Heritage Lists The procedures for adding and removing sites from the World Heritage List and the Danger List are outlined in the "Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention," developed by the World Heritage Committee.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (the World Heritage Convention) identifies and helps protect international sites of such exceptional ecological, scientific, or cultural importance that their preservation is considered a global responsibility. Under the Convention, which entered into force in 1975, participating countries nominate sites to be included on the World Heritage List and the List of World Heritage in Danger (Danger List). Countries that are party to the Convention agree to protect listed sites within their borders and refrain from actions that might harm such sites in other countries. Currently, the World Heritage List is composed of 936 natural and cultural sites in 153 countries, and the Danger List includes 35 sites from 28 countries. One hundred and eighty-seven countries, including the United States, are party to the Convention. The Obama Administration has requested and provided voluntary contributions to the World Heritage Fund and generally supports U.S. participation in the Convention. The Department of the Interior National Park Service administers the U.S. World Heritage program, processing U.S. nominations and handling other daily program operations. It administers sites with funds appropriated by Congress, except for several sites that are owned by states, private foundations, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or Native American tribes. Twenty-one sites in the United States are currently included on the World Heritage List, including the Statue of Liberty and Yellowstone National Park. In July 2010, Papahānaumokuākea in Hawaii became the latest U.S. site to be added to the list. Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar announced in June 2009 that the Obama Administration was taking steps to include Everglades National Park on the Danger List. The site was inscribed in July 2010. (The George W. Bush Administration had removed the site from the Danger List in 2007, maintaining that the United States had made considerable progress in conserving the park.) Members of Congress have generally supported the World Heritage Convention. The Senate unanimously provided advice and consent to ratification of the Convention in 1973, and some Members have supported the inclusion of sites on the World Heritage List or Danger List. In the mid-1990s, some Members expressed concern that designating U.S. lands and monuments as World Heritage sites would infringe on national sovereignty. Ultimately, however, U.S. participation in the Convention does not give UNESCO or the United Nations authority over U.S. World Heritage sites or related land-management decisions. In addition, some Members have expressed concern with what they view as the limited role of Congress in nominating U.S. World Heritage Sites. Under current law, Congress is involved in the nomination of U.S. sites only to the extent that the Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks is required to notify the House Committee on Natural Resources and the Senate Committee on Energy and National Resources regarding which sites he or she plans to nominate for inclusion on the World Heritage List. This report provides background information on the World Heritage Convention, outlines U.S. participation and funding, and highlights criteria for adding and removing sites from the World Heritage Lists. It discusses possible issues for the 112th Congress, including the Convention's possible impact on U.S. sovereignty, the role of the legislative branch in designating sites, and the potential implications for a site's inclusion on the Lists. The report will be updated as events warrant.

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Introduction and Issue For Congress Rising procurement costs for Navy ships are a matter of concern for both Navy officials and Members of Congress who track Navy-related issues. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that executing a 30-year Navy shipbuilding plan submitted to Congress in early 2006 may require annual funding levels about 33% higher than the Navy plans, and about 76% more than the Navy has received on average in recent years. An additional option, particularly if the above options are not implemented or prove insufficient, would be to reduce Navy ship procurement costs by shifting from currently planned designs to designs with lower unit procurement costs. Background Recent Reports Proposing Lower-Cost Designs Lower-cost designs for attack submarines, aircraft carriers, larger surface combatants, and smaller surface combatants have been proposed in recent reports on the future of the Navy by the CBO, DOD's Office of Force Transformation (OFT), and an independent policy-research organization called the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). A medium-sized nuclear-powered carrier. A very small, high-speed VSTOL carrier. Options for a reduced-cost surface combatant include a roughly 11,000-ton cruiser-destroyer, a roughly 6,000-ton frigate, and a lower-cost gunfire support ship based on the basic LPD-17 amphibious ship hull design. Legislative Activity For FY2007 FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 5122 (conference report H.Rept. 109-702 of September 29, 2006) authorizes 4-year incremental funding for the CVN-21 class aircraft carriers CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80. Section 122 establishes unit procurement cost caps for CVN-21 class aircraft carriers. Section 123 increases a previously legislated procurement cost cap for the CVN-77 aircraft carrier. Section 125 establishes a unit procurement cost cap for LHA(R) amphibious assault ships. Section 126 establishes unit procurement cost caps for four LPD-17 class amphibious ships. Section 215 authorizes $4 million for implementing or evaluating Navy shipbuilding technology proposals under the Defense Acquisition Challenge Program. Section 1016 directs the Navy to conduct an assessment of naval vessel construction efficiencies and of the effectiveness of special contractor incentives. The sections establishing new procurement cost caps allow the caps to be adjusted upward for inflation and other factors. 5631/P.L. Other Options for Responding to Rising Ship Costs Aside from reducing planned ship procurement rates or shifting or shifting to lower-cost ship designs, one option for responding to rising Navy ship procurement costs would be to increase annual ship-procurement funding.

Rising procurement costs for Navy ships are a matter of concern for both Navy officials and Members of Congress who track Navy-related issues. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan that the Navy submitted to Congress in early 2006 may require annual funding levels about 33% higher than the Navy plans, and about 76% more than the Navy has received on average in recent years. The issue for Congress is how to respond to rising Navy ship procurement costs. Aside from reducing planned ship procurement rates, one option would be to reduce Navy ship procurement costs by shifting from currently planned designs to designs with lower unit procurement costs. Lower-cost ship designs have been proposed in recent reports by the CBO, Department of Defense's Office of Force Transformation (OFT), and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). Options for lower-cost submarines include a non-nuclear-powered submarine and a reduced-cost SSN design using new technologies now being developed. Options for lower-cost aircraft carriers include a medium-sized, conventionally powered carrier and a small, high-speed carrier. Options for lower-cost major surface combatants include a new-design 11,000-ton cruiser-destroyer, a 6,000-ton frigate (FFG(X)), or a lower-cost gunfire support ship. Options for a lower-cost smaller surface combatant include a 1,000- or 100-ton surface ship. FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364). Section 121 of P.L. 109-364 (conference report H.Rept. 109-702 of September 29, 2006) authorizes 4-year incremental funding for the CVN-21 class aircraft carriers CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80. Section 122 establishes unit procurement cost caps for CVN-21 class aircraft carriers. Section 123 increases a previously legislated procurement cost cap for the CVN-77 aircraft carrier. Section 125 establishes a unit procurement cost cap for LHA(R) amphibious assault ships. Section 126 establishes unit procurement cost caps for four LPD-17 class amphibious ships. Section 215 authorizes $4 million for implementing or evaluating Navy shipbuilding technology proposals under the Defense Acquisition Challenge Program. Section 1016 directs the Navy to conduct an assessment of naval vessel construction efficiencies and of the effectiveness of special contractor incentives. The sections establishing new procurement cost caps allow the caps to be adjusted upward for inflation and other factors. This CRS report will be updated when events warrant.

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Introduction National Security Letters (NSLs) are roughly comparable to administrative subpoenas. Intelligence agencies issue them for intelligence gathering purposes to telephone companies, Internet service providers, consumer credit reporting agencies, banks, and other financial institutions, directing the recipients to turn over certain customer records and similar information. S. 193 would also have extended three USA PATRIOT Act-related amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) then scheduled to expire earlier this year. The Senate Judiciary Committee reported out an amended version of S. 193 on April 6, 2011. Thereafter, Congress extended the FISA amendments separately. Senator Leahy then reintroduced the reported version of S. 193 as S. 1125 , stripped of the FISA extension provisions. Representative Conyers introduced companion legislation in the House ( H.R. 1805 ). Senator Paul offered several bills that address many of the same issues ( S. 1050 , S. 1070 , S. 1073 , S. 1075 ). 1681v); return the others, as of December 31, 2013, to their pre-USA PATRIOT Act form; amend the judicial review procedure to reflect judicial constructions; and adjust the audit and reporting requirements. Background Prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, the NSL statutes were four. USA PATRIOT Act Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act altered the FBI's NSL authority under Section 2709, the Right to Financial Privacy Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act in several ways: it expanded issuing authority to include the heads of FBI field offices (special agents in charge (SACs)); it eliminated the requirement of specific and articulable facts demonstrating a nexus to a foreign power or its agents; it required instead that the information was sought for or relevant to various national security investigations; and it directed that no NSL related investigation of a "U.S. person" (American citizen or foreign resident alien) be predicated exclusively on First Amendment protected activities. More specifically, the report found that: a "significant number of NSL-related possible violations were not being identified or reported" as required; the only FBI data collection system produced "inaccurate" results; the FBI issued over 700 exigent letters acquiring information in a manner that "circumvented the ECPA NSL statute and violated the Attorney General's Guidelines ... and internal FBI policy;" the FBI's Counterterrorism Division initiated over 300 NSLs in a manner that precluded effective review prior to approval; 60% of the individual files examined showed violations of FBI internal control policies; the FBI did not retain signed copies of the NSLs it issued; the FBI had not provided clear guidance on the application of the Attorney General's least-intrusive-feasible-investigative-technique standard in the case of NSLs; the precise interpretation of toll billing information as it appears in the ECPA NSL statute is unclear; SAC supervision of the attorneys responsible for review of the legal adequacy of proposed NSLs made some of the attorneys reluctant to question the adequacy of the underlying investigation previously approved by the SAC; there was no indication that the FBI's misuse of NSL authority constituted criminal conduct; personnel both at FBI headquarters and in the field considered NSL use indispensable; and information generated by NSLs was fed into a number of FBI systems. Failure to comply with the court's order thereafter is punishable as contempt of court. Proposed Amendments Sunset and Repeal Three provisions governing foreign intelligence investigations sunset on June 1, 2015. S. 1125 and H.R. Prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, the NSL statutes strictly prohibited recipients from disclosing the request to anyone, ever. Nondisclosure Each of the NSL statutes has a nondisclosure provision. For example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) provides fairly rigorous statutory procedures that must be honored before electronic surveillance or physical searches may be authorized in a national security context. 1805 would expand each of these requirements.

National Security Letters (NSLs) are roughly comparable to administrative subpoenas. Various intelligence agencies use them to demand certain customer information from communications providers, financial institutions, and consumer credit reporting agencies under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the National Security Act, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. The USA PATRIOT Act expanded NSL authority. Later reports of the Department of Justice's Inspector General indicated that (1) the FBI considered the expanded authority very useful; (2) after expansion the number of NSL requests increased dramatically; (3) the number of requests relating to Americans increased substantially; and (4) FBI use of NSL authority had sometimes failed to comply with statutory, Attorney General, or FBI policies. Originally, the NSL statutes authorized nondisclosure requirements prohibiting recipients from disclosing receipt or the content of an NSL to anyone, ever. They now permit judicial review of these secrecy provisions. As understood by the courts, recipients may request the issuing agency to seek and justify to the court the continued binding effect of any secrecy requirement. In conjunction with congressional consideration of three expiring USA PATRIOT Act-related amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended that the NSL statutes be returned to their USA PATRIOT Act form and that judicial construction of the nondisclosure provisions be codified, S.Rept. 112-13 to accompany S. 193. Thereafter, Congress extended the FISA provisions in separate legislation, P.L. 112-14 (S. 990). Senator Leahy (S. 1125) and Representative Conyers (H.R. 1805) have reintroduced the NSL proposals found in S. 193. Senator Paul has offered several proposals to require FISA court approval before an NSL could be executed as well as to require NSL minimization standards (S. 1050, S. 1070, S. 1073, and S. 1075). This report reprints the text of the five NSL statutes as they now appear and as they appeared prior to amendment by the USA PATRIOT Act (to which form they would be returned under S. 1125 and H.R. 1805). Related reports include CRS Report R40138, Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Extended Until June 1, 2015, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33320, National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: Legal Background and Recent Amendments, by [author name scrubbed].

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Regulatory programs that implement these laws are administered through permits issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), which shares responsibility with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under the authority of the Clean Water Act; the Rivers and Harbors Act; and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act. The Corps' regulatory process involves two types of permits: general permits for actions by private landowners that are similar in nature and will likely have a minor effect on waters and wetlands, and individual permits for more significant action. Nationwide permits, which number 52 and cover a range of activities, can be issued for a period of no more than five years and cannot be extended. They were last reissued in total in 2012. In advance of their scheduled expiration in 2017, the Corps issued a proposal to reissue and modify the existing nationwide permits on June 1, 2016, and issued final permits on January 6, 2017. At issue in the program is the balance of two objectives: providing regulatory protection to ensure minimal impacts on aquatic resources, and providing a fair and efficient regulatory system. Background General permits, including nationwide permits, are a key means by which the Corps seeks to minimize the burden and delay of its regulatory program: they authorize a landowner or developer to proceed with the covered activity without having to obtain an individual, site-specific permit in advance. The Corps believes that the likely result would be greater annual acreages of authorized impacts to aquatic resources, because standard individual permits have no acreage limits. Issues Concerning the NWP Program As the nationwide permit program has grown (from 15 permits in 1977 to 52 currently) and become more complex over time, interest groups have increasingly united to argue that the program as it has developed fails to meet its overall objectives, although their reasons for this criticism are very different. Nationwide Permit 12 One of the current nationwide permits, NWP 12, is used to authorize utility line activities, including the construction, maintenance, or repair of utility lines in waters of the United States. Tribal Rights and Endangered Species and Historic Properties Consultation As noted previously, activities that may be authorized by the nationwide permit program are subject to a number of general conditions, in addition to permit-specific restrictions. They also argue that the general permit process is inappropriate for such large-scale activities. Yet, many industry stakeholders question whether a number of administrative requirements of the permits, such as advance notification to the Corps and other agencies, written verification of permit compliance, and opportunities for regional conditions, are tilted too much in the direction of protecting aquatic resources and not enough in the direction of regulatory relief, while also making the nationwide permit program unduly complicated. Echoing their concerns about the Corps' reliance on compensatory mitigation, environmental groups have criticized the Corps' expectation that regional conditioning can assure that impacts are minimal. State Coordination Issues Implementation of the Corps' regulatory program, including the nationwide permits, requires considerable coordination between federal and state governments. It has been more than 15 years since Congress examined the nationwide permit program through oversight hearings or legislation (in connection with appropriations bills). As this report has described, the program has continued to evolve and to generate wide-ranging concerns among stakeholder and interest groups. While the Obama Administration's initiatives concerning some activities that are authorized by nationwide permits have drawn congressional attention and criticism—such as surface coal mining activities in Appalachia —that attention has not extended to oversight of the Corps' regulatory program generally. Whether recent controversies about NWP 12 and its use in siting of pipeline and utility line projects, or other issues, will lead to greater congressional interest in the program is unknown for now. Surface Coal Mining Operations 22.

Permits issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) authorize various types of development projects in wetlands and other waters of the United States. The Corps' regulatory process involves two types of permits: general permits for actions by private landowners that are similar in nature and will likely have a minor effect on jurisdictional waters and wetlands, and individual permits for more significant actions. The Corps uses general permits to minimize the burden of its regulatory program: general permits authorize landowners to proceed with a project without the more time-consuming need to obtain standard individual permits in advance. More than 97% of the Corps' regulatory workload is processed in the form of general permits. Nationwide permits are one type of general permit. Nationwide permits, which number 52, are issued for five-year periods and thereafter must be renewed. They were previously reissued in total in March 2012. In advance of their scheduled expiration in March 2017, the Corps reissued the 2012 permits, with some revisions and modifications, in January 2017. The current nationwide permit program has received criticism from multiple stakeholders and has few strong supporters, for differing reasons. Developers and other industry groups say that it is too complex and burdened with arbitrary restrictions that limit opportunities for an efficient permitting process and have little environmental benefit. Environmentalists say that it does not adequately protect aquatic resources, because the review procedures and permit requirements are less rigorous than those for individual permits and because the Corps fails to adequately track impacts on aquatic resources. At issue is whether the program has become so complex and expansive that it cannot either protect aquatic resources or provide for a fair regulatory system, which are its dual objectives. Controversies also exist about the use of specific nationwide permits for authorizing particular types of activities, such as pipeline and utility line projects and surface coal mining operations. In addition to general objections, interest groups have a number of specific criticisms of the permit program, such as requirements that there must be compensatory mitigation for impacts of some authorized activities and impacts of regional conditioning through which local aquatic considerations are addressed. Coordinating implementation of the nationwide permits between federal, state, and tribal governments also raises a number of issues. Of particular concern to states is tension over whether their authority to certify the nationwide permits is sufficient to assure that state water quality standards or coastal zone management plans will not be violated. Whether the Corps adequately ensures protection of endangered or threatened species and critical habitat is an issue of concern to some stakeholders. It has been more than 15 years since Congress examined the nationwide permit program in oversight hearings or in connection with bills to fund the Corps' regulatory program. While the Obama Administration's initiatives concerning some activities that are authorized by nationwide permits drew congressional attention and criticism—such as initiatives concerning surface coal mining activities in Appalachia—that attention has not extended to oversight of the Corps' regulatory program generally. The nationwide permit program has continued to evolve and to generate wide-ranging concerns among stakeholder and interest groups. Recent controversies about the Corps' use of nationwide permits to authorize large pipeline and utility line projects could lead to greater congressional interest in the program.

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Given these recent events, a number of states have sought to take action to assure that power plants within their borders are operating safely. Most visibly, the State of Vermont has suggested that it will not approve the continued operation of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant, despite the NRC's approval of an extension to the plant's operating license. The dispute may have profound effects on establishing the scope of state control over nuclear power—including whether states have the authority to shut down a federally licensed and long-operating nuclear power plant. However, while safety concerns may prompt states to assert influence over nuclear power plants, federal law severely limits the extent to which states can regulate nuclear power. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly held that, while states retain authority over "questions of need, reliability, cost, and other related State concerns," federal preemption under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) prevents states from regulating nuclear power for the purposes of radiological safety. This report will look at general constitutional principles of preemption, analyze the Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of federal preemption under the AEA, and apply established preemption principles to the Vermont Yankee licensing dispute. Although there is "no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula" for determining whether a state law is preempted by federal law, the Supreme Court has established three general classes of preemption: express preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption. In each instance, however, "the question of preemption is one of determining congressional intent." Much of the debate surrounding federal preemption of state regulation of nuclear power has centered on field preemption. English, therefore, established that an analysis of whether a state law was preempted under the AEA required a consideration of both the purpose and effect of the state law in question. Thus, any state law motivated by radiological safety concerns or that has a "direct and substantial" effect on the safety of nuclear plant "construction and operation" falls within the field exclusively occupied by the NRC and is preempted. Preemption Analysis Whether Vermont, or any other state, may act to prevent a nuclear power plant from operating, despite the fact that the plant has been authorized by the NRC, will depend principally on whether the state law or regulation in question is preempted by the AEA.

A number of states have recently sought to take action to assure that nuclear power plants within their borders are operating safely. Most visibly, the State of Vermont has suggested that it will not approve the continued operation of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant, despite the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) approval of an extension to the plant's operating license. The dispute may have profound effects on establishing the scope of state control over nuclear power—including whether states have the authority to shut down a federally licensed and long operating nuclear power plant. However, while safety concerns may prompt states to assert influence over nuclear power plants, federal law severely limits the extent to which states can regulate nuclear power. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly held that, while states retain authority over "questions of need, reliability, cost, and other related State concerns," federal preemption prevents states from regulating radiological safety aspects of nuclear power production. Whether Vermont, or any other state, can act to prevent a nuclear power plant from operating, despite the fact that the plant has been authorized by the NRC, will depend principally on whether the state law or regulation in question is preempted by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Although there is "no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula" for determining whether a state law is preempted by federal law, the Supreme Court has established three general classes of preemption: express preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption. In each instance however, "the question of preemption is one of determining Congressional intent." Much of the debate surrounding federal preemption of state regulation of nuclear power has centered on field preemption. Under existing Supreme Court precedent, an analysis of whether a state law is preempted under the AEA requires a consideration of both the purpose and effect of the state law in question. Thus, any state law grounded in radiological safety concerns or that has a "direct and substantial" effect on the safety of nuclear plant "construction and operation," falls within the field exclusively occupied by the NRC and is therefore preempted. This report will look at general constitutional principles of preemption, analyze the Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of federal preemption under the AEA, and apply established preemption principles to the Vermont Yankee licensing dispute.

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Background Information on H1N1 In April 2009, a novel influenza virus began to spread around the world. WHO refers to the virus as Influenza A(H1N1). The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other Administration officials refer to it as 2009 H1N1 flu. Throughout this report, the virus is referred to as H1N1. The virus does not appear to be as lethal as H5N1 avian influenza—which reemerged in 2005—but is slightly more lethal than seasonal flu. Although H1N1 has spread enough to be characterized as a pandemic, researchers are not yet sure how virulent the virus will become. As of June 22, 2009, WHO reported that more than 50,000 human cases of H1N1 had been confirmed in more than 80 countries and territories, including 231 deaths ( Table A-1 and Figure A-1 ). The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and WHO agree that there is no risk of contracting the virus from consumption of well-cooked pork or pork products. WHO also advises that "limiting travel and imposing travel restrictions would have very little effect on stopping the virus from spreading, but would be highly disruptive to the global community." WHO has tested those who received treatments in Mexico and the United States and found that older antiviral drugs have not been very effective against H1N1, though oseltamivir (brand name Tamiflu®) and zanamivir (brand name Relenza®) are. WHO has been maintaining a global stockpile of approximately 5 million adult treatment courses of oseltamivir that were donated by manufacturers and donor countries. This stockpile was initiated after the onset of H5N1 bird flu outbreaks. WHO has already distributed some of the treatments and is distributing 3 million adult treatment courses from the stockpile to developing countries in need. There is no available vaccine against the current strain of H1N1, though CDC, WHO, and others are working on developing one. As of May 18, 2009, the United States has provided more than $16 million to assist countries in Latin America and the Caribbean respond to H1N1 outbreaks. At the onset of the outbreak, CDC sent experts out to the field to help strengthen laboratory capacity and train health experts to control the spread of a virus. In total, the Administration aims to distribute 2 million courses in Latin America and the Caribbean. The U.S. Agency for International Development USAID announced on April 28, 2009, that it would provide an additional $5 million to WHO and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) in support of efforts to respond to the H1N1 virus in the Latin America and the Caribbean, with particular emphasis placed on advanced disease surveillance and control measures. The assistance includes support to FAO for animal surveillance efforts in Mexico and other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean and provision of commodities. In May 2009, it distributed more than 100,000 personal protection equipment (PPE) kits valued at more than $1 million from its avian and pandemic influenza stockpile to protect first responders in the region from contracting or spreading the disease. USAID also announced that it had already pre-positioned 400,000 PPE kits in 82 countries in preparation of a possible influenza pandemic. The $949 million was provided for the following efforts: $319 million for bilateral activities; $196 million for support to international organizations, including WHO, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the U.N. System Influenza Coordinator (UNSIC), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF); $123 million for regional programs, including disease detection sites; $83 million for a global worldwide contingency, available to address the evolving nature of the threat; $77 million for international technical and humanitarian assistance and international coordination; $71 million for international influenza research (including vaccines and modeling of influenza outbreaks) and wild bird surveillance, including the U.S. launch of the Global Avian Influenza Network for Surveillance (GAINS) for wild birds, with a collection of tens of thousands of samples for H5N1 analysis; $67 million for stockpiles of non-pharmaceutical supplies, including over 1.6 million PPE kits, approximately 250 laboratory specimen collection kits and 15,000 decontamination kits for use in surveillance, outbreak investigation and emergency response and containment efforts; and $13 million for global communications and outreach. Investments that the United States and other international players have made to prepare for a possible influenza pandemic, and to monitor the spread of other infectious diseases, have been applied to the most recent global response to H1N1. Some health experts are concerned that some of the poorer countries may not yet have the capacity to sufficiently monitor and respond to H1N1. Questions still remain about whether the virus could change or reassort its genes, particularly should outbreaks in countries simultaneously contending with H5N1 bird flu cases occur (such as Egypt, Vietnam, and Indonesia).

In April 2009, a novel influenza virus began to spread around the world. The World Health Organization (WHO) refers to the virus as Influenza A(H1N1). The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other Administration officials refer to it as 2009 H1N1 flu. Throughout this report, the virus is referred to as H1N1. The virus does not appear to be as lethal as H5N1 avian influenza—which reemerged in 2005—but is slightly more lethal than seasonal flu. Although the virus has been characterized as a pandemic, researchers can not predict how virulent the virus will be ultimately. As of June 22, 2009, WHO confirmed that more than 50,000 human cases of H1N1 had occurred in more than 80 countries and territories, including 231 deaths. With the exception of Britain and Australia, all human deaths have occurred in the Americas. About 87% of all deaths have occurred in Mexico (49%) and the United States (38%). The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and WHO agree that there is no risk of contracting the virus from consuming well-cooked pork or pork products. WHO asserts that limiting travel and imposing travel restrictions would minimally affect the spread of the virus, but would be highly disruptive to the global community. The strain of H1N1 circulating the globe is treatable with two antiviral drugs, oseltamivir (brand name Tamiflu®) and zanamivir (brand name Relenza®), though there is no available vaccine. WHO has been maintaining a global stockpile of approximately 5 million adult treatment courses of oseltamivir that were donated by manufacturers and donor countries. This stockpile was initiated after the onset of H5N1 bird flu outbreaks. WHO has already distributed some of the treatments through the WHO Regional Offices and is distributing 3 million treatment courses from the stockpile to developing countries in need. As of May 18, 2009, the United States had provided more than $16 million to assist countries respond to H1N1 outbreaks. Global responses by U.S. agencies to H1N1 are conducted primarily by CDC and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), though DOD does provide some support to global aid. CDC has sent experts to Latin America and the Caribbean to help the countries strengthen laboratory capacity and train health experts. HHS has already sent 400,000 treatment courses to Mexico, accounting for less than 1% of the total American stockpile. In total, the Administration aims to provide 2 million courses to Mexico. USAID announced on April 28, 2009, that it would provide an additional $5 million to WHO and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) for interventions against H1N1 in Mexico and Central America. To date, USAID has provided $6.2 million for international H1N1 assistance. The assistance includes support to FAO for animal surveillance efforts in Mexico and other parts of Central America, and the provision of personal protection equipment (PPE) kits from its avian and pandemic influenza stockpile to prevent first responders from contracting or spreading the disease. In May 2009, it distributed more than 100,000 PPE kits in Mexico City and announced that it had already pre-positioned 400,000 PPE kits in 82 countries in preparation of a possible influenza pandemic. Investments that the United States and other stakeholders have made to prepare for a possible influenza pandemic, and to monitor the spread of other infectious diseases, have been applied to the most recent global response to H1N1. While health experts have made considerable gains against the disease, questions remain. Some health experts are concerned that poorer countries may not yet have the capacity to sufficiently monitor and respond to H1N1. Others warn that H1N1 transmission might accelerate in winter months. Questions still remain about whether the disease can change or reassort, particularly in countries simultaneously contending with H5N1 bird flu cases occur (such as Egypt, Vietnam, and Indonesia).

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To ensure that such channels of communication are preserved, States receiving foreign diplomats and consular officers have long accorded such persons with certain privileges and immunities on the basis of comity, reciprocity, and international agreement. This report describes the privileges and immunities generally owed to foreign diplomatic, consular, and international organization personnel under U.S. law. It does not discuss certain exceptions to these immunities that may apply to U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents who are employed by international organizations or foreign embassies or consulates. The treaties and statutes discussed in this report are: the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Diplomatic Convention); the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Consular Convention); the Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations (Headquarters Agreement); the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (U.N. Convention); and the International Organizations Immunities Act. Overview of Applicable Statutes and Treaties The following sections provide an overview of the statutes and agreements governing the privileges and immunities accorded to foreign diplomats, consular officials, employees of international organizations, and related personnel. These immunities and privileges are largely similar to those accorded via the IOIA.

To conduct foreign relations and promote the interests of their nationals located abroad, diplomatic and consular officers must be free to represent their respective States (i.e., countries) without hindrance by their hosts. Recognizing this, States receiving foreign diplomats and consular officers have long accorded such persons with certain privileges and immunities on the basis of comity, reciprocity, and international agreement. As international organizations have become increasingly important for multilateral relations and cooperation, representatives to and employees of such organizations have occasionally been granted privileges and immunities similar to those traditionally accorded to diplomats or consular officials. This report describes the privileges and immunities generally owed by the U.S. to foreign diplomatic, consular, and international organization personnel under treaties and statutes. It does not discuss certain exceptions to these immunities that may apply to U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents who are employed by international organizations or foreign embassies or consulates. Among the pertinent legal authorities are the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the International Organizations Immunities Act, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and the Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations. Included are charts that detail the specific types of jurisdiction and obligations from which various categories of diplomatic and consular personnel are immune under each of these authorities.

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Deterioration of Political Situation The political situation in the country deteriorated considerably the week before the non-binding referendum was to be held as Honduran society and the country's governmental institutions became increasingly polarized. In the aftermath of the ouster, the Honduran Supreme Court produced documents asserting that an arrest warrant for President Zelaya had been issued in secrecy on June 26, 2009, as a result of the executive branch's noncompliance with judicial rulings that had declared the non-binding referendum unconstitutional. The judicial process was halted before a trial could be held, however, as a result of the Honduran military's actions. Throughout the seven months between the ouster and the inauguration of President Lobo, Micheletti maintained that he was the legitimate president of Honduras as a result of a "constitutional substitution." Based largely on the San José Accord, the "Tegucigalpa/San José Accord" called for (1) the formation of a national unity and reconciliation government; (2) a renunciation of any attempts to reform the non-amendable provisions of the constitution; (3) a recognition of the November elections with international observation; (4) the transfer of supervision of the armed forces (who traditionally assist in election logistics) to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal one month prior to the election; (5) a congressional vote—considering the input of the Supreme Court—on Zelaya's restitution to the presidency; (6) the creation of a verification commission to ensure the accord's implementation, and a truth commission to investigate the events before, during, and after the June 28 ouster; and (7) international recognition of Honduras and the removal of all sanctions against the country. Lack of International Recognition President Lobo faces a challenge in winning support from the international community. Not a single nation recognized the Micheletti government, and since Zelaya was not returned to office prior to the November 2009 election, a number of countries refused to recognize the result. Several resolutions were introduced in the first session of the 111 th Congress regarding the political crisis. On July 8, 2009, H.Res. 619 (Mack) and H.Res. 620 (Serrano) were introduced in the House. H.Res. 619 condemned Zelaya for his "unconstitutional and illegal" actions and called on all parties to seek a peaceful resolution. H.Res. 620 called upon the Micheletti government to end its "illegal seizure of power" and work within the rule of law to resolve the situation. On July 10, H.Res. 630 (Delahunt) was introduced in the House. It condemned the "coup d'etat" in Honduras; refused to recognize the Micheletti government; called for the reinstatement of Zelaya; urged the Obama Administration to suspend non-humanitarian assistance to Honduras; called for international observation of the November 2009 elections; and welcomed the mediation efforts of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. On September 17, H.Res. 749 (Ros-Lehtinen) was introduced in the House. The resolution called for the Secretary of State to work with Honduran authorities to ensure free and fair elections in Honduras. It also called on President Obama to recognize the November elections "as an important step in the consolidation of democracy and rule of law in Honduras." The Honduran Supreme Court indicated that an arrest warrant had previously been issued for the deposed president, and the National Congress replaced Zelaya with the President of Congress, Roberto Micheletti. On the same day, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution that condemned Zelaya's ouster and called for his immediate return, U.S. Southern Command ordered U.S. troops to minimize contact with the Honduran military, and the Honduran National Congress suspended a number of constitutional rights—such as the freedom of association and the freedom of movement—during curfew hours. On January 27, 2010, Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo Sosa was inaugurated President of Honduras.

On June 28, 2009, the Honduran military detained President Manuel Zelaya and flew him to exile in Costa Rica, ending 27 years of uninterrupted democratic, constitutional governance. Honduran governmental institutions had become increasingly polarized in the preceding months as a result of Zelaya's intention to hold a non-binding referendum and eventually amend the constitution. After the ouster, the Honduran Supreme Court asserted that an arrest warrant had been issued for Zelaya as a result of his noncompliance with judicial decisions that had declared the non-binding referendum unconstitutional. However, the military's actions halted the judicial process before a trial could be held. The Honduran National Congress then adopted a resolution to replace Zelaya with the President of Congress, Roberto Micheletti. Micheletti insisted that he took power through a "constitutional succession" throughout the seven months between Zelaya's forced removal and the inauguration of new President Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo Sosa. He also maintained tight control of Honduran society, severely restricting political activity that opposed his government. President Lobo, who won a November 2009 election that had been scheduled prior to the ouster, took office on January 27, 2010. Some Hondurans declared the election illegitimate, however, as a result of the conditions in the country at the time it was held. The political crisis has left Lobo with a number of challenges, including considerable domestic political polarization, a lack of international recognition, and a faltering economy. The United States and the rest of the international community universally condemned Zelaya's ouster. They leveled a series of diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Micheletti government and pushed for a negotiated agreement to end the crisis. Although an accord was signed roughly one month before the November 2009 election, it quickly fell apart. The unity of the international community crumbled along with the agreement, as some countries—such as the United States—agreed to recognize the results of the election despite Zelaya never being restored to office, while others refused to do so. Members demonstrated considerable interest in the Honduran political crisis during the first session of the 111th Congress. A number of resolutions were introduced regarding the situation. On July 8, 2009, H.Res. 619 (Mack) and H.Res. 620 (Serrano) were introduced in the House. H.Res. 619 condemned Zelaya for his "unconstitutional and illegal" actions and called for a peaceful resolution. H.Res. 620 called upon the Micheletti government to end its "illegal seizure of power." On July 10, 2009, H.Res. 630 (Delahunt) was introduced in the House. It condemned the "coup d'état" in Honduras; refused to recognize the Micheletti government; urged the Obama Administration to suspend non-humanitarian aid; and called for international observation of the November 2009 elections. On September 17, 2009, H.Res. 749 (Ros-Lehtinen) was introduced in the House. It called for the Secretary of State to work with Honduran authorities to ensure free and fair elections and for President Obama to recognize the November elections "as an important step in the consolidation of democracy and rule of law in Honduras." This report examines the political crisis in Honduras, with specific focus on the events between June 2009 and January 2010. It concludes with the inauguration of President Lobo. For more information on the current political situation in Honduras, see CRS Report RL34027, Honduran-U.S. Relations.

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Cuba's retention on the terrorism list has received more attention in recent years in light of increased support for legislative initiatives to lift some U.S. economic sanctions under the current embargo. Should U.S. sanctions be removed, a variety of trade and aid restrictions would nonetheless remain in place because of Cuba's retention on the terrorism list. Cuba's Initial Placement on the Terrorism List Effective March 1, 1982, the Reagan Administration added Cuba to the list of state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979. A 2003 State Department document broadened the explanation of why Cuba was designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1982. Current Rationale for Retaining Cuba on the Terrorism List According to the State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism 2005 report (issued in April 2006), Cuba has "actively continued to oppose the U.S.-led Coalition prosecuting the global war on terror and has publicly condemned various U.S. polices and actions." The State Department report also noted that Cuba maintains close relationships with other state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran and North Korea and asserted that it has provided safe haven for members of several Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The 2005 report also maintained that Cuba continues to permit U.S. fugitives from justice to live legally in Cuba but noted that "Cuba has stated that it will no longer provide safe haven to new U.S. fugitives who may enter Cuba." (For more on the Posada case, see CRS Report RL32488, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed].) Arguments Supporting and Opposing Cuba's Retention on the Terrorism List In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that there is ample evidence that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the government's history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government's continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice. Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover of the Cold War. They argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list, and maintain that Cuba's presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist threats. Some who question the Administration's rationale for keeping Cuba on the terrorism list, while acknowledging Cuba's history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa point to several versions of the State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism report in the 1990s that stated that Cuba no longer actively supported armed struggle in Latin America or other parts of the world. As noted above, in addition to Cuba, there are four other countries on the list—Iran, Syria, Sudan, and North Korea.

Cuba was first added to the State Department's list of states sponsoring international terrorism in 1982, pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72). At the time, numerous U.S. government reports and statements under the Reagan Administration alleged Cuba's ties to international terrorism and its support for terrorist groups in Latin America. Cuba had a history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992 Fidel Castro stressed that his country's support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Cuba's policy change was in large part a result of Cuba's diminishing resources following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the loss of billions of dollars in annual subsidies to Cuba. Cuba remains on the State Department's terrorism list with four other countries: Iran, Syria, Sudan, and North Korea. According to the State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism 2005 (issued in April 2006), Cuba has "actively continued to oppose the U.S.-led Coalition prosecuting the global war on terror and has publicly condemned various U.S. polices and actions." The State Department report also asserted that Cuba maintains close relationships with other state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran and North Korea and contended that Cuba has provided safe haven for members of several Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The report also maintained that Cuba continues to provide safe haven to U.S. fugitives from justice but noted that "Cuba has stated that it will no longer provide safe haven to new U.S. fugitives who may enter Cuba." Cuba's retention on the terrorism list has received more attention in recent years in light of increased support for legislative initiatives to lift some U.S. sanctions under the current economic embargo. Should U.S. restrictions be lifted, a variety of trade and aid restrictions would remain in place because of Cuba's retention on the terrorism list. Supporters of keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that there is ample evidence that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the government's history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They stress the government's continued hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice. Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that the policy is a holdover from the Cold War and that Cuba no longer supports terrorism abroad. They argue that domestic political considerations are responsible for keeping Cuba on the terrorism list and question many of the allegations made in the State Department report. For additional information on Cuba, see CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. For further information on state-sponsored terrorism and U.S. policy, see CRS Report RL33600, International Terrorism: Threat, Policy, and Response, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32417, The Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State Sponsors, and Related Issues, by [author name scrubbed].

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Introduction On May 8, 2013, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 1406 , the Working Families Flexibility Act of 2013. If enacted, the bill would amend the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to allow private sector employers to provide paid leave in the future ( compensatory time or comp time ) in lieu of overtime pay when the overtime is worked. Under H.R. 1406 , compensatory time would be available only when an employer and employee (or representative of the employee) agree to replace overtime wages with paid time off. Compensatory time would be accrued at a rate of not less than one and one-half hours of comp time for each hour of employment for which overtime pay is required. In October 2013, a Senate version of the Working Families Flexibility Act ( S. 1623 ) was introduced. The bill's language was identical to the House-passed version of H.R. S. 1623 was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions but, as of this writing, has seen no further action. §207) specifies that employers must pay covered workers at least one and one-half times their regular hourly wage for hours worked in excess of 40 in a single work week. The largest group of workers who are exempt are bona fide executive, administrative, and professional employees (the "EAP exemption"). H.R. Under the act, an employee would be eligible to accrue a maximum of 160 hours of comp time. 1406 , the use of comp time in lieu of overtime wages would be optional for both the employer and employee. H.R. 1406 would allow employees to withdraw from a comp time agreement and return to overtime wages at any time. Employees who withdraw from a comp time agreement may also request to have any unused comp time converted to a cash payment. An employee may request unused comp time to be converted to monetary payment at any time. If employment is terminated, either voluntarily or involuntarily, unused comp time must be converted to a monetary payment. Under H.R. 1406 , the changes to the FLSA made would expire five years after enactment.

On May 8, 2013, the House passed H.R. 1406, the Working Families Flexibility Act of 2013. If enacted, this bill would amend the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to allow private sector employers to provide future paid leave (compensatory time or comp time) in lieu of overtime wages. Under current law, the FLSA requires employers to pay covered, nonexempt employees one and one-half times their regular hourly wage ("time and a half") for any hours worked in excess of 40 in a single work week. If enacted, H.R. 1406 would give employers and employees the option to agree to replace overtime wages with one and one-half hours of paid time off for each hour of overtime worked. H.R. 1406 would not affect workers who are not presently covered by, or are exempt from, the overtime provisions of the FLSA such as many executive, administrative, and professional employees. Under H.R. 1406, the replacement of overtime wages with comp time would be optional for both employers and employees. If an employer and an employee (or the representative of the employee) enter into a comp time agreement, either party may terminate the agreement. If such an agreement is terminated, any unused comp time would be converted to a cash payment to the employee. Under a comp time agreement, employees would be permitted to accrue up to 160 hours of comp time. Once a year, employers would be required to convert all unused comp time to a monetary payment. Accrued comp time would also be converted to a monetary payment upon the voluntary or involuntary termination of an employee. If enacted, the comp time provisions of H.R. 1406 would expire five years after enactment. In October 2013, a Senate version of the Working Families Flexibility Act (S. 1623) was introduced. The bill's language was identical to the House-passed version of H.R. 1406. S. 1623 was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions but, as of this writing, has seen no further action.

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Introduction The No Child Left Behind Act ( P.L. 107-110 ) amended and reauthorized the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act (SDFSCA) within the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) as Part A of Title IV—21 st Century Schools. SDFSCA is administered by the Department of Education (ED). Although the SDFSC program is the primary federal government program targeted to reduce drug use and violence through educational and prevention methods in the nation's schools, it is one of several substance abuse and violence prevention programs funded by the federal government. ED, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) administered 48 of the programs. School Safety Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2006 ( Indicators Study ), a joint publication by ED and DOJ, provides the most recent federal data on school crime and student safety. The report states that "it is difficult to gauge the scope of crime and violence in schools given the large amount of attention devoted to isolated incidents of extreme school violence." Preliminary data revealed that 28 youth ages 5 to 18 were victims of school-associated violent deaths from July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2005—that is, 21 homicides and 7 suicides. Those figures translated to about one homicide or suicide of school-aged students at school per 2 million students enrolled during the 2004-05 school year. In 2004, 12-to-18-year-old students were victims of about 1.4 million nonfatal crimes at school. The Indicators Study stated that "Our nation's schools should be safe havens for teaching and learning, free of crime and violence." Researchers discovered the following: As mentioned above, less than 1% of all homicides among school-aged children, 5 to 19 years, occurred in or around school grounds or on the way to and from school; 65% of school-related deaths were students, 11% were teachers or other staff members, and 23% were community members who were killed on school property; 83% of school homicide or suicide victims were males; 23% of the fatal injuries occurred inside the school building, 36% happened outdoors on school property, and 35% occurred off campus; and The deaths occurred in 25 states across the nation and took place in both primary and secondary schools and communities of all sizes. The update suggested measures that might help prevent school-associated violent deaths as follows: —Encouraging efforts to reduce crowding, increase supervision, and institute plans/policies to handle disputes during transition times that may reduce the likelihood of potential conflicts and injuries; —Taking threats seriously: students need to know who to go to when they have learned of a threat to anyone at the school, while parents, educators, and mentors should be encouraged to take an active role in helping troubled children and teens; —Taking talk of suicide seriously: it is important to address risk factors for suicidal behavior when trying to prevent violence toward self and others; —Promoting prevention programs that are designed to help teachers and other school staff recognize and respond to incidences of bullying between students; —Ensuring at the start of each semester that schools' security plans are being enforced and that staff are trained and prepared to use the plans. There has been a spate of school-related violent deaths and injuries thus far in the 2006-2007 school year. OxyContin use increased among 8 th and 10 th graders, but slightly declined among 12 th graders. The proportion of 8 th , 10 th , and 12 th grade students who reported using such drugs to get high translated to one in every 25 students in 8 th grade and one in 14 high school seniors. Teen cigarette smoking rates continued to show a decline in all grade levels in 30-day use with the greatest decrease among 12 th graders. Similarly, smokeless tobacco use declined only among 12 th graders who had used the product 30 days prior to the survey. Other Illicit Drug Use In 2006, as previously mentioned, researchers found no or very little decline at any grade level in the use of LSD, hallucinogens other than LSD, cocaine powder, inhalants, crystal methamphetamine ("ice"), heroin, narcotics other than heroin, tranquilizers, sedatives, various club drugs, and steroids. In 2006, only 10 th graders showed a further decline in use of the drug, which was statistically significant, although their belief that there was a great risk in using the drug slightly declined after an increase in that belief in 2005 over 2004. In 2005, alcohol use declined in all three grades. Grants are authorized for state programs and for a variety of national programs to promote school safety and assist in preventing drug abuse in the nation's schools. As previously stated the SDFSC Act is up for reauthorization in the 110 th Congress.

The No Child Left Behind Act (P.L. 107-110), amended and reauthorized the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act (SDFSCA) as Part A of Title IV—21st Century Schools. The act is up for reauthorization in the 110th Congress. The Department of Education (ED) administers SDFSCA through the SDFSC program, which is the federal government's major initiative to prevent drug abuse and violence in and around schools. State grants are awarded by formula to outlying areas, state educational agencies, and local educational agencies in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Also, funds go to state Governors for creating programs to deter youth from using drugs and committing violent acts in schools. National programs are supported through discretionary funds for a variety of national leadership projects designed to prevent drug abuse and violence at all educational levels. Other federally sponsored substance abuse and violence prevention programs are administered in the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, and other agencies. Those programs are not discussed in this report. A joint Department of Education and Department of Justice (DOJ) study (Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2006) states that "Our nation's schools should be a safe haven for teaching and learning free of crime and violence.... However, it is difficult to gauge the scope of crime and violence in schools given the large amount of attention devoted to isolated incidents of extreme school violence." ED and DOJ data show that from July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2005, there were 21 homicides and seven suicides at school of 5- to 18-year-old students, which translated to about one homicide or suicide of such a student at school per 2 million students enrolled in the 2004-05 school year. Also, in 2004, 12- to-18-year-old students were victims of about 1.4 million nonfatal crimes at school. A spate of school violence deaths and injuries occurred early in the 2006-2007 school term, prompting renewed interest in the issue, including a White House conference on school safety. A study conducted by the University of Michigan (2006 Monitoring the Future), revealed a continued general decline in illicit drug use by all 8th, 10th, and 12th grade students. In 2006, very little or no declines in drug use occurred in any grade of such drugs as inhalants, LSD, cocaine powder, methamphetamines, heroin, tranquilizers, sedatives, various club drugs, steroids and others. There was little change in MDMA (ecstasy) use among 8th and 10th graders, but a very small increase in annual use among 12th graders. Marijuana use continued to decline among 10th and 12th graders, but stopped declining among 8th graders. After decreasing slightly in recent years among all grades, crack cocaine use showed a further decline among 10th graders. OxyContin use increased among 8th and 10th graders, but declined among 12th graders. Vicodin use slightly increased among all three grades. Alcohol use, cigarette smoking, and smokeless tobacco use declined only among 12th graders who had used the product 30 days prior to the survey. About one in every 25 8th graders and one in every 14 high school seniors abused over-the-counter cough or cold medications.

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As evidenced by patent reform proposals currently before the 112 th Congress, the operation of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is among the subjects of legislative interest. Stakeholders have expressed concerns over a number of issues, including the USPTO's backlog of filed but unexamined applications, as well as the quality of the patents issued by the agency. The USPTO has long strived to approve only those patent applications that meet the statutory requirements for obtaining a patent. The USPTO has actively engaged in efforts to address its application backlog and concerns over patent quality, and more generally to improve contemporary patent administration. A number of USPTO initiatives have responded to perceived concerns about the patenting process. Among them are The Patent Application Backlog Reduction Stimulus Plan, which allows an individual who has filed multiple pending applications to receive expedited review of one patent application when he agrees to withdraw another, unexamined application. The Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH), which potentially applies to inventors who have filed patent applications in multiple countries. The Enhanced First Action Interview Pilot Program, which allows participants to conduct an interview with the patent examiner early in the application review process. The "Three-Track Initiative," under which applications would be placed into one of three queues: prioritized examination, traditional examination, or delayed examination. The Adoption of Metrics for the Enhancement of Patent Quality, which endeavors to improve USPTO mechanisms for measuring the quality of patent examination. Of course, the increasing number of patent applications—along with a large backlog of unexamined applications—also potentially impacts the ability of the USPTO to maintain high levels of patent quality. Two bills, H.R. 1249 and S. 23 propose that the USPTO be given the authority to "set or adjust by rule any fee established or charged by the Office." New realities within the intellectual property environment, including a growing number of patent applications, increasingly complex technologies, and heightened user demand for prompt and accurate patent services have encouraged the USPTO to innovate in recent years.

Congressional interest in the operation of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has been demonstrated by extensive discussion of patent reform proposals that would impact that agency. An increasing number of patent applications filed each year, the growing complexity of cutting edge technology, and heightened user demands for prompt and accurate patent services are among the challenges faced by the USPTO. Stakeholders have expressed concern over the agency's large backlog of patent applications that have been filed but have yet to receive examiner review. Others have expressed concerns about the agency's accuracy in approving applications only on those inventions that fulfill the statutory requirements to receive a patent. Even as discussion of patent reform has continued in Congress, the USPTO has actively engaged in efforts to address its application backlog, maintain high levels of patent quality, and more generally improve contemporary patent administration. The agency has launched a number of initiatives in recent years to address perceived concerns over the patent-granting process, including The Patent Application Backlog Stimulus Reduction Plan, which allows an individual who has filed multiple applications to receive expedited review of one patent application when he agrees to withdraw another, unexamined application. The Patent Prosecution Highway, which allows certain inventors who have received a favorable ruling from the USPTO to receive expedited review from foreign patent offices. The Enhanced First Action Interview Pilot Program, which allows applicants to conduct an interview with patent examiners early in the review process. The "Three-Track Initiative," under which an application would be placed into one of three queues: prioritized examination, traditional examination, or delayed examination. The Adoption of Metrics for the Enhancement of Patent Quality, which endeavors to improve USPTO mechanisms for measuring the quality of patent examination. A number of patent reform issues under consideration by the 112th Congress would potentially impact upon the ability of the USPTO to respond to changing circumstances in the intellectual property environment. In particular, two bills before the 112th Congress, H.R. 1249 and S. 23, would grant the USPTO the ability to set its own fees, potentially allowing the agency to act in a more flexible manner. In addition, discussion persists over whether the USPTO should have greater ability to engage in substantive rulemaking.

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G eorge Washington, Bob Hope, Joe Louis, the Wright Brothers, Robert Frost, Francis Albert "Frank" Sinatra, and Mother Teresa of Calcutta share a common bond in American history. Through these awards, Congress has expressed public gratitude for distinguished contributions, dramatized the virtues of patriotism, and perpetuated the remembrance of great events. Following a long-standing historical practice, Congress commissioned gold medals as tributes for what were considered to be the most distinguished achievements. This medal, like the Tuskegee Gold Medal, is to be given to the Smithsonian Institution for display as appropriate. In 2014, a gold medal was awarded to Shimon Peres. Photographs of the honoree are also examined during this meeting. It is my goal that every recipient, [P]resident, civil rights leader, military hero, inventor, or noted healer, who receives the Congressional Gold Medal will remain part of a unique honor bestowed by the United States Congress." Recipients of Congressional Gold Medals, 1776-2016: A Chronological List George Washington . Winston Churchill . "In recognition of the highly distinguished and impressive career of Miss Marian Anderson for a period of more than a half a century during which she has been the recipient of the highest awards from a score of foreign countries, for her untiring and unselfish devotion to the promotion of the arts in this country and throughout the world including the establishment of scholarships for young people, for her strong and imaginative support to humanitarian causes at home, for her contributions to the cause of world peace through her work as United States delegate to the United Nations and her performances and recordings which have reached an estimated seven million people throughout the world, and her unstinting efforts on behalf of the brotherhood of man, and the many treasured moments she has brought to us with enormous demand on her time, talent, and energy."

Senators and Representatives are frequently asked to support or sponsor proposals recognizing historic events and outstanding achievements by individuals or institutions. Among the various forms of recognition that Congress bestows, the Congressional Gold Medal is often considered the most distinguished. Through this venerable tradition, the occasional commissioning of individually struck gold medals in its name, Congress has expressed public gratitude on behalf of the nation for distinguished contributions for more than two centuries. Since 1776, this award, which initially was bestowed on military leaders, has also been given to such diverse individuals as Sir Winston Churchill and Bob Hope, George Washington and Robert Frost, Joe Louis and Mother Teresa of Calcutta. Members of Congress and their staff frequently ask questions concerning the nature, history, and contemporary application of the process for awarding Gold Medals. This report responds to congressional inquiries concerning this process, and includes a historical examination and chronological list of these awards. It is intended to assist Members of Congress and staff in their consideration of future Gold Medal proposals, and will be updated as Gold Medals are approved.

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114-95 ), comprehensively reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). Among other changes, the ESSA amended federal K-12 educational accountability requirements for states and local educational agencies (LEAs) receiving ESEA funds, including those regarding the identification, support, and improvement of high schools with low graduation rates. The national graduation rate for the Class of 2016 was 84.1%—the highest rate recorded since 2010-2011, when most states and LEAs began consistently reporting under 2008 federal guidelines. Improvement in the national rate has been accompanied by improvements in nearly every state and across all reported groups of students, including all racial and ethnic subgroups, low-income students, English learners, and students with disabilities. However, graduation rate gaps persist among the several student subgroups. Importantly for ESSA accountability implementation, CRS analysis of school-level data reveals that as many as 16% of high schools may fail to graduate at least one-third of their students. Thus, there are potentially thousands of high schools nationwide that may be identified for intervention in the coming years. Measuring the Graduation Rate In addition to new accountability rules, the ESSA provided the first definition of the high school graduation rate in federal education law. For the Class of 2016, the ACGR in 27 states was above the national average (84.1%) and below the national average in 23 states. Four states graduated fewer than 76.1% of their students, nineteen states graduated 76.2%-84.1%, seventeen states graduated 84.1%-87.7%, and ten states graduated 87.8% or more.

The Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) comprehensively reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). Among other changes, the ESSA amended federal K-12 educational accountability requirements for states and local educational agencies (LEAs) receiving ESEA funds, including those regarding the identification, support, and improvement of high schools with low graduation rates. In addition to new accountability rules, the ESSA provided the first definition of the high school graduation rate in federal education law. States and LEAs have been reporting their rates using the same definition, originally laid out in 2008 regulations, since the 2010-2011 school year. The national graduation rate for the Class of 2016 was 84.1%—the highest rate recorded using the new methodology. The graduation rate for the Class of 2011 was 79.0%. This national-level improvement has been accompanied by improvements in nearly every state and across all reported groups of students, including all racial and ethnic subgroups, low-income students, English learners, and students with disabilities. Still, graduation rate gaps persist among several student subgroups. At the state level, 27 states were above the national average in 2016 and 23 were below. Three states graduated fewer than 75% of their students, nine states graduated 75%-79.9%, eleven states graduated 80%-84.9%, seventeen states graduated 85%-87.9%, and ten states graduated 88% or more. Importantly for ESSA accountability implementation, analysis of 2014-2015 school-level data reveals that as many as 16% of high schools may fail to graduate at least one-third of their students. Thus, there are potentially thousands of high schools nationwide that may be identified for intervention in the coming years.

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In light of these concerns, various reform bills have been introduced in the past several Congresses, with three major reform bills pending in the 114 th Congress. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2015 ( S. 356 ) and the Email Privacy Act ( H.R. 699 ), almost identical in text, would, among other things, place both ECSs and RCSs under the same legal requirement; eliminate the current 180-day rule found in the Stored Communications Act (SCA) and require a warrant for emails no matter how long they have been stored or whether they have been opened; and eliminate the reliance on the definition of "electronic storage," which has confused the lower courts. 656 ) would make similar changes to the SCA. Some federal agencies, most prominently the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which currently rely on their subpoena authority to access electronic communications, have argued that these bills would stymie their ability to conduct investigations as they lack legal authority to obtain a warrant. In response to this concern, both the Email Privacy Act and the ECPA Amendments Act include a rule of construction providing that nothing in these bills should be read to preclude the SEC or any other federal agency from seeking these records directly from a party to the communication, rather than the target's third-party service provider. Finally, there has been ongoing litigation in the lower federal courts as to ECPA's extraterritorial reach. The scope of the SCA is determined largely by the entities to which it applies. First, it does not apply to personal users, but only to providers of an "electronic communication service" (ECS) and a "remote computing service" (RCS). A provider of RCS provides "computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communication system." The SCA has two core components: (1) a broad prohibition against providers voluntarily sharing customers' communications with the government or others, subject to certain enumerated exceptions, and (2) procedures permitting the government to require the disclosure of customers' communications or records. Section 2703 sets up a tiered system with different standards that apply depending on whether an ECS or RCS is holding the record, whether the data sought is content or non-content, whether the email has been opened, and whether advanced notice has been given to the customer. ECPA Reform Legislation In recent years, ECPA has faced increased criticism from both the technology and privacy communities that it has outlived its usefulness in the digital era and does not provide adequate privacy safeguards for individuals' electronic communications. 283 ) and the Email Privacy Act ( H.R. A competing bill, the Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad (LEADS) Act ( S. 512 , H.R. Third, H.R. Like the Email Privacy Act, the ECPA Amendments Act, and the Online Communication and Geolocation Privacy Act, the Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad Act (LEADS Act) would require a warrant based on probable cause to obtain the contents of communications from both an ECS and RCS and eliminate the 180-day rule. The act would require third-party service providers to disclose the contents of U.S. persons' electronic communications held overseas upon issuance of a warrant based on probable cause.

In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to both protect the privacy of an individual's electronic communications and provide the government with a means for accessing these communications and related records. Although passed at the infancy of the Internet, the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which is part of ECPA, has been interpreted over the years to cover the content of emails, private Facebook messages, YouTube videos, and so-called metadata, or non-content information, connected to our Internet transactions (e.g., websites visited, to/from and time/date stamps on emails). The scope of the SCA is determined largely by the entities to which it applies, "electronic communication service" (ECS) providers and "remote computing service" (RCS) providers, as defined in the statute. It does not apply to government access to records held by a party to the communication. The SCA has two core components. First, it creates a broad bar against service providers voluntarily disclosing a customer's communications to the government or others, subject to various exceptions, and second, it establishes procedures under which the government can require a provider to disclose customers' communications or records. As to government access, ECPA utilizes a tiered system with different levels of evidence required depending on whether the provider is an ECS or RCS; whether the data sought is content or non-content; whether the email has been opened; and whether advance notice has been given to the customer. In recent years, ECPA has faced increased criticism from both the technology and privacy communities that it has outlived its usefulness in the digital era and does not provide adequate privacy safeguards for individuals' electronic communications. In light of these concerns, various reform bills have been introduced in the past several Congresses, with three major reform bills pending in the 114th Congress. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2015 (S. 356, H.R. 283) and the Email Privacy Act (H.R. 699), almost identical in text, would, among other things, place both ECS and RCS providers under the same legal requirement; eliminate the current 180-day rule found in the SCA and require a warrant for emails no matter how long they have been stored or whether they have been opened; and remove the reliance on the definition of "electronic storage," which has confused the lower courts. Additionally, the Online Communications and Geolocation Privacy Act (H.R. 656) would make similar changes to the SCA. Some federal agencies, most prominently the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which currently rely on their subpoena authority to access electronic communications, have argued that these bills would stymie their ability to conduct investigations as they have no legal authority to obtain a warrant. In response to this concern, both the Email Privacy Act and the ECPA Amendments Act include a rule of construction providing that nothing in these bills should be read to preclude the SEC or any other federal agency from seeking these records directly from a party to the communication, rather than the target's service provider. Finally, there has been ongoing litigation in the lower federal courts as to ECPA's extraterritorial reach. The Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad (LEADS) Act (S. 512, H.R. 1174) would require third-party service providers to disclose the contents of U.S persons' electronic communications held overseas upon issuance of a warrant based on probable cause.

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Legislative oversight is most commonly conducted through congressional budget, authorization, appropriations, confirmation, and investigative processes, and, in rare instances, through impeachment. But the adversarial, often confrontational, and sometimes high profile nature of congressional investigations sets it apart from the more routine, accommodative facets of the oversight process experienced in authorization, appropriations, or confirmation exercises. While all aspects of legislative oversight share the common goals of informing Congress so as to best accomplish its tasks of developing legislation, monitoring the implementation of public policy, and of disclosing to the public how its government is performing, the inquisitorial process also sustains and vindicates Congress's role in our constitutional scheme of separated powers and checks and balances. The rich history of congressional investigations from the failed St. Clair expedition in 1792 through Teapot Dome, Watergate, Iran-Contra, Whitewater, and the current ongoing inquiries into Operation Fast and Furious, has established, in law and practice, the nature and contours of congressional prerogatives necessary to maintain the integrity of the legislative role in that constitutional scheme. A review of the historical experience pertinent to congressional access to information regarding the law enforcement activities of the Department of Justice indicates that the vast majority of requests for materials are resolved through political negotiation and accommodation, without the need for judicial resolution. Absent an executive privilege claim or a statute barring disclosure there appears to be no court precedent imposing a threshold burden on committees to demonstrate a "substantial reason to believe wrongdoing occurred" in order to obtain information. Instead, an inquiring committee need only show that the information sought is within the broad subject matter of its authorized jurisdiction, is in aid of a legitimate legislative function, and is pertinent to the area of concern. In the last 85 years, Congress has consistently sought and obtained access to information concerning prosecutorial misconduct by Department of Justice officials in closed cases; and access to pre-decisional deliberative prosecutorial memoranda—while often resisted by the Department—is usually released upon committee insistence, as well. In contrast, the Department rarely releases—and committees rarely subpoena—material relevant to open criminal investigations. Typically, disputes are resolved without recourse to an executive privilege claim. Instead, negotiations produce various compromises: narrowing informational requests, delaying the release of information that could have prejudicial consequences on prosecutions, or redacting sensitive materials. However, when Presidents do claim executive privilege, courts have been reluctant to resolve the dispute. Indeed, litigation over the scope of executive privilege in direct relation to congressional oversight and investigations has been quite limited. In total, there have been four cases dealing with executive privilege in the context of information access disputes between Congress and the executive, and two of those resulted in decisions on the merits. The Supreme Court has never addressed executive privilege in the face of a congressional demand for information.

Legislative oversight is most commonly conducted through congressional budget, authorization, appropriations, confirmation, and investigative processes, and, in rare instances, through impeachment. But the adversarial, often confrontational, and sometimes high profile nature of congressional investigations sets it apart from the more routine, accommodative facets of the oversight process experienced in authorization, appropriations, or confirmation exercises. While all aspects of legislative oversight share the common goals of informing Congress so as to best accomplish its tasks of developing legislation, monitoring the implementation of public policy, and disclosing to the public how its government is performing, the inquisitorial process also sustains and vindicates Congress's role in our constitutional scheme of separated powers and checks and balances. The rich history of congressional investigations from the failed St. Clair expedition in 1792 through Teapot Dome, Watergate, Iran-Contra, Whitewater, and the current ongoing inquiries into Operation Fast and Furious, has established, in law and practice, the nature and contours of congressional prerogatives necessary to maintain the integrity of the legislative role in that constitutional scheme. A review of the historical experience pertinent to congressional access to information regarding the law enforcement activities of the Department of Justice indicates that the vast majority of requests for materials are resolved through political negotiation and accommodation, without the need for judicial resolution. Absent an executive privilege claim or a statute barring disclosure there appears to be no court precedent imposing a threshold burden on committees to demonstrate a "substantial reason to believe wrongdoing occurred" in order to obtain information. Instead, an inquiring committee need only show that the information sought is within the broad subject matter of its authorized jurisdiction, is in aid of a legitimate legislative function, and is pertinent to the area of concern. In the last 85 years, Congress has consistently sought and obtained access to information concerning prosecutorial misconduct by Department of Justice officials in closed cases; and access to pre-decisional deliberative prosecutorial memoranda—while often resisted by the Department—is usually released upon committee insistence as well. In contrast, the Department rarely releases—and committees rarely subpoena—material relevant to open criminal investigations. Typically, disputes are resolved without recourse to an executive privilege claim. Instead, negotiations produce various compromises: narrowing informational requests, delaying the release of information that could have prejudicial consequences on prosecutions, or redacting sensitive materials. However, when Presidents do claim executive privilege, courts have been reluctant to resolve the dispute. Indeed, litigation over the scope of executive privilege in direct relation to congressional oversight and investigations has been quite limited. In total, there have been four cases dealing with executive privilege in the context of information access disputes between Congress and the executive, and two of those resulted in decisions on the merits. The Supreme Court has never addressed executive privilege in the face of a congressional demand for information.

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The President's action, in effect, withdrew the proposed agreement from further congressional consideration for the foreseeable future. Introduction and Overview Nuclear Cooperation with Russia and the Atomic Energy Act On May 13, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a proposed agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with the Russian Federation. For an agreement like that with Russia, the effect of these provisions is that the agreement will go into effect at the end of 90 "days of continuous session" of Congress after it is initially submitted, unless, during that time, a joint resolution disapproving the agreement is enacted through procedures defined in section 130. of the act (42 U.S.C. How and when are resolutions of disapproval (or approval) introduced? of the AEA. (2) stipulates that [F]or purposes of this section insofar as it applies to section 123 ... continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of Congress sine die; and ... the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days are excluded in the computation of any period of time in which Congress is in continuous session. 398 , which stipulated that both chambers reconvene on September 8. The House schedule projects adjournment sine die on September 26, 2008; the Senate schedule includes no projection for this event. Inasmuch as the President has 10 days to act on a measure presented for his approval (Sundays excepted), Congress might, in practice, be unable to prevent an agreement from taking effect unless it completes its initial action on the disapproval resolution by about the 88 th day of continuous session. This difficulty, however, might be overcome by use of the authority of the leadership or the President to reconvene Congress before the expiration of the recess. The leaders identified by the statute would presumably have to introduce new resolutions of disapproval on the first day of the following period of 60 days of continuous session, and the agreement would go into effect if no resolution of disapproval were to be enacted by the end of that 60-day period. will not run concurrently with the 30-day period prescribed by section 123.b., but will instead follow that 30-day period. First, the President's letter of submittal made explicit reference only to submitting the agreement to Congress for approval; it did not explicitly submit the text of the agreement to the committees of jurisdiction as well. The chief reason against doing so appears to be the apparent presumption of the statute that the President's "agreement and determination," the submission of which is required for the beginning of the 60-day period for congressional action, is to follow and, in some sense, result from the consultation with committees that is supposed to occur during the period of at least 30 days. The House measure is a joint resolution of disapproval, which, if enacted before the end of the 60-day period, would presumably have the effect contemplated by the statute of preventing the agreement from taking effect. If this resolution were to be enacted within the 60-day period, it would neither prevent nor hasten the entering into effect of the proposed agreement. 85 ) had already been introduced in the House on May 14, the day after the President submitted the agreement to Congress. Pursuant to this expedited procedure, the joint resolution of disapproval is privileged, meaning that the Senate may take it up by approving a non-debatable motion to proceed to consider. (5) authorizes the Committee on Rules to report a special rule providing for consideration of the measure under terms that "may be similar, if applicable" to those of ISAAECA.

On May 13, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation with the Russian Federation. On September 8, the President announced that he was rescinding his certification of the proposed U.S.-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement. This action, in effect, withdrew the proposed agreement from further congressional consideration for the foreseeable future Under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), the text of such an agreement is to be submitted to the committees of jurisdiction for at least 30 days of consultation, and the agreement itself is then to be submitted to Congress for 60 days, during which the committees are to consider it and report recommendations. The AEA requires the President to state his approval of the agreement before the 60-day period begins, but he did so in his initial letter of submission, perhaps rendering moot the consultive purpose of the 30-day period. Such an agreement would go into effect unless a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted by the end of the 60-day period, which, the President's submittal stipulated, will immediately follow the 30-day period. Both periods are measured in "days of continuous session," which includes all days except recesses of either house of more than three days, with "continuity" broken only by the sine die adjournment of a Congress. September 8, when the August recess is to end, is to be the 59th day of the full 90-day period, and the projected sine die adjournment on September 26 may be only the 77th day. A later sine die adjournment, a "lame duck" session, recall by the President or by congressional leadership, or the use of pro forma sessions instead of recesses could allow the 90th day to be reached within the 110th Congress. Otherwise, the agreement could not take effect until the end of a new disapproval period starting anew after the 111th Congress convenes in January, 2009. The AEA prescribes an expedited procedure for Senate consideration, including committee discharge, a non-debatable motion to proceed to consider, a 10-hour limit on consideration, and a prohibition on amendments. For the House, the Committee on Rules is invited to prescribe similar terms of consideration. A disapproval resolution was introduced in the House on May 14, and another, by committee leaders, as the AEA prescribes, at the start of the 60-day period on June 24. On the same date, Senate committee leaders introduced a resolution of approval. Although enactment of the approval resolution neither block nor hasten the effectiveness of the agreement, it could apparently be considered under the expedited procedure, and might thereby prevent expedited action on a disapproval resolution. Congress could also disapprove the agreement, or approve it with conditions, by enacting an alternative measure under its general rules. The President might likely veto any disapproval or conditional approval, in which case the agreement would go into effect unless Congress overrides the veto before the end of the disapproval period. Inasmuch as the President may take 10 days for his action, the timely enactment of a disapproval resolution may be feasible only if Congress initially passes it with more than 10 days remaining in the disapproval period. This report will not be updated.

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Introduction The 107 th Congress considered and approved reauthorization legislation to amend and extend through FY2007 the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act (SDFSCA). Most Recent Developments For FY2008, the President requested $324.2 million for the program—$100 million for state grants, and $224.2 million for national programs (see " Possible Reauthorization Issues ," below, for the Administration's reauthorization proposals). 5647 ), and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $492.5 million, which also includes $310 million for the state grant program ( S. 3708 ). For FY2006, Congress appropriated $568.8 million for the SDFSC program. This report discusses the 107 th Congress SDFSCA reauthorization and appropriations to fund the SDFSC program. The Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Program: Authorizations The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA, P.L. 107-110 ) amended and reauthorized SDFSCA as Part A of Title IV—21 st Century Schools. It authorizes funds for the SDFSC program, which is the federal government's major initiative to prevent drug abuse and violence in and around schools. National programs are supported through discretionary funds for a variety of national leadership projects designed to prevent drug abuse and violence among all educational levels, from preschool through the postsecondary level. The House Appropriations Committee, however, recommended a total of $526.0 million, including $310 million for state grants and $216.0 million for the national programs ( H.R. The SDFSC program continues to operate at FY2006 levels under a continuing resolution through February 15, 2007. Legislation in the 109th Congress During the 109 th Congress, several bills were introduced related to school safety and violence prevention. All of the bills were referred to the appropriate Committee, but died at the end of the 109 th Congress, except one ( H.R. 3010 , the Department of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-149 ) was amended by the Senate to require the ED Secretary to conduct a study evaluating the effectiveness of violence prevention programs that receive funding under SDFSCA. This amendment, however, was not included in the conference agreement and did not become law. Another amendment to H.R. 3010 was introduced on the Senate floor to increase funding for the SDFSC program, but was ruled out of order by the chairman. H.R. Legislation in the 110th Congress One bill has been introduced thus far in the 110 th Congress related to SDFSCA. 354 , the Safe Schools Against Violence in Education Act (SAVE Act), introduced by Representative McCarthy on January 9, 2007, would amend the ESEA requiring states to allow a student attending a public elementary or secondary school "that does not have a safe climate for academic achievement," or who becomes a violent crime victim on school property, while riding a school bus, or attending a school function, to transfer to a safe public school within the same school district, including a private charter school. 354 was referred to the House Education and Labor Committee (formerly the House Education and the Workforce Committee). To date, no further action has occurred.

The No Child Left Behind Act (P.L. 107-110) amended and reauthorized through FY2007 the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act (SDFSCA) within the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) as Part A of Title IV, 21st Century Schools. The act is likely to be considered for reauthorization by the 110th Congress. Funds are authorized for the SDFSC program, which is the federal government's primary initiative to prevent drug abuse and violence in and around schools. Through the program, state educational agencies, local educational agencies, and outlying areas are awarded grants by formula to create programs deterring drug abuse and violence among elementary and secondary students. Discretionary funds support national programs for various national leadership projects to prevent drug abuse and violence among students from preschool through postsecondary educational levels. For FY2006, Congress appropriated $568.8 million for the program. For FY2007, the President requested $216.0 million for national programs only, and proposed no funding for state grant programs. The House Appropriations Committee, however, recommended $526.0 million for the SDFSC program, and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $492.5 million (both including $310 million for state grants). For FY2008, the President has requested $323.2 million for the program, which includes $100 million for state grants and $224.2 million for national programs. The SDFSC program continues to operate at FY2006 levels under a continuing resolution through February 15, 2007. In the 109th Congress, several bills were introduced related to school safety and violence prevention. All of the bills were referred to the appropriate committee, but died at the end of the 109th Congress, except one (H.R. 3010). H.R. 3010, the Department of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-149), was amended by the Senate to require the Secretary of Education to conduct a study evaluating the effectiveness of violence prevention programs that receive funding under SDFSCA. This amendment, however, was not included in the conference agreement and did not become law. Another amendment to H.R. 3010 was introduced on the Senate floor to increase funding for the SDFSC program, but was ruled out of order by the chairman. One bill has been introduced thus far in the 110th Congress related to SDFSCA. H.R. 354, the Safe Schools Against Violence in Education Act (SAVE Act), would amend the ESEA by requiring states to allow a student attending a persistently dangerous public school, who has been a violent-crime victim on school property, while riding a school bus, or attending a school function, to transfer to a safe public school within the school district. The bill was referred to the House Education and Labor Committee, but no further action has occurred. This report discusses the 107th Congress SDFSCA reauthorization and appropriations to fund the SDFSC program, and possible 110th Congress reauthorization issues.

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A Voluntary ".xxx" Domain It has been proposed that there be a domain on the Internet exclusively for Websites that contain sexually explicit material; it might be labeled ".xxx" to complement the current ".com," ".org," and others. Some propose making use of a ".xxx" domain voluntary, but others propose that Congress make it mandatory. The latter proposal raises the question whether a mandatory separate domain would violate the First Amendment, and this report focuses on that question. On June 26, 2008, ICANN approved a plan that would allow a virtually unlimited number of top-level domains names. This could be viewed as analogous to requiring "adult" movie theaters to locate in areas that are zoned for them. Strict scrutiny If the ".xxx" proposal were viewed as content-based, and not as constitutional simply by virtue of its similarity to the statute upheld in Meese v. Keene , then, as noted, it would be subject to "strict scrutiny," which means that it would be constitutional only if it is necessary "to promote a compelling interest," and is "the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest." Criminal penalties A factor that might make a difference to the ".xxx" proposal's constitutionality is whether it imposed criminal penalties; if it did, that might tip the balance toward making it unconstitutional.

It has been proposed that there be a domain on the Internet exclusively for websites that contain sexually explicit material; it might be labeled ".xxx" to complement the current ".com," ".org," and others. Some propose making use of a ".xxx" domain voluntary, and a June 26, 2008, decision by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to allow a virtually unlimited number of top-level domain names may make the voluntary use of ".xxx" possible in 2009. Others propose that Congress make use of ".xxx" mandatory for websites that contain sexually explicit material. This proposal raises the question whether a mandatory separate domain would violate the First Amendment, and this report focuses on that question. It is unclear whether making a ".xxx" domain mandatory would violate the First Amendment. Whether it would be constitutional might depend upon whether a court viewed it as a content-based restriction on speech or as analogous to the zoning of adult theaters, or even as a mere disclosure requirement that did not raise a significant First Amendment issue. If a court viewed it as a content-based restriction on speech, then it would be constitutional only if the court found that it served a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means. Other factors that could affect its constitutionality might be whether it imposed criminal penalties and whether it were limited to websites that are predominantly pornographic.

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Introduction The Islamic Republic of Iran is a central focus of U.S. national security policy. The United States has designated the Iranian government as a state sponsor of terrorism. The United States contends that Iran is a destabilizing force in the Middle East and expresses concern about its growing influence in the region and internationally. The United States has decried Iran's uranium enrichment activities, which allegedly are being used to develop nuclear weapons. Second, in the context of U.S. economic sanctions imposed for national security and foreign policy reasons, the report evaluates Iran's economic structure, strengths, and vulnerabilities and discusses issues and options for Congress. Internal challenges include the large role of oil export revenues in financing government spending and vulnerability to oil price fluctuations; dependence on gasoline imports to meet domestic energy needs; high inflation, unemployment levels, and poverty levels; reported domestic economic mismanagement; and widespread economic inefficiency. To that end, the United States has imposed sanctions to curtail the development of Iran's petroleum sector and constrain Iran's financial resources in a way that motivates policy change in Iran. Some European Union states and other countries also have imposed sanctions on Iran in line with moves by the United Nations (U.N.). Overview of Iran's Economy Iran's economic growth was expected to slow in 2009, owing to the decline in international oil prices in late 2008, domestic economic mismanagement, and limited oil revenue savings to weather the recent global economic turndown. In line with Ahmadinejad's populist agenda, fiscal policy has been expansionary. Many believe that bonyads enjoy a significant advantage over private companies. Economic Sectors Iran's economy has a number of key sectors. The United States is attempting to isolate Iran from the international financial and commercial system in an effort to promote policy change in Iran regarding its nuclear program and purported terror financing. UAE-based banks may be wary of reputational and financial risks associated with such transactions. United States U.S. trade with Iran is limited, receding drastically with the 1987 U.S. ban on imports from Iran and the 1995 ban on U.S. exports to and investments in Iran. With Western involvement in Iran's energy sector tenuous, Iran has been turning toward Asian countries, such as China and Pakistan; Russia and Central Asian countries; and regional partners, such as Bahrain and Turkey. The Iranian government contends that sanctions and international pressure have not slowed down foreign investment in Iran's gas sector. Congressional Issues and Options Members of Congress appear to be divided about the United States' course of action with respect to Iran. Both countries also have growing trade relations with Iran. Some analysts point to Iran's low levels of foreign investment, difficulties obtaining trade finance, and challenges in developing its oil and gas sectors as evidence of the impact of sanctions. Action in the 111th Congress In the 111 th Congress, several bills have been introduced to expand economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran. Some lawmakers have advocated targeting Iran's dependency on imports of refined petroleum products.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, a resource-rich and labor-rich country in the Middle East, is a central focus of U.S. national security policy. The United States asserts that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism and that Iran's uranium enrichment activities are for the development of nuclear weapons. To the extent that U.S. sanctions and other efforts to change Iranian state policy target aspects of Iran's economy as a means of influence, it is important to evaluate Iran's economic structure, strengths, and vulnerabilities. Since 2000, Iran has enjoyed broad-based economic growth. However, strong economic performance has been hindered by high levels of inflation and unemployment and low levels of foreign investment. Some contend that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's expansionary monetary and fiscal policies have worsened unemployment, inflation, and poverty in Iran. With the onset of the global economic downturn, Iran's economic growth was expected to slow in 2009 and through 2010. Iran has long been subject to U.S. economic sanctions, and more recently, to United Nations sanctions, over its uranium enrichment program and purported support for terror activities. Such sanctions are believed by some analysts to contribute to Iran's growing international trade and financial isolation. Iran's economy is highly dependent on the production and export of crude oil to finance government spending, and consequently is vulnerable to fluctuations in international oil prices. Although Iran has vast petroleum reserves, the country lacks adequate refining capacity and imports gasoline to meet domestic energy needs. Iran is seeking foreign investment to develop its petroleum sector. While some deals have been finalized, reputational and financial risks may have limited other foreign companies' willingness to finalize deals. While Iran-U.S. economic relations are limited, the United States has a key interest in Iran's relations with other countries. As some European countries have curbed trade and investment dealings with Iran, other countries, such as China and Russia, have emerged as increasingly important economic partners. Iran also has focused more heavily on regional trade opportunities, such as with the United Arab Emirates. High oil prices have increased Iran's leverage in dealing with international issues, but the country's dependence on oil and other weak spots in the economy have to come to light by the 2008 international financial crisis, which may portend a slowing down of Iran's economy. Members of Congress are divided about the proper course of action in respect to Iran. Some advocate a hard line, while others contend that sanctions are ineffective at promoting policy change in Iran and hurt the U.S. economy. In the 110th Congress, several bills were introduced that reflect both perspectives. Policies toward Iran remain a key issue for the 111th Congress.

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It typically grows in dense, even-aged stands that have regenerated following intense wildfires that killed the previous stand. Life Cycle of the Mountain Pine Beetle The mountain pine beetle is a seasonally adapted insect, successfully reproducing and occasionally reaching epidemic levels where it is univoltine —completing an entire life cycle in one year. The mountain pine beetle, in turn, has evolved a mass-attack strategy that overwhelms tree defenses through sheer numbers of attacking beetles." Thus, trees under stress—from drought, disease, injury, or other cause—are more susceptible to attack by the mountain pine beetle and blue-stain fungus. When a widespread stress (e.g., a regional drought) affects a forest with many relatively large-diameter lodgepole pine trees, the stage is set for a mountain pine beetle epidemic. Most researchers note that mountain pine beetle epidemics are known to have occurred in lodgepole pine forests, but that the current epidemic is more extensive than has been seen in the past century. The epidemic may have been exacerbated by climate change. The Lodgepole Pine Epidemic in Canada The interior forests of British Columbia (BC), stretching west from the Rocky Mountain crest to the east side of the Coast Range, are similar to U.S. forests of the Rocky Mountains, and include extensive stretches of mature lodgepole pine. As with the lodgepole pine forests of the central U.S. Rockies, the mountain pine beetle is an endemic (native) species, with periodic epidemics. This is likely the result of climate change leading to insufficient freezing temperatures farther north than previously recorded. As with the mountain pine beetle outbreak in extreme northern BC, climate change is likely a significant factor in the current epidemic in high-elevation pine ecosystems, because warmer temperatures allow the mountain pine beetle to become univoltine in these areas. As one group of researchers noted, "once MPB [the mountain pine beetle] infests a tree nothing practical can be done to save that tree." Individually valuable trees, such as those near residences or in campgrounds, can be protected by insecticide sprays, but the cost is prohibitive at a landscape scale. Silvicultural treatments (timber harvests and other tree stand management practices) are sometimes discussed as a way to restrict the spread of the mountain pine beetle, but some observers have noted that such efforts are unlikely to make a difference, at least in the short run: In the current epidemic, it is impractical to expect that silvicultural treatment of lodgepole pine forests will prevent or even impede the advance of the epidemic in Colorado and southern Wyoming. Ecological Consequences The mountain pine beetle epidemic has two primary impacts of concern: first, the possible increase in wildfire threat, and second, forest regeneration following the epidemic. The effects on the high-elevation pines are different, and are discussed separately. Ecological Effects on Lodgepole Pine Ecosystems The initial concern about the ecological impacts of mountain pine beetles on lodgepole pines is the apparent increase in the threat of wildfire conflagrations from the large numbers of dead and dying trees. Lodgepole pine forests historically burned occasionally, typically in crown fires (conflagrations that kill most of the trees in the stand) under extreme weather conditions. In addition, the high-elevation pines are susceptible to destruction by white pine blister rust. However, lumber markets could be a problem. The largest market for Canadian lumber is the U.S. housing market. There are some limitations to the potential use of beetle-killed timber for energy production. Capacity could be built, and the wood might still be available for many years, but some of the capacity to use the substantial volume would become superfluous after the available beetle-killed timber was all used.

The mountain pine beetle is a native insect of western U.S. pine forests. It survives by killing infested trees, usually individually, but occasionally in epidemics. Mountain pine beetle epidemics are particularly associated with lodgepole pine, a common western tree that typically grows in dense, even-aged stands. The beetle is a seasonally adapted species that thrives in areas where it can complete its life cycle in one year. The beetle has evolved a mass-attack approach to overwhelm tree defenses through large numbers, and adults congregate on large trees under stress. Widespread stress (e.g., a regional drought) sets the stage for an epidemic. Mountain pine beetle epidemics are recurrent events in western forests. The current epidemic can be separated into three distinct events: the central U.S. Rocky Mountains, interior British Columbia (Canada), and high-elevation pines. Two aspects of the current epidemic are widely believed to have been exacerbated by climate change: (1) increased temperatures farther north and at higher elevations (allowing complete life cycles in areas previously not susceptible to the beetle) and (2) possibly regional drought (making trees more susceptible to beetle attacks). Controlling a mountain pine beetle epidemic can be problematic. Individual trees can be protected by insecticide sprays, but the cost of preventive spraying at a landscape scale is prohibitive. Once a tree is infested, nothing can be done to save the tree. In the long run, silvicultural treatments to provide less dense, more diverse forests may reduce the extent of future epidemics, but epidemics cannot be prevented. One concern about the consequences of the current epidemic is the possible increase in wildfire threats. Little research has been done to assess the change in threats and impacts of wildfires. The limited existing information suggests that tree mortality due to mountain pine beetles may have little effect on the threat or impacts of wildfire in the affected areas, because lodgepole pines (live or dead) naturally burn in extensive crown fires that typically kill most of the large trees. Furthermore, because of the natural regeneration cycle of lodgepole pine and because the beetles do not kill small trees, natural regeneration of the pine forests is likely. However, warming as a result of climate change could have two consequential ecological outcomes. First, the beetle outbreak in the high-elevation pine ecosystems could significantly alter these ecosystems, because these pines are much slower to regenerate and small high-elevation pines are highly susceptible to the white pine blister rust (an introduced fungus). The second concern is the potential for the mountain pine beetle to spread across northern Canada through the boreal jack pine forest, and become an invasive pest of eastern pine forests. There are economic consequences of the mountain pine beetle epidemic. The aesthetic values of the area—such as property values and tourism—will likely be harmed by the extensive tree mortality. Much of the beetle-killed timber could be used, for lumber or for biomass energy, but the substantial volume of timber available far exceeds existing capacity to use the wood, and expanding capacity could be unsustainable—a short-run surplus and long-run shortage. Also, Canadian lumber faces restrictions on shipments to U.S. markets.

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Introduction This report discusses the FY2017 budget request for the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) as proposed by the Obama Administration in February 2016, the amended FY2017 appropriations request proposed by the Trump Administration in March 2017, and the status of FY2017 congressional appropriations for EERE. On March 16, 2017, the Trump Administration requested an $18 billion decrease in nondefense appropriations for FY2017. It is not clear how such a cut would apply to EERE. Additionally, the Administration released a budget blueprint for FY2018. The blueprint states that funding for EERE would focus on "limited, early-stage applied energy research and development activities where the Federal role is stronger." The blueprint requests $28.0 billion for DOE, a decrease of $1.7 billion, or 5.6%, from the FY2017 annualized continuing resolution level. The blueprint does not specify how much of the proposed $1.7 billion cut would apply to EERE programs. The blueprint specifies two program eliminations: the Weatherization Assistance Program and the State Energy Program, which received FY2016 appropriations of $211.6 million and $50.0 million, respectively (see Table 1 ). The total $4.2 billion request is an increase of $2.2 billion (104%) from the enacted FY2016 level of $2.1 billion. EERE collaborates with industry, academia, national laboratories, and others to develop technology-specific road maps and then focuses on early stage research and development (R&D), technology validation and risk-reduction activities, and the reduction of market barriers to the adoption of market-ready new technologies. FY2011-FY2016 Appropriations EERE receives its appropriations from the annual energy and water development (E&W) appropriations bill. During the last several years of the Obama Administration, the budget request was to increase funding to support EERE programs and objectives. FY2017 Obama Administration Request The Obama Administration requested $4.2 billion to support EERE programs and objectives for FY2017 ($2.9 billion in discretionary funding and $1.3 billion in mandatory funding). Discretionary Portion of Request The discretionary portion of the Obama Administration request, $2.9 billion, would be an increase of $829 million (40%) over the FY2016 enacted level of $2.1 billion (see Table 1 ). The discretionary portion of the EERE FY2017 request is approximately 10% of the discretionary portion of the overall DOE FY2017 request of $30.2 billion. The FY2017 EERE request would allocate approximately 61% of the appropriations to sustainable transportation and energy efficiency, combined. The program would focus on providing funding for research, development, and demonstration activities, with the goal of strengthening regional clean energy innovation ecosystems, accelerating next-generation clean energy technology pathways, and encouraging clean energy innovation and commercialization collaborations between the National Laboratories and American entrepreneurs. Approximately 51% of the $215 million requested for the crosscutting innovation initiative would be spent on regional energy innovation partnerships. [$100 million] Accelerate the transition to a cleaner vehicle fleet by issuing challenge grants to encourage cleaner state, tribal, and local government vehicle fleets. The $1.3 billion in mandatory funding requested to support the 21 st Century Clean Transportation Plan is part of a multiagency effort that depends on the enactment of a new revenue source. For instance, EERE stated that it would use the mandatory funding, in part, to "establish regional fueling infrastructure to support the deployment of low-carbon fuels." If so, Congress rejected a related effort in the 2014 farm bill ( P.L. FY2017 Appropriations Action The Senate passed the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017 ( H.R. 2028 ) on May 12, 2016. The bill would have provided $2.1 billion for EERE, $825 million below the Obama Administration's FY2017 discretionary request and $3.8 million above the FY2016 enacted level. On May 26, 2016, the House rejected an Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 2017 ( H.R. 5055 ). The bill would have provided $1.8 billion for EERE, $1.1 billion below the Obama Administration's FY2017 discretionary request and $244 million below the FY2016 enacted level. Funding is currently being provided by a continuing resolution.

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) is the principal government agency responsible for renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency efforts. EERE works with industry, academia, national laboratories, and others to conduct research and development (R&D) and to issue grants to state governments. EERE oversees nearly a dozen technologies and programs—from vehicle technologies to solar energy to advanced manufacturing to weatherization and intergovernmental programs—each with its own respective mission and program goals. EERE receives funding from the annual energy and water development (E&W) appropriations bill. At issue for the 115th Congress is not only the level of EERE appropriations but also which activities EERE should support, including whether to continue support for specific initiatives and programs. On March 16, 2017, the Trump Administration released a budget blueprint for FY2018. The blueprint states that funding for EERE would focus on "limited, early-stage applied energy research and development activities where the Federal role is stronger." The blueprint requests $28.0 billion for DOE, a decrease of $1.7 billion, or 5.6%, from the FY2017 annualized continuing resolution level. The blueprint does not specify how much of the proposed $1.7 billion cut would apply to EERE programs. The blueprint specified that the Trump Administration's request includes two specific program eliminations: the Weatherization Assistance Program and the State Energy Program, which received FY2016 appropriations of $211.6 million and $50.0 million, respectively. The Trump Administration also requested an $18 billion decrease in nondefense appropriations for FY2017; it is not clear how such a cut would apply to EERE. For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested $2.9 billion of discretionary funding for EERE and $1.3 billion of mandatory funding for a new program, bringing the total FY2017 budget request to $4.2 billion. This total request, if enacted, would be an increase of $2.2 billion (104%) over the enacted FY2016 level of $2.1 billion (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016; P.L. 114-113, Division D). The $2.9 billion of discretionary funding requested would be an increase of $829 million (40%) over the FY2016 enacted level of $2.1 billion. The bulk of the discretionary portion of the request would be split among three areas: nearly 32% for energy efficiency programs, about 21% for renewable energy programs, and about 29% for sustainable transportation programs. The discretionary funding portion of the request is nearly 10% of the $30.2 billion discretionary portion of the FY2017 request for DOE. The Obama EERE request included new and ongoing efforts that range in scale and cost. EERE would continue to support the EV Everywhere Grand Challenge, concerning the adoption and use of plug-in electric vehicles; the SunShot Initiative to make solar energy cost-competitive by 2020; and the establishment of energy efficiency requirements for equipment and appliances. With the discretionary funding, EERE requested $40 million to establish a new R&D program focused on reducing the climate impacts of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems. Further, the Obama Administration requested $215 million for a new EERE Crosscutting Innovation Initiatives program, which has several goals, including the establishment of regionally focused clean energy innovation partnerships across the country and the acceleration of next-generation clean energy technology pathways. A relatively significant new measure contained in the Obama budget request was $1.3 billion in mandatory funding for EERE's portion of the Obama Administration's 21st Century Clean Transportation System—a new multiagency initiative to build a clean transportation system. EERE reports that this initiative would "expand investment in transportation technologies of the future; establish regional fueling infrastructure to support the deployment of low-carbon fuels; and accelerate the transition to a cleaner vehicle fleet." On May 12, 2016, the Senate passed the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 2028). The bill would have provided $2.1 billion for EERE, $825 million below the Obama Administration's FY2017 discretionary request and $3.8 million above the FY2016 enacted level. On May 26, 2016, the House rejected an Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 2017 (H.R. 5055). The bill would have provided $1.8 billion for EERE, $1.1 billion below the Obama Administration's FY2017 discretionary request and $244 million below the FY2016 enacted level. Funding is currently being provided by a continuing resolution.

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Introduction Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in an extended discourse overthe future direction of U.S. defense strategy and military force structure. (1) In the past, these discussionshave focused almost exclusively on questions related to U.S. conventional military forces, withdiscussions about nuclear weapons held in separate fora. However, the 2005 Quadrennial DefenseReview (QDR) examined both nuclear and conventional forces, a first in the QDR's history. (2) As a result, this indicates thatanalysts both inside and outside government are beginning to review and assess the relationshipbetween conventional and nuclear weapons. A key question for contemporary defense planners is what proportion of U.S. militarycapabilities should be focused on traditional military challenges and what proportion should befocused on non-traditional challenges, such as "irregular, disruptive and catastrophic" threats? Owing to growing concerns about controlling the overall size of the federal budget, itappears that pressure is building on DOD leaders to make strategy and force structure decisions withcost-effectiveness in mind. Deterrence. To effectively analyze the desired size and characteristics of tomorrow's military, some arguethat we must take "a hard look at feasible, real-world contingencies." Analysis The analysis that follows seeks to study the role that U.S. nuclear and conventional forcesmight play in four stages of each potential conflict: deterrence prior to the start of the conflict; crisisstability in the early stages of the conflict; warfighting during the height of the conflict; and wartermination. (60) Potential Implications A possible conflict with China attracts considerable attention from defense planners becauseit is a regional competitor today and could over time grow to be a "near-peer" competitor. Analystscan also easily identify flashpoints where the two nations might meet and feel compelled to defendnational interests. Conclusion This report highlights a number of policy issues that may bear consideration in the ongoingdebate regarding investments in conventional and nuclear forces: It appears that China and the United States currently have a stable deterrentrelationship. Nuclear and conventional military capabilities can simultaneously havepositive effects on deterrence or warfighting, and negative effects on crisis stability or wartermination objectives. Therefore, it may be overly simplistic to make changes in military forcestructure or capabilities to improve deterrence, for example, without considering potential effectson crisis stability, for example. Investments in military capabilities that may positively contribute to allpotential stages of military conflict (e.g. deterrence, crisis stability, warfighting, and wartermination), might be preferred to investments that have a mixed effect on the potential range ofconflict.

Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in an extended discourse overthe future direction of U.S. defense strategy and military force structure. In the past, thesediscussions have focused almost exclusively on questions related to U.S. conventional militaryforces, with discussions about nuclear weapons held in separate fora. However, the 2005Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) examined both nuclear and conventional forces, a first in theQDR's history. This indicates that analysts both inside and outside government are beginning toreview and assess the potential deterrent and operational relationship between conventional andnuclear weapons. It appears that considerable pressure is building on DOD leaders to make strategy and forcestructure decisions with cost-effectiveness in mind. A key question for contemporary defenseplanners is what proportion of U.S. military capabilities should be focused on traditional militarychallenges and what proportion should be focused on non-traditional challenges, such as "irregular,disruptive and catastrophic" threats? To effectively analyze the desired size and characteristics of tomorrow's military, some arguethat we must take a hard look at feasible, real-world contingencies. A possible conflict with Chinaattracts considerable attention from defense planners because it is a regional competitor today andcould over time grow to be a "near-peer" competitor. Analysts can also easily identify flashpointswhere the two nations might meet and feel compelled to defend national interests. The analysis that follows seeks to explore the possible role that U.S. nuclear andconventional forces might play in four stages of potential conflicts: deterrence, prior to the start ofthe conflict; crisis stability in the early stages of the conflict; warfighting during the height of theconflict; and war termination, through either a negotiated settlement or a battlefield victory. This report highlights a number of policy issues that may bear consideration in the ongoingdebate regarding military investments. For example, this report suggests that nuclear andconventional military capabilities can simultaneously have positive effects on deterrence orwarfighting and negative effects on crisis stability or war termination objectives. Therefore, changesin military force structure or capabilities to improve deterrence, for example, should considerpotential effects on crisis stability, for example. Further, investments in military capabilities thatmay positively contribute to all potential stages of military conflict (e.g. deterrence, crisis stability,warfighting, and war termination), might be preferred to investments that have a mixed effect on thepotential range of conflict. This report will not be updated.

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The Administration's 2007 farm bill proposal is separate from its FY2008 budget request. The direct loan program would bear most of the decrease in loan authority (-12%), although it accounts for most of the increase in loan subsidy. Programs of the NRCS would increase by $195 million to $2.0 billion in FY2008. The request reflects recommended changes in the Administration's broader farm bill proposal, which proposes to consolidate some existing conservation programs. Marketing and Regulatory Programs For the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the USDA agency that protects U.S. agriculture from domestic and foreign pests and diseases, the FY2008 budget request proposes an appropriation of $946 million, an increase of about $100 million above the FY2007 appropriation. 480 foreign food assistance, the Administration requests a $1.2 billion appropriation ($1.3 billion program value with carryover and reimbursements), all of it for Title II commodity donations. The absence of Title I funds would effectively reduce spending on FFP. This program level would be supported by a requested appropriation of $2.05 billion (including salaries and expenses). The FY2008 request is approximately $23 million more in budget authority and $985 million more in program level than estimated for FY2007. Domestic Food Assistance Domestic food assistance represents the majority of the USDA budget.

The Administration's FY2008 budget request for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) includes $92.2 billion in budget authority. Proposed discretionary budget authority would increase 1.6% from FY2007 levels to $20.3 billion. Mandatory budget authority would remain nearly steady at $71 billion; formula-driven increases in crop insurance and domestic food assistance would offset decreases in commodity program payments. The Administration's 2007 farm bill proposal is largely separate from its budget request, although a $500 million per year placeholder for new spending is included in the FY2008 budget amounts. In its FY2008 request, the Administration proposes to use foreign assistance funds to purchase food in foreign markets. For agricultural research, competitive funding would replace some formula funding. Several conservation and rural development programs would be reduced or cut. Food safety and animal health protection programs would increase. This report will not be updated, but will be followed by a CRS report tracking the FY2008 agriculture appropriations bill.

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Background The Coast Guard's Role in Homeland Security The Coast Guard, which is a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security. Section 888(a)(2) of The Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. As shown in the table, the Coast Guard for FY2008 is requesting a total of about $4.5 billion, or a bit more than half its total proposed budget, for these five missions.

The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security. For FY2008, the Coast Guard is requesting a total of about $4.5 billion, or a bit more than half its total proposed budget, for the five missions defined in The Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 ) as the Coast Guard's homeland security missions. The Coast Guard's homeland security operations pose several potential issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Background Federal financial reporting—defined here as the process of recording retrospective executive department-level financial and performance information—may provide both a snapshot of the government's financial health at a given moment in time, as well as an accounting of its financial performance over a given time frame. Each report presents a distinct array of financial information intended to permit various stakeholders—Congress, the President, agency heads, program managers, and citizens—to evaluate the federal government's performance relative to the collection and disbursement of public money. Congress, in particular, may utilize the information in federal financial reports for policy formulation and planning, programmatic decision making, and exercising oversight authority ( Figure 1 ). The Current Statutory Framework for Federal Financial Reporting During the past two decades, Congress has further developed federal financial reporting through enactment of three statutes: (1) the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act), the Government Management Reform Act of 1994 (GMRA), and (3) the Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002 (ATDA). More specifically, the CFO Act established the Office of Federal Financial Management (OFFM) within OMB and designated a CFO in each executive department and major executive agency (subsequently known as CFO agencies); requires each CFO agency to prepare and audit annual financial statements for each revolving fund and trust fund and for accounts that performed substantial commercial functions; directed 10 agencies, including the Department of Agriculture, the General Services Administration, and the Department of the Army, to prepare audited financial statements for all of their agency accounts; and requires the director of the OMB to produce an annual financial management status report and a government-wide, five-year financial management plan. Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002 To build upon this improvement, Congress enacted ATDA, which further expanded the CFO Act's reporting requirements to cover all executive branch agencies to prepare and submit audited financial statements to OMB and the Congress; and permits OMB to exempt a non-CFO agency from this requirement if "the total amount of budget authority available to the agency for the fiscal year does not exceed $25,000,000; and ... the Director determines that requiring an annual audited financial statement for the agency with respect to the fiscal year is not warranted due to the absence of risks associated with the agency's operations, the agency's demonstrated performance, or other factors that the Director considers relevant." Further improvements have built on these initial results, with demonstrable progress across numerous financial management indicators, including timeliness, consistency, and auditability. In FY2012, 21 of 24 CFO agencies received unqualified audit opinions on their annual financial statements. In addition, federal financial statements may not provide readily understandable information to their multiple stakeholders. Unqualified overall audit opinions can obscure material weaknesses that underlie systematic financial management issues. In addition, two agencies—the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD)—have never received unqualified audit opinions, which signifies the persistence of financial problems at these agencies. Government-Wide Financial Reporting Issues Government-wide, the U.S. consolidated financial statements have received a disclaimer of opinion every year since they were first required under GMRA. GAO was unable to express an opinion on the FY2012 U.S. consolidated financial statements due to material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting and other limitations on the scope of its work. Recent Legislation Congress has recently considered legislation relating to audits of federal financial statements. In the 113 th Congress, Representative Barbara Lee has introduced legislation ( H.R. 559 ) that would require a 5% reduction in a federal agency's discretionary budgetary authority for failure to produce an annual financial statement or failure to receive either an unqualified or qualified audit opinion on its annual financial statement. The 112 th Congress considered similar legislation, as well as legislation on audited annual financial statements at DOD and DHS, specifically. S. 3487 would have mandated auditable financial statements by DOD for its FY2017 statements. The legislation also would have required DOD to provide a complete and validated statement of budgetary resources by FY2014. In the 113 th Congress, Representative Lee introduced the Audit the Pentagon Act of 2013 ( H.R. 559 ). It was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Committee on Armed Services. DHS Audit Requirement Target Act Congress also considered legislation to address problems at the Department of Homeland Security in the 112 th Congress. The DART Act directs DHS to obtain an unqualified audit opinion beginning with its FY2013 annual financial statements. The DART Act of 2012 (126 Stat. 1591) was signed into law on December 20, 2012.

Federal financial reporting—defined here as the process of recording retrospective executive department-level financial and performance information—can provide both a snapshot of the government's financial health at a given moment in time, as well as an accounting of its financial performance over a particular time frame. Federal financial reports may help the federal government demonstrate accountability, provide information for policy formulation and planning, and be used to evaluate governmental performance. Multiple reports are required by law, and all are intended to permit users—Congress, the President, agency heads, program managers, and citizens—to see how the government raises, handles, and expends public money. Congress, in particular, may find the information in federal financial reports useful for oversight. The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 was the first statute to require executive agencies to provide reports and information on their financial condition to the Secretary of the Treasury. The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) mandates the preparation of audited annual financial statements for certain funds and accounts from a number of executive branch agencies, with 10 agencies selected to provide audited annual financial statements for all agency accounts. The latter provision was expanded to every agency covered under the CFO Act (commonly referred to as CFO agencies) in the Government Management Reform Act of 1994 (GMRA) and to every executive agency in the Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002 (ATDA). In addition, the CFO Act requires the director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to furnish an annual financial management status report and a government-wide five-year financial management plan, and GMRA requires the Secretary of the Treasury to provide government-wide annual consolidated financial statements to be audited by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). GAO has documented improvements to federal financial reporting since the enactment of the CFO Act. Demonstrable progress has been in evidence across numerous financial management indicators, including timeliness, consistency, and auditability. In FY2012, 21 of 24 CFO agencies received unqualified (clean) audit opinions on their annual financial statements, which means that their statements were free of material misstatements and accord with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Challenges have persisted, though, both within agencies and government-wide. Unqualified overall audit opinions can obscure material weaknesses that underlie systematic financial management issues. In addition, two agencies—the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD)—have never received unqualified audit opinions, which signifies the persistence of financial problems at these agencies. Government-wide, the U.S. consolidated financial statements have received a disclaimer of opinion every year since they were first required under GMRA. GAO was unable to express an opinion on the FY2012 U.S. consolidated financial statements due to material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting and other limitations on the scope of its work. Finally, federal financial statements may not provide readily understandable information to their multiple stakeholders. Congress has recently considered legislation relating to audits of federal financial statements. In the 113th Congress, Representative Lee has introduced legislation (H.R. 559) that would require a 5% reduction in a federal agency's discretionary budgetary authority for failure to produce an annual financial statement or failure to receive either an unqualified or qualified audit opinion on its annual financial statement. H.R. 559 was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Committee on Armed Services. The 112th Congress considered similar legislation, as well as legislation on audited annual financial statements at DOD and DHS, specifically. In the 112th Congress, Senator Coburn introduced the Audit the Pentagon Act, which would have mandated auditable financial statements by DOD for its FY2017 statements. The legislation also would have required DOD to provide a complete and validated statement of budgetary resources by FY2014. Congress also considered legislation to address problems at the Department of Homeland Security in the 112th Congress. The DHS Audit Requirement Target Act of 2012 (DART, 126 Stat. 1591) was signed into law on December 20, 2012. The DART Act directs DHS to obtain an unqualified audit opinion beginning with its FY2013 annual financial statements. This report will be updated to reflect significant developments.

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As illustrated in Figure 2 , residential energy use per capita had remained relatively constant since the 1970s. There is some debate, however, about the optimal level of investment in energy efficiency. The first credit, the nonbusiness energy property tax credit (IRC §25C), allows taxpayers to claim a tax credit for energy-efficiency improvements they make to the building envelope (insulation, windows, doors) of their primary residence and for the purchase of high-efficiency heating, cooling, and water-heating appliances they purchase for their primary residence. The maximum value of the credit is capped at $500. The amount of the credit is calculated as a percentage of expenditures on technologies that generate renewable energy, including labor and installation costs. For 2017, the credit rate is 30%. Information on the current budgetary effects of Section 25C and Section 25D can be found in Appendix C . The Economic Rationale for Residential Energy-Efficiency Tax Credits A rational consumer would be expected to invest in an energy-efficiency technology if the savings that resulted from using the property were greater than the cost of the property. Although the two tax credits analyzed in this report are designed to encourage additional investment in residential energy-efficient property in existing homes, they may not rectify other existing market failures, limiting their ability to increase usage of energy-efficient technologies to their optimal or economically efficient levels. Finally, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) has identified administrative issues with the current tax benefits for residential energy efficiency. Tax credits that reward consumers for residential energy-efficiency investments, rather than lead consumers to make additional residential energy-efficiency investments, provide a windfall gain to credit recipients without resulting in additional economy-wide energy-efficiency investment or reduced energy consumption. For example, estimates suggest that in 2017, 44% of U.S. households had no federal income tax liability, meaning that tax credits for energy-efficiency investment do not provide a current financial incentive for such investments for these taxpayers. The purpose of residential energy-efficiency tax incentives is to increase investment in energy efficiency and properties that generate renewable energy. By definition, the value of a nonrefundable credit cannot exceed a taxpayer's tax liability. Residential energy-efficiency tax incentives tend to be limited to higher-income taxpayers, which may undermine one of the policy rationales behind using tax credits to motivate energy-efficiency investments. Policy Options27 The Section 25C and Section 25D tax credits are temporary provisions and one policy option available to Congress is to allow these tax credits to expire as scheduled. Absent congressional action, the Section 25C credit expired at the end of 2017 and the Section 25D credit expires at the end of 2021, respectively. There may be other policy options Congress might want to consider regarding future incentives for residential energy efficiency, including modifying the credits or replacing them with a grant program. Allow Tax Credits to Expire as Scheduled One option regarding these credits is to let them expire as scheduled. Extend or Modify Current Tax Incentives Policymakers may choose to extend, expand, or otherwise modify residential energy-efficiency tax incentives. Legislative History Tax credits for residential energy efficiency were first introduced in the late 1970s. The first credit was the nonbusiness energy property credit (IRC §25C). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ) further extended and modified the Section 25C and Section 25D tax credits. With respect to the Section 25C credit, ARRA extended the credit for two years (2009 and 2010) and modified the calculation of the credit to be equal to 30% of qualified expenditures for energy-efficiency improvements and energy property, eliminating the technology-specific credit amounts. 111-312 ) Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (The 2010 Tax Act; P.L. The American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) The American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. 112-240 ) extended the 2011 parameters of the Section 25C credit for two additional years—2012 and 2013. The Tax Increase Prevention Act (TIPA) The Tax Increase Prevention Act (TIPA; P.L. The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act (PATH) The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act (PATH Act; Division Q of P.L. Division P of P.L. 114-113 extended the 25D credit for solar technologies through 2021 and modified the credit formula for these technologies. Before enactment of P.L. 114-113 , the 25D credit for all qualifying technologies was scheduled to expire at the end of 2016. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA) The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123 ) extended the 25C credit retroactively for 2017. Under BBA, the credit rates for these nonsolar technologies now equal 30% for property placed in service before the end of 2019, falling to 26% in 2020 and 22% in 2021, identical to the credit rates for solar technologies.

Currently, on their 2017 federal income tax return, taxpayers may be able to claim two tax credits for residential energy efficiency. The nonbusiness energy property or "Section 25C" credit expired at the end of 2017. The residential energy efficient property or "Section 25D" credit is scheduled to expire at the end of 2021. The nonbusiness energy property tax credit (Internal Revenue Code [IRC] §25C) provides homeowners with a tax credit for investments in certain high-efficiency heating, cooling, and water-heating appliances, as well as tax credits for energy-efficient windows and doors. For installations made during 2011 through 2017, the credit rate is 10% of eligible expenses, with a maximum credit amount of $500. The credit available for 2011 through 2017 was less than what had been available during 2009 and 2010, when taxpayers were allowed a 30% tax credit of up to $1,500 for making energy-efficiency improvements to their homes. The residential energy efficient property credit (IRC §25D), which provides a 30% tax credit for investments in properties that generate renewable energy, is scheduled to be in effect through the end of 2021, although the percentage of expenditures a taxpayer can claim will fall from 30% to 26% in 2020, and to 22% in 2021. Advances in energy efficiency have allowed per-capita residential energy use to remain relatively constant since the 1970s, even as demand for energy-using technologies has increased. Experts believe, however, that there is unrealized potential for further residential energy efficiency. One reason investment in these technologies might not be at optimal levels is that certain market failures result in energy prices that are below the socially optimal level. If energy is relatively inexpensive, consumers will not have a strong incentive to purchase a technology that will lower their energy costs. Tax credits are one policy option to potentially encourage consumers to invest in energy-efficiency technologies. Residential energy-efficiency tax credits were first introduced in the late 1970s, but were allowed to expire in 1985. Tax credits for residential energy efficiency were again enacted as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). These credits were expanded and extended as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5). The Section 25C credit was extended, at a reduced rate, and with a reduced cap, through 2011, as part of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312). At the end of 2012, the 25C credit was extended for 2012 and 2013 by the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. 112-240). The Section 25C credit was extended for 2014 by the Tax Increase Prevention Act (P.L. 113-295). The Section 25C credit was extended for 2015 and 2016 by the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act (PATH Act), which was included in P.L. 114-113. The Section 25D credit as it applies to solar technologies was also extended and modified by P.L. 114-113. Most recently, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123) extended the Section 25C credit for 2017, and extended the Section 25D credit for nonsolar technologies through 2021, providing parity in Section 25D between solar and nonsolar renewable energy technologies. Although the purpose of residential energy-efficiency tax credits is to motivate additional energy-efficiency investment, the amount of the investment resulting from these credits is unclear. Purchasers investing in energy-efficient property for other reasons—for example, concern about the environment—would have invested in such property absent tax incentives, and hence stand to receive a windfall gain from the tax benefit. Further, the fact that the incentive is delivered as a nonrefundable credit limits the provision's ability to motivate investment for low- and middle-income taxpayers with limited tax liability. The administration of residential energy-efficiency tax credits has also had compliance issues, as identified in a Treasury Department Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) report. There are various policy options available for Congress to consider regarding incentives for residential energy efficiency. One option is to let the existing tax incentives expire as scheduled. Another option would be to repeal these tax credits. A third option would be to extend or modify the current tax incentives. Finally, policymakers could replace the current tax credits with a grant or rebate program. Grants or rebates could be made more widely available, and not be limited to taxpayers with tax liability.

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Introduction On October 24, 2018, President Trump signed into law H.R. 6 , the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act ( P.L. 115-271 ; the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, or the SUPPORT Act). The SUPPORT Act is a sweeping measure designed to address widespread overprescribing and abuse of opioids in the United States. The act includes provisions involving law enforcement, public health, and health care financing and coverage. Broadly, the legislation imposes tighter oversight of opioid production and distribution; imposes additional reporting and safeguards to address fraud; and limits coverage of prescription opioids, while expanding coverage of and access to opioid addiction treatment services. The bill also authorizes a number of programs that seek to expand consumer education on opioid use and train additional providers to treat individuals with opioid use disorders. Related Prior Laws The SUPPORT Act builds on recent efforts by the federal government to address the opioid epidemic, including the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198 ) and the 21 st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255 ). CARA addressed substance use issues broadly, targeting the opioid crisis predominantly through public health and law enforcement strate gies. The Cures Act also authorized additional funding to combat opioid addiction and included provisions addressing various mental health and substance use activities. This report summarizes the provisions in Title III—the FDA and Controlled Substance Provisions, as well as Section 4004 "Modernizing the Reporting Requirements of Biological and Biosimilar Products" in Title IV—Offsets. Subtitle B of Title III addresses Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) regulation of controlled substances and includes provisions that, among other things, provide additional flexibility with respect to medication-assisted treatment (MAT) for opioid use disorders; modify controlled substances disposal requirements at qualified hospice programs; and authorize grants to states to increase participation of eligible collectors in drug-disposal programs. Section 4004 of Title IV amends reporting requirements for certain agreements between brand drug, generic drug, and biosimilar product manufacturers. Subtitle A addresses FDA medical product regulation and includes provisions that, among other things, facilitate the development of new medical products for treatment of pain; provide for special packaging and disposal mechanisms for opioids; and amend postmarket study and labeling requirements.

On October 24, 2018, President Trump signed into law H.R. 6, the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act (P.L. 115-271; the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, or the SUPPORT Act). The SUPPORT Act is a sweeping measure designed to address widespread overprescribing and abuse of opioids in the United States. The act includes provisions involving law enforcement, public health, and health care financing and coverage. Broadly, the legislation imposes tighter oversight of opioid production and distribution; imposes additional reporting and safeguards to address fraud; and limits coverage of prescription opioids, while expanding coverage of and access to opioid addiction treatment services. The bill also authorizes a number of programs that seek to expand consumer education on opioid use and train additional providers to treat individuals with opioid use disorders. The SUPPORT Act builds on recent efforts by the federal government to address the opioid epidemic, including the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198) and the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255). CARA addressed substance use issues broadly, targeting the opioid crisis predominantly through public health and law enforcement strategies. The Cures Act, enacted that same year, largely focused on medical innovation but also authorized additional funding to combat opioid addiction and included provisions addressing various mental health and substance use activities. CRS is publishing a series of reports on the SUPPORT Act, which consists of eight titles. This report summarizes the provisions in Title III—the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) and Controlled Substance Provisions, as well as Section 4004 "Modernizing the Reporting Requirements of Biological and Biosimilar Products" in Title IV—Offsets. Subtitle A of Title III addresses FDA medical product regulation and includes provisions that, among other things, facilitate the development of new medical products for treatment of pain, provide for special packaging and disposal mechanisms for opioids, and amend postmarket study and labeling requirements. Subtitle B of Title III addresses Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) regulation of controlled substances and includes provisions that, among other things, provide additional flexibility with respect to medication-assisted treatment (MAT) for opioid use disorders, modify controlled substances disposal requirements at qualified hospice programs, and authorize grants to states to increase participation of eligible collectors in drug-disposal programs. Section 4004 of Title IV amends reporting requirements for certain agreements between brand drug, generic drug, and biosimilar product manufacturers.

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The debate about the future of PTC incentives generally falls within a spectrum of options. At one end of the spectrum, proposals have been made to eliminate the incentive. At the other end of the spectrum, proposals include making the PTC permanent. Various other proposals, such as extending and phasing out the PTC over time, fall within these two extremes. This report examines various alternatives for phasing out production tax credits (PTC) for qualified renewable electricity generation. In addition to elimination or permanent extension of the PTC, four different phase-out approaches are examined in this report: (1) phase-out under current law, (2) straight line phase-out over five years, (3) American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) phase-out concept, and (4) a market-linked phase-out policy option. Each alternative is unique in terms of complexity, certainty, and other aspects. It is beyond the scope of this report to holistically examine all phase-out alternatives. This report is focused on production tax credits that are available for renewable electricity generation and potential options for eliminating, extending, or phasing out this financial incentive over a period of time. During the 2012 debate about the future of wind PTC incentives, the concept of phasing out the PTC for wind over a period of time was discussed by both congressional and industry stakeholders. In the 113 th Congress, two bills— H.R. 2081 and H.R. Rationale for phasing out the PTC over time is generally based on the argument that the wind industry would have the opportunity to adapt to a gradual reduction of this federal financial incentive as opposed to adapting to a sudden and drastic elimination of the PTC based on a defined expiration date. As the 2013 expiration of the PTC incentive approaches, Congress may choose to debate the future of wind PTC incentives and may also consider PTC phase-out policy options. This report is designed to inform debate about various policy options for the PTC that have been proposed. The President's FY2014 budget proposes to make the PTC permanent and refundable. Proponents of extending the availability of PTC incentives argue that the temporary nature of PTC incentives creates an investment climate that is uncertain and that other sources of energy have tax incentives that are permanent in nature, thus resulting in unfair treatment across the spectrum of energy sources and technologies. Phase Out the Renewable Electricity PTC: Selected Alternatives A potential policy alternative to either eliminating or extending the PTC might be an approach that could phase out the incentive over a period of time. Phase-out in Current Law If it were extended, current law (Section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code), requires that the wind PTC be reduced and phased out when a reference price for wind power (calculated and published annually by the IRS) exceeds an inflation-adjusted threshold value, as discussed in the footnote below. Generally, this proposed approach would reduce the PTC level by 20% of its current (2013) level, each year, for five years. AWEA Phase-out Concept On December 12, 2012, the American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) sent a letter to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Ways and Means that outlined a PTC phase-out concept. 2081 and H.R. 2987 ). Another example is Japan, where FIT rates for renewable power are periodically reviewed and adjusted based on certain market conditions. Variables such as the cost of debt, the cost of equity, leverage ratios, loan terms, and natural gas prices can change over the course of a year and the market-linked approach allows for consideration of these energy and financial market changes, if so desired. PTC value could be capped to not exceed its current level (2.3 cents per kilowatt-hour) and when price parity with NGCC generation is achieved, the PTC incentive is no longer available: The underlying goal of the market-linked phase-out policy option would be to reduce and eventually eliminate federal PTC incentives for wind power projects. This LCOE calculation does not include any production tax credit, renewable energy credit (REC) sales, or other state/federal incentives that might be available to wind projects. Other options may also be possible. This assumption was made as a way to include a policy lever to incentivize the wind industry to continuously reduce costs and improve technology performance in order to become economically viable on an unsubsidized basis.

Under current law, the production tax credit (PTC) incentive for renewable electricity will expire at the end of 2013. Generally, congressional debate about the PTC falls within a spectrum of options. At one end of the spectrum, proposals have been made to eliminate the incentive. At the other end of the spectrum, proposals include making the PTC permanent. Other proposals, such as temporarily extending and phasing out the PTC over time, fall within these two extremes. This report examines selected alternatives for phasing out PTC incentives. During the 2012 debate about the future of the PTC, the concept of phasing out PTCs over a period of time was considered as a potential option. In August 2012 the Senate Committee on Finance reported S. 3521, which expressed the sense of the Senate, regarding tax reform, that "whenever possible, federal energy tax expenditures should be responsibly phased-out in a manner that allows these technologies to function without a reliance on federal subsidies." This language is not specific to any energy technology, and does not refer to either fossil energy or renewable energy. In December 2012, the American Wind Energy Association published a PTC phase out proposal that would result in the PTC being eliminated by 2019. Debate about energy subsidies is multi-faceted. Different energy sources receive different types of subsidy support over varying time periods. Comparing tax incentives and subsidies across all energy types is beyond the scope of this report. This report examines and considers possible options for renewable electricity PTCs, with a focus on phase-out alternatives. Generally, the goal of a tax credit phase-out approach is to reduce the incentive value over a period of time in order to encourage industry to reduce costs so that certain renewable power technologies might compete on an unsubsidized basis. In general, proponents of technology-promoting legislation aim to reduce the cost or price gap between preferred and conventional technologies. Opponents often view this approach as "picking winners." If the PTC were extended, Internal Revenue Code Section 45 includes provisions for phasing out the PTC based several parameters. However, a phase-out under current law is unlikely in the near to medium term due to the phase-out design—which is statutorily based on a threshold electricity value that escalates with inflation and a reference price that declines with technology and cost improvements—as well as forecasted electric power market conditions. One phase-out approach under consideration is a linear reduction of PTC incentives each year. For example, the PTC could be reduced from its current level by 20 percentage points each year for five years. After the end of the five-year period, PTCs would no longer be available. This approach is simple conceptually, and may be easy to implement. However, this approach may or may not be effective, depending on market conditions (i.e., electricity prices, wind installation costs, natural gas prices). Alternatively, PTC incentives might also be reduced annually based on a non-linear formulation that incorporates the myriad of market variables that can affect the cost competitiveness of renewable electricity. While this approach is more complex when compared to the straight-line method, it could establish benchmark PTC levels using a comparative metric (e.g., natural gas power). A detailed examination and analysis of this "market-linked" phase-out approach is included in this report. Each phase-out approach differs in terms of complexity, implementation, and potential impacts to renewable electricity deployment. Various proposals have been introduced in the 113th Congress that would eliminate the renewable electricity PTC (e.g., November 14, 2013, letter to Committee on Ways and Means from more than 50 House members), permanently extend the PTC (e.g., H.R. 2539, and the President's FY2014 budget) or phase out the PTC (e.g., H.R. 2081 and H.R. 2987). If Congress chooses to debate the future of the renewable electricity PTC, background and analysis of various policy alternatives may serve to inform discussions about this federal incentive.

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Introduction The 1,153-square mile estuary at the confluence of the San Francisco Bay and the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers Delta—the Bay-Delta—is also the hub of California's extensive water supply system. This partnership resulted in an agreement known as the Bay-Delta Accord, which ultimately led to the development of the CALFED Bay-Delta Program (CALFED) and the Record of Decision (ROD) for the CALFED Bay-Delta Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement and Report (EIS/EIR). The reauthorization of federal participation in the CALFED program was quite controversial. While the CALFED program is an attempt to balance competing interests and develop a plan for managing Bay-Delta water resources to meet competing demands, all parties have not been 100% satisfied in the final goals, programmatic actions, and water management regimes called for the in the ROD. 108-361 ). Two networks of pumps, dams, canals, and reservoirs take an estimated 5.9 million acre-feet (maf) of water from the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers and their tributaries, and distribute it to agricultural and urban water users in the California Central Valley via the CVP, and to Southern California via the SWP. Today, the Bay-Delta ecosystem is still generally considered to be unhealthy and unable to provide reliable amounts of water for water users. Conflicts and Federal Government Involvement The limited supply of water in California has been the subject of conflicts among competing interests for decades. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) by state water contractors. The Accord was in effect until 2000 and then was incorporated in part by the ROD. CALFED Bay-Delta Program Controversies surrounding implementation of the federal statutes outlined above fueled the creation of the Bay-Delta Framework Agreement (a refinement of the Accord), which was signed in 1995 by state and federal agencies with regulatory responsibilities in the Bay-Delta. This agreement marked the beginning of the CALFED process and defined three issues that were deemed important for federal-state coordination and cooperation: the formulation of water quality standards; coordination of federal and state project operations with regulatory requirements (i.e., coordination of CVP and SWP operations to maintain compliance with the ESA, CVPIA, and state and federal water quality provisions); and development of a joint federal-state process to develop long-term solutions to environmental, water supply, and water quality problems in the Bay-Delta. The CALFED Program was created from the Framework Agreement to address these issues. This legislation authorized nearly $430 million for FY1998 to FY2000. The funding authorization expired September 30, 2000; however, some activities that support CALFED program goals continued to receive federal funding. CALFED Legislative Issues The debate over the reauthorization of CALFED in the 108 th Congress largely centered on specific issues such as the authorization for water storage projects, cost allocation, balance among project and program activities, and water supplies for the environment, as well as broader issues such as governance and the degree to which the ROD is implemented. Funding The implementation of CALFED is expected to cost an estimated $10 billion dollars over 30 years; however, during the first seven years (referred to as Stage 1), implementation costs are estimated to be $8.7 billion. For example, the ROD estimates that nearly 260,000 acres of agricultural land will need to be used for ecosystem restoration, water quality, water storage and conveyance, and levee system integrity projects and activities. 2003 —The Sacramento splittail is delisted from the threatened species list by the U.S. 2004 —The Water Supply, Reliability, and Environmental Improvement Act is signed into law on October 25, 2004 ( P.L.

The California Bay-Delta Program (CALFED) was initiated in 1995 to resolve water resources conflicts in the Sacramento/San Joaquin Rivers Delta and San Francisco Bay (Bay-Delta) in California. The program planning effort focused on developing a plan to address three main problem areas in the Bay-Delta: ecosystem health, water quality, and water supply reliability. CALFED was initially authorized to receive federal funding from FY1998 to FY2000; and since that time only certain projects supporting CALFED goals received appropriations. The program was finally reauthorized October 25, 2004. The Bay-Delta is formed by the confluence of the north-flowing San Joaquin River, the south-flowing Sacramento River, and the San Francisco Bay, to which the delta of the two rivers is linked. This 738,000-acre area contains a vast network of marshes, wetlands, and open water that supplies water to two-thirds of California's population and nearly seven million acres of farmland through a series of pumps, canals, and dams operated by the federal and state governments. The competing demands for Bay-Delta water have stretched the resource's capacity to provide reliable amounts of water to users (e.g., farmers) and the ecosystem. The Bay-Delta ecosystem is being altered by habitat conversion and water quality degradation, including salt water intrusion. For example, several fish populations have declined, and some species are on federal threatened and endangered species lists. Many attribute the deterioration to unnaturally low levels of water in the Bay-Delta. Listing of these species has affected the timing and use of water pumped from the Bay-Delta and has created uncertainty in water supplies for water users in southern California. Allocating water from the Bay-Delta has been the subject of conflicts and disputes among stakeholders such as farmers, urban water contractors, and environmentalists for years. CALFED was developed as a response to these conflicts through a series of agreements and revisions that have involved federal and state legislation, and stakeholder accords. A Record of Decision (ROD) for the current CALFED Program was issued by a consortium of state and federal agencies in August 2000; however, legislation to implement the CALFED Program as outlined in the ROD had not been enacted until recently. CALFED, as described in the ROD, has 12 program components that range from water quality and supply to ecosystem restoration and governance. CALFED was planned to be implemented in three phases, of which two are already completed. The third phase is the implementation of the CALFED program as outlined in the ROD. Stage I (of three stages in phase III) of CALFED is currently underway and is expected to take seven years to complete and cost nearly $8.7 billion. The reauthorization of CALFED funding has been controversial. Specific issues such as authorization for water storage projects, balance among project and program activities, and water supplies for the environment, as well as broader issues such as governance and the degree to which the ROD is implemented, were resolved to varying degrees with the passage of P.L. 108-361, which reauthorized the CALFED Program. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Potential Advantages of a Carbon Tax This report examines four potential advantages of a carbon tax approach to controlling GHG emissions. These issues are discussed below. The Task Force finds, however, that the political momentum behind cap-and-trade makes its near term adoption much more likely.... [emphasis added] Although a carbon tax would likely face more political obstacles than a cap-and-trade program, some of these obstacles may be based on misunderstandings regarding the differences between the two approaches or on assumptions that the tax would be set too low to be effective. Conclusions Market-based mechanisms that limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can be divided into two types: quantity control (e.g., cap-and-trade) and price control (e.g., carbon tax). To some extent, a carbon tax and cap-and-trade program would produce similar effects: Both would place a price on carbon, and both are estimated to increase the price of fossil fuels, which would ultimately be borne by energy users, particularly households. In an economically efficient market with perfect information, either a price (carbon tax) or quantity control instrument (cap-and-trade system) could be designed to achieve the same outcome. Because this market ideal does not exist, preference for a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program ultimately depends on which variable one prefers to control—emissions or costs. Although there are several design mechanisms that could be included with either program that would blur the distinction, the gap between price control and quantity control can never be completely overcome. Moreover, with a set price, industry would have better information to guide investment decisions (e.g., energy efficiency improvements and/or equipment upgrades), unless the tax rate was subject to periodic adjustment to achieve GHG emission reduction goals. Economists often highlight the relative economic efficiency advantage of a carbon tax, but this advantage rests on assumptions about the expected costs and benefits of climate change mitigation, both of which contain considerable uncertainty and some controversy. Some contend that a carbon tax may provide implementation advantages, including greater transparency, reduced administrative burden, and relative ease of modification. The primary disadvantage of a carbon tax is that it would yield uncertain emissions. Some argue that the potential for irreversible climate change impacts necessitates the emissions certainty that is only available with a quantity-based instrument (e.g., cap-and-trade). Although it may present implementation challenges, policymakers could devise a tax program that yields only short-term emission fluctuations, as it progresses towards its long-term emission reduction objective. Proponents argue that short-term emission fluctuations would be preferable to price fluctuations that might be expected with a cap-and-trade system. For example, Congress could devise a cap-and-trade program that controls total costs and price volatility to some degree.

Market-based mechanisms that limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can be divided into two types: quantity control (e.g., cap-and-trade) and price control (e.g., carbon tax or fee). To some extent, a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program would produce similar effects: Both are estimated to increase the price of fossil fuels, which would ultimately be borne by consumers, particularly households. Although there are multiple tools available to policymakers that could control GHG emissions—including existing statutory authorities—this report focuses on a carbon tax approach and how it compares to its more frequently discussed counterpart: cap-and-trade. If policymakers had perfect information regarding the market, either a price (carbon tax) or quantity control (cap-and-trade system) instrument could be designed to achieve the same outcome. Because this market ideal does not exist, preference for a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program ultimately depends on which variable one wants to control—emissions or costs. Although there are several design mechanisms that could blur the distinction, the gap between price control and quantity control can never be completely overcome. A carbon tax has several potential advantages. With a fixed price ceiling on emissions (or their inputs—for example, fossil fuels), a tax approach would not cause additional volatility in energy prices. A set price would provide industry with better information to guide investment decisions: e.g., efficiency improvements, equipment upgrades. Economists often highlight a relative economic efficiency advantage of a carbon tax, but this potential advantage rests on assumptions—about the expected costs and benefits of climate change mitigation—that are uncertain and controversial. Some contend that a carbon tax may provide implementation advantages: greater transparency, reduced administrative burden, and relative ease of modification. The primary disadvantage of a carbon tax is that it would yield uncertain emission control. Some argue that the potential for irreversible climate change impacts necessitates the emissions certainty that is only available with a quantity-based instrument (e.g., cap-and-trade). Although it may present implementation challenges, policymakers could devise a tax program that allows some short-term emission fluctuations, while progressing toward a long-term emission reduction objective. Proponents argue that short-term emission fluctuations would be preferable to the price volatility that might be expected with a cap-and-trade system. Although a carbon tax could possibly face more political obstacles than a cap-and-trade program, some of these obstacles may be based on misunderstandings of the differences between the two approaches or on assumptions that the tax would be set too low to be effective. Carbon tax proponents could possibly address these issues to some degree, but there remains considerable political momentum for a cap-and-trade program.

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Background Industry observers have raised concerns about perceived gaps in food import safety over the past few years. One particular area of concern focuses on imported goods that are released into the United States market after the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) detains them under an import alert. Generally, these goods may be released into the market after an importer "provides evidence that the entry is in compliance with federal laws and regulations." Currently, the FDA does not have express statutory authority to regulate the private laboratories that sample or test these imported goods, although the FDA regulates the importer and imported products. This report focuses on proposals for FDA regulation of the private laboratories that analyze imported, FDA-regulated goods. It provides background on the relationship between the FDA and the private laboratories, as well as information about agency and Bush Administration proposals and legislative responses in the 110 th Congress (particularly the Dingell Draft, S. 2418 , H.R. 5904 , and H.R. 5827 ) to the current lack of regulation.

Industry observers have raised concerns about perceived gaps in food import safety over the past few years. One particular area of concern focuses on imported goods that are released into the United States market after the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) detains them under an import alert. Generally, these goods may be released into the market after an importer "provides evidence that the entry is in compliance with federal laws and regulations." Currently, the FDA does not have express statutory authority to regulate the private labs that test these imported goods for compliance, although the FDA has authority over the importer and imported products. This report focuses on obstacles to and legislative proposals for FDA regulation of the private laboratories that analyze imported FDA-regulated goods. It provides background to that relationship, as well as information about agency and Bush Administration proposals and legislative responses from the 110th Congress (particularly the Dingell Draft, S. 2418, H.R. 5904, and H.R. 5827) to the lack of regulation.

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Introduction Article V of the U.S. Constitution provides two alternatives for amending the nation's fundamental charter: proposal of amendments to the states by vote of two-thirds of the Members of both houses of Congress, and proposal by a convention called as a result of applications from two-thirds of the states, the "Article V Convention." From the 1960s to the 1980s, supporters of Article V Conventions mounted vigorous but ultimately unsuccessful campaigns to call conventions to consider such issues as school busing to achieve racial balance, restrictions on abortion, apportionment in state legislatures, and a balanced federal budget. Since approximately 2010, after more than 20 years of comparative inaction, the Article V Convention alternative has drawn a new generation of supporters. Advocacy groups across a broad range of the political spectrum are pushing for conventions to consider various amendments. This report provides information for Members of Congress and congressional staff on current developments in Congress, the states, and the advocacy community on the Article V Convention alternative. Two companion reports provide more exposition and analysis of this issue: CRS Report R42592, The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for Congress ; and CRS Report R42589, The Article V Convention to Propose Constitutional Amendments: Contemporary Issues for Congress . Convention advocacy groups listed below are identified in greater detail later in this report. Balanced Budget Amendment Task Force (balanced federal budget amendment) claims 28 applications, including related "legacy" applications of the 1970s and 1980s. 1742 , the "Article V Records Transparency Act of 2017," introduced in the 115 th Congress by Representative Luke Messer, would require the National Archives to make an organized compilation of all state applications for, and rescissions of applications for, an Article V Convention. Upon completion, the Archivist of the United States would transmit physical and electronic copies to the chairs of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives for public availability. This is the consideration and proposal of amendments to limit the authority of the federal government. This organization advocates an Article V Convention to propose an amendment that would reverse what it refers to as the "corporate personhood" aspects of the Supreme Court's Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission decision. Current Developments in Congress The Article V Convention issue continues to receive attention in the 115 th Congress, including (1) the aforementioned establishment of House of Representatives procedures for receipt and publication of state applications for a convention, (2) introduction of a proposed concurrent resolution to effectuate the Compact for America's Compact for a Balanced Budget, and (3) introduction of proposed legislation to authorize an official compilation by the National Archives of all Article V Convention applications received from the states. Publication of State Applications by the Clerk of the House of Representatives In the 114 th Congress, the House of Representatives established new procedures for the receipt and publication of state memorials related to the convention issue, including both applications for a convention and rescissions of previous applications. 5 , which provides rules for the House and reads as follows: Providing for Transparency With Respect to Memorials Submitted Pursuant to Article V of the Constitution of the United States.—With respect to any memorial presented under clause 3 of Rule XII purporting to be an application of the legislature of a State calling for a convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States pursuant to Article V, or a rescission of any such prior application— (1) the chair of the Committee on the Judiciary shall, in the case of such a memorial presented in the One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, and may, in the case of such a memorial presented prior to the One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, designate any such memorial for public availability by the Clerk; and (2) the Clerk shall make such memorials as are designated pursuant to paragraph (1) publicly available in electronic form, organized by State of origin and year of receipt. The Clerk's website has also recorded 21 rescissions from 20 states at the time of this writing. 115th Congress Legislative Proposals Two proposals directly related to the Article V Convention movement have been introduced to date in the 115 th Congress. H.R. 73—Compact for a Balanced Budget On July 26, 2017, Representative Luke Messer introduced H.Con.Res. Current Developments in the States In recent years, measures proposing applications for one or more of the alternative Article V Convention proposals have been introduced in many states. As noted earlier in this report, to date in 2017, three states have submitted applications for a balanced budget amendment as proposed by the BBA Task Force effort, four have joined the Convention of States Project, and one has applied for the Compact for America's Compact for a Balanced Budget.

Article V of the U.S. Constitution provides two procedures for amending the nation's fundamental charter: proposal of amendments by Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of the Members of both houses, and proposal by a convention, generally referred to as an "Article V Convention," called on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds (34) of the states. Amendments proposed by either method must be ratified by three-fourths (38) of the states in order to become part of the Constitution. This report provides information for Members of Congress and congressional staff on current developments in Congress, the states, and the relevant advocacy and policy communities concerning the Article V Convention alternative. From the 1960s to the 1980s, supporters of Article V Conventions mounted vigorous but ultimately unsuccessful campaigns to call conventions to consider amendments related to diverse issues, including school busing to achieve racial balance, abortion restrictions, apportionment in state legislatures, and, most prominently, a balanced federal budget. After more than 20 years of comparative inaction, the past decade has seen a resurgence of interest in, and support for, the Article V Convention alternative. Congress has responded to this development, particularly requests for broader public availability of state applications for a convention. In the 114th Congress (2015-2017), the House of Representatives provided for registration and public availability on the Clerk of the House's website of state memorials related to the convention issue received since the beginning of that Congress. The rules, which remain in effect for the 115th Congress, direct the chair of the Judiciary Committee to provide new convention applications and rescissions of previous applications to the Clerk for publication. They also authorize publication, at the chair's discretion, of applications for a convention previously forwarded to Congress. Relevant legislation has also been introduced in the 115th Congress. On March 27, 2017, Representative Luke Messer introduced H.R. 1742, the "Article V Records Transparency Act of 2017." This proposed legislation would direct the National Archives to make an organized compilation of all state applications and rescissions of applications for an Article V Convention currently held in its various collections. The Archives would also be directed to transmit physical and electronic copies to the Judiciary Committee chairs of the Senate and House of Representatives. One relevant constitutional amendment has also been introduced to date in the 115th Congress, H.Con.Res. 73. This measure, introduced by Representative Messer on July 26, 2017, would "effect" the Compact for America's Interstate Compact for a Balanced Budget, summon an Article V Convention, and propose the amendment approved by the convention to the states for ratification. Non-governmental advocacy groups across a broad range of the political spectrum continue to campaign for conventions to consider various amendments. Some of the issues and sponsoring organizations include a revival of the balanced budget amendment convention proposed in the 1970s-1980s (Balanced Budget Amendment Task Force); an interstate compact to call a convention and propose—and prospectively ratify—a balanced budget amendment (Compact for a Balanced Budget); an amendment or amendments to restrict the authority of the federal government (Convention of States); and an amendment to permit regulation of corporate spending in election campaigns, which is intended to nullify parts of the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (Wolf PAC). Activity continues in the states. According to one source, approximately 175 applications for one or more of the several pending Article V Convention variants have been introduced in the legislatures of 40 states to date in 2017. At the time of this writing, the Balanced Budget Amendment Task Force claims 28 applications, many of which originated in the 1970s and 1980s; the Convention of States claims 12; and the Compact for America and Wolf PAC each claim five. Two additional CRS Reports address other aspects of this issue. CRS Report R42589, The Article V Convention to Propose Constitutional Amendments: Contemporary Issues for Congress, identifies and analyzes the contemporary role of Congress in the Article V Convention process in greater detail. CRS Report R42592, The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for Congress examines the procedure's constitutional origins and history and provides an analysis of related state procedures. This report will be updated as warranted by events.

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Most observers agree that after 30 years, a comprehensive review of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is warranted. Further, there appears to be a broad consensus among observers that DOD must retain its strength while becoming considerably more agile in order to enable the United States to meet a variety of critical emerging national security challenges. Yet agreement seemingly ends there. There appears to be little consensus regarding what changes are needed within DOD and what specific direction reform ought to take. Discussions have begun to coalesce around a number of proposals, including reforming defense acquisition processes, further strengthening the Joint Staff, reducing Pentagon staffs, and better empowering the services in the "joint" arena. However, ideas vary on how, specifically, to accomplish those goals. Disagreement also exists as to whether or not reorganizing DOD alone will be sufficient. Some observers maintain that a reform of the broader interagency system on national security matters is needed. Yet there are several fundamental, first order questions that seem to be driving the current examination of DOD's structure. These include, but are not limited to the following: Why, after the expenditure of nearly $1.6 trillion and over 15 years at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, has the United States had such perceived difficulty translating tactical and operational victories into sustainable political outcomes? Why, despite the expenditure of now over $600 billion per year on defense, is the readiness of the force approaching critically low levels, according to senior military officials, while the number of platforms and capabilities being produced are generally short of perceived requirements? Why, despite tactical and operational level adaptations around the world, is DOD often seen as having difficulty formulating strategies and policies in sufficient time to adapt to and meet the increasingly dynamic threat environment of the 21 st century? No single answer exists for these questions. No one decision, no one individual, no one process led to these arguably less than desirable outcomes. Taken together, however, the issues raised by these questions suggest the systemic nature of the challenges with which the Department of Defense appears to be grappling. In other words, they suggest that DOD's organizational architecture and culture may merit serious review and analysis. Key findings included the following: The United States should undertake a broad transformation of its military and national security structures, operational concepts, and equipment, and DOD's key business processes; Transformation should go beyond operational concepts, force structures, and equipment, and should include procurement reform and changes to the support structure, including base closures; The concept of "jointness" should be extended beyond the military to the broader national security establishment (a "Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency"); The Unified Command Plan should be augmented through: The establishment of an "Americas Command," to address the challenges of homeland defense as well as those of the Western Hemisphere; The establishment of a Joint Forces Command to be the force provider to the geographic CINCs (later to be called Combatant Commands), address standardization among the various unified commands, oversee joint training and experimentation, and coordinate and integrate activities among the networked service battle labs; Elimination of U.S. Atlantic Command, subordination of Southern Command; Establishment of a Logistics Command that merges necessary support functions divided among various agencies; Assignment of the information domain to Space Command; Initiation of planning and preparedness for urban operations as a matter of priority; Enhanced defense intelligence capabilities, and in particular prioritization of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection capabilities; Reconsideration and/or redesign of the PPBS.

Thirty years after its enactment, Congress has undertaken a review of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) as well as the broader organization and structure of the contemporary Department of Defense (DOD) more broadly. Most observers agree that in principle a comprehensive review of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is warranted at this juncture. Further, a broad consensus appears to exist among observers that DOD must become considerably more agile while retaining its strength in order to enable the United States to meet a variety of critical emerging national security challenges. Agreement seemingly ends there. There appears to be little consensus on what should be changed within DOD and what specific direction reform ought to take. Discussions have begun to coalesce around a number of proposals, including reforming defense acquisition processes, further strengthening the Joint Staff, reducing Pentagon staffs, and better empowering the services in the joint arena. Ideas vary, however, on how, specifically, to achieve those outcomes. Disagreement also exists as to whether or not reorganizing DOD alone will be sufficient. Some observers maintain that a reform of the broader interagency system on national security matters is needed. Despite these disagreements, several fundamental, "first order" questions appear to be driving the current examination of DOD's structure. These include, but are not limited to the following: Why, after the expenditure of nearly $1.6 trillion and over 15 years at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, has the United States had such difficulty translating tactical and operational victories into sustainable political outcomes? Why, despite the expenditure of over $600 billion per year on defense, is the readiness of the force approaching critically low levels, according to military officials, while the number of platforms and capabilities being produced are generally short of perceived requirements? Why, despite tactical and operational adaptations around the world, is DOD often seen as having difficulty formulating strategies and policies in sufficient time to adapt to and meet the increasingly dynamic threat environment? No single answer exists for these questions. No one decision, no one individual, no one process led to these arguably less than desirable outcomes. Taken together, however, the issues raised by these questions suggest the systemic nature of the challenges with which the Department of Defense appears to be grappling. In other words, they suggest that DOD's organizational architecture and culture may merit serious review and analysis. This report is intended to assist Congress as it evaluates the variety of reform proposals currently under discussion around Washington.

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Introduction The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 ), as amended, attempts to increase access to health insurance coverage, expands federal private health insurance market requirements, and requires the creation of health insurance exchanges to provide certain individuals and small employers with access to insurance. To ensure that employers continue to provide some degree of coverage, ACA includes a "shared responsibility" provision. This provision does not explicitly mandate that an employer offer employees health insurance; instead, ACA imposes penalties on "large" employers if at least one of their full-time employees obtains a premium credit through the newly established exchange. A companion provision to the employer requirements is the ACA requirement for most individuals to maintain health insurance coverage ("individual mandate") or pay a penalty, with exceptions. These provisions are effective in 2014 according to the ACA statute. On July 2, 2013, the Obama Administration announced that it is going to delay, until 2015, enforcement and associated reporting requirements relating to potential employer penalties under ACA. This delay may have implications for the individual mandate and eligibility for tax assistance provided through the exchanges. Reporting Requirements Under ACA ACA requires the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to coordinate various information reporting requirements. Specifically, ACA enacts Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Sections 6055 and 6056 to provide this information (see Table 1 ), which will be used for determining whether: employer coverage exists and, if it does, whether it is adequate and affordable for purposes of the employer shared responsibility payments; and individuals have an offer of minimum essential coverage for purposes of the individual mandate, as well as eligibility for premium credits in the newly established exchanges. IRS Notice on Transition Relief On July 11, 2013, the IRS released Notice 2013-45, which provided greater detail on transition relief for 2014 regarding information reporting requirements for the employer shared responsibility provisions. According to the notice: This transition relief will provide additional time for input from employers and other reporting entities in an effort to simplify information reporting consistent with effective implementation of the law. One potential impact of a delay in the enforcement of potential employer penalties under ACA in 2014 may be a lower than projected number of "large" employers offering health insurance coverage. This may result in a larger than projected increase in the number of workers eligible for premium tax credits in the exchanges in 2014. The magnitude of this effect is beyond the scope of this report. CBO and JCT have not yet completed an analysis of the impact that the Administration's July 2, 2013, announcement and other recently issued final rules will have on spending and revenues under current law. 2667: Authority for Mandate Delay Act On July 11, 2013, the House of Representatives introduced H.R. The bill would delay for one year certain reporting requirements as well as penalties for certain large employers that do not offer "affordable" health insurance coverage to their employees (as affordability is defined in the Affordable Care Act, P.L. CBO and JCT's cost estimate of H.R. 2667 on July 16 reported that enacting H.R. 2667 would not affect direct spending or revenues because the bill essentially codifies the Administration's recent announcement. Therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. On July 17, 2013, the House passed H.R. 2667 .

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148), as amended, attempts to increase access to health insurance coverage, expands federal private health insurance market requirements, and requires the creation of health insurance exchanges to provide certain individuals and small employers with access to insurance. To ensure that employers continue to provide some degree of coverage, ACA includes a "shared responsibility" provision. This provision does not explicitly mandate that an employer offer employees health insurance; instead, ACA imposes penalties on "large" employers if at least one of their full-time employees obtains a premium credit through the newly established exchange. A companion provision to the employer requirements is the ACA requirement for most individuals to maintain health insurance coverage ("individual mandate") or pay a penalty, with exceptions. These provisions are effective in 2014 according to the ACA statute. ACA requires the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to coordinate various information reporting requirements. Specifically, this information will be used for determining whether employer coverage exists and, if it does, whether it is adequate and affordable for purposes of the employer shared responsibility payments; and individuals have an offer of minimum essential coverage for purposes of the individual mandate, as well as eligibility for premium credits in the newly established exchanges. On July 2, 2013, the Obama Administration announced that it is going to delay, until 2015, enforcement and associated reporting requirements relating to potential employer penalties under ACA. On July 11, 2013, the IRS released Notice 2013-45, which provided more detailed information on this transitional relief. According to the IRS notice, this transition relief will provide additional time for input from employers and other reporting entities in an effort to simplify information reporting consistent with effective implementation of the law. This delay may have implications for an individual's health insurance coverage and eligibility for tax assistance provided through the exchanges. One potential impact of a delay in the enforcement of potential employer penalties may be a lower than projected number of "large" employers offering health insurance coverage. This may result in a larger than projected increase in the number of workers eligible for premium tax credits in the exchanges in 2014 and an increase in the number of uninsured. However, while measurement of the magnitude of this effect is beyond the scope of this report, one recent study found that a delay may not have a significant effect on the employer-sponsored health insurance coverage. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) have not yet completed an analysis of the impact that the Administration's announcement and other recently issued final rules will have on spending and revenues under current law. On July 11, 2013, the House of Representatives introduced H.R. 2667: Authority for Mandate Delay Act, which would delay for one year certain reporting requirements as well as penalties for certain large employers. CBO and JCT's cost estimate of H.R. 2667 on July 16 reported that enacting H.R. 2667 would not affect direct spending or revenues because the bill essentially codifies the Administration's recent announcement. Therefore, according to CBO, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. On July 17, 2013, the House passed H.R. 2667.

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Daylight Saving Time (DST) is a period of the year between spring and fall when clocks in the United States are set one hour ahead of standard time. Currently, the following states and territories do not observe DST: Arizona, Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Section 110 of this act amended the Uniform Time Act, by changing DST to begin the second Sunday in March and end the first Sunday in November. Which Federal Agency Regulates DST in the United States?

Daylight Saving Time (DST) is a period of the year between spring and fall when clocks in the United States are set one hour ahead of standard time. DST is currently observed in the United States from 2:00 a.m. on the second Sunday in March until 2:00 a.m. on the first Sunday in November. The following states and territories do not observe DST: Arizona (except the Navajo Nation, which does observe DST), Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

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107-108 ; the Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. In the 109 th Congress, two measures, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, P.L. 109-177 , and the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, P.L. 109-178 , made significant changes to FISA. On August 22, 2002, the unclassified opinion was released to the public by Senator Leahy, Senator Grassley and Senator Specter. The FISC's May 17 th memorandum opinion and order were not appealed directly. This report will provide background on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, discuss its statutory framework, and review these two decisions. As the provisions of E.O. § 1801 et seq. This measure seeks to strike a balance between national security needs in the context of foreign intelligence gathering and privacy rights. Creation of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Court of Review FISA establishes two special courts, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (Court of Review), comprised of federal judges to address applications for court orders authorizing such electronic surveillance, physical searches, installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices, and production of tangible things. Section 1804(a) sets out what must be included in the application: (1) the identity of the Federal officer making the application; (2) the authority conferred on the Attorney General by the President of the United States and the approval of the Attorney General to make the application; (3) the identity, if known, or a description of the specific target of the electronic surveillance; (4) a statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify his belief that— (A) the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; and (B) each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (5) a statement of the proposed minimization procedures; (6) a detailed description of the nature of the information sought and the type of communications or activities to be subjected to the surveillance; (7) a certification or certifications by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or an executive branch official or officials designated by the President from among those executive officers employed in the area of national security or defense and appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate — (A) that the certifying official deems the information sought to be foreign intelligence information; (B) that a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information; (C) that such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques; (D) that designates the type of foreign intelligence information being sought according to the categories described in 1801(e) of this title; and (E) including a statement of the basis for the certification that— (i) the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence information designated; and (ii) such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques; (8) a statement of the means by which the surveillance will be effected and a statement whether physical entry is required to effect the surveillance; (9) a statement of the facts concerning all previous applications that have been made to any judge under this subchapter involving any of the persons, facilities, or places specified in the application, and the action taken on each previous application; (10) a statement of the period of time for which the electronic surveillance is required to be maintained, and if the nature of the intelligence gathering is such that the approval of the use of electronic surveillance under this subchapter should not automatically terminate when the described type of information has first been obtained, a description of facts supporting the belief that additional information of the same type will be obtained thereafter; and (11) whenever more that one electronic, mechanical or other surveillance device is to be used with respect to a particular proposed electronic surveillance, the coverage of the devices involved and what minimization procedures apply to information acquired by each device. 2338 , the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (which became P.L. 107-56 , and modified further by P.L. Although denominated "access to certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations," the reach of Section 1861, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, P.L. 108-458 , the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, created additional semiannual reporting requirements under FISA. Published Decisions of the FISC and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review The FISC Decision Summary In its May 17, 2002, decision, the FISC considered a government motion for the court "to vacate the minimization and 'wall' procedures in all cases now or ever before the Court, including this Court's adoption of the Attorney General's July 1995 intelligence sharing procedures, which are not consistent with new intelligence sharing procedures submitted for approval with this motion." In a memorandum and order written by the then Presiding Judge, U.S. District Court Judge Royce Lamberth, issued on the last day of his tenure on the FISC, and concurred in by all of the judges then sitting on the FISC, the FISC granted the Department of Justice (DOJ) motion with significant modifications to section II.B. In its first decision ever, the Court of Review, in a lengthy per curiam opinion issued on November 18, 2002, reversed and remanded the FISC orders. 107-296 , amended FISA, 50 U.S.C.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., as passed in 1978, provided a statutory framework for the use of electronic surveillance in the context of foreign intelligence gathering. In so doing, Congress sought to strike a delicate balance between national security interests and personal privacy rights. Subsequent legislation expanded federal laws dealing with foreign intelligence gathering to address physical searches, pen registers and trap and trace devices, and access to certain business records. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, made significant changes to some of these provisions. Further amendments were included in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, P.L. 107-108, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, P.L. 108-458, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, P.L. 109-177, and the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, P.L. 109-178. In addressing international terrorism or espionage, the same factual situation may be the focus of both criminal investigations and foreign intelligence collection efforts. Some of the changes in FISA under these public laws are intended, in part, to facilitate information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence elements. In its Final Report, the 9/11 Commission noted that the removal of the pre-9/11 "wall" between intelligence and law enforcement "has opened up new opportunities for cooperative action within the FBI." On May 17, 2002, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) issued a memorandum opinion and order written by the then Presiding Judge of the court, and concurred in by all of the other judges then on the court. The unclassified opinion and order were provided to the Senate Judiciary Committee in response to a letter from Senator Leahy, Senator Grassley, and Senator Specter, who released them to the public on August 22, 2002. In its decision, the FISC considered a motion by the U.S. Department of Justice "to vacate the minimization and 'wall' procedures in all cases now or ever before the Court, including this Court's adoption of the Attorney General's July 1995 intelligence sharing procedures, which are not consistent with new intelligence sharing procedures submitted for approval with this motion." The FISC granted the Department's motion, but modified part of what it saw as proposed minimization procedures. This decision was not appealed directly, but the Department of Justice did seek review of an FISC order granting as modified an application for electronic surveillance of an agent of a foreign power and for an FISC order renewing that surveillance, both subject to restrictions based on the May 17 memorandum opinion and order by the FISC. The U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review reversed and remanded the FISC orders on November 18, 2002. This report will examine the detailed statutory structure provided by FISA and related provisions of E.O. 12333, and will discuss the decisions of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. It will be updated as subsequent changes require.

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Background Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), an applicant for a federal license or permit to conduct any activity that may result in a discharge to waters of the United States must provide the federal agency with a Section 401 certification. The certification, made by the state in which the discharge originates, declares that the discharge will comply with applicable provisions of the act, including water quality standards. Stakeholder Concerns and Other Court Rulings For the most part, the debate over the Section 401 certification issue has centered on states and hydropower interests. Development and hydropower interests, on the other hand, said that it would make licensing of hydropower facilities more difficult and costly. Section 401 and Land Runoff In 1996, a federal district court in Oregon ruled that Section 401 "applies to all federally permitted activities that may result in a discharge, including discharges from nonpoint sources." Supporters said that the ruling gave states new regulatory power over federal licenses or permits that affect water quality by clarifying that Section 401 applies to nonpoint source discharges of water pollution, in addition to point source discharges. Point sources are discrete conveyances, such as pipes or ditches, from which pollutants are discharged. Following the Supreme Court's 2006 ruling in the S.D. Legislative Response Since the mid-1990s, Congress has shown interest in these issues in proposals reflecting varying perspectives, but no legislation that would modify Section 401 has been enacted. This provision in H.R. 114th Congress In the 114 th Congress, the Senate and House are considering comprehensive energy policy proposals, including legislation that some states believe could impinge on states' authority under CWA Section 401 concerning hydropower projects.

Section 401 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) requires that an applicant for a federal license or permit provide a certification that any discharges from the facility will comply with the act, including state-established water quality standard requirements. Disputes have arisen over the states' exercise of this authority in protecting water quality. For the most part, the debate over the Section 401 certification issue has been between states and hydropower interests. A 1994 Supreme Court decision, which upheld the states' authority in this area, dismayed development and hydropower interest groups. The Court revisited these issues in a 2006 ruling that unanimously upheld the authority of states to condition hydropower licenses by exercising Section 401. The dispute between states and industry groups about Section 401 authority has been a legislative issue on several occasions, but Congress has not modified the provision's scope since it was enacted in 1972. In the 114th Congress, the Senate and House are considering comprehensive energy policy proposals (H.R. 8 and S. 2012) with provisions that some states believe could impinge on states' authority under CWA Section 401 concerning hydropower projects. In addition, there has been interest in clarifying whether Section 401 certification applies to nonpoint source discharges, such as rainfall runoff, as well as point source discharges from pipes or ditches. This question was raised in lawsuits in Oregon, where a federal court twice ruled that Section 401 does not apply to nonpoint source discharges. Still, some interests continue to favor a broad reading of 401 that would apply to both nonpoint and point sources of pollutant discharges.

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In their 2018 report, the trustees project that, under their intermediate assumptions and under current law, the Federal Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund will become depleted in 2032 and the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund will do so in 2034. Although the two funds are legally separate, they are often described in combination. Although benefits would be paid in some form, it is unclear how the necessary reductions would be implemented, because the Social Security Act does not specify what would happen to benefits if a trust fund became insolvent. One option would be to pay full benefits on a delayed schedule; another would be to make timely but reduced payments. The Social Security Trust Funds How the Trust Funds Work8 Social Security's receipts and expenditures are accounted for through two legally distinct federal trust funds: the OASI trust fund and the DI trust fund. 98-21 ) increased Social Security income and reduced spending. Considered on a hypothetical combined basis, the trust funds would become insolvent in 2034. The trustees project that, under their intermediate assumptions, tax income would be sufficient to cover about 79% of scheduled benefits following insolvency of the combined trust funds in 2034, declining to 74% in 2092. Another law, the Antideficiency Act, prohibits government spending in excess of available funds. Consequently, if the Social Security trust funds become insolvent—that is, if current tax receipts and accumulated assets are not sufficient to pay the benefits to which people are entitled—the law effectively prohibits full Social Security benefits from being paid on time. Legal Entitlement to Social Security Benefits The Social Security Act states that every individual who meets program eligibility requirements is entitled to benefits. If the federal government fails to pay the benefits stipulated by law, beneficiaries could take legal action. The authorized limit in law for Social Security benefits is the balance of the trust fund. At that point, no benefits could be paid until more tax receipts were credited to the trust funds. For example, Congress could decrease Social Security benefits. If changes were made sooner, they could be smaller, since the burden of lower benefits or higher taxes would be shared by more beneficiaries or workers over a longer period. Size of Payroll Tax Rate Increases The trustees project that paying scheduled benefits after depletion in 2034 would require an increase in the combined employee and employer payroll tax rate of 3.3 percentage points, from the current 12.4% to 15.7%, after insolvency in 2034. The sooner changes are made to the program, the smaller and less abrupt the changes would need to be to maintain solvency.

Social Security's receipts and expenditures are accounted for through two federal trust funds: the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund. Under their intermediate assumptions and under current law, the Social Security trustees project that the DI trust fund will become depleted in 2032 and the OASI trust fund will become depleted in 2034. Although the two funds are legally separate, they are often considered in combination. The trustees project that the combined Social Security trust funds will become depleted in 2034. At that point, the combined trust funds would become insolvent, because incoming tax revenue would be sufficient to pay only about 79% of scheduled benefits. If a trust fund became depleted and current receipts were insufficient to cover current expenditures, there would be a conflict between two federal laws. Under the Social Security Act, beneficiaries would still be legally entitled to their full scheduled benefits. However, the Antideficiency Act prohibits government spending in excess of available funds, so the Social Security Administration (SSA) would not have legal authority to pay full Social Security benefits on time. It is unclear what specific actions SSA would take if a trust fund were insolvent. After depletion, the trust funds would continue to receive tax revenues, from which a majority of scheduled benefits could be paid. One option would be to pay full benefits on a delayed schedule; another would be to make timely but reduced payments. Social Security beneficiaries would remain legally entitled to full, timely benefits and could take legal action to claim the balance of their benefits. Maintaining financial balance after trust fund insolvency would require substantial reductions in Social Security benefits, substantial increases in tax revenues, or some combination of the two. The trustees project that following depletion of the combined funds in 2034, Congress could restore balance by reducing scheduled benefits by about 21%; the required reduction would grow gradually to 26% by 2092. Alternatively, Congress could raise the Social Security payroll tax rate from 12.4% to 15.7% following depletion in 2034, then gradually increase it to 16.7% by 2092. Trust-fund insolvency could be avoided if expenditures were reduced or receipts increased sufficiently. The sooner Congress acts to adjust Social Security policy, the less abrupt the changes would need to be, because they could be spread over a longer period and would therefore affect a larger number of workers and beneficiaries. Even if changes were not implemented immediately, enacting them sooner would give workers and beneficiaries more time to plan and adjust their work and savings behavior.

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RS21868 -- U.S.-Dominican Republic Free-Trade Agreement Updated January 3, 2005 Provisions of the Free-Trade Agreement On August 5, 2004, representatives of the United States, the Dominican Republic, and five Central American countries signed a regional free-trade agreement(DR-CAFTA) among their countries. Later, on March 15, 2004, the United States and the Dominican Republic announced that they had concludeda bilateral trade agreement that from theoutset of negotiations was intended to be integrated into (or "docked onto") CAFTA. It is uncertain when the Administration might submit implementing legislation for DR-CAFTA to the Congress.

On March 15, 2004, the United States and the Dominican Republic concluded a draftfree-trade agreement tointegrate the Dominican Republic into the earlier signed Central American Free-Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Thefinal agreement (DR-CAFTA) was signed byall parties on August 5, 2004. The Dominican Republic would have its own market access provisions, but wouldaccept the rest of the CAFTA framework. Legislation to implement DR-CAFTA might be considered in the 109th Congress. This report willbe updated as developments occur.

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Background Over the past decade, global health has become a priority in U.S. foreign policy, and U.S. appropriations for health-related efforts have more than tripled. Some observers expect the 112 th Congress to debate the appropriate funding level for ongoing global health programs, to consider ways to make U.S. global health initiatives more effective and efficient, and to encourage other players to become more engaged, particularly countries such as China and India that are receiving assistance from donors to address health challenges while their economies are undergoing considerable growth. NTDs comprise a group of 17 diseases found mostly among the poorest in 149 countries and territories, primarily in areas with unsafe water, inadequate sanitation, and limited health services. Prevalence The best available estimates indicate that some 2 billion people are at risk of contracting an NTD, of whom more than 1 billion people are afflicted with one or more NTD. Roughly 534,000 are killed by an NTD annually ( Table 1 ). The near eradication of dracunculiasis (guinea worm disease) is one of the most profound cases. The NTD Program continues to be an important part of U.S. global health assistance under the Obama Administration. The President requested $155 million for the NTD Program in FY2011. It costs less than $2 annually to treat each person who needs to be treated for the seven most common NTDs that account for roughly 90% of all illnesses in this group. Also, HIV treatments must be taken daily, while treatments for the seven most common NTDs are usually taken once or twice annually. In that fiscal year, U.S. support for NTDs amounted to less than 1% of the total global health budget. Supporters of expanding the definition also point to the threat some of these diseases could pose to the United States, particularly Chagas disease and dengue. Advocates of a concentrated approach, particularly on the seven most common NTDs, argue that these diseases should be eliminated or eradicated first to build momentum in sustained global health efforts. Other NTDs, like dengue and buruli ulcer, have no known cure. Some proponents call for boosting U.S. funding for consortiums such as the Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR) and the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DND i ), which have played a critical role in identifying innovative NTD tools. Final Discussion As noted, neglected tropical diseases are diseases that primarily plague the poorest people in the poorest parts of the world. Changes in the environment and population flows, however, make industrialized countries, including the United States, vulnerable to some NTDs as well. Some observers are concerned that mosquitoes capable of spreading dengue fever are gradually spreading across the United States, particularly since there is no vaccine or treatment against this disease. While blood centers are now required to test for Chagas, some health experts surmise that several cases remain undiagnosed in the United States and that Chagas stands as an undetected cause of heart disease and stroke. In addition, travelers from industrialized countries are increasingly contracting NTDs like schistosomiasis while engaged in eco-tourism and other travel "off the beaten track." These cases are usually identified once tourists develop severe, acute infection or other unusual problems.

Over the past decade, global health has become a priority in U.S. foreign policy, and U.S. funding for related efforts has more than tripled. Neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), an important focus of U.S. global health assistance, may come under scrutiny as the 112th Congress debates spending levels for ongoing global health programs. NTDs are a group of 17 diseases that are found primarily among the poorest people in 149 countries and territories. Estimates indicate that some 2 billion people are at risk of contracting an NTD, of whom more than 1 billion people are afflicted with one or more. Roughly 534,000 people are believed to be killed by an NTD annually. Although these diseases are concentrated among the world's poor, population shifts and climate change increase the vulnerability of the United States to some of these diseases, particularly Chagas disease and dengue. While blood centers test for Chagas, some health experts believe that several cases remain undiagnosed in the United States and that Chagas stands as an undetected cause of heart disease and stroke. Some observers are concerned about scientists' expectations that mosquitoes capable of spreading dengue fever are gradually spreading across the United States, particularly because no vaccine or treatment exists for this disease. In addition, travelers from industrialized countries are increasingly contracting NTDs such as schistosomiasis while engaged in tourism. These cases are usually identified once tourists develop severe, acute infection or other unusual problems. Proponents support funding research on and treatment for NTDs because it is a cost-effective way of making a significant health impact. Roughly 90% of all NTDs are easy to treat with drugs that cost less than $2 per dose and need to be taken only once or twice annually. This means that all people at risk of contracting an NTD worldwide can be treated for less than $2 billion over the next five years. With consistent treatment and control, several NTDs are being eliminated in various parts of the world, especially in Latin America, and guinea worm disease is on the cusp of eradication, meaning there is no risk of contracting the disease. Some groups argue that the United States should increase funding for NTD programs to improve global health and advance domestic capacity to detect NTD cases that may arise, particularly for diseases like dengue and Chagas. Other groups maintain that countries like Brazil, China, and India that have received support for eliminating NTDs should play a greater role in addressing the health challenge, particularly as their own economies exhibit strong growth. The 112th Congress may debate funding much of the President's FY2011 budget, which includes $155 million for the NTD Program, as well as upcoming FY2012 budget levels. The 112th Congress will likely weigh calls for greater spending on NTDs with other challenges, such as streamlining foreign and global health assistance to make them more effective and efficient, particularly in light of efforts to reduce federal spending. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted to the President alone. Other appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate via the nomination and confirmation of appointees. This report identifies, for the 112 th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions. A pair of tables presents information for each agency in this report. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Appointments During the 112th Congress During the 112 th Congress, President Barack Obama submitted 34 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these nominations, 27 were confirmed, 6 were returned to the President, and 1 was withdrawn. The President made one recess appointment during this period to a position in organizations covered in this report. For each nomination covered by this report and confirmed in the 112 th Congress, the report provides the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). The median number of days elapsed was 112.0.

The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted to the President alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate. This report identifies all nominations that were submitted to the Senate for full-time positions in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other reports. Information for each agency is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each independent agency. Additional summary information across all agencies covered in the report appears in the appendix. During the 112th Congress, the President submitted 34 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these 34 nominations, 27 were confirmed, 1 was withdrawn, and 6 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 142.7 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 112.0. The President made one recess appointment to a full-time position in an independent agency during the 112th Congress. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2012 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions). This report will not be updated.

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Background Organic farming, as defined in the final rule establishing the U.S Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Organic Program (NOP), is "a production system that is managed in accordance with the [Organic Foods Production] Act and regulations ... to respond to site-specific conditions by integrating cultural, biological, and mechanical practices that foster cycling of resources, promote ecological balance, and conserve biodiversity." The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 Congress passed the Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA) of 1990 (Title 21 of P.L. 101-624 , the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990; the 1990 farm bill) with widespread support from organic industry groups, the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, and other farm and consumer groups. After October 21, 2002, all products sold as organic had to be in compliance with the regulations and carry the "USDA Organic" seal. Others, notably some of the newer entrants into the organic market, are concerned lest the regulations become so prescriptive that they deprive producers and processors of the opportunity to benefit from the expanding market for organic products. Critics of the NOP are expressing their concern that as more time passes without a final rule, additional large feedlot dairy operations are being certified organic in possible violation of the OFPA. On October 24, 2008, USDA published its proposed rule to amend the NOP livestock standards to clarify the role pasture plays in the production of organic ruminants. Major Organic Provisions in the 2002 Farm Bill Cost-Sharing Start-Up Costs Although the OFPA requires the cost of the National Organic Program to be fully supported by user fees collected for USDA accreditation and certification services, Congress has appropriated funds on several occasions to help the program in its initial stages. Title X of the farm act gave USDA authority to continue to defray the costs of producers and handlers seeking organic certification through FY2007, and authorized a one-time, mandatory transfer of $5 million from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to establish a national organic certification cost-share program under the NOP. Other provisions in the research title (1) require ERS to gather and maintain segregated data on the production and marketing of organic agriculture; and (2) require ERS and the National Agricultural Library to make it easier for U.S. organic producers, researchers, and extension professionals to obtain the results of organic research conducted in foreign countries. Organic Agriculture in the 2008 Farm Bill Title X of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. Certification Cost-Sharing The 2008 farm bill reauthorizes the National Organic Certification Cost-share Program and provides a one-time transfer of $22 million in mandatory funds to support it. The bill provides a total of $78 million in mandatory funds for the initiative in FY2009-FY2012, and also authorizes $25 million annually in appropriations. House and Senate appropriators will determine the actual funding available.

Congress passed the Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA) in 1990 as part of a larger law governing U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs from 1990 through 1996 ( P.L. 101-624 , the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990). The act authorized the creation of a National Organic Program (NOP) within USDA to establish standards for producers and processors of organic foods, and permit such operations to label their products with a "USDA Organic" seal after being officially certified by USDA-accredited agents. The purpose of the program, which was implemented in October 2002, is to give consumers confidence in the legitimacy of products sold as organic, permit legal action against those who use the term fraudulently, increase the supply and variety of available organic products, and facilitate international trade in organic products. Policy issues affecting the National Organic Program since implementation largely reflect the differences in interpretation among stakeholders of the language and intent of OFPA and the actual operation of the program under the final rule. The NOP was challenged in 2003 by a lawsuit claiming that many of the regulations were more lenient than the original statute permitted. Although the issues around the lawsuit were ultimately resolved, partly by court-ordered rulemaking and partly by an amendment to the OFPA that was attached to the FY2006 appropriations bill, new issues concerning program operation continue to arise. One of these relates to USDA's efforts to write a new regulation governing access to pasture for organic dairy cows (and other ruminants). Tight supplies of certain organic commodities, particularly dairy products, and the entry into the market of major grocery retailers wanting to sell organic foods are adding pressure to this debate. Critics charge that large organic dairy operations are not abiding by the intent of OFPA by feeding organic grain to cows in feedlots, and that the principle of grazing is central to consumers' concept of organic milk. Supporters of existing regulations point to the need for flexibility in order to maintain an organic dairy sector that can meet growing demand. USDA published its proposed rules on October 24, 2008. The new omnibus law that will govern USDA programs and policies through FY2012 contains several provisions affecting organic agriculture and the NOP ( H.R. 2419 / P.L. 110-246 ; the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008). The law provides $22 million in mandatory funds to continue a cost-share program to help farmers obtain organic certification; $5 million in mandatory funds and $25 million in authority for appropriated funds over five years to support the collection and analysis of organic production and marketing data; and $78 million in mandatory funds over four years to support the organic agriculture research and extension initiative. This report will be revised as events warrant.

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Introduction The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit available to eligible workers earning relatively low wages. The EITC, enacted more than 40 years ago, has evolved from a relatively modest tax benefit to a significant antipoverty program. As the credit has expanded and changed over time, researchers have evaluated various aspects of the credit, including how the EITC affects recipients' decision to start working (and number of hours they work); how the credit affects poverty rates; and difficulties that taxpayers have with complying with the credit's rules. This report reviews current economic research on the EITC. An understanding of the economic impacts of the credit, as well as its limitations and potential drawbacks, may inform future legislative modifications of the EITC or the structure of other social benefits provided in the tax code. In addition, the work-bonus plan was seen as a way to help reduce increasing payroll tax burdens. Unlike the expansion of the credit for workers with children, the main rationale for this "childless EITC" was not poverty reduction. Instead the credit was intended to partly offset a gasoline tax increase included in OBRA93. Another study found that 34% of the increase in employment among single mothers between 1993 and 1999 was due to legislative expansions of the EITC. For example, a single childless worker working full time at a minimum wage job (40 hours a week, 50 weeks a year) would receive a $59 credit in 2018. The EITC has had a significant impact on reducing poverty among recipients with children, but little impact among childless individuals. Finally, the EITC has increased inequity in the tax code between those with and without children. In addition, as illustrated in Figure 3 , the EITC results in a relatively small reduction in poverty rates among childless workers in comparison to workers with children. Among unmarried households with three children, CRS estimates 40.5% are poor without the EITC, falling to an estimated 32.3% when the EITC is included, a 20.5% reduction. While the EITC was not designed as a health or education benefit, current research suggests that it may improve the health and educational achievement of low-income populations. One concern with the EITC is that its complex rules and formulas make it difficult for taxpayers to comply with and difficult for the Internal Revenue Service to administer. Studies indicate that EITC errors by taxpayers (whether intentional or unintentional) result in a relatively high proportion of EITC payments being issued incorrectly. The IRS estimates that in FY2017, between $14.9 billion and $17.6 billion in EITC payments (i.e., between 21.9% and 25.8% of payments) were issued improperly. Concluding Remarks When initially enacted in the 1970s, there were two major purposes of the EITC. First, the credit was meant to encourage the nonworking poor (only those with children) to enter the workforce and be more self-sufficient. Second, the credit was intended to help reduce the tax burdens of working poor families with children. Some policymakers at the time worried that payroll taxes would reduce poor families' take home pay to such an extent that they would need to rely on cash welfare. In the 1990s, the purposes of the credit were expanded to include poverty reduction, with a focus on encouraging welfare recipients—generally unmarried mothers—to work. Research on the EITC suggests that the EITC has generally achieved many policymakers' original goals: It has encouraged single mothers to enter the workforce and it has reduced poverty among families with children.

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit available to eligible workers earning relatively low wages. The EITC, enacted more than 40 years ago, has evolved from a relatively modest tax benefit to a significant antipoverty program. This report reviews economic research on the EITC. Understanding the economic impact of the credit, as well as its limitations and potential drawbacks, may inform future legislative discussions of the EITC and other refundable tax credits. When initially enacted in the 1970s, there were two major purposes of the EITC. First, the credit was meant to encourage the nonworking poor with children to enter the workforce. Second, the credit was intended to help reduce the tax burdens of working poor families with children. Some policymakers at the time worried that taxes—especially payroll taxes—would reduce poor families' take-home pay to such an extent that they would need to rely on cash welfare. In the 1990s, the purpose of the credit was expanded to include poverty reduction, with a focus on encouraging welfare recipients—generally unmarried mothers—to work. At the time, the EITC was seen as a way to ensure that a full-time worker with children would not be in poverty. As the credit has expanded and changed over time, researchers have evaluated various aspects of the credit, including the following: Decisions About Working: The EITC has encouraged single mothers to enter the workforce, but generally has had little to no impact on the number of hours they work. For example, one study found that 34% of the increase in employment among single mothers between 1993 and 1999 was due to legislative expansions of the EITC. Poverty: The EITC has had a significant impact on reducing poverty among recipients with children, but little impact among childless individuals. For example, CRS analysis indicates that the EITC reduces the proportion of unmarried childless workers in poverty from 19.9% to 19.6% (a 1.5% reduction). In comparison, the EITC reduces the proportion of unmarried households with three children in poverty from 40.5% to 32.3% (a 20.2% reduction). Health and Education Outcomes: Although the EITC was not designed as a health or education benefit, current research suggests that it may improve the health and educational achievement of low-income populations. Fairness: The EITC has increased inequity in the tax code between those with and without children. The unequal benefit the credit provides to families with children in comparison to those without is largely due to the different objectives of the credit for these two populations. For workers with children who work full time at a minimum wage job, the EITC was intended to ensure that the family would not be in poverty. In contrast, the smaller childless EITC was designed to help childless workers offset a gas tax increase, and not intended to lift them out of poverty. Complex Rules: The EITC's complex rules and formulas may make it difficult for taxpayers to comply with and difficult for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to administer. Studies indicate that EITC errors (whether intentional or unintentional) result in a relatively high proportion of EITC payments being issued incorrectly. The IRS estimates that between $14.9 billion and $17.6 billion in EITC payments (i.e., between 21.9% and 25.8% of payments) were issued improperly in FY2017. The majority of the dollar amount of these errors is due to taxpayers incorrectly claiming children for the credit. In addition, the IRS may have difficulty ensuring that tax filers are in compliance with all the parameters of the EITC.

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Workers' Compensation in the United States Workers' compensation provides cash and medical benefits to workers who are injured or become ill in the course of their employment and benefits to the survivors of workers killed on the job. Benefits are provided without regard to fault and are the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries, illnesses, and deaths. Employers are responsible for providing workers' compensation benefits to their workers and generally purchase insurance to cover these costs. The Grand Bargain Workers' compensation is often referred to as a grand bargain between workers and employers. In exchange for this coverage, employees are prohibited from suing their employers for workplace injuries, illnesses, and deaths. Employers are protected from lawsuits but must pay defined benefits in all cases, regardless of fault, liability, or defense. The LHWCA has been extended several times to cover other groups of private-sector workers. Coordination with Social Security A worker may receive disability benefits under both workers' compensation and the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program. There is no federal mandate that states have workers' compensation laws and no federal standards for workers' compensation systems. With the general duty clause, Congress established that every employer has an affirmative responsibility to provide a safe workplace to its workers, thus reinforcing the basic tenet of workers' compensation that employers are responsible for the injuries, illnesses, and deaths of their employees, regardless of fault. Beginning January 1, 1975, states would have been required to operate workers' compensation systems with the following elements: compulsory coverage of all employees, including coverage for occupational illnesses equivalent to the coverage provided by the federal black lung benefits program; no duration or monetary limit on total disability benefits paid; no duration or monetary limit on medical or rehabilitation benefits; total disability benefits paid at two-thirds of the worker's pre-disability wage, with maximum benefits increasing to 200% of the state's average wage by January 1, 1978, and minimum benefits of at least 50% of the state's average wage, with annual adjustments to benefits to reflect growth in the state's average wage; survivors benefits payable to a spouse for life or until two-years after remarriage and to children until the age of 18 or 23 if enrolled in higher education or for life if disabled; a waiting period of no more than three days with retroactive benefits paid after no more than 14 days of benefit duration; maintenance of a SIF; reconsideration of denials of benefits made prior to the enactment of the federal standards; the right of workers to select the initial treating physician from a list maintained by the state workers' compensation agency, with the state agency having oversight of medical care and the right to order necessary changes to care; a three-year statute of limitation on claims beginning with when the worker knew or should have known that his or her condition was related to his or her employment; state regulation of attorney's fees; compromise and release settlements must be approved by the state workers' compensation agency; employee choice of state system if work involved more than more state; measures to ensure payment of benefits in case of employer or insurer insolvency. Noncompulsory Workers' Compensation in Texas In Texas, employers may opt-out of the workers' compensation system and employers who chose not to participate in workers' compensation are termed "nonsubscribers." Unlike the Texas noncompulsory system, in Oklahoma, an employer who opted-out of workers' compensation by providing an approved alternative benefit plan retained its protection from lawsuits for employment-related injuries, illnesses, and deaths.

Workers' compensation provides cash and medical benefits to workers who are injured or become ill in the course of their employment and provides benefits to the survivors of workers killed on the job. Benefits are provided without regard to fault and are the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries, illnesses, and deaths. Nearly all workers in the United States are covered by workers' compensation. With the exception of federal employees and some small groups of private-sector employees covered by federal law, workers compensation is provided by a network of state programs. In general, employers purchase insurance to provide for workers' compensation benefits. Workers' compensation has been called a grand bargain between employers and workers that developed at the beginning of the 20th century in response to dissatisfaction with the tort system as a method of compensating workers for occupational injuries, illnesses, and deaths. Under this grand bargain, workers receive guaranteed, no-fault benefits for injuries, illnesses, and deaths, but forfeit their rights to sue their employers. Employers receive protection from lawsuits but must provide benefits regardless of fault. Recently, concerns have been raised over what some allege are cuts to state workers' compensation benefits or policy changes that make it harder for workers to receive benefits. These cuts and policy changes may be shifting some of the costs associated with workplace injuries, illnesses, and deaths away from the employer and to the employee or social programs, such as Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Medicare. There is no federal requirement for states to have workers' compensation systems and no minimum federal standards for state systems. The decentralized nature of workers' compensation led to unsuccessful calls for minimum state standards in the early 1970s and has caused concerns over benefit equity among the states today. In 2013, Oklahoma joined Texas in making its workers' compensation system noncompulsory. Unlike in Texas, Oklahoma employers were permitted to opt-out of workers' compensation by offering alternative benefits to employees and keep their protection from lawsuits, whereas Texas employers are exposed to legal liability in the event of employee injury when employers opt-out of worker's compensation. In 2016, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the state's noncompulsory workers' compensation system violated the state's constitution.

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Introduction Congress annually considers several appropriations measures, which provide discretionary funding for numerous activities—such as national defense, education, and homeland security—as well as general government operations. These measures are considered by Congress under certain rules and practices, referred to as the congressional appropriations process . This report discusses the following aspects of this process: The annual appropriations cycle, The relationship between authorization and appropriation measures, Types of appropriations measures, Budget enforcement for appropriations measures, and Rescissions. The President is required to submit the annual budget on or before the first Monday in February. The CBA establishes April 15 as the target date for congressional adoption of the budget resolution. The act also prohibits both House and Senate floor consideration of appropriations measures for the upcoming fiscal year before Congress completes the budget resolution and, in the Senate, before the Senate Appropriations Committee receives its spending ceilings. Consideration by the full House and Senate may continue through the fall. Amendments to general appropriations bills are governed by a variety of requirements: House standing rules and precedents that establish several requirements applicable to all types of measures, such as requiring amendments to be germane to the bill; House standing rules and precedents that establish a separation between appropriations and other legislation; Separate orders establishing certain requirements, such as those requiring a "spending reduction account" section in each regular appropriations bill and limiting permissible amendments to that section ; Spending limits imposed by the congressional budget process (see " Allocations and Other Limits on Appropriations Associated with the Budget Resolution " below); and Provisions of a special rule or unanimous consent agreement providing for consideration of a particular appropriations bill. These points of order are not self-enforcing. These measures perform different functions. Authorization acts establish, continue, or modify agencies or programs. In general, during a calendar year, Congress may consider: 12 regular appropriations bills for the fiscal year that begins on October 1 (often referred to as the budget year) to provide the annual funding for the agencies, projects, and activities funded therein; one or more continuing resolutions for that same fiscal year; and one or more supplemental appropriations measures for the current fiscal year. Budget Enforcement for Appropriations Measures Budget enforcement for appropriations measures under the congressional budget process has both statutory and procedural elements. The statutory elements are derived from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), which imposes limits on discretionary spending each fiscal year through FY2021. The procedural elements of budget enforcement generally stem from requirements under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (CBA) that are normally associated with the budget resolution. Through this CBA process, the Appropriations Committee in each chamber, as well as each of their subcommittees, receives a procedural limit on the total amount of budget authority for the upcoming fiscal year. The timing of this calculation, which is to occur many months prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, is intended to allow time for congressional consideration of appropriations measures that comply with the revised limits. Discretionary spending is controlled by appropriations acts, which are under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. Emergency Spending In the House and Senate, discretionary appropriations may be designated or otherwise provided so that they are effectively exempt from the budget enforcement limits. Rescissions Rescissions are provisions of law that cancel previously enacted budget authority. As budget authority providing the funding must be enacted into law, so too a rescission cancelling the budget authority must be enacted into law. Rescissions can be included either in separate rescission measures or any of the three types of appropriations measures.

Congress annually considers several appropriations measures, which provide discretionary funding for numerous activities—for example, national defense, education, and homeland security—as well as general government operations. Congress has developed certain rules and practices for the consideration of appropriations measures, referred to as the congressional appropriations process. The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of this process. Appropriations measures are under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. In recent years these measures have provided approximately 35% to 39% of total federal spending. The remainder of federal spending comprises direct (or mandatory) spending, controlled by House and Senate legislative committees, and net interest on the public debt. The annual appropriations cycle is initiated with the President's budget submission, which is due on the first Monday in February. This is followed by congressional consideration of a budget resolution that, in part, sets spending ceilings for the upcoming fiscal year. The target date for completion of the budget resolution is April 15. Committee and floor consideration of the annual appropriations bills occurs during the spring and summer months and may continue through the fall and winter until annual appropriations are enacted. Floor consideration of appropriations measures is subject to procedural rules that may limit the content of those measures and any amendments thereto. Congress has established a process that provides for two separate types of measures associated with discretionary spending: authorization bills and appropriation bills. These measures perform different functions. Authorization bills establish, continue, or modify agencies or programs. Appropriations measures subsequently provide funding for the agencies and programs authorized. There are three types of appropriations measures. Regular appropriations bills provide most of the funding that is provided in all appropriations measures for a fiscal year and must be enacted by October 1, the beginning of the fiscal year. If regular bills are not enacted by the beginning of the new fiscal year, Congress adopts continuing resolutions to continue funding, generally until regular bills are enacted. Supplemental appropriations bills provide additional appropriations to become available during a fiscal year. Budget enforcement for appropriations measures under the congressional budget process has both statutory and procedural elements. The statutory elements are derived from the Budget Control Act of 2011, which imposes limits on discretionary spending for each of the fiscal years between FY2012 and FY2021. The procedural elements generally stem from requirements under the Congressional Budget Act that are normally associated with the budget resolution. Through this Budget Act process, the Appropriations Committee in each chamber, as well as each of their subcommittees, receives procedural limits on the total amount of budget authority for the upcoming fiscal year (referred to as 302(a) and 302(b) allocations). Enforcement of the statutory limits occurs primarily through sequestration, while enforcement of the procedural limits occurs through points of order. Discretionary appropriations may be designated or otherwise provided so that they are effectively exempt from statutory and procedural budget enforcement. Such designations include "emergency requirements," "overseas contingency operations/global war on terrorism," and for "disaster relief." Rescissions are provisions of law that cancel previously enacted budget authority. As budget authority providing the funding must be enacted into law, so too a rescission cancelling the budget authority must be enacted into law. Rescissions can be included either in separate rescission measures or any of the three types of appropriations measures.

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Introduction On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. 111-148 , ACA). 111-152 , the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA). Throughout this report, this amended version is referred to as ACA. However, in general, ACA did not make any significant changes to the Department of Defense (DOD) TRICARE program or to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care system. Moreover, many have sought clarification as to whether certain provisions in ACA, such as a mandate for most individuals to have health insurance, or extending dependent coverage up to age 26, would apply to TRICARE and VA health care beneficiaries. To address some of these concerns, Congress has introduced and/or enacted legislation. Questions and Answers How Does ACA Affect TRICARE? The TRICARE Affirmation Act ( H.R. 4887 ; P.L. 111-159 ), signed into law on April 26, 2010, amended the Internal Revenue Code to provide that TRICARE coverage satisfies the minimum essential coverage requirements as required by ACA. Likewise, P.L. 111-173 , signed into law on May 27, 2010, clarifies that those enrolled in the VA health care system meet the minimum essential coverage requirement. It was initially unclear whether the Spina Bifida Health Care Program (SBHCP) and the Children of Women Vietnam Veterans Health Care Program (CWVV) met the "minimum essential coverage" requirement under ACA. However, P.L. Subsequent to the passage of the ACA, however, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 ( P.L. The ACA provision amended the Public Health Service Act to include a Section 2714 that provides: A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage that provides dependent coverage of children shall continue to make such coverage available for an adult child (who is not married) until the child turns 26 years of age. This requirement relating to coverage of adult children took effect for the plan years beginning on or after September 23, 2010. In the 113 th Congress, the CHAMPVA Children's Protection Act of 2013 ( H.R. 288 ) and a similar measure ( S. 325 ) have been introduced. Section 1781(c) to extend eligibility for coverage of children under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs (CHAMPVA) until they reach age 26 so that eligibility for coverage of children under CHAMPVA will be consistent with certain private sector coverage under the Affordable Care Act.

The 111th Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148; ACA), which was later amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152; HCERA), and is hereinafter referred to as ACA. In general, ACA did not make any significant changes to the Department of Defense (DOD) TRICARE program or to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care system. However, many have sought clarification as to whether certain provisions in ACA, such as a mandate for most individuals to have health insurance, or extending dependent coverage up to age 26, would apply to TRICARE and VA health care beneficiaries. To address some of these concerns, Congress has introduced and/or enacted legislation. The TRICARE Affirmation Act (P.L. 111-159), signed into law on April 26, 2010, affirms that TRICARE satisfies the minimum essential coverage requirement in ACA. Similarly, P.L. 111-173, signed into law on May 27, 2010, clarifies that the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs (CHAMPVA), Spina Bifida Health Care Program, and the Children of Women Vietnam Veterans Health Care Program meet the "minimum essential coverage" requirement under ACA. TRICARE coverage of children was extended to age 26 by the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (P.L. 111-383). ACA requires that if a health insurance plan provides for dependent coverage of children, the plan must continue to make such coverage available for an adult child until age 26. This requirement relating to coverage of adult children took effect for the plan years beginning on or after September 23, 2010. Under ACA, both married and unmarried children qualify for this coverage. The authorizing statute for CHAMPVA currently does not conform to this ACA requirement. Furthermore, although the TRICARE authorizing statute has been amended to provide for coverage of children until age 26, the coverage provided by the new legislation differs from that required by ACA in some important ways. To address CHAMPVA's nonconformance with ACA's requirements, the CHAMPVA Children's Protection Act (H.R. 288) and a similar measure (S. 325) have been introduced in the 113th Congress. This report addresses key questions concerning how ACA affects TRICARE and VA health care.

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Introduction Both House and Senate bills competing to become the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 contain a subtitle addressing issues related to detainees at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ("Guantanamo"), and more broadly, hostilities against Al Qaeda and other entities. H.R. On December 1, 2011, the Senate passed S. 1867 , as amended. 1540 , with the Senate bill's provisions inserted in place of the original language. The White House has been critical of aspects of each bill, and has threatened to veto any legislation "that challenges or constrains the President's critical authorities to collect intelligence, incapacitate dangerous terrorists, and protect the Nation." In particular, the Administration has expressed strong opposition to any provision which mandates the military detention of certain categories of persons, limits executive discretion as to the appropriate forum to prosecute terrorist suspects, or constrains its ability to transfer detainees from U.S. custody. This report offers a brief background of the salient issues, provides a section-by-section analysis of the relevant subdivisions of the House- and Senate-passed bills, and compares the bills' approach with respect to the major issues they address. Background At the heart of both houses' detainee provisions appears to be an effort to confirm or, as some observers view it, expand the detention authority Congress implicitly granted the President in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In enacting the Authorization for Use of Military Force ( P.L. 1540 , as passed by the House of Representatives on May 26, 2011, contains provisions that would reaffirm the conflict and define its scope; impose specific restrictions on the transfer of any non-citizen wartime detainee into the United States; establish stringent conditions upon the transfer or release of any Guantanamo detainee to a foreign country; and require that any foreign national who has engaged in an offense related to a terrorist attack be tried by military commission if jurisdiction exists. S. 1253 , as reported out of the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 22, 2011, would have authorized the detention of certain categories of persons and require the military detention of a subset of them; regulated status determinations for persons held pursuant to the AUMF, regardless of location; regulated periodic review proceedings concerning the continued detention of Guantanamo detainees; and made permanent the current funding restrictions that relate to Guantanamo detainee transfers to foreign countries. After the White House and the chairs of the Senate Judiciary and Intelligence Committees objected to some of these provisions, Senate Majority Leader Reid delayed consideration of the bill pending a resolution of the detainee issues. The Senate Armed Services Committee reported a new version of the bill, S. 1867 , on November 15, 2011, with revised detainee provisions. Differences between the House- and Senate-passed versions of the bill will be considered in conference. 112-55 ), prohibit the transfer of Guantanamo detainees into the United States for any purpose, including criminal prosecution. A single amendment was made to the detainee provisions of the bill as had been reported out of committee, which clarified that the bill's affirmation of the legal authority to detain persons captured in the conflict with Al Qaeda did not modify any existing authorities relating to the power to detain U.S. citizens or lawful resident aliens, or any other persons captured or arrested in the United States. The Senate subsequently passed H.R. Unlike H.R.

The House and Senate bills competing to become the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 contain a subtitle addressing issues related to detainees at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and more broadly, hostilities against Al Qaeda and other entities. At the heart of both bills' detainee provisions appears to be an effort to confirm or, as some observers view it, expand the detention authority that Congress implicitly granted the President via the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40) in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. H.R. 1540, as passed by the House of Representatives on May 26, 2011, contains provisions that would reaffirm the conflict and define its scope; impose specific restrictions on the transfer of any non-citizen wartime detainee into the United States; place stringent conditions on the transfer or release of any Guantanamo detainee to a foreign country; and require that any foreign national who has engaged in an offense related to a terrorist attack be tried by military commission if jurisdiction exists. In June, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its initial version of the bill, S. 1253, which included many provisions similar to the House bill, but also included a provision requiring the military detention of certain terrorist suspects. Consideration of the bill was delayed after the the White House and the chairs of other Senate committees objected to some of the provisions. The Senate Armed Services Committee reported a second version of the authorization bill, addressing some, but not all of the concerns. The new bill, S. 1867, would authorize the detention of certain categories of persons and require the military detention of a subset of them; regulate status determinations for persons held pursuant to the AUMF, regardless of location; regulate periodic review proceedings concerning the continued detention of Guantanamo detainees; and continue current funding restrictions that relate to Guantanamo detainee transfers to foreign countries. Unlike the House bill, the Senate bill would not bar the transfer of detainees into the United States for trial or perhaps for other purposes. On December 1, 2011, the Senate passed S. 1867. During floor debate, significant attention centered on the extent to which the bill and existing law permit the military detention of U.S. citizens believed to be enemy belligerents. A single amendment was made to the detainee provisions to clarify that the bill's affirmation of detention authority under the AUMF was not intended to affect any existing authorities relating to the detention of U.S. citizens or lawful resident aliens, or any other persons captured or arrested in the United States. The Senate subsequently passed H.R. 1540, with the Senate bill's language inserted in place of the original provisions. Differences between the House- and Senate-passed versions of the bill will be considered in conference. The White House has been critical of aspects of each bill, and has threatened to veto any legislation "that challenges or constrains the President's critical authorities to collect intelligence, incapacitate dangerous terrorists, and protect the Nation." In particular, the Administration has expressed strong opposition to any provision which mandates the military detention of certain categories of persons, limits executive discretion as to the appropriate forum to prosecute terrorist suspects, or constrains its ability to transfer detainees from U.S. custody. This report offers a brief background of the salient issues raised by H.R. 1540 and S. 1867 regarding detention matters, provides a section-by-section analysis of the relevant subdivision of each bill, and compares the bills' approaches with respect to the major issues they address.

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Introduction Spending programs and tax expenditures are the two primary ways that the federal government provides benefits to the public. Though each type of intervention increases net budget deficits, differences in the budget process, saliency, and targeting of each may have ramifications for usage across different types of services. This report briefly describes spending programs and tax expenditures, observes a few ways that they differ, and discusses how those distinctions may inform the relative use of each type of intervention across the government portfolio. Description Spending Federal expenditures (or spending) are transfers from the federal government to individuals, firms, or institutions that do not draw directly from individual or corporate tax liability. Federal spending programs fall into three broad categories: (1) discretionary spending, (2) mandatory spending, and (3) net interest payments. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that federal spending will total $3.897 trillion in FY2016, or 21.1% of annual gross domestic product (GDP). Tax Expenditures Tax expenditures are revenue losses attributable to federal tax provisions. There are three main types of tax expenditures: (1) exclusions, exemptions, and deductions from gross personal or corporate income; (2) preferential tax rates for certain programs; and (3) refundable and nonrefundable tax credits. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates the revenue losses attributable to certain programs. Tax expenditures were projected to increase net deficits in FY2016 by $1.521 trillion, or 8.2% of GDP. These factors may have implications for the relative usage of spending programs and tax expenditures in meeting certain policy objectives. Budget Outcomes Holding other activities constant, increases in resources devoted to spending programs and tax expenditures lead to increases in net budget deficits—spending programs through increases in federal outlays, and tax expenditures through reductions in federal receipts. Mandatory spending programs are legislated outside of the appropriations process. The ease and ability to complete this process may differ across spending and tax expenditure programs. The mechanisms for targeting and enforcement implemented by spending programs are dependent on context. Tax Expenditures The adoption of tax expenditure programs may be restricted by the use of income tax returns to allocate benefits. Usage by Budget Function The following tables identify the largest spending and tax expenditure programs in eight categories of federal activity: (1) defense and international affairs; (2) general science, space and technology, natural resources and the environment, and agriculture; (3) commerce and housing, community and regional development, and transportation; (4) education, training, employment, and social services; (5) health, including Medicare; (6) income security; (7) Social Security and veterans' benefits; and (8) administration of justice and general governance.

Spending programs and tax expenditures are the two primary ways that the federal government provides benefits to the public. Though each type of intervention represents a transfer from the government to individuals and firms, differences in the budget process, saliency, and targeting may have ramifications for usage across different types of services. This report briefly describes spending programs and tax expenditures, observes a few ways that they differ, and discusses how those distinctions may inform the relative use of each policy across the government portfolio. Federal expenditures (spending) are transfers from the federal government to individuals, firms, or institutions that do not draw directly from individual or corporate tax liability. Federal spending programs fall into three broad categories: (1) discretionary spending, (2) mandatory spending, and (3) net interest payments. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that federal resources devoted to spending programs will total $3.897 trillion in FY2016, or 21.1% of annual gross domestic product (GDP). Tax expenditures are revenue losses attributable to federal tax provisions. There are three main types of tax expenditures: (1) exclusions, exemptions, and deductions from gross personal or corporate income; (2) preferential tax rates for certain programs; and (3) refundable and nonrefundable tax credits. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates the revenue losses attributable to certain programs. As of December 2015, projected revenue losses due to tax expenditures in FY2016 summed to $1.521 trillion, or 8.2% of GDP. Holding other activities constant, an increase in spending programs or tax expenditures will increase net budget deficits. However, differences in the characteristics and composition of spending and tax expenditures may have implications for the way each is used across major sectors of the federal budget. Federal spending programs may be better able to target groups that are unlikely to file federal tax returns, like low-income and elderly households. Tax expenditures may be more likely than spending programs to utilize targeting and enforcement services already undertaken by the federal government. Other differences important to federal usage occur within certain types of federal spending and tax expenditures. Discretionary spending and, in some cases, expiring tax expenditures typically involve more frequent legislative action than mandatory spending and permanent tax expenditure programs. Discretionary spending programs also provide increased budget certainty to Congress through the use of budget authority, while mandatory spending and tax expenditure resources depend on the participation and benefit choices of program recipients. This report identifies the largest spending and tax expenditures across eight major categories of federal activity: (1) defense and international affairs; (2) general science, space and technology, natural resources and the environment, and agriculture; (3) commerce and housing, community and regional development, and transportation; (4) education, training, employment, and social services; (5) health, including Medicare; (6) income security; (7) Social Security and veterans' benefits; and (8) administration of justice and general governance.

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Background1 On December 23, 2008, a military junta calling itself the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) seized power in Guinea following the death of longtime President Lansana Conté. The CNDD dissolved the constitution and legislature, appointed a civilian prime minister, and promised to hold presidential and legislative elections. On December 3, 2009, Dadis Camara was shot and wounded in the head by a member of his presidential guard. He was evacuated to Morocco for medical treatment. The declaration stated that Konaté would assume executive powers as "Interim President" and form a government of national unity. Recent legislation includes H.Res. 1013 (Ros-Lehtinen), a bill condemning the violent suppression of legitimate political dissent and gross human rights abuses in the Republic of Guinea, introduced January 13, 2010, and passed by the House on January 20, 2010; and S.Res. 345 (Boxer), a resolution deploring the rape and assault of women in Guinea and the killing of political protesters on September 28, 2009, introduced on November 9, 2009, and agreed to in the Senate on February 22, 2010. Doré, the former spokesman for the Forces Vives coalition, was named prime minister on January 19. Issues for U.S. Policy While the United States has expressed support for the transitional government, restrictions on some forms of U.S. assistance to Guinea remain in place, as do targeted travel restrictions against certain CNDD members, other Guinean officials, and key associates. As electoral preparations advance, a number of issues will confront U.S. policy-makers. These include the status of bilateral relations; the monitoring of progress toward elections; U.S. policy toward a potential International Criminal Court investigation of alleged CNDD human rights abuses; and potential U.S. support for security sector reform. Bilateral Relations with the Transitional Government U.S. relations with the unity government, underpinned by support for the Ouagadougou declaration and Konaté's transitional leadership, represent a significant shift from U.S. policy toward the government led by Dadis Camara. Progress Toward Elections Presidential elections are scheduled for June 27, 2010. However, the formation of a transitional government has not altered the underlying causes of Guinea's recent instability, and the months leading up to planned elections could prove decisive to Guinea's future trajectory and that of the sub-region.

A "government of national unity" was formed in Guinea on January 15, 2010, a year after a military junta, the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD), took power in a coup d'état. While the CNDD has not been dissolved, it has agreed to share power with civilian opposition groups in the lead-up to presidential elections, scheduled for June 27, 2010. Defense Minister Sekouba Konate has assumed executive power as interim president, while opposition spokesman Jean-Marie Dore was named prime minister. The formation of a unity government followed six weeks of political uncertainty after CNDD President Capt. Moussa Dadis Camara was shot in December 2009 by a member of his personal guard and evacuated for medical treatment. The appointment of the unity government has temporarily stemmed international concerns over political instability in Guinea and its potential spillover into fragile neighboring countries, such as Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. However, concerns remain over the political will to hold elections, impunity and disorder among the security forces, and the potential for "spoilers" to disrupt Guinea's long-awaited transition to civilian rule. The United States, which had been highly critical of Dadis Camara's erratic leadership, has expressed support for Guinea's transitional government. At the same time, certain restrictions on U.S. bilateral assistance and targeted travel restrictions against CNDD members and others remain in place. As electoral preparations advance, a number of issues will confront U.S. policy. These include U.S. relations with the Guinean government; the status of U.S. assistance and travel restrictions on CNDD members; the monitoring of progress toward elections; U.S. policy toward a potential International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation of alleged CNDD human rights abuses; and potential U.S. support for security sector reform in Guinea. The 111th Congress continues to monitor events in Guinea and the potential for regional destabilization. Recent legislation includes H.Res. 1013 (Ros-Lehtinen), a bill condemning the violent suppression of legitimate political dissent and gross human rights abuses in the Republic of Guinea, introduced on January 13, 2010, and passed by the House on January 20, 2010; and S.Res. 345 (Boxer), a resolution deploring the rape and assault of women in Guinea and the killing of political protesters on September 28, 2009, introduced on November 9, 2009, and passed by the Senate on February 22, 2010. For further background on Guinea and issues for U.S. policy, see CRS Report R40703, Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

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Introduction Since the mid-1980s, many decision makers and others have demonstrated serious interest in deploying ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems capable of defending the United States from ballistic missile attack. In fact, efforts to counter ballistic missiles have been underway since the dawn of the missile age at the close of World War II. Since 1985, the United States has spent more than $120 billion on a range of BMD efforts. This short report provides a brief overview of the history of the BMD efforts undertaken to defend the United States. It begins with a brief summary of the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which shaped most of the history of the U.S. BMD effort, and includes a short review of U.S. programs leading to the current program. Throughout this period, Congress tendered strong support for the ABM Treaty. National Missile Defense Acquisition President George W. Bush entered office prepared to advance long-range BMD deployment as a key national security objective. Russian opposition has been strong, and European support is mixed.

For some time now, ballistic missile defense (BMD) has been a key national security priority, even though such interest has been ongoing since the end of World War II. Many current BMD technologies date their start to the 1980s, and even earlier. This effort has been challenging technically and politically controversial. For a 25-year review of the major BMD technology thrust, see CRS Report RL33240, Kinetic Energy Kill for Ballistic Missile Defense: A Status Overview , by [author name scrubbed]. More than $120 billion has been spent on a range of BMD programs since the mid-1980s; Congress appropriated $9.4 billion for FY2007 and $9.9 billion for FY2008. This report provides a brief overview of U.S. BMD efforts to date. It may be updated periodically.

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For M2,or any other measure of money to be used as an intermediate target, it must be either directly or indirectly under the control of the Fed. However, they do not have direct control over that supply. Although the conditions under which a measure of money serves as an informational variable are less demanding than in its role as an intermediate target variable (e.g., it does not have to be under the control of the Fed) its usefulness in providing information diminishes in the absence of a close relationship between it and, for example, aggregate spending. These notions can be formalized in terms of a simple equation. Economists have taken several approaches to this task. Its velocity must be stable and predictable . What such a collection of assets would be was not to be determined by logic. Nevertheless, in their studies, M2 was stable and predictably related to nominal GDP. While the Board continued to set growth rate ranges for each aggregate, it concluded in that report: With considerable uncertainty persisting about the relationship of the monetary aggregates to spending, the behavior of the aggregates relative to their annual ranges will be of limited use in guiding policy ... and the Federal Reserve will continue to utilize a broad range of financial and economic indicators in assessing its policy stance. It involved redefining M2, redefining the opportunity cost of M2, accounting for changes in the institutional setting determining M2 velocity, and factoring in any number of changes essentially of a one time nature to account for the resolution of the thrift and banking crisis of the mid-1980s. Rule-Based Monetary Policy and the Money Supply Suppose that a measure of money is shown to be stable and predictably related to money spending and that the Federal Reserve can, by manipulating bank reserves, control this measure of money on a timely basis. How should it conduct monetary policy? What happens if this monetary theory of business cycles is not true? Of importance is the cause of cyclical instability. The reason for using interest rates in these roles is that they are an important channel by which changes in monetary policy cause changes in spending. However, the interest rates suggested by economic theory as relevant are not the rates used by the Fed. Movements in interest rates must be read with great care if they are to provide any information about monetary policy. Consequences of Ambiguous Indicators for the Conduct of Monetary Policy It is now widely accepted that monetary policy is a powerful tool in the short run for affecting the pace of economic activity and employment and, over the longer run, the rate of inflation. With monetary aggregates that convey little information about monetary policy and interest rates that can be equally devoid of information, those exercising oversight are left in the position of having to rely heavily on the nation's central banker as the conduit of information about and judgments on the policy that he or she is responsible for formulating and executing. Moreover, without unambiguous indicators of monetary policy, those formulating policy are more likely to rely on current developments in the economy in making their decisions on what policy should be even though the effects of that policy may be felt at some distant time, perhaps as long as two years in the future. Trying to explain what these effects have been and how to adjust to them has been part of a large and ongoing research effort involving the specification of new monetary aggregates, new measures of opportunity cost and risk, and new measures of total spending. U.S. government 2. Households. 25, No. "Do Monetary Aggregates Help Forecast Inflation?" "Monetary Aggregates and Monetary Policy in the 21 st Century." "Can Monetary Models be Fixed?"

Economic theory and history make a compelling case that monetary policy is powerful in affecting the pace of economic activity and employment in the short run and the rate of inflation in the longer run. Thus, unambiguous indicators should exist for those formulating, executing, and overseeing monetary policy. To this end, definitions of money are sought, as are collections of assets consistent with those definitions. For these measures of money—known as monetary aggregates—to be useful in a policy context, they must, at a minimum, be stable and predictably related to spending, meaning that when they are changed, the subsequent change in spending can be closely predicted. If they meet that test they can provide information about the current stance of monetary policy. Should they be under the control of the Federal Reserve (Fed), they may be useful as intermediate target variables in the execution of monetary policy. The monetary aggregates constructed by the Fed are no longer stable and predictably related to spending, although they once may have been. A vast number of studies have sought to explain the reason for this sudden instability. Their findings highlighted efforts by financial institutions to get around federal regulations, structural changes related to economic development, the use of U.S. currency abroad, and a number of one-time events such as the thrift crisis of the mid-1980s. Accounting for these developments led to refinements of the existing aggregates, development of new aggregates, and new measures of opportunity costs. At most, this research suggests that the refined old and new aggregates can provide useful information about future income growth, employment, and inflation. Several of the aggregates, however, do not seem to be under the control of the Fed. Were monetary aggregates to exist that were stable and predictably related to spending and under the control of the Fed, their use in the conduct of monetary policy would likely be controversial. Some economists, who see monetary instability as the major cause of business cycles, favor a rule-based policy of increasing the aggregates at a fixed percentage per year. Others, with different notions of the causes of cyclical instability, tend to favor a discretionary approach to policy and monetary fine tuning. If ideal monetary aggregates do not exist or are not under the control of the Fed if they do exist, monetary policy can be formulated and executed in terms of interest rates. However, the relevant interest rates for household and business spending decisions are the real or inflation-adjusted rates. These rates can be affected by actions of others in the economy in addition to the Fed and by developments abroad. Thus, their movements may provide little information about monetary policy. The oversight of monetary policy is handicapped by a lack of reliable, objective, and unambiguous monetary indicators. This leads to the unhealthy situation in which those responsible for overseeing monetary policy must rely heavily on the Fed to provide them with an assessment of policy, which may hinder an arms length assessment. This report will be updated.

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What are the costs of trade expansion? While it is debatable how well existing worker assistance policies have worked, funding is also a long-standing issue. (The effect of globalization on U.S. trade flows are discussed in the section on U.S. trade performance.) A trade deficit occurs when a country's imports are greater than its exports. The most significant cause of the U.S. trade deficit is the low rate of U.S. domestic savings relative to its investment needs. This would lower the U.S. trade deficit with the first country and increase it with the other, and the overall U.S. trade deficit would be relatively unchanged. In reducing the U.S. trade deficit, the policy tool kit includes direct measures (trade policy) that are aimed at imports, exports, and the exchange rate, and indirect measures (monetary and fiscal policies) aimed at U.S. interest rates, saving rates, budget deficits, and capital flows. Formulation of U.S. Trade Policy Role of Congress 29 . Role of the Executive Branch 34 . Who is in charge of U.S. trade policy ? Congress created the USTR in 1962 (originally as the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations) to heighten the profile of trade and provide better balance between competing domestic and international interests in the formulation and implementation of U.S. trade policy and negotiations, which were previously managed by the U.S. Department of State. The formal role of the private sector in the formulation of U.S. trade policy is embodied in a three-tiered committee system that Congress has provided in Section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. Private sector organizations also lobby Congress and the executive branch to promote their interests in U.S. trade policy actions and agreements. U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Issues Trade Negotiations and Agreements 44 . The United States negotiates trade liberalizing agreements for economic and commercial reasons, including to encourage foreign trade partners to reduce or eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers and, in so doing, increase market access for U.S. exporters; gain an advantage for U.S. exporters over foreign competitors in a third-country market; increase access to lower cost imports that help to control inflation and offer domestic and industrial consumers a wider choice of products; and encourage trading partners, especially developing countries, to rationalize their trade regimes, and thereby improve the efficiency of their economies. In general, reciprocal trade agreements can be categorized by the number of countries involved: bilateral agreements , such as free trade agreements (FTAs), are between two countries; regional agreements , such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), involve three or more countries in a geographic region; plurilateral agreements involve a number of countries (not always from the same region) that often negotiate to liberalize trade in a specific sector, such as the proposed Trade in Services Agreement (TISA); and multilateral agreements , such as those negotiated in the World Trade Organization (WTO), cover a significant share of global trade. The United States is currently negotiating a number of FTAs, including the TPP, involving the United States and 11 other countries in the Asia-Pacific region; and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) between the United States and the European Union. For the home country, direct investment benefits the individual firms that invest abroad, because they are better able to exploit their existing competitive advantages and to acquire additional skills and advantages. CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy , by [author name scrubbed]. List of Questions Trade Concepts 1. What are the costs of trade expansion? How important is trade to the U.S. economy? What are other benefits of imports? Investment Issues 68. What are some of the benefits of FDI?

Congress plays a major role in U.S. trade policy through its legislative and oversight authority. There are a number of major trade issues that are currently the focus of Congress. For example, bills were introduced in the 113th Congress to reauthorize Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and legislative action on these issues could be forthcoming in the 114th Congress. Additionally, Congress has been involved with proposed free trade agreements (FTAs), including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) involving the United States and 11 other countries and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union (EU). Also of interest to Congress are current plurilateral negotiations for a Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) and an updated multilateral Information Technology Agreement (ITA) in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Trade and investment policies of major U.S. trading partners (such as China), especially when they are deemed harmful to U.S. economic interests, are also of continued concern to Congress. Recent improved U.S. relations with Cuba have resulted in the introduction of several bills to boost bilateral commercial ties. The costs and benefits of trade to the U.S. economy, firms, workers, and constituents, and the future direction of U.S. trade policy, are the subject of ongoing debates in Congress. This report provides information and context for these and many other trade topics. It is intended to assist Members and staff who may be new to trade issues. The report is divided into four sections in a question-and-answer format: trade concepts; U.S. trade performance; formulation of U.S. trade policy; and trade and investment issues. Additional suggested readings are provided in an appendix. The first section, "Trade Concepts," deals with why countries trade, the consequences of trade expansion, and the relationship between globalization and trade. Key questions address the benefits of specialization in production and trade, efforts by governments to influence a country's comparative advantage, how trade expansion can be costly and disruptive to workers in some industries, and some unique characteristics of trade between developed countries. The second section, "U.S. Trade Performance," lists data on U.S. trade flows and focuses on the U.S. trade deficit, including its implications for the U.S. economy. Questions address the causes of trade deficits, the role of foreign trade barriers, and how the trade deficit might be reduced. The third section, "Formulation of U.S. Trade Policy," deals with the roles played by the executive branch, Congress, the private sector, and the judiciary in the formulation of U.S. trade policy. Information on how trade policy functions are organized in Congress and the executive branch, as well as the respective roles of individual Members and the President, is provided. The roles of the private sector and the judiciary are also discussed. The fourth section, "U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Issues," lists questions related to trade negotiations and agreements and to imports, exports, and investments. The justification, types, and consequences of trade liberalization agreements, along with the role of the WTO, are treated in this section. The costs and benefits of imports, exports, and investments are also discussed, including how the government deals with disruption and injury to workers and companies caused by imports and its efforts to both restrict and promote exports. The motivations and consequences of foreign direct investment flows are also discussed.

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Introduction In the midst of national concern over the opioid epidemic and the large number of prescription opioid overdose deaths in the United States, federal and state officials are paying greater attention to the manner in which opioids are prescribed. Most prescription drugs that are misused are originally prescribed by a physician (rather than, for example, being stolen from pharmacies); therefore, attention has been directed toward preventing the diversion of prescription drugs after the prescriptions are dispensed. Prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) maintain statewide electronic databases of dispensed prescriptions for controlled substances. Possible uses of PDMPs include identifying or preventing drug abuse and diversion; facilitating the identification of prescription drug-addicted individuals and appropriate intervention and treatment; outlining use and abuse trends to inform public health initiatives; and educating individuals about prescription drug use, abuse, and diversion. As of February 2018, 50 states, the District of Columbia, and two territories (Guam and Puerto Rico) had operational PDMPs within their borders. Each state also determines which entities dispensing prescriptions for controlled substances are required to submit data to the PDMP. Interstate Information Sharing and Interoperability State PDMPs vary widely with respect to whether or how information contained in the database is shared with other states. The overarching finding was that costs vary widely, with program startup costs ranging from $450,000 to over $1.5 million. PDMP financing often involves monies from the state general fund, prescriber and pharmacy licensing fees, state controlled substance registration fees, health insurers' fees, direct-support organizations, state or federal grants, or a combination thereof. The author concluded that PDMPs reduce "doctor shopping," change prescribing behavior, and reduce prescription drug abuse. Another potential unintended consequence of a state PDMP is that it may push drug diversion activities over the border into a neighboring state. Federal Programs that Support State PDMPs The federal government supports state PDMPs through programs at the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Health and Human Services (HHS). Since FY2002, DOJ has administered the Harold Rogers Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, and in FY2017, DOJ incorporated this grant program into the new Comprehensive Opioid Abuse Program. HHS programs include the National All Schedules Prescription Electronic Reporting (NASPER), State Demonstration Grants for Comprehensive Opioid Abuse Response, Opioid Prevention in States grants, and various pilots and initiatives under the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC). NASPER grants were last funded in FY2010. 2. Selected Policy Issues Role of PDMPs in Federal Efforts to Address Prescription Drug Abuse In 2011, in response to the "epidemic" of prescription drug abuse, the Obama Administration released an action plan. Specific actions offered included working with states to establish effective PDMPs by encouraging research on PDMP effectiveness and means to improve PDMP effectiveness; supporting the NASPER reauthorization; ensuring that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are authorized to share patient information with state PDMPs; encouraging federally funded health care programs to provide controlled substance prescription information to the state PDMPs (in states where they operate health care facilities or pharmacies); exploring the feasibility of reimbursing prescribers for checking PDMPs before writing controlled substance prescriptions to patients covered under insurance plans; evaluating programs that require certain doctor shoppers or drug abusing individuals to use one doctor and one pharmacy; evaluating the potential for state PDMPs to reduce Medicare and Medicaid fraud; issuing a final rule from DEA on electronic prescribing of controlled substances; increasing the use of "Screening, Brief Intervention, and Referral to Treatment" programs to identify and prevent prescription drug abuse; identifying how health information technologies can enhance prescription drug information; testing the usefulness of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's surveillance system to generate measures of prescription drug abuse; assessing the use of the Drug Abuse Warning Network to better understand prescription drug abuse at the community level; expanding DOJ's efforts to enhance interstate PDMP interoperability, particularly though the PMIX program; and evaluating existing databases with information on prescription drug access, use, misuse, and toxicity to improve their utility and as new sources of data. Balancing Stakeholder Concerns While establishment and enhancement of PDMPs (such as interstate data sharing and real-time data access) enjoy broad support, some stakeholders express concerns about health care versus law enforcement uses of PDMP data, particularly with regard to protection of personally identifiable health information. Federal Role in Interstate Information Sharing and Interoperability Federal policymakers have repeatedly emphasized the importance of enhancing interstate information sharing and the interoperability of state systems. In November 2017, a presidential commission recommended, among other things, that the Trump Administration support legislation to require DOJ to fund a "data-sharing hub" and require states receiving federal grant funds to share PDMP data.

In the midst of national concern over the opioid epidemic, federal and state officials are paying greater attention to the manner in which opioids are prescribed. Nearly all prescription drugs involved in overdoses are originally prescribed by a physician (rather than, for example, being stolen from pharmacies). Thus, attention has been directed toward better understanding how opioids are being prescribed and preventing the diversion of prescription drugs after the prescriptions are dispensed. Prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) maintain statewide electronic databases of prescriptions dispensed for controlled substances (i.e., prescription drugs with a potential for abuse that are subject to stricter government regulation). Information collected by PDMPs may be used to educate and inform prescribers, pharmacists, and the public; identify or prevent drug abuse and diversion; facilitate the identification of prescription drug-addicted individuals and enable intervention and treatment; outline drug use and abuse trends to inform public health initiatives; or educate individuals about prescription drug use, abuse, diversion, and PDMPs themselves. As of February 2018, 50 states, the District of Columbia, and two territories (Guam and Puerto Rico) had operational PDMPs within their borders. How PDMPs are organized and operated varies among states. Each state determines which agency houses the PDMP; which controlled substances must be reported; which types of dispensers (e.g., pharmacies) are required to submit data; how often data are collected; who may access information in the PDMP database (e.g., prescribers, dispensers, or law enforcement); the circumstances under which the information may (or must) be accessed; and what enforcement mechanisms are in place for noncompliance. PDMP costs may vary widely, with startup costs that can range as high as $450,000 to over $1.5 million and annual operating costs ranging from $125,000 to nearly $1.0 million. States finance PDMPs using monies from a variety of sources including the state general fund, prescriber and pharmacy licensing fees, state controlled substance registration fees, health insurers' fees, direct-support organizations, state grants, and/or federal grants. The federal government supports state PDMPs through programs at the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Health and Human Services (HHS). Since FY2002, DOJ has administered the Harold Rogers Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, and in FY2017, DOJ incorporated this grant program into the new Comprehensive Opioid Abuse Program. HHS programs include National All Schedules Prescription Electronic Reporting (NASPER), State Demonstration Grants for Comprehensive Opioid Abuse Response, Opioid Prevention in States grants, State Targeted Response to the Opioid Crisis Grants, and various pilots and initiatives under the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC). Of note, NASPER last received appropriations (of $2.0 million) in FY2010. State PDMPs vary with respect to whether or how information contained in the database is shared with other states. Federal policymakers have repeatedly emphasized the importance of enhancing interstate information sharing and the interoperability of state PDMPs. In 2011, the Obama Administration included efforts to increase interstate data sharing in its action plan to counter prescription drug abuse. In 2017, a presidential commission recommended, among other things, that the Trump Administration support legislation to require DOJ to fund a "data-sharing hub" and require states receiving federal grant funds to share PDMP data. The available evidence suggests that PDMPs can be effective in reducing the time required for drug diversion investigations, changing prescribing behavior, reducing "doctor shopping," and reducing prescription drug abuse. Assessments of effectiveness should also take into consideration potential unintended consequences of PDMPs, such as limiting access to medications for legitimate use or pushing drug diversion activities over the border into a neighboring state. Experts suggest that PDMP effectiveness might be improved by increasing the timeliness, completeness, consistency, and accessibility of the data. Policy issues that might come before Congress include the role of state PDMPs in federal efforts to combat prescription drug abuse, the role of the federal government in interstate data-sharing and interoperability, and the possible link between the crackdown on prescription drug abuse and the uptick in illicit opioid (e.g., heroin and illicit fentanyl) abuse. While establishment and enhancement of PDMPs enjoy relatively broad support, stakeholders express concerns about health care versus law enforcement uses of PDMP data (particularly with regard to protection of personally identifiable health information).

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Introduction The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) regulations include requirements for certain facilities to prevent, prepare for, and respond to discharges of oil and oil products—defined broadly—that may reach U.S. navigable waters or adjoining shorelines. In recent years, the SPCC program has received considerable interest from Congress. Most of this interest has involved the SPCC program's applicability to farms. Because farms may store oil onsite for agricultural equipment use, they may be subject to the SPCC regulations if the oil storage capacity exceeds regulatory thresholds. SPCC Regulations—Background Statutory Authority The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1970 included a provision directing the President to promulgate oil spill prevention and response regulations. Among other obligations, SPCC regulations require secondary containment (e.g., dikes or berms) for certain oil-storage units. EPA made changes and clarifications to the SPCC regulations in 2002. For most types of facilities subject to SPCC requirements, the deadline for complying with the changes made in 2002 was November 10, 2011. However, a subsequent EPA rulemaking extended this compliance date for farms to May 10, 2013. The applicability of SPCC regulations to farms garnered considerable attention in recent Congresses. WRRDA 2014 On June 10, 2014, the President signed the Water Resources Reform and Development Act (WRRDA) of 2014 ( P.L. 113-121 ). Section 1048 of the act altered the applicability of the SPCC to farms. Selected changes include the following: Farms with an aggregate aboveground storage capacity of less than 2,500 gallons are not subject to SPCC regulations (compared to 1,320 gallons for other facilities); Farms with an aggregate aboveground storage capacity of less than 6,000 gallons (or a to-be-determined lower threshold, discussed below) and no reportable discharge history are not subject to SPCC regulations; Farms with an aggregate aboveground storage capacity of less than 20,000 gallons (the prior threshold was 10,000 gallons), no individual storage tank greater than 10,000 gallons, and no reportable discharge history may self-certify their SPCC plan in lieu of hiring a professional engineer for certification; and Farms can exclude oil containers on separate parcels with capacities less than 1,000 gallons when determining aggregate storage capacity. WRRDA directed EPA to determine whether the interim 6,000 gallon threshold (mentioned above) should be decreased (to not less than 2,500 gallons) based on a significant risk of an oil discharge to water. EPA released the SPCC threshold study in June 2015. According to the regulatory agenda, EPA was scheduled to release a proposed rule regarding this change in August 2016, with a final rule scheduled for December 2016. As of the date of this report, EPA has not published a proposed rule. WIIN 2016 On December 16, 2016, the President signed the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN, P.L. 114-322 ). WIIN provisions build upon the changes made in WRRDA 2014. In particular, the SPCC regulations would not apply to farm containers on separate parcels with (1) an individual storage capacity of 1,000 gallons or less, and (2) an aggregate storage capacity of 2,500 gallons or less. Under WRRDA, smaller containers (i.e., 1,000 gallons or less) would not be counted toward an aggregate storage capacity, but these containers were still subject to any relevant SPCC regulations. Pursuant to the above WIIN provision, smaller containers would not be counted toward a farm's aggregate storage capacity or covered by SPCC regulations even if the farm's aggregate storage capacity breached regulatory thresholds.

In 1970, Congress enacted legislation directing the President to promulgate oil spill prevention and response regulations. President Nixon delegated this presidential authority to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970. In 1973, EPA issued Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) regulations that require certain facilities to prevent, prepare for, and respond to oil discharges that may reach navigable waters of the United States or adjoining shorelines. In general, a facility must prepare an SPCC plan if the facility has an aboveground aggregate oil storage capacity greater than 1,320 gallons or a completely buried oil storage capacity greater than 42,000 gallons. Among other obligations, SPCC regulations require secondary containment (e.g., dikes or berms) for certain oil-storage units. A licensed professional engineer must certify the plan, although some facilities—depending on storage capacity and spill history—may be able to self-certify. In recent years, the SPCC regulations have received considerable interest from Congress. Most of this interest has involved the applicability of SPCC regulations to farms, which may be subject to the SPCC regulations for oil stored onsite for agricultural equipment use. Farms account for approximately 25% of SPCC regulated entities, second only to oil and gas production facilities. In 2002, EPA issued a final rule that made changes and clarifications to its SPCC regulations. For most types of facilities subject to SPCC requirements, the compliance deadline was November 10, 2011. However, EPA extended this compliance date for farms to May 10, 2013. The 2013 compliance date generated considerable attention in the 113th Congress. On June 10, 2014, the President signed the Water Resources Reform and Development Act (WRRDA) of 2014 (P.L. 113-121). The act altered the applicability of the SPCC regulations to farms. Two key changes include 1. farms with an aggregate aboveground oil storage capacity less than 2,500 gallons are not subject to SPCC regulations; and 2. farms with an aggregate aboveground oil storage capacity less than 6,000 gallons (or an alternate threshold determined by EPA) and no reportable discharge history are not subject to SPCC regulations. WRRDA directed EPA to conduct a study to determine whether the interim 6,000 gallon threshold should be decreased (to not less than 2,500 gallons) based on a significant risk of an oil discharge to water. In June 2015, EPA concluded that the appropriate threshold should be 2,500 gallons instead of 6,000 gallons. According to the regulatory agenda, EPA was scheduled to release a proposed rule regarding this change in August 2016, with a final rule scheduled for December 2016. As of the date of this report, EPA has not published a proposed rule. On December 16, 2016, the President signed the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN, P.L. 114-322). WIIN provisions build upon the changes made in WRRDA. In particular, the SPCC regulations would not apply to farm containers on separate parcels with (1) an individual storage capacity of 1,000 gallons or less, and (2) an aggregate storage capacity of 2,500 gallons or less. Under WRRDA, smaller containers (i.e., 1,000 gallons or less) would not be counted toward an aggregate storage capacity, but these containers were still subject to any relevant SPCC regulations. Pursuant to the WIIN provision, smaller containers would not be counted toward a farm's aggregate storage capacity or covered by SPCC regulations even if the farm's aggregate storage capacity breached regulatory thresholds.

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Introduction U.S. laws provide a variety of avenues for U.S. industries, including agricultural producers, to seek relief when they believe they have been injured by the effects of trade. The use of trade remedies has grown along with increased U.S. involvement in trade agreements. Trade relief is viewed as a cushion against the potentially negative impacts of trade liberalization on import-sensitive products – a number of them agricultural – thus helping to build broader political support for trade agreements. U.S. trade remedy laws generally reflect and are subject to international trade rules, notably those under the World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral agreements and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). On the other hand, when such U.S. laws are applied in conformity with the international trade rules, WTO and NAFTA dispute settlement procedures can serve to validate and strengthen any U.S. actions taken. Some prominent examples where segments of U.S. agriculture have formally sought import relief in recent years include cattle imports from Canada and Mexico; wheat imports from Canada; lamb meat imports primarily from Australia and New Zealand; wheat gluten from Europe; and apple juice and honey from China, among others. Types of Trade Remedies and Trade Relief Currently, federal law provides for four primary trade remedies. Three address import concerns: safeguards (or escape clause), antidumping duties (AD), and countervailing duties (CVD). The fourth, commonly called Section 301, is the principal tool to challenge unfair foreign trade practices that affect U.S. commerce generally, including exports to other countries. Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers Several proposals have been offered to extend trade adjustment assistance (TAA) to farmers. Other possible costs of trade remedies are the extent, if any, to which they might sustain economically inefficient U.S. producers, heighten international trade tensions, and/or increase government outlays. Trade remedy laws already have come under scrutiny and challenge by the United States' major trading partners, and by the WTO itself. Some foreign governments might suggest that this position is inconsistent with the U.S. opposition to examining anti-dumping practices. Still, U.S. producers are likely to resist changes in U.S. law, and possibly to push for stronger protections, so long as they perceive foreign competitors engaging in unfair subsidization of their own agricultural producers.

U.S. laws provide a variety of avenues for U.S. industries, including agricultural producers, to seek relief when they believe they have been by injured by imports or unfair trade practices. Currently, federal law provides for four primary trade remedies. Three of these – safeguards, countervailing duties, and anti-dumping duties – address concerns about the impacts of competing imports. The fourth remedy, commonly called Section 301, is the principal tool to challenge (under dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements where applicable) unfair foreign trade practices that affect U.S. commerce generally, including exports to other countries. Recent examples of prominent agricultural import cases concern cattle from Mexico and Canada; wheat from Canada; lamb meat from Australia and New Zealand; wheat gluten from the European Union; and apple juice and honey from China. The use of trade remedies has grown along with increased U.S. involvement in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. The availability of trade remedies is viewed as a cushion against the potentially negative impacts of trade liberalization on import-sensitive products – a number of them agricultural – thus helping to build broader political support for trade agreements. On the other hand, trade remedies also can have costs, to the extent that they raise import prices for U.S. consumers and processors, sustain economically inefficient U.S. producers, heighten international trade tensions, and/or increase government outlays. A range of bills have been introduced in recent Congresses, including the 107th, to change various trade remedy laws, mostly with the objective of increasing the likelihood that domestic industries will prevail when they seek such assistance. Other bills propose tools for helping U.S. industries cope with import competition – such as extending trade adjustment assistance to farmers. Current U.S. trade remedy laws already have come under scrutiny and challenge by the United States' major trading partners. Over the next few years, the World Trade Organization will be involved in negotiations aimed at clarifying the antidumping and subsidies agreements. U.S. officials point out that these negotiations are premised on preserving the "basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of these Agreements and the instruments and objectives." Some U.S. trading partners suggest that this position is inconsistent with past U.S. opposition to discussions that examine anti-dumping practices with a possible view toward revision. Still, U.S. agricultural producers are likely to resist changes in U.S. law, and possibly to push for stronger protections, so long as they perceive foreign competitors are engaging in unfair subsidization of their own agricultural producers.

crs_98-938

crs_98-938_0

Introduction In each of the past four fiscal years, Congress has directed the Administration to reduce the size of the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition workforce—the DOD employees who participate in the development and procurement of weapons and equipment for the military services. These mandates to reduce the size of the DOD acquisition workforce reflected Congress' view that the workforce has not been downsized enough—that reductions continue to lag in proportion to the decline in the size of the overall defense budget, in general, and the acquisition portion of the defense budget, in particular. Over the past three years, as Congress and the Administration have debated the future of the defense acquisition workforce, policymakers have sought to answer the basic question: What, precisely, is the DOD acquisition workforce? How many people are in it, where in DOD are they located, and what, exactly, are their functions? Defining the Defense Acquisition Workforce There is no commonly accepted definition of the DOD acquisition workforce. Jefferson Solutions issued its report in September 1997. The study revealed that the largest acquisition workforce group consisted of scientists and engineers (about 43 percent), followed by computer systems analysts and logistical and program managers (about 16 percent), and contractors, purchasers, or procurement support personnel (about 15 percent). Notably, the report did not provide statistics on the extent to which DOD used private-sector contractors to perform acquisition-related functions. Issues for Congress In the wake of the Jefferson Solutions Report and legislation in the FY 1998 and FY 1999 defense authorization bills, Congress will confront a number of important issues regarding the defense acquisition workforce, including the following: Adequacy and Usefulness of New Definition Should Congress adopt the definition of the defense acquisition workforce presented in the Jefferson Solutions Report? If so, it will result in a significant reduction in the DOD's official count of defense acquisition personnel. Will savings be achieved through attrition, reductions-in-force, removals, early buyouts, or retirements? Will potential savings be offset by associated administrative costs, as well as costs of increased service contracts for work previously performed by government personnel? On November 20, 1998, Deputy Secretary of Defense (for Acquisition and Technology) Jacques S. Gansler issued a memorandum to defense agencies on his review of the recommendations of the Acquisition Workforce Identification Working Group. This group was formed in response to requirements in Section 912(b). He required each agency to conduct a workforce analysis based on the modified Packard definition, revise the personnel count, and report their findings by December 30, 1998.

In each of the past four fiscal years (FY1996-FY1999), Congress has directed the Administration to reduce the size of the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition workforce—defined as the employees who participate in the development and procurement of weapons, equipment, and provisions for the military services. These mandates reflect a view in Congress that the workforce has not been downsized in proportion to the decline in of the overall defense budget in general, nor of the acquisition portion of the defense budget, in particular. As Congress and the Administration have debated the future of the defense acquisition workforce, participants have encountered basic questions: What, precisely, is the DOD acquisition workforce? How many people are in it, and what, exactly, are their functions? At present, there is no commonly accepted definition of the DOD acquisition workforce. Previous attempts, within the decade, to define the workforce have produced estimates ranging from 25,000 to 582,000 personnel. In early 1997, DOD hired the Jefferson Solutions Group, a private consulting firm, to define the size and composition of the acquisition workforce. Jefferson Solutions issued its report in September 1997. It estimated that the overall workforce included about 189,000 people, and that the largest acquisition workforce group consists of scientists and engineers (about 43 percent), followed by computer systems analysts and logistical and program managers (about 16 percent), and contractors, purchasers, or procurement support personnel (about 15 percent). Notably, the study did not address the issue or provide statistics on the extent to which DOD relied on private-sector contractors to perform acquisition-related functions. In response to Section 912(b) of the FY1998 Defense Authorization Act, Deputy Secretary of Defense (for Acquisition and Technology) Jacques S. Gansler issued a memorandum to defense agencies on November 20, 1998, having determined that DOD would use a modified version of the definition used by the Packard Commission Report. Each agency is required to conduct a functional workforce analysis, revise its personnel count, and report findings by December 30, 1998. Currently, two major questions confront Congress in regard to the acquisition workforce. First, should the new definition constructed by the Jefferson Solutions Group be adopted formally? If so, it will result in a significant reduction in DOD's official count of acquisition personnel. Second, to what extent will savings achieved through reductions be offset by additional, unanticipated costs? Such costs may include: (1) hiring contractors to perform acquisition-related functions previously performed by government employees; (2) separation costs, such as early buyouts, retirements, and severance pay; and, (3) overtime costs due to both personnel shortages and inexperienced personnel.

crs_97-618

crs_97-618_0

Introduction In 1988, the Supreme Court, in Communications Workers of America v. Beck (hereinafter referred to as Beck ), ruled against organized labor and held that non-union employees could not be required to pay full union dues if some of those funds were to be used for activities unrelated to collective bargaining. It required notification to federal contractor non-union employees that their union dues may not be used to support political activities that they oppose. Prior to the Beck and Lehnert decisions, the Supreme Court regularly revisited this issue in a line of decisions which held that labor unions cannot use dissenting non-union employees' dues for political and ideological activities outside the scope of the activities related to collective bargaining. Such cases include: (1) International Association of Machinists v. Street , 367 U.S. 740 (1961); (2) Railway Clerks v. Allen , 373 U.S. 113 (1963); (3) Abood v. District Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977); (4) Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); and (5) Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986). Another type of a union security agreement is the agency shop agreement whereby the employees do not have to join the union or have full union membership in good standing within thirty days, but must support the union by paying a sum of money equivalent to union dues in order to retain employment. The union established a three-stage procedure with the union's administration to consider non-members' objections to such deductions.

Under union shop agreements, labor unions must establish strict safeguards and procedures for ensuring that non-members' dues are not used to support certain political and ideological activities that are outside the scope of normal collective bargaining activities. The "union shop" or "agency shop" agreement essentially provides that employees do not have to join the union, but must support the union in order to retain employment by paying dues to defray the costs of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance matters. In a line of decisions, the Supreme Court has addressed this issue and has concluded that compulsory union dues of non-members may not be used for political and ideological activities that are outside the scope of the unions' collective bargaining and labor-management duties when non-members object to such use. Seven Supreme Court decisions have held that union dues exacted from dissenting non-members may not to be used for political and ideological purposes and must be expeditiously refunded to dissenting non-members according to proper procedural safeguards: (1) International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); (2) Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); (3) Abood v. District Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977); (4) Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); (5) Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); (6) Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); and Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 (1991).

crs_RL34258

crs_RL34258_0

When it comes to future reliable oil supplies, Canadian oil sands will likely account for a larger share of U.S. oil imports. Oil sands account for about 46% of Canada's total oil production, and oil sand production is increasing as conventional oil production declines. Since 2004, when a substantial portion of Canada's oil sands were deemed economic, Canada has been ranked second behind Saudi Arabia in oil reserves. Canadian crude oil exports were about 1.82 million barrels per day in 2006, of which 1.8 mbd or 99% went to the United States. Canadian crude oil accounts for about 18% of U.S. net imports and about 12% of all U.S. crude oil supply. These U.S. pilot projects did not prove to be commercially viable for oil production and have since been abandoned. Oil sands (also called tar sands) are mixtures of organic matter, quartz sand, bitumen, and water that can either be mined or extracted in-situ using thermal recovery techniques. Typically, oil sands contain about 75% inorganic matter, 10% bitumen, 10% silt and clay, and 5% water. Bitumen is a heavy crude that does not flow naturally because of its low API (less than 10 degrees) and high sulfur content. This thick, black, tar-like substance must be upgraded with an injection of hydrogen or by the removal of some of the carbon before it can be processed. Oil sand products are sold in two forms: (1) as a raw bitumen that must be blended with a diluent (becoming a bit-blend) for transport and (2) as a synthetic crude oil (SCO) after being upgraded to constitute a light crude. Major development obstacles to the U.S. oil sands resource base include remote and difficult topography, scattered deposits, and the lack of water for in-situ production (steam recovery and hot water separation) or undeveloped technology to extract oil from U.S. "hydrocarbon-wetted" deposits. Canadian Oil Sands Canada began producing its oil sands in 1967 after decades of research and development that began in the early 1900s. By 1919, the Scientific and Industrial Research Council of Alberta (SIRCA), predecessor to the Alberta Research Council (ARC), became interested in oil sands development. In 1967, Suncor began to produce oil sands at a rate of 12,000 barrels per day. A number of enhanced SAGD methods are being tested by the Alberta Research Council. Royalties paid on bitumen, which is valued much lower than SCO, would result in less revenue for the government. In light of the environmental and social problems associated with oil sands development, e.g., water requirements, toxic tailings, carbon dioxide emissions, and skilled labor shortages, and given the fact that Canada has 175 billion barrels of reserves and a total of over 300 billion barrels of potentially recoverable oil sands (an attractive investment under current conditions demonstrated by the billions of dollars already committed to Canadian development), the smaller U.S. oil sands base may not be a very attractive investment in the near-term. This expanded capacity will likely lead to even greater investment in Canada. U.S. markets will continue to be a major growth area for oil production from Canadian oil sands.

When it comes to future reliable oil supplies, Canada's oil sands will likely account for a greater share of U.S. oil imports. Oil sands account for about 46% of Canada's total oil production and oil sands production is increasing as conventional oil production declines. Since 2004, when a substantial portion of Canada's oil sands were deemed economic, Canada, with about 175 billion barrels of proved oil sands reserves, has ranked second behind Saudi Arabia in oil reserves. Canadian crude oil exports were about 1.82 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2006, of which 1.8 mbd or 99% went to the United States. Canadian crude oil accounts for about 18% of U.S. net imports and about 12% of all U.S. crude oil supply. Oil sands, a mixture of sand, bitumen (a heavy crude that does not flow naturally), and water, can be mined or the oil can be extracted in-situ using thermal recovery techniques. Typically, oil sands contain about 75% inorganic matter, 10% bitumen, 10% silt and clay, and 5% water. Oil sand is sold in two forms: (1) as a raw bitumen that must be blended with a diluent for transport and (2) as a synthetic crude oil (SCO) after being upgraded to constitute a light crude. Bitumen is a thick tar-like substance that must be upgraded by adding hydrogen or removing some of the carbon. Exploitation of oil sands in Canada began in 1967, after decades of research and development that began in the early 1900s. The Alberta Research Council (ARC), established by the provincial government in 1921, supported early research on separating bitumen from the sand and other materials. Demonstration projects continued through the 1940s and 1950s. The Great Canadian Oil Sands company (GCOS), established by U.S.-based Sunoco, later renamed Suncor, began commercial production in 1967 at 12,000 barrels per day. The U.S. experience with oil sands has been much different. The U.S. government collaborated with several major oil companies as early as the 1930s to demonstrate mining of and in-situ production from U.S. oil sand deposits. However, a number of obstacles, including the remote and difficult topography, scattered deposits, and lack of water, have resulted in an uneconomic oil resource base. Only modest amounts are being produced in Utah and California. U.S. oil sands would likely require significant R&D and capital investment over many years to be commercially viable. An issue for Congress might be the level of R&D investment in oil sands over the long term. As oil sands production in Canada is predicted to increase to 2.8 million barrels per day by 2015, environmental issues are a cause for concern. Air quality, land use, and water availability are all impacted. Socio-economic issues such as housing, skilled labor, traffic, and aboriginal concerns may also become a constraint on growth. Additionally, a royalty regime favorable to the industry has recently been modified to increase revenue to the Alberta government. However, despite these issues and potential constraints, investment in Canadian oil sands will likely continue to be an energy supply strategy for the major oil companies.

crs_RL33622

crs_RL33622_0

Cuban Political Developments On July 31, 2006, President Fidel Castro provisionally ceded political power to his brother Raúl "for several weeks" in order to recover from intestinal surgery. Although Cuba has remained a hard-line communist state under Fidel Castro since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, Fidel's announcement that he was temporarily ceding political power to his brother Raúl could be the beginning of a political transition. Before Fidel's recent surgery, observers discerned several potential scenarios for Cuba's future when Fidel either dies in office or departs the political scene because of age or declining health. These fit into three broad categories: the continuation of a communist government; a military government; or a democratic transition or fully democratic government. Successor Communist Government According to most observers, the most likely scenario, at least in the short term, is a successor communist government led by Raúl Castro. This is the case for a variety of reasons, but especially because of Raúl's designation by Fidel as successor in the party and his position as leader of the FAR, which, since 1989, has been in control of the government's security apparatus (police, intelligence, and security services) within the Ministry of the Interior (MININT). Preparation for Cuba's Political Transition For a number of years, the U.S. government has been making efforts to prepare for a political transition in Cuba. Since 1997, the U.S. government has provided assistance—primarily through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but also through the Department of State—to fund projects aimed at promoting a democratic transition in Cuba. May 2004 CAFC Report In October 2003, the Bush Administration established an inter-agency Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC) to help plan for Cuba's transition from communism to democracy, and to identify ways to help bring it about. In the new context of Fidel's provisional transfer of power to his brother Raúl, observers have advocated two general policy approaches to contend with Cuba's transition process: 1) a stay-the-course or status-quo approach that would maintain the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people; and 2) an approach aimed at influencing the Cuban government and Cuban society through increased contact and engagement. Stay the Course A stay-the-course approach essentially emphasizes the current U.S. policy of isolating the Cuban government with comprehensive economic sanctions, while providing support to the Cuban people. Engagement An alternative policy approach advocated by some observers is one that seeks to advance U.S. engagement with Cuba with the goal of being able to influence Cuba in the aftermath of Fidel Castro's departure from the political scene.

Cuba has remained a hard-line communist state under Fidel Castro for more than 47 years, but Fidel's July 31, 2006 announcement that he was ceding political power to his brother Raúl for several weeks in order to recover from surgery could be the beginning of a political transition. Over the past few years, there has been increased speculation about Cuba's future without Fidel, who turned 80 on August 13, 2006. While previous predictions about Fidel's imminent demise proved premature, his recent surgery and advanced age make the date of his permanent departure from the political scene all the closer. Before his recent surgery, observers discerned several potential scenarios for Cuba's future after Fidel. These fit into three broad categories: the continuation of a communist government; a military government; or a democratic transition or fully democratic government. According to most observers, the most likely scenario, at least in the short term, is a successor communist government led by Raúl Castro. This the most likely scenario for a variety of reasons, but especially because of Raúl's official designation as successor and his position as leader of the Cuban military. For a number of years, the U.S. government has begun to plan for Cuba without Fidel at the helm. This has included examining transition issues and appointing a State Department Cuba Transition Coordinator. Assistance has been provided—primarily through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but also through the Department of State—to fund projects aimed at promoting a democratic transition in Cuba. The Bush Administration established an inter-agency Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba to help plan for Cuba's transition to democracy and to help Cubans hasten the transition to democracy. Some observers, however, have questioned the adequacy of the transition planning, in part because it does not recognize the likelihood of a successor communist government headed by Fidel's brother Raúl. In the new context of Fidel's transfer of power, there are two broad policy approaches to contend with political change in Cuba: a stay-the-course or status-quo approach that would maintain the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people; and an approach aimed at influencing the Cuban government and Cuban society through increased contact and engagement. Some Members support the Administration's stay-the-course policy approach through assistance to strengthen Cuban civil society while maintaining U.S. economic sanctions. Other Members advocate a change in U.S. policy toward Cuba in the direction of engagement, easing sanctions, or providing the President with flexibility to respond to change in Cuba. This report will not be updated. It was written in the aftermath of Fidel Castro's July 2006 announcement that he was temporarily stepping down from power, and provides analysis of potential future political scenarios for Cuba after Fidel Castro and U.S. policy implications and approaches. For further information, see CRS Report RL33819, Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress.

crs_R40690

crs_R40690_0

Introduction The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is the major federal statute for the education of children with disabilities. IDEA both authorizes federal funding for special education and related services and, for states that accept these funds, sets out principles under which special education and related services are to be provided. The requirements are detailed, especially when the regulatory interpretations are considered. Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) Statutory Language The core requirement of IDEA is that a state must provide children with disabilities a free appropriate public education in order to receive federal funding under the act. IDEA contains detailed requirements for the IEP. Since the IEP is the way FAPE is implemented, it is a key component of IDEA and has been the subject of numerous judicial decisions. Procedural Safeguards and Discipline Statutory Overview IDEA was originally enacted to respond to situations where children with disabilities were being excluded from school without any statutory recourse. Section 615 of IDEA provides detailed procedural safeguards for children with disabilities and their parents. Procedural safeguards are provisions protecting the rights of parents and children with disabilities regarding a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and include notice of rights, mediation, resolution sessions, and due process procedures. Section 615 has been a continual source of controversy, especially the provisions relating to the discipline of children with disabilities.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is the major federal statute for the education of children with disabilities. IDEA both authorizes federal funding for special education and related services and, for states that accept these funds, sets out principles under which special education and related services are to be provided. The requirements are detailed, especially when the regulatory interpretations are considered, and have been the subject of numerous judicial decisions. The key concept in IDEA is the requirement for the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for children with disabilities. In order to implement FAPE, IDEA requires that each child with a disability have an individualized education program. Children with disabilities may also receive related services and must receive their education in the least restrictive environment. IDEA was originally enacted to respond to situations where children with disabilities were being excluded from school without any statutory recourse. Section 615 of IDEA provides detailed procedural safeguards for children with disabilities and their parents. Procedural safeguards are provisions protecting the rights of parents and children with disabilities regarding a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and include notice of rights, mediation, resolution sessions, and due process procedures. Section 615 has been a continual source of controversy, especially the provisions relating to the discipline of children with disabilities. IDEA also provides for attorneys' fees in some situations, but the Supreme Court has found that parents are not entitled to expert witness fees.

crs_RL30024

crs_RL30024_0

Introduction: The Three Cs The nature of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (particularly carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions) makes their control difficult to integrate with the U.S economy and traditional U.S. energy policy. Despite the obvious interrelationship between energy policy and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the United States has struggled to integrate the two. For a country that has traditionally used its cheap supply of energy to substitute for more expensive labor and capital costs to compete internationally, this linkage is particularly strong, as witnessed by the nation's high GHG emissions per capita. In the face of this economic reality, along with continuing scientific uncertainty, debate over a greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction program can be categorized by three inter-related Cs: C ost, C ompetitiveness, and C omprehensiveness. Cost, as a sound-bite, commonly refers to some monetary estimate of what a GHG reduction program would require, typically expressed as a gross dollar amount or as a percentage reduction in gross domestic product for some period of time. Competitiveness, at the simplest level, most typically reflects concerns about what firms would be disadvantaged by cost increases as a result of GHG reduction requirements. The Three-Cs: Re-evaluating the Policy Assumptions Three fundamental policy assumptions changed between the U.S. ratification of the 1992 UNFCCC and key events of the first decade of the 21 st century—the George W. Bush Administration's 2001 decision to abandon the Kyoto Protocol process and the 2009 negotiations at Copenhagen. First, the ratification of the UNFCCC was based at least partially on the premise that significant reductions could be achieved at little or no cost . This assumption helped to reduce concern some had (including those of the former George H.W. Bush Administration) that the treaty could have deleterious effects on U.S. competitiveness—a significant consideration because developing countries are treated differently from developed countries under the UNFCCC. Further ameliorating this concern, compliance with the treaty was voluntary. But the presumption has never lacked critics; and their views—and to some extent, experience based on alternative energy costs—have rendered the "low cost" assumption tenuous in the eyes of many. Second, theUNFCCC was debated and ratified at a time when salient competitiveness issues were as much focused on Japan and Europe as on developing nations. Instead, those concerns about international competitiveness have refocused on rapidly growing economies in the developing world, particuarly those of India and China. In 2005 China passed the United States to become the world's largest emitter, and 9 of the 20 largest GHG emitting countries were non-Annex I countries. Copenhagen tried to preserve the twin goals by allowing each nation to set its own emissions reduction (Annex I) or mitigation action (non-Annex I) goal—thereby allowing each nation to determine the costs it would accept; and also by establishing a mechanism by which the developed nations would provide funds for GHG reduction actions by non-Annex I nations. What remains to be seen is whether any voluntary program can successfully reduce GHG emissions sufficiently to meet the goal of holding the increase in global temperatures to 2 degrees C. What also remains to be seen is whether the Agreement's provision by which Annex I countries set actual reduction targets, while non-Annex I countries establish nationally appropriate mitigation actions, will be enough to lessen the competitiveness and comprehensiveness concerns—given that some mitigation actions, such as China's, may not necessarily actually reduce emissions.

The nature of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (particularly carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions) makes their control difficult to integrate with the U.S economy and traditional U.S. energy policy. Despite the obvious interrelationship between energy policy and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the United States has struggled to integrate the two. For a country that has traditionally used its relatively cheap supply of energy to substitute for more expensive labor and capital costs to compete internationally, this linkage is particularly strong, as witnessed by the nation's high GHG emissions per capita. In the face of this economic reality, along with continuing scientific uncertainty, debate over a greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction program can be categorized by three inter-related Cs: Cost, Competitiveness, and Comprehensiveness. Cost typically refers to some monetary estimate of what a GHG reduction program would require, often expressed as a gross dollar amount or as a percentage reduction in gross domestic product for some period of time. Competitiveness, at the simplest level, reflects concerns about what firms would be disadvantaged by cost increases as a result of GHG reduction requirements. Comprehensiveness concerns the extent to which all nations have to meet comparable GHG reduction requirements—in contrast to the current situation in which developing nations, such as China, have no obligation to actually reduce emissions. Fundamental policy assumptions regarding each of the three Cs have changed between the U.S. ratification of the 1992 UNFCCC and key events of the first decade of the 21st century—the George W. Bush Administration's 2001 decision to abandon the Kyoto Protocol process and the 2009 negotiations at Copenhagen. First, the ratification of the UNFCCC was based at least partially on the premise that significant reductions could be achieved at little or no cost. This assumption helped to reduce concern some had that the treaty could have deleterious effects on U.S. competitiveness. Further ameliorating this concern, compliance with the treaty was voluntary. But the assumption has never lacked critics; and their views—and to some extent, experience based on alternative energy costs—have rendered the "low cost" assumption tenuous in the eyes of many. Second, theUNFCCC was approved at a time when salient competitiveness issues were focused as much or more on developed nations, rather than developing ones. But the competitiveness issue has increasingly refocused on the rapidly growing economies, especially of India and China—shifting the competitiveness concern to countries that have been absolved from mandatory reduction requirements while they grow their economies. And third, the UNFCCC was approved at a time when the developed nations dominated GHG emissions, and it was assumed comprehensiveness could be subordinated temporarily to the imperative for developing nations to grow their economies. But by 2005 China had passed the United States to become the world's largest emitter. The Copenhagen Agreement tried to preserve the twin goals of economic development and emissions reductions by allowing each nation to determine the costs it would accept; and also by establishing a mechanism by which the developed nations would provide funds for greenhouse gas reduction actions in developing nations. What remains to be seen is whether any voluntary program can successfully reduce emissions sufficiently to meet the UNFCCC goal of holding the increase in global temperatures to 2°C.

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Congress has renewed its interest in facilitating the immigration of foreign professional workers in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) fields. "STEM visa" is a shorthand for an expedited immigration avenue that enables foreign nationals with graduate degrees in STEM fields to adjust their immigration status to legal permanent residence (LPR) without waiting in the queue of numerically-limited LPR visas. The fundamental policy question is: should the United States create additional pathways for STEM graduates to remain in the United States permanently? Although the United States remains the leading host country for international students in STEM fields, the global competition for talent, most notably with the European Union and Asian nations, has intensified in recent years. Other researchers maintain that a record number of STEM graduates—both U.S. residents and foreign nationals—are entering the U.S. labor market. Foreign Nationals Earning STEM Degrees The number of full-time graduate students in science, engineering, and health fields who were foreign students grew from 91,150 in 1990 to 148,923 in 2009. Despite the rise in foreign student enrollment, the percentage of STEM graduate students with temporary visas in 2009 (32.7%) was comparable to 1990 (31.1%). Graduate enrollments in engineering fields have exhibited the most growth of STEM fields in recent years. Optional Practical Training (OPT) After completing their undergraduate or graduate studies, F-1 foreign students are permitted to participate in employment known as Optional Practical Training (OPT), which is temporary employment that is directly related to an F-1 student's major area of study. Generally, an F-1 foreign student may work up to 12 months in OPT status. In 2008, DHS expanded the OPT work period to 29 months for F-1 students in STEM fields. Temporary Professional Specialty Worker: H-1B Visas Many F-1 visa holders (especially those who are engaged in OPT) often change their immigration status to become professional specialty workers (H-1B). In FY2010, the most recent year for which detailed data on H-1B beneficiaries (i.e., workers renewing their visas as well newly arriving workers) are available, almost 91,000 H-1B workers were employed in computer-related occupations, and they made up 47% of all H-1B beneficiaries that year, as Figure 5 indicates. Pathways to Legal Permanent Residence The H-1B visa and OPT often provide the link for foreign students to become employment-based LPRs. The INA establishes an annual worldwide level of 140,000 employment-based preference immigrants, and that ceiling includes the accompanying spouse and children in addition to the principal (i.e., qualifying) alien. In total, foreign nationals reporting STEM occupations made up 44% of all of the 676,642 LPRs who were employment-based principals in the first, second, and third preference categories during the decade of FY2000-FY2009. Of all of the LPRs reporting STEM occupations (297,668) over this decade, 52% entered as third preference principals. As Figure 8 shows, STEM graduates seeking LPR status are likely to wait in line to obtain LPR status, but those who meet the criteria of the extraordinary ability or advanced degrees preference categories have a much shorter wait. The House Committee on the Judiciary held two hearings on these issues in 2011. These issues also arose during the Senate Committee on the Judiciary hearing on the economic rationale for immigration reform. A variety of bills creating STEM visas have been introduced, including H.R. 399 , H.R. 2161 , H.R. 3146 , H.R. 5893 , H.R. 6429 , S. 1965 , S. 1986 , S. 3185 , S. 3192 , and S. 3217 . On September 20, 2012, the STEM Jobs Act of 2012 ( H.R. 6429 ) failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote to pass under suspension of the rules. Most recently, the House passed revised version of the STEM Jobs Act of 2012 ( H.R.

Although the United States remains the leading host country for international students in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) fields, the global competition for talent has intensified. A record number of STEM graduates—both U.S. residents and foreign nationals—are entering the U.S. labor market, and there is a renewed focus on creating additional immigration pathways for foreign professional workers in STEM fields. Current law sets an annual worldwide level of 140,000 employment-based admissions, which includes the spouses and children in addition to the principal (i.e., qualifying) aliens. "STEM visa" is shorthand for an expedited immigration avenue that enables foreign nationals with graduate degrees in STEM fields to adjust to legal permanent resident (LPR) status without waiting in the queue of numerically limited LPR visas. The fundamental policy question is should the United States create additional pathways for STEM graduates to remain in the United States permanently? The number of full-time graduate students in science, engineering, and health fields who were foreign students (largely on F-1 nonimmigrant visas) grew from 91,150 in 1990 to 148,923 in 2009, with most of the increase occurring after 1999. Despite the rise in foreign student enrollment, the percentage of STEM graduate students with temporary visas in 2009 (32.7%) was comparable to 1990 (31.1%). Graduate enrollments in engineering fields have exhibited the most growth of the STEM fields in recent years. About 40,000 graduate degrees were awarded to foreign STEM students in 2009, with 10,000 of those going to Ph.D. recipients. After completing their studies, foreign students on F-1 visas are permitted to participate in employment known as Optional Practical Training (OPT), which is temporary employment that is directly related to an F-1 student's major area of study. Generally, a foreign student may work up to 12 months in OPT status. In 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) expanded the OPT work period to 29 months for F-1 students in STEM fields. Many F-1 visa holders (especially those who are engaged in OPT) often change their immigration status to become professional specialty workers (H-1B). Most H-1B beneficiaries are typically admitted to work in STEM occupations. In FY2010, the most recent year for which detailed data on H-1B beneficiaries (i.e., workers renewing their visas as well as newly arriving workers) are available, almost 91,000 H-1B workers were employed in computer-related occupations, and they made up 47% of all H-1B beneficiaries that year. The H-1B visa and the OPT often provide the link for foreign students to become employment-based LPRs. In total, foreign nationals reporting STEM occupations made up 44% of all of the 676,642 LPRs who were employment-based principal immigrants during the decade of FY2000-FY2009. Of all of the LPRs reporting STEM occupations (297,668) over this decade, 52% entered as professional and skilled workers. STEM graduates seeking LPR status are likely to wait in line to obtain LPR status. Those immigrating as professional and skilled workers face wait times of many years, but those who meet the criteria of the extraordinary ability or advanced degrees preference categories have a much shorter wait. STEM visas have gained interest in the 112th Congress, and various bills with STEM visa provisions (H.R. 399, H.R. 2161, H.R. 3146, H.R. 5893, H.R. 6412, S. 1965, S. 1986, S. 3185, S. 3192, and S. 3217) have been introduced. The House Committee on the Judiciary held two hearings on STEM and other high-skilled immigration in 2011. These issues also arose during a 2011 Senate Committee on the Judiciary hearing on the economic rationale for immigration reform. On September 20, 2012, the STEM Jobs Act of 2012 (H.R. 6429) failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote to pass under suspension of the rules. Most recently, the House passed a revised version of the STEM Jobs Act of 2012 (H.R. 6429) on November 30, 2012.

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Introduction Each year, the President is required to submit a comprehensive federal budget proposal to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. Once it is submitted, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analyzes the proposal using its own economic assumptions and estimation techniques. Then, the House and Senate Budget Committees each develop a budget resolution after reviewing the President's budget, the views of other committees, and information from CBO. Differences between the houses are supposed to be resolved by April 15, but this deadline is rarely met. Although it is not binding, the resolution provides a framework for subsequent legislative action on the budget (e.g., annual appropriations bills). It will be updated to reflect relevant activity until the President's FY2008 budget is released. Medicaid and SCHIP in the President's FY2007 Budget The President's FY2007 budget contains a number of proposals that would affect Medicaid and SCHIP. Some are program expansions, and others are designed to reduce federal spending. Legislative Versus Administrative Proposals As shown in Table 1 , some of the President's proposals would require legislative action, while others would be implemented administratively (e.g., via regulatory changes, issuance of program guidance, etc.). H.R. Reports. (pdf) Congressional Action On March 9, 2006, the Senate Budget Committee reported a budget resolution, S.Con.Res. 83 , which was subsequently amended and passed by the Senate on March 16. The resolution did not include reconciliation instructions for the Senate Finance Committee, which has jurisdiction over Medicaid and SCHIP. It did include a deficit-neutral reserve fund for the uninsured, and a March 8 Senate Budget Committee document indicates that it included funding for four of the President's Medicaid and SCHIP proposals: TMA extension ($523 million over five years); Vaccines for Children proposal allowing health departments to provide vaccines ($715 million); Cover the Kids initiative ($874 million); and SCHIP funding boost in 2007 and 2008 ($225 million). On March 29, 2006, the House Budget Committee reported its own budget resolution, H.Con.Res. 376 , which was subsequently amended and passed by the House on May 18. The resolution did not include reconciliation instructions for the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which has jurisdiction over Medicaid and SCHIP. 109-402 ) indicates that spending levels for Medicaid and SCHIP were based on CBO's baseline projections under current law and policies, and that no reduction in Medicaid was assumed. Although no agreement was reached by the House and Senate on a FY2007 budget resolution, current law spending for Medicaid and SCHIP is unaffected. As entitlement programs, their spending levels are based on the underlying benefit and eligibility criteria established in law (in the case of SCHIP, these criteria include a statutory annual funding cap). However, legislation that would increase Medicaid or SCHIP spending above current law could encounter procedural roadblocks in the House or Senate if funding is not assumed in a budget resolution or in a "deeming resolution." The annual appropriations process also provides an opportunity for Congress to place limitations on the availability of federal funds for specified Medicaid and SCHIP activities. Before the 109 th Congress adjourned, it passed two bills that addressed a variety of Medicaid and SCHIP issues, including some of the proposals in the President's FY2007 budget. H.R.

Each year, the President is required to submit a comprehensive federal budget proposal to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. Once it is submitted, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analyzes the proposal using its own economic assumptions and estimation techniques. Then, the House and Senate Budget Committees each develop a budget resolution after reviewing the President's budget, the views of other committees, and information from CBO. Differences between the houses are supposed to be resolved by April 15, but this deadline is rarely met. Although it is not binding, the resolution provides a framework for subsequent legislative action on the budget (e.g., annual appropriations bills). The President's FY2007 budget contains a number of proposals that would affect Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Some are program expansions, and others are designed to reduce federal spending. While certain proposals would require legislative action, others would be implemented administratively (e.g., via regulatory changes, issuance of program guidance, etc.). On March 9, 2006, the Senate Budget Committee reported a budget resolution, S.Con.Res. 83, which was subsequently amended and passed by the Senate on March 16. The resolution did not include reconciliation instructions for the Senate Finance Committee, which has jurisdiction over Medicaid and SCHIP. It did include a deficit-neutral reserve fund for the uninsured and funding for four of the President's Medicaid and SCHIP proposals. On March 29, 2006, the House Budget Committee reported its own budget resolution, H.Con.Res. 376, which was subsequently amended and passed by the House on May 18. The resolution did not include reconciliation instructions for the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which has jurisdiction over Medicaid and SCHIP. Its spending levels for Medicaid and SCHIP are based on CBO's baseline projections under current law and policies, with no reduction in Medicaid assumed. Although no agreement was reached by the House and Senate on a FY2007 budget resolution, current law spending for Medicaid and SCHIP is unaffected. As entitlement programs, their spending levels are based on the underlying benefit and eligibility criteria established in law (in the case of SCHIP, these criteria include a statutory annual funding cap). However, legislation that would increase Medicaid or SCHIP spending above current law could encounter procedural roadblocks in the House or Senate if funding is not assumed in a budget resolution or in a "deeming resolution." The annual appropriations process also provides an opportunity for Congress to place limitations on the availability of federal funds for specified Medicaid and SCHIP activities. Before the 109th Congress adjourned, it passed two bills—H.R. 6111 and H.R. 6164—that addressed a variety of Medicaid and SCHIP issues, including some of the proposals in the President's FY2007 budget. This report will be updated to reflect relevant activity until the President's FY2008 budget is released.

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There has been much litigation over the past five years concerning the sale or purchase of trademarks as keywords to trigger sponsored search engine results. Federal courts have struggled to determine whether such trademark usage constitutes actionable trademark infringement. The defendant used the mark in commerce in connection with any goods or services without the consent of the plaintiff. These advertisements typically relate to search terms entered by Internet users and appear as "banner" advertisements on the top of the Web page or "sponsored links" that are displayed on the right column of a Web page or before relevant search results; such Web ads, if clicked on, direct the user to the website of the advertiser. Litigation Over Keyword Advertising Keyword-triggered advertising cases have involved trademark owners bringing suit against either keyword sellers (Internet search engines) or keyword buyers (advertisers). It is important to note that there have been very few final court rulings in keyword advertising cases, as most opinions have involved pre-trial rulings from judges on procedural motions filed by the parties. For example, courts have had to address a threshold question about whether a trademark owner would be able to overcome defense motions to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim for relief (pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), on the grounds that the use of a trademark as a paid keyword is not a "use in commerce" within the meaning of the Lanham Act. "Use in Commerce" Until recently, there was a split in opinion among the federal courts in different circuits concerning the use of trademarks as keyword triggers for online advertising. District courts in the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit have found that the use of a trademark as a keyword trigger (or facilitating such use) does constitute a "use in commerce" for purposes of the Lanham Act. In the past several years, district courts in the Second Circuit have issued opinions that held that the use of a trademark keyword to trigger an online advertisement is not a "use in commerce" for purposes of satisfying the second prong of a trademark infringement claim, because they believed that such an "internal" use of a trademark (in which the competitor advertisements did not themselves exhibit the trademark) is not a "use in commerce." However, this district court decision, and similar ones issued by district courts in the Second Circuit, were effectively overruled in April 2009 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc . "Likelihood of Confusion" As noted above, establishing that a defendant uses another's mark in commerce is only one element of the infringement claim; for a violation of the Lanham Act to be found, such use must be unauthorized and "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation ... or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of ... goods [or] services." When a consumer searches for a trademarked item, she receives a search results list that includes links to both the trademarked product's website and a competitor's website. However, as discussed above, there is a lack of judicial consensus concerning the more important question of whether such trademark use causes likelihood of confusion.

The use of trademarks in connection with Internet-based advertising has sparked disputes between trademark owners, advertisers, and Internet search engine operators over whether such activity violates federal trademark law. Specifically, trademark owners have expressed concern over the sale of their trademarks by Internet search engines to third parties that want to have "banner" advertisements, "sponsored links," or "sponsored results" appear on a search results Web page when those trademarked words are entered as a search query. For example, the shoe company Reebok may purchase the trademark "Nike" from the Internet search engine Google as a "keyword." If a consumer conducts a search for the term "Nike" on Google's website, the consumer would be presented with paid advertisements for Reebok's products in the right-hand margin of the Web page immediately next to the search results for Nike's shoes and apparel. Whether the use of trademarks as "keywords" that trigger such online advertisements constitutes actionable trademark infringement is a question that has been the subject of much litigation over the past five years. However, to date there have been very few final court rulings on the legality of keyword advertising; most cases have involved rulings from judges on procedural pre-trial motions filed by the parties. The primary issue for these courts was not whether the trademark owner would prevail in a lawsuit brought against a keyword seller (search engines) or keyword buyer (advertisers), but whether the plaintiff was entitled to proceed to trial to offer evidence in support of the trademark infringement claim. For example, most courts have had to answer a threshold question about whether a trademark owner would be able to overcome defense motions to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim for relief, on the grounds that the use of a trademark as a paid keyword is not a "use in commerce" within the meaning of the Lanham Act. Until recently, there was a split in opinion among the federal courts in different circuits concerning this question. The April 2009 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc. resolved the circuit conflict in favor of a determination that the use of a trademark as a keyword trigger (or facilitating such use) does constitute a "use in commerce" for purposes of the Lanham Act. However, establishing that a defendant uses another's mark in commerce is only one element of the infringement claim; for a violation of the Lanham Act to be found, such use must be likely to cause consumer confusion or mistake as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the goods or services offered by the defendant. So far, there is a lack of judicial consensus on this second element, and thus the legality of using trademarks for keyword-triggered advertising remains unsettled. This report provides a summary and analysis of judicial opinions that have developed the current state of trademark law governing keyword-triggered advertising.

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Because of sharply rising cost estimates for plutonium disposition facilities under construction in South Carolina, the Obama Administration proposed in its FY2017 budget request to end construction and pursue a "dilute and dispose" (D&D) option. The Trump Administration proposed the same strategy in its FY2018 budget request. In September 1998, the United States and Russia each agreed to convert 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA). The two countries agreed to begin plutonium disposition in 2018. The plutonium disposition program, including U.S. assistance for the Russian program, is administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency of the Department of Energy (DOE). A key component of the U.S. strategy for disposing of surplus weapons plutonium has been the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) at DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina. NNSA estimated in 2002 that MFFF would cost about $1 billion to design and build. According to DOE's FY2014 budget request, the MFFF contractor then estimated that the project's total construction cost would rise to $7.78 billion, and that construction would not be completed until November 2019. 113-235 ) each required DOE to conduct independent cost and schedule estimates for MFFF and analyze alternative disposition approaches. "As a result, beginning in FY 2017 the MFFF project will be terminated." In its FY2018 request to Congress, the Trump Administration supported the proposal to "terminate the MOX project and pursue the dilute and dispose strategy as an alternative." The current poor political climate between the United States and Russia was another factor to consider. Russian Program Russia promised after suspending its participation in the PMDA not to use its 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium for weapons. The FY2013 budget justification said that the requested funds would be used to "provide technical support to the DOE in meeting U.S. obligations to support disposition of weapon-grade plutonium in Russia; provide U.S. technical oversight of work in Russia associated with the disposition of surplus Russian weapon-grade plutonium in the BN-600 and BN-800 fast reactors; and support the implementation of IAEA verification activities in both the U.S. and Russia." The FY2014-FY2018 budget requests included no funds for the Russian plutonium disposition program. The program had long planned to blend surplus plutonium from the U.S. nuclear weapons program with uranium to make MOX fuel for commercial nuclear reactors. After fueling a reactor for several years, the plutonium in MOX fuel would be mostly destroyed by fission, and remaining plutonium would be isotopically less desirable for weapons use. In addition, the used MOX fuel would contain highly radioactive fission products that would provide an obstacle to diversion for weapons purposes. DOE's FY2015 budget justification said the total lifecycle cost of the MOX disposition option had risen to $30 billion—from $24.2 billion in April 2013. However, Congress rejected the Administration's plan to put MFFF in "cold standby." Instead, Congress appropriated $345 million to continue MFFF construction at a reduced level from FY2014 and required DOE within 120 days to conduct an "independently verified lifecycle cost estimate for the option to complete construction and operate the MOX facility and the option to downblend and dispose of the material in a repository." DOE requested $345 million for FY2016 to continue MFFF construction at the FY2015 level, pending a decision based on the new study.

The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) in South Carolina has been a key component of the current U.S. strategy for disposing of surplus weapons plutonium from the Cold War. Disposition of surplus plutonium is required by a 1998 agreement, amended in 2010, between the United States and the Russian Federation. Each country agreed to convert 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons, to begin in 2018. Russia suspended its participation in the agreement in October 2016 due to what it called "hostile actions" by the United States. However, both countries appear to be continuing their plans for surplus plutonium disposition. The U.S. disposition strategy called for the surplus plutonium, in oxide form, to be blended with uranium oxide to make mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for U.S. commercial nuclear reactors. The plutonium in MOX fuel would be mostly destroyed in the reactors by fission (splitting into other isotopes). At the same time, isotopes of plutonium undesirable for weapons would be created, along with highly radioactive fission products. As a result, after several years in a reactor, spent MOX fuel would have less total plutonium than when it was freshly loaded, and the remaining plutonium would be degraded for weapons purposes. Moreover, the fission products would make the material difficult to handle, in case of future attempts to use the plutonium. Because of sharply rising cost estimates for the MOX project, the Obama Administration proposed to terminate the project in its FY2017 budget request. The Trump Administration in its FY2018 request also proposed replacing the MFF with the dilute and dispose option. Starting with the FY2015 budget request, the Administration proposed placing MFFF in "cold standby" and studying other plutonium disposition options. However, Congress authorized and appropriated $345 million for FY2015 to continue construction at a reduced level and required the Department of Energy (DOE) to procure an independent cost and schedule estimate for MFFF and alternative disposition approaches. Pending the results of those analyses, DOE requested $340 million for FY2016 to continue construction at about the FY2015 level. DOE's FY2017 budget proposed to instead pursue a dilute and dispose (D&D) program. The federal plutonium disposition program is run by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency of DOE. NNSA estimated in 2002 that MFFF would cost about $1 billion to design and build. DOE said in its budget justification for FY2014 that the MFFF contractor had estimated the project's total construction cost would rise to $7.78 billion, and that construction would not be completed until November 2019. DOE's FY2015 budget justification said the life-cycle cost estimate for the MOX program had risen to $30 billion. Differing sharply from the U.S. MOX strategy, Russia is planning to use its BN-600 and BN-800 fast breeder reactors for plutonium disposition. According to the World Nuclear Association, the BN-800 started producing electricity in 2015, and the reactor is "capable of burning 1.7 metric tons of plutonium per year from dismantled weapons." The DOE FY2015 through FY2018 budget requests included no funds for support of the Russian plutonium disposition program. The debate over U.S. plutonium disposition strategy raises several issues for Congress. The Administration asserts that the rising cost estimates for MFFF are unsustainable in the current budget environment and proposes a different disposal method. The effects of alternative disposal options on DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina, where MFFF is located, will also be an important element of the debate.

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Natural Resources: The Policy Setting Natural resource management remains a significant issue for the federal government, and the availability of particular natural resources, such as energy resources, can be matters of broad public concern. Growing demands and pressures for both resources and services from the nation's resources, plus heightened interest in how these resources are used, have increased the complexity of their management and administration. The federal role in natural resource management continues to be controversial. Some stakeholders seek to maintain or enhance the federal role in resource management. Common themes include how to balance the tensions in multi-use management and protection programs, whether resources should be managed to produce national or local benefits, and how to balance current uses with future supplies and opportunities. While specific management concerns are constantly in flux, many of the concerns fall under the same categories that have confronted policy-makers for decades: role of the federal government in establishing policies; interagency conflicts and overlaps; sources and levels of funding; information and role of science; and coordination of federal, state, and local efforts. Although these categories of issues are fairly constant and broader questions of resource goals and management objectives remain, Congress for many reasons typically confronts the resource issues based on the natural resource in question—lands and related resources, oceans and coasts, species and ecosystems, or water. Multiple use management is an approach to balancing use conflicts that can occur on federal lands. For example, science is instrumental in defining the uncertainty and potential extent and impact of climate change and weather on resource stocks and conditions. Natural resources management often is intertwined with issues in other policy areas. The 31 issues have been grouped into five categories, as follows: Federal and Indian Lands and Resources Natural Hazards, Climate, and Earth Science Ocean and Coastal Affairs Species Management and Ecosystem Protection Water Resources Federal and Indian Lands and Resources Conceptual Framework The federal government manages about 650 million acres of land and resources—about 29% of the 2.27 billion acres of land in the United States. Other policy questions for federal lands funding relate to setting fees. Indian land issues include energy rights-of-way across tribal lands, especially the compensation sought by Indian tribes. There has been increasing support for the use of marine protected areas (MPAs) to protect and manage ocean resources. Regional issues regarding endangered and threatened species, invasive species, and ecosystem restoration initiatives, as well as national issues, such as wetlands protection and agricultural conservation, also may be considered. The 110 th Congress may conduct oversight on the implementation of ESA as it relates to the listing and protection of foreign threatened and endangered species. Some center on the effects of private land uses on natural resources, especially on agricultural lands in rural areas. Dams and Levees Recent disasters have brought attention to the safety and security of the nation's water resources infrastructure, including its dams and levees.

Natural resources management remains a significant issue for the federal government. Growing demands on the nation's resources and interest in their protection and allocation among multiple uses have increased the complexity of management. The federal role in defining policy and institutional context shapes the combination of supported uses and protection measures. Certain themes are common to federal resource issues. Many conflicts center on balancing traditional versus alternative uses and protection programs, managing to produce national or local benefits, and supporting current or future resource consumption. Other challenges involve the effect of federal resource management on private lands, fees for using federal resources, and financing of management efforts. Interagency conflicts and overlaps and the coordination of federal, state, and local efforts also are common implementation problems. For many reasons, Congress often confronts resource issues based on the natural resource in question—lands and related resources, oceans and coasts, species and ecosystems, or water. Federal land issues include land ownership and management, prioritization of uses, designation of special areas, and fee collection and disbursement. Energy production and recreation on federal lands remain controversial. Indian land issues include energy rights-of-way across tribal lands and treaty rights. Ocean topics encompass broad policy questions, such as whether to respond to recommendations by two commissions for more coordinated ocean policies and institutions. More specific multi-use management challenges range from fisheries, marine mammal, and coastal zone management, to adherence to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Species management and ecosystem protection topics include federal protection and habitat designations for threatened and endangered species, prevention and response to invasive species, protection of international species, wetlands protection, and large-scale ecosystem restoration. Increased competition for water has fostered interest in the federal role in water resources, particularly in relation to water supply in western states and multi-use river management. Other water topics are dam and levee safety and security, and transboundary water resources management. Natural resource science and management contributes to understanding and mitigating the nation's natural hazard risks. Science also is instrumental in defining the uncertainty and potential extent and impact of climate change and weather on resource conditions. Often natural resource management is intertwined with other topics of broad public concern, such as environmental protection, energy, and agricultural policy. The 110th Congress may pursue natural resources topics in the context of these other policy areas as well as through authorizations, appropriations, and oversight related to specific natural resources issues.

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T he Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ) was enacted on March 23, 2018. This omnibus bill included appropriations for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), of which USDA's domestic food assistance is a part. Prior to its enactment, the government had continued to operate for the first six months of the fiscal year under continuing resolutions (CRs). This report focuses on USDA's domestic food assistance programs; their funding; and, in some instances, policy changes provided by the enacted FY2018 appropriations law. USDA's domestic food assistance programs include the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp Program), Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), and the child nutrition programs (such as the National School Lunch Program). The domestic food assistance funding is, for the most part, administered by USDA's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS). CRS Report R45128, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2018 Appropriations provides an overview of the entire FY2018 Agriculture and Related Agencies appropriations law as well as a review of the reported bills and CRs preceding its enactment. Domestic food assistance funding ( Table 1 ) largely consists of open-ended, appropriated mandatory programs—that is, it varies with program participation (and in some cases inflation) under the terms of the underlying authorization law. The largest mandatory programs include SNAP and the child nutrition programs (including the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program). Though their funding levels are dictated by the authorizing law, in most cases appropriations are needed to make funds available. The three largest discretionary budget items are WIC, the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), and federal nutrition program administration. The enacted FY2018 appropriation would provide nearly $105 billion for domestic food assistance ( Table 1 ). This is a decrease of approximately $3.2 billion from FY2017. Declining participation in SNAP is responsible for most of the difference. Over 95% of the FY2018 appropriations are for mandatory spending. It requested no funding for the WIC Farmers' Market Nutrition Program, a program that had received consistent discretionary funding in past years (see " Commodity Assistance Program "). SNAP and Other Programs under the Food and Nutrition Act Appropriations under the Food and Nutrition Act (formerly the Food Stamp Act) support (1) SNAP (and related grants); (2) a nutrition assistance block grant for Puerto Rico and nutrition assistance block grants to American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (all in lieu of SNAP); (3) the cost of food commodities as well as administrative and distribution expenses under the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (FDPIR); (4) the cost of commodities for TEFAP, but not administrative/distribution expenses, which are covered under the Commodity Assistance Program budget account; and (5) Community Food Projects. The SNAP account also includes mandatory funding for TEFAP commodities. The FY2017 appropriations law limited USDA's implementation of December 2016 regulations regarding SNAP retailers' inventory requirements, and the enacted FY2018 appropriation (§728) continues those limits. Section 728 in the enacted appropriation continues to require that USDA amend its final rule to define "variety" more expansively and that USDA "apply the requirements regarding acceptable varieties and breadth of stock" that were in place prior to P.L. The enacted FY2018 appropriation provides approximately $24.3 billion for child nutrition programs. These include the following: School Meals Equipment Grants. The law provides $30 million, $5 million more than was provided in FY2017. Summer EBT (Electronic Benefit Transfer) Demonstration Projects. School Personnel Training . FY2018 general provisions also included policy provisions : Processed Poultry from China. Certain Types of Discrimination in the School Meals Programs. Paid Lunch Equity. The law keeps WIC FMNP at the FY2017 level, though the President's budget requested no funding for this program. The enacted appropriation provides nearly $154 million for this account, a decrease of approximately $17 million from FY2017.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) was enacted on March 23, 2018. This omnibus bill included appropriations for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), of which USDA's domestic food assistance programs are a part. Prior to its enactment, the federal government had continued to operate for the first six months of the fiscal year under continuing resolutions (CRs). This report focuses on the enacted appropriations for USDA's domestic food assistance programs and, in some instances, policy changes provided by the omnibus law. CRS Report R45128, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2018 Appropriations provides an overview of the entire FY2018 Agriculture and Related Agencies portion of the law as well as a review of the reported bills and CRs preceding it. Domestic food assistance funding is primarily mandatory but also includes discretionary funding. Most of the programs' funding is for open-ended, appropriated mandatory spending—that is, terms of the authorizing law require full funding and funding may vary with program participation (and in some cases inflation). The largest mandatory programs include the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp Program) and the child nutrition programs (including the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program). Though their funding levels are dictated by the authorizing law, in most cases, appropriations are needed to make funds available for obligation and expenditure. The three largest discretionary budget items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP); and federal nutrition program administration. The domestic food assistance funding is, for the most part, administered by USDA's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS). The enacted FY2018 appropriation provides nearly $105 billion for domestic food assistance (Table 1). This is a decrease of approximately $3.2 billion from FY2017. Declining participation in SNAP is responsible for most of the difference. Over 95% of the FY2018 appropriations for domestic food assistance are for mandatory spending. Highlights of the associated appropriations accounts are summarized below. For SNAP and other programs authorized by the Food and Nutrition Act, such as The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP) commodities, the FY2018 appropriations law provides approximately $74.0 billion. Certain provisions of the law affect SNAP policies. For example, it continues a policy in the FY2017 appropriations law that limited USDA's implementation of December 2016 regulations regarding SNAP retailers' inventory requirements. USDA must amend its final rule to define "variety" more expansively and must "apply the requirements regarding acceptable varieties and breadth of stock." For the child nutrition programs (National School Lunch Program and others), the enacted law provides approximately $24.3 billion. This includes discretionary funding for school meals equipment grants ($30 million) and Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) demonstration projects ($28 million). General provisions provide an additional $5 million for farm-to-school grants and $2 million for training school nutrition personnel. The law includes policy provisions related to processed poultry from China, discrimination in the school meals programs, and requirements for schools' paid lunch pricing. For the WIC program, the law provides nearly $6.2 billion while also rescinding $800 million in prior-year carryover funding. For the Commodity Assistance Program account, which includes funding for the Commodity Supplemental Food Program, TEFAP administrative and distribution costs, and other programs, the law provides over $322 million. It provides level funding for the WIC Farmers' Market Nutrition Program ($18.5 million), though the President's budget requested no funding for this program. For Nutrition Programs Administration, the law provides nearly $154 million.

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T he Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) is a violent criminal gang operating both in the United States and abroad—namely Central America. Birth and Evolution of MS-13 MS-13 was born on the streets of Los Angeles, CA. It was formed in the 1980s by refugees who were fleeing civil conflict in El Salvador. MS-13 became a transnational gang as members who were deported from the United States to Central America established gang ties there. Organizational Structure In the United States, MS-13's organizational structure largely consists of loosely organized cells, or "cliques." Membership Estimates While some have suggested that the size of MS-13 has grown in the United States, since at least 2005 the FBI has consistently estimated the domestic size of the gang to be around 10,000 members. Criminal Activities In the United States, MS-13 gang members have been involved in local crimes including extortion, drug distribution, prostitution, robbery, and murder, as well as in more transnational illicit activity such as drug trafficking and human smuggling and trafficking. In recent years, this violence has been demonstrated in a reported wave of violent homicides and other criminality attributed to MS-13 in certain locales. Federal Domestic Enforcement Efforts Countering gang crime is generally the purview of state and local law enforcement. However, given that gang activity is not constrained by jurisdictional boundaries, and that local law enforcement agencies may not have the capacity to investigate complex gang crimes, federal law enforcement has had a long-standing interest in contending with gangs, including MS-13. Conceptualizing MS-13 for a Policy Response One challenge in determining the appropriate policy responses to tackle threats posed by MS-13 is developing a clear conceptualization of the gang. Researchers and authorities have primarily described MS-13 as either a criminal street gang or a transnational criminal organization (TCO); however, policy discussions of the gang often blur these lines. Gangs DOJ describes a gang as (1) an association of three or more individuals; (2) whose members collectively identify themselves by adopting a group identity which they use to create an atmosphere of fear or intimidation frequently by employing one or more of the following: a common name, slogan, identifying sign, symbol, tattoo or other physical marking, style or color of clothing, hairstyle, hand sign or graffiti; (3) the association's purpose, in part, is to engage in criminal activity and the association uses violence or intimidation to further its criminal objectives; (4) its members engage in criminal activity, or acts of juvenile delinquency that if committed by an adult would be crimes; (5) with the intent to enhance or preserve the association's power, reputation, or economic resources; (6) the association may also possess some of the following characteristics: (a) the members employ rules for joining and operating within the association; (b) the members meet on a recurring basis; (c) the association provides physical protection of its members from other criminals and gangs; (d) the association seeks to exercise control over a particular location or region, or it may simply defend its perceived interests against rivals; or (e) the association has an identifiable structure; (7) this definition is not intended to include traditional organized crime groups such as La Cosa Nostra, groups that fall within the Department's definition of "international organized crime," drug trafficking organizations or terrorist organizations. There are hazy lines. Evolving Issues for Domestic Gang Enforcement Tracking MS-13 membership In countering the danger posed by MS-13, a foundational challenge is understanding the scope of the threat. Key questions focus on whether the gang is growing in number or in territory. Reviews from oversight bodies such as DOJ's Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have critiqued areas in which these efforts could be improved. Immigration and Unaccompanied Minors The relationship between transnational gangs such as MS-13 and unaccompanied alien children (UAC) arriving in the United States has received interest from researchers, policymakers, Administration officials, and the public alike. Some observers have suggested that MS-13's evolution in Central America—including challenging government legitimacy, committing crimes with impunity, and expanding into more sectors of the global criminal economy—could continue to drive unauthorized migration into the United States by those seeking to escape the gang and its violence. In addition, there have been concerns that MS-13 may exploit the U.S. Southwest border in order to bring gang members from Central America to the United States as UAC or may recruit some of the vulnerable UAC to join the gang's ranks once in the United States. Understanding the nuances of these potential relationships between MS-13 and UAC can be particularly challenging.

The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) is a violent criminal gang operating both in the United States and abroad—namely Central America. MS-13 was formed on the streets of Los Angeles, CA, in the 1980s by refugees who were fleeing civil conflict in El Salvador. It became a transnational gang as MS-13 members who were deported from the United States to Central America helped establish gang ties and spread U.S. gang culture abroad. In the United States, MS-13's structure largely consists of loosely organized cells, or "cliques," that each control specific territory. While some have suggested that the size of MS-13 has grown in the United States, since at least 2005 law enforcement officials have consistently cited its membership to be around 10,000. Domestically, MS-13 has been involved in local crimes including extortion, drug distribution, prostitution, robbery, and murder, as well as transnational illicit activity such as drug trafficking and human smuggling and trafficking. The gang is known for its particularly violent criminality, which has been demonstrated in a reported uptick in violent homicides attributed to MS-13 in certain locales. Countering gang crime has often been the purview of state and local law enforcement. However, given that gang activity is not constrained by jurisdictional boundaries, and that local law enforcement agencies may not have the capacity to investigate complex gang crimes, federal law enforcement has had a long-standing interest in countering gangs, including MS-13. One element in determining the appropriate federal policy responses to tackle threats posed by MS-13 may be to have a clear conceptualization of the gang. Researchers and criminal justice system authorities have primarily described MS-13 as a criminal gang or a transnational criminal organization (TCO)—concepts that have some overlap in structure, motivation, and criminality. Whether MS-13 demonstrates elements that are uniquely gang or TCO may help inform the federal policy response to its illegal activities. Another challenge in countering the danger posed by MS-13 is understanding the scope of the threat. Key questions focus on the validity of existing estimates and whether the gang is growing in number or in territory. Thus, policymakers may question how officials define and determine gang membership. While there is no centralized database to track gang membership, a number of agencies maintain datasets that contain gang-related information. Policymakers may also question how this information is shared and utilized. Oversight bodies such as the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have recommended means by which federal law enforcement could enhance its enforcement efforts against violent criminal gangs such as MS-13, and policymakers may take interest in whether some of these recommendations are still relevant. There is also a current debate about the relationship between gangs such as MS-13 and unaccompanied alien children (UAC) arriving in the United States. Some have suggested that MS-13's presence in Central America could continue to drive unauthorized migration into the United States by those seeking to escape the gang and its violence. There are also concerns that MS-13 may exploit the U.S. Southwest border by bringing young gang members from Central America to the United States as UAC or may recruit some of the vulnerable UAC to join the gang's ranks once in the United States. Policymakers may seek more data from officials in order to understand the nuances of these potential relationships between MS-13 and UAC.

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In 2009, congressional debate focused primarily on stimulating the economy, health care reform, and climate change. These issues are not only interrelated, but are also intimately linked with the taxation of businesses. For example, in February, Congress enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ). Two of the act's business tax provisions provided for a temporary increase of small business expensing and temporary "bonus" depreciation limits, while other provisions allow a delayed recognition of cancelation of debt income and five-year carryback of net operating losses for small businesses. The act also modified several renewable energy provisions, including the Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit, the Investment Tax Credit, and tax credit for Alternative Fueling Property. Congressional debate in 2010 has focused on extending selected expired tax provisions and reforming health care. In particular, the Tax Extenders Act of 2009, H.R. 4213 , passed the House on December 9, 2009, and the Senate on March 10, 2010. In addition, the debate on health care reform is ongoing and the President's Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Proposal calls for the modification of selected business taxes, the removal or restriction of several oil and gas tax provisions, and reforming international taxation. As the year progresses, it is anticipated that congressional deliberations will consider the extension of several expiring business tax provisions, energy taxation, tax shelters, and international taxation, while continuing to examine opportunities for economic stimulus.

In 2009, congressional debate focused primarily on stimulating the economy, health care reform, and climate change. These issues are not only interrelated, but are also intimately linked with the taxation of businesses. For example, in February, Congress enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5). Two of the act's business tax provisions provided for a temporary increase of small business expensing and temporary "bonus" depreciation limits, while other provisions allow a delayed recognition of cancelation of debt income and five-year carryback of net operating losses for small businesses. The act also modified several renewable energy provisions, including the Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit, the Investment Tax Credit, and tax credit for Alternative Fueling Property. Congressional debate in 2010 has focused on extending selected expired tax provisions and reforming health care. In particular, the Tax Extenders Act of 2009, H.R. 4213, passed the House on December 9, 2009, and the Senate on March 10, 2010. In addition, the debate on health care reform is ongoing and the President's Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Proposal calls for the modification of selected business taxes, the removal or restriction of several oil and gas tax provisions, and reforming international taxation. As the year progresses, it is anticipated that congressional deliberations will consider the extension of several expiring business tax provisions, energy taxation, tax shelters, and international taxation, while continuing to examine opportunities for economic stimulus.

crs_R44773

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Introduction The procedure for appointing a Justice to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided for by the Constitution in only a few words. The "Appointments Clause" (Article II, Section 2, clause 2) states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court." The process of appointing Justices has undergone changes over two centuries, but its most basic feature—the sharing of power between the President and Senate—has remained unchanged. To receive a lifetime appointment to the Court, a candidate must first be nominated by the President and then confirmed by the Senate. The most recent vacancy on the Court was created by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016. The issues addressed by the report include (1) how frequently vacancies occur on the Supreme Court, particularly vacancies created by the death of a sitting Justice; (2) how the length of the Scalia vacancy compares to past vacancies on the Court (as well as how the length of time the Garland nomination was pending before the Senate compares to past nominations); (3) how often vacancies on the Court arise during presidential election years (as well as how often vacancies on the Court have rolled over into a presidential election year from a preceding year); (4) how often vacancies on the Court have arisen during one presidency but are filled during a different presidency; and (5) how often vacancies on the Court have required multiple nominations prior to the appointment of a new Justice. Since President George Washington's initial six appointments to the Supreme Court in 1789 and 1790, a vacancy on the Court has occurred, on average, every two years. The length of time, however, between the vacancy created by the retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens in 2010 and the vacancy created by Justice Scalia's death in 2016 is the fifth longest period of time between two vacancies ever occurring on the Court (specifically, 2,054 days, or 5.6 years, between the two vacancies occurring). Under the Constitution, Justices on the Supreme Court hold office "during good Behaviour," in effect typically receiving lifetime appointments to the Court. Once confirmed, Justices may hold office for as long as they live or until they voluntarily step down. As of March 1, 2017, the Scalia vacancy will have lasted for 382 days—making it currently the seventh longest vacancy in the history of the Court. The Scalia vacancy is the first to occur since 1932 under these particular circumstances. As shown by the figure, the Scalia vacancy is one of three for which the Senate did not approve a President's nominee for a vacancy that arose during a presidential election year prior to the election itself, and for which a President submitted a nomination prior to the election.

The procedure for appointing a Justice to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided for by the Constitution in only a few words. The "Appointments Clause" (Article II, Section 2, clause 2) states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court." The process of appointing Justices has undergone changes over two centuries, but its most basic feature—the sharing of power between the President and Senate—has remained unchanged. To receive a lifetime appointment to the Court, a candidate must first be nominated by the President and then confirmed by the Senate. Under the Constitution, once confirmed, Justices on the Supreme Court hold office "during good Behaviour," in effect typically receiving lifetime appointments to the Court. In other words, Justices may hold office for as long as they live or until they voluntarily step down from office. Following the initial six appointments made to the Court by President George Washington in 1789 and 1790, the first vacancy occurred on the Court as a result of the resignation of Justice John Rutledge on March 5, 1791. The most recent vacancy on the Court was created by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016. From 1791 to the present, vacancies have occurred, on average, on the Court every two years. The Scalia vacancy, however, occurred approximately 5.5 years after the last vacancy on the Court (following the retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens in 2010)—making the length of time between the Stevens vacancy and the Scalia vacancy the fifth longest period of time between two vacancies occurring in the history of the Court. The Scalia vacancy is notable in several other ways: It is only the second vacancy, of 24, on the Court since 1954 to occur as a result of the death of a sitting Justice (the other being Chief Justice William Rehnquist in 2005); it is the seventh longest vacancy on the Court since 1791 (and the longest vacancy since 1861); it is one of nine vacancies since 1791 that arose during a presidential election year, prior to the election itself and for which a President submitted a nomination prior to the election (and the first such vacancy since 1932); and it is the eighth time in the history of the Court in which a vacancy that arose during one presidency will be filled during a different presidency (with the last time occurring in 1881). This report discusses these issues and others, with the purpose of providing historical context to some of the frequently asked questions about the vacancy created by Justice Scalia's departure from the Court. This report will be updated upon Senate confirmation of Justice Scalia's successor.

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Cases Decided During the 2003-2004 Term EPA oversight of state programs under the Clean Air Act: Alaska Dep't of Environmental Conservation v. EPA The broad concern of Alaska DEC is EPA's authority to oversee state administration of theClean Air Act (CAA), and in particular to enforce the act contrary to state determinations. Theprecise issue is whether EPA may issue CAA noncompliance orders to a company, where suchorders effectively overrule a state permit issued to the company under the state's EPA-approved CAAimplementation plan. (6) The Supreme Court affirmed 5-4. District The issue before the Court here was whether the CAA preempts rules of a state agencyrequiring that when local operators of vehicle fleets buy fleet vehicles, they buy only those vehiclesthe district has designated, based on their low emissions. As to the CAA, the court held that the regulations did not fall withinregulatory exemptions from the conformity-determination requirement. Discharge permits under the Clean Water Act: South Florida Water Mgmt. District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians This case addresses the backbone of the Clean Water Act (CWA) regulatory program -- itsrequirement that the "discharge of a pollutant" from a point source into navigable waters be pursuantto a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. (24) NPDEScoverage, it held, is triggered notwithstanding that the point source did not itself generate thepollutant. Judicial review of public lands management: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance This case raises an important question as to the availability of judicial review under theAdministrative Procedure Act (APA). Cases Accepted During the 2003-2004 Term for Decision During the 2004-2005 Term "Contribution" actions under the Superfund Act: Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. Pesticide Act preemption of state tort law claims: Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC The issue before the Supreme Court in this case is whether -- and if so, to what extent -- theFederal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA, or "Pesticide Act") preempts state tortlaw claims, here for crop damage. Comments The cases decided by the Court in the 2003-2004 term, and those to be argued next term,present a diverse picture. No unifying substantive theme is apparent. Further, why some of thecases were of interest to the Court is perplexing: many of them involve issues of narrow focus, withno accompanying split in the circuit court decisions. There are commonalities, however. In this regard, Norton may be the mostimportant of the cases, since the statute construed there, the Administrative Procedure Act, is thebasic charter for accessing judicial review of federal agency action, and the issue in the case, whenagency inaction is reviewable, is a ubiquitous one in administrative law. The results, in the fivecases decided so far, have indeed largely tilted against the environmental positions advanced, but notexclusively so. Finally, three of the seven cases inquire into the nature of the federal-state relationship( Alaska DEC , Engine Manufacturers Ass'n , and Bates ), presumably reflecting the Court's continuinginterest in federalism issues, and environmental federalism in particular.

In the Supreme Court's 2003-2004 term, concluded June, 2004, the Court accepted for reviewseven environmental cases -- an unusually large number. Five decisions were handed down duringthe term, and two cases were carried over to the upcoming 2004-2005 term. Of the five decided cases, three involve the Clean Air Act (CAA). Alaska Dep't ofEnvironmental Conservation v. EPA asked whether EPA may issue CAA enforcement orders thateffectively overrule a permit issued by a state under its EPA-approved air program. The Court saidyes, though only by a 5-4 margin. In Engine Manufacturers Ass'n v. South Coast Air QualityManagement District , the Court held that the CAA preempts a state from compelling local vehiclefleet operators to buy new vehicles from the state's list of low-emission models. And Dep't ofTransportation v. Public Citizen spoke to whether DOT safety regulations whose promulgationallowed Mexican trucks greater range in the United States must be preceded by environmentalanalyses under the CAA and National Environmental Policy Act. Because DOT lacks discretion toprevent the truck movement, said the Court, the added emissions from that movement did not haveto be considered. The other decided cases are, first, South Florida Water Management District v. MiccosukeeTribe of Indians , holding that a point source of discharges into U.S. navigable waters must obtaina Clean Water Act permit despite the fact that the point source itself did not add the pollutants in thedischarged water. Second, Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance clarified the availabilityof judicial review of federal agency inaction under the Administrative Procedure Act, which allowsreview of agency action "unlawfully withheld." Environmental cases to be heard in the 2004-2005 term are Cooper Industries, Inc. v. AviallServices, Inc. , addressing when contribution actions are available under the Superfund Act, and Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC , which wrestles with the scope of federal preemption of state lawunder the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. It is not apparent why the Court has chosen this moment to enlarge its environmental docket. No unifying theme is apparent in the accepted cases, and why some of them piqued the Court'sinterest is perplexing. There are some commonalities, however. All seven cases raise principallystatutory, rather than constitutional, issues. The results, in the cases decided so far, lean against the"environmental" side, though not exclusively so. And three of the seven cases turn on the nature ofthe federal-state relationship, a favorite theme of the current Court.

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Introduction At the beginning of the 112 th , 113 th , and 114 th Congresses—in 2011, 2013, and 2015 respectively—a number of reform-minded Senators unsuccessfully urged the Senate to adopt its rules on opening day by majority vote (as the House does on its first day) without having to overcome a supermajority hurdle required under existing procedures. The Senator's comments highlight a two-fold conundrum that suffuses this report: (1) a majority of the Senate can amend the chamber's rules; (2) however, before that may occur, reform advocates might be required under existing Senate rules—which carry over from one Congress to the next (part of the "continuing body" thesis)—to first muster a supermajority to bring interminable debate to a close on proposals to amend Senate rules. It is so well-known that Hollywood even made a classic movie in 1939 ( Mr. Smith Goes t o Washington ) that highlighted the filibuster's educative and political value. The nuclear option refers to the creation by majority vote of new precedents to curb filibusters of specific measures or matters. Fifth, the report examines several issues that emerged during these past attempts to change Senate rules that might affect contemporary efforts to revise Senate rules. The filibuster is perhaps the prime target for change because its goal is often to delay or prevent votes on measures or matters that might otherwise pass the Senate with majority support. The "constitutional" option refers to efforts at the start of a new Congress to amend Senate rules by majority vote, without regard to Rule XXII's two-thirds requirement for ending debate. Proponents of this approach cite the constitutional provision that "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings." Remember that a Senate majority can amend the Standing Rules at any time. Precedents and Senate Rules A feature of precedential change is that the text of a formal rule remains unchanged, such as Rule XXII, but the new precedent effectively alters all or part of its application and interpretation in chamber proceedings. They were successful. It has been assumed that the Senate is a continuing body and that it has continuing rules." In short, opening day could extend over many days, weeks, months, or the entire two-year life of a Congress. In response to this sentiment, and concern about the public's negative view of the proceedings, the chamber's two party leaders (Mansfield and Dirksen) propounded on January 30 the following unanimous consent agreement (UCA): Ordered , That on Thursday, January 31, 1963, at the conclusion of routine morning business, the Senate resume consideration of the following question submitted on the 28 th instant by the Vice President to the Senate for its decision, namely, "Does a majority of the Senate have the right under the Constitution to terminate debate at the beginning of a session and proceed to an immediate vote on a rule change notwithstanding the provisions of the existing Senate rules?" They were unsuccessful. Proponents rejected those arguments. Two points are noteworthy. The Senate has the constitutional authority to change any rule by majority vote at the start of a new Congress. In response to the parliamentary inquiry of the Senator from Idaho, therefore, the Chair informs the Senate that in order to give substance to the right of the Senate to determine or change its rules and to determine whether the two-thirds requirement of rule XXII is an unconstitutional inhibition on that right at the opening of a new Congress, if a majority of the Senators present and voting but fewer than two-thirds, vote in favor of the pending motion for cloture, the Chair will announce that a majority having agreed to limit debate on Senate Resolution 11, to amend rule XXII at the opening of a new Congress, debate will proceed under the cloture provisions of that rule. Reformers were fairly optimistic that this time they would be successful in amending Rule XXII. 1, Senate Resolution 4, amending rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate with respect to limitation of debate; and that under article I, section 5, of the U.S. Constitution, I move that debate upon the pending motion to proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 4 be brought to a close by the Chair immediately putting this motion to end debate to the Senate for a yea-and-nay vote; and, upon the adoption thereof by a majority of those Senators present and voting, a quorum being present, the Chair shall immediately thereafter put to the Senate, without further debate, the question on the adoption of the pending motion to proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 4. Senator Allen dominated debate and castigated the reformers' effort to change Rule XXII. Important to reemphasize is that the Senate, at any time during the two-year life of a Congress, could circumvent the supermajority requirements of Rule XXII and create a new precedent for majority cloture. (The 2013 case is discussed below.) President Obama also backed use of the nuclear option. They can refuse to hold hearings on executive and judicial branch nominees or fail to report them for possible floor consideration.

The filibuster (extended debate) is the Senate's most well-known procedure. Hollywood even highlighted its use in a famous 1939 movie entitled Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, starring actor Jimmy Stewart in the title role of Senator Jefferson Smith. Lengthy debate has many virtues (informing the public, for example) but the blocking potential of interminable debate has often made the filibuster a target for change by reform-minded Senators. Rule XXII requires 60 votes of Senators duly chosen and sworn to end debate on measures or motions—"except on a measure or motion to amend the Senate rules, in which case the necessary affirmative vote shall be two-thirds of the Senators present and voting." Real or threatened filibusters, along with cloture motions, have increased in recent Congresses. One consequence has been unsuccessful efforts by change-oriented Senators to amend Rule XXII without having to overcome the two-thirds supermajority hurdle. The contention of the reformers is that at the start of a new Congress, the Senate can amend its rules by majority vote—as the House does on its first day. They cite the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 5) as authority for their claim: "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings," which implicitly means by majority vote, state the reformers. Opponents reject the so-called "constitutional" option. They point out that the Senate has adopted rules and the Constitution says nothing about the vote required to adopt those rules. Moreover, they contend that the Senate is a "continuing body"—a quorum to conduct business is always present given the staggered terms of Senators—with continuing rules. The bottom line: a Senate majority can always amend the chamber's rules at any time during the two-year life of a Congress so long as the existing rules are observed, such as Rule XXII. Proponents of change refute that argument. They agree that a majority of the Members can change Senate rules at any time. Their concern is Rule XXII's two-thirds requirement for invoking cloture on proposals to amend Senate rules, which can prevent a majority from altering Senate rules. From 1953 to 1975, initiatives to reform Rule XXII at the start of a new Congress were biennial rituals. They were instigated by Senators in each party frustrated by the chamber's inability to enact social and civil rights legislation because of opposition from other Members. The bulk of this report examines each Congress where reform actions occurred on "opening day," which could extend for days, weeks, or months. Most of the reform attempts failed, but two efforts were successful: in 1959 and 1975. An analysis of the successes and failures of this nearly quarter-century era of opening day reform efforts could inform contemporary efforts to revise Senate rules by examining the controversies, conditions, and circumstances that produced the various outcomes. The report discusses, for example, the roles of various Senate Presidents (the Vice President) and party leaders, as well as the procedural strategies used by opponents and proponents of amending Rule XXII by majority vote at the start of a new Congress. The report also includes an "Afterword" that examines several subsequent and successful efforts to change Rule XXII in 1977, 1979, 1986, and 2013. The 2013 case is noteworthy because it created a new Senate precedent that allows majority cloture on most executive and judicial branch nominees. This precedential approach is sometimes called the "nuclear" option because of the likelihood of strong opposition and contentious parliamentary fallout from Senators opposed to its use on consequential measures or matters. In brief, the nuclear option indirectly "amends" Senate rules by majority vote through the creation of a new precedent that alters the application or interpretation of a chamber's rule, such as Rule XXII, without changing its formal text.

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In fact, it is not a federal crime to attempt to commit most federal offenses. More often, Congress has outlawed the attempt to commit a particular crime, such as attempted murder, or the attempt to commit one of a particular block of crimes, such as the attempt to violate the controlled substance laws. In those instances, the statute simply outlaws attempt, sets the penalties, and implicitly delegates to the courts the task of developing the federal law of attempt on a case-by-case basis. In doing so, it rarely did more than outlaw an attempt to commit a particular substantive crime and set its punishment. The Model Penal Code defined attempt as the intent required of the predicate offense coupled with a substantial step: "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime, if acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he ... purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime." Some states recognize an abandonment or renunciation defense; the federal courts do not. Most federal attempt crimes carry the same penalties as the substantive offense. May a defendant be charged with attempting to attempt an offense? This is no longer the case in federal court—if it ever was. In federal law, "[n]either common sense nor precedent supports success as a defense to a charge of attempt." The Double Jeopardy Clause ordinarily precludes conviction for both the substantive offense and the attempt to commit it. Crimes of general application would not have applied to other crimes of general application. When attempt is a federal crime, the cases suggest that a defendant may be punished for aiding and abetting the attempt and that a defendant may be punished by attempting to aid and abet the substantive offense.

It is not a crime to attempt to commit most federal offenses. Unlike state law, federal law has no generally applicable crime of attempt. Congress, however, has outlawed the attempt to commit a substantial number of federal crimes on an individual basis. In doing so, it has proscribed the attempt, set its punishment, and left to the federal courts the task of further developing the law in the area. The courts have identified two elements in the crime of attempt: an intent to commit the underlying substantive offense and some substantial step towards that end. The point at which a step may be substantial is not easily discerned; but it seems that the more serious and reprehensible the substantive offense, the less substantial the step need be. Ordinarily, the federal courts accept neither impossibility nor abandonment as an effective defense to a charge of attempt. Attempt and the substantive offense carry the same penalties in most instances. A defendant may not be convicted of both the substantive offense and the attempt to commit it. Commission of the substantive offense, however, is neither a prerequisite for, nor a defense against, an attempt conviction. Whether a defendant may be guilty of an attempt to attempt to commit a federal offense is often a matter of statutory construction. Attempts to conspire and attempts to aid and abet generally present less perplexing questions. This is an abridged version of CRS Report R42001, Attempt: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law, by [author name scrubbed], without the footnotes, attributions, citations to authority, or appendix found in the longer report.

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Empowerment Zones (EZs), Enterprise Communities (ECs), and Renewal Communities (RCs) are federally designated geographic areas characterized by high levels of poverty and economic distress, where businesses and local governments may be eligible to receive federal grants and tax incentives. The objective of this report is to provide a comparative overview of the similarities and differences among the three programs, specifically policies to target and provide federal incentives to economically distressed zones. The report also examines studies that have evaluated the impact of EZs, ECs, and RCs, and provides information on their current status. Finally, the report discusses recent legislative activity and congressional issues and options. Since 1993, Congress has authorized three rounds of EZs (1993, 1997, 1999), two rounds of ECs (1993, 1997), and one round of RCs (2000) with the objective of revitalizing selected economically distressed communities. The three programs have different benefits and eligibility criteria. For example, the nine initial EZs each received tax incentives and grants of $100 million (urban) and $40 million (rural), whereas the 95 initial ECs each received tax benefits and smaller grants of $2.95 million for smaller urban counties and rural communities. RCs did not receive grants, but benefitted from wage credits, and tax investment incentives. Eligibility varied depending on levels of population, unemployment, and poverty. In its FY2010 and FY2011 budgets, the Administration requested that Congress extend tax incentives for EZs and RCs until December 31, 2010 and 2011. EZ and RC tax incentives were extended in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( P.L. Currently, the estimated $1.8 billion in grant incentives provided to EZs and ECs since 1993 have mostly been expended. 111-312 ), enacted on December 17, 2010, extended EZ tax benefits, but not RCs, until the end of 2011. 111-5 ) provided broadband education, training, and equipment for selected facilities located within EZs and ECs, and recovery zone bonds for EZs. In 2009, P.L. 111-8 and P.L. 111-80 provided $3 million in appropriations for EZs and ECs. While a short-term extension of EZ tax incentives was enacted in the 111 th Congress, a similar extension of the RC tax incentives might continue to be an issue in the 112 th Congress. Although EZ and EC grants have mostly been expended, Congress has provided funding for selected EZs and ECs through annual HUD and USDA appropriations (see section " Grant Incentives "); in addition, legislation such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 110-343 ). Studies of EZ/EC and RC Effectiveness A number of studies have evaluated the effectiveness of the EZ, EC, and RC programs. In addition, several non-governmental economic studies have evaluated the effectiveness of zone incentives. Overall, these studies have found modest, if any, effects and call into question the cost-effectiveness of these programs. Finally, at the end of the 111 th Congress, Empowerment Zone tax incentives were extended through December 31, 2011 by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 ( P.L. Policy Options There are several options that Congress can consider regarding the EZ, EC, and RC programs in particular, and for federal economic development policy in general. Two contrasting options are to permanently extend the programs as currently constituted or to allow the programs to expire.

Empowerment Zones (EZs), Enterprise Communities (ECs), and Renewal Communities (RCs) are federally designated geographic areas characterized by high levels of poverty and economic distress, where businesses and local governments may be eligible to receive federal grants and tax incentives. Congress remains interested in these programs to revitalize selected areas affected by unemployment and a decline in economic activity, despite increased concern over the size and sustainability of the long-term budget outlook. The objective of this report is to provide a comparative overview of the similarities and differences between the EZ, EC, and RC programs, and a review of congressional policy choices to target and provide federal incentives to economically distressed zones. The report also examines studies that have evaluated the impact of EZs, ECs, and RCs, and provides information on their current status. Finally, the report discusses recent legislative activity and congressional issues and options. Since 1993, Congress has authorized three rounds of EZs (1993, 1997, 1999), two rounds of ECs (1993, 1997), and one round of RCs (2000) with the objective of revitalizing selected economically distressed communities. The three programs have different benefits and eligibility criteria. For example, the nine initial EZs each received tax incentives and grants of $100 million (urban) and $40 million (rural), whereas the 95 initial ECs each received tax benefits and smaller grants of $2.95 million for smaller urban counties and rural communities. RCs did not receive grants, but benefitted from wage credits, and tax investment incentives. Eligibility varied depending on levels of population, unemployment, and poverty. In its FY2010 and FY2011 budgets, the Administration requested that Congress extend tax incentives for EZs and RCs until December 31, 2010 and 2011. EZ and RC tax incentives were extended in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343), through December 31, 2009. Currently, the estimated $1.8 billion in grant incentives provided to EZs and ECs since 1993 have mostly been expended. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) enacted on December 17, 2010, extended EZ tax benefits, but not RCs, until the end of 2011. In addition, legislation such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) provided broadband education, training, and equipment for selected facilities located within EZs and ECs, and recovery zone bonds for EZs. In 2009, P.L. 111-8 and P.L. 111-80 provided $3 million in funding for EZs and ECs. While a short-term extension of EZ tax incentives was enacted in the 111th Congress, a similar extension of the RC tax incentives might continue to be an issue in the 112th Congress. A number of studies have evaluated the effectiveness of the EZ, EC, and RC programs. Several government-sponsored studies have failed to link EZ and EC designation with a general improvement in community outcomes. In addition, several academic researchers have evaluated the effectiveness of zone incentives. Overall, these studies have found modest, if any, effects, and call into question the cost-effectiveness of these programs. There are several options that Congress can consider regarding the EZ, EC, and RC programs. These options may range from permanently extending the programs to allowing them to expire. Other options include a temporary extension, increased oversight, a redesignation of economic development zones, program consolidation, or a combination of these options. This report will be updated as legislative developments warrant.

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(See "Food and Medical Exports" below.) Economic Conditions(1) With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced severeeconomic deterioration from 1989-1993, although there has been some improvement since 1994. Political Conditions Although Cuba has undertaken some limited economic reforms, politically the countryremains a hard-line Communist state. (10) Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the islandnation through comprehensive economic sanctions. The principal tool of U.S. policy remainscomprehensive sanctions, which were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-114 ), often referredto as the Helms/Burton legislation. Bush Administration Policy. On May 20, 2002, President Bush announced a new initiative on Cuba that includes fourmeasures designed to reach out to the Cuban people: 1) facilitating humanitarian assistance to theCuban people by U.S. religious and other non-governmental organization (NGOs); 2) providingdirect assistance to the Cuban people through NGOs; 3) calling for the resumption of direct mailservice to and from Cuba (12) ; and 4) establishing scholarships in the United States for Cubanstudents and professional involved in building civil institutions and for family members of politicalprisoners. (14) Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations Overall Direction of U.S. Policy Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objective of U.S.policy toward Cuba -- to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island -- therehave been several schools of thought about how to achieve that objective. Some advocate a policyof keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuingcurrent U.S. efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referredto as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting theCuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Legislative initiativesintroduced in the 107th Congress reflected divergent views on the direction of U.S. policy towardCuba (whether sanctions should be eased or intensified) and also covered a range of issues includinghuman rights, drug interdiction cooperation, and broadcasting to Cuba. (For a complete listing, see"Legislative Initiatives in the 107th Congress" toward the end of this report.) 2590 , the FY2002 Treasury Department appropriations bill. In the second session of the 107th Congress, the Senate version of the 2002 "Farm Bill," H.R. 5120 , the House approved three amendments on Cuba sanctions that wouldprohibit funds in the bill from being used to enforce regulations on travel, remittances, and U.S.agricultural sales to Cuba; the House subsequently approved H.R. The Senate version of the bill, S. 2740 , as reportedout of committee, included a provision that would prohibit funds from being used to enforceTreasury Department regulations on travel to Cuba. Final action on the FY2003 TreasuryDepartment appropriations measure was not completed before the end of the 107th Congress. Numerous other initiatives introduced in the 107th Congresswould have eased U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba, but action was not taken on these bills: H.R. 106-553 ),it provided $22.095 million for radio and television broadcasting to Cuba.

Cuba remains a hard-line Communist state, with a poor record on human rights. Fidel Castrohas ruled since he led the Cuban Revolution, ousting the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batistafrom power in 1959. With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experiencedsevere economic deterioration from 1989 to 1993. There has been some improvement since 1994as Cuba has implemented limited reforms. Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the islandnation through comprehensive economic sanctions. The Bush Administration has essentiallycontinued this policy. The principal tool of policy remains comprehensive sanctions, which weremade stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) in 1992 and the Cuban Liberty andDemocratic Solidarity Act in 1996, often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. Anothercomponent of U.S. policy consists of support measures for the Cuban people, including privatehumanitarian donations and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. In May 2002,President Bush announced a new initiative that includes several measures designed to reach out tothe Cuban people. There appears to be broad agreement on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba --to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island. But there are several schools ofthought on how to achieve that objective. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressureon the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S. efforts to supportthe Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred to as constructive engagement,that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting the Cuban people, and move towardengaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations bylifting the U.S. embargo. Policy debate in the past several years has focused on whether to maintainU.S. restrictions on food and medical exports as well as on travel to Cuba. Legislative initiatives introduced in the 107th Congress reflected these divergent views on thedirection of U.S. policy toward Cuba and also covered a range of issues including human rights, foodand medical exports, travel restrictions, drug interdiction cooperation, and broadcasting to Cuba.Many of these will likely be introduced in the 108th Congress. In the second session of the 107thCongress, the House version of the FY2003 Treasury Department appropriations bill, H.R. 5120 , included three Cuba provisions that would have eased restrictions on travel,remittances, and U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba; the Senate version of the bill, S. 2740 ,as reported out of committee, would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba. Final action on themeasure was not completed before the end of the 107th Congress; the 108th Congress will face earlyaction on these and other appropriations measures with Cuba provisions. This report will not be updated. It reflects legislative action through the end of the 107thCongress.