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53. À cet égard, il y a lieu de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, lorsque le Tribunal a constaté ou apprécié les faits, la Cour est compétente pour exercer, en vertu de l’article 225 CE, un contrôle sur la qualification juridique de ces faits et les conséquences de droit qui en ont été tirées par le Tribunal (voir arrêts du 6 avril 2006, General Motors/Commission, C‑551/03 P, Rec. p. I‑3173, point 51, et du 22 mai 2008, Degussa/Commission et Conseil, C‑266/06 P, point 72).

51. In that regard, it is clear from Article 225 EC and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first to find the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts. When the Court of First Instance has found or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 225 EC to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see, in particular, Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraph 23).

18 For want of any definition at all in Directive 2006/112 of the concept of ‘sport’, the meaning and scope of that term must, as the Court has consistently held, be determined by considering its usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which it is used and the purposes of the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 September 2014, Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds, C‑201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited, and of 26 May 2016, Envirotec Denmark, C‑550/14, EU:C:2016:354, paragraph 27).

28 It is true that the measures envisaged by Article 99 and the relevant procedural rules are those provided for by the domestic law of the Member State concerned for the purposes of the national trade mark. However, since the Community is a party to the TRIPs Agreement and since that agreement applies to the Community trade mark, the courts referred to in Article 99 of Regulation No 40/94, when called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures for the protection of rights arising under a Community trade mark, are required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 50 of the TRIPs Agreement (see, by analogy, Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019, paragraph 9, and Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, paragraph 52).

9 As a preliminary point, it must be observed, first, that the European Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers and that, consequently, Article 6 abovementioned must be interpreted, and its scope limited, in the light of the relevant rules of the international law of the sea.

60. In that regard, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that, where a transaction comprises a bundle of features and acts, regard must be had to all the circumstances in which the transaction in question takes place in order to determine, firstly, if there were two or more distinct supplies or one single supply and, secondly, whether, in the latter case, that single supply is to be regarded as a supply of goods or services (see, to that effect, Case C‑111/05 Aktiebolaget NN [2007] ECR I‑2697, paragraph 21 and case-law cited).

25. As regards the principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination and the obligation of transparency, the Member States must be recognised as having a certain amount of discretion for the purpose of adopting measures intended to ensure compliance with those principles, which are binding on contracting authorities in any procedure for the award of a public contract (see judgment in Serrantoni and Consorzio stabile edili , C‑376/08, EU:C:2009:808, paragraphs 31 and 32).

32. Each Member State is best placed to identify, in the light of historical, legal, economic or social considerations specific to it, situations propitious to conduct liable to bring about breaches of those principles (see Michaniki , paragraph 56).

131. Further, to the extent that Dunamenti Erőmű’s arguments concern the claim that the General Court erred in law because it failed to demonstrate the presence of a structural risk when examining whether there was an advantage, for the purposes of Article 87(1) EC, the criticism cannot be made of that company that it failed to identify specific parts of that judgment (see, to that effect, the judgment in Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission , C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑245/99 P to C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C‑252/99 P and C‑254/99 P, EU:C:2002:582, paragraph 423).

19. It should be recalled that, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the need of uniform application and of uniform interpretation of an act of EU law makes it impossible to consider one language version of the text in isolation, but requires that measure to be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim that the latter seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all the languages (see Case C‑569/08 Internetportal und Marketing , EU:C:2010:311, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

35. It must be borne in mind in this regard that, according to settled case‑law, the necessity for uniform application and, accordingly, for uniform interpretation of a Community measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim the latter seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all languages (see, inter alia, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Joined Cases C-261/08 and C-348/08 Zurita García and Choque Cabrera [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 54; and Case C‑473/08 Eulitz [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).

22 A Member State may restrict such activities and the relevant professional training to men or to women, as appropriate. In such a case, as is clear from Article 9(2) of the Directive, Member States have a duty to assess periodically the activities concerned in order to decide whether, in the light of social developments, the derogation from the general scheme of the Directive may still be maintained (Johnston, paragraph 37, and Sirdar, paragraph 25).

38 The Court has consistently held that classification as ‘State aid’ within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU requires all the conditions mentioned in that provision to be fulfilled. Thus, first, there must be intervention by the State or through State resources. Second, the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States. Third, it must confer a selective advantage on the recipient. Fourth, it must distort or threaten to distort competition (judgments of 21 December 2016, Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck, C‑524/14 P, EU:C:2016:971, paragraph 40, and of 21 December 2016, Commission v World Duty Free Group and Others, C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P, EU:C:2016:981, paragraph 53).

53 First, it must be recalled that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, classification of a national measure as ‘State aid’, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, requires all the following conditions to be fulfilled. First, there must be an intervention by the State or through State resources. Second, the intervention must be liable to affect trade between the Member States. Third, it must confer a selective advantage on the recipient. Fourth, it must distort or threaten to distort competition (see, inter alia, judgment of 16 July 2015, BVVG, C‑39/14, EU:C:2015:470, paragraph 24).

46. It is, on the other hand, necessary that the person filing the application for registration of a trade mark with respect to a service of bringing together services should identify the latter with sufficient clarity and precision (see, by analogy, Praktiker Bau- und Heimwerkermärkte EU:C:2005:425, paragraph 50, and Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys EU:C:2012:361, paragraph 45).

147. In that vein, the statement of reasons required under Article 253 EC must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted that measure in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for it and to enable the competent Court of the European Union to exercise its jurisdiction to review legality (see France v Commission , paragraph 35, and Deutsche Telekom v Commission , paragraph 130).

35 In that connection, it must be borne in mind that the obligation to state reasons is an essential procedural requirement, as distinct from the question whether the reasons given are correct, which goes to the substantive legality of the contested measure. The statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review (Commission v Sytraval and Brink's France, cited above, paragraphs 67 and 63).

52 In that context, it is apparent from well-established case-law that a finding of abuse requires a combination of objective and subjective elements. First, with regard to the objective element, that finding requires that it must be apparent from a combination of objective circumstances that, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved. Second, such a finding requires a subjective element, namely that it must be apparent from a number of objective factors that the essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain an undue advantage. The prohibition of abuse is not relevant where the economic activity carried out may have some explanation other than the mere attainment of an advantage (judgment of 28 July 2016, Kratzer, C‑423/15, EU:C:2016:604, paragraphs 38 to 40 and the case-law cited).

38. In so deciding, the Court held, in paragraphs 45 to 47 of the judgment in My (C‑293/03, EU:C:2004:821) and in paragraphs 29 to 32 of the order in Ricci and Pisaneschi (C‑286/09 and C‑287/09, EU:C:2010:420), that the legislation at issue in the cases which gave rise to that judgment and that order could impede the recruitment by the EU institutions or bodies of national officials with a certain length of service.

47. It is plain that national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings is likely to impede and therefore to discourage employment within an institution of the European Union, inasmuch as, by accepting employment with such an institution, a worker who was formerly a member of a national pension scheme risks losing the right to benefit under that scheme from an old-age pension to which he would have been entitled had he not accepted that employment.

18 The German and Norwegian Governments, and the Commission, maintain that an exclusive right to place employees should be assessed in the light of the principles that can be extracted from the judgment in Höfner and Elser, cited above.

19. First of all, to the extent that the advantageous rates at issue provide for a distinction on the basis of nationality, it should be recalled that such advantages are compatible with Community law only if they can be covered by an express derogating provision, such as Article 46 EC, to which Article 55 EC refers, namely public policy, public security or public health. Economic aims cannot constitute grounds of public policy within the meaning of Article 46 EC (see, inter alia , Case C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson [1995] ECR I-3955, paragraph 15).

15 As stated in paragraph 12 above, the rule in question entails discrimination based on the place of establishment. Such discrimination can only be justified on the general interest grounds referred to in Article 56(1) of the Treaty, to which Article 66 refers, and which do not include economic aims (see in particular Case C-288/89 Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and Others v Commissariaat voor de Media [1991] ECR I-4007, paragraph 11).

31. According to the basic relevant rule, all plant protection products placed on the market of a Member State must be authorised by the competent authorities of that Member State. Article 3(1) of Directive 91/414 thus provides that no plant protection product can be placed on the market and used in a Member State unless a prior marketing authorisation has been issued by that Member State in accordance with the directive. That requirement applies even when the product concerned already has a marketing authorisation in another Member State (see to that effect, Joined Cases C-260/06 and C-261/06 Escalier and Bonnarel [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24).

51. The grant of a concession, in the absence of any transparency, to an operator located in the Member State of the awarding authority constitutes a difference in treatment to the detriment of operators located in other Member States, who have no real possibility of manifesting their interest in obtaining the concession in question. Such a difference in treatment is contrary to the principle of equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, and constitutes indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality prohibited by Articles 43 EC and 49 EC, unless it is justified by objective circumstances (see, to that effect, Coname , paragraph 19; Parking Brixen , paragraph 50; and Case C‑347/06 ASM Brescia [2008] ECR I‑5641, paragraphs 59 and 60).

50. It is for the concession-granting public authority to evaluate, subject to review by the competent courts, the appropriateness of the detailed arrangements of the call for competition to the particularities of the public service concession in question. However, a complete lack of any call for competition in the case of the award of a public service concession such as that at issue in the main proceedings does not comply with the requirements of Articles 43 EC and 49 EC any more than with the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency.

49. Indeed, decisions or measures adopted by the competent national authorities relating to a possible right of entry or residence, on the basis of Directive 2004/38, are intended to establish the individual position of a national of a Member State or of his family members with regard to that directive (see, to this effect, with regard to issue of a residence permit on the basis of secondary legislation, judgments in Collins , C‑138/02, EU:C:2004:172, paragraph 40; Commission v Belgium , C‑408/03, EU:C:2006:192, paragraphs 62 and 63; and Dias , C‑325/09, EU:C:2011:498, paragraph 48).

36. It has also held that, by specifying that the placing of goods on the market outside the EEA does not exhaust the proprietor’s right to oppose the importation of those goods without his consent, the Community legislature thus allowed the proprietor of the trade mark to control the initial marketing in the EEA of goods bearing the mark (see Case C-173/98 Sebago and Maison Dubois [1999] ECR I-4103, paragraph 21, Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss , paragraph 33, and Van Doren + Q , paragraph 26).

33 The effect of the Directive is therefore to limit exhaustion of the rights conferred on the proprietor of a trade mark to cases where goods have been put on the market in the EEA and to allow the proprietor to market his products outside that area without exhausting his rights within the EEA. By making it clear that the placing of goods on the market outside the EEA does not exhaust the proprietor's right to oppose the importation of those goods without his consent, the Community legislature has allowed the proprietor of the trade mark to control the initial marketing in the EEA of goods bearing the mark (Case C-173/98 Sebago and Maison Dubois [1999] ECR I-4103, paragraph 21).

26. As the Court has already held, where a matter is harmonised at Community level, national measures relating thereto must be assessed in the light of the provisions of that harmonising measure and not of those of the EC Treaty (see, to that effect, Case C-324/99 DaimlerChrysler [2001] ECR I-9897, paragraph 32 and Case C-257/06 Roby Profumi [2008] ECR I-189, paragraph 14).

30. Freedom of establishment, which Article 43 EC grants to Community nationals and which includes the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the Member State where such establishment is effected, entails, in accordance with Article 48 EC, for companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the European Community, the right to exercise their activity in the Member State concerned through a subsidiary, a branch or an agency (see, in particular, Case C-307/97 Saint Gobain ZN [1999] ECR I-6161, paragraph 35).

35 As far as companies or firms are concerned, their corporate seat, in the sense expressed above, serves to determine, like nationality for natural persons, their connection to a Member State's legal order (see ICI, cited above, paragraph 20, and the case-law cited there).

41. However, since the fact that the newspaper publisher proceeds with such publications which are liable to promote – possibly indirectly – the products and services of a third party is not liable to alter significantly the economic behaviour of the consumer in his decision to purchase or take possession of the (free) newspaper in question (on this aspect see Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag , paragraphs 44 and 45), such a publishing practice is not in itself liable to be classified as a ‘commercial practice’ within the meaning of Article 2(d) of Directive 2005/29.

70 Secondly, the case-law of the Court also shows that an obligation placed on traders in a Member State to obtain a certain percentage of their supplies of a given product from a national supplier limits to that extent the possibility of importing the same product by preventing those traders from obtaining supplies in respect of part of their needs from traders situated in other Member States (see, to that effect, Case 72/83 Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2727, paragraph 16; Case C-21/88 Du Pont de Nemours Italiana [1990] ECR I-889, paragraph 11).

16 THE OBLIGATION PLACED ON ALL IMPORTERS TO PURCHASE A CERTAIN PROPORTION OF THEIR SUPPLIES OF A GIVEN PRODUCT FROM A NATIONAL SUPPLIER LIMITS TO THAT EXTENT THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPORTING THE SAME PRODUCT . IT THUS HAS A PROTECTIVE EFFECT BY FAVOURING NATIONAL PRODUCTION AND , BY THE SAME TOKEN , WORKS TO THE DETRIMENT OF PRODUCERS IN OTHER MEMBER STATES , REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT THE RAW MATERIALS USED IN THE NATIONAL PRODUCTION IN QUESTION MUST THEMSELVES BE IMPORTED .

24 In that regard, it is important to point out that, under the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Directive 2006/112, in accordance with the requirements of the principle of neutrality of the common system of value added tax, the term ‘exploitation’ refers to all transactions, whatever may be their legal form, by which it is sought to obtain income from the goods in question on a continuing basis (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 June 2007 in T-Mobile Austria and Others, C‑284/04, EU:C:2007:381, paragraph 38, and 13 December 2007 in Götz, EU:C:2007:789, paragraph 18).

72. Consequently, as Apis, the Bulgarian Government and the Commission argue, the fact that all or part of the materials brought together in a collection of data are official and publicly accessible does not relieve the national court of an obligation to verify, in the light of all relevant facts, whether that collection constitutes a database capable of being protected by the sui generis right on the ground that a substantial investment, in quantitative or qualitative terms, was necessary to obtain, verify and/or present its overall contents (see, to that effect, Case 46/02 Fixtures Marketing , cited above, paragraphs 32 to 38).

35. That interpretation is backed up by the 39th recital of the preamble to the directive, according to which the aim of the sui generis right is to safeguard the results of the financial and professional investment made in ‘obtaining and collection of the contents’ of a database. As the Advocate General points out in points 61 to 66 of her Opinion, despite slight variations in wording, all the language versions of the 39th recital support an interpretation which excludes the creation of the materials contained in a database from the definition of obtaining.

35 In that context, it must be noted that the fact that the amounts covering general electricity charges are not intended for the general national budget but, as the Italian Government states, are paid to the management accounts of the Electricity Industry Equalisation Fund and allocated to certain categories of operators for specific uses cannot of itself preclude them from coming within the field of direct taxation (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 April 2010, CIBA, C‑96/08, EU:C:2010:185, paragraph 23).

70. It is of little account that that designated company was at one and the same time the centralising body for the tax received, the manager of the monies collected and the recipient of part of those monies. The mechanisms provided for by the Law and, more specifically, the detailed accounts certified by an auditor, make it possible to distinguish those different roles and to monitor the use of the monies. It follows that as long as that designated company did not appropriate to itself the amount of NLG 400 million, at the time when it was freely able to do so, that amount remained under public control and therefore available to the national authorities, which is sufficient for it to be categorised as State resources (see, to that effect, Case C-482/99 France v Commission [2002] ECR I-4397, paragraph 37).

37 Second, it should be recalled that it has already been established in the case-law of the Court that Article 87(1) EC covers all the financial means by which the public authorities may actually support undertakings, irrespective of whether or not those means are permanent assets of the public sector. Therefore, even if the sums corresponding to the measure in question are not permanently held by the Treasury, the fact that they constantly remain under public control, and therefore available to the competent national authorities, is sufficient for them to be categorised as State resources (see the judgment in Case C-83/98 P France v Ladbroke Racing and Commission [2000] ECR I-3271, paragraph 50).

25 Accordingly, conditions imposed by national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory where, although applicable irrespective of nationality, they affect essentially migrant workers or where the great majority of those affected are migrant workers, as well as conditions which are applicable without distinction but can more easily be satisfied by national workers than by migrant workers or where there is a risk that they may operate to the particular detriment of migrant workers (Case C-237/94 O'Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617, paragraph 18).

48. It is incompatible in principle with the rules on freedom of movement for a worker who has made use of that right to be the subject of less favourable treatment in the Member State of which he is a national than he would receive if he had not made use of the opportunities offered by those rules. However, it must be remembered that discrimination can arise only through the application of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different situations (see, inter alia, Schumacker , paragraph 30; Gschwind , paragraph 21; and Case C‑383/05 Talotta [2007] ECR I‑2555, paragraph 18).

30 It is also settled law that discrimination can arise only through the application of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different situations.

27. It should be noted in that regard that a distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (Case C‑535/06 P Moser Baer India v Council [2009] ECR I‑7051, paragraph 33 and case‑law cited).

42. According to settled case-law, for a trade mark to possess distinctive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 it must serve to identify the goods in respect of which registration is sought as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods from those of other undertakings (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-456/01 P and C-457/01 P Henkel v OHIM [2004] ECR I-5089, paragraph 34; Case C-136/02 P Mag Instrument v OHIM [2004] ECR I-9165, paragraph 29, and Case C-238/06 P Develey v OHIM [2007] ECR I-9375, paragraph 79).

79. According to consistent case-law, the distinctive character of a trade mark within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 means that the mark in question makes it possible to identify the product in respect of which registration is applied for as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish that product from those of other undertakings (Joined Cases C‑473/01 P and C‑474/01 P Procter & Gamble v OHIM [2004] ECR I‑5173, paragraph 32, and Case C‑64/02 P OHIM v Erpo Möbelwerk [2004] ECR I‑10031, paragraph 42). That distinctive character must be assessed, first, by reference to the products or services in respect of which registration has been applied for and, second, by reference to the perception of the relevant public ( Procter & Gamble v OHIM , paragraph 33, and Case C‑24/05 P Storck v OHIM [2006] ECR I‑5677, paragraph 23).

46 In that regard, it is appropriate to begin by recalling that Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/96 defines ‘energy products’ for the purposes of that directive by drawing up an exhaustive list of the products covered by that definition by reference to the codes of the combined nomenclature (judgments of 4 June 2015, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems, C‑5/14, EU:C:2015:354, paragraph 47, and of 1 October 2015, OKG, C‑606/13, EU:C:2015:636, paragraph 26).

46. The situation at issue in the main proceedings is therefore that of a person who, while maintaining paid employment in his State of origin, transferred his residence to another Member State, and then found other employment in his State of origin. The fact that Mr Hendrix, after taking up residence in Belgium, continued to work in the Netherlands and then changed employer in that Member State gives him the status of a migrant worker and brings him, throughout the period at issue in the main proceedings, that is from June 1999 to 2001, within the scope of Community law and, in particular, within the scope of its provisions relating to freedom of movement for workers (Case C‑152/03 Ritter-Coulais [2006] ECR I‑1711, paragraphs 31 and 32, and Case C‑212/05 Hartmann [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 17).

31. It should be noted that any Community national who, irrespective of his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers and who has been employed in a Member State other than that of residence falls within the scope of Article 48 EC (see Case C-385/00 De Groot [2002] ECR I-11819, paragraph 76; Case C-209/01 Schilling and Fleck-Schilling [2003] ECR I-13389, paragraph 23; and Case C-277/03 Van Pommeren-Bourgondiën [2005] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 19, 44 and 45).

32. The Court can refuse to give a preliminary ruling on a question submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the ruling sought by that court on the interpretation or validity of Community law bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, or where the problem is hypothetical (see Bosman , paragraph 61, and Acereda Herrera , paragraph 48).

29. It is settled case-law that all measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of the freedom of establishment must be regarded as restrictions of that freedom (see, inter alia, Case C‑79/01 Payroll and Others [2002] ECR I‑8923, paragraph 26; Case C‑442/02 CaixaBank France [2004] ECR I‑8961, paragraph 11; and Case C‑157/07 Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee‑Seniorenheimstatt [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 30).

26 It must also be borne in mind that Article 43 EC requires the elimination of restrictions on the freedom of establishment and that all measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of such freedom must be regarded as constituting such restrictions (see, for example, Case C-439/99 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-305, paragraph 22).

43. Thus, under Article 11(1)(a) of Directive 90/434, Member States may refuse to apply, or may withdraw the benefit of, all or any part of the provisions of that directive, inter alia, where the exchange of shares has tax evasion or tax avoidance as its principal objective or as one of its principal objectives. That same provision also provides that the fact that the operation is not carried out for valid commercial reasons, such as the restructuring or rationalisation of the activities of the companies participating in the operation, may constitute a presumption that the operation has such an objective ( Leur-Bloem , paragraphs 38 and 39, and Kofoed , paragraph 37).

56 It is only quite exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the EU legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed: those concerned must have acted in good faith and there must be a risk of serious difficulties (judgments of 27 February 2014, Transportes Jordi Besora, C‑82/12, EU:C:2014:108, paragraph 41, and of 22 September 2016, Microsoft Mobile Sales International and Others, C‑110/15, EU:C:2016:717, paragraph 60).

41. It is only quite exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the legal order of the European Union, decide to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely, that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties (see, inter alia, Case C‑402/03 Skov and Bilka [2006] ECR I‑199, paragraph 51; Case C‑2/09 Kalinchev [2010] ECR I‑4939, paragraph 50; and Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others , paragraph 59).

26 In the light of those criteria, the refusal to allow farmers who let their holdings prior to the entry into force of the modified scheme in 1989 to obtain a special reference quantity, even though farmers who let their holdings after that date and those who continue to operate their holdings on their own account, albeit with employed labour, are able to do so, is justified by the need to prevent a reference quantity from being claimed for the sole purpose of deriving a purely financial advantage therefrom, owing to the market value which those reference quantities have acquired in the mean time, without there being any real intention on the part of the person concerned of resuming the marketing of milk (see von Deetzen v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg, paragraph 24).

10 It must first be observed that in the context of the organization of the powers of the Community the choice of the legal basis for a measure may not depend simply on an institution' s conviction as to the objective pursued but must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review (see the judgment in Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493, paragraph 11). Those factors include in particular the aim and content of the measure.

11 IT MUST BE OBSERVED THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE POWERS OF THE COMMUNITY THE CHOICE OF THE LEGAL BASIS FOR A MEASURE MAY NOT DEPEND SIMPLY ON AN INSTITUTION' S CONVICTION AS TO THE OBJECTIVE PURSUED BUT MUST BE BASED ON OBJECTIVE FACTORS WHICH ARE AMENABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW .

22. Article 31 of the Montreal Convention accordingly states that a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose (Case C‑70/09 Hengartner and Gasser [2010] ECR I‑7233, paragraph 36 and the case‑law cited, and Walz , paragraph 23 and the case‑law cited).

43. The Court has also pointed out that the number of hospitals, their geographical distribution, the mode of their organisation and the facilities with which they are provided, and even the nature of the medical services which they are able to offer, are all matters for which planning, generally designed to satisfy various needs, must be possible. For one thing, such planning seeks to ensure that there is sufficient and permanent access to a balanced range of high-quality hospital treatment in the State concerned. For another thing, it assists in meeting a desire to control costs and to prevent, as far as possible, any wastage of financial, technical and human resources. Such wastage would be all the more damaging because it is generally recognised that the hospital care sector generates considerable costs and must satisfy increasing needs, while the financial resources which may be made available for healthcare are not unlimited, whatever the mode of funding applied ( Smits and Peerbooms , paragraphs 76 to 79, and Watts , paragraphs 108 and 109).

79 For another thing, it assists in meeting a desire to control costs and to prevent, as far as possible, any wastage of financial, technical and human resources. Such wastage is all the more damaging because it is generally recognised that the hospital care sector generates considerable costs and must satisfy increasing needs, while the financial resources which may be made available for health care are not unlimited, whatever the mode of funding applied.

95. Aid may be selective for the purposes of that provision even if it concerns a whole economic sector (see, inter alia, Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] ECR I-3671, paragraph 33).

42. The first point to be noted here is that in the procedure laid down by Article 234 EC providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. In addition, it is to be borne in mind that the Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of Community law necessary to national courts in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts (Case C-280/91 Viessmann [1993] ECR I-971, paragraph 17; Case C‑42/96 Immobiliare SIF [1997] ECR I‑7089, paragraph 28; and Case C‑45/06 Campina [2007] ECR I‑2089, paragraphs 30 and 31).

30. In the procedure laid down by Article 234 EC providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (Case C-286/05 Haug [2006] ECR I-4121, paragraph 17 and the case‑law cited).

20. As a preliminary point, it must, first, be recalled that, in the absence of EU sectoral rules or of national legislation providing for specific rules on the limitation period, the four-year limitation rule laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 is applicable to irregularities which are detrimental to the European Union’s financial interests (see, to that effect, judgment in Pfeifer & Langen , C‑564/10, EU:C:2012:190, paragraphs 39 and 40 and the case-law cited).

25 Nevertheless, in Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 21, the Court considered that, in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction, it is a matter for the Court of Justice to examine the conditions in which the case has been referred to it by the national court. The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in the preliminary-ruling procedure requires the national court to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to assist in the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions (Foglia v Novello, cited above, paragraphs 18 and 20, and Case 149/82 Robards v Insurance Officer [1983] ECR 171, paragraph 19).

20 WHILST THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION WHICH MUST GOVERN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DUTIES ASSIGNED BY ARTICLE 177 TO THE NATIONAL COURTS ON THE ONE HAND AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE ON THE OTHER REQUIRES THE LATTER TO HAVE REGARD TO THE NATIONAL COURT ' S PROPER RESPONSIBILITIES , IT IMPLIES AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE NATIONAL COURT , IN THE USE WHICH IT MAKES OF THE FACILITIES PROVIDED BY ARTICLE 177 , SHOULD HAVE REGARD TO THE PROPER FUNCTION OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN THIS FIELD .

23. That interpretation is supported by the finding that limiting the scope of ‘denied boarding’ exclusively to cases of overbooking would have the practical effect of substantially reducing the protection afforded to passengers under Regulation No 261/2004 and would therefore be contrary to the aim of that regulation — referred to in recital 1 in the preamble thereto — of ensuring a high level of protection for passengers. Consequently, a broad interpretation of the rights granted to passengers is justified (see, to that effect, Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2006] ECR I-403, paragraph 69, and C-549/07 Wallentin-Hermann [2008] ECR I-11061, paragraph 18).

84. Il convient de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence bien établie de la Cour, en l’absence de tout indice selon lequel la durée excessive de la procédure devant la Commission et le Tribunal aurait eu une incidence sur la solution du litige, le non-respect d’un délai raisonnable ne saurait conduire à l’annulation de la décision litigieuse ou de l’arrêt attaqué (voir, en ce sens, arrêts Technische Unie/Commission, C‑113/04 P, EU:C:2006:593, point 48, ainsi que Gascogne Sack Deutschland/Commission, C‑40/12 P, EU:C:2013:768, point 81).

48. It is perfectly lawful to make use of that criterion for the purpose of finding that there has been a breach of the ‘reasonable time’ principle. At paragraph 49 of the judgment in Baustahlgewebe v Commission , the Court of Justice held, when evaluating the duration of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance, that an indication that the length of the proceedings affected their outcome may result in the judgment under appeal being set aside. The same approach is to be found in the reasoning followed by the Court of First Instance where it considered that the excessive duration of the procedure before the Commission must entail the annulment of the contested decision if TU’s rights of defence have been compromised, in which case there is necessarily a possible effect on the outcome of the procedure.

34. Cette disposition, en tant qu’elle constitue une dérogation au principe fondamental de la libre circulation des capitaux, doit faire l’objet d’une interprétation stricte. Partant, elle ne saurait être interprétée en ce sens que toute législation fiscale comportant une distinction entre les contribuables en fonction du lieu où ils résident ou de l’État dans lequel ils investissent leurs capitaux est automatiquement compatible avec le traité (voir arrêts du 11 septembre 2008, Eckelkamp e.a., C‑11/07, Rec. p. I_6845, point 57; du 22 avril 2010, Mattner, C‑510/08, Rec. p. I‑3553, point 32, ainsi que du 10 février 2011, Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel et Österreichische Salinen, C‑436/08 et C‑437/08, Rec. p. I‑305, point 56).

26 According to the Cassis de Dijon case-law (Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral [1979] ECR 649), in the absence of harmonisation of legislation, obstacles to free movement of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods (such as those relating to designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling, packaging) constitute measures of equivalent effect prohibited by Article 30, even if those rules apply without distinction to all products, unless their application can be justified by a public-interest objective taking precedence over the free movement of goods (Case C-293/93 Houtwipper [1994] ECR I-4249, paragraph 11).

11 It is established by the case-law beginning with "Cassis de Dijon" (Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuer Branntwein [1979] ECR 649) that, in the absence of harmonization of legislation, obstacles to the free movement of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marked, rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods (such as those relating to designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling, packaging) constitute measures of equivalent effect prohibited by Article 30. This is so even if those rules apply without distinction to all products unless their application can be justified by a public-interest objective taking precedence over the free movement of goods.

34. Thirdly, it is by operation of that decision that that body acquires an exclusive right (see, to that effect, judgment in Albany , C‑67/96, EU:C:1999:430, paragraph 90). The extension decision has the effect of excluding operators established in other Member States which might be interested in carrying out that management activity (see, by analogy, judgment in Sporting Exchange , C‑203/08, EU:C:2010:307, paragraph 47).

44. According to settled case-law, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied on before the national courts by individuals against the State where the latter has failed to implement the directive in domestic law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly (see, in particular, Case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53, paragraph 25; Joined Cases C‑246/94 to C‑249/94 Cooperativa Agricola Zootecnica S. Antonio and Others [1996] ECR I‑4373, paragraph 17; and Case C‑226/07 Flughafen Köln/Bonn [2008] ECR I‑5999, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

25 THUS , WHEREVER THE PROVISIONS OF A DIRECTIVE APPEAR , AS FAR AS THEIR SUBJECT-MATTER IS CONCERNED , TO BE UNCONDITIONAL AND SUFFICIENTLY PRECISE , THOSE PROVISIONS MAY , IN THE ABSENCE OF IMPLEMENTING MEASURES ADOPTED WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD , BE RELIED UPON AS AGAINST ANY NATIONAL PROVISION WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE DIRECTIVE OR IN SO FAR AS THE PROVISIONS DEFINE RIGHTS WHICH INDIVIDUALS ARE ABLE TO ASSERT AGAINST THE STATE .

16. Furthermore, as regards possible linguistic divergences, the Court has already held, firstly, that the need for a uniform interpretation of Community law means that a particular provision should not be considered in isolation but in cases of doubt should be interpreted and applied in the light of the other language versions and, secondly, that the different language versions of a Community text must be given a uniform interpretation and hence, in the case of divergence between the language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part (see, to that effect, Case C‑372/88 Cricket St Thomas [1990] ECR I-1345, paragraph 19, and Case C‑174/05 Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie and Natuur en Milieu [2006] ECR I-2443, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).

43 In this connection, it should be noted first of all that Article 291(2) TFEU is not the only provision of EU law that confers an implementing power on the Council. Other provisions of primary law may confer such a power on it directly (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 November 2014, Parliament and Commission v Council, C‑103/12 and C‑165/12, EU:C:2014:2400, paragraph 50, and of 7 September 2016, Germany v Parliament and Council, C‑113/14, EU:C:2016:635, paragraphs 55 and 56). In addition, acts of secondary legislation may establish implementing powers outside the regime laid down in Article 291 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 January 2014, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, C‑270/12, EU:C:2014:18, paragraphs 78 to 86 and 98).

56 In that regard, although Article 43(3) TFEU grants the Council the power to adopt, inter alia, implementing acts in the area concerned, the fact remains that those acts are not simply to be considered the same as those conferring implementing powers, within the meaning of Article 291(2) TFEU (judgment of 1 December 2015 in Parliament and Commission v Council, C‑124/13 and C‑125/13, EU:C:2015:790, paragraph 54).

22. Provisions preventing or deterring a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of movement constitute an obstacle to that freedom, even if they apply without regard to the nationality of the workers concerned ( Commission v Denmark , paragraph 35; Commission v Portugal , paragraph 16; Commission v Sweden , paragraph 18; and Case C-318/05 Commission v Germany , paragraph 115).

9. À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé (voir, notamment, arrêts du 17 septembre 1996, Commission/Italie, C‑289/94, Rec. p. I‑4405, point 20; du 2 juin 2005, Commission/Irlande, C‑282/02, Rec. p. I‑4653, point 40, et du 10 mai 2007, Commission/Belgique, C‑407/06, non publié au Recueil, point 9).

20 The Court has consistently held that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in the Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (Case C-133/94 Commission v Belgium [1996] ECR I-0000, paragraph 17).

23 Second, the fact that it may be necessary to order the defendant in the main proceedings to cease its activities in the future provides sufficient justification for interpreting the relevant provisions of Regulation No 1475/95 (see, to that effect, Case C-408/95 Eurotunnel and Others v Seafrance [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24).

39. However, the concept of aid does not encompass measures creating different treatment of undertakings in relation to charges where that difference is attributable to the nature and general scheme of the system of charges in question (see, in particular, Case C-351/98 Spain v Commission [2002] ECR I-8031, paragraph 42, and Case C-159/01 Netherlands v Commission [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 42).

42 It is true that the concept of aid has been interpreted by the Court as not encompassing differential treatment of undertakings in the application of charges, where that differential treatment flows from the nature and general scheme of the system of charges in question (see, to that effect, Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 15; Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Sloman Neptun [1993] ECR I-887, paragraph 21; and Case C-390/98 Banks [2001] ECR I-6117, paragraph 33).

27 It must be borne in mind first of all that the purpose of Article 7 is to protect consumers against the risks arising from the insolvency of the organiser of the package travel. Those risks, inherent in the contract concluded between the purchaser and the organiser, stem from the payment in advance of the price of the package and from the spread of responsibilities between the travel organiser and the various providers of the services which, in combination, make up the package. Consequently, the result prescribed by Article 7 of the Directive entails the grant to the traveller of rights guaranteeing the refund of money that he has paid over and his repatriation in the event of the organiser's insolvency (Case C-364/96 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v sterreichische Kreditversicherungs [1998] ECR I-2949, paragraph 18).

35 In that regard, Article 13(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 provides that the persons to whom that regulation applies are to be subject to the legislation of a single Member State only, which therefore excludes — subject to the cases provided for in Articles 14c and 14f — any possibility of the overlapping of the national legislation of several Member States in respect of one and the same period (see, to that effect, the judgments of 5 May 1977, Perenboom, 102/76, EU:C:1977:71, paragraph 11, and 26 February 2015, de Ruyter, C‑623/13, EU:C:2015:123, paragraph 36).

11 ARTICLE 13 ( 1 ) OF REGULATION NO 1408/71 , WHICH PROVIDES THAT A WORKER ' SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE LEGISLATION OF A SINGLE MEMBER STATE ONLY ' , EXCLUDES ANY POSSIBILITY OF THE OVERLAPPING OF SEVERAL NATIONAL LEGISLATIONS IN RESPECT OF ONE AND THE SAME PERIOD .

56. Thus, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, the principle of proportionality requires, in particular, the principle of equal treatment to be reconciled as far as possible with the requirements of road safety which determine the conditions for driving motor vehicles (see, by analogy, Johnston EU:C:1986:206, paragraph 38; Sirdar EU:C:1999:523, paragraph 26; and Case C‑285/98 Kreil EU:C:2000:2, paragraph 23).

45. Similarly, as regards certain social security benefits under national schemes other than the German care insurance scheme, the Court has held in essence that benefits that are granted objectively on the basis of a legally defined position and are intended to improve the state of health and life of persons reliant on care must be regarded as ‘sickness benefits’ within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 (see, to that effect, Case C‑215/99 Jauch [2001] ECR I‑1901, paragraph 28; Case C‑286/03 Hosse [2006] ECR I‑1771, paragraphs 38 to 44; and Case C‑299/05 Commission v Parliament and Council [2007] ECR I‑8695, paragraphs 10, 61 and 70).

44. In those circumstances, even if they have their own particular characteristics, such benefits must be regarded as sickness benefits within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71.

24 As the referring court itself points out, the Court has repeatedly held that the principle of legal certainty is one of the objectives of the Brussels Convention (Case 38/81 Effer [1982] ECR 825, paragraph 6; Case C-26/91 Handte [1992] ECR I-3967, paragraphs 11, 12, 18 and 19; Case C-129/92 Owens Bank [1994] ECR I-117, paragraph 32; Case C-288/92 Custom Made Commercial [1994] ECR I-2913, paragraph 18; and Case C-440/97 GIE Groupe Concorde and Others [1999] ECR I-6307, paragraph 23).

42. Accordingly, Directive 1999/70 and the framework agreement are applicable to all workers providing remunerated services in the context of a fixed-term employment relationship linking them to their employer ( Del Cerro Alonso , paragraph 28).

28. Accordingly, Directive 1999/70 and the framework agreement are applicable to all workers providing remunerated services in the context of a fixed-term employment relationship linking them to their employer.

68. As the Court has already pointed out, the objective pursued by the rules of EU law governing equality between men and women is, with regard to the rights of pregnant women and women who have given birth, to protect those women before and after they give birth (see Case C‑191/03 McKenna [2005] ECR I‑7631, paragraph 42).

41. According to those provisions, this harmonisation at Community level in relation to the organisation of working time is intended to guarantee better protection of the safety and health of workers by ensuring that they are entitled to minimum rest periods – particularly daily and weekly – and adequate breaks and by providing for a ceiling of 48 hours on the average duration of the working week, a maximum limit which is expressly stated to include overtime (see Simap , paragraph 49, BECTU , paragraph 38, Jaeger , paragraph 46, Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 92, and Case C‑313/02 Wippel [2004] ECR I‑9483, paragraph 47).

47. According to the same provisions, such harmonisation at Community level in relation to the organisation of working time is intended to guarantee better protection of the safety and health of workers by ensuring that they are entitled to minimum rest periods – particularly daily and weekly – and adequate breaks and by providing for a ceiling on the duration of the working week (see Case C-303/98 Simap [2000] ECR I-7963, paragraph 49; BECTU , paragraph 38, and Jaeger , paragraph 46). That protection constitutes a social right conferred on each worker as an essential minimum requirement in order to ensure the protection of his security and health ( BECTU, paragraph 47).

91. It should also be borne in mind that the lawfulness of a decision concerning State aid falls to be assessed by the European Union judicature in the light of the information available to the Commission at the time when the decision was adopted (Case C‑390/06 Nuova Agricast [2008] ECR I‑2577, paragraph 54).

81 Thus, it is following a schematic interpretation of the relevant EU rules that the Court of Justice interpreted those rules as meaning that, as from 2000, the Commission is required to comply with a legal time limit when adopting a decision on financial corrections (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 56 to 82, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 56 to 82).

59. It is clear from the preamble to Regulation No 1265/1999, in particular recitals 1, 2, 4 and 5, that Annex II was amended, in order to make the Cohesion Fund more effective, to simplify the system of financial management while making provision for improved checks that expenditure has actually been incurred and to improve and to put on a more systematic basis cooperation between the Commission and the Member State concerned on the checking of projects.

59. The activities of collecting societies are subject to the provisions of Article 56 TFEU et seq. relating to the freedom to provide services (see, to that effect, Case 22/79 Greenwich Film Production [1979] ECR 3275, paragraph 12, Case 7/82 GVL v Commission [1983] ECR 483, paragraph 38; and Joined Cases C‑92/92 and C‑326/92 Phil Collins and Others [1993] ECR I‑5145, paragraph 24).

37. The establishment in Member States of independent supervisory authorities is thus an essential component of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data (Case C-518/07 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-1885, paragraph 23).

23. The supervisory authorities provided for in Article 28 of Directive 95/46 are therefore the guardians of those fundamental rights and freedoms, and their existence in the Member States is considered, as is stated in the 62nd recital in the preamble to Directive 95/46, as an essential component of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.

22 A reference by a national court can be rejected only if it appears that the procedure laid down by Article 177 of the Treaty has been misused and a ruling from the Court elicited by means of a contrived dispute, or it is obvious that Community law cannot apply, either directly or indirectly, to the circumstances of the case referred to the Court (Giloy, cited above, paragraph 22).

52. Here it is to be noted that Article 34 EU provides that the Council may adopt acts varying in nature and scope. Under Article 34(2)(a) EU the Council may ‘adopt common positions defining the approach of the Union to a particular matter’. A common position requires the compliance of the Member States by virtue of the principle of the duty to cooperate in good faith, which means in particular that Member States are to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of their obligations under European Union law (see Pupino , paragraph 42). Article 37 EU thus provides that the Member States are to defend the common positions ‘[w]ithin international organisations and at international conferences in which they take part’. However, a common position is not supposed to produce of itself legal effects in relation to third parties. That is why, in the system established by Title VI of the EU Treaty, only framework decisions and decisions may be the subject of an action for annulment before the Court of Justice. The Court’s jurisdiction, as defined by Article 35(1) EU, to give preliminary rulings also does not extend to common positions but is limited to rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework decisions and decisions, on the interpretation of conventions established under Title VI and on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing them.

42. It would be difficult for the Union to carry out its task effectively if the principle of loyal cooperation, requiring in particular that Member States take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of their obligations under European Union law, were not also binding in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which is moreover entirely based on cooperation between the Member States and the institutions, as the Advocate General has rightly pointed out in paragraph 26 of her Opinion.

24 As the Advocate General pointed out at point 17 of his Opinion, authorization has the effect of suspending currency exports and makes them conditional in each case upon the consent of the administrative authorities, which must be sought by means of a special application.

50. Secondly, as regards making the issue of the EU Posting Confirmation subject to the requirement that there must be an employment contract of at least one year or of indefinite duration, such a measure goes beyond what is required for the objective of social protection as a necessary condition for providing services through the posting of workers who are nationals of non-Member States ( Commission v Luxembourg , paragraphs 32 and 33, and Commission v Germany , paragraph 58).

32. Moreover, making the granting of a collective work permit subject to the requirement that an employment contract of indefinite duration must have been in existence between the workers and their undertaking of origin for at least six months before their deployment to Luxembourg goes beyond what is required for the objective of social welfare protection as a necessary condition for providing services through the deployment of workers who are nationals of non-member countries.

42. In so far as the Federal Republic of Germany submits that the disputed administrative practice is justified by the fact that the provision in question is contained in a bilateral international agreement, it must be noted that, when giving effect to commitments assumed under international agreements, be it an agreement between Member States or an agreement between a Member State and one or more non-member countries, Member States are required, subject to the provisions of Article 307 EC, to comply with the obligations that Community law imposes on them (see, inter alia, Gottardo , paragraph 33).

En faisant application de cette jurisprudence au cas d’espèce, le Tribunal n’a commis aucune erreur de droit, étant donné que la Cour a déjà constaté que, du point de vue de l’accès au dossier administratif, les procédures de contrôle des aides d’État et celles de contrôle des opérations de concentration sont comparables et qu’il convient de reconnaître l’existence d’une présomption générale de confidentialité des documents afférents à ces procédures dans chacune de celles-ci (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 28 juin 2012, Commission/Éditions Odile Jacob, C‑404/10 P, EU:C:2012:393, points 117 à 123).

122. If persons other than those entitled to have access to the file by the rules on merger control proceedings, or those who could be regarded as involved parties but have not used their right of access to the information or have been refused access, were able to obtain access to the documents relating to such a procedure on the basis of Regulation No 1049/2001, the system introduced by that legislation would be undermined.

21 That argument disregards the fact the activity of a television broadcaster which consists in providing, on a permanent basis, services from the Member State in which it is established for the purposes of Article 2(1) of the Directive does not imply, as such, the pursuit in the host Member State of an activity in regard to which it must be determined whether it is temporary or not, as was the case in Case C-222/94 Commission v United Kingdom.

31 In that regard, it must first be borne in mind that the Court also rejected that argument in its judgment in Joined Cases C-19/90 and C-20/90 cited above, in particular at paragraphs 25 to 28.

26 That objective would be seriously frustrated if the Member States were entitled to derogate from the provisions of the directive by maintaining in force rules - even rules categorized as special or exceptional - under which it is possible to decide by administrative measure, outside any decision by the general meeting of shareholders, to effect an increase in the company' s capital which would have the effect either of obliging the original shareholders to increase their contributions to the capital or of imposing on them the addition of new shareholders, thus reducing their involvement in the decision-taking power of the company.

21 According to established case-law (see, in particular, Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraphs 59 to 61 and Case C-60/98 Butterfly Music [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 13), it is solely for the national court hearing the case, which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, with regard to the particular aspects of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it refers to the Court. The Court may refuse a request made by such a court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought bears no relation to the actual facts or purpose of the main proceedings or where the problem is hypothetical and the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted.

38. The Court has repeatedly held that classification as aid requires that all the conditions set out in Article 87(1) EC are fulfilled (see Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission , ‘Tubemeuse’ , [1990] ECR I-959, paragraph 25; Joined Cases C‑278/92 to C-280/92 Spain v Commission [1994] ECR I-4103, paragraph 20; Case C-482/99 France v Commission [2002] ECR I‑4397, paragraph 68; and Case C‑280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] ECR I‑7747, paragraph 74).

25 It should be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, investment by the public authorities in the capital of undertakings, in whatever form, may constitute State aid where the conditions set out in Article 92 are fulfilled ( see the judgments of 14 November 1984 in Case 323/82 Intermills v Commission (( 1984 )) ECR 3809, and of 13 March 1985 in Joined Cases 296 and 318/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission (( 1985 )) ECR 809 ).

37. In that respect, it should be noted that the equal treatment rule laid down both in Article 45 TFEU and in Article 7 of Regulation No 1612/68 prohibits not only overt discrimination on grounds of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, through the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result (see, inter alia, Case C-57/96 Meints [1997] ECR I-6689, paragraph 44, and Case C-269/07 Commission v Germany [2009] ECR I-7811, paragraph 53).

55. As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that Article 34 of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted strictly inasmuch as it constitutes an obstacle to the attainment of one of the fundamental objectives of that regulation (see Case C‑414/92 Solo Kleinmotoren [1994] ECR I-2237, paragraph 20; Case C‑7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR I-1935, paragraph 21, and Case C-38/98 Renault [2000] ECR I-2973, paragraph 26). With regard, more specifically, to the public-policy clause in Article 34(1) of the regulation, it may be relied on only in exceptional cases (see Case 145/86 Hoffmann [1988] ECR 645, paragraph 21; Case C‑78/95 Hendrikman and Feyen [1996] ECR I-4943, paragraph 23; Krombach , paragraph 21, and Renault , paragraph 26).

26 The first point to note is that Article 27 of the Convention must be interpreted strictly inasmuch as it constitutes an obstacle to the attainment of one of the fundamental objectives of the Convention (Case C-414/92 Solo Kleinmotoren [1994] ECR I-2237, paragraph 20, and Krombach, paragraph 21). With regard more specifically to the clause on public policy in Article 27, point 1, of the Convention, the Court has made it clear that it may be relied on only in exceptional cases (Case 145/86 Hoffmann v Krieg [1988] ECR 645, paragraph 21, and Case C-78/95 Hendrikman and Feyen v Magenta Druck & Verlag [1996] ECR I-4943, paragraph 23).

42 In that regard, the Court has held that, once the employment relationship has ended, the person concerned as a rule loses his status of worker within the meaning of Article 48 of the Treaty, although that status may produce certain effects after the relationship has ended (see Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691, paragraph 32).

39. Since the concept of extraction is used in various provisions of Article 7 of Directive 96/9, the answers to the questions being considered must be placed in the general context of that article (see, to that effect, Case C‑304/07 Directmedia Publishing [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 28).

28. Since the concept of extraction is thus used in various provisions of Article 7 of Directive 96/9, it must be interpreted in the general context of that article (see, to that effect, The British Horseracing Board and Others , paragraph 67).

20. In the second place, concerning the objectives of Directive 95/46, it is apparent from the third, seventh and eighth recitals in the preamble thereto that, through the harmonisation of national provisions on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, that directive seeks principally to ensure the free movement of such data between the Member States, which is necessary for the establishment of and the functioning of the internal market, within the meaning of Article 14(2) EC (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑465/00, C‑138/01 and C‑139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I‑4989, paragraphs 39 and 70).

55 It also follows from the case-law of the Court that, in the absence of provisions of Community law, disputes concerning the recovery of amounts wrongly paid under Community law must be decided by national courts in application of their own domestic law, subject to the limits imposed by Community law, on the basis that the rules and procedures laid down by domestic law must not have the effect of making it practically impossible or excessively difficult to recover the aid not due and that the national legislation must be applied in a manner which is not discriminatory as compared to procedures for deciding similar national disputes (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor and Others [1983] ECR 2633, paragraph 19, Case C-366/95 Landbrugsministeriet v Steff-Houlberg Export and Others [1998] ECR I-2661, paragraph 15 and Case C-298/96 Oelmühle and Schmidt Söhne [1998] ECR I-4767, paragraph 24).

15 It follows from the case-law of the Court that, in the absence of provisions of Community law, disputes concerning the recovery of amounts paid but not due under Community law must be decided by national courts pursuant to their own national law subject to the limits imposed by Community law inasmuch as the rules and procedures laid down by national law must not have the effect of making it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to implement Community rules and national legislation must be applied in a manner which is not discriminatory compared to procedures for deciding similar national disputes (see, in particular, Deutsche Milchkontor, paragraph 19, and, as regards national procedural law, Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I-4599, paragraph 12, and Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel and Van Veen [1995] ECR I-4705, paragraph 17). Although national law requires the various interests in question, namely, on the one hand, the public interest in the revocation of an unlawful administrative measure and, on the other, the protection of the legitimate expectation of the person to whom it is addressed, to be weighed against one another before the measure is revoked, the interests of the Community must be taken fully into account (Deutsche Milchkontor, paragraph 32).

66. En outre, la Cour a déjà jugé que la circonstance qu’un État membre a confié à ses régions le soin de mettre en œuvre des directives ne saurait avoir aucune incidence sur l’application de l’article 258 TFUE. En effet, si chaque État membre est libre de répartir, comme il l’entend, les compétences normatives sur le plan interne, il n’en demeure pas moins que, en vertu de l’article 258 TFUE, il reste seul responsable, vis-à-vis de l’Union, du respect des obligations qui résultent du droit de l’Union (voir arrêt du 10 juin 2004, Commission/Italie, C‑87/02, Rec. p. I‑5975, point 38 et jurisprudence citée). Dès lors, un État membre ne saurait exciper de dispositions, pratiques ou situations de son ordre juridique interne pour justifier le non-respect des obligations et des délais résultant du droit de l’Union (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 15 décembre 2005, Commission/Allemagne, C‑67/05, point 9 et jurisprudence citée).

16. The fact, however, that a Member State does not grant to a non-resident certain tax benefits which it grants to a resident is not, as a rule, discriminatory having regard to the objective differences between the situations of residents and of non-residents, both from the point of view of the source of their income and from that of their personal ability to pay tax or their personal and family circumstances (Case C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225, paragraph 34, and Case C-391/97 Gschwind [1999] ECR I-5451, paragraph 23).

23 In paragraph 34 of Schumacker, cited above, the Court held that the fact that a Member State does not grant to a non-resident certain tax benefits which it grants to a resident is not, as a rule, discriminatory having regard to the objective differences between the situations of residents and of non-residents, both from the point of view of the source of their income and their personal ability to pay tax or their personal and family circumstances.

72. In paragraphs 57 and 58 of Kügler , cited above, the Court added that, in order to determine which organisations should be recognised as charitable within the meaning of Article 13A(1)(g) of the Sixth Directive, the national authorities should, in accordance with Community law and subject to review by the national courts, take a number of factors into consideration. Those factors include the public interest of the activities of the taxable person in question, the fact that other taxable persons carrying on the same activities already have similar recognition, and the fact that the costs incurred for the treatment in question may be largely met by health insurance schemes or other social security bodies.

19 As far as the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is concerned, it must be remembered that, as the Court has held (see in particular the judgment in Case C-177/90 Kuehn v Landwirtschaftkammer Weser-Ems [1992] ECR I-35, paragraph 15), where a producer has been encouraged by a Community measure to suspend the marketing of milk for a limited period in the general interest and against payment of a premium, he may legitimately expect not to be subject, upon the expiry of his undertaking, to restrictions which specifically affect him precisely because he availed himself of the possibilities offered by the Community provisions. On the other hand, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations does not preclude the imposition of restrictions on a producer under a system like the additional levy system by reason of the fact that he did not market milk during a given period prior to the entry into force of that system for reasons unconnected with his non-marketing or conversion undertaking.

15 Thus an economic operator who has been encouraged by a Community measure to suspend marketing of milk for a limited period in the general interest and against payment of a premium may, therefore, legitimately expect not to be subject, upon the expiry of his undertaking, to restrictions which affect him specifically precisely because he availed himself of the possibilities offered by the Community rules (see the judgments in Mulder, paragraph 24, and Von Deetzen, paragraph 13, both cited above). On the other hand, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations does not preclude, in the case of a scheme such as that concerning the additional levy, the imposition of restrictions on a producer by reason of the fact that he has not marketed milk or has marketed only a reduced quantity of milk during a period prior to the entry into force of that scheme, in consequence of a decision which he freely took without being encouraged to do so by a Community measure.

36. The fact that taxpayers have, under national law, another remedy enabling them to seek the repayment of taxes levied in breach of EU law, in the form of the Woolwich cause of action, cannot call into question that finding (see, to that effect, judgment in Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation , EU:C:2013:834, paragraph 39).

31. Where national rules fall within the scope of Community law, and reference is made to the Court for a preliminary ruling, the Court must provide all the criteria of interpretation needed by the national court to determine whether those rules are compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of which the Court ensures (Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 42, and Case C-85/97 SFI [1998] ECR I-7447, paragraph 29).

29 On that point, it should be recalled first of all that, where national rules fall within the scope of Community law, and reference is made to the Court for a preliminary ruling, the Court must provide all the criteria of interpretation needed by the national court to determine whether those rules are compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of which the Court ensures (Case C-260/89 ERT v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 42).

54. As regards, in the second place, the question of whether the rights of the defence of the interested parties in the main proceedings were observed, when they could submit their observations only in the objection procedure, it must be noted that the general interest of the European Union, in particular the interest in recovering its own revenue as soon as possible, means that inspections must be capable of being carried out promptly and effectively ( Sopropé , EU:C:2008:746, paragraph 41).

51. The Court reiterated that position, with regard to public service contracts, in the judgments in BFI Holding (paragraphs 55 and 56) and Korhonen (paragraphs 57 and 58) and, with regard to public supply contracts, in the judgment in Adolf Truley (paragraph 56). That position also applies to Directive 2004/18, which represents a recasting of the provisions of all the preceding directives on the award of public contracts which it follows (see, to that effect, Bayerischer Rundfunk , paragraph 30).

56 Since the status of a body governed by public law is not dependent on the relative importance, within its business as a whole, of the meeting of needs in the general interest not having an industrial or commercial character, it is a fortiori immaterial that commercial activities may be carried out by a separate legal person forming part of the same group or concern as it.

40 The same is also true of a legislative measure which could allow, without even requiring a later assessment and even where there are no specific exceptional circumstances, a project which ought to have been subject to an environmental impact assessment, by virtue of Article 2(1) of Directive 85/337, to be deemed to have been subject to such an assessment, even if such a measure were applicable only to projects in respect of which consent was no longer subject to a possibility of being directly challenged before the courts because of the expiry of the time limit for bringing proceedings laid down in national legislation (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 November 2016, Stadt Wiener Neustadt, C‑348/15, EU:C:2016:882, paragraphs 38 and 43).

40. The Court has stated that, when a tax on registration is paid in a Member State, the amount of that tax is incorporated in the value of the vehicle. Thus, if a vehicle registered in the Member State in question is subsequently sold as a second-hand vehicle in that Member State, its market value, including the residual registration tax, will be equal to a percentage of its original value, determined by depreciation ( Nádasdi and Németh , paragraph 54). Therefore, to ensure the neutrality of the tax, the value of the imported second-hand vehicle taken as the basis of taxation must reflect the value of a similar vehicle already registered on national territory ( Weigel , paragraph 71, and Case C‑74/06 Commission v Greece [2007] ECR I‑7585, paragraph 28).

54. A new vehicle in respect of which registration duty has been paid in Hungary loses, with time, part of its market value. With the depreciation in value, the amount of registration duty included in the residual value of the vehicle also diminishes. Since it is a used vehicle, it can be sold only for a percentage of its initial value, which contains the residual amount of the registration duty.

40. S’agissant du premier critère, il importe de relever que les fonctionnaires qui bénéficient d’un régime de pension doivent être considérés comme constituant une catégorie particulière de travailleurs. En effet, ceux-ci ne se distinguent des travailleurs groupés dans une entreprise ou un groupement d’entreprises, dans une branche économique ou un secteur professionnel ou interprofessionnel qu’en raison des caractéristiques propres qui régissent leur relation d’emploi avec l’État, avec d’autres collectivités ou employeurs publics (arrêts précités Griesmar, point 31, et Niemi, point 48).

27. It must be observed that according to settled case-law the definition of ‘body governed by public law’, a concept of Community law which must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community, is defined in functional terms exclusively under the three cumulative conditions in the second subparagraph of Article 1(b) of Directives 93/36 and 93/37 (see, to that effect, Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria and Others , paragraphs 20 and 21; Case C-470/99 Universale-Bau and Others [2002] ECR I-11617, paragraphs 51 to 53; Case C-214/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-4667, paragraphs 52 and 53; and Case C-283/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-11697, paragraph 69).

69. A preliminary point to be noted is that, according to settled case-law, in order to be defined as a body governed by public law within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1(b) of the Directive an entity must satisfy the three cumulative conditions set out therein, requiring it to be a body established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest not having an industrial or commercial character, to possess legal personality and to be closely dependent on the State, regional or local authorities or other bodies governed by public law (Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria and Others , paragraphs 20 and 21, and Case C-214/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-4667, paragraph 52).

33. In that context, it is common ground that whether the defendant was served with the document which instituted the proceedings is a relevant aspect of the overall assessment of a factual nature (see, to that effect Case 166/80 Klomps [1981] ECR 1593, paragraphs 15 and 18), which must be conducted by the court of the Member State in which enforcement is sought in order to ascertain whether that defendant has the time necessary in order to prepare his defence or to take the steps necessary to prevent a decision delivered in default of appearance.

40. Therefore, where the tax authority has the information necessary to establish that the taxable person is, as the recipient of the supply of services at issue, liable to VAT, Articles 167, 168 and 178(f) of Directive 2006/112 preclude legislation which imposes, in relation to the right of that taxable person to deduct that tax, additional conditions which may have the effect of rendering that right ineffective for practical purposes (see, to that effect, Bockemühl , paragraph 51 and Ecotrade , paragraph 64).

51. In that context, it is true that an invoice has an important documentary function because it may contain verifiable data. In a reverse charge situation, however, it is precisely on the strength of such verifiable information that the recipient of goods or services will have been held liable for the VAT, and in what amount. Where the tax administration has the information necessary to establish that the taxable person is, as the recipient of the supply in question, liable to VAT, it cannot, in relation to the right of that taxable person to deduct that VAT, impose additional conditions which may have the effect of rendering that right ineffective for practical purposes.

38. As the Court has repeatedly held, the right to deduct provided for in Article 167 et seq. of Directive 2006/112 is an integral part of the VAT scheme and in principle may not be limited. In particular, the right to deduct is exercisable immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I-1577, paragraph 43; Joined Cases C-439/04 and C-440/04 Kittel and Recolta Recycling [2006] ECR I-6161, paragraph 47; Case C-392/09 Uszodaépítő [2010] ECR I-8791, paragraph 34; and Commission v Hungary , paragraph 43).

64. Dans ces conditions, ne saurait affecter le manquement l’affirmation faite par cet État membre selon laquelle la procédure de récupération en cours relative au régime d’aides en cause n’a fait l’objet d’aucune contestation par la Commission (voir, en ce sens, arrêts Commission/Allemagne, C‑209/00, EU:C:2002:747, points 69 à 72, et Commission/Italie, C‑411/12, EU:C:2013:832, point 40).

72. It follows that the German Government's complaint regarding the alleged failure by the Commission to cooperate in good faith cannot affect that Government's failure to comply with its obligations.

58. Since Article 80(2) EC does not lay down any explicit limitations as to the nature of the specific common rules which the Council may adopt on that basis in accordance with the procedural provisions laid down in Article 71 EC, the Community legislature has broad legislative powers under Article 80(2) EC and is competent – by virtue of that provision and in keeping with the other provisions of the EC Treaty relating to the common transport policy, in particular Article 71(1) EC – to lay down, inter alia, ‘measures to improve transport safety’ and ‘any other appropriate provisions’ in the field of maritime transport (see, to that effect, in respect of road transport, Joined Cases C‑184/02 and C‑223/02 Spain and Finland v Parliament and Council [2004] ECR I‑7789, paragraph 28).

31 Nor can the fact that ACC was always RJB's sole contractor and subcontracted the work to AMS preclude in itself the existence of a transfer within the meaning of the Directive. First, the transfer of customers between transferor and transferee is only one factor amongst others in the overall assessment to be made to ascertain whether a transfer has taken place (Spijkers, cited above, paragraph 13). Second, the Directive is applicable wherever, in the context of contractual relations, there is a change in the natural or legal person responsible for carrying on the business who incurs the obligations of an employer towards employees of the undertaking (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-171/94 and C-172/94 Merckx and Neuhuys [1996] ECR I-1253, paragraph 28).

13 IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THOSE CONDITIONS ARE MET , IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER ALL THE FACTS CHARACTERIZING THE TRANSACTION IN QUESTION , INCLUDING THE TYPE OF UNDERTAKING OR BUSINESS , WHETHER OR NOT THE BUSINESS ' S TANGIBLE ASSETS , SUCH AS BUILDINGS AND MOVABLE PROPERTY , ARE TRANSFERRED , THE VALUE OF ITS INTANGIBLE ASSETS AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSFER , WHETHER OR NOT THE MAJORITY OF ITS EMPLOYEES ARE TAKEN OVER BY THE NEW EMPLOYER , WHETHER OR NOT ITS CUSTOMERS ARE TRANSFERRED AND THE DEGREE OF SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE ACTIVITIES CARRIED ON BEFORE AND AFTER THE TRANSFER AND THE PERIOD , IF ANY , FOR WHICH THOSE ACTIVITIES WERE SUSPENDED . IT SHOULD BE NOTED , HOWEVER , THAT ALL THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE MERELY SINGLE FACTORS IN THE OVERALL ASSESSMENT WHICH MUST BE MADE AND CANNOT THEREFORE BE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION .

73. However, according to settled case-law, such compatibility would exist only to the extent that, in particular, the national legislation concerned does not place the worker at a disadvantage compared to those who pursue all their activities in the Member State where it applies and does not purely and simply result in the payment of social security contributions on which there is no return (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑393/99 and C‑394/99 Hervein and Others [2002] ECR I‑2829, paragraph 51; Case C‑493/04 Piatkowski [2006] ECR I‑2369, paragraph 34; Case C‑3/08 Leyman [2009] ECR I‑9085, paragraph 45; and van Delft and Others , paragraph 101).

26 Article 60 of the Treaty provides that the chapter concerning services applies to services normally provided for remuneration. It has already been held that, for the purposes of that provision, the essential characteristic of remuneration lies in the fact that it constitutes consideration for the service in question (see Case 263/86 Belgian State v Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, paragraph 17).

17 The essential characteristic of remuneration thus lies in the fact that it constitutes consideration for the service in question, and is normally agreed upon between the provider and the recipient of the service .

14 In this connection, it should be recalled that the Court has consistently held that Article 4(1) of the directive precludes the application of a national measure which, although formulated in neutral terms, works to the disadvantage of a much higher percentage of women than men, unless that measure is based on objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex. That is the case where the measures chosen reflect a legitimate social policy aim of the Member State whose legislation is at issue, are appropriate to achieve that aim and are necessary in order to do so (see Case C-343/92 De Weerd, née Roks, and Others [1994] ECR I-571, paragraphs 33 and 34; see also Case C-444/93 Megner and Scheffel [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24).

44. Next, it must be noted that the discharge of obligations pursuant to Regulation No 261/2004 is without prejudice to air carriers’ rights to seek compensation from any person who caused the delay, including third parties, as Article 13 of Regulation No 261/2004 provides ( Nelson and Others , paragraph 80).

80. Moreover, the discharge of obligations pursuant to Regulation No 261/2004 is without prejudice to air carriers’ rights to seek compensation from any person who caused the delay, including third parties, as Article 13 of that regulation provides. Such compensation may accordingly reduce or even remove the financial burden borne by carriers in consequence of those obligations. Nor does it appear unreasonable for those obligations initially to be borne, subject to the abovementioned right to compensation, by the air carriers with which the passengers concerned have a contract of carriage that entitles them to a flight that should be neither cancelled nor delayed ( IATA and ELFAA , paragraph 90, and Sturgeon and Others , paragraph 68).

55. In preliminary ruling proceedings, although it is ultimately for the national court to assess the facts, the Court of Justice, which is called on to provide answers of use to the national court, may nevertheless provide guidance based on the documents in the file and on the written and oral observations which have been submitted to it, in order to enable the national court to give judgment (see, to that effect, Case C‑381/99 Brunnhofer EU:C:2001:358, paragraph 65, and Case C‑191/12 Alakor Gabonatermelő és Forgalmazó EU:C:2013:315, paragraph 31).

145. For the purposes of applying Article 85(1) of the Treaty, it is sufficient that the object of an agreement should be to restrict, prevent or distort competition irrespective of the actual effects of that agreement. Consequently, in the case of agreements reached at meetings of competing undertakings, that provision is infringed where those meetings have such an object and are thus intended to organise artificially the operation of the market. In such a case, the liability of a particular undertaking in respect of the infringement is properly established where it participated in those meetings with knowledge of their object, even if it did not proceed to implement any of the measures agreed at those meetings. The greater or lesser degree of regular participation by the undertaking in the meetings and of completeness of its implementation of the measures agreed is relevant not to the establishment of its liability but rather to the extent of that liability and thus to the severity of the penalty (see Joined Cases C‑238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C‑252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission [2002] ECR I-8375, paragraphs 508 to 510).

510 The greater or lesser degree of regular participation by the undertaking in the meetings and of completeness of its implementation of the measures agreed is relevant not to the establishment of its liability but rather to the extent of that liability and thus to the severity of the penalty.

24 As regards, moreover, the obligation on the referring court to set out the reasons that led it to raise the question of the validity of Article 20 of Directive 2014/40, it does indeed follow from the spirit of cooperation which must prevail in the operation of the preliminary reference procedure that it is essential that the national court sets out in its order for reference the precise reasons why it considers a reply to its questions concerning the interpretation or validity of certain provisions of EU law to be necessary to enable it to give judgment (see to that effect, inter alia, judgments in Bertini and Others, 98/85, 162/85 and 258/85, EU:C:1986:246, paragraph 6; ABNA and Others, C‑453/03, C‑11/04, C‑12/04 and C‑194/04, EU:C:2005:741, paragraph 46; and IATA and ELFAA, C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 31).

71. The Court has, however, made it clear that the transactions covered by the exemption of management of special investment funds are those which are specific to the business of undertakings for collective investment (judgments in Abbey National , C‑169/04, EU:C:2006:289, paragraph 63; Deutsche Bank , C‑44/11, EU:C:2012:484, paragraph 31; and ATP PensionService , C‑464/12, EU:C:2014:139, paragraph 65). In particular, it has found that management services provided by a third-party manager must, viewed broadly, form a distinct whole and be specific to, and essential for, the management of special investment funds (judgment in ATP PensionService , C‑464/12, EU:C:2014:139, paragraph 65).

31. As regards the exemption provided for in Article 135(1)(g) of Directive 2006/112, it must be pointed out that the concept of ‘management of special investment funds’ is not defined in Directive 2006/112. The Court has however stated that the transactions covered by that exemption are those which are specific to the business of undertakings for collective investment (Case C-169/04 Abbey National [2006] ECR I-4027, paragraph 63).

27. Even if the Greek Government had cited Article 8 of Directive 92/13, which provides for a procedure essentially identical to that under Article 3 of Directive 89/665, it follows from settled case‑law that, even were it preferable that the Commission use the procedure for direct intervention established by those directives, such a procedure is a preventive measure which can neither derogate from nor replace the powers of the Commission under Article 226 EC (see, in the context of Directive 89/665, Case C-359/93 Commission v Netherlands [1995] ECR I‑157, paragraph 13; Case C-79/94 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I‑1071, paragraph 11; Case C-353/96 Commission v Ireland [1998] ECR I‑8565, paragraph 22; and Commission v Austria , cited above, paragraph 57). The fact that the Commission used or did not use that procedure is therefore irrelevant where it is a matter of deciding on the admissibility of infringement proceedings.

60. However, in that context, attention should also be drawn to the requirement that national law be interpreted in conformity with EU law, which permits national courts, for the matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when they determine the disputes before them (see, inter alia, Case C‑268/06 Impac t [2008] ECR I‑2483, paragraph 99). The principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that the directive in question is fully effective and achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see Impact , paragraph 101 and the case-law cited).

99. The requirement that national law be interpreted in conformity with Community law is inherent in the system of the EC Treaty, since it permits national courts, for the matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of Community law when they determine the disputes before them (see, inter alia, Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 114, and Adeneler and Others , paragraph 109).

34. As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts established by Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see,inter alia , Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 38, and Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607, paragraph 18).

21. Moreover, by focusing on a comparison of the percentage of recoverable waste in the States of destination and dispatch, the Netherlands rules on shipments of waste allow an objection to be raised against a shipment of waste for recovery on the basis not only of an independent evaluation of the economic and environmental aspects of the recovery operation in the State of destination, but also of the treatment capacity available in the State of dispatch. The Court has held that, in the context of the Community rules on shipments of waste, considerations of self‑sufficiency and proximity do not apply to shipments of waste for recovery (Case C-203/96 Dusseldorp and Others [1998] ECR I-4075, paragraphs 27 to 34).

29 Article 7 of the Regulation, which is in Chapter B, concerning waste for recovery, and is the corresponding provision to Article 4, does not provide for the possibility of adopting measures to implement the principles of self-sufficiency and proximity.

41. The national courts must therefore ensure that all appropriate conclusions will be drawn from an infringement of the last sentence of Article 88(3) EC, in accordance with their national law, as regards both the validity of measures giving effect to the aid and the recovery of financial support granted in disregard of that provision (‘ FNCE ’, paragraph 12, and SFEI and Others , cited above, paragraph 40, as well as Joined Cases C‑261/01 and C‑262/01 van Calster and Others [2003] ECR I‑12249, paragraph 64, and Transalpine Ölleitung in Österreich and Others , cited above, paragraph 47).

32. As regards the ninth recital in the preamble to Regulation No 1706/89, it is sufficient to recall that the preamble to a Community act has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on either as a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in question or for interpreting those provisions in a manner clearly contrary to their wording (Case C-162/97 Nilsson and Others [1998] ECR I-7477, paragraph 54, and Case C-308/97 Manfredi [1998] ECR I-7685, paragraph 30).

54 On this point, it must be stated that the preamble to a Community act has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on as a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in question.

20. As regards the exemptions provided for by the Sixth Directive, it should be recalled that these constitute independent concepts of Community law which must be placed in the general context of the common system of VAT introduced by the Sixth Directive (see, inter alia, Case 235/85 Commission v Netherlands [1987] ECR 1471, paragraph 18; Case C-2/95 SDC [1997] ECR I-3017, paragraph 21, and Cimber Air , paragraph 23).

55 However, if the grounds of a decision of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law, but its operative part is shown to be well founded on other legal grounds, such an infringement is not capable of bringing about the annulment of that decision, and a substitution of grounds must be made (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 150, and of 5 March 2015, Commission and Others v Versalis and Others, C‑93/13 P and C‑123/13 P, EU:C:2015:150, paragraph 102 and the case-law cited).

150. Although it emerges from paragraphs 138 to 140 and 142 to 149 of this judgment that errors of law were made by the General Court, it is necessary to determine whether, notwithstanding those errors, the operative part of the judgment under appeal can be seen to be well founded on legal grounds other than those maintained by the General Court, in which event an appeal must be dismissed (see, to that effect, the judgment of 19 April 2012 in Case C‑221/10 P Artegodan v Commission [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 94 and case‑law cited). – The unlawfulness of the contested regulation

35. In this respect, it should be borne in mind that those provisions must, in accordance with settled case-law in respect of derogations from fundamental freedoms, be interpreted strictly (see, inter alia, as regards the derogations provided for in Article 296 EC, Case C-284/05 Commission v Finland [2009] ECR I-11705, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). Although Article 296(1)(b) EC refers to measures which a Member State may consider necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security, that article cannot, however, be read in such a way as to confer on Member States a power to depart from the provisions of the EC Treaty based on no more than reliance on those interests ( Commission v Finland , paragraph 47).

35 That case-law relating to the principle that trade mark rights may be exhausted, based on Article 36 TFEU, is intended, like Article 7(1) of Directive 2008/95, to reconcile the fundamental interest in protecting trade mark rights, on the one hand, with the fundamental interest in the free movement of goods within the internal market, on the other (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 1996, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others, C‑427/93, C‑429/93 and C‑436/93, EU:C:1996:282, paragraph 40).

40 Article 7 of the directive, like Article 36 of the Treaty, is intended to reconcile the fundamental interest in protecting trade mark rights with the fundamental interest in the free movement of goods within the common market, so that those two provisions, which pursue the same result, must be interpreted in the same way.

89. The Court has held that when the profits underlying foreign-sourced dividends are subject in the State of the company making the distribution to a lower level of tax than the tax levied in the Member State of the recipient company, that Member State must grant an overall tax credit corresponding to the tax paid by the company making the distribution in the State in which it is established ( Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraph 51, and Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen , paragraph 87).

7 IT SHOULD ALSO BE BORNE IN MIND , HOWEVER , THAT AT THE TIME IN QUESTION THE COUNCIL HAD NOT IMPLEMENTED THE PROTECTIVE MEASURES ENVISAGED BY ARTICLE 102 . THIS LED TO UNCERTAINTY IN THE LAW , BUT IT DID NOT ACTUALLY ENTAIL A LEGAL VACUUM FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF COMMUNITY LAW . THE COURT HAS SHOWN IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 16 FEBRUARY 1978 ( CASE 61/77 COMMISSION V IRELAND ( 1978 ) ECR 417 , PARAGRAPHS 28 TO 37 AND 56 TO 68 ), WHAT THE LAW IS APPLICABLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND HOW POWERS ARE DIVIDED BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND THE MEMBER STATES . IT FOLLOWS THAT DURING THE YEAR 1978 THE MEMBER STATES HAD THE RIGHT AND THE DUTY TO ADOPT , WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE SPHERES OF JURISDICTION , ANY MEASURE COMPATIBLE WITHIN COMMUNITY LAW TO PROTECT THE BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA AND , IN PARTICULAR , TO FIX FISHING QUOTAS FOR FISHING UNDERTAKINGS AND FISHERMEN SUBJECT TO THEIR CONTROL .

66IT WAS THEREFORE WITH GOOD REASON THAT , IN ANNEX VI TO THE HAGUE RESOLUTION , AFTER STATING THAT IN PRINCIPLE THE MEMBER STATES WOULD NOT TAKE ANY UNILATERAL MEASURES PENDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMUNITY MEASURES , THE COUNCIL RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH MEASURES COULD BE ADOPTED , ON AN INTERIM BASIS , IF NO COMMUNITY MEASURES HAD BEEN ADOPTED IN TIME .

37 The assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the internal market, under Article 107(3) TFEU, falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Courts of the European Union (see judgment of 21 November 2013, Deutsche Lufthansa, C‑284/12, EU:C:2013:755, paragraph 28).

30. It must be noted that, under Article 220(2)(b) of the Customs Code, the competent authorities are not to make subsequent entry of the import duties in the accounts unless three cumulative conditions are fulfilled. First, it is necessary that the duties were not levied as a result of an error on the part of the competent authorities themselves, secondly, that the error made by them was such that it could not reasonably have been detected by a person liable for payment acting in good faith and, finally, that that person complied with all the provisions laid down by the legislation in force as regards the customs declaration (see, by analogy, Case 161/88 Binder [1989] ECR 2415, paragraphs 15 and 16; Joined Cases C‑153/94 and C‑204/94 Faroe Seafood and Others [1996] ECR I‑2465, paragraph 83; order in Case C‑299/98 P CPL Imperial 2 and Unifrigo v Commission [1999] ECR I‑8683, paragraph 22, and order in Case C‑30/00 William Hinton & Sons [2001] ECR I‑7511, paragraphs 68, 69, 71 and 72). If those conditions are fulfilled, the person liable is entitled to the waiver of the subsequent recovery of the duty (Case C‑348/89 Mecanarte [1991] ECR I-3277, paragraph 12).

12 With respect to the first question, the Court has consistently held that Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1697/79 must be interpreted as meaning that if all the conditions laid down by that provision are fulfilled the person liable is entitled to the waiver of the recovery of the duty in question (see the judgments in Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199, paragraph 22, Case 378/87 Top Hit [1989] ECR 1359, paragraph 18 and Case 161/88 Binder [1989] ECR 2415, paragraph 16).

36. Those objective criteria for assessing the depreciation of motor vehicles have not been listed by the Court as being obligatory. They need not thus necessarily be applied cumulatively. However, the application of a scale based on a single criterion of depreciation, such as the age of the motor vehicle, does not guarantee that the scale will reflect the actual depreciation of those vehicles. In particular, given the failure to take account of the kilometrage, such a scale does not, as a general rule, lead to a reasonable approximation of the actual value of imported second-hand vehicles (judgments in Commission v Greece , C‑74/06, EU:C:2007:534, paragraphs 37 to 43, and Tatu , C‑402/09, EU:C:2011:219, paragraph 42).

49. Although, according to settled case-law, in the light of those principles, the exemptions envisaged in Article 15 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia, Velker International Oil Company , paragraph 19; Cimber Air , paragraph 25; Joined Cases C-181/04 to C-183/04 Elmeka [2006] ECR I-8167, paragraph 15; Navicon , paragraph 22; and Feltgen and Bacino Charter Company , paragraph 19), that requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions should be construed in such a way as to deprive those exemptions of their intended effect (see, inter alia, Navicon , paragraph 22).

19. Furthermore, according to settled case-law, VAT exemptions must be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that turnover tax is to be levied on each service supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia, Case C-185/89 Velker International Oil Company [1990] ECR I-2561, paragraph 19, and Joined Cases C-181/04 to C-183/04 Elmeka [2006] ECR I‑8167, paragraph 15).

20. It is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court that the partial annulment of an EU act is possible only if the elements whose annulment is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act (see judgments in Commission v Council , C‑29/99, EU:C:2002:734, paragraph 45, and Germany v Commission , C‑239/01, EU:C:2003:514, paragraph 33). The Court has repeatedly ruled that that requirement of severability is not satisfied where the partial annulment of an act would have the effect of altering its substance (see judgment in Commission v Parliament and Council , C‑427/12, EU:C:2014:170, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).

40. It follows that the scope of Article 22a of the Directive must be determined by considering the usual meaning in everyday language of the terms used in that article, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part (see, Case C‑336/03 easyCar [2005] ECR I‑1947, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

21. It is settled case‑law that the meaning and scope of terms for which Community law provides no definition must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part (Case C-128/94 Hönig [1995] ECR I-3389, paragraph 9, and Case C-164/98 P DIR International Film and Others v Commission [2000] ECR I-447, paragraph 26). When those terms appear, as in the main proceedings, in a provision which constitutes a derogation from a principle or, more specifically, from Community rules for the protection of consumers, they must, in addition, be interpreted strictly (Case C‑83/99 Commission v Spain [2001] ECR I-445, paragraph 19, and Case C‑481/99 Heininger [2001] ECR I-9945, paragraph 31).

41. The legislation at issue in the main proceedings, inasmuch as it constitutes a restriction on the freedom of movement and residence of a citizen of the Union, such as the appellant in the main proceedings, is also too exclusive because it does not make it possible to take account of other factors which may connect such a student to the Member State providing the benefit, such as the nationality of the student, his schooling, family, employment, language skills or the existence of other social and economic factors (see, to that effect, judgment in Prinz and Seeberger , EU:C:2013:524, paragraph 38). Likewise, as the Advocate General stated at point 103 of her Opinion, the employment of the family members on whom the student depends in the Member State providing the benefit may also be one of the factors to be taken into account in assessing those links.

48 It should be borne in mind at the outset that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires that acts of the EU institutions be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not exceed the limits of what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, to that effect, judgments in British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, C‑491/01, EU:C:2002:741, paragraph 122; ERG and Others, C‑379/08 and C‑380/08, EU:C:2010:127, paragraph 86; and Gauweiler and Others, C‑62/14, EU:C:2015:400, paragraphs 67 and 91).

122. As a preliminary point, it ought to be borne in mind that the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of Community law, requires that measures implemented through Community provisions should be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it (see, inter alia , Case 137/85 Maizena [1987] ECR 4587, paragraph 15; Case C-339/92 ADM Ölmühlen [1993] ECR I-6473, paragraph 15, and Case C-210/00 Käserei Champignon Hofmeister [2002] ECR I-6453, paragraph 59).

33 Second, in order to prevent a taxable person who has been able to deduct VAT on the purchase of goods used for his business from escaping payment of VAT when he takes those goods away from his business for private purposes and from thereby enjoying undue advantages over an ordinary consumer who buys the goods and pays VAT on them, Article 6(2) of the Sixth Directive provides that "the use of goods forming part of the assets of a business for the private use of the taxable person or of his staff or more generally for purposes other than those of his business where the value added tax on such goods is wholly or partly deductible" is to be treated as a supply of services for consideration (see Case C-20/91 De Jong v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1992] ECR I-2847, paragraph 15, concerning Article 5(6) of the Sixth Directive, which is based on the same principle).

34. The Court has repeatedly held, first, that the employment rights and, accordingly, the rights of residence which are conferred on Turkish workers by the provisions set out in the three indents of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 are progressively extended in proportion to the duration of lawful paid employment and are intended to consolidate progressively the position of the persons concerned in the host Member State. Secondly, the Court has also consistently held that the national authorities have no option to attach conditions to or restrict the application of such rights, as they would otherwise undermine the effect of that decision (see Case C-36/96 Günaydin [1997] ECR I-5143, paragraphs 37 to 40 and paragraph 50; Case C-1/97 Birden [1998] ECR I-7747, paragraph 19; Case C-188/00 Kurz [2002] ECR I-10691, paragraph 26; and Joined Cases C-317/01 and C-369/01 Abatay and Others [2003] ECR I-12301, paragraph 78).

39 Accordingly, the Member States have no power to make conditional or restrict the application of the precise and unconditional rights which Decision No 1/80 grants to Turkish nationals who satisfy its conditions (Sevince, paragraph 22 and Kus, paragraph 31, cited above).

33. According to settled case-law, Article 43 EC precludes any national measure which, even though it is applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, is liable to hinder or render less attractive the exercise by Community nationals of the freedom of establishment that is guaranteed by the Treaty (see, inter alia, Case C‑299/02 Commission v Netherlands [2004] ECR I‑9761, paragraph 15, and Case C‑140/03 Commission v Greece [2005] ECR I‑3177, paragraph 27).

70. According to settled case-law, compliance with the principle of equal treatment, or of non-discrimination, requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (Case C-44/94 Fishermen’s Organisations and Others [1995] ECR I-3115, paragraph 46; Case C-304/01 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I-7655, paragraph 31; Case C-141/05 Spain v Council [2007] ECR I-9485, paragraph 40; and Case C-442/04 Spain v Council [2008] ECR I-3517, paragraph 35).

40. Consequently, the Kingdom of Spain found itself, as it claims, in a different situation from the other Member States at the time that Regulation No 1954/2003 was adopted, marked, in particular, by no increase, in the period from 1998 to 2002, in the fishing opportunities as limited by the Act of Accession and by the number of Spanish vessels which could be in the Irish Box at the same time being limited to 40.

31. Article 59 of the Treaty requires the elimination of any restriction on the freedom to provide services, even if it applies to national providers of services and to those of other Member States alike, when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services (see to that effect Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221, paragraph 12, and Case C-58/98 Corsten [2000] ECR I-7919, paragraph 33). Moreover, freedom to provide services is enjoyed by both providers and recipients of services (see to that effect Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377, paragraph 16).

37. The directive is intended to bring about equality in substance rather than in form. The exercise of rights conferred on women as referred to in Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 by provisions intended to protect women in relation to pregnancy and maternity cannot be made subject to unfavourable treatment regarding their working conditions (see Thibault , paragraph 26).

26 The conferral of such rights, recognised by the Directive, is intended to ensure implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women regarding both access to employment (Article 3(1)) and working conditions (Article 5(1)). Therefore, the exercise of the rights conferred on women under Article 2(3) cannot be the subject of unfavourable treatment regarding their access to employment or their working conditions. In that light, the result pursued by the Directive is substantive, not formal, equality.

42. However, pursuant to Article 58 TFEU, the freedom to provide services in the transport sector is not governed by Article 56 TFEU, but rather by Title VI in Part Three of the FEU Treaty, which concerns the common transport policy (see Case C‑338/09 Yellow Cab Verkehrsbetrieb [2010] ECR I‑13927, paragraphs 29 and 30). Moreover, as the referring court points out, car and driver hire services such as those at issue in the main proceedings do not, in essence, fall within the scope of the provisions adopted, on the basis of Article 91(1) TFEU, in order to liberalise transport services.

45. À cet égard, il importe de rappeler que la Cour a eu l’occasion de préciser, en ce qui concerne la directive 2003/55, que, bien qu’il ne résulte pas explicitement de l’article 23, paragraphe 1, sous c), de cette directive, ni, d’ailleurs, des autres dispositions de ladite directive, que le prix de fourniture du gaz naturel devait, à compter du 1 er juillet 2007, être seulement fixé par le jeu de l’offre et de la demande, cette exigence découlait de la finalité même et de l’économie générale de la même directive qui, ainsi que le précisaient ses considérants 3, 4 et 18, avait pour objectif de parvenir progressivement à une libéralisation totale du marché du gaz naturel dans le cadre de laquelle, notamment, tous les fournisseurs peuvent librement délivrer leurs produits à tous les consommateurs (arrêt Federutility e.a., C-265/08, EU:C:2010:205, points 17 et 18).

17. Article 23(1)(c) of Directive 2003/55 provides that Member States must ensure that all customers are free to buy natural gas from the supplier of their choice as from 1 July 2007.

Pour autant qu’il est demandé à la Cour d’annuler l’arrêt attaqué en raison d’une violation, par le Tribunal, de l’article 47 de la Charte, il y a lieu de relever que, en l’absence de tout indice selon lequel la durée excessive de la procédure devant le Tribunal aurait eu une incidence sur la solution du litige, le non‑respect d’un délai de jugement raisonnable ne saurait conduire à l’annulation de cet arrêt. En effet, en l’absence d’une telle incidence, l’annulation de l’arrêt attaqué ne remédierait pas à la violation, par le Tribunal, du principe de protection juridictionnelle effective (arrêts du 26 novembre 2013, Gascogne Sack Deutschland/Commission, C‑40/12 P, EU:C:2013:768, points 81 et 82 ; du 26 novembre 2013, Groupe Gascogne/Commission, C‑58/12 P, EU:C:2013:770, points 73 et 74, ainsi que du 10 juillet 2014, Telefónica et Telefónica de España/Commission, C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, point 64).

21. For a taxable person to be accorded the right to deduct input VAT, and in order to determine the extent of that right, the existence of a direct and immediate link between a particular input transaction and an output transaction or transactions giving rise to the right to deduct is, in principle, necessary (see Case C‑98/98 Midland Bank [2000] ECR I‑4177, paragraph 24, and Case C‑408/98 Abbey National [2001] ECR I‑1361, paragraph 26).

26 As the Court held in paragraph 24 of Midland Bank, Article 2 of the First Directive and Article 17(2), (3) and (5) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that, in principle, the existence of a direct and immediate link between a particular input transaction and a particular output transaction or transactions giving rise to the right to deduct is necessary before the taxable person is entitled to deduct input VAT and in order to determine the extent of such entitlement.

23 It should be observed in this regard that the Court has consistently held that the question whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations must be examined on the basis of the position in which the Member State found itself at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-166/97 Commission v France [1999] ECR I-1719, paragraph 18, and Case C-220/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-5831, paragraph 33).

61. It must, however, be recalled that a penalty, even of a non-criminal nature, cannot be imposed unless it rests on a clear and unambiguous legal basis (Case C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke [2000] ECR I-11569, paragraph 56; Käserei Champignon Hofmeister , paragraph 52; and Case C‑274/04 ED & F Man Sugar [2006] ECR I‑3269, paragraph 15).

56 Contrary to the assertions of Emsland-Stärke, the obligation to repay refunds received in the event that the two constituent elements of an abuse are established would not breach the principle of lawfulness. The obligation to repay is not a penalty for which a clear and unambiguous legal basis would be necessary, but simply the consequence of a finding that the conditions required to obtain the advantage derived from the Community rules were created artificially, thereby rendering the refunds granted undue payments and thus justifying the obligation to repay them.

170 In addition, it is for the persons pleading the illegality of an anti-dumping regulation to adduce arguments and evidence to show that factors other than those relating to the imports could have had such importance that they called into question the causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports (judgments in Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ and ENRC Marketing v Council, C‑10/12 P, EU:C:2013:865, paragraph 28, and TMK Europe, C‑143/14, EU:C:2015:236, paragraph 42).

65 In response to that plea, it is sufficient to state that, according to settled case-law (see, in particular, Case C-146/91 KYDEP v Council and Commission [1994] ECR I-4199, paragraph 19), non-contractual liability on the part of the Community under the second paragraph of Article 215 of the Treaty is subject to a number of conditions relating to the illegality of the conduct alleged against the Community institutions, actual damage and the existence of a causal link between the conduct of the institution and the damage complained of. If any one of those conditions is not satisfied, the entire action must be dismissed and it is unnecessary to consider the other conditions for non-contractual liability on the part of the Community (Case C-146/91 KYDEP v Council and Commission, paragraph 81).

19 It is settled case law that the Community' s non-contractual liability under the second paragraph of Article 215 of the EEC Treaty is dependent on the coincidence of a series of conditions as regards the unlawfulness of the acts alleged against the Community institutions, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between the conduct of the institution and the damage complained of (see, in particular, the judgment in Cases C-258/90 and C-259/90 Pesquerias de Bermeo and Naviera Laida v Commission [1992] ECR I-2901, paragraph 42).

75. In paragraph 99 of the judgment in Budĕjovický Budvar , the Court recalled, in relation to the protection of an indication of source granted under a bilateral agreement of essentially the same kind as the one at issue in the main proceedings, that the aim of such an agreement, which is to prevent the producers of a contracting State from using the geographical names of another State and thereby taking advantage of the reputation of the products of undertakings established in the regions or places indicated by those names, is to ensure fair competition, since such an objective may be regarded as falling within the sphere of the protection of industrial and commercial property within the meaning of Article 30 EC, provided that the names in question have not, either at the time of the entry into force of that agreement or subsequently, become generic in the country of origin (see Exportur , paragraph 37, and Case C‑87/97 Consorzio per la tutela del formaggio Gorgonzola [1999] ECR I‑1301, paragraph 20).

41. Under Article 157(2) TFEU, ‘pay’ means ‘the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment, from his employer’. It is settled case-law that that concept covers any consideration, whether immediate or future, provided that the worker receives it, albeit indirectly, in respect of his employment, from his employer, and irrespective of whether it is received under a contract of employment, by virtue of legislative provisions or on a voluntary basis (see Case C‑262/88 Barber [1990] ECR I‑1889, paragraph 12; Case C‑66/96 Høj Pedersen and Others [1998] ECR I‑7327, paragraph 32; Case C‑236/98 JämO [2000] ECR I‑2189, paragraph 39; and Case C‑147/02 Alabaster [2004] ECR I‑3101, paragraph 42).

12 As the Court has held, the concept of pay, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 119, comprises any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, whether immediate or future, provided that the worker receives it, albeit indirectly, in respect of his employment from his employer ( see, in particular, the judgment of 9 February 1982 in Case 12/81 Garland v British Rail Engineering (( 1982 )) ECR 359, paragraph 5 ). Accordingly, the fact that certain benefits are paid after the termination of the employment relationship does not prevent them from being in the nature of pay, within the meaning of Article 119 of the Treaty .

102. The Court has already held, in the case of offers of imitations for sale, that, where a third party attempts, through the use of a sign which is identical with, or similar to, a reputable mark, to ride on the coat-tails of that mark in order to benefit from its power of attraction, its reputation and its prestige, and to exploit, without paying any financial compensation and without being required to make efforts of its own in that regard, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of that mark in order to create and maintain the image of that mark, the advantage resulting from such use must be considered to be an advantage that has been unfairly taken of the distinctive character or the repute of that mark ( L’Oréal and Others , paragraph 49).

26 That principle requires, in particular, that all tenderers are afforded equality of opportunity when formulating their tenders, which therefore implies that the tenders of all competitors must be subject to the same conditions (judgments of 25 April 1996, Commission v Belgium, C‑87/94, EU:C:1996:161, paragraph 54; of 12 December 2002, Universale-Bau and Others, C‑470/99, EU:C:2002:746, paragraph 93, and of 12 March 2015, eVigilo, C‑538/13, EU:C:2015:166, paragraph 33).

93. It follows therefrom that the procedure for awarding a public contract must comply, at every stage, particularly that of selecting the candidates in a restricted procedure, both with the principle of the equal treatment of the potential tenderers and the principle of transparency so as to afford all equality of opportunity in formulating the terms of their applications to take part and their tenders (see, to that effect, in relation to the stage of comparison of tenders, Case C-87/94 Commission v Belgium [1996] ECR I-2043, paragraph 54).

45. In that regard, the Court has already held that the protection of fundamental rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty, such as the free movement of goods (see Case C‑112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I‑5659, paragraph 74) or freedom to provide services (see Case C‑36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I‑9609, paragraph 35).

186. Furthermore, it must be recalled that the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of European Union law, enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Court has consistently held that the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently, and different situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified (see Case C‑550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission and Others [2010] ECR I‑8301, paragraphs 54 and 55 and case-law cited).

55. According to settled case-law, that principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2006] ECR I-403, paragraph 95; Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld [2007] ECR I-3633, paragraph 56; and Case C-127/07 Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others [2008] ECR I-9895, paragraph 23).

36 It also follows from the case-law of the Court that a refusal by the authorities of a Member State to recognise the name of a national of that State who exercised his right of free movement in the territory of another Member State, as determined in that second Member State, is likely to hinder the exercise of the right, enshrined in Article 21 TFEU, to move and reside freely in the territories of the Member States. Confusion and inconvenience are liable to arise from the divergence between the two names used for the same person (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 June 2016, Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff, C‑438/14, EU:C:2016:401, paragraph 37).

40. With regard to the fourth question referred by the Corte suprema di cassazione, concerning a possible abuse of rights on the part of the cooperatives at issue in the main proceedings, it should be noted that, according to the Court’s established case‑law, European Union law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends (see, inter alia, Case C‑255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECR I‑1609, paragraph 68, and Case C‑16/05 Tum and Dari [2007] ECR I‑7415, paragraph 64).

68. Notwithstanding that finding, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, Community law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends (see, in particular Case C-367/96 Kefalas and Others [1998] ECR I-2843, paragraph 20; Case C-373/97 Diamantis [2000] ECR I-1705, paragraph 33; and Case C-32/03 Fini H [2005] ECR I-1599, paragraph 32).

12 In this respect, it must be stated that only the national courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action for the recovery of amounts wrongfully charged by a national administration on the basis of Community rules which are subsequently declared invalid (see to this effect the judgment in Case 20/88 Roquette Frères v Commission [1989] ECR 1553, at paragraph 14). Following its action before the College, Vreugdenhil was able to obtain actual reimbursement of the sums wrongfully charged by the Netherlands intervention agency, plus interest at the statutory rate and the costs of the proceedings.

25. It follows from well-established case-law that, whilst the third paragraph of Article 50 EC refers only to the active provision of services – where the provider moves to the beneficiary of the services – that also includes the freedom of the persons for whom the services are intended, including tourists, to go to another Member State, where the provider is, in order to enjoy the services there (see, inter alia, Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377, paragraphs 10 and 16; Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz [2007] ECR I‑6849, paragraph 36; and Case C-318/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR. I‑6957, paragraph 65).

16 IT FOLLOWS THAT THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES INCLUDES THE FREEDOM , FOR THE RECIPIENTS OF SERVICES , TO GO TO ANOTHER MEMBER STATE IN ORDER TO RECEIVE A SERVICE THERE , WITHOUT BEING OBSTRUCTED BY RESTRICTIONS , EVEN IN RELATION TO PAYMENTS AND THAT TOURISTS , PERSONS RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT AND PERSONS TRAVELLING FOR THE PURPOSE OF EDUCATION OR BUSINESS ARE TO BE REGARDED AS RECIPIENTS OF SERVICES .

26. Furthermore, it is irrelevant that those balloons can also be used as festive articles. If the objective characteristic of a product can be established at the time of customs clearance, the fact that it may also be possible to envisage another use for that product will not preclude its classification for legal purposes. For its classification for customs purposes, that product does not have to be solely or exclusively intended for use corresponding to that objective characteristic. It suffices if that is the main use for which it is intended (see, to that effect, Case C‑395/93 Neckermann Versand [1994] ECR I‑4027, paragraphs 8 and 9).

50. The First Directive is therefore part of a series of directives which came progressively to define the obligations of Member States concerning civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles. Although the Court has repeatedly held that it is apparent from the recitals in the preambles to the First and Second Directives that the aim of those directives is to ensure the free movement of vehicles normally based on European Union territory and of persons travelling in those vehicles, it has also repeatedly held that they also have the objective of guaranteeing that the victims of accidents caused by those vehicles receive comparable treatment irrespective of where in the European Union the accident occurred (see, inter alia, to that effect Ruiz Bernáldez , C‑129/94, EU:C:1996:143, paragraph 13, and Csonka and Others , C‑409/11, EU:C:2013:512, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

26. In that regard, it must be pointed out that the First Directive is part of a series of directives which came progressively to define the obligations of Member States concerning civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles. According to the recitals to the First and Second Directives, the aim of those directives is, first, to ensure the free movement of vehicles normally based on European Union territory and of persons travelling in those vehicles and, secondly, to guarantee that the victims of accidents caused by those vehicles receive comparable treatment irrespective of where in the European Union the accident occurred (see, inter alia, Case C‑300/10 Marques Almeida [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

47. Second, as the Court explained in Wells , at paragraph 52, where national law provides for a consent procedure comprising more than one stage, one involving a principal decision and the other involving an implementing decision which cannot extend beyond the parameters set by the principal decision, the effects which a project may have on the environment must be identified and assessed at the time of the procedure relating to the principal decision. It is only if those effects are not identifiable until the time of the procedure relating to the implementing decision that the assessment should be carried out in the course of that procedure.

82. As the Commission rightly points out, to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea and arguments which it did not raise before the General Court would be to authorise it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court. In an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is thus confined to a review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the General Court ( Alliance One International and Standard Commercial Tobacco v Commission and Commission v Alliance One International and Others , paragraph 111 and the case-law cited).

111. In accordance with settled case-law, to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law which it has not raised before the General Court would in effect allow that party to bring before the Court a wider case than that heard by the General Court. In an appeal, the Court’s jurisdiction is, as a general rule, confined to a review of the assessment by the General Court of the pleas argued before it ( AceaElectrabel Produzione v Commission , paragraph 113 and case-law cited).

42 However, in order for those principles to apply in relation to public procurement activities in respect of which all the relevant elements are confined to a single Member State, it is necessary for the contract at issue in the main proceedings to be of certain cross-border interest (judgment in Azienda sanitaria locale No 5 Spezzino and Others, C‑113/13, EU:C:2014:2440, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

15 Furthermore, national courts may refer questions to the Court only if there is a case pending before them and they are called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature (see, in particular, the order of 18 June 1980 in Case 138/80 Borker [1980] ECR 1975, paragraph 4 and the judgment in Case C-134/97 Victoria Film [1998] ECR I-7023, paragraph 14).

14 In this connection, it should be observed that it has been consistently held that a national court may refer a question to the Court only if there is a case pending before it and if it is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature (see Case 318/85 Greis Unterweger [1986] ECR 955, paragraph 4, and Case C-111/94 Job Centre [1995] ECR I-3361, paragraph 9).

51. In addition, the Court has already held that punishable acts consisting of exporting and of importing the same narcotic drugs and which are prosecuted in different Contracting States party to the CISA are, in principle, to be regarded as ‘the same acts’ for the purposes of Article 54 ( Van Esbroeck , paragraph 42).

32. The option of applying those results is justified by the very purpose of the Customs Code, which is, as stated in recital 5 in the preamble to that code, to ensure the correct application of the duties provided for therein, while guaranteeing, as is apparent from paragraph 23 of this judgment, rapid and efficient procedures in the interests of both traders and the customs authorities, by dispensing with a systematic examination of all declared goods, thus keeping to a minimum, as stated in recital 6 in the preamble to that code, customs formalities and controls (see, to that effect, Derudder , paragraphs 42 and 45).

42. In such circumstances, the right to challenge the representativeness of a sample of the imported goods taken by the customs authorities cannot a priori be denied to the declarant or his representative, even if he made no objection in this regard at the time the samples were taken. In addition to the fact that such an interpretation is in no way precluded by the wording of the abovementioned provisions, it also coincides fully with the actual aim of the Community customs rules, as stated in particular in the ninth recital in the preamble to Directive 79/695 and the fifth recital in the preamble to the Community Customs Code, that is to say to ensure the correct application of duties, charges and levies laid down by that legislation. Whilst to that end the customs authorities must be regarded as having wide powers of inspection, traders must also have the right to contest decisions taken by those authorities, in particular where, as in the main proceedings, they consider that the samples taken for analysis by those authorities are not representative of the whole of the goods imported and because of that have led to incorrect assessment of import duties.

30 At the outset, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law of the Court, the objective of EU law on customs valuation is to introduce a fair, uniform and neutral system excluding the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values. The customs value must thus reflect the real economic value of imported goods and therefore take into account all of the elements of such goods that have economic value (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 November 2006, Compaq Computer International Corporation, C‑306/04, EU:C:2006:716, paragraph 30, and of 16 June 2016, EURO 2004. Hungary, C‑291/15, EU:C:2016:455, paragraphs 23 and 26).

48. Consequently, the differential treatment in question could be justified only if it were based on objective considerations independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and were proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions (Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637, paragraph 27, and D’Hoop , cited above, paragraph 36). Justification of discrimination Arguments of the parties – Justification based on safeguarding the homogeneity of the Austrian higher or university education system

27 A residence requirement of that kind can be justified only if it is based on objective considerations independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and is proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions (see, to that effect, Case C-15/96 Schöning-Kougebetopoulou [1998] ECR I-47, paragraph 21).

20 As regards the objective criteria which may indicate certain cross-border interest, the Court has previously held that such criteria may be, in particular, the fact that the contract in question is for a significant amount, in conjunction with the place where the work is to be carried out or the technical characteristics of the contract and the specific characteristics of the products concerned. In that context, it is also possible to take account of the existence of complaints brought by operators situated in other Member States, provided that it is determined that those complaints are real and not fictitious (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 May 2008, SECAP and Santorso, C‑147/06 and C‑148/06, EU:C:2008:277, paragraph 31, and of 16 April 2015, Enterprise Focused Solutions, C‑278/14, EU:C:2015:228, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).

58. The mere fact that a Member State has opted for a system of protection which differs from that adopted by another Member State cannot affect the assessment of the need for, and proportionality of, the provisions enacted to that end. Those provisions must be assessed solely by reference to the objectives pursued by the competent authorities of the Member State concerned and the degree of protection which they seek to ensure (Case C-124/97 Läärä and Others [1999] ECR I‑6067, paragraph 36, and Case C-67/98 Zenatti [1999] ECR I‑7289, paragraph 34).

34 In those circumstances, the mere fact that a Member State has chosen a system of protection different from that adopted by another Member State cannot affect the appraisal as to the need for and proportionality of the provisions adopted. They must be assessed solely in the light of the objectives pursued by the national authorities of the Member State concerned and of the level of protection which they seek to ensure.

20. The grant of a measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings may also lead to a multiplication of the bases of jurisdiction in relation to one and the same legal relationship, which is contrary to the aims of the Convention (Case C-295/95 Farrell [1997] ECR I-1683, paragraph 13).

31. At the outset, it should be noted that, even though, formally, the referring court has limited its questions to the interpretation of Articles 10(1) and 13 of Decision No 1/80, such a situation does not prevent the Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of European Union law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case before it, whether or not that court has specifically referred to them in the questions (see Case C‑251/06 ING. AUER [2007] ECR I‑9689, paragraph 38, and Case C‑434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I‑3375, paragraph 24).

38. In that regard, even though, formally, the national court has limited its questions to the interpretation of Article 4(1)(g) and (3)(b), and of Article 7(2), of Directive 69/335, such a situation does not prevent the Court from providing the national court with all the elements of interpretation of Community law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case before it, whether or not that court has specifically referred to them in the questions (see, to that effect, Case C‑241/89 SARPP [1990] ECR I-4695, paragraph 8; Case C‑87/97 Consorzio per la tutela del formaggio Gorgonzola [1999] ECR I‑1301, paragraph 16; and C-392/05 Alevizos [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 64).

30. It should be observed, however, that a provision such as the one at issue in the main proceedings, which allows for the renewal of fixed-term contracts to replace other employees who are momentarily unable to perform their tasks, is not per se contrary to the FTW Framework Agreement. The temporary replacement of another employee in order to satisfy, in essence, the employer’s temporary staffing requirements may, in principle, constitute an objective reason under clause 5(1)(a) of the FTW Framework Agreement (see, to that effect, Angelidaki and Others , paragraph 102).

45. It follows that, in proceedings before the national courts, every party has the right to plead before the court hearing the case the illegality of the provisions contained in legislative acts of the European Union which serve as the basis for a decision or act of national law relied upon against him and to prompt that court, which does not have jurisdiction itself to make a finding of such illegality, to put that question to the Court by means of a reference for a preliminary ruling (see, to that effect, Cases C‑239/99 Nachi Europe [2001] ECR I‑1197, paragraph 35, and Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council , paragraph 40).

40 By Article 173 and Article 184 (now Article 241 EC), on the one hand, and by Article 177, on the other, the Treaty has established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of acts of the institutions, and has entrusted such review to the Community Courts (see, to that effect, Les Verts v Parliament, paragraph 23). Under that system, where natural or legal persons cannot, by reason of the conditions for admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, directly challenge Community measures of general application, they are able, depending on the case, either indirectly to plead the invalidity of such acts before the Community Courts under Article 184 of the Treaty or to do so before the national courts and ask them, since they have no jurisdiction themselves to declare those measures invalid (see Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199, paragraph 20), to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on validity.

38. This must be so where that rule would allow the proprietor of the trade mark to partition national markets and thus assist the maintenance of price differences which may exist between Member States (see, to that effect, inter alia , Case C-349/95 Loendersloot [1997] ECR I-6227, paragraph 23).

58. However, such application complies with the principle of legal certainty only if it was sufficiently foreseeable. In this regard, it need only be noted that it is not for the Court to establish, in the present proceedings for a preliminary ruling, whether such a judicially determined practice existed (see, to that effect, judgment in Ze Fu Fleischhandel and Vion Trading , EU:C:2011:282, paragraph 34).

34. However, such application complies with the principle of legal certainty only if it results from a judicially determined practice that was sufficiently foreseeable. In this regard, it need only be noted that it is not for the Court to establish, in the present proceedings for a preliminary ruling, whether such a judicially determined practice existed.

57 Regulation No 1408/71 does not set up a common scheme of social security, but allows different national social security schemes to exist and its sole objective is to ensure the coordination of those schemes. It thus allows different schemes to continue to exist, creating different claims on different institutions against which the claimant possesses direct rights by virtue either of national law alone or of national law supplemented, where necessary, by EU law (judgment of 21 February 2013, Dumont de Chassart, C‑619/11, EU:C:2013:92, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

22. As far as concerns social security benefits the Court has, on several occasions, discussed the factors to be taken into consideration for the purposes of ascertaining the legal nature of such benefits. Thus, the Court has stated that a benefit may be regarded as a social security benefit in so far as it is granted, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, to recipients on the basis of a legally defined position and provided that it concerns one of the risks expressly listed in Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 (see, inter alia , Case 249/83 Hoeckx [1985] ECR 973, paragraphs 12 to 14, and Case C-78/91 Hughes [1992] ECR I-4839, paragraph 15).

13 AS IS CLEAR FROM DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE COURT , THE ' MINIMEX ' IS CHARACTERIZED ON THE ONE HAND BY THE FACT THAT IT CONFERS UPON RECIPIENTS A LEGALLY DEFINED POSITION AND , ON THE OTHER , BY THE FACT THAT IT IS GRANTED TO ANY PERSON WHO DOES NOT HAVE ADEQUATE MEANS AND IS UNABLE TO ' OBTAIN THEM EITHER BY HIS OWN EFFORTS OR IN ANY OTHER WAY ' ( ARTICLE 1 ( 1 ) OF THE LAW OF 7 AUGUST 1974 ); IT THUS ADOPTS NEED AS AN ESSENTIAL CRITERION FOR ITS APPLICATION AND DOES NOT MAKE ANY STIPULATIONS AS TO PERIODS OF WORK , CONTRIBUTION OR AFFILIATION TO ANY PARTICULAR SOCIAL SECURITY BODY COVERING A SPECIFIC RISK . A CLAIMANT NEED ONLY SHOW THAT ' HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT WORK ' UNLESS PREVENTED BY HIS STATE OF HEALTH OR COMPELLING SOCIAL REASONS ; FURTHERMORE , HE IS REQUIRED TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHTS TO SOCIAL BENEFITS OR EVEN ANY RIGHTS TO MAINTENANCE IF THE PUBLIC SOCIAL WELFARE CENTRE CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY ( ARTICLE 6 ( 1 ) AND ( 2 ) OF THE 1974 LAW ).

41. Although in preliminary ruling proceedings it is for the national court to establish, in the light of the considerations referred to in paragraphs 30 to 39 of this judgment, whether, despite such changes, ID-Lelystad must be regarded as being a laboratory referred to in Article 11(1) and Article 13(1) of Directive 85/511, the Court of Justice, which is called on to provide answers of use to the national court, may provide guidance based on the documents in the file and on the written and oral observations which have been submitted to it, in order to enable the national court to give judgment (see, to that effect, Case C-278/93 Freers and Speckmann [1996] ECR I-1165, paragraph 24, and Case C-77/02 Steinicke [2003] ECR I‑9027, paragraph 59).

45. However, the Court has acknowledged that it is open to the institution concerned to base its decisions in that regard on general presumptions which apply to certain categories of documents, as considerations of a generally similar kind are likely to apply to requests for disclosure relating to documents of the same nature ( Sweden and Turco v Council , paragraph 50; Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau , paragraph 54; Sweden and Others v API and Commission , paragraph 74; Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob , paragraph 116; and Commission v Agrofert Holding , paragraph 57).

116. It is true that, in order to justify refusal of access to a document, it is not sufficient, in principle, for that document to fall within an activity or an interest mentioned in Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001. The institution concerned must also supply explanations as to how access to that document could specifically and actually undermine the interest protected by an exception laid down in that article. However, it is open to the institution to base its decisions in that regard on general presumptions which apply to certain categories of documents, as similar general considerations are likely to apply to requests for disclosure relating to documents of the same nature (see Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau , paragraphs 53 and 54 and the case-law cited).

88. A prohibition on marketing processing aids or foodstuffs in which processing aids have been used which have been lawfully manufactured and/or marketed in other Member States must therefore be based on an in-depth assessment of the risk alleged by the Member State invoking Article 30 EC (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark , paragraph 47; Case C‑24/00 Commission v France , paragraph 54; and Case C‑41/02 Commission v Netherlands [2004] ECR I-11375, paragraph 48).

44. As the Commission pointed out, for the trade mark to be able to fulfil its essential role in the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to establish and maintain, it must offer a guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it have been manufactured or supplied under the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their quality (see, in particular, Arsenal Football Club , paragraph 48).

48 In that context, the essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity of origin of the marked goods or services to the consumer or end user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin. For the trade mark to be able to fulfil its essential role in the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to establish and maintain, it must offer a guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it have been manufactured or supplied under the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their quality (see, inter alia, Case 102/77 Hoffman-La Roche [1978] ECR 1139, paragraph 7, and Case C-299/99 Philips [2002] ECR I-0000, paragraph 30).

49. According to Article 58(1)(a) EC, Article 56 EC is without prejudice to the right of Member States ‘to apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same situation … with regard to the place where their capital is invested’. However, that derogation is itself limited by Article 58(3) EC, which provides that the national provisions referred to in Article 58(1) EC ‘shall not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free movement of capital and payments as defined in Article 56’ (Case C-319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I-7477, paragraph 28, and Case C‑10/10 Commission v Austria , paragraph 28).

28 Finally, the person liable must have complied with all of the provisions laid down by the rules in force as far as his customs declaration is concerned. Moreover, it is for the national court to establish whether, having regard to the facts of the case, the three conditions laid down in Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1697/79 are fulfilled (Olasagasti, cited above, paragraph 36).

36 Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second question must be that it is for the national court to establish whether the conditions laid down in Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1679/79 are fulfilled. In determining whether or not the error committed by the authorities could reasonably have been detected by the person liable account should be taken, in particular, of the nature of the error, the professional experience of the trader concerned and the degree of care exercised by him. The relevant factors to be taken into account include the complexity of the legislation, the terms in which the objective of the provisions at issue is expressed, recurrence of the error in question in other measures of the Member State concerned and any divergence of views between the Member States as to the proper interpretation of the relevant provisions.

63. Accordingly, the practice in question, adopted by a dominant undertaking, constitutes an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, where, given its effect of excluding competitors who are at least as efficient as itself by squeezing their margins, it is capable of making more difficult, or impossible, the entry of those competitors onto the market concerned (see, to that effect, Deutsche Telekom v Commission , paragraph 253).

60. The Guidelines, which, the Court has held, form rules of practice from which the administration may not depart in an individual case without giving reasons compatible with the principle of equal treatment (Case C‑397/03 P Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission [2006] ECR I‑4429, paragraph 91), merely describe the method used by the Commission to examine infringements and the criteria that the Commission requires to be taken into account in setting the amount of a fine.

91. It should be noted in that regard that, whilst rules of conduct designed to produce external effects, as is the case of the Guidelines, which are aimed at traders, may not be regarded as rules of law which the administration is always bound to observe, they nevertheless form rules of practice from which the administration may not depart in an individual case without giving reasons that are compatible with the principle of equal treatment (see, to that effect, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraphs 209 and 210).

68. As regards, lastly, the principle of territoriality, as recognised by the Court in paragraph 22 of the judgment in Futura Participations and Singer , it must be held that that principle is also not capable of justifying the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings.

20. It is true that, according to the case-law of the Court, national legislation making the use of a nutritional substance in a foodstuff lawfully manufactured and/or marketed in other Member States subject to prior authorisation is not, in principle, contrary to Community law if certain conditions are satisfied (see, to that effect Case C-344/90 Commission v France [1992] ECR I-4719, paragraph 8, and Case C-24/00 Commission v France [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 25 to 27).

8 In deciding on this action it should be recalled that according to the case-law of the Court (see Case 247/84 Motte [1985] ECR 3887, at paragraph 25; Case 304/84 Muller [1986] ECR 1511, at paragraph 26; and Case C-42/90 Bellon [1990] ECR I-4863, at paragraphs 16 and 17), rules making the use of an additive subject to authorization are in compliance with Community law if two conditions are satisfied.

52. According to the settled case-law of the Court, the place where the damage occurred is the place where the alleged damage actually manifests itself (see judgment in Zuid-Chemie , C‑189/08, EU:C:2009:475, paragraph 27). As for loss consisting in additional costs incurred because of artificially high prices, such as the price of the hydrogen peroxide supplied by the cartel at issue in the main proceedings, that place is identifiable only for each alleged victim taken individually and is located, in general, at that victim’s registered office.

18 The first point to note is that, according to established case-law, in the absence of Community rules governing the matter it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, however, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (the principle of equivalence) and do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (the principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, Case 33/76 Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5; Case 45/76 Comet v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043, paragraphs 13 and 16; Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel and Van Veen v SPF [1995] ECR I-4705, paragraph 17; Case C-261/95 Palmisani v INPS [1997] ECR I-4025, paragraph 27; Case C-246/96 Magorrian and Cunningham [1997] ECR I-7153, paragraph 37; and paragraph 16 of the judgment of 15 September 1998 in Joined Cases C-279/96, C-280/96 and C-281/96 Ansaldo Energia and Others [1998] ECR I-5025).

16 According to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, in the absence of Community rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, however, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions and do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (Rewe, paragraph 5, Comet, paragraphs 13 and 16, both cited above, and, more recently, Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck v Belgian State [1995] ECR I-4599, paragraph 12).

80. As regards the amount of that lump sum, account must be taken, in addition to the considerations set out in paragraphs 63 to 78 of the present judgment, of the capacity to pay of the Kingdom of Spain (see, to that effect, Commission v Spain EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 131).

52. On the other hand, as regards the child of both parents, it must be observed that, as is clear from the documents before the Court, this child is indeed the child of a national of a Member State who is or has been employed in the territory of another Member State, within the meaning of Article 12 of Regulation No 1612/68. However, so that the mother, as the parent who is that child’s primary carer, may have a right of residence based on that provision, the child of both parents must have entered the educational system in the host Member State (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑147/11 and C‑148/11 Czop and Punakova [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 29).

29. On the other hand, Ms Czop cannot derive a right of residence from the sole fact that she is the primary carer of her son Lukasz Czop, who entered the educational system in the United Kingdom in 2006.

46 The Court has held that the specific factors that allow a link to be established between the articles of the FEU Treaty on freedom to provide services and the subject or circumstances of a dispute, confined in all respects within a single Member State, must be apparent from the order for reference (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C‑268/15, EU:C:2016:874, paragraph 54).

52. In that connection, the Court has held that a national or international body governed by public law which pursues the recovery of charges payable by a person governed by private law for the use of its equipment and services acts in the exercise of its public powers, in particular where that use is obligatory and exclusive and the rate of charges, the methods of calculation and the procedures for collection are fixed unilaterally in relation to the users (judgments in LTU , 29/76, EU:C:1976:137, paragraph 4, and Lechouritou and Others , C‑292/05, EU:C:2007:102, paragraph 32).

4 IF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONCEPT IS APPROACHED IN THIS WAY , IN PARTICULAR FOR THE PURPOSE OF APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE III OF THE CONVENTION , CERTAIN TYPES OF JUDICIAL DECISION MUST BE REGARDED AS EXCLUDED FROM THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION , EITHER BY REASON OF THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE ACTION OR OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE ACTION . ALTHOUGH CERTAIN JUDGMENTS GIVEN IN ACTIONS BETWEEN A PUBLIC AUTHORITY AND A PERSON GOVERNED BY PRIVATE LAW MAY FALL WITHIN THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION , THIS IS NOT SO WHERE THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY ACTS IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS POWERS . SUCH IS THE CASE IN A DISPUTE WHICH , LIKE THAT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION , CONCERNS THE RECOVERY OF CHARGES PAYABLE BY A PERSON GOVERNED BY PRIVATE LAW TO A NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL BODY GOVERNED BY PUBLIC LAW FOR THE USE OF EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES PROVIDED BY SUCH BODY , IN PARTICULAR WHERE SUCH USE IS OBLIGATORY AND EXCLUSIVE . THIS APPLIES IN PARTICULAR WHERE THE RATE OF CHARGES , THE METHODS OF CALCULATION AND THE PROCEDURES FOR COLLECTION ARE FIXED UNILATERALLY IN RELATION TO THE USERS , AS IS THE POSITION IN THE PRESENT CASE WHERE THE BODY IN QUESTION UNILATERALLY FIXED THE PLACE OF PERFORMANCE OF THE OBLIGATION AT ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AND SELECTED THE NATIONAL COURTS WITH JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE UPON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OBLIGATION .

29. As for the question whether the contested Directive could legitimately be adopted on the basis of Article 31 EA, it is clear from settled case-law that the choice of legal basis for a measure must rest on objective factors that are amenable to judicial review; these include the purpose and content of that measure (see, inter alia, judgments in Parliament v Council , EU:C:1991:373, paragraph 9; Parliament v Council , C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 42; Commission v Council , C‑137/12, EU:C:2013:675, paragraph 52; and Commission v Parliament and Council , C‑43/12, EU:C:2014:298, paragraph 29).

48. The consequences, for all other parts of the agreement or for other obligations flowing from it, of the prohibition of contractual terms incompatible with Article 81 EC are not, however, a matter for Community law. It is therefore for the national court to determine, in accordance with the national law applicable, the extent and consequences, for the contractual relation as a whole, of the prohibition of certain terms under Article 81 EC (see, to this effect, Case 10/86 VAG France [1986] ECR 4071, paragraphs 14 and 15, and Case C-230/96 Cabour [1998] ECR I‑2055, paragraph 51).

15 IT IS FOR THE NATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT NATIONAL LAW THE EXTENT AND CONSEQUENCES , FOR THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS AS A WHOLE , OF THE NULLITY OF CERTAIN CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 85 ( 2 ). IT IS ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL LAW THAT IT IS NECESSARY IN PARTICULAR TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH INCOMPATIBILITY MAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF OBLIGING THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO AMEND THE CONTENT OF THEIR AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO PREVENT IT FROM BEING VOID AND , AS THE CASE MAY BE , TO CHOOSE , TO THAT END , THE ONE OR THE OTHER OF THE POSSIBILITIES LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 5 ( 2 ) OF REGULATION NO 123/85 WITH REGARD TO THE DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT .

53. In view of the fact that, where a sphere has been the subject of exhaustive harmonisation at Community level, any national measure relating thereto must be assessed in the light of the provisions of the harmonising measure and not those of the Treaty (Case C-37/92 Vanacker and Lesage [1993] ECR I-4947, paragraph 9, Case C-324/99 DaimlerChrysler [2001] ECR I-9897, paragraph 32, and Case C‑322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 64), it must be determined whether the harmonisation brought about by Directive 94/62 precludes the compatibility of the national rules in question with Article 28 EC from being examined.

51 Secondly, it should be recalled that an action for annulment is available against all measures adopted by the EU institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have binding legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position (see, inter alia, judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 9, and of 9 September 2015, Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro v Commission, C‑506/13 P, EU:C:2015:562, paragraph 16).

9 IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE MEASURES IN QUESTION ARE ACTS WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 173 IT IS NECESSARY , THEREFORE , TO LOOK TO THEIR SUBSTANCE . ACCORDING TO THE CONSISTENT CASE-LAW OF THE COURT ANY MEASURE THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF WHICH ARE BINDING ON , AND CAPABLE OF AFFECTING THE INTERESTS OF , THE APPLICANT BY BRINGING ABOUT A DISTINCT CHANGE IN HIS LEGAL POSITION IS AN ACT OR DECISION WHICH MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF AN ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 173 FOR A DECLARATION THAT IT IS VOID . HOWEVER , THE FORM IN WHICH SUCH ACTS OR DECISIONS ARE CAST IS , IN PRINCIPLE , IMMATERIAL AS REGARDS THE QUESTION WHETHER THEY ARE OPEN TO CHALLENGE UNDER THAT ARTICLE .

191. Admittedly, it is true, as DSD has pointed out, that failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time constitutes a procedural irregularity (see, to that effect, Baustahlgewebe v Commission , paragraph 48).

84. In addition, the Court has repeatedly held that the exception in the first paragraph of Article 45 EC must be restricted to activities which in themselves are directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority ( Reyners , paragraph 45; Case C‑42/92 Thijssen [1993] ECR I‑4047, paragraph 8; Commission v Spain , paragraph 35; Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti , paragraph 46; Commission v Germany , paragraph 38; and Commission v Portugal , paragraph 36).

38. Thus, according to settled case-law, derogation under those articles must be restricted to activities which, in themselves, are directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority (see Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti , cited above, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited), which excludes from being regarded as connected with the exercise of official authority, within the meaning of that derogation, functions that are merely auxiliary and preparatory vis-à-vis an entity which effectively exercises official authority by taking the final decision ( Thijssen , cited above, paragraph 22).

44 Furthermore, the criterion on the basis of which the national provision excludes type A and type B share transfers from that tax advantage - namely the fact that the transfer is to a company established under the legislation of another Member State or a branch set up in Sweden by such a company - relates to the exercise of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the Treaty and cannot, therefore, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of establishment (see, to that effect, inter alia, Centros, cited above, paragraph 27).

26 With regard to the classification of a practice as a restriction by object, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that certain types of coordination between undertakings reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition that there is no need to examine their effects (judgment in ING Pensii, C‑172/14, EU:C:2015:484, paragraph 31). That case-law arises from the fact that certain types of coordination between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition (judgment in CB v Commission, C‑67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204, paragraph 50).

50. That case-law arises from the fact that certain types of coordination between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition (see, to that effect, in particular, judgment in Allianz Hungária Biztosító and Others (EU:C:2013:160) paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

31 The Commission, referring to the judgments of 27 February 2007 in Segi and Others v Council (C‑355/04 P, EU:C:2007:116, paragraphs 51 to 54), and 24 June 2014 in Parliament v Council (C‑658/11, EU:C:2014:2025, paragraph 70), contends that the final sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU do not mean that all acts adopted in the context of the CFSP automatically fall outside the jurisdiction of the EU judicature. As the limitation on the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to the CFSP is a derogation from the rule of general jurisdiction laid down in Article 19 TEU, it should be narrowly construed. The interpretation adopted by the General Court that it lacked jurisdiction for the sole reason that the contested decisions were taken by a body set up by a measure adopted pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty is contrary to the wording, the general scheme and the objectives of those provisions of the Treaties.