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32 It is appropriate in this regard to bear in mind the settled case-law, according to which, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the tariff classification of goods is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (judgment in Delphi Deutschland, C‑423/10, EU:C:2011:315, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

23. It is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, X , paragraph 15 and case-law cited).

78. Furthermore, such an interpretation finds support in the Court’s case-law. Thus, the Court has held that a proportional approach is required even in circumstances where the wording of the relevant provision of the Sixth Directive does not provide for it expressly ( Armbrecht , paragraphs 29 and 32, and Case C-230/94 Enkler [1996] ECR I‑4517, paragraph 38).

64. The Court has also recognised that limited authorisation of games on an exclusive basis has the advantage of confining the operation of gambling within controlled channels and of preventing the risk of fraud or crime in the context of such operation (see Läärä and Others , paragraph 37, and Zenatti , paragraph 35).

37 Contrary to the arguments advanced by the appellants in the main proceedings, the fact that the games in issue are not totally prohibited is not enough to show that the national legislation is not in reality intended to achieve the public interest objectives at which it is purportedly aimed, which must be considered as a whole. Limited authorisation of such games on an exclusive basis, which has the advantage of confining the desire to gamble and the exploitation of gambling within controlled channels, of preventing the risk of fraud or crime in the context of such exploitation, and of using the resulting profits for public interest purposes, likewise falls within the ambit of those objectives.

42. In that connection, it should be noted that, regardless of whether, in the present case, the tax in question constitutes direct or indirect taxation, the tax has not been harmonised within the European Union and therefore falls within the competence of the Member States, which, according to settled case-law, must exercise that competence consistently with EU law (see, in particular, with regard to direct taxation, Case C-334/02 Commission v France [2004] ECR I-2229, paragraph 21; Case C-155/09 Commission v Greece [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39; and Case C-10/10 Commission v Austria [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 23).

203. The Court has consistently held that, in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it forms part (Case C-223/98 Adidas [1999] ECR I-7081, paragraph 23; Case C-301/98 KVS International [2000] ECR I-3583, paragraph 21; Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 50, and Case C-191/99 Kvaerner [2001] ECR I-4447, paragraph 30).

30 It should be remembered, at the outset, that the Court has consistently held that, in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it forms part (See Case 292/82 Merck [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12; Case 337/82 St Nikolaus Brennerei und Likörfabrik [1984] ECR 1051, paragraph 10; Case C-223/98 Adidas [1999] ECR I-7081, paragraph 23; Case C-301/98 KVS International [2000] ECR I-3583, paragraph 21; and Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 50).

91. First of all, it should be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, amendments to national legislation are irrelevant for the purposes of giving judgment on the subject-matter of an action for failure to fulfil obligations if they have not been implemented before the expiry of the period set by the reasoned opinion (see, in particular, Case C-392/96 Commission v Ireland , paragraph 86). It is thus inappropriate to take into account, for the purpose of assessing the merits of the present complaint, the amendments made to the Irish legislation in 2006.

28 However, it is clear from settled case-law of the Court that the interpretation of a provision of EU law may be relevant in cases in which, although the facts of the main proceedings are outside the direct scope of EU law, the provisions of EU law have been made applicable by national legislation, which, in dealing with situations confined in all respects within a single Member State, follows the same approach as that provided for by EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C‑268/15, EU:C:2016:874, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

53 The same applies in cases in which, although the facts of the main proceedings are outside the direct scope of EU law, the provisions of EU law have been made applicable by national legislation, which, in dealing with situations confined in all respects within a single Member State, follows the same approach as that provided for by EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 October 1990, Dzodzi, C‑297/88 and C‑197/89, EU:C:1990:360, paragraphs 36, 37 and 41; of 17 July 1997, Leur-Bloem, C‑28/95, EU:C:1997:369, paragraphs 27 and 32; and of 14 March 2013, Allianz Hungária Biztositó and Others, C‑32/11, EU:C:2013:160, paragraph 20).

30. Therefore, the rationale of Directive 89/665 is to allow, by the establishment of appropriate review procedures, the effective application of the substantive provisions of European Union law on public contracts, which seek to ensure, for traders established in the Member States, the opening-up to competition which is undistorted and as wide as possible (see, to that effect, Case C‑337/06 Bayerischer Rundfunk and Others [2007] ECR I‑11173, paragraphs 38 and 39 and case-law cited).

22 None the less, whatever the applicable national law may be, it must be interpreted, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 189 of the EC Treaty (see, inter alia, Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8, and Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori v Recreb [1994] ECR I-3325, paragraph 26).

26 It must also be borne in mind that, as the Court has consistently held since its judgment in Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, paragraph 26, the Member States' obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by the directive and their duty under Article 5 of the Treaty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, is binding on all the authorities of Member States, including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts. The judgments of the Court in Case C-106/89 Marleasing v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8, and Case C-334/92 Wagner Miret v Fondo de Garantía Salarial [1993] ECR I-6911, paragraph 20, make it clear that, when applying national law, whether adopted before or after the directive, the national court that has to interpret that law must do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive so as to achieve the result it has in view and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty.

32 The Court has held that the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons would be compromised if the abolition of State barriers could be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by associations or organisations not governed by public law (see Walrave, paragraph 18, and Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 83).

29 As is also apparent from settled case-law, the requirement to state reasons must be assessed by reference to the circumstances of the case. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all of the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgments of 29 September 2011, Elf Aquitaine v Commission, C‑521/09 P, EU:C:2011:620, paragraph 150 and of 21 December 2016, Club Hotel Loutraki and Others v Commission, C‑131/15 P, EU:C:2016:989, paragraph 47).

47 The requirement that reasons be given must be assessed according to the circumstances of the case. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all of the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgment of 29 September 2011, Elf Aquitaine v Commission, C‑521/09 P, EU:C:2011:620, paragraph 150 and the case-law cited).

61. It must be added that undertakings involved in an administrative procedure in which fines may be imposed for infringement of the Community competition rules cannot acquire a legitimate expectation that the Commission will not exceed the level of fines previously imposed or of a particular method of calculating the fines. The Court has stated in particular that the undertakings in question must take account of the possibility that the Commission may decide at any time to raise the level of the fines by reference to that applied in the past (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425, paragraphs 228 and 229).

51 Moreover, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that the disclosure provided for in Article 3 of Directive 68/151 is intended to enable any interested third parties to inform themselves of these matters, without having to establish a right or an interest requiring to be protected. The Court noted, in that regard, that the very wording of Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty, on which that directive was based, refers to the need to protect the interests of third parties generally, without distinguishing or excluding any categories falling within the ambit of that term, and consequently the third parties referred to in that article cannot be limited in particular merely to creditors of the company concerned (see judgment of 4 December 1997, Daihatsu Deutschland, C‑97/96, EU:C:1997:581, paragraphs 19, 20 and 22, and the order of 23 September 2004, Springer, C‑435/02 and C‑103/03, EU:C:2004:552, paragraphs 29 and 33).

22 As regards Article 6 of the First Directive, the fourth recital in the preamble shows that disclosure of annual accounts is primarily designed to provide information for third parties who do not know or cannot obtain sufficient knowledge of the company's accounting and financial situation. Article 3 of the First Directive, which provides for the maintenance of a public register in which all documents and particulars to be disclosed must be entered, and pursuant to which copies of the annual accounts must be obtainable by any person upon application, confirms the concern to enable any interested persons to inform themselves of these matters. That concern also finds expression in the recitals in the preamble to the Fourth Directive, which refer to the need to establish in the Community minimum equivalent legal requirements as regards the extent of the financial information that should be made available to the public by companies that are in competition with one another (see, in particular, the third recital).

103. In that regard, it must be pointed out that the right to take collective action for the protection of the workers of the host State against possible social dumping may constitute an overriding reason of public interest within the meaning of the case‑law of the Court which, in principle, justifies a restriction of one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑369/96 and C‑376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I‑8453, paragraph 36; Case C‑165/98 Mazzoleni and ISA [2001] ECR I‑2189, paragraph 27; Joined Cases C‑49/98, C‑50/98, C‑52/98 to C‑54/98 and C‑68/98 to C‑71/98 Finalarte and Others [2001] ECR I‑7831, paragraph 33, and Case C‑438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 77).

79. Or, il résulte de la jurisprudence de la Cour qu’un État membre ne saurait être tenu de prendre en considération, aux fins de l’application de sa propre législation fiscale, les conséquences éventuellement défavorables découlant des particularités d’une réglementation d’un autre État membre applicable à un immeuble situé sur le territoire de ce dernier État et appartenant à un contribuable résidant sur le territoire du premier État (voir, par analogie, arrêts du 6 décembre 2007, Columbus Container Services, C‑298/05, Rec. p. I‑10451, point 51; du 28 février 2008, Deutsche Shell, C‑293/06, Rec. p. I‑1129, point 42, et Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt, précité, point 49).

51. As stated in paragraph 44 of this judgment, in the current state of harmonisation of Community tax law, Member States enjoy a certain autonomy. It follows from that tax competence that the freedom of companies and partnerships to choose, for the purposes of establishment, between different Member States in no way means that the latter are obliged to adapt their own tax systems to the different systems of tax of the other Member States in order to guarantee that a company or partnership that has chosen to establish itself in a given Member State is taxed, at national level, in the same way as a company or partnership that has chosen to establish itself in another Member State.

39 Consequently, an action for a declaration of non-liability, such as that brought in the main proceedings in this case by the shipowners, and another action, such as that brought subsequently by the cargo owners on the basis of shipping contracts which are separate but in identical terms, concerning the same cargo transported in bulk and damaged in the same circumstances, have the same cause of action.

67. As regards the division of jurisdiction between the European Union judicature and national courts, it is in principle for the national court to determine whether the factual conditions triggering the application of a European Union rule are fulfilled in the case pending before it, while the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling, may, where appropriate, provide clarification to guide the national court in its interpretation (see, to that effect, Case C‑424/97 Haim [2000] ECR I‑5123, paragraph 58, and Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze [2009] ECR I-4585, paragraph 23).

58 Although, as regards the division of jurisdiction between the Community judicature and national courts, it is in principle for the national court to determine whether those conditions are fulfilled in the case pending before it, the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling, may, where appropriate, provide clarification to guide the national court in its interpretation.

48. The fact that the number of undertakings able to claim entitlement under the measure at issue is very large, or that they belong to different sectors of activity, is not sufficient to call into question its selective nature and therefore, to rule out its classification as State aid (Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission , paragraph 32 and Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke , paragraph 48).

26. However, it is for the Court to provide the national court with all those elements for the interpretation of Community law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has specifically referred to them in its questions (see, inter alia, Case C-87/97 Consorzio per la tutela del formaggio Gorgonzola [1999] ECR I-1301, paragraph 16, and Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, paragraph 38).

38. It should be recalled here that it is for the Court to provide the national court with all those elements for the interpretation of Community law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has specifically referred to them in its questions (see inter alia, to that effect, Case C-241/89 SARPP [1990] ECR I-4695, paragraph 8; Case C-315/92 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb (‘Clinique’) [1994] ECR I-317, paragraph 9; and Case C‑87/97 Consorzio per la tutela del formaggio Gorgonzola [1999] ECR I-1301, paragraph 16).

8. À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé (voir, notamment, arrêts du 14 septembre 2004, Commission/Espagne, C‑168/03, Rec. p. I‑8227, point 24, et du 27 septembre 2007, Commission/Luxembourg, C‑529/06, non publié au Recueil, point 7).

43. Nevertheless, when adopting measures to implement Community legislation, national authorities must exercise their discretion in compliance with the general rules of Community law, which include the principles of proportionality, legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations (see, to that effect, Case C-313/99 Mulligan and Others [2002] ECR I-5719, paragraphs 35 and 36).

36 Consequently, a clawback measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings must be established and applied in compliance with the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-63/93 Duff and Others [1996] ECR I-569, paragraph 34). Moreover, it must be proportionate to the aim pursued (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-22/94 Irish Farmers Association and Others [1997] ECR I-1809, paragraphs 30 and 31) and applied without discrimination (see, to that effect, in particular Klensch and Others, paragraph 8). Similarly, such a measure must respect fundamental rights, such as the right to property (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-2/92 Bostock [1994] ECR I-955, paragraphs 16 and 20) and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession (see, to that effect, in particular Joined Cases C-90/90 and C-91/90 Neu and Others [1991] ECR I-3617, paragraph 13).

20 However, the Court has observed that, in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction, it is necessary to examine the circumstances in which the case has been referred to it by the national court. The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in preliminary ruling proceedings requires the national court for its part to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to contribute to the administration of justice in the Member States and not to give opinions on general or hypothetical questions (see, in particular, Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec v TF1 Publicité and M6 Publicité [1995] ECR I-179, paragraph 12).

20 When a textual interpretation of a provision of EU law does not permit its precise scope to be assessed, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to its purpose and general structure (see, to that effect, judgments of 31 March 1998, France and Others v Commission, C‑68/94 and C‑30/95, EU:C:1998:148, paragraph 168, and of 7 April 2016, Marchon Germany, C‑315/14, EU:C:2016:211, paragraphs 28 and 29).

29 Article 17(2) of Directive 86/653 must consequently be interpreted by taking account of the context of that provision and the objectives pursued by that directive (see, by analogy, judgments in Csonka and Others, C‑409/11, EU:C:2013:512, paragraph 23, and Vnuk, C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146, paragraph 42).

32 The Court has also held that the Member States have the duty, in exercising their competence to determine the seat of the institutions, to respect the Parliament's power to determine its own internal organization and to ensure that such decisions do not stand in the way of the proper functioning of that institution (Joined Cases 358/85 and 51/86 France v Parliament [1988] ECR 4821, paragraph 35). Whilst it is true that the Edinburgh Decision does place certain constraints on the Parliament as regards the organization of its work, those constraints are inherent in the need to determine its seat while maintaining several places of work for the institution. Nor do they conflict with the practice generally followed by the Parliament.

21 On that point, it should be noted that the purpose of Article 5(6) of the Sixth Directive is to ensure equal treatment as between a taxable person who applies business assets for private purposes and an ordinary consumer who purchases goods of the same type (see Case C-20/91 De Jong [1992] ECR I-2847, paragraph 15, and Case C-230/94 Enkler [1996] ECR I-4517, paragraph 33).

33 Second, in order to prevent a taxable person who has been able to deduct VAT on the purchase of goods used for his business from escaping payment of VAT when he takes those goods away from his business for private purposes and from thereby enjoying undue advantages over an ordinary consumer who buys the goods and pays VAT on them, Article 6(2) of the Sixth Directive provides that "the use of goods forming part of the assets of a business for the private use of the taxable person or of his staff or more generally for purposes other than those of his business where the value added tax on such goods is wholly or partly deductible" is to be treated as a supply of services for consideration (see Case C-20/91 De Jong v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1992] ECR I-2847, paragraph 15, concerning Article 5(6) of the Sixth Directive, which is based on the same principle).

31. In that regard, it should be pointed out that it is for the Court to assess in each case, in the light of the circumstances of the case, the financial penalties to be imposed (Case C‑304/02 Commission v France , paragraph 86, and Case C‑177/04 Commission v France [2006] ECR I‑2461, paragraph 58)

33 Second, the Court took the view, in paragraph 47 of Crispoltoni II, that, in adopting Regulation No 1114/88, the Council had acted not only in compliance with the principle of proportionality, in that it did not choose a measure which was manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective pursued, but also in accordance with the need to effect the appropriate adjustments by degrees prescribed by Article 39(2)(b) of the Treaty.

47 The alleged breach of the principle of proportionality has accordingly not been established. C ° The alleged discrimination

34. It should be borne in mind in that regard that the principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of European Union law and requires that measures implemented through European Union law provisions be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (Case C‑58/08 Vodafone and Others [2010] ECR I‑4999, paragraph 51, and the case-law cited).

21. Thirdly, as regards the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80, it is settled case-law that the rights accorded by that provision to the members of a Turkish worker’s family who satisfy the conditions set out in that paragraph cannot be restricted except in accordance with Article 14(1) of that decision, namely on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, or because of the fact that the party concerned has left the territory of the host Member State for a significant length of time without legitimate reason (Case C-329/97 Ergat [2000] ECR I-1487, paragraphs 45, 46 and 48; Case C‑467/02 Cetinkaya [2004] ECR I-10895, paragraphs 36 and 38; and Case C‑373/03 Aydinli [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 27).

36. The Court has already held that the limits to the right of residence, as the corollary of the right to have access to the employment market and take up employment, are of two kinds. First, Article 14(1) of Decision No 1/80 itself provides Member States with the possibility of placing restrictions on the presence of a migrant Turk in the host Member State in individual and appropriately justified cases, where, through his own conduct, he constitutes a genuine and serious threat to public order, public security or public health. Second, a family member, duly authorised to join a Turkish worker in a Member State, who leaves the territory of the host State for a significant length of time without legitimate reason as a rule loses the legal status he acquired under the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 (see Ergat , paragraphs 45, 46 and 48).

48. In order to answer those questions, it must, first of all, be recalled that preventing possible tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an objective which is recognised and encouraged by the directive (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-487/01 and C-7/02 Gemeente Leusden and Holin Groep [2004] ECR I-5337, paragraph 76, and Halifax and Others , paragraph 71).

21. In order to determine, more specifically, whether or to what extent a Member State may provide for restrictions in that regard, it should be borne in mind, first of all, that Article 78 of the Customs Code introduces a procedure enabling the customs authorities, if necessary on their own initiative, to make a post-clearance amendment to the customs declaration, that is to say, after release of the goods covered by that declaration (see, to that effect, judgments in Overland Footwear , C‑468/03, EU:C:2005:624, paragraphs 62, 64 and 66, and Greencarrier Freight Services Latvia , C‑571/12, EU:C:2014:102, paragraph 28).

62. Article 78 of the Customs Code expressly introduced, from that date, the possibility of the customs authorities revising a customs declaration on an application by the declarant submitted after the release of the goods.

34. Nor is it disputed before the Court of Justice that the questions submitted are relevant to the outcome of the main proceedings, as the adoption of national measures designed to transpose a directive into domestic law in the United Kingdom may be subject to the condition that the directive be valid (see British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco , paragraph 37).

20 So far as concerns the possibility of applying Article 113 of the Treaty, it is important to note that the Treaty does not contain any provision similar to Article 95 regarding domestic taxation in respect of trade with non-member countries, subject, however, to any treaty provisions which may be in force between the Community and the country of origin of a given product (see the judgment in Case 148/77 Hansen v Hauptzollamt Flensburg [1978] ECR 1787, paragraph 24) and that although Article 113 confers upon the Community powers which enable it to take any appropriate measure concerning the common commercial policy, it nevertheless does not in itself contain any legal criterion which is sufficiently precise to enable an assessment of the contested national rules to be made (see the judgment in Case 266/81 SIOT v Ministero delle Finanze [1983] ECR 731, paragraph 29).

29 AS REGARDS ARTICLE 113 OF THE TREATY , ALTHOUGH THAT PROVISION CONFERS UPON THE COMMUNITY POWERS WHICH ENABLE IT TO TAKE ANY APPROPRIATE MEASURE CONCERNING THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY , IT NEVERTHELESS DOES NOT IN ITSELF CONTAIN ANY LEGAL CRITERION WHICH IS SUFFICIENTLY PRECISE TO ENABLE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTESTED TRANSIT RULES TO BE MADE .

9. Selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé. Les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêt du 4 novembre 2008, Commission/Luxembourg, C‑95/08, point 24).

61. Thus, the competent national authority has the task of proving, in accordance with the national procedural rules, that State security would in fact be compromised by precise and full disclosure to the person concerned of the grounds which constitute the basis of a decision taken under Article 27 of Directive 2004/38 and of the related evidence (see, by analogy, Case C-284/05 Commission v Finland [2009] ECR I‑11705, paragraphs 47 and 49). It follows that there is no presumption that the reasons invoked by a national authority exist and are valid.

49. Consequently it is for the Member State which seeks to take advantage of Article 296 EC to prove that it is necessary to have recourse to that derogation in order to protect its essential security interests.

23. As the Advocate General stated in point 44 of his Opinion, in the majority of the language versions, the purchaser is to ‘transmit’ or ‘communicate’ to the competent national authority, before 15 May each year, a summary of the statements drawn up for each milk producer. Such wording implies, rather, that the information must be sent before the deadline.

39 It is clear, however, from the judgments in Case C-57/93 Vroege [1994] ECR I-4541, paragraphs 20 to 27, Fisscher, cited above, paragraphs 17 to 24, and Case C-246/96 Magorrian and Cunningham v EHSSB and DHSS [1997] ECR I-7153, paragraphs 27 to 35, that the limitation in time of the effects of Article 119 resulting from both the Barber judgment and the Protocol concerns only those kinds of discrimination which employers and pension schemes could reasonably have considered to be permissible owing to the transitional derogations for which Community law provided and which were capable of being applied to occupational pensions (see Case C-435/93 Dietz v Stichting Thuiszorg Rotterdam [1996] ECR I-5223, paragraph 19).

30 Therefore, as the judgment in Bilka included no limitation of its effects in time, the direct effect of Article 119 may be relied on, as from 8 April 1976, the date of the judgment in Defrenne, in which that article was first held to have direct effect, in order retroactively to claim equal treatment in relation to the right to join an occupational pension scheme (Dietz, paragraph 21).

54. There is no reason why the tax authorities concerned should not request from the taxpayer the evidence that they consider they need to effect a correct assessment of the taxes concerned and, where appropriate, refuse the exemption applied for if that evidence is not supplied (see, inter alia, Case C‑451/05 ELISA [2007] ECR I‑8251, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

27. It is to be noted that Article 49 TFEU requires the abolition of restrictions on the freedom of establishment. Therefore, even though, according to their wording, the provisions of TFEU on freedom of establishment are directed to ensuring that foreign nationals and companies are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation (judgments in Marks & Spencer , C‑446/03, EU:C:2005:763, paragraph 31; National Grid Indus , C‑371/10, EU:C:2011:785, paragraph 35; and Bouanich , C‑375/12, EU:C:2014:138, paragraph 57).

35. Article 49 TFEU requires the abolition of restrictions on the freedom of establishment. Even though, according to their wording, the Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment are aimed at ensuring that foreign nationals are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation (see Case C‑264/96 ICI [1998] ECR I‑4695, paragraph 21; Case C‑298/05 Columbus Container Services [2007] ECR I‑10451, paragraph 33; Case C‑157/07 Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee‑Seniorenheimstatt [2008] ECR I‑8061, paragraph 29; and Case C‑96/08 CIBA [2010] ECR I‑2911, paragraph 18).

38. The Court has held previously in that regard that, by reason of the primacy of directly-applicable European Union law, national legislation concerning a public monopoly on games of chance which, according to the findings of a national court, comprises restrictions that are incompatible with the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, because those restrictions do not contribute to limiting betting activities in a consistent and systematic manner, cannot continue to apply during a transitional period (Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten [2010] ECR I-8015, paragraph 69).

72. Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive provides that if, in spite of a negative assessment carried out in accordance with the first sentence of Article 6(3) of the directive, a plan or project must nevertheless be carried out for imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature, and there are no alternative solutions, the Member State is to take all compensatory measures necessary to ensure that the overall coherence of Natura 2000 is protected (see Case C‑304/05 Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I‑7495, paragraph 81).

81. That provision states that, if, in spite of a negative assessment carried out in accordance with the first sentence of Article 6(3) of the directive, a plan or project must nevertheless be carried out for imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature, and there are no alternative solutions, the Member State is to take all compensatory measures necessary to ensure that the overall coherence of Natura 2000 is protected.

89. Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, to avoid it conferring an economic advantage which may favour the recipient undertaking over competing undertakings ( Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg , paragraph 90).

46. Contrary to the arguments put forward by the Commission, by the ground of appeal relating to infringement of the right of access to the file, Solvay is not criticising the findings of fact made at first instance, but the rules applied by the General Court as regards the standard of proof relating to the usefulness of the documents, some of which have been mislaid. The question whether the General Court applied the correct legal standard when determining the usefulness of those documents for Solvay’s defence is a question of law, which is amenable to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑403/04 P and C‑405/04 P Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission [2007] ECR I‑729, paragraph 40, and Case C‑413/06 P Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala [2008] ECR I‑4951, paragraph 117).

40. The first part of the plea concerns essentially the question whether the alleged absence of commercial interests in committing the alleged infringement ought to have led the Court of First Instance to evaluate the evidence according to different criteria from those which it used. Contrary to the Commission’s contention, this part of the plea is admissible. The question whether the Court of First Instance applied the correct legal standard when examining the evidence is a question of law.

35. It is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, Case C‑142/06 Olicom [2007] ECR I‑6675, paragraph 16, and Case C‑370/08 Data I/O [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 29).

37 It is clear, however, from the judgments in Case C-57/93 Vroege [1994] ECR I-4541, paragraphs 20 to 27, Case C-128/93 Fisscher [1994] ECR I-4583, paragraphs 17 to 24, and Case C-246/96 Magorrian and Cunningham v EHSSB and DHSS [1997] ECR I-7153, paragraphs 27 to 35, that the limitation in time of the effects of Article 119 resulting from both the Barber judgment and the Protocol concerns only those kinds of discrimination which employers and pension schemes could reasonably have considered to be permissible owing to the transitional derogations for which Community law provided and which were capable of being applied to occupational pensions (see Case C-435/93 Dietz v Stichting Thuiszorg Rotterdam [1996] ECR I-5223, paragraph 19).

32 As regards the right to receive benefits additional to a retirement pension under an occupational scheme such as that involved in the main proceedings, the Court finds that, even if the persons concerned have always been entitled to a retirement pension under the Superannuation Scheme, nevertheless they were not fully admitted to that contributory scheme. Solely on account of the fact that they worked part-time, they were specifically excluded from MHO status which gives access to a special scheme under the Superannuation Scheme.

24. Such treatment is permissible only if it pursues a legitimate objective compatible with the Treaty or is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. It is further necessary, in such a case, that its application be appropriate to ensuring the attainment of the objective thus pursued and not go beyond what is necessary to attain it (see, in particular, Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I‑10837, paragraph 35; Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I-7995, paragraph 47; and Case C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 37).

49. In particular, it must be ascertained whether the body in question carries on its activities in a situation of competition, since the existence of such competition may, as the Court has previously held, be an indication that a need in the general interest has an industrial or commercial character (see, to that effect, BFI Holding , paragraphs 48 and 49).

49 The existence of significant competition, and in particular the fact that the entity concerned is faced with competition in the marketplace, may be indicative of the absence of a need in the general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character.

16 For the purpose of answering that question, it should be observed that the Court has consistently held that wherever the provisions of a directive appear, as far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, individuals may rely on those provisions in the absence of implementing measures adopted in the prescribed time as against any national provision which is incompatible with the directive (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 71/85 Netherlands v Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging [1986] ECR 3855, paragraph 13).

58 While Article 22(8) of the Sixth Directive, in the version resulting from Article 28h thereof, allows Member States to adopt measures to ensure the correct collection of VAT and the prevention of evasion, such a refusal to allow an exemption would go further than is necessary to attain those objectives, since such an infringement of national law can be penalised by a fine proportionate to the seriousness of the infringement (see, by analogy, judgments of 9 July 2015, Salomie and Oltean, C‑183/14, EU:C:2015:454, paragraphs 62 and 63, and of 15 September 2016, Barlis 06 — Investimentos Imobiliários e Turísticos, C‑516/14, EU:C:2016:690, paragraphs 47 and 48).

47 Secondly, it must be stated that the Member States have power to lay down penalties for failure to comply with the formal conditions for the exercise of the right to deduct VAT. In accordance with Article 273 of Directive 2006/112, the Member States can adopt measures to ensure the correct collection of VAT and to prevent evasion, provided that those measures do not go further than is necessary to attain those objectives and do not undermine the neutrality of VAT (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2015, Salomie and Oltean, C‑183/14, EU:C:2015:454, paragraph 62).

14 First, it should be recalled that it is for the Member States, by virtue of Article 5 of the EC Treaty, to ensure that Community regulations, particularly those concerning the common agricultural policy, are implemented within their territory (Deutsche Milchkontor, paragraph 17). Likewise, it follows from Article 8(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 of the Council of 21 April 1970 on the financing of the common agricultural policy (OJ, English Special Edition 1970 (I), p. 218), that Member States must take the measures necessary to recover sums lost as a result of irregularities or negligence (Deutsche Milchkontor, paragraph 18). The exercise of any discretion to decide whether or not it would be expedient to demand repayment of Community funds unduly or irregularly granted would be inconsistent with that duty (Deutsche Milchkontor, paragraph 22).

19. However, because of the spirit of cooperation in relations between the national courts and the Court of Justice in the context of the preliminary ruling procedure, the lack of such preliminary findings by the referring court relating to the existence of certain cross-border interest does not necessarily lead to the request being inadmissible if the Court, having regard to the information available from the file, considers that it is in a position to give a useful answer to the referring court. That is the case, in particular, where the order for reference contains sufficient relevant information for the existence of such an interest to be determined. Nevertheless, the Court’s answer is given subject to the proviso that, on the basis of a detailed assessment of all the relevant facts in the case in the main proceedings, certain cross-border interest in the case in the main proceedings is established by the referring court (see, to that effect, judgment in Azienda sanitaria locale n. 5 ‘Spezzino’ and Others , C‑113/13, EU:C:2014:2440, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

48. By reason of the spirit of cooperation in relations between the national courts and the Court of Justice in the context of the preliminary rulings procedure, the lack of such preliminary findings by the referring court relating to the existence of certain cross-border interest does not lead to the request being inadmissible if, in spite of those failings, the Court, having regard to the information available from the file, considers that it is in a position to give a useful answer to the referring court. That is the case, in particular, where the order for reference contains sufficient relevant information for the existence of such an interest to be determined. However, the Court’s answer is given subject to the proviso that, on the basis of a detailed assessment of all the relevant facts in the case in the main proceedings, certain cross-border interest in the case in the main proceedings is established by the referring court (see judgments in SECAP and Santorso , EU:C:2008:277, paragraph 34 and Serrantoni and Consorzio stabile edili , EU:C:2009:808, paragraph 25).

226 As points 51 and 52 of the contested decision show, K+S/MdK and SCPA will hold shares of the relevant market, after the concentration, of 23% and 37% respectively, calculated on the basis of sales. A market share of approximately 60%, subdivided in that way, cannot of itself point conclusively to the existence of a collective dominant position on the part of those undertakings.

69 As the Court held in Robertson, cited above, paragraph 12, and Houtwipper, cited above, paragraph 15, the requirement of a hallmark consistent with the national legislation is not justified where the information provided by a hallmark struck by an independent body in another Member State is equivalent to that prescribed by the Member State of importation and intelligible to consumers of that State.

15 That is why the Court stated in its judgment in Robertson, cited above, that a Member State cannot require a fresh hallmark to be affixed to products imported from another Member State in which they have been lawfully marketed and hallmarked in accordance with the legislation of that State, where the information provided by that hallmark, in whatever form, is equivalent to that prescribed by the Member State of importation and intelligible to consumers of that State.

38. It follows that proof of an accelerated growth of algae and higher forms of plant life cannot be considered, as such, to demonstrate undesirable disturbance to the balance of organisms present in the water and to the quality of the water within the meaning of Article 2(11) of Directive 91/271, the undesirability or harmfulness of a proliferation having to be examined not in the context of the second eutrophication criterion, as the Commission suggests, but in that of the third and fourth criteria (see, by analogy, Commission v France , paragraphs 48, 61 and 97).

58 As the Court has already held, that provision, which seeks to take due account of the Member States’ different fiscal traditions in this regard and the frequent recourse to indirect taxation for the implementation of non-budgetary policies, allows Member States to introduce, in addition to minimum excise duty, other indirect taxes having a specific purpose (judgment of 4 June 2015, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems, C‑5/14, EU:C:2015:354, paragraph 58).

58. With regard to the term ‘other indirect taxes’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 2008/118, it should be noted that that provision, which seeks to take due account of the Member States’ different fiscal traditions in this regard and the frequent recourse to indirect taxation for the implementation of non-budgetary policies, allows Member States to introduce, in addition to minimum excise duty, other indirect taxes having a specific purpose (see, by analogy, judgment in Commission v France , C‑434/97, EU:C:2000:98, paragraphs 18 and 19).

32 The Court has already held that, in determining their policy in matters of agriculture, the Community institutions enjoy a wide discretionary power regarding not only establishment of the factual basis of their action but also definition of the objectives to be pursued, within the framework of the provisions of the Treaty, and choice of the appropriate means of action (see, in particular, Joined Cases 197/80, 198/80, 199/80, 200/80, 243/80, 245/80 and 247/80 Ludwigshafener Walzmühle Erling and Others v Council and Commission [1981] ECR 3211, paragraph 37).

35. However, although it cannot be denied that such grounds are among those which, under Article 30 EC, may be relied on by a Member State in order to justify such an obligation, and that, in the absence of harmonising rules, the Member States are free to decide on their intended level of protection of health and life of humans (Case C‑293/94 Brandsma [1996] ECR I-3159, paragraph 11, and Commission v Portugal , paragraph 44), the fact remains that an exception to the principle of the free movement of goods may be justified under that article only if the national authorities show that it is necessary in order to attain one or more objectives mentioned in that article and that it is in conformity with the principle of proportionality (Case 227/82 Van Bennekom [1983] ECR 3883, paragraph 40; Case C‑358/95 Morellato [1997] ECR I-1431, paragraph 14; ATRAL , paragraph 67; and Commission v Italy , paragraph 22).

44. It is settled case-law that, in the absence of harmonising rules, the Member States are free to decide on their intended level of protection of health and life of humans and on whether to require prior authorisation for the marketing of the products concerned (see Case C‑293/94 Brandsma [1996] ECR I-3159, paragraph 11).

50 The Court has already noted, moreover, that the purpose of Directive 68/151 is to guarantee legal certainty in relation to dealings between companies and third parties in view of the intensification of trade between Member States following the creation of the internal market and that, with that in mind, it is important that any person wishing to establish and develop trading relations with companies situated in other Member States should be able easily to obtain essential information relating to the constitution of trading companies and to the powers of persons authorised to represent them, which requires that all the relevant information should be expressly stated in the register (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 November 1974, Haaga, 32/74, EU:C:1974:116, paragraph 6).

31. In any event, if the Court decides to impose a lump sum payment, it must, in exercising its discretion, do so in a manner that is, first, appropriate to the circumstances and, secondly, proportionate both to the breach that has been established and the ability to pay of the Member State concerned (Case C-568/07 Commission v Greece [2009] ECR I‑4505, paragraph 47).

47. In any event, if the Court decides to impose a lump sum payment, it must, in exercising its discretion, do so in a manner that is, on the one hand, appropriate to the circumstances and, on the other, proportionate both to the breach that has been established and the ability to pay of the Member State concerned (see Case C‑278/01 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I‑14141, paragraph 41).

43. That conclusion cannot be undetermined by the provisions of Article 8(1)(a) of Directive 92/81 or Article 2(4)(b) of Directive 2003/96, according to which mineral oils and energy products, used for purposes other than as motor fuels or heating fuels, must, respectively, be exempted from the harmonised excise duty or excluded from the scope of Directive 2003/96. Indeed, to apply those provisions to fuel additives, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which are subject to an express requirement for taxation under the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 2(3) of Directive 92/81 and the second subparagraph of Article 2(3) of Directive 2003/96 would deprive those provisions of any useful effect (see, by analogy, Case C‑346/97 Braathens [1999] ECR I‑3419, paragraphs 24 and 25, and Case C‑437/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I‑9861, paragraphs 31 to 33).

45. On that basis the Court has held that Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures, including refusals to grant rights of residence to family members of a Union citizen, which have the effect of denying Union citizens the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by their status (see Ruiz Zambrano , paragraph 42).

42. In those circumstances, Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union (see, to that effect, Rottmann , paragraph 42).

26 According to settled case-law, the concepts used in Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention must be interpreted independently, by reference principally to the system and objectives of the Convention (see, in particular, Case 150/77 Bertrand v Ott [1978] ECR 1431, paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 19, Case C-89/91 Shearson Lehman Hutton v TVB [1993] ECR I-139, paragraph 13, and Case C-269/95 Benincasa v Dentalkit [1997] ECR I-3767, paragraph 12).

34. It follows from Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34 that the definition of ‘technical regulation’ can be broken down into three categories: first, the ‘technical specification’ within the meaning of Article 1(3) of that directive; second, the ‘other requirement’, as defined in Article 1(4); and, third, the prohibition of the manufacture, importation, marketing or use of a product referred to in Article 1(11) (see, in particular, Case C‑267/03 Lindberg [2005] ECR I‑3247, paragraph 54).

54. It follows from Article 1(9) of Directive 83/189 that the definition of ‘technical regulation’ is divided into three categories, namely, first, the ‘technical specification’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of that directive, second, the ‘other requirement’ as defined in Article 1(3) of that directive and, third, the ‘provisions … prohibiting the manufacture, importation, marketing or use of a product’ referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 1(9) of that directive.

14 It should also be pointed out that the Court has specifically held that a system of benefits providing for supplements not directly based on the sex of the beneficiaries but taking account of their marital status or family situation, in respect of which it emerges that a considerably smaller proportion of women than of men are entitled to such supplements, is contrary to Article 4(1) of the directive if that system of benefits cannot be justified by reasons which exclude discrimination on grounds of sex (judgment in Case 30/85, Teuling v Bedrijfivereniging voor de Chemische Industrie [1987] ECR 2497, paragraph 13).

31 It is true that the protection of workers is among the overriding requirements relating to the public interest which have been recognised by the Court as justifying a restriction on a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty (see Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305, paragraph 19; Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/81 Seco and Desquenne & Giral [1982] ECR 223, paragraph 14; Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417, paragraph 18; Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraph 36; Case C-165/98 Mazzoleni and ISA [2001] ECR I-2189, paragraph 27; Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte and Others [2001] ECR I-7831, paragraph 33, and Case C-164/99 Portugaia Construções [2002] ECR I-787, paragraph 20).

19 IT FOLLOWS IN PARTICULAR THAT IT IS PERMISSIBLE FOR MEMBER STATES , AND AMOUNTS FOR THEM TO A LEGITIMATE CHOICE OF POLICY PURSUED IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST , TO SUBJECT THE PROVISION OF MANPOWER WITHIN THEIR BORDERS TO A SYSTEM OF LICENSING IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO REFUSE LICENCES WHERE THERE IS REASON TO FEAR THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES MAY HARM GOOD RELATIONS ON THE LABOUR MARKET OR THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE WORKFORCE AFFECTED ARE NOT ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARDED . IN VIEW OF THE DIFFERENCES THERE MAY BE IN CONDITIONS ON THE LABOUR MARKET BETWEEN ONE MEMBER STATE AND ANOTHER , ON THE ONE HAND , AND THE DIVERSITY OF THE CRITERIA WHICH MAY BE APPLIED WITH REGARD TO THE PURSUIT OF ACTIVITIES OF THAT NATURE ON THE OTHER HAND , THE MEMBER STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICES ARE TO BE SUPPLIED HAS UNQUESTIONALBY THE RIGHT TO REQUIRE POSSESSION OF A LICENCE ISSUED ON THE SAME CONDITIONS AS IN THE CASE OF ITS OWN NATIONALS .

51. Moreover, according to settled case-law, grounds of a purely economic nature cannot constitute overriding reasons in the public interest justifying a restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaties (Case C‑388/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I‑721, paragraph 22, and Case C‑109/04 Kranemann [2005] ECR I‑2421, paragraph 34).

33 It should also be recalled that, according to the judgment in Case C-221/89 The Queen v The Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and Others [1991] ECR I-3905, paragraph 23, the conditions laid down for the registration of vessels must not form an obstacle to freedom of establishment. The legislation of the kind in question does not, however, concern the registration of vessels.

23 It follows that the conditions laid down for the registration of vessels must not form an obstacle to freedom of establishment within the meaning of Article 52 et seq. of the Treaty.

51. By contrast, the idea that Article 87(2)(c) EC permits full compensation for the undeniable economic lack of development suffered by the new Länder disregards both the nature of that provision as a derogation and its context and aims (Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission , cited above, paragraph 53).

38. À cet égard, il convient de rappeler, tout d’abord, que, ainsi que le souligne à juste titre la juridiction de renvoi, la Cour a déjà jugé qu’un organisme tel que l’Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat possède toutes les caractéristiques requises pour que lui soit reconnue la qualité de juridiction au sens de l’article 267 TFUE (arrêt du 4 mars 1999, HI, C‑258/97, Rec. p. I‑1405, point 18).

18 As the Advocate General observed in points 12 to 14 of his Opinion, a body such as the UVK displays all the characteristics required for it to be recognised as a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 177 of the Treaty.

19 It is settled case-law ((see, inter alia, Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, paragraph 20, and Outokumpu, cited above, paragraph 20) that any pecuniary charge, whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense, constitutes a charge having equivalent effect within the meaning of Articles 9 and 12 of the Treaty. However, such a charge may not be so characterised if it forms part of a general system of internal dues applying systematically to categories of products according to objective criteria applied without regard to the origin of the products, in which case it falls within the scope of Article 95 of the Treaty.

30. In that regard, it must be made clear, firstly, that when the law of a Member State provides for such liability on the part of a service provider, that liability may, in any event and as has been stated in particular by the French, German and Greek Governments and by the Advocate General at point 45 of his Opinion, be introduced only on condition that it does not adversely affect the system established by Directive 85/374. Indeed, the application of national rules may not impair the effectiveness of the directive (Case C‑203/99 Veedfald [2001] ECR I‑3569, paragraph 27). Thus, it must remain possible for the producer’s liability to be put in issue when the conditions laid down by the directive for such liability to exist are fulfilled. That possibility of putting the producer’s liability in issue must be open not only to the injured person but also to the service provider who must thus be entitled to use, to that end, a mechanism such as that of third-party proceedings, to which the national court refers in its first question.

27 Although it is left to national legislatures to determine the precise content of those two heads of damage, nevertheless, save for non-material damage whose reparation is governed solely by national law, full and proper compensation for persons injured by a defective product must be available in the case of those two heads of damage. Application of national rules may not impair the effectiveness of the Directive (see, to this effect, the judgment in Case C-365/88 Hagen [1990] ECR I-1845, paragraph 20) and the national court must interpret its national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 891, paragraph 26).

63. The risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically-linked undertakings, constitutes a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 (see Alcon v OHIM , paragraph 55, and, to that effect, Canon , paragraph 29). Where there is a ‘family’ or ‘series’ of trade marks, the likelihood of confusion results more specifically from the possibility that the consumer may be mistaken as to the provenance or origin of goods or services covered by the trade mark applied for or considers erroneously that that trade mark is part of that family or series of marks.

100. As recalled in paragraph 87 of the present judgment, a restriction of Article 49 EC can be justified only to the extent that the public interest sought to be protected by national legislation is not safeguarded by the rules to which the service provider is subject in the Member State of establishment. The Court has thus held, in particular, that a national authorisation scheme goes beyond what is necessary where the requirements to which the issue of authorisation is subject duplicate the equivalent evidence and safeguards required in the Member State of establishment, inferring in particular an obligation on the part of the host Member State to take account of controls and verifications already carried out in the Member State of establishment (see, to that effect, Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305, paragraph 20; Case 205/84 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755, paragraph 47; Case C‑355/98 Commission v Belgium , paragraph 38; and Case C‑171/02 Commission v Portugal , paragraphs 60 and 66).

38 By requiring all undertakings to fulfil the same conditions for obtaining prior authorisation or approval, the Belgian legislation makes it impossible for account to be taken of obligations to which the person providing the service is already subject in the Member State in which he is established. The requirement of an identification card

34 As the Court has consistently held (see, inter alia, the judgment in Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 41), fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of which the Court observes. For that purpose the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories. The European Convention on Human Rights has special significance in that respect. It follows that the Community cannot accept measures which are incompatible with observance of human rights thus recognized and guaranteed.

21 Furthermore, according to settled case-law of the Court, since comparative advertising contributes to demonstrating, in an objective manner, the advantages of various comparable goods and thus to stimulating competition between suppliers of goods and services to the consumer’s advantage, the conditions to be met for such advertising must be interpreted in the sense most favourable to that advertising, while ensuring at the same time that comparative advertising is not used anticompetitively and unfairly or in a manner which affects adversely the interests of consumers (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 October 2001, Toshiba Europe, C‑112/99, EU:C:2001:566, paragraphs 36 and 37; of 19 September 2006, Lidl Belgium, C‑356/04, EU:C:2006:585, paragraph 22; and of 18 November 2010, Lidl, C‑159/09, EU:C:2010:696, paragraphs 20 and 21 and the case-law cited).

21. It follows that the conditions listed in Article 3a(1) of Directive 84/450 must be interpreted in the sense most favourable to permitting advertisements which objectively compare the characteristics of goods or services, while ensuring at the same time that comparative advertising is not used anti-competitively and unfairly or in a manner which affects the interests of consumers ( L’Oréal and Others , paragraph 69 and the case‑law cited).

55. That interpretation finds support in the Court’s case-law. The Court has held that, where the centre of a debtor’s main interests is transferred after the lodging of a request to open insolvency proceedings, but before the proceedings are opened, the courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of main interests was situated at the time when the request was lodged retain jurisdiction to rule on those proceedings (Case C‑1/04 Staubitz‑Schreiber [2006] ECR I‑701, paragraph 29). It must be inferred from this that, in principle, it is the location of the debtor’s main centre of interests at the date on which the request to open insolvency proceedings was lodged that is relevant for the purpose of determining the court having jurisdiction.

137 In that regard, the Court has already held that an undertaking which is in a dominant position on a market and ties purchasers — even if it does so at their request — by an obligation or promise on their part to obtain all or most of their requirements exclusively from that undertaking abuses its dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, whether the obligation is stipulated without further qualification or whether it is undertaken in consideration of the grant of a rebate. The same applies if the undertaking in question, without tying the purchasers by a formal obligation, applies, either under the terms of agreements concluded with these purchasers or unilaterally, a system of loyalty rebates, that is to say, discounts conditional on the customer’s obtaining all or most of its requirements — whether the quantity of its purchases be large or small — from the undertaking in a dominant position (see judgment of 13 February 1979, Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, 85/76, EU:C:1979:36, paragraph 89).

89AN UNDERTAKING WHICH IS IN A DOMINANT POSITION ON A MARKET AND TIES PURCHASERS - EVEN IF IT DOES SO AT THEIR REQUEST - BY AN OBLIGATION OR PROMISE ON THEIR PART TO OBTAIN ALL OR MOST OF THEIR REQUIREMENTS EXCLUSIVELY FROM THE SAID UNDERTAKING ABUSES ITS DOMINANT POSITION WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 86 OF THE TREATY , WHETHER THE OBLIGATION IN QUESTION IS STIPULATED WITHOUT FURTHER QUALIFICATION OR WHETHER IT IS UNDERTAKEN IN CONSIDERATION OF THE GRANT OF A REBATE . THE SAME APPLIES IF THE SAID UNDERTAKING , WITHOUT TYING THE PURCHASERS BY A FORMAL OBLIGATION , APPLIES , EITHER UNDER THE TERMS OF AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED WITH THESE PURCHASERS OR UNILATERALLY , A SYSTEM OF FIDELITY REBATES , THAT IS TO SAY DISCOUNTS CONDITIONAL ON THE CUSTOMER ' S OBTAINING ALL OR MOST OF ITS REQUIREMENTS - WHETHER THE QUANTITY OF ITS PURCHASES BE LARGE OR SMALL - FROM THE UNDERTAKING IN A DOMINANT POSITION .

65 The Court has consistently held that the requirements flowing from the protection of general principles recognised in the Community legal order, including the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, are also binding on Member States when they implement Community rules, and that consequently they are bound, as far as possible, to apply the rules in accordance with those requirements. Where national rules fall within the scope of Community law and reference is made to the Court for a preliminary ruling, the Court must provide all the criteria of interpretation needed by the national court to determine whether those rules are compatible with the general principles the observance of which is ensured by the Court (see, on fundamental rights falling within those general principles, Case C-2/92 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Bostock [1994] ECR I-955, paragraph 16).

50 As is clear from Article 4(5) of Directive 2004/35, that obligation also applies in the context of the fault-based liability system — under which liability arises from fault or negligence on the part of the operator — provided for in Article 3(1)(b) of that directive in respect of occupational activities other than those listed in Annex III thereto (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 March 2015, Fipa Group and Others, C‑534/13, EU:C:2015:140, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

56. As is clear from Article 4(5) of Directive 2004/35, that obligation also applies in the context of the fault-based liability system — under which liability arises from fault or negligence on the part of the operator — provided for in Article 3(1)(b) of that directive in respect of occupational activities other than those listed in Annex III thereto.

41 For the application of Article 92 of the Treaty, it is irrelevant that the situation of the presumed beneficiary of the measure is better or worse in comparison with the situation under the law as it previously stood, or has not altered over time (see, to that effect, Case 57/86 Greece v Commission [1988] ECR 2855, paragraph 10). The only question to be determined is whether, under a particular statutory scheme, a State measure is such as to favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the Treaty in comparison with other undertakings which are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in question (see, to that effect, Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] ECR I-3671, paragraphs 28 to 31).

49. In that regard, it should be emphasised that the appraisal of the effects of agreements or practices in the light of Article 81 EC entails the need to take into consideration the actual context to which they belong, in particular the economic and legal context in which the undertakings concerned operate, the nature of the goods or services affected, as well as the real conditions of the functioning and the structure of the market or markets in question (see, to that effect, Case C‑250/92 DLG [1994] ECR I‑5641, paragraph 31; Case C‑399/93 Oude Luttikhuis and Others [1995] ECR I‑4515, paragraph 10; and Javico , paragraph 22).

22 Although the contested provisions of those agreements do not, by their very nature, have as their object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market within the meaning of Article 85(1), it is, however, for the national court to determine whether they have that effect. Appraisal of the effects of those agreements necessarily implies taking account of their economic and legal context (Case C-393/92 Almelo and Others v Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij [1994] ECR I-1477, paragraph 37) and, in particular, of the fact that YSLP has established in the Community a selective distribution system enjoying an exemption.

25. It must be remembered with regard to the expression ‘shall be treated as contracts for the carriage of goods’ and the conditions under which another contract may be considered a contract for the carriage of goods that consistent and independent criteria are necessary in order to guarantee the full effectiveness of the Rome Convention in view of the objectives which it pursues (see, by way of analogy, Koelzsch C‑29/10, EU:C:2011:151, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

27. Exempting almost all, if not all, categories of establishments which engage in such lending from the obligation laid down in Article 5(1) of the Directive would deprive authors of remuneration allowing them to recoup their investments, with inevitable repercussions for the creation of new works (see Metronome Musik , paragraph 24, and Commission v Portugal , paragraph 25). In those circumstances, a transposition of the Directive that results, in practice, in such an exemption for almost all, if not all, categories of establishments goes against the main objective of that directive.

25. It follows that the fact of exempting all categories of establishments which engage in such lending from the obligation laid down in Article 5(1) of the directive would deprive authors of remuneration with which they could recoup their investments, with inevitable repercussions for the creation of new works (see Metronome Musik , paragraph 24). In those circumstances, a transposition of the directive that resulted in such an exemption for all categories of establishments would go directly against the objective of that directive.

33. With regard, firstly, to the time from which the Member States are required to provide the material reception conditions, it is appropriate to note that the Court has already held that, regarding the period during which the material reception conditions must be granted to the applicants, that period is to begin when the asylum seeker applies for asylum (see, to that effect, Case C‑179/11 Cimade and GISTI [2012] ECR, paragraph 39).

64. The incompatibility of national legislation with Community provisions, even provisions which are directly applicable, can be finally remedied only by means of national provisions of a binding nature (see, to that effect, Case C-334/94 Commission v France [1996] ECR I-1307, paragraph 30, and Case C-197/96 Commission v France [1997] ECR I‑1489, paragraph 14).

30. It has consistently been held that the incompatibility of national legislation with provisions of the Treaty, even provisions which are directly applicable, can be finally remedied only by means of national provisions of a binding nature which have the same legal force as those which must be amended. Mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of obligations under the Treaty (Case 168/85 Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 2945, paragraph 13).

35. Quant à l’argument du Royaume d’Espagne selon lequel l’article 56 CE n’est pas applicable à la présente affaire du fait que les opérations soumises à une autorisation préalable en vertu du paragraphe 1, second alinéa, de la quatorzième fonction modifiée relèvent du champ d’application de l’article 43 CE, il convient de rappeler que, pour savoir si une législation nationale relève de l’une ou de l’autre des libertés de circulation, il résulte d’une jurisprudence constante qu’il y a lieu de prendre en considération l’objet de la législation en cause (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 12 septembre 2006, Cadbury Schweppes et Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, C‑196/04, Rec. p. I‑7995, points 31 à 33; du 3 octobre 2006, Fidium Finanz, C‑452/04, Rec. p. I‑9521, points 34 et 44 à 49; du 12 décembre 2006, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation, C‑374/04, Rec. p. I‑11673, points 37 et 38; du 13 mars 2007, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, C‑524/04, Rec. p. I‑2107, points 26 à 34, ainsi que Holböck, précité, point 22).

100 Further, in accordance with Article 6 of the Charter, the executing judicial authority may decide to hold the person concerned in custody only in so far as the procedure for the execution of the European arrest warrant has been carried out in a sufficiently diligent manner and in so far as, consequently, the duration of the detention is not excessive (see, to that effect, judgment in Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraphs 58 to 60). The executing judicial authority must give due regard, with respect to individuals who are the subject of a European arrest warrant for the purposes of prosecution, to the principle of the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 48 of the Charter.

60. Against that background, the fact that the requested person has been held in custody for a period the total of which greatly exceeds the time-limits stipulated in Article 17 of the Framework Decision is also relevant, in so far as those time-limits are, in principle, sufficient, in the light, inter alia, of the essential role of the principle of mutual recognition in the system put in place by the Framework Decision, for the executing judicial authority to carry out checks prior to the execution of the European arrest warrant and to adopt the decision on the execution of such a warrant.

20 In that context, it must be remembered that, in the absence of Community rules concerning the refunding of domestic taxes which have been wrongly levied, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions governing legal proceedings seeking to safeguard the rights which citizens derive from the direct effect of Community law, it being understood that such conditions cannot be less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature, and may not make it impossible in practice to exercise rights which the national courts have a duty to protect (Case 33/76 REWE v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5; Case 45/76 Comet v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043, paragraphs 13 and 16; Case 61/79 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Denkavit Italiana [1980] ECR 1205, paragraph 25; and Case 240/87 Deville v Administration des impôts [1988] ECR 3513, paragraph 12).

37. Such an interpretation would run counter to the principle of legal certainty. That principle, which is a fundamental principle of Community law, requires in particular that a rule such as the one before the Court, which may lead to the imposition of charges on the economic operators concerned, must be clear and precise, so that they know unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and can take steps accordingly (see, to that effect, Case C-143/93 Van Es Douane Ag enten [1996] ECR I-431, paragraph 27, and Case C-354/95 National Farmers ' Union and Others [1997] ECR I-4559, paragraph 57).

27 However, that still leaves the question of legal certainty to be addressed. In that regard, it should be noted that the principle of legal certainty is a fundamental principle of Community law (see, to that effect, the judgment in Joined Cases 205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor and Others v Germany [1983] ECR 2633) which requires in particular that rules imposing charges on a taxpayer be clear and precise so that he may be able to ascertain unequivocally what his rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly (see the judgments in Case 169/80 Gondrand Frères [1981] ECR 1931 and in Joined Cases 92/87 and 93/87 Commission v France and United Kingdom [1989] ECR 405).

32. Suffice it in this regard to point out that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-110/00 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-7545, paragraph 13, and Case C-310/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2004] ECR I-1969, paragraph 7).

21. It is necessary to point out that the Community legal order does not, in principle, aim to define concepts on the basis of one or more national legal systems unless there is express provision to that effect (Case 64/81 Corman [1982] ECR 13, paragraph 8; Case C‑296/95 EMU Tabac and Others [1998] ECR I‑1605, paragraph 30; Case C‑103/01 Commission v Germany [2003] ECR I‑5369, paragraph 33). In so far as Article 14(1) of Directive 92/12 provides, in its third sentence, that each Member State is to lay down the conditions under which the exemptions provided for in the first sentence of that provision are granted, that reference to national law does not affect the meaning or scope of the term ‘ force majeure ’ which appears in the first sentence.

8 THESE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS ARE BASED ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH REGULATION NO 1259/72 , THAT IS TO SAY , ON PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW WHICH DO NOT REFER TO LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE MEMBER STATES IN DETERMINING THEIR MEANING AND SCOPE ; THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER DOES NOT IN FACT AIM IN PRINCIPLE TO DEFINE ITS CONCEPTS ON THE BASIS OF ONE OR MORE NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS WITHOUT EXPRESS PROVISION TO THAT EFFECT . IN THIS CASE ALL NATIONAL VARIATIONS FROM SUCH COMMUNITY REQUIREMENTS AS TO QUALITY TEND TO DISTORT THE UNIFORM EFFECT OF REGULATION NO 1259/72 AS AMENDED AND TO USE IT FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN THAT FOR WHICH IT WAS INTENDED , WHICH IS THE DISPOSAL OF BUTTER STOCKS BY SALE AT A REDUCED PRICE TO CERTAIN PROCESSING UNDERTAKINGS BY PERMITTING A REDUCTION IN THE MONETARY COMPENSATORY AMOUNTS PERTAINING TO THE MARKETING OF PRODUCTS WHOSE DESTINATION IS NOT NECESSARILY THAT FOR WHICH A FAVOURABLE RATE IS PROVIDED BY THAT REGULATION .

98. Thus, the Court has previously held that the requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations (Case C-333/07 Régie Networks [2008] ECR I-10807, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

55. However, as far as the exercise of the power of taxation so allocated is concerned, the Member States are obliged to comply with Community rules (see, to that effect, Saint-Gobain , paragraph 58; Case C‑385/00 De Groot [2002] ECR I‑11819, paragraph 94; and Case C‑265/04 Bouanich [2006] ECR I‑923, paragraph 50).

58 In the case of a double-taxation treaty concluded between a Member State and a non-member country, the national treatment principle requires the Member State which is party to the treaty to grant to permanent establishments of non-resident companies the advantages provided for by that treaty on the same conditions as those which apply to resident companies.

43 According to settled case-law (judgment in Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5), the prohibition laid down in Article 30 of the Treaty covers all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade.

44 Even if the national measure in question could be justified by reasons relating to the protection of the environment, it is sufficient to point out that the arguments put forward by the Netherlands Government, concerning the profitability of the national undertaking AVR Chemie and the costs incurred by it, are of an economic nature. The Court has held that aims of a purely economic nature cannot justify barriers to the fundamental principle of the free movement of goods (Case C-120/95 Decker [1998] ECR I-0000, paragraph 39).

39 It must be recalled that aims of a purely economic nature cannot justify a barrier to the fundamental principle of the free movement of goods. However, it cannot be excluded that the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the social security system may constitute an overriding reason in the general interest capable of justifying a barrier of that kind.

57. In those circumstances, and in accordance with settled case-law, to determine whether vitamin preparations should be classified as medicinal products within the meaning of Directive 65/65, the national authorities, acting under the control of the court, must work on a case-by-case basis, having regard to all of their characteristics, in particular their composition, their pharmacological properties – to the extent to which they can be established in the present state of scientific knowledge – the manner in which they are used, the extent of their distribution, their familiarity to consumers and the risks which their use may entail (see, inter alia, Van Bennekom , cited above, paragraph 29; Case C-60/89 Monteil and Samanni [1991] ECR I-1547, paragraph 29; Case C-112/89 Upjohn [1991] ECR I‑1703, paragraph 23; and Commission v Germany , cited above, paragraph 17).

21. It must be recalled that according to settled case-law, the need to provide an interpretation of Community law which will be of use to the national court makes it necessary that the national court define the factual and legal context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based (Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, paragraph 39).

39 According to settled case-law, the need to provide an interpretation of Community law which will be of use to the national court makes it necessary that the national court define the factual and legal context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based. Those requirements are of particular importance in certain areas, such as that of competition, where the factual and legal situations are often complex (see in particular Joined Cases C-320/90, C-321/90 and C-322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo and Others [1993] ECR I-393, paragraphs 6 and 7, Case C-284/95 Safety High-Tech v S. & T. [1998] ECR I-4301, paragraphs 69 and 70, and Case C-341/95 Bettati [1998] ECR I-4355, paragraphs 67 and 68).

En effet, il résulte d’une jurisprudence constante de la Cour que la procédure suivie devant les juridictions de l’Union est contradictoire. À l’exception des moyens d’ordre public que le juge est tenu de soulever d’office, telle l’absence de motivation de la décision attaquée, c’est à la partie requérante qu’il appartient de soulever des moyens contre cette dernière et d’apporter des éléments de preuve à l’appui de ces moyens (arrêt du 24 octobre 2013, Kone e.a./Commission, C‑510/11 P, non publié, EU:C:2013:696, point 30).

56 It follows that essential provisions of the Wild Birds Directive, such as those of the second and third sentences of Article 7(4), have not in any event been completely, clearly and unambiguously transposed into the French rules (see, to that effect, Case 262/85 Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 39).

39 HOWEVER, IT MUST BE OBSERVED FIRST OF ALL THAT THE PROVISION CONCERNED MAKES NO REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 9 ( 1 ), WHICH PROVIDES THAT A DEROGATION FROM ARTICLES 7 AND 8 OF THE DIRECTIVE MAY BE GRANTED ONLY IF THERE IS NO OTHER SATISFACTORY SOLUTION . SECONDLY, ARTICLE 18 OF THE LAW, WHICH AUTHORIZES THE REGIONS TO PERMIT THE USE OF MEANS AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR CAPTURING BIRDS, TO FIX THE PERIODS IN WHICH CAPTURING IS PERMITTED AND TO DRAW UP THE LIST OF BIRDS WHICH MAY BE HUNTED, DOES NOT, CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 9 ( 2 ) OF THE DIRECTIVE, SPECIFY THE MEANS, ARRANGEMENTS OR METHODS AUTHORIZED FOR THE CAPTURE OR KILLING OF BIRDS, THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF TIME AND PLACE UNDER WHICH THE DEROGATIONS MAY BE GRANTED OR THE SPECIES COVERED BY THE DEROGATIONS . SUCH CRITERIA AND CONDITIONS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE DEROGATION IS APPLIED IN A STRICTLY CONTROLLED AND SELECTIVE MANNER . SINCE ARTICLE 18 ( 2 ) OF THE LAW DOES NOT ITSELF ESTABLISH THE CRITERIA AND CONDITIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 9 ( 2 ) OF THE DIRECTIVE OR REQUIRE THE REGIONS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THOSE CRITERIA AND CONDITIONS, IT INTRODUCES AN ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY AS REGARDS THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH THE REGIONS MUST OBSERVE WHEN ADOPTING THEIR REGULATIONS . THEREFORE, THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE CAPTURE OF CERTAIN SPECIES OF BIRDS WILL BE LIMITED TO THE STRICT MINIMUM, THAT THE PERIOD OF CAPTURE WILL NOT COINCIDE UNNECESSARILY WITH PERIODS IN WHICH THE DIRECTIVE AIMS TO PROVIDE PARTICULAR PROTECTION OR THAT THE MEANS, ARRANGEMENTS OR METHODS FOR CAPTURE ARE NOT LARGE-SCALE, NON-SELECTIVE OR CAPABLE OF CAUSING THE LOCAL DISAPPEARANCE OF A SPECIES . IT FOLLOWS THAT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE DIRECTIVE HAVE NOT BEEN TRANSPOSED COMPLETELY, CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY INTO THE ITALIAN RULES .

31. It is appropriate to recall that, in accordance with settled case-law, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, Case C‑142/06 Olicom [2007] ECR I‑6675, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).

47. According to settled case-law, the general principle of legal certainty, which is a fundamental principle of Community law, requires, in particular, that rules should be clear and precise, so that individuals may be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and may take steps accordingly (see Case 169/80 Gondrand and Garancini [1981] ECR 1931, paragraph 17; Case C‑110/03 Belgium v Commission [2005] ECR I‑2801, paragraph 30; Case C‑344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2006] ECR I‑403, paragraph 68; and Intertanko and Others , paragraph 69).

17 THAT ARGUMENT MUST BE REJECTED . EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE INTERPRETATION ADVOCATED BY THE COMMISSION IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LOGIC OF THE SYSTEM OF MONETARY COMPENSATORY AMOUNTS , NEVERTHELESS IT IS FOR THE COMMUNITY LEGISLATURE TO ADOPT THE APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS . THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY REQUIRES THAT RULES IMPOSING CHARGES ON THE TAXPAYER MUST BE CLEAR AND PRECISE SO THAT HE MAY KNOW WITHOUT AMBIGUITY WHAT ARE HIS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AND MAY TAKE STEPS ACCORDINGLY .

47. Consequently, a Member State which establishes a criterion which leads, in practice, to an entire class of plans being exempted in advance from the requirement of environmental assessment would exceed the limits of its discretion under Article 3(5) of Directive 2001/42, in conjunction with Article 3(2) and (3), unless all plans exempted could, on the basis of relevant criteria such as, inter alia, their objective, the extent of the territory covered or the sensitivity of the landscape concerned, be regarded as not being likely to have significant effects on the environment (see, to that effect, in respect of the margin of discretion accorded to Member States pursuant to Article 4(2) of Directive 85/337, Case C‑427/07 Commission v Ireland [2009] ECR I‑6277, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

35 The scope of the appeal provided for in Article 27(1) of Regulation No 604/2013 must therefore be determined in the light of the wording of the provisions of that regulation, its general scheme, its objectives and its context, in particular its evolution in connection with the system of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 December 2013 in Abdullahi, (C‑394/12, EU:C:2013:813, paragraph 51).

51. As regards the scope of the appeal provided for in Article 19(2) of Regulation No 343/2003, that regulation must be construed not only in the light of the wording of its provisions, but also in the light of its general scheme, its objectives and its context, in particular its evolution in connection with the system of which it forms part.

37. In order to meet that double objective, the Eighth Directive gives the taxable person a right to reimbursement of the input VAT paid in a Member State in which he has neither his business, nor a fixed establishment, nor his permanent address or usual place of residence, and where he has not supplied any goods or services (see, to that effect, Case C‑429/97 Commission v France [2001] ECR I‑637, paragraph 28), subject to the production to the tax authority of the Member State in which that reimbursement is applied for (‘the reimbursing Member State’), of a certificate provided by the tax authority of the issuing Member State concerning the capacity of the operator seeking that reimbursement as a taxable person liable to VAT.

75 Furthermore, in accordance with paragraph 61 of the judgment in Azienda sanitaria locale No 5 Spezzino and Others (C‑113/13, EU:C:2014:2440) and paragraph 64 of the present judgment, the activities of voluntary associations must strictly comply with the requirements laid down by national law that are applicable to them. Thus, the Court found that, within the limits set by that judgment, the regulatory framework of the activities of those associations falls within the competence of Member States.

61. In that connection, it is essential that, where they act in that context, the voluntary associations do not pursue objectives other than those mentioned in the previous paragraph of the present judgment, do not make any profit as a result of their services, apart from the reimbursement of the variable, fixed and on-going expenditure necessary to provide them, and do not procure any profit for their members. Furthermore, although it is permissible to maintain a workforce, for it would, without one, be almost impossible for those associations to act effectively in numerous domains in which the principle of the good of the community may naturally be implemented, the activities of those associations must strictly comply with the requirements laid down by national law.

25 However, the obligation to grant the person concerned the same legal remedies in respect of any decision concerning entry, or refusing the issue or renewal of a residence permit, or ordering expulsion from the territory as are available to nationals in respect of acts of the administration, means that a Member State cannot, without being in breach of the obligation imposed by Article 8, organize, for persons covered by the directive, legal remedies governed by special procedures affording lesser safeguards than those pertaining to remedies available to nationals in respect of acts of the administration (Pecastaing, paragraph 10, and Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Dzodzi v Belgian State [1990] ECR I-3763, paragraph 58).

57. However, since, in accordance with the ‘polluter pays’ principle, the obligation to take remedial measures is imposed on operators only because of their contribution to the creation of pollution or the risk of pollution (see, by analogy, Case C‑188/07 Commune de Mesquer [2008] ECR I‑4501, paragraph 77), in order for such a causal link to thus be presumed, the competent authority must have plausible evidence capable of justifying its presumption, such as the fact that the operator’s installation is located close to the pollution found and that there is a correlation between the pollutants identified and the substances used by the operator in connection with his activities.

77. On this point, Article 15 of Directive 75/442 provides that certain categories of persons, in this case the ‘previous holders’ or the ‘producer of the product from which the waste came’, may, in accordance with the ‘polluter pays’ principle, be responsible for bearing the cost of disposing of waste. That financial obligation is thus imposed on them because of their contribution to the creation of the waste and, in certain cases, to the consequent risk of pollution.

33. A sign which, in relation to the goods or services for which its registration as a mark is applied for, has descriptive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94 is – save where Article 7(3) applies – devoid of any distinctive character as regards those goods or services (as regards Article 3 of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1), see, by analogy, Case C-265/00 Campina Melkunie [2004] ECR I‑1699, paragraph 19; as regards Article 7 of Regulation No 40/94, see Case C‑191/01 P OHIM v Wrigley [2003] ECR I‑12447, paragraph 30, and the order in Case C‑150/02 P Streamserve v OHIM [2004] ECR I‑1461, paragraph 24).

35 It will be recalled, as the Court has previously pointed out in case-law that predates the adoption of the provisions at issue, that the European Union is based on the rule of law and the acts of its institutions are subject to review by the Court of their compatibility with EU law and, in particular, with the FEU Treaty and the general principles of law (judgment of 29 June 2010, E and F, C‑550/09, EU:C:2010:382, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited), and natural and legal persons must enjoy effective judicial protection.

44. Against that background, it should be noted that the European Union is based on the rule of law and the acts of its institutions are subject to review by the Court of their compatibility with EU law and, in particular, with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the general principles of law. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to confer on the judicature of the European Union jurisdiction to review the legality of acts of the institutions of the European Union (see, to that effect, Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I‑6677, paragraphs 38 and 40, and Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission , paragraph 281).

20 As the Court has consistently held since its judgment in Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Health Authority [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 48, a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied upon as such against an individual.

26. Subsequently, the Court has made clear that the principal objective of the Brussels Convention is to simplify the procedures in the State where enforcement is sought by laying down a very summary, simple and rapid enforcement procedure, whilst at the same time giving the party against whom enforcement is sought an opportunity to bring an appeal (see, to that effect, Case C-414/92 Solo Kleinmotoren [1994] ECR I-2237, paragraph 20, and Case C-260/97 Unibank [1999] ECR I‑3715, paragraph 14).

20 As has already been stated in paragraph 15 of this judgment, the definition of "judgment" given in Article 25 applies to all the provisions of the Convention in which that term is used. Moreover, Article 27 constitutes an obstacle to the achievement of one of the fundamental objectives of the Convention, which is to facilitate, to the greatest extent possible, the free movement of judgments by providing for a simple and rapid enforcement procedure. Article 27 must therefore be interpreted strictly, which precludes treating a court settlement as a judgment given by a court or tribunal.

19 As is apparent from recitals 35 and 38 of Directive 2001/29, that provision reflects the EU legislature’s intention to establish a specific compensation scheme which is triggered by the existence of harm caused to rightholders, which gives rise, in principle, to the obligation to ‘compensate’ them (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 October 2010 in Padawan, C‑467/08, EU:C:2010:620, paragraph 41).

44. In this respect, it must be borne in mind that the meaning and scope of terms for which European Union law provides no definition must be determined by considering, inter alia, the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they form part (see, inter alia, Case C-336/03 easyCar [2005] ECR I-1947, paragraph 21; Case C-549/07 Wallentin-Hermann [2008] ECR I-11061, paragraph 17; Case C-151/09 UGT-FSP [2010] ECR I-7591, paragraph 39; and Case C-34/10 Brüstle [2011] ECR I-9821, paragraph 31).

17. It is settled case‑law that the meaning and scope of terms for which Community law provides no definition must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part. Moreover, when those terms appear in a provision which constitutes a derogation from a principle or, more specifically, from Community rules for the protection of consumers, they must be read so that that provision can be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, Case C‑336/03 easyCar [2005] ECR I‑1947, paragraph 21 and the case‑law cited). Furthermore, the preamble to a Community measure may explain the latter’s content (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2006] ECR I‑403, paragraph 76).

18. As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law of the Court, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied on before the national courts by individuals against the State where the latter has failed to implement the directive in domestic law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly (see, inter alia, Case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53, paragraph 25, and Case C‑282/10 Dominguez [2012] ECR, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

25. It follows that the presumption that questions referred by national courts for a preliminary ruling are relevant may be rebutted only in exceptional cases and, in particular, where it is quite obvious that the interpretation which is sought of the provisions of Community law referred to in those questions bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose (see, inter alia, Case C‑415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I‑4921, paragraph 61, and Case C‑212/06 Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon [2008] ECR I‑1683, paragraph 29).

29. It follows that the presumption that questions referred by national courts for a preliminary ruling are relevant may be rebutted only in exceptional cases, where it is quite obvious that the interpretation which is sought of the provisions of Community law referred to in the questions bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose (Case C‑415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I‑4921, paragraph 61, and Case C‑355/97 Beck and Bergdorf [1999] ECR I‑4977, paragraph 22).

63. Such an assessment is consistent with the case-law of the Court relating to the principles on the administration of proof in the sector of State aid that the Commission is required to conduct a diligent and impartial examination of the contested measures, so that it has at its disposal, when adopting the final decision establishing the existence and, as the case may be, the incompatibility or unlawfulness of the aid, the most complete and reliable information possible for that purpose (see, to that effect, Case C‑290/07 P Commission v Scott [2010] ECR I‑7763, paragraph 90).

33 Provided that that evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it. The appraisal by the Court of First Instance of the evidence put before it does not therefore constitute, save where the evidence has been fundamentally misconstrued, a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (Case C-7/95 P Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraph 22).

22 The Court of Justice thus has no jurisdiction to establish the facts or, in principle, to examine the evidence which the Court of First Instance accepted in support of those facts. Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it (see, in particular, the order in San Marco v Commission, cited above, paragraph 40). The appraisal by the Court of First Instance of the evidence put before it does not constitute, save where the evidence has been fundamentally misconstrued, a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (judgment in Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraph 42). The first ground of appeal

28. Thus it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that the objective of reducing the cost of medical care and making that care more accessible to individuals is common to both the exemption provided for in Article 13A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive and that in letter (c) of the same provision (see Case C‑76/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I‑249, paragraph 23; Kügler , paragraph 29; and Dornier , paragraph 43). It must also be borne in mind that the principle of fiscal neutrality precludes, inter alia, economic operators carrying on the same activities from being treated differently as far as the levying of VAT is concerned (see Kügler , paragraph 30, and Dornier , paragraph 44).

72 Secondly, as regards the criterion relating to urgency, it is necessary, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, to take into account the fact that the person concerned in the case in the main proceedings is currently deprived of his liberty and that the question as to whether he may continue to be held in custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings (see, in particular, judgment of 10 November 2016, Kovalkovas, C‑477/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:861, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). Moreover, the situation of the person concerned must be assessed as it stood at the time when consideration was given to whether the reference should be dealt with under the urgent procedure (judgment of 24 May 2016, Dworzecki, C‑108/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:346, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

22 In the second place, as regards the test for urgency, it is necessary, according to the case-law of the Court, to take into consideration the fact that the person involved in the main proceedings is currently deprived of his liberty and that the question as to whether he may continue to be held in custody depends on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015 in Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 24). In addition, the situation of the person concerned must be assessed as it existed at the time when consideration was given to whether the request for a preliminary ruling should be dealt with under the urgent procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 February 2016 in N., C‑601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, paragraph 40).

63. It must be noted in that regard that while it is true that, as regards the scope of the judicial review of the legality of a decision of an institution refusing public access to a document on the basis of one of the exceptions relating to the public interest provided for in Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001, that institution must be recognised as enjoying a wide discretion for the purpose of determining whether the disclosure of documents relating to the fields covered by those exceptions could undermine the public interest. The review by the Courts of the European Union of the legality of such a decision must therefore be limited to verifying whether the procedural rules and the duty to state reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers ( Sison v Council , C‑266/05 P, EU:C:2007:75, paragraph 34).

29. With regard, in particular, to the subsequent verification of the EUR.1 certificates issued by the exporting State, the findings of the authorities of the exporting State are binding on the authorities of the importing Member State. The cooperation established by a protocol with regard to the origin of goods can function only if the importing State accepts the determinations legally made in that regard by the exporting State (Case C‑97/95 Pascoal & Filhos [1997] ECR I-4209, paragraph 33; Case C‑442/08 Commission v Germany , paragraphs 72 and 73; and Case C‑386/08 Brita [2010] ECR I‑1289, paragraph 62).

33 In the same judgments, the Court also considered that that mechanism can function only if the customs authorities of the importing country accept the determinations legally made by the authorities of the exporting country (Faroe Seafood, paragraph 20).

72. That regulation was not intended to penalise speculative conduct on the part of operators but, first, to prevent, by a system of deterrent charges, stocks from being built up for speculative purposes and, second, to neutralise the economic advantages anticipated by those holding them ( Balbiino , paragraph 69).

43. As regards Article 43 EC, according to settled case-law that provision precludes any national measure which, even though it is applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, is liable to hinder or render less attractive the exercise by Community nationals of the freedom of establishment that is guaranteed by the Treaty (see, in particular, Case C-19/92 Kraus [1993] ECR I-1663, paragraph 32, and Case C‑299/02 Commission v Netherlands [2004] ECR I‑9761, paragraph 15).

32 Consequently, Articles 48 and 52 preclude any national measure governing the conditions under which an academic title obtained in another Member State may be used, where that measure, even though it is applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, is liable to hamper or to render less attractive the exercise by Community nationals, including those of the Member State which enacted the measure, of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. The situation would be different only if such a measure pursued a legitimate objective compatible with the Treaty and was justified by pressing reasons of public interest (see to that effect, judgment in Case 71/76 Thieffry v Conseil de l' Ordre des Avocats à la Cour de Paris [1977] ECR 765, paragraphs 12 and 15). It would however also be necessary in such a case for application of the national rules in question to be appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective they pursue and not to go beyond what is necessary for that purpose (see judgment in Case C-106/91 Ramrath v Ministre de la Justice [1992] ECR I-3351, paragraphs 29 and 30).

19. The Court has held that in order to classify a domestic tax measure as ‘selective’, it is necessary to begin by identifying and examining the common or ‘normal’ tax regime applicable in the Member State concerned. It is in relation to this common or ‘normal’ tax regime that it is necessary, secondly, to assess and determine whether any advantage granted by the tax measure at issue may be selective by demonstrating that the measure derogates from that common regime inasmuch as it differentiates between economic operators who, in light of the objective assigned to the tax system of the Member State concerned, are in a comparable factual and legal situation (see Joined Cases C‑78/08 to C‑80/08 Paint Graphos and Others [2011] ECR I‑7611, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

17. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the right to a refund of charges levied in a Member State in breach of the rules of European Union law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by provisions of European Union law prohibiting such charges. The Member State is therefore required in principle to repay charges levied in breach of European Union law (see Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, paragraph 12; Joined Cases C‑441/98 and C‑442/98 Michaïlidis [2000] ECR I‑7145, paragraph 30; Case C‑309/06 Marks & Spencer [2008] ECR I‑2283, paragraph 35; and Case C‑264/08 Direct Parcel Distribution Belgium [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 45).

45. According to well-established case-law, the right to a refund of charges levied in a Member State in breach of the rules of Community law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by Community provisions as interpreted by the Court. The Member State is therefore required in principle to repay charges levied in breach of Community law (see, inter alia, Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation [2007] ECR I‑2107, paragraph 110 and case-law cited).

25 It is settled case-law that, in order to determine whether a body making a reference for a preliminary ruling is a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 EC, which is a question governed by Community law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see, in particular, Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin [1997] ECR I-4961, paragraph 23, and Case C-103/97 Köllensperger and Atzwanger v Gemeindeverband Bezirkskrankenhaus Schwaz [1999] ECR I-551, paragraph 17).

84 The risk of thus undermining the main objective of Regulation No 1234/2007, which is that of guaranteeing the quality of the agricultural products concerned, is particularly high because, unlike in the case of trade marks, no measure harmonising any national systems of protection for geographical indications has to date been adopted by the EU legislature (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 September 2009, Budějovický Budvar, C‑478/07, EU:C:2009:521, paragraph 113).

113. That risk of damage to the central aim of ensuring the quality of the agricultural products concerned is all the more important since, as the Advocate General observed in point 111 of his Opinion, unlike in the case of trade marks, no Community measure has been adopted in tandem, harmonising any national systems.

188. As regards the condition linked to the operator’s professional experience, the Court of First Instance rightly noted in paragraph 140 of the judgment under appeal that it is necessary to examine whether or not the operator is a trader whose business activities consist mainly in import and export transactions and whether he had already gained some experience in the conduct of such transactions ( Söhl & Söhlke , paragraph 57).

38. With regard, second, to the assessment of whether legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings is proportionate, it must be noted that it follows from the case-law of the Court that since Article 30 EC constitutes an exception, which is to be strictly interpreted, to the rule of the free movement of goods within the Community, it is for the national authorities to demonstrate that their rules are necessary in order to achieve the declared purpose and that that objective could not be achieved by less extensive prohibitions or restrictions, or by prohibitions or restrictions having less effect on intra-Community trade (see, to that effect, Case C‑17/93 van der Veldt [1994] ECR I‑3537, paragraph 15; Case C‑189/95 Franzén [1997] ECR I‑5909, paragraphs 75 and 76; Case C‑434/04 Ahokainen and Leppik [2006] ECR I‑9171, paragraph 31; and Rosengren and Others , paragraph 50).

76 Although the protection of human health against the harmful effects of alcohol, on which the Swedish Government relies, is indisputably one of the grounds which may justify derogation from Article 30 of the Treaty (see, to this effect, the judgment in Joined Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior and Publivía v Departamento de Sanidad y Seguridad Social de la Generalitat de Cataluña [1991] ECR I-4151, paragraph 13), the Swedish Government has not established that the licensing system set up by the Law on Alcohol, in particular as regards the conditions relating to storage capacity and the high fees and charges which licence-holders are required to pay, was proportionate to the public health aim pursued or that this aim could not have been attained by measures less restrictive of intra-Community trade.

49. With regard, in the second place, to the Commission’s action as regards Article 12 of the Statutes, it must be borne in mind from the outset that, in proceedings under Article 226 EC for failure to fulfil obligations, it is for the Commission to prove the alleged failure by placing before the Court all the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled (see, in particular, Case C‑160/08 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 116, and Commission v France , paragraph 56).

50. The adjustment mechanism provided for in those articles is an integral part of the VAT deduction scheme established by Directive 2006/112. It is intended to enhance the precision of deductions so as to ensure the neutrality of VAT, with the result that transactions effected at an earlier stage continue to give rise to the right to deduct only in so far as they are used to make supplies subject to VAT. That mechanism thus aims to establish a close and direct relationship between the right to deduct input VAT paid and the use of the goods or services concerned for taxable output transactions ( TETS Haskovo , paragraphs 30 and 31).

30. The adjustment provided for in those articles of the Directive is an integral part of the VAT deduction scheme established by that directive.

28. Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive establishes an assessment procedure intended to ensure, by means of a prior examination, that a plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the site concerned but likely to have a significant effect on it is authorised only to the extent that it will not adversely affect the integrity of that site ( Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging , paragraph 34, and Case C‑182/10 Solvay and Others [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 66).

21. Those opportunities could not be fully effective if a national of a Member State could be deterred from availing himself of them by obstacles placed in the way of his stay in the host Member State by legislation in his State of origin penalising the fact that he has used them ( Pusa , paragraph 19).

19. Those opportunities could not be fully effective if a national of a Member State could be deterred from availing himself of them by obstacles raised to his residence in the host Member State by legislation of his State of origin penalising the fact that he has used them (see, by analogy, D’Hoop , paragraph 31).

92. Furthermore and above all, protection of the fundamental right to respect for private life at EU level requires derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data to apply only in so far as is strictly necessary (judgment in Digital Rights Ireland and Others , C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, EU:C:2014:238, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).

30. An aid measure within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC which is put into effect in infringement of the obligations arising from Article 88(3) EC is unlawful (see Case C-354/90 Fédération nationale du commerce extérieur des produits alimentaires and Syndicat national des négociants et transformateurs de saumon [1991] ECR I-5505, paragraph 17). It is for the national courts to uphold the rights of the persons concerned in the event of a possible breach by the national authorities of the prohibition on putting aid into effect, taking all the consequential measures under national law as regards both the validity of decisions giving effect to aid measures and the recovery of the financial support granted (see Joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01 Enirisorse [2003] ECR I-14243, paragraph 42).

17 Taking all these matters into account, the answer to the question asked by the Conseil d' Etat must be that the last sentence of Article 93(3) of the Treaty is to be interpreted as imposing on authorities of Member States an obligation whose infringement will affect the validity of measures giving effect to aid, and that the subsequent adoption by the Commission of a final decision declaring the measures compatible with the common market does not have the effect of regularizing the invalid measures ex post facto.

58. In any event the concepts of " working time" and " rest period" within the meaning of Directive 93/104 may not be interpreted in accordance with the requirements of the various legislations of the Member States but constitute concepts of Community law which must be defined in accordance with objective characteristics by reference to the scheme and purpose of that directive, as the Court did at paragraphs 48 to 50 of the judgment in Simap . Only such an autonomous interpretation is capable of securing for that directive full efficacy and uniform application of those concepts in all the Member States.

23. It must be noted, next, according to settled case‑law, the concept of ‘worker’ within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU has a specific independent meaning and must not be interpreted narrowly. Any person who pursues activities that are real and genuine, to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary, must be regarded as a ‘worker’. The essential feature of an employment relationship is, according to that case‑law, that for a certain period of time a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration (see, in particular, Case 66/85 Lawrie‑Blum [1986] ECR 2121, paragraphs 16 and 17; Case C‑138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I‑2703, paragraph 26; and Case C‑456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I‑7573, paragraph 15).

15. As the Court has held, the concept of ‘worker’ within the meaning of Article 39 EC has a specific Community meaning and must not be interpreted narrowly. Any person who pursues activities which are real and genuine, to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary, must be regarded as a ‘worker’. The essential feature of an employment relationship is, according to that case-law, that for a certain period of time a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for w hich he receives remuneration (see, in particular, Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121, paragraphs 16 and 17, and Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 26).

26 As regards the interpretation of clause 5 of the framework agreement, it should be noted that the purpose of that agreement is to implement one of the objectives of that agreement, namely to place limits on successive recourse to fixed-term employment contracts or relationships, regarded as a potential source of abuse to the detriment of workers, by laying down as a minimum a number of protective provisions designed to prevent the status of employees from being insecure (judgments of 4 July 2006, Adeneler and Others, C‑212/04, EU:C:2006:443, paragraph 63; of 23 April 2009, Angelidaki and Others, C‑378/07 to C‑380/07, EU:C:2009:250, paragraph 73; of 26 January 2012, Kücük, C‑586/10, EU:C:2012:39, paragraph 25; of 13 March 2014, Márquez Samohano, C‑190/13, EU:C:2014:146, paragraph 41; of 3 July 2014, Fiamingo and Others, C‑362/13, C‑363/13 and C‑407/13, EU:C:2014:2044, paragraph 54, and of 26 November 2014, Mascolo and Others, C‑22/13, C‑61/13, C‑63/13 and C‑418/13, EU:C:2014:2401, paragraph 72).

Ce mécanisme de correction forfaitaire et les critères contenus à cet égard dans les orientations exposées dans lesdits documents ne sauraient toutefois, ainsi que le Tribunal l’a constaté à bon droit au point 54 de l’arrêt attaqué, être considérés comme violant, en soi, le principe de proportionnalité (voir en ce sens, notamment, arrêts du 7 octobre 2004, Espagne/Commission, C‑153/01, EU:C:2004:589, point 73, et du 27 octobre 2005, Grèce/Commission, C‑387/03, non publié, EU:C:2005:646, point 68).

73. As regards the rate of 5% applied by the Commission in order to calculate the adjustment in respect of aid for olive oil production, it should be pointed out, on the one hand, that the register of olive cultivation and the computerised database are fundamental aspects of the Community system for checking aid. Until those aspects are operational it is justified in principle to impose the 10% adjustment rate provided for by the Commission guidelines, as set out in its document No VI/5330/97 (see Greece v Commission , cited above, paragraph 70).

98. Accordingly, the conditions of admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, but such an interpretation cannot have the effect of setting aside the conditions expressly laid down in that Treaty (see, to that effect, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council , paragraph 44, and Commission v Jégo-Quéré , paragraph 36).

17. In the absence of a definition of ‘leasing’ and ‘letting of immovable property’ in Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive, the Court has defined the letting of immovable property, within the meaning of that provision, as the landlord of property assigning to the tenant, in return for rent and for an agreed period, the right to occupy his property and to exclude any other person from it (see, to that effect, Case C‑326/99 ‘Goed Wonen’ [2001] ECR I‑6831, paragraph 55; Case C‑409/98 Mirror Group [2001] ECR I‑7175, paragraph 31; Case C‑108/99 Cantor Fitzgerald International [2001] ECR I‑7257, paragraph 21; and also Commission v Ireland, paragraphs 52 to 57; Sinclair Collis , paragraph 25; Temco Europe, paragraph 19; and Fonden Marselisborg Lystbådehavn , paragraph 30).

25. However, it is also settled that the fundamental characteristic of a letting of immovable property for the purposes of Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive lies in conferring on the person concerned, for an agreed period and for payment, the right to occupy property as if that person were the owner and to exclude any other person from enjoyment of such a right (see, to that effect, "Goed Wonen" , paragraph 55, and Case C-108/99 Cantor Fitzgerald International [2001] ECR I-7257, paragraph 21).

52. Those obligations are set out in Article 4 of Directive 2003/4. That article allows Member States to provide that a request for environmental information may, except where the information relates to emissions into the environment, be refused if disclosure of the information would adversely affect the confidentiality of commercial or industrial information where such confidentiality is provided for by national or European Union law. However, the article also requires that such a ground for refusal must be interpreted in a restrictive way, taking into account the public interest served by disclosure, and that in every particular case the public interest served by disclosure must be weighed against the interest served by the refusal.

44. Respect for the rights of the defence requires that the undertaking concerned must have been afforded the opportunity, during the administrative procedure, to make known its views on the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the documents used by the Commission to support its claim that there has been an infringement (Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 10; Case C‑310/93 P BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission [1995] ECR I-865, paragraph 21; and Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , paragraph 66).

66. Equally, respect for the rights of the defence requires that the undertaking concerned must have been afforded the opportunity, during the administrative procedure, to make known its views on the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the documents used by the Commission to support its claim that there has been an infringement of the Treaty (see Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 10, and Case C-310/93 P BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission [1995] ECR I-865, paragraph 21).

41. First, the principle of proportionality is a general principle of Community law that must be observed by the Community legislature and by the national legislatures and courts, in particular with regard to the common agricultural policy. That principle requires that measures adopted by Community institutions should not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see Case C‑534/06 Industria Lavorazione Carni Ovine [2008] ECR I‑4129, paragraph 25).

43. By contrast, the form in which an act or decision is adopted is in principle irrelevant to the right to challenge such acts or decisions by way of an action for annulment (see, to that effect, IBM v Commission , paragraph 9, and Case C‑208/03 P Le Pen v Parliament [2005] ECR I‑6051, paragraph 46).

46. As regards the appellant’s main argument alleging a distortion of the scope of Article 12(2) of the 1976 Act and a mistaken assessment by the Court of First Instance of the true legal nature of the contested act which alone brings about a change in his legal position, the contention that, in order to determine whether an act may be the subject of a challenge in an action under Article 230 EC, it is the substance of the act in question and the intention of its author which should be taken into account, is well founded. According to settled case-law, the form in which an act or decision is adopted is in principle irrelevant to the right to challenge such acts or decisions by way of an application for annulment (see, in particular, Commission v Council , cited above, paragraph 42, and IBM v Commission , paragraph 9).

34. More particularly, it follows from Article 3(1)(a) and (c) of Directive 2000/78 that the directive applies, within the framework of the areas of competence conferred on the Community, ‘to all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies’, on the one hand, in relation to ‘conditions for access to employment, … including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of activity and at all levels of the professional hierarchy’ and, on the other hand, in relation to ‘employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay’.

46. In the procedure laid down by Article 234 EC providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (Case C‑286/05 Haug [2006] ECR I‑4121, paragraph 17, and Case C‑45/06 Campina [2006] ECR I‑2089, paragraph 30).

30. In the procedure laid down by Article 234 EC providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (Case C-286/05 Haug [2006] ECR I-4121, paragraph 17 and the case‑law cited).

21 In that regard, it is to be noted that the objective pursued by Directive 87/344, in particular Article 4 thereof, concerning the free choice of lawyer or representative, is to protect, broadly, the interests of insured persons. The general scope and obligatory nature that the right of the insured party to choose his lawyer or representative is recognised to possess militate against a restrictive interpretation of Article 4(1)(a) of that directive (see, to that effect, judgments in Eschig, C‑199/08, EU:C:2009:538, paragraphs 45 and 47, and Sneller, C‑442/12, EU:C:2013:717, paragraph 24).

45 However, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 225 EC to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see Case C-7/95 P Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraph 21). Furthermore, the question whether the grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance are contradictory or inadequate is a question of law which is amenable, as such, to judicial review on appeal (Case C-401/96 P Somaco v Commission [1998] ECR I-2587, paragraph 53).

21 It also follows from the foregoing provisions that an appeal may be based only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts. The Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to establish the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts. When the Court of First Instance has established or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 168a of the Treaty to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see, in particular, the order in San Marco v Commission, cited above, paragraph 39).

27. In the present case, note 1(c) to Chapter 3 of Part Two, Section I, of the CN states that that chapter does not cover fish unsuitable for human consumption by reason of either their species or their condition. It is therefore clear from the wording of that note that the decisive criterion for determining whether the goods at issue in the main proceedings come under Chapter 3 lies in the fact that they are fit for human consumption. Under those circumstances, the determinant question is whether, at the time that they were cleared through customs, the frozen backbones of farmed Atlantic salmon, obtained after filleting the fish, constituting those goods, were fit for human consumption (see, by analogy, Case C‑395/93 Neckermann Versand [1994] ECR I‑4027, paragraph 8, and Case C‑14/05 Anagram International [2006] ECR I‑6763, paragraph 26), which it is for the national court to ascertain.

58. As such objectives form part of public health protection, which, as is clear from Article 4(8) of Directive 2006/123 and the Court’s established case-law, is one of the overriding reasons relating to the public interest that may justify restrictions on freedom of establishment (see, to that effect, judgment in Ottica New Line di Accardi Vincenzo , C‑539/11, EU:C:2013:591, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited), it must be concluded that the requirement that the territorial restriction at issue in the main proceedings should be necessary is also fulfilled.

34. In that regard, it is clear form Article 52(1) TFEU that restrictions on the freedom of establishment may be justified by the general objective of the protection of public health (see, to that effect, Hartlauer , paragraph 46, and Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others , paragraph 27).

32 It must be observed, thirdly, that the responsibility imposed on a Member State by virtue of Articles 86 and 90(1) of the Treaty is engaged only if the abusive conduct on the part of the agency concerned is liable to affect trade between Member States. That does not mean that the abusive conduct in question must actually have affected such trade. It is sufficient to establish that that conduct is capable of having such an effect (see Case 322/81 Michelin, above, paragraph 104).

40. More specifically, the existence of ‘waste’, within the meaning of Directive 2006/12, must be determined in the light of all the circumstances, regard being had to the aim of that directive and the need to ensure that its effectiveness is not undermined (see Joined Cases C‑418/97 and C‑419/97 ARCO Chemie Nederland and Others [2000] ECR I‑4475, paragraphs 73, 88 and 97; Case C‑9/00 Palin Granit and Vehmassalon kansanterveystyön kuntayhtymän hallitus [2002] ECR I‑3533, paragraph 24; and Commission v Italy , paragraph 41).

24 More specifically, the question whether a given substance is waste must be determined in the light of all the circumstances, regard being had to the aim of Directive 75/442 and the need to ensure that its effectiveness is not undermined (ARCO Chemie Nederland, paragraphs 73, 88 and 97).

55 It must be borne in mind here that, in Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria, cited above, paragraph 25, the Court held that it was immaterial whether, in addition to its duty to meet needs in the general interest, an entity was free to carry out other activities. The fact that meeting needs in the general interest constitutes only a relatively small proportion of the activities actually pursued by that entity is also irrelevant, provided that it continues to attend to the needs which it is specifically required to meet.

40 In that regard the Court has held that an activity carried on by a private individual is not excluded from the scope of VAT merely because it consists in the performance of acts falling within the prerogatives of the public authority (Commission v Netherlands, cited above, paragraph 21, and Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, cited above, paragraph 19). The Court held, in paragraph 20 of the latter judgment, that it follows that if a commune entrusts the activity of collecting taxes to an independent third party the exclusion from VAT provided for by Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive is not applicable. Similarly, the Court held in paragraph 22 of the judgment in Commission v Netherlands, cited above, that even assuming that in performing their official services notaries and bailiffs in the Netherlands exercise the powers of a public authority by virtue of their appointment to public office, they cannot enjoy the exemption provided for in Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive because they pursue those activities, not in the form of a body governed by public law, since they are not part of the public administration, but in the form of an independent economic activity carried out in the exercise of a liberal profession.

21 IT IS CLEAR FROM THAT PROVISION, WHEN EXAMINED IN THE LIGHT OF THE AIMS OF THE DIRECTIVE, THAT TWO CONDITIONS MUST BE FULFILLED IN ORDER FOR THE EXEMPTION TO APPLY; THE ACTIVITIES MUST BE CARRIED OUT BY A BODY GOVERNED BY PUBLIC LAW AND THEY MUST BE CARRIED OUT BY THAT BODY ACTING AS A PUBLIC AUTHORITY . THIS MEANS THAT BODIES GOVERNED BY PUBLIC LAW ARE NOT AUTOMATICALLY EXEMPTED IN RESPECT OF ALL THE ACTIVITIES IN WHICH THEY ENGAGE BUT ONLY IN RESPECT OF THOSE WHICH FORM PART OF THEIR SPECIFIC DUTIES AS PUBLIC AUTHORITIES ( SEE THE JUDGMENT OF 11 JULY 1985 IN CASE 107/84 COMMISSION V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (( 1985 )) ECR 2663 ) AND, SECONDLY, THAT AN ACTIVITY CARRIED ON BY A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL IS NOT EXEMPTED FROM VAT MERELY BECAUSE IT CONSISTS IN CARRYING OUT ACTS FALLING WITHIN THE PREROGATIVES OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY .

35 It must be borne in mind, in that regard, that, in the context of the cooperation instituted by Article 267 TFEU, the need to provide an interpretation of EU law which will be of use to the national court means that the national court is bound to observe scrupulously the requirements concerning the content of a request for a preliminary ruling, expressly set out in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, of which the referring court should be aware (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 July 2016, Ognyanov, C‑614/14, EU:C:2016:514, paragraphs 18 and 19 and the case-law cited).

34. The same is true of any amendment subsequent to the entry into force of the Sixth Directive which increases the extent of exclusions applicable immediately before that amendment (Case C-40/00 Commission v France , paragraph 18).

18 The same is true of any amendment subsequent to the entry into force of the Sixth Directive which increases the extent of exclusions applicable immediately before that amendment.

37. In that regard, it should be noted that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied on before the national courts by individuals against the State where the latter has failed to implement the directive in domestic law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I-8835, paragraph 103; Joined Cases C-152/07 to C-154/07 Arcor and Others [2008] ECR I-5959, paragraph 40, and Case C-282/10 Dominguez [2012] ECR, paragraph 33).

42. Although in Bachmann and Commission v Belgium , since the taxpayer was one and the same person, there was a direct link between deductibility of pension and life assurance contributions and taxation of the sums received under those insurance contracts and preservation of that link was necessary to safeguard the coherence of the relevant tax system, there is no such direct link where, as in the present case, the subsidiary of a non-resident parent company suffers less favourable tax treatment and the German Government has not pointed to any tax advantage to offset such treatment (see, to that effect, Wielockx , paragraph 24; Case C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson [1995] ECR I- 3955, paragraph 18; Eurowings Luftverkehr , paragraph 42; Verkooijen , paragraphs 56 to 58, and Baars , paragraph 40).

18 In those cases there was a direct link between the deductibility of the contributions and the tax on the sums payable by the insurers under death and old-age insurance policies, a link which had to be preserved in order to preserve the integrity of the relevant fiscal regime, whereas there is no direct link whatsoever in this case between the grant of the interest rate subsidy to borrowers on the one hand and its financing by means of the profit tax on financial establishments on the other.

74. Thus, clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement requires Member States, in order to prevent the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships, to adopt one or more of the measures listed in a manner that is effective and binding, where domestic law does not include equivalent legal measures. The measures listed in clause 5(1)(a) to (c), of which there are three, relate, respectively, to objective reasons justifying the renewal of such contracts or relationships, the maximum total duration of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships, and the number of renewals of such contracts or relationships (see, inter alia, judgments in Kücük , EU:C:2012:39, paragraph 26, and Fiamingo and Others , EU:C:2014:2044, paragraph 56).

55 In that context, it is important to verify whether the restrictions thus imposed by the rules at issue in the main proceedings are limited to what is necessary to ensure the implementation of legitimate objectives (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2006, Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission, C‑519/04 P, EU:C:2006:492, paragraph 47; of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C‑136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 54, and of 4 September 2014, API and Others, C‑184/13 to C‑187/13, C‑194/13, C‑195/13 and C‑208/13, EU:C:2014:2147, paragraph 48).

48. In that context, it is important to verify whether the restrictions thus imposed by the rules at issue in the main proceedings are limited to what is necessary to ensure the implementation of legitimate objectives (see, to that effect, judgments in Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission , C‑519/04 P, EU:C:2006:492, paragraph 47, and Consiglio nazionale dei geologi and Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato , EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 54).

41. As the Court has held, in the light of the essential purpose of Directive 93/104, which aims to effectively protect the safety and health of workers, each worker must, inter alia, enjoy adequate rest periods, which must not only be effective in enabling the persons concerned to recover from the fatigue engendered by their work, but also preventive in nature, so as to reduce as much as possible the risk of affecting the safety or health of employees which successive periods of work without the necessary rest are likely to produce ( Jaeger , paragraph 92).

19 As is clear from Bernini, paragraph 25, study finance awarded by a Member State to children of workers constitutes for a migrant worker a social advantage within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1612/68 where the worker continues to support the child.

25 It follows from the judgment of the Court in Case 94/84 ONEM v Deak [1985] ECR 1873 that a migrant worker may rely on Article 77(2) of Regulation No 1612/68 in order to obtain social benefits provided for in the legislation of the host Member State in favour of the children of national workers (see paragraph 24 of the judgment). However, that benefit constitutes in favour of the migrant worker a social advantage within the meaning of that provision only where the worker continues to support his descendant (see the judgment in Case 316/85 Centre Publique d' Aide Sociale de Courcelles v Lebon [1987] ECR 2811, paragraph 13).

41. Moreover, the question of whether such an order should be made and the fixing, if necessary, of the amount of the lump sum must, in each individual case, depend on all the relevant factors pertaining to both the particular nature of the infringement established and the individual conduct of the Member State involved in the procedure instigated pursuant to Article 260 TFEU (see, inter alia, Commission v France , paragraph 62; Commission v Greece , paragraph 30; and Commission v Ireland , paragraph 67).

80. As the Court has pointed out, such an increase is also designed to protect the health and life of humans, animals and plants, which are among the public interest grounds listed in Article 36 TFEU (see, to that effect, PreussenElektra , EU:C:2001:160, paragraph 75).

75 It should be noted that that policy is also designed to protect the health and life of humans, animals and plants.

10. À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et que les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêt du 27 octobre 2005, Commission/Luxembourg, C‑23/05, Rec. p. I‑9535, point 9 et jurisprudence citée).

47. In order to answer the question referred, the Court bases its considerations on the origins, objectives and scheme of Regulation No 44/2001 (see Case C-386/05 Color Drack [2007] ECR I-3699, paragraph 18, and Case C-204/08 Rehder [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 31).

18. Consequently, the first indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted in the light of the origins, objectives and scheme of that regulation (see, to that effect, Case C‑103/05 Reisch Montage [2006] ECR I‑6827, paragraph 29, and Case C‑283/05 ASML [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).

52. In this respect, in his observations to the Court, Mr Güzeli referred to the interpretation of an analogous provision in the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, signed in Rabat on 27 April 1976 and concluded on behalf of the Community by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2211/78 of 26 September 1978 (OJ 1978 L 264, p. 1) which was given by the Court in Case C‑416/96 Eddline El-Yassini [1999] ECR I‑1209, paragraphs 62 to 64. According to that interpretation, although a Member State is not in principle prohibited from refusing to extend the residence permit of a Moroccan national whom it has previously authorised to enter its territory and to work there where the initial reason for the grant of a right of residence no longer exists at the time that his residence permit expires, the situation would be different if the host Member State had granted the Moroccan migrant worker specific rights in relation to employment which were more extensive than the rights of residence conferred on him by that State.

41. Finally, so far as concerns the third argument, it is apparent from Joined Cases C‑403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League and Others [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 76 to 145, that communications to the public by satellite must be capable of being received in all the Member States and that they therefore by definition have a cross-border nature. Furthermore, the communications at issue in the main proceedings display such a nature since they involve Belgian and Netherlands companies, Airfield and Canal Digitaal, and the programme-carrying signals are intended in particular for television viewers residing in Belgium and Luxembourg.

91. Those parties contend in particular in this regard that, if there were no protection of that territorial exclusivity, the holder of intellectual property rights would no longer be able to obtain appropriate licence fees from the broadcasters given that the live broadcast of sporting events would have lost part of its value. Broadcasters are not interested in acquiring licences outside the territory of the Member State of broadcast. Acquiring licences for all the national territories where potential customers reside is not financially attractive, because of the extremely high cost of such licences. Thus, broadcasters acquire licences to transmit the works concerned in the territory of a single Member State. They are prepared to pay a substantial premium provided that they are guaranteed territorial exclusivity, because that exclusivity enables them to stand out from their competitors and thereby to attract additional customers.

44 Furthermore, the Court has also held that the fact that the adoption of a given measure under a common organisation of the market may affect producers in different ways, depending upon the particular nature of their production or on local conditions, cannot be regarded as discrimination prohibited by Article 40(3) of the Treaty if that measure is determined on the basis of objective rules, formulated to meet the needs of the general common organisation of the market (see, to that effect, judgment in Case 179/84 Bozzetti [1985] ECR 2301, paragraph 34).

18. The Court has consistently held that Article 49 EC precludes the application of any national rules which have the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services entirely within a single Member State (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-155/08 and C-157/08 X and Passenheim-van Schoot [2009] ECR I-5093, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). Restrictions on the freedom to provide services are national measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of that freedom (see, inter alia, Case C-330/07 Jobra [2008] ECR I-9099, paragraph 19, and Case C-287/10 Tankreederei I [2010] ECR I-14233, paragraph 15).

32. It should be recalled in this regard that Article 49 EC precludes the application of any national rules which have the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within a Member State (see, in particular, Case C‑118/96 Safir [1998] ECR I‑1897, paragraph 23; Case C‑334/02 Commission v France [2004] ECR I‑2229, paragraph 23; and Case C‑318/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I‑6957, paragraph 81).

25 It should first be noted, with respect to this question, that Article 7(2) of the Directive does not indicate the criteria which must be taken into consideration where the customer is a legal person whose seat is not situated in the place where its business is run and its commercial activity carried on. That provision must therefore be interpreted in the light of its context and the aim of the Directive (see Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11, and Case C-7/90 Vandevenne and Others [1991] ECR I-4371, paragraph 6).

60 In its judgment of 21 December 2011, N. S. and Others (C‑411/10 and C‑493/10, EU:C:2011:865, paragraphs 86 to 94 and 106), the Court stressed that the transfer of asylum seekers within the framework of the Dublin system may, in certain circumstances, be incompatible with the prohibition laid down in Article 4 of the Charter. It thus held that an asylum seeker would run a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of that article, in the event of a transfer to a Member State in which there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the conditions for the reception of applicants. Consequently, in accordance with the prohibition laid down in that article, the Member States may not carry out transfers within the framework of the Dublin system to a Member State in the case where they cannot be unaware that such flaws exist in that Member State.

87. With regard to the situation in Greece, the parties who have submitted observations to the Court are in agreement that that Member State was, in 2010, the point of entry in the European Union of almost 90% of illegal immigrants, that influx resulting in a disproportionate burden being borne by it compared to other Member States and the inability to cope with the situation in practice. The Hellenic Republic stated that the Member States had not agreed to the Commission’s proposal that the application of Regulation No 343/2003 be suspended and that it be amended by mitigating the criterion of first entry.

16. Il y a toutefois lieu de rappeler que l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêt du 13 septembre 2007, Commission/Italie, C-260/04, Rec. p. I-7083, point 18).

19. In paragraph 52 of that judgment, the Court held that, in the light of the considerations referred to in paragraphs 28 to 35 of the judgment, to the effect, in particular, that SOAs are commercial undertakings performing their activities in conditions of competition and do not have any power to make decisions connected with the exercise of public powers, SOAs’ certification activities are not directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority within the meaning of Article 51 TFEU.

54. En l’occurrence, la vérification, par les SOA, de la capacité technique et financière des entreprises soumises à la certification, de la véracité et du contenu des déclarations, certificats et documents présentés par les personnes auxquelles l’attestation est délivrée ainsi que du maintien des conditions relatives à la situation personnelle du candidat ou du soumissionnaire ne saurait être considérée comme une activité relevant de l’autonomie décisionnelle propre à l’exercice de prérogatives de puissance publique. Cette vérification est entièrement déterminée par le cadre réglementaire national. En outre, elle est accomplie sous une surveillance étatique directe et elle a pour fonction de faciliter la tâche des pouvoirs adjudicateurs dans le domaine des marchés publics de travaux, sa finalité étant de permettre à ces derniers d’accomplir leur mission en ayant une connaissance précise et circonstanciée de la capacité tant technique que financière des soumissionnaires.

53. Following the ratification by the European Union of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which was approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009 (OJ 2010 L 23, p. 35), the Court held that the concept of ‘disability’ must be understood as referring to a limitation which results in particular from long-term physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers (see judgments in HK Danmark , EU:C:2013:222, paragraphs 37 to 39; Z. , C‑363/12, EU:C:2014:159, paragraph 76; and Glatzel , C‑356/12, EU:C:2014:350, paragraph 45).

58. In that regard, first of all, if supply on a market is highly concentrated, the exchange of certain information may, according in particular to the type of information exchanged, be liable to enable undertakings to be aware of the market position and commercial strategy of their competitors, thus distorting rivalry on the market and increasing the probability of collusion, or even facilitating it. On the other hand, if supply is fragmented, the dissemination and exchange of information between competitors may be neutral, or even positive, for the competitive nature of the market (see, to that effect, Thyssen Stahl v Commission , paragraphs 84 and 86). In the present case, it is common ground, as may be seen from paragraph 10 of this judgment, that the referring court premissed its reference for a preliminary ruling on the existence of ‘a fragmented market’, which it is for that court to verify.

86. Contrary to what the appellant claims, an information exchange system may constitute a breach of competition rules even where the relevant market is not a highly concentrated oligopolistic market. It is true that, in its judgment in Case T-35/92 John Deere , cited above, which was upheld in this regard by the Court's judgment in John Deere , the Court of First Instance concluded that the tractors market was such a market. However, those judgments take into consideration a number of criteria in that regard, the only general principle applied in relation to the market structure being that supply must not be atomised.

18 If Note 2 of Chapter 99 of the Common Customs Tariff is interpreted by reference to the objective of tariff Heading 99.02, the exclusion of mechanical or photomechanical processes can only relate to the making of the original plate from which the impressions are produced .

18 As the Court has already held, where a matter is regulated in a harmonised manner at Community level, any national measure relating thereto must be assessed in the light of the provisions of that harmonising measure and not of Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty (Case C-150/88 Parfümerie-Fabrik 4711 [1989] ECR 3891, paragraph 28, Case C-37/92 Vanacker and Lesage [1993] ECR I-4947, paragraph 9, and Case C-324/99 DaimlerChrysler [2001] ECR I-9897, paragraph 32).

9 In order to reply to the second part of the question, it must be observed, first, that, since the question of the collection of waste oil has been regulated in a harmonized manner at Community level by the directive, any national measure relating thereto must be assessed in the light of the provisions of the directive and not of Articles 30 to 36 of the Treaty.

28. It should be noted in that regard, first, that the term ‘worker’ in that provision cannot be defined by reference to the legislation of the Member States but must be given an autonomous and uniform meaning in the EU legal order (judgment in Balkaya , C‑229/14, EU:C:2015:455, paragraph 33).

18 In this respect, the overriding reasons relating to the public interest which the Court has already recognized include professional rules intended to protect recipients of the service (Joined Cases 110/78 and 111/78 Van Wesemael [1979] ECR 35, paragraph 28); protection of intellectual property (Case 62/79 Coditel [1980] ECR 881); the protection of workers (Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305, paragraph 19; Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/81 Seco v EVI [1982] ECR 223, paragraph 14; Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417, paragraph 18); consumer protection (Case 220/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 3663, paragraph 20; Case 252/83 Commission v Denmark [1986] ECR 3713, paragraph 20; Case 205/84 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755, paragraph 30; Case 206/84 Commission v Ireland [1986] ECR 3817, paragraph 20; Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 20; and Commission v Greece, cited above, paragraph 21), the conservation of the national historic and artistic heritage (Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 20); turning to account the archaeological, historical and artistic heritage of a country and the widest possible dissemination of knowledge of the artistic and cultural heritage of a country (Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 17, and Commission v Greece, cited above, paragraph 21).

20 IN ITS JUDGMENT DELIVERED THIS DAY IN CASE 205/84 COMMISSION V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ( 1986 ) ECR 3793 , THE COURT HELD THAT IN THE INSURANCE SECTOR IN GENERAL THERE WERE IMPERATIVE REASONS RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSUMER BOTH AS A POLICY-HOLDER AND AS AN INSURED PERSON WHICH MIGHT JUSTIFY RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES . THE COURT ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT IN THE PRESENT STATE OF COMMUNITY LAW , IN PARTICULAR WITH REGARD TO THE COORDINATION OF THE RELEVANT NATIONAL RULES , THE PROTECTION OF THAT INTEREST WAS NOT NECESSARILY GUARANTEED BY THE RULES OF THE STATE OF ESTABLISHMENT . THE COURT CONCLUDED THEREFROM THAT , AS REGARDS THE FIELD OF DIRECT INSURANCE IN GENERAL , THE REQUIREMENT OF A SEPARATE AUTHORIZATION GRANTED BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICE WAS PROVIDED REMAINED JUSTIFIED SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS . ON THE OTHER HAND , THE COURT CONSIDERED THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF AN ESTABLISHMENT , WHICH REPRESENTED THE VERY NEGATION OF THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES , EXCEEDED WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO ATTAIN THE OBJECTIVE PURSUED AND THAT , ACCORDINGLY , THAT REQUIREMENT WAS CONTRARY TO ARTICLES 59 AND 60 OF THE TREATY .

47. However, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that, in any event, that levy cannot be applied to the supply of reproduction equipment, devices and media to persons other than natural persons for purposes clearly unrelated to private copying (see, to that effect, judgments in Padawan , EU:C:2010:620, paragraph 52, and Amazon.com International Sales and Others , EU:C:2013:515, paragraph 28).

181. Second, the operator or owner of an illegal tip must be regarded as the holder of waste for the purposes of Article 8 of the Directive, so that this provision imposes on the Member State concerned the obligation to take, in his regard, the steps necessary to ensure that that waste is handed over to a private or public waste collector or a waste disposal undertaking, unless it is possible for the operator or owner himself to recover or dispose of the waste (see, in particular, San Rocco , paragraph 108, the judgment of 9 September 2004 in Case C-383/02 Commission v Italy , not published in the ECR, paragraphs 40, 42 and 44, and the judgment of 25 November 2004 in Case C-447/03 Commission v Italy , not published in the ECR, paragraphs 27, 28 and 30).

27 In the present case, the letter of formal notice must be held to satisfy the degree of precision required by the case-law, because identification of the Member State's non-compliance and its designation as being capable of constituting an infringement of Articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10 of Directive 75/442 were sufficient to enable the Italian Republic to present its defence.

55 In the examination of terms in an individual action brought by a consumer, the law designated as applicable as the law of the contract may be different from the law designated as applicable to an action for an injunction as the law of the tort or delict. It must be observed in this respect that the level of protection of consumers still varies from one Member State to another, in accordance with Article 8 of Directive 93/13, so that the assessment of a term may vary, other things being equal, according to the applicable law.

122. First, there must be intervention by the State or through State resources. Second, the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States. Third, it must confer an advantage on the recipient. Fourth, it must distort or threaten to distort competition (see, in particular, Case C‑451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti [2006] ECR I‑2941, paragraph 56).

56. First, there must be intervention by the State or through State resources. Second, the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States. Third, it must confer an advantage on the recipient. Fourth, it must distort or threaten to distort competition.

47. Il résulte d’une jurisprudence constante de la Cour que les restrictions à la liberté d’établissement, qui sont applicables sans discrimination tenant à la nationalité, peuvent être justifiées par des raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général, à condition qu’elles soient propres à garantir la réalisation de l’objectif poursuivi et qu’elles n’aillent pas au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour atteindre cet objectif (voir, notamment, arrêts Commission/Autriche, C‑356/08, EU:C:2009:401, point 42, et Commission/France, EU:C:2010:772, point 50).

38. In that context, the Court has already held that, for the purpose of an overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion, it must be borne in mind inter alia that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question ( Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer , paragraph 26).

26 For the purposes of that global appreciation, the average consumer of the category of products concerned is deemed to be reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (see, to that effect, Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide and Tusky [1998] ECR I-4657, paragraph 31). However, account should be taken of the fact that the average consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct comparison between the different marks but must place his trust in the imperfect picture of them that he has kept in his mind. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer's level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question.

32. In that regard, it is appropriate, first of all, to note that nothing in the wording of Directive 85/374 gives grounds for concluding that the EU legislature, in establishing producer liability for defective products, intended, so as to ensure undistorted competition and to facilitate the free movement of goods, to deny the Member States the power, as regards compensation for damage caused by a defective product used in the context of a service provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings, to provide for a system of liability on the part of the service provider corresponding to that established by Directive 85/374 (see, by analogy, Moteurs Leroy Somer , paragraph 30).

26. The deduction system provided for in Article 17(5) of the Sixth Directive covers only cases in which the goods and services are used by a taxable person to carry out both economic transactions which give rise to a right to deduct and those which do not, that is to say, goods and services for mixed use. Member States may use one of the methods of deduction referred to in the third subparagraph of Article 17(5) only for those goods and services (judgment in Portugal Telecom , C‑496/11, EU:C:2012:557, paragraph 40).

40. It follows from that case-law, first, that the deduction system provided for in Article 17(5) of the Sixth Directive only covers cases in which the goods and services are used by a taxable person to carry out both economic transactions which give rise to a right to deduct and those which do not, that is to say, goods and services for mixed use and, second, that Member States may use one of the methods of deduction referred to in the third subparagraph of Article 17(5) only for those goods and services.

22. It is necessary, however, to determine whether such a restriction may be allowed as a derogation, on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, as expressly provided for under Articles 45 EC and 46 EC, which are applicable in the area of freedom to provide services by virtue of Article 55 EC, or justified, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, by overriding reasons in the public interest (Case C-470/11 Garkalns [2012] ECR, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

25. As regards the first objective invoked by the Belgian Government, it must be pointed out that the provisions of European Union law do not preclude the adoption of a policy for the protection and promotion of one or more official languages of a Member State (see, to that effect, Case C‑379/87 Groener [1989] ECR 3967, paragraph 19, and Case C‑391/09 Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn [2011] ECR I‑3787, paragraph 85).

19 The EEC Treaty does not prohibit the adoption of a policy for the protection and promotion of a language of a Member State which is both the national language and the first official language . However, the implementation of such a policy must not encroach upon a fundamental freedom such as that of the free movement of workers . Therefore, the requirements deriving from measures intended to implement such a policy must not in any circumstances be disproportionate in relation to the aim pursued and the manner in which they are applied must not bring about discrimination against nationals of other Member States .

140 [As rectified by order of 24 October 2017] The analysis of the capacity to foreclose is also relevant in assessing whether a system of rebates which, in principle, falls within the scope of the prohibition laid down in Article 102 TFEU, may be objectively justified. In addition, the exclusionary effect arising from such a system, which is disadvantageous for competition, may be counterbalanced, or outweighed, by advantages in terms of efficiency which also benefit the consumer (judgment of 15 March 2007,British Airways v Commission, C‑95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, paragraph 86). That balancing of the favourable and unfavourable effects of the practice in question on competition can be carried out in the Commission’s decision only after an analysis of the intrinsic capacity of that practice to foreclose competitors which are at least as efficient as the dominant undertaking.

20 With respect to the obligation to state the ‘purpose of the request’, this relates to the Commission’s obligation to indicate the subject of its investigation in its request, and therefore to identify the alleged infringement of competition rules (see, to that effect, judgment in SEP v Commission, C‑36/92 P, EU:C:1994:205, paragraph 21).

21 For the reasons stated in paragraphs 21 to 42 of the Advocate General' s Opinion, the first, second, third, fourth and fifth grounds of appeal must be rejected as unfounded. The sixth, seventh and eight grounds of appeal

57 Regarding aid in the course of implementation the payment of which is continuing and which the Member State regards as existing aid, the contrary classification as new aid, even if provisional, adopted by the Commission in its decision to initiate the procedure under Article 88(2) EC in relation to that aid, has independent legal effects.

40 Accordingly, the Court has repeatedly held that the concept is an autonomous one of EU law, which has to be interpreted in the light of the context of the provisions referring to that concept and the objectives of Regulation No 2201/2003, in particular that which is apparent from recital 12 thereof, according to which the grounds of jurisdiction which it establishes are shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity (see judgments of 2 April 2009, A, C‑523/07, EU:C:2009:225, paragraphs 34 and 35, and of 22 December 2010, Mercredi, C‑497/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:829, paragraphs 44 to 46).

44. In that regard, it must first be observed that the Regulation contains no definition of the concept of ‘habitual residence’. It merely follows from the use of the adjective ‘habitual’ that the residence must have a certain permanence or regularity.

31 In the main proceedings, Mr Petruhhin, an Estonian national, made use, in his capacity as a Union citizen, of his right to move freely within the European Union by moving to Latvia, so that the situation at issue in the main proceedings falls within the scope of application of the Treaties, within the meaning of Article 18 TFEU, which sets out the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 February 1989 in Cowan, 186/87, EU:C:1989:47, paragraphs 17 to 19).

32 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, for the purposes of interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also its context and the objectives of the rules of which it is part (judgment of 11 May 2017, Krijgsman, C‑302/16, EU:C:2017:359, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

24 According to settled case-law, for the purposes of interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also its context and the objectives of the rules of which it is part (see judgment of 16 November 2016, Hemming and Others, C‑316/15, EU:C:2016:879, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

32 The fact remains that a goods duty which, as the Court held in paragraphs 20 to 24 of Haahr, forms part of a general system of internal dues applying systematically to categories of products according to objective criteria applied without regard to the origin of the products, constitutes an internal measure of a fiscal nature within the meaning of Article 18 of the EEC/Sweden Agreement, and that application to imported products alone of a surcharge in addition to the duty payable on domestic and imported products is contrary to the prohibition of discrimination laid down in that provision.

41. Next, it should be noted that the system for the identification and registration of the animals must be fully effective and reliable at all times so as, in particular, to enable the competent authorities, in the event of epizootic disease, to pinpoint as soon as possible the origin of an animal and immediately to take the necessary measures for avoiding any risk to public health (see Case C‑45/05 Maatschap Schonewille-Prins [2007] ECR I‑3997, paragraph 41). In order to meet that need for constant effectiveness and reliability, it is for the keepers of animals to register their bovine animals in the computerised database of that system.

41. In order to meet those objectives, the system of identification and registration of bovine animals must be fully effective and reliable at all times so as, in particular, to enable the competent authorities, in the event of epizootic disease, to pinpoint as soon as possible the origin of an animal and immediately to take the necessary measures for the purpose of avoiding any risk to public health. That cannot occur where the keeper of animals fails to notify movements of his bovine animals to the computerised database within the period prescribed in Article 7(1), second indent, of Regulation No 1760/2000.

96 According to settled case-law, the reasoning required by Article 190 of the Treaty must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the Community authority which adopted the contested measure so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise its power of review (Joined Cases 43/82 and 63/82 VBVB and VBBB v Commission [1984] ECR 19, paragraph 22).