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It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the concept of ‘State aid’ does not refer to State measures which differentiate between undertakings and which are, therefore, prima facie selective where that differentiation arises from the nature or the overall structure of the system of which they are part (judgments in Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 145 and the case-law cited, and BNP Paribas and BNL v Commission, C‑452/10 P, EU:C:2012:366, paragraph 101). In carrying out the necessary comprehensive review of the characterisation of the tax scheme at issue as State aid, the General Court had to examine whether the differentiation between undertakings arising from that scheme was due to the nature or general scheme of the tax system of which it formed part (judgment in BNP Paribas and BNL v Commission, C‑452/10 P, EU:C:2012:366, paragraph 102).

102. It is apparent from those considerations that, in carrying out the necessary comprehensive review of the characterisation of the tax scheme at issue as State aid, the General Court had to examine whether the differentiation between undertakings arising from that scheme was due to the nature or general scheme of the tax system of which it formed part.

34. That broad construction of the concept of ‘re-utilisation’ is lent support by the objective pursued by the Community legislature through the establishment of a sui generis right (see, to that effect, as regards the concept of extraction, Directmedia Publishing , paragraph 32).

15 Nor is it relevant, as the Advocate General noted in point 6 of his Opinion, that no high-speed trains operate in Northern Ireland. In that connection the Court has already held that the fact that an activity referred to in a directive does not yet exist in a Member State cannot release that State from its obligation to adopt laws or regulations in order to ensure that all the provisions of the directive are properly transposed (Case C-214/98 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-9601, paragraph 22, and Commission v Ireland, cited above, paragraph 11).

22 In order to decide whether this complaint of the Commission is well founded, it must be recalled that, according to the Court's case-law, the fact that an activity referred to in a directive does not exist in a particular Member State cannot release that State from its obligation to adopt laws or regulations in order to ensure that all the provisions of the directive are properly transposed (see, to that effect, Case C-339/87 Commission v Netherlands [1990] ECR I-851, paragraph 22).

40. The prevention of tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an objective recognised and encouraged by Directive 2006/112. In that connection, the Court has held that European Union law cannot be relied on by individuals for abusive or fraudulent ends. It is therefore for the national courts and judicial authorities to refuse the right of deduction if it is shown, in the light of objective factors, that that right is being relied on for fraudulent or abusive ends (to that effect, Case C‑285/11 Bonik [2012] ECR, paragraphs 35 to 37).

72. Il convient de rappeler que, ainsi qu’il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour, une décision de suspension de la saisine de la Cour ne saurait être considérée comme une renonciation au pouvoir discrétionnaire de saisir la Cour dont dispose la Commission, au moment qu’elle juge opportun, lorsqu’elle estime qu’un État membre persiste à ne pas respecter les obligations qui lui incombent en vertu du droit de l’Union (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 1 er juin 1994, Commission/Allemagne, C‑317/92, Rec. p. I‑2039, point 4; du 25 novembre 1999, Commission/Irlande, C‑212/98, Rec. p. I‑8571, point 12, et du 8 décembre 2005, Commission/Luxembourg, C‑33/04, Rec. p. I‑10629, point 66).

4 Secondly, it is for the Commission to judge at what time it will bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations; the considerations which determine its choice of time cannot affect the admissibility of the action (see judgment in Case 7/68 Commission v Italy [1968] ECR 423). That being so, the fact, on the one hand, that no action was taken further to the reasoned opinion, either immediately or shortly afterwards, and, on the other hand, that the subject of the failure to fulfil obligations was not formally raised at a bilateral meeting, could not confer on the Member State concerned a legitimate expectation that the procedure was at an end.

24. Consequently, in so far as an E 101 certificate establishes a presumption that posted workers are properly affiliated to the social security system of the Member State in which the undertaking which posted those workers is established, such a certificate is binding on the competent institution of the Member State to which those workers are posted (see to that effect FTS , paragraph 53).

73 It is only in so far as the Court of Justice considers that the level of the penalty is not merely inappropriate, but also excessive to the point of being disproportionate, that it would have to find that the General Court erred in law, due to the inappropriateness of the amount of a fine (judgment of 18 July 2013, Schindler Holding and Others v Commission, C‑501/11 P, EU:C:2013:522, paragraph 165 and the case-law cited).

165. It is only in so far as the Court of Justice considers that the level of the penalty is not merely inappropriate, but also excessive to the point of being disproportionate, that it would have to find that the General Court erred in law, due to the inappropriateness of the amount of a fine (Case C‑89/11 P E.ON Energie v Commission [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 126).

33. The Court has always emphasised that the public policy exception is a derogation from the fundamental principle of freedom of movement for persons, which must be interpreted strictly, and that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by the Member States (Case 36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219, paragraph 27; Bouchereau , paragraph 33; Case C‑441/02 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I‑3449, paragraph 34; and Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 42).

55. It follows from Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1), first subparagraph, (c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the order or judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal. That requirement is not satisfied by an appeal which, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the contested judgment, confines itself to reproducing the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance. Such an appeal amounts in reality to no more than a request for re-examination of the application submitted to the Court of First Instance, which the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to undertake (Case C‑352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I‑5291, paragraphs 34 and 35, and Case C‑76/01 P Eurocoton and Others v Council [2003] ECR I‑10091, paragraphs 46 and 47).

34 As regards the objection of inadmissibility raised by the Commission and the French Government, it follows from Article 168a of the EC Treaty (now Article 225 EC), the first paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside, and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (Case C-7/95 P Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraphs 34 to 35; order of 16 December 1999 in Case C-170/99 P Clauni and Others v Commission, not reported in the ECR, paragraph 15).

58. As the Court has ruled, the system for financing the costs of disposal is designed in such a way that the A quota, which represents internal consumption, attracts only a minimal levy whereas the B quota, which is mainly for export, is subject to a much higher levy in order to finance the necessary refunds whilst discouraging production (see Case 250/84 Eridania zuccherifici nazionali and Others [1986] ECR 117, paragraph 19).

19. It follows from settled case-law that, under Article 258 TFEU, the subject-matter of an action for failure to fulfil obligations is determined by the Commission’s reasoned opinion, with the result that the action must be based on the same grounds and pleas as that opinion. However, that requirement cannot be carried so far as to mean that in every case the statement of complaints in the operative part of the reasoned opinion and the form of order sought in the application must be exactly the same, where the subject-matter of the proceedings, as defined in the reasoned opinion, has not been extended or altered. In its application the Commission may, inter alia, c larify its initial complaints, provided, however, that it does not alter the subject-matter of the proceedings (see judgment in Commission v Poland , C‑281/11, EU:C:2013:855, paragraphs 87 and 88 and the case-law cited).

88. Toutefois, cette exigence ne saurait aller jusqu’à imposer, en toute hypothèse, une coïncidence parfaite entre l’énoncé des griefs figurant dans le dispositif de l’avis motivé et les conclusions de la requête, dès lors que l’objet du litige, tel que défini dans l’avis motivé, n’a pas été étendu ou modifié (arrêt du 8 juillet 2010, Commission/Portugal, précité, point 26). La Commission peut notamment préciser ses griefs initiaux dans sa requête, à la condition cependant qu’elle ne modifie pas l’objet du litige (arrêt du 11 juillet 2013, Commission/Pays‑Bas, C‑576/10, point 35).

34. Pour ce qui est du principe d’effectivité, il convient de rappeler que la Cour a déjà jugé que chaque cas où se pose la question de savoir si une disposition procédurale nationale rend impossible ou excessivement difficile l’application du droit de l’Union doit être analysé en tenant compte de la place de cette disposition dans l’ensemble de la procédure, de son déroulement et de ses particularités, devant les diverses instances nationales. Dans cette perspective, il y a lieu de prendre en considération, s’il échet, les principes qui sont à la base du système juridictionnel national, tels que la protection des droits de la défense, le principe de sécurité juridique et le bon déroulement de la procédure (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 6 octobre 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, C‑40/08, Rec. p. I‑9579, point 39 et jurisprudence citée, ainsi que Aziz, précité, point 53).

67 However, it is only in circumstances where the action for annulment would unquestionably have been admissible that the Court has held that a person may not plead the invalidity of an act of the European Union before a national court (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 March 1994, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf, C‑188/92, EU:C:1994:90, paragraphs 17 to 25; of 30 January 1997, Wiljo, C‑178/95, EU:C:1997:46, paragraphs 15 to 25; of 15 February 2001, Nachi Europe, C‑239/99, EU:C:2001:101, paragraphs 29 to 40; and of 22 October 2002, National Farmers’ Union, C‑241/01, EU:C:2002:604, paragraphs 34 to 39). In numerous other cases, the Court has held that it was not established that the action would unquestionably have been admissible (see, inter alia, to that effect, judgments of 23 February 2006, Atzeni and Others, C‑346/03 and C‑529/03, EU:C:2006:130, paragraphs 30 to 34; of 8 March 2007, Roquette Frères, C‑441/05, EU:C:2007:150, paragraphs 35 to 48; of 29 June 2010, E and F, C‑550/09, EU:C:2010:382, paragraphs 37 to 52; of 18 September 2014, Valimar, C‑374/12, EU:C:2014:2231, paragraphs 24 to 38; and of 5 March 2015, Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraphs 27 to 32).

29. Nevertheless, it follows from that case-law that the admissibility of such a direct action must be beyond any doubt (see judgment in Bolton Alimentari , EU:C:2011:87, paragraph 23). In the present case, the information submitted with the request for a preliminary ruling and that which the Bulgarian Government and Valimar provided in their oral submissions does not allow the Court to conclude that such a direct action would have been admissible.

13. In that regard, it must be pointed out, first, that the Court may, of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at the request of the parties, order the reopening of the oral procedure under Article 61 of its Rules of Procedure if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see Case C‑210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, paragraph 25; Case C‑138/05 Stichting Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie [2006] ECR I‑8339, paragraph 23; and order in Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] ECR I‑665, paragraph 18).

48. Similar reasoning would apply if the transfer of shares in the subsidiary to a third party was already provided for at the time of transfer of the activities to the subsidiary (see, to that effect, Case C-29/04, Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-9705, paragraphs 38 to 42).

39. It must be borne in mind that the transfer of 49% of the shares in AbfallgmbH took place shortly after that company was made responsible, exclusively and for an unlimited period, for the collection and treatment of the town of Mödling’s waste. Furthermore, AbfallgmbH became operational only after Saubermacher AG took over some of its shares.

75 It should be recalled, as a preliminary point, that the purpose of the Framework Decision, as is apparent in particular from Article 1(1) and (2) thereof and recitals 5 and 7 in the preamble thereto, is to replace the multilateral system of extradition based on the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 with a system of surrender between judicial authorities of convicted or suspected persons for the purpose of enforcing judgments or of conducting prosecutions, that system of surrender being based on the principle of mutual recognition (see judgments in West, C‑192/12 PPU, EU:C:2012:404, paragraph 54; Melloni, C‑399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraph 36; F., C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraph 34; and Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 27).

48 In that regard, it should be pointed out that, according to the case-law, a Member State may not apply a criminal penalty for failure to complete an administrative formality where such completion has been refused or rendered impossible by the Member State concerned, in breach of EU law. Given that Question 1(b) and (c) seeks to establish whether the conditions imposed for the award of an authorisation under the national legislation were contrary to EU law, the relevance of that question for the purposes of resolving the dispute before the referring court cannot be called into question (see, to that effect, judgment in Costa and Cifone, C‑72/10 and C‑77/10, EU:C:2012:80, paragraph 43).

43. In that regard, it should be noted that, according to consistent case‑law, a Member State may not apply a criminal penalty for failure to complete an administrative formality where such completion has been refused or rendered impossible by the Member State concerned, in infringement of EU law ( Placanica and Others , paragraph 69). Given that the question referred is intended precisely to establish whether the conditions which were imposed for the award of a licence under the national legislation, and which led Stanley to decline to participate in the tendering procedures at issue in the main proceedings, were contrary to EU law, the relevance of that question for the purposes of deciding the cases before the referring court cannot be called into question.

36. As regards the scope of Article 135(1)(f) of that directive, the Court has held that transactions in shares and other securities are transactions on the market in marketable securities and that trade in securities involves acts which alter the legal and financial situation as between the parties (see, to that effect, Case C-2/95 SDC [1997] ECR I-3017, paragraphs 72 and 73, and Case C-259/11 DTZ Zadelhoff [2012] ECR, paragraph 22).

57 To that end, the court having jurisdiction must determine whether the transfer of the case to that other court is such as to provide genuine and specific added value, with respect to the decision to be taken in relation to the child, as compared with the possibility of the case remaining before that court. In that context, the court having jurisdiction may take into account, among other factors, the rules of procedure in the other Member State, such as those applicable to the taking of evidence required for dealing with the case. However, the court having jurisdiction should not take into consideration, within such an assessment, the substantive law of that other Member State which might be applicable by the court of that other Member State, if the case were transferred to it. If the court were to take that into consideration, doing so would be in breach of the principles of mutual trust between Member States and mutual recognition of judgments that are the basis of Regulation No 2201/2003 (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 December 2009, Detiček, C‑403/09 PPU, EU:C:2009:810, paragraph 45, and of 15 July 2010, Purrucker, C‑256/09, EU:C:2010:437, paragraphs 70 and 71).

71. As stated in Recital 21 of the regulation, that recognition should be based on the principle of mutual trust.

28. However, although direct taxation falls within their competence, the Member States must exercise that competence consistently with Community law (see Case C-265/04 Bouanich [2006] ECR I-923, paragraph 28, and Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation , paragraph 36). The existence of a restriction on the freedom of establishment

85 So, in considering whether Article 100a was the proper legal basis, the Court must verify whether the measure whose validity is at issue in fact pursues the objectives stated by the Community legislature (see, in particular, Spain v Council, cited above, paragraphs 25 to 41, and Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-2405, paragraphs 10 to 21).

40 It follows from the above that the regulation was validly adopted on the basis of Article 100a of the Treaty, and did not therefore have to be adopted on the basis of Article 100 or Article 235.

34 In a situation of that kind, it must be concluded that in practice provisions such as those at issue in the main proceedings result in discrimination against women employees as compared with men and must in principle be regarded as contrary to Directive 76/207. The position would be different only if the distinction between those two categories of employee were justified by factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex (see inter alia Case 170/84 Bilka v Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607, paragraph 29; Case 171/88 Rinner-Kühn v FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung [1989] ECR 2743, paragraph 12; and Case C-457/93 Kuratorium für Dialyse und Nierentransplantation v Lewark [1996] ECR I-243, paragraph 31).

39 Next, as regards the application of national social security laws to workers and members of their families, Article 51 of the Treaty entrusts the Council with the task of adopting such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers (see, in particular, the judgments in Cases C-481/93 Moscato v Bestuur van de Nieuwe Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging [1995] ECR I-3525, paragraph 27, and Case C-482/93 Klaus v Bestuur van de Nieuwe Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging [1995] ECR I-3551, paragraph 21).

27 First of all, it should be noted that Article 51 of the Treaty entrusts the Council with the task of adopting such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers. The provisions of Regulation No 1408/71 must therefore be interpreted in the light of that objective (see, in particular, Case C-406/93 Reichling v INAMI [1994] ECR I-4061, paragraph 21).

33. Lastly, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg acknowledges that, under Luxembourg law, there is no maximum duration, for the purposes of Clause 5(1)(b) of the Framework Agreement, in respect of successive fixed-term employment contracts concluded with ‘occasional workers in the entertainment arts’ within the meaning of Article 4 of the amended Law of 30 July 1999. Nor is there any limit to the number of times such contracts may be renewed, for the purposes of Clause 5(1)(c) of the Framework Agreement. On the other hand, according to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, which refers to the judgment in Márquez Samohano (C‑190/13, EU:C:2014:146, paragraph 45), the situation of those workers is characterised by the existence of ‘objective reasons’ within the meaning of Clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement and the case-law of the Court. In particular, those workers participate in individual projects which are limited in time, and enjoy a measure of flexibility and social benefits owing to the fact that it is possible for an employer to renew fixed-term contracts with the same workers. According to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Commission acknowledges, moreover, that working on the basis of individual projects is an objective reason capable of justifying the use of successive fixed-term contracts. In that regard, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg recalls that, in its judgment in Kücük (C‑586/10, EU:C:2012:39, paragraph 56), the Court held that, where an objective reason is to be found in the specific nature of the tasks to be carried out, the mere fact that an employer may have to hire workers under recurring fixed-term contracts does not mean that there is no objective reason under Clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement or that there is abuse within the meaning of that clause. Findings of the Court

22 In Defrenne, cited above, the Court held that the principle of equal pay under Article 119 may be relied on before national courts and that those courts have a duty to ensure the protection of the rights which that provision vests in individuals. However, the Court also stated, at paragraphs 74 and 75 of that judgment, that important considerations of legal certainty affecting all the interests involved, both public and private, meant that the direct effect of Article 119 could not be relied on in order to support claims concerning pay periods prior to the date of that judgment, 8 April 1976, except as regards workers who had already brought legal proceedings or made an equivalent claim.

75 THEREFORE , THE DIRECT EFFECT OF ARTICLE 119 CANNOT BE RELIED ON IN ORDER TO SUPPORT CLAIMS CONCERNING PAY PERIODS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THIS JUDGMENT , EXCEPT AS REGARDS THOSE WORKERS WHO HAVE ALREADY BROUGHT LEGAL PROCEEDINGS OR MADE AN EQUIVALENT CLAIM .

35. In that regard, it is settled case-law that, for the purposes of the application of the provisions of European Union competition law, an undertaking is any entity engaged in an economic activity, irrespective of its legal status and the way in which it is financed (see, inter alia, Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 21, and Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637, paragraph 17). It is clear from established case-law that any activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given market is an economic activity (see Case C-82/01 P Aéroports de Paris v Commission [2002] ECR I-9297, paragraph 79; Case C-49/07 MOTOE [2008] ECR I-4863, paragraph 22; and Case C-437/09 AG2R Prévoyance [2011] ECR I-973, paragraph 42). Thus, the State itself or a State entity may act as an undertaking (see, to that effect, Case 41/83 Italy v Commission [1985] ECR 873, paragraphs 16 to 20).

42. Second, according to the Court’s settled case-law, for a request for substitution of grounds to be admissible, the appellant must have an interest in bringing proceedings, in so far as the request must be capable, if successful, of procuring an advantage to the party making it. That may be the case where the request for substitution of grounds amounts to a defence to one of the applicant’s pleas (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑501/06 P, C‑513/06 P, C‑515/06 P and C‑519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission [2009] ECR I‑9291, paragraph 23, and the judgment of 21 December 2011 in Case C‑329/09 P Iride v Commission , paragraphs 48 to 51).

50. En effet, il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour que l’existence d’un intérêt à agir suppose qu’une demande telle que celle faite par la Commission soit susceptible, par son résultat, de procurer un bénéfice à la partie qui l’a intentée (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 6 octobre 2009, GlaxoSmithKline Services e.a./Commission e.a., C‑501/06 P, C‑513/06 P, C‑515/06 P et C‑519/06 P, Rec. p. I‑9291, point 23 ainsi que jurisprudence citée).

24. In this respect, it should first of all be pointed out that, although, as the German, Netherlands, Austri an, Swedish and United Kingdom Governments as well as the Commission have observed, the Member States are competent, under Article 149(1) EC, as regards the content of teaching and the organisation of their respective education systems, it is none the less the case that that competence must be exercised in compliance with Community law (see, to that effect, Case C‑308/89 di Leo [1990] ECR I‑4185, paragraphs 14 and 15; Case C‑337/97 Meeusen [1999] ECR I‑3289, paragraph 25; Case C‑147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I‑5969, paragraphs 31 to 35, and Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz , paragraph 70) and, in particular, in compliance with the Treaty provisions on the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 18(1) EC (see, to that effect, Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz , paragraph 99).

62. When applying domestic law the national court must, as far as is at all possible, interpret it in a way which accords with the objective of Directive 89/665 (see, to that effect, Santex , paragraphs 62 and 63).

63. As is clear from the case-law of the Court, when applying domestic law the national court must, as far as is at all possible, interpret it in a way which accords with the requirements of Community law (see, in particular, Case C-165/91 Van Munster [1994] ECR I-4661, paragraph 34, and Case C-262/97 Engelbrecht [2000] ECR I-7321, paragraph 39).

39. According to equally settled case‑law, even though the provisions of an agreement such as the ITA are not such as to create rights upon which individuals may rely directly before the courts under European Union law, where the European Union has legislated in the field in question, the primacy of international agreements concluded by the European Union over provisions of secondary Community legislation means that such provisions must, so far as is possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements ( British Sky Broadcasting Group and Pace , paragraph 83 and the case‑law cited).

43. The Court has, admittedly, held that disturbing the balance and reciprocity of a bilateral international agreement concluded between a Member State and a non-member country may constitute an objective justification for the refusal by a Member State party to that agreement to extend to nationals of other Member States the advantages which its own nationals derive from that agreement (see, inter alia, Case C‑307/97 Saint-Gobain ZN [1999] ECR I‑6161, paragraph 60, and Gottardo , paragraph 36).

36 Disturbing the balance and reciprocity of a bilateral international convention concluded between a Member State and a non-member country may, it is true, constitute an objective justification for the refusal by a Member State party to that convention to extend to nationals of other Member States the advantages which its own nationals derive from that convention (see, to that effect, Saint-Gobain ZN, cited above, paragraph 60).

35 The Court considers that it is to be observed first of all that, according to its settled case-law, in order to establish, in particular in the sector of the common organisation of the agricultural markets, whether a provision of Community law complies with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary to ascertain whether the penalty exceeds what is appropriate and necessary to attain the objective pursued by the rules which have been breached (see Case C-118/89 Lingenfelser [1990] ECR I-2637, paragraph 12; Case C-319/90 Pressler [1992] ECR I-203, paragraph 12; and Case C-354/95 National Farmers' Union and Others [1997] ECR I-4559, paragraph 49).

78. In that regard, according to settled case-law, under the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4 TEU, it is for the Member States to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under EU law (see, to that effect, Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5; Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, paragraph 12; Case C-213/89 Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I-2433, paragraph 19; and Case C‑432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I‑2271, paragraph 38).

38. Under the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC, it is for the Member States to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under Community law (see, to that effect, Case 33/76 Rewe , [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5; Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, paragraph 12; Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraphs 21 and 22; Case C-213/89 Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I-2433, paragraph 19; and Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I-4599, paragraph 12).

48. Under the third paragraph of Article 49 of that Statute, the Community institutions do not have to show any interest in order to bring an appeal against a judgment of the Court of First Instance ( Commission v Anic Partecipazioni, cited above, paragraph 171).

17. As regards that latter principle, the Court has stated that it is compatible with EU law to lay down reasonable periods within which proceedings must be brought in the interests of legal certainty, which protects both the individual and the authorities concerned. Such periods are not by their nature liable to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law, even if the expiry of those periods necessarily entails the dismissal, in whole or in part, of the action brought (see Case C‑90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I‑4085, paragraph 48; Case C‑188/95 Fantask and Others [1997] ECR I‑6783, paragraph 48; Case C‑231/96 Edis [1998] ECR I‑4951, paragraph 35; and Marks & Spencer , paragraph 35).

35 As regards the latter principle, the Court, as pointed out in paragraph 20 of this judgment, has held that it is compatible with Community law to lay down reasonable limitation periods for bringing proceedings in the interests of legal certainty which protects both the taxpayer and the administration concerned. Such time-limits are not liable to render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law. In that regard, a time-limit of three years under national law, reckoned from the date of the contested payments, appears reasonable.

102. In fact, such a discretion is, first, in accordance with the idea that each Member State is best placed to determine, in accordance with its national needs, the requirements of public security, in the light of historical, legal, economic or social considerations specific to it (see, by analogy, Case C‑213/07 Michaniki [2008] ECR I‑9999, paragraph 56).

25. In addition, the general principle in the system of the Convention is that the courts of the Contracting State in which the defendant is domiciled are to have jurisdiction, and that rules of jurisdiction which derogate from this general principle cannot give rise to an interpretation going beyond the cases expressly envisaged by the Convention (see, in particular, Shearson Lehman Hutton , cited above, paragraphs 14 and 16; Benincasa , cited above, paragraph 13, and Case C-412/98 Group Josi [2000] ECR I-5925, paragraph 49). This interpretation is even more compelling in relation to a rule of jurisdiction like that in Article 5(2) of the Convention, which enables the maintenance creditor to sue the defendant before the courts of the Contracting State in which the applicant is domiciled. Other than in the cases expressly provided for, the Convention appears hostile towards the attribution of jurisdiction to the courts of the applicant ' s domicile (see, to this effect, Shearson Lehman Hutton , cited above, paragraph 17; Benincasa , cited above, paragraph 14, and Group Josi , cited above, paragraph 50).

16 Consequently, the rules of jurisdiction which derogate from that general principle cannot give rise to an interpretation going beyond the cases envisaged by the Convention (see the judgments in Bertrand, paragraph 17, and Handte, paragraph 14, cited above).

31 As observed by the Advocate General in point 45 of his Opinion, such a high evidentiary standard, which amounts to excluding any method of proof other than certain proof based on medical research, could make it excessively difficult in many situations or, as in the present case, where it is common ground that medical research neither confirms nor rules out the existence of such a causal link, impossible to establish producer liability, thereby undermining the effectiveness of Article 1 of Directive 85/374 (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 November 1983, San Giorgio, 199/82, EU:C:1983:318, paragraph 14).

63. Furthermore, Decree-Law No 177/92 makes provision for meeting the costs of medical care abroad solely in exceptional cases where the treatment needed for patients affiliated to the Portuguese health system is not available under that system. By its very nature, that condition will severely limit the circumstances in which such authorisation can be obtained (see, to that effect, Smits and Peerbooms , paragraph 64, and Müller-Fauré and van Riet , paragraph 42).

42. Since the requirement of medical necessity is in practice satisfied only where adequate treatment cannot be obtained without undue delay from a contracted doctor or hospital in the Member State in which the person is insured, this requirement by its very nature is liable severely to limit the circumstances in which such authorisation will be issued (Smits and Peerbooms , paragraph 64).

51. As regards the second condition set out in Article 230 EC, it should be borne in mind that the fact that a disputed provision is, by its nature and scope, a provision of general application inasmuch as it applies to the traders concerned in general, does not of itself prevent it being of individual concern to some ( Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission , paragraph 58 and the case‑law cited).

27 Furthermore, the rules of jurisdiction which derogate from the general principle on jurisdiction, such as the rules featuring in Articles 13 and 14, cannot give rise to an interpretation going beyond the cases envisaged by the Convention (see Bertrand, paragraph 17, Shearson Lehman Hutton, paragraphs 14, 15 and 16, and Benincasa, paragraphs 13 and 14, all cited above).

15 It is only by way of derogation from that general principle that the Convention provides for the cases, exhaustively listed in Sections 2 to 6 of Title II, in which a defendant domiciled or established in a Contracting State may, where the situation comes under a rule of special jurisdiction, or must, where the situation comes under a rule of exclusive jurisdiction or of prorogation of jurisdiction, be sued in the courts of another Contracting State.

14 It must be observed at the outset that only intervention undertaken in accordance with the Community rules in the framework of the common organisation of agricultural markets is to be financed by the EAGGF (see Case C-247/98 Greece v Commission [2001] ECR I-1, paragraph 7, and Case C-278/98 Netherlands v Commission [2001] ECR I-1501, paragraph 38).

35. According to settled case-law, the choice of the legal basis for a European Union measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include in particular the aim and content of the measure (judgments in Commission v Council , C‑338/01, EU:C:2004:253, paragraph 54 and case-law cited, and Parliament v Council , C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 42).

42. According to settled case-law, the choice of the legal basis for a Community measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include the aim and content of that measure (see, in particular, Parliament v Council , paragraph 34 and case-law cited).

33. However, although it is true that those requirements could constitute an important characteristic of the conditions of eligibility for unemployment benefit (see, to that effect, Case 79/81 Baccini [1982] ECR 1063, paragraphs 15 and 16; Acciardi , cited above, paragraphs 16 and 17; Case C‑25/95 Otte [1996] ECR I‑3745, paragraph 36; and De Cuyper , cited above, paragraph 27), the fact of being dispensed from fulfilling those conditions in a particular case cannot, as such, affect the very nature of the benefit at issue in the main proceedings.

33 Also, the Court has held on several occasions that the place of performance of the obligation in question is to be determined by the law governing that obligation according to the conflict rules of the court seised (Case 12/76 Tessili v Dunlop [1976] ECR 1473, paragraph 13, Case C-288/92 Custom Made Commercial v Stawa Metallbau [1994] ECR I-2913, paragraph 26, and Case C-440/97 Groupe Concorde and Others v The Master of the Vessel Suhadiwarno Panjan and Others [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 32).

13 THIS FREEDOM OF CHOICE WAS INTRODUCED IN VIEW OF THE EXISTENCE IN CERTAIN WELL-DEFINED CASES OF A PARTICULARLY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A DISPUTE AND THE COURT WHICH MAY BE MOST CONVENIENTLY CALLED UPON TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE MATTER . THUS IN THE CASE OF AN ACTION RELATING TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS ARTICLE 5 ( 1 ) ALLOWS A PLAINTIFF TO BRING THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT FOR THE PLACE ' OF PERFORMANCE ' OF THE OBLIGATION IN QUESTION . IT IS FOR THE COURT BEFORE WHICH THE MATTER IS BROUGHT TO ESTABLISH UNDER THE CONVENTION WHETHER THE PLACE OF PERFORMANCE IS SITUATE WITHIN ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION . FOR THIS PURPOSE IT MUST DETERMINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OWN RULES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS WHAT IS THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP IN QUESTION AND DEFINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT LAW THE PLACE OF PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION IN QUESTION .

28. According to settled case-law, it is for the Court alone, where questions are formulated imprecisely, to extract from all the information provided by the national court or tribunal and from the documents in the main proceedings the points of European Union law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject-matter of those proceedings (Joined Cases C‑436/08 and C‑437/08 Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

19. In particular, as regards the principle of proportionality, the Court has already held that, in accordance with that principle, the Member States must employ means which, whilst enabling them effectively to attain the objectives pursued by their domestic laws, cause the least possible detriment to the objectives and principles laid down by the relevant Community legislation (see Molenheide and Others , paragraph 46, and Case C‑409/04 Teleos and Others [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 52).

52. Secondly, as regards the principle of proportionality, it must be recalled that the Court held, in paragraph 46 of its judgment in Molenheide and Others , that, in accordance with that principle, the Member States must employ means which, whilst enabling them effectively to attain the objectives pursued by their domestic laws, cause the least possible detriment to the objectives and principles laid down by the relevant Community legislation.

73. The Court has also had occasion to explain that, construed in the light of that case-law and of the explanations relating to Article 51 of the Charter, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must be respected where national legislation falls within the scope of EU law. In other words, the applicability of EU law entails the applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter (see, to that effect, Åkerberg Fransson , paragraphs 20 and 21).

27. It is on the basis of those principles that the Court has ruled that the national court’s power to determine of its own motion whether a term is unfair constitutes a means both of achieving the result sought by Article 6 of the Directive, namely preventing an individual consumer from being bound by an unfair term, and of contributing to achieving the aim of Article 7, since if the court undertakes such an examination, that may act as a deterrent and contribute to preventing unfair terms in contracts concluded between consumers and sellers or suppliers ( Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores , paragraph 28, and Case C-473/00 Cofidis [2002] ECR I-10875, paragraph 32).

32 It must be noted that the Court ruled in paragraph 28 of Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores that the court's power to determine of its own motion whether a term is unfair constitutes a means both of achieving the result sought by Article 6 of the Directive, namely preventing an individual consumer from being bound by an unfair term, and of contributing to achieving the aim of Article 7, since if the court undertakes such an examination, that may act as a deterrent and contribute to preventing unfair terms in contracts concluded between consumers and sellers or suppliers.

12 In those judgments, the Court added that illegal imports or supplies of such goods, whose release into the economic and commercial channels of the Community was by definition absolutely precluded and which could give rise only to penalties under the criminal law, were wholly alien to the provisions of the Sixth Directive (see the judgments in Case 294/82, cited above, at paragraphs 19 and 20, in Cases 269/86 and 289/86, cited above, at paragraphs 15 and 17 in each case, and in Case C-343/89, cited above, at paragraph 19). Those judgments therefore concern products which, because of their special characteristics, may not be marketed or incorporated into economic channels.

20 However, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (judgment of 19 January 2017, Commission v Total and Elf Aquitaine, C‑351/15 P, EU:C:2017:27, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

31 However, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (judgments of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 51, and of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 47).

88. Measures which restrict a fundamental freedom, such as that provided for in Article 21 TFEU, may, however, be justified by objective considerations only if they are necessary for the protection of the interests which they are intended to secure and only in so far as those objectives cannot be attained by less restrictive measures (see Sayn-Wittgenstein , paragraph 90 and the case-law cited).

39. In that connection, it must be recalled that the protection of the rights of the child is recognised by various international instruments which the Member States have cooperated on or acceded to, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1989 and entered into force on 2 September 1990. The Court has already had occasion to point out that those international instruments are among those concerning the protection of human rights of which it takes account in applying the general principles of Community law (see, inter alia, Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769, paragraph 37).

37. The Court has already had occasion to point out that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is one of the international instruments for the protection of human rights of which it takes account in applying the general principles of Community law (see, inter alia, Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283, paragraph 31; Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Dzodzi [1990] ECR I‑3763, paragraph 68; and Case C-249/96 Grant [1998] ECR I-621, paragraph 44). That is also true of the Convention on the Rights of the Child referred to above which, like the Covenant, binds each of the Member States.

50 In that regard, it should also be recalled that the validity of an EU measure must be assessed on the basis of the facts and the law as they stood at the time when that measure was adopted and cannot therefore depend on retrospective assessments of its efficacy. Where the EU legislature is obliged to assess the future effects of rules to be adopted and those effects cannot be accurately foreseen, its assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available to it at the time of the adoption of the rules in question (see, inter alia, judgment of 17 October 2013, Schaible, C‑101/12, EU:C:2013:661, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

39. According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 TFEU is infringed where the tax charged on the imported product and that charged on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product (Case C‑393/98 Gomes Valente [2001] ECR I‑1327, paragraph 21; Case C‑387/01 Weigel [2004] ECR I‑4981, paragraph 67; Brzeziński , paragraph 29; and Case C‑74/06 Commission v Greece [2007] ECR I‑7585, paragraph 25). In that respect, it must be borne in mind that, in order to apply Article 110 TFEU, not only the rate of direct or indirect internal taxation on domestic and imported products but also the basis of assessment for levying that tax must be taken into consideration (see Case 74/76 Iannelli & Volpi [1977] ECR 557, paragraph 21, and Commission v Denmark , paragraph 18).

25. It is settled case-law that the first paragraph of Article 90 EC is infringed where the taxation on the imported product and that on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, even if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product (see, inter alia, Commission v Greece , paragraph 20, and the case-law cited there; Case C‑393/98 Gomes Valente [2001] ECR I‑1327, paragraph 21; and Case C‑101/00 Tulliasiamies and Siilin [2002] ECR I‑7487, paragraph 53).

71. The Court has, however, made it clear that the transactions covered by the exemption of management of special investment funds are those which are specific to the business of undertakings for collective investment (judgments in Abbey National , C‑169/04, EU:C:2006:289, paragraph 63; Deutsche Bank , C‑44/11, EU:C:2012:484, paragraph 31; and ATP PensionService , C‑464/12, EU:C:2014:139, paragraph 65). In particular, it has found that management services provided by a third-party manager must, viewed broadly, form a distinct whole and be specific to, and essential for, the management of special investment funds (judgment in ATP PensionService , C‑464/12, EU:C:2014:139, paragraph 65).

23 It should also be noted that, in accordance with Article 29 of the Customs Code, the customs value of imported goods is, in principle, to be made up of their transaction value, Article 29(1)(d) and (2) have the objective of ensuring that the customs value reflects the real economic value of imported goods and is not determined arbitrarily or fictitiously (see, to that effect, judgments in Mitsui & Co. Deutschland, C‑256/07, EU:C:2009:167, paragraph 20, and Christodoulou and Others, C‑116/12, EU:C:2013:825, paragraphs 39 and 40). To that end, customs authorities are entitled to examine the price indicated by the person making the declaration and to reject it if they consider that the latter has been influenced by the relationships which exist between the parties to the transaction (judgment in Carboni e derivati, C‑263/06, EU:C:2008:128, paragraph 37).

20. In order to answer those questions, it should first be pointed out that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, the objective of the Community legislation on customs valuation is to introduce a fair, uniform and neutral system excluding the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values (Case C-11/89 Unifert [1990] ECR I-2275, paragraph 35, and Case C-15/99 Sommer [2000] ECR I-8989, paragraph 25). The customs value must thus reflect the real economic value of an imported good and take into account all of the elements of that good that have economic value (see Case C‑306/04 Compaq Computer International Corporation [2006] ECR I‑10991, paragraph 30).

14 It is settled case-law that in order to determine whether a body making a reference for a preliminary ruling is a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 177 of the Treaty, which is a question governed by Community law alone, the Court will take account of a number of factors, such as whether the referring body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see Case 61/65 Vaassen (née Göbbels) [1966] ECR 261, at 272 and 273, and Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I-4961, paragraph 23).

35. Hence, in the absence of harmonisation of national legislation, obstacles to the free movement of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods constitute measures of equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions even if those rules apply to all products alike (see, to that effect, ‘ Cassis de Dijon ’, paragraphs 6, 14 and 15; Case C‑368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689, paragraph 8; and Case C‑322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband [2003] ECR I-14887, paragraph 67).

15CONSEQUENTLY , THE FIRST QUESTION SHOULD BE ANSWERED TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CONCEPT OF ' ' MEASURES HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS ' ' CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 30 OF THE TREATY IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN THAT THE FIXING OF A MINIMUM ALCOHOL CONTENT FOR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES INTENDED FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION BY THE LEGISLATION OF A MEMBER STATE ALSO FALLS WITHIN THE PROHIBITION LAID DOWN IN THAT PROVISION WHERE THE IMPORTATION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES LAWFULLY PRODUCED AND MARKETED IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE IS CONCERNED .

28 However, that jurisdiction to interpret the EEA Agreement under Article 177 of the Treaty applies solely with regard to the Community; the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of that agreement as regards its application in the EFTA States.

40. As regards the question how to determine whether a mark has acquired a distinctive character through use, it is settled case-law that the competent authority for registering trade marks must carry out an examination by reference to the actual situation ( Libertel EU:C:2003:244, paragraph 77, and Case C‑404/02 Nichols EU:C:2004:538, paragraph 27) and make an overall assessment of the evidence that the mark has come to identify the goods or services concerned as originating from a particular undertaking ( Windsurfing Chiemsee EU:C:1999:230, paragraph 49, and Nestlé EU:C:2005:432, paragraph 31). Moreover, that evidence must relate to use of the mark as a trade mark, that is to say for the purposes of such identification by the relevant class of persons ( Philips EU:C:2002:377, paragraph 64, and Nestlé EU:C:2005:432, paragraphs 26 and 29).

29. The expression ‘use of the mark as a trade mark’ must therefore be understood as referring solely to use of the mark for the purposes of the identification, by the relevant class of persons, of the product or service as originating from a given undertaking.

39. The prohibition on measures having equivalent effect to restrictions set out in Article 30 of the Treaty covers all commercial rules enacted by the Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade (see, in particular, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5; Commission v Denmark , paragraph 39; and Commission v France , paragraph 22).

57. Second, it is apparent from paragraph 29 of the judgment in France v Parliament that the seat of the Parliament is the place where ‘12 ordinary plenary part-sessions’ of that institution must take place on a regular basis, and that those 12 part-sessions must be distinguished from the ‘additional plenary part-sessions’ which cannot be scheduled unless the Parliament actually holds the 12 ordinary plenary part-sessions.

29 The Edinburgh Decision must thus be interpreted as defining the seat of the Parliament as the place where 12 ordinary plenary part-sessions must take place on a regular basis, including those during which the Parliament is to exercise the budgetary powers conferred upon it by the Treaty. Additional plenary part-sessions cannot therefore be scheduled for any other place of work unless the Parliament holds the 12 ordinary plenary part-sessions in Strasbourg, where it has its seat.

30 To that end, Article 3(1) of that regulation lays down an obligation, for any natural person entering or leaving the European Union and carrying an amount of cash equal to or more than EUR 10000, to declare that amount (see judgment of 16 July 2015, Chmielewski, C‑255/14, EU:C:2015:475, paragraph 19).

33. The term ‘discard’ must be interpreted in the light not only of the fundamental aim of the directive, which, according to the third recital in the preamble thereto, is ‘the protection of human health and the environment against harmful effects caused by the collection, transport, treatment, storage and tipping of waste’, but also of Article 174(2) EC. The latter provision states that ‘Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken …’. It follows that the term ‘discard’ – and, accordingly, the concept of ‘waste’, within the meaning of Article 1(a) of the directive – cannot be interpreted restrictively (see, to that effect, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑418/97 and C‑419/97 ARCO Chemie Nederland and Others [2000] ECR I‑4475, paragraphs 36 to 40, and Thames Water Utilities , paragraph 27).

40 It follows that the concept of waste cannot be interpreted restrictively.

18. Furthermore, it must be stated that the Court, in its case-law concerning the assess ment of the question whether proceedings derive directly from insolvency proceedings or are closely connected with them, has taken into account, first, the fact that the various types of actions which it heard were brought in connection with insolvency proceedings. Secondly, the Court concerned itself above all with determining on each occasion whether the action at issue derived from insolvency law or from other rules (see, to that effect, judgment in Nickel & Goeldner Spedition , C‑157/13, EU:C:2014:2145, paragraph 26).

42. However, in order for an argument founded on such a justification to succeed, it is necessary, in accordance with settled case-law, that the existence of a direct link be established between the tax advantage concerned and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy ( Manninen , paragraph 42, and Keller Holding , paragraph 40), the direct nature of that link falling to be examined in the light of the objective pursued by the rules in question ( Manninen , paragraph 43; Case C‑293/06 Deutsche Shell [2008] ECR I-1129, paragraph 39; and Papillon , paragraph 44).

40. In that respect, it should be pointed out that, in paragraphs 28 and 21 respectively of the judgments in Bachmann and Commission v Belgium , the Court recognised that the need to maintain the cohesion of a tax system can justify a restriction on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. However, for an argument based on such a justification to succeed, a direct link must be established between the tax advantage concerned and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy (see, to that effect, Case C‑484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson [1995] ECR I-3955, paragraph 18; ICI , paragraph 29; and Manninen , paragraph 42).

94 It follows that the competent national authorities, when they receive a request for development consent for a project relating to Annex II to that directive, must carry out a specific evaluation as to whether, taking account of the criteria set out in Annex III to that directive, an environmental impact assessment should be carried out (judgment in Marktgemeinde Straßwalchen and Others, C‑531/13, EU:C:2015:79, paragraph 42).

42. Indeed neither Article 1 of the First Directive, Article 3(1) of that directive nor any other provision of that directive or of the other directives relating to compulsory insurance refer to the law of the Member States as regards that concept. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of European Union law and the principle of equality require the terms of a provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope normally to be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union; that interpretation must take into account not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, Omejc , C‑536/09, EU:C:2011:398, paragraphs 19 and 21 and the case-law cited).

21. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case‑law, in interpreting a provision of European Union law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Case 292/82 Merck [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12; Case C‑34/05 Schouten [2007] ECR I‑1687, paragraph 25; and Case C‑116/10 Felgen and Bacino Charter Company [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 12).

31. A transmission made by a professional, in the circumstances set out in the paragraph above, is not just a technical means of ensuring or improving reception of the original broadcast in its catchment area (see, by analogy, judgment in Airfield and Canal Digitaal , C‑431/09 and C‑432/09, EU:C:2011:648, paragraph 79).

56. In that regard, the longer limitation periods which Member States retain the possibility of applying under Article 3(3) of Regulation No 2988/95 may result from general provisions of law predating the adoption of that regulation, so that Member States can apply such longer periods by means of application determined by case-law of a provision of general purport laying down a limitation period of more than four years to the recovery of wrongly received advantages (judgment in Ze Fu Fleischhandel and Vion Trading , EU:C:2011:282, paragraph 29).

29. In replying to the third question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Bundesfinanzhof in Joined Cases C-278/07 to C-280/07 that the longer limitation periods which Member States retain the possibility of applying under Article 3(3) of Regulation No 2988/95 may result from general provisions of law predating the adoption of that regulation, the Court implicitly but necessarily confirmed to the Bundesfinanzhof that Member States can apply such longer periods by means of application determined by case-law of a provision of general purport laying down a limitation period of more than four years to the recovery of wrongly received advantages, a practice which the German courts refer to as application ‘by analogy’.

36. Under that system of supervision, the Commission and the national courts have different powers and responsibilities (judgment in Namur-Les assurances du crédit , C‑44/93, EU:C:1994:311, paragraph 14).

33. As the Court has repeatedly held, the concepts used in the Brussels Convention – and in particular those featured in Article 5(1) and (3) and Article 13 – must be interpreted independently, by reference principally to the system and objectives of the Convention, in order to ensure that it is uniformly applied in all the Contracting States (see, in particular, Case 150/77 Bertrand [1978] ECR 1431, paragraphs 14, 15 and 16; Case C-89/91 Shearson Lehman Hutton [1993] ECR I‑139, paragraph 13; Case C-269/95 Benincasa [1997] ECR I-3767, paragraph 12; Case C-99/96 Mietz [1999] ECR I-2277, paragraph 26; and Gabriel , paragraph 37).

12 In this connection, regard should be had to the principle laid down by the case-law (see, in particular, Case 150/77 Bertrand [1978] ECR 1431, paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 19, and Case C-89/91 Shearson Lehman Hutton [1993] ECR I-139, paragraph 13) according to which the concepts used in the Convention, which may have a different content depending on the national law of the Contracting States, must be interpreted independently, by reference principally to the system and objectives of the Convention, in order to ensure that the Convention is uniformly applied in all the Contracting States. This must apply in particular to the concept of `consumer' within the meaning of Article 13 et seq. of the Convention, in so far as it determines the rules governing jurisdiction.

16. Member States must take measures which are sufficiently effective to achieve the aim of the directive and they must ensure that the rights conferred by it can be effectively relied upon before the national courts by the persons concerned (see Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 1891, paragraph 18, and Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 17).

110. It should first be observed that, by claiming that the General Court infringed Article 73 of Regulation No 40/94 in rejecting their plea concerning failure to state sufficient reasons for the contested decisions, Helena Rubinstein and L’Oréal are disputing the General Court’s interpretati on of European Union law or its application of that law. Accordingly, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not in that way base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see, inter alia, Case C‑41/00 P Interporc v Commission [2003] ECR I‑2125, paragraph 17, and Case C‑16/06 P Les Éditions Albert René v OHIM [2008] ECR I‑10053, paragraph 110). The fourth ground of appeal is therefore admissible.

110. Admittedly, provided that an appellant challenges the interpretation or application of Community law by the Court of First Instance, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the Court of First Instance, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see, in particular, Case C-41/00 P Interporc v Commission [2003] ECR I-2125, paragraph 17, and Storck v OHIM , paragraph 48).

24. Under Article 4(1) of the Directive, Member States are to take all necessary measures to ensure that the quality of bathing water conforms to the limit values set in accordance with Article 3 (see Case C-92/96 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-505, paragraph 27; and Case C-307/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-3933, paragraph 48).

45. Having noted that the system resulting from the WTO agreements accorded considerable importance to negotiation between the parties (see judgment in Portugal v Council , EU:C:1999:574, paragraph 36), the Court found that to require courts to refrain from applying rules of domestic law which are inconsistent with the WTO agreements would have the consequence of depriving the legislative or executive organs of the contracting parties of the possibility, afforded in particular by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, which forms Annex 2 to the Agreement establishing the WTO (‘the Dispute Settlement Understanding’), of entering into a negotiated arrangement even on a temporary basis (see judgments in Portugal v Council , EU:C:1999:574, paragraph 40, and Van Parys , EU:C:2005:121, paragraph 48).

36 While it is true that the WTO agreements, as the Portuguese Government observes, differ significantly from the provisions of GATT 1947, in particular by reason of the strengthening of the system of safeguards and the mechanism for resolving disputes, the system resulting from those agreements nevertheless accords considerable importance to negotiation between the parties.

54 As regards CN heading 8543, it is clear from the wording of that heading that it covers ‘electrical machines and apparatus, having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in [Chapter 85 of the CN]’. Thus, the classification of a product under the same heading is feasible only if it is not possible to classify that product under another heading of Chapter 85. It follows from paragraphs 42, 46 and 50 of the present judgment that that is not the case here (see, by analogy, judgment of 25 February 2016, G. E. Security, C‑143/15, EU:C:2016:115, paragraph 71.

44. As regards the arguments put forward by the Kingdom of Belgium as to the absence of any obligation to transpose the provisions of the Directive concerning the requirement to consult with the Member States concerned beforehand in the case of an interconnector, and the requirement to notify exemption decisions to the Commission, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the effect of the third paragraph of Article 249 EC is that Community directives must be implemented by appropriate measures taken by the Member States. The fact that, in specific circumstances, where the implementing measures required have not been adopted or measures have been adopted which are not consistent with a directive, the persons affected thereby are entitled to rely in law on a directive as against a defaulting Member State cannot justify a Member State absolving itself from taking in due time implementing measures sufficient to meet the purpose of each directive (see, to that effect, Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 1473, paragraph 12; Case C-433/93 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I‑2303, paragraph 24; and Case C-253/95 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-2423, paragraph 13). Similarly, and a fortiori, the fact that certain provisions of the Directive in question are directly applicable in the national legal system is not grounds for relieving the Member States of their obligations to transpose Community law.

13 Secondly, the effect of the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty is that Community directives must be implemented by appropriate implementing measures taken by the Member States. Only in specific circumstances, in particular where a Member State has failed to take the implementing measures required or has adopted measures which do not conform to a directive, has the Court recognized the right of persons affected thereby to rely in law on a directive as against a defaulting Member State. This minimum guarantee, arising from the binding nature of the obligation imposed on the Member States by the effect of directives under the third paragraph of Article 189, cannot justify a Member State absolving itself from taking in due time implementing measures sufficient to meet the purpose of each directive (see, in particular, Case C-433/93 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-2303, paragraph 24). The German Government' s argument based on the direct effect of the directive cannot therefore be accepted either.

23. As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that Article 4 of Directive 79/409 lays down a regime which is specifically targeted and reinforced both for the species listed in Annex I and for the migratory species, an approach justified by the fact that they are, respectively, the most endangered species and the species constituting a common heritage of the European Community (Case C‑191/05 Commission v Portugal [2006] ECR I‑6853, paragraph 9, and case-law cited). Furthermore, it is clear from the ninth recital in the preamble to that directive that the preservation, maintenance or restoration of a sufficient diversity and area of habitats is essential to the conservation of all species of birds. The Member States are therefore required to adopt the measures necessary for the conservation of those species.

68. In that regard, the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, laid down in Article 9 of the Association Agreement, and the application of that principle to the specific field of workers, in accordance with Article 10 of Decision No 1/80, contribute to facilitating the progressive integration of migrant Turkish workers and Turkish nationals who move for the purposes of establishment or in order to provide services in a Member State (see, to that effect, with regard to workers, Wählergruppe Gemeinsam , paragraph 78).

78. Consequently, in the light of the principles laid down in connection with the freedom of movement for workers who are nationals of a Member State and applicable by analogy to Turkish workers enjoying the rights conferred by Decision No 1/80, national legislation which makes eligibility for election to a body representing and defending the interests of workers, such as the chambers of workers in Austria, subject to possession of the nationality of the host Member State must be considered to be incompatible with Article 10(1) of that decision.

32. It is, admittedly, true that, according to the Court’s case-law, the movement certificate constitutes documentary evidence of the preferential origin of goods and to allow other means of proof to be adduced in addition to that evidence of origin would adversely affect the unity and security of the application of those free-trade agreements concluded with non-member countries (see, to that effect, Case C‑334/93 Bonapharma [1995] ECR I‑319, paragraph 16). The requirement of valid proof of origin cannot, therefore, be considered to be a mere formality that may be overlooked where the place of origin is established by means of other evidence (see, to that effect, Case C‑386/08 Brita [2010] ECR I‑1289, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

43 It must be recalled that the Treaty provisions concerning freedom of movement for persons do not prevent the adoption of rules or practices excluding foreign players from certain matches for reasons which are not of an economic nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus of sporting interest only, such as, for example, matches between national teams from different countries. The Court stressed, however, that that restriction on the scope of the provisions in question must remain limited to its proper objective and cannot be relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting activity (see Case 13/76 Donà v Mantero [1976] ECR 1333, paragraphs 14 and 15, and Bosman, paragraphs 76 and 127).

14 HOWEVER , THOSE PROVISIONS DO NOT PREVENT THE ADOPTION OF RULES OR OF A PRACTICE EXCLUDING FOREIGN PLAYERS FROM PARTICIPATION IN CERTAIN MATCHES FOR REASONS WHICH ARE NOT OF AN ECONOMIC NATURE , WHICH RELATE TO THE PARTICULAR NATURE AND CONTEXT OF SUCH MATCHES AND ARE THUS OF SPORTING INTEREST ONLY , SUCH AS , FOR EXAMPLE , MATCHES BETWEEN NATIONAL TEAMS FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES .

86. Such a claim must, in any event be dismissed. It should be pointed out that the use of that form A/B is mandatory and is an essential prior condition for the validity of the notification (see Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck and Others v Commission [1980] ECR 3125, paragraphs 61 and 62).

15 As the Court held in the judgment in Case 189/87 Kalfelis v Schroeder [1988] ECR 5565, paragraphs 15 and 16, the concept of "matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict" serves as a criterion for defining the scope of one of the rules concerning the special jurisdictions available to the plaintiff. Regard being had to the objectives and general scheme of the Convention, it is important that, in order to ensure as far as possible the equality and uniformity of the rights and obligations arising out of the Convention for the Contracting States and the persons concerned, that concept should not be interpreted as a simple reference to the national law of one or other of the States concerned. Accordingly, the concept of "matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict" must be regarded as an independent concept which is to be interpreted, for the application of the Convention, principally by reference to the scheme and objectives of the Convention in order to ensure that the latter is given full effect.

16 Accordingly, the concept of matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict must be regarded as an autonomous concept which is to be interpreted, for the application of the Convention, principally by reference to the scheme and objectives of the Convention in order to ensure that the latter is given full effect .

35. However, if the imposition of such compensatory measures is not provided for by the national legislation in force, it is apparent from the case‑law that a Member State which has failed to fulfil its obligation to transpose the provisions of a directive into national law can no more rely, as against Community citizens, upon the limitations laid down by those provisions than it can require that they perform the obligations laid down by that directive (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑6/90 and C‑9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 21, and Beuttenmüller , paragraph 63).

78. It should be remembered at this point that while, in proceedings under Article 226 EC for failure to fulfil obligations it is for the Commission to prove the existence of the alleged infringement and to place before the Court the information necessary for it to determine whether the infringement is made out, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumption (see, to this effect, inter alia Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland [2005] ECR I-3331, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited, and Case C-441/02 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I‑3449, paragraph 48), the Member States are required, under Article 10 EC, to facilitate the achievement of the Commission’s tasks (see, inter alia, Case C‑494/01 Commission v Ireland , paragraph 42). It follows in particular that, where the Commission has adduced sufficient evidence of certain matters in the territory of the defendant Member State, it is incumbent on the latter to challenge in substance and in detail the information produced and the consequences flowing therefrom (Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland , paragraph 44).

42. However, the Member States are required, under Article 10 EC, to facilitate the achievement of the Commission’s tasks, which consist in particular, pursuant to Article 211 EC, in ensuring that the provisions of the Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied (Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 7, and Case C-408/97 Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 16).

58. Secondly, for the same reasons, paragraphs 125 to 128 of the judgment in Diputación Foral de Vizcaya and Others v Commission (C‑465/09 P to C‑470/09 P, EU:C:2011:372) do not in any way support the Commission’s view that the aid at issue in the present case had to be assessed in the light of Regulation No 1370/2007 alone.

28. According to settled case-law, the mere acquisition, holding and sale of shares do not, in themselves, constitute economic activities within the meaning of the Sixth Directive (see, inter alia, Case C‑77/01 EDM [2004] ECR I‑4295, paragraph 59, and Case C‑435/05 Investrand [2007] ECR I‑1315, paragraph 25 and the case-law there cited). Those transactions cannot amount to exploitation of an asset intended to produce revenue on a continuing basis, as the only consideration for those transactions consists of a possible profit on the sale of those shares (see, to that effect, EDM , paragraph 58).

58. Likewise, the simple acquisition and the mere sale of other negotiable securities cannot amount to exploitation of an asset intended to produce revenue on a continuing basis, the only consideration for those transactions consisting of a possible profit on the sale of those securities.

166 Furthermore, the Court has held that, where a Member State has levied taxes in breach of the rules of EU law, individuals are entitled to reimbursement not only of the tax unduly levied but also of the amounts paid to that State or retained by it which relate directly to that tax (see judgment of x15 September 2011, Nicula, C‑331/13, EU:C:2014:2285, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

45. In that regard, the Court has already held that the protection of fundamental rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty, such as the free movement of goods (see Case C‑112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I‑5659, paragraph 74) or freedom to provide services (see Case C‑36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I‑9609, paragraph 35).

35. Since both the Community and its Member States are required to respect fundamental rights, the protection of those rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as the freedom to provide services (see, in relation to the free movement of goods, Schmidberger , paragraph 74).

63 As previously noted in paragraph 51 of this judgment, it is settled case-law that compensation for the loss suffered is intended so far as possible to provide restitution for the victim of the unlawful conduct of the Community institutions (Grifoni v EAEC, cited above, paragraph 40). In order to restore victims to the situation in which they would have found themselves if the harmful act had not been perpetrated, it is primarily the damage actually suffered which must be made good. Thus, loss of earnings must be assessed, so far as possible, on the basis of the individual data and figures reflecting the actual situation of each applicant and of his farm.

53 That definition of the term `onset of the employer's insolvency' cannot, however, preclude the option available to the Member States, acknowledged in Article 9 of the Directive, of applying or introducing provisions that are more favourable to employees, in particular for the purpose of including unpaid remuneration during a period subsequent to the lodging of a request that proceedings to satisfy collectively the claims of creditors be opened (see also the judgment of today's date in Joined Cases C-94/95 and C-95/95 Bonifaci and Others and Berto and Others, cited above, at paragraphs 36 to 43).

38 In the event, the Italian State opted for the date of the onset of the employer's insolvency referred to in Article 3(2), first indent, and Article 4(2), first indent, and extended the reference period from six to twelve months.

33. According to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling from a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑222/05 to C‑225/05 van der Weerd and Others [2007] ECR I‑4233, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

42 It follows that any distribution agreement containing such typical elements may be classified as a ‘contract for the provision of services’ for the purpose of applying the rule of jurisdiction in the second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation (judgment of 19 December 2013 in Corman-Collins, C‑9/12, EU:C:2013:860, paragraph 41).

41. Il s’ensuit qu’un contrat de concession comportant les obligations typiques précisées aux points 27 et 28 du présent arrêt peut être qualifié de contrat de fourniture de services aux fins de l’application de la règle de compétence figurant à l’article 5, point 1, sous b), second tiret, du règlement.

24. S’agissant des taxes frappant les véhicules automobiles, il est constant que les véhicules présents sur le marché dans un État membre sont des «produits nationaux» de celui-ci, au sens de l’article 110 TFUE. Lorsque ces produits sont mis en vente sur le marché des véhicules d’occasion de cet État membre, ils doivent être considérés comme des «produits similaires» aux véhicules d’occasion importés de même type, de mêmes caractéristiques et de même usure. En effet, les véhicules d’occasion achetés sur le marché dudit État membre et ceux achetés, aux fins de l’importation et de la mise en circulation dans celui-ci, dans d’autres États membres, constituent des produits concurrents (arrêt Tatu, précité, point 55 et jurisprudence citée).

71. It should be noted in that regard that the right to a refund of charges levied in a Member State in breach of rules of EU law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by provisions of EU law as interpreted by the Court (see, inter alia, Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, paragraph 12, and Joined Cases C‑397/98 and C‑410/98 Metallgesellschaft and Others [2001] ECR I‑1727, paragraph 84). The Member State is therefore required in principle to repay charges levied in breach of EU law (Joined Cases C-192/95 to C-218/95 Comateb and Others [1997] ECR I-165, paragraph 20; Metallgesellschaft and Others , paragraph 84; Case C‑147/01 Weber’s Wine World and Others [2003] ECR I‑11365, paragraph 93; and Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraph 202).

84 According to well-established case-law, the right to a refund of charges levied in a Member State in breach of rules of Community law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by Community provisions as interpreted by the Court (judgments in Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, paragraph 12; Case 309/85 Barra [1988] ECR 355, paragraph 17; Case C-62/93 BP Supergas [1995] ECR I-1883, paragraph 40; Case C-343/96 Dilexport [1999] ECR I-579, paragraph 23; and judgment of 21 September 2000 in Joined Cases C-441/98 and C-442/98 Michailidis [2000] ECR I-7145, paragraph 30). The Member State is therefore required in principle to repay charges levied in breach of Community law (Joined Cases C-192/95 to C-218/95 Comateb and Others [1997] ECR I-165, paragraph 20, Dilexport, cited above, paragraph 23, and Michailidis, cited above, paragraph 30).

52. That conclusion is not undermined by Coname . Admittedly, the Court considered in that judgment that a 0.97% interest is so small as to preclude a municipality from exercising control over the concessionaire managing a public service (see Coname , paragraph 24). However, in that passage of the judgment, the Court was not concerned with the question whether such control could be exercised jointly.

59. It must be observed, as a preliminary point, that the only permitted exceptions to the application of the Directive are those which are expressly mentioned in it (see, by analogy, Case C-107/98 Teckal [1999] ECR I-8121, paragraph 43, and Case C‑340/04 Carbotermo and Consorzio Alisei [2006] ECR I-4137, paragraph 45).

45. Moreover, as the Court stated in paragraph 43 of Teckal , the only permitted exceptions to the application of Directive 93/36 are those which are exhaustively and expressly mentioned therein.

23. However, the effect on trade within the Union of the other provisions of the domestic legislation, which are separable from the operation of the monopoly although they have a bearing upon it, must be examined in the light of Article 34 TFEU (see, inter alia, Franzén , paragraph 36, and Rosengren and Others , paragraph 18).

37. It follows that the Finnish tax legislation makes the grant of the tax credit subject to the condition that the dividends be distributed by companies established in Finland, while shareholders fully taxable in Finland find themselves in a comparable situation, whether they receive dividends from companies established in that Member State or from companies established in other Member States (see, to that effect, Case C-107/94 Asscher [1996] ECR I‑3089, paragraphs 41 to 49, and Case C-234/01 Gerritse [2003] ECR I-5933, paragraphs 47 to 54).

49. It should be noted that, where it is nevertheless established that a partially taxable person has received the greater part of his income in Germany, by fulfilling one of the two conditions mentioned in paragraph 7 of this judgment, the national provision at issue in the main proceedings assesses him to tax in precisely the same way as a wholly taxable person, by applying to the income of the taxpayer concerned a progressive table including a tax-free allowance.

7 IN DECIDING THIS QUESTION IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT, AS A DEROGATION FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE THAT WORKERS IN THE COMMUNITY SHOULD ENJOY FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND NOT SUFFER DISCRIMINATION, ARTICLE 48 ( 4 ) MUST BE CONSTRUED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO LIMIT ITS SCOPE TO WHAT IS STRICTLY NECESSARY FOR SAFEGUARDING THE INTERESTS WHICH THAT PROVISION ALLOWS THE MEMBER STATES TO PROTECT .

25. However, as the Court has already held on several occasions, the first paragraph of Article 4 of Directive 75/442 does not specify the actual content of the measures which are to be taken to ensure that waste is recovered or disposed of without endangering human health and without using processes or methods which could harm the environment, but is binding on the Member States as to the objective to be achieved, whilst leaving to the Member States a margin of discretion in assessing the need for such measures (see, inter alia, Case C‑365/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I‑7773, paragraph 67; Case C‑420/02 Commission v Greece [2004] ECR I‑11175, paragraph 21; and Case C‑135/05 Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I‑3475, paragraph 37).

21. It should be noted at the outset that whilst the first subparagraph of Article 4 of the directive does not specify the actual content of the measures which must be taken in order to ensure that waste is disposed of without endangering human health and without harming the environment, it is none the less true that it is binding on the Member States as to the objective to be achieved, whilst leaving to the Member States a margin of discretion in assessing the need for such measures (Case C‑365/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-7773, paragraph 67).

25 Lastly, it is for the national court to make the necessary factual appraisal, in the light of the criteria for interpretation specified by the Court, in order to establish whether or not there is a transfer in the sense indicated (judgment in Spijkers, cited above, paragraph 14).

40 It should be specified in this connection that, unlike in Case C-15/90 Middleburgh [1991] ECR I-4655, paragraphs 14 and 15, the rules which, as regards freedom of establishment, are essential for the purpose, in particular of ensuring that benefits are in fact used for the upkeep of dependent children and avoiding overlapping payments, have been adopted by the Community legislator as regards the periods in question. In cases such as those before the national court, therefore, the national authorities must apply by analogy such of those rules as are applicable to self-employed persons coming within the scope of Regulation No 1408/71.

14 Secondly, it must be noted that at the material time the Community legislature had not yet adopted the necessary measures, in the area of freedom of establishment, to ensure the payment of child benefits to persons residing in the territory of the Member States. Such measures, which were essential, especially in order to ensure that benefits are in fact used for the upkeep of dependent children and to avoid overlapping payments, were subsequently adopted by Council Regulation (EEC) No 3427/89 of 30 October 1989 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation No 1408/71 (Official Journal 1989 L 331, p. 1), which brought self-employed persons within the scope of application of Article 73 of Regulation No 1408/71.

45 In that regard, in so far as the requests for a preliminary ruling concern the compatibility of the requirements in question with the provisions of the TFEU on freedom to provide services, it should be observed that they are not applicable in a situation all the elements of which are confined within a single Member State (see, to that effect, order of 12 May 2016, Security Service and Others, C‑692/15 to C‑694/15, EU:C:2016:344, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited, and judgment of 15 November 2016, Ullens de Schooten, C‑268/15, EU:C:2016:874, paragraph 47).

31 It should be noted that, according to consistent case-law (see in particular the judgment in Case 323/88 SA Sermes v Directeur des Services des Douanes de Strasbourg [1990] ECR I-3027), the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must disclose clearly and unequivocally the reasoning followed by the adopting body in such a way as to allow the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and thus enable them to defend their rights, and to enable the Court to exercise its review. It cannot, however, be required that the statement should go into all the relevant factual and legal points. The question whether the statement of grounds for a decision meets those requirements must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to the context of the decision and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, in this regard, the judgment in Case 185/83 University of Groningen v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Groningen [1984] ECR 3623, paragraph 38).

38 ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT THE COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT THE STATEMENT OF GROUNDS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 190 OF THE TREATY MUST DISCLOSE IN A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL FASHION THE REASONING FOLLOWED BY THE COMMUNITY AUTHORITY WHICH ADOPTED THE MEASURE IN QUESTION IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAKE THE PERSONS CONCERNED AWARE OF THE REASONS FOR THE MEASURE AND THUS ENABLE THEM TO DEFEND THEIR RIGHTS , AND TO ENABLE THE COURT TO EXERCISE ITS SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION , THE AUTHORITY IS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE DETAILS OF ALL RELEVANT FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS . THE QUESTION WHETHER THE STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS FOR A DECISION MEETS THOSE REQUIREMENTS MUST BE ASSESSED WITH REGARD NOT ONLY TO ITS WORDING BUT ALSO TO ITS CONTEXT AND TO ALL THE LEGAL RULES GOVERNING THE MATTER IN QUESTION .

18. In that regard, according to settled case‑law, the reference date for assessing whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations under Article 228 EC is the date of expiry of the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion issued under that provision (see Case C‑304/02 Commission v France [2005] ECR I‑6263, paragraph 30; Case C‑119/04 Commission v Italy [2006] ECR I‑6885, paragraph 27; and Case C‑503/04 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 19).

15 As the Court has frequently held, any pecuniary charge, however small and whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on domestic or foreign goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense, constitutes a charge having equivalent effect within the meaning of Articles 9, 12 and 16 of the Treaty, even if it is not imposed for the benefit of the State (see Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v Brachfeld, paragraph 18; Case 158/82 Commission v Denmark [1983] ECR 3573, paragraph 18; Case C-426/92 Germany v Deutsches Milch-Kontor [1994] ECR I-2757, paragraph 50; and Case C-347/95 Fazenda Pública v Ucal [1997] ECR I-4911, paragraph 18).

18 THE COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT ANY PECUNIARY CHARGE , WHATEVER ITS DESIGNATION OR MODE OF APPLICATION , WHICH IS IMPOSED UNILATERALLY ON GOODS BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT THEY CROSS A FRONTIER , AND WHICH IS NOT A CUSTOMS DUTY IN THE STRICT SENSE , CONSTITUTES A CHARGE HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO A CUSTOMS DUTY WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLES 9 , 12 , 13 AND 16 OF THE TREATY , EVEN IF IT IS NOT IMPOSED ON BEHALF OF THE STATE .

28. Article 4 of the Sixth Directive gives a very wide scope to VAT (see Case 235/85 Commission v Netherlands [1987] ECR 1471, paragraph 7, and Case C‑186/89 van Tiem [1990] ECR I-4363, paragraph 17).

38 It should be observed that the fact that the appellant in the main proceedings is a Greek national has no bearing on the application of the principle of freedom of movement for workers laid down by Article 48 of the Treaty. Any Community national, irrespective of his place of residence and his nationality, who has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers and has been employed in another Member State falls within the scope of that provision (see Case C-419/92 Scholz v Opera Universitaria di Cagliari [1994] ECR I-505, paragraph 9).

9 Any Community national who, irrespective of his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers and who has been employed in another Member State, falls within the scope of the aforesaid provisions.

45 It is true that, as the Court held in Case 244/78 Union Laitière Normande v French Dairy Farmers [1979] ECR 2663, at paragraph 5, the need to afford an interpretation of Community law which is helpful to the national court makes it essential to define the legal context in which the interpretation requested should be placed. From that point of view it may, depending on the circumstances, be an advantage for the facts in the case to be established and for questions of purely national law to be settled at the time the reference is made to the Court of Justice so that it can be in a position to take cognisance of all the factual and legal elements which may be relevant to the interpretation of Community law which it is called upon to give (Joined Cases 36/80 and 71/80 Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association and Others v Ireland and Others [1981] ECR 735, paragraph 6).

40 In that respect, it is important to clarify that the case in the main proceedings can be distinguished from the case that gave rise to the judgment of 14 April 2015, Cachaldora Fernández (C‑527/13, EU:C:2015:215), in which the Court held that the legislation at issue, concerning the determination of the basis for the calculation of a pension for total permanent invalidity, did not involve discrimination within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7. In that judgment, the Court considered, on the one hand, that it did not have irrefutable statistical information regarding the number of part-time workers who had had a gap in their contributions or showing that that group of workers was principally made up of women (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 April 2015, Cachaldora Fernández, C‑527/13, EU:C:2015:215, paragraph 30) and, on the other, that the provision at issue had random effects, since some part-time workers — the group allegedly disadvantaged by the provision — could even benefit from the application of that provision.

30. In that regard, it should be noted that, as is apparent from the order for reference, the national provision at issue is not applicable to all part-time workers, but only to workers who have had a gap in their contributions during the reference period of eight years preceding the date of the event giving rise to the invalidity, when that gap follows a period of part-time work. Accordingly, general statistical data concerning the group of part-time workers, taken as a whole, are not relevant to establish that many more women than men are affected by that provision.

32. Similarly, in areas covered by EU law, the legal rules of the Member States must be worded unequivocally so as to give the persons concerned a clear and precise understanding of their rights and obligations and to enable national courts to ensure that those rights and obligations are observed (see judgment in Commission v Italy , 257/86, EU:C:1988:324, paragraph 12).

83 Next, it should be emphasised that where, in the case of infringement of the rules on the common organisation of agricultural markets, the Commission applies such a financial correction, it is not required to prove the existence of loss suffered by the EAGGF, but to establish the probability that harm was caused to the Community budget (Case C-232/96 France v Commission [1998] ECR I-5699, paragraph 56).

56 In addition, it indicated how it was possible for the unlawful conduct of the French tenderers to have led to an erroneous assessment of the market by the Community authorities likely to result in the purchase of excessive quantities of beef and veal, possibly at higher prices. In so doing, it established the probability that harm was caused to the Community budget. The Commission cannot be required to do more than that, since it cannot carry out the systematic checks and since analysis of the current state of a given market depends on information gathered by the Member States (see Case C-48/91 Netherlands v Commission, cited above, paragraph 17).

38. The damage would be even more serious if the application of the criteria in question gave the defendant a wide choice, thereby encouraging the practice of forum shopping which the Convention seeks to avoid and which the Court, in its judgment in Kalfelis , specifically sought to prevent (see Kalfelis , paragraph 9).

27. However, in order to provide the referring court with elements of interpretation which may be of use to it, the Court can consider provisions of the European Union legal order which the national court has not referred to in the question submitted for a preliminary ruling (see Case C‑241/99 SARPP [1990] ECR I‑4695, paragraph 8, and Case C‑506/06 Mayr [2008] ECR I‑1017, paragraph 43).

8 By way of a preliminary observation, it should be pointed out that although the Court may not, within the framework of Article 177 of the Treaty, rule on the compatibility of a provision of national law with the Treaty, it may provide the national court with all those elements by way of interpretation of Community law which may enable it to assess that compatibility for the purposes of the case before it . Moreover, in doing so it may deem it necessary to consider provisions of Community law to which the national court has not referred in its question .

52 In the second place, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that Article 101 TFEU does not preclude the Commission, in the exercise of its competence in competition law matters, from finding that there has been an infringement of that article without imposing a fine, although such treatment can be accorded in strictly exceptional situations only, such as where an undertaking’s cooperation has been decisive in detecting and actually suppressing the cartel (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 June 2013, Schenker & Co. and Others, C‑681/11, EU:C:2013:404, paragraphs 48 and 49).

70. Such direct effect of a provision of a directive depends neither on the existence of a deliberate wrongful act or negligence by the member State concerned when transposing the directive at issue into national law, nor on the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of Union law (see, to that effect, Case C‑62/00 Marks & Spencer [2002] ECR I‑6325, paragraphs 25 and 27; Joined Cases C‑397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I‑8835, paragraph 103, and Case C‑309/06 Marks & Spencer , paragraph 36).

103. In that regard, it is clear from the settled case-law of the Court that, whenever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied upon before the national courts by individuals against the State where the latter has failed to implement the directive in domestic law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑6/90 and C‑9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I‑5357, paragraph 11, and Case C‑62/00 Marks & Spencer [2002] ECR I‑6325, paragraph 25).

56 It is clear from the wording of that provision that the acquisition of the rights set out in that provision is subject to three cumulative conditions: the person concerned must be a member of the family of a Turkish worker who is already duly registered as belonging to the labour force of the host Member State; that person has been authorised by the competent authorities of that State to join that worker there, and he has been legally resident in that Member State for three or five years (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 July 2012, Dülger, C‑451/11, EU:C:2012:504, paragraph 29).

22 On the other hand, although it is for the national court alone to rule on the classification of allegedly unfair terms in accordance with the particular circumstances of the case, the fact remains that the Court has jurisdiction to elicit from the provisions of Directive 93/13, in this case Article 3(1) and Article 4(2), the criteria that the national court may or must apply when examining contractual terms with regard to those provisions (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 March 2013, RWE Vertrieb, C‑92/11, EU:C:2013:180, paragraph 48, and 23 April 2015, Van Hove, C‑96/14, EU:C:2015:262, paragraph 28).

48. It must be recalled that ultimately it is not for the Court but for the national court to determine in each particular case whether that is so. The jurisdiction of the Court extends to the interpretation of the provisions of those directives and to the criteria which the national court may or must apply when examining a contractual term in the light of those provisions, bearing in mind that it is for that court to determine, in the light of those criteria, whether a particular contractual term is actually unfair in the circumstances of the case (see Case C‑137/08 VB Pénzügyi Lízing [2010] ECR I‑10847, paragraph 44, and Invitel , paragraph 22).

72 As regards restrictive measures, without going so far as to require a detailed response to the comments made by the person concerned, the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU entails in all circumstances, not least when the reasons stated for the EU measure represent reasons stated by an international body, that that statement of reasons identifies the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities consider that the person concerned must be subject to restrictive measures. The Courts of the European Union must, therefore, in particular determine whether the reasons relied on are sufficiently detailed and specific (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 116 and 118, and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 76).

99. In that regard, according to the settled case-law of the Court, the gravity of infringements of EU competition law must be determined by reference to numerous factors such as, in particular, the specific circumstances and context of the case and the deterrent effect of fines, although no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria to be applied has been drawn up (see, inter alia, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraph 241, and Case C‑534/07 P Prym and Prym Consumer v Commission [2009] ECR I‑7415, paragraph 54).

241. The gravity of the infringements must be assessed in the light of numerous factors, such as the particular circumstances of the case, its context and the dissuasive effect of fines, although no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria to be applied has been drawn up (see, in particular, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission , paragraph 465).

23. Next, concerning products other than those referred to in Article 3(1) of Directive 92/12, in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 3(3), Member States retain the right to introduce or maintain taxes which are levied on those products provided that those taxes do not give rise to border-crossing formalities in trade between Member States (Joined Cases C‑145/06 and C‑146/06 Fendt Italiana [2007] ECR I‑5869, paragraph 44).

47. The differences in treatment authorised by Article 58(1)(a) EC must thus be distinguished from the forms of discrimination prohibited by Article 58(3) EC. The case-law of the Court shows that in order, for national tax legislation such as that at issue here to be capable of being regarded as compatible with the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of capital, the difference in treatment must concern situations which are not objectively comparable or be justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest (Case C‑35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I‑4071, paragraph 43; Case C‑319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477, paragraph 29; Amurta , paragraph 32; and Commission v Italy , paragraph 49).

49. The differences in treatment authorised by Article 58(1)(a) must thus be distinguished from the forms of discrimination prohibited by Article 58(3). The case-law shows that, for national tax legislation such as that at issue here to be capable of being regarded as compatible with the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of capital, the difference in treatment must concern situations which are not objectively comparable or be justified by an overriding reason in the public interest (Case C‑35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I‑4071, paragraph 43; Case C‑319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477, paragraph 29; and Case C‑512/03 Blanckaert [2005] ECR I‑7685, paragraph 42).

32 Indeed, according to established case-law, the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that turnover tax is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see to that effect Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties, cited above, paragraph 13; Case C-453/93 Bulthuis-Griffioen [1995] ECR I-2341, paragraph 19; Case C-346/95 Blasi [1998] ECR I-481, paragraph 18; and Case C-149/97 Institute of the Motor Industry [1998] ECR I-7053, paragraph 17).

61. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the concept of ‘waste’ within the meaning of Directive 75/442 cannot be interpreted restrictively (see ARCO Chemie Nederland and Others , paragraphs 37 to 40, and Palin Granit , paragraph 23). It should also not be understood as excluding substances and objects which are capable of economic reuse. The system of supervision and management established by Directive 75/442 is intended to cover all objects and substances discarded by their holders, even if they have a commercial value and are collected on a commercial basis for recycling, reclamation or reuse (see Palin Granit , paragraph 29).

23 The term `discard' must be interpreted in light of the aim of Directive 75/442 which, according to its third recital, is the protection of human health and the environment against harmful effects caused by the collection, transport, treatment, storage and tipping of waste, and Article 174(2) EC, which provides that Community policy on the environment is to aim at a high level of protection and is to be based, in particular, on the precautionary principle and the principle that preventive action should be taken. It follows that the concept of waste cannot be interpreted restrictively (see Joined Cases C-418/97 and C-419/97 ARCO Chemie Nederland and Others [2000] ECR I-4475, paragraphs 36 to 40).

35. As regards the second condition, it must be pointed out that a national set of rules for the protection of designations, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, even when applied to both domestic products and those imported into the territory of the State concerned, is liable to promote the marketing of products of domestic origin to the detriment of imported products (Joined Cases C‑321/94 to C‑324/94 Pistre and Others EU:C:1997:229, paragraph 45).

62. It is to be noted that the Court has held, in relation to a student who is a citizen of the Union, that entitlement to a non-contributory social benefit, such as the Belgian minimum subsistence allowance (‘minimex’), falls within the scope of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality and that, therefore, Articles 6 and 8 of the Treaty preclude eligibility for that benefit from being subject to conditions which are liable to constitute discrimination on grounds of nationality ( Grzelczyk , paragraph 46).

46 It follows from the foregoing that Articles 6 and 8 of the Treaty preclude entitlement to a non-contributory social benefit, such as the minimex, from being made conditional, in the case of nationals of Member States other than the host State where they are legally resident, on their falling within the scope of Regulation No 1612/68 when no such condition applies to nationals of the host Member State. The second question referred for a preliminary ruling

47. It should be observed in regards to that argument that, unlike workers who have taken parental leave, it is true that workers who have remained in active service have had the opportunity to acquire more experience, which generally enables those workers to perform their duties better (see, to that effect, Case C‑17/05 Cadman [2006] ECR I‑9583, paragraphs 34 and 35). However, the fact of being able to perform one’s duties better is merely a possibility for those workers who have remained in active service, since mere presence at work does not guarantee that a worker’s results will necessarily improve.

18 The Court notes to begin with that Article 5 of the Treaty, referred to in question 1, which provides that Member States must ensure fulfilment of their obligations arising out of the Treaty, is worded so generally that there can be no question of applying it autonomously when the situation concerned is governed by a specific provision of the Treaty (see the judgment in Joined Cases C-78/90 to C-83/90 Compagnie Commerciale de l' Ouest and Others v Receveur Principal des Douanes de La Pallice Port [1992] ECR I-1847, paragraph 19).

19 Similarly, the wording of Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty is so general that there can be no question of applying them independently when the situation concerned is governed by a specific provision of the Treaty, as in the present case. Consequently, the question concerning Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Treaty does not need to be answered. Articles 12 and 13, 30 et seq. and 95 of the Treaty

58. The fact that a substance is the result of a recovery operation within the meaning of Directive 2008/98 is only one of the factors which must be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining whether that substance is still waste, but does not as such permit a definitive conclusion to be drawn in that regard ( ARCO Chemie Nederland and Others , paragraph 97).

46. Furthermore, the concept of ‘worker’ employed by Regulation No 1408/71 includes all persons who are insured, if only against one risk, under compulsory or optional insurance with a general or specific social security scheme mentioned in Article 1(a) of Regulation No 1408/71, irrespective of whether there is an employment relationship (judgments in Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691, paragraph 36, and Kuusijärvi, paragraph 21).

36 So a person has the status of employed person within the meaning of Regulation No 1408/71 where he is covered, even if only in respect of a single risk, compulsorily or on an optional basis, by a general or special social security scheme mentioned in Article 1(a) of Regulation No 1408/71, irrespective of the existence of an employment relationship (see, on this point, Case 182/78 Pierik II [1979] ECR 1977, paragraphs 4 and 7, and Joined Cases 82/86 and 103/86 Laborero and Sabato [1987] ECR 3401, paragraph 17).

51 Given the absence of Community provisions relating to the procedure for recovering undue payments, the recovery of unlawfully paid aid must in principle take place in accordance with the relevant procedural provisions of national law (see Case C-24/95 Alcan Deutschland [1997] ECR I-1591, paragraph 24). The Member State is therefore in the best position to determine the appropriate means for such recovery.

56. According to the general principles on which the Community is based and which govern relations between it and the Member States, it is for the latter, under Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10 EC), to ensure that Community rules are implemented within their territories. In so far as Community law, including its general principles, does not include common rules to that effect then, when the national authorities implement Community rules, they are to act in accordance with the procedural and substantive rules of their own national law (see, in particular, Case C-285/93 Dominikanerinnen-Kloster Altenhohenau [1995] ECR I-4069, paragraph 26, and Karlsson and Others , cited above, paragraph 27).

26 It should, first, be recalled that in Case C-290/91 Peter v Hauptzollamt Regensburg [1993] ECR I-2981, the Court held (at paragraph 8) that "according to the general principles on which the Community is based and which govern the relations between the Community and the Member States, it is for the Member States, by virtue of Article 5 of the Treaty, to ensure that Community regulations are implemented within their territory. In so far as Community law, including its general principles, does not include common rules to this effect, the national authorities when implementing Community regulations act in accordance with the procedural and substantive rules of their own national law; however, these national rules must be reconciled with the need to apply Community law uniformly so as to avoid unequal treatment of producers and traders. Furthermore, such rules must not have the effect of making it virtually impossible to implement Community regulations (see the judgment in Joined Cases 205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche Milch-Kontor v Germany [1983] ECR 2633, at paragraphs 17 and 19).

33 The requirement for national law to be interpreted in conformity with EU law is inherent in the system of the TFEU, since it permits the national court, for the matters within its jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when it determines the dispute before it (judgment of 5 October 2004 in Pfeiffer and Others, C‑397/01 to C‑403/01, EU:C:2004:584, paragraph 114).

66. Although those provisions allow Member States to take certain measures, they must not however go further than is necessary to attain the objectives mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Such measures may not therefore be used in such a way that they would have the effect of systematically undermining the right to deduct VAT, which is a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT established by the relevant Community legislation (see Joined Cases C‑286/94, C‑340/95, C‑401/95 and C‑47/96 Molenheide and Others [1997] ECR I‑7281, paragraph 47, and Gabalfrisa and Others , paragraph 52).

52 Furthermore, it must be noted that the measures which the Member States may adopt under Article 22(8) of the Sixth Directive in order to ensure the correct levying and collection of the tax and for the prevention of fraud must not go further than is necessary to attain such objectives. They may not therefore be used in such a way that they would have the effect of systematically undermining the right to deduct VAT, which is a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT established by the relevant Community legislation (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-286/94, C-340/95, C-401/95 and C-47/96 Molenheide and Others v Belgian State [1997] ECR I-7281, paragraph 47).

47 In a field to which TRIPs applies and in respect of which the Community has already legislated, as is the case with the field of trade marks, it follows from the judgment in Hermès, in particular paragraph 28 thereof, that the judicial authorities of the Member States are required by virtue of Community law, when called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures for the protection of rights falling within such a field, to do so as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 50 of TRIPs.

31 In order to answer that question, it must be recalled that the Court has consistently held that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 16 July 2015, Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 35).

35. It should be noted, in that regard, that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments in Maatschap L.A. en D.A.B. Langestraat en P. Langestraat-Troost , C‑11/12, EU:C:2012:808, paragraph 27, and Koushkaki , C‑84/12, EU:C:2013:862, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

41. It is to be recalled that the system under Article 234 EC is capable of being applied to references for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 35 EU, subject to the conditions laid down in the latter article (see Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285, paragraph 28). Under the procedure envisaged in Article 234 EC, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, any assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court. The Court of Justice is thus empowered to rule on the interpretation or validity of Community provisions only on the basis of the facts which the national court puts before it (see Case C-235/95 Dumon and Froment [1998] ECR I‑4531, paragraph 25, and Case C-421/01 Traunfellner [2003] ECR I‑11941, paragraph 21).

56. Although it is true that Article 7(5) of Directive 91/439 affirms the single nature of a driving licence (see Joined Cases C‑329/06 and C‑343/06 Wiedemann and Funk [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 70, and Joined Cases C‑334/06 to 336/06 Zerche and Others [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 67), it is also true that the sole effect of that provision is to prohibit the issue of a second Community driving licence after the date at which the provision was applicable, namely 1 July 1996, at which date Directive 80/1263 was repealed.

67. Article 7(5) of Directive 91/439, in providing that no person may hold a driving licence from more than one Member State, affirms the single nature of a driving licence. So, as a precondition making it possible to establish whether a particular candidate has observed the other conditions imposed by the directive, the condition of residence, which determines the Member State of issue, assumes special importance in relation to the other conditions laid down by the directive.

46 Recourse to this justification presupposes the existence of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society (see, as far as public policy is concerned, Bouchereau, cited above, paragraph 35).

56. It is clear that such an assessment of the risk could reveal that scientific uncertainty persists as regards the existence or extent of real risks to human health. In such circumstances, it must be accepted that a Member State may, in accordance with the precautionary principle, take protective measures without having to wait until the existence and gravity of those risks are fully demonstrated (see to that effect Case C-157/96 National Farmers ' Union and Others [1998] ECR I-2211, paragraph 63). However, the risk assessment cannot be based on purely hypothetical considerations (see Case C-236/01 Monsanto Agricoltura Italia and Others [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 106, and Commission v Denmark , paragraph 49).

106. If the twofold objective of Regulation No 258/97, namely ensuring the functioning of the internal market in novel foods and protecting public health against the risks to which those foods may give rise, is not to be adversely affected, protective measures adopted under the safeguard clause may not properly be based on a purely hypothetical approach to risk, founded on mere suppositions which are not yet scientifically verified (see to that effect, as regards a non-harmonised field, the judgment of the EFTA Court in Case E-3/00 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway , EFTA Court Reports 2000-2001, p. 73, paragraphs 36 to 38).

29. In accordance with settled case-law, national provisions which apply to holdings by nationals of the Member State concerned in the capital of a company established in another Member State, giving them definite influence on the company’s decisions and allowing them to determine its activities, come within the scope of the provisions of the Treaty on freedom of establishment (see, to that effect, Case C-231/05 Oy AA [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 20, and Case C‑112 /05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 13).

28. Thus, in order for VAT to be chargeable before the supply of goods or services is made, all the relevant information concerning the chargeable event, namely the future supply of goods or services, must already be known and therefore, in particular, the goods or services must be precisely identified at the time the payment on account is made ( BUPA Hospitals and Goldsborough Developments , paragraph 48, and Case C-520/10 Lebara [2012] ECR, paragraph 26). Therefore, payments on account of supplies of goods or services that have not yet been clearly identified cannot be subject to VAT ( BUPA Hospitals and Goldsborough Developments , paragraph 50, and Case C-270/09 MacDonald Resorts [2010] ECR I-13179, paragraph 31).

26. Moreover, it follows from point (1) of Article 2 of the Sixth Directive that it is supplies of goods or services which are subject to VAT, rather than payments made by way of consideration for such supplies (see, to that effect, Case C‑108/99 Cantor Fitzgerald International [2001] ECR I‑7257, paragraph 17, and Case C‑419/02 BUPA Hospitals and Goldsborough Developments [2006] ECR I‑1685, paragraph 50). However, under the second subparagraph of Article 10(2) of the Sixth Directive, where a payment is to be made on account, the VAT may become chargeable without the supply having yet taken place, provided that all the relevant information concerning the chargeable event — namely, the future delivery or future performance — are already known (see BUPA Hospitals and Goldsborough Developments , paragraph 48).

43 Thus, whereas the rules at issue in Case C-338/91 Steenhorst-Neerings v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel [1993] ECR I-5475 and in Johnson merely limited the period, prior to commencement of proceedings, in respect of which backdated benefits could be obtained, the rule at issue in the main proceedings in this case prevents the entire record of service completed by those concerned after 8 April 1976 until 1990 from being taken into account for the purposes of calculating the additional benefits which would be payable even after the date of the claim.

148. Thus, in the context of individual decisions, it is settled case-law that the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an individual decision is based is, in addition to permitting review by the Courts, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to know whether the decision may be vitiated by an error enabling its validity to be challenged (see, inter alia, to that effect, Case C‑199/99 P Corus UK v Commission [2003] ECR I‑11177, paragraph 145, and Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Røhrindistri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraph 462).

462. According to a consistent body of case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state reasons is to enable the Court to review the legality of the decision and to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the decision is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested (see, in particular, Case C-199/99 P Corus UK v Commission [2003] ECR I-11177, paragraph 145).

43. In the context of that cooperation, the national court before which the dispute has been brought, which alone has direct knowledge of the facts of the case in the main proceedings and must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, is in the best position to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court ( Lourenço Dias , cited above, paragraph 15, and Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607, paragraph 18).

15 In this connection it should be recalled that, according to the Court' s case-law (see inter alia the judgments in Case 240/84 Toyo v Council [1987] ECR 1809, at paragraph 13, Case 255/84 Nachi Fujikoshi v Council [1987] ECR 1861, at paragraph 14, Case 258/84 Nippon Seiko v Council [1987] ECR 1923, at paragraph 14, and Case 260/84 Minebea v Council [1987] ECR 1975, at paragraph 8), determination of the normal value and determination of the export price are governed by separate rules and therefore selling, administrative and other general expenses need not necessarily be treated in the same way in both cases.

13 IT MUST BE STATED IN THE FIRST PLACE THAT THE PROCEDURE FOR CALCULATING THE NORMAL VALUE IS LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 2*(3 ) TO ( 7 ) OF REGULATION NO 3017/79, AND THE PROCEDURE FOR CALCULATING THE EXPORT PRICE IS LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 2*(8 ) THEREOF . THOSE PROVISIONS SEPARATELY SPECIFY SEVERAL DIFFERENT METHODS FOR CALCULATING EACH OF THE TERMS OF THE COMPARISON .

44. On this point, it must be recalled that a restriction of freedom of establishment, applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, may be justified by overriding reasons in the general interest, provided that it is appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary for attaining that objective ( Commission v Greece , paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

139. In addition, it is clear from settled case-law ( Segers , paragraph 16, and Centros , paragraph 29) that the fact that a company does not conduct any business in the Member State in which it has its registered office and pursues its activities only or principally in the Member State where its branch is established is not sufficient to prove the existence of abuse or fraudulent conduct which would entitle the latter Member State to deny that company the benefit of the provisions of Community law relating to the right of establishment.

29 In addition, it is clear from paragraph 16 of Segers that the fact that a company does not conduct any business in the Member State in which it has its registered office and pursues its activities only in the Member State where its branch is established is not sufficient to prove the existence of abuse or fraudulent conduct which would entitle the latter Member State to deny that company the benefit of the provisions of Community law relating to the right of establishment.

11HAVING REGARD TO THE FACT THAT THE CONCEPTS REFERRED TO GIVE THE RIGHT TO DEROGATE FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF JURISDICTION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION THEIR INTERPRETATION MUST SHOW WITHOUT DIFFICULTY THE SPECIAL LINK JUSTIFYING SUCH DEROGATION . SUCH SPECIAL LINK COMPRISES IN THE FIRST PLACE THE MATERIAL SIGNS ENABLING THE EXISTENCE OF THE BRANCH , AGENCY OR OTHER ESTABLISHMENT TO BE EASILY RECOGNIZED AND IN THE SECOND PLACE THE CONNEXION THAT THERE IS BETWEEN THE LOCAL ENTITY AND THE CLAIM DIRECTED AGAINST THE PARENT BODY ESTABLISHED IN ANOTHER CONTRACTING STATE .

26 In order to interpret Article 7(1) of Regulation No 3950/92 and, more specifically, to ascertain whether clawback measures such as those at issue in the main proceedings may be included amongst the detailed rules to be determined by the Member States, it is first necessary to recall the Court's settled case-law to the effect that the entire system of reference quantities is based on the general principle laid down initially by Article 7 of Regulation No 857/84 and Article 7 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1546/88 of 3 June 1988 laying down detailed rules for the application of the additional levy referred to in Article 5c of Regulation No 804/68 (OJ 1988 L 139, p. 12) and then by the first subparagraph of Article 7(1) of Regulation No 3950/92. According to that principle, the reference quantity is allocated in relation to land and must therefore be transferred with that land (see, to that effect, Case C-98/91 Herbrink [1994] ECR I-223, paragraph 13, Case C-189/92 Le Nan [1994] ECR I-261, paragraph 12, Case C-463/93 St. Martinus Elten [1997] ECR I-255, paragraph 24; and Case C-15/95 EARL de Kerlast [1997] ECR I-1961, paragraphs 17 and 18).

17 The Court has consistently held that the entire system of reference quantities is based on the general principle laid down by Article 7 of Regulation No 857/84 and Article 7 of Regulation No 1546/88, that a reference quantity is allocated in relation to land and must therefore be transferred with that land (see, to that effect, Case C-463/93 Katholische Kirchengemeinde St Martinus Elten v Landwirtschtskammer Rheinland [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24, Case C-98/91 Herbrink v Netherlands [1994] ECR I-223, paragraph 13, and Case C-189/92 Le Nan v Coopérative Laitière de Ploudaniel [1994] ECR I-261, paragraph 12).

36. In the case where a parent company holds 100% of its subsidiary’s capital, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent company does in fact exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary (see judgment in Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission , C‑97/08 P, EU:C:2009:536, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).

116. Contrary to those submissions, it is apparent from the case‑law that the fact that a body is non‑profit‑making is a relevant factor for the purpose of determining whether or not an activity is of an economic nature but it is not sufficient of itself (see, inter alia, to that effect, Case C‑244/94 Fédération française des sociétés d’assurance and Others [1995] ECR I‑4013, paragraph 21; Case C‑67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I‑5751, paragraph 85; and Case C‑237/04 Enirisorse [2006] ECR I‑2843, paragraph 31).

31. As the Advocate General observes in point 25 of his Opinion, Sotacarbo’s objects include developing new technologies for the use of coal and providing specialist support services for authorities, public bodies and companies interested in the development of those technologies. An undertaking’s economic activity generally consists in precisely that kind of activity. Moreover, it is not disputed that Sotacarbo is run for profit.

26. Moreover, those measures cannot be enforced against natural and legal persons in a Member State before those persons have had an opportunity to make themselves acquainted with them through their proper publication in the Official Journal of the European Union ( Racke , paragraph 15, and Skoma-Lux , paragraph 37).

45 Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty thus guarantee nationals of Member States of the Community who have exercised their freedom of establishment and companies or firms which are assimilated to them the same treatment in the host Member State as that accorded to nationals of that Member State (Saint-Gobain, paragraph 35), both as regards access to an occupational activity on first establishment and as regards the exercise of that activity by the person established in the host Member State.

35 As far as companies or firms are concerned, their corporate seat, in the sense expressed above, serves to determine, like nationality for natural persons, their connection to a Member State's legal order (see ICI, cited above, paragraph 20, and the case-law cited there).

38. It follows from the distinction thus drawn by the EU legislature and from all the specifications made in Articles 26 and 28 of Regulation No 1698/2005 and in recitals 21 and 23 thereto that, in the regulatory context established by that regulation, the term ‘agricultural holdings’ as used in Articles 20(b)(i) and 26 of the regulation should be understood as referring to a holding that is engaged in the production of primary agricultural products (see also, to that effect, as regards earlier legislation relating to the two types of support examined here, Case 107/80 Cattaneo Adorno v Commission EU:C:1981:127, paragraphs 19 and 21).

21 To the extent that the questions referred relate to Article 176 of Directive 2006/112, it should be recalled that the Court has already assessed that article in the context of cases relating to Article 70 of the ZDDS (judgments of 16 February 2012, Eon Aset Menidjmunt, C‑118/11, EU:C:2012:97, paragraphs 71 to 74, and of 18 July 2013, AES-3C Maritza East 1, C‑124/12, EU:C:2013:488, paragraphs 45 to 54). It is important to point out that, even if Article 70 of the ZDDS were to provide for an exception from the right to deduct in place at the date of accession of the Republic of Bulgaria to the European Union, Article 176 of Directive 2006/112 allows for such exclusions to be maintained only in so far as they do not provide for general exclusions from the right to a deduct established by that directive and in particular by Article 168 thereof (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2009, PARAT Automotive Cabrio, C‑74/08, EU:C:2009:261, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

45. However, it must be recalled, according to the settled case-law of the Court, that national legislation does not constitute a derogation permitted by the second paragraph of Article 176 of Directive 2006/112 if its effect is to increase, after the entry into force of that directive, the extent of existing exclusions actually applied, thus diverging from the objective of that directive (see, to that effect, Magoora , paragraphs 37 and 38).

45. La Cour a également jugé que le principe de protection de la confiance légitime s’oppose à ce qu’une modification de la législation nationale prive un contribuable, avec effet rétroactif, du droit dont il disposait antérieurement à ladite modification d’obtenir le remboursement d’impôts perçus en violation du droit de l’Union (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Marks & Spencer, précité, point 46).

110. It is true that the obligation on a national court to refer to the content of a directive when interpreting and applying the relevant rules of domestic law is limited by general principles of law, particularly those of legal certainty and non-retroactivity, and that obligation cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem (see, by analogy, Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I‑5285, paragraphs 44 and 47).

47. The obligation on the national court to refer to the content of a framework decision when interpreting the relevant rules of its national law ceases when the latter cannot receive an application which would lead to a result compatible with that envisaged by that framework decision. In other words, the principle of conforming interpretation cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem . That principle does, however, require that, where necessary, the national court consider the whole of national law in order to assess how far it can be applied in such a way as not to produce a result contrary to that envisaged by the framework decision.

29. In that regard, the Court has stated not only that the place where the alleged dam age occurred within the meaning of that provision may vary according to the nature of the right allegedly infringed, but also that the likelihood of damage occurring in a particular Member State is subject to the condition that the right whose infringement is alleged is protected in that Member State (see judgment in Pinckney , EU:C:2013:635, paragraphs 32 and 33).

52. Thirdly, it is appropriate to determine whether the higher taxation of wine as compared with strong beer is such as to have the effect, on the market in question, of reducing potential consumption of imported products to the advantage of competing domestic products (see Commission v Belgium , paragraph 15, and Roders and Others , paragraph 39).

15 IT FOLLOWS THAT ANY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF A GIVEN TAX WITH THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 95 MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE IMPACT OF THAT TAX ON THE COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRODUCTS CONCERNED . THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION IS THEREFORE WHETHER OR NOT THE TAX IS OF SUCH A KIND AS TO HAVE THE EFFECT, ON THE MARKET IN QUESTION, OF REDUCING POTENTIAL CONSUMPTION OF IMPORTED PRODUCTS TO THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETING DOMESTIC PRODUCTS .

65 However, as regards the complaint that the General Court’s examination was deficient and insufficient and that there was therefore a failure to state adequate reasons, it must be borne in mind that the question whether the grounds of a judgment of the General Court are adequate is a question of law which is amenable, as such, to judicial review on appeal (see, inter alia, judgment of 14 October 2010, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, C‑280/08 P, EU:C:2010:603, paragraph 123).

35. The national court, in assessing the facts characterising the transaction in question, must take into account the type of undertaking or business concerned. It follows that the degree of importance to be attached to each criterion for determining whether or not there has been a transfer within the meaning of Directive 77/187 will necessarily vary according to the activity carried on, or indeed the production or operating methods employed in the relevant undertaking, business or part of a business ( Süzen , paragraph 18, and Hidalgo , cited above, paragraph 31).

18 As pointed out in paragraph 14 of this judgment, the national court, in assessing the facts characterizing the transaction in question, must take into account among other things the type of undertaking or business concerned. It follows that the degree of importance to be attached to each criterion for determining whether or not there has been a transfer within the meaning of the directive will necessarily vary according to the activity carried on, or indeed the production or operating methods employed in the relevant undertaking, business or part of a business. Where in particular an economic entity is able, in certain sectors, to function without any significant tangible or intangible assets, the maintenance of its identity following the transaction affecting it cannot, logically, depend on the transfer of such assets.

67. However, pursuant to Article 2(7)(b), in anti-dumping investigations concerning imports from China, normal value is to be determined in accordance with Article 2(1) to (6) of the basic regulation, if it is shown, on the basis of properly substantiated claims by one or more producers subject to the investigation, and in accordance with the criteria and procedures set out in Article 2(7)(c), that market economy conditions prevail for that producer or those producers in respect of the manufacture and sale of the like product concerned.

66. As regards, next, the argument concerning the balanced apportionment of the power to tax, it should be recalled that such a justification may be accepted, in particular, where the system in question is designed to prevent conduct capable of jeopardising the right of a Member State to exercise its tax jurisdiction in relation to activities carried out on in its territory (see Case C‑347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz [2007] ECR I‑2647, paragraph 42; Oy AA , paragraph 54; and Amurta , paragraph 58).

42. It must be acknowledged in that regard that there are courses of action which are capable of jeopardising the right of the Member States to exercise their taxing powers in relation to activities carried on in their territory and thus of undermining a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States (see Marks & Spencer , paragraph 46) and which may justify a restriction on freedom of establishment (see Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas , paragraphs 55 and 56). The Court has thus held that the fact of giving companies the right to elect to have their losses taken into account in the Member State in which they are established or in another Member State would seriously undermine a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States, since the tax base would be increased in the first State, and reduced in the second, by the amount of the losses surrendered.

28. According to settled case-law, it is for the Court alone, where questions are formulated imprecisely, to extract from all the information provided by the national court or tribunal and from the documents in the main proceedings the points of European Union law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject-matter of those proceedings (Joined Cases C‑436/08 and C‑437/08 Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

59. In that regard, firstly, contrary to the Commission’s submissions, the fact that Deltafina did not raise any objection at the hearing does not have the effect of rendering the second ground of appeal inadmissible (see, to that effect, Case C‑199/99 P Corus UK v Commission EU:C:2003:531, paragraphs 32 and 35).

35. It follows from these findings that the second limb of the first ground of appeal is unfounded. The third limb of the first ground of appeal

31. As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, in so far as Regulation No 44/2001 now replaces the Brussels Convention in relations between the Member States, an interpretation given by the Court concerning that convention also applies to the regulation, where its provisions and those of the Brussels Convention may be treated as equivalent (see, inter alia, Case C‑406/09 Realchemie Nederland [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

48 It follows from the case-law that actual or presumed awareness of a usage on the part of the parties may be made out, in particular, by showing either that the parties had previously had commercial or trade relations between themselves or with other parties operating in the sector in question, or that, in that sector, a particular course of conduct is sufficiently well known because it is generally and regularly followed when a particular type of contract is concluded, so that it may be regarded as being an established practice (judgments of 20 February 1997 in MSG, C‑106/95, EU:C:1997:70, paragraph 24, and of 16 March 1999 in Castelletti, C‑159/97, EU:C:1999:142, paragraph 43).

43 As to the second point, it is clear from paragraph 24 of MSG that actual or presumed awareness of a usage on the part of the parties to a contract can be made out, in particular, by showing either that the parties had previously had commercial or trade relations between themselves or with other parties operating in the sector in question, or that, in that sector, a particular course of conduct is sufficiently well known because it is generally and regularly followed when a particular type of contract is concluded, so that it may be regarded as being an established usage.

27. Finally, the national court should be reminded that the objective of the legislation cannot be circumvented by the splitting of projects and that failure to take account of their cumulative effect must not mean in practice that they all escape the obligation to carry out an assessment when, taken together, they are likely to have significant effects on the environment within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 85/337 (see, to that effect, Case C‑392/96 Commission v Ireland [1999] ECR I‑5901, paragraph 76).

52 In that regard, it is appropriate to observe, as a preliminary point, that Articles 203 and 204 of the Customs Code have different spheres of application. It is clear from the wording of Article 204 of the Customs Code that it applies only to situations which do not fall within the scope of Article 203, the applicability of which to the situation in question must be examined first (judgments of 12 February 2004, Hamann International, C‑337/01, EU:C:2004:90, paragraphs 28 to 30, and of 29 October 2015, B & S Global Transit Center, C‑319/14, EU:C:2015:734, paragraphs 25 to 27).

28. In order to answer the question as thus reformulated, it is appropriate to note, as a preliminary point, that Articles 203 and 204 of the Customs Code have different spheres of application. Whilst the first provision covers conduct leading to the goods ' being removed from customs supervision, the second covers failure to fulfil obligations and non-compliance with the conditions of the various customs schemes which have no effect on customs supervision.

15 It has consistently been held that any measure capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade constitutes a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction (Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5, and Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec v TF1 Publicité and M6 Publicité [1995] ECR I-179, paragraph 18).

44. Furthermore, that conclusion cannot be called into question by Regulation No 827/2011, which classifies a product similar to that at issue in the main proceedings under heading 3212 of the CN, since that regulation is not applicable ratione temporis to those proceedings. In any event, it should be noted that the Commission’s power to adopt measures relating to the classification of certain products in the CN does not authorise it to alter the subject-matter of the tariff headings which have been defined on the basis of the HS established by the Convention, the scope of which the Community has undertaken, under Article 3 thereof, not to modify (see Hewlett-Packard Europe , C‑361/11, EU:C:2013:18, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

39. Moreover, according to settled case-law, the Council has conferred upon the Commission, acting in cooperation with the customs experts of the Member States, a broad discretion to define the subject-matter of tariff headings falling to be considered for the classification of particular goods. However, the Commission’s power to adopt the measures mentioned in Article 9(1)(a), (b), (d) and (e) of Regulation No 2658/87 does not authorise it to alter the subject-matter of the tariff headings which have been defined on the basis of the HS established by the Convention whose scope the European Union has undertaken, under Article 3 thereof, not to modify (see Case C-267/94 France v Commission [1995] ECR I-4845, paragraphs 19 and 20; Case C-15/05 Kawasaki Motors Europe [2006] ECR I-3657, paragraph 35; and Joined Cases C-522/07 and C-65/08 Dinter and Europol Frost-Food [2009] ECR I-10333, paragraph 32).

26. Likewise, Article 5(1) of the directive provides, in order to avoid double taxation, for exemption in the State of the subsidiary from withholding tax upon distribution of profits to its parent company, at least where the latter holds a minimum of 25% of the capital of the subsidiary ( Denkavit and Others paragraph 22; Epson Europe , paragraph 20; Athinaiki Zithopiia , paragraph 25; and Océ Van der Grinten , paragraph 45).

31. In this respect, it must be noted that, in the absence of harmonisation of national enforcement procedures, the detailed rules establishing the right of appeal against a decision ruling on the legality of a contractual clause, arising in the course of mortgage enforcement proceedings, are matters falling within the domestic legal order of each Member State, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States. Nonetheless, the Court has emphasised that those detailed rules must meet the conditions that they should be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they should not in practice render impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the EU legal order (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgments in Mostaza Claro , C‑168/05, EU:C:2006:675, paragraph 24; Asturcom Telecomunicaciones , C‑40/08, EU:C:2009:615, paragraph 38; Aziz , EU:C:2013:164, paragraph 50; and Barclays Bank , EU:C:2014:279, paragraph 37).

50. In that regard, in the absence of harmonisation of the national mechanisms for enforcement, the rules implementing the grounds of objection allowed in mortgage enforcement proceedings and the powers conferred on the court hearing the declaratory proceedings, which enjoys jurisdiction to analyse the lawfulness of the contractual clauses on the basis of which the right to seek enforcement was established, are a matter for the national legal order of each Member State, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States, on condition, however, that they are no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and do not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred on consumers by European Union law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, Case C-168/05 Mostaza Claro [2006] ECR I-10421, paragraph 24, and Case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones [2009] ECR I-9579, paragraph 38).

153 The determination, in the context of the internal relationship of those held jointly and severally liable for payment of a fine, of the shares each of them is required to pay does not pursue that dual objective. That is a contentious issue, to be resolved at a later stage, and, in principle, the Commission no longer has any interest in the matter, where the fine has been paid in full by one or more of those held liable. Accordingly, the Commission cannot be required to determine such shares (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2014, Commission v Siemens Österreich and Others and Siemens Transmission & Distribution and Others v Commission, C‑231/11 P to C‑233/11 P, EU:C:2014:256, paragraphs 60 to 64).

67. As far as concerns Article 17(7) of the Sixth Directive, which is relied on indirectly by the Austrian Government, it is not necessary to rule on the question whether the national measures in question in the main proceedings are of a temporary nature and designed to deal with a cyclical economic situation; it is nevertheless common ground that the Austrian authorities did not consult the VAT Committee before adopting Paragraph 1(1)(2)(d) of the UStG 1994. The Austrian Government cannot therefore rely on Article 17(7) of the Sixth Directive to the detriment of taxable persons (see, by way of analogy, concerning Article 27(1) and (5) of the Sixth Directive, Case C-97/90 Lennartz [1991] ECR I-3795, paragraph 34).

34 Since the measure in question has neither been notified to the Commission under Article 27(5) nor authorized by a Council decision pursuant to Article 27(1), the German Government cannot rely on that measure to the detriment of taxable persons.

13 A CET EGARD, IL CONVIENT D' OBSERVER QUE L' ARTICLE 37 VISE EN PARTICULIER LES SITUATIONS OU LES AUTORITES NATIONALES SONT A MEME DE CONTROLER OU DE DIRIGER LES ECHANGES ENTRE ETATS MEMBRES, OU ENCORE DE LES INFLUENCER SENSIBLEMENT, PAR VOIE D' UN ORGANISME INSTITUE A CET EFFET OU D' UN MONOPOLE DELEGUE . CETTE DISPOSITION ENGLOBE, PAR CONSEQUENT, LA SITUATION OU LE MONOPOLE EN CAUSE EST EXERCE PAR UNE ENTREPRISE OU UN GROUPE D' ENTREPRISES, OU PAR DES UNITES TERRITORIALES DE L' ETAT, TELLES QUE LES COMMUNES .

18. Even though, according to their wording, the provisions concerning freedom of establishment are aimed at ensuring that foreign nationals are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation (see Case C‑298/05 Columbus Container Services [2007] ECR I‑10451, paragraph 33; Case C‑157/07 Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee‑Seniorenheimstatt [2008] ECR I‑8061, paragraph 29; and Filipiak , paragraph 60).

60. The Court has also stated on several occasions that, even though, according to their wording, the provisions concerning freedom of establishment are mainly aimed at ensuring that foreign nationals are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation which comes within the definition contained in Article 48 EC (see Case C‑251/98 Baars [2000] ECR I‑2787, paragraph 28; Case C‑9/02 de Lasteyrie du Saillant [2004] ECR I‑2409, paragraph 42, and Heinrich Bauer Verlag , paragraph 26).

50. So far as concerns the purport of Commission v Luxembourg , it is clear on reading paragraph 47 of that judgment that, in interpreting clause 2.1 of the Framework Agreement as meaning that the grant of parental leave is subject not to birth but to the condition that a child has been born, the Court sought to indicate that the right to parental leave is not connected with the date of birth and that it is not necessary for the child to have been born after the entry into force of Directive 96/34 in the Member State concerned. The Court thus ruled on the temporal application of Directive 96/34 and not on whether, in the event of a multiple birth, a number of periods of parental leave equal to the number of children born must be granted.

32 The principle of effective judicial protection of the rights which individuals derive from EU law comprises various elements; in particular, the rights of the defence, the principle of equality of arms, the right of access to a tribunal and the right to be advised, defended and represented (judgment of 6 November 2012, Otis and Others, C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraph 48).

48. The principle of effective judicial protection laid down in Article 47 of the Charter comprises various elements; in particular, the rights of the defence, the principle of equality of arms, the right of access to a tribunal and the right to be advised, defended and represented.

38. It is true that, according to the Court’s case-law, the preamble to a European Union act has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on either as a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in question or for interpreting them in a manner clearly contrary to their wording (Case C‑308/97 Manfredi [1998] ECR I‑7685, paragraph 30; Case C‑136/04 Deutsche Milch‑Kontor [2005] ECR I‑10095, paragraph 32; Case C‑134/08 Tyson Parketthandel [2009] ECR I‑2875, paragraph 16; and Case C‑7/11 Caronna [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 40).

25. On the other hand, it is not contrary to European Union law to require the person other than the personal liable to pay the tax to take every step which could reasonably be required of him to satisfy himself that the transaction which he is effecting does not result in his participation in tax evasion (see, to that effect, Federation of Technological Industries and Others , paragraph 33; Teleos and Others , paragraph 65; and Netto Supermarkt , paragraph 24).

24. On the other hand, as the Court has already held, it is not contrary to Community law to require the supplier to take every step which could reasonably be required of him to satisfy himself that the transaction which he is effecting does not result in his participation in tax evasion (see Teleos and Others , paragraph 65, and the case-law cited there).

49 Within the discretion conferred on it by Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, the Commission is entitled to refuse the grant of aid where that aid does not induce the recipient undertakings to adopt conduct likely to assist attainment of one of the objectives referred to in that provision. Such aid must be necessary for the attainment of the objectives specified in that provision, in the sense that, without it, market forces alone would not succeed in getting the recipient undertakings to adopt conduct likely to assist attainment of those objectives. Aid which improves the financial situation of the recipient undertaking but is not necessary for the attainment of the objectives specified in Article 107(3) TFEU cannot be considered to be compatible with the internal market (judgment of 13 June 2013, HGA and Others v Commission, C‑630/11 P to C‑633/11 P, EU:C:2013:387, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited).

40. Accordingly, the effect on intra-Community trade is normally the result of a combination of several factors which, taken separately, are not necessarily decisive (Case C‑250/92 DLG [1994] ECR I-5641, paragraph 54).

54 The Court has consistently held that, in order that an agreement between undertakings may affect trade between Member States, it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact that it may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States, such as might prejudice the realization of the aim of a single market in all the Member States (see Case 42/84 Remia v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, paragraph 22). Accordingly, the effect on intra-Community trade is normally the result of a combination of several factors which, taken separately, are not necessarily decisive.

52. Second, it is contrary to the principle of mutual recognition for a host Member State to refuse to recognise a driving licence issued by another Member State on the ground that, according to the information supplied by the host Member State, the holder of that licence did not, at the date of its issue, satisfy the necessary conditions for obtaining it (see, to that effect, the order in Da Silva Carvalho , paragraph 22, and Kapper , paragraph 47).

50 In that regard, it is necessary to examine, first, the general criteria for inclusion on the lists of persons subject to restrictive measures, second, the grounds stated for including Mr Akhras on such lists and, third, the evidence that his listing was well founded (see, to that effect, the judgments in Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 41; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 40; and Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 39).

40. It is necessary to examine, first, the general criteria for inclusion on the lists of persons subject to restrictive measures, second, the grounds stated for including Mr Anbouba on such a list and, third, the evidence that his listing was well founded.

87. Article 17(1) is a specific expression of the obligation of genuine cooperation under Article 10 EC, which requires Member States, when they encounter problems in the application of Community law, to submit those problems to the Commission (see, by analogy, inter alia Case C-499/99 Commission v Spain [2002] ECR I-6031, paragraph 24) and, in addition, does not allow them to introduce national safeguard measures in response to objections, reservations or conditions which the Commission might put forward (see, by analogy, Case 804/79 Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045, paragraph 32). In the present case, it is common ground that the Federal Republic of Germany acted unilaterally, even after the Commission had expressed objections.

71. Such restrictions may, however, be recognised as exceptional measures, as expressly provided for in Articles 45 EC and 46 EC, or justified by overriding reasons in the public interest, provided that they comply with the requirements under the case‑law of the Court with regard to their proportionality. A certain number of overriding reasons relating to the public interest have been recognised in that regard by the case‑law, such as the objectives of consumer protection and the prevention of both fraud and incitement to squander on betting and gaming, as well as the general need to preserve public order ( Placanica and Others , paragraphs 45, 46 and 48).

48. However, although the Member States are free to set the objectives of their policy on betting and gaming and, where appropriate, to define in detail the level of protection sought, the restrictive measures that they impose must nevertheless satisfy the conditions laid down in the case-law of the Court as regards their proportionality.

43. The Court has consistently held that for an appellant to have an interest in bringing proceedings the appeal must be capable, if successful, of procuring an advantage to the party bringing it (see, in particular, Case C‑535/06 P Moser Baer India v Council [2009] ECR I‑7051, paragraph 24 and case-law cited).

33 Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty apply only to anti-competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings on their own initiative (see to that effect, as regards Article 86 of the Treaty, Case 41/83 Italy v Commission [1985] ECR 873, paragraphs 18 to 20; Case C-202/88 France v Commission - the so-called `telecommunications terminals' judgment - [1991] ECR I-1223, paragraph 55; and Case C-18/88 GB-Inno-BM [1991] ECR I-5941, paragraph 20). If anti-competitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation or if the latter creates a legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part, Articles 85 and 86 do not apply. In such a situation, the restriction of competition is not attributable, as those provisions implicitly require, to the autonomous conduct of the undertakings (see also Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission [1975] ECR 1663, paragraphs 36 to 72, and more particularly paragraphs 65, 66, 71 and 72).

70 MOREOVER THE ONLY EFFECTIVE COMPETITION, WHICH THESE REGULATIONS, AT LEAST OSTENSIBLY, ALLOWED TO REMAIN, NAMELY COMPETITION RELATING TO THE AMOUNTS OF THE 'SOVRAPREZZO' TO BE TENDERED FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE ADJUDICATIONS TO TENDER, WAS LIKELY TO INCREASE A NOT INCONSIDERABLE ITEM OF THE COST PRICE OF ANY PURCHASER AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE PRICES APPLIED WHEN THE SUGAR AWARDED IS RESOLD, WHEREAS THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO COMPETITION ARE ON THE CONTRARY DESIGNED, INTER ALIA, TO PREVENT CARTELS ALLOWING ITS MEMBERS TO APPLY UNJUSTIFIED PRICES .

49 In this case there is nothing to justify a derogation from the principle that a ruling on the interpretation of Community law takes effect from the date on which the rule interpreted entered into force (see Case C-137/94 Richardson [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 33).

45. As regards, first, the principle of proportionality, it must be noted that the Court has already had occasion to find, in Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2010] ECR I-403, paragraphs 78 to 92, that Articles 5 to 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 are not invalid by reason of infringement of the principle of proportionality.

84. It must be stated, first, that the measures prescribed by Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation No 261/2004 are in themselves capable of immediately redressing some of the damage suffered by passengers in the event of cancellation of, or a long delay to, a flight and therefore enable a high level of passenger protection, sought by the regulation, to be ensured.

47. Besides that lack of internal consistency, it must also be observed that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings relies on the criterion of previous professional experience for the purposes of determining grading within the scale and, consequently, the pay of contractual public servants. Rewarding experience that enables the worker to perform his duties better is, as a general rule, acknowledged to be a legitimate aim. That is why the employer is free to reward such experience (see Case C‑17/05 Cadman [2006] ECR I‑9583, paragraphs 35 and 36). The fact remains, however, that national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings does not merely reward experience but also establishes, where experience is equal, a difference in treatment on the basis of the age at which that experience was acquired. In those circumstances, such an age-related criterion therefore has no direct relationship with the aim, so far as the employer is concerned, of rewarding professional experience.

57. It is settled case-law that the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect laid down by Article 28 EC applies not only to national measures but also to measures adopted by the Community institutions (see in particular, to that effect, Case 15/83 Denkavit Nederland [1984] ECR 2171, paragraph 15; Case C-51/93 Meyhui [1994] ECR I-3879, paragraph 11; and Case C-114/96 Kieffer and Thill [1997] ECR I-3629, paragraph 27).

11 It is settled law that the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and of all measures having equivalent effect applies not only to national measures but also to measures adopted by the Community institutions (see in particular Case 15/83 Denkavit Nederland v Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten [1984] ECR 2171, paragraph 15).

65. In that regard, the Court has always drawn a distinction between the pre-litigation and litigation stages of the procedure set out in Article 226 EC and has held that the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is, inter alia, to define the subject-matter of the dispute with a view to the bringing of an action before the Court and to ensure that the contentious procedure will have as its subject-matter a clearly defined dispute (see, to that effect, Case C-230/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1169, paragraph 31; Case C-1/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-9989, paragraphs 53 and 54; Case C-362/01 Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-11433, paragraphs 17 and 18; and Case C-145/01 Commission  v Italy [2003] ECR I-5581, paragraph 17).

29. So far as more particularly concerns the effects of an interruption of the employment relationship, it is to be emphasised that, in paragraph 28 of its judgment in Case C‑212/99 Commission v Italy , the Court held that only an analysis concentrating on the substance, rather than the form, of statutory schemes will make it possible to establish whether their actual application to different categories of workers in comparable legal situations leads to situations which are compatible or, in contrast, incompatible with the fundamental principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality.

28 As for the Italian Government's argument that reference to Law No 230 is irrelevant since that law provides for the automatic conversion of contracts contrary to the scheme established by Law No 236, which sets out a new public selection procedure for former foreign-language assistants, regard must be had to the substance and the objectives of those two statutory schemes rather than to their form and detailed rules. Only an analysis concentrating on the substance, rather than the form, of those statutory schemes will make it possible to establish whether their actual application to different categories of workers in comparable legal situations leads to situations which are compatible or, in contrast, incompatible with the fundamental principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality.

20 In view of that dual purpose the Commission must allow Member States a reasonable period to reply to the letter of formal notice and to comply with a reasoned opinion, or, where appropriate, to prepare their defence. In order to determine whether the period allowed is reasonable, account must be taken of all the circumstances of the case (judgment in Case 293/85 Commission v Belgium, cited above, paragraph 14).