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36. Second, the Court has held that a national court that is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of EU law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of such a provision by legislative or other constitutional means (see, inter alia, Simmenthal , 106/77, EU:C:1978:49, paragraphs 21 and 24; Filipiak , C‑314/08, EU:C:2009:719, paragraph 81; Melki and Abdeli , EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited; and Åkerberg Fransson , C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 45).

43. Second, the Court has already held that a national court which is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of EU law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional means (see, inter alia, Simmenthal , paragraphs 21 and 24; Case C‑187/00 Kutz‑Bauer [2003] ECR I‑2741, paragraph 73; Joined Cases C‑387/02, C‑391/02 and C‑403/02 Berlusconi and Others [2005] ECR I‑3565, paragraph 72; and Case C‑314/08 Filipiak [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 81).

108 It is only exceptionally that, in application of a general principle of legal certainty which is inherent in the Community legal order, the Court may decide to restrict the right to rely upon a provision it has interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relations established in good faith. As the Court has consistently held, such a restriction may be allowed only in the actual judgment ruling upon the interpretation sought (see in particular Case C-35/97 Commission v France [1998] ECR I-5325, paragraph 49).

19 In this connection, it is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, in particular, Case C-60/96 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-3827, paragraph 15, and Case C-166/97 Commission v France [1999] ECR I-1719, paragraph 18).

15 As the Court has consistently held, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C-289/94 Commission v Italy [1996] ECR I-4405, paragraph 20, and Case C-302/95 Commission v Italy [1996] ECR I-6765, paragraph 13).

63. Pour ce faire, les raisons justificatives susceptibles d’être invoquées par un État membre doivent être accompagnées des preuves appropriées ou d’une analyse de l’aptitude et de la proportionnalité de la mesure restrictive adoptée par cet État, ainsi que des éléments précis permettant d’étayer son argumentation (arrêts du 13 novembre 2003, Lindman, C‑42/02, Rec. p. I‑13519, point 25; du 18 mars 2004, Leichtle, C‑8/02, Rec. p. I‑2641, point 45; du 7 juillet 2005, Commission/Autriche, C‑147/03, Rec. p. I‑5969, point 63; du 16 février 2006, Rockler, C‑137/04, Rec. p. I‑1441, point 25, et Öberg, C‑185/04, Rec. p. I‑1453, point 22, ainsi que du 7 juin 2007, Commission/Belgique, précité, point 36).

42 According to that case-law, the ‘habitual residence’ of a child corresponds to the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment. That place must be established by the national courts, taking account of all the circumstances of fact specific to each individual case (judgments of 2 April 2009, A, C‑523/07, EU:C:2009:225, paragraphs 42 and 44, and of 22 December 2010, Mercredi, C‑497/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:829, paragraph 47).

42. In the light of the criteria laid down in paragraphs 38 to 41 of this judgment and according to an overall assessment, it is for the national court to establish the place of the children’s habitual residence.

66. With regard to the arguments put forward by the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit concerning cost-neutrality and the burden associated with planning and allocating posts in the German public sector, although budgetary considerations may underlie a Member State ' s choice of social policy and influence the nature or scope of the social protection measures which it wishes to adopt, they do not in themselves constitute an aim pursued by that policy and cannot therefore justify discrimination against one of the sexes ( Roks and Others , paragraph 35, and Kutz-Bauer , paragraph 59).

38. In this connection, the Court has already held that a national of a Member State who goes to another Member State and pursues secondary education there exercises the freedom to move guaranteed by Article 18 EC (see Case C‑224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191, paragraphs 29 to 34, and Bidar , paragraph 35).

34 By linking the grant of tideover allowances to the condition of having obtained the required diploma in Belgium, the national legislation thus places at a disadvantage certain of its nationals simply because they have exercised their freedom to move in order to pursue education in another Member State.

42. That conclusion cannot challenged by the argument of the Czech Government that the effects of the legislation at issue are negligible, given that, according to settled case-law, a restriction on a fundamental freedom is prohibited by the Treaty even if it is of limited scope or minor importance ( Commission v France , C‑34/98, EU:C:2000:84, paragraph 49, and X , EU:C:2012:635, paragraph 30). Justification of a restriction on the freedom to provide services

41. The Court has already ruled on several occasions that the purpose of coordinating at Community level the procedures for the award of public contracts is to eliminate barriers to the freedom to provide services and goods and therefore to protect the interests of traders established in a Member State who wish to offer goods or services to contracting authorities established in another Member State (see, in particular, Case C-380/98 University of Cambridge [2000] ECR I-8035, paragraph 16, Case C-237/99 Commission v France , cited above, paragraph 41, Case C-92/00 HI [2002] ECR I-5553, paragraph 43, and Case C-470/99 Universale-Bau and Others [2002] ECR I-11617, paragraph 51).

16 It should be borne in mind at the outset that, as far as the purpose of Directives 92/50, 93/36 and 93/37 is concerned, the Court has held that the purpose of coordinating at Community level the procedures for the award of public contracts is to eliminate barriers to the freedom to provide services and goods and therefore to protect the interests of traders established in a Member State who wish to offer goods or services to contracting authorities established in another Member State (see, to that effect, Case C-360/96 Gemeente Arnhem, Gemeente Rheden v BFI Holding [1998] ECR I-6821, paragraph 41).

105. It is common ground that the measures contained in Law No 218/90 were never notified to the Commission. Therefore, as regards the allegation that the measure provided for in Article 7(3) of that law was very similar to the tax reduction, it is sufficient to note that that measure was not examined by the Commission. In that context, the time which has elapsed since the adoption of that law, as pleaded by Unicredito, is irrelevant. In addition, even supposing that the two successive measures are, as suggested by the national tribunal, related, the one being a continuation and extension of the other, the fact that the Commission took no action regarding the first is immaterial, since the system at issue in the current proceedings, viewed independently of its predecessor, favours certain undertakings (see, to that effect, Case 57/86 Greece v Commission [1988] ECR 2855, paragraph 10).

116. The Court has consistently held that there is a misuse of power where an institution adopts a measure with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see, in particular, Case C‑84/94 United Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR I-5755, paragraph 69, and Case C-48/96 P Windpark Groothusen v Commission [1998] ECR I-2873, paragraph 52).

69 The Court' s case-law (see, in particular, Case C-156/93 Parliament v Commission [1995] ECR I-2019, paragraph 31) defines misuse of powers as the adoption by a Community institution of a measure with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case.

92. Dans l’exercice de son pouvoir d’appréciation en la matière, il incombe à la Cour de fixer l’astreinte de sorte que celle-ci soit, d’une part, adaptée aux circonstances et, d’autre part, proportionnée au manquement constaté ainsi qu’à la capacité de paiement de l’État membre concerné (arrêt Commission/Grèce, C‑369/07, EU:C:2009:428, point 114 et jurisprudence citée).

116 Those provisions must be viewed in the light of the duty to cooperate in good faith with the Commission, established by Article 5 of the EC Treaty, which, with particular regard to the utilisation of Community resources, requires Member States to set up comprehensive administrative checks and on-the-spot inspections, thus guaranteeing the conformity of financial operations with Community law. Consequently, if, as in the present case, no comprehensive system exists or if the system introduced gives rise to doubts as to compliance with the conditions imposed for eligibility for the reimbursement of the expenditure concerned, the Commission is entitled to disallow certain expenditure incurred by the Member State in question (see Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 16 to 21).

19 As regards premiums for the maintenance of the suckler cow herd, Article 4(1 ) of Commission Regulation ( EEC ) No 1244/82 of 19 May 1982 laying down detailed rules implementing the system of premiums for maintaining suckler cows ( Official Journal 1982, L 143, p . 20 ), imposes on the competent authorities designated by each Member State the obligation to carry out administrative checks supplemented by random or, if necessary, systematic on-the-spot checks .

19. It should be noted, at the outset, that Article 234 EC does not empower the Court to apply rules of Community law to a particular case, but only to rule on the interpretation of the EC Treaty and of acts adopted by European Community institutions (see, inter alia, Case 100/63 van der Veen [1964] ECR 565, 572, and Case C‑203/99 Veedfald [2001] ECR I‑3569, paragraph 31). The Court may, however, in the framework of the judicial cooperation provided for by that article and on the basis of the material presented to it, provide the national court with an interpretation of Community law which may be useful to it in assessing the effects of one or other of its provisions (Case 20/87 Gauchard [1987] ECR 4879, paragraph 5, and Joined Cases C‑515/99, C‑519/99 to C‑524/99 and C‑526/99 to C‑540/99 Reisch and Others [2002] ECR I‑2157, paragraph 22).

26. In this respect, it is settled case‑law that the need for a uniform interpretation of Community law makes it impossible for the text of a provision to be considered, in case of doubt, in isolation; on the contrary, it requires that it be interpreted also in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (see Case 9/79 Koschniske [1979] ECR 2717, paragraph 6; Case C‑296/95 EMU Tabac and Others [1998] ECR I‑1605, paragraph 36; and Case C‑174/05 Zuid‑Hollandse Milieufederatie and Natuur en Milieu [2006] ECR I‑2443, paragraph 20) and by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which that provision forms part (Case 30/77 Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, paragraph 14).

6 HOWEVER , THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNITY REGULATIONS MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THAT PASSAGE TO BE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION AND REQUIRES THAT IT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN THE LIGHT OF THE VERSIONS EXISTING IN THE OTHER OFFICIAL LANGUAGES .

46. As regards judicial review of the implementation of that principle, bearing in mind the wide discretion enjoyed by the Community legislature where the common agricultural policy is concerned, the lawfulness of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate in terms of the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (Case C‑344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2006] ECR I‑403, paragraph 80, and Spain v Council , paragraph 98).

106. In any event, undertakings falling within the scope of Article 106(2) TFEU may rely on that provision of the Treaty to justify a measure contrary to Article 101 TFEU only if the restrictions on competition, or even the exclusion of all competition, are necessary in order to ensure the performance of the particular tasks assigned to them (see, to that effect, Case C-203/96 Dusseldorp and Others [1998] ECR I-4075, paragraph 65; Case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2533, paragraph 14; and Case C-393/92 Almelo [1994] ECR I-1477, paragraph 46).

65 It follows from the case-law of the Court that that provision may be relied upon to justify a measure contrary to Article 86 of the Treaty adopted in favour of an undertaking to which the State has granted exclusive rights if that measure is necessary to enable the undertaking to perform the particular task assigned to it and if it does not affect the development of trade in a manner contrary to the interest of the Community (see, to that effect, Case C-320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2533, paragraph 14, and Case C-159/94 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-5815, paragraph 49).

35 The Court has held that the specific factors that allow a link to be established between the articles of the FEU Treaty on freedom to provide services and the subject or circumstances of a dispute, confined in all respects within a single Member State, must be apparent from the order for reference (judgment of 8 December 2016, Eurosaneamientos and Others, C‑532/15 and C‑538/15, EU:C:2016:932, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

41. According to settled case-law, the purpose of the first paragraph of Article 307 EC is to make clear, in accordance with the principles of international law, as set out in, inter alia, Article 30(4)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, that the application of the EC Treaty does not affect the duty of the Member State concerned to respect the rights of non-member countries under a prior agreement and to perform its obligations thereunder (see, to that effect, Case 812/79 Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, paragraph 8).

8 AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY HELD IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 27 FEBRUARY 1962 IN CASE 10/61 COMMISSION V ITALY ( 1962 ) ECR 1 , THE PURPOSE OF THAT PROVISION IS TO LAY DOWN , IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW , THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY DOES NOT AFFECT THE DUTY OF THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED TO RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES UNDER A PRIOR AGREEMENT AND TO PERFORM ITS OBLIGATIONS THEREUNDER .

30 However, it is settled case-law that Article 6(1) cannot be construed as permitting a Member State to modify unilaterally the scope of the system of gradually integrating Turkish workers into the host State's labour force (see, most recently, Case C-1/97 Birden v Stadtgemeinde Bremen [1998] ECR I-7747, paragraph 37), so that that State no longer has the power to adopt measures regarding residence which are such as to impede the exercise of the rights expressly granted by Decision No 1/80 to someone who fulfils its conditions and, by the same token, is already duly integrated in the host Member State.

60. Nor may that provision be relied on by a Member State to refuse indefinitely to recognise, in relation to a person who has been the object in its territory of a measure withdrawing or cancelling a previous licence issued by that State, the validity of any licence that may subsequently be issued to him by another Member State (see, to that effect, Kapper , paragraph 76, and the orders in Halbritter , paragraph 27, and Kremer , paragraph 29). To accept that a Member State is entitled to rely on its national provisions in order to refuse indefinitely to recognise a licence issued by another Member State would be fundamentally incompatible with the principle of mutual recognition of driving licences which is the linchpin of the system established by Directive 91/439 ( Kapper , paragraph 77, and the orders in Halbritter , paragraph 28, and Kremer , paragraph 30).

77. That conclusion is not affected by the fact that the applicable national provisions, in particular those set out in Paragraph 28 of the FeV 1999, have as their specific aim the indefinite extension of the temporal effects of a measure withdrawing or cancelling a previous licence and the reservation to the German authorities of the right to issue a new licence. As the Advocate General noted at point 75 of his Opinion, to allow a Member State to rely on its national provisions in order to refuse indefinitely to recognise a licence issued by another Member State would be fundamentally incompatible with the principle of the mutual recognition of driving licences which is the linchpin of the system established by Directive 91/439.

40. In its written submissions, the Kingdom of Spain refers to the transposition of those provisions by the national decree of 2011 together with the supplementing clause. In that regard, it must be pointed out that the national decree of 2011 did not, in any event, enter into force until after the period laid down in the reasoned opinion had expired. It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (Case C‑286/12 Commission v Hungary [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

41 The reason for this mitigation of the burden of proof on the Commission is that it is the Member State which is best placed to collect and verify the data required for the clearance of EAGGF accounts; consequently, it is for the State to adduce the most detailed and comprehensive evidence that it has made checks or that its figures are accurate and, if appropriate, that the Commission's assertions are incorrect (Cases C-54/95 Germany v Commission, cited above, paragraph 35, and C-28/94 Netherlands v Commission, cited above, paragraph 41).

41 The reason for this mitigation of the burden of proof on the Commission is that it is the State which is best placed to collect and verify the data required for the clearance of EAGGF accounts, and that it is consequently for the State to adduce the most detailed and comprehensive evidence that it has made checks and, if appropriate, that the Commission's assertions are incorrect (see, to that effect, Germany v Commission, paragraph 35).

27. In that regard, it must be borne in mind, first, that the proprietor of a trade mark is entitled to prohibit a third party from using, without the proprietor’s consent, a sign identical with that trade mark when that use is in the course of trade, is in relation to goods or services which are identical with, or similar to, those for which that trade mark is registered, and affects, or is liable to affect, the functions of the trade mark (Joined Cases C‑236/08 to C‑238/08 Google France and Google [2010] ECR I‑2417, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

22. Next, it should be recalled that national legislation which places certain nationals of the Member State concerned at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State constitutes a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 21(1) TFEU on every citizen of the Union (Case C‑406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR I‑6947, paragraph 39; Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 25; and Prinz and Seeberger , paragraph 27). In that respect, a national of a Member State who goes to another Member State and pursues secondary education there exercises the freedom of movement guaranteed by Article 20 TFEU (see, to that effect, D’Hoop , paragraphs 29 to 34, and Case C‑209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I‑2119, paragraph 35).

30 In that a citizen of the Union must be granted in all Member States the same treatment in law as that accorded to the nationals of those Member States who find themselves in the same situation, it would be incompatible with the right of freedom of movement were a citizen, in the Member State of which he is a national, to receive treatment less favourable than he would enjoy if he had not availed himself of the opportunities offered by the Treaty in relation to freedom of movement.

27. However, Article 52(1) of the Charter accepts that limitations may be imposed on the exercise of rights and freedoms, such as the freedom to conduct a business, as long as those limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert [2010] ECR I-11063, paragraph 65, and Sky Österreich , paragraph 48).

41 The Court has repeatedly held that, where they cause tensions prejudicial to the proper functioning of the service, internal relationship difficulties may justify the transfer of an official in the interests of the service. Such a measure may even be taken irrespective of the question of responsibility for the incidents in question (see Case 124/78 List v Commission [1979] ECR 2499, paragraph 13).

13 CONTRARY TO WHAT THE APPLICANT ALLEGES THESE MEASURES CANNOT BE REGARDED AS CONSTITUTING A BREACH OF THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE SET OUT IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 24 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS . QUITE APART FROM THE QUESTION OF WHO BEARS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT ON 15 JUNE 1977 , WHICH IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE COURT TO DECIDE IN THESE PROCEEDINGS , IT SHOULD BE OBSERVED THAT IT WAS FOR THE APPLICANT , WHO HAD BEEN GIVEN THE TASK OF CO-ORDINATION , TO ENSURE THAT RELATIONS COMPATIBLE WITH THE PROPER RUNNING OF THE SERVICE WERE MAINTAINED WITHIN HIS WORKING GROUP . ONCE IT BECAME CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SMOOTH OUT THE DIFFERENCES WHICH HAD ARISEN BETWEEN THE APPLICANT AND HIS FIVE COLLEAGUES THE DEFENDANT INSTITUTION WAS ENTITLED TO TAKE ANY APPROPRIATE STEPS IN ORDER TO RESTORE A PEACEABLE ATMOSPHERE IN THE DEPARTMENT IN QUESTION . THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE ADMINISTRATION NAMELY , FIRST , IN GIVING RESPONSIBILITY FOR CO-ORDINATION WHICH HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT BY THE APPLICANT TO HIS SUPERIOR AND SECONDLY IN PLACING THE APPLICANT AT THE DISPOSAL OF A DEPARTMENT WHERE A REVISER WITH THE APPLICANT ' S QUALIFICATIONS WAS REQUIRED , CONSTITUTE A REASONABLE REACTION TO THE SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE DETERIORATION OF WORKING RELATIONSHIPS IN THE TRANSLATION GROUP IN QUESTION . THE MEASURES WERE THUS ADOPTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE SERVICE AND THERE IS NOTHING TO SHOW THAT THE WAY IN WHICH THEY WERE ADOPTED DETRIMENTALLY AFFECTED THE APPLICANT ' S INTERESTS AS AN OFFICIAL . IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THE CLAIM FOR A DECLARATION THAT THE INSTITUTION FAILED TO FULFIL ITS OBLIGATION UNDER THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 24 OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS MUST BE DISMISSED .

100. In that regard, it cannot validly be maintained that that case-law is not applicable to relations between Member States and non-Member States, since a lack of reciprocity in such relations, as relied on by the German Government, cannot justify a restriction on movements of capital between Member States and those non-Member States (see, to that effect, Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen , paragraph 128).

139. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations (see, inter alia, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France , paragraph 63; Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala , paragraph 166; and Melli Bank v Council , paragraph 93).

93. With regard to the obligation to provide a statement of reasons, the appellant does not challenge the principle that that obligation must be assessed by reference to the circumstances of each case, which the General Court recalled in paragraphs 143 to 145 of the judgment under appeal. It does however contend that the General Court erred in law in holding that the statement of reasons for the contested decision was sufficient and satisfied the obligation laid down in Article 15(3) of Regulation No 423/2007 to give individual and specific reasons for that decision.

17 Although applicable without distinction to all products, an obligation such as that imposed in the present case by Article 6(1)(1) of the Royal Decree is of a nature such as to hinder intra-Community trade. It may force the importer to alter the packaging of his products on the basis of the place where they are marketed and therefore to incur additional packaging and labelling costs (see, to that effect, Case C-51/93 Meyhui v Schott Zwiesel Glaswerke [1994] ECR I-3879, paragraph 13; and Case C-33/97 Colim v Bigg's Continent Noord [1999] ECR I-3175, paragraph 36).

13 Accordingly, in its application the Commission may clarify its initial complaints provided, however, that it does not alter the subject-matter of the dispute (see judgment in Commission v Finland, C‑195/04, EU:C:2007:248, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).

18. In this regard, although it is true that the subject-matter of proceedings brought under Article 226 EC is circumscribed by the pre-litigation procedure provided for in that provision and that, consequently, the Commission’s reasoned opinion and the application must be based on the same objections, that requirement cannot go so far as to mean that in every case exactly the same wording must be used in both, where the subject-matter of the proceedings has not been extended or altered but simply narrowed (see, in particular, Case C‑229/00 Commission v Finland [2003] ECR I-5727, paragraphs 44 and 46, Case C-433/03 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-6985, paragraph 28, and Case C-150/04 Commission v Denmark [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 67). Accordingly, in its application the Commission may clarify its initial grounds of objection provided, however, that it does not alter the subject-matter of the dispute (Case C-67/99 Commission v Ireland [2001] ECR I-5757, paragraph 23, judgment of 12 October 2004 in Case C-328/02 Commission v Greece , not published in the ECR, paragraph 32, and Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland [2005] ECR I-3331, paragraph 38).

52. According to the settled case-law of the Court, the place where the damage occurred is the place where the alleged damage actually manifests itself (see judgment in Zuid-Chemie , C‑189/08, EU:C:2009:475, paragraph 27). As for loss consisting in additional costs incurred because of artificially high prices, such as the price of the hydrogen peroxide supplied by the cartel at issue in the main proceedings, that place is identifiable only for each alleged victim taken individually and is located, in general, at that victim’s registered office.

51. In that regard, it is apparent from case-law that, while the Community directives on public procurement do not in theory preclude the examination of the tenderers’ suitability and the award of the contract from taking place simultaneously, the two procedures are nevertheless distinct and are governed by different rules (see, by analogy, Case 31/87 Beentjes [1988] ECR 4635, paragraphs 15 and 16, and Case C‑532/06 Lianakis and Others [2008] ECR I‑251, paragraph 26).

15 According to the structure of the directive, in particular Title IV ( Common rules on participation ), the examination of the suitability of contractors to carry out the contracts to be awarded and the awarding of the contract are two different operations in the procedure for the award of a public works contract . Article 20 of the directive provides that the contract is to be awarded after the contractor' s suitability has been checked .

53. Indeed, an interpretation to that effect would be incompatible with the objectives of Directive 2001/42 and would undermine its effectiveness, since it would mean that a potentially broad category of measures modifying plans and programmes likely to give rise to significant environmental effects is, on principle, excluded from the scope of that directive even though those measures are expressly covered by the terms of Articles 2(a) and 3(2)(a) of that directive.

39. However, as has been held on several occasions, Directive 77/187 is applicable whenever, in the context of contractual relations, there is a change in the natural or legal person responsible for carrying on the business and entering into the obligations of an employer towards employees of the undertaking. Thus there is no need, in order for Directive 77/187 to be applicable, for there to be any direct contractual relationship between the transferor and the transferee: the transfer may take place through the intermediary of a third party such as the owner or the person putting up the capital (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-171/94 and C-172/94 Merckx and Neuhuys [1996] ECR I-1253, paragraphs 28 to 30, Süzen , paragraph 12, and Case C-51/00 Temco [2002] ECR I-969, paragraph 31).

30. It is clear from that case-law that, for the Directive to apply, it is not necessary for there to be a direct contractual relationship between the transferor and the transferee. Consequently, where a motor vehicle dealership concluded with one undertaking is terminated and a new dealership is awarded to another undertaking pursuing the same activities, the transfer of undertaking is the result of a legal transfer for the purposes of the Directive, as interpreted by the Court.

46 Consequently, those conditions may not have the effect of excluding from the scope of national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, persons to whom that legislation applies by virtue of Regulation No 1408/71; moreover, the compulsory insurance schemes must be compatible with the provisions of Articles 18 and 45 TFEU (judgment of 17 January 2012, Salemink, C‑347/10, EU:C:2012:17, paragraph 40).

21. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, in particular, Joined Cases C‑94/04 and C‑202/04 Cipolla and Others [2006] ECR I‑11421, paragraph 25; Case C‑285/09 R [2010] ECR I‑12605, paragraph 32; and Case C‑307/10 Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

25. As regards Mr Cipolla’s pleas of inadmissibility, it should be recalled that questions on the interpretation of Community law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance (see Case C‑300/01 Salzmann [2003] ECR I-4899, paragraphs 29 and 31). The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 39, and Case C-466/04 Acereda Herrera [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 48).

48. In this respect, it must be recalled that, where two entities constitute one economic entity, the fact that the entity that committed the infringement still exists does not as such preclude imposing a penalty on the entity to which its economic activities were transferred (see, to that effect, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , paragraphs 355 to 358).

23. In situations such as those at issue in the main proceedings, in which the irregularities were allegedly committed by the operators in 1993 when a national rule provided for a 30-year limitation period, an action by the national authorities for recovery of the sums wrongly received as a result of such irregularities was liable, in the absence of a suspensory act, to be time-barred in the course of 1997 pursuant to the four-year limitation rule provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95, provided, however, that the Member State in which the irregularities were committed did not make use of the possibility offered to it under Article 3(3) of that regulation (see Josef Vosding Schlacht-, Kühl- und Zerlegebetrieb and Others , paragraphs 36 and 38).

36. In situations such as those at issue in the main proceedings, in which the irregularities were allegedly committed by the operators in 1993 subject to a national rule providing for a 30-year limitation period, as was found in paragraph 33 above, the repayment of the sums wrongly received as a result of such irregularities was liable, in the absence of a suspensory act, to be time-barred in the course of 1997, provided that the Member State in which the irregularities were committed has not made use of the possibility offered to it under Article 3(3) of Regulation No 2988/95.

54 Nevertheless, it is settled case-law of the Court that fundamental rights do not constitute unfettered prerogatives and may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the measure in question and that they do not involve, with regard to the objectives pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes upon the very substance of the rights guaranteed (judgment of 18 March 2010, Alassini and Others, C‑317/08 to C‑320/08, EU:C:2010:146, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

39 In that regard, according to the case-law of the Court, the basis of assessment for a provision of services is everything which makes up the consideration for the service provided and a provision of services is taxable only if there is a direct link between the service provided and the consideration received (Apple and Pear Development Council, paragraphs 11 and 12, and Case C-16/93 Tolsma [1994] ECR I-743, paragraph 13). A supply of services is therefore taxable only if there exists between the service provider and the recipient a legal relationship in which there is a reciprocal performance, the remuneration received by the provider of service constituting the value actually given in return for the service supplied to the recipient (Tolsma, paragraph 14).

11 IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT, IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 5 FEBRUARY 1981 ( CASE 154/80 STAATSSECRETARIS VAN FINANCIEN V COOEPERATIEVE AARDAPPELENBEWAARPLAATS (( 1981 )) ECR 445 ) THE COURT RULED THAT, FOR THE PROVISION OF SERVICES TO BE TAXABLE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SECOND DIRECTIVE, THERE MUST BE A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE SERVICE PROVIDED AND THE CONSIDERATION RECEIVED .

17. It must first be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the need to provide an interpretation of Community law which will be of use to the national court makes it necessary that the national court should define the factual and legislative context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-115/97 to C‑117/97 Brentjens’ [1999] ECR I-6025, paragraph 38; Case C-207/01 Altair Chimica [2003] ECR I-8875, paragraph 24; and Case C-72/03 Carbonati Apuani [2004] ECR I-8027, paragraph 10).

41. In that regard, it is for the competent national authorities to assess whether the knowledge acquired in the host Member State, either during a course of study or by way of practical experience, is sufficient in order to prove possession of the knowledge which is lacking ( Vlassopoulou , paragraph 20; Fernández de Bobadilla , paragraph 33; and Morgenbesser , paragraph 71).

20 In this regard, the competent national authorities must assess whether the knowledge acquired in the host Member State, either during a course of study or by way of practical experience, is sufficient in order to prove possession of the knowledge which is lacking.

17 FOR A NEW FACT TO BE ABLE TO JUSTIFY THE RAISING OF A FRESH ISSUE DURING THE PROCEEDINGS THE FACT MUST NOT HAVE EXISTED OR MUST NOT HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO THE APPLICANT WHEN THE ACTION WAS COMMENCED . SINCE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS ARE PRESUMED TO BE VALID UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE COURT MAY DECLARE THEM INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE COMMUNITIES , THE JUDGMENT GIVEN BY THE COURT IN CASE 112/80 MERELY CONFIRMED THE LAW WHICH WAS KNOWN TO THE APPLICANT WHEN IT BROUGHT ITS ACTION .

36. It is admittedly true that the Court has also held that, where the European Union intends to implement a particular obligation assumed under the agreements concluded in the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or where the European Union legal measure refers expressly to specific provisions of those agreements, it is for the Court, when appropriate, to review the legality of the Union measure at issue in the light of the WTO rules (see, to that effect, the judgments in Fediol v Commission , 70/87, EU:C:1989:254, paragraphs 19 to 22, and Nakajima v Council , C‑69/89, EU:C:1991:186, paragraphs 29 to 32; see, also, the judgment in LVP , C‑306/13, EU:C:2014:2465, paragraph 47 and case-law cited).

32 In those circumstances, it is necessary to examine whether the Council went beyond the legal framework thus laid down, as Nakajima claims, and whether, by adopting the disputed provision, it acted in breach of Article 2(4) and (6) of the Anti-Dumping Code.

23 In this regard, it should be observed that, according to the case-law, the statement of the reasons on which a decision adversely affecting a person is based must allow the Court to exercise its power of review as to its legality and must provide the person concerned with the information necessary to enable him to decide whether or not the decision is well founded (Michel v Parliament, cited above, paragraph 22).

15 As regards the argument relating to the principle of equality between private and public undertakings, it should be recalled that, as the Court pointed out in the judgment in Case C-303/88 (Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, at paragraph 20), it follows from that principle of equal treatment that capital placed by the State, directly or indirectly, at the disposal of an undertaking, in circumstances which correspond to normal market conditions cannot be regarded as State aid. However, regard being had to the facts recorded above, it is impossible to maintain that the undertakings in question received the capital placed at their disposal in circumstances which corresponded to normal market conditions.

20 It follows from that principle of equal treatment that capital placed by the State, directly or indirectly, at the disposal of an undertaking in circumstances which correspond to normal market conditions cannot be regarded as State aid. In the present case it must therefore be determined whether, in similar circumstances, a private industrial group might also have made up the operating losses of the four subsidiaries between 1983 and 1987.

31. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the concept of force majeure must be understood as referring to unusual and unforeseeable circumstances which were beyond the control of the party by whom it is pleaded and the consequences of which could not have been avoided even if all due care had been exercised (Case 145/85 Denkavit België [1987] ECR 565, paragraph 11; Case C‑377/03 Commission v Belgium [2006] ECR I‑9733, paragraph 95; and Case C‑218/09 SGS Belgium and Others [2010] ECR I‑2373, paragraph 44).

25 The Brussels Convention is intended to facilitate the free movement of judgments by establishing a simple and rapid procedure in the Contracting State where enforcement of a foreign decision is applied for. That enforcement procedure constitutes an autonomous and complete system (see to that effect Case 148/84 Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v Brasserie du Pêcheur [1985] ECR 1981, paragraph 17, and Case C-172/91 Sonntag v Waidmann [1993] ECR I-1963, paragraphs 32 and 33).

17 IN ORDER TO ATTAIN THAT OBJECTIVE THE CONVENTION ESTABLISHED AN ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE WHICH CONSTITUTES AN AUTONOMOUS AND COMPLETE SYSTEM , INCLUDING THE MATTER OF APPEALS . IT FOLLOWS THAT ARTICLE 36 OF THE CONVENTION EXCLUDES PROCEDURES WHEREBY INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES MAY CHALLENGE AN ENFORCEMENT ORDER UNDER DOMESTIC LAW .

118. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the principle of non-discrimination prohibits not only direct or overt discrimination on grounds of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other distinguishing criteria, lead to the same result (see Case C‑212/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I‑4923, paragraph 24, and Case C‑224/00 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I‑2965, paragraph 15).

61. Finally, the Commission has also failed to show how the requirement referred to in paragraph 53 of this judgment restricts freedom to provide services, but has simply confined itself to noting disparities between national social security schemes which remain in the absence of harmonisation at the level of EU law in that respect (see, in that regard, Case 41/84 Pinna [1986] ECR 1, paragraph 20, and Commission v Spain , paragraph 61).

61. With regard to an insured person whose travel to another Member State is for reasons relating to tourism or education, for example, and not to any inadequacy in the health service to which he is affiliated, the rules of the Treaty on freedom of movement offer no guarantee that all hospital treatment services which may have to be provided to him unexpectedly in the Member State of stay will be neutral in terms of cost. Given the disparities between one Member State and another in matters of social security cover and the fact that the objective of Regulation No 1408/71 is to coordinate the national laws but not to harmonise them, the conditions attached to a hospital stay in another Member State may, according to the circumstances, be to the insured person’s advantage or disadvantage (see, by analogy, Joined Cases C‑393/99 and C‑394/99 Hervein and Others [2002] ECR I‑2829, paragraphs 50 to 52; Case C‑387/01 Weigel [2004] ECR I‑4981, paragraph 55; and Case C‑392/05 Alevizos [2007] ECR I‑3505, paragraph 76).

43. In this connection, the Court has repeatedly held that EU law cannot be relied on by individuals for abusive or fraudulent ends (see, inter alia, judgments in Kittel and Recolta Recycling , EU:C:2006:446, paragraph 54; Fini H , C‑32/03, EU:C:2005:128, paragraph 32; and Maks Pen , C‑18/13, EU:C:2014:69, paragraph 26).

83 If the Member States were permitted to allow their producers to use, within their national territories, one of the indications or symbols which are reserved, under Regulation No 1234/2007, for designations registered under that regulation, on the basis of a national right which could meet less strict requirements than those laid down in that regulation for the products in question, the risk is that that assurance of quality, which constitutes the essential function of rights conferred pursuant to Regulation No 1234/2007, could not be guaranteed. To confer such a discretion on those national producers would also carry the risk of jeopardising the attainment of free and undistorted competition in the internal market between producers of products bearing those indications or symbols and, in particular, would be liable to harm rights which ought to be reserved for producers who have made a genuine effort to improve quality in order to be able to use a geographical indication registered under that regulation (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 September 2009, Budějovický Budvar, C‑478/07, EU:C:2009:521, paragraph 112).

112. If the Member States were permitted to allow their producers to use, within their national territories, one of the indications or symbols which are reserved, under Article 8 of Regulation No 510/2006, for designations registered under that regulation, on the basis of a national right which could meet less strict requirements than those laid down in that regulation for the products in question, the risk is that that assurance of quality, which constitutes the essential function of rights conferred pursuant to Regulation No 510/2006, could not be guaranteed. That also carries the risk, in the internal market, of jeopardising the aim of fair competition between producers of products bearing those indications or symbols and, in particular, would be liable to harm rights which ought to be reserved for producers who have made a genuine effort to improve quality in order to be able to use a geographical indication registered under that regulation.

39. Le fait que, dans l’affaire ayant donné lieu à l’arrêt Marks & Spencer, précité, le contribuable ne disposait que d’une voie de recours, tandis que, dans l’affaire en cause au principal, le contribuable dispose de deux voies de recours, ne saurait, dans des circonstances telles que celles portées devant la juridiction de renvoi, conduire à un résultat différent.

60. It should be recalled, in this respect, that the Court has held that the mere requirement, for treatment planned in another Member State, of prior authorisation to which responsibility for payment by the competent institution is made subject, in accordance with the rules governing cover in force in the Member State to which that institution belongs, constitutes, both for patients and service providers, an obstacle to the freedom to provide services, since such a system deters, or even prevents, those patients from approaching providers of medical services established in a Member State to obtain the treatment in question (see, to that effect, Kohll , paragraph 35; Smits and Peerbooms , paragraph 69; Müller-Fauré and van Riet , paragraphs 41, 44 and 103; Watts , paragraph 98; and Commission v France , paragraph 32).

32. In the circumstances of the case, the prior authorisation to which the national legislation makes subject responsibility for payment by the competent institution, in accordance with the rules governing cover in force in the Member State to which it belongs, for treatment planned in another Member State and involving the use of major medical equipment outside hospital infrastructures is capable of deterring, or even preventing, persons insured under the French system from applying to providers of medical services established in such another Member State in order to obtain the treatment in question. It constitutes, therefore, for both the insured persons and the providers of those services, a restriction of the freedom to provide services (see, to that effect, Müller-Fauré and van Riet , paragraphs 44 and 103, and Watts , paragraph 98).

221. According to that case-law, such an interpretation cannot lead to the imposition on an individual of an obligation laid down by a directive which has not been transposed or, a fortiori, have the effect of determining or aggravating, on the basis of the decision and in the absence of a law enacted for its implementation, the liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of that directive’s provisions (see, in particular, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen , cited above, paragraph 14, and Case C-168/95 Arcaro [1996] ECR I-4705, paragraph 42).

82. As regards, firstly, the relevance of the effects of the infringement in question, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, the gravity of infringements of European Union competition law is determined by reference to numerous factors, and that no binding or exhaustive list of criteria to be taken into account has been drawn up (see, inter alia, judgment of 19 December 2012 in Case C‑445/11 P Bavaria v Commission , paragraph 59 and the case-law cited). With regard, more specifically, to the actual impact of an infringement on the market, that is not a decisive factor for determining the level of fines (see KME Germany and Others v Commission , paragraph 34 and Case C‑389/10 P KME Germany and Others v Commission [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 44).

59. En particulier, pour ce qui est de la gravité des infractions au droit de l’Union relatif à la concurrence, il résulte d’une jurisprudence constante que celle-ci doit être établie en fonction d’un grand nombre d’éléments, tels que, notamment, les circonstances particulières de l’affaire, le rôle joué par chaque entreprise dans une entente, le profit qu’elle a pu tirer de cette pratique, la taille de l’entreprise, la valeur des marchandises ou des services concernés, le risque que des infractions de ce type représentent pour les objectifs de l’Union ainsi que la portée dissuasive des amendes, et ce sans qu’ait été établie une liste contraignante ou exhaustive de critères devant obligatoirement être pris en compte (voir, en ce sens, arrêts Dansk Rørindustri e.a./Commission, précité, points 241 et 242, ainsi que du 3 septembre 2009, Prym et Prym Consumer/Commission, C‑534/07 P, Rec. p. I‑7415, point 54).

56. By contrast, reliance on the mere fact of the temporary nature of the employment of staff of the public administration does not meet those requirements and is therefore not capable of constituting an ‘objective ground’ within the meaning of clause 4(1) of the framework agreement (judgment in Gavieiro Gavieiro and Iglesias Torres , C‑444/09 and C‑456/09, EU:C:2010:819, paragraph 56, and orders in Montoya Medina , C‑273/10, EU:C:2011:167, paragraph 42, and Lorenzo Martínez , C‑556/11, EU:C:2012:67, paragraph 49).

67. In paragraph 184 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rightly pointed out that where, following the annulment of a decision penalising undertakings which have infringed Article 81(1) EC because of a procedural defect concerning exclusively the procedures governing its final adoption by the College of Commissioners, the Commission is to adopt a fresh decision, with substantially the same content and based on the same objections, it is not required to conduct a new hearing of the undertakings concerned (see, to that effect, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission , paragraphs 83 to 111).

102 Therefore, since the PVC I decision had become final in relation to those two undertakings, they could no longer be addressees of the PVC II decision. Nevertheless, to the extent that they were involved in the objections raised with respect to all the undertakings initially implicated, their respective roles could be taken into account by the Commission in the PVC II decision in so far as they related to the objections raised against the addressees of that decision for the purposes of establishing the infringements found to have been committed by those addressees, each within the limits of its own liability. The PVC I and PVC II decisions do not therefore relate to agreements or concerted practices in respect of which the participants proceeded against in 1994 are different from those proceeded against in 1988. They concern the same agreements or concerted practices in respect of the same undertakings which, solely by virtue of the application of procedural rules, were penalised by two successive decisions.

60. Furthermore, the existence of an earlier practice of establishing secondary legal bases cannot reasonably be relied upon. Even on the assumption that there is such a practice, it cannot derogate from the rules laid down in the Treaty and cannot therefore create a precedent binding on the institutions (see, to that effect, United Kingdom v Council , paragraph 24, and Case C‑426/93 Germany v Council [1995] ECR I‑3723, paragraph 21).

41 Next, under Paragraph 270(1) of the BAO, the President of the regional finance authority has the power to nominate members of the appeal chambers on the basis of the lists of appeal commission members. There is no legislative provision to prevent him from modifying, at his discretion, the composition of an appeal chamber for the inquiry into each complaint, or even in the course of the inquiry into a complaint. In the absence of an express legislative provision determining the length of the mandate of appeal chamber members and specifying the conditions of removal, members cannot be said to enjoy sufficient safeguards against undue intervention or pressure on the part of the executive (see, to that effect, Case C-103/97 Köllensperger and Atzwanger [1999] ECR I-551, paragraph 21).

21 Moreover, the passage in Paragraph 6(4) of the TVergG concerning removal of members `if the conditions for appointment are no longer met or if circumstances occur which prevent proper exercise of the office and are likely to do so for a long time' appears prima facie too vague to guarantee against undue intervention or pressure on the part of the executive.

40. It is settled case-law that Article 4 of the Sixth Directive thus gives VAT a very wide scope, comprising all stages of production, distribution and the provision of services (see, inter alia, Case C-186/89 Van Tiem [1990] ECR I-4363, paragraph 17, and MKG-Kraftfahrzeuge-Factoring , cited above, paragraph 42).

67 First, having regard to the objective of promoting competition, set out in Article 8(2) of the Framework Directive and to the requirements of the principle of proportionality, the sum required for eligibility for the allocation of radio frequencies must be set at an appropriate level to reflect, in particular, the value of the use of those radio frequencies, which requires account to be taken of the economic and technical situation and the competitiveness of the market in question (see, by analogy, judgments of 10 March 2011, Telefónica Móviles España, C‑85/10, EU:C:2011:141, paragraphs 27 and 28, and of 21 March 2013, Belgacom and Others, C‑375/11, EU:C:2013:185, paragraphs 50 and 51).

27. It is also apparent from the European Commission’s written observations that the authorisation to use public property which constitutes a scarce resource enables the holder of that authorisation to make significant economic gains and grants that holder advantages as compared with other operators who are also seeking to use and exploit that resource, which justifies imposing a charge which reflects, inter alia, the value of the use of the scarce resource at issue.

18. Accordingly, the present action for failure to fulfil obligations cannot in any case be regarded as being devoid of purpose (see, to this effect, Case 240/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 1835, paragraphs 12 to 15).

49. Similarly, the Court has consistently held that the purpose of Article 88(3) EC, which is designed to prevent the putting into effect of aid contrary to the EC Treaty, requires that the prohibition laid down in that respect by the last sentence of that provision should be effective during the whole of the preliminary stage. That is why, in order to take account of the interest of Member States in being informed of the position quickly in spheres where the necessity to intervene may be of an urgent nature, the Commission must act diligently. If, after being informed by a Member State of a plan to grant aid, the Commission fails to initiate the contentious procedure within a reasonable period of time, the Member State may, after giving prior notice to the Commission, put the aid in question into effect, whereupon it will come under the system for already existing aid. Guided by Articles 173 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 230 EC) and 175 of the EC Treaty (now Article 232 EC), the Court has held that a reasonable period ought not to exceed two months (see, to that effect, Lorenz , cited above, paragraph 4, and Case C-99/98 Austria v Commission [2001] ECR I-1101, paragraph 32). Moreover, the Court has also held that that period of two months constitutes a mandatory time-limit (Austria v Commission , cited above, paragraphs 72 to 74).

4 ACCORDING TO THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 93 THE MEMBER STATE SHALL NOT PUT ITS PROPOSED MEASURES INTO EFFECT UNTIL THIS PROCEDURE HAS RESULTED IN A FINAL DECISION . THE OBJECTIVE PURSUED BY ARTICLE 93 ( 3 ), WHICH IS TO PREVENT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AID CONTRARY TO THE TREATY, IMPLIES THAT THIS PROHIBITION IS EFFECTIVE DURING THE WHOLE OF THE PRELIMINARY PERIOD . WHILE THIS PERIOD MUST ALLOW THE COMMISSION SUFFICIENT TIME, THIS LATTER MUST, HOWEVER, ACT DILIGENTLY AND TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE INTEREST OF MEMBER STATES OF BEING INFORMED OF THE POSITION QUICKLY IN SPHERES WHERE THE NECESSITY TO INTERVENE CAN BE OF AN URGENT NATURE BY REASON OF THE EFFECT THAT THESE MEMBER STATES EXPECT FROM THE PROPOSED MEASURES OF ENCOURAGEMENT . IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY REGULATION SPECIFYING THIS PERIOD, THE MEMBER STATES CANNOT UNILATERALLY TERMINATE THIS PRELIMINARY PERIOD WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR THE COMMISSION TO FULFIL ITS ROLE . THE LATTER, HOWEVER, COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS ACTING WITH PROPER DILIGENCE IF IT OMITTED TO DEFINE ITS ATTITUDE WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD . IT IS APPROPRIATE IN THIS RESPECT TO BE GUIDED BY ARTICLES 173 AND 175 OF THE TREATY WHICH, IN DEALING WITH COMPARABLE SITUATIONS, PROVIDE FOR A PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS . WHEN THIS PERIOD HAS EXPIRED, THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED MAY IMPLEMENT THE PLAN, BUT THE REQUIREMENTS OF LEGAL CERTAINTY INVOLVE THAT PRIOR NOTICE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE COMMISSION .

125. As regards the seriousness of the infringement, the vital nature of the rules of the FEU Treaty on State aid must be borne in mind (Case C-369/07 Commission v Greece , paragraph 118).

11 Article 3(1) of Regulation No 857/84 has already been interpreted by the Court in its judgments in Joined Cases 196/88, 197/88 and 198/88 Cornée and Others v Copall and Others [1989] ECR 2309 and in Case C-16/89 Spronk v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij [1990] ECR I-3185. As regards the situation referred to in the first indent of Article 3(1), it is clear from the very wording of the provision, as was held in particular in paragraph 13 of the judgment in Cornée and Others, cited above, that Member States have a discretion to decide whether or not special reference quantities should be allocated to the producers mentioned in that provision and, if so, to determine their volume.

13 From the wording of the aforementioned provision it is clear that it grants to the Member States a discretionary power to decide whether special reference quantities should be allocated to the producers mentioned in that provision and, if so, to determine their size .

41. That directive is intended to achieve only partial harmonisation of the area in question. It is not intended to establish a uniform level of protection throughout the European Union on the basis of common criteria, but to ensure that the employee is protected in his relations with the transferee to the same extent as he was in his relations with the transferor under the legal rules of the Member State concerned (Case C‑209/91 Watson Rask and Christensen [1992] ECR I‑5755, paragraph 27, and Case C‑4/01 Martin and Others [2003] ECR I‑12859, paragraph 41).

40. That division of powers results from the fact that the claim and the instrument permitting enforcement are established on the basis of the law in force in the Member State in which the applicant authority is situated, whilst, for enforcement measures in the Member State in which the requested authority is situated, the latter applies, pursuant to Articles 5 and 6 of Directive 76/308, the provisions which its national law lays down for corresponding measures, that authority being the best placed to judge the legality of the measure according to its national law (see, by analogy, Case C‑184/05 Twoh International [2007] ECR I‑7897, paragraph 36, and Case C-318/07 Persche [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 63).

63. However, Directive 77/799 does not in any way affect the powers of the competent authorities of the donor’s Member State to assess in particular whether the conditions to which that legislation subjects the grant of a tax advantage are fulfilled (see, to that effect, Twoh International , paragraph 36). Thus, as regards a body established and recognised as having charitable status in another Member State, the donor’s Member State must allow identical tax treatment to that applied to gifts made to national bodies only if that body satisfies the requirements laid down by the legislation of that latter Member State for the grant of tax advantages, among which are the pursuit of objectives identical to those promoted by the tax law of that Member State. It is for the competent national authorities, including the national courts, to establish whether, under the rules of national law, compliance with the requirements imposed by the donor’s Member State for the grant of the tax advantage in question has been proved.

79. However, Article 49 EC precludes the application of any national rules which have the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within one Member State (Joined Cases C‑544/03 and C‑545/03 Mobistar and Belgacom Mobile [2005] ECR I‑7723, paragraph 30).

41 Accordingly, as the Court has repeatedly held, in so far as the rules regarding the manner in which the EU institutions arrive at their decisions are laid down in the Treaties and are not within the discretion of the Member States or of the institutions themselves, the Treaties alone may, in particular cases, empower an institution to amend a decision-making procedure established by the Treaties (judgment of 6 September 2017, Slovakia and Hungary v Council, C‑643/15 and C‑647/15, EU:C:2017:631, paragraph 149).

149 Indeed, as the Court has already held, as the rules regarding the manner in which the EU institutions arrive at their decisions are laid down in the Treaties and are not within the discretion of the Member States or of the institutions themselves, the Treaties alone may, in particular cases, empower an institution to amend a decision-making procedure established by the Treaties (judgment of 10 September 2015, Parliament v Council, C‑363/14, EU:C:2015:579, paragraph 43).

63. The Court finds on this point that, although any classification presupposes that the competent authorities are convinced, based on the best scientific knowledge available, that the site in question is among the most suitable areas for the protection of birds (see, to that effect, Case C‑60/05 WWF Italia and Others [2006] ECR I‑5083, paragraph 27), that does not however mean that the obligation to classify does not, as a rule, arise so long as those authorities have not completed their evaluation and check of the new scientific knowledge.

50. It is clear, however, from the judgment in Case C-5/01 Belgium v Commission [2002] ECR I-11991, paragraph 60, that that period cannot be regarded as a mandatory time‑limit subject to withdrawal of competence, the expiry of which would prevent the Commission from deciding on the compatibility of the proposed aid measure with the Treaty.

60. Therefore, given its general context and objective, the three-month period set out in Article 6(5) of the sixth steel aid code cannot be regarded as a prescription period linked to loss of competence.

47. In that regard, the first paragraph of Article 110 TFEU is infringed where the tax charged on the imported product and that charged on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product (see, to that effect, judgments in Bobie Getränkevertrieb , 127/75, EU:C:1976:95, paragraph 3, and Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten and Gemeindebetriebe Frohnleiten , C‑221/06, EU:C:2007:657, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

64 In that respect, DEI and the Commission state that, if, according to the settled case-law of the Court, an omission attributed to a Member State may result in the emergence of State aid (judgment of 19 mars 2013, Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others and Commission v France and Others, C‑399/10 P and C‑401/10 P, EU:C:2013:175, paragraphs 100 to 103), such would, a fortiori, be the case of a measure taken by an organ of the State, even when it is not a legislative measure.

102. It is settled case-law that Article 107(1) TFEU defines measures of State intervention in relation to their effects (Case C-124/10 P Commission v EDF and Others [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

26. Regarding services of a medical nature, the case-law is to the effect that the term ‘medical care’ in Article 13A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as covering all provisions of medical care envisaged in letter (c) of the same provision ( Dornier , paragraph 50), since those two provisions are intended to regulate all exemptions of medical services in the strict sense ( Kügler , paragraph 36).

31. In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it is for the national courts alone which are seised of the case and are responsible for the judgment to be delivered to determine, in view of the special features of each case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to give their judgment and the relevance of the questions which they put to the Court. Consequently, where questions submitted by national courts concern the interpretation of a provision of European Union law, the Court is, in principle, obliged to give a ruling (see Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 38; Case C‑390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I‑607, paragraph 18; and Case C‑373/00 Adolf Truley [2003] ECR I‑1931, paragraph 21).

18 It is settled case-law that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts established by Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, for example, Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59).

105. In paragraph 20 of Daily Mail and General Trust , the Court stated that the legislation of the Member States varies widely in regard to both the factor providing a connection to the national territory required for the incorporation of a company and the question whether a company incorporated under the legislation of a Member State may subsequently modify that connecting factor. Certain States require that not merely the registered office but also the real seat ( siège réel ) – that is to say, the central administration of the company – should be situated in their territory, and the removal of the central administration from that territory thus presupposes the winding-up of the company with all the consequences that winding-up entails under company law. The legislation of other States permits companies to transfer their central administration to a foreign country but certain of them make that right subject to certain restrictions, and the legal consequences of a transfer vary from one Member State to another.

91. In any event, it is clear from the Court’s case‑law that restrictions on the right to import third-country bananas resulting from the opening of any tariff quota and from the machinery for its subdivision are inherent in the establishment of a common organisation of the market designed to ensure that the objectives of Article 33 EC are safeguarded and that the Community’s international obligations are complied with. Such restrictions are therefore not such as to impair improperly the freedom of traditional traders in third-country bananas to pursue their trade or business (see Case C-280/93 Germany v Council , paragraphs 82 and 87, and Case C‑122/95 Germany v Council , paragraph 77).

87 Accordingly, the restriction imposed by the Regulation on the freedom of traditional traders in third-country bananas to pursue their trade or business corresponds to objectives of general Community interest and does not impair the very substance of that right.

27. It is on the basis of those principles that the Court has ruled that the national court’s power to determine of its own motion whether a term is unfair constitutes a means both of achieving the result sought by Article 6 of the Directive, namely preventing an individual consumer from being bound by an unfair term, and of contributing to achieving the aim of Article 7, since if the court undertakes such an examination, that may act as a deterrent and contribute to preventing unfair terms in contracts concluded between consumers and sellers or suppliers ( Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores , paragraph 28, and Case C-473/00 Cofidis [2002] ECR I-10875, paragraph 32).

105. Second, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, partial annulment of a Community act is possible only if the elements the annulment of which is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act (Case C‑244/03 France v Parliament and Council [2005] ECR I-4021, paragraph 12 and case-law cited).

12. It must be borne in mind in this regard that, as follows from settled case-law, partial annulment of a Community act is possible only if the elements the annulment of which is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act (see, inter alia, Case C-29/99 Commission v Council [2002] ECR I-11221, paragraphs 45 and 46; Case C-378/00 Commission v Parliament and Council [2003] ECR I‑937, paragraph 30; and Case C-239/01 Germany v Commission [2003] ECR I‑10333, paragraph 33).

26 The Italian Government has contended, however, that is clear from ERT, cited above, that where trade in goods is closely linked with the provision of a service, as in the case of electricity, it is not sufficient, in order to establish an infringement of the Treaty rules on the free movement of goods in general and Article 37 in particular, to refer to indirect or potential obstacles to Community trade; evidence must be provided of the existence of an actual obstacle and therefore of real discrimination suffered by the imported product as compared with the domestic product.

32 As the Court stated in paragraph 31 of the judgment of 10 October 2013 in Swm Costruzioni 2 and Mannocchi Luigino (C‑94/12, EU:C:2013:646), by that article, Directive 2004/18 provides for the use of subcontractors without imposing any limit in that regard.

31. That finding is corroborated by several provisions in Directive 2004/18. Thus, Article 48(2)(b) thereof refers to reliance on technicians or technical bodies, whether or not they belong directly to the undertaking of the economic operator concerned, upon whom the contractor can call in order to carry out the work. Similarly, Article 48(2)(h) of the directive refers to the tools, plant or technical equipment available to the contractor for carrying out the contract, without imposing any limit on the number of entities who will provide them. To the same effect, Article 4(2) of the directive permits groups of economic operators to participate in public procurement procedures without imposing any limit on the combining of capacities, in the same way as Article 25 of the directive provides for the use of subcontractors without imposing any limit in that regard.

35. It should also be pointed out that, during that period, Article 10 of Directive 92/85 does not provide for any exception to, or derogation from, the prohibition of dismissing pregnant workers, save in exceptional cases not connected with their condition where the employer justifies the dismissal in writing ( Webb , paragraph 22; Brown , paragraph 18; Tele Danmark , paragraph 27; and Paquay , paragraph 31).

35. As for the second objective, the Commission points out that, in order for a prior authorisation scheme, such as that at issue, which derogates from a fundamental freedom, to be justified, it must be based on objective non‑discriminatory criteria known in advance to the undertakings concerned, in such a way as to circumscribe the exercise of the authorities’ discretion so that it is not used arbitrarily. Furthermore, all persons affected by a restrictive measure based on such a derogation must have a legal remedy available to them (see, inter alia, Case C‑205/99 Analir and Others [2001] ECR I‑1271, paragraph 38, and Case C‑463/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I‑4581, paragraph 69).

69. As regards a system of prior administrative approval of the kind at issue in the present case, the Court has previously held that such a system must be proportionate to the aim pursued, inasmuch as the same objective could not be attained by less restrictive measures, in particular a system of declarations ex post facto (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 and C-250/94 Sanz de Lera and Others [1995] ECR I-4821, paragraphs 23 to 28; Case C-205/99 Analir and Others [2001] ECR I-1271, paragraph 35; Commission v Portugal , paragraph 50; and Commission v France , paragraph 46). Such a system must be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance to the undertakings concerned, and all persons affected by a restrictive measure of that type must have a legal remedy available to them (Analir , paragraph 38; Commission v Portugal , paragraph 50; and Commission v France , paragraph 46).

44. On this point, it must be recalled that a restriction of freedom of establishment, applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, may be justified by overriding reasons in the general interest, provided that it is appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary for attaining that objective ( Commission v Greece , paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

40 That analysis is supported by the fact that the sale of the goods generally takes place in a different setting depending on the brands to which they belong. In that regard, the Court has already held that a brand is often, in addition to being an indication of the origin of the goods or services, an instrument of commercial strategy used for, inter alia, advertising purposes or to acquire a reputation in order to develop consumer loyalty (judgment in Interflora and Interflora British Unit, C‑323/09, EU:C:2011:604, paragraph 39).

39. With regard to the functions of the trade mark other than that of indicating origin, it should be noted that both the European Union legislature – by using the words ‘in particular’ in the tenth recital to Directive 89/104 and in the seventh recital to Regulation No 40/94 – and the Court – by using since its judgment in Arsenal Football Club the words ‘functions of the trade mark’ – have indicated that a trade mark’s function of indicating origin is not the only function of the mark that is worthy of protection against injury by third parties. They have thus taken into account the fact that a trade mark is often, in addition to an indication of the origin of the goods or services, an instrument of commercial strategy used, inter alia, for advertising purposes or to acquire a reputation in order to develop consumer loyalty.

38 Contrary to the submissions made by the Commission in its observations, that approach does not conflict with the judgment in Delimitis. Although that judgment, in the context of the case then under consideration, set out in paragraphs 25 and 26 the criteria for assessing the extent to which a supplier's contracts, without being more specific, contribute to the cumulative sealing-off effect, it did not exclude a selective assessment according to the various categories of contracts that a particular supplier might have entered into.

67. With respect to the need to request production of the original of the minutes, it is for the Community Court to decide, in the light of the circumstances of the case and in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Procedure on measures of inquiry, whether it is necessary for a document to be produced. As regards the Court of First Instance, it follows from Article 49 read in conjunction with Article 65(b) of its Rules of Procedure that a request for production of documents is a measure of inquiry which the Court may order at any stage of the proceedings (Case C-286/95 P Commission v ICI [2000] ECR I-2341, paragraphs 49 and 50).

49 It is for the Community court to decide in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Procedure in regard to measures of inquiry whether it is necessary for such an act to be produced, in the light of the circumstances of the case.

33. Such a global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must be based on the overall impression created by those marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components (see Mülhens v OHIM , paragraph 19, and, in particular, in respect of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1), Case C‑251/95 SABEL [1997] ECR I-6191, paragraph 23, and Case C‑342/97 Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer [1999] ECR I-3819, paragraph 25).

20. It is apparent from settled case-law that the right to a refund of taxes levied in a Member State in breach of the rules of European Union law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by provisions of European Union law prohibiting such taxes. The Member State is therefore required in principle to repay taxes levied in breach of European Union law (Case C-398/09 Lady & Kid and Others [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 17, and Case C‑591/10 Littlewoods Retail and Others [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24).

24. It is settled case-law that the right to a refund of charges levied in a Member State in breach of rules of EU law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by provisions of EU law as interpreted by the Court (see, inter alia, Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, paragraph 12, and Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98 Metallgesellschaft and Others [2001] ECR I-1727, paragraph 84). The Member State is therefore in principle required to repay charges levied in breach of Community law (Joined Cases C-192/95 to C-218/95 Comateb and Others [1997] ECR I-165, paragraph 20; Metallgesellschaft , paragraph 84; Case C-147/01 Weber’s Wine World and Others [2003] ECR I-11365, paragraph 93; Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation [2006] ECR I-11753, paragraph 202).

24 However, as the Court held in its judgment in Joined Cases C-305/86 and C-160/87 Neotype v Commission and Council [1990] ECR I-2945, paragraphs 26 and 27, Yugoslavia cannot be regarded as a country which does not have a market economy . During the period under consideration, there was no general system for the fixing of prices in Yugoslavia, and in any event there was no such system in the electric motors sector .

38. Moreover, unlike the legislation at issue in Futura Participations and Singer , the Finnish tax legislation cannot be regarded as an emanation of the principle of territoriality. As the Advocate General has pointed out in paragraph 42 of her Opinion, that principle does not preclude the granting of a tax credit to a person fully taxable in Finland in respect of dividends paid by companies established in other Member States ( Futura Participations and Singer , paragraphs 18 to 22).

18 The first condition is that losses carried forward must be economically linked to the income earned in the Member State in which tax is charged, so that only losses arising from the non-resident taxpayer's activities in that State can be carried forward.

77. Furthermore, it has been consistently held that the statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community Court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, in particular, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France , paragraph 63 and the case-law cited, and Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala , paragraph 166 and the case-law cited).

47. In addition, since such court fees amount to detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights conferred by EU law on candidates and tenderers harmed by decisions of contracting authorities, they must not compromise the effectiveness of Directive 89/665 (see, to that effect, judgments in Universale-Bau and Others , C‑470/99, EU:C:2002:746, paragraph 72, and eVigilo , C‑538/13, EU:C:2015:166, paragraph 40).

72. None the less, since there are detailed procedural rules governing the remedies intended to protect rights conferred by Community law on candidates and tenderers harmed by decisions of contracting authorities, they must not compromise the effectiveness of Directive 89/665.

20. At the outset, it should be noted that, even though, formally, the referring court has limited its questions to the interpretation of Article 20 TFEU, such a situation does not prevent the Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of European Union law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case before it, whether or not that court has specifically referred to them in the questions (see, to that effect, Case C‑434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I‑3375, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

94 As the Commission has argued, that would seem to be the case of measures which — provided that they comply with the requirements of EU law — are aimed, for example, at ensuring that SZÉP card issuers are subject to a system of supervision or a mechanism entailing a bank guarantee or insurance (see, by analogy, judgment in Commission v Portugal, C‑171/02, EU:C:2004:270, paragraph 43) and make provision for the use by issuers of telephone services or commercial agents.

43. Such a condition cannot be justified on the ground of protection of creditors. Since there are means of attaining that objective which restrict freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment to a lesser degree, such as setting up a guarantee or taking out an insurance contract, that condition must be regarded as disproportionate.

41. As it is clear from the wording of Article 18(2) of the Sixth Directive, the right to deduct must be exercised in principle ‘during the same period’ as that in which it arose.

86. Such national legislation, which disadvantages some nationals of a Member State simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State, amounts to a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 21(1) TFEU on every citizen of the Union (see D’Hoop , paragraph 35; Pusa , paragraph 20; De Cuyper , paragraph 39; and Rüffler , paragraph 73).

39. It is established that national legislation such as that in this case which places at a disadvantage certain of its nationals simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State is a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 18 EC on every citizen of the Union (see, to that effect, Case C-224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191, paragraph 31, and Case C‑224/02 Pusa [2004] ECR I-5763, paragraph 19).

30. In addition, the Court has stated that all components of total remuneration relating to the professional and personal status of the worker must continue to be paid during his paid annual leave. Thus, any allowances relating to seniority, length of service and to professional qualifications must be maintained (see, to that effect, Case C‑471/08 Parviainen EU:C:2010:391, paragraph 73, and Williams and Others EU:C:2011:588, paragraph 27).

72. However, according to established case-law, EU law does not prevent a national legal system from disallowing repayment of charges which have been levied but were not due where to do so would lead to unjust enrichment of the recipients (Case 104/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 1799, paragraph 6; Case C-343/96 Dilexport [1999] ECR I‑579, paragraph 47; Joined Cases C-441/98 and C-442/98 Michaïlidis [2000] ECR I-7145, paragraph 31; and Case C‑309/06 Marks & Spencer [2008] ECR I‑2283, paragraph 41). The protection of the rights so guaranteed by the EU legal order does not therefore require repayment of taxes, charges and duties levied in breach of EU law where it is established that the person required to pay such charges has actually passed them on to other persons (see Comateb and Others , paragraph 21, and Case C‑398/09 Lady & Kid and Others [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 18).

41. Community law does not prevent a national legal system from disallowing repayment of charges which have been levied but were not due where to do so would lead to unjust enrichment of the recipients (Case 104/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 1799, paragraph 6; Case C-343/96 Dilexport [1999] ECR I‑579, paragraph 47; and Joined Cases C-441/98 and C-442/98 Michaïlidis [2000] ECR I-7145, paragraph 31). However, in order to comply with Community law, the principle prohibiting unjust enrichment must be implemented in accordance with principles such as that of equal treatment.

157. An undertaking which has participated in such a single and complex infringement, by its own conduct, which meets the definition of an agreement or concerted practice having an anti-competitive object within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC and was intended to help bring about the infringement as a whole, may also be responsible for the conduct of other undertakings in the context of the same infringement throughout the period of its participation in the infringement. That is the position where it is shown that the undertaking intended, through its own conduct, to contribute to the common objectives pursued by all the participants and that it was aware of the offending conduct planned or put into effect by other undertakings in pursuit of the same objectives or that it could reasonably have foreseen it and was prepared to take the risk (judgment in Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens , C‑441/11 P, EU:C:2012:778, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

102. If a sign identical with, or similar to, the proprietor’s trade mark is to be ‘used’, within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 89/104 and Article 9 of Regulation No 40/94, by a third party, that implies, at the very least, that that third party uses the sign in its own commercial communication. In so far as that third party provides a service consisting in enabling its customers to display on its website, in the course of their commercial activities such as their offers for sale, signs corresponding to trade marks, it does not itself use those signs within the meaning of that EU legislation (see, to that effect, Google France and Google , paragraphs 56 and 57).

56. In that regard, suffice it to note that the use, by a third party, of a sign identical with, or similar to, the proprietor’s trade mark implies, at the very least, that that third party uses the sign in its own commercial communication. A referencing service provider allows its clients to use signs which are identical with, or similar to, trade marks, without itself using those signs.

79. Finally, as regards the argument relating to the incomplete provision of documents relating to the refused confirmatory applications, it must be recalled that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence, save where the facts or evidence are distorted (judgment in Rousse Industry v Commission , C‑271/13 P, EU:C:2014:175, paragraph 81). There will be distortion where, in particular, the General Court has manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of the evidence.

54. As regards judicial review of compliance with those conditions, it must be stated that in matters concerning the common agricultural policy the Community legislature has a discretionary power which corresponds to the political responsibilities given to it by Articles 34 EC and 37 EC. Consequently, the lawfulness of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see, in particular, Case 265/87 Schräder [1989] ECR 2237, paragraph 22, and Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others [1990] ECR I‑4023, paragraph 14).

14 However, with regard to judicial review of compliance with those conditions it must be stated that in matters concerning the common agricultural policy the Community legislature has a discretionary power which corresponds to the political responsibilities given to it by Articles 40 and 43 of the Treaty . Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue ( see in particular the judgment in Case 265/87 Schraeder [1989] ECR 2237, paragraphs 21 and 22 ).

23. It follows that a resident company may, irrespective of whether the lending company of the non-member country has a shareholding in it, or of the size of any such shareholding, rely upon the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital in order to call into question the legality of such national rules (see, by analogy, Case C‑35/11 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraph 104).

41. As regards the second condition, it is clear from Article 2(1) of Directive 85/337 that the fundamental objective of the directive is to ensure that projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location are made subject to an assessment with regard to their environmental effects before consent is given (see Linster , paragraph 52).

52 As is clear from Article 2(1), the Directive's fundamental objective is that, before consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location should be made subject to an assessment with regard to their effects.

31 Those opportunities could not be fully effective if a national of a Member State could be deterred from availing himself of them by obstacles raised on his return to his country of origin by legislation penalising the fact that he has used them (see, to that effect, Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, paragraph 23).

84 Moreover, it is clear from equally settled case-law of the Court that the alleged failure to refer to a specific provision of the Treaty, such as in this case Article 216(1) TFEU, as raised by the Federal Republic of Germany, does not constitute an infringement of essential procedural requirements if the legal basis for a measure may be determined from other parts of the measure, provided that the parties concerned and the Court are not left uncertain as to the specific legal basis (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2017, Commission v Council (WRC‑15), C‑687/15, EU:C:2017:803, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

55 Moreover, while it is true that failure to refer to a specific provision of the Treaty need not necessarily constitute an infringement of essential procedural requirements if the legal basis for a measure may be determined from other parts of the measure, as claimed by the Council, such explicit reference is, however, indispensable where, in its absence, the parties concerned and the Court are left uncertain as to the specific legal basis (see, inter alia, judgment of 14 June 2016, Commission v McBride and Others, C‑361/14 P, EU:C:2016:434, paragraph 48).

98. In those circumstances, it is sufficient for the Commission to prove that the subsidiary is wholly owned by the parent company in order to avail itself of the presumption that the parent exercises decisive influence over the commercial policy of the subsidiary. The Commission will then be able to regard the parent company as jointly and severally liable for payment of the fine imposed on its subsidiary, unless the parent company, which has the burden of rebutting that presumption, adduces sufficient evidence to show that its subsidiary acts independently on the market ( Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission , paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

64. It is settled case-law that the principle of non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified (see inter alia Omega Air and Others , paragraph 79, and Case C-137/00 Milk Marque and National Farmers’ Union [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 126).

79 On this point, it is settled case-law that the general principle of equality, which is one of the fundamental principles of Community law, requires that similar situations are not treated differently and different situations not treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, to that effect, SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf, paragraph 50, and Case C-292/97 Karlsson and Others [2000] ECR I-2737, paragraph 39).

49 Nevertheless, the mere fact that that evidence is more difficult to provide cannot authorise a Member State to deny categorically to non-residents, as taxpayers with limited liability, a deduction which it grants to residents, as taxpayers with unlimited liability, given that it cannot a priori be ruled out that a non-resident is able to provide relevant documentary evidence enabling the tax authorities of the Member State of taxation to ascertain, clearly and precisely, the nature and genuineness of the business expenses in respect of which deduction is sought (see, by analogy, judgments of 27 January 2009 in Persche, C‑318/07, EU:C:2009:33, paragraph 53, and 26 May 2016 in Kohll and Kohll-Schlesser, C‑300/15, EU:C:2016:361, paragraph 55).

33 It must next be noted that although pregnancy is not in any way comparable to a pathological condition (Case C-32/93 Webb v EMO Air Cargo [1994] ECR I-3567, paragraph 25), the fact remains that it is a period during which disorders and complications may arise compelling a woman to undergo strict medical supervision and, in some cases, to take absolute rest for all or part of her pregnancy. Those disorders and complications, which may cause incapacity for work, form part of the risks inherent in the condition of pregnancy and are thus a specific feature of that condition (Case C-394/96 Brown v Rentokil [1998] ECR I-4185, paragraph 22).

20 Furthermore, by reserving to Member States the right to retain or introduce provisions which are intended to protect women in connection with "pregnancy and maternity", Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 recognizes the legitimacy, in terms of the principle of equal treatment, first, of protecting a woman' s biological condition during and after pregnancy and, second, of protecting the special relationship between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth (Habermann-Beltermann, cited above, paragraph 21, and Case 184/83 Hoffmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse [1984] ECR 3047, paragraph 25).

24. It is common ground that legislation of a Member State such as the legislation at issue in the main proceedings constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services enshrined in Article 49 EC (see, to that effect, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International , paragraph 52, and Case C‑258/08 Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming and Ladbrokes International [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 16).

104. Moreover, it should be noted that, having regard to the discretion which Member States enjoy in determining the level of protection of consumers and the social order in the gaming sector, it is not necessary, with regard to the criterion of proportionality, that a restrictive measure decreed by the authorities of one Member State should correspond to a view shared by all the Member States concerning the means of protecting the legitimate interest at issue (see, by analogy, Case C‑518/06 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I‑3491, paragraphs 83 and 84).

83. As regards whether the obligation to contract as it is in force in the Italian Republic goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective of social protection for victims of road traffic accidents, it must be borne in mind, first of all, that it is not essential, with regard to the proportionality criterion, that a restrictive measure laid down by the authorities of a Member State should correspond to a view shared by all the Member States concerning the means of protecting the legitimate interest at issue.

26. As regards diagnostic reagents, it is clear from those notes that diagnostic reagents are used in the evaluation of physical, biophysical or biochemical processes and states in animals and humans and that their function is based upon a measurable or observable change in their constituent biological or chemical substances (see, to that effect, judgment in Sysmex Europe , EU:C:2014:2097, paragraph 34).

31. It follows from the last sentence of Article 88(3) EC that throughout the preliminary period the Member State concerned may not put the planned aid into effect. Where the consultative examination procedure is initiated, that prohibition continues until the Commission reaches a decision on the compatibility of the planned aid with the common market (Case C-39/94 SFEI and Others [1996] ECR I-3547, paragraph 38). However, if the Commission has not responded within two months of notification, the Member State concerned may implement the plan after informing the Commission (see the judgment in Lorenz , cited above, paragraph 4).

4 ACCORDING TO THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 93 THE MEMBER STATE SHALL NOT PUT ITS PROPOSED MEASURES INTO EFFECT UNTIL THIS PROCEDURE HAS RESULTED IN A FINAL DECISION . THE OBJECTIVE PURSUED BY ARTICLE 93 ( 3 ), WHICH IS TO PREVENT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AID CONTRARY TO THE TREATY, IMPLIES THAT THIS PROHIBITION IS EFFECTIVE DURING THE WHOLE OF THE PRELIMINARY PERIOD . WHILE THIS PERIOD MUST ALLOW THE COMMISSION SUFFICIENT TIME, THIS LATTER MUST, HOWEVER, ACT DILIGENTLY AND TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE INTEREST OF MEMBER STATES OF BEING INFORMED OF THE POSITION QUICKLY IN SPHERES WHERE THE NECESSITY TO INTERVENE CAN BE OF AN URGENT NATURE BY REASON OF THE EFFECT THAT THESE MEMBER STATES EXPECT FROM THE PROPOSED MEASURES OF ENCOURAGEMENT . IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY REGULATION SPECIFYING THIS PERIOD, THE MEMBER STATES CANNOT UNILATERALLY TERMINATE THIS PRELIMINARY PERIOD WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR THE COMMISSION TO FULFIL ITS ROLE . THE LATTER, HOWEVER, COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS ACTING WITH PROPER DILIGENCE IF IT OMITTED TO DEFINE ITS ATTITUDE WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD . IT IS APPROPRIATE IN THIS RESPECT TO BE GUIDED BY ARTICLES 173 AND 175 OF THE TREATY WHICH, IN DEALING WITH COMPARABLE SITUATIONS, PROVIDE FOR A PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS . WHEN THIS PERIOD HAS EXPIRED, THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED MAY IMPLEMENT THE PLAN, BUT THE REQUIREMENTS OF LEGAL CERTAINTY INVOLVE THAT PRIOR NOTICE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE COMMISSION .

21. According to the case-law of the Court, the exemptions provided for in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive constitute independent concepts of European Union law whose purpose is to avoid divergences in the application of the VAT system from one Member State to another (see, in particular, Case C‑349/96 CPP [1999] ECR I‑973, paragraph 15; Horizon College , paragraph 15; and Case C‑242/08 Swiss Re Germany Holding [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 33). As a consequence, the terms of a provision of the Sixth Directive which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Union (see to that effect Case C-497/01 Zita Modes [2003] ECR I‑14393, paragraph 34, and Case C‑25/03 HE [2005] ECR I‑3123, paragraph 63).

17. The situations falling within the scope of Community law include those involving the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, in particular those involving the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 18 EC (see, inter alia, as cited above, Grzelczyk , paragraph 33; D’Hoop , paragraph 29, and Garcia Avello , paragraph 24).

24. The situations falling within the scope ratione materiae of Community law include those involving the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, in particular those involving the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 18 EC (Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637, paragraphs 15 and 16, Grzelczyk , cited above, paragraph 33, and D'Hoop , paragraph 29).

24. However, a taxable person also has a right to deduct even where there is no direct and immediate link between a particular input transaction and an output transaction or transactions giving rise to the right to deduct, where the costs of the services in question are part of his general costs and are, as such, components of the price of the goods or services which he supplies. Such costs do have a direct and immediate link with the taxable person’s economic activity as a whole (see, inter alia, judgments in Cibo Participations , C‑16/00, EU:C:2001:495, paragraph 33, and Portugal Telecom , C‑496/11, EU:C:2012:557, paragraph 37).

29 Legislation such as that at issue here which restricts or prohibits certain forms of advertising may, although it does not directly affect imports, be such as to restrict their volume because it affects marketing opportunities for the imported products ( see the judgment in Case 286/81 Oosthoek' s Uitgeversmaatschappij [1982] ECR 4575, paragraph 15 ). The possibility cannot be ruled out that to compel a producer either to modify the form or the content of an advertising campaign depending on the Member States concerned or to discontinue an advertising scheme which he considers to be particularly effective may constitute an obstacle to imports even if the legislation in question applies to domestic products and imported products without distinction .

15 LEGISLATION WHICH RESTRICTS OR PROHIBITS CERTAIN FORMS OF ADVERTISING AND CERTAIN MEANS OF SALES PROMOTION MAY , ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT DIRECTLY AFFECT IMPORTS , BE SUCH AS TO RESTRICT THEIR VOLUME BECAUSE IT AFFECTS MARKETING OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE IMPORTED PRODUCTS . THE POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE RULED OUT THAT TO COMPEL A PRODUCER EITHER TO ADOPT ADVERTISING OR SALES PROMOTION SCHEMES WHICH DIFFER FROM ONE MEMBER STATE TO ANOTHER OR TO DISCONTINUE A SCHEME WHICH HE CONSIDERS TO BE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE MAY CONSTITUTE AN OBSTACLE TO IMPORTS EVEN IF THE LEGISLATION IN QUESTION APPLIES TO DOMESTIC PRODUCTS AND IMPORTED PRODUCTS WITHOUT DISTINCTION .

38. On the basis of those considerations, the Court held that a Bulgarian national who intends to take up an activity in a Member State as an employed or self-employed person but who circumvents the relevant national controls by falsely declaring that he is entering that Member State for the purpose of seasonal work places himself outside the sphere of protection afforded to him under the association agreement in question ( Kondova , paragraph 80).

33. Article 7(1) of the Directive and Article 13(1) of the Regulation limit exhaustion of the rights conferred on the proprietor of a trade mark to cases where goods are put on the market in the Community. They allow the proprietor to market his products outside the Community without thereby exhausting his rights within it. By making it clear that putting goods on the market outside the Community does not exhaust the proprietor’s right to oppose the importation of those goods without his consent, the Community legislature has thus allowed the trade mark proprietor to control the initial marketing in the Community of goods bearing the mark (see, in particular, on the subject of the Directive and with reference to the territory of the EEA, Joined Cases C-414/99 Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss [2001] ECR I‑8691, paragraph 33).

33 The effect of the Directive is therefore to limit exhaustion of the rights conferred on the proprietor of a trade mark to cases where goods have been put on the market in the EEA and to allow the proprietor to market his products outside that area without exhausting his rights within the EEA. By making it clear that the placing of goods on the market outside the EEA does not exhaust the proprietor's right to oppose the importation of those goods without his consent, the Community legislature has allowed the proprietor of the trade mark to control the initial marketing in the EEA of goods bearing the mark (Case C-173/98 Sebago and Maison Dubois [1999] ECR I-4103, paragraph 21).

47. Admittedly, that criterion cannot be regarded as exclusive, inasmuch as pensions paid under statutory social security schemes may reflect, wholly or in part, pay in respect of work ( Beune , paragraph 44; Evrenopoulos , paragraph 20; Griesmar , paragraph 29; Niemi , paragraph 46; and Schönheit and Becker , paragraph 57).

49. It is true that the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by that directive and their duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation are binding on all the authorities of the Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (see, inter alia, Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 1891, paragraph 26, and Kücükdeveci , paragraph 47 and the case‑law cited).

47. However, the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by that directive and their duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation are binding on all the authorities of the Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (see, inter alia, to that effect, Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 1891, paragraph 26; Case C‑106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I‑4135, paragraph 8; Faccini Dori , paragraph 26; Case C‑129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie [1997] ECR I‑7411, paragraph 40; Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 110; and Joined Cases C‑378/07 to C‑380/07 Angelidaki and Others [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 106).

34. In that connection, it must be recalled that, in the event of disruption to the service or danger, the adoption of measures necessary for restoring normal operating conditions, including the withdrawal of train paths, is not a matter of train path allocation (see, Case C-473/10 Commission v Hungary [2013] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 56 and 59).

40 Finally, the Court held that it was not appropriate to limit the temporal effects of the interpretation of Regulation No 384/96 that is referred to in paragraph 38 of the present judgment (judgment in Zhejiang Aokang Shoes v Council, C‑247/10 P, EU:C:2012:710, paragraphs 39 to 41).

41. In those circumstances, the request that the temporal effects of the present judgment be limited must be rejected. Costs

35 According to established case-law, the derogation for which it provides must be restricted to activities which in themselves are directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority (Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] ECR 631, paragraph 45, and Case C-42/92 Thijssen [1993] ECR I-4047, paragraph 8).

35. Accordingly, the Court held that the decisive criterion for determining whether a measure falls within the scope of ‘employment conditions’ within the meaning of clause 4(1) of the framework agreement on part-time work is, precisely, the criterion of employment, that is to say the employment relationship between a worker and his employer (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑395/08 and C‑396/08 Bruno and Others [2010] ECR I‑5119, paragraph 46).

46. It is appropriate to bear in mind that the only possible decisive criterion is whether the retirement pension is paid to the worker by reason of the employment relationship between him and his former employer, that is to say, the criterion of employment, which is based on the wording of Article 141 EC itself. However, that criterion cannot be regarded as exclusive, since pensions paid under statutory social security schemes may reflect, wholly or in part, pay in respect of work. Such pensions do not constitute ‘pay’ for the purposes of Article 141 EC (see Schönheit and Becker , paragraphs 56 and 57 and the case‑law cited).

42. The Court thus called upon the referring court, in paragraph 56 of the judgment in Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , to determine whether the tax rates are indeed the same and whether different levels of taxation occur only in certain cases by reason of a change to the tax base as a result of certain exceptional reliefs.

50. In that regard, it must, first, be recalled that, in paragraphs 75 to 84 of Abatay and Others , the Court held that Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 is not subject to the condition that the Turkish national concerned satisfy the requirements of Article 6(1) of that decision and that the scope of that Article 13 is not restricted to Turkish migrants who are in paid employment.

77. Thus, in the wake of Decision No 2/76 on the implementation of Article 12 of the Association Agreement, adopted by the Association Council on 20 December 1976, the social provisions of Decision No 1/80 constitute a further stage in securing freedom of movement for workers on the basis of Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the EEC Treaty, which became Articles 48 and 49 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment Articles 39 EC and 40 EC) and Article 50 of the EC Treaty (now Article 41 EC) (see inter alia Case C-1/97 Birden [1998] ECR I-7747, paragraph 52, and Case C-188/00 Kurz [2002] ECR I-10691, paragraph 40).

29. However, the national provision at issue in the main proceedings affects every undertaking which uses capital goods in the territory of a Member State other than the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, and does so even where nothing, as in the main proceedings, points towards the existence of such an artificial arrangement (see, to that effect, Jobra , paragraphs 36 to 38).

34 Second, it must be recalled that, according to case-law, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret acts which, while indeed adopted by bodies which cannot be described as ‘institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union’, are by their nature measures implementing or applying an act of EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 September 1990, Sevince, C‑192/89, EU:C:1990:322, paragraph 10, and 21 January 1993, Deutsche Shell, C‑188/91, EU:C:1993:24, paragraph 17), such a solution being justified by the very objective of Article 267 TFEU, which is to ensure the uniform application, throughout the European Union, of all provisions forming part of the European Union legal system and to ensure that the interpretation thereof does not vary according to the interpretation accorded to them by the various Member States (judgment of 20 September 1990, Sevince, C‑192/89, EU:C:1990:322, paragraph 11).

17 Since measures emanating from bodies which have been established by an international agreement of that type, and which have been entrusted with responsibility for its implementation, are directly linked to the agreement which they implement, they form part of the Community legal order (see Case C-192/89 S.Z. Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR I-3461, paragraph 10). Since the arrangements of the Joint Committee are to be regarded as a measure required for the application of the Convention under Article 15(2)(b), that recommendation is directly linked to the Convention. The arrangements of the Joint Committee therefore form part of Community law.

15. As the Court has consistently held, the procedure provided for in Article 234 EC is an instrument for cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts which enables it to provide them with the elements of interpretation of Community law they require in order to settle disputes before them. On the other hand, it is not for the Court to interpret, in the context of that procedure, the national law of a Member State and, save exceptionally, it is for the national court, which is alone in having a direct knowledge of the facts of the case and of the arguments put forward by the parties and which must assume the responsibility of giving judgment in the case, to assess, with full knowledge of the matter before it, the relevance of the questions of law raised by the dispute before it and the need for a preliminary ruling so as to enable it to give judgment (see, in particular Case 53/79 Damiani [1980] ECR 273, paragraph 5). In the present case, it is not apparent that the questions referred by the Sozialgericht Aachen are in any way exceptional such as to justify not examining them. Substance

89. Directive 92/85, which was adopted in accordance with Article 118A of the EC Treaty (Articles 117 to 120 of the EC Treaty were replaced by Articles 136 EC to 143 EC), does not prevent a Member State, as is clear from Article 137(4) EC, from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures provided that they are compatible with the provisions of the Treaty (see, to that effect, Jiménez Melgar , paragraph 37).

37 It is clear from the wording of that provision that Directive 92/85 does not impose on the Member States any obligation to draw up a specific list of the reasons for dismissal which, by exception, would be allowed in the case of pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth and workers who are breastfeeding. Nevertheless, that directive, which lays down minimum provisions, does not in any way prevent the Member States from providing for higher protection for those workers, by laying down specific grounds on which such workers may be dismissed.

21 It is true, as the Court ruled in its judgment of 25 February 1986 in Case 284/84 Spruyt v Sociale Verzekeringsbank (( 1986 )) ECR 685, paragraph 19, that the aim of Articles 48 and 51 of the Treaty would not be attained if, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom of movement, workers were to lose the advantages in the field of social security guaranteed to them by the laws of an individual Member State . However, as the Court held in its judgments of 24 April 1980 in Case 110/79 Coonan v Insurance Officer (( 1980 )) ECR 1445, paragraph 12 and of 24 September 1987 in Case 43/86 Sociale Verzekeringsbank v de Rijke (( 1987 )) ECR 3611, paragraph 12, it is for the legislature of each Member State to lay down the conditions creating the right or the obligation to become affiliated to a social security scheme or to a particular branch under such a scheme, provided always that in this connection there is no discrimination between nationals of the host State and nationals of other Member States . The documents before the Court make it clear that the provisions of national legislation which gave rise to the main proceedings do not operate any discrimination on the basis of nationality .

29. Thus, in view of the aim of protecting victims, which is restated many times in the directives at issue, the Court has held that Article 3(1) of the First Directive precludes an insurer against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles from relying on statutory provisions or contractual clauses in order to refuse to compensate third-party victims of an accident caused by the insured vehicle ( Ruiz Bernáldez , paragraph 20, and Candolin and Others , paragraph 18).

20. That being so, Article 3(1) of the First Directive precludes an insurer from being able to rely on statutory provisions or contractual clauses to refuse to compensate third-party victims of an accident caused by the insured vehicle.

24 Moreover, as regards proof, it must be emphasised that although, as observed in paragraph 19 of this judgment, Article 4 of Directive 85/374 provides that the victim has the burden of proof, neither Article 4 nor any other provision of that directive addresses the other aspects relating to how that proof is to be made out (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 November 2014, Novo Nordisk Pharma, C‑310/13, EU:C:2014:2385, paragraphs 25 to 29).

21. In so far as Article 65(1)(a) TFEU is a derogation from the fundamental principle of the free movement of capital, it must be interpreted strictly. It cannot therefore be interpreted as meaning that all tax legislation which draws a distinction between taxpayers on the basis of their place of residence or the State in which they invest their capital is automatically compatible with the Treaty (see Case C‑11/07 Eckelkamp and Others [2008] ECR I‑6845, paragraph 57; Case C‑510/08 Mattner [2010] ECR I‑3553, paragraph 32; and Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen , paragraph 56).

56. In so far as Article 65(1)(a) TFEU is a derogation from the fundamental principle of the free movement of capital, it must be interpreted strictly. It cannot therefore be interpreted as meaning that all tax legislation which draws a distinction between taxpayers on the basis of their place of residence or the State in which they invest their capital is automatically compatible with the Treaty (see Case C‑11/07 Eckelkamp and Others [2008] ECR I‑6845, paragraph 57, and Case C‑510/08 Mattner [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 32).

64. The content of the Explanatory Notes to the CN, which do not take the place of those of the HS but should be regarded as complementary to them (see, to that effect, Case C‑486/06 Van Landeghem [2007] ECR I‑10661, paragraph 36), and consulted jointly with them, must accordingly be consistent with the provisions of the CN and may not alter their scope (see, in particular, Kamino International Logistics , paragraph 48).

16. As the Court has already had occasion to observe, the directive governs only certain specific rules intended to combat such delays, namely, rules on interest for late payments (Article 3), retention of title (Article 4) and procedures for recovery of unchallenged claims (Article 5) (see Case C-302/05 Commission v Italy [2006] ECR I-10597, paragraph 23, and Case C-306/06 01051 Telecom [2008] I-0000, paragraph 21).

21. In order to answer the question referred by the national court, it must first be recalled that although, as Deutsche Telekom and the German, Austrian and Finnish Governments point out, the Directive does not harmonise fully all the rules relating to late payments in commercial transactions, it does govern certain specific rules in that regard. They include, inter alia, as the Court has already held, rules on interest for late payment (see, to that effect, Case C‑302/05 Commission v Italy [2006] ECR I‑10597, paragraph 23).

51 In those circumstances, the Court must hold that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, by requiring the liquidation of the company, is liable to impede, if not prevent, the cross-border conversion of a company. It therefore constitutes a restriction on freedom of establishment (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2008Cartesio, C‑210/06, EU:C:2008:723, paragraphs 112 and 113).

30. The Court has held in that regard that where the decision affects a group of persons who were identified or identifiable when that measure was adopted by reason of criteria specific to the members of the group, those persons may be individually concerned by that measure inasmuch as they form part of a limited class of economic operators (Case C‑125/06 P Commission v Infront WM [2008] ECR I‑1451, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited therein).

71. It is also clear from the Court’s case-law that where the decision affects a group of persons who were identified or identifiable when that measure was adopted by reason of criteria specific to the members of the group, those persons might be individually concerned by that measure inasmuch as they form part of a limited class of traders (see Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 207, paragraph 31, and Joined Cases C‑182/03 and C‑217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission [2006] ECR I-5479, paragraph 60).

41 The aim of that principle is to ensure a procedural balance between the parties to judicial proceedings, guaranteeing the equality of rights and obligations of those parties as regards, inter alia, the rules that govern the bringing of evidence and the adversarial hearing before the court (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2012 in Otis and Others, C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraphs 71 and 72) and also those parties’ rights to bring an action (judgment of 17 July 2014 in Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García, C‑169/14, EU:C:2014:2099, paragraphs 44, 48 and 49).

13 Citing the case-law of the Court (judgments in Case 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299, especially at p. 345; Case 24/67 Parke, Davis and Co. v Centrafarm [1968] ECR 55, especially at p. 72; Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon v Metro [1971] ECR 487, paragraph 11; Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491, paragraph 14; and Case C-30/90 Commission v United Kingdom [1992] ECR I-829, paragraphs 16 and 17), Spain argues that the Community has no power to regulate substantive patent law, and may harmonize only those aspects relating to the exercise of industrial property rights which are capable of having an effect upon the achievement of the general objectives laid down in the Treaty. Such action may not take the form of a new industrial property right which, by its nature, content and effects, alters the basic concept in force under the national legal systems of each of the Member States. The duration of a patent is its most important feature, since it intrinsically affects the balance in time between the rights and obligations of its holder, whether legal or economic in character.

17 In those circumstances it is for the national legislature to determine the conditions and rules regarding the protection conferred by patents.

65. Furthermore, in the area of value added tax, the Court declared in Commission v Spain that there had been a failure to fulfil obligations on the ground that the Kingdom of Spain had not shown that the exemption from that tax on imports and acquisitions of arms, ammunition and equipment exclusively for military use, an exemption provided for by Spanish legislation, was justified, under Article 296(1)(b) EC, by the need to protect the essential interests of the security of that Member State ( Commission v Greece , paragraph 53).

50 It is true that the Court held in Emmott, at paragraph 23, that until such time as a directive has been properly transposed, a defaulting Member State may not rely on an individual's delay in initiating proceedings against it in order to protect rights conferred upon him by the provisions of the directive and that a period laid down by national law within which proceedings must be initiated cannot begin to run before that time.

23 It follows that, until such time as a directive has been properly transposed, a defaulting Member State may not rely on an individual' s delay in initiating proceedings against it in order to protect rights conferred upon him by the provisions of the directive and that a period laid down by national law within which proceedings must be initiated cannot begin to run before that time.

121. Although it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced (Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraph 24), a plea alleging distortion of the clear sense of that evidence is admissible in an appeal (Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraph 42).

47 As regards the circumstances that would allow for a finding of such a subjective element, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that, in order for it to be considered that the essential aim of a mechanism such as that at issue in the main proceedings is to confer an undue advantage on the second buyer in the European Union, it is necessary that the imports be intended to confer such an advantage on that buyer and that the transactions be devoid of any economic and commercial justification for the importers and the other operators involved in the mechanism, a matter which it is for the referring court to establish (see, by analogy, judgments in SICES and Others, C‑155/13, EU:C:2014:145, paragraph 37, and Cimmino and Others, C‑607/13, EU:C:2015:448, paragraph 65).

37. In the second place, with regard to the subjective element referred to in paragraph 33 of the present judgment, it should be noted that, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, for it to be possible to regard the transactions at issue as being designed to confer an undue advantage on the purchaser in the European Union, it is necessary that the importers intended to confer such an advantage on that purchaser and that the transactions be devoid of any economic and commercial justification for those importers, which it is for the referring court to establish. The latter’s finding that such transactions are not devoid of economic and commercial justification could, for example, be based on the fact that the sale price of the goods was fixed at a level which allowed importers to derive a significant profit from the sales concerned. Likewise, account may also be taken of the fact that it follows from Article 35 of Regulation No 1291/2000, read in conjunction with Article 6(2) of Regulation No 341/2007, that the importers are obliged to use the ‘A’ licences which were issued to them subject to penalties and they therefore have a genuine interest in carrying out imports, including in the context of transactions such as those at issue in the main proceedings.

37 It follows that the fact that goods are accompanied by certificates of origin is not a circumstance capable of preventing the recovery of duty due in respect of the import of those goods if, after that import has taken place, those certificates prove to be inaccurate (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 July 1997 in Pascoal & Filhos, C‑97/95, EU:C:1997:370, paragraphs 55 to 57 and the case-law cited).

121. However, when it decides to exercise that power to impose penalties, the Commission is not free to determine how joint and several liability is to be imposed from an external perspective or, in particular, the amount of the fine in respect of which it may demand full payment by each of those held jointly and severally liable (see, to that, effect, Commission v Siemens Österreich and Others and Siemens Transmission & Distribution and Others v Commission , paragraphs 52 and 54).

54. In that connection, the General Court was also correct to find, first, at paragraph 153 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission does not have complete freedom to determine the sums to be paid jointly and severally and, second, at paragraph 154 of the judgment, that, in the present case, the Commission had to take account of the findings which it made in recital 468 of the contested decision regarding the responsibility of the various undertakings for the infringement periods concerning them.

35 Furthermore, an action against a confirmatory decision is inadmissible only if the confirmed decision has become final in relation to the person concerned because no action has been brought within the prescribed period. Otherwise, the person concerned is entitled to challenge either the confirmed decision, or the confirmatory decision, or both (judgment of 18 December 2007, Weißenfels v Parliament, C‑135/06 P, EU:C:2007:812, paragraph 54).

66. In that regard, the Court has accepted that a measure that allows for the compulsory retirement of workers when they reach the age of 65 can meet the aim of encouraging recruitment and be regarded as not unduly prejudicing the legitimate claims of the workers concerned, if those workers are entitled to a pension the level of which cannot be regarded as unreasonable (see, to that effect, Palacios de la Villa , paragraph 73). The Court has also held, in regard to a measure requiring the automatic termination of employment contracts at that age, in a sector in which, according to the national court, that measure was liable to cause significant financial hardship to the worker concerned, that that measure did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve the desired aims, in particular the encouragement of recruitment. The Court took into account the fact that the worker was eligible for payment of a pension while at the same time remaining in the labour market and enjoying protection from discrimination on grounds of age (see, to that effect, Rosenbladt , paragraphs 73 to 76).

75. Viewed against that background, the termination by operation of law of an employment contract as a result of a measure such as Paragraph 19(8) of the RTV does not have the automatic effect of forcing the persons concerned to withdraw definitively from the labour market. It follows that that provision does not establish a mandatory scheme of automatic retirement (see, to that effect, Age Concern England , paragraph 27). It does not prevent a worker who wishes to do so, for example, for financial reasons, from continuing to work beyond retirement age. It does not deprive employees who have reached retirement age of protection from discrimination on grounds of age where they wish to continue to work and seek a new job.

22. According to the case-law of the Court, it is for the national courts to determine whether Member States’ legislation actually serves the objectives which might justify it and whether the restrictions it imposes do not appear disproportionate in the light of those objectives ( Gambelli and Others , paragraph 75, and Placanica and Others , paragraph 58).

Par conséquent, un moyen portant sur la légalité au fond de la décision litigieuse, qui relève de la violation des traités ou de toute règle de droit relative à leur application, au sens de l’article 263, deuxième alinéa, TFUE, ne peut en principe être examiné par le juge de l’Union que s’il est invoqué par le requérant (voir arrêts du 10 décembre 2013, Commission/Irlande e.a., C‑272/12 P, EU:C:2013:812, point 28, ainsi que du 20 mars 2014, Rousse Industry/Commission, C‑271/13 P, non publié, EU:C:2014:175, point 18).

18. Par conséquent, un moyen portant sur la légalité au fond de la décision litigieuse, qui relève de la violation des traités ou de toute règle de droit relative à leur application, au sens de l’article 263, deuxième alinéa, TFUE, ne peut en principe être examiné par le juge de l’Union que s’il est invoqué par le requérant (arrêt Commission/Irlande e.a., précité, point 28).

37 As a final price, the selling price must necessarily include the unavoidable and foreseeable components of the price, components that are necessarily payable by the consumer and constitute the pecuniary consideration for the acquisition of the product concerned (see, by analogy, judgment of 18 September 2014 in Vueling Airlines, C‑487/12, EU:C:2014:2232, paragraph 36).

25 The reason why those requirements are so stringent is that revision is not an appeal procedure but an exceptional review procedure which allows the authority of res judicata to be called in question (see Case 267/80 REV Riseria Modenese v Council and Others [1985] ECR 3499, paragraph 10).

10 THE COURT POINTS OUT THAT , ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 41 OF THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE , THE ADMISSIBILITY OF AN APPLICATION FOR REVISION IS CONDITIONAL ON THE EXISTENCE OF A FACT ( A ) ANTEDATING THE DELIVERY OF THE JUDGMENT , ( B ) UNKNOWN TO THE COURT AND TO THE APPLICANT AND ( C ) OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO BE A DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE . THE STRICTNESS OF THOSE CONDITIONS IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT AN APPLICATION FOR REVISION IS NOT A MEANS OF APPEAL BUT AN EXCEPTIONAL REVIEW PROCEDURE WHICH MAY RENDER INAPPLICABLE THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA .

27. According to settled case-law, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see, inter alia, Case C‑466/04 Acereda Herrera [2006] ECR I‑5341, paragraph 47).

39. It should be recalled that, according to equally settled case-law, each of the Member States to which a directive is addressed is obliged to adopt, within the framework of its national legal system, all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective it pursues (see, in particular, Case C‑336/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-3771, paragraph 19; Case C‑97/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2053, paragraph 9; and Case C‑478/99 Commission v Sweden [2002] ECR I-4147, paragraph 15).

15 In that respect, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, each of the Member States to which a directive is addressed is obliged to adopt, within the framework of its national legal system, all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective it pursues (see in particular Case C-336/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-3771, paragraph 19, and Case C-97/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2053, paragraph 9).

31 On the other hand, the reorganisation of structures of the public administration or the transfer of administrative functions between public administrative authorities does not constitute a transfer of an undertaking within the meaning of the Directive. In those cases the transfer concerns activities involving the exercise of public authority (Case C-298/94 Henke v Gemeinde Schierke and Verwaltungsgemeinschaft Brocken [1996] ECR I-4989, paragraphs 14 and 17).

22. In that regard, the Court has previously ruled that the common organisations of the market are based on the concept of an open market to which every producer has free access under conditions of effective competition (judgment in Milk Marque and National Farmers’ Union , C‑137/00, EU:C:2003:429, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

59. That conclusion is also confirmed both by the first recital in the preamble to Regulation No 26 and by the Court ' s case-law, according to which the common organisations of the market are based on the concept of an open market to which every producer has free access under effective conditions of competition (see, inter alia , Case 83/78 Pigs Marketing Board [1978] ECR 2347, paragraph 57, and Case C-281/87 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 4015, paragraph 16).

613 By way of that negative formulation, it merely gave expression to the conclusion which it had reached in the exercise of its unfettered discretion following its assessment of the gravity and duration of the matters established and having regard to Montedison's arguments disputing those facts or casting a different light on them, which it had previously rejected.

51. It follows that, although the Court has held that the application of the first paragraph of Article 13 of the Brussels Convention is limited to contracts which give rise to reciprocal and interdependent obligations between the parties, basing itself, moreover, expressly on the wording of that provision referring to a ‘contract for the supply of goods or a contract for the supply of services’ (see Gabriel , paragraphs 48 to 50, and Engler , paragraphs 34 and 36), the scope of Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No 44/2001 appears, by contrast, to be no longer being limited to those situations in which the parties have assumed reciprocal obligations.

50 Thus, in regard to a case such as that in the main proceedings, that contract relates more specifically to the supply, through a mail-order sale, of goods ordered by a consumer on the basis of a proposal made and at a price specified by the vendor.

42 In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that a large number of subscribers to Ziggo and XS4ALL have downloaded media files using the online sharing platform TPB. It is also clear from the observations submitted to the Court that this platform is used by a considerable number of persons, the operators of TPB claiming, on their online sharing platform, to have several dozens of millions of ‘peers’. In this respect, the communication at issue in the main proceedings covers, at the very least, all of the platform’s users. These users can access, at any time and simultaneously, the protected works which are shared by means of the platform. Thus, that communication is aimed at an indeterminate number of potential recipients and involves a large number of persons (see, to this effect, judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C‑527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

43 The Court held in paragraph 51 of the judgment in Birden that the concept of being `duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member State' cannot be interpreted as applying to the labour market in general as opposed to a restricted market with a specific objective.

51 Consequently, the concept of `being duly registered as belonging to the labour force' must be regarded as applying to all workers who have complied with the requirements laid down by law and regulation in the Member State concerned and are thus entitled to pursue an occupation in its territory. By contrast, contrary to the assertions of the German Government and the Commission, it cannot be interpreted as applying to the labour market in general as opposed to a specific market with a social objective supported by the public authorities.

32. It should be recalled in this regard that Article 49 EC precludes the application of any national rules which have the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within a Member State (see, in particular, Case C‑118/96 Safir [1998] ECR I‑1897, paragraph 23; Case C‑334/02 Commission v France [2004] ECR I‑2229, paragraph 23; and Case C‑318/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I‑6957, paragraph 81).

66 An administrative fine imposed on the owner of land as a result of unlawful pollution which he has not prevented and in respect of which he is not able to identify the party responsible can therefore come under the liability mechanism covered by Article 16 of Directive 2004/35 and Article 193 TFEU, provided that the legislation laying down such a fine is, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, appropriate for the purposes of contributing to the attainment of the objective of more stringent protection, which is the purpose of the legislation prescribing joint liability, and that the methods for determining the amount of the fine do not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective (see, by analogy, judgment of 9 June 2016, Nutrivet, C‑69/15, EU:C:2016:425, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

51 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in order to assess whether the penalty in question is consistent with the principle of proportionality, account must be taken inter alia of the nature and the degree of seriousness of the infringement which the penalty seeks to sanction and of the means of establishing the amount of the penalty (see, inter alia, judgment in Rodopi-M 91, C‑259/12, EU:C:2013:414, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). The Member States are thus required to comply with the principle of proportionality also as regards the assessment of the factors which may be taken into account in the fixing of a fine (judgment of 9 February 2012 in Urbán, C‑210/10, EU:C:2012:64, paragraph 54).

44 Furthermore, the Court has also held that the fact that the adoption of a given measure under a common organisation of the market may affect producers in different ways, depending upon the particular nature of their production or on local conditions, cannot be regarded as discrimination prohibited by Article 40(3) of the Treaty if that measure is determined on the basis of objective rules, formulated to meet the needs of the general common organisation of the market (see, to that effect, judgment in Case 179/84 Bozzetti [1985] ECR 2301, paragraph 34).

54. In those circumstances, the Community Courts must restrict themselves to considering whether the exercise of that discretion contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power or whether the Community institutions clearly exceeded the bounds of their discretion (see Antillean Rice Mills , paragraph 48; Case C-110/97 Netherlands v Council , paragraph 62, and Case C-301/97 Netherlands v Council , paragraph 74).

74 In cases involving such a discretion, the Community courts must restrict themselves to considering whether the exercise of that discretion contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power or whether the Community institutions clearly exceeded the bounds of their discretion (see Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 48; see also, to that effect, Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 207, paragraph 40, and Case C-189/01 Jippes and Others [2001] ECR I-5689, paragraph 80).

50. In that regard, the Court has consistently held that that condition is not satisfied when the hunting season under a derogation coincides, without need, with periods in which the Directive aims to provide particular protection. There is no such need, in particular, if the sole purpose of the derogation authorising hunting is to extend the hunting seasons for certain species of birds in territories which they already frequent during the hunting seasons fixed in accordance with Article 7 of the Directive (see Ligue pour la protection des oiseaux and Others , paragraph 16, and Case C‑135/04 Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I‑5261, paragraph 19).

63. In so far as concerns the relevance for the circumstances at issue to the principal, in Article 28 of the VAT Directive, according to which’[w]here a taxable person acting in his own name but on behalf of another person takes part in a supply of services, he shall be deemed to have received and supplied those services himself’, it must be observed, first, that although B.G.Ż. Leasing concluded the insurance contract at issue in the main proceedings in its own name and on its own behalf it is for the referring court to ascertain, the transaction concerned does not fall within the scope of Article 28 (see, by analogy Case C-520/10 Lebara [2012] ECR, paragraph 43). Second, if the insurance contract had been concluded on behalf of someone else, the case-law of the Court on Article 28 of the VAT Directive is such as to support the exemption of the transaction at issue in the main proceedings.

43. Consequently, the answer to the first question is that point (1) of Article 2 of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a telecommunications services operator which offers telecommunications services consisting in selling to a distributor phonecards which display all the information necessary for making international telephone calls by means of the infrastructure provided by that operator and which are resold by the distributor, in its own name and on its own behalf, to end users, either directly or through other taxable persons such as wholesalers or retailers, carries out a supply of telecommunications services for consideration to the distributor. On the other hand, that operator does not carry out a second supply of services for consideration, this time to the end user, where that user, having purchased the phonecard, exercises the right to make telephone calls using the information on the card.

33. Thereafter, that provision seeks to deepen the lasting integration of the Turkish migrant worker’s family in the host Member State by granting to the family member concerned, after three years of legal residence, the possibility of himself gaining access to the labour force. The fundamental objective thus pursued is that of consolidating the position of that family member, who is, at that stage, already legally integrated in the host Member State, by giving him the means to earn his own living in that State and therefore to establish a position which is independent of that of the migrant worker (see, inter alia, Eyüp , paragraph 26; Cetinkaya , paragraph 25; Aydinli , paragraph 23; Case C‑325/05 Derin [2007] ECR I‑6495, paragraphs 50 and 71; and Bozkurt , paragraph 34).

51. The German Government, referring to paragraphs 31 and 32 of Case C-242/08 Swiss Re Germany Holding [2009] ECR I-10099, maintains the opposite. According to that Government, the Court stated, in that judgment, that the sound functioning and uniform interpretation of the common system of VAT require that the concepts of ‘insurance transactions’ and ‘reinsurance’ in the provisions of Sixth Directive 77/388 which correspond to Articles 56(1)(e) and 135(1)(a) of Directive 2006/112 are not defined differently depending on whether they are used in one of those provisions or the other. That reasoning should apply by analogy to ‘financial transactions’.

31. Second, it should be pointed out that the sound functioning and uniform interpretation of the common system of VAT require that the concepts of ‘insurance transactions’ and ‘reinsurance’ in Articles 9(2)(e), fifth indent, and 13B(a) of the Sixth Directive are not defined differently depending on whether they are used in one of those provisions or the other.

20 THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION SUBMITTED BY THE NATIONAL COURT MUST THEREFORE BE THAT , AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY RULED IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 15 OCTOBER 1980 IN CASE 145/79 , THE PROVISIONS OF COMMISSION REGULATION NO 2140/79 , AS AMENDED BY COMMISSION REGULATION NO 1541/80 , ARE INVALID IN SO FAR AS THEY FIX THE MONETARY COMPENSATORY AMOUNTS APPLICABLE TO EXPORTS OF POWDERED GLUCOSE FALLING UNDER SUBHEADING NO 17.02 B II ( A ) OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF . THE FACT THAT THE PROVISIONS OF COMMISSION REGULATION NO 2140/79 , AS AMENDED BY COMMISSION REGULATION NO 1541/80 , HAVE BEEN DECLARED INVALID PROVIDES NO GROUND FOR CALLING IN QUESTION THE LEVYING OR PAYMENT OF MONETARY COMPENSATORY AMOUNTS BY THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES ON THE BASIS OF THOSE PROVISIONS IN RESPECT OF THE PERIOD PRECEDING 15 OCTOBER 1980 , THE DATE ON WHICH THE JUDGMENT DECLARING SUCH PROVISIONS INVALID WAS DELIVERED .

107. However, the Court of Justice has also stated that the non-legislative activity of the institutions does not fall outside the scope of Regulation No 1049/2001. Suffice it to note in that respect that Article 2(3) of that regulation states that the latter applies to all documents held by an institution, that is to say, drawn up or received by it and in its possession, in all areas of EU activity (see, to that effect, Sweden v MyTravel and Commission , C‑506/08 P, EU:C:2011:496, paragraphs 87, 88 and 109).

109. In order to reply to the second plea in the appeal, it is necessary to recall at the outset that, as stated in paragraphs 87 and 88 of this judgment and contrary to what seems to be suggested, in particular, by the Commission, the administrative activity of the institutions does not escape in any way from the scope of Regulation No 1049/2001.

96. Furthermore, it is evident that under the system established by Directive 93/104, although Article 15 allows generally for the application or introduction of national provisions more favourable to the protection of the safety and health of employees, only certain specifically mentioned provisions of the directive may form the subject-matter of derogations by the Member States or social partners (see Jaeger , paragraph 80).

38. First, regarding the prevention of tax evasion, it should be noted that the mere fact that a resident taxpayer uses the services of a non-resident service provider cannot provide a sound basis for a general presumption of abusive practices and justify a measure which compromises the exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty (see, by analogy, Case C-436/00 X and Y [2002] ECR I-10829, paragraph 62; Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I-7995, paragraph 50; Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation [2007] ECR I-2107, paragraph 73; Case C-105/07 Lammers & Van Cleeff [2008] ECR I-173, paragraph 27; and Jobra , paragraph 37).

27. The mere fact that a resident company is granted a loan by a related company which is established in another Member State cannot be the basis of a general presumption of abusive practices and justify a measure which compromises the exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty ( Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation , paragraph 73 and the case‑law cited).

20. As a preliminary point, it must, first, be recalled that, in the absence of EU sectoral rules or of national legislation providing for specific rules on the limitation period, the four-year limitation rule laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 is applicable to irregularities which are detrimental to the European Union’s financial interests (see, to that effect, judgment in Pfeifer & Langen , C‑564/10, EU:C:2012:190, paragraphs 39 and 40 and the case-law cited).

38. That is the position where a tax fraud is committed by the taxable person himself. In such a case, the objective criteria which form the basis of the concepts of ‘supply of goods or services effected by a taxable person acting as such’ and ‘economic activity’ are not met (see Halifax and Others , paragraphs 58 and 59, and Kittel and Recolta Recycling , paragraph 53).

53. By contrast, the objective criteria which form the basis of the concepts of ‘supply of goods effected by a taxable person acting as such’ and ‘economic activity’ are not met where tax is evaded by the taxable person himself (see Case C‑255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 59).

87 Although, as is apparent from paragraph 79 of the present judgment, financial support for travel costs constitutes maintenance aid for the students concerned, only maintenance aid for studies ‘consisting in student grants or student loans’ falls within the scope of the derogation from the principle of equal treatment under Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2012 in Commission v Austria, C‑75/11, EU:C:2012:605, paragraph 55).

18 The mere creation of such a dominant position by the granting of an exclusive right within the meaning of Article 90(1) is not as such incompatible with Article 86 of the Treaty. A Member State contravenes the prohibitions contained in those two provisions only if, in merely exercising the exclusive right granted to it, the undertaking in question cannot avoid abusing its dominant position (see the judgments in Case C-41/90 Hoefner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 29, and, most recently, in Case C-179/90 Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova [1991] ECR I-5889, paragraph 17).

29 Secondly, the simple fact of creating a dominant position of that kind by granting an exclusive right within the meaning of Article 90(1) is not as such incompatible with Article 86 of the Treaty (see Case 311/84 CBEM, above, paragraph 17). A Member State is in breach of the prohibition contained in those two provisions only if the undertaking in question, merely by exercising the exclusive right granted to it, cannot avoid abusing its dominant position.

19. In the present case, it should first be borne in mind that, in paragraph 102 of Italy v Commission , cited above, regarding the principle of legitimate expectation, the Court pointed out that, by a notice published in the Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ 1983 C 318, p. 3), the Commission had informed potential recipients of State aid of the risk attaching to any aid granted to them illegally, in that they might have to refund the aid (see Case C-5/89 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3437, paragraph 15).

14 In interpreting Article 3(f), the second paragraph of Article 5 and Article 85 of the Treaty it should be noted that Article 85, read in isolation, relates only to the conduct of undertakings and does not cover measures adopted by Member States by legislation or regulations. However, the Court has consistently held that Article 85, read in conjunction with Article 5 of the Treaty, requires the Member States not to introduce or maintain in force measures, even of a legislative or regulatory nature, which may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings. By virtue of the same case-law, such is the case where a Member State requires or favours the adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 85 or reinforces their effects or deprives its own legislation of its official character by delegating to private traders responsibility for taking economic decisions affecting the economic sphere (see Case 267/86 Van Eycke v ASPA [1988] ECR 4769, paragraph 16).

16 It must be pointed out in that regard that Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty per se are concerned only with the conduct of undertakings and not with national legislation . The Court has consistently held, however, that Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, in conjunction with Article 5, require the Member States not to introduce or maintain in force measures, even of a legislative nature, which may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings . Such would be the case, the Court has held, if a Member State were to require or favour the adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 85 or to reinforce their effects, or to deprive its own legislation of its official character by delegating to private traders responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere .

33 Whether a body making a reference is a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU depends on a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Consorci Sanitari del Maresme, C‑203/14, EU:C:2015:664, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).

34. According to the settled case-law of the Court, the transposition of a directive into domestic law does not necessarily require that its provisions be incorporated formally and verbatim in express, specific legislation; a general legal context may be adequate for the purpose provided that it does indeed guarantee the full application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner (see, by analogy, SALIX Grundstücks-Vermietungsgesellschaft , paragraph 40).

40. As regards the question whether the Member States can rely on the option provided for by the fourth subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive only if they have previously adopted an express legal provision to that effect, it should be pointed out that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, the transposition of a directive into domestic law does not necessarily require that its provisions be incorporated formally and verbatim in express, specific legislation; a general legal context may be adequate for the purpose provided that it does indeed guarantee the full application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner (Case C-131/88 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-825, paragraph 6; Case C-49/00 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-8575, paragraph 21; and Case C-410/03 Commission v Italy [2005] ECR I-3507, paragraph 60).

119. As regards the merits of this ground of appeal, it should be noted at the outset that the Court has already held, in substance, that the concept of a collective dominant position is included in that of ‘dominant position’ within the meaning of Article 2 of the Regulation (see, to that effect, Kali & Salz , paragraphs 166 and 178). In that regard, the existence of an agreement or of other links in law between the undertakings concerned is not essential to a finding of a collective dominant position. Such a finding may be based on other connecting factors and would depend on an economic assessment and, in particular, on an assessment of the structure of the market in question (see Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie maritime belge transports and Others v Commission [2000] ECR I‑1365, paragraph 45).

25. It must be pointed out in this connection that the prevention of potential tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an objective which is recognised and encouraged by the Sixth VAT Directive (see Joined Cases C-487/01 and C‑7/02 Gemeente Leusden and Holin Groep [2004] ECR I-5337, paragraph 76; Case C-255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECR I-1609, paragraph 71; and Commission v Italy , paragraph 46).

76. In that connection, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 13(B) of the Sixth Directive, Member States are to exempt the leasing or letting of immovable property under conditions which they are to lay down for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of the exemptions and of preventing any possible evasion, avoidance or abuse. That wording demonstrates that preventing possible tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an objective recognised and encouraged by the Sixth Directive.

33. Where the customs debt is incurred on the basis of Articles 202 to 205 and Articles 210, 211 and 220 of the Customs Code, all of which concern situations involving breach by the trader concerned of the EU customs legislation, neither the Customs Code nor the implementing regulation provides for specific measures, such as an increase in the customs duty corresponding to the amount which would have been incurred by way of interest on arrears for the period falling between the date on which the customs debt was incurred and the date of its entry in the accounts, or between the date on which the customs debt originally entered in the accounts fell due and the date on which it was subsequently entered in the accounts (see, to that effect, Case C‑91/02 Hannl-Hofstetter [2003] ECR I‑12077, paragraphs 19 and 23).

27. However, it should be stressed that the explanatory notes drawn up in relation to that harmonised system by the World Customs Organisation and in relation to the CN by the European Commission are interpretative in character and do not have legally binding force (see, inter alia, Case C‑396/02 DFDS EU:C:2004:536, paragraph 28; Case C‑15/05 Kawasaki Motors Europe EU:C:2006:259, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited; and Case C‑312/07 JVC France EU:C:2008:324, paragraph 37).

37. It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that the reply to the second question must be that the explanatory notes to the CN relating to subheading 8525 40 99, published on 6 July 2001 and 23 October 2002, are interpretative in character and do not have legally binding force. They are in accordance with the wording of the CN and do not alter its scope. It follows that the adoption of a new classification regulation was not necessary. Costs

66. Thus, as the Belgian Government and the Commission submit, given that there is no Community legislation governing the period within which proof must be furnished of the place where the offence or irregularity was committed, it is for the national court to determine, according to the principles of its national law on evidence, whether, in the specific case before it and in the light of all the circumstances, that proof was furnished within the period prescribed (see, by analogy, Joined Cases C-310/98 and C-406/98 Met-Trans and Sagpol [2000] ECR I-1797, paragraphs 29 and 30).

14 It is only for national courts before which actions have been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judgment, to assess, in the light of the circumstances of each case, both the necessity for a preliminary ruling in order to be able to give their judgment and the relevance of the questions they refer to the Court (see, for example, the judgment in Case C-369/89 Piageme [1991] ECR I-2971, at paragraph 10).

10 It is worth remembering that it has been consistently held that it is only for national courts before which actions have been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judgment, to assess, in the light of the circumstances of each case, both the necessity for a preliminary ruling in order to be able to give their judgment and the relevance of the questions they refer to the Court. Consequently where questions referred by national courts relate to the interpretation of a Community-law provision, the Court is, in principle, obliged to make a ruling (judgment in Case C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher v Oberfinanzdirektion Koeln [1990] ECR I-4003, paragraph 20). The preliminary question

45. In that context, it is immaterial whether, in some circumstances, the contested measure affects, as well as nationals of other Member States, nationals of the Member State in question who are unable to meet such a criterion. In order for a measure to be treated as being indirectly discriminatory, it is not necessary for it to have the effect of placing all the nationals of the Member State in question at an advantage or of placing at a disadvantage only nationals of other Member States, but not nationals of the State in question (see, to that effect, Case C‑388/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I‑721, paragraph 14; Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 38; and Case C-172/11 Erny [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 41).

18 It must be borne in mind first of all that the purpose of Article 7 is to protect consumers against the risks arising from the insolvency of the package holiday or tour organiser. As the French Government has pointed out, those risks, which are inherent in the contract concluded between the purchaser and the package holiday organiser, stem from the payment in advance of the price of the package and from the spread of liability between the travel organiser and the various providers of the services which, in combination, make up the package. Consequently, the result prescribed by Article 7 of the Directive entails the grant to package travellers of rights guaranteeing the refund of money that they have paid over and their repatriation in the event of the organiser's insolvency (see Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94 to C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others v Federal Republic of Germany [1996] ECR I-4845, paragraph 42).

42 Consequently, it must be concluded that the result prescribed by Article 7 of the Directive entails the grant to package travellers of rights guaranteeing the refund of money that they have paid over and their repatriation in the event of the organizer' s insolvency.

64. Finally, with regard to the allegedly deficient reasoning of the judgment under appeal arising from the fact that the General Court, in infringement of the obligation to state reasons, failed to justify why it considered that Team Relocations could be held responsible for the single and continuous infringement, but the company Verhuizingen Coppens could not, it should be noted that, in line with settled case-law, the statement of the reasons on which a judgment is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose the General Court’s thinking, so that the persons concerned can be apprised of the justification for the decision taken and the Court of Justice can exercise its power of review (see, inter alia, Case C‑259/96 P Council v de Nil and Impens [1998] ECR I‑2915, paragraphs 32 and 33, and General Química and Others v Commission , paragraph 59).

58. In the second place, it must be recalled that, in paragraph 32 of the judgment in Sodemare and Others , EU:C:1997:301, the Court held that a Member State may, in the exercise of the powers it retains to organise its social security system, consider that a social welfare system for elderly people necessarily implies, with a view to attaining its objectives, that the admission of private operators to that system as providers of social welfare services is to be made subject to the condition that they are non-profit-making.

32 In that regard, it must be stated that, as Community law stands at present, a Member State may, in the exercise of the powers it retains to organize its social security system, consider that a social welfare system of the kind at issue in this case necessarily implies, with a view to attaining its objectives, that the admission of private operators to that system as providers of social welfare services is to be made subject to the condition that they are non-profit-making.

33 It is apparent from the case-law of the Court that VAT applies to each production or distribution transaction after deduction of the VAT directly borne by the various cost components (judgment of 6 December 2012 in Bonik, C‑285/11, EU:C:2012:774, paragraph 28). It follows that, as regards VAT, each transaction must be the subject of a specific evaluation, independently of the VAT due on previous or subsequent transactions.

74. In accordance with settled case-law, a national court which is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of European Union law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation (see, inter alia, Simmenthal , paragraphs 21 to 24, and Case C-119/05 Lucchini [2007] ECR I-6199, paragraph 61).

61. It also follows from settled case-law that a national court which is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation (see, inter alia, Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraphs 21 to 24; Case 130/78 Salumificio di Cornuda [1979] ECR 867, paragraphs 23 to 27; and Case C-213/89 Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I-2433, paragraphs 19 to 21).

33. However, it should be added that, in such a situation, first, only the authorisation in respect of the first medicinal product placed on the European Union market comprising, among its active ingredients, the active ingredient which is the subject of the application may be regarded as the first MA for that ‘product’ as a medicinal product within the meaning of Article 3(d) of Regulation No 469/2009 ( Medeva , paragraph 40).

76. It is necessary in particular to be satisfied that the way in which the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings pursues those objectives is coherent. According to the Court’s case-law, the national legislation as a whole and the various relevant rules will be appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective relied upon only if they genuinely reflect a concern to attain that objective in a consistent and systematic manner (see, to that effect, judgment in Ottica New Line di Accardi Vincenzo , C‑539/11, EU:C:2013:591, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

47. None the less, it is also necessary that the way in which Regional Law No 12/2004 pursues those objectives is coherent. According to the Court’s case-law, the national legislation as a whole and the various relevant rules are appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective relied upon only if they genuinely reflect a concern to attain that objective in a consistent and systematic manner (see, to that effect, Hartlauer , paragraph 55, and Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others , paragraph 42).

23 Second, the fact that it may be necessary to order the defendant in the main proceedings to cease its activities in the future provides sufficient justification for interpreting the relevant provisions of Regulation No 1475/95 (see, to that effect, Case C-408/95 Eurotunnel and Others v Seafrance [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24).