Datasets:

ngarneau

/

link_prediction_contrastive

like 0

58 In that connection, in certain cases the very circumstances in which the aid has been granted show that it is liable to affect trade between Member States and to distort or threaten to distort competition. In such cases, the Commission must set out those circumstances in the statement of reasons for its decision (see Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission, cited above, paragraph 24; Germany and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 52; and Joined Cases C-15/98 and C-105/99 Italy and Sardegna Lines v Commission [2000] ECR I-8855, paragraph 66). Contrary to what the Spanish Government claims, the statement of reasons in the contested decision, as set out in the first sentence of paragraph 56 above, is sufficient to explain the effect of the Plan on competition and trade between Member States since the Plan applies to an indeterminate number of beneficiaries above the de minimis threshold, it relates to services the supply of which is liberalised between the Member States and those services are by nature liable to be the subject of inter-State supplies. The fact that only a small number of professional transport companies from other Member States actually engage in cabotage in Spain is irrelevant precisely because the Plan could have the effect of hampering growth in the supply of such services.

24 EVEN IF IN CERTAIN CASES THE VERY CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE AID IS GRANTED ARE SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT THE AID IS CAPABLE OF AFFECTING TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND OF DISTORTING OR THREATENING TO DISTORT COMPETITION , THE COMMISSION MUST AT LEAST SET OUT THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR ITS DECISION . IN THIS CASE IT HAS FAILED TO DO SO SINCE THE CONTESTED DECISION DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SLIGHTEST INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SITUATION OF THE RELEVANT MARKET , THE PLACE OF LEEUWARDER IN THAT MARKET , THE PATTERN OF TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES IN THE PRODUCTS IN QUESTION OR THE UNDERTAKING ' S EXPORTS .

33 Any activity consisting in offering goods or services on a given market is an economic activity (judgment of 1 July 2008, MOTOE, C‑49/07, EU:C:2008:376, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited). In the present case, it is apparent from the file available to the Court that it is not disputed that the AKKA/LAA’s activity, consisting in the collection of the fees from which authors of musical works are remunerated, is a service.

26. Thus, where an appeal merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments submitted to the General Court, including those based on facts expressly rejected by that Court (see, in particular, Interporc v Commission , paragraph 16), it fails to satisfy the requirement to state reasons under those provisions. In reality, such an appeal amounts to no more than a request for a re-examination of the application submitted to the General Court, a matter which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission , paragraph 50).

50. Thus, where an appeal merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments submitted to the Court of First Instance, including those based on facts expressly rejected by that Court, it fails to satisfy the requirement to state reasons under those provisions (see inter alia the order in Case C-174/97 P FFSA and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-1303, paragraph 24, and Interporc v Commission , paragraph 16). Such an appeal amounts in reality to no more than a request for re‑examination of the application submitted to the Court of First Instance, which the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to undertake (see the order in Case C-26/94 P X v Commission [1994] ECR I-4379, paragraph 13, and Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission , paragraph 35).

35. In fact, the purpose of Article 31(1) EC is to reconcile the possibility for Member States to maintain certain monopolies of a commercial character as instruments for the pursuit of public interest aims with the requirements of the establishment and functioning of the common market. It aims at the elimination of obstacles to the free movement of goods, save, however, for restrictions on trade which are inherent in the existence of the monopolies in question ( Franzén , paragraph 39).

38. Articles 4, 5 and 10 of Directive 80/987, which permit the Member States not only to set the detailed rules regarding the organisation, financing and operation of the guarantee institution, but also to limit, in certain circumstances, the protection which it is designed to provide to employees, provide for neither a temporal limitation of the rights that employees derive from that directive nor a restriction on Member States’ freedom to set a time-limit for lodging applications (Case C‑125/01 Pflücke [2003] ECR I-9375, paragraph 31).

31. Articles 4, 5 and 10 of Directive 80/987, which permit the Member States not only to set the detailed rules regarding the organisation, financing and operation of the guarantee institution, but also to limit, in certain circumstances, the protection which it is designed to provide to employees, provide for neither a temporal limitation of the rights that employees derive from that directive nor a restriction on Member States ' freedom to set a time-limit for lodging applications.

33 Second, under the rule laid down by Article 3(1)(b), (c) and (d), trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character, descriptive marks, and marks which consist exclusively of indications which have become customary in the current language or in the bona fide and established practices of the trade are to be refused registration or declared invalid if registered (Windsurfing Chiemsee, cited above, paragraph 45).

39. That interpretation is also dictated in the light of the purpose of Decision No 1/80 taken a whole, regarding which it has repeatedly been held that it seeks to improve the situation of Turkish migrants in the host State by promoting the gradual integration in that State of Turkish nationals who satisfy the conditions laid down in one of the provisions of that decision and therefore enjoy the rights conferred on them by the decision (see, inter alia, Case C‑329/97 Ergat [2000] ECR I-1487, paragraphs 43 and 44; Derin , paragraph 53; and Altun , paragraphs 28 and 29).

28. A different interpretation of that concept, according to whether it is considered in the context of Article 6 of Decision No 1/80 or Article 7, would upset the coherence of the system put in place by the Association Council in order gradually to consolidate the situation of Turkish workers in the host Member State.

28 However, it should be emphasised that the information which Directive 77/799 allows the competent authorities of a Member State to request is in fact all the information which appears to them to be necessary to ascertain the correct amount of revenue tax payable by a taxpayer in relation to the legislation which they have to apply themselves (see, to this effect, Futura Participations and Singer, at paragraph 41) and that the directive does not in any way affect the competence of those authorities to assess in particular whether the conditions to which that legislation subjects the deduction of certain costs are fulfilled.

72. Furthermore, on grounds identical to those set out in paragraphs 70 to 72 of the judgment in Sürül , consideration of the purpose and the nature of the Association Agreement of which that provision forms part does not contradict the finding that the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Decision No 3/80 is capable of directly governing the situation of individuals.

70 The purpose of the Agreement is to establish an association to promote the development of trade and economic relations between the parties, including in the field of employment, through the progressive achievement of freedom of movement for workers, with a view to improving the standard of living of the Turkish people and facilitating the accession of the Turkish Republic to the Community at a later date (see the fourth recital in the preamble to the Agreement).

42. Regarding the claim that the answer to the question referred is clear, it should be pointed out that, where the answer to a question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling may be clearly deduced from existing case-law and where it leaves no scope for any reasonable doubt, first, a court or tribunal against the decisions of which there is no judicial remedy under national law is not required, in certain circumstances, to make a preliminary reference (see, to that effect, Case 283/81 Cilfit and Others [1982] ECR 3415, paragraphs 14 and 16 to 20) and, second, this Court may give its decision by reasoned order pursuant to Article 104(3) of its Rules of Procedure.

37. It is to be noted at the outset that, according to settled case-law, the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of Community law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, paragraphs 18 and 19; Case 222/86 Heylens and Others [1987] ECR 4097, paragraph 14; Case C-424/99 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-9285, paragraph 45; Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, paragraph 39; and Case C-467/01 Eribrand [2003] ECR I-6471, paragraph 61) and which has also been reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, proclaimed on 7 December 2000 in Nice (OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1).

39 Individuals are therefore entitled to effective judicial protection of the rights they derive from the Community legal order, and the right to such protection is one of the general principles of law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. That right has also been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (see, in particular, Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 18, and Case C-424/99 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-9285, paragraph 45).

11 In its judgment in Case C-262/88 Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] ECR I-1889 ("the Barber judgment"), the Court ruled that pensions paid under a contracted-out pension scheme fall within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty (paragraph 28), which prohibits any discrimination between men and women in relation to pay, whatever the arrangements giving rise to such inequality. Accordingly, it is contrary to Article 119 to impose an age condition which differs according to sex, even if the difference between the pensionable ages for men and women corresponds to that provided for by the national statutory scheme (paragraph 32).

25. It should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see, in particular, Case C‑415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I‑4921, paragraph 59, and Case C‑466/04 Acereda Herrera [2006] ECR I‑5341, paragraph 47).

47. It must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see, inter alia, Case C-415/93 Bosman and Others [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59, and Case C‑36/99 Idéal tourisme [2000] ECR I‑6049, paragraph 20).

26. The same applies in respect of the concept of ‘remuneration’ in Article 5(1) of Directive 92/100, which is not defined by the latter (concerning the concept of ‘equitable remuneration’, see, by analogy, SENA , paragraph 24).

42 It should be noted first of all that, under Article 6(3) of Directive 92/43, an appropriate assessment of the implications of a plan or project for the site concerned implies that, prior to its approval, all aspects of that plan or project which can, by themselves or in conjunction with other plans or projects, affect the site’s conservation objectives must be identified in the light of the best scientific knowledge in the field. The competent national authorities are to authorise an activity on the protected site only if they have made certain that it will not adversely affect the integrity of that site. That is the case where no reasonable scientific doubt remains as to the absence of such an effect (see to that effect, in particular, judgments of 24 November 2011, Commission v Spain, C‑404/09, EU:C:2011:768, paragraph 99, and of 14 January 2016, Grüne Liga Sachsen and Others, C‑399/14, EU:C:2016:10, paragraphs 49 and 50).

50 The assessment carried out under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive may not have lacunae and must contain complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions capable of removing all reasonable scientific doubt as to the effects of the works proposed on the protected site concerned (judgment in Briel and Others, C‑521/12, EU:C:2014:330, point 27).

18. The Brussels Convention does not harmonise the different systems of service abroad of legal documents which are in force in the Contracting States (Case 228/81 Pendy Plastic [1982] ECR 2723, paragraph 13 and Lancray , paragraph 28). However, the first paragraph of Article IV of the Protocol states that judicial documents drawn up in one Contracting State which have to be served on persons in another Contracting State are to be transmitted in accordance with the procedures laid down in the conventions concluded between the Contracting States.

70. Lastly, it should be borne in mind that clause 4 of the framework agreement is unconditional and sufficiently precise for individuals to be able to rely on it before a national court as against the State from the date of expiry of the period within which the Member States should have transposed Directive 1999/70 (see, to that effect, Gavieiro Gavieiro and Iglesias Torres , paragraphs 78 to 83, 97 and 98; order in Montoya Medina , paragraph 46; and Rosado Santana , paragraph 56).

80. Admittedly, that provision includes, in relation to the principle of non-discrimination laid down therein, a qualification concerning justification on objective grounds.

35 It is true that the General Court did not expressly rule on whether that argument was admissible or well founded. However, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, the General Court cannot be required, every time that a party raises, in the course of the procedure, a new plea in law which clearly does not satisfy the requirements of Article 48(2) of its Rules of Procedure, either to explain in its judgment the reasons for which that plea is inadmissible, or to examine it in detail (see, inter alia, judgment of 20 March 2014, Rousse Industry v Commission, C‑271/13 P, not published, EU:C:2014:175, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

75. As regards, in that respect, InnoLux’s argument that taking those sales into account in order to calculate the fine imposed for breach of Article 101 TFEU is likely to result in the same anti-competitive conduct giving rise to concurrent penalties imposed by the competition authorities of a non-member State, it must be pointed out that, contrary to the Commission’s contentions, that claim is admissible at the appeal stage in the light of Article 170(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, since it does not change the subject-matter of the proceedings. However, it must be borne in mind that, as the Court has held, neither the principle non bis in idem nor any other principle of law obliges the Commission to take account of proceedings and penalties to which the undertaking has been subject in non-member States (see judgments in Showa Denko v Commission , C‑289/04 P, EU:C:2006:431, paragraphs 52 to 58; SGL Carbon v Commission , C‑308/04 P, EU:C:2006:433, paragraphs 28 to 34; and SGL Carbon v Commission , C‑328/05 P, EU:C:2007:277, paragraphs 24 to 35).

30. In those circumstances, the argument put forward in its appeal alleging breach of the principle non bis in idem cannot be accepted.

53. À cet égard, il y a lieu de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, lorsque le Tribunal a constaté ou apprécié les faits, la Cour est compétente pour exercer, en vertu de l’article 225 CE, un contrôle sur la qualification juridique de ces faits et les conséquences de droit qui en ont été tirées par le Tribunal (voir arrêts du 6 avril 2006, General Motors/Commission, C‑551/03 P, Rec. p. I‑3173, point 51, et du 22 mai 2008, Degussa/Commission et Conseil, C‑266/06 P, point 72).

18 In that same judgment, at paragraph 33, the Court held that, in the light of the wording of Article 21 of the Convention and the objective set out above, that article must be understood as requiring, as a condition of the obligation of the second court seised to decline jurisdiction, that the parties to the two actions be identical.

33 Consequently, where some of the parties are the same as the parties to an action which has already been started, Article 21 requires the second court seised to decline jurisdiction only to the extent to which the parties to the proceedings pending before it are also parties to the action previously started before the court of another Contracting State; it does not prevent the proceedings from continuing between the other parties.

25 As follows in particular from recital 10 of Regulation No 1215/2012, the intention of the EU legislature was to adopt a broad definition of the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ in Article 1(1) of that regulation and, consequently, to provide that the article should be broad in its scope. By contrast, the scope of Regulation No 1346/2000, as stated in recital 6 of that regulation, should not be given a broad interpretation (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 November 2017, Tünkers France and Tünkers Maschinenbau, C‑641/16, EU:C:2017:847, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).

15. The prohibition of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions set out in Article 28 EC covers all measures which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade (see, in particular, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5; Case 178/84 Commission v Germany ( Beer purity ) [1987] ECR 1227, paragraph 27; Case C‑192/01 Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR I-9693, paragraph 39; and Case C‑366/04 Schwarz [2005] ECR I‑10139, paragraph 28).

5 ALL TRADING RULES ENACTED BY MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF HINDERING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ACTUALLY OR POTENTIALLY, INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE ARE TO BE CONSIDERED AS MEASURES HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS .

59 In those circumstances, the answer to the first and second questions referred is that Article 4 of, and Annex II to, Decision 2013/448, laying down the correction factor, are invalid (judgment of 28 April 2016, Borealis Polyolefine and Others, C‑191/14, C‑192/14, C‑295/14, C‑389/14 and C‑391/14 to C‑393/14, EU:C:2016:311, paragraph 99).

61. It is clear from the Court’s case-law that, in order to assess the capacity to mislead of a description to be found on a label, the national court must in essence take account of the presumed expectations, in light of that description, of an average consumer who is reasonably well informed, and reasonably observant and circumspect, as to the origin, provenance, and quality associated with the foodstuff, the critical point being that the consumer must not be misled and must not be induced to believe, incorrectly, that the product has an origin, provenance or quality which are other than genuine (see, to that effect, Case C‑470/93 Mars [1995] ECR I‑1923, paragraph 24; Gut Springenheide and Tusky , cited above, paragraph 31; and Case C‑220/98 Estée Lauder [2000] ECR I‑117, paragraph 30).

24 Reasonably circumspect consumers may be deemed to know that there is not necessarily a link between the size of publicity markings relating to an increase in a product' s quantity and the size of that increase.

14. In order to answer that question, it must be recalled that Article 12 of the Protocol ensures a uniform treatment of the said salaries, wages and emoluments for all the officials and other servants of the Union, preventing, firstly and chiefly, their effective remuneration from differing according to their nationality or fiscal domicile as a result of the assessment of different national taxes, and, secondly, preventing this remuneration from being inordinately taxed as a result of double liability (judgment in Brouerius van Nidek , 7/74, EU:C:1974:73, paragraph 11).

32. The Court has consistently held that restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services referred to in Articles 43 EC and 49 EC respectively are measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of such freedoms (see, to that effect, Case C‑439/99 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I‑305, paragraph 22; Case C‑451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti [2006] ECR I‑2941, paragraph 31; Case C‑65/05 Commission v Greece [2006] ECR I‑10341, paragraph 48; and Case C‑248/06 Commission v Spain [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 21).

21. Par ailleurs, la Cour a itérativement jugé que des restrictions à la liberté d’établissement ainsi qu’à la libre prestation des services visées respectivement aux articles 43 CE et 49 CE sont constituées par des mesures qui interdisent, gênent ou rendent moins attrayant l’exercice de ces libertés (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 15 janvier 2002, Commission/Italie, C‑439/99, Rec. p. I‑305, point 22; du 30 mars 2006, Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti, C‑451/03, Rec. p. I‑2941, point 31, et du 26 octobre 2006, Commission/Grèce, C‑65/05, Rec. p. I‑10341, point 48).

39. It follows from the wording itself of that article and, in particular, from the terms ‘in accordance with conditions which they shall determine’ that the Member States have a certain freedom in determining the conditions for the refund of excess VAT (Case C‑78/00 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I‑8195, paragraph 32; Case C‑25/07 Sosnowska [2008] ECR I‑5129, paragraph 17; and Case C‑107/10 Enel Maritsa Iztok 3 [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 33 and 64).

45. The Court has held that copyright within the meaning of Directive 2001/29 is liable to apply only in relation to a subject-matter which is original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation (see, to that effect, with regard to Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29, Infopaq International , paragraphs 33 to 37).

37. In those circumstances, copyright within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29 is liable to apply only in relation to a subject-matter which is original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation.

39. It is settled case-law, however, that the concept of ‘worker’ within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU has an autonomous meaning specific to European Union law and must not be interpreted narrowly (see, to that effect, inter alia Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121, paragraph 16; Case 197/86 Brown [1988] ECR 3205, paragraph 21; Case C-3/90 Bernini [1992] ECR I-1071, paragraph 14; and Case C-413/01 Ninni-Orasche [2003] ECR I-13187, paragraph 23).

62. The national court must also confirm whether the use made in the present case is one ‘in the course of trade’ and ‘in relation to goods’ within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 89/104 (see, inter alia, Arsenal Football Club , paragraphs 40 and 41).

40 In those circumstances, as the national court stated, the use of the sign identical to the mark is indeed use in the course of trade, since it takes place in the context of commercial activity with a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter. It also falls within Article 5(1)(a) of the Directive, as use of a sign which is identical to the trade mark for goods which are identical to those for which the mark is registered.

73. This is indeed borne out by recital 17 in the preamble to Directive 93/83, according to which the right holders concerned must be ensured an appropriate remuneration for the communication to the public by satellite of their works that takes account of all aspects of the broadcast, such as its actual audience and its potential audience (see, to this effect, Football Association Premier League and Others , paragraphs 108 and 110).

57. So far as concerns the main proceedings, it is apparent from the order for reference that the tax authorities inferred that there was no taxable supply from, in particular, the fact that the supplier did not submit the documents required during a tax audit. Since that conclusion is contested by the claimant, it is for the national court to verify it, by carrying out, in accordance with the rules of evidence of national law, an overall assessment of all the facts and circumstances of the case (see, by analogy, Case C-273/11 Mecsek-Gabona [2012] ECR, paragraph 53, and Case C-285/11 Bonik [2012] ECR, paragraph 32)

32. However, it should be borne in mind that, in proceedings brought under Article 267 TFEU, the Court has no jurisdiction to check or to assess the factual circumstances of the case before the referring court. It is therefore for the national court, in accordance with the rules of evidence of national law, to carry out an overall assessment of all the facts and circumstances of the case in order to establish whether Bonik may exercise a right of deduction on the basis of those supplies of goods (see, to that effect, Case C-273/11 Mecsek-Gabona [2012] ECR, paragraph 53).

37. To exclude automatically application of the framework agreement in situations such as those in the cases before the referring court would, in disregard of the objective attributed to clause 4, effectively reduce the scope of the protection against discrimination for the workers concerned and would give rise to an unduly restrictive interpretation of that clause, contrary to the case-law of the Court ( Rosado Santana , paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

46. On that basis, as is apparent from well-established case-law, the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under Community law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness) (see, in particular, Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral , paragraph 5; Comet , paragraphs 13 to 16; Peterbroeck , paragraph 12; Unibet , paragraph 43; and van der Weerd and Others , paragraph 28).

14 ARTICLES 100 TO 102 AND 235 OF THE TREATY ENABLE THE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO BE TAKEN AS NECESSARY , TO ELEMINATE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PROVISIONS LAID DOWN IN SUCH MATTERS BY LAW , REGULATION OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN MEMBER STATES IF THESE DIFFERENCES ARE FOUND TO BE SUCH AS TO CAUSE DISTORTION OR TO AFFECT THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMON MARKET .

59 As regards, in the first place, the territorial scope of the rights of the Community design holder, conferred under Regulation No 6/2002, they extend, as a rule, to the entire area of the European Union, on which designs enjoy uniform protection and have effect (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 April 2011, DHL Express France, C‑235/09, EU:C:2011:238, paragraph 39).

26. Article 4(4)(a) of the Directive establishes, for the benefit of trade marks with a reputation, a wider form of protection than that provided for in Article 4(1). The specific condition of that protection consists of a use of the later mark without due cause which takes or would take unfair advantage of, or is or would be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark (see, to that effect, in respect of Article 5(2) of the Directive, Marca Mode , paragraph 36; Adidas-Salomon and Adidas Benelux , paragraph 27, and Case C-102/07 adidas and adidas Benelux [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 40).

27. In that regard, it must be noted at the outset that, unlike Article 5(1)(b) of the Directive, which is designed to apply only if there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, Article 5(2) of the Directive establishes, for the benefit of trade marks with a reputation, a form of protection whose implementation does not require the existence of such a likelihood. Article 5(2) applies to situations in which the specific condition of the protection consists of a use of the sign in question without due cause which takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark (see Case C-425/98 Marca Mode [2000] ECR I-4861, paragraphs 34 and 36).

28. Thus it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that the objective of reducing the cost of medical care and making that care more accessible to individuals is common to both the exemption provided for in Article 13A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive and that in letter (c) of the same provision (see Case C‑76/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I‑249, paragraph 23; Kügler , paragraph 29; and Dornier , paragraph 43). It must also be borne in mind that the principle of fiscal neutrality precludes, inter alia, economic operators carrying on the same activities from being treated differently as far as the levying of VAT is concerned (see Kügler , paragraph 30, and Dornier , paragraph 44).

27 That interpretation is confirmed by the second sentence of Article 130r(2), pursuant to which environmental protection requirements are to be a component of the Community' s other policies. That provision, which expresses the principle that all Community measures must satisfy the requirements of environmental protection, implies that a Community measure cannot be part of Community action on environmental matters merely because it takes account of those requirements (Greece v Council, cited above, paragraph 20, C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR I-2867, paragraph 22).

20 Moreover, that interpretation is confirmed by the second sentence of Article 130r(2 ), pursuant to which "environmental protection requirements shall be a component of the Community' s other policies ". That provision, which reflects the principle whereby all Community measures must satisfy the requirements of environmental protection, implies that a Community measure cannot be part of Community action on environmental matters merely because it takes account of those requirements .

33 It should be pointed out, first of all, that the Regulation repealed and replaced Council Directive 84/631/EEC of 6 December 1984 on the supervision and control within the European Community of the transfrontier shipment of hazardous waste (OJ 1984 L 326, p. 31), which, as the Court has held, had introduced a complete system covering, in particular, transfrontier shipments of dangerous waste with a view to their disposal at establishments conforming to specific requirements and was based on the obligation of the holder of the waste to make a detailed notification in advance (see Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431, paragraph 20, and Case C-422/92 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-1097, paragraph 32).

29. In order to answer the question thus reformulated, the Court observes at the outset that, according to settled case-law, the concept of matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict covered by Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention includes all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a contract within the meaning of Article 5(1) of that Convention (see, inter alia, Case 189/87 Kalfelis [1988] ECR 5565, paragraph 17; Case C-261/90 Reichert and Kockler [1992] ECR I-2149, paragraph 16; Case C-51/97 Réunion européenne and Others [1998] ECR I-6511, paragraph 22; Gabriel , paragraph 33; and Case C-167/00 Henkel [2002] ECR I-8111, paragraph 36).

16 The Court also held in its abovementioned judgment in Case 189/87 Kalfelis, at paragraph 17, that in order to ensure uniformity in all the Member States, it must be recognized that the concept of "matters relating to tort, delict and quasi-delict" covers all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a "contract" within the meaning of Article 5(1).

34 The courts of the Member State in which the centre of interests of the person affected is located are, consequently, best placed to assess the impact of such content on the rights of that person (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and Others, C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:685, paragraph 48).

73 Annulment of a Community measure does not necessarily affect the preparatory acts (Spain v Commission, cited above, paragraph 32), since the procedure for replacing such a measure may, in principle, be resumed at the very point at which the illegality occurred (Spain v Commission, paragraph 31).

31 According to Article 176 of the Treaty, the institution whose act has been declared void is required to take the measures necessary to comply with the judgment of the Court. As the Court held in its judgment in Joined Case 97/86, 193/86, 99/86 and 215/86 Asteris and Others v Commission [1988] ECR 2181, paragraph 27, in order to comply with the judgment and to implement it fully, the institution is required to have regard not only to the operative part of the judgment but also to the grounds which led to the judgment and constitute its essential basis, in so far as they are necessary to determine the exact meaning of what is stated in the operative part. It is those grounds which, on the one hand, identify the precise provision held to be illegal and, on the other, indicate the specific reasons which underlie the finding of illegality contained in the operative part and which the institution concerned must take into account when replacing the annulled measure. The procedure for replacing such a measure may thus be resumed at the very point at which the illegality occurred (see the judgment in Case 34/86 Council v Parliament [1986] ECR 2155, paragraph 47).

49 In order to answer that question, it is necessary, in the first place, to bear in mind that Article 56 TFEU requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of services who are established in another Member State, but also the abolition of any restriction on the freedom to provide services, even if that restriction applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less attractive the activities of a service provider established in another Member State where it lawfully provides similar services (judgments of 18 July 2013, Citroën Belux, C‑265/12, EU:C:2013:498, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited, and of 11 June 2015, Berlington Hungary and Others, C‑98/14, EU:C:2015:386, paragraph 35).

31. Selon ces dispositions, le Tribunal est seul compétent, d’une part, pour constater les faits, sauf dans le cas où l’inexactitude matérielle de ses constatations résulterait des pièces du dossier qui lui ont été soumises, et, d’autre part, pour apprécier ces faits. Lorsque le Tribunal a constaté ou apprécié les faits, la Cour est compétente pour exercer, en vertu de l’article 225 CE, un contrôle sur la qualification juridique de ces faits et les conséquences de droit qui en ont été tirées par le Tribunal (voir, notamment, arrêts du 16 mars 2000, Parlement/Bieber, C‑284/98 P, Rec. p. I‑1527, point 31, et du 27 novembre 2001, Z/Parlement, C‑270/99 P, Rec. p. I‑9197, point 37).

31 It also follows from the above provisions that an appeal may be based only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts. The Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to establish the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts. When the Court of First Instance has established or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 168a of the Treaty to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see, inter alia, Brazzelli Lualdi, paragraphs 48 and 49, and Deere, paragraph 21).

42. According to the Court ' s settled case-law, as a result of the direct effect which the last sentence of Article 93(3) of the Treaty has been held to have the immediate enforceability of the prohibition on implementation referred to in that article extends to all aid which has been implemented without being notified (Case C-354/90 Fédération nationale du Commerce Extérieur des Produits Alimentaires et Syndicat Nat ional des Négociants et Transformateurs de Saumon [1991] ECR I-5505, paragraph 11). It is for the national courts to uphold the rights of the persons concerned in the event of a possible breach by the national authorities of the prohibition on putting aid into effect, taking all the consequential measures under national law as regards both the validity of decisions giving effect to aid measures and the recovery of the financial support granted (Case C-17/91 Lornoy and Others [1992] ECR I-6523, paragraph 30).

48. Secondly, paragraph 51 of the judgment in Commission v Germany must also be construed in the light of the remainder of the judgment. Accordingly, in observing that the cap on voting rights ‘supplements’ a legal framework which enables the Federal and State authorities to exercise, on the basis of a reduced investment, considerable influence over the decisions adopted by Volkswagen, the Court stressed the complementary nature of Paragraphs 2(1) and 4(3) of the VW Law, and not, contrary to what the Commission claims, the independent effects of that latter provision.

51. By capping voting rights at the same level of 20%, Paragraph 2(1) of the VW Law supplements a legal framework which enables the Federal and State authorities to exercise considerable influence on the basis of such a reduced investment.

28 Article 73 of the Regulation is intended in particular to prevent Member States from making entitlement to, and the amount of, family benefits dependent on residence of the members of the worker's family in the Member State providing the benefits, so that Community workers are not deterred from exercising their right to freedom of movement (Hoever and Zachow, cited above, paragraph 34).

105. As regards the Swiss Confederation’s argument relating to the alleged refusal of the General Court to examine the necessity of the measures laid down in the 213th Regulation, as amended, the Court notes that that argument is based on a manifest misinterpretation of paragraph 149 of the judgment under appeal, which must be understood in the light of its context (see, to that effect, Case C‑294/95 P Ojha v Commission [1996] ECR I‑5863, paragraphs 48 and 49). In paragraph 149 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court merely stated that the German authorities were entitled to adopt such measures. However, it is apparent from paragraphs 154 et seq. of the judgment under appeal that, by that assertion, the General Court in no way sought to limit its power of review over the proportionate nature of those measures. In particular, in paragraphs 163 et seq. of that judgment, the General Court examined in a precise and detailed manner whether less onerous measures existed which would have enabled the Federal Republic of Germany to achieve the objective pursued by the measures laid down in the 213th Regulation, as amended.

49 Resting as it does on an erroneous interpretation of the contested judgment, the first part of the third plea must therefore be dismissed. The second part of the plea

51 It is the Court’s established case-law that, when appraising the requirement of selectivity, Article 107(1) TFEU requires assessment of whether, under a particular legal regime, a national measure is such as to favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ in comparison with others which, in the light of the objective pursued by that regime, are in a comparable factual and legal situation (judgment of 15 November 2011, Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).

87. According to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question, so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, in particular, Joined Cases 296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission [1985] ECR 809, paragraph 19, and Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink ' s France [1998] ECR I-1719, paragraph 63).

63 As regards the Commission's obligation to state reasons, it is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, in particular, Joined Cases 296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission [1985] ECR 809, paragraph 19, Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I-395, paragraphs 15 and 16, and Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission [1996] ECR I-723, paragraph 86).

23 IF THE NATIONAL COURT SHOULD FIND THAT THE MEASURE WHOSE COMPATIBILITY WITH COMMUNITY LAW IT IS CALLED UPON TO CONSIDER DOES NOT MEET THE CONDITIONS TO WHICH SUCH CONFORMITY IS SUBJECT , IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND WITH REGARD TO THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 36 OF THE TREATY , AS THE COURT HAS HELD ON MANY OCCASIONS ( FOR EXAMPLE THE JUDGMENT OF 19 DECEMBER 1961 IN CASE 7/61 COMMISSION V ITALY ( 1961 ) ECR 317 ), THAT ARTICLE 36 RELATES TO MEASURES OF A NON-ECONOMIC NATURE . THAT PROVISION CANNOT THEREFORE JUSTIFY A MEASURE WHOSE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS BUDGETARY INASMUCH AS IT IS INTENDED TO REDUCE THE OPERATING COSTS OF A SICKNESS INSURANCE SCHEME . B - THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE TREATY

29. As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that the objective of Directive 92/85, which was adopted on the basis of Article 118a EC, to which Article 153 TFEU corresponds, is to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding (Case C‑460/06 Paquay [2007] ECR I‑8511, paragraph 27, and Case C‑232/09 Danosa [2010] ECR I‑11405, paragraph 58).

27. In that regard, it is necessary to recall that the objective of Directive 92/85 is to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding.

206. However, according to the case-law of the Court, it follows from the application of the second paragraph of Article 10 EC in conjunction with the third paragraph of Article 249 EC and the directive concerned that, during the period prescribed for the transposition of a directive, the Member States to which it is addressed must refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to compromise the attainment of the result prescribed by that directive ( Inter-Environnement Wallonie , paragraph 45; Case C‑14/02 ATRAL [2003] ECR I‑4431, paragraph 58; and Mangold , paragraph 67). In this connection it is immaterial whether or not the provision of national law at issue which has been adopted after the directive in question entered into force is concerned with the transposition of the directive ( Adeneler and Others , paragraph 121, and the order in Vassilakis and Others , paragraph 69).

37 That conclusion is all the more compelling in that the purpose of the obligation of consultation laid down in Article 2 of the directive, namely to avoid terminations of employment contracts, or to reduce their number, and to mitigate the consequences (judgment of 10 September 2009, Akavan Erityisalojen Keskusliitto AEK and Others, C‑44/08, EU:C:2009:533, paragraph 46), and the objective pursued by the notices of amendment, according to the referring court, namely to avoid individual redundancies, coincide to a large extent. Where a decision entailing an amendment of working conditions may enable collective redundancies to be avoided, the consultation procedure provided for in Article 2 of the directive must start when the employer contemplates making such amendments (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2009, Akavan Erityisalojen Keskusliitto AEK and Others, C‑44/08, EU:C:2009:533, paragraph 47).

47. On the other hand, it is clear that to draw a link between the requirement to hold consultations arising under Article 2 of Directive 98/59 and the adoption of a strategic or commercial decision which makes the collective redundancies of workers necessary may deprive that requirement, in part, of its effectiveness. As is clear from the first subparagraph of that Article 2(2), the consultations must cover, inter alia, the possibility of avoiding or reducing the collective redundancies contemplated. A consultation which began when a decision making such collective redundancies necessary had already been taken could not usefully involve any examination of conceivable alternatives with the aim of avoiding them.

69 Those principles and that obligation require, in particular, that the subject matter and the award criteria for the contract concerned are clearly determined from the beginning of the award procedure for that contract and that the conditions and detailed rules of the award procedure must be drawn up in a clear, precise and unequivocal manner in the contract notice or specifications so that, first, all reasonably informed tenderers exercising ordinary care can understand their exact significance and interpret them in the same way and, second, the contracting authority is able to ascertain whether the bids submitted satisfy the criteria applying to the contract in question (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 May 2012, Commission v Netherlands, C‑368/10, EU:C:2012:284, paragraphs 56, 88 and 109; of 6 November 2014, Cartiera dell’Adda, C‑42/13, EU:C:2014:2345, paragraph 44; and of 14 July 2016, TNS Dimarso, C‑6/15, EU:C:2016:555, paragraph 23). The obligation of transparency also means that the subject matter and the award criteria must be adequately publicised by the contracting authorities (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 January 2008, Lianakis and Others, C‑532/06, EU:C:2008:40, paragraph 40).

14. According to settled case-law, any Community national who, irrespective of his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers and who has been employed in a Member State other than that of residence falls within the scope of Article 48 of the Treaty (Case C-385/00 de Groot [2002] ECR I-11819, paragraph 76; Case C-232/01 Van Lent [2003] ECR I-11525, paragraph 14; and Case C-209/01 Schilling and Fleck-Schilling [2003] ECR I-13389, paragraph 23).

76. Any Community national who, irrespective of his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers and who has been employed in a Member State other than that of residence falls within the scope of Article 48 of the Treaty and Article 7 of Regulation No 1612/68 (Case C-419/92 Scholz [1994] ECR I-505, paragraph 9, and Terhoeve , cited above, paragraph 27).

54. There is no reason why the tax authorities concerned should not request from the taxpayer the evidence that they consider they need to effect a correct assessment of the taxes concerned and, where appropriate, refuse the exemption applied for if that evidence is not supplied (see, inter alia, Case C‑451/05 ELISA [2007] ECR I‑8251, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

50. Secondly, the compatibility with Article 90 EC of a system of taxation of imported second-hand vehicles which takes account of the actual depreciation of the vehicles on the basis of general criteria presupposes that the owner of such a vehicle is able to challenge the application of such a fixed method of calculation to the vehicle in order to demonstrate that it leads to taxation exceeding the amount of the residual tax incorporated in the value of similar used vehicles already registered in the national territory ( Tulliasiamies and Siilin , paragraph 88).

88 Furthermore, such compatibility also presupposes that the owner of an imported used vehicle is able to challenge the application of a flat-rate method of calculation to that vehicle in order to demonstrate that it leads to taxation exceeding the amount of the residual tax incorporated in the value of similar used vehicles already registered in the national territory (Gomes Valente, paragraph 32).

18 That argument cannot be accepted. A national tax system which is liable to eliminate a competitive advantage held by imported products over domestic products would be manifestly incompatible with Article 95, which seeks to guarantee that internal charges have no effect on competition between domestic and imported products (Commission v Denmark, cited above, paragraph 9).

21. The principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality imply, in particular, a duty of transparency which enables the concession-granting public authority to ensure that those principles are complied with. That obligation of transparency which is imposed on the public authority consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the service concession to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed (see, to that effect, Telaustria and Telefonadress , paragraphs 61 and 62, and Parking Brixen , paragraph 49).

49. The principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality imply, in particular, a duty of transparency which enables the concession-granting public authority to ensure that those principles are complied with. That obligation of transparency which is imposed on the public authority consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the service concession to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed (see, to that effect, Telaustria and Telefonadress , cited above, paragraphs 61 and 62).

26 According to settled case-law of the Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal because, if a party could not base its appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, the appeal procedure would be deprived of part of its purpose (judgment of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 45).

47. Thus, in ruling on a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court before which inter partes proceedings, initiated following an objection lodged by a consumer against an order for payment, had been brought, the Court held that that national court must investigate of its own motion whether a term conferring exclusive territorial jurisdiction in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer falls within the scope of the directive and, if it does, assess of its own motion whether such a term is unfair (Case C-137/08 VB Pénzügyi Lízing [2010] ECR I-10847, paragraph 56).

56. The answer to the third additional question referred is thus that the national court must investigate of its own motion whether a term conferring exclusive territorial jurisdiction in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer, which is the subject of a dispute before it, falls within the scope of the Directive and, if it does, assess of its own motion whether such a term is unfair. Costs

140. It should be noted at the outset that, in exercising the discretion conferred on it in such matters, the Court is empowered to impose a penalty payment and a lump sum payment cumulatively (Case C-369/07 Commission v Greece , paragraph 143).

27 In that regard, it must be recalled that the need to provide an interpretation of EU law which will be of use to the national court means that the national court is bound to observe scrupulously the requirements concerning the content of a request for a preliminary ruling, expressly set out in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, of which the referring court should be aware (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 July 2016, Ognyanov, C‑614/14, EU:C:2016:514, paragraphs 18 and 19 and the case-law cited, and of 27 October 2016, Audace and Others, C‑114/15, EU:C:2016:813, paragraph 35).

18 The need to provide an interpretation of EU law which will be of use to the national court means that the national court must define the factual and legal context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, explain the assumptions of fact on which those questions are based (see orders of 8 September 2011, Abdallah, C‑144/11, not published, EU:C:2011:565, paragraph 10 and the case-law cited; of 19 March 2015, Andre, C‑23/15, not published, EU:C:2015:194, paragraph 5 and the case-law cited, and the judgment of 10 March 2016, Safe Interenvíos, C‑235/14, EU:C:2016:154, paragraph 114).

6 As the Court has already observed, only intervention undertaken in accordance with the Community rules within the framework of the common organisation of agricultural markets is to be financed by the EAGGF (see Case C-48/91 Netherlands v Commission [1993] ECR I-5611, paragraph 14). In that context, it is for the Commission to prove an infringement of the rules on the common organisation of the agricultural markets (see Case 347/85 United Kingdom v Commission [1988] ECR 1749, paragraph 16; Case C-281/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-347, paragraph 19; Case C-55/91 Italy v Commission [1993] ECR I-4813, paragraph 13; and Case C-48/91, cited above, paragraph 18). Accordingly, the Commission is obliged to give reasons for its decision finding an absence of, or defects in, inspection procedures operated by the Member State in question (Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission [1990] ECR I-2321, paragraph 23).

42. Furthermore, in general, limitation periods fulfil the function of ensuring legal certainty, which simultaneously protects both the taxpayer and the administration concerned (see, to that effect, Edis , paragraph 35 and Case C-367/09 SGS Belgium and Others [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 68). The Court has also held that the principle of effectiveness is not infringed in the case of a national limitation period allegedly more advantageous for the tax authorities than the limitation period in force for individuals (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-95/07 and C‑96/07 Ecotrade [2008] ECR I-3457, paragraphs 49 to 54).

54. In light of the foregoing, the answer to the national court must be that Articles 17, 18(2) and (3) and 21(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive do not preclude national legislation which lays down a limitation period for the exercise of the right to deduct, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are respected. The principle of effectiveness is not infringed merely because the tax authority has a longer period in which to recover unpaid VAT than the period granted to taxable persons for the exercise of their right to deduct. The reassessment and recovery practice

54 As regards the specific case of a risk of deception, it should be noted that that situation presupposes the existence of actual deceit or a sufficiently serious risk that the consumer will be deceived (judgments of 4 March 1999, Consorzio per la tutela del formaggio Gorgonzola, C‑87/97, EU:C:1999:115, paragraph 41, and of 30 March 2006, Emanuel, C‑259/04, EU:C:2006:215, paragraph 47).

107. Although the statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the Community authority which adopted the contested measure, so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise its power of review, it is not required to go into every relevant point of fact and law (Case C-122/94 Commission v Council [1996] ECR I‑881, paragraph 29; British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco , paragraph 165; Arnold André , paragraph 61; Swedish Match , paragraph 63; and Alliance for Natural Health and Others , paragraph 133).

133. In that regard, it should be observed that, although the reasoning required by Article 253 EC must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the Community authority which adopted the contested measure so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise its power of review, it is not required to go into every relevant point of fact and law (Case C‑122/94 Commission v Council [1996] ECR I‑881, paragraph 29).

68. Dans ces conditions, en prévoyant qu’un contribuable résident qui encourt une perte lors de la vente d’un immeuble sis en France ne peut pas faire valoir cette perte en Finlande, le régime finlandais reflète une logique symétrique (voir, en ce sens, arrêts précités Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt, point 42; Commission/Belgique, point 73, et Commission/Hongrie, point 74).

29 The Court has confirmed that Articles 48 and 52 of the Treaty implement the fundamental principle contained in Article 3c of the Treaty in which it is stated that, for the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community are to include the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons (see, in particular, judgments in Case 118/75 Watson and Belmann [1976] ECR 1185, paragraph 16; in Heylens, cited above, paragraph 8 and in Case C-370/90 The Queen, ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh [1992] ECR I-4265).

16 THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY AND OF SECONDARY COMMUNITY LAW TO WHICH REFERENCE HAS JUST BEEN MADE IMPLEMENT A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 3 ( C ) OF THE TREATY , WHICH STATES THAT , FOR THE PURPOSES SET OUT IN ARTICLE 2 , THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY SHALL INCLUDE THE ABOLITION , AS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES , OF OBSTACLES TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR PERSONS , SERVICES AND CAPITAL . THESE PROVISIONS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY NATIONAL RULE WHICH MIGHT CONFLICT WITH THEM .

82. The Court does not need to examine the form of order sought against the Kingdom of Spain for failing to inform the Commission of the measures referred to in the preceding paragraph, since that Member State did not in fact implement the contested decisions within the prescribed period (see Case C-348/93 Commission v Italy [1995] ECR I-673, paragraph 31).

12 In this respect, it must be stated that only the national courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action for the recovery of amounts wrongfully charged by a national administration on the basis of Community rules which are subsequently declared invalid (see to this effect the judgment in Case 20/88 Roquette Frères v Commission [1989] ECR 1553, at paragraph 14). Following its action before the College, Vreugdenhil was able to obtain actual reimbursement of the sums wrongfully charged by the Netherlands intervention agency, plus interest at the statutory rate and the costs of the proceedings.

14 On the other hand, it is appropriate for the Court to verify, of its own motion, whether an action to establish non-contractual liability may be brought before it where the alleged damage includes monetary compensatory amounts overcharged by a national administration and only the national courts have jurisdiction to entertain actions for the reimbursement of such amounts .

30. According to the Court, that interpretation results in the exclusion of certain legal actions and judicial decisions from the scope of the Brussels Convention, by reason either of the legal relationships between the parties to the action or of the subject-matter of the action (see LTU , paragraph 4; Rüffer , paragraph 14; Baten , paragraph 29; Préservatrice foncière TIARD , paragraph 21; ČEZ , paragraph 22; and Case C‑167/00 Henkel [2002] ECR I-8111, paragraph 29).

34. Furthermore, it is settled case-law that the determination of the existence of harm to the Community industry requires an appraisal of complex economic situations and the judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of those fac ts or a misuse of powers (see Ikea Wholesale , paragraph 41, and the case-law cited). That is, particularly, the case as regards the determination of the factors injuring the Community industry in an anti-subsidy proceeding.

41. Furthermore, it is settled case-law that the choice between the different methods of calculating the dumping margin, such as those set out in Article 2(11) of the basic regulation, together with the assessment of the normal value of a product or the determination of the existence of harm require an appraisal of complex economic situations and the judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of powers (see, to that effect, Case 240/84 NTN Toyo Bearing and Others v Council [1987] ECR 1809, paragraph 19; Case C-156/87 Gestetner Holdings v Council and Commission [1990] ECR I-781, paragraph 63; and Case C-150/94 United Kingdom v Council [1998] ECR I-7235, paragraph 54).

80 The Court has held that a refusal to allow a parent, whether a national of a Member State or of a third country, who is the carer of a minor child, who is a Union citizen and who has a right of residence under Article 21 TFEU and Directive 2004/38, to reside with that Union citizen in the host Member State would deprive that citizen’s right of residence of any useful effect, since enjoyment by a young child of a right of residence necessarily implies that the child is entitled to be accompanied by the person who is his primary carer and accordingly that the carer must be in a position to reside with the child in the host Member State for the duration of such residence (see judgments of 19 October 2004, Zhu and Chen, C‑200/02, EU:C:2004:639, paragraph 45, and 10 October 2013, Alokpa and Moudoulou, C‑86/12, EU:C:2013:645, paragraph 28).

24. That consideration is particularly important in the field of education in view of the aims pursued by Article 6(e) TFEU and the second indent of Article 165(2) TFEU, namely, inter alia, encouraging mobility of students and teachers (see D’Hoop , paragraph 32; Case C‑147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I‑5969, paragraph 44; Morgan and Bucher , paragraph 27; and Prinz and Seeberger , paragraph 29).

32 That consideration is particularly important in the field of education. The objectives set for the activities of the Community include, in Article 3(p) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 3(1)(q) EC), a contribution to education and training of quality. That contribution must, according to the second indent of Article 126(2) of the EC Treaty (now the second indent of Article 149(2) EC) be aimed, inter alia, at encouraging mobility of students and teachers.

35. That finding is also corroborated by the case-law of the Court of Justice on mutual assistance between the competent authorities in the area of direct taxation, which is transposable by analogy to a situation such as that in the main proceedings. According to that case-law, the mutual assistance directive may be relied on by a Member State in order to obtain from the competent authorities of another Member State all the information enabling it to ascertain the correct amount of tax. There is, however, nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer himself to provide such proof as they may consider necessary in order to determine whether or not the deduction requested should be granted (see, to that effect, Case C-55/98 Vestergaard [1999] ECR I-7641, paragraph 26; Case C-136/00 Danner [2002] ECR I-8147, paragraphs 49 and 50).

33 When aid granted by the State or through State resources strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-Community trade the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, paragraph 11, and Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, paragraph 17).

17 They argue that in private industrial groups it is quite normal to find transfers of funds between companies in order to make up losses suffered by one of the members of the group. Such transfers may be explained by the desire to safeguard the reputation of the group, by a price strategy decided on at group level, for which the group may consider it appropriate to tolerate losses in one sector of its activities for a certain period, or by a programme of progressive disinvestment, where the group may decide to bear the losses suffered during the last years of operation of one of its members. Consequently, a public holding company should be allowed to make up the losses of one of its members under the same conditions as a private holding company.

41. The fact that Sportradar granted, by contract, the right of access to its server to companies offering betting services to that public may also be evidence of its intention to target them, if – which will be for the referring court to ascertain – Sportradar was aware, or must have been aware, of that specific destination (see, by analogy, Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof , paragraph 89, and Donner , paragraphs 27 and 28). It could be relevant in this respect if it were the case that the remuneration fixed by Sportradar as consideration for the grant of that right of access took account of the extent of the activities of those companies in the United Kingdom market and the prospects of its website betradar.com subsequently being consulted by internet users in the United Kingdom.

42. Finally, as regards the argument of that Member State that it is impossible to determine with certainty the amount of aid to be recovered, it must be recalled that, in situations involving the recovery of amounts of aid from a large number of undertakings in conjunction with numerous individual calculation parameters, the Court has held that such difficulties in implementing the relevant decisions did not constitute an absolute impossibility, within the meaning of the case-law cited (see, in particular, Case C-280/95 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-259, paragraphs 18 and 23, and Commission v Belgium , paragraphs 41 and 42). The documents before the Court do not show that the problems arising, in the present case, in calculating the amount of aid to be recovered are greater than those encountered in the situations that gave rise to the judgments cited above.

18 The Italian Republic claims, secondly, that recovery of the tax credit is also technically impossible to carry out. It would require, it says, the number of beneficiaries to be determined (around 100 000), and then each individual situation would have to be examined over one or more years (1992 and subsequent years). Then, it would be a case of checking the tax credit actually used, the allocation of the total credit used by each beneficiary to the different tax headings, preparing the documents in support of each recovery demand and the demand itself, on the basis that each department is to recover the taxes within its area of competence, both by reference to geographical territory and to the type of tax. Evidently, such a recovery procedure would involve a large number of departments scattered over the territory (tax offices, area offices, direct taxation departments, departments responsible for value added tax) and would require them to conduct checks in excess of those normally provided for and planned on the basis of their capacities. The resources devoted to such an action would seriously affect the normal capacity of those services for carrying out checks, which would prejudice the proper functioning of the tax system.

19. Since, if such a supply of services is not separate from the supply of mobile telephone services, the SPHC would receive the same tax treatment as the sums payable for the latter services (see, to that effect, Case C‑349/96 CPP [1999] ECR I‑973, paragraph 32, and Case C‑453/05 Ludwig [2007] ECR I‑5083, paragraph 20), it is appropriate to consider the eighth question first of all. The eighth question

44. As the Court has already held, the cigarette market particularly lends itself to the development of unlawful trade (see Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453, paragraph 87; Case C‑222/01 British American Tobacco [2004] ECR I‑4683, paragraph 72; and BATIG , paragraph 34).

72. In that context, particular attention should also be given to the nature of the goods transported, since, as the Court has already held, the cigarette market particularly lends itself to the development of unlawful trade (see Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453, paragraph 87).

Certes, l’obligation de motivation qui incombe au Tribunal n’impose pas à celui-ci de fournir un exposé qui suivrait, de manière exhaustive et un par un, tous les raisonnements articulés par les parties au litige (voir en ce sens, notamment, arrêts FIAMM e.a./Conseil et Commission, C‑120/06 P et C-121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, point 96, ainsi que Italie/Commission, C-385/13 P, EU:C:2014:2350, point 87).

38. In that regard, the Court has held that it was clear from Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) No 802/68 of the Council of 27 June 1968 on the common definition of the concept of the origin of goods (OJ, English Special Edition 1968 (I), p. 165), the provision which was the forerunner of Article 24 of the Customs Code but which is identical in effect, that the decisive criterion is that of the last substantial process or operation (Case C‑26/88 Brother International [1989] ECR 4253, paragraph 15, and Case C-372/06 Asda Stores [2007] ECR I‑11223, paragraph 32).

32. That Article 24 of the Community Customs Code reproduces the terms of Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) No 802/68 of the Council of 27 June 1968 on the common definition of the concept of the origin of goods (OJ, English Special Edition 1968 (I), p. 165), which applied before the entry into force of the Community Customs Code. For the purpose of interpreting that regulation, the Court has held that it is clear from Article 5 that the decisive criterion is that of the last substantial process or operation (Case C‑26/88 Brother International [1989] ECR 4253, paragraph 15).

43. It should be recalled, moreover, that the procedure laid down in Article 228 EC is based on the objective finding that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations (Case C‑304/02 Commission v France , paragraph 44).

71. According to settled case-law, the definition of aid is more general than that of a subsidy as it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, therefore, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (see judgments in Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke , C‑143/99, EU:C:2001:598, paragraph 38; Paint Graphos and Others , C‑78/08 to C‑80/08, EU:C:2011:550, paragraph 45; and Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom , C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 71).

71. According to settled case-law, the definition of aid is more general than that of a subsidy, given that it includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect (see Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-8365, paragraph 38, and Joined Cases C‑78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos and Others [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

42. However, as is clear from the case-law of the Court, the social aim of an insurance scheme is not in itself sufficient to preclude the activity in question from being classified as an economic activity (see, to that effect, Case C‑67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I‑5751, paragraph 86; Joined Cases C‑180/98 to C‑184/98 Pavlov and Others [2000] ECR I‑6451, paragraph 118; and Cisal , paragraph 37).

34. The Court has also held that the first subparagraph of Article 2(1) of the Second Directive simply repeats that obligation, with respect to provisions or clauses in an insurance policy referred to in that article excluding from the cover provided by insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, damage or injury suffered by third parties who have been victims of an accident caused by the use or driving of an insured vehicle by persons not authorised to drive the vehicle, persons not holding a driving licence, or persons in breach of the statutory technical requirements concerning the condition and safety of the vehicle ( Ruiz Bernáldez , paragraph 21; Candolin and Others , paragraph 19; and Carvalho Ferreira Santos , paragraph 30).

30. The Court has also held that the first subparagraph of Article 2(1) of the Second Directive simply repeats that obligation with respect to provisions or clauses in an insurance policy excluding from insurance cover against civil liability in respect of motor vehicles damage caused to third parties as a result of the use or driving of the insured vehicle by persons not authorised to drive the vehicle, persons not holding a driving licence or persons in breach of the statutory technical requirements concerning the condition and safety of the vehicle ( Ruiz Bernáldez , paragraph 21, and Candolin and Others , paragraph 19).

130. It is to be remembered that the framework established by Directive 77/799 for cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States does not exist between those authorities and the competent authorities of a non‑member State where that State has not entered into any undertaking of mutual assistance (see Commission v Italy , paragraph 70, and Établissements Rimbaud , paragraph 41).

45. The first point to be noted here is that in the procedure laid down by Article 234 EC providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. In addition, it is to be borne in mind that the Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of Community law necessary to national courts in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts (Case C-280/91 Viessmann [1993] ECR I-971, paragraph 17; Case C-42/96 Immobiliare SIF [1997] ECR I-7089, paragraph 28, and Case C‑45/06 Campina [2007] ECR I-2089, paragraphs 30 and 31).

30. In the procedure laid down by Article 234 EC providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (Case C-286/05 Haug [2006] ECR I-4121, paragraph 17 and the case‑law cited).

30. According to settled case‑law, the purpose of coordinating at European Union level the procedures for the award of public contracts is to eliminate barriers to the freedom to provide services and goods and therefore to protect the interests of traders established in another Member State ( Commission v Ireland , paragraph 27 and the case‑law cited).

32 According to Article 4(5) of the Habitats Directive, as interpreted by the Court, the protective measures prescribed in Article 6(2) to (4) of that directive are required only as regards sites which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 4(2) of that directive, are placed on the list of sites selected as SCIs as adopted by the Commission under the procedure laid down in Article 21 of the same directive (judgments in Dragaggi and Others, C‑117/03, EU:C:2005:16, paragraph 25, and Bund Naturschutz in Bayern and Others, C‑244/05, EU:C:2006:579, paragraph 36).

25. It thus follows from the foregoing that, on a proper construction of Article 4(5) of the Directive, the protective measures prescribed in Article 6(2), (3) and (4) of the Directive are required only as regards sites which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 4(2) of the Directive, are on the list of sites selected as sites of Community importance adopted by the Commission in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 21 of the Directive.

17 A trade mark proprietor’s opposition to repackaging contributes to the artificial partitioning of the markets between the States party to the EEA Agreement where the repackaging is necessary to enable the product imported in parallel to be marketed in the importing State (see, by analogy, judgment of 26 April 2007, Boehringer Ingelheim and Others, C‑348/04, EU:C:2007:249, paragraph 18 and the case law cited).

41. Lastly, since, according to the referring court’s presentation of the then applicable national law and in particular the case-law to the effect that the administrative authority has a discretion in respect of adopting that type of measure and there is no judicial review of the exercise of that discretion, it must be emphasised that the person to whom such a measure is applied must have an effective judicial remedy (see, inter alia, Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, paragraphs 18 and 19; Case 222/86 Heylens and Others [1987] ECR 4097, paragraph 14; and Case C‑50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I‑6677, paragraph 39). That remedy must permit a review of the legality of the decision at issue as regards matters of both fact and law in the light of European Union law (see, to that effect, Case C‑69/10 Samba Diouf [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 57). In order to ensure that such review by the courts is effective, the interested party must be able to obtain the reasons for the decision taken in relation to him, either by reading the decision itself or by requesting and obtaining notification of those grounds, without prejudice to the power of the court with jurisdiction to require the authority concerned to provide that information (see, to that effect, inter alia, Heylens , paragraph 15, and Joined Cases C‑372/09 and C‑373/09 Peñarroja Fa [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 63).

57. As regards judicial review within the framework of a substantive action against the decision rejecting the application for international protection, the effectiveness of that action would not be guaranteed if – because of the impossibility of bringing an appeal under Article 20(5) of the Law of 5 May 2006 – the reasons which led the Minister for Labour, Employment and Immigration to examine the merits of the application under an accelerated procedure could not be the subject of judicial review. In a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the reasons relied on by that Minister in order to use the accelerated procedure are in fact the same as those which led to that application being rejected. Such a situation would render review of the legality of the decision impossible, as regards both the facts and the law (see, by analogy, Case C‑506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I‑8613, paragraphs 60 to 62).

30 The period laid down in Article 187 of the VAT Directive for adjustment of deductions makes it possible to avoid inaccuracies in the calculation of deductions and unjustified advantages or disadvantages for a taxable person where, in particular, changes in the factors initially taken into consideration in order to determine the amount of deductions occur after the declaration has been made. The likelihood of such changes is particularly significant in the case of capital goods, which are often used over a number of years, during which the purposes to which they are put may alter (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 March 2006 in Uudenkaupungin kaupunki, C‑184/04, EU:C:2006:214, paragraph 25, and order of 5 June 2014 in Gmina Międzyzdroje, C‑500/13, EU:C:2014:1750, paragraph 20).

35. The appropriate legal basis on which an act must be adopted should be determined according to its content and main object (see, in particular, Case C-155/91 Commission v Council [1993] ECR I-939, paragraphs 19 to 21, and Netherlands v Parliament and Council , paragraph 27).

19 However, contrary to the Commission' s contention, the mere fact that the establishment or functioning of the internal market is affected is not sufficient for Article 100a of the Treaty to apply. It appears from the Court' s case-law that recourse to Article 100a is not justified where the measure to be adopted has only the incidental effect of harmonizing market conditions within the Community (judgment in Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council [1991] ECR I-4529, paragraph 17).

63. However, it is settled law that Article 43 EC precludes any national measure which, even though it is applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, is liable to hinder or to render less attractive the exercise by EU citizens of the freedom of establishment that is guaranteed by the Treaty (see, inter alia, Case C‑299/02 Commission v Netherlands [2004] ECR I‑9761, paragraph 15, and Case C‑140/03 Commission v Greece [2005] ECR I‑3177, paragraph 27).

72. Consequently, as Apis, the Bulgarian Government and the Commission argue, the fact that all or part of the materials brought together in a collection of data are official and publicly accessible does not relieve the national court of an obligation to verify, in the light of all relevant facts, whether that collection constitutes a database capable of being protected by the sui generis right on the ground that a substantial investment, in quantitative or qualitative terms, was necessary to obtain, verify and/or present its overall contents (see, to that effect, Case 46/02 Fixtures Marketing , cited above, paragraphs 32 to 38).

32. Article 7(1) of the directive reserves the protection of the sui generis right to databases which meet a specific criterion, namely to those which show that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in the obtaining, verification or presentation of their contents.

54 In that context, the making of an application under Regulation No 604/2013 cannot, as the Advocate General observed in point 74 of her Opinion, be equated with forum shopping, which the Dublin system seeks to avoid (judgment of 21 December 2011 in N.S. and Others, C‑411/10 and C‑493/10, EU:C:2011:865, paragraph 79). Indeed, the court hearing such an application will not be required to make a Member State that is to the asylum seeker’s liking responsible for the examination of the asylum application, but to verify whether the criteria for determining responsibility laid down by the EU legislature have been applied correctly.

64. As to the argument put forward by the Danish and Belgian Governments that, in the procedure provided for in Articles 871 and 873 of Regulation No 2454/93, the Commission consented to the application of Article 220(2)(b) of the Customs Code, the Court notes that that procedure does not pertain to the Member States’ obligation to establish the Communities’ entitlement to own resources. The purpose of Articles 871 and 873 of Regulation No 2454/93 is to ensure the uniform application of Community law (see, to that effect, Mecanarte , cited above, paragraph 33) and, together with Article 220(2)(b) of the Customs Code, to safeguard debtors’ legitimate expectations (see paragraph 62 of this judgment).

33 As the Court made clear in the same judgment, that interpretation is in conformity with the purpose of Regulation No 1697/79, which is to ensure the uniform application of Community law. That is likely to be jeopardized in cases where an application to waive post-clearance recovery is allowed, since the assessment which a Member State may make in taking a favourable decision is likely, in actual fact, owing to the probable absence of any appeal, to escape any review by means of which the uniform application of the conditions laid down in the Community legislation may be ensured. On the other hand, that is not the case where the national authorities proceed to effect recovery, whatever the amount in issue. It is then open to the person concerned to challenge such a decision before the national courts. As a result, it will then be possible for the uniformity of Community law to be ensured by the Court of Justice through the preliminary ruling procedure.

26 Similarly, it should be noted that Article 8a of the Treaty, which sets out generally the right of every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, finds specific expression in Article 48 of the Treaty in relation to the free movement of workers. Since the facts with which the main proceedings are concerned fall within the scope of the latter provision, it is not necessary to rule on the interpretation of Article 8a of the Treaty (see, in relation to freedom of establishment, the judgment in Case C-193/94 Skanavi and Chryssanthakopoulos [1996] ECR I-929, paragraph 22).

17. A judgment delivered on a reference for a preliminary ruling is such as to have effects on legal relationships which arose before its delivery. It follows, in particular, that a rule of Community law so interpreted must be applied by an administrative body within the sphere of its competence even to legal relationships which arose and were formed before delivery of the Court’s judgment ruling on the question referred to it (see, to this effect, Kühne & Heitz , cited above, paragraph 22). In the absence of Community rules on applications for the repayment of taxes, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the conditions under which such applications may be made; those conditions must observe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, that is to say, they must not be less favourable than those relating to similar claims founded on provisions of domestic law or framed so as to render virtually impossible the exercise of rights conferred by the Community legal order (see, to this effect, Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, paragraph 12, and Case C-147/01 Weber’s Wine World and Others [2003] ECR I-11365, paragraph 103).

103. It has consistently been held that in the absence of Community rules on the recovery of national charges levied though not due, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing such actions for repayment, provided, however, that they are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the Community legal order (principle of effectiveness) (see, in particular, Metallgesellschaft and Others , paragraph 85, and Case C-255/00 Grundig Italiana [2002] ECR I-8003, paragraph 33). ─ Principle of equivalence

99. As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, for the purposes of Article 87(3) EC, the Commission enjoys a wide margin of discretion, the exercise of which involves assessments of an economic and social nature which must be made within a Community context. The Court, in reviewing whether that freedom was lawfully exercised, cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the competent authority but must restrict itself to examining whether the authority’s assessment is vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of powers (see, in particular, Case C-310/99 Italy v Commission , paragraph 45, Case C-456/00 France v Commission [2002] ECR I-11949, paragraph 41, and Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission , paragraph 135).

30. On the other hand, it is apparent from paragraphs 56 to 63 of the judgment in Italy v Council , in which the Court examined the plea alleging lack or inadequacy of a statement of the reasons on which Regulation No 1361/98 was based in the light of Article 190 of the EC Treaty (now Article 253 EC), that that reasoning was held to be in keeping with the requirements of that provision. Indeed, in paragraph 63 of that judgment, the Court found that, in the context of the set of rules in issue and the way in which the market concerned had developed, the statement of reasons given in Regulation No 1361/98 for the classification of Italy as a non-deficit area for the marketing year 1998/99, whilst very succinct, sufficiently fulfilled the requirements laid down in the Court’s case-law regarding the statement of reasons.

59 In defining the scope of the obligation laid down in Article 190 of the Treaty, the Court has held that the statement of the reasons on which regulations are based is not required to specify the often very numerous and complex matters of fact or of law dealt with in those regulations, provided that the latter fall within the general scheme of the body of measures of which they form part (see, in particular, paragraph 40 of the judgment of 6 July 2000). It has also held that the question whether a statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 190 must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, in particular, paragraph 41 of the judgment of 6 July 2000).

27. The detailed procedural rules governing the remedies intended to protect rights conferred by Community law on candidates and tenderers harmed by decisions of contracting authorities must not compromise the effectiveness of Directive 89/665 ( Universale-Bau and Others , paragraph 72).

48 Admittedly, the weight to be given to that factor, for the purposes of determining where a child is habitually resident, depends on the circumstances specific to each individual case (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 December 2010, Mercredi, C‑497/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:829, paragraphs 50 and 51).

51. In that regard, it must be stated that, in order to distinguish habitual residence from mere temporary presence, the former must as a general rule have a certain duration which reflects an adequate degree of permanence. However, the Regulation does not lay down any minimum duration. Before habitual residence can be transferred to the host State, it is of paramount importance that the person concerned has it in mind to establish there the permanent or habitual centre of his interests, with the intention that it should be of a lasting character. Accordingly, the duration of a stay can serve only as an indicator in the assessment of the permanence of the residence, and that assessment must be carried out in the light of all the circumstances of fact specific to the individual case.

40. It is thus necessary to examine in particular whether, in the cases in the main action, the restriction on advertising imposed by the Lotterilag in respect of gambling organised in Member States other than the Kingdom of Sweden, by private operators for the purpose of profit, is suitable for achieving the legitimate objective or objectives invoked by that Member State, and whether it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. National legislation is moreover appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective pursued only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain it in a consistent and systematic manner. In any event, those restrictions must be applied without discrimination ( Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International , paragraphs 60 and 61).

56. Any other interpretation of that provision would run counter to not only its wording but also to the Court’s obligation to interpret that derogation in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, including those relating to Union citizenship (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze [2009] ECR I-4585, paragraph 44).

44. In any event, the derogation provided for in Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted in accordance with Article 39(2) EC.

45 It should be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, liability for the conduct of a subsidiary can be imputed to its parent company in particular where, although it has separate legal personality, that subsidiary does not decide independently on its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company, having regard in particular to the economic, organisational and legal links between those two legal entities (judgment of 16 June 2016, Evonik Degussa and AlzChem v Commission, C‑155/14 P, EU:C:2016:446, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

56. By contrast, that Member State is not entitled to provide in that regard for rules which differ from those resulting from Decision No 1/80 or which impose conditions other than those provided for in that decision. According to the Court’s well-established case‑law, it follows both from the primacy of European Union law and from the direct effect of a provision such as the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 that Member States are not permitted to modify unilaterally the scope of the system of gradually integrating Turkish nationals in the host Member State and do not, therefore, have the power to adopt measures which may undermine the legal status expressly conferred on those nationals by the law governing the EEC-Turkey Association (see, to that effect, Case C‑65/98 Eyüp [2000] ECR I‑4747, paragraphs 40 and 41; Case C‑188/00 Kurz [2002] ECR I‑10691, paragraphs 66 to 68; and Case C-14/09 Genc [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 36 to 38).

36. According to well-established case‑law, it follows both from the primacy of European Union law over Member States’ domestic law and from the direct effect of a provision such as Article 6 of Decision No 1/80 that a Member State is not permitted to modify unilaterally the scope of the system of gradually integrating Turkish workers into the host Member State’s labour force (see, inter alia, Case C‑1/97 Birden [1998] ECR I‑7747, paragraph 37, and Case C‑188/00 Kurz [2002] ECR I‑10691, paragraph 66).

Toutefois, les États membres sont tenus, conformément à l’article 4, paragraphe 3, TUE, de faciliter à la Commission l’accomplissement de sa mission, consistant notamment, selon l’article 17, paragraphe 1, TUE, à veiller à l’application des dispositions du traité FUE ainsi que des dispositions prises par les institutions de l’Union en vertu de celui-ci (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 26 avril 2007, Commission/Italie, C‑135/05, EU:C:2007:250, point 27 et jurisprudence citée).

40 As to the substantive merits of the case, it should be observed first of all, on the one hand, that the concept of pay, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 119, covers all forms of consideration, in cash or in kind and whether present or future, provided that the worker receives it, even indirectly, in respect of his employment from his employer (see, in particular, Case C-167/97 Seymour-Smith and Perez [1999] ECR I-623, paragraph 23).

23 According to settled case-law, the concept of pay, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 119, comprises any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, whether immediate or future, provided that the worker receives it, albeit indirectly, in respect of his employment from his employer (see, in particular, Case 12/81 Garland v British Rail Engineering [1982] ECR 359, paragraph 5, and Case C-262/88 Barber [1990] ECR I-1889, paragraph 12).

63. It must be observed, in that regard, that the objective sought by the establishment, in Article 23(2), of an upper limit of 10% of the turnover of each undertaking participating in an infringement is, inter alia, to ensure that the imposition of a fine higher in amount that that ceiling should not exceed the capacity of an undertaking to make payment at the time when it is identified as responsible for the infringement and a financial penalty is imposed on it by the Commission.

59 It must be recalled in that regard that the Member States are required to comply with the principle of proportionality not only as regards the determination of factors constituting an infringement and the determination of the rules concerning the severity of fines, but also as regards the assessment of the factors which may be taken into account in the fixing of a fine (see, inter alia, judgments of 9 February 2012, Urbán, C‑210/10, EU:C:2012:64, paragraph 54, and of 19 October 2016, EL-EM-2001, C‑501/14, EU:C:2016:777, paragraph 41).

54. It is, however, necessary to point out, in that respect, that Member States are required to comply with the principle of proportionality not only as regards the determination of factors constituting an infringement and the determination of the rules concerning the severity of fines, but also as regards the assessment of the factors which may be taken into account in the fixing of a fine.

35. Quant à l’argument du Royaume d’Espagne selon lequel l’article 56 CE n’est pas applicable à la présente affaire du fait que les opérations soumises à une autorisation préalable en vertu du paragraphe 1, second alinéa, de la quatorzième fonction modifiée relèvent du champ d’application de l’article 43 CE, il convient de rappeler que, pour savoir si une législation nationale relève de l’une ou de l’autre des libertés de circulation, il résulte d’une jurisprudence constante qu’il y a lieu de prendre en considération l’objet de la législation en cause (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 12 septembre 2006, Cadbury Schweppes et Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, C‑196/04, Rec. p. I‑7995, points 31 à 33; du 3 octobre 2006, Fidium Finanz, C‑452/04, Rec. p. I‑9521, points 34 et 44 à 49; du 12 décembre 2006, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation, C‑374/04, Rec. p. I‑11673, points 37 et 38; du 13 mars 2007, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, C‑524/04, Rec. p. I‑2107, points 26 à 34, ainsi que Holböck, précité, point 22).

43. It follows that the subject-matter of proceedings under Article 226 EC is delimited by the pre-litigation procedure governed by that provision and cannot, therefore, be extended during the judicial procedure. The Commission’s reasoned opinion and the application must be based on the same grounds and pleas, with the result that the Court cannot examine a ground of complaint which was not formulated in the reasoned opinion, which for its part must contain a cogent and detailed exposition of the reasons which led the Commission to the conclusion that the Member State concerned had failed to fulfil one of its obligations under the Treaty (see Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 20, and Case C‑441/02 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I‑3449, paragraphs 59 and 60).

59. The Court has consistently held (see, inter alia, Case C-365/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-7773, paragraph 23) that the letter of formal notice sent by the Commission to a Member State, and the reasoned opinion issued by the Commission, delimit the subject-matter of the dispute, so that it cannot thereafter be extended. The opportunity for the Member State concerned to submit its observations, even if it chooses not to avail itself thereof, constitutes an essential guarantee intended by the EC Treaty, adherence to which is an essential formal requirement of the procedure for finding that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations.

23 It must be observed that Article 148(c) of Directive 2006/112 exempts, inter alia, hire, repairs and maintenance if the latter pertains to something used for the operation of vessel covered by point (a) of that article. Essentially, Article 148(c) therefore lays down a requirement for the existence of a link between the supply of services made and the operation of the vessel concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 July 1985, Berkholz, 168/84, EU:C:1985:299, paragraph 21).

115. It is not until the beginning of the administrative inter partes stage that the entity concerned is informed, via the statement of objections, of all the essential elements on which the Commission is relying at that stage of the procedure. Consequently, it is only after the statement of objections has been issued that the undertaking concerned can rely in full on its rights of defence (see, to that effect, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission , paragraphs 315 and 316; Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission , paragraph 47; and Case C‑407/04 P Dalmine v Commission [2007] ECR I‑829, paragraph 59).

59. It is by the statement of objections that the undertaking concerned is informed of all the essential evidence on which the Commission relies at that stage of the procedure (Joined Cases C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑245/99 P, C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C‑252/99 P and C‑254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission [2002] ECR I‑8375, paragraphs 315 and 316, and Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , paragraphs 66 and 67). Consequently, it is only after notification of the statement of objections that the undertaking is able to rely in full on the rights of the defence (Case C‑105/04 P Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 47 and 50).

49. By contrast, the fact that the worker returns to his Member State of origin at the end of the posting cannot preclude that worker from having been made available in the host Member State. Although it is true that a worker posted for the purpose of carrying out work as part of a provision of services by his employer, within the meaning of Article 1(3)(a) of Directive 96/71, returns, in general, to his State of origin after the completion of that service (see, to that effect, Rush Portuguesa , paragraph 15, and Vander Elst , paragraph 21), there is nothing to prevent a worker who has been hired out, within the meaning of Article 1(3)(c) of Directive 96/71, from leaving the host Member State and also returning to his Member State of origin after having carried out his work within the user undertaking.

34. According to settled case-law, it follows from the need for uniform application of Community law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Community, having regard to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, in particular, Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11, and Case C-98/07 Nordania Finans and BG Factoring [2008] ECR I-1281, paragraph 17).

17. It should be borne in mind at the outset that, in determining the scope of a provision of Community law, its wording, context and objectives must all be taken into account (Case C-162/91 Tenuta il Bosco [1992] ECR I‑5279, paragraph 11; Case C-315/00 Maierhofer [2003] ECR I-563, paragraph 27; and Case C-280/04 Jyske Finans [2005] ECR I-10683, paragraph 34). Furthermore, it follows from the need for uniform application of Community law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community, having regard to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, inter alia, Case C-321/02 Harbs [2004] ECR I-7101, paragraph 28, and Case C-195/06 Österreichischer Rundfunk [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24).

22. In that connection, attention should be drawn to the importance, both for the Community legal order and for the national legal systems, of the principle of res judicata . In order to ensure stability of the law and legal relations, as well as the sound administration of justice, it is important that judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time-limits provided for in that regard can no longer be called into question (Case C‑224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239, paragraph 38, and Case C‑234/04 Kapferer [2006] ECR I-2585, paragraph 20).

105 The Court has also held that the fact that an economic sector, such as that of financial services, has been involved in a significant liberalisation process at EU level, enhancing the competition that may already have resulted from the free movement of capital provided for in the Treaty, may serve to determine that the aid has a real or potential effect on competition and affects trade between Member States (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 January 2006, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others, C‑222/04, EU:C:2006:8, paragraphs 142 and 145, and of 5 March 2015, Banco Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C‑667/13, EU:C:2015:151, paragraph 51).

51. With regard to the criterion of trade between Member States being affected, it has been held that, when aid granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking in comparison with other competing undertakings in trade between Member States, that trade must be regarded as being affected by that aid. In this regard, the fact that an economic sector, such as that of financial services, has been involved in a significant liberalisation process at EU level, enhancing the competition that may already have resulted from the free movement of capital provided for in the Treaty, may serve to determine that the aid has a real or potential effect on competition and affects trade between Member States (see, to that effect, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others , EU:C:2006:8, paragraphs 141, 142 and 145, first indent).

86 It is true, as the Court observed in paragraph 35 of its judgment in Spain v Council, cited above, that recourse to Article 100a as a legal basis is possible if the aim is to prevent the emergence of future obstacles to trade resulting from multifarious development of national laws. However, the emergence of such obstacles must be likely and the measure in question must be designed to prevent them.

51 The provisions of the Second Directive do not therefore preclude an exceptional measure affecting the share capital of a public limited liability company, such as the Direction Order, taken by the national authorities where there is a serious disturbance of the economy and financial system of a Member State, without the approval of the general meeting of that company, with the objective of preventing a systemic risk and ensuring the financial stability of the European Union (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 July 2016, Kotnik and Others, C‑526/14, EU:C:2016:570, paragraphs 88 to 90).

89 Contrary to what is claimed by the applicants in the main proceedings, Directive 2010/30 does not preclude measures relating to share capital being adopted, in certain specific circumstances, such as those mentioned in the Banking Communication, without the approval of the company general meeting. That interpretation cannot, moreover, be called into question by the judgment of 12 March 1993, Pafitis and Others (C‑441/93, EU:C:1996:92).

29. None the less, the measures must not go further than is necessary to attain the objectives thereby pursued and may not, therefore, be used in such a way that they would have the effect of undermining the neutrality of VAT, which is a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT established by the relevant European Union law (see Stadeco , paragraph 39, and the case-law cited).

46 In that regard, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, finality of an administrative decision, which is acquired upon expiry of the reasonable time limits for legal remedies or by exhaustion of those remedies, contributes to legal certainty, and it follows that EU law does not require that an administrative body be, in principle, under an obligation to reopen an administrative decision which has become final (see, inter alia, judgments of 13 January 2004, Kühne & Heitz, C‑453/00, EU:C:2004:17, paragraph 24; of 12 February 2008, Kempter, C‑2/06, EU:C:2008:78, paragraph 37; and of 4 October 2012, Byankov, C‑249/11, EU:C:2012:608, paragraph 76).

24. Legal certainty is one of a number of general principles recognised by Community law. Finality of an administrative decision, which is acquired upon expiry of the reasonable time-limits for legal remedies or by exhaustion of those remedies, contributes to such legal certainty and it follows that Community law does not require that administrative bodies be placed under an obligation, in principle, to reopen an administrative decision which has become final in that way.

78. As to the circumstances in which an entity that is not the author of an infringement can nevertheless be penalised for that infringement, this situation arises if the entity that has committed the infringement has ceased to exist in law (see, to that effect, Commission v Anic Partecipazioni , paragraph 145).

45. It is only quite exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the EU legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties (judgment in Balazs , C‑401/13 and C‑432/13, EU:C:2015:26, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

50. It is only quite exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the EU legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties (see judgment in Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others , EU:C:2012:286, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

65. Whilst individuals are entitled to effective judicial protection of the rights they derive from the Community legal order ( Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council , paragraph 39; Commission v Jégo-Quéré , paragraph 29; and C‑15/06 P Regione Siciliana v Commission , paragraph 39), invoking the right to such protection cannot call into question the conditions laid down in Article 230 EC.

34. Furthermore, the provisions of Title II of Regulation No 1408/71, of which Article 13 forms part, are intended not only to prevent the concurrent application of a number of national legislative systems and the complications which might ensue, but also to ensure that persons covered by that regulation are not left without social security cover because there is no legislation which is applicable to them ( Kits van Heijningen, cited above, paragraph 12, and Kuusijärvi , cited above, paragraph 28).

28 In that connection it should be pointed out that the provisions of Title II of Regulation No 1408/71, of which Article 13 forms part, constitute a complete and uniform system of conflict rules. Those provisions are intended not only to prevent the concurrent application of a number of national legislative systems and the complications which might ensue, but also to ensure that persons covered by Regulation No 1408/71 are not left without social security cover because there is no legislation which is applicable to them (see, in particular, Kits van Heijningen, cited above, paragraph 12).

8 As a preliminary matter, it should be recalled that the first paragraph of Article 55 of the Treaty excludes from the application of the provisions on freedom of establishment activities which in a Member State are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority. Nevertheless, as the Court ruled in Reyners (cited above, at paragraph 45), the derogation provided for in Article 55 must be restricted to activities which in themselves are directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority.

48. Inasmuch as, from a taxation perspective, they put Community situations at a disadvantage compared with purely domestic situations, the provisions of the Law on corporation tax of 1969 at issue in the main proceedings thus constitute a restriction which is, in principle, prohibited by the provisions of the Treaty relating to freedom of establishment ( Papillon EU:C:2008:659, paragraph 32).

32. Inasmuch as, from a taxation perspective, they put Community situations at a disadvantage compared with purely domestic situation s, the provisions of the CGI at issue in the main proceedings thus constitute a restriction which is, in principle, prohibited by the provisions of the Treaty relating to the freedom of establishment.

42. However, according to the Court’s well-established case-law, national measures, capable of hindering the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the FEU Treaty or of making it less attractive, may nonetheless be allowed provided that they pursue a legitimate objective in the public interest, are appropriate to ensuring the attainment of that objective, and do not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective pursued (see, inter alia, judgment in van Caster , C‑326/12, EU:C:2014:2269, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

130. That general, abstract and vague argument cannot ultimately be capable of establishing in the present case the reality of a breach of the rights of the defence, which must be examined by reference to the specific circumstances of each case (see, by analogy, Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission , paragraphs 52 to 61).

61. Thus, the plea in law raised by the FEG in support of its action before the Court of First Instance, and alleging a breach of the ‘reasonable time’ principle, is unfounded and must, accordingly, be rejected.

23 It should be noted that, according to the case-law of the Court, the principal purpose of Directive 2003/109 is the integration of third-country nationals who are settled on a long-term basis in the Member States (judgments of 26 April 2012, Commission v Netherlands, C‑508/10, EU:C:2012:243, paragraph 66, and of 2 September 2015, CGIL and INCA, C‑309/14, EU:C:2015:523, paragraph 21).

81 As to review of proportionality, the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of Community law, requires that measures adopted by Community institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see Fedesa and Others, cited above, paragraph 13, and Joined Cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Crispoltoni and Others [1994] ECR I-4863, paragraph 41).

13 The Court has consistently held that the principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of Community law . By virtue of that principle, the lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued .

21. As far as concerns the objective of Directive 92/83 with respect to beer produced in small independent breweries, it follows from the 7th and 17th recitals in the preamble to that directive, that it seeks common solutions to permit Member States to apply reduced rates of duty to those products, while not allowing those reduced rates to lead to distortions of competition in the internal market. Therefore, that directive seeks to prevent the benefits of such a reduction from being granted to breweries, the size and capacity of which could cause such distortions (see, to that effect, judgment in Glückauf Brauerei , C‑83/08, EU:C:2009:228, paragraphs 25 and 26).

55. In that regard, the justifications put forward by the Kingdom of Belgium relate to the need to safeguard the objectives of consumer protection, protection of the environment and road safety, which, according to the case-law, constitute overriding reasons in the public interest capable of justifying a hindrance to the free movement of goods (see, to that effect, Case C-297/05 Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 77; Case C-265/06 Commission v Portugal , paragraph 38; Case C-170/07 Commission v Poland , paragraph 49; and Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy , paragraph 60).

77. With regard to the argument put forward by the Netherlands Government that the examination of the general condition of vehicles safeguards road safety and the protection of the environment in so far as it ensures that only vehicles which satisfy Netherlands road safety and environmental requirements are allowed onto the road in the Netherlands, there is no dispute about the fact that road safety and the protection of the environment do constitute overriding reasons in the public interest capable of justifying a hindrance to the free movement of goods (see, in particular, Cura Anlagen , paragraph 59).

62 Next, the Court has held that it is for the vendor to furnish proof that the conditions laid down for the application of the intra-Community supply exemption, including those imposed by the Member States for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of the exemptions and for preventing any evasion, avoidance or abuse, are fulfilled (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 September 2012, VSTR, C‑587/10, EU:C:2012:592, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

30 That legislation therefore introduces a difference of treatment based directly on age, as referred to in Articles 1 and 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78, read together (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 November 2014, Vital Pérez, C‑416/13, EU:C:2014:2371, paragraph 33)

33. In the present case, Article 32(b) of Law 2/2007 has the consequence that certain persons are treated less favourably than other persons in comparable situations on the sole ground that they have exceeded the age of 30 years. It is obvious that such a rule introduces a difference of treatment based directly on age as referred to in Articles 1 and 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78, read together.

28. The Court has held that Article 10(2) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1) (now Article 66(a) of the VAT Directive) is to be interpreted as meaning that where a Member State opts for the derogation allowed under the first indent of the third subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 77/388, (now Article 66(c) of the VAT Directive), that is to say, where it makes the tax chargeable no later than the issue of the invoice or the document serving as invoice, it may, in accordance with the third indent, provide that the tax is to become chargeable ‘where an invoice or document serving as invoice is not issued, or is issued late, within a specified period from the date of the chargeable event’ (see Italittica , paragraph 22).

35 In particular, the Commission’s action must contain a coherent and detailed statement of the reasons which have led it to conclude that the Member State in question has failed to fulfil one of its obligations under the Treaties (see judgment of 6 September 2012 in Commission v Belgium, C‑150/11, EU:C:2012:539, paragraphs 27 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, a contradiction in the heads of claim put forward by the Commission in support of its action for failure to fulfil obligations does not satisfy the requirements imposed (see, to that effect, judgments of 1 February 2007 in Commission v United Kingdom, C‑199/04, EU:C:2007:72, paragraph 25, and of 28 June 2007 in Commission v Spain, C‑235/04, EU:C:2007:386, paragraph 47).

27. It follows that the Commission’s action must contain a coherent and detailed statement of the reasons which have led it to conclude that the Member State in question has failed to fulfil one of its obligations under the Treaties (Case C-508/10 Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 36).

38 Clearly, the words including negotiation are not intended to define the principal object of the exemption laid down in the provision, but to extend the scope of the exemption to negotiation.

41 However, as was confirmed by the Court in paragraph 26 of Johnson, cited above, it is clear from the judgment in Steenhorst-Neerings, cited above, that the solution adopted in Emmott was justified by the particular circumstances of that case, in which a time-bar had the result of depriving the plaintiff in the main proceedings of any opportunity whatever to rely on her right to equal treatment under a Community directive (see also Haahr Petroleum, cited above, paragraph 52, and Joined Cases C-114/95 and C-115/95 Texaco and Olieselskabet Danmark [1997] ECR I-4263, paragraph 48).

52 In paragraph 17 of that judgment, the Court expressly recounted the principle that the fixing of reasonable time-limits which, if unobserved, bar proceedings, satisfies the conditions laid down in the decisions referred to. It was only because of the particular nature of directives and having regard to the specific circumstances of that case that the Court held, in paragraph 23, that until such time as a directive has been properly transposed into domestic law, a Member State may not rely on an individual's delay in initiating proceedings against it in order to protect rights conferred upon him by the provisions of the directive and that a period laid down by national law within which proceedings must be initiated cannot begin to run before that time.

24 The Court has, however, held (Case C-127/92 Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority [1993] ECR I-5535, paragraphs 13 and 14) that the burden of proof, which is normally on the worker bringing legal proceedings against his employer with a view to removing the discrimination of which he believes himself to be the victim, may be shifted when that is necessary to avoid depriving workers who appear to be the victims of discrimination of any effective means of enforcing the principle of equal pay. Thus in particular where an undertaking applies a system of pay which is wholly lacking in transparency it is for the employer to prove that his practice in the matter of wages is not discriminatory if a female worker establishes, in relation to a relatively large number of employees, that the average pay for women is less than that for men (Case 109/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening ("Danfoss") [1989] ECR 3199, paragraph 16). Similarly, where significant statistics disclose an appreciable difference in pay between two jobs of equal value, one of which is carried out almost exclusively by women and the other predominantly by men, so that there is prima facie case of sex discrimination, Article 119 of the Treaty requires the employer to show that that difference is based on objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex (Enderby, cited above, paragraphs 16 and 19).

19 Secondly, the Court has consistently held that Article 7 of the EEC Treaty (Article 6 of the EC Treaty), which lays down the general principle of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, applies independently only to situations governed by Community law in respect of which the Treaty lays down no specific prohibition of discrimination (see the judgment in Case C-179/90 Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova v Siderurgica Gabrielli [1991] ECR I-5889, paragraph 11).

11 As regards, in the first place, the nationality condition imposed on the workers of the dock-work company, it should be recalled, to begin with, that according to the case-law of the Court, the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article 7 of the Treaty applies independently only to situations governed by Community law in regard to which the Treaty lays down no specific prohibition of discrimination (see for example Case 305/87 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 1461, paragraphs 12 and 13; Case C-10/90 Masgio v Bundesknappschaft [1991] ECR I-1119, paragraph 12).

71 On that basis, the Court has previously held that Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as Union citizens (judgment of 8 March 2011, Ruiz Zambrano, C‑34/09, EU:C:2011:124, paragraph 42).

46. In the absence of an EC Treaty definition of ‘movement of capital’ within the meaning of Article 56(1) EC, the Court has acknowledged the indicative value of the nomenclature of movements of capital set out in Annex I to Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article [67] of the Treaty (article repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam) (OJ 1988 L 178, p. 5). Thus, the Court has held that movements of capital within the meaning of Article 56(1) EC include in particular ‘direct’ investments, namely investments in the form of participation in an undertaking through the holding of shares which confers the possibility of effectively participating in its management and control, and ‘portfolio’ investments, namely investments in the form of the acquisition of shares on the capital market solely with the intention of making a financial investment without any intention to influence the management and control of the undertaking (see Joined Cases C‑282/04 and C‑283/04 Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 19 and case-law cited; Commission v Germany , paragraph 18; and Case C‑171/08 Commission v Portugal , paragraph 49).

19. In the absence of a definition in the EC Treaty of ‘movements of capital’ for the purposes of Article 56(1) EC, the Court has recognised the nomenclature annexed to Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty (an article repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam) (JO 1988 L 178, p. 5) as having indicative value. Movements of capital for the purposes of Article 56(1) EC thus include in particular direct investments in the form of participation in an undertaking through the holding of shares which confers the possibility of effectively participating in its management and control (‘direct’ investments) and the acquisition of shares on the capital market solely with the intention of making a financial investment without any intention to influence the management and control of the undertaking (‘portfolio’ investments) (see, to that effect, Case C-222/97 Trummer and Mayer [1999] ECR I-1661, paragraph 21; Commission v France , paragraphs 36 and 37, and Commission v United Kingdom , paragraphs 39 and 40).

48. In carrying out the requisite assessment, the national court must also take account of all the relevant factors in the case, having regard, as follows from Article 3 of Directive 84/450, to the information contained in the advertisement at issue and, more generally, to all its features (see Lidl Belgium , paragraph 79 and the case‑law cited).

30. However, for an activity to be classified as economic, it is not necessary that it is carried out for profit (see to that effect, judgments in Smits and Peerbooms , C‑157/99, EU:C:2001:404, paragraphs 50 and 52, and Jundt, C‑281/06, EU:C:2007:815, paragraph 33).

50 Some of those governments also maintain that it follows from Case 293/83 Gravier [1985] ECR 593 and Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447, paragraph 17, that a further condition to be satisfied before a service can constitute an economic activity within the meaning of Article 60 of the Treaty is that the person providing the service must do so with a view to making a profit.

48 In accordance with settled case-law, an obstacle to the freedom of movement of persons can be justified only where it is based on objective considerations and is proportionate to the legitimate objective of the national provisions (see judgments of 14 October 2008 in Grunkin and Paul, C‑353/06, EU:C:2008:559, paragraph 29, and of 22 December 2010 in Sayn-Wittgenstein, C‑208/09, EU:C:2010:806, paragraph 81).

25 So far as health inspections carried out at frontiers are concerned, the Court has held that, as a result of the delays inherent in the inspections and the additional transport costs which the trader may incur thereby, the inspections in question are likely to make imports or exports more difficult or more costly (Case 35/76 Simmenthal v Italian Minister for Finance [1976] ECR 1871, paragraph 7).

7 TO COME WITHIN THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN THESE PROVISIONS IT IS ENOUGH FOR THE MEASURES IN QUESTION TO BE CAPABLE OF ACTING AS A DIRECT OR INDIRECT , REAL OR POTENTIAL HINDRANCE TO IMPORTS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES . THESE CONDITIONS ARE SATISFIED AS FAR AS LIVESTOCK AND MEAT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION IS CONCERNED , IF COMPULSORY , VETERINARY AND PUBLIC HEALTH INSPECTIONS ARE CARRIED OUT AT THE FRONTIERS OF A MEMBER STATE . AS A RESULT IN PARTICULAR OF THE DELAYS INHERENT IN THE INSPECTIONS AND THE ADDITIONAL TRANSPORT COSTS WHICH THE IMPORTER MAY INCUR THEREBY , THE INSPECTIONS IN QUESTION ARE LIKELY TO MAKE IMPORTATION MORE DIFFICULT OR MORE COSTLY .

72. In accordance with settled case-law, natural or legal persons can claim to be concerned individually by a measure of general application only if they are affected by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from any other person (see, to this effect, Plaumann v Commission , at p. 107, and Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I‑6677, paragraph 36).

19 It should additionally be noted that, within the framework of the system of supervision provided for by Regulation No 729/70, the Commission exercises only a supplementary function. This is clearly expressed in the eighth recital in the preamble to that regulation, according to which, in addition to supervision carried out by Member States on their own initiative, which remains essential, provision should be made for verification by officials of the Commission and for it to have the right to enlist the help of the Member States (judgments in Case C-366/88 France v Commission [1990] ECR I-3571, paragraph 20, and C-55/91 Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 31 and 32).

32 The complementary nature of those two types of supervision also emerges from Article 9(2) of Regulation No 729/70, from which it appears that the purpose of on-the-spot inspections performed by the Commission is to establish whether the checks carried out by the Member States were accurate.

74. Finally, with regard to a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which a decision has been taken by the competent authorities of the host Member State to expel a Turkish national after his conviction there for several offences under national legislation, it must be pointed out that it is Article 14(1) of Decision 1/80 which establishes the relevant legal framework authorising the Member States to take the necessary measures. Those authorities are, however, obliged to assess the personal conduct of the offender and whether it constitutes a present, genuine and sufficiently serious threat to public policy and security, and in addition they must observe the principle of proportionality (see, to that effect, Nazli , paragraphs 57 to 61, and, by analogy, Case C-100/01 Oteiza Olazabal [2002] ECR I-10981, paragraphs 39, 43 and 44). In particular, a measure ordering expulsion based on Article 14(1) of that decision may be taken only if the personal conduct of the person concerned indicates a specific risk of new and serious prejudice to the requirements of public policy. Consequently, such a measure cannot be ordered automatically following a criminal conviction and with the aim of general deterrence (see Case C-383/03 Dogan [2005] ECR I-6237, paragraph 24).

43. Since the contested provisions are liable to hinder intra-Community trade, they must be considered as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports within the meaning of Article 28 EC, without it being necessary to prove that they have had an appreciable effect on such trade (see Case C‑166/03 Commission v France [2004] ECR I‑6535, paragraph 15).

15. It follows that that provision of the CGI should be considered a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports within the meaning of Article 28 EC, without it being necessary to prove that it has had an appreciable effect on intra-Community trade.

46. With respect to the reference in paragraph 164 of the judgment under appeal to the presumption of validity enjoyed by the measures of Community institutions (see, inter alia, Case C-137/92 P Commission v BASF and Others [1994] ECR I-2555, paragraph 48), suffice it to state that the Court of First Instance did not draw from that presumption any factual or legal conclusion but relied solely on its own assessment of the facts and evidence to conclude that the contested decision had been properly authenticated.

35. In that regard, it is settled case-law that, for the purposes of the application of the provisions of European Union competition law, an undertaking is any entity engaged in an economic activity, irrespective of its legal status and the way in which it is financed (see, inter alia, Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 21, and Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637, paragraph 17). It is clear from established case-law that any activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given market is an economic activity (see Case C-82/01 P Aéroports de Paris v Commission [2002] ECR I-9297, paragraph 79; Case C-49/07 MOTOE [2008] ECR I-4863, paragraph 22; and Case C-437/09 AG2R Prévoyance [2011] ECR I-973, paragraph 42). Thus, the State itself or a State entity may act as an undertaking (see, to that effect, Case 41/83 Italy v Commission [1985] ECR 873, paragraphs 16 to 20).

21 It must be observed, in the context of competition law, first that the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed and, secondly, that employment procurement is an economic activity.

51. It is apparent from the Court’s case-law that, in order to rebut the presumption that a parent company which holds 100% of the capital of its subsidiary actually exercises a decisive influence over that subsidiary, it is for the parent company to put before the EU judicature any evidence relating to the organisational, economic and legal links between its subsidiary and itself which are apt to demonstrate that they do not constitute a single economic entity (see Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission , paragraph 65).

88. It is apparent from the case-law, as Arkema points out, that the 1998 Guidelines merely constitute rules of practice from which the administration may not depart in an individual case without giving reasons that are compatible with the principle of equal treatment (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraphs 209 and 210).

210. That case-law applies a fortiori to rules of conduct designed to produce external effects, as is the case of the Guidelines, which are aimed at traders.

108. As the Court has held, Article 7(6) of Directive 80/778 does not establish a mere duty of due diligence but an obligation to achieve a particular result (Case C‑316/00 Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I‑10527, paragraph 37).

20. Like the tax charged on inheritances, which consist in the transfer to one or more persons of assets left by a deceased person and likewise fall under that heading of Annex I to the directive (see, inter alia, Case C‑256/06 Jäger [2008] ECR I‑123, paragraph 25; Eckelkamp and Others , paragraph 39; Arens-Sikken , paragraph 30; Block , paragraph 20; and Case C‑35/08 Busley and Cibrian Fernandez [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 18), the tax treatment of gifts, whether they are gifts of money, immovable property or movable property, therefore comes under the Treaty provisions on the movement of capital, except where their constituent elements are confined within a single Member State (see, to that effect, Persche , paragraph 27).

27. Like the tax levied on inheritances, the tax treatment of gifts in money or in kind therefore comes within the compass of the Treaty provisions on the movement of capital, except in cases where the constituent elements of the transactions concerned are confined within a single Member State (see, to that effect, Eckelkamp , paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

9. Selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêts du 14 septembre 2004, Commission/Espagne, C‑168/03, Rec. p. I‑8227, point 24, et du 27 septembre 2007, Commission/France, C-9/07, point 8).

61. It must be possible to plan the number of hospitals, their geographical distribution, their organisation and the facilities with which they are provided, and even the nature of the medical services which they are able to offer, in a way which, first, meets, as a general rule, the objective of guaranteeing in the territory of the Member State concerned sufficient and permanent access to a balanced range of high-quality hospital treatment and, secondly, assists in ensuring the desired control of costs and prevention, as far as possible, of any wastage of financial, technical and human resources (see Case C‑157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, paragraphs 76 to 80; Case C‑385/99 Müller-Fauré and van Riet [2003] ECR I‑4509, paragraphs 77 to 80; and Watts , paragraphs 108 and 109).

80 From both those perspectives, a requirement that the assumption of costs, under a national social security system, of hospital treatment provided in another Member State must be subject to prior authorisation appears to be a measure which is both necessary and reasonable.

50. As respect for the rights of the defence, a principle whose fundamental nature has been emphasised on many occasions in the case-law of the Court (see, in particular, Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 7), is of crucial importance in procedures such as that followed in the present case, it is essential to prevent those rights from being irremediably compromised on account of the excessive duration of the investigation phase and to ensure that the duration of that phase does not impede the establishment of evidence designed to refute the existence of conduct susceptible of rendering the undertakings concerned liable. For that reason, examination of any interference with the exercise of the rights of the defence must not be confined to the actual phase in which those rights are fully effective, that is to say, the second phase of the administrative procedure. The assessment of the source of any undermining of the effectiveness of the rights of the defence must extend to the entire procedure and be carried out by reference to its total duration.

40. In the case of companies, it should be borne in mind that their registered office for the purposes of Article 48 EC serves, in the same way as nationality in the case of individuals, as the connecting factor with the legal system of a State. Acceptance of the proposition that the Member State in which a company seeks to establish itself may freely apply different treatment merely by reason of its registered office being situated in another Member State would deprive Article 43 EC of all meaning (see, to that effect, Case 270/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 273, paragraph 18; Case C-330/91 Commerzbank [1993] ECR I‑4017, paragraph 13; Metallgesellschaft and Others , paragraph 42; and Marks & Spencer , paragraph 37). Freedom of establishment thus aims to guarantee the benefit of national treatment in the host Member State, by prohibiting any discrimination based on the place in which companies have their seat (see, to that effect, Commission v France , paragraph 14, and Saint‑Gobain ZN , paragraph 35).

42 Freedom of establishment thus defined includes, pursuant to Article 58 of the Treaty, the right of companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community, to pursue their activities in the Member State concerned through a branch or agency (Case C-264/96 ICI [1998] ECR I-4695, paragraph 20, and the case-law cited therein, and Case C-307/97 Saint-Gobain ZN [1999] ECR I-6161, paragraph 34). With regard to companies, it should be noted in this context that it is their corporate seat in the above sense that serves as the connecting factor with the legal system of a particular State, like nationality in the case of natural persons (ICI, cited above, paragraph 20, and the case-law cited therein, and Saint-Gobain ZN, cited above, paragraph 35). Acceptance of the proposition that the Member State in which a company seeks to establish itself may freely apply to it a different treatment solely by reason of the fact that its registered office is situated in another Member State would thus deprive Article 52 of all meaning (Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 18).

30. Admittedly, the adoption of national rules concerning the conditions and procedures for recognition of the ‘charitable’ nature of organisations other than bodies governed by public law is allowed under Article 13A of the Sixth Directive (see, to that effect, Kingscrest Associates and Montecello , paragraph 50).

84 As the Court of Justice has previously had occasion to point out in its judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission (C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 81), and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission (C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 81), Article 18 of Regulation No 1386/2002, in accordance with which the Commission set the parameters for the application of Regulation No 1164/94, as amended, can be understood only as confirming the existence of a legal time limit for the purposes of adoption of a decision on financial corrections.

81. In addition, concerning more particularly Regulation No 1386/2002, the purpose of which is to lay down the procedure for implementing Regulation No 1164/94, as amended, of which the provision at issue in the present dispute forms part, the view advanced by the Commission, and affirmed by the General Court in paragraphs 33 and 36 of the judgment under appeal, that Article 18 of Regulation No 1386/2002 merely fixes the date when the time-limit for taking a decision under Article H(2) of Annex II to Regulation No 1164/94, as amended, starts to run, cannot be accepted, since the European Union legislature could not have set the starting point for a time-limit for adopting a decision under Article H if such a time-limit did not exist.

50 Such an interpretation is consonant with the objective pursued by that regulation, which established flexible conflict of law rules to reflect the mobility of individuals and to protect the rights of a spouse who has left the country of common habitual residence, while ensuring there is a genuine link between the party concerned and the Member State exercising jurisdiction (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 November 2007, Sundelind Lopez, C‑68/07, EU:C:2007:740, paragraph 26).

36. On the basis of that reasoning, the Court held that the principle of effectiveness does not preclude a national provision which prevents national courts from raising of their own motion an issue as to whether the provisions of Community law have been infringed, where examination of that issue would oblige them to abandon the passive role assigned to them by going beyond the ambit of the dispute defined by the parties themselves and relying on facts and circumstances other than those on which the party with an interest in application of those provisions has based his claim (see Van Schijndel and van Veen , paragraph 22).

22 In those circumstances, the answer to the second question must be that Community law does not require national courts to raise of their own motion an issue concerning the breach of provisions of Community law where examination of that issue would oblige them to abandon the passive role assigned to them by going beyond the ambit of the dispute defined by the parties themselves and relying on facts and circumstances other than those on which the party with an interest in application of those provisions bases his claim. The other questions

28 Therefore, the unequal treatment permitted under Article 65(1)(a) TFEU must be distinguished from the discrimination prohibited by Article 65(3) TFEU. According to the Court’s case-law, for a national tax provision which distinguishes between taxpayers depending on the place where their capital is invested to be capable of being regarded as compatible with the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital, the difference in treatment must apply to situations which are not objectively comparable or be justified by overriding reasons in the public interest (judgment of 13 March 2014 in Bouanich, C‑375/12, EU:C:2014:138, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

45. In addition, it follows from the third paragraph of that article that the Member States, whether or not they were parties to the case at first instance, do not have to show interest in order to bring an appeal against a judgment of the General Court (Case C‑49/92 P Commission v Anic Partecipazioni [1999] ECR I‑4125, paragraph 171).

171 The Court finds that it is sufficient to observe here, first, that, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 49 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, with the exception of cases relating to disputes between the Community and its servants, an appeal may be brought by Member States and Community institutions even if they did not intervene in the proceedings before the Court of First Instance. Whether or not they were parties to the case at first instance, the Community institutions do not, therefore, have to show interest in order to bring an appeal against a judgment of the Court of First Instance.

30. Nevertheless, the Court has held that it cannot give a preliminary ruling on a question submitted by a national court where it is quite obvious that the ruling sought by that court on the interpretation or validity of European Union law bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see Bosman , paragraph 61, and Case C‑36/99 Idéal tourisme [2000] ECR I‑6049, paragraph 20).

62. According to the Court, such an interpretation of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC would give those provisions an excessively broad meaning and would fail to take any account at all of the requirement, imposed by their very wording, that the measures decided on the basis of those provisions must be taken against third countries ( Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission , paragraph 168).

168. To accept the interpretation of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC proposed by the Commission, that it is enough for the restrictive measures at issue to be directed at persons or entities present in a third country or associated with one in some other way, would give those provisions an excessively broad meaning and would fail to take any account at all of the requirement, imposed by their very wording, that the measures decided on the basis of those provisions must be taken against third countries.

284. It is also clear from the case-law that respect for human rights is a condition of the lawfulness of Community acts (Opinion 2/94, paragraph 34) and that measures incompatible with respect for human rights are not acceptable in the Community (Case C‑112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I‑5659, paragraph 73 and case-law cited).

18. According to settled case-law, the procedure established in Article 234 EC rests on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, with the result that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see Case C‑448/01 EVN and Wienstrom [2003] ECR I‑14527, paragraph 74, and Case C‑145/03 Keller [2005] ECR I‑2529, paragraph 33).

74. It should be noted at the outset that, according to settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts provided for by Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59; PreussenElektra , paragraph 38; Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607, paragraph 18; Case C-153/00 Der Weduwe [2002] ECR I-11319, paragraph 31, and Case C-318/00 Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins [2003] ECR I-905, paragraph 40).

27 Next, the Court has already held, with regard to the free movement of workers who are nationals of Member States, that Article 48 of the Treaty entails the right for the latter to reside in another Member State for the purpose of seeking employment there and that, while the duration of the stay of a person seeking employment in the Member State concerned may be limited under the relevant national legislation, to give full effect to Article 48 none the less requires that the person concerned be given a reasonable time in which to apprise himself, in the territory of the Member State which he has entered, of offers of employment corresponding to his occupational qualifications and to take, where appropriate, the necessary steps in order to be engaged (see, in this connection, Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745, paragraphs 13, 15 and 16).

25. First of all, it must be recalled that the concepts used in Regulation No 44/2001, in particular those which appear in Article 15(1) of the regulation, must be interpreted independently, by reference principally to the general scheme and objectives of the regulation, in order to ensure that it is applied uniformly in all the Member States (see, to that effect, Case C‑27/02 Engler [2005] ECR I‑481, paragraph 33; Joined Cases C‑585/08 and C‑144/09 Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof [2010] ECR I‑12527, paragraph 55, and Case C‑190/11 Mühlleitner [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 28).

33. As the Court has repeatedly held, the concepts used in the Brussels Convention – and in particular those featured in Article 5(1) and (3) and Article 13 – must be interpreted independently, by reference principally to the system and objectives of the Convention, in order to ensure that it is uniformly applied in all the Contracting States (see, in particular, Case 150/77 Bertrand [1978] ECR 1431, paragraphs 14, 15 and 16; Case C-89/91 Shearson Lehman Hutton [1993] ECR I‑139, paragraph 13; Case C-269/95 Benincasa [1997] ECR I-3767, paragraph 12; Case C-99/96 Mietz [1999] ECR I-2277, paragraph 26; and Gabriel , paragraph 37).

54. However, as regards the determination of the taxable revenue of resident companies holding shares in non-resident companies, the Court has already held that the fact that it is possible, subsequently, to obtain an exemption for capital gains realised on a disposal, assuming that a sufficient level of profit is achieved, does not constitute a consideration based on fiscal coherence which is capable of justifying a refusal to allow an immediate deduction in respect of losses incurred by companies holdings shares in non-resident companies (see, by analogy, Rewe Zentralfinanz , paragraph 67).

19. So far as (ii) the criterion of independence is concerned, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that the Tribunal Català de Contractes del Sector Públic acts as a third party in relation to the authority which adopted the decision challenged in the main proceedings (see judgments in Corbiau , C‑24/92, EU:C:1993:118, paragraph 15, and Wilson , C‑506/04, EU:C:2006:587, paragraph 49). In that regard, it would appear that the Tribunal carries out its functions in a wholly independent manner, not occupying a hierarchical or subordinate position in relation to any other body and not taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever (see judgment in Torresi , C‑58/13 and C‑59/13, EU:C:2014:2088, paragraph 22); it is thus protected against external intervention or pressure liable to jeopardise the independent judgment of its members (judgments in Wilson , C‑506/04, EU:C:2006:587, paragraph 51, and TDC , C‑222/13, EU:2014:2265, paragraph 30).

49. The concept of independence, which is inherent in the task of adjudication, involves primarily an authority acting as a third party in relation to the authority which adopted the contested decision (see, to that effect, inter alia Case C‑24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277, paragraph 15, and Case C‑516/99 Schmid [2002] ECR I-4573, paragraph 36).

19 It must next be considered, as the Court stated in its judgment in Reiff (paragraph 20), whether the public authorities have delegated their powers in the matter of fixing tariffs to private economic operators.

29. In addition, it follows from the Court’s case-law that the jurisdiction conferred on national courts, in accordance with those provisions, must allow them to order those intermediaries to take measures aimed not only at bringing to an end infringements already committed against intellectual-property rights using their information-society services, but also at preventing further infringements (see Case C‑70/10 Scarlet Extended [2011] ECR I-11959, paragraph 31).

31. Next, it follows from the Court’s case-law that the jurisdiction conferred on national courts, in accordance with those provisions, must allow them to order those intermediaries to take measures aimed not only at bringing to an end infringements already committed against intellectual-property rights using their information-society services, but also at preventing further infringements (see, to that effect, Case C‑324/09 L’Oréal and Others [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 131).

39. This conclusion is borne out by the contents of Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement, which, in conformity with the third paragraph of the preamble to the Framework Agreement as well as paragraphs 8 and 10 of its general considerations, makes it possible for Member States, when implementing the agreement, to take account of the needs of specific sectors and/or categories of workers involved, provided that that is justified on objective grounds (see, to this effect, Marrosu and Sardino , C-53/04, EU:C:2006:517, paragraph 45, and Kücük , C‑586/10, EU:C:2012:39, paragraph 49).

16 It is settled case-law that Article 59 of the Treaty requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of services who are established in another Member State, but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less attractive the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State in which he lawfully provides similar services (see Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221, paragraph 12; Case C-43/93 Vander Elst [1994] ECR I-3803, paragraph 14; Case C-272/94 Guiot [1996] ECR I-1905, paragraph 10; Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraph 33; and Case C-165/98 Mazzoleni and ISA [2001] ECR I-2189, paragraph 22).

14 Article 59 of the Treaty therefore requires not only the elimination, against a person providing services who is established in another Member State, of all discrimination on the ground of his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services (see the judgment in Case C-76/90 Saeger v Dennemeyer [1991] ECR I-4221, paragraph 12).

33. Moreover, the requirement that the cost should be ‘not prohibitively expensive’ pertains, in environmental matters, to the observance of the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and to the principle of effectiveness, in accordance with which detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under European Union law must not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by European Union law (see, inter alia, Case C‑240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK [2011] ECR I‑1255, paragraph 48).

18. Article 71 of Regulation No 1408/71 contains specific provisions applicable to unemployed persons who, during their last period of employment, resided in a Member State other than the competent Member State. The Court has already held that the provisions of that article are intended to ensure that migrant workers receive unemployment benefit under the conditions which are most favourable to the search for new employment (see judgment in Miethe , 1/85, EU:C:1986:243, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).

16 IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT , AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY HELD IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 15 DECEMBER 1976 IN CASE 39/76 ( BESTUUR DER BEDRIJFSVERENIGING VOOR DE METAALNIJVERHEID V L . MOUTHAAN ( 1976 ) ECR 1901 ) AND IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 27 MAY 1982 IN CASE 227/81 ( AUBIN V UNEDIC AND ASSEDIC ( 1982 ) ECR 1991 ), ARTICLE 71 OF REGULATION NO 1408/71 IS INTENDED TO ENSURE THAT MIGRANT WORKERS RECEIVE UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT IN THE CONDITIONS MOST FAVOURABLE TO THE SEARCH FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT . THAT BENEFIT IS NOT MERELY PECUNIARY BUT INCLUDES THE ASSISTANCE IN FINDING NEW EMPLOYMENT WHICH THE EMPLOYMENT SERVICES PROVIDE FOR WORKERS WHO HAVE MADE THEMSELVES AVAILABLE TO THEM .

47 As regards the extent of the monitoring of observance of that principle, it should be noted that the EU legislature enjoys a wide discretion in matters concerning agriculture. Consequently, judicial review must be limited to verifying that the measure in question is not vitiated by any manifest error or misuse of powers and that the authority concerned has not manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion (judgment of 14 March 2013 in Agrargenossenschaft Neuzelle, C‑545/11, EU:C:2013:169, paragraph 43).

56. It is apparent from case-law that the award of a public contract to a semi-public company without a call for tenders would interfere with the objective of free and undistorted competition and the principle of equal treatment, in that such a procedure would offer a private undertaking with a capital holding in that company an advantage over its competitors ( Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau , paragraph 51, and Case C‑29/04 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I‑9705, paragraph 48).

48. The award of a public contract to a semi-public company without calling for tenders would interfere with the objective of free and undistorted competition and the principle of equal treatment of the persons concerned, referred to in Directive 92/50, in that such a procedure would offer a private undertaking with a capital presence in that undertaking an advantage over its competitors ( Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau , paragraph 51).

11 As far as technological need is concerned, according to the Court' s settled case-law (see the "Purity requirement for beer case" Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227, at paragraph 52), in evaluating the need to use an additive account must be taken of the findings of international scientific research and the assessment made by the authorities of the other Member States.

55. First, it must be recalled that national legislation is appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective pursued only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain it in a consistent and systematic manner (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑338/04, C‑359/04 and C‑360/04 Placanica and Others [2007] ECR I‑1891, paragraphs 53 and 58, and Case C‑500/06 Corporación Dermoestética [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 39 and 40).

40. Consequently, national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, cannot be regarded as being appropriate for the purpose of securing the attainment of the objective of public health and constitutes an unjustified restriction for the purposes of Article 43 EC and 49 EC.

28. The Court has already held that the concept of activities ‘closely related’ to ‘hospital or medical care’ within the meaning of Article 13(A)(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive is to be interpreted as not covering activities such as the collection and transport of blood where the medical care provided in a hospital environment to which those activities are merely potentially related has not been performed, commenced or yet envisaged (see judgment in Future Health Technologies , C‑86/09, EU:C:2010:334, paragraph 49). Therefore, transportation of samples of human origin cannot be characterised as an activity ‘closely related’ to ‘hospital or medical care’.

36. In that connection, it is to be noted that, unlike Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, Articles 2(j) and 4 of that regulation do not provide that, in the event of ‘denied boarding’ owing to ‘extraordinary circumstances’ which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken, an air carrier is exempted from its obligation to compensate passengers denied boarding against their will (see, by analogy, IATA and ELFAA , paragraph 37). It follows that the EU legislature did not intend that compensation may be precluded on grounds relating to the occurrence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’.

37. Article 6 of Regulation No 261/2004 provides that, in the event of a long delay to a flight, the operating air carrier must offer to assist and take care of the passengers concerned. It does not provide that the carrier may escape such obligations in the event of extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken.

18. In examining this condition, the national court must take into consideration all the relevant facts of the case, in particular the market share held by the trade mark, the intensity, geographical extent and duration of its use, and the size of the investment made by the undertaking in promoting it (judgment in PAGO International , C‑301/07, EU:C:2009:611, paragraph 25).

21. It follows that EU law does not preclude a national authority from relying on the expiry of a reasonable limitation period unless, by its conduct, it was responsible for the delay in the application, thereby depriving the applicant in the main proceedings of the opportunity to enforce his rights under an EU directive before the national courts (see, to that effect, Edis , paragraph 48, and Case C‑228/96 April e [1998] ECR I‑7141, paragraph 43; see also, by analogy, Case C‑327/00 Santex [2003] ECR I‑1877, paragraphs 57 to 61, and Case C‑542/08 Barth [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 33 to 36).

59. As is apparent from the information provided by the referring court, USL indicated initially that it would take account of the reservations expressed by Santex and that it would not apply the economic condition laid down by the disputed clause at the tender admission stage.  It was only by means of the exclusion decision, which eliminated from the tendering procedure all tenderers who did not satisfy that condition, that the contracting authority stated its definitive position regarding the interpretation of the disputed clause.

18. Enfin, la Commission fait valoir qu’il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour, et notamment de l’arrêt Commission/Irlande (C‑55/12, EU:C:2013:274, point 45), qu’un État membre ne saurait se prévaloir de dispositions, de pratiques ou de situations de son ordre juridique interne pour justifier l’inobservation des obligations résultant du droit de l’Union et que la procédure visée à l’article 258 TFUE repose sur la constatation objective du non-respect par un État membre des obligations que lui imposent les traités ou un acte de droit dérivé.

83 In considering the question whether the requirement that a Bulgarian national whose presence within the host Member State's territory is irregular must submit a new establishment application in due and proper form in his State of origin or, as the case may be, in another country is compatible with the rule of equal treatment laid down in Article 45(1) of the Association Agreement, where such a requirement could not be imposed on the host Member State's own nationals, it is important to bear in mind that the Court has held, with regard to the free movement of workers, that the reservation contained in Article 48(3) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 39(3) EC) allows Member States, on the grounds set out in that provision, and in particular grounds justified by requirements of public policy, to take measures against nationals of other Member States which they could not apply to their own nationals, inasmuch as they have no authority to expel the latter from the national territory or deny them access to it (see, in this regard, Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, paragraph 22; Joined Cases 115/81 and 116/81 Adoui and Cornuaille [1982] ECR 1665, paragraph 7; Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, paragraph 22; Joined Cases C-65/95 and C-111/95 Shingara and Radiom [1997] ECR I-3343, paragraph 28; and Case C-171/96 Pereira Roque [1998] ECR I-4607, paragraph 37).

28 As the Court of Justice held in Joined Cases 115/181 and 116/81 Adoui and Cornuaille v Belgian State [1982] ECR 1665, paragraph 7, the reservations contained in Articles 48 and 56 of the EC Treaty permit Member States to adopt, with respect to the nationals of other Member States and on the grounds specified in those provisions, in particular grounds justified by the requirements of public policy, measures which they cannot apply to their own nationals, inasmuch as they have no authority to expel the latter from the national territory or to deny them access thereto.

43 The object of the Brussels Convention is not to unify the procedural rules of the Contracting States, but to determine which court has jurisdiction in disputes concerning civil and commercial matters in intra-Community relations and to facilitate the enforcement of judgments (see Case C-365/88 Hagen [1990] ECR I-1845, paragraph 17, and Case C-68/93 Shevill and Others [1995] ECR I-415, paragraph 35).

21. According to the case-law of the Court, the exemptions provided for in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive constitute independent concepts of European Union law whose purpose is to avoid divergences in the application of the VAT system from one Member State to another (see, in particular, Case C‑349/96 CPP [1999] ECR I‑973, paragraph 15; Horizon College , paragraph 15; and Case C‑242/08 Swiss Re Germany Holding [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 33). As a consequence, the terms of a provision of the Sixth Directive which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Union (see to that effect Case C-497/01 Zita Modes [2003] ECR I‑14393, paragraph 34, and Case C‑25/03 HE [2005] ECR I‑3123, paragraph 63).

15. According to the case-law of the Court, the exemptions provided for in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive constitute independent concepts of Community law whose purpose is to avoid divergences in the application of the VAT system from one Member State to another (see Case C‑349/96 CPP [1999] ECR I‑973, paragraph 15; Case C‑240/99 Skandia [2001] ECR I‑1951, paragraph 23; and Ygeia , paragraph 15).

19 In this instance, the Commission has not shown that that was the case.