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57 It is settled case-law that a decision which has not been challenged by the addressee within the time-limit laid down by Article 173 of the Treaty becomes definitive as against him (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 20/65 Collotti v Court of Justice [1965] ECR 847 and the judgment in TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf, cited above, at paragraph 13).

13 It is settled law that a decision which has not been challenged by the addressee within the time-limit laid down by Article 173 of the Treaty becomes definitive as against him (see in the first place the judgment in Case 20/65 Collotti v Court of Justice [1965] ECR 847).

29 It also held, in that judgment, in the context of the third indent of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 that even though that provisions governs the situation of the Turkish worker only with respect to employment and not to the right of residence, those two aspects of the personal situation of a Turkish worker are closely linked and that, by granting to such a worker, after a specified period of legal employment in the Member State, access to any paid employment of his choice, the provision in question necessarily implies ° since otherwise the right granted by it to the Turkish worker would be deprived of any effect ° the existence, at least at that time, of a right of residence for the person concerned (paragraph 29 of the judgment).

59. In that regard, it may be necessary to produce evidence showing that the decision is based on economic evaluations comparable to those which, in the circumstances, a rational private vendor in a situation as close as possible to that of the Member State would have had carried out, before making the investment, in order to determine its future profitability (see, to that effect, Commission v EDF , paragraph 84).

84. In that regard, it may be necessary to produce evidence showing that the decision is based on economic evaluations comparable to those which, in the circumstances, a rational private investor in a situation as close as possible to that of the Member State would have had carried out, before making the investment, in order to determine its future profitability.

18. Accordingly, the present action for failure to fulfil obligations cannot in any case be regarded as being devoid of purpose (see, to this effect, Case 240/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 1835, paragraphs 12 to 15).

48. According to the Court’s case-law, Articles 43 EC and 49 EC are specific expressions of the principle of equal treatment (see Case C-3/88 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 4035, paragraph 8). The prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality is also a specific expression of the general principle of equal treatment (see Case 810/79 Überschär [1980] ECR 2747, paragraph 16). In its case-law relating to the Community directives on public procurement, the Court has stated that the principle of equal treatment of tenderers is intended to afford equality of opportunity to all tenderers when formulating their tenders, regardless of their nationality (see, to that effect, Case C-87/94 Commission v Belgium [1996] ECR I-2043, paragraphs 33 and 54). As a result, the principle of equal treatment of tenderers is to be applied to public service concessions even in the absence of discrimination on grounds of nationality.

54 The procedure for comparing tenders therefore had to comply at every stage with both the principle of the equal treatment of tenderers and the principle of transparency so as to afford equality of opportunity to all tenderers when formulating their tenders.

16 Consequently, since the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of a provision of Community law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see Case C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bischer v Oberfinanzdirektion Koeln [1990] ECR I-4003, paragraph 20).

42. The requirement of effectiveness embodies the general obligation on the Member States to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under European Union law. It applies both as regards the designation of the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction to hear and determine actions based on European Union law and as regards the definition of detailed procedural rules (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑317/08 and C‑320/08 Alassini and Others [2010[ ECR I‑0000, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

49. Those requirements of equivalence and effectiveness embody the general obligation on the Member States to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under EU law. They apply both as regards the designation of the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction to hear and determine actions based on EU law and as regards the definition of detailed procedural rules (see Impact , paragraphs 47 and 48, and Case C-63/08 Pontin [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 44).

37. Furthermore, it must be noted that international treaty law was codified, in essence, by the Vienna Convention and that the rules contained in that convention apply to an agreement concluded between a State and an international organisation, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with Egypt, in so far as those rules are an expression of general international customary law (see, by analogy, Brita , paragraphs 40 and 41).

41. In so far as, in view of the fact that the company distributing the dividends is located in a third State, only the free movement of capital may be relied upon against the national legislation relating to the treatment of the dividends distributed by it, account does not have to be taken of the size of the shareholdings in the company making the distribution. A company resident in a Member State may rely on Article 63 TFEU in order to call into question the legality of such rules irrespective of the extent of its shareholding in the company distributing dividends established in a third country (see, to this effect, judgment in Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , EU:C:2012:707, paragraphs 99 and 104).

104. Having regard to the foregoing, the answer to the fourth question is that European Union law must be interpreted as meaning that a company that is resident in a Member State and has a shareholding in a company resident in a third country giving it definite influence over the decisions of the latter company and enabling it to determine its activities may rely upon Article 63 TFEU in order to call into question the consistency with that provision of legislation of that Member State which relates to the tax treatment of dividends originating in the third country and does not apply exclusively to situations in which the parent company exercises decisive influence over the company paying the dividends. Question 5

37. The common element in the above situations is that, although they are governed by legislation which falls a priori within the competence of the Member States, namely legislation on the right of entry and stay of third-country nationals outside the scope of provisions of secondary legislation which, under certain conditions, provide for the attribution of such a right, they none the less have an intrinsic connection with the freedom of movement of a Union citizen, which prevents the right of entry and residence being refused to those nationals in the Member State of residence of that citizen, in order not to interfere with that freedom (see, to that effect, Iida , paragraph 72).

22. Furthermore, as stated in the order for reference and not contested by the defendant, ACMC has no contractual relationship with the insured parties, since the insurance contracts are underwritten by UL. The national court was therefore correct to consider that ACMC’s activities do not constitute insurance transactions within the meaning of Article 13B(a) of the Sixth Directive (see, to that effect, Case C-240/99 Skandia [2001] ECR I-1951, paragraphs 41 and 43).

41 According to the definition of insurance transactions set out in paragraph 17 of the judgment in CPP and cited in paragraph 37 of this judgment, it appears that the identity of the person supplied with the service is relevant for the purposes of the definition of the type of services covered by Article 13B(a) of the Sixth Directive and that an insurance transaction necessarily implies the existence of a contractual relationship between the provider of the insurance service and the person whose risks are covered by the insurance, namely the insured.

69. It is clear from Article 225 EC and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to find the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts. When the Court of First Instance has found or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 225 EC to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and to review the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see, in particular, Baustahlgewebe v Commission , paragraph 23, and Case C-551/03 P General Motors v Commission [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 51).

79. In that regard, it should be noted that the Court has consistently held that the principle of legal certainty is a fundamental principle of Community law which requires, in particular, that rules should be clear and precise, so that individuals may be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and may take steps accordingly (see, in particular, Case C-143/93 Van Es Douane Agenten [1996] ECR I-431, paragraph 27, and Case C-110/03 Belgium v Commission [2005] ECR I-2801, paragraph 30). The principle of legal certainty must be observed all the more strictly in the case of a measure liable to have financial consequences (Case 326/85 Netherlands v Commission [1987] ECR 5091, paragraph 24, and Case C‑94/05 Emsland-Stärke [2006] ECR I‑2619, paragraph 43).

30. It must be borne in mind that the principle of legal certainty is a fundamental principle of Community law which requires, in particular, that rules should be clear and precise, so that individuals may be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and may take steps accordingly (see Case 169/80 Gondrand Frères and Garancini [1981] ECR 1931 and Case C-143/93 Van Es Douane Agenten [1996] ECR I-431, paragraph 27).

35. That global assessment means that conceptual and visual differences between two signs may counteract aural similarities between them, provided that at least one of those signs has, from the point of view of the relevant public, a clear and specific meaning, so that the public is capable of grasping it immediately (see, to that effect, Case C‑361/04 P Ruiz-Picasso and Others v OHIM [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 20).

25. It should be noted as a preliminary point that trade mark rights are an essential element in the system of undistorted competition which the EC Treaty seeks to establish and maintain. Under such a system, an undertaking must be in a position to keep its customers by virtue of the quality of its products and services, something which is possible only if there are distinctive marks which enable customers to identify them (see, in particular, Case C-10/89 Hag [1990] ECR I‑3711, paragraph 13; Case C‑ 517/99 Merz & Krell [2001] ECR I‑6959, paragraph 21, and Case C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club [2002] ECR I‑10273, paragraph 47).

13 Trade mark rights are, it should be noted, an essential element in the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to establish and maintain . Under such a system, an undertaking must be in a position to keep its customers by virtue of the quality of its products and services, something which is possible only if there are distinctive marks which enable customers to identify those products and services . For the trade mark to be able to fulfil this role, it must offer a guarantee that all goods bearing it have been produced under the control of a single undertaking which is accountable for their quality .

97. The argument that is it not necessary to grant an exceptional increase in cases where pension holders and their spouses enjoy sufficient aggregate resources as not to fall below the social minimum cannot be relied on as objective justification for the difference in the treatment of persons in receipt of a minimum pension and of those who receive higher-level pensions, in so far as the latter have in principle, by reason of the amount of their pensions alone, sufficient resources (see, by analogy, Case C‑102/88 Ruzius-Wilbrink [1989] ECR 4311, paragraph 16).

29 As for the third possibility open to the Commission, namely to establish a dialogue with the applicants concerning the implementation of the Chavane de Dalmassy judgment, the Court of First Instance rightly found, at paragraph 74 of the contested judgment, that, failing the adoption of new rules by the Council, the Commission was unable to apply a weighting to the applicants' remuneration other than that laid down by the rules in force. That inability, as the Court of First Instance found, undoubtedly constituted a `particular difficulty' in implementing the Chavane de Dalmassy judgment, and, in such a situation, it is for the institution concerned to take a decision of a nature such as to provide fair compensation for the disadvantage which has resulted for the persons concerned by the decision which has been annulled (see Case C-412/92 P Parliament v Meskens [1994] ECR I-3757, paragraph 28). The Court of First Instance was therefore right in holding, at paragraph 75, that, as it was not disputed that the applicants had obtained overall, during the period from January 1992 until 1 July 1994, the application to their remuneration of a weighting higher than that which they would have obtained if the Council had already amended the rules in force, such a disadvantage had not been demonstrated.

28 The Court went on to state that "where compliance with a judgment annulling a measure presents particular difficulties, the defendant may satisfy the obligation arising from Article 176 of the Treaty by taking 'such decision as will provide due compensation for the damage which [the person concerned] has suffered as a result of the decision which has been annulled' (see the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 76/79 Koenecke v Commission, cited above, at p. 679; see also the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 144/82 Detti v Court of Justice, cited above). In that context, the appointing authority could also have established a dialogue with the applicant in order to attempt to reach agreement offering her fair compensation for the unlawfulness of which she had been the victim" (paragraph 80).

24. It is settled case-law that the exemption of VAT in respect of the intra-Community supply of goods becomes applicable only when the right to dispose of the goods as owner has been transferred to the purchaser, the supplier establishes that those goods have been dispatched or transported to another Member State and that, as a result of that dispatch or that transport, they have physically left the territory of the Member State of supply (see, inter alia, judgment in Teleos and Others , C‑409/04, EU:C:2007:548, paragraph 42).

38. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that Court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, judgments in Pohotovosť , C‑470/12, EU:C:2014:101, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited, and Kušionová , C‑34/13, EU:C:2014:2189, paragraph 38).

27. It should be noted in that respect that, according to settled case‑law, questions on the interpretation of European Union law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, for example, Joined Cases C‑222/05 to C‑225/05 van der Weerd and Others [2007] ECR I‑4233, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

82. The prohibition on measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions set out in Article 28 EC covers all measures which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade (see, in particular, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5; Case C‑192/01 Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR I‑9693, paragraph 39; Commission v France , paragraph 22; and Commission v Germany , paragraph 80).

100 The reasonableness of a period cannot be determined by reference to a precise maximum limit determined in an abstract manner (judgments of 7 April 2011 in Greece v Commission, C‑321/09 P, EU:C:2011:218, paragraph 33, and 28 February 2013 in Review of Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134, paragraphs 29 and 30).

29. The Court observed, in paragraph 192 of that judgment, that the reasonableness of a period cannot be determined by reference to a precise maximum limit determined in an abstract manner but, rather, must be appraised in the light of the specific circumstances of each case.

25. It should also be noted that the plea of illegality raised by the Kingdom of Spain in regard to Regulation No 1954/2003 does not infringe the principle of res judicata . That principle extends only to matters of fact and of law actually or necessarily settled by the judicial decision in question (Joined Cases C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑245/99 P, C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C‑252/99 P and C‑254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission [2002] ECR I‑8375, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited therein). However, in its judgment in Spain v Council , the Court did not rule on the legality of Articles 3, 4 and 6 of Regulation No 1954/2003 – covered by the plea of illegality raised in the present case – but rejected the pleas on the basis of which annulment of those articles was sought, on the ground that the pleas were inadmissible.

36. By contrast, activities which fall within the exercise of public powers are not of an economic nature justifying the application of the FEU Treaty rules of competition (see, to that effect, Case 107/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 2655, paragraphs 14 and 15; Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft [1994] ECR I-43, paragraph 30; and MOTOE , paragraph 24).

15 IT FOLLOWS THAT , EVEN IF POSTAL ACTIVITIES ARE ASSIGNED TO BODIES GOVERNED BY PUBLIC LAW , ARTICLE 13 AND THE REFERENCE TO IT CONTAINED IN THE FINAL SUBPARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 4 ( 5 ) ARE NECESSARY TO EXEMPT THE WHOLE OF THOSE ACTIVITIES , OF WHICH ONLY A PART MAY BE REGARDED AS THE ACTIVITIES OF A PUBLIC AUTHORITY IN THE STRICT SENSE . IT IS THEREFORE INCORRECT TO STATE THAT THE EXEMPTION PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLE 13 WOULD BE DEPRIVED OF ANY MEANING IF IT ONLY APPLIED TO THE ACTIVITIES OF A BODY GOVERNED BY PUBLIC LAW .

12 To begin with, it should be noted that the Italian Government lays emphasis on the fact that the situation has not changed since the judgment in Case 159/78 Commission v Italy [1979] ECR 3247.

60 With regard to the question of the circumstances in which such an imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’, it should be stated that, having regard to the 16th recital of Directive 93/13, the national court must assess for those purposes whether the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to such a term in individual contract negotiations (judgment of 14 March 2013, Aziz, C‑415/11, EU:C:2013:164, paragraph 69).

69. With regard to the question of the circumstances in which such an imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’, having regard to the sixteenth recital in the preamble to the directive and as stated in essence by the Advocate General in point 74 of her Opinion, the national court must assess for those purposes whether the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to such a term in individual contract negotiations.

52. As the Commission rightly maintains, the project in question is part of a 251-km-long railway line between Valencia and Tarragona, which forms part of the project known as the ‘Mediterranean corridor’, linking the Spanish region of Levante to Catalonia and the French border.

43. Thus, the CRF does not preclude national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, being directed at any undertaking which assigns telephone numbers to end-users, affects electronic communications undertakings in a general and non-discriminatory manner – provided, however, that such legislation does not encroach upon the powers which the NRAs derive directly from the provisions of the CRF ( Telekomunikacja Polska , paragraphs 27 and 28; see also Case C‑424/07 Commission v Germany [2009] ECR I‑11431, paragraphs 78 and 91 to 99).

27. It is therefore necessary to examine whether national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, affects the powers that the NRA concerned derives from the abovementioned provisions of the Framework Directive and the Universal Service Directive.

20. In order to answer those questions, it should first be pointed out that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, the objective of the Community legislation on customs valuation is to introduce a fair, uniform and neutral system excluding the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values (Case C-11/89 Unifert [1990] ECR I-2275, paragraph 35, and Case C-15/99 Sommer [2000] ECR I-8989, paragraph 25). The customs value must thus reflect the real economic value of an imported good and take into account all of the elements of that good that have economic value (see Case C‑306/04 Compaq Computer International Corporation [2006] ECR I‑10991, paragraph 30).

82. Indeed, as the Belgian Government correctly submits, the guaranteeing associations, which, under Article 8(1) of the TIR Convention, are jointly and severally liable with the holder of the TIR carnet to pay the customs duties which may be due, may, like the holder, bring a challenge against the entitlements themselves (see, to that effect, concerning proof of the place where the irregularity occurred, Case C-78/01 BGL [2003] ECR I‑9543, paragraphs 50 to 53). The Commission contends, however, that the disputes referred to by the Belgian Government concern the enforcement of the security and not the existence or amount of the claims in dispute. The Belgian Government has, moreover, failed to demonstrate that the conditions laid down in Article 6(3)(b) of Regulation No 1150/2000 are met in the present case, namely that the entitlements at issue in the present proceedings were challenged by those associations within the prescribed periods and might, upon settlement of the disputes which have arisen, be subject to change.

52. Furthermore, respect for the right to a fair hearing in any procedure brought against a person which may lead to an act adversely affecting him, in particular a procedure which may lead to penalties being imposed, constitutes a fundamental principle of Community law. That principle requires that any person on whom a penalty may be imposed must be placed in a position in which he can effectively make known his view of the matters on the basis of which the penalty is imposed and can produce any evidence relevant to his defence (see, to that effect, Case C-135/92 Fiskano v Commission [1994] ECR I-2885, paragraphs 39 and 40, and Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission ( " Tubemeuse " ) [1990] ECR I-959, paragraphs 46 and 47).

83 It should be observed, in the first place, that the Commission adopted the 2006 Guidelines, in connection with the application of fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, in order to ensure the transparency and impartiality of its decisions. That provision is designed, inter alia, to ensure that the fine has sufficient deterrent effect, which justifies the taking into consideration of the economic power of the undertaking concerned (judgment in Dole Food and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission, C‑286/13 P, EU:C:2015:184, paragraph 142). It is the intention to ensure that the fine has sufficient deterrent effect, reiterated in point 4 of the 2006 Guidelines, which justifies the taking into account of the financial capacity of the undertaking concerned (see, to that effect, judgments in YKK and Others v Commission, C‑408/12 P, EU:C:2014:2153, paragraph 85, and Dole Food and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission, C‑286/13 P, EU:C:2015:184, paragraph 143).

53 However, in view of the account of the facts in the decision at issue, the status as negotiators with regard to the social aspects within SFP, relied upon by the appellants, constitutes only a tenuous link with the actual subject-matter of that decision, so that the position of the appellant is not comparable to that in Van der Kooy v Commission and CIRFS and Others v Commission, cited above.

23 LASTLY, THE LANDBOUWSCHAP IS ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT WHICH ESTABLISHED THE TARIFF DISALLOWED BY THE COMMISSION, AND IN THAT CAPACITY IS MENTIONED SEVERAL TIMES IN DECISION 85/215 . IN THAT CAPACITY IT WAS ALSO OBLIGED, IN ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE DECISION, TO COMMENCE FRESH TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS WITH GASUNIE AND TO REACH A NEW AGREEMENT .

32. In conclusion, ‘subsidies directly linked to the price’ for the purposes of Article 11(A)(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive include only subsidies which constitute the whole or part of the consideration for a supply of goods or services and which are paid by a third party to the seller or supplier ( Office des produits wallons, paragraph 18).

41. Finally, so far as concerns the third argument, it is apparent from Joined Cases C‑403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League and Others [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 76 to 145, that communications to the public by satellite must be capable of being received in all the Member States and that they therefore by definition have a cross-border nature. Furthermore, the communications at issue in the main proceedings display such a nature since they involve Belgian and Netherlands companies, Airfield and Canal Digitaal, and the programme-carrying signals are intended in particular for television viewers residing in Belgium and Luxembourg.

80. That said, where legislation concerns, in this field, an activity in respect of which the services provided by the economic operators are particularly prominent, whilst the supply of telecommunications equipment is related thereto in only a purely secondary manner, it is appropriate to examine that activity in the light of the freedom to provide services alone.

89 According to the Commission, the opposite conclusion would amount to interpreting the concept of aid subjectively, depending on the body that adopts the measure introducing the aid, and would therefore be contrary to the Court’s case-law and, in particular, the judgment of 8 December 2011, France Télécom v Commission (C‑81/10 P, EU:C:2011:811, paragraph 17 and case-law cited), in which it was held that the concept of State aid has a legal character and must be interpreted on the basis of objective factors and according to the effects of that aid.

17 As regards, first, the genuine nature of the dispute in the main proceedings, it should be noted that the claim for judicial review of the ‘intention and/or obligation’ of the United Kingdom Government to implement Directive 2014/40, which Pillbox has brought before the referring court, has been held admissible by the latter, even though, when those claims were brought, the period prescribed for implementation of the directive had not yet expired and no national implementation measures had been adopted. There is, moreover, disagreement between Pillbox and the Secretary of State for Health as to whether or not the abovementioned claim is well founded. Given that the referring court has been asked to resolve that disagreement, it is not obvious that the dispute in the main proceedings is not genuine (see, by analogy, judgment in British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, C‑491/01, EU:C:2002:741, paragraphs 36 and 38).

38. It is therefore not obvious that the assessment of the Directive's validity or its interpretation, requested by the national court, bear no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose or raise a purely hypothetical question.

26. The first point to be noted is that, according to the settled case-law of the Court concerning Article 228(2) EC, the reference date for assessing whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations under Article 228(2) EC is the deadline set in the reasoned opinion issued under that provision (see judgments in Commission v France , C‑304/02, EU:C:2005:444, paragraph 30, and in Commission v Spain , C‑610/10 EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 66).

21. As the Court has already stated, the Community legislature thus meant to secure the principle of freedom to set rates in the non-life insurance sector (Case C‑518/06 Commission v Italy , paragraph 101 and the case-law cited).

101. As the Court has already stated, the Community legislature thus meant to secure the principle of freedom to set rates in the non-life insurance sector, including third-party liability motor insurance (Case C-59/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-1759, paragraph 29, and Case C‑346/02 Commission v Luxembourg , paragraph 21).

54 It should be noted in that regard that the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of EU law, which is now set out in Article 47 of the Charter. Article 47 secures in EU law the protection afforded by Article 6(1) and Article 13 of the ECHR. It is necessary, therefore, to refer only to Article 47 (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2012, Otis and Others, C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraphs 46 and 47).

23 It is in this regard settled case-law that if the advantages stemming from the use of the revenue from a charge forming part of a general system of internal charges applying systematically to national products processed and marketed on the national market and to products exported in an unprocessed state fully offset the burden borne by the national product processed and marketed on the national market when it is placed on the market, that charge constitutes a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty, contrary to Articles 9 and 12 of the Treaty (see, by way of analogy, Compagnie Commerciale de l'Ouest and Others, cited above, paragraph 27, Case C-17/91 Lornoy and Others [1992] ECR I-6523, paragraph 21, and Case C-72/92 Scharbatke [1993] ECR I-5509, paragraph 10). On the other hand, if the advantages accruing to the taxed national products processed and marketed on the national market from the use of the revenue generated by the charge offset only partially the burden borne by those products, such a charge will constitute a breach of the prohibition of discrimination laid down by Article 95 of the Treaty (see inter alia, by way of analogy, UCAL, paragraph 22).

22 It is settled case-law (see in particular Compagnie Commerciale de l'Ouest and Others, cited above, paragraph 27; Lornoy and Others, cited above, paragraph 21, and Case C-72/92 Scharbatke v Germany [1993] ECR I-5509, paragraph 10) that if the advantages stemming from the use of the revenue from a charge forming part of a general system of internal charges applying systematically to domestic and imported products fully offset the burden borne by the domestic product when it is placed on the market, that charge constitutes a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty, contrary to Articles 9 and 12 of the Treaty. On the other hand, if the advantages accruing to the taxed domestic products from the use of the revenue from the charge only partly offset the burden borne by those products, such a charge would constitute a breach of the prohibition of discrimination laid down by Article 95 of the Treaty.

43. The principle of fiscal neutrality cannot extend the scope of reduced rates of VAT to the supply of electronic books (see, to that effect, judgment in Zimmermann , C‑174/11, EU:C:2012:716, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). Point 6 of Annex III to the VAT Directive is not a provision which, unequivocally, extends the scope of reduced rates of VAT to the supply of electronic books. On the contrary, as is clear from paragraph 49 above, such a supply is not covered by that provision.

38. In regard to the national court’s observation that the priority purpose pursued by the national legislature on adoption of Paragraph 1(a) of the AEntG is to protect the national job market rather than remuneration of the worker, it should be pointed out that it is for that court to verify whether, on an objective view, the legislation at issue in the main proceedings secures the protection of posted workers. It is necessary to determine whether those rules confer a genuine benefit on the workers concerned, which significantly augments their social protection. In this context, the stated intention of the legislature may lead to a more careful assessment of the alleged benefits conferred on workers by the measures which it has adopted ( Portugaia Construções , paragraphs 28 and 29 and case law cited).

29 As the Court has already held, it is necessary to determine whether those rules confer a genuine benefit on the workers concerned, which significantly augments their social protection. In this context, the stated intention of the legislature may lead to a more careful assessment of the alleged benefits conferred on workers by the measures which it has adopted (Finalarte and Others, paragraph 42).

24. In that regard, it follows from Article 249 EC that Member States have the obligation, when they transpose a directive, to ensure that it is fully effective, whilst retaining a broad discretion as to the choice of methods (see, in particular, Case C‑216/05 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I‑10787, paragraph 26).

54. As regards the field of State aid, applicants who challenge the merits of a decision appraising aid taken on the basis of Article 88(3) EC or at the end of the formal examination procedure are considered to be individually concerned by that decision if their market position is substantially affected by the aid to which the contested decision relates (see, to that effect, Cofaz and Others v Commission paragraphs 22 to 25, and Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum , paragraphs 37 and 70).

37. On the other hand, if the applicant calls in question the merits of the decision appraising the aid as such, the mere fact that it may be regarded as concerned within the meaning of Article 88(2) EC cannot suffice to render the action admissible. It must then demonstrate that it has a particular status within the meaning of the Plaumann v Commission case‑law. That applies in particular where the applicant’s market position is substantially affected by the aid to which the decision at issue relates (see, to that effect, the judgment in Case 169/84 Cofaz and Others v Commission [1986] ECR 391, paragraphs 22 to 25, and the order in Sveriges Betodlares Centralförening and Henrikson v Commission , paragraph 45).

13 Since the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction, in proceedings for a preliminary ruling under Article 177, to rule on the compatibility of a national measure with Community law (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-188/91 Deutsche Shell v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg [1993] I-363, paragraph 27), it is unable to rule on the validity of that argument.

38. Finally, it is important to note that the intended use of a product may constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (see Case C‑459/93 Thyssen Haniel Logistic [1995] ECR I‑1381, paragraph 13; Case C‑396/02 DFDS [2004] ECR I‑8439, paragraph 29; and Case C‑183/06 RUMA [2007] ECR I‑1559, paragraph 36). It is common ground that the objective characteristics and properties of products such as those at issue in the main proceedings, including the form, colour and name under which they are marketed, correspond to those of a spirituous beverage.

36. The intended use of a product may also constitute an objective criterion for classification if it is inherent to the product, and that inherent character must be capable of being assessed on the basis of the product’s objective characteristics and properties (see Case C-459/93 Thyssen Haniel Logistic [1995] ECR I-1381, paragraph 13).

10 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the Court has already held in Case C-130/92 OTO v Ministero delle Finanze [1994] ECR I-3281, paragraph 11, which concerned the interpretation of Community law with regard to the same Italian legislation, that a charge such as the national consumption tax at issue in the main proceedings must be regarded as an integral part of a general system of internal taxation within the meaning of Article 95 of the Treaty and that its compatibility with Community law must therefore be assessed on the basis of that article.

91 It is important to note that such a transitional situation, prolonged indefinitely beyond the period that ended, pursuant to Article 13(3) of Regulation No 1924/2006, at the latest on 31 January 2010, does not meet the requirements of that regulation, formulated in recital 23 thereof, according to which, in order to ensure a scientific assessment of the claims that is harmonised and of the highest possible standard, such assessments should be carried out by the EFSA (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 July 2016, Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb, C‑19/15, EU:C:2016:563, paragraph 41).

41 As stated in recital 17 of that regulation, the scientific substantiation is to be the main aspect to be taken into account for the use of nutrition and health claims. Moreover, recital 23 of the regulation provides that the health claims are only be authorised for use in the European Union after a scientific assessment of the highest possible standard and that, in order to ensure harmonised scientific assessment of these claims, the European Food Safety Authority is to carry out such assessments.

17 It should be observed, first, that while Member States are still, in principle, free to determine the requirements of public policy and public security in the light of their national needs, those grounds must, in the Community context and, in particular, as derogations from the fundamental principle of free movement of capital, be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the Community institutions (see, to this effect, Case 36/75 Rutili v Minister for the Interior [1975] ECR 1219, paragraphs 26 and 27). Thus, public policy and public security may be relied on only if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society (see, to this effect, Rutili, cited above, paragraph 28, and Case C-348/96 Calfa [1999] ECR I-11, paragraph 21). Moreover, those derogations must not be misapplied so as, in fact, to serve purely economic ends (to this effect, see Rutili, paragraph 30). Further, any person affected by a restrictive measure based on such a derogation must have access to legal redress (see, to this effect, Case 222/86 Unectef v Heylens and Others [1987] ECR 4097, paragraphs 14 and 15).

41. It is common ground that legislation of a Member State such as that at issue in the main proceedings under which exclusive rights to organise and promote games of chance are conferred on a single operator, and whereby all other operators, including operators established in another Member State, are prohibited from offering over the internet services falling within the scope of that regime in the territory of the first Member State, constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services guaranteed by Article 49 EC (see, to that effect, Case C‑203/08 Sporting Exchange [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 22 and 24 and the case-law cited).

22. By its first question, the national court asks, in essence, whether Article 49 EC must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State, such as the legislation at issue in the main pr oceedings, under which exclusive rights to organise and promote games of chance are conferred on a single operator, and which prohibits any other operator, including an operator established in another Member State, from offering via the internet services within the scope of that regime in the territory of the first Member State.

38. In that judgment, the Court stated first of all that, under the first indent of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80, a Turkish worker needs only to have been in legal employment for more than one year in order to be entitled to the renewal of his permit to work for the same employer, since that provision does not make that right dependant on any other condition, such as the circumstances under which the right of entry and residence was obtained ( Kus , paragraph 21).

57. In that regard, it must be pointed out that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, complaints based on findings of fact and on the assessment of those facts in the judgment under appeal are admissible on appeal where the appellant submits that the Court of First Instance has made findings of fact which the documents in the file show to be substantially incorrect or that it has distorted the clear sense of the evidence before it (see, to that effect, Case C-82/01 P Aéroports de Paris v Commission [2002] ECR I‑9297, paragraph 56, and Case C‑229/05 P PKK and KNK v Council [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 35).

35. As to the Council’s argument that the fourth ground of appeal is inadmissible because it relates to a finding of fact made by the Court of First Instance, it must be pointed out that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, complaints based on findings of fact and on the assessment of those facts in the contested decision are admissible on appeal where the appellant contends that the Court of First Instance has made findings which the documents in the file show to be substantially incorrect or that it has distorted the clear sense of the evidence before it (see, to this effect, Case C-82/01 P Aéroports de Paris v Commission  [2002] ECR I-9297, paragraph 56). That is indeed the case here.

55 It follows from Article 2 of the Sixth Directive that every supply must normally be regarded as distinct and independent (judgments of 21 February 2008, Part Service, C‑425/06, EU:C:2008:108, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited, and of 27 September 2012, Field Fisher Waterhouse, C‑392/11, EU:C:2012:597, paragraph 14).

72 On the other hand, the Treaty provisions on citizenship of the Union do not confer any autonomous right on third-country nationals (judgments of 8 November 2012, Iida, C‑40/11, EU:C:2012:691, paragraph 66, and of 8 May 2013, Ymeraga and Others, C‑87/12, EU:C:2013:291, paragraph 34).

34. As regards Article 20 TFEU, the Treaty provisions on citizenship of the Union do not confer any autonomous right on third-country nationals (Case C‑40/11 Iida [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 66).

48. The former company and the new operating companies can form an economic unit, inter alia, where the restructuring carried out constitutes an indivisible whole, from an industrial and economic point of view (see, to that effect, Intermills v Commission , paragraph 12).

65 In the present case, the Court of First Instance found that KLE and its supplier had agreed, at least implicitly, at the time of submission of the contract to the Agency, that the materials would come from the CIS, so that the parties were in a position to mention the origin of the uranium in the contract itself; consequently, it held, in paragraph 36, that later communication as provided for in Article 5 bis (c) of the Rules of the information on the country of origin was not permissible. Such a finding of fact does not, except where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, which has not been established in this case, constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, Case C-136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraphs 47 to 49 and 66; the order of 17 September 1996 in Case C-19/95 P San Marco v Commission [1996] ECR I-4435, paragraphs 36 to 40; and Case C-7/95 P Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraphs 18 to 22).

48 It must also be borne in mind that the appeal may rely only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts, and is therefore admissible only in so far as it is claimed that the decision of the Court of First Instance is incompatible with the rules of law the application of which it was called upon to ensure (see the judgments in Case C-283/90 P Vidranyi v Commission [1991] ECR I-4339, paras 11 to 13; in Case C-346/90 P F v Commission [1992] ECR I-2691, paras 6 and 7 and in Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-0000, para. 10).

28. It is important to note in that regard that, as in the case of Article 27 of Regulation No 44/2001 and Article 21 of the Brussels Convention, the concept of ‘established jurisdiction’ in Article 19 of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted independently, by reference to the scheme and purpose of the act that contains it (see, to that effect, judgments in Shearson Lehman Hutton , C‑89/91, EU:C:1993:15, paragraph 13, and Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa Corporate Solutions assurances , C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 32).

36. However, Article 345 TFEU does not mean that rules governing the system of property ownership current in the Member States are not subject to the fundamental rules of the FEU Treaty, which rules include, inter alia, the prohibition of discrimination, freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital (see, to that effect, Case 182/83 Fearon [1984] ECR 3677, paragraph 7; Case C‑302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I‑3099, paragraph 38; Case C‑452/01 Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg [2003] ECR I‑9743, paragraph 24; Case C‑171/08 Commission v Portugal [2010] ECR I‑6817, paragraph 64; Case C‑271/09 Commission v Poland [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 44; and Commission v Greece , paragraph 16).

64. First, as regards Article 295 EC, which states that ‘[the] Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership’, it is sufficient to note that, in accordance with settled case‑law, that article does not have the effect of exempting the Member States’ systems of property ownership from the fundamental rules of the Treaty and cannot, therefore, be relied on by way of justification for obstacles, resulting from privileges attached to the position of Member States as shareholders in privatised undertakings, to the exercise of the freedoms laid down in the Treaty (see Commission v Spain , paragraph 67 and case‑law cited).

33. In the present case, the Court considers it necessary to rule at the outset on the substance of the case. Substance

26. According to the case-law of the Court, removal from customs supervision must be understood as encompassing any act or omission the result of which is to prevent, if only for a short time, the competent customs authority from gaining access to goods under customs supervision and from monitoring them as provided for in Article 37(1) of the Customs Code ( D. Wandel , paragraph 47; Liberexim , paragraph 55; and Case C-337/01 Hamann International [2004] ECR I-1791, paragraph 31).

47 However, if Articles 37(1), 50, 51(1) and 203(1) of the Customs Code are read together, it is apparent that the scope of Article 203(1) extends well beyond the acts referred to in Article 865 of the implementing regulation and that removal must be understood as encompassing any act or omission the result of which is to prevent, if only for a short time, the competent customs authority from gaining access to goods under customs supervision and from monitoring them as provided for in Article 37(1) of the Customs Code.

56. It also follows from a consistent line of decisions that, provided that the Commission sets out in the statement of objections the main elements of fact and of law capable of leading to the imposition of a fine, such as the gravity and the duration of the alleged infringement and also the circumstance that the infringement was committed deliberately or negligently, the Commission satisfies its obligation to observe the undertakings’ right to be heard (see, to that effect, Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, paragraphs 19 and 20, and Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraph 428).

57. Consequently, the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) of Directive 2006/112 cannot be construed narrowly (see, to that effect, Isle of Wight Council and Others , paragraph 60, and SALIX Grundstücks-Vermietungsgesellschaft , paragraph 68).

68. Consequently, the second subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive cannot be construed narrowly (see Isle of Wight Council and Others , paragraph 60).

66. On the one hand, some provisions contained in the Community harmonisation measures already adopted merely laid down minimal requirements, leaving the Member States a degree of discretion to adapt them (see Case C-222/91 Philip Morris Belgium and Others [1993] ECR I-3469, paragraphs 11 and 17, and also Case C-11/92 Gallaher and Others [1993] ECR I-3545, paragraphs 14 and 20). On the other hand, Directives 89/622 and 90/239 covered only certain aspects of the conditions for manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products, the Member States being free to adopt national rules in respect of those aspects not thereby covered.

37 In paragraphs 11 and 12 of Mialocq, concerning the same legislation as that at issue in the main proceedings in this case, the Court found that the circumstances referred to in the judgment making the reference and those which had come to light in the course of the proceedings before it were not sufficient to support the view that such legislation indirectly established a monopoly hindering the free movement of goods, since any individual breeder was free to request the insemination centre for his area to supply him with semen from a production centre of his choice, in France or abroad.

11 THE CIRCUMSTANCES REFERRED TO IN THE JUDGMENT MAKING THE REFERENCE AND THOSE WHICH HAVE COME TO LIGHT IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT ARE NOT , HOWEVER , SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT LEGISLATION OF THE KIND WHICH IN FRANCE GOVERNS THE ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION OF CATTLE INDIRECTLY ESTABLISHES A MONOPOLY HINDERING THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS .

39. Even if the setting of retention rates at different levels by the Member States could lead to distortion of competition between producers of the same product in different Member States (a point not made in the order for reference), it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, even in regard to the competition rules of the Treaty, Article 36 EC gives precedence to the objectives of the CAP over the objectives of competition policy (Case C‑137/00 Milk Marque and National Farmers’ Union [2003] ECR I‑7975, paragraph 81).

102. If a sign identical with, or similar to, the proprietor’s trade mark is to be ‘used’, within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 89/104 and Article 9 of Regulation No 40/94, by a third party, that implies, at the very least, that that third party uses the sign in its own commercial communication. In so far as that third party provides a service consisting in enabling its customers to display on its website, in the course of their commercial activities such as their offers for sale, signs corresponding to trade marks, it does not itself use those signs within the meaning of that EU legislation (see, to that effect, Google France and Google , paragraphs 56 and 57).

57. That conclusion is not called into question by the fact that that service provider is paid by its clients for the use of those signs. The fact of creating the technical conditions necessary for the use of a sign and being paid for that service does not mean that the party offering the service itself uses the sign. To the extent to which it has permitted its client to make such a use of the sign, its role must, as necessary, be examined from the angle of rules of law other than Article 5 of Directive 89/104 and Article 9 of Regulation No 40/94, such as those referred to in paragraph 107 of the present judgment.

56 Likewise, as is apparent from that same line of case-law, the scope of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations cannot be extended to the point of generally preventing new rules from applying to the future effects of situations which arose under the earlier rules (see, inter alia, judgment of 3 September 2015 in A2A, C‑89/14, EU:C:2015:537, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

76. Thus the Court must decline to give a preliminary ruling on a question submitted by a national court where it is quite obvious that the interpretation or the assessment of the validity of a provision of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, or where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, in particular, Bosman , paragraph 61; Case C-437/97 EKW and Wein & Co. [2000] ECR I-1157, paragraph 52; Case C-36/99 Idéal Tourisme [2000] ECR I-6049, paragraph 20, and Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins , paragraph 42).

61 That is why the Court has held that it has no jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on a question submitted by a national court where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose (see, inter alia, Case C-143/94 Furlanis v ANAS [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 12) or where the problem is hypothetical and the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Meilicke, cited above, paragraph 32).

13 The first point to note is that in the context of a Community based on the principles of freedom of movement for persons and freedom of establishment, the protection of the linguistic rights and privileges of individuals is of particular importance (Case 137/84 Mutsch [1985] ECR 2681, paragraph 11).

57. It should be observed first of all that Article 20(1) TFEU confers on any person holding the nationality of a Member State the status of citizen of the Union (judgment in N. , C-46/12, EU:C:2013:9725, paragraph 25).

25. It should be observed as a preliminary point that Article 20(1) TFEU confers on any person holding the nationality of a Member State the status of citizen of the Union.

70. It should also be borne in mind that, according to the case‑law of the Court of Justice, activities which fall within the exercise of public powers are not of an economic nature justifying the application of the Treaty rules of competition (see, to that effect, Case 107/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 2655, paragraphs 14 and 15; SAT Fluggesellschaft , paragraph 30; and MOTOE , paragraph 24)

8 Although Article 59 of the Treaty expressly contemplates only the situation of a person providing services who is established in a Member State other than that in which the recipient of the service is established, the purpose of that Article is nevertheless to abolish restrictions on the freedom to provide services by persons who are not established in the State in which the service is to be provided (see judgment in Case 76/81 Transporoute v Minister of Public Works [1982] ECR 417, at paragraph 14). It is only when all the relevant elements of the activity in question are confined within a single Member State that the provisions of the Treaty on freedom to provide services cannot apply (judgment in Case 52/79, Procureur du Roi v Debauve [1980] ECR 833, at paragraph 9).

14 IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE RESULT OF THAT INTERPRETATION OF DIRECTIVE 71/305 IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE SCHEME OF THE TREATY PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE PROVISION OF SERVICES . TO MAKE THE PROVISION OF SERVICES IN ONE MEMBER STATE BY A CONTRACTOR ESTABLISHED IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE CONDITIONAL UPON THE POSSESSION OF AN ESTABLISHMENT PERMIT IN THE FIRST STATE WOULD BE TO DEPRIVE ARTICLE 59 OF THE TREATY OF ALL EFFECTIVENESS , THE PURPOSE OF THAT ARTICLE BEING PRECISELY TO ABOLISH RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES BY PERSONS WHO ARE NOT ESTABLISHED IN THE STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICE IS TO BE PROVIDED .

9. It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia , Case C-29/01 Commission v Spain [2002] ECR I-2503, paragraph 11).

21. The Court has also held that importers associated with exporters in third countries on whose products anti-dumping duties have been imposed may challenge the regulations imposing such duties, particularly where the export price has been calculated on the basis of those importers’ resale prices on the Community market and where the anti-dumping duty itself is calculated on the basis of those resale prices (see judgments in Neotype Techmashexport v Commission and Council , C‑305/86, EU:C:1990:295, paragraphs 19 and 20, and in addition Valimar , C‑374/12, EU:C:2014:2231, paragraph 32).

19 According to the Court' s consistent case-law, regulations imposing an anti-dumping duty, although by their nature and scope of a legislative nature, are of direct and individual concern inter alia to those importers whose resale prices for the products in question form the basis of the constructed export price, pursuant to Article 2(8)(b ) of Regulation No 2176/84, where exporter and importer are associated ( see judgments in Case 118/77 ISO v Council [1979] ECR 1277, paragraph 16, and in Cases 239 and 275/82 Allied Corporation v Commission [1984] ECR 1005, paragraphs 11 and 15, and the orders of the Court in Case 279/86 Sermes v Commission [1987] ECR 3109, paragraphs 14 to 16, and Case 301/86 Frimodt Pedersen v Commission [1987] ECR 3123, paragraphs 14 to 16 ).

33. Even though Article 2(1) of the basic regulation sets out the general principle that the normal value is normally to be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting countries, it does not follow from either the wording or the scheme of Article 2(7) of that regulation or from the Court’s case‑law that, when the institutions of the European Union determine the normal value ‘on any other reasonable basis’, that normal value must always correspond to the normal value at which the product is supplied to the first independent customer. Such an interpretation would undermine the discretion granted to the institutions of the European Union when determining the normal value in respect of non-market-economy countries (see, to that effect, Ikea Wholesale , paragraph 40).

23. Although, as a general rule, the principle of legal certainty precludes a Community measure from taking effect from a point in time before its publication, it may exceptionally be otherwise when the purpose to be attained so demands and when the legitimate expectations of the persons concerned are duly respected (see Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest [1991] ECR I-415, paragraph 49, and Case C-110/97 Netherlands v Council [2001] ECR I-8763, paragraph 151).

151 The fact nevertheless remains that the principle of legal certainty generally precludes a Community act from taking effect as from a date prior to its publication. It may however exceptionally be otherwise where the purpose to be attained so requires and the legitimate expectations of the persons concerned are properly respected (see Case 98/78 Racke [1979] ECR 69, paragraph 20; Case 99/78 Decker [1979] ECR 101, paragraph 8; Case 258/80 Rumi v Commission [1982] ECR 487, paragraph 11; and Case C-337/88 SAFA [1990] ECR I-1, paragraph 13).

22. It should be noted at the outset that, in the absence of any unifying or harmonising measures at Community level, in particular under the second indent of Article 293 EC, the Member States retain the power to define, by treaty or unilaterally, the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation, particularly with a view to eliminating double taxation (see Case C‑336/96 Gilly [1998] ECR I‑2793, paragraphs 24 and 30; Case C‑307/97 Saint-Gobain [1999] ECR I‑6161, paragraph 57; Case C‑376/03 D . [2005] ECR I‑5821, paragraph 52; Case C‑265/04 Bouanich [2006] ECR I‑923, paragraph 49; Case C‑470/04 N [2006] ECR I‑7409, paragraph 44; Case C‑374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation [2006] ECR I‑11673, paragraph 52; and Case C‑170/05 Denkavit Internationaal and Denkavit France [2006] ECR I‑11949, paragraph 43).

23. According to settled case-law, an agreement concluded by the Council, in accordance with Articles 300 EC and 310 EC, is, as far as the Community is concerned, an act of one of the institutions of the Community, within the meaning of subparagraph (b) of the first paragraph of Article 234 EC. The provisions of such an agreement form an integral part of the Community legal order as from its entry into force and, within the framework of that order, the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of such an agreement (Case 181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449, paragraphs 4 to 6; Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 7; Case C-321/97 Andersson and Wåkerås-Andersson [1999] ECR I-3551, paragraph 26; and Case C-431/05 Merck Genéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos [2007] ECR I-7001, paragraph 31).

6 WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS LAW, THE COURT ACCORDINGLY HAS JURISDICTION TO GIVE PRELIMINARY RULINGS CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF THIS AGREEMENT .

17. The contested decision states that the assessment of the gravity of [Tomra’s] infringement must take account of the fact that they had deliberately employed the practices in question in the context of their exclusionary strategy and also of the geographic scope of the infringement, namely the fact that it encompassed five EEA States: Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Norway. Conversely, account must also be taken, in the Commission’s view, of the fact that the infringement did not cover the whole of the reference period on all the national markets under consideration and that within each of those markets its intensity could well have varied over time.

165 The only exception to the right to repayment of taxes levied in breach of EU law is in a case in which a charge that was not due has been directly passed on by the taxable person to another person (see judgments of 6 September 2011, Lady & Kid and Others, C‑398/09, EU:C:2011:540, paragraph 18, and 15 September 2011, Accor, C‑310/09, EU:C:2011:581, paragraphs 72 and 74).

74. Thus, it is apparent from paragraphs 20 and 25 of Lady & Kid and Others that the only exception to the right to repayment of taxes levied in breach of EU law is in a case in which a charge that was not due has been directly passed on by the taxable person to the purchaser.

29. That objective of accelerating judicial cooperation is present in various aspects of the Framework Decision, inter alia in the treatment of the time-limits for adopting decisions relating to a European arrest warrant (judgment in F. , C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraph 58).

35 With regard to the interpretation of Article 44(4)(a)(i) of the Association Agreement between the Communities and Poland and of Article 45(4)(a)(i) of the Association Agreement between the Communities and the Czech Republic, it is important to point out that, according to well-established case-law, an international treaty must be interpreted not solely by reference to the terms in which it is worded but also in the light of its objectives. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties stipulates in that respect that a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose (see, inter alia, to that effect, Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, paragraph 14, Case C-312/91 Metalsa [1993] ECR I-3751, paragraph 12, and Case C-416/96 Eddline El-Yassini [1999] ECR I-1209, paragraph 47).

12 An international treaty must not be interpreted solely by reference to the terms in which it is worded but also in the light of its objectives. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the law of treaties stipulates in that respect that a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose (Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, paragraph 14).

26 In its judgment of 19 February 1998 in Case C-212/96 Chevassus-Marche v Conseil Régional de la Réunion [1998] ECR I-0000, the Court examined Decision 89/688 and held that consideration thereof, in so far as it authorises a system of exemptions from the charge termed octroi de mer subject to strict conditions which it lays down, disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect its validity. The national court must therefore classify and interpret its domestic law in the light of the criteria set out in that judgment.

In that judgment, the Court, taking into account the case-law according to which, when the amount of the fine is determined, the application of different methods of calculation cannot result in discrimination between the undertakings which have participated in the same infringement of Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 19 July 2012, Alliance One International and Standard Commercial Tobacco v Commission and Commission v Alliance One International and Others, C‑628/10 P and C‑14/11 P, EU:C:2012:479, paragraph 58), reduced the fine imposed on a participant in an infringement, in order to take account of the fact that the Commission, by incorrectly applying the method it had chosen to determine the amount of the fine, had imposed on another participant in the same cartel a fine which reduced the relative size of that participant’s contribution to the infringement (judgment of 12 November 2014, Guardian Industries and Guardian Europe v Commission, C‑580/12 P, EU:C:2014:2363, paragraphs 70 to 80).

71. In that regard, the Commission’s argument that the amount of the fine imposed on Saint-Gobain was increased by 30% in order to reflect more effectively the fact that it was a vertically integrated producer cannot be upheld. According to recital 519 of the decision at issue, the increase at issue was imposed on Saint-Gobain for the purposes of providing the fine with a sufficiently deterrent effect, on account in particular of Saint-Gobain’s ‘far bigger presence in the glass sector’ and ‘its turnover [which] is, in absolute terms, much larger than that of the others’.

13 IT IS THEREFORE APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE TO REGARD THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE DISPUTE AS BEING THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES' FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED PERIODS, AS EVIDENCED BY THE CONTINUOUS DELAYS, WITHOUT THERE BEING ANY NEED TO CONSIDER EACH CASE OF LATE COMMUNICATION OF DATA OR TO EXCLUDE EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE AFTER THE DELIVERY OF THE REASONED OPINION . THE ALLEGED BREACH OF OBLIGATIONS

36. However, the Court has equally clearly expressed the view, in that regard, referring expressly to the fact that the right to paid annual leave is a principle of European Union social law of particular importance expressly affirmed by Article 31(2) of the Charter, that to uphold that right, the objective of which is the protection of workers, any carry-over period must be substantially longer than the reference period in respect of which it is granted ( KHS , paragraphs 37 and 38, and Neidel , paragraphs 40 and 41).

41. It follows that, in order to uphold that right, the objective of which is the protection of workers, any carry‑over period must take into account the specific circumstances of a worker who is unfit for work for several consecutive reference periods. Thus, the carry‑over period must, inter alia, ensure that the worker can have, if need be, rest periods that may be staggered, planned in advance and available in the longer term and must be substantially longer than the reference period in respect of which it is granted ( KHS , paragraph 38).

29. Second, it should be recalled that the Court may reject a reference for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual and legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C‑415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I‑4921, paragraph 61, and Case C‑450/09 Schröder [2011] ECR I‑2497, paragraph 17).

81. Therefore the interpretation mentioned in paragraph 75 of this judgment is paradoxical and liable to deprive Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 of any meaning, since a Turkish national who is already lawfully employed in a Member State no longer needs the protection of a "standstill" clause as regards access to employment, as such access has already been allowed and the person concerned subsequently enjoys, for the rest of his career in the host Member State, the rights which Article 6 of that decision expressly confers on him. On the other hand, the "standstill" requirement as regards conditions of access to employment is intended to ensure that the national authorities refrain from taking measures likely to compromise the achievement of the objective of Decision No 1/80, which is to allow freedom of movement for workers, even if, initially, with a view to the gradual introduction of that freedom, existing national restrictions as regards access to employment may be retained (see, for comparison, Case 77/82 Peskeloglou [1983] ECR 1085, paragraph 13).

13 FROM THAT IT FOLLOWS THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IS AUTHORIZED TO MAINTAIN EXISTING RESTRICTIONS BUT MAY NOT IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD MAKE MORE STRINGENT THE CONDITIONS ON THE TAKING UP AND PURSUIT OF EMPLOYMENT BY GREEK NATIONALS THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF FRESH RESTRICTIVE MEASURES .

48. Furthermore, where a charge specifically intended to finance aid proves to be contrary to other provisions of the Treaty, for example Articles 9 and 12 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Articles 23 EC and 25 EC) or to Article 95 of the Treaty, the Commission cannot declare the aid scheme of which the charge forms part to be compatible with the common market (see, to that effect, Case 73/79 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR 1533, paragraph 11).

8 Furthermore, Article 59 of the Treaty applies not only where a person providing services and the recipient thereof are established in different Member States, but also in all cases where the person providing services offers those services in a Member State other than that in which he is established, wherever the recipients of those services may be established (Commission v Greece, cited above, paragraphs 8 to 10).

8 In that connection the Greek Government argued that Article 59 of the Treaty applies only where a person providing services and their recipients are established in different Member States.

27. In that context, the concept of establishment means that the operator offers its services on a stable and continuous basis from an establishment in the Member State of destination. On the other hand, every provision of services which are not offered on a stable and continuous basis from an establishment in the Member State of destination constitutes a ‘provision of services’ for the purposes of Article 49 EC (see Duomo Gpa and Others , paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

47. According to settled case-law, the imposition of a penalty payment is, in principle, justified only in so far as the failure to comply with an earlier judgment of the Court continues up to the time of the Court’s examination of the facts (judgment in Commission v Belgium , C‑533/11, EU:C:2013:659, paragraph 64 and case-law cited).

64. According to settled case-law, the imposition of a penalty payment is, in principle, justified only in so far as the failure to comply with an earlier judgment of the Court continues up to the time of the Court’s examination of the facts (Case C‑374/11 Commission v Ireland , paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

60 As the Court has stated in relation to a refusal to sell on the part of an undertaking holding a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty, such action would be inconsistent with the objective laid down by Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 3(g) EC), as explained in Article 86, in particular in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of its second paragraph (Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, paragraph 183).

24. Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the limitation period referred to in Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 seeks to ensure legal certainty for economic operators (see, to that effect, judgments in Handlbauer , C‑278/02, EU:C:2004:388, paragraph 40, and SGS Belgium and Others , C‑367/09, EU:C:2010:648, paragraph 68). Those operators must be in a position to determine which among their transactions are definitive and which may still be the subject of legal proceedings.

68. In general, limitation periods fulfil the function of ensuring legal certainty. Such a function would not be wholly fulfilled, if the limitation period referred to in Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 could be interrupted by any act relating to a general check by the national authorities which bears no relation to any suspicion concerning the existence of irregularities regarding sufficiently precisely circumscribed transactions ( Handlbauer , paragraph 40).

121. It follows that the provisions of the Convention relied on by Ireland in the dispute relating to the MOX plant and submitted to the Arbitral Tribunal are rules which form part of the Community legal order. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to deal with disputes relating to the interpretation and application of those provisions and to assess a Member State’s compliance with them (see, in that connection, Case C‑13/00 Commission v Ireland , paragraph 20, and Case C-239/03 Commission v France , paragraph 31).

46. In order to do so, it is necessary to determine whether the flat-rate limit on permitted deductions, set at 50% of the amount paid by way of input VAT, could be considered necessary and appropriate for the attainment of the objectives which Decision 2000/186 pursues and as least likely to affect the objectives and principles of the Sixth Directive (see Joined Cases C-177/99 and C‑181/99 Ampafrance and Sanofi [2000] ECR I‑7013, paragraph 43).

43 In order to do so, it is necessary to consider whether the provisions of Decision 89/487 are necessary and appropriate for the attainment of the specific objective which they pursue and whether they have the least possible effect on the objectives and principles of the Sixth Directive.

22. In any event, it is not essential that that period be fixed at the time the contract is concluded. It is necessary to take into account the reality of the contractual relations ( Blasi , paragraph 26). The period of a letting may be shortened or extended by the mutual agreement of the parties during the performance of the contract.

85. However, for an argument based on such a justification to succeed, a direct link must be established between the tax advantage concerned and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy (see, inter alia, Case C-319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I-7477, paragraph 42; Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation [2007] ECR I-2107, paragraph 68; and Commission v Hungary , paragraph 72), the direct nature of that link falling to be examined in the light of the objective pursued by the rules in question (see, inter alia, Manninen , paragraph 43).

68. In that respect, it should be pointed out that, in paragraphs 28 and 21 respectively of the judgments in Case C-204/90 Bachmann [1992] ECR I-249 and Case C‑300/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-305, the Court recognised that the need to maintain the cohesion of a tax system can justify a restriction on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. However, for an argument based on such a justification to succeed, a direct link must be established between the tax advantage concerned and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy (see, to that effect, Case C‑484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson [1995] ECR I-3955, paragraph 18; Manninen , paragraph 42; and Case C-471/04 Keller Holding [2006] ECR I-2107, paragraph 40).

25. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of a Community text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see Case C-437/97 EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I-1157, paragraph 42).

81 Thus, it is following a schematic interpretation of the relevant EU rules that the Court of Justice interpreted those rules as meaning that, as from 2000, the Commission is required to comply with a legal time limit when adopting a decision on financial corrections (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 56 to 82, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 56 to 82).

79. The fact that Regulation No 1260/1999 does not apply to the Cohesion Fund as such does not preclude such an interpretation, since the text of Article 39(3) of that regulation and the text of Article H(2) of Annex II to Regulation No 1164/94, as amended, are almost identical, and there appears to be no basis for finding that, in the second regulation, the time-limit should relate to the absence of an agreement between the parties, while in the first regulation, that time-limit relates to the taking of a decision by the Commission.

22 With regard to whether such State intervention is compatible with the provisions of Regulation No 2727/75, it should be noted that the common organizations of the markets are based on the concept of an open market to which every producer has free access under genuinely competitive conditions and the functioning of which is regulated solely by the instruments provided for in those organizations. In particular, in sectors covered by a common organization of the market, and a fortiori when that organization is based, as in the present case, on a common price system, Member States can no longer take action, through national provisions adopted unilaterally, affecting the machinery of price-formation as established under the common organization (judgment in Case C-35/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR I-3125, paragraph 29).

62. Since the case in the main proceedings falls within the scope of Article 39 EC, it is not necessary to rule on the interpretation of Articl e 18 EC (see, to that effect, Oteiza Olazabal , paragraph 26, and Alevizos, paragraph 80), and there is, therefore, no need to answer the fourth question. Costs

26 Similarly, it should be noted that Article 8a of the Treaty, which sets out generally the right of every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, finds specific expression in Article 48 of the Treaty in relation to the free movement of workers. Since the facts with which the main proceedings are concerned fall within the scope of the latter provision, it is not necessary to rule on the interpretation of Article 8a of the Treaty (see, in relation to freedom of establishment, the judgment in Case C-193/94 Skanavi and Chryssanthakopoulos [1996] ECR I-929, paragraph 22).

33. S’agissant des participations dans des entreprises nouvelles ou existantes, ainsi que le confirment ces notes explicatives, l’objectif de créer ou de maintenir des liens économiques durables présuppose que les actions détenues par l’actionnaire donnent à celui-ci, soit en vertu des dispositions de la législation nationale sur les sociétés par actions, soit autrement, la possibilité de participer effectivement à la gestion de cette société ou à son contrôle (voir arrêts du 12 décembre 2006, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, C‑446/04, Rec. p. I‑11753, point 182; du 24 mai 2007, Holböck, C‑157/05, Rec. p. I‑4051, point 35, et Commission/Allemagne, précité, point 18).

33 On the other hand, the costs of those services are part of the taxable person's general costs and are, as such, cost components of an undertaking's products. Such services therefore do, in principle, have a direct and immediate link with the taxable person's business as a whole (see BLP Group, paragraph 25, Midland Bank, paragraph 31, and Abbey National, paragraphs 35 and 36).

35 However, the costs of those services form part of the taxable person's overheads, and as such are cost components of the products of a business. Even in the case of a transfer of a totality of assets, where the taxable person no longer effects transactions after using those services, their costs must be regarded as part of the economic activity of the business as a whole before the transfer. Any other interpretation of Article 17 of the Sixth Directive would be contrary to the principle that the VAT system must be completely neutral as regards the tax burden on all the economic activities of a business provided that they are themselves subject to VAT, and would make the economic operator liable to pay VAT in the context of his economic activity without giving him the possibility of deducting it (see, to that effect, Gabalfrisa, paragraph 45). An arbitrary distinction would thus be drawn between expenditure incurred for the purposes of a business before it is actually operated and that incurred during its operation, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the expenditure incurred in order to terminate its operation.

51. In this context, it should be recalled that it follows from Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34 that the definition of ‘technical regulation’ can be broken down into three categories: first, the ‘technical specification’ within the meaning of Article 1(3) of that directive; second, the ‘other requirements’, as defined in Article 1(4) of that directive; and, third, the prohibition of the manufacture, importation, marketing or use of a product referred to in Article 1(11) of the directive (see Case C-267/03 Lindberg [2005] ECR I-3247, paragraph 54, Case C-20/05 Schwibbert [2007] ECR I-9447, paragraph 34 and Intercommunale Intermosane and Fédération de l’industrie et du gaz , paragraph 11).

98 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Saderat Iran’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 109).

119. The effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter also requires that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to list or to maintain the listing of a given person in Annex I to Regulation No 881/2002 (the Kadi judgment, paragraph 336), the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person individually (see, to that effect, the judgment of 23 April 2013 in Joined Cases C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P Gbagbo and Others v Council [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 56), is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis (see, to that effect, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa , paragraph 68). That entails a verification of the allegations factored in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision (see to that effect, E and F , paragraph 57), with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated.

51. First, having regard to the objective of Directive 98/59, which is, as is apparent from recital 2 in the preamble thereto, inter alia, to afford greater protection to workers in the event of collective redundancies, a narrow definition cannot be given to the concepts that define the scope of that directive, including the concept of ‘redundancy’ in the first subparagraph of Article 1(1)(a) thereof (see, to that effect, Balkaya , C‑229/14, EU:C:2015:455, paragraph 44).

81 Thus, it is following a schematic interpretation of the relevant EU rules that the Court of Justice interpreted those rules as meaning that, as from 2000, the Commission is required to comply with a legal time limit when adopting a decision on financial corrections (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 56 to 82, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 56 to 82).

62. It follows from Article 18(3) of Regulation No 1386/2002, which refers expressly to Article H(2) of Annex II to Regulation No 1164/94, as amended, that the Commission has, by virtue of Article H(2), a three-month period to take a decision on financial corrections, and that period begins to run from the date of the hearing.

49. According to the Court, in view of the objectives pursued by the framework agreement, as recalled in the preceding two paragraphs, clause 4 thereof must be interpreted as articulating a principle of EU social law which cannot be interpreted restrictively (see Del Cerro Alonso , paragraph 38, and Impact , paragraph 114).

28. Article 4 of the Sixth Directive gives a very wide scope to VAT (see Case 235/85 Commission v Netherlands [1987] ECR 1471, paragraph 7, and Case C‑186/89 van Tiem [1990] ECR I-4363, paragraph 17).

17 In that respect it should first of all be underlined that Article 4 of the Sixth Directive confers a very wide scope on value added tax, comprising all stages of production, distribution and the provision of services ( see the judgments of the Court in Case 235/85 Commission v Netherlands [1987] ECR 1487, paragraph 7, and in Case 348/87 Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1989] ECR 1737, paragraph 10 ).

14 It should also be pointed out that the Court has specifically held that a system of benefits providing for supplements not directly based on the sex of the beneficiaries but taking account of their marital status or family situation, in respect of which it emerges that a considerably smaller proportion of women than of men are entitled to such supplements, is contrary to Article 4(1) of the directive if that system of benefits cannot be justified by reasons which exclude discrimination on grounds of sex (judgment in Case 30/85, Teuling v Bedrijfivereniging voor de Chemische Industrie [1987] ECR 2497, paragraph 13).

32. In that context, in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC, national courts are required, so far as possible, to interpret and apply national procedural rules governing the exercise of rights of action in a way that enables natural and legal persons to challenge before the courts the legality of any decision or other national measure relative to the application to them of a Community act of general application, by pleading the invalidity of such an act (see Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council , paragraph 42).

42 In that context, in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty, national courts are required, so far as possible, to interpret and apply national procedural rules governing the exercise of rights of action in a way that enables natural and legal persons to challenge before the courts the legality of any decision or other national measure relative to the application to them of a Community act of general application, by pleading the invalidity of such an act.

39. As regards more specifically European Union law, Framework Decision 2004/757 provides, in Article 2(1)(a), that each Member State is to take the necessary measures to ensure that, inter alia, the following intentional conduct when committed without right is punishable: offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever and brokerage of drugs. Under Article 2(2) the conduct described in paragraph 1 is not to be included in the scope of that Framework Decision when it is committed by its perpetrators exclusively for their own personal consumption as defined by national law. It is stated in Article 1(1) of that act that the term ‘drugs’ includes any of the substances covered by the Single Convention and by the United Nations Convention on Pyschotropic Substances, concluded at Vienna on 21 February 1971.

63. It is on precisely such criteria that the Court has already relied for the purpose of determining the date on which the limitation period provided for in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice begins to run. As is clear from paragraph 33 of Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission , the Court has held that that limitation period begins to run from the moment at which the financial loss suffered by the victim actually materialised. It follows therefore that the start of that period is linked to the objective loss actually caused to the assets of the party which claims to have suffered harm.

33. In paragraph 68 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance erred in law by holding that the limitation period began to run as soon as the bank guarantees were provided. Whilst the claim for damages could no doubt have been brought as soon as the guarantees were provided, since at that time the damage caused by the contested Commission decision was certain as to the grounds and could be determined as to the scope, the period of limitation could not, for its part, begin until the financial loss had in fact materialised, that is, until the bank guarantee charges had begun to run. However, whatever date is used falls well before that on which the Court gave its ruling in the Cement judgment, which the applicant regards as being the starting date of the limitation period. The first part of the first plea in law must be rejected. The second part, alleging that the damage was ongoing

86 It follows that, in order to establish an infringement of the right not to give self-incriminating evidence, it is necessary for the undertaking concerned to be effectively compelled to provide information or evidence capable of proving the infringement (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 October 2002, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑245/99 P, C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C‑252/99 P and C‑254/99 P, EU:C:2002:582, paragraph 275).

37. Dans la mesure où l’article 132, paragraphe 1, sous i), de la directive TVA ne précise pas les conditions ou les modalités auxquelles ces fins comparables peuvent être reconnues, il appartient, en principe, au droit national de chaque État membre d’édicter les règles selon lesquelles une telle reconnaissance peut être accordée à de tels organismes. Les États membres disposent d’un pouvoir d’appréciation à cet égard (voir, en ce sens, arrêts précités Kingscrest Associates et Montecello, points 49 et 51, ainsi que Zimmermann, point 26).

26. Article 13A(1)(g) of the Sixth Directive does not specify the conditions and procedures for recognising such organisations (see Case C‑498/03 Kingscrest Associates and Montecello [2005] ECR I‑4427, paragraph 49). In consequence, it is in principle for the national law of each Member State to lay down the rules in accordance with which that recognition may be granted to such organisations. Member States have a discretion in that respect (see inter alia, to that effect, Kügler , paragraph 54; Kingscrest Associates and Montecello , paragraphs 49 and 51; and Case C‑415/04 Stichting Kinderopvang Enschede [2006] ECR I‑1385, paragraph 23).

45. Moreover, the Court must display special vigilance when, in the course of proceedings between individuals, a question is referred to it with a view to permitting the national court to decide whether the legislation of another Member State is in accordance with Community law (Foglia , paragraph 30).

18. In that connection, it must be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the purpose of the first paragraph of Article 307 EC is to make it clear, in accordance with the principles of international law, that application of the Treaty is not to affect the duty of the Member State concerned to respect the rights of third countries under a prior agreement and to perform its obligations (see Case 812/79 Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, paragraph 8; Case C-216/01 Budĕjovický Budvar [2003] ECR I‑13617, paragraphs 144 and 145; Case C-205/06 Commission v Austria [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 33; and Case C‑249/06 Commission v Sweden [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 34).

33. Under the first paragraph of Article 307 EC, the rights and obligations arising from an agreement concluded before the date of accession of a Member State between it and a third country are not affected by the provisions of the Treaty. The purpose of that provision is to make it clear, in accordance with the principles of international law, that application of the Treaty is not to affect the duty of the Member State concerned to respect the rights of third countries under a prior agreement and to perform its obligations thereunder (see Case 812/79 Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, paragraph 8; Case C-84/98 Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR I‑5215, paragraph 53; and Case C-216/01 Budĕjovický Budvar [2003] ECR I‑13617, paragraphs 144 and 145).

56. It is true, in the exercise of that power the Member States may not introduce or maintain unjustified restrictions of the exercise of fundamental freedoms in the area of health care. However, in the assessment of compliance with that prohibition, account must be taken of the fact that the health and life of humans rank foremost among the assets or interests protected by the Treaty and it is for the Member States, which have a discretion in the matter, to decide on the degree of protection which they wish to afford to public health and on the way in which that degree of protection is to be achieved (see to that effect, judgments in Commission v Germany , C‑147/07, EU:C:2008:492, paragraphs 46 and 51 and the case-law cited, and Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez, EU:C:2010:300, paragraphs 43, 44, 68 and 90 and the case-law cited).

25. It is settled case-law that the Court may refuse to rule on a request for a preliminary ruling made by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the facts of the main action or to its subject-matter, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (Case C-11/07 Eckelkamp and Others [2008] ECR I-6845, paragraph 28, and Case C-259/12 Rodopi-M 91 [2013] ECR, paragraph 27).

27. In accordance with settled case-law, the Court can, however, decline to rule on a request for a preliminary ruling from a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the facts of the main action or to its subject-matter, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (Case C‑11/07 Eckelkamp and Others [2008] ECR I‑6845, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

112 With regard to the fourth reason, concerning the fact that FEE, a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank Mellat, is covered by Resolution 1929 (2010), the General Court found, in paragraph 117 of the judgment under appeal, that it was based on mere allegations. The Council did not produce any evidence that would have enabled the General Court to determine whether that reason was well founded. In such a situation, it is impossible for the Courts of the European Union — which are called upon to review whether the grounds for listing are well founded in fact, taking into consideration any observations and exculpatory evidence produced by the person concerned and the response of the competent EU authority to those observations — to find that those reasons are well founded, and consequently those reasons cannot be relied on as the basis for the contested listing decision (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 137).

70. In that regard, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure meets the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, inter alia, judgments in Case C‑114/00 Spain v Commission [2002] ECR I‑7657, paragraphs 62 and 63, and Case C‑301/96 Germany v Commission [2003] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 87).

63 Furthermore, that requirement must be appraised by reference to the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see France v Commission, cited above, paragraph 36, and Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraph 48).

34 However, in Twijnstra the general principle that a reference quantity is attached to the land, as expressed in particular in Case C-463/93 St. Martinus Elten [1997] ECR I-255, paragraph 14, was formulated in relation only to the transfer of part of a holding all of which was given over to dairy production. Accordingly that judgment did not deal with the case, such as that in point in the main proceedings, where part of a mixed holding is transferred.

22. As a preliminary point, it is important to note that it follows from the Court’s case-law (see, inter alia, Case 10/86, VAG France [1986] ECR 4071, paragraph 12; Case C-230/96 Cabour [1998] ECR I-2055, paragraphs 47, 48 and 51; and Case C-260/07 Pedro IV Servicios [2009] ECR I-2437, paragraph 68) that non-compliance with a condition necessary for the exemption cannot, in itself, give rise to damages pursuant to Article 101 TFEU or oblige a supplier to accept an applicant distributor into a distribution system.

68. However, where an agreement does not satisfy all the conditions provided for by an exempting regulation, it will be caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC only if its object or effect is perceptibly to restrict competition within the common market and it is capable of affecting trade between Member States. In that latter case, and in the absence of individual exemption pursuant to Article 81(3) EC, that agreement would be automatically void under Article 81(2) EC (see, to that effect, Case C‑230/96 Cabour [1998] ECR I‑2055, paragraph 48, and CEPSA , paragraph 72).

13. However, the referring court considers that there is still doubt as to the compatibility of that tax regime with EU law. It is true that, in its judgment in Schröder (C‑450/09, EU:C:2011:198), the Court held that there is a restriction of free movement of capital under Article 63 TFEU if support payments by a non-resident taxpayer connected with rental income of domestic origin arising from immovable property are not deductible, while corresponding payments undertaken by a resident person with full tax liability are deductible. However, in the view of the referring court, since the Court of Justice was not asked a question on that matter, it did not make a ruling in its judgment in Schröder (EU:C:2011:198) on the specific issue as to whether it is necessary to take into account the fact that the German tax regime concerned was based on the ‘principle of correspondence’ (‘Korrespondenzprinzip’), according to which, where the person obliged to make the payment has a right to have it deducted, the recipient of the payment must be liable to tax.

37 However, the Community system of VAT is the result of a gradual harmonisation of national laws in the context of Articles 99 and 100 of the EC Treaty (now Articles 93 EC and 94 EC). As the Court has repeatedly stated, this harmonisation, as brought about by successive directives and in particular by the Sixth Directive, is still only partial (see Case C-165/88 ORO Amsterdam Beheer and Concerto v Inspecteur der Omzetbelasting [1989] ECR 4081, paragraph 21).

21 On the whole the Community system of VAT is the result of a gradual harmonization of national legislation pursuant to Articles 99 and 100 of the Treaty . The Court has consistently held that this harmonization, as brought about by successive directives and in particular by the Sixth Directive, is still only partial .

39. Consequently, the case in the main proceedings differs from the Kerckhaert and Morres case. The national legislation at issue in Kerckhaert and Morres did not make any distinction between dividends from shares in companies established in the territory of the State concerned and dividends from shares in companies established in another Member State which had been subject to a tax levied at source in that other Member State, since that legislation subjected those dividends, within the context of income tax, to the same uniform rate of taxation (see, to that effect, Kerckhaert and Morres , paragraph 17). In such circumstances, the Court held that the adverse consequences which might arise from the application of an income tax system such as that at issue in that case would result from the exercise in parallel by two Member States of their tax jurisdiction ( Kerckhaert and Morres , paragraph 20).

179. That right has, moreover, been reaffirmed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. As the Court of Justice has held on several occasions, that article relates to the principle of effective judicial protection (Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, paragraph 37; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 335; and Case C-47/07 P Masdar (UK) v Commission [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 50).

37. It is to be noted at the outset that, according to settled case-law, the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of Community law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, paragraphs 18 and 19; Case 222/86 Heylens and Others [1987] ECR 4097, paragraph 14; Case C-424/99 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-9285, paragraph 45; Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, paragraph 39; and Case C-467/01 Eribrand [2003] ECR I-6471, paragraph 61) and which has also been reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, proclaimed on 7 December 2000 in Nice (OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1).

78. In that connection, it must be borne in mind that the deduction system under the Sixth Directive is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject in principle to VAT (see, in particular, Case C-408/98 Abbey National [2001] ECR I-1361, paragraph 24, and Zita Modes , paragraph 38).

51 However, a refusal to allow a parent, a third-country national, who is the carer of a minor child who is a Union citizen to reside with that child in the host Member State would deprive the child’s right of residence of any useful effect, since enjoyment by a child who is a minor of a right of residence necessarily implies that the child is entitled to be accompanied by the person who is his primary carer and accordingly that the carer must be in a position to reside with the child in the host Member State for the duration of such residence (see judgments of 19 October 2004, Zhu and Chen, C‑200/02, EU:C:2004:639, paragraph 45, and of 10 October 2013, Alokpa and Moudoulou, C‑86/12, EU:C:2013:645, paragraph 28).

28. Consequently, it has been held that a refusal to allow a parent, whether a national of a Member State or of a third country, who is the carer of a minor child who is a Union citizen to reside with that child in the host Member State would deprive the child’s right of residence of any useful effect, since enjoyment by a young child of a right of residence necessarily implies that the child is entitled to be accompanied by the person who is his primary carer and accordingly that the carer must be in a position to reside with the child in the host Member State for the duration of such residence (see Zhu and Chen , paragraph 45, and Iida , paragraph 69).

51. In the case-law referred to in paragraphs 34 to 41, 44 and 45 of this judgment, the Court recognised the need to reconcile the requirement relating to the qualifications necessary in order to pursue a particular occupation with the requirement that the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Articles 39 and 43 EC be capable of being exercised effectively (see to that effect, in particular, Heylens and Others , paragraph 13).

17 In order to determine whether the work being done by different persons is the same, it is necessary to ascertain whether, taking account of a number of factors such as the nature of the work, the training requirements and the working conditions, those persons can be considered to be in a comparable situation (see, to that effect, Case C-400/93 Royal Copenhagen [1995] ECR I-1275, paragraphs 32 and 33).

33 Where such a comparison involves the average pay of two groups of workers paid by the piece, it must in order to be relevant encompass groups each comprising all the workers who, taking account of a set of factors such as the nature of the work, the training requirements and the working conditions, can be considered to be in a comparable situation.

43 Consequently, the expression ‘persons with disabilities’ used in Article 5 of that directive must be interpreted as encompassing all persons suffering from a disability corresponding to the definition set out in the preceding paragraph (judgment of 4 July 2013, Commission v Italy, C‑312/11, not published, EU:C:2013:446, paragraph 57).

30. In that regard, according to settled case-law, the procedure provided for by Article 234 EC is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts by means of which the former provides the latter with interpretation of such Community law as is necessary for them to give judgment in cases upon which they are called to adjudicate (see, inter alia , Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Dzodzi [1990] ECR I-3763, paragraph 33; Case C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher [1990] ECR I-4003, paragraph 18; Case C-83/91 Meilicke [1992] ECR I-4871, paragraph 22, and Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I-7091, paragraph 31).

18 The procedure provided for in Article 177 of the Treaty is therefore an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts by means of which the former provides the latter with interpretation of such Community law as is necessary for them to give judgment in cases upon which they are called to adjudicate .

50 It must, however, be pointed out that the protection of consumers against abuses of advertising or, as an aim of cultural policy, the maintenance of a certain level of programme quality constitute overriding reasons relating to the general interest which may justify restrictions on freedom to provide services (see, in particular, Case C-288/89 Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and Others v Commissariaat voor de Media [1991] ECR I-4007, paragraph 27).

42 The legality of a Community act cannot depend on retrospective considerations of its efficacy (judgment in Case 40/72 Schroeder v Germany [1973] ECR 125, point 14). Where the Community legislature is obliged to assess the future effects of rules to be adopted and those effects cannot be accurately foreseen, its assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available to it at the time of the adoption of the rules in question (judgment in Joined Cases C-267 to 285/88 Wuidart and Others v Laiterie Coopérative Eupenoise, a cooperative society, and Others [1990] ECR I-435, paragraph 14).

14 However, with regard to judicial review of compliance with those conditions it must be stated that in matters concerning the common agricultural policy the Community legislature has a discretionary power which corresponds to the political responsibilities given to it by Articles 40 and 43 of the Treaty . Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue ( see in particular the judgment in Case 265/87 Schraeder [1989] ECR 2237, paragraphs 21 and 22 ).

105. It is common ground that the measures contained in Law No 218/90 were never notified to the Commission. Therefore, as regards the allegation that the measure provided for in Article 7(3) of that law was very similar to the tax reduction, it is sufficient to note that that measure was not examined by the Commission. In that context, the time which has elapsed since the adoption of that law, as pleaded by Unicredito, is irrelevant. In addition, even supposing that the two successive measures are, as suggested by the national tribunal, related, the one being a continuation and extension of the other, the fact that the Commission took no action regarding the first is immaterial, since the system at issue in the current proceedings, viewed independently of its predecessor, favours certain undertakings (see, to that effect, Case 57/86 Greece v Commission [1988] ECR 2855, paragraph 10).

97. However, it must be held, in accordance with settled case‑law, that review by the Community judicature of complex economic assessments made by the Commission, such as those in this case, must necessarily be confined to verifying whether the rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers ( Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , paragraph 279, and Joined Cases C‑501/06 P, C‑513/06 P, C‑515/06 P and C‑519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 85).

279. As regards the exchanges of price information, Aalborg, Buzzi Unicem and Cementir are essentially reproducing the same arguments as they had already raised in vain before the Court of First Instance. Examination by the Community judicature of the complex economic assessments made by the Commission must necessarily be confined to verifying whether the rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers (see, inter alia, Case 42/84 Remia and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, paragraph 34, and BAT and Reynolds v Commission , paragraph 62).

42. In the absence of such Community harmonisation, it is in principle for the Member States to decide on the degree of protection they intend to afford to such legitimate interests and on the way in which that protection is to be achieved. They may do so, however, only within the limits set by the Treaty and must, in particular, observe the principle of proportionality, which requires that the measures adopted should be appropriate to secure the attainment of the objective which they pursue and should not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Commission v Germany , paragraph 73, and case-law cited).

93. Where it proves to be impossible to determine with certainty the existence or extent of the alleged risk because of the insufficiency, inconclusiveness or imprecision of the results of studies conducted, but the likelihood of real harm to public health persists should the risk materialise, the precautionary principle justifies the adoption of restrictive measures, provided they are non-discriminatory and objective ( Commission v Denmark , paragraph 52, and Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 54).

54. Where it proves to be impossible to determine with certainty the existence or extent of the alleged risk because of the insufficiency, inconclusiveness or imprecision of the results of studies conducted, but the likelihood of real harm to public health persists should the risk materialise, the precautionary principle justifies the adoption of restrictive measures (see Commission v Denmark , paragraphs 52 and 53).

42 According to settled case-law, a Member State cannot rely on provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal order in order to justify its failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down by a directive (see, in particular, Case C-144/97 Commission v France [1998] ECR I-613, paragraph 8).

39. In addition, the Court has held that the provisions of that agreement are not directly applicable and are not such as to create rights upon which individuals may rely directly before the courts by virtue of Community law (see, to that effect, Case C‑149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I‑8395, paragraphs 42 to 48; Joined Cases C‑300/98 and C‑392/98 Dior and Others [2000] ECR I‑11307, paragraphs 44 and 45, and Case C‑245/02 Anheuser-Busch [2004] ECR I‑10989, paragraph 54).

48 That interpretation corresponds, moreover, to what is stated in the final recital in the preamble to Decision 94/800, according to which `by its nature, the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, including the Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts'.

50 Finally, it should be noted that, in so far as the Charter contains rights corresponding to the rights guaranteed by the ECHR, Article 52(3) of the Charter seeks to ensure the necessary consistency between the rights contained in it and the corresponding rights guaranteed by the ECHR, without thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of EU law and that of the Court of Justice of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 July 2016, JZ, C‑294/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:610, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). Account must therefore be taken of Article 5(1) of the ECHR for the purpose of interpreting Article 6 of the Charter. By adopting the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of Directive 2013/33, the EU legislature did not disregard the level of protection afforded by the second limb of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR.

27. In the case in the main proceedings, following the judgment of the Corte costituzionale of 24 October 2012, the national legislation applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings is no longer that under consideration in the context of the request for a preliminary ruling (see, by analogy, Fluxys , paragraph 32). That judgment, declaring some of the provisions of Decree No 28/2010 incompatible with the constitution, has the effect of removing them from the national legal system.

32. In the present case, it is clear from the letters received at the Court after the lodging of the reference for a preliminary ruling that, first, Fluxys has withdrawn the pleas in law before the referring court concerning the illegality of the method of fixing tariffs applied by the CREG in the decision at issue before the referring court and it now seeks the annulment of the decisions at issue before the Cour d’appel of Brussels only in relation to historical contracts benefiting from a derogation under Article 32(1) of Directive 2003/55. Moreover, following the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 8 July 2010, the national legislation applicable by the referring court is no longer that under consideration in the context of the request for a preliminary ruling.

104. Il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour que le Conseil bénéficie, pour l’application de l’article 108, paragraphe 2, troisième alinéa, TFUE, d’un large pouvoir d’appréciation dont l’exercice implique des évaluations complexes d’ordre économique et social, qui doivent être effectuées dans le contexte de l’Union. Dans ce cadre, le contrôle juridictionnel appliqué à l’exercice de ce pouvoir d’appréciation se limite à la vérification du respect des règles de procédure et de motivation ainsi qu’au contrôle de l’exactitude matérielle des faits retenus et de l’absence d’erreur de droit, d’erreur manifeste dans l’appréciation des faits ou de détournement de pouvoir (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 29 février 1996, Commission/Conseil, précité, points 18 et 19, ainsi que, par analogie, arrêt du 22 décembre 2008, Régie Networks, C‑333/07, Rec. p. I‑10807, point 78).

37 The Court has consistently held that the equal treatment rule laid down in Article 48 of the Treaty and in Article 7 of Regulation No 1612/68 prohibits not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other distinguishing criteria, lead in fact to the same result (see, inter alia, Case 152/73 Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 153, paragraph 11, and Case C-57/96 Meints v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [1997] ECR I-6689, paragraph 44).

11 THE RULES REGARDING EQUALITY OF TREATMENT, BOTH IN THE TREATY AND IN ARTICLE 7 OF REGULATION NO 1612/68, FORBID NOT ONLY OVERT DISCRIMINATION BY REASON OF NATIONALITY BUT ALSO ALL COVERT FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION WHICH, BY THE APPLICATION OF OTHER CRITERIA OF DIFFERENTIATION, LEAD IN FACT TO THE SAME RESULT . THIS INTERPRETATION, WHICH IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVE WORKING OF ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMUNITY, IS EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZED BY THE FIFTH RECITAL OF THE PREAMBLE TO REGULATION NO 1612/68 WHICH REQUIRES THAT EQUALITY OF TREATMENT OF WORKERS SHALL BE ENSURED 'IN FACT AND IN LAW '. IT MAY THEREFORE BE THAT CRITERIA SUCH AS PLACE OF ORIGIN OR RESIDENCE OF A WORKER MAY, ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES, BE TANTAMOUNT, AS REGARDS THEIR PRACTICAL EFFECT, TO DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY, SUCH AS IS PROHIBITED BY THE TREATY AND THE REGULATION .

61. It must be noted that, as claimed by the German Government, failure to observe the condition of normal residence for the purpose of Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 91/439 is capable, in itself, of justifying the refusal by a Member State to recognise a driving licence issued by another Member State (see Case C‑224/10 Apelt [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 34).

20. In the first place, that the Council of the European Union adopted Directive 2000/78 on the basis of Article 13 EC, and the Court has held that that directive does not itself lay down the principle of equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation, which derives from various international instruments and from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, but has the sole purpose of laying down, in that field, a general framework for combating discrimination on various grounds including age (see Mangold , paragraph 74).

74. In the second place and above all, Directive 2000/78 does not itself lay down the principle of equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation. Indeed, in accordance with Article 1 thereof, the sole purpose of the directive is ‘to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’, the source of the actual principle underlying the prohibition of those forms of discrimination being found, as is clear from the third and fourth recitals in the preamble to the directive, in various international instruments and in the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.

34. Furthermore, as regards the plans and projects which are not covered by Article 6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive when they are adopted, the Court has held that the possibility cannot be excluded that a Member State, by analogy with the procedure in derogation provided for in Article 6(4) of that directive, may, in a procedure under domestic law for assessing the environmental impacts of a plan or project capable of significantly affecting the interests of conserving a site, invoke a reason of public interest and, if the conditions laid down by that provision are essentially satisfied, authorise an activity which, subsequently, is no longer prohibited by Article 6(2). However, in order to be able to verify whether the conditions laid down by Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive have been met, the impacts of the plan or project must first have been analysed in accordance with Article 6(3) of that directive (Case C‑404/09 Commission v Spain EU:C:2011:768, paragraphs 156 and 157).

70. In this respect it should be noted that the provisions of Regulation No 1408/71 enacted to give effect to Article 48 TFEU must be interpreted in the light of the objective of that article, which is to contribute to the establishment of the greatest possible freedom of movement for migrant workers (see, inter alia, Case 10/78 Belbouab [1978] ECR 1915, paragraph 5; Jauch , paragraph 20; Hosse , paragraph 24; and Case C‑287/05 Hendrix [2007] ECR I‑6909, paragraph 52).

5THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GREATEST POSSIBLE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR MIGRANT WORKERS , WHICH IS ONE OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY , IS THE PRIMARY AIM OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE TREATY . IT IS IN THE LIGHT OF THAT OBJECTIVE THAT REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THAT ARTICLE ARE TO BE INTERPRETED .

70. Where a national measure relates to both the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital, it is necessary to consider to what extent the exercise of those fundamental freedoms is affected and whether, in the circumstances of the main proceedings, one of them prevails over the other. The Court will in principle examine the measure in dispute in relation to only one of those two freedoms if it appears, in the circumstances of the case, that one of them is entirely secondary in relation to the other and may be considered together with it (Case C-452/04 Fidium Finanz [2006] ECR I-9521, paragraph 34).

71. While it is, admittedly, true that the OPFs are liable to be considered to be performing a task of general economic interest (see, by analogy, Albany , paragraphs 105 to 111), it must nevertheless be pointed out that the Republic of Poland has failed to demonstrate to the requisite legal standard that the conditions for the application of that article are met. In particular, the Republic of Poland has not demonstrated to what extent the application of the Treaty rules, in this case those relating to the free movement of capital between Member States, would obstruct the attainment, in law or in fact, of the objectives pursued by the OPFs.

106 Moreover, the importance of the social function attributed to supplementary pensions has recently been recognised by the Community legislature's adoption of Council Directive 98/49/EC of 29 June 1998 on safeguarding the supplementary pension rights of employed and self-employed persons moving within the Community (OJ 1998 L 209, p. 46).

35. That line of argument cannot be accepted. The prohibition on deductions cannot be interpreted in a purely formal manner as covering only deductions which are actually made on the occasion of payments. Thus the prohibition on any deduction must of necessity extend to all charges which are directly and inseparably linked to the amounts disbursed (see by analogy, concerning the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF, Case C‑312/02 Sweden v Commission [2004] ECR I‑9247, paragraph 22).

43. National legislation not intended to apply only to those shareholdings which enable the holder to have a definite influence on a company’s decisions and to determine its activities but which applies irrespective of the size of the holding which the shareholder has in a company may fall within the ambit of both Article 43 EC and Article 56 EC (Case C‑326/07 Commission v Italy , paragraph 36).

36. National legislation not intended to apply only to those shareholdings which enable the holder to have a definite influence on a company’s decisions and to determine its activities but which applies irrespective of the size of the holding which the shareholder has in a company may fall within the ambit of both Article 43 EC and Article 56 EC (see, to that effect, Holböck , paragraphs 23 and 24). Contrary to what the Italian Republic maintains, Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas does not support the conclusion that in such a case only Article 43 EC is of relevance. That judgment, as its paragraph 32 makes clear, concerns only a situation in which a company holds shareholdings giving it control of other companies (see Case C‑207/07 Commission v Spain [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 36).

13 In addition, the Court has consistently held that the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement cannot be applied to activities which are confined in all respects within a single Member State, and the question whether that is the case depends on findings of fact which are for the national court to make (see in particular Case C-332/90 Steen [1992] ECR I-341, paragraph 9).

35. In particular, where aid granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-Community trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid. Moreover, it is not necessary that the recipient undertaking itself be involved in the said trade (see, in particular, Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission , paragraphs 115 and 117, and Unicredito Italiano , paragraphs 56 and 58, and the case-law cited).

56. In particular, when aid granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-Community trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (see, in particular, Case 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, paragraph 11; Case C‑53/00 Ferring [2001] ECR I-9067, paragraph 21; and Case C-372/97 Italy v Commission , cited above, paragraph 52).

91. Accordingly, after finding that the agreement had as its object the sharing of domestic markets in the Community, the Court of First Instance correctly concluded at paragraph 157 of the judgment under appeal that the agreement had the potential effect of affecting trade between Member States. The Court of Justice has already held, moreover, that the sharing of domestic markets in the Community is capable of significantly affecting the pattern of trade between Member States (see Ambulanz Glöckner , paragraphs 48 and 49).

67. In paragraph 184 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rightly pointed out that where, following the annulment of a decision penalising undertakings which have infringed Article 81(1) EC because of a procedural defect concerning exclusively the procedures governing its final adoption by the College of Commissioners, the Commission is to adopt a fresh decision, with substantially the same content and based on the same objections, it is not required to conduct a new hearing of the undertakings concerned (see, to that effect, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission , paragraphs 83 to 111).

111 It follows that the objection concerning the absence of a new hearing of the undertakings concerned must be rejected. (c) The objection that the Advisory Committee was not re-consulted

109. The Court has already ruled that, in the private security sector, the obligation to lodge a guarantee with a deposits and loans office is likely to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services within the meaning of Articles 43 EC and 49 EC, in so far as it makes the provision of services or the formation of a subsidiary or secondary establishment more onerous for private security undertakings established in ot her Member States than for those established in the Member State of destination (see Case C‑514/03 Commission v Spain , paragraph 41).

29. In that regard, it is important to note that, as regards the award of public procurement contracts, the Court has held that an action for failure to fulfil obligations is inadmissible if, when the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion expired, the contract in question had already been completely performed (see Case C-362/90 Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I‑2353, paragraphs 11 and 13, and Case C‑394/02 Commission v Greece [2005] ECR I‑4713, paragraph 18).

18. In that regard, it is indeed the case that, as far as concerns the award of public procurement contracts, the Court has held that an action for failure to fulfil obligations is inadmissible if, when the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion expired, the contract in question had already been completely performed (see, to that effect, Case C-362/90 Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-2353, paragraphs 11 and 13).

28. It is also apparent from the case-law of the Court that a Member State which, in giving effect to a Commission decision on State aid, encounters unforeseen and unforeseeable difficulties, whether of a political, legal or practical kind, or becomes aware of consequences overlooked by the Commission, must submit those problems to the Commission for consideration, together with proposals for suitable amendments to the decision in question. In such cases, the Commission and the Member State concerned must work together in good faith with a view to overcoming the difficulties whilst fully observing the provisions of the EC Treaty and in particular those on aid (see Commission v France , paragraph 24; Case C-378/98 Commission v Belgium [2001] ECR I-5107, paragraph 31; and Commission v Spain , paragraphs 24 and 25).

46 Further, it must be recalled that, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, Article 107(1) TFEU covers all the financial means by which the public authorities may actually support undertakings, irrespective of whether or not those means are permanent assets of the State. Therefore, even if the sums corresponding to the measure in question are not permanently held by the Treasury, the fact that they constantly remain under public control, and therefore available to the competent national authorities, is sufficient for them to be categorised as ‘State resources’ (see judgments of 16 May 2002, France v Commission, C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 37; of 17 July 2008, Essent Netwerk Noord and Others, C‑206/06, EU:C:2008:413, paragraph 70; of 30 May 2013, Doux Élevage and Coopérative agricole UKL-ARREE, C‑677/11, EU:C:2013:348, paragraph 35; and of 19 December 2013, Association Vent De Colère! and Others, C‑262/12, EU:C:2013:851, paragraph 21).

35. Thus, the Court has ruled that Article 107(1) TFEU covers all the financial means by which the public authorities may actually support undertakings, irrespective of whether or not those means are permanent assets of the public sector. Therefore, even if the sums corresponding to the measure in question are not permanently held by the Treasury, the fact that they constantly remain under public control, and therefore available to the competent national authorities, is sufficient for them to be categorised as State resources (see France v Commission , paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

25. It follows that the fact of exempting all categories of establishments which engage in such lending from the obligation laid down in Article 5(1) of the directive would deprive authors of remuneration with which they could recoup their investments, with inevitable repercussions for the creation of new works (see Metronome Musik , paragraph 24). In those circumstances, a transposition of the directive that resulted in such an exemption for all categories of establishments would go directly against the objective of that directive.

25 As regards the possibility of seeking compensation for loss caused by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition, it should be remembered from the outset that, in accordance with settled case-law, the national courts whose task it is to apply the provisions of Community law in areas within their jurisdiction must ensure that those rules take full effect and must protect the rights which they confer on individuals (see inter alia the judgments in Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 16, and in Case C-213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433, paragraph 19).

16THIS CONSEQUENCE ALSO CONCERNS ANY NATIONAL COURT WHOSE TASK IT IS AS AN ORGAN OF A MEMBER STATE TO PROTECT , IN A CASE WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION , THE RIGHTS CONFERRED UPON INDIVIDUALS BY COMMUNITY LAW .

45. It should be noted that, through the Bureau, the Licensing and Control Authority of the Broadcasting Authority, which is a decision-making body, is linked, in terms of functions, with the Broadcasting Authority as a whole and with the Investigatory Office, upon whose proposals it decides. Consequently, when it adopts a decision, the Licensing and Control Authority of the Broadcasting Authority is not distinct from the administrative monitoring body, which can act as a party to proceedings relating to broadcasting matters (see, by analogy, Syfait and Others , paragraph 33).

37. Furthermore, it can be seen from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, although Regulation No 1408/71 does not expressly cover family situations following a divorce, there is nothing to justify the exclusion of such situations from the scope of that regulation (see Case 149/82 Robards [1983] ECR p. 171, paragraph 15; Kulzer , paragraph 32; Case C‑255/99 Humer [2002] ECR I‑1205, paragraph 42; and Case C‑363/08 Slanina [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 30).

42 Admittedly, as the Swedish Government has pointed out, Regulation No 1408/71 does not expressly cover family situations following a divorce. However, contrary to that Government's argument, there is nothing to justify the exclusion of such situations from the scope of Regulation No 1408/71.

26. The Court has already held that the condition of genuine use of a trade mark, within the meaning of Article 15(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, may be satisfied where the trade mark is used only through another composite mark, or where it is used only in conjunction with another mark, and the combination of those two marks is, furthermore, itself registered as a trade mark (see, to that effect, Case C‑12/12 Colloseum Holding [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 35 and 36).

16. Secondly, it should be borne in mind that Article 26 of the Sixth Directive introduces an exception to the general rules on the taxable amount with respect to certain operations of travel agents and tour operators and that, as an exception to the normal rules of the Sixth Directive, Article 26 must be applied only to the extent necessary to achieve its objective (Joined Cases C‑308/96 and C‑94/97 Madgett and Baldwin [1998] ECR I‑6229, paragraphs 5 and 34, and Case C‑149/01 First Choice Holidays [2003] ECR I‑6289, paragraphs 21 and 22).

5 Article 26 of the Sixth Directive, which introduces an exception to the general rules on the taxable amount with respect to certain operations of travel agents and tour operators, states: `1. Member States shall apply value added tax to the operations of travel agents in accordance with the provisions of this Article, where the travel agents deal with customers in their own name and use the supplies and services of other taxable persons in the provision of travel facilities. This Article shall not apply to travel agents who are acting only as intermediaries and accounting for tax in accordance with Article 11A(3)(c). In this Article travel agents include tour operators. 2. All transactions performed by the travel agent in respect of a journey shall be treated as a single service supplied by the travel agent to the traveller. It shall be taxable in the Member State in which the travel agent has established his business or has a fixed establishment from which the travel agent has provided the services. The taxable amount and the price exclusive of tax, within the meaning of Article 22(3)(b), in respect of this service shall be the travel agent's margin, that is to say, the difference between the total amount to be paid by the traveller, exclusive of value added tax, and the actual cost to the travel agent of supplies and services provided by other taxable persons where these transactions are for the direct benefit of the traveller. 3. If transactions entrusted by the travel agent to other taxable persons are performed by such persons outside the Community, the travel agent's service shall be treated as an exempted intermediary activity under Article 15(14). Where these transactions are performed both inside and outside the Community, only that part of the travel agent's service relating to transactions outside the Community may be exempted. 4. Tax charged to the travel agent by other taxable persons on the transactions described in paragraph 2 which are for the direct benefit of the traveller, shall not be eligible for deduction or refund in any Member State.'

76. Consequently it is apparent that the expression ‘equivalent legal measures’ in clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement is intended to cover any national legal measure whose purpose, like that of the measures laid down by that clause, is to prevent effectively the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships (see, to that effect, Adeneler and Others , paragraph 65).

93. Legislation is not limited to what is strictly necessary where it authorises, on a generalised basis, storage of all the personal data of all the persons whose data has been transferred from the European Union to the United States without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of the objective pursued and without an objective criterion being laid down by which to determine the limits of the access of the public authorities to the data, and of its subsequent use, for purposes which are specific, strictly restricted and capable of justifying the interference which both access to that data and its use entail (see, to this effect, concerning Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 54), judgment in Digital Rights Ireland and Others , C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, EU:C:2014:238, paragraphs 57 to 61).

55. The need for such safeguards is all the greater where, as laid down in Directive 2006/24, personal data are subjected to automatic processing and where there is a significant risk of unlawful access to those data (see, by analogy, as regards Article 8 of the ECHR, S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom , § 103, and M. K. v. France , 18 April 2013, no. 19522/09, § 35).

44. However, that legal basis is provided by the combined provisions of Article 5(2)(c) of Regulation No 729/70 and Articles 2 and 3 of the same regulation, under the terms of which refunds granted and intervention undertaken "in accordance with the Community rules" within the framework of the common organisation of agricultural markets are to be financed by the EAGGF. By allowing the Commission to charge to the EAGGF only intervention carried out in accordance with Community provisions, those articles oblige the Commission to refuse financing of expenditure when it finds, as in this case, that irregularities have occurred (see, to that effect, Case 11/76 Netherlands v Commission [1979] ECR 245, paragraph 8).

20 In the second place, according to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgments in St. Nikolaus Brennerei und Likörfabrik, 337/82, EU:C:1984:69, paragraph 10; VEMW and Others, C‑17/03, EU:C:2005:362, paragraph 41; and Eschig, C‑199/08, EU:C:2009:538, paragraph 38).

38. It should be recalled, at the outset, that according to the settled case‑law of the Court, in interpreting a provision of Community law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it is part (see Case 292/82 Merck [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12; Case 337/82 St Nikolaus Brennerei und Likörfabrik [1984] ECR 1051, paragraph 10; Case C-223/98 Adidas [1999] ECR I-7081, paragraph 23; Case C-191/99 Kvaerner [2001] ECR I-4447, paragraph 30; and Case C-17/03 VEMW and Others [2005] ECR I-4983, paragraph 41).

35 It is to be remembered first of all that, in accordance with settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and subsequent changes cannot be taken into account by the Court (Case C-214/96 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-7661, paragraph 25).

32 Since, in certain labour-intensive sectors, a group of workers engaged in a joint activity on a permanent basis may constitute an economic entity, it must be recognised that such an entity is capable of maintaining its identity after it has been transferred where the new employer does not merely pursue the activity in question but also takes over a major part, in terms of their numbers and skills, of the employees specially assigned by his predecessor to that task. In those circumstances, the new employer takes over a body of assets enabling him to carry on the activities or certain activities of the transferor undertaking on a regular basis (Süzen, cited above, paragraph 21).

21 Since in certain labour-intensive sectors a group of workers engaged in a joint activity on a permanent basis may constitute an economic entity, it must be recognized that such an entity is capable of maintaining its identity after it has been transferred where the new employer does not merely pursue the activity in question but also takes over a major part, in terms of their numbers and skills, of the employees specially assigned by his predecessor to that task. In those circumstances, as stated in paragraph 21 of Rygaard, cited above, the new employer takes over a body of assets enabling him to carry on the activities or certain activities of the transferor undertaking on a regular basis.

27. As regards the admissibility of the grounds of action relating to the provisions of Regulation No 1/2005 having repealed and replaced Directive 91/628 as of 5 January 2007, that is to say, after the expiry of the period set out in the reasoned opinion, it must be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, the existence of an infringement in proceedings brought under Article 226 EC must be assessed in the light of the Community legislation in force at the close of the period prescribed by the Commission for the Member State concerned in order to comply with its reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, paragraph 42, and Case C‑377/03 Commission v Belgium [2006] ECR I-9733, paragraph 33).

24 As the Court held in Case C-129/94 Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829, at paragraphs 13 to 16, the preambles to the directives in question show that their aim is, first, to ensure the free movement of vehicles normally based on Community territory and of persons travelling in those vehicles and, second, to guarantee that the victims of accidents caused by those vehicles receive comparable treatment irrespective of where in the Community the accident occurred (see, more particularly, the fifth recital in the preamble to the Second Directive and the fourth recital in the preamble to the Third Directive).

14. For that purpose the First Directive, having regard to the agreement between the national insurers ' bureaux, established a system based on the presumption that vehicles normally based on Community territory are covered by insurance (see the eighth recital). Article 3(1) of the First Directive thus provides that Member States are, subject to the derogations in Article 4, to take all appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles is covered by insurance.

42. It is true that the Court has held that, in the context of measures laid down by a Member State in order to prevent or mitigate the imposition of a series of charges to tax on, or economic double taxation of, profits distributed by a resident company, resident shareholders receiving dividends are not necessarily in a comparable situation to that of shareholders receiving dividends who are resident in another Member State ( Denkavit Internationaal and Denkavit France , paragraph 34, and Amurta , paragraph 37).

86. According to settled case-law, the status of citizen of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those among such nationals who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law within the area of application ratione materiae of the EC Treaty irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for in that regard (see, in particular, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, paragraph 31; Case C‑224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191, paragraph 28; Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613, paragraphs 22 and 23; and Case C-224/02 Pusa [2004] ECR I-5763, paragraph 16).

23. That status enables nationals of the Member States who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy within the scope ratione materiae of the EC Treaty the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for (see, in particular, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, paragraph 31, and D'Hoop , cited above, paragraph 28).

84. The referring court must likewise take account of the compulsory, widespread and lasting nature of the practice at issue which, because, first, it has thus been extended without distinction to all the district’s inhabitants irrespective of whether their individual meters have been tampered with or given rise to unlawful connections and of the identity of the perpetrators of that conduct and, secondly, it still endures nearly a quarter of a century after it was introduced, is such as to suggest that the inhabitants of that district, which is known to be lived in mainly by Bulgarian nationals of Roma origin, are, as a whole, considered to be potential perpetrators of such unlawful conduct. Such a perception may also be relevant for the overall assessment of the practice at issue (see, by analogy, judgment in Asociația Accept , C‑81/12, EU:C:2013:275, paragraph 51).

32 It is settled case-law that freedom to provide services, as referred to in Article 59 of the EC Treaty, requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of services who are established in another Member State, but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less attractive the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services (see, inter alia, Case C-266/96 Corsica Ferries France [1998] ECR I-3949, paragraph 56; Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraph 33; and Case C-205/99 Analir and Others [2001] ECR I-1271, paragraph 21). Pursuant to that rule, freedom to provide services may also be relied on by an undertaking as against the State in which it is established, if the services are provided for persons established in another Member State (see, inter alia, Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 14, and Case C-224/97 Ciola [1999] ECR I-2517, paragraph 11).

33 It is settled case-law that Article 59 of the Treaty requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of services who are established in another Member State but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services (see Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221, paragraph 12, Case C-43/93 Vander Elst v Office des Migrations Internationales [1994] ECR I-3803, paragraph 14, Case C-272/94 Guiot [1996] ECR I-1905, paragraph 10, Case C-3/95 Reisebüro Broede v Sandker [1996] ECR I-6511, paragraph 25, and Case C-222/95 Parodi v Banque H. Albert de Bary [1997] ECR I-3899, paragraph 18).

25 It should also be noted that the inventory of areas which are of great importance for the conservation of wild birds, more commonly known under the acronym IBA (Inventory of Important Bird Areas in the European Community) includes the area in question. The Court of Justice has held that that inventory, although not legally binding on the Member States concerned, contains scientific evidence making it possible to assess whether a Member State has complied with its obligation to classify as SPAs the most suitable territories in number and size for conservation of the protected species (Case C-3/96 Commission v Netherlands [1998] ECR I-3031, paragraphs 69 and 70).

23. Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained (OJ 1998 L 77, p. 36) concerns only lawyers who are fully qualified as such in their Member States of origin (see Morgenbesser , paragraph 45). In addition, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that the activities undertaken by legal trainees are regarded as forming the practical part of the training required to enter the legal professions in Germany. It follows that such a legal traineeship cannot be classed as a ‘regulated profession’, within the meaning of Council Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 on a general system for the recognition of higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least three years’ duration (OJ 1989 L 19, p. 16), as amended by Directive 2001/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2001 (OJ 2001 L 206, p. 1), separable from the German legal professions themselves, such as the profession of lawyer (see, by analogy, Morgenbesser , paragraphs 46 to 55).

54. It also appears that, since Ms Morgenbesser has not obtained in France the certificat d ' aptitude à la profession d ' avocat (CAPA), she does not hold the professional qualifications for access to the status of " stagiaire" at the bar of that Member State. In those circumstances, the maîtrise en droit which she holds does not, in itself, constitute a " diploma, certificate or other evidence of formal qualifications" within the meaning of Article 1(a) of Directive 89/48.

52. Although the time-limits prescribed by those articles are mandatory (see, to that effect, Molkereigenossenschaft Wiedergeltingen , paragraphs 38 to 40), the fact remains that they do not preclude the competent authorities of a Member State from making after-the-event checks and corrections for the purpose of ensuring that that Member State’s production does not exceed the guaranteed global quantity allocated to it.

53. Indeed, as is apparent from the case-law of the Court, for it to be possible to regard family benefits as being due under the legislation of a Member State, the law of that State must recognise the right to the payment of benefits in favour of the member of the family who works in that State. It is thus necessary for the person concerned to fulfil all the conditions, as to both form and substance, imposed by the internal legislation of that State in order to be able to exercise that right, which may in some cases include the condition that a prior application must have been made for the payment of such benefits (see, by analogy with a previous version of Article 76 of Regulation No 1408/71, Case 134/77 Ragazzoni [1978] ECR 963, paragraphs 8 to 11; Case 191/83 Salzano [1984] ECR 3741, paragraphs 7 and 10; Case 153/84 Ferraioli [1986] ECR 1401, paragraph 14; and Kracht , paragraph 11).

10IT IS NOT DISPUTED THAT IN THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE DISPUTE AROSE AND ON THE BASIS OF THE PROVISIONS IN FORCE IN ITALY AT THE TIME , ITALIAN LEGISLATION , IN THAT IT DID NOT CONFER THE STATUS OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD UPON A MOTHER WHO WAS NEITHER SEPARATED FROM NOR ABANDONED BY HER HUSBAND , PRECLUDED THE RIGHT OF THE FORMER TO RECEIVE FAMILY ALLOWANCES FOR HER CHILDREN .

45. It must be borne in mind that, in order to assess whether a regulatory act entails implementing measures, it should be assessed by reference to the position of the person pleading the right to bring proceedings under the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. It is therefore irrelevant whether the act in question entails implementing measures with regard to other persons (judgments in Telefónica v Commission , C‑274/12 P, EU:C:2013:852, paragraph 30, and T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission , C‑456/13 P, EU:C:2015:284, paragraph 32).

34 It must be possible to verify the ‘sole’ or ‘principal’ intended use of the turret system at the time of customs clearance and, therefore, when the application for release for free circulation of such goods is being considered (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 April 2015 in ALKA, C‑635/13, EU:C:2015:268, paragraph 37).

37. It follows from the Court’s settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes. The objective characteristics and properties of products must be capable of being assessed at the time of customs clearance (see, to that effect, judgment in Panasonic Italia and Others , C‑472/12, EU:C:2014:2082, paragraphs 35 and 36 and the case-law cited).

46. Thus, the General Court was correct in holding, in paragraph 105 of the judgment under appeal, that Articles 17, 7, 10 and 11 of the Charter secure in EU law the protection conferred by the provisions of the ECHR relied on by the appellants and that it is appropriate, in this instance, to base the examination of the validity of the basic regulation solely on the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter (see, to this effect, judgments in Otis and Others , C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraph 47, and Ziegler v Commission , C‑439/11 P, EU:C:2013:513, paragraph 126 and the case-law cited).

11 It should be observed that, as the Court has consistently held (see Case 368/87 Hartmann Troiani v Landesversicherungsanstalt Rheinprovinz [1989] ECR 1333, paragraph 15), the object of Article 9(2) of Regulation No 1408/71 is to guarantee that periods of insurance completed in different Member States are treated as equivalent so that the persons concerned can satisfy the condition of a minimum length of insurance periods where national legislation makes admission to a voluntary or optional continued insurance scheme subject to such a condition.

15 As regards Article 9(2 ) of Regulation No 1408/71, the object of that provision is to guarantee that periods of insurance completed in different Member States are treated as equivalent so that the persons concerned can satisfy the condition of a minimum length of insurance periods where national legislation makes admission to a voluntary or optional insurance scheme subject to such a condition .

19. According to settled case-law, the essential feature of an employment relationship resides in the fact that for a certain period of time a person performs services for and under the direction of another person, in return for which he receives remuneration (see, in particular, Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121, paragraphs 16 and 17; Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691, paragraph 32, and Case C-43/99 Leclere and Deaconescu [2001] ECR I-4265, paragraph 55). It is common ground that, in the main proceedings, there was no employment relationship, within the meaning of that case-law, between the defendants and Alpina.

22. On that last point, it should be recalled that the Court has already held that, whilst the protective measures prescribed in Article 6(2) to (4) of the Habitats Directive are required only as regards sites which are placed on the list of sites selected as SCIs drawn up by the Commission, this does not mean that the Member States do not have to protect sites as soon as they propose them, under Article 4(1) of the directive, as sites eligible for identification as SCIs on the national list transmitted to the Commission (see Case C‑117/03 Dragaggi and Others [2005] ECR I‑167, paragraphs 25 and 26, and Case C‑244/05 Bund Naturschutz in Bayern and Others [2006] ECR I‑8445, paragraphs 36 and 37).

26. This does not mean that the Member States are not to protect sites as soon as they propose them, under Article 4(1) of the Directive, as sites eligible for identification as sites of Community importance on the national list transmitted to the Commission.

83. That evidence must show clearly that, before or at the same time as conferring the economic advantage (see, to that effect, France v Commission , paragraphs 71 and 72), the Member State concerned took the decision to make an investment, by means of the measure actually implemented, in the public undertaking.

75. That argument is ineffective, as pointed out by the Advocate General at point 27 of his Opinion, since the appellants’ reliance on the non-essential nature of wholesale products formed part of a broader argument in which the General Court was invited to apply the criteria established by the Court of Justice in Bronner (Case C‑7/97 EU:C:1998:569) in connection with a refusal to supply amounting to abuse. As is apparent from paragraphs 180 and 181 of the judgment under appeal, the abusive conduct of which the appellants stand accused, which took the form of a margin squeeze, constitutes an independent form of abuse distinct f rom that of refusal to supply, so that the criteria established in Bronner (EU:C:1998:569) were not applicable in the present case (Case C‑52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige EU:C:2011:83, paragraphs 55 to 58).

55. Such an interpretation is based on a misunderstanding of that judgment. In particular, it cannot be inferred from paragraphs 48 and 49 of that judgment that the conditions to be met in order to establish that a refusal to supply is abusive must necessarily also apply when assessing the abusive nature of conduct which consists in supplying services or selling goods on conditions which are disadvantageous or on which there might be no purchaser.

24 The Court also found, in the same judgment, first, that consumers did have a wide choice of imported vehicles in the 15-16 CV tax band and, second, that the progression coefficient between the 12-14 CV band and the 15-16 CV band was the same, in round figures, as that between the 15-16 CV band and the 17-18 CV band, so that consumers who were looking for a top-of-the-range vehicle would not be induced to purchase a vehicle in the 15-16 CV band. It concluded that under a system such as that established by the French legislation on tax on motor vehicles at the time of the facts in Casarin the increase in the progression coefficient for the bands above 18 CV did not have the effect of favouring the sale of vehicles of domestic manufacture.

26 Furthermore, as regards the criticisms made by Porsche and Audi of the Advocate General’s Opinion, it must be borne in mind, first, that the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure of the Court make no provision for interested parties to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (judgment of 25 October 2017, Polbud — Wykonawstwo, C‑106/16, EU:C:2017:804, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

23 Furthermore, as regards the criticisms made of the Advocate General’s Opinion, it must be borne in mind, first, that the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure of the Court make no provision for interested parties to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (judgment of 4 September 2014, Vnuk, C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited)..

29 According to the established case-law of the Court, although the last paragraph of Article 177 unreservedly requires national courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law to refer to the Court any question of interpretation raised before them, the authority of an interpretation provided by the Court under Article 177 may deprive that obligation of its purpose and thus empty it of its substance. This is especially so when the question raised is substantially the same as a question which has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case (see, in particular, CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo, cited above, paragraph 13, and Joined Cases 28/62, 29/62 and 30/62 Da Costa en Schaake and Others v Nederlandse Belastingadministratie [1963] ECR 31). Such is also the case, a fortiori, when the question raised is substantially the same as a question which has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in the same national proceedings.

47. As stated in the second paragraph of Article 1, the objective of Directive 91/271 is to protect the environment from the adverse effects of urban waste water discharges (see, inter alia, Case C-280/02 Commission v France [2004] ECR I-8573, paragraph 13).

13. As stated in the second paragraph of Article 1, the objective of Directive 91/271 is to protect the environment from the adverse effects of urban waste water discharges.

83. However, the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling, may, where appropriate, provide clarification designed to give the national court guidance in its assessment (see, inter alia, judgment in Fiamingo and Others , EU:C:2014:2044, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited). – Existence of measures preventing the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts

28. Freedom of establishment includes, for companies or firms formed in accordance with the laws of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community, the right to pursue their activities in the Member State concerned through a subsidiary, a branch or an agency (Case C‑307/97 Saint-Gobain ZN [1999] ECR I‑6161, paragraph 35; Case C‑141/99 AMID [2000] ECR I‑11619, paragraph 20; Keller Holding , paragraph 29).

35 As far as companies or firms are concerned, their corporate seat, in the sense expressed above, serves to determine, like nationality for natural persons, their connection to a Member State's legal order (see ICI, cited above, paragraph 20, and the case-law cited there).

52. Finally, with respect to the scheme set out in Directive 2006/123, it must be recalled that, as is clear from recital 7 in its preamble, that directive establishes a general legal framework which benefits a wide variety of services while taking into account the distinctive features of each type of activity and its system of regulation, as well as other general interest objectives, including consumer protection. It follows that the EU legislature expressly sought to ensure respect for the balance between, on the one hand, the objective of eliminating obstacles to freedom of establishment of service providers and the free movement of services, and, on the other, the need to safeguard the specific characteristics of certain sensitive activities, in particular those linked to consumer protection (see, to that effect, judgment in Femarbel , C‑57/12, EU:C:2013:517, paragraph 39).

23 The Court has ruled that the obligation cannot be interpreted as referring to any obligation whatsoever arising under the contract in question, but is rather that which corresponds to the contractual right on which the plaintiff' s action is based (see Case 14/76 De Bloos v Bouyer [1976] ECR 1497, paragraphs 10 and 13).

13 IT FOLLOWS THAT FOR THE PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE PLACE OF PERFORMANCE WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 5 , QUOTED ABOVE , THE OBLIGATION TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IS THAT WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT ON WHICH THE PLAINTIFF ' S ACTION IS BASED .

58 According to the Court’s settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be given priority over the other language versions in that regard. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU languages. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgments of 27 March 1990, Cricket St Thomas, C‑372/88, EU:C:1990:140, paragraphs 18 and 19; of 15 November 2012, Kurcums Metal, C‑558/11, EU:C:2012:721, paragraph 48; and of 17 March 2016, Kødbranchens Fællesråd, C‑112/15, EU:C:2016:185, paragraph 36).