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28. As regards the question whether such a tax may be justified by Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/7, which allows Member States to charge a duty on the transfer of securities, the Court has already had occasion to rule that Article 12 of Directive 69/335, the wording of which was substantially the same as that of Article 6 of Directive 2008/7, is an exception to the prohibition in principle of taxes with the same characteristics as capital duty (judgment in Grillo Star Fallimento , C‑443/09, EU:C:2012:213, paragraph 28).

28. It should be recalled that the Court has already had occasion to rule that Article 12 of Directive 69/335, the wording of which is substantially the same as that of Article 6 of Directive 2008/7, is an exception to the prohibition in principle of taxes with the same characteristics as capital duty in Article 10 of Directive 69/335, itself substantially reproduced in Article 5(1) of Directive 2008/7 (see, to that effect, inter alia, Fantask and Others , paragraph 20).

56 However, as far as judicial review of those conditions is concerned, it must be stated that in matters relating to the common agricultural policy the Community legislature has a discretion which corresponds to the political responsibilities which Articles 40 and 43 of the EC Treaty place upon it (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 179/84 Bozzetti v Invernizzi [1985] ECR 2301, paragraph 30). Thus, in examining whether such a discretionary power has been lawfully exercised, judicial review must be confined to determining whether it is vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of powers or whether the authority in question clearly exceeded the bounds of its discretion.

26 On this point, suffice it to recall that the fact that the Commission, with a view to possible amendment of the Directive, decided to consult the interested parties as to the expediency of abolishing the threshold provided for in Article 9(b) of the Directive cannot dispense the Member States from the obligation to comply with the provision of Community law currently in force (see, in particular, Case C-236/88 Commission v France [1990] ECR I-3163, paragraph 19, and today's judgment in Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 34). The alleged incompatibility of the threshold with general principles of Community law

19 As regards the French Government' s reference to the Commission' s proposal of 8 August 1985, it must be emphasized that the fact that a proposal which could terminate an infringement is submitted to the Council cannot relieve the Member State responsible for that infringement of its obligation to comply with the provisions of Community law in force .

It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the concept of ‘State aid’ does not refer to State measures which differentiate between undertakings and which are, therefore, prima facie selective where that differentiation arises from the nature or the overall structure of the system of which they are part (judgments in Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 145 and the case-law cited, and BNP Paribas and BNL v Commission, C‑452/10 P, EU:C:2012:366, paragraph 101). In carrying out the necessary comprehensive review of the characterisation of the tax scheme at issue as State aid, the General Court had to examine whether the differentiation between undertakings arising from that scheme was due to the nature or general scheme of the tax system of which it formed part (judgment in BNP Paribas and BNL v Commission, C‑452/10 P, EU:C:2012:366, paragraph 102).

38. Article 174 EC states that European Community policy on the environment is to aim at a high level of protection and is based, inter alia, on the principle that the polluter should pay. That provision is therefore confined to defining the general environmental objectives of the Community, since Article 175 EC confers on the Council of the European Union responsibility for deciding what action is to be taken, where appropriate following the codecision procedure with the European Parliament (see, to that effect, Case C‑379/92 Peralta [1994] ECR I‑3453, paragraphs 57 and 58).

57 Secondly, Article 130r is confined to defining the general objectives of the Community in the matter of the environment. Responsibility for deciding what action is to be taken is conferred on the Council by Article 130s. Moreover, Article 130t states that the protective measures adopted pursuant to Article 130s are not to prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures compatible with the Treaty.

69. It should be borne in mind in this context that, as regards Article 13A(1)(g) of the Sixth Directive, the Court has held that where a taxable person seeks the status of charitable organisation, it is for the national courts to examine whether the competent authorities have observed the limits on their discretion under that provision while applying Community principles, in particular the principle of equal treatment ( Kügler , cited above, paragraph 56).

40. If that comparative examination of diplomas results in the finding that the knowledge and qualifications attested by the foreign diploma correspond to those required by the national provisions, the Member State must recognise that diploma as fulfilling the requirements laid down by its national provisions. If, on the other hand, the comparison reveals that the knowledge and qualifications attested by the foreign diploma and those required by the national provisions correspond only partially, the host Member State is entitled to require the person concerned to show that he has acquired the knowledge and qualifications which are lacking (see Vlassopoulou , paragraph 19; Aguirre Borrell and Others , paragraph 14; Case C‑234/97 Fernández de Bobadilla [1999] ECR I‑4773, paragraph 32; Morgenbesser , paragraph 70; and Case C‑255/01 Markopoulos and Others [2004] ECR I‑9077, paragraphs 64 and 65).

70. If that comparative examination of diplomas results in the finding that the knowledge and qualifications certified by the foreign diploma correspond to those required by the national provisions, the Member State must recognise that diploma as fulfilling the requirements laid down by its national provisions. If, on the other hand, the comparison reveals that the knowledge and qualifications certified by the foreign diploma and those required by the national provisions correspond only partially, the host Member State is entitled to require the person concerned to show that he has acquired the knowledge and qualifications which are lacking ( Vlassopoulou , paragraph 19).

36. Moreover, the Court has already held that national legislation under which the pursuit of an activity is subject to a condition linked to the economic or social need for that activity constitutes a restriction in that it tends to limit the number of providers of services (see, to that effect, Case C‑63/99 Gloszczuk [2001] ECR I‑6369, paragraph 59, and Case C‑255/04 Commission v France [2006] ECR I‑5251, paragraph 29).

26. It should also be noted that, according to the Court’s case‑law, the question whether it is a service concession or a public service contract and, in the latter case, whether the value of the contract reaches the threshold provided for under the EU rules has no effect on the Court’s answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling, given that the exception to the application of the rules of EU law where the ‘similar control’ conditions are fulfilled is applicable in all those situations (see, to that effect, Case C‑573/07 Sea [2009] ECR I-8127, paragraphs 31 to 40).

32. So far as may be deduced from what is set out in the decision for reference and in the file sent to the Court of Justice by the court making that reference, the contract at issue in the main proceedings might constitute a public service contract, especially by reason of the fact that the contract concluded between Setco and the Comune di Ponte Nossa for the provision of the services in question provides for the Comune to pay Setco consideration for the services supplied by the latter.

82 However, questions concerning the origin of a disease are by their nature medical questions (Case C-185/90 P Commission v Gill [1991] ECR I-4779, paragraph 25).

23. The exemption of activities closely related to hospital and medical care provided for in Article 13A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive is designed to ensure that access to such care is not prevented by the increased costs of providing it that would follow if it, or closely related activities, were subject to VAT ( Commission v France , paragraph 23).

23 As the Advocate General noted in point 23 of his Opinion, that concept does not, however, call for an especially narrow interpretation since the exemption of activities closely related to hospital and medical care is designed to ensure that the benefits flowing from such care are not hindered by the increased costs of providing it that would follow if it, or closely related activities, were subject to VAT.

51. Thus the Court has held that the purpose of coordinating at Community level the procedures for the award of public contracts is to eliminate barriers to the freedom to provide services and goods and therefore to protect the interests of traders established in a Member State who wish to offer goods or services to contracting authorities established in another Member State (see, in particular, Case C-380/98 University of Cambridge [2000] ECR I-8035, paragraph 16, and Case C-237/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-939, paragraph 41).

43 The Court's case-law shows that, for a person to be directly concerned by a Community measure, the latter must directly affect the legal situation of the individual and leave no discretion to the addressees of that measure who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules without the application of other intermediate rules (see to that effect, in particular, International Fruit Company, cited above, paragraphs 23 to 29, Case 92/78 Simmenthal v Commission [1979] ECR 777, paragraphs 25 and 26, Case 113/77 NTN Toyo Bearing Company and Others v Council [1979] ECR 1185, paragraphs 11 and 12, Case 118/77 ISO v Council [1979] ECR 1277, paragraph 26, Case 119/77 Nippon Seiko and Others v Council and Commission [1979] ECR 1303, paragraph 14, Case 120/77 Koyo Seiko and Others v Council and Commission [1979] ECR 1337, paragraph 25, Case 121/77 Nachi Fujikoshi and Others v Council [1979] ECR 1363, paragraph 11, Joined Cases 87/77, 130/77, 22/83, 9/84 and 10/84 Salerno and Others v Commission and Council [1985] ECR 2523, paragraph 31, Case 333/85 Mannesmann-Röhrenwerke and Benteler v Council [1987] ECR 1381, paragraph 14, Case 55/86 Arposol v Council [1988] ECR 13, paragraphs 11 to 13, Case 207/86 Apesco v Commission [1988] ECR 2151, paragraph 12, and Case C-152/88 Sofrimport v Commission [1990] ECR I-2477, paragraph 9).

14 IT FOLLOWS THAT THE FIXING OF THE PERCENTAGE OF THE SUB-QUOTA FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY BY REGULATION NO 2355/85 DOES NOT DIRECTLY AFFECT THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE UNDERTAKINGS PRODUCING OCTG TUBES IN THAT COUNTRY, SINCE THE ISSUE OF EXPORT LICENCES TO THOSE UNDERTAKINGS IS NOT BASED DIRECTLY ON THAT PERCENTAGE BUT DEPENDS IN THE FIRST PLACE ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE COMMISSION HAS CALCULATED AND ADJUSTED THE COMMUNITY EXPORT LIMIT AND FIXED GERMANY' S SUB-QUOTA ON THE BASIS OF THAT PERCENTAGE, AND SECONDLY ON THE APPORTIONMENT OF THAT SUB-QUOTA BY THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AMONG THE UNDERTAKINGS CONCERNED, WHICH IS IN NO WAY AN AUTOMATIC PROCESS BUT IS BASED ON A NUMBER OF CRITERIA .

48. It also follows from the case-law of the Court that, save in the special case envisaged by Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 concerning annual paid holidays, that directive is limited to regulating certain aspects of the organisation of working time so that, generally, it does not apply to the remuneration of workers (see judgment in Dellas and Others , C‑14/04, EU:C:2005:728, paragraph 38, and orders in Vorel , C‑437/05, EU:C:2007:23, paragraph 32, and Grigore , C‑258/10, EU:C:2011:122, paragraphs 81 and 83).

23. According to the Court’s case-law, Directive 2004/38 aims to facilitate the exercise of the primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States that is conferred directly on Union citizens by the Treaty, and it aims in particular to strengthen that right, so that Union citizens cannot derive less rights from that directive than from the instruments of secondary legislation which it amends or repeals (see Case C­‑127/08 Metock and Others [2008] ECR I‑6241, paragraphs 59 and 82, and Case C‑162/09 Lassal [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 30).

30. With regard to Directive 2004/38, the Court has already had occasion to point out that that directive aims to facilitate the exercise of the primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States that is conferred directly on Union citizens by the Treaty and that it aims in particular to strengthen that right, so that Union citizens cannot derive less rights from that directive than from the instruments of secondary legislation which it amends or repeals (see Case C‑127/08 Metock and Others [2008] ECR I‑6241, paragraphs 82 and 59).

59. According to the scheme of Directive 93/36, in particular Title IV, the examination of the suitability of contractors to deliver the products which are the subject of the contract to be awarded and the awarding of the contract are two different operations in the procedure for the award of a public works contract. Article 15(1) of Directive 93/36 provides that the contract is to be awarded after the supplier's suitability has been checked (see to this effect, regarding public works contracts, Case 31/87 Beentjes [1988] ECR 4635, paragraph 15).

75. With regard to statements of figures relating to the calculation of fines, it is appropriate to point out that, however useful and desirable such figures may be, they are not essential to compliance with the duty to state reasons for a decision imposing fines; in any event, the Commission cannot, by mechanical recourse to arithmetical formulas alone, divest itself of its own power of assessment (Case C-291/98 P Sarrió v Commission [2000] ECR I-9991, paragraphs 75 to 77, and Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij , paragraph 464).

75 The fact that more specific information, such as the turnover achieved by the undertakings or the rates of reduction applied by the Commission, were communicated subsequently, at a press conference or during the proceedings before the Court of First Instance, is not such as to call in question the finding in paragraph 348 of the contested judgment. Where the author of a contested decision provides explanations to supplement a statement of reasons which is already adequate in itself, that does not go to the question whether the duty to state reasons has been complied with, though it may serve a useful purpose in relation to review by the Community court of the adequacy of the grounds of the decision, since it enables the institution to explain the reasons underlying its decision.

63. In addition, it is settled case-law that the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia , Case C-409/98 Mirror Group [2001] ECR I-7175, paragraph 30).

61. The objective of deterrence which the Commission is entitled to pursue when setting the amount of a fine is to ensure compliance by undertakings with the competition rules laid down by the EC Treaty for the conduct of their activities within the common market (see, to that effect, Case 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 661, paragraphs 173 to 176). Consequently, when assessing the deterrent nature of a fine to be imposed for infringement of those rules, the Commission is not required to take into account any penalties imposed on an undertaking for infringement of the competition rules of non-member States.

173 THEIR OBJECT IS TO SUPPRESS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND TO PREVENT ANY REFERENCE .

38. Those elements must be taken into account by the national court in order to decide whether Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No 44/2001 is applicable to the transaction‑management contract (see, by analogy, judgment in Emrek , C‑218/12, EU:C:2013:666, paragraph 31).

38. The Court has held previously with respect to the exemption of samples taken by laboratories for the purpose of medical analysis that it is irrelevant, for the application of Article 13A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive, whether the laboratory which takes the sample also carries out the analysis, or subcontracts it to another laboratory but remains responsible to the patient for the analysis, or, because of the nature of the analysis at issue, is obliged to send the sample to a specialised laboratory ( Commission v France , paragraph 28). Likewise, paragraph 67 of D’Ambrumenil and Dispute Resolution Services indicates that medical checks intended principally to enable the prevention or detection of illness or the monitoring of the health of workers or insured persons may satisfy the conditions for exemption under Article 13A(1)(c) of the Sixth Directive, even if they take place at the request of third parties.

67. By contrast, regular medical checks at the behest of certain employers and certain insurance companies may satisfy the conditions for exemption under Article 13A(1)(c), provided that such checks are intended principally to enable the prevention or detection of illness or the monitoring of the health of workers or insured persons. The fact that such medical checks take place at a third party ' s request, and may also serve the employers ' or insurance companies ' own interests, does not preclude health protection being regarded as the principal aim of such checks.

44 Consequently, the formalities to be complied with by taxable persons to exercise, vis-à-vis the tax authorities, the right to reduce the taxable amount for VAT must be limited to those which make it possible to provide proof that, after the transaction has been concluded, part or all of the consideration will definitely not be received. It is for the national courts to ascertain whether that is true of the formalities required by the Member State concerned (judgment of 15 May 2014, Almos Agrárkülkereskedelmi, C‑337/13, EU:C:2014:328, paragraph 39).

100 The purpose of Article 9(2) of Directive 64/221 is to provide minimum procedural guarantees for persons refused a first residence permit, or whose expulsion is ordered before the issue of the permit, in any of the three cases defined in Article 9(1). Where the right of appeal against administrative measures is restricted to the legality of the decision, the purpose of the intervention of the competent authority is to enable an examination of the facts and circumstances, including factors demonstrating the appropriateness of the proposed measure, to be carried out before the decision is finally taken (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-65/95 and C-111/95 Shingara and Radiom [1997] ECR I-3343, paragraphs 34 and 37).

37 Accordingly, the reply to the third question is that, on a proper construction of Article 9 of the directive, the three cases mentioned in Article 9(1) (namely `where there is no right of appeal to a court of law, or where such appeal may be only in respect of the legal validity of the decision, or where the appeal cannot have suspensory effect') apply equally as regards Article 9(2), that is to say, where the decision challenged is a refusal to issue a first residence permit or a decision ordering expulsion before the issue of such a permit. Fourth and fifth questions

72. In accordance with settled case-law, natural or legal persons can claim to be concerned individually by a measure of general application only if they are affected by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from any other person (see, to this effect, Plaumann v Commission , at p. 107, and Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I‑6677, paragraph 36).

34 First, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, a pension scheme of the type at issue in the main proceedings, which essentially relates to the employment of the person concerned, forms part of the pay received by that person and comes within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty (to that effect, see Case 170/84 Bilka v Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607, paragraph 22, Barber, cited above, paragraph 28, and Case C-7/93 Beune [1994] ECR I-4471, paragraph 46). Accordingly, the exclusion of part-time workers from such a pension scheme may be found to be contrary to Article 119 (to that effect, see Bilka, cited above, paragraph 29).

22 DANS CES CONDITIONS , IL FAUT CONCLURE QUE LE REGIME DE PENSIONS D ' ENTREPRISE VISE DANS LE LITIGE PRINCIPAL NE CONSTITUE PAS UN REGIME DE SECURITE SOCIALE DIRECTEMENT REGLE PAR LA LOI ET SOUSTRAIT , DE CE FAIT , AU CHAMP D ' APPLICATION DE L ' ARTICLE 119 , ET QUE LES PRESTATIONS SERVIES AUX EMPLOYES EN VERTU DU REGIME LITIGIEUX CONSTITUENT UN AVANTAGE PAYE PAR L ' EMPLOYEUR AU TRAVAILLEUR EN RAISON DE L ' EMPLOI DE CE DERNIER , AU SENS DE L ' ARTICLE 119 , ALINEA 2 .

42 Il convient d'ajouter que, dans des affaires similaires concernant les indications figurant sur le conditionnement de certains produits cosmétiques, dans lesquelles les autorités autrichiennes invoquaient également la protection de la santé des consommateurs et la prévention des fraudes, la Cour a jugé que la nécessité d'obtenir l'autorisation prévue à l'article 9, paragraphe 3, du LMG constitue une entrave à la libre circulation des produits en cause, privée de toute justification (arrêts du 28 janvier 1999, Unilever, C-77/97, Rec. p. I-431, point 34, et Linhart et Biffl, précité, point 45).

41. As regards, secondly, Article 49 TFEU, it is common ground that all elements of the disputes before the referring court are confined within a single Member State. In those circumstances, it is necessary to determine whether the Court has jurisdiction in the present cases to give a ruling on that provision (see, by analogy, inter alia, Case C‑380/05 Centro Europa 7 [2008] ECR I‑349, paragraph 64; Case C‑245/09 Omalet [2010] ECR I‑13771, paragraphs 9 and 10; and Duomo Gpa and Others , paragraph 25).

25. As regards the interpretation of Articles 43 EC and 49 EC, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that all the facts in the main proceedings are confined within a single Member State. In those circumstances, it is necessary to ascertain whether the Court has jurisdiction in the present cases to give a ruling on those provisions (see, by analogy, Case C‑380/05 Centro Europa 7 [2008] ECR I‑349, paragraph 64, and Case C‑245/09 Omalet [2010] ECR I‑13771, paragraphs 9 and 10).

56 Article 4(1) of that directive states that such mechanisms are capable of contributing to attaining the objectives set out in Article 6 EC and Article 174(1) EC, the latter listing the objectives of EU policy on the environment (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 September 2013, IBV & Cie, C‑195/12, EU:C:2013:598, paragraphs 59 and 60).

78. Lastly, the Court has previously held that the exercise of joint control, by two parent companies which are independent of each other, of their subsidiary does not, in principle, preclude a finding by the Commission of the existence of an economic unit comprising one of those parent companies and the subsidiary concerned (judgment in Alliance One International and Standard Commercial Tobacco v Commission and Commission v Alliance One International and Others , C‑628/10 P and C‑14/11 P, EU:C:2012:479, paragraph 101).

101. As regards the substance, the Court has previously ruled that the exercise of joint control, by two parent companies who are independent of each other, of their subsidiary does not, in principle, preclude a finding by the Commission of the existence of an economic unit comprising one of those parent companies and the subsidiary concerned, and that this applies even if the proportion of the subsidiary’s share capital owned by that parent company is smaller than that owned by the other parent company (see, to that effect, AceaElectrabel Produzione v Commission, paragraph 64). That being the case, a fortiori a parent company and its subsidiary, which is itself a parent company of the company which has committed an infringement, can both be deemed to be members of an economic unit which includes the latter company.

95. With regard to the first limb of this ground of appeal, it must be borne in mind that the General Court alone has jurisdiction to examine how in each particular case the Commission appraised the gravity of unlawful conduct. In the context of an appeal, the purpose of review by the Court is, first, to examine to what extent the General Court took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all the essential factors to assess the gravity of particular conduct in the light of Article 81 EC and Article 23 of Regulation No 1/2003 and, second, to consider whether the General Court responded to a sufficient legal standard to all the arguments raised by the appellant with a view to having the fine cancelled or reduced (see, inter alia, Baustahlgewebe v Commission , paragraph 128, and Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraph 244).

53. In order to satisfy the requirements of that law, the European Union judicature must ensure that the principle that the parties should be heard is respected in proceedings before them and that they themselves respect that principle, which applies to any procedure which may result in a decision by an institution of the European Union perceptibly affecting a person’s interests (Case C‑89/08 P Commission v Ireland and Others [2009] ECR I‑11245, paragraphs 51 and 53, and Case C‑197/09 RX-II Review M v EMEA [2009] ECR I‑12033, paragraphs 41 and 42).

41. Ce principe s’applique à toute procédure susceptible d’aboutir à une décision d’une institution communautaire affectant de manière sensible les intérêts d’une personne (voir arrêts du 10 juillet 2001, Ismeri Europa/Cour des comptes, C‑315/99 P, Rec. p. I‑5281, point 28, ainsi que Commission/Irlande e.a., précité, point 50). Il implique, en règle générale, le droit pour les parties à un procès d’être en mesure de prendre position sur les faits et les documents sur lesquels sera fondée une décision judiciaire ainsi que de discuter les preuves et les observations présentées devant le juge et les moyens de droit relevés d’office par le juge, sur lesquels celui-ci entend fonder sa décision (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Commission/Irlande e.a., précité, points 52 et 55). En effet, pour satisfaire aux exigences liées au droit à un procès équitable, il importe que les parties puissent débattre contradictoirement tant des éléments de fait que des éléments de droit qui sont décisifs pour l’issue de la procédure (voir arrêt Commission/Irlande e.a., précité, point 56).

29 While the Court initially held that it is for the national court to refuse if necessary to apply any conflicting provision of national law (see Simmenthal, cited above, paragraph 21), it subsequently refined its case-law in two respects.

18 It should be pointed out that, according to paragraph 17 of its judgment in Keck and Mithouard, if national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements are to avoid being caught by Article 30 of the Treaty, they must not be of such a kind as to prevent access to the market by products from another Member State or to impede access any more than they impede the access of domestic products.

17 Provided that those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such rules to the sale of products from another Member State meeting the requirements laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent their access to the market or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic products. Such rules therefore fall outside the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty.

16 It is settled case-law that Article 59 of the Treaty requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of services who are established in another Member State, but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less attractive the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State in which he lawfully provides similar services (see Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221, paragraph 12; Case C-43/93 Vander Elst [1994] ECR I-3803, paragraph 14; Case C-272/94 Guiot [1996] ECR I-1905, paragraph 10; Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraph 33; and Case C-165/98 Mazzoleni and ISA [2001] ECR I-2189, paragraph 22).

45. As regards, next, the conclusions to be drawn by a national court from a conflict between provisions of domestic law and rights guaranteed by the Charter, it is settled case-law that a national court which is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of European Union law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of such a provision by legislative or other constitutional means (Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraphs 21 and 24; Case C-314/08 Filipiak [2009] ECR I-11049, paragraph 81; and Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 Melki and Abdeli [2010] ECR I-5667, paragraph 43).

24THE FIRST QUESTION SHOULD THEREFORE BE ANSWERED TO THE EFFECT THAT A NATIONAL COURT WHICH IS CALLED UPON , WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ITS JURISDICTION , TO APPLY PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW IS UNDER A DUTY TO GIVE FULL EFFECT TO THOSE PROVISIONS , IF NECESSARY REFUSING OF ITS OWN MOTION TO APPLY ANY CONFLICTING PROVISION OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION , EVEN IF ADOPTED SUBSEQUENTLY , AND IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE COURT TO REQUEST OR AWAIT THE PRIOR SETTING ASIDE OF SUCH PROVISION BY LEGISLATIVE OR OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS .

34. It is for the Court of Justice to supply the referring court with guidance on interpreting the Community concept of ‘national legislation’ within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive, in order to enable that court to determine its content at the date of entry into force of that directive (see Metropol and Stadler , paragraph 47).

111. According to settled case-law, an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, in particular, judgments in France v Monsanto and Commission , C‑248/99 P, EU:C:2002:1, paragraph 68, and Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council , C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 46).

46. It must, first, be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal. An appeal which merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the General Court, including those based on facts expressly rejected by the General Court, does not satisfy the requirement to state reasons under those provisions (see, inter alia, Case C-41/00 P Interporc v Commission [2003] ECR I-2125, paragraphs 15 and 16, and Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v Commission [2010] ECR I-9555, paragraph 24 and the case‑law cited).

13 In those circumstances, legislation of the kind at issue, which makes the grant and the amount of a pension supplement to the pensioner depend exclusively on income from work earned by the younger spouse, leads in principle to indirect discrimination against women in relation to men, contrary to Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7, unless such legislation is justified by objective factors unconnected with any discrimination on grounds of sex. It follows from the case-law of the Court that this is the case if the means chosen correspond to a legitimate aim of the social policy of the Member State whose legislation is at issue and are suitable and requisite for attaining the aim pursued (see the judgment in Case C-229/89 Commission v Belgium [1991] ECR I-2205).

32. As regards the placing of foodstuffs on the market, the Court has held that it is for the Member States, in the absence of harmonisation, to decide on their intended level of protection of human health and life, always taking into account the requirements of the free movement of goods within the Community (see, to that effect, Case 174/82 Sandoz [1983] ECR 2445, paragraph 16; Joined Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior et Publivía [1991] ECR I-4151, paragraph 16; Case C-271/92 LPO [1993] ECR I-2899, paragraph 10; Commission v Denmark , paragraph 42; and Case C-41/02 Commission v Netherlands [2004] ECR I-11375, paragraph 42).

16 On the second point it must be stated that in the present state of Community law, in which there are no common or harmonized rules governing in a general manner the advertising of alcoholic beverages, it is for the Member States to decide on the degree of protection which they wish to afford to public health and on the way on which that protection is to be achieved. They may do so, however, only within the limits set by the Treaty and must, in particular, comply with the principle of proportionality.

16 As the Court has already held, the only articles in which the Treaty provides for derogations applicable in situations which may affect public security are Articles 36, 48, 56, 223 (now, after amendment, Articles 30 EC, 39 EC, 46 EC and 296 EC) and 224, which deal with exceptional and clearly defined cases. It is not possible to infer from those articles that there is inherent in the Treaty a general exception covering all measures taken for reasons of public security. To recognise the existence of such an exception, regardless of the specific requirements laid down by the Treaty, might impair the binding nature of Community law and its uniform application (see, to that effect, Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 26).

12. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case‑law, in interpreting a provision of European Union law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Case 292/82 Merck [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12; Case C-34/05 Schouten [2007] ECR I‑1687, paragraph 25; and Case C‑433/08 Yaesu Europe [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 24).

24. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that – according to the settled case‑law of the Court – in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Case 292/82 Merck [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12; Case C-34/05 Schouten [2007] ECR I‑1687, paragraph 25; and Case C-466/07 Klarenberg [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 37).

39. With regard, second, to the power of veto contained in Article 2(1)(c) of Decree-Law No 332/1994, that power clearly relates to decisions within the scope of the management of the company and therefore concerns only those shareholders capable of exerting a definite influence on the companies concerned, with the result that the criteria applying to the exercise of that power must be examined in the light of Article 43 EC. Moreover, even if the effects of those criteria are restrictive of the free movement of capital, those effects would be the unavoidable consequence of any restriction on freedom of establishment and would not warrant independent examination in the light of Article 56 EC ( Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas , paragraph 33). Consequently, the criteria applying to the exercise of the power of veto must be examined solely from the point of view of Article 43 EC. The criteria set out in Article 1(2) of the Decree of 2004 as they relate to the exercise of powers of opposition – Failure to fulfil obligations under Article 56 EC

26. The Court has therefore held that the mere fact that the person to whom the activity is transferred is a public-law body, in this case a municipal authority, cannot be a ground for excluding the existence of a transfer within the scope of that directive (see Case C‑175/99 Mayeur [2000] ECR I‑7755, paragraphs 29, 33 and 34, and Case C‑151/09 UGT-FSP [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 23).

33 Articles 1(1) and 2(b) of Directive 77/187 do not therefore permit the transfer of an economic activity from a legal person governed by private law to a legal person governed by public law to be excluded from the scope of Directive 77/187 solely on the ground that the person to whom the activity is transferred is a public-law body. Only the reorganisation of structures of the public administration or the transfer of administrative functions between public administrative authorities are excluded, by the judgment in Henke, from the scope of that directive.

28. The Court has also made clear that an order imposing a periodic penalty payment and/or a lump sum is intended to place a defaulting Member State under economic pressure which induces it to put an end to the infringement established. The financial penalties imposed must therefore be decided on according to the degree of persuasion needed for the Member State in question to alter its conduct (see, to that effect, Case C‑304/02 Commission v France , paragraph 91, and Case C‑177/04 Commission v France , paragraphs 59 and 60).

43. Accordingly, the existence and the degree of unjust enrichment which repayment of a charge which was levied though not due from the aspect of Community law entails for a taxable person can be established only following an economic analysis in which all the relevant circumstances are taken into account (see, inter alia, Case C-147/01 Weber’s Wine World and Others [2003] ECR I-11365, paragraphs 94 to 100).

96. Thus, at paragraph 17 of Bianco and Girard , cited above, the Court held, in particular, that even though indirect taxes are designed in national law to be passed on to the final consumer and in commerce are normally passed on in whole or in part, it cannot be generally assumed that the charge is actually passed on in every case. The actual passing on of such taxes, either in whole or in part, depends on various factors in each commercial transaction which distinguish it from other transactions in other contexts. Consequently, the question whether an indirect tax has or has not been passed on in each case is a question of fact to be determined by the national court, which is free to assess the evidence adduced before it.

70 It must be borne in mind that, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, to which the General Court correctly referred in paragraph 99 of the judgment under appeal, in the context of the review conducted by the European Union judicature of complex economic assessments made by the Commission in the field of State aid, it is not for that judicature to substitute its own economic assessment for that of the Commission. However, the European Union judicature must, inter alia, establish not only whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the relevant information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it (see, inter alia, judgment of 24 October 2013, Land Burgenland and Others v Commission, C‑214/12 P, C‑215/12 P and C‑223/12 P, EU:C:2013:682, paragraphs 78 and 79 and the case-law cited).

24 However, for advantages to be capable of being categorised as aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, they must, first, be granted directly or indirectly through State resources (see Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Sloman Neptun v Bodo Ziesemer [1993] ECR I-887, paragraph 19; Case C-189/91 Kirsammer-Hack v Sidal [1993] ECR I-6185, paragraph 16; Joined Cases C-52/97 to C-54/97 Viscido and Others v Ente Poste Italiane [1998] ECR I-2629, paragraph 13; Case C-200/97 Ecotrade v Altiformi e Ferriere di Servola [1998] ECR I-7907, paragraph 35; Case C-295/97 Piaggio v International Factors Italia (Ifitalia), Dornier Luftfahrt, Ministero della Difesa [1999] ECR I-3735, paragraph 35; and Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra v Schleswag [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 58) and, second, be imputable to the State (Van der Kooy, paragraph 35; Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, paragraph 11; Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraph 13). The first part of the first plea in law Arguments of the parties

13 As the Court has consistently held (see in particular the judgment in Joined Cases 67, 68 and 70/85, Van der Kooy v Commission [1988] ECR 219, paragraph 35) no distinction should be drawn between cases where aid is granted directly by the State and cases where it is granted by public or private bodies established or appointed by the State to administer the aid. In the present case, there is considerable evidence in the documents before the Court that the injections of capital were the result of action attributable to the Italian State.

69. It should be borne in mind in this context that, as regards Article 13A(1)(g) of the Sixth Directive, the Court has held that where a taxable person seeks the status of charitable organisation, it is for the national courts to examine whether the competent authorities have observed the limits on their discretion under that provision while applying Community principles, in particular the principle of equal treatment ( Kügler , cited above, paragraph 56).

122 Finally, as regards Brentjens' argument that an adequate level of pension for workers could be assured by laying down minimum requirements to be met by pensions offered by insurance companies, it must be emphasised that, in view of the social function of supplementary pension schemes and the margin of appreciation enjoyed, according to settled case-law, by the Member States in organising their social security systems (Case 238/82 Duphar and Others [1984] ECR 523, paragraph 16; Poucet and Pistre, cited above, paragraph 6; and Case C-70/95 Sodemare and Others [1997] ECR I-3395, paragraph 27), it is incumbent on each Member State to consider whether, in view of the particular features of its national pension system, laying down minimum requirements would still enable it to ensure the level of pension which it seeks to guarantee in a sector by compulsory affiliation to a pension fund.

16 ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT POSSIBLE , CONTRARY TO THE CONTENTION OF THE DEFENDANT IN THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS , TO EQUATE THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY OF A MEMBER STATE WHICH , WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A HEALTH-CARE INSURANCE SCHEME FINANCED BY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE INSURED PERSONS AND BY FINANCING FROM THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES , DRAWS UP RULES GOVERNING AND LIMITING REIMBURSEMENT OF THE COSTS OF HEALTH CARE , WITH AN ECONOMIC OPERATOR WHO IN EACH CASE FREELY CHOOSES THE GOODS WHICH HE ACQUIRES ON THE MARKET , IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT COMMUNITY LAW DOES NOT DETRACT FROM THE POWERS OF MEMBER STATES TO ORGANIZE THEIR SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS AND TO ADOPT , IN PARTICULAR , PROVISIONS INTENDED TO GOVERN THE CONSUMPTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OF THEIR HEALTH-CARE INSURANCE SCHEMES .

31. That article concerns the conditions under which fees may be imposed for the rights of use for radio frequencies or numbers or rights to install facilities on, over or under public or private property (judgments in Belgacom and Mobistar , C‑256/13 and C‑264/13, EU:C:2014:2149, paragraph 31, and Base Company , C‑346/13, EU:C:2015:649, paragraph 19).

86. Consequently, the Court has already held that a criterion for charging higher taxation which by definition can never be fulfilled by similar domestic products cannot be considered to be compatible with the prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 90 EC. Such a system has the effect of excluding domestic products in advance from the heaviest taxation (Case 319/81 Commission v Italy [1983] ECR 601, paragraph 17). Likewise, the Court has held that such differential taxation is incompatible with Community law if the products most heavily taxed are, by their very nature, imported products (Case 106/84 Commission v Denmark [1986] ECR 833, paragraph 21).

21 HOWEVER , SUCH DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH COMMUNITY LAW IF THE PRODUCTS MOST HEAVILY TAXED ARE , AS IN THIS CASE , BY THEIR VERY NATURE , IMPORTED PRODUCTS .

27. S’il est vrai que les États membres sont tenus de respecter, lorsqu’ils précisent les catégories particulières des biens auxquelles ils appliquent un taux réduit de TVA, les contours des catégories définies aux points énumérés à l’annexe III de la directive 2006/112, tels qu’interprétés par la Cour (arrêt Commission/Espagne, C‑360/11, EU:C:2013:17, point 22), il incombe toutefois à la Commission d’établir l’existence du manquement allégué et d’apporter à la Cour tous les éléments nécessaires à la vérification, par celle-ci, de l’existence du manquement allégué sans pouvoir se fonder sur une présomption quelconque. – Sur le grief de la Commission, en ce qu’il concerne les positions 84, 85, 90, 91, 97 et 100 de l’annexe n° 3 de la loi sur la TVA

25. There is no doubt, therefore, that in order to satisfy fully the obligations arising from the first indent of Article 11(1) of the Directive, the plan drawn up must be specific and in conformity with the system for the disposal of PCBs laid down by the Directive as a whole (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-232/95 and C-233/95 Commission v Greece [1998] ECR I-3343, paragraphs 34 to 36, and Case C-207/97 Commission v Belgium [1999] ECR I-275, paragraph 39).

39 On that point it should be noted that, according to established case-law, the programmes to be established under Article 7 of the Directive must be specific. Thus, the objective of reducing pollution pursued by general purification programmes does not necessarily correspond to the more specific objective of the Directive (Joined Cases C-232/95 and C-233/95 Commission v Greece [1998] ECR I-3343, paragraph 35).

23 Likewise, the Court has consistently held (see, in particular, Case C-237/91 Kus v Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden [1992] ECR I-6781, paragraph 25) that Decision No 1/80 does not encroach upon the competence retained by the Member States to regulate both the entry into their territories of Turkish nationals and the conditions under which they may take up their first employment, but merely regulates, in Article 6, the situation of Turkish workers already integrated into the labour force of the host Member State.

42. The effect of such legislation is to discourage taxpayers residing in Sweden from investing their capital in companies established outside the EEA. Since the dividends which such companies pay to Swedish residents receive less favourable tax treatment than dividends distributed by a company established in an EEA Member State, the shares of such companies are less attractive to investors residing in Sweden than shares in companies established in such a State (see, to that effect, Verkooijen , paragraphs 34 and 35, and Manninen , paragraphs 22 and 23, and, with regard to movement of capital between Member States and third countries, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraph 166).

23. Such a provision also has a restrictive effect as regards companies established in other Member States, in that it constitutes an obstacle to their raising capital in Finland. Since revenue from capital of non-Finnish origin receives less favourable tax treatment than dividends distributed by companies established in Finland, the shares of companies established in other Member States are less attractive to investors residing in Finland than shares in companies which have their seat in that Member State (Case C-35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4071, paragraph 35; Case C-334/02 Commission v France [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24).

31 However, it is clear from paragraph 9 of Hoffmann-La Roche that the derogation from free movement of goods which is the consequence of the trade mark proprietor's opposition to repackaging cannot be accepted if the proprietor's exercise of that right constitutes a disguised restriction on trade between Member States within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 30 EC.

9. À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante de la Cour, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et que les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêts du 14 septembre 2004, Commission/Espagne, C‑168/03, Rec. p. I‑8227, point 24; du 18 janvier 2007, Commission/République tchèque, C‑203/06, point 6, et du 27 septembre 2007, Commission/Luxembourg, C‑354/06, point 7).

24. In accordance with settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-103/00 Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I-1147, paragraph 23, and Case C-209/02 Commission v Austria [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 16). Even when the default has been remedied after the time-limit prescribed by that opinion, pursuit of the action still has an object. That object may consist in particular in establishing the basis of the liability that a Member State could incur towards those who acquire rights as a result of its default (see, inter alia, Case 154/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2717, paragraph 6, and Case C-299/01 Commission v Luxembourg [2002] ECR I-5899, paragraph 11).

18. Accordingly, the present action for failure to fulfil obligations cannot in any case be regarded as being devoid of purpose (see, to this effect, Case 240/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 1835, paragraphs 12 to 15).

27. Those principles must also be observed and have the same consequences where, for its implementation, EU legislation obliges Member States to adopt measures imposing obligations on individuals. Accordingly, national measures which, for the purposes of implementing EU legislation, impose obligations on individuals must be published in order for the individuals concerned to be able to ascertain those obligations (see, to that effect, Case C-313/99 Mulligan and Others [2002] ECR I-5719, paragraphs 51 and 52). In such circumstances, it must also be possible for the individuals to determine the source of the national measures imposing obligations upon them. Accordingly, not only must the national legislation be published but also the measure of EU law which, in some circumstances, obliges the Member States to take the measures imposing obligations on individuals (see, to that effect, Heinrich , paragraphs 45 to 47).

52 As is clear from the case-law cited in paragraph 47 above, the reason why the principle of legal certainty, as a general principle of Community law, requires appropriate publicity of measures adopted by the Member States in implementation of an obligation under Community law is the obvious need to ensure that persons concerned by such measures are able to ascertain the scope of their rights and obligations in the particular area governed by Community law.

51 In that connection, whilst the Court has held that the relatively small amount of aid or the relatively small size of the undertaking which receives it does not as such exclude the possibility that intra-Community trade might be affected (see, in particular, Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission (the `Tubemeuse' case) [1990] ECR I-959, paragraph 43), a small amount of aid to an undertaking over a given period does not affect trade between Member States in particular economic sectors.

59. It is clear from the case-law referred to by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 46 of the judgment under appeal that undertakings involved in an administrative procedure in which fines may be imposed must take account of the possibility that the Commission may decide at any time to raise the level of the fines by reference to that applied in the past. That is true not only where the Commission raises the level of the amount of fines by imposing fines in individual decisions but also where that increase takes effect by the application, in particular cases, of rules of conduct of general application, such as the 1998 Guidelines ( Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraphs 229 and 230).

229. Consequently, the undertakings in question must take account of the possibility that the Commission may decide at any time to raise the level of the fines by reference to that applied in the past.

31. The Court has already held that that provision must be strictly interpreted, since it lays down an exception to the mechanism for reviewing the substance of unfair terms, such as that provided for by the system of consumer protection put in place by Directive 93/13 (judgments in Kásler and Káslerné Rábai , C‑26/13, EU:C:2014:282, paragraph 42, and Matei , C‑143/13, EU:C:2015:127, paragraph 49).

105. The additional request of LPN seeks not to have the judgment under appeal set aside, even in part, that is to say the operative part thereof (see Joined Cases C‑539/10 P and C‑550/10 P Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited), but merely the amendment of one of the grounds of that judgment which will not affect its content or the outcome of the dispute at first instance. It is clear from the judgment under appeal, particularly paragraphs 18, 38 and 59 thereof, that the action dismissed in paragraph 1 of the operative part of that judgment referred to the decision of 22 November 2007.

44. However, in the present case, the appellant’s appeal seeks not to have the judgment under appeal set aside, even in part, that is to say the operative part thereof (see, to that effect, Case C‑263/09 P Edwin v OHIM [2011] ECR I‑5853, paragraphs 83 to 85, and the judgment of 21 December 2011 in Case C‑329/09 P Iride v Commission , paragraph 48), but merely the amendment of some of the grounds of that judgment, as the appellant itself acknowledges in its appeal.

25 In the case of acts or decisions drawn up in a procedure involving several stages, and particularly at the end of an internal procedure, it is only those measures which definitively determine the position of the institution upon the conclusion of that procedure which are open to challenge and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision (see, for example, Case T-212/95 Oficemen v Commission [1997] ECR II-1161, paragraph 53).

55. Suffice it to state with regard to those submissions that, while the Court has held that a national provision by which a Member State discharges its obligations under a directive cannot be classified as a barrier to trade ( that n see, to this effect, Case 46/76 Bauhuis [1977] ECR 5, paragraphs 28 to 30, Case C-246/98 Berendse-Koenen [2000] ECR I‑1777, paragraphs 24 and 25, and Deutscher Apothekerverband , cited above, paragraphs 52 to 54), it is clear that Article 5 of Directive 94/62 merely authorises the Member States to encourage systems for the reuse of packaging in conformity with the Treaty, without imposing any obligation to that effect.

24 A national rule such as that laid down by Article 3(1) of the Verordening, read in conjunction with Article 2 thereof, does not therefore constitute a unilateral measure designed to protect individual interests of the Member State which enacted it, but is adopted in order to comply with a directive of the Council in the general interest of the Community (Case 46/76 Bauhuis v Netherlands [1977] ECR 5, paragraphs 28 and 29).

19 Moreover, according to settled case-law (see, in particular, Case C-130/93 Lamaire v NDALTP [1994] ECR I-3215, paragraph 14), a charge which is imposed on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier may escape classification as a charge having equivalent effect as prohibited by the Treaty, if it is levied on account of inspections carried out for the purpose of fulfilling obligations imposed by Community law.

33. While it is true that, according to well-established case-law, procedural rules are generally held to apply to all proceedings pending at the time when they enter into force, whereas substantive rules are usually interpreted as not applying to situations existing before their entry into force (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑121/91 and C-122/91 CT Control (Rotterdam) and JCT Benelux v Commission [1993] ECR I-3873, paragraph 22; Case C-61/98 De Haan [1999] ECR I-5003, paragraph 13; and Case C-251/00 Ilumitrónica [2002] ECR I-10433, paragraph 29), the fact remains that, as the Advocate General observed in points 33 and 34 of his Opinion, the new law applies immediately only in relation to situations which, although they arose at the time when the earlier legislation was in force, continue to produce effects when the new legislation becomes applicable.

22 It should be noted that, according to consistent case-law, procedural rules are generally held to apply to all proceedings pending at the time when they enter into force, whereas substantive rules are usually interpreted as not applying to situations existing before their entry into force (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 212/80 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Salumi [1981] ECR 2735, paragraph 9).

41 Thirdly, the significant distortions of competition which treatment as non-taxable persons of bodies governed by public law acting as public authorities would lead to must be evaluated by reference to the activity in question, as such, without that evaluation relating to any particular market, and by reference not only to actual competition, but also to potential competition, provided that the possibility of a private operator entering the relevant market is real and not purely hypothetical (judgments of 25 March 2010, Commission v Netherlands, C‑79/09, not published, EU:C:2010:171, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited, and of 29 October 2015, Saudaçor, C‑174/14, EU:C:2015:733, paragraph 74).

20 The Court has already stated, both in the judgment in Lafuente Nieto, cited above (paragraphs 41 and 42), and in the judgment in Naranjo Arjona and Others, cited above (paragraphs 23 and 24), that the new provisions which Regulation No 1248/92 introduced into heading D, paragraph 4, of Annex VI to Regulation No 1408/71 are consistent with that interpretation: they merely provide additional clarification of the detailed rules set out in that regulation under which the average contribution basis is to be determined with sole reference to insurance periods completed under the legislation concerned, whilst leaving the content of Article 47(1)(g) unaltered, and are intended only to ensure the compatibility thereof with the principles set out in Article 51 of the Treaty.

23 That interpretation is confirmed by the new provisions which Regulation No 1248/92 introduced into Annex VI, heading D, paragraph 4 of the regulation, whereby `the calculation of the theoretical Spanish benefit shall be carried out on the basis of the actual contributions of the insured person during the years immediately preceding payment of the last contribution to the Spanish social security' and `the amount of the pension obtained shall be increased by the amount of the increases and revalorizations calculated for each year after and up to the year preceding the materialization of the risk for pensions of the same kind'.

47. Secondly, it is settled case-law that, in the absence of any unifying or harmonising measures of the European Union, the Member States retain the power to define, by treaty or unilaterally, the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation, particularly with a view to eliminating double taxation (Case C‑540/07 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I‑10983, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited, and National Grid Indus , paragraph 45).

46. As to the reformulation of the fifth head of claim, the Court notes that in principle it is not permissible for a party to alter the very subject-matter of the case during the proceedings, and the merits of the action must be examined solely in the light of the claims contained in the application initiating the proceedings (see, to that effect, Case 232/78 Commission v France [1979] ECR 2729, paragraph 3; Case C-256/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I‑2487, paragraph 31; and Case C-508/03 Commission v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 61).

31 Those submissions are inadmissible because they are contrary to Article 38(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure, under which the parties are required to state the subject-matter of the proceedings in the application initiating proceedings. Even though Article 42 of those Rules allows, subject to specific conditions, the introduction of new pleas in law, it is not permissible for a party to alter the very subject-matter of the proceedings. It follows that the merits of an application must be determined solely in the light of the submissions made in the application initiating the proceedings (see Case 232/78 Commission v France [1979] ECR 2729, paragraph 3).

26. It should be noted that the purpose of Directive 89/105, according to Article 1 thereof, is to ensure that any national measure to control the prices of medicinal products for human use or to restrict the range of medicinal products covered by the national health insurance systems complies with the requirements of that directive (judgment in Commission v Finland , C‑229/00, EU:C:2003:334, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

71. Second, for periods of residence longer than three months, the right of residence is subject to the conditions set out in Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38 and, under Article 14(2), that right is retained only if the Union citizen and his family members satisfy those conditions. It is apparent from recital 10 in the preamble to the directive in particular that those conditions are intended, inter alia, to prevent such persons from becoming an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State (judgment in Ziolkowski and Szeja , EU:C:2011:866, paragraph 40).

40. Second, for periods of residence of longer than three months, the right of residence is subject to the conditions set out in Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38 and, under Article 14(2), that right is retained only if the Union citizen and his family members satisfy those conditions. It is apparent from recital 10 in the preamble to the directive in particular that those conditions are intended, inter alia, to prevent such persons becoming an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State.

32 As the Court held in paragraph 63 of its judgment in Martínez Sala, cited above, a citizen of the European Union, lawfully resident in the territory of a host Member State, can rely on Article 6 of the Treaty in all situations which fall within the scope ratione materiae of Community law.

76. While it is therefore essential that the legal situation resulting from national implementing measures is sufficiently precise and clear to enable the individuals concerned to know the extent of their rights and obligations, it is none the less the case that, according to the very words of the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty, Member States may choose the form and methods for implementing directives which best ensure the result to be achieved by the directives, and that provision shows that the transposition of a directive into national law does not necessarily require legislative action in each Member State. The Court has thus repeatedly held that it is not always necessary formally to enact the requirements of a directive in a specific express legal provision, since the general legal context may be sufficient for implementation of a directive, depending on its content. In particular, the existence of general principles of constitutional or administrative law may render superfluous transposition by specific legislative or regulatory measures provided, however, that those principles actually ensure the full application of the directive by the national authorities and that, where the relevant provision of the directive seeks to create rights for individuals, the legal situation arising from those principles is sufficiently precise and clear and that the persons concerned are put in a position to know the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, to be able to rely on them before the national courts (see, inter alia, Case 29/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 1661, paragraphs 22 and 23, and Case C-217/97 Commission v Germany , cited above, paragraphs 31 and 32).

23 IT FOLLOWS FROM THAT PROVISION THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A DIRECTIVE DOES NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN EACH MEMBER STATE . IN PARTICULAR THE EXISTENCE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW MAY RENDER IMPLEMENTATION BY SPECIFIC LEGISLATION SUPERFLUOUS , PROVIDED HOWEVER THAT THOSE PRINCIPLES GUARANTEE THAT THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES WILL IN FACT APPLY THE DIRECTIVE FULLY AND THAT , WHERE THE DIRECTIVE IS INTENDED TO CREATE RIGHTS FOR INDIVIDUALS , THE LEGAL POSITION ARISING FROM THOSE PRINCIPLES IS SUFFICIENTLY PRECISE AND CLEAR AND THE PERSONS CONCERNED ARE MADE FULLY AWARE OF THEIR RIGHTS AND , WHERE APPROPRIATE , AFFORDED THE POSSIBILITY OF RELYING ON THEM BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURTS . THAT LAST CONDITION IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE WHERE THE DIRECTIVE IN QUESTION IS INTENDED TO ACCORD RIGHTS TO NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES BECAUSE THOSE NATIONALS ARE NOT NORMALLY AWARE OF SUCH PRINCIPLES .

27. Whilst assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the common market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the European Union Courts, it is for the national courts to ensure that the rights of individuals are safeguarded where the obligation to give prior notification of State aid to the Commission pursuant to Article 88(3) EC has been infringed ( van Calster and Others , paragraph 75, and Transalpine Ölleitung in Österreich and Others , paragraph 38).

29 However, even national legislation which applies without distinction to all services, irrespective of the place of establishment of the provider, is liable to constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services in so far as it reserves an advantage solely to users of services which comply with certain conditions which are de facto specific to the national market and thus deny that advantage to users of other services which are essentially similar but do not comply with the specific conditions provided for in that legislation. Such legislation affects the situation of users of services as such and is thus liable to discourage them from using the services of certain providers, since the services offered by them do not comply with the conditions laid down in that legislation, thus directly affecting access to the market (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 May 1995, Alpine Investments, C‑384/93, EU:C:1995:126, paragraphs 26 to 28 and 35 to 38, and of 10 November 2011, Commission v Portugal, C‑212/09, EU:C:2011:717, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

26 First, it must be determined whether the prohibition against telephoning potential clients in another Member State without their prior consent can constitute a restriction on freedom to provide services. The national court draws the Court' s attention to the fact that providers established in the Member States where the potential recipients reside are not necessarily subject to the same prohibition or in any event not on the same terms.

36. Thus, according to settled case-law, derogation under those articles must be restricted to activities which, in themselves, are directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority (see Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti , cited above, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited), which excludes from being regarded as connected with the exercise of official authority, within the meaning of that derogation, functions that are merely auxiliary and preparatory vis-à-vis an entity which effectively exercises official authority by taking the final decision (Case C‑42/92 Thijssen [1993] ECR I‑4047, paragraph 22).

71 In determining the probative value of those different factors, it must be noted that parallel conduct cannot be regarded as furnishing proof of concertation unless concertation constitutes the only plausible explanation for such conduct. It is necessary to bear in mind that, although Article 85 of the Treaty prohibits any form of collusion which distorts competition, it does not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors (see the judgment in Suiker Unie, cited above, paragraph 174).

174 ALTHOUGH IT IS CORRECT TO SAY THAT THIS REQUIREMENT OF INDEPENDENCE DOES NOT DEPRIVE ECONOMIC OPERATORS OF THE RIGHT TO ADAPT THEMSELVES INTELLIGENTLY TO THE EXISTING AND ANTICIPATED CONDUCT OF THEIR COMPETITORS, IT DOES HOWEVER STRICTLY PRECLUDE ANY DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN SUCH OPERATORS, THE OBJECT OR EFFECT WHEREOF IS EITHER TO INFLUENCE THE CONDUCT ON THE MARKET OF AN ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL COMPETITOR OR TO DISCLOSE TO SUCH A COMPETITOR THE COURSE OF CONDUCT WHICH THEY THEMSELVES HAVE DECIDED TO ADOPT OR CONTEMPLATE ADOPTING ON THE MARKET .

20. Although it is true that It is true that in Bachmann (paragraph 28) and Case C-300/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I‑305, paragraph 21, the Court accepted that the need to safeguard the coherence of the tax system could justify a restriction on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. Subsequently, however, it has stated that, in Bachmann and Commission v Belgium , there was a direct link, with respect to the taxpayer subject to income tax, between the deductibility of the insurance contributions from taxable income and the later taxation of the sums paid by the insurers under pension and life assurance contracts, and that link had to be maintained in order to preserve the coherence of the tax system concerned (see, inter alia, Case C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson [1995] ECR I‑3955, paragraph 18, and Case C-319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 42). Where there is no such direct link, the argument based on the need to safeguard the coherence of the tax system cannot be relied upon (see, inter alia, Weidert and Paulus , paragraphs 20 and 21).

29 However, it must be recalled that it follows from settled case-law of the Court of Justice that where the grounds of a judgment of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law but the operative part of the judgment is shown to be well founded for other legal reasons, the appeal must be dismissed (see, in particular, judgments of 15 December 1994 in Finsider v Commission, C‑320/92 P, EU:C:1994:414, paragraph 37; 16 December 1999 in CES v E, C‑150/98 P, EU:C:1999:616, paragraph 17, and 13 July 2000 in Salzgitter v Commission, C‑210/98 P, EU:C:2000:397, paragraph 58).

37 However, where the grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance disclose an infringement of Community law but the operative part of the judgment is shown to be well founded for other legal reasons, the appeal must be dismissed (judgment in Case C-30/91 Lestelle v Commission [1992] ECR I-3755, paragraph 28).

26. Secondly, while the second subparagraph of Article 17(5) of the Sixth Directive provides that the calculation rule applies to all mixed use goods and services acquired by a taxable person, the third subparagraph of Article 17(5), which also contains the provision in point (c), begins with the word ‘however’, which implies the existence of exceptions to that rule (judgment in Royal Bank of Scotland , EU:C:2008:750, paragraph 23).

35. In accordance with the case-law of the Court, that applies to all the tax advantages connected with the non-resident’s ability to pay tax which are not taken into account either in the State of residence or in the State of employment (see, to that effect, judgment in Lakebrink and Peters-Lakebrink , C‑182/06, EU:C:2007:452, paragraph 34) and also, mutatis mutandis , in a situation where a retirement pension constitutes the taxable income (judgment in Turpeinen , C‑520/04, EU:C:2006:703, point 29).

29. That reasoning applies mutatis mutandis in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, where a retirement pension constitutes the taxable income.

31 On the one hand, the purpose of Article 94(1) of the regulation is that financial compensation should be paid in respect of the benefit which has been gained by the person who committed the infringement, that benefit corresponding to the amount equivalent to the licence fee which that person has failed to pay (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 July 2012 in Geistbeck, C‑509/10, EU:C:2012:416, paragraph 40). The Court has stated in that regard that Article 94(1) does not provide for reparation for damage other than damage connected to the failure to pay ‘reasonable compensation’ within the meaning of that provision (see judgment of 5 July 2012 in Geistbeck, C‑509/10, EU:C:2012:416, paragraph 50).

43 Even though the procedural rule at issue does not totally deprive the claimants of access to membership, the fact nevertheless remains that, just as in Magorrian and Cunningham, a procedural rule like regulation 12 of the Occupational Pension Regulations prevents the entire record of service completed by those concerned before the two years preceding the date on which they commenced their proceedings from being taken into account for the purposes of calculating the benefits which would be payable even after the date of the claim.

47 Accordingly, the reply to be given to the second question must be that Community law precludes the application, to a claim based on Article 119 of the EC Treaty for recognition of the claimants' entitlement to join an occupational pension scheme, of a national rule under which such entitlement, in the event of a successful claim, is limited to a period which starts to run from a point in time two years prior to commencement of proceedings in connection with the claim.

63. Pour ce faire, les raisons justificatives susceptibles d’être invoquées par un État membre doivent être accompagnées des preuves appropriées ou d’une analyse de l’aptitude et de la proportionnalité de la mesure restrictive adoptée par cet État, ainsi que des éléments précis permettant d’étayer son argumentation (arrêts du 13 novembre 2003, Lindman, C‑42/02, Rec. p. I‑13519, point 25; du 18 mars 2004, Leichtle, C‑8/02, Rec. p. I‑2641, point 45; du 7 juillet 2005, Commission/Autriche, C‑147/03, Rec. p. I‑5969, point 63; du 16 février 2006, Rockler, C‑137/04, Rec. p. I‑1441, point 25, et Öberg, C‑185/04, Rec. p. I‑1453, point 22, ainsi que du 7 juin 2007, Commission/Belgique, précité, point 36).

66 As regards the failure, in a credit agreement, to include certain information relating to the terms of repayment and charges linked to that credit, the Court has also held that, in the light of the objective pursued by Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit (OJ 1987 L 42, p. 48), as amended by Directive 98/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 (OJ 1998 L 101, p. 17) (‘Directive 87/102’), of protecting the consumer against unfair credit terms and of enabling him to have full knowledge of the terms of the future performance of the agreement entered into at the time of concluding such an agreement, Article 4 of that directive, required that the borrower must have to hand all information which could have a bearing on the extent of his liability (see judgment of 9 July 2015, Bucura, C‑348/14, not published, EU:C:2015:447, paragraph 57).

57. S’agissant, deuxièmement, de l’omission dans le contrat de crédit litigieux de la mention de certaines informations relatives aux conditions de remboursement et aux frais liés à ce crédit, la Cour a jugé que, eu égard à l’objectif de protection du consommateur poursuivi par la directive 87/102 contre des conditions de crédit inéquitables et afin de lui permettre d’avoir une entière connaissance des conditions de l’exécution future du contrat souscrit, lors de la conclusion de celui‑ci, l’article 4 de cette directive exige que l’emprunteur détienne l’ensemble des éléments susceptibles d’avoir une incidence sur la portée de son engagement (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Berliner Kindl Brauerei, C‑208/98, EU:C:2000:152, point 21, et ordonnance Pohotovosť, C‑76/10, EU:C:2010:685, point 68).

257. It follows from those principles that, subject to compliance with the upper limit provided for in that decision, which refers to total turnover (see Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 119), it is permissible for the Commission to take account of the turnover of the undertaking concerned in order to assess the gravity of the infringement when determining the amount of the fine, but that disproportionate importance must not be attributed to that turnover by comparison with other relevant factors.

99. Consequently, the protective measures which the Member States are called upon to take by virtue of Article 1 of the Directive must also relate to wild birds whose natural habitat occurs not in the territory of the State in question, but in that of one or more other Member States (see, to this effect, Commission v Belgium , paragraph 22, and Case C-149/94 Vergy [1996] ECR I‑299, paragraphs 17 and 18).

22 HOWEVER, THE PROTECTIVE EFFECT OF THE DIRECTIVE ALSO COVERS SPECIES OF NATURALLY OCCURRING BIRDS IN THE WILD STATE IN THE EUROPEAN TERRITORY OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE WHICH ARE NOT NATURALLY OR USUALLY TO BE FOUND IN THE TERRITORY OF THE BENELUX COUNTRIES BUT WHICH ARE TRANSPORTED THERE, KEPT THERE OR MARKETED THERE, WHETHER ALIVE OR DEAD . THE PROVISION IN QUESTION DOES NOT EXTEND THE PROTECTION PROVIDED FOR BY THE DIRECTIVE TO THOSE GROUPS OF BIRDS . ARTICLE 1 OF THE ROYAL DECREE DOES NOT, THEREFORE, TRANSPOSE THE WIDER PROTECTION REQUIRED BY THE DIRECTIVE COMPLETELY INTO THE BELGIAN LEGAL ORDER .

13. The Court has already held that German child-raising allowance constitutes a social advantage within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1612/68 (see Martínez Sala , paragraph 26).

29 However, the Court has also previously held that the principle of equal treatment does not preclude the correction or amplification of details of a tender, where it is clear that they require clarification or where it is a question of the correction of obvious clerical errors, subject, however, to the fulfilment of certain requirements (see, to that effect, in the context of tendering procedures under Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114), judgments of 29 March 2012, SAG ELV Slovensko and Others, C‑599/10, EU:C:2012:191, paragraphs 35 to 45, concerning the evaluation of offers stage, and of 10 October 2013, Manova, C‑336/12, EU:C:2013:647, paragraphs 30 to 39, concerning the stage of pre-selection of tenderers).

36. By its very nature, the restricted public procurement procedure means that, once the tenderers have been selected and once their respective tenders have been submitted, in principle those tenders can no longer be amended either at the request of the contracting authority or at the request of the tenderers. The principle of equal treatment of tenderers and the obligation of transparency resulting therefrom preclude, in that procedure, any negotiation between the contracting authority and one or other of the tenderers.

36 The Court has repeatedly held that trade mark rights constitute an essential element in the system of undistorted competition which EU law seeks to establish and maintain. Within such a system, undertakings must be able to retain customers by virtue of the quality of their goods or services, something which is possible only if there are distinctive signs enabling customers to identify those goods and services. For the trade mark to be able to play that part, it must offer a guarantee that all the goods which bear it have been manufactured under the control of a single undertaking that may be held accountable for the quality of those goods (judgments of 17 October 1990, HAG GF, C‑10/89, EU:C:1990:359, paragraph 13, and of 11 July 1996, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others, C‑427/93, C‑429/93 and C‑436/93, EU:C:1996:282, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

46. It follows from that case-law that that obligation holds good for any case in which a Member State breaches EU law, whichever public authority is responsible for the breach and whichever public authority is in principle, under the law of the Member State concerned, responsible for making reparation (see, to that effect, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame , paragraph 32; C‑302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I‑3099, paragraph 62; Case C‑424/97 Haim [2000] ECR I‑5123, paragraph 27; and Case C‑224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I‑10239, paragraph 31).

62 It is for each Member State to ensure that individuals obtain reparation for damage caused to them by non-compliance with Community law, whichever public authority is responsible for the breach and whichever public authority is in principle, under the law of the Member State concerned, responsible for making reparation. A Member State cannot, therefore, plead the distribution of powers and responsibilities between the bodies which exist in its national legal order in order to free itself from liability on that basis.

104 Consequently, the transfer rules constitute an obstacle to freedom of movement for workers prohibited in principle by Article 48 of the Treaty. It could only be otherwise if those rules pursued a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and were justified by pressing reasons of public interest. But even if that were so, application of those rules would still have to be such as to ensure achievement of the aim in question and not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose (see, inter alia, the judgment in Kraus, cited above, paragraph 32, and Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 37). Existence of justifications

24. It must first be borne in mind that, according to established case-law, Community law does not preclude a Member State from requiring an undertaking established in another Member State which provides services in the territory of the first Member State to pay its workers the minimum remuneration laid down by the national rules of that State (Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/81 Seco and Desquenne & Giral [1982] ECR 223, paragraph 14; Case C-272/94 Guiot [1996] ECR I-1905, paragraph 12; Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraph 33; Case C-165/98 Mazzoleni and ISA [2001] ECR I‑2189, paragraphs 28 and 29; and Case C-164/99 Portugaia Construções [2002] ECR I-787, paragraph 21). The application of such rules must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue, that is to say, the protection of posted workers, and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective (see to that effect, inter alia, Arblade and Others , cited above, paragraph 35, Mazzoleni and ISA , cited above, paragraph 26, and Case C‑60/03 Wolff & Müller [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 34).

14 IT IS WELL-ESTABLISHED THAT COMMUNITY LAW DOES NOT PRECLUDE MEMBER STATES FROM APPLYING THEIR LEGISLATION , OR COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY BOTH SIDES OF INDUSTRY RELATING TO MINIMUM WAGES , TO ANY PERSON WHO IS EMPLOYED , EVEN TEMPORARILY , WITHIN THEIR TERRITORY , NO MATTER IN WHICH COUNTRY THE EMPLOYER IS ESTABLISHED , JUST AS COMMUNITY LAW DOES NOT PROHIBIT MEMBER STATES FROM ENFORCING THOSE RULES BY APPROPRIATE MEANS . HOWEVER , IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DESCRIBE AS AN APPROPRIATE MEANS ANY RULE OR PRACTICE WHICH IMPOSES A GENERAL REQUIREMENT TO PAY SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS , OR OTHER SUCH CHARGES AFFECTING THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES , ON ALL PERSONS PROVIDING SERVICES WHO ARE ESTABLISHED IN OTHER MEMBER STATES AND EMPLOY WORKERS WHO ARE NATIONALS OF NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES , IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THOSE PERSONS HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE LEGISLATION ON MINIMUM WAGES IN THE MEMBER STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICES ARE PROVIDED , BECAUSE SUCH A GENERAL MEASURE IS BY ITS NATURE UNLIKELY TO MAKE EMPLOYERS COMPLY WITH THAT LEGISLATION OR TO BE OF ANY BENEFIT WHATSOEVER TO THE WORKERS IN QUESTION .

24 Next, where a provision of Community law is open to several interpretations, only one of which can ensure that the provision retains its effectiveness, preference must be given to that interpretation (see, to that effect, the judgment in Case 187/87 Saarland and Others v Ministre de l'Industrie [1988] ECR 5013, paragraph 19).

42 In the absence of fraud or abuse and subject to any adjustments to be made under the conditions laid down in Article 20 of the Sixth Directive, entitlement to deduct, once it has arisen, is retained even if the taxable person has been unable to use the goods or services which gave rise to a deduction in the context of taxable transactions by reason of circumstances beyond his control. In such a case, there is no risk of fraud or abuse capable of justifying subsequent repayment of the sums deducted (Ghent Coal Terminal, paragraphs 20 and 22).

22 However, when circumstances beyond the control of the taxable person have prevented him from using the goods or services giving rise to deduction for the needs of his taxable transactions, there is no risk of fraud or abuse capable of justifying subsequent repayment.

47. Likewise, Article 3(1)(g) EC also cannot, by itself, produce legal obligations for the Member States. That provision is limited to indicating, as the Court has already clarified, an objective which must, however, be specified more closely in other provisions of the Treaty, in particular those concerning competition rules (see, to that effect, Case 322/81 Nederlandsche Banden‑Industrie‑Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 29, and Alsthom Atlantique , paragraph 10).

24. Thus, where powers of taxation are exercised by a State in the territory in which activity has generated taxable income, it must be possible for the costs directly connected to that activity to be taken into account in the taxation of non-residents. In that connection, Community law does not preclude a Member State from going further, by allowing costs that do not have such a connection to be taken into account (see, to that effect, FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen, paragraphs 50 to 52).

51. This question must be answered in the light of the considerations on the previous question and bearing in mind the fact that the Court does not have the material to make a comparison between the situations of resident and non-resident providers of services. While the expenses which the provider of services has reported to his debtor must be deducted in the procedure for the retention of tax at source, Articles 59 and 60 of the EEC Treaty do not preclude the taking into account if appropriate of expenses that are not directly linked, within the meaning of the Gerritse line of case-law, to the economic activity that generated the taxable income, in a subsequent refund procedure.

51. The Court cannot, in the face of the clear and precise wording of a provision such as Article 2(1) of the Thirteenth Directive, interpret that provision with the intention of correcting it and thereby extending the obligations of the Member States relating to it (see, by analogy, Case C‑48/07 Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves [2008] ECR I-10627, paragraph 44).

29. Furthermore, the Court has already held that where a Member State has a system for preventing or mitigating a series of charges to tax or economic double taxation for dividends paid to residents by resident companies, it must treat dividends paid to residents by non-resident companies in the same way (see, to that effect, Case C-315/02 Lenz [2004] ECR I-7063, paragraphs 27 to 49; Manninen , paragraphs 29 to 55, and Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation [2006] ECR I-11673, paragraph 55).

39. An argument based on the need to preserve the coherence of the Austrian tax system cannot therefore be accepted.

90. However, it follows from the case-law of the Court that the fact that the Commission, in the past, imposed fines of a certain level for certain types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising that level within the limits indicated in Regulation No 17 if that is necessary to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy, but that, on the contrary, the proper application of the Community competition rules requires that the Commission may at any time adjust the level of fines to the needs of that policy (see Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraph 227).

57. The fact that such a product is unsuitable for human consumption is equally irrelevant for its classification under CN code 2207. As is apparent from its very title, Directive 92/83 seeks to harmonise in a general manner the structures of excise duties on both alcoholic beverages and alcohol (Case C‑163/09 Repertoire Culinaire [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 27 and 29).

29. In addition, it must be noted that, as is apparent from its title, Directive 92/83 seeks to harmonise in a general manner the structures of excise duties on both alcoholic beverages and alcohol.

55 In that regard it should be pointed out that even though Article 8(1) of Regulation No 729/70 did not include provisions as specific as those of Article 17(4) of Regulation (EEC) No 2456/93, the fact remains that, according to settled case-law of the Court, that provision, which constitutes an expression, in the sphere of agriculture, of the obligations imposed on Member States by Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10 EC), defines the principles according to which the Community and the Member States must ensure the implementation of Community decisions on agricultural intervention financed by the EAGGF and combat fraud and irregularities in relation to those operations (see Joined Cases 146/81, 192/81 and 193/81 BayWa and Others v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung [1982] ECR 1503, paragraph 13). It imposes on the Member States the general obligation to take the measures necessary to satisfy themselves that the transactions financed by the EAGGF are actually carried out and are executed correctly, even if the specific Community act does not expressly provide for the adoption of particular supervisory measures (see Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission [1990] ECR I-2321, paragraphs 16 and 17 and Case C-209/96 United Kingdom v Commission [1998] ECR I-5655, paragraph 43).

27. According to the case-law of the Court, in interpreting a provision of European Union law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (Case C-150/10 Beneo-Orafti [2011] ECR I-6843, paragraph 41 and case-law cited).

41. However, according to settled case‑law, in interpreting a provision of European Union law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Case C‑116/10 Feltgen and Bacino Charter Company [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 12).

78. In that regard, it must be pointed out that a significant proportion of VAT fraud arises in connection with genuine or claimed intra-Community trade and, moreover, that the Court of Justice has previously held that the mutual assistance of and administrative cooperation between the tax authorities of the Member States concerned is of fundamental importance for the purposes, inter alia, of ensuring that intra-Community acquisitions do not escape payment of VAT (see, to that effect, Case C‑285/09 R [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 52).

40. The rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article 6.1 of Regulation No 44/2001 provides that a person may, where he is one of a number of defendants, be sued in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided that the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings (see Case C‑145/10 Painer [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 73).

73. The rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 provides that a person may, where he is one of a number of defendants, be sued in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.

23. In accordance with settled case-law of the Court, in the absence of relevant European Union rules, the detailed procedural rules designed to ensure the protection of the rights which individuals acquire under European Union law are a matter for the domestic legal order of each Member State, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States, provided that they are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the European Union legal order (principle of effectiveness) (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-392/04 and C-422/04 i-21 Germany and Arcor [2006] ECR I-8559, paragraph 57, and Case C-262/09 Meilicke and Others [2011] ECR I-5669, paragraph 55).

51. That interpretation of Directive 2001/18 is substantiated by the requirement, referred to in the third indent of Article 25(4) thereof, that information concerning the environmental risk assessment may not be kept confidential. Indeed, such an assessment is possible only with full knowledge of the proposed release, because, without such information, it would not be possible validly to assess the potential effects of a deliberate release of GMOs on human health and the environment (see, to that effect, Case C‑121/07 Commission v France , paragraphs 75 and 77).

77. As previously stated, where failure to comply with a judgment of the Court is likely to harm the environment and endanger human health, the protection of which is, indeed, one of the Community’s environmental policy objectives, as is apparent from Article 174 EC, such a breach is of a particularly serious nature (see, to that effect, Commission v Greece , paragraph 94, and Commission v Spain , paragraph 57).

45. It follows from Article 2(2) of the Aarhus Convention, read together with Articles 6 and 9 of the Convention, and from Article 1(5) of Directive 85/337 that neither the Convention nor the directive applies to projects adopted by a legislative act satisfying the conditions set out in paragraph 31 above (see Boxus and Others , paragraph 50).

32 Likewise the reference in Article 13 to the rights which an injured person may rely on under a special liability system existing at the time when the Directive was notified must be construed, as is clear from the third clause of the 13th recital thereto, as referring to a specific scheme limited to a given sector of production (see judgments of today in Case C-52/00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 13 to 23, and Case C-154/00 Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 9 to 19).

22 The reference in Article 13 of the Directive to the rights which an injured person may rely on under the rules of the law of contractual or non-contractual liability must be interpreted as meaning that the system of rules put in place by the Directive, which in Article 4 enables the victim to seek compensation where he proves damage, the defect in the product and the causal link between that defect and the damage, does not preclude the application of other systems of contractual or non-contractual liability based on other grounds, such as fault or a warranty in respect of latent defects.

64 In that connection, it is essential that, where they act in that context, the voluntary associations do not pursue objectives other than those mentioned in the previous paragraph of the present judgment, do not make any profit as a result of their services, apart from the reimbursement of the variable, fixed and on-going expenditure necessary to provide them, and do not procure any profit for their members. Furthermore, although it is permissible to maintain a workforce, for it would, without one, be almost impossible for those associations to act effectively in numerous domains in which the principle of the good of the community may naturally be implemented, the activities of those associations must strictly comply with the requirements laid down by national law (judgment in Azienda sanitaria locale No 5 Spezzino and Others, C‑113/13, EU:C:2014:2440, paragraph 61).

49. That question is of particular importance, for VAT purposes, for applying the rate of tax or the exemption provisions in the Sixth Directive (see Case C-349/96 CPP [1999] ECR I-973, paragraph 27 and Case C-41/04 Levob Verzerkeringen and OV Bank [2005] ECR I-9433, paragraph 18).

18. As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that the question of the extent of a transaction is of particular importance, for VAT purposes, both for identifying the place where the taxable transactions take place and for applying the rate of tax or, where appropriate, the exemption provisions in the Sixth Directive (Case C‑349/96 CPP [1999] ECR I‑973, paragraph 27).

27 It should be observed at the outset that Article 226 EC enables the Commission to institute proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations each time it considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under Community law, without its being required to draw distinctions based on the nature or gravity of the infringement, since such proceedings are based on the objective finding that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty or secondary legislation (see Case 301/81 Commission v Belgium [1983] ECR 467, paragraph 8; Case C-209/88 Commission v Italy [1990] ECR I-4313, paragraph 13; Case C-71/97 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-5991, paragraph 14, and Case C-333/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1025, paragraphs 32 and 33).

254. As regards the second argument, it must be borne in mind that, in an appeal, the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, first, to examine to what extent the Court of First Instance took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all the essential factors needed to assess the gravity of particular conduct in the light of Article 81 EC and Article 15 of Regulation No 17 and, second, to consider whether the Court of First Instance responded to a sufficient legal standard to all the arguments raised by the appellant with a view to having the fine cancelled or reduced ( Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraph 244 and the case-law there cited).

244. It should be borne in mind, second, that in the context of an appeal the purpose of review by the Court of Justice is, first, to examine to what extent the Court of First Instance took into consideration, in a legally correct manner, all the essential factors to assess the gravity of particular conduct in the light of Article 85 of the Treaty and Article 15 of Regulation No 17 and, second, to consider whether the Court of First Instance responded to a sufficient legal standard to all the arguments raised by the appellant with a view to having the fine cancelled or reduced (see, in particular, Baustahlgewebe v Commission , cited above, paragraph 128, and Case C-359/01 P British Sugar v Commission [2004] ECR I-4933, paragraph 47).

29. Whilst it is true that, in a sector which has not been subject to full harmonisation at Community level, Member States remain, in principle, competent to define the conditions for the pursuit of the activities in that sector, they must, when exercising their powers, respect the basic freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty (see Case C‑514/03 Commission v Spain [2006] ECR I‑963, paragraph 23, and Case C‑257/05 Commission v Austria [2006] ECR I‑134, paragraph 18).

22. It must, however, be borne in mind that the reasons which may be invoked by a Member State by way of justification must be accompanied by an analysis of the appropriateness and proportionality of the restrictive measure adopted by that State (Case C-8/02 Leichtle [2004] ECR I-2641, paragraph 45).

45. However, the reasons which may be invoked by a Member State by way of justification must be accompanied by an analysis of the appropriateness and proportionality of the restrictive measure adopted by that State.

37. In contrast to the legal contexts which led respectively to the judgments in Candolin and Others and in Farrell , those national rules do not have the effect, therefore, where the victim, who in the present case was a passenger in a vehicle involved in such an accident, contributes to his own loss or injury, of automatically excluding or limiting disproportionately the right of that victim to compensation by means of compulsory insurance against the civil liability of the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident (see Carvalho Ferreira Santos , paragraph 43, and Ambrósio Lavrador and Olival Ferreira Bonifácio , paragraph 34).

58. First, the Court of First Instance did not err in law in holding that the guidelines of the United Kingdom Patent Office which, according to the appellant, confirm the descriptive character of the silhouette of the fir tree for the goods in question, were of no relevance. As the Court of First Instance rightly observes, the Community trade mark regime is an autonomous system with its own set of rules and objectives peculiar to it and applies independently of any national system, and the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal must be evaluated solely on the basis of Regulation No 40/94, as it is interpreted by the Community Courts (see, to that effect, Case C-238/06 P Develey v OHIM [2007] ECR I‑9375, paragraphs 65 and 66).

66. Consequently, the mark applied for must be assessed only on the basis of relevant Community rules and the national decision can under no circumstances call in question the legality of either the contested decision or the judgment under appeal.

57 First, it should be borne in mind that Article 60 of the Treaty does not require that the service be paid for by those for whom it is performed (Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders and Others [1988] ECR 2085, paragraph 16, and Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège [2000] ECR I-2549, paragraph 56).

88. With regard, first, to the right to property of importers of third-country bananas, the Court has already held that that right is not undermined by the introduction of the Community quota and the rules for its subdivision. No economic operator can claim a right to property in a market share which he held at a time before the establishment of a common organisation of a market, since such a market share constitutes only a momentary economic position exposed to the risks of changing circumstances (see Case C‑280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I‑4973, paragraph 79, and Case C‑122/95 Germany v Council [1998] ECR I‑973, paragraph 77).

77 With reference to infringement of the right to property, the applicant submits that by depriving operators who traditionally marketed third-country bananas of market shares for a long period of time, the Regulation breached those operators' right to property and infringed their freedom to pursue their trade or business.

54 As the Court pointed out at paragraph 51 of its judgment in Belgium v Commission, cited above, the Commission withdrew that charge, which had been made in Annex II to its 1993 summary report; it also stated that Decision 97/333 was not based on that charge. However, the contested Decision is based on the same grounds as Decision 97/333.

51. As the Court has repeatedly held, the deduction system is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject to VAT (see, among others, Case 268/83 Rompelman [1985] ECR 655, paragraph 19; Case 50/87 Commission v France [1988] ECR 4797, paragraph 15; Case C-37/95 Ghent Coal Terminal [1998] ECR I-1, paragraph 15; and Case C-465/03 Kretztechnik [2005] ECR I‑4357, paragraph 34).

15 With regard to the first part of this question, the Court has stated repeatedly that the deduction system is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of value added tax consequently ensures that all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject to VAT, are taxed in a wholly neutral way (see in particular Case 268/83 Rompelman v Minister van Financiën [1985] ECR 655, paragraph 19, and Case 50/87 Commission v France [1988] ECR 4797, paragraph 15).

53. According to settled case-law, the interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 234 EC, the Court gives to a rule of Community law clarifies and defines, where appropriate, the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time it was brought into force. It follows that the rule as thus interpreted may, and must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships which arose and were established before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions for bringing a dispute relating to the application of that rule before the competent courts are satisfied (see, in particular, Case 24/86 Blaizot [1988] ECR 379, paragraph 27, and Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 141).

29. It must, first, be recalled that the transactions which are, or may be, subjected by the Member States to capital duty are laid down in Article 4 of Directive 69/335 (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-280/91 Viessmann [1993] ECR I-971, paragraph 12; Bautiaa and Société française maritime , paragraphs 31 and 32; and Case C-152/97 Agas [1998] ECR I-6553, paragraphs 19 and 20).

12 In answering that question, it should be borne in mind that the directive harmonizes both the structure and the rate of indirect taxes on the raising of capital within the Community and that Article 4 of the directive lists the transactions which the Member States may or must, according to the category, subject to capital duty.

28. The Court has explained this concept of ‘redundancy’ by stating that it has a Community law meaning and has to be interpreted as including any termination of contract of employment not sought by the worker, and therefore without his consent (Case C-55/02 Commission v Portugal [2004] ECR I-9387, paragraphs 49 and 50).

26. It should be borne in mind at the outset that, as the German Government maintains, the exemptions envisaged in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia, Case C‑2/95 SDC [1997] ECR I‑3017, paragraph 20; Case C‑141/00 Kügler [2002] ECR I‑6833, paragraph 28; and Case C‑45/01 Dornier [2003] ECR I‑12911, paragraph 42). However, the interpretation of the terms used in that provision must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions and comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT (see Kügler , paragraph 29, and Dornier , paragraph 42).

28 That interpretation is not contradicted by the Court's case-law according to which the exemptions envisaged in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, in particular, SDC, cited above, paragraph 20).

31 Article 66(5) of Regulation No 817/2004 provides in addition that, where support is multiannual, payments subsequent to that made in the year in which an application was submitted must be made in response to an annual application for payment, except where the Member State has introduced an effective annual verification procedure as referred to in Article 67(1). It is apparent from that Article 66(5) that, apart from the existence of such a national procedure, no payment is made to farmers if they do not submit an annual application for payment. Submission of that annual application thus constitutes a condition governing eligibility for receiving agri-environmental aid on the basis of Articles 22 to 24 (judgment of 7 February 2013 in Pusts, C‑454/11, EU:C:2013:64, paragraph 32).

80. As a preliminary, it must be pointed out, in the first place, that a collecting society, such as OSA, is an undertaking to which Article 102 TFEU applies (see, to that effect, Case 127/73 BRT and Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs [1974] ECR 313, paragraphs 6 and 7, ‘ BRT II ’).

7 THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO GIVE JUDGMENT ON A REQUEST FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING, WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 177, NOTIFIED BY A NATIONAL COURT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 20 OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE .

42. Consequently, where a taxable person chooses to treat an entire building as forming part of the assets of his business and uses part of that building for private purposes he is both entitled to deduct the input VAT paid on all construction costs relating to that building and subject to the corresponding obligation to pay VAT on the amount of expenditure incurred to effect such use ( Wollny , paragraph 24).

52 It is also settled case-law that the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia, Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties, cited above, paragraph 13, Bulthuis-Griffioen, cited above, paragraph 19, SDC, cited above, paragraph 19, and Case C-216/97 Gregg v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1999] ECR I-4947, paragraph 12).

19 At paragraph 13 of the same judgment the Court held that the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that turnover tax is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person.

18. National legislation intended to apply only to those shareholdings which enable the holder to exert a definite influence on a company’s decisions and to determine its activities falls within the scope of Article 49 TFEU on freedom of establishment (judgments in Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , C‑35/11, EU:C:2012:707, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited and Hervis Sport- és Divatkereskedelmi , C‑385/12, EU:C:2014:47, paragraph 22).

25 As the Commission has argued in its written observations, that latter question should be interpreted as seeking to establish which supply, of the loan or of the goods, determines the regime applicable to the integrated cooperation operation. Indeed, since ancillary supplies share the VAT treatment of the principal supply (judgment of 2 December 2010, Everything Everywhere, C‑276/09, EU:C:2010:730, paragraph 24), if the grant of a loan constituted the principal supply, the entire transaction would be exempt from VAT by virtue of Article 135(1)(b) of the VAT Directive.

24. That is so in particular in cases where one or more elements are to be regarded as constituting the principal service, whilst one or more elements are to be regarded, by contrast, as ancillary services which share the tax treatment of the principal service (see, inter alia, CPP , paragraph 30; Case C‑34/99 Primback [2001] ECR I‑3833, paragraph 45; RLRE Tellmer Property , paragraph 18; and order of 14 May 2008 in Joined Cases C‑231/07 and C‑232/07 Tiercé Ladbroke and Derby , paragraph 21).

28. More specifically, a Member State may not charge tax on imported second-hand motor vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that they are taxed more heavily than similar second-hand cars on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark , paragraph 22). The taxable value imputed to the imported second-hand vehicle by the revenue authorities should faithfully reflect the value of a similar second-hand vehicle already registered on the domestic market (see, inter alia, Weigel , paragraph 71).

40. If those structures and the ground on which they stand cannot be classified as ‘buildings’ within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 12(2) of the VAT Directive, a distinction must be drawn depending on whether there are distinct supplies of land and of other elements or one single transaction consisting primarily of the supply of land (see, to that effect, Case C‑461/08 Don Bosco Onroerend Goed [2009] ECR I‑11079, paragraphs 35 to 38). It should also be ascertained whether the land in question falls within the definition of ‘building land’ in Article 12(3) of the VAT Directive. If so, the supplies would be taxable. If not, the supplies would be exempt in accordance with Article 135(1)(k) of the directive, subject to a possible right to opt for taxation.

35. It is true that it follows from Article 2 of the Sixth Directive that every supply or transaction must normally be regarded as distinct and independent (see, to that effect, particularly Part Service , paragraph 50 and the case-law cited, as well as Case C‑572/07 RLRE Tellmer Property [2009] ECR I–0000, paragraph 17).

21. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives pursued by the exemptions provided for in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive and comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Thus, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 13 should be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effect (see, to that effect, Case C-445/05 Haderer [2007] ECR I-4841, paragraph 18, and Case C-461/08 Don Bosco Onroerend Goed [2009] ECR I-11079, paragraph 25.

25 That conclusion cannot validly be called into question by the argument made by the Council based, first, on the fact that the Bulgarian language version of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court is the only one to contain the ambiguity pointed out by the applicant and, second, on the case-law of the Court according to which the need to apply and interpret EU law uniformly precludes the examination of a provision in one of the language versions in isolation, but requires, on the contrary, its interpretation in the light of all the other language versions in accordance with its author’s intention (see, to that effect, the judgments of 12 November 1969, Stauder, 29/69, EU:C:1969:57, paragraph 3; of 17 July 1997, Ferriere Nord v Commission, C‑219/95 P, EU:C:1997:375, paragraph 15, and of 15 October 2015, Grupo Itevelesa and Others, C‑168/14, EU:C:2015:685, paragraph 42).

42. It should be noted, in regard to this linguistic divergence, that, according to settled case-law, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in that regard. The provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied in a uniform manner, in the light of the versions established in all the languages of the European Union. Where there is a divergence between the various language versions of a provision of EU law, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part (see judgment in Kurcums Metal , C‑558/11, EU:C:2012:721, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

59. In order to assess the implications of Article 51 of Regulation No 800/1999, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with recitals 63 and 64 in the preamble to that regulation, the purpose of the EU legislation, in the light of experience, is to combat irregularities and notably fraud harmful to the EU budget, by providing for penalties designed to encourage exporters to comply with rules in this field (see, to that effect, judgment in Elfering Export , C‑27/05, EU:C:2006:260, paragraph 31), the subjective aspect of the fault committed having no impact in that regard (judgment in Eurofit , EU:C:2013:487, paragraph 38).

76. According to the Court’s settled case-law, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is among the fundamental principles of EU law and any economic operator whom an institution has, by giving him precise insurances, caused to entertain justified expectations may rely on that principle (see, to that effect, Case C‑369/09 P ISD Polska and Others v Commission [2011] ECR I‑2011, paragraphs 122 and 123, and Case C‑335/09 P Poland v Commission [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 180).

180. According to the Court’s settled case-law, any economic operator on whose part an institution has promoted reasonable expectations may rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. Furthermore, while the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union, economic operators are not justified in having a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the Community institutions in the exercise of their discretionary power will be maintained, particularly in an area such as that of the common organisation of the markets, the objective of which involves constant adjustment to reflect changes in economic circumstances (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-37/02 and C-38/02 Di Lenardo and Dilexport [2004] ECR I-6911, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).

48. In that regard, it should be noted that the Court has consistently held that, in interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the aims of the rules of which it forms part (see, inter alia , Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 50, and Case C-191/99 Kvaerner [2001] ECR I-4447, paragraph 30).

181. The General Court did not err in law in pointing out, at paragraph 416 of the judgment under appeal, that in the determination of the amount of the fine in a case of infringement of the competition rules, the Commission fulfils its obligation to state reasons when it indicates in its decision the factors which enabled it to determine the gravity of the infringement and its duration, and it is not required to indicate the figures relating to the method of calculating the fines (see Case C‑280/98 P Weig v Commission EU:C:2000:627, paragraphs 43 to 46; Case C‑291/98 P Sarrió v Commission EU:C:2000:631, paragraphs 73 to 76; and Joined Cases, C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑245/99 P, C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C‑252/99 P and C‑254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission EU:C:2002:582, paragraphs 463 to 464).

75 The fact that more specific information, such as the turnover achieved by the undertakings or the rates of reduction applied by the Commission, were communicated subsequently, at a press conference or during the proceedings before the Court of First Instance, is not such as to call in question the finding in paragraph 348 of the contested judgment. Where the author of a contested decision provides explanations to supplement a statement of reasons which is already adequate in itself, that does not go to the question whether the duty to state reasons has been complied with, though it may serve a useful purpose in relation to review by the Community court of the adequacy of the grounds of the decision, since it enables the institution to explain the reasons underlying its decision.

26 Goods are supplied `for consideration' within the meaning of Article 2, point 1, of the Sixth Directive only if there is a legal relationship between the supplier and the purchaser entailing reciprocal performance, the price received by the supplier constituting the value actually given in return for the goods supplied (see, to that effect, concerning the supply of services, Case C-16/93 Tolsma [1994] ECR I-743, paragraph 14).

146. However, such a question is purely hypothetical and therefore inadmissible (see Joined Cases C‑188/10 and C‑189/10 Melki and Abdeli [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 27 and the case‑law cited).

27. In that regard, suffice it to point out that, according to settled case‑law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C‑333/07 Regie Networks [2008] ECR I‑10807, paragraph 46; Case C‑478/07 Budejovicky Budvar [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 63; and Case C‑56/09 Zanotti [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 15).

34. Moreover, that principle precludes national legislation which curtails, retroactively and without any transitional arrangements, the period within which repayment of the sums collected in breach of EU law could be sought (see judgment in Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation , EU:C:2013:834, paragraph 38).

30 In that judgment, the Court held, in paragraph 15, that a complex contract concerning a range of services provided in return for a lump sum paid by the customer did not constitute a tenancy of immovable property within the meaning of Article 16(1) of the Brussels Convention.

15 A complex contract of that type, which concerns a range of services provided in return for a lump sum paid by the customer, is outside the scope within which the exclusive jurisdiction laid down by Article 16(1) finds its raison d' être and cannot constitute a "tenancy agreement" within the meaning of that article as interpreted in the judgment in Sanders v Van der Putte, cited above.

57 Nor are those measures contrary to the principle of proportionality. The Commission decision approving the MAGP leaves the United Kingdom considerable freedom to evaluate and choose the measures to be taken in order to implement the plan. When considering whether the exercise of such freedom is lawful, the courts cannot substitute their own evaluation for that of the competent authority, but must restrict themselves to examining whether the evaluation of the latter contains a patent error or constitutes a misuse of power (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 57/72 Westzucker v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Zucker [1973] ECR 321, paragraph 14, and Case 78/74 Deuka v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Getreide [1975] ECR 421, paragraph 9).

20. Article 9 of the Sixth Directive contains rules for determining the place where services are deemed to be supplied for tax purposes. Article 9(1) sets out a general rule in that regard, while Article 9(2) lists a number of specific connecting rules. The object of those provisions is to avoid, first, conflicts of jurisdiction, which may result in double taxation, and, secondly, non-taxation (Case 168/84 Berkholz [1985] ECR 2251, paragraph 14; Case C-327/94 Dudda [1996] ECR I-4595, paragraph 20; and Case C-291/07 Kollektivavtalsstiftelsen TRR Trygghetsrådet [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24).

20 As regards the relationship between Article 9(1) and Article 9(2), the Court has already held that Article 9(2) sets out a number of specific instances of places where certain services are deemed to be supplied, whereas Article 9(1) lays down the general rule on the matter. The object of those provisions is to avoid, first, conflicts of jurisdiction, which may result in double taxation, and, secondly, non-taxation, as Article 9(3) indicates, albeit only as regards specific situations (Case 168/84 Berkholz v Finanzamt Hamburg-Mitte-Altstadt [1985] ECR 2251, paragraph 14).

34. It is settled case‑law that, although the Court may not, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, rule upon the compatibility of a provision of domestic law with European Union law or interpret domestic legislation or regulations, it may nevertheless provide the national court with an interpretation of European Union law on all such points as may enable that court to determine the issue of compatibility for the purposes of the case before it (see, inter alia, Case C-292/92 Hünermund and Others [1993] ECR‑I-6787, paragraph 8, and Joined Cases C‑285/99 and C‑286/99 Lombardini and Mantovani [2001] ECR I‑9233, paragraph 27).

60. Any other solution would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty which, as is clear from settled case-law, requires, particularly, that rules of law be clear, precise and predictable in their effects, in particular where they may have negative consequences on individuals (see, to that effect, Case C-143/93 Van Es Douane Agenten [1996] ECR I-431, paragraph 27, and Case C-158/07 Förster [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 67).

67. According to settled case-law, the principle of legal certainty – which is one of the general principles of Community law – requires, particularly, that rules of law be clear, precise and predictable in their effects, in particular where they may have negative consequences on individuals and undertakings (see, to that effect, Case C-143/93 Van Es Douane Agenten [1996] ECR I-431, paragraph 27, and Case C‑347/06 ASM Brescia [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 69).

17 It must be pointed out at the outset that it has been consistently held since Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 48, that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual, in this case a private-sector employer, and thus cannot be relied upon as such against such a person.

48 Although the offsetting system is indeed based on the principle of financial neutrality inasmuch as the total of the levies collected must be equivalent to the total of the reimbursements paid, as is evident from Article 6(2) of Regulation No 1358/77 and from the case-law of the Court of Justice (see Case 121/83 Zuckerfabrik Franken v Hauptzollamt Würzburg [1984] ECR 2039, paragraph 26), that balance must be achieved at Community level and not at the level of the Member State or the undertaking concerned (see Case C-242/96 Italy v Commission [1998] ECR I-5863, paragraph 118).

118 Although the compensation system is indeed based on the principle of financial neutrality in that the levies collected must be equivalent to the reimbursement paid, as is evident from Article 6(2) of Regulation No 1358/77 and the case-law of the Court of Justice (see Case 121/83 Zuckerfabrik Franken v Hauptzollamt Würzburg [1984] ECR 2039, paragraph 26), that balance must be achieved at Community level and not at the level of the Member State or the undertaking concerned as the Advocate General has indicated at points 138 and 140 of his Opinion.

25. It follows from the Court’s settled case-law that the measures prohibited by Article 63(1) TFEU, as restrictions on the movement of capital, include those that are such as to discourage non-residents from making investments in a Member State or to discourage that Member State’s residents from doing so in other States (see judgment in C‑338/11 to C‑347/11 Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others , EU:C:2012:286, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited, and judgment in C‑375/12 Bouanich , EU:C:2014:138, paragraph 43).

72. The Court has also stated that the appraisal of the facts by the General Court does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (Case C‑397/03 P Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission [2006] ECR I‑4429, paragraph 85, and ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission , paragraph 180).

180. The Court has also stated that the appraisal of the facts by the General Court does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (Case C‑397/03 P Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission [2006] ECR I‑4429, paragraph 85, and order in EREF v Commission , paragraph 42).

37 In addition, the obligation on a national court to refer to the content of a directive when interpreting and applying the relevant rules of domestic law is limited by general principles of law, particularly those of legal certainty and non-retroactivity, and that obligation cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem (judgment of 15 April 2008, Impact, C‑268/06, EU:C:2008:223, paragraph 100).

30. In the absence of any unifying or harmonising Community measures, Member States retain the power to define, by treaty or unilaterally, the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation, particularly with a view to eliminating double taxation (see Gilly , paragraphs 24 and 30; Case C‑307/97 Saint-Gobain ZN [1999] ECR I‑6161, paragraph 57; Amurta , paragraph 17; and Orange European Smallcap Fund , paragraph 32). It is for the Member States to take the measures necessary to prevent situations of double taxation by applying, in particular, the criteria followed in international tax practice (see Kerckhaert and Morres , paragraph 23).

23. Consequently, it is for the Member States to take the measures necessary to prevent situations such as that at issue in the main proceedings by applying, in particular, the apportionment criteria followed in international tax practice. The purpose of the France-Belgium Convention is essentially to apportion fiscal sovereignty between the French Republic and the Kingdom of Belgium in those situations. However, that convention is not at issue in the preliminary reference at hand.

22 As the Court has emphasized in previous judgments, in interpreting a provision of Community law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it is part (Case 292/82 Merck v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12, and Case 337/82 St Nikolaus Brennerei v Hauptzollamt Krefeld [1984] ECR 1051, paragraph 10).

48. The fact nevertheless remains that, when exercising that power, Member States must comply with EU law and, in particular, with the provisions on the freedom to provide services (see, inter alia, Case C‑157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, paragraphs 44 to 46; Müller-Fauré and van Riet , paragraph 100; Watts , paragraph 92; Elchinov , paragraph 40; Case C‑211/08 Commission v Spain [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 53; and Commission v Luxembourg , paragraph 32).

40. Secondly, it must also be borne in mind that, as submitted by the Governments which have submitted observations in the present case, it is established that European Union law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organise their social security systems and that, in the absence of harmonisation at European Union level, it is for the legislation of each Member State to determine the conditions for the grant of social security benefits. The fact nevertheless remains that, when exercising that power, Member States must comply with European Union law and, in particular, with the provisions on the freedom to provide services which prohibit the Member States from introducing or maintaining unjustified restrictions on the exercise of that freedom in the healthcare sector (see in particular, to that effect, Watts , paragraph 92 and the case-law cited; Case C‑444/05 Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I‑3185, paragraph 23; and Commission v Spain , paragraph 53).

33. Admittedly, such treatment means that the shareholdings held by the parent company at the head of a tax-integrated group in its subsidiaries are disregarded, which means that various transactions within the group are considered non-existent in fiscal terms. The Court accepted in its judgment in Papillon (C‑418/07, EU:C:2008:659, paragraph 50) that a direct link may exist under the tax integration regime between a tax advantage given to the companies belonging to a tax-integrated group and a tax disadvantage resulting from such neutralisation of intragroup transactions. In the case giving rise to that judgment, the immediate taking into account by the parent company of the losses incurred by its subsidiary was offset by the fact that, in the context of a tax-integrated group, the existence of the first company’s holding in the second was disregarded, making it impossible for the parent company to make a provision for the depreciation of its holding in the subsidiary incurring the losses (see judgments in Papillon , C‑418/07, EU:C:2008:659, paragraph 48, and SCA Group Holding and Others , C‑39/13 to C‑41/13, EU:C:2014:1758, paragraphs 34 and 35).

29. Furthermore, the Court has also held that the production by the Commission of additional evidence intended, at the stage of proceedings before the Court, to support the proposition that the failure thus alleged is general and consistent cannot be ruled out in principle (Case C-494/01 Commission v Ireland [2005] ECR I-3331, paragraph 37, and judgment of 22 December 2008 in Case C-189/07 Commission v Spain , paragraph 29).

29. Toutefois, il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour que, dans la mesure où le recours vise à dénoncer un manquement d’ordre général aux obligations découlant des dispositions du règlement n° 2847/93, qui serait tiré, selon la Commission, notamment de l’attitude systématique et constante de tolérance adoptée par les autorités espagnoles à l’égard de situations non conformes à ce règlement, la production d’éléments complémentaires visant, au stade de la procédure devant la Cour, à étayer la généralité et la constance du manquement ainsi allégué ne saurait être exclue en principe (voir, par analogie, arrêt du 26 avril 2005, Commission/Irlande, C‑494/01, Rec. p. I‑3331, point 37).

22 Also, the Court has consistently held that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion. The Court therefore cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see Case C-364/97 Commission v Ireland [1998] ECR I-6593, paragraph 8).

28. Admittedly, it follows from the case-law of the Court that a mere technical means to ensure or improve reception of the original transmission in its catchment area does not constitute a ‘communication’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 (see, to that effect, Football Association Premier League and Others , paragraph 194, and Airfield and Canal Digitaal , paragraphs 74 and 79).

194. The Court, proceeding on the basis of such an interpretation, has already held that a hotel proprietor carries out an act of communication when he gives his customers access to the broadcast works via television sets, by distributing in the hotel rooms, with full knowledge of the position, the signal received carrying the protected works. The Court has pointed out that such intervention is not just a technical means to ensure or improve reception of the original broadcast in the catchment area, but an act without which those customers are unable to enjoy the broadcast works, although physically within that area (see, to this effect, SGAE , paragraph 42).

82. It should be noted that the tax authorities of a Member State are entitled to require the taxpayer to provide such proof as they may consider necessary in order to determine whether the conditions of a tax advantage provided for in the legislation at issue have been met and, consequently, whether to allow that advantage (see, to that effect, Case C‑136/00 Danner [2002] ECR I‑8147, paragraph 50; Case C‑422/01 Skandia and Ramstedt [2003] ECR I‑6817, paragraph 43; Case C‑318/07 Persche [2009] ECR I‑359, paragraph 54; Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen , paragraph 95; and Case C-262/09 Meilicke and Others [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 45).

45. However, the Court has repeatedly pointed out that the option provided for in Article 8(4) of Directive 91/439 constitutes a derogation from the general principle of mutual recognition of driving licences and is therefore to be interpreted strictly (see, inter alia, Case C‑1/07 Weber [2008] ECR I‑8571, paragraph 29; Schwarz , paragraph 84; and order in Case C‑334/09 Scheffler [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 63).

29. The Court has held on a number of occasions in that regard that the first subparagraph of Article 8(4) of Directive 91 /439 constitutes a derogation from the general principle of mutual recognition of driving licences and is, therefore, to be interpreted strictly (see, inter alia, Wiedemann and Funk , paragraph 60, and Zerche and Others , paragraph 57).

37. With regard to social assistance benefits, the Court held in Case C‑456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 43, that a citizen of the Union who is not economically active may rely on the first paragraph of Article 12 EC where he has been lawfully resident in the host Member State for a certain time or possesses a residence permit.

46. The Court has made clear that, in the particular case of a parent company having a 100% shareholding in a subsidiary which has infringed the Union’s rules on competition, that parent company is able to exercise decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary, and there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent company does in fact exercise such influence (Joined Cases C-201/09 P and C-216/09 P ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others [2011] ECR I-2239, paragraph 97, and Elf Aquitaine v Commission , paragraph 56).

56. In that regard, the Court has stated that, in the specific case where a parent company has a 100% shareholding in a subsidiary which has infringed the competition rules of the European Union: (i) the parent company is able to exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of the subsidiary and (ii) there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent company does in fact exercise such a decisive influence (‘the presumption of actual exercise of decisive influence’) (see, inter alia, Case 107/82 AEG-Telefunken v Commission [1983] ECR 3151, paragraph 50; Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission , paragraph 60; General Química and Others v Commission , paragraph 39; and ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others , paragraph 97).

105 It should also be noted that it is not for the Court, when ruling on questions of law in the context of an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the General Court exercising its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of fines imposed on undertakings for infringements of EU law (see, inter alia, judgment of 9 June 2016 in Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades and Others v Commission, C‑617/13 P, EU:C:2016:416, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited).

21. In order to determine the nature of the civil liability claims brought before the referring court, it is important first to check whether they are, regardless of their classification under national law, contractual in nature (see, to that effect, Case C‑167/00 Henkel [2002] ECR I‑8111, paragraph 37).

37 It is therefore necessary in the first instance to examine whether an action such as that at issue in the main proceedings is contractual in nature.

62 Identifying the elements of a matter which must be categorised as essential must be based on objective factors amenable to judicial review, and requires account to be taken of the characteristics and particular features of the field concerned (judgment of 22 June 2016, DK Recycling und Roheisen v Commission, C‑540/14 P, EU:C:2016:469, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

58 When it undertakes that assessment, the Court is concerned in particular to ensure that the persons concerned are not deprived of the right to effective judicial protection in the event of a breach of Community law by the institutions and that the practical effect of Article 177 is not jeopardized (see the judgment in Case C-228/92 Roquette Frères v Hauptzollamt Geldern [1994] ECR I-1445, paragraph 27).

27 An economic agent such as the plaintiff in the main proceedings would thereby be deprived of its right to effective judicial protection in the event of a breach of Community law by the institutions, and the practical effect of Article 177 of the Treaty would thereby be jeopardized.

38. As regards the first condition, relating to the public authority’s control, it is important to note that the participation, even as a minority, of a private undertaking in the capital of a company in which the contracting authority in question is also a participant excludes in any event the possibility of that contracting authority exercising over that company a control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments (see Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau , cited above, paragraph 49).

29. For that to be the case, the subsidy must first be paid specifically to the subsidised operator to enable it to supply particular goods or services. Only in that case can the subsidy be regarded as consideration for the supply of goods or services and therefore be taxable. It must be noted, in particular, that the beneficiary is recognised as having a right to receive the subsidy, since a taxable supply has been made by it (Case C‑184/00 Office des produits wallons [2001] ECR I-9115, paragraphs 12 and 13).

13 In order to establish whether the subsidy constitutes such consideration, it should be noted that the price of the goods or services must, in principle, be determined not later than the time of the triggering event. It should also be noted that the undertaking to pay the subsidy made by the person who grants it has as its corollary the right of the beneficiary to receive it, since a taxable supply has been made by the latter. That link between the subsidy and the price must appear unequivocally following a case by case analysis of the circumstances underlying the payment of that consideration. On the other hand, it is not necessary for the price of the goods or services - or a part of the price - to be ascertained. It is sufficient for it to be ascertainable.

38. Furthermore, the fact that a Member State does not grant to a non-resident certain tax benefits which it grants to a resident is not, as a rule, discriminatory, having regard to the objective differences between the situation of residents and that of non-residents, from the point of view both of the source of their income and of their personal ability to pay tax or their personal and family circumstances ( Schumacker , paragraph 34; Gerritse , paragraph 44; and Commission v Spain , paragraph 47).

74 That requirement cannot, however, go so far as to make it necessary that the national provisions mentioned in the reasoned opinion and in the application should always be completely identical. Where a change in the legislation occurred between those two procedural stages, it is sufficient that the system established by the legislation contested in the pre-litigation procedure has, on the whole, been maintained by the new measures which were adopted by the Member State after the issue of the reasoned opinion and have been challenged in the application (judgments in Case 45/64 Commission v Italy [1965] ECR 857, Case C-42/89 Commission v Belgium [1990] ECR I-2821, and Case C-105/91 Commission v Greece, cited above, paragraph 13).

13 That requirement cannot, however, go so far as to make it necessary that in every event the national provisions mentioned in the reasoned opinion and in the application should be completely identical. Where a change in the legislation occurred between those two phases in the procedure, it is sufficient that the system established by the legislation contested in the pre-litigation procedure has as a whole been maintained by the new measures which were adopted by the Member State after the issue of the reasoned opinion and have been challenged in the application (see the judgments in Case 45/64 Commission v Italy [1965] ECR 857 and in Case C-42/89 Commission v Belgium [1990] ECR I-2821).

59. Before Directive 92/85 came into force, the Court had already held that, by virtue of the principle of non-discrimination and, in particular, under the provisions of Directive 76/207, protection against dismissal must be granted to women not only during maternity leave, but also throughout pregnancy. According to the Court, a dismissal occurring during those periods affects only women and therefore constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex (see, to that effect, Case C‑179/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund [1990] ECR I‑3979, paragraph 13; Case C‑394/96 Brown [1998] ECR I‑4185, paragraphs 24 to 27; and Case C‑460/06 Paquay [2007] ECR I‑8511, paragraph 29).

37 First, it is well established in case-law that a product which is lawfully marketed in one Member State must in principle be able to be marketed in any other Member State without being subject to additional controls, save in the case of exceptions provided for or allowed by Community law (see, in particular, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649, paragraph 14, and Case C-123/00 Bellamy and English Shop Wholesale [2001] ECR I-2795, paragraph 18).

18 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in the absence of harmonisation of legislation, obstacles to free movement of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods (such as those relating to designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling, packaging) constitute measures having equivalent effect which are prohibited by Article 28 EC, even if those rules apply without distinction to all products, unless their application can be justified by a public-interest objective taking precedence over the free movement of goods (see, in particular, Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral [1979] ECR 649, paragraph 14, and Case C-383/97 Van der Laan [1999] ECR I-731, paragraph 19).

22. According to the Court’s case-law, a measure restricting one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty may be justified only if it pursues a legitimate objective which is compatible with the Treaty and respects the principle of proportionality. For that reason, such a measure must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, in particular, Case C-19/92 Kraus [1993] ECR I-1663, paragraph 32, and Case C-100/01 Oteiza Olazabal [2002] ECR I-10981, paragraph 43).

135 As for the Danish Government's arguments seeking to justify the clause on the ownership and control of airlines, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, recourse to justification on grounds of public policy and public safety under Article 56 of the Treaty presupposes the need to maintain a discriminatory measure in order to deal with a genuine and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society (see, to that effect, Case 30/77 R v Bouchereau [1977] ECR I-1999, paragraph 35; Case C-114/97 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-6717, paragraph 46; Case C-348/96 Calfa [1999] ECR I-11, paragraph 21). It follows that there must be a direct link between that threat, which must, moreover, be current, and the discriminatory measure adopted to deal with it (see, to that effect, Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders v Netherlands State [1988] ECR 2085, paragraph 36; and Calfa, paragraph 24).

21 Under the Court's case-law, the concept of public policy may be relied upon in the event of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of society (see Case 30/77 Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, paragraph 35).

33 It is clear from that provision that it is not the ground on which the difference of treatment is based but a characteristic related to that ground which must constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement (judgment of 13 November 2014, Vital Pérez, C‑416/13, EU:C:2014:2371, paragraph 36 and case-law cited).

43. Selon une jurisprudence constante, l’article 56 TFUE confère des droits non seulement au prestataire de services lui-même, mais également au destinataire desdits services (arrêts Eurowings Luftverkehr, C‑294/97, EU:C:1999:524, point 34; FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen, C‑290/04, EU:C:2006:630, point 32; Dijkman et Dijkman-Lavaleije, C‑233/09, EU:C:2010:397, point 24, ainsi que X, C‑498/10, EU:C:2012:635, point 23).

32. Finally, it is settled case-law that Article 59 of the EEC Treaty confers rights not only on the provider of services but also on the recipient (see, in particular, Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377; Case C‑204/90 Bachmann [1992] ECR I‑249; Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I‑1931; Case C‑224/97 Ciola [1999] ECR I‑2517; and Case C‑294/97 Eurowings Luftverkehr [1999] ECR I‑7447).

58. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 8(3)(a) of Directive 2004/35, read in conjunction with recital 20 thereto, the operator is not required to bear the costs of preventive or remedial action taken pursuant to that directive if he can prove that the environmental damage was caused by a third party, and occurred despite the fact that appropriate safety measures were in place, or resulted from an order or instruction emanating from a public authority (see, to that effect, judgment in ERG and Others , EU:C:2010:126, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited, and order in Buzzi Unicem and Others , EU:C:2010:129, paragraph 46).

58. The Court of Justice also based its findings on the fact that the interested parties, except for the Member State responsible for granting the aid, do not have a right under the procedure for reviewing State aid to consult the documents on the Commission’s administrative file and that, if those interested parties were able to obtain access, on the basis of Regulation No 1049/2001, to those documents, the system for the review of State aid would be called into question (see Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau , paragraphs 58 and 61).

58. It follows from the above that the interested parties, except for the Member State responsible for granting the aid, do not have a right under the procedure for reviewing State aid to consult the documents on the Commission’s administrative file. Account must be taken of that fact for the purposes of interpreting the exception laid down by Article 4(2), third indent, of Regulation No 1049/2001. If those interested parties were able to obtain access, on the basis of Regulation No 1049/2001, to the documents in the Commission’s administrative file, the system for the review of State aid would be called into question.

32. More specifically, as regards the derogation referred to in Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/83, the Court has already pointed out that the possibility of importing non-approved medicinal products, provided for under national legislation implementing the power laid down in that provision, must remain exceptional in order to preserve the practical effect of the marketing authorisation procedure (see, to this effect, Case C‑143/06 Ludwigs-Apotheke [2007] ECR I‑9623, paragraphs 33 and 35).

93. Moreover, the Court has held that Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 must be interpreted as meaning that a tightening of a provision which provided for a relaxation of the provision applicable to the conditions for the exercise of the freedom of movement of Turkish workers at the time of the entry into force of Decision No 1/80 in the Member State concerned, constitutes a ‘new restriction’, even where that tightening does not make those conditions more stringent than those under the provision applicable at the time of the entry into force of Decision No 1/80 in that Member State (see, to that effect, Toprak and Oguz , paragraph 62).

62. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that, in circumstances such as those of the cases in the main proceedings, concerning a national provision on the acquisition of a residence permit by Turkish workers, Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 must be interpreted as meaning that a tightening of a provision introduced after 1 December 1980, which provided for a relaxation of the provision applicable on 1 December 1980, constitutes a ‘new restriction’ within the meaning of that article, even where that tightening does not make the conditions governing the acquisition of that permit more stringent than those which resulted from the provision in force on 1 December 1980, this being a matter for the national court to determine. Costs

40. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the protection which Directive 93/13 is intended to provide, the Court has held on numerous occasions that such an imbalance may only be corrected by positive action unconnected with the actual parties to the contract ( Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores , paragraph 27; Mostaza Claro , paragraph 26; Asturcom Telecomunicaciones , paragraph 31; and the order in Pohotovost’ , paragraph 39).

22. On the facts as described by the national court, however, it appears likely that, as the Austrian Government and the Commission submit, the carriage of goods in question may be governed by the AETR Agreement. To that extent, the Court can provide an interpretation of Community law which may assist the national court in deciding the case in the main proceedings and it may therefore deem it necessary to consider provisions of Community law to which the national court has not referred in the text of its question (see, in particular, Case C-304/00 Shawson and Gagg & Sons [2002] ECR I-10737, paragraphs 57 and 58).

57 It is settled case-law that the Court can provide the national court with an interpretation of Community law which may assist it in deciding the case in the main proceedings (Case C-175/99 Mayeur [2000] ECR I-7755, paragraph 22).

34. It must be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, in the absence of pertinent provisions of European Union law, the recovery of aid which has been declared incompatible with the internal market is to be carried out in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down by national law, in so far as those rules and procedures do not have the effect of making the recovery required by European Union law practically impossible and do not undermine the principle of equivalence with procedures for deciding similar but purely national disputes (see Case C‑382/99 Netherlands v Commission [2002] ECR I‑5163, paragraph 90). Disputes arising in connection with the enforcement of recovery are a matter for the national court alone (see, to that effect, the order in Case C‑297/01 Sicilcassa and Others [2003] ECR I‑7849, paragraphs 41 and 42).

50. One of the principal aims of the EEA Agreement is to provide for the fullest possible realisation of the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the whole European Economic Area, so that the internal market established within the European Union is extended to the EFTA States. From that angle, several provisions of the abovementioned Agreement are intended to ensure as uniform an interpretation as possible thereof throughout the EEA (see Opinion 1/92 of 10 April 1992, [1992] ECR I‑2821). It is for the Court in that context to ensure that the rules of the EEA Agreement which are identical in substance with those of the Treaty are interpreted in a uniform manner within the Member States (Case C‑452/01 Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg [2003] ECR I‑9743, paragraph 29, and Case C-540/07 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I‑10983, paragraph 65).

29. Furthermore, one of the principal aims of the EEA Agreement is to provide for the fullest possible realisation of the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the whole European Economic Area, so that the internal market established within the European Union is extended to the EFTA States. From that angle, several provisions of the abovementioned Agreement are intended to ensure as uniform an interpretation as possible thereof throughout the EEA (see Opinion 1/92 [1992] ECR I-2821). It is for the Court, in that context, to ensure that the rules of the EEA Agreement which are identical in substance to those of the Treaty are interpreted uniformly within the Member States.

55. Étant donné qu’il revient aux États membres de déterminer les mesures à prendre afin de remédier à un manquement, ce n’est que lorsque la Commission entend faire du défaut d’adoption d’une mesure particulière l’objet de son recours en manquement qu’elle doit indiquer de manière spécifique quelle est cette mesure dans l’avis motivé (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Commission/Grèce, C‑394/02, EU:C:2005:336, point 23 et jurisprudence citée).

24 First of all, it must be recalled that, by reason in particular of their effects on intra-Community trade in goods and services, copyright and related rights fall within the scope of application of the EC Treaty (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-92/92 and C-326/92 Phil Collins and Others [1993] ECR I-5145, paragraph 27).

27 It follows that copyright and related rights, which by reason in particular of their effects on intra-Community trade in goods and services, fall within the scope of application of the Treaty, are necessarily subject to the general principle of non-discrimination laid down by the first paragraph of Article 7 of the Treaty, without there even being any need to connect them with the specific provisions of Articles 30, 36, 59 and 66 of the Treaty.

41. It is for the national court to determine whether those conditions have been satisfied. For that purpose, it must take account both of the content of the legislative act adopted and of the entire legislative process which led to its adoption, in particular the preparatory documents and parliamentary debates (see Boxus and Others , paragraph 47).

74. By those agreements, concluded between collecting societies, the societies confer on each other the right to grant, within the territory for which they are responsible, the requisite authorisations for any public performance of protected works of members of the other societies and to subject those authorisations to certain conditions, in conformity with the laws applicable in the territory in question (see, to that effect, Case 395/87 Tournier [1989] ECR 2521, paragraph 17, and Joined Cases 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88 Lucazeau and Others [1989] ECR 2811, paragraph 11).

17 With regard to the first point, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that a "reciprocal representation contract", as referred to by the national court, must be taken to mean a contract between two national copyright-management societies concerned with musical works whereby the societies give each other the right to grant, within the territory for which they are responsible, the requisite authorizations for any public performance of copyrighted musical works of members of the other society and to subject those authorizations to certain conditions, in conformity with the laws applicable in the territory in question . Those conditions include in particular the payment of royalties, which are collected for the other society by the society which it has empowered to act as its agent . The contract specifies that each society is to apply, with respect to works in the other society' s repertoire, the same scales, methods and means of collection and distribution of royalties as those which it applies for works in its own repertoire .

47. Even though the method of financing satisfies the other requirements of the Treaty, and in particular those flowing from Article 95, that does not mean that the measure in question is valid in relation to Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty (see, to that effect, France v Commission , paragraph 13). It may be that aid in the narrow sense does not substantially affect trade between Member States and may thus be acknowledged as permissible but that the disturbance which it creates is increased by a method of financing it which would render the scheme as a whole incompatible with a single market and the common interest (see France v Commission , paragraph 16).

58. In the judgment in ETI and Others (EU:C:2007:775) to which the Court of Justice expressly referred in paragraph 144 of the judgment in ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v Commission (EU:C:2011:191), the Court of Justice held that the Commission was entitled to impute the infringement to a company which had not committed the infringement where the entity which had done so continued to exist as an economic operator on other markets (see judgment in ETI and Others , EU:C:2007:775, paragraph 45). The Court of Justice based that assessment on the fact that, at the time of the infringement, the companies concerned were held by the same public entity (see judgments in ETI and Others , EU:C:2007:775, paragraph 50, and Versalis v Commission , EU:C:2013:386, paragraph 56).

50. In the main proceedings, it is not disputed that at the time of their infringing conduct, AAMS and ETI were owned by the same public entity, namely the Ministry of the Economy and Finance.

49. Indeed, the length of residence in the Member State in which payment of a benefit is sought cannot be regarded as an intrinsic element of the concept of residence within the meaning of Regulation No 1408/71 (see, to that effect, Swaddling EU:C:1999:96, paragraph 30).

94 Moreover, in paragraphs 23 to 25 of Sutton, the Court distinguished the circumstances of that case from those of Case C-271/91 Marshall [1993] ECR I-4367 (Marshall II). In the latter case, which concerned the award of interest on amounts payable by way of reparation for loss and damage sustained as a result of discriminatory dismissal, the Court ruled that full compensation for the loss and damage sustained cannot leave out of account factors, such as the effluxion of time, which may in fact reduce its value, and that the award of interest is an essential component of compensation for the purposes of restoring real equality of treatment (Marshall II, cited above, paragraphs 24 to 32). The award of interest was held in that case to be an essential component of the compensation which Community law required to be paid in the event of discriminatory dismissal.

24 However, the objective is to arrive at real equality of opportunity and cannot therefore be attained in the absence of measures appropriate to restore such equality when it has not been observed. As the Court stated in paragraph 23 of the judgment in Von Colson and Kamann, cited above, those measures must be such as to guarantee real and effective judicial protection and have a real deterrent effect on the employer.

35. Second, it should be pointed out, as noted by the Advocate General in paragraph 23 of his Opinion, that the Member States are required to apply the Sixth Directive even if they consider it to be less than perfect. It is stated in Case C-338/98 Commission v Netherlands [2001] ECR I-8265, paragraphs 55 and 56, that even if the interpretation put forward by certain Member States better served the aims of the Sixth Directive, such as fiscal neutrality, the Member States may not disregard the provisions expressly laid down in that directive.

50. Under Article 23(2) EC, the measures laid down for the liberalisation of intra-Community trade apply in the same way both to products originating in Member States and to products coming from third countries which are in free circulation in the Community (see Case 41/76 Donckerwolcke and Schou [1976] ECR 1921, paragraph 15).

15 ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 9 ( 2 ) THE PROVISIONS ADOPTED FOR THE LIBERALIZATION OF INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE APPLY IN IDENTICAL FASHION TO PRODUCTS ORIGINATING IN MEMBER STATES AND TO PRODUCTS COMING FROM THIRD COUNTRIES WHICH ARE IN ' FREE CIRCULATION ' IN THE COMMUNITY .

17. It must be observed that the exception whereby the institutions may, in the review procedure, apply a method different from that used in the original investigation when the circumstances have changed must be interpreted strictly, for a derogation from or exception to a general rule must be interpreted narrowly (see judgment of 29 September 2011 in Case C‑82/10 Commission v Ireland , paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

29. As noted by the Advocate General in point 24 of his Opinion, the transposition of Article 12(1) of the Directive requires the Member States not only to adopt a comprehensive legislative framework but also to implement concrete and specific protection measures (see, to that effect, Case C‑103/00 Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I‑1147, paragraphs 34 to 39).

36 It follows that the use of mopeds on the sand beach to the east of Laganas and the presence of pedalos and small boats in the sea area around Gerakas and Dafni constitute the deliberate disturbance of the species in question during its breeding period for the purposes of Article 12(1)(b) of the Directive.

34. The Court has thus held that, although certain actions between a public authority and a person governed by private law may come within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001, it is otherwise where the public authority is acting in the exercise of its public powers (see, in particular, Sapir and Others , paragraph 33 and the case‑law cited).