Datasets:

ngarneau

/

link_prediction_contrastive

like 0

61. It also follows from settled case-law that a national court which is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation (see, inter alia, Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraphs 21 to 24; Case 130/78 Salumificio di Cornuda [1979] ECR 867, paragraphs 23 to 27; and Case C-213/89 Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I-2433, paragraphs 19 to 21).

23THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE COMMISSION ON 28 JULY 1966 BY VIRTUE OF THE AFORESAID PROVISIONS , HAVING BEEN NOTIFIED ON THE SAME DAY , TOOK EFFECT WITH REGARD TO THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC AT THE TIME OF THAT NOTIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 191 OF THE TREATY .

206. However, according to the case-law of the Court, it follows from the application of the second paragraph of Article 10 EC in conjunction with the third paragraph of Article 249 EC and the directive concerned that, during the period prescribed for the transposition of a directive, the Member States to which it is addressed must refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to compromise the attainment of the result prescribed by that directive ( Inter-Environnement Wallonie , paragraph 45; Case C‑14/02 ATRAL [2003] ECR I‑4431, paragraph 58; and Mangold , paragraph 67). In this connection it is immaterial whether or not the provision of national law at issue which has been adopted after the directive in question entered into force is concerned with the transposition of the directive ( Adeneler and Others , paragraph 121, and the order in Vassilakis and Others , paragraph 69).

34 In Case C-193/91 Mohsche [1993] ECR I-2615, paragraphs 13 and 14, the Court held that private use of goods is taxable only exceptionally and that, consequently, the words "use of goods" in Article 6(2)(a) are to be interpreted strictly, as meaning only the use of the goods themselves. Accordingly, services supplied by third parties for the purpose of maintaining or using goods where the taxable person is unable to deduct the input tax paid are not covered by that provision.

13 Such a view, however, would be incompatible with the purpose of Article 6(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive. Unlike normal services, which are taxable in principle, whether or not the input tax on the goods and services used for their implementation is deductible, the private use of goods is taxable only exceptionally.

71. In those circumstances, the refusal to grant to the resident taxpayer the right either to deduct from the basis of assessment in Poland the amount of the compulsory social security contributions paid in another Member State or to reduce the tax payable in Poland by the amount of the compulsory health insurance contributions paid in a Member State other than the Republic of Poland may deter that taxpayer from taking advantage of the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services under Articles 43 EC and 49 EC, and amounts to a restriction on those freedoms (see, to that effect, in relation to Article 18 EC, Rüffler , paragraphs 72 and 73).

61. Subject to the investigations to be undertaken by the national court as to the nature and effect of a mortgage mandate and as to whether the mandate at issue in the main proceedings constitutes a charge on the immovable property in question – as it would appear on the basis of the case-file – the assessment of inheritance and transfer duties is, under that legislation, directly linked to the value of that immovable property. In that case, there cannot objectively be any difference in situation such as to justify unequal tax treatment so far as concerns the level of inheritance and transfer duties payable in relation to, respectively, an immovable property situated in Belgium which belongs to a person residing in that Member State at the time of death, and an immovable property belonging to a person residing in another Member State at the time of death. Accordingly, the situation of Ms Eckelkamp’s heirs is comparable to that of any heir whose inheritance includes an immovable property situated in Belgium and left by a person who was residing in that State at the time of death (see, to that effect, Jäger , paragraph 44).

44. The calculation of the tax is, under the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, directly linked to the value of the assets included in the estate, with the result that there is objectively no difference in situation such as to justify unequal tax treatment so far as concerns the level of inheritance tax payable in relation to, respectively, an asset situated in Germany and an asset situated in another Member State. A situation such as that of Mr Jäger is therefore comparable to that of any other heir whose inheritance consists only of agricultural land and forestry situated in Germany bequeathed by a person domiciled in that State.

9 As the Court has held, the concept of pay, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, comprises any other consideration, whether in cash or kind, whether immediate or future, provided that the worker receives it, albeit indirectly, from his employer in respect of his employment ( see most recently the judgment of 17 May 1990 in Case C-262/88 Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group (( 1990 )) ECR I-1889, paragraph 12 ). Accordingly, the fact that certain benefits are paid after the termination of the employment relationship does not prevent them from being in the nature of pay, within the meaning of Article 119 of the Treaty .

17 As the Court held in Erpelding (above, paragraph 18), the structure and purpose of the rules indicate that they contain an exhaustive list of the situations in which reference quantities or individual quantities may be granted and that they set out precise rules as to how those quantities are to be determined. Even in the factual circumstances described by the national court in its question, none of the applicable Community provisions provides for the possibility of granting a reference quantity to producers whose period of non-marketing or conversion expired before 1 January 1983 and who did not deliver milk in 1981 or 1982.

18 It should be noted that the structure and the purpose of the rules concerned indicate that they contain an exhaustive list of the situations in which reference quantities or individual quantities may be granted and set out precise rules concerning the determination of those quantities . Since none of those provisions makes it possible for producers to obtain reference to milk deliveries made by them outside the 1981 to 1983 period it must be held that such an option is excluded, even in cases where the persons concerned had no representative production throughout the period .

42. It is apparent from the fourth recital in Regulation No 2988/95 that the effectiveness of the combating of fraud against the European Union’s financial interests calls for a common set of legal rules to be enacted for all areas covered by European Union policies. Furthermore, according to the fifth recital, the conduct which constitutes an irregularity and the administrative measures and penalties relating thereto are provided for in sectoral rules in accordance with Regulation No 2988/95 (Case C-295/02 Gerken [2004] ECR I-6369, paragraph 55).

17. Although the referring court does not refer directly to the fundamental rules and general principles of EU law in the order for reference, it is settled case-law that in order to provide a useful answer to a national court which has referred a question to it, the Court may deem it necessary to consider rules of EU law to which the national court has not referred in its request for a preliminary ruling (see, to that effect, judgment in Medipac — Kazantzidis , C‑6/05, EU:C:2007:337, paragraph 34).

34. Admittedly, the national court does not refer directly in its reference for a preliminary ruling to the general principles of Community law. It is settled case-law, however, that in order to provide a satisfactory answer to a national court which has referred a question to it, the Court may deem it necessary to consider rules of Community law to which the national court has not referred in its reference (Case 35/85 Tissier [1986] ECR 1207, paragraph 9; Case C-315/88 Bagli Pennacchiotti [1990] ECR I-1323, paragraph 10; Case C-107/98 Teckal [1999] ECR I‑8121, paragraph 39, and Telaustria and Telefonadress , paragraph 59).

57. In that regard, it must be pointed out, as is apparent from paragraph 34 above, that the principle of fiscal neutrality, which is the reflection in the field of VAT of the principle of equal treatment, precludes, inter alia, for taxable persons effecting the same transactions or similar economic transactions, different treatment with regard to the method of rounding applied when VAT is calculated (see to that effect, also, Case C‑162/07 Ampliscientifica and Amplifin [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 25, and Case C‑132/06 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39).

48. The Court has consistently held that indirect discrimination on grounds of sex arises where a national measure, albeit formulated in neutral terms, puts considerably more workers of one sex at a disadvantage than the other (see, to that effect, Case C‑1/95 Gerster [1997] ECR I‑5253, paragraph 30; Case C‑123/10 Brachner [2011] ECR I‑10003, paragraph 56; and Case C‑7/12 Riežniece [2013] ECR, paragraph 39).

39. The Court has consistently held that indirect discrimination arises where a national measure, albeit formulated in neutral terms, works to the disadvantage of far more women than men (see, in particular, Case C‑1/95 Gerster [1997] ECR I-5253, paragraph 30, and Case C‑123/10 Brachner [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 56).

51. Similarly, it is for the referring court to ascertain if, on application of the third condition laid down in paragraph 92 of the judgment in Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg (C‑280/00, EU:C:2003:415), the compensation exceeds what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the payment by money order of retirement pensions, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations.

24. In particular, as the Court has already held, any citizen of the Union may rely on Article 12 EC in all situations falling within the material scope of Community law (Case C‑85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I‑2691, paragraph 62, and Schempp , paragraph 17).

62 Article 8(2) of the Treaty attaches to the status of citizen of the Union the rights and duties laid down by the Treaty, including the right, laid down in Article 6 of the Treaty, not to suffer discrimination on grounds of nationality within the scope of application ratione materiae of the Treaty.

43 In that context, recital 1 to the REACH regulation indicates that the latter should ensure, in particular, the free movement of goods. In that regard, the Court has specified that the REACH Regulation concerns the internal market (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 March 2016, Canadian Oil Company Sweden and Rantén, C‑472/14, EU:C:2016:171, paragraph 32). Recital 2 of that regulation states that the efficient functioning of the internal market for substances can be achieved only if requirements for substances do not differ significantly from Member State to Member State. According to recital 7 of that regulation, to preserve the integrity of the internal market and to ensure a high level of protection for human health, especially the heath of workers, and the environment, it is necessary to ensure that manufacturing of substances in the Community complies with Community law, even if those substances are exported.

32. In addition, a system of taxation may be considered compatible with Article 90 EC only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than similar domestic products, so that it cannot, in any event, have discriminatory effect ( Brzeziński , paragraph 40 and case-law cited).

40. It is settled law that a system of taxation may be considered compatible with Article 90 EC only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than similar domestic products, so that it cannot in any event have discriminatory effect ( Haahr Petroleum , paragraph 34, and Case C‑375/95 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I‑5981, paragraph 29).

16 The answer to the first two questions must therefore be that the erroneous release by the national intervention agency of the security provided for in Article 25 of Commission Regulation No 2730/79 of 29 November 1979 laying down common detailed rules for the application of the system of export refunds on agricultural products does not have the effect of discharging the exporter from his obligations . In its decision on whether to grant an extension of time for the submission of the documents required under the regulation, the intervention agency must take into consideration the consequences which its error may have had on the exporter' s conduct . The period prescribed for the submission of a request for an extension of time ( Question 3 )

31. First, measures of inquiry would necessarily lead to the Court ruling on questions of fact (see, to that effect, Case C-199/92 P Hüls v Commission [1999] ECR I-4287, paragraph 91).

91 On the one hand, measures of inquiry would necessarily lead to the Court ruling on questions of fact and would change the subject-matter of the proceedings commenced before the Court of First Instance, in breach of Article 113(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.

21. In that procedure, the reasoned opinion and the action must set out the Commission’s complaints coherently and precisely in order that the Member State and the Court may appreciate exactly the scope of the infringement of Community law complained of, a condition which is necessary in order to enable the Member State to avail itself of its right to defend itself and the Court to determine whether there is a breach of obligations as alleged (see, to this effect, Case C-98/04 Commission v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-4003, paragraph 18).

30. It is precisely in view of the harmful effects which the risk of dismissal may have on the physical and mental state of women who are pregnant, have recently given birth or are breastfeeding, including the particularly serious risk that pregnant women may be prompted voluntarily to terminate their pregnancy, that, pursuant to Article 10 of Directive 92/85, the Community legislature subsequently laid down special protection for women, by prohibiting dismissal during the period from the beginning of their pregnancy to the end of their maternity leave (Case C-32/93 Webb [1994] ECR I-3567, paragraph 21; Brown , paragraph 18; C-109/00 Tele Danmark [2001] ECR I-6993, paragraph 26; and McKenna , paragraph 48).

18 It was precisely in view of the harmful effects which the risk of dismissal may have on the physical and mental state of women who are pregnant, women who have recently given birth or women who are breastfeeding, including the particularly serious risk that pregnant women may be prompted voluntarily to terminate their pregnancy, that the Community legislature, pursuant to Article 10 of Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive adopted within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) (OJ 1992 L 348, p. 1), which was to be transposed into the laws of the Member States no later than two years after its adoption, provided for special protection to be given to women, by prohibiting dismissal during the period from the beginning of their pregnancy to the end of their maternity leave. Article 10 of Directive 92/85 provides that there is to be no exception to, or derogation from, the prohibition of dismissal of pregnant women during that period, save in exceptional cases not connected with their condition (see, in this regard, paragraphs 21 and 22 of the judgment in Webb, cited above).

53. However, the fact remains that, in cases involving such discretion the EU legislature must base its choice on objective criteria (see, Case C‑58/08 Vodafone and Others EU:C:2010:321, paragraph 53) and it must ensure that fundamental rights are observed (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑92/09 and C‑93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert EU:C:2010:662, paragraph 46; and Case C‑236/09 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others EU:C:2011:100, paragraph 17).

37 Thus, first, Article 4(1) of Directive 90/435 provides that, where a parent company receives, by virtue of its association with its subsidiary, distributed profits, the Member State of the parent company is either to refrain from taxing such profits, or to authorise the parent company to deduct from the amount of tax payable that fraction of the corporation tax paid by the subsidiary which relates to those profits and, if appropriate, the amount of the withholding tax levied by the Member State in which the subsidiary is resident, up to the limit of the amount of the corresponding domestic tax (judgments of 12 December 2006, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, C‑446/04, EU:C:2006:774, paragraph 102, and of 3 April 2008, Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel, C‑27/07, EU:C:2008:195, paragraph 25).

102. It should be noted in that regard that, by virtue of Article 4(1) of Directive 90/435, a Member State which does not exempt profits received by a resident parent company from a subsidiary which is resident in another Member State must authorise that parent company to deduct from the amount of tax due the fraction of the tax paid by the subsidiary which relates to those profits and, if appropriate, the amount of the withholding tax levied by the Member State in which the subsidiary is resident, up to the limit of the amount of the corresponding domestic tax.

26. According to settled case-law, the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, with the result that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see, inter alia, the judgment in Hoesch Metals and Alloys , C‑373/08, EU:C:2010:68, paragraph 59).

26 Indeed, that obligation is, in itself, unconditional and sufficiently precise (judgment of 25 February 1999, Carbonari and Others, C‑131/97, EU:C:1999:98, paragraph 44) and is thus entirely linked to fulfilling the requirements for training in specialised medicine (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 February 1999, Carbonari and Others, C‑131/97, EU:C:1999:98, paragraph 41).

44 It is in that context that Article 2(1)(c) of the `coordination' directive and point 1 of the Annex thereto, as amended by Directive 82/76, impose an obligation on Member States, in respect of doctors liable to benefit from the system of mutual recognition, to provide remuneration for periods of training in medical specialties in so far as they fall within the scope of the directive. That obligation is, in itself, unconditional and sufficiently precise.

18. It must be answered in that regard that, under Article 1(b) of Directive 92/50, regional or local authorities are, by definition, contracting authorities. It is clear from case-law that Article 1(a) of the directive makes no distinction between public contracts awarded by a contracting authority for the purposes of fulfilling its task of meeting needs in the general interest and those which are unrelated to that task (see, by way of analogy, in relation to Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the awarding of public works contracts (OJ 1993 L 199, p. 54), Case C-44/96 Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria and Others [1998] ECR I-73, paragraph 32). It is likewise irrelevant that the contracting authority intends to operate as a provider of services itself and that the contract in question aims, in that context, to subcontract a part of the activities to a third party. It is conceivable that the decision of the contracting authority as to the choice of that third party will be based on considerations that are not economic ones. It follows that, whatever the nature and context of the contract at issue may be, it constitutes a ‘public contract’ within the meaning of Article 1(a) of Directive 92/50.

It should be borne in mind that review of the legal basis of an act enables the procedure for the adoption of that act to be checked as to whether it was vitiated by any irregularity (judgment of 6 December 2005 in ABNA and Others, C‑453/03, C‑11/04, C‑12/04 and C‑194/04, EU:C:2005:741, paragraph 53). According to settled case-law, the choice of the legal basis for an EU measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include the aim and content of that measure (see, in particular, judgment of 19 July 2012 in Parliament v Council, C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 42).

53. As the Council has stated in its observations and argued at the hearing, if the contested measure had not directly had the objective of safeguarding public health, it could have come under Article 37 EC, which also confers competence on the Community legislature. Review of the legal basis of Directive 2002/2 does, however, remain relevant for the purpose of verifying whether the procedure for the adoption of that directive was vitiated by any irregularity (see, in this connection, Case C‑491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I‑11453, paragraph 111).

46. As regards application of the principle of effectiveness, each case which raises the question whether a national procedural provision renders application of Community law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In the light of that analysis, the basic principles of the domestic judicial system, such as protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of procedure, must, where appropriate, be taken into consideration (see Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel and Van Veen [1995] ECR I-4705, paragraph 19).

60. First, the French Republic stated at the hearing – and the point was not disputed by the Commission – that, like biomedical analyses, a significant majority of medicinal products are sold in pharmacies on medical prescription. Second, in Case C‑531/06 Commission v Italy (paragraph 90) and Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others (paragraph 60), the Court held that medicinal products prescribed or used for therapeutic reasons may none the less prove seriously harmful to health if they are consumed unnecessarily or incorrectly. Thus, the existence of a prescription does not appear to prevent the risk for public health stemming from the incorrect or inappropriate dispensing of medicinal products.

60. Given the particular nature of medicinal products and of the medicinal-product market, and as Community law currently stands, the Court’s findings in Commission v Greece cannot be transposed to the field of the retail supply of medicinal products. Unlike optical products, medicinal products prescribed or used for therapeutic reasons may none the less prove seriously harmful to health if they are consumed unnecessarily or incorrectly, without the consumer being in a position to realise that when they are administered. Furthermore, a medically unjustified sale of medicinal products leads to a waste of public financial resources which is not comparable to that resulting from unjustified sales of optical products.

51. Finally, a different interpretation would enable the objective of that directive which aims, according to the settled case-law of the Court, to ensure the continuity of employment relationships existing within an economic entity irrespective of any change of ownership to be circumvented with ease ( Klarenberg , paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

39 As far as the existence of exclusive rights is concerned, it is settled law that an undertaking having a statutory monopoly in a substantial part of the common market may be regarded as having a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty (Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macrotron [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 28; Case C-260/89 ERT v DRP [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 31; Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova, cited above, paragraph 14; and Raso and Others, cited above, paragraph 25).

31 In that respect it should be borne in mind that an undertaking which has a statutory monopoly may be regarded as having a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty (see the judgment in Case C-311/84 CBEM, COT IPB [1985] ECR 3261, paragraph 16) and that the territory of a Member State over which the monopoly extends may constitute a substantial part of the common market (see the judgment in Case C-322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 28).

103. According to the case-law of the Court, for advantages to be capable of being categorised as aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, they must, first, be granted directly or indirectly through State resources, and, second, be imputable to the State (Case C‑482/99 France v Commission [2002] ECR I-4397, paragraph 24 and case-law cited).

21. First of all, it should be noted that, as a general rule, the Court will refrain from considering the principle of tax neutrality with a view to ascertaining whether EU law precludes national rules which lay down time-limits within which a VAT refund must be claimed, failing which the action is time-barred (see, to that effect, Case C‑85/97 SFI [1998] ECR I‑7447, paragraphs 22 to 36; Case‑62/00 Marks & Spencer [2002] ECR I‑6325, paragraphs 22 to 47; and Case C‑472/08 Alstom Power Hydro [2010] ECR I‑623, paragraphs 14 to 22).

47 In the light of all those considerations, the reply to the question referred must be that national legislation retroactively curtailing the period within which repayment may be sought of sums paid by way of VAT collected in breach of provisions of the Sixth Directive with direct effect, such as those in Article 11A(1), is incompatible with the principles of effectiveness and of protection of legitimate expectations.

34 For the same reasons, once the Court of First Instance has found the existence of damage, it alone has jurisdiction to assess, within the confines of the claim, the method and extent of compensation for the damage (see Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others, paragraph 66, and Case C-259/96 P Council v De Nil and Impens [1998] ECR I-2915, paragraph 32).

97. As to the payment of interest, the Court pointed out in paragraph 31 of Case C‑271/91 Marshall [1993] ECR I-4367 that an award made in accordance with the applicable national rules constitutes an essential component of compensation.

31 With regard to the second part of the second question relating to the award of interest, suffice it to say that full compensation for the loss and damage sustained as a result of discriminatory dismissal cannot leave out of account factors, such as the effluxion of time, which may in fact reduce its value. The award of interest, in accordance with the applicable national rules, must therefore be regarded as an essential component of compensation for the purposes of restoring real equality of treatment.

74. It must be stated at the outset that any restriction concerning the supply of games of chance over the internet is more of an obstacle to operators established outside the Member State concerned, in which the recipients benefit from the services; those operators, as compared with operators established in that Member State, would thus be denied a means of marketing that is particularly effective for directly accessing that market (see, to that effect, Case C‑322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband [2003] ECR I‑14887, paragraph 74, and Case C‑108/09 Ker‑Optika [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 54).

46. Contrary to Versalis and Eni’s submissions, that finding of the General Court is not tantamount to considering the presumption of actual decisive influence to be an irrebuttable presumption. The fact that it is difficult to adduce the evidence necessary to rebut a presumption does not in itself mean that that presumption is in fact irrebuttable, especially where the entities against which the presumption operates are those best placed to seek that evidence within their own sphere of activity (see judgment in Elf Aquitaine v Commission , EU:C:2011:620, paragraph 70).

70. As regards, moreover, the criticism set out in the first indent of paragraph 44 above, that the size of the shareholding in the subsidiary is in itself sufficient to trigger the presumption of actual exercise of decisive influence, it should be observed that the fact that it is difficult to adduce the evidence necessary to rebut a presumption does not in itself mean that that presumption is in fact irrebuttable, especially where the entities against which the presumption operates are those best placed to seek that evidence within their own sphere of activity.

50. On the basis of those considerations, the Court held that the existence of a certain degree of integration may be regarded as established by a finding that the student in question has resided in the host Member State for a certain length of time ( Bidar , paragraph 59).

25 However, the question whether the grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance are contradictory or inadequate is a question of law which is amenable, as such, to judicial review on appeal (see, in particular, Case C-283/90 P Vidrányi v Commission [1991] ECR I-4339, paragraph 29; Case C-188/96 P Commission v V [1997] ECR I-6561, paragraph 24, and Case C-401/96 P Somaco v Commission [1998] ECR I-2587, paragraph 53). The pleas alleging procedural irregularities Breach of the principle that proceedings must be disposed of within a reasonable time

29 With regard, finally, to the complaint in the third plea that the Court of First Instance failed to rule on the plea regarding the infringement of the first and second paragraphs of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, it must be said that although he does not claim the infringement of any precise rule of law, it may be understood as alleging an irregularity amounting to a failure to state reasons, and hence failure to observe a general principle which places on every court the obligation to state the reasons on which its decisions are based, by indicating in particular the reasons which led it not to uphold a complaint expressly raised before it.

52. Par ailleurs, l’article 9, paragraphe 1, sous b), de la directive précise qu’une accumulation de diverses mesures, y compris des violations des droits de l’homme, qui est suffisamment grave pour affecter un individu d’une manière comparable à ce qui est indiqué à l’article 9, paragraphe 1, sous a), de la directive doit également être considérée comme une persécution.

16 Moreover, in paragraphs 18 to 20 of its judgment of 7 February 1991 in Case C-184/89 Nimz v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [1991] ECR I-297, the Court held that a national court must set aside any discriminatory provision of national law, without having to request or await its prior removal by collective bargaining or by any other constitutional procedure, and to apply to members of the disadvantaged group the same arrangements as those enjoyed by other workers, arrangements which, failing correct application of Article 119 in national law, remain the only valid point of reference.

19 It should also be pointed out that the Court has consistently held (see in particular the judgment of 9 March 1978 in Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629) that a national court which is called upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary by refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional means.

17 Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of a provision of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (Case C-83/91 Meilicke [1992] ECR I-4871, paragraph 24).

53. Likewise, the Court has stated that the essential purpose and object of that regulation is to combat international terrorism, in particular to cut it off from its financial resources by freezing the economic funds and resources of persons or entities suspected of involvement in activities linked to terrorism ( Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission , paragraph 169).

169. In addition, the essential purpose and object of the contested regulation is to combat international terrorism, in particular to cut it off from its financial resources by freezing the economic funds and resources of persons or entities suspected of involvement in activities linked to terrorism, and not to affect economic relations between the Community and each of the third countries where those persons or entities are, always supposing, moreover, that their place of residence is known.

46. As the Court indicated at paragraph 56 of its judgment in Portugal v Commission , in order to determine whether the measure at issue is selective, it is appropriate to examine whether, within the context of a particular legal system, that measure constitutes an advantage for certain undertakings in comparison with others which are in a comparable legal and factual situation.

21. What is more, the provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement for persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by Community nationals of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the European Community, and they preclude measures which might place those nationals at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of another Member State (Case C‑464/02 Commission v Denmark [2005] ECR I‑7929, paragraph 34; Commission v Portugal , paragraph 15; Commission v Sweden , paragraph 17; and Case C‑318/05 Commission v Germany , paragraph 114).

34. The provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement for persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by Community citizens of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the Community, and preclude measures which might place Community citizens at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of another Member State (Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 94; Case C-232/01 Van Lent [2003] ECR I-11525, paragraph 15; and Case C-387/01 Weigel [2004] ECR I-4981, paragraph 52).

62. As regards, next, the admissibility of those minutes as evidence, it must be held, as the Court of First Instance held at paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal, that the lawfulness of the transmission to the Commission by a national prosecutor or the authorities competent in competition matters of information obtained in application of national criminal law is a question governed by national law. Furthermore, as the Court of First Instance observed at the same paragraph, the Community judicature has no jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness, as a matter of national law, of a measure adopted by a national authority (Case C-97/91 Oleificio Borelli v Commission [1992] ECR I-6313, paragraph 9).

31. While Member State nationals who move in search for work benefit from the principle of equal treatment only as regards access to employment, those who have already entered the employment market may, on the basis of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1612/68, claim the same social and tax advantages as national workers (see in particular, Lebon , cited above, paragraph 26, and Case C-278/94 Commission v Belgium [1996] ECR I-4307, paragraphs 39 and 40).

39 It follows that the special programmes in question, which, in view of their special features, are linked to unemployment, fall outside the field of access to employment in the strict sense, as provided for in Title I of Regulation No 1612/68, in particular Article 3(1) on which the Commission relies.

32. The option of applying those results is justified by the very purpose of the Customs Code, which is, as stated in recital 5 in the preamble to that code, to ensure the correct application of the duties provided for therein, while guaranteeing, as is apparent from paragraph 23 of this judgment, rapid and efficient procedures in the interests of both traders and the customs authorities, by dispensing with a systematic examination of all declared goods, thus keeping to a minimum, as stated in recital 6 in the preamble to that code, customs formalities and controls (see, to that effect, Derudder , paragraphs 42 and 45).

37. Contrary to what is claimed by OHIM, it is not apparent from paragraphs 50 to 52 of Edwin v OHIM that a rule of national law, made applicable by a reference such as that in Article 52(2) of Regulation No 40/94, should be treated as a purely factual matter, the existence of which OHIM and the Court merely establish on the basis of the evidence before them.

52. Secondly, according to Article 63(2) of Regulation No 40/94, actions may be brought before the General Court against decisions of the Boards of Appeal on grounds of infringement of the Treaty, of Regulation No 40/94 or of any rule of law relating to their application. It follows from this, as the Advocate General stated in points 61 to 67 of her Opinion, that the General Court has jurisdiction to conduct a full review of the legality of OHIM’s assessment of the particulars submitted by an applicant in order to establish the content of the national law whose protection he claims.

16 According to that same judgment, in order to ascertain whether that criterion is satisfied, it is necessary to consider whether the operation of the entity in question is actually continued or resumed by the new employer, with the same or similar economic activities (Spijkers v Benedik, paragraph 12).

69 Accordingly, the fact that a tax measure is contrary to provisions of EU law other than Articles 107 and 108 TFEU does not mean that the exemption from that measure enjoyed by certain taxpayers cannot be classified as State aid, as long as the measure in question produces effects vis-à-vis other taxpayers and has not been either repealed or declared unlawful and, therefore, inapplicable (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 March 2005, Heiser, C‑172/03, EU:C:2005:130, paragraph 38).

38. Even if the legislation providing for the adjustment of deductions, that is to say, Paragraph 12(10) of the UStG 1994, in the main proceedings, is unlawful, the fact none the less remains that that legislation is liable to have an impact as long as it is not repealed or, at the very least, as long as its unlawfulness is not established. Consequently it is such as to create a charge which is normally included in the budget of a medical practitioner specialising in dentistry, such as Mr Heiser. The fact that the Republic of Austria subsequently discontinued the adjustment of deductions by a separate measure from that providing for such adjustment, therefore mitigates the charges which are normally included in the budget of such a medical practitioner and, accordingly, constitutes an advantage for him.

En effet, il est constant que les travaux de confinement et de désaffectation de la décharge de Barranco de Sedases n’ont pas été exécutés avant le 26 juin 2013 et que de tels travaux pour les autres décharges mentionnées au point 49 du présent arrêt n’ont pas été exécutés avant le 25 mars 2013. D’ailleurs, le Royaume d’Espagne n’a pas avancé de raisons particulières afin de motiver ce non-respect des délais fixés dans les avis motivés.

79. According to consistent case-law, the distinctive character of a trade mark within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 means that the mark in question makes it possible to identify the product in respect of which registration is applied for as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish that product from those of other undertakings (Joined Cases C‑473/01 P and C‑474/01 P Procter & Gamble v OHIM [2004] ECR I‑5173, paragraph 32, and Case C‑64/02 P OHIM v Erpo Möbelwerk [2004] ECR I‑10031, paragraph 42). That distinctive character must be assessed, first, by reference to the products or services in respect of which registration has been applied for and, second, by reference to the perception of the relevant public ( Procter & Gamble v OHIM , paragraph 33, and Case C‑24/05 P Storck v OHIM [2006] ECR I‑5677, paragraph 23).

42. It is also clear from the case-law that the distinctiveness of a trade mark within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 means that the mark in question makes it possible to identify the product for which registration is sought as originating from a given undertaking and therefore to distinguish the product from those of other undertakings and, therefore, is able to fulfil the essential function of the trade mark (see, to that effect, in particular Procter & Gamble v OHIM , paragraph 32, and the case-law there cited, and, in relation to the same provision contained in Article 3(1)(b) of Directive 89/104, Merz & Krell, paragraph 37, and Linde and Others , paragraph 40, and the case-law there cited).

55 The scope of Article 47 of the Charter, in so far as the action of the Member States is concerned, is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States when they are implementing EU law. That provision confirms the Court’s settled case-law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (judgment of 8 November 2016, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK, C‑243/15, EU:C:2016:838, paragraph 51).

23. In that regard, the Court has already held that the purpose of excluding incidental financial transactions from the denominator of the fraction used to calculate the deductible proportion in accordance with Article 19 of the Sixth Directive is to comply with the objective of complete neutrality guaranteed by the common system of VAT. If all receipts from a taxable person’s financial transactions linked to a taxable activity were to be included in that denominator, even where the creation of such receipts did not entail the use of goods or services subject to VAT or, at least, entailed only their very limited use, calculation of the deduction would be distorted (Case C-306/94 Régie dauphinoise [1996] ECR I-3695, paragraph 21).

21 The purpose of excluding incidental financial transactions from the denominator of the fraction used to calculate the deductible proportion in accordance with Article 19 of the Sixth Directive is to comply with the objective of complete neutrality guaranteed by the common system of VAT. As the Advocate General has observed at point 39 of his Opinion, if all receipts from a taxable person' s financial transactions linked to a taxable activity were to be included in that denominator, even where the creation of such receipts did not entail the use of goods or services subject to VAT or, at least, entailed only their very limited use, calculation of the deduction would be distorted.

47. By way of such limitations and conditions, Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 provides that a Member State may require nationals of another Member State wishing to have the right of residence on its territory for a period of longer than three months without being economically active to have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State and sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of that Member State during their period of residence (see, to that effect, Case C‑480/08 Teixeira [2010] ECR I‑1107, paragraph 42).

112. With regard to the second argument, it essentially asks the Court of Justice to re‑examine the amount of the fine set by the Court of First Instance. However, it has been consistently held that it is not for the Court of Justice, when ruling in the context of an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the Court of First Instance exercising its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of a fine imposed on an undertaking for its infringement of Community law (see, in particular, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission , paragraph 614, and Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraph 245).

614 It is not for the Court of Justice, when ruling on questions of law in the context of an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the Court of First Instance exercising its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of fines imposed on undertakings for infringements of Community law (Sarrió, paragraph 96).

31. The Court has also held that that principle applies to any case in which a Member State breaches Community law, whichever is the authority of the Member State whose act or omission was responsible for the breach ( Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, cited above, paragraph 32; Case C-302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I-3099, paragraph 62 and Haim, cited above, paragraph 27).

59. Furthermore, the judgment in Atlanta v European Community , to which the Court of First Instance also referred, in paragraph 67 of the contested judgment, is irrelevant in this connection. In paragraph 19 of the judgment in Atlanta v European Community the Court of Justice found that the DSB decision, taken after the appeal had been brought and which establishes the incompatibility of the Community measure in question with WTO law, was inescapably and directly linked to the plea of infringement of the provisions of GATT, which had been raised by the appellant before the Court of First Instance but had not been repeated by it in its pleas on appeal. Consequently, the Court of Justice rejected as inadmissible, on account of the late stage at which it had been invoked, the plea based on the DSB ' s decision, raised before the Court of Justice for the first time in the reply, and the Court did not examine the substance of the plea.

67 The seventh plea must therefore be dismissed.

32. The Court has also stated that, for such compensation to escape classification as State aid in a particular case, a number of conditions must be satisfied (judgment in Fallimento Traghetti del Mediterraneo , C‑140/09, EU:C:2010:335, paragraph 36).

53 Although it is true that the judgment of 29 November 2011, National Grid Indus (C‑371/10, EU:C:2011:785), was adopted in the context of the taxation of capital gains on companies, the Court subsequently transposed the principles laid down in that judgment also to the taxation on capital gains of natural persons (see judgments of 12 July 2012, Commission v Spain , C‑269/09, EU:C:2012:439, paragraphs 75 to 78, and of 16 April 2015, Commission v Germany , C‑591/13, EU:C:2015:230, paragraphs 65 to 67).

75. It follows, consequently, from the foregoing that Article 14(3) of Law 35/2006, which obliges taxpayers who transfer their residence abroad to include any income not yet charged to tax in the tax base for the last tax year in which they were treated as resident taxpayers, is disproportionate.

30. As the Court has already held in respect of the Brussels Convention, the international nature of a legal relationship may derive from the fact that the situation at issue in the proceedings is such as to raise questions relating to the determination of international jurisdiction (Case C‑281/02 Owusu [2005] ECR I‑1383, paragraph 26).

26. In that connection, the Court has already held that three-yearly length of service increments fall within the definition of ‘employment conditions’ within the meaning of clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement (see, to that effect, Del Cerro Alonso , paragraph 47; Gaviero Gaviero and Iglesias Torres , paragraphs 50 to 58; and order of 18 March 2011 in Case C‑273/10 Montoya Medina , paragraphs 32 to 34) as well as the compensation that the employer must pay to an employee on account of the unlawful insertion of a fixed-term clause into his employment contract ( Carratù, paragraph 38).

47. In contrast, as has already been explained at paragraphs 44 and 45 of the present judgment, the question whether in applying the principle of non-discrimination laid down in clause 4(1) of the framework agreement, one of the constituent parts of the pay should, as an employment condition, be granted to fixed-term workers in the same way as it is to permanent workers does come within the scope of Article 137(1)(b) EC and therefore of Directive 1999/70 and the framework agreement adopted on that basis.

58. In accordance wi th that case-law, such legislation may be justified in order to meet imperative requirements, on condition that it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and that it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective ( Commission v Italy , paragraph 59 and case-law cited).

18. In that connection, it must be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the purpose of the first paragraph of Article 307 EC is to make it clear, in accordance with the principles of international law, that application of the Treaty is not to affect the duty of the Member State concerned to respect the rights of third countries under a prior agreement and to perform its obligations (see Case 812/79 Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, paragraph 8; Case C-216/01 Budĕjovický Budvar [2003] ECR I‑13617, paragraphs 144 and 145; Case C-205/06 Commission v Austria [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 33; and Case C‑249/06 Commission v Sweden [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 34).

8 AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY HELD IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 27 FEBRUARY 1962 IN CASE 10/61 COMMISSION V ITALY ( 1962 ) ECR 1 , THE PURPOSE OF THAT PROVISION IS TO LAY DOWN , IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW , THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY DOES NOT AFFECT THE DUTY OF THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED TO RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES UNDER A PRIOR AGREEMENT AND TO PERFORM ITS OBLIGATIONS THEREUNDER .

53. Article 7 of Directive 2004/38, which concerns the right of residence for more than three months, likewise requires that the family members of a Union citizen who are not nationals of a Member State ‘accompany’ or ‘join’ him in the host Member State in order to enjoy a right of residence there (judgment in Metock and Others , C‑127/08, EU:C:2008:449, paragraph 86).

44 Suffice it to recall in this regard that, according to settled case-law, it is for the national courts alone, before which the proceedings are pending and which must assume responsibility for the judgment to be given, to determine, having regard to the particular features of each case, both the need for a preliminary ruling to enable them to give judgment and the relevance of the questions which they refer to the Court. A request for a preliminary ruling from a national court may be rejected only if it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual nature of the case or the subject-matter of the action (see, in particular, Case C-129/94 Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-0000, paragraph 7).

7. On this point, the Court has consistently held that it is for the national courts alone, before which the proceedings are pending and which must assume responsibility for the judgment to be given, to determine, having regard to the particular features of each case, both the need for a preliminary ruling to enable them to give judgment and the relevance of the questions which they refer to the Court. A request for a preliminary ruling from a national court may be rejected only if it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual nature of the case or the subject-matter of the main action (see, inter alia , Case C-143/94 Furlanis Costruzioni Generali [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 12). That is not so, however, in the main proceedings in this case.

33. That possibility also accords with the specific logic of Article 78 of the Customs Code, which is to bring the customs procedure into line with the actual situation by correcting material errors or omissions and errors in the interpretation of the applicable law (see, to that effect, Overland Footwear , paragraph 63; Joined Cases C‑430/08 and C‑431/08 Terex Equipment and Others [2010] ECR I‑321, paragraph 56; and Joined Cases C‑608/10, C‑10/11 and C‑23/11 Südzucker [2012] ECR, paragraph 47).

71 In order to answer those questions, it should be noted at the outset that Regulation No 1393/2007 exhaustively provides for various means of service of judicial documents, in respect of which it lays down the applicable rules, without establishing a hierarchy between them (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 February 2006, Plumex, C‑473/04, EU:C:2006:96, paragraphs 20 to 22, and of 19 December 2012, Alder (C‑325/11, EU:C:2012:824, paragraphs 31 and 32). Those means of transmission include postal service, at issue in the main proceedings, which is essentially the subject of Article 14 of that regulation.

31. In addition, Regulation No 1393/2007 itself provides, in its Section 2, for other possible means of transmission, but without establishing a hierarchy between them (Case C-473/04 Plumex [2006] ECR I-1417, paragraphs 19 to 22), such as the transmission by consular or diplomatic channels, as well as service by diplomatic or consular agents, service by postal services, or even directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the Member State addressed.

41. Quant au plan de gestion provisoire du SIC «Is Arenas», à supposer même qu’il constitue une mesure appropriée au regard des exigences de l’article 6, paragraphe 2, de la directive «habitats», force est de constater qu’il a été approuvé après l’expiration du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé complémentaire. Or, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêt du 11 janvier 2007, Commission/Irlande, C‑183/05, Rec. p. I‑137, point 17).

44 It should also be recalled that, as regards the rules governing the exercise of the right to deduct VAT in the reverse charge procedure under Article 199(1) of Directive 2006/112, a taxable person who is liable as the purchaser of an item of property for the VAT relating thereto is not obliged to hold an invoice drawn up in accordance with the formal requirements of that directive in order to be able to exercise his right to deduct, and only has to fulfil the formalities laid down by the Member State concerned in the exercise of the option conferred by Article 178(f) of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 February 2014, Fatorie, C‑424/12, EU:C:2014:50, paragraphs 32 and 33).

32. As regards, secondly, the procedures for exercising the right to deduct VAT listed in Article 178 of the VAT Directive, only that set out in Article 178(f) of that directive is applicable since a reverse charge procedure under Article 199(1)(a) of that directive is at issue.

55. According to the case-law of the Court, a parallel importer must, in any event, in order to be entitled to repackage trade-marked pharmaceutical products, fulfil the requirement of prior notice. If the parallel importer does not satisfy that requirement, the trade mark proprietor may oppose the marketing of the repackaged pharmaceutical product. It is incumbent on the parallel importer itself to give notice to the trade mark proprietor of the intended repackaging. It is not sufficient that the proprietor be notified by other sources, such as the authority which issues a parallel import licence to the importer ( Boehringer Ingelheim and Others , paragraphs 63 and 64).

42. It is settled case-law that the need to guarantee the effectiveness of fiscal supervision constitutes an overriding reason in the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty (see Dijkman and Dijkman-Lavaleije , paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

58. Secondly, the Court has acknowledged that the need to guarantee the effectiveness of fiscal supervision constitutes an overriding reason in the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty (see, to that effect, X and Passenheim-van Schoot , paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

48. Indeed, there is also an obligation on taxable persons to state when their activity commences, changes or ceases, in accordance with the measures adopted to that end by the Member States, pursuant to Article 213 of Directive 2006/112. However, the Court has already held that that in no way authorises Member States, in the event of such a declaration not being submitted, to defer the exercise of the right to deduct until the time at which taxable transactions actually begin to be carried out on a regular basis, or to deprive the taxable person of that right (see, by analogy, Joined Cases C‑110/98 to C‑147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I-1577, paragraph 51).

72. The free movement of capital may be restricted by national measures justified on the grounds set out in Article 58 EC or by overriding reasons in the general interest to the extent that there are no Community harmonising measures providing for measures necessary to ensure the protection of those interests (see Commission v Portugal , paragraph 49; Commission v France , paragraph 45; Commission v Belgium , paragraph 45; Commission v Spain , paragraph 68; Commission v Italy , paragraph 35; and Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 32).

45 The free movement of capital, as a fundamental principle of the Treaty, may be restricted only by national rules which are justified by reasons referred to in Article 73d(1) of the Treaty or by overriding requirements of the general interest and which are applicable to all persons and undertakings pursuing an activity in the territory of the host Member State. Furthermore, in order to be so justified, the national legislation must be suitable for securing the objective which it pursues and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it, so as to accord with the principle of proportionality (see, to that effect, Sanz de Lera, cited above, paragraph 23, and Case C-54/99 Église de Scientologie [2000] ECR I-1335, paragraph 18).

51. As regards the question whether there was, at the time when the national temporary regulation was adopted, an outbreak of a zoonosis, disease or other cause likely to constitute a serious hazard to animals or to human health within the meaning of that provision, that condition is likely to be met when new information significantly alters the perception of the danger represented by the disease (Case C-220/01 Lennox [2003] ECR I‑7091, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

130 However, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, the justification for making a request for a preliminary ruling is not for advisory opinions to be delivered on general or hypothetical questions, but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute concerning EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 April 2012, Kamberaj, C‑571/10, EU:C:2012:233, paragraph 41; of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 42, and of 27 February 2014, Pohotovosť, C‑470/12, EU:C:2014:101 paragraph 29).

41. However, the Court must examine the circumstances in which cases are referred to it by the national court in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction. The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in the preliminary ruling procedure requires the national court for its part to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to contribute to the administration of justice in the Member States and not to give advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions (see Adeneler and Others , paragraph 42).

43. Or, dans le cadre du présent recours, qui a pour objet un manquement à l’exécution d’une décision en matière d’aides d’État et qui n’a pas été déférée devant la Cour par l’État membre qui en est destinataire, ce dernier ne saurait être fondé à contester la légalité d’une telle décision (voir arrêt du 12 mai 2005, Commission/Grèce, C‑415/03, Rec. p. I‑3875, point 38 et jurisprudence citée).

37. According to settled case-law, a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports may be justified only by one of the public-interest reasons laid down in Article 30 EC or by one of the overriding requirements referred to in the judgments of the Court (see, in particular, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral ( ‘ Cassis de Dijon ’) [1979] ECR 649, paragraph 8), provided in each case that that measure is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (Case C-14/02 ATRAL [2003] ECR I-4431, paragraph 64; Case C-432/03 Commission v Portugal [2005] ECR I-9665, paragraph 42; and Case C-254/05 Commission v Belgium , paragraph 33).

33. Such a measure may be justified only by one of the public-interest reasons laid down in Article 30 EC or by one of the overriding requirements referred to in the case-law of the Court, provided that, in either case, that measure is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it ( ATRAL , paragraph 64, and Case C‑432/03 Commission v Portugal [2005] ECR I‑9665, paragraph 42).

32 In that connection, it must also be borne in mind that the equal treatment rule laid down in Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 prohibits not only overt discrimination based on the nationality of the beneficiaries of social security schemes but also all covert forms of discrimination which, through the application of other distinguishing criteria, lead in fact to the same result (CRAM v Toia, cited above, paragraph 12).

29 The Court has therefore held that, in a sector where the activity is based essentially on manpower, the identity of an economic entity cannot be retained if the majority of its employees are not taken on by the alleged transferee (judgment of 26 November 2015, Aira Pascual and Algeposa Terminales Ferroviarios, C‑509/14, EU:C:2015:781, paragraph 35).

35. It is true that the Court has held in that respect that, in a sector where the activity is based essentially on manpower, the identity of an economic entity cannot be retained if the majority of its employees are not taken on by the alleged transferee (see, to that effect, judgment in CLECE , C‑463/09, EU:C:2011:24, point 41).

36. In that regard, given that, in principle, periods of imprisonment interrupt the continuity of the period of residence for the purposes of Article 28(3)(a) of Directive 2004/38, such periods may – together with the other factors going to make up the entirety of relevant considerations in each individual case – be taken into account by the national authorities responsible for applying Article 28(3) of that directive as part of the overall assessment required for determining whether the integrating links previously forged with the host Member State have been broken, and thus for determining whether the enhanced protection provided for in that provision will be granted (see, to that effect, Tsakouridis , paragraph 34).

39. In order to determine whether the refusal by a pharmaceuticals company to supply medicinal products to such wholesalers indeed falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 82 EC, in particular at point (b) of the second paragraph of that article, it must be examined whether, as GSK AEVE maintains, there are objective considerations based on which such a practice cannot be regarded as an abuse of the dominant position occupied by that undertaking (see, to that effect, United Brands and United Brands Continentaal v Commission , paragraph 184, and Case C‑95/04 P British Airways v Commission [2007] ECR I‑2331, paragraph 69). The abusive nature of the refusal to supply

69. It then needs to be examined whether there is an objective economic justification for the discounts and bonuses granted. In accordance with the analysis carried out by the Court of First Instance in paragraphs 279 to 291 of the judgment under appeal, an undertaking is at liberty to demonstrate that its bonus system producing an exclusionary effect is economically justified.

46. Lastly, in any event, the case-law shows that the importance of the objective of consumer protection, which therefore includes the protection of air passengers, may justify even substantial negative economic consequences for certain economic operators ( Nelson and Others , paragraph 81, and case-law cited).

28 It is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law that, with regard to inheritances, the measures which Article 63 TFEU prohibits as constituting restrictions on the movement of capital include those the effect of which is to reduce the value of the inheritance of a resident of a Member State other than the Member State in which the assets concerned are situated and which taxes the transfer of those assets by way of inheritance (see, inter alia, judgments of 11 December 2003 in Barbier, C‑364/01, EU:C:2003:665, paragraph 62, and of 17 October 2013 in Welte, C‑181/12, EU:C:2013:662, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

62. As for the existence of a "restriction" within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Directive 88/361, national provisions such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which determine the value of immovable property for the purposes of assessing the amount of tax due when it is acquired through inheritance, are such as to discourage the purchase of immovable property situated in the Member State concerned and the transfer of financial ownership of such property to another person by a resident of another Member State. They also have the effect of reducing the value of the estate of a resident of a Member State other than that in which the property is situated who is in the same position as Mr Barbier.

71 On that basis, the Court has previously held that Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as Union citizens (judgment of 8 March 2011, Ruiz Zambrano, C‑34/09, EU:C:2011:124, paragraph 42).

42 It is also settled case-law that every court of a Member State must apply Community law in its entirety and protect the rights which Community law confers on individuals, setting aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it (see, by analogy, Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 21).

21IT FOLLOWS FROM THE FOREGOING THAT EVERY NATIONAL COURT MUST , IN A CASE WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION , APPLY COMMUNITY LAW IN ITS ENTIRETY AND PROTECT RIGHTS WHICH THE LATTER CONFERS ON INDIVIDUALS AND MUST ACCORDINGLY SET ASIDE ANY PROVISION OF NATIONAL LAW WHICH MAY CONFLICT WITH IT , WHETHER PRIOR OR SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMMUNITY RULE .

92 It must be pointed out that, as regards areas classified as SPAs, Article 7 of the Habitats Directive provides that the obligations arising under Article 4(4) of the Birds Directive are replaced, inter alia, by the obligations arising under Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive as from the date of implementation of the Habitats Directive or the date of classification under the Birds Directive, where the latter date is later (judgment of 18 December 2007, Commission v Spain, C‑186/06, EU:C:2007:813, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

65. S’il s’avère qu’un dispositif médical muni du marquage CE n’est pas conforme aux exigences essentielles prévues par la directive 93/42, l’État membre concerné est tenu, conformément à l’article 8, paragraphe 3, de cette directive, de prendre les mesures appropriées et d’en informer la Commission ainsi que les autres États membres. Par ailleurs, il résulte de l’article 18 de ladite directive que, sans préjudice de l’article 8, lorsqu’un État membre constate l’apposition indue de ce marquage, le fabricant ou son mandataire établi dans l’Union est tenu de cesser l’infraction dans les conditions fixées par cet État membre (arrêt Medipac-Kazantzidis, C-6/05, EU:C:2007:337, point 47).

47. Under Article 8(3) of Directive 93/42, where a medical device bearing the CE marking nevertheless does not comply with the essential requirements provided for by that directive, the Member State concerned is to take appropriate action and to inform the Commission and the other Member States. Moreover, Article 18 of that same directive provides that where a Member State establishes that the CE marking has been affixed unduly, the manufacturer or his authorised representative established within the Community is to be obliged to end the infringement under conditions imposed by the Member State.

74 It follows that the concepts in Article 45(2), first paragraph, including ‘serious misrepresentation’, can be specified and explained in national law, provided that it has regard for EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2012, Forposat and ABC Direct Contact, C‑465/11, EU:C:2012:801, paragraph 26).

39 Under the principles set out by the Court in Adoui and Cornuaille, paragraph 12, a Community national expelled from a Member State may apply for a fresh residence permit, and if that application is made after a reasonable time it must be examined by the competent administrative authority in that State, which must take into account, in particular, the arguments put forward to establish that there has been a material change in the circumstances which justified the first decision ordering expulsion.

12 AS REGARDS THE POSSIBILITY FOR A PERSON AGAINST WHOM A DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN ORDERING HIS EXPULSION FROM THE TERRITORY OF A MEMBER STATE TO BE RE-ADMITTED TO THE TERRITORY OF THE STATE IN QUESTION AND APPLY THERE FOR A FRESH RESIDENCE PERMIT , IT MUST BE STRESSED THAT ANY NATIONAL OF A MEMBER STATE WHO WISHES TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE MAY RE-APPLY FOR A RESIDENCE PERMIT . SUCH AN APPLICATION , WHEN SUBMITTED AFTER A REASONABLE PERIOD HAS ELAPSED , MUST BE EXAMINED BY THE COMPETENT ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY IN THE HOST STATE , WHICH MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT , IN PARTICULAR , THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD BY THE PERSON CONCERNED PURPORTING TO ESTABLISH THAT THERE HAS BEEN A MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH JUSTIFIED THE FIRST DECISION ORDERING HIS EXPULSION . HOWEVER , WHERE SUCH A DECISION HAS BEEN VALIDLY ADOPTED IN HIS CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMMUNITY LAW AND CONTINUES TO BE LEGALLY EFFECTIVE SO AS TO EXCLUDE HIM FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE STATE IN QUESTION , COMMUNITY LAW CONTAINS NO PROVISION CONFERRING UPON HIM A RIGHT OF ENTRY INTO THAT TERRITORY DURING THE EXAMINATION OF HIS FURTHER APPLICATION . THE FOURTEENTH QUESTION

30 In that regard, the Court has held that Community law does not prevent national courts from taking steps to ensure that the protection of the rights guaranteed by Community law does not entail the unjust enrichment of those who enjoy them (see, in particular, Case 238/78 Ireks-Arkady v Council and Commission [1979] ECR 2955, paragraph 14, Case 68/79 Just [1980] ECR 501, paragraph 26, and Joined Cases C-441/98 and C-442/98 Michaïlidis [2000] ECR I-7145, paragraph 31).

33. However, according to settled case-law of the Court, where national legislation falling within an area which has not been harmonised at Community level is applicable without distinction to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the Member State concerned, it may, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services, be justified where it meets overriding requirements relating to the public interest in so far as that interest is not already safeguarded by the rules to which the service provider is subject in the Member State in which he is established and in so far as it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Säger , paragraph 15; Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraphs 34 and 35; Case C‑164/99 Portugaia Construções [2002] ECR I‑787, paragraph 19; Case C‑279/00 Commission v Italy , paragraph 33; Case C‑445/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2004] ECR I‑10191, paragraph 21; and Commission v Germany , paragraph 31).

21. However, where national legislation falling within an area which has not been harmonised at Community level is applicable without distinction to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the Member State in which the service is provided, it may, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services, be justified where it meets overriding requirements relating to the public interest in so far as that interest is not safeguarded by the rules to which the provider of such a service is subject in the Member State in which he is established and in so far as it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraphs 34 and 35, and Portugaia Construções , cited above, paragraph 19).

55 Secondly, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, the objective of Directive 2003/4 is to ensure a general principle of access to environmental information held by or for public authorities and, as is apparent from recital 9 and Article 1 of that directive, to achieve the widest possible systematic availability and dissemination to the public of environmental information (see, inter alia, judgment of 19 December 2013, Fish Legal and Shirley, C‑279/12, EU:C:2013:853, paragraph 66).

17 Having regard to those considerations, the Court interpreted Article 36 of the Treaty as meaning that a trade mark proprietor may rely on his rights as proprietor to prevent an importer from marketing a product put on the market in another Member State by the proprietor or with his consent, where that importer has repackaged the product in new packaging to which the trade mark has been reaffixed (see Hoffmann-La Roche, paragraph 8, and Bristol-Myers Squibb, paragraph 49). However, the Court has also held that the exercise by the proprietor of his trade-mark right may constitute a disguised restriction under Article 36 of the Treaty if it is established that reliance on the trade-mark right by the proprietor, having regard to the marketing system which he has adopted, would contribute to the artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States, and that, in the event of repackaging, the protection of certain legitimate interests of the trade-mark proprietor is assured, in particular that the repackaging cannot adversely affect the original condition of the product and that the presentation of the repackaged product is not such as to be liable to damage the reputation of the trade mark (see Hoffmann-La Roche, paragraph 10, Bristol-Myers Squibb, paragraph 49, and Case C-349/95 Loendersloot v Ballantine [1997] ECR I-6227, paragraph 29).

8IT IS ACCORDINGLY JUSTIFIED UNDER THE FIRST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 36 TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROPRIETOR OF A TRADE-MARK IS ENTITLED TO PREVENT AN IMPORTER OF A TRADE-MARKED PRODUCT , FOLLOWING REPACKAGING OF THAT PRODUCT , FROM AFFIXING THE TRADE-MARK TO THE NEW PACKAGING WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE PROPRIETOR .

40 Nevertheless, it is settled case-law that the restrictions imposed by Member States must satisfy the principle of proportionality and that national legislation is appropriate for achieving the objective invoked only if the means used are consistent and systematic (judgments of 6 March 2007, Placanica and Others, C‑338/04, C‑359/04 and C‑360/04, EU:C:2007:133, paragraph 48 and 53, and 16 February 2012, Costa and Cifone, C‑72/10 and C‑77/10, EU:C:2012:80, paragraph 63).

17 That provision should therefore be construed in such a way as to make it possible for the legal protection of persons established in the Community to be strengthened and recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions to be facilitated, in particular by reducing the danger of irreconcilable judgments being delivered, that being a ground for refusing recognition and enforcement under Article 27(3) and the second paragraph of Article 34 of the Brussels Convention (see Case C-220/88 Dumez France and Tracoba v Hessische Landesbank and Others [1990] ECR I-49, paragraph 18, and Overseas Union Insurance, paragraph 15).

18 In order to meet that objective, which is of fundamental importance in a convention which has essentially to promote the recognition and enforcement of judgments in States other than those in which they were delivered, it is necessary to avoid the multiplication of courts of competent jurisdiction which would heighten the risk of irreconcilable decisions, this being the reason for which recognition or an order for enforcement is withheld by virtue of Article 27(3 ) of the Convention .

31 In that regard, the Court has pointed out that Article 2(1) provides for two categories of such services by distinguishing between regular and special regular services. The former are open to all and provide for the carriage of passengers at specified intervals along specified routes, passengers being taken up and set down at predetermined stopping points. The latter are provided under the same conditions, but only for specified categories of passengers (judgment of 30 April 1998, Clarke & Sons and Ferne, C‑47/97, EU:C:1998:185, paragraph 16), namely for the carriage of ‘workers between home and work’, carriage ‘to and from the educational institution’ for school pupils and students, and the carriage of soldiers and their families ‘between their state of origin and the area of their barracks’.

28 In that context, the Court has stated that the decisive factor for the purposes of the application of Regulation No 1408/71 is that there must be a direct and sufficiently relevant link between the provision in question and the legislation governing the branches of social security listed in Article 4 of Regulation No 1408/71 (judgments of 18 May 1995, Rheinhold & Mahla, C‑327/92, EU:C:1995:144, paragraph 23; 15 February 2000, Commission v France, C‑34/98, EU:C:2000:84, paragraph 35; 15 February 2000, Commission v France, C‑169/98, EU:C:2000:85, paragraph 33; and 26 February 2015, de Ruyter, C‑623/13, EU:C:2015:123, paragraph 23).

23. The Court has stated that the decisive factor for the purposes of the application of Regulation No 1408/71 is that there must be a direct and sufficiently relevant link between the provision in question and the legislation governing the branches of social security listed in Article 4 of Regulation No 1408/71 (judgments in Rheinhold & Mahla , EU:C:1995:144, paragraph 23; Commission v France , EU:C:2000:84, paragraph 35; and Commission v France , EU:C:2000:85, paragraph 33).

36. First, it should be borne in mind that Article 1(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 introduces ‘general rules … relating to homogenous checks and to administrative measures and penalties concerning irregularities with regard to Community law’ in order, as is clear from the third recital in the preamble to the regulation, to combat ‘fraud against the Communities’ financial interests … for all areas …’ (Case C‑278/02 Handlbauer [2004] ECR I‑6171, paragraph 31).

30 The Court notes in that regard that, according to settled case-law, the right of taxable persons to deduct the VAT due or paid on goods purchased and services received as inputs from the VAT which they are liable to pay is a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT established by EU law (see judgments of 8 January 2002 in Metropol and Stadler, C‑409/99, EU:C:2002:2, paragraph 42, and of 6 September 2012 in Tóth, C‑324/11, EU:C:2012:549, paragraph 23).

23. According to settled case-law, the right of taxable persons to deduct the VAT due or already paid on goods purchased and services received as inputs from the VAT which they are liable to pay is a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT established by the relevant European Union legislation (see, inter alia, Case C-78/00 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-8195, paragraph 28; Case C-25/07 Sosnowska [2008] ECR I-5129, paragraph 14; and Joined Cases C-80/11 and C-142/11 Mahagében and Dávid [2012] ECR, paragraph 37).

95. Aid may be selective for the purposes of that provision even if it concerns a whole economic sector (see, inter alia, Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] ECR I-3671, paragraph 33).

61. That conclusion cannot be brought into question by the Belgian Government’s argument that, in essence, the effects of those rules are negligible, on the ground that only the disclosure of a limited amount of information is requested, that the obligation to make the declaration at issue is purely declaratory and that it comes into play only as an alternative. In that regard, it should be noted that, in any event, a restriction on a fundamental freedom is, in principle, prohibited by the Treaty even if it is of limited scope or minor importance (judgments in Corsica Ferries (France) , C‑49/89, EU:C:1989:649, paragraph 8, and in Strojírny Prostějov and ACO Industries Tábor , EU:C:2014:2011, paragraph 42). Justification for the restriction on the freedom to provide services

42. That conclusion cannot challenged by the argument of the Czech Government that the effects of the legislation at issue are negligible, given that, according to settled case-law, a restriction on a fundamental freedom is prohibited by the Treaty even if it is of limited scope or minor importance ( Commission v France , C‑34/98, EU:C:2000:84, paragraph 49, and X , EU:C:2012:635, paragraph 30). Justification of a restriction on the freedom to provide services

38. In that regard, the principle that VAT must be proportionate can relate only to the taxable amount. Although that amount usually corresponds to the price payable by the final consumer as consideration for the supply of goods or services, the very wording of Article 73 of the VAT Directive makes it clear that that is not always necessarily the case. Under that provision, the taxable amount is made up of everything which constitutes consideration ‘obtained’ by the supplier, in return for the supply, from the customer ‘or a third party, including subsidies directly linked to the price of the supply’. Accordingly, the taxable amount is determined by what the taxable person actually receives as consideration, and not by what one particular service user pays in a specific case (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑149/01 First Choice Holidays [2003] ECR I‑6289, paragraphs 28 to 31 and the case‑law cited).

24. However, while the establishment and application of those rules falls within the competence of the Member States, the latter must none the less exercise that competence in accordance with European Union law (see, to that effect, the judgment of 12 November 2009 in Case C‑154/08 Commission v Spain , paragraph 121 and the case-law cited). In particular, they may not render the implementation of European Union law impossible or excessively difficult (see, to that effect, Case C‑298/96 Oelmühle and Schmidt Söhne [1998] ECR I‑4767, paragraphs 23 and 24 and the case‑law cited) and, specifically, in the area of competition law, they must ensure that the rules which they establish or apply do not jeopardise the effective application of Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU (see, to that effect, VEBIC , paragraph 57).

24 It follows from the case-law of the Court that, in the absence of provisions of Community law, disputes concerning the recovery of amounts unduly paid under Community law must be decided by national courts in application of their own domestic law, subject to the limits imposed by Community law, on the basis that the rules and procedures laid down by domestic law must not have the effect of making it practically impossible or excessively difficult to implement the Community rules and that the national legislation must be applied in a manner which is not discriminatory as compared to procedures for deciding similar national disputes (see, in particular, Deutsche Milchkontor, paragraph 19, and Case C-366/95 Landbrugsministeriet v Steff-Houlberg Export and Others [1998] ECR I-0000 and, as regards national procedural law, Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I-4599, paragraph 12, and Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel and Van Veen [1995] ECR I-4705, paragraph 17). If domestic law requires the various interests in question, namely, on the one hand, the public interest in the revocation of an unlawful administrative measure and, on the other, the protection of the legitimate expectation of the person to whom it is addressed, to be weighed against one another before the measure is revoked, the interests of the Community must be taken fully into account (Deutsche Milchkontor, paragraph 32).

38 Nevertheless, it is also clear from the case-law of the Court that, in certain circumstances, several formally distinct services, which could be supplied separately and thus give rise, separately, to taxation or exemption, must be considered to constitute a single transaction when they are not independent. There is a single supply where two or more elements or acts supplied by the taxable person to the customer are so closely linked that they form, objectively, a single, indivisible economic supply, which it would be artificial to split (judgment of 16 July 2015, Mapfre asistencia and Mapfre warranty, C‑584/13, EU:C:2015:488, paragraph 50).

42. With regard to respect for the acquired rights and the protection of the legitimate expectations of civil servants favoured by the previous system with regard to their remuneration, it should be noted that these constitute legitimate employment-policy and labour-market objectives which can justify, for a transitional period, the maintenance of earlier pay and, consequently, the maintenance of a system that discriminates on the basis of age (see, to that effect, judgment in Hennigs and Mai , C‑297/10 and C‑298/10, EU:C:2011:560, paragraphs 90 and 92).

92. The Court has held that leaving it to the social partners to strike a balance between their respective interests offers considerable flexibility, as each of the parties may, where appropriate, reject the agreement (see Palacios de la Villa , paragraph 74, and Rosenbladt , paragraph 67). It is thus apparent that the maintenance of earlier pay, and consequently of a system that discriminates according to age, had the aim of avoiding losses of pay and was a decisive factor in enabling the social partners to implement the changeover from the system laid down by the BAT to that under the TVöD. The transitional rules in the TVÜ-Bund must therefore be regarded as pursing a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78.

34. In order to determine whether such an entity retains its identity, it is necessary to consider all the facts characterising the transaction in question, including in particular the type of undertaking or business concerned, whether or not its tangible assets, such as buildings and movable property, are transferred, the value of its intangible assets at the time of the transfer, whether or not the majority of its employees are taken over by the new employer, whether or not its customers are transferred, the degree of similarity between the activities carried on before and after the transfer, and the period, if any, for which those activities were suspended. However, all those circumstances are merely single factors in the overall assessment which must be made and cannot therefore be considered in isolation (see, inter alia, Case 24/85 Spijkers [1986] ECR 1119, paragraph 13; Case C‑29/91 Redmond Stichting [1992] ECR I‑3189, paragraph 24; Case C‑13/95 Süzen [1997] ECR I‑1259, paragraph 14; and Case C‑340/01 Abler and Others [2003] ECR I‑14023, paragraph 33).

48 The Commission supports the views set out by the German Government. In its opinion, the inspections in question are not regulated in a restrictive sense by Community law. Nor does Community law specify who is to bear the costs. For that reason, Member States may pass those costs on to the traders involved, within the limits set by the Court in its judgment in Denkavit. As those limits were not exceeded in this case, according to the findings made by the national court, the costs at issue are compatible with Regulations No 1624/76 and No 1725/79. In order not to fall within the category of charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties, however, charges must, in the Commission' s view, satisfy the conditions laid down by the Court in paragraph 8 of its judgment in Case 18/87 Commission v Germany [1988] ECR 5427, that is to say, they must be prescribed by Community law in the general interest of the Community, they must be obligatory and uniform for all the products concerned and they must not exceed the actual costs of the inspections in connection with which they are charged. The Commission considers that those conditions are satisfied in this case.

8 Since the contested fee was charged in connection with inspections carried out pursuant to a Community provision, it should be noted that according to the case-law of the Court ( judgment of 25 January 1977 in Bauhuis, cited above; judgment of 12 July 1977 Commission v Netherlands (( 1977 )) ECR 1355; judgment of 31 January 1984 in Case 1/83 IFG v Freistaat Bayern (( 1984 )) ECR 349 ) such fees may not be classified as charges having an effect equivalent to a customs duty if the following conditions are satisfied : ( a ) they do not exceed the actual costs of the inspections in connection with which they are charged; ( b ) the inspections in question are obligatory and uniform for all the products concerned in the Community; ( c ) they are prescribed by Community law in the general interest of the Community; ( d ) they promote the free movement of goods, in particular by neutralizing obstacles which could arise from unilateral measures of inspection adopted in accordance with Article 36 of the Treaty .

37 It is to be noted that the fact that a tax or levy is a special charge or is appropriated for a specific purpose cannot prevent its falling within the field of application of Article 95 of the Treaty (see Case 74/76 Iannelli v Meroni [1977] ECR 557, paragraph 19) nor, where appropriate, the prohibition laid down by that provision.

29 However, although the OCTs are associated countries and territories having particular links with the Community, they are not part of it and are, as regards the Community, in the same situation as non-member countries (see Opinion 1/78 of 4 October 1979 [1979] ECR 2871, paragraph 62, and Opinion 1/94 of 15 November 1994 [1994] ECR I-5267, paragraph 17). In particular, free movement of goods between the OCTs and the Community does not exist without restriction at this stage, in accordance with Article 132 of the Treaty (Antillean Rice Mills, cited above, paragraph 36).

36 Here it must be borne in mind first that, as the Court has already held, association of the OCTs with the Community is to be achieved by a dynamic and progressive process which may necessitate the adoption of a number of measures in order to attain all the objectives mentioned in Article 132 of the Treaty, having regard to the experience acquired through the Council's previous decisions (Case C-310/95 Road Air v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1997] ECR I-2229, paragraph 40). It follows that although the OCTs are countries and territories which have special links with the Community, they do not, however, form part of the Community, and free movement of goods between the OCTs and the Community does not exist unrestrictedly at this stage, in accordance with Article 132 of the Treaty.

46. In accordance with the case-law of the Court, the judicial review mechanisms laid down in Article 263 TFEU apply to the bodies, offices and agencies established by the EU legislature which were given powers to adopt measures that are legally binding on natural or legal persons in specific areas, such as the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) and the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (see, to that effect, judgment in United Kingdom v Council and Parliament , C‑270/12, EU:C:2014:18, paragraph 81).

53 The same applies in cases in which, although the facts of the main proceedings are outside the direct scope of EU law, the provisions of EU law have been made applicable by national legislation, which, in dealing with situations confined in all respects within a single Member State, follows the same approach as that provided for by EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 October 1990, Dzodzi, C‑297/88 and C‑197/89, EU:C:1990:360, paragraphs 36, 37 and 41; of 17 July 1997, Leur-Bloem, C‑28/95, EU:C:1997:369, paragraphs 27 and 32; and of 14 March 2013, Allianz Hungária Biztositó and Others, C‑32/11, EU:C:2013:160, paragraph 20).

41 Where Community law is made applicable by national provisions, it is for the national court alone to assess the precise scope of that reference to Community law . If it takes the view that the content of a provision of Community law is applicable, by virtue of that reference, to the purely internal situation underlying the dispute brought before it, the national court is entitled to request the Court for a preliminary ruling on the terms laid down by the provisions of Article 177 as a whole, as they have been interpreted in the case-law of the Court of Justice .

À cet égard, la Cour a déjà jugé que la réglementation d’un État membre qui fait dépendre l’application d’un taux réduit du lieu de résidence du défunt ou du bénéficiaire au moment du décès, lorsqu’elle aboutit à ce que les successions impliquant des non-résidents soient soumises à une charge fiscale plus lourde que celle n’impliquant que des résidents, constitue une restriction à la libre circulation des capitaux (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 17 octobre 2013, Welte, C‑181/12, EU:C:2013:662, points 25 et 26 ; du 3 septembre 2014, Commission/Espagne, C‑127/12, non publié, EU:C:2014:2130, point 58, ainsi que du 26 mai 2016, Commission/Grèce, C‑244/15, EU:C:2016:359, point 29).

37 Furthermore, encouragement of recruitment undoubtedly constitutes a legitimate aim of Member States’ social or employment policy, in particular when the promotion of access of young people to a profession is involved (judgment of 21 July 2011, Fuchs and Köhler, C‑159/10 and C‑160/10, EU:C:2011:508, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

49. It must be noted that, according to the case-law, encouragement of recruitment undoubtedly constitutes a legitimate aim of Member States’ social or employment policy, in particular when the promotion of access of young people to a profession is involved ( Georgiev , paragraph 45). The Court has, moreover, held that the mix of different generations of employees can also contribute to the quality of the activities carried out, inter alia by promoting the exchange of experience (see, to that effect, in relation to teaching staff and researchers, Georgiev , paragraph 46).

103. The Court has held in that connection that restrictive practices are viewed differently by European Union law and national law. Whilst Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU view them in the light of the obstacles which may result for trade between the Member States, each body of national legislation proceeds on the basis of considerations peculiar to it and considers restrictive practices solely in that context (see, to that effect, Case C-67/91 Asociación Española de Banca Privada and Others [1992] ECR I-4785, paragraph 11).

39. By contrast, according to the appellant in the main proceedings, the Greek Government and the Commission, it follows from the Court’s case-law on Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention that the consistent interpretation of the criterion of the place where the employee ‘habitually carries out his work’ has the result that that rule can also be applied in cases where work is carried out in several Member States. In particular, they point out that, for the purposes of specifically determining that place, the Court has made reference to the place from which the employee mainly carries out his obligations towards his employer ( Mulox IBC , paragraphs 21 to 23) or to the place in which he has established the effective centre of his working activities (Case C‑383/95 Rutten [1997] ECR I‑57, paragraph 23), or, in the absence of an office, to the place in which the employee carries out the majority of his work (Case C‑37/00 Weber [2002] ECR I‑2013, paragraph 42).

23 Having regard to the requirements set out in the previous paragraph, where a contract of employment is performed in several Contracting States, Article 5(1) of the Convention, as amended by the San Sebastian Convention, must be understood to refer to the place where the employee has established the effective centre of his working activities and where, or from which, he in fact performs the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer.

27 Since such jurisdiction extends to all grounds capable of invalidating those measures, the Court is obliged to examine whether their validity may be affected by reason of the fact that they are contrary to a rule of international law (International Fruit Company, paragraph 6).

49 Furthermore, it is settled case-law that the rules of jurisdiction which derogate from the general principle, set out in the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention, that the courts of the Contracting State in which the defendant is domiciled or established are to have jurisdiction, cannot give rise to an interpretation going beyond the cases expressly envisaged by the Convention (see, in particular, Handte, paragraph 14; Case C-89/91 Shearson Lehman Hutton v TVB [1993] ECR I-139, paragraphs 15 and 16; Case C-269/95 Benincasa v Dentalkit [1997] ECR I-3767, paragraph 13; and Case C-51/97 Réunion Européenne and Others [1998] ECR I-6511, paragraph 16).

15 It is only by way of derogation from that general principle that the Convention provides for the cases, exhaustively listed in Sections 2 to 6 of Title II, in which a defendant domiciled or established in a Contracting State may, where the situation comes under a rule of special jurisdiction, or must, where the situation comes under a rule of exclusive jurisdiction or of prorogation of jurisdiction, be sued in the courts of another Contracting State.

30. Subsequently, the Court treated as provisions governing sales arrangements within the meaning of the judgment in Keck and Mithouard provisions concerning, in particular, a number of marketing methods (see, inter alia, Hünermund and Others , paragraphs 21 and 22; Case C-254/98 TK-Heimdienst [2000] ECR I-151, paragraph 24; and Case C-441/04 A-Punkt Schmuckhandel [2006] ECR I-2093, paragraph 16).

62. According to the Court’s settled case-law, where national legislation falling within an area which has not been harmonised at EU level is applicable without distinction to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the Member State concerned, it may, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services, be justified where it meets an overriding requirement relating to the public interest and that interest is not already safeguarded by the rules to which the service provider is subject in the Member State in which he is established, and in so far as it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (judgments in Arblade and Others , C‑369/96 and C‑376/96, EU:C:1999:575, paragraphs 34 and 35; in dos Santos Palhota and Others , EU:C:2010:589, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited; and in Commission v Belgium , EU:C:2012:814, paragraph 44).

44. Where national legislation falling within an area which has not been harmonised at European Union level is applicable without distinction to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the Member State concerned, it may, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services, be justified where it meets an overriding requirement in the public interest and that interest is not already safeguarded by the rules to which the service provider is subject in the Member State in which he is established and in so far as it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it ( Arblade and Others , paragraphs 34 and 35; Case C-224/04 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I-885, paragraph 31; and Case C-219/08 Commission v Belgium [2009] ECR I-9213, paragraph 14).

44. As regards the arguments put forward by the Kingdom of Belgium as to the absence of any obligation to transpose the provisions of the Directive concerning the requirement to consult with the Member States concerned beforehand in the case of an interconnector, and the requirement to notify exemption decisions to the Commission, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the effect of the third paragraph of Article 249 EC is that Community directives must be implemented by appropriate measures taken by the Member States. The fact that, in specific circumstances, where the implementing measures required have not been adopted or measures have been adopted which are not consistent with a directive, the persons affected thereby are entitled to rely in law on a directive as against a defaulting Member State cannot justify a Member State absolving itself from taking in due time implementing measures sufficient to meet the purpose of each directive (see, to that effect, Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 1473, paragraph 12; Case C-433/93 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I‑2303, paragraph 24; and Case C-253/95 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-2423, paragraph 13). Similarly, and a fortiori, the fact that certain provisions of the Directive in question are directly applicable in the national legal system is not grounds for relieving the Member States of their obligations to transpose Community law.

131. As to the admissibility of the claim in so far as it concerns the alleged failure to transpose Directive 2005/36, it must be recalled that, as the Court has previously held, although the claims as stated in the application cannot in principle be extended beyond the infringements alleged in the operative part of the reasoned opinion and in the letter of formal notice, the fact nevertheless remains that the Commission has standing to seek a declaration that a Member State has failed to fulfil obligations which were created in the original version of a European Union measure, subsequently amended or repealed, and which were maintained in force under the provisions of a new European Union measure. Conversely, the subject-matter of the dispute cannot be extended to obligations arising under new provisions which have no equivalent in the original version of the measure concerned, for otherwise it would constitute a breach of the essential procedural requirements of infringement proceedings (see, to that effect, Case C‑365/97 Commission v Italy , paragraph 36; Case C‑363/00 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I‑5767, paragraph 22; and Case C‑416/07 Commission v Greece [2009] ECR I‑7883, paragraph 28).

22. Thus, although the claims as stated in the application cannot in principle be extended beyond the infringements alleged in the operative part of the reasoned opinion and in the letter of formal notice, it is none the less true that, where Community law is amended during the course of the pre-litigation procedure, the Commission has standing to seek a declaration that a Member State has failed to fulfil obligations which were created in the initial version of a Community measure, subsequently amended or repealed, and which were maintained in force under the new provisions. Conversely, the subject-matter of the dispute cannot be extended to obligations arising under new provisions which do not correspond to those arising under the initial version of the measure concerned, as otherwise it would constitute a breach of the essential procedural requirements of infringement proceedings (see Commission v Italy , cited above, paragraphs 36 and 39).

32. More specifically, as regards the derogation referred to in Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/83, the Court has already pointed out that the possibility of importing non-approved medicinal products, provided for under national legislation implementing the power laid down in that provision, must remain exceptional in order to preserve the practical effect of the marketing authorisation procedure (see, to this effect, Case C‑143/06 Ludwigs-Apotheke [2007] ECR I‑9623, paragraphs 33 and 35).

19. In relation to direct taxation, the Court has accepted, in cases relating to taxation of the income of natural persons, that the situation of residents and the situation of non-residents in a given State are not generally comparable, since there are objective differences between them, both from the point of view of the source of the income and from the point of view of their ability to pay tax or the possibility of taking account of their personal and family circumstances ( Schumacker , paragraphs 31 to 34, Case C-80/94 Wielockx [1995] ECR I‑2493, paragraph 18; and Case C‑107/94 Asscher [1996] ECR I‑3089, paragraph 41). The Court has made it clear, however, that, in the case of a tax advantage which is not available to a non-resident, a difference in treatment as between the two categories of taxpayer may constitute discrimination within the meaning of the Treaty where there is no objective difference between the situations of the two such as to justify different treatment in that regard ( Schumacker , paragraphs 36 to 38, and Asscher , paragraph 42).

31 In relation to direct taxes, the situations of residents and of non-residents are not, as a rule, comparable.

39 Where an appellant alleges distortion of the evidence by the General Court, it must, under Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure, indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in its view, led to such distortion. In addition, according to the Court’s settled case-law, that distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgment of 30 November 2016, Commission v France and Orange, C‑486/15 P, EU:C:2016:912, paragraph 99 as well as the case-law cited).

34 According to the settled case-law of the Court, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be made to override the other language versions. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions established in all the languages of the European Union. Where there is divergence between the various versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 1 March 2016, Alo and Osso, C‑443/14 and C‑444/14, EU:C:2016:127, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

27 According to settled case-law of the Court, the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions. Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions established in all the languages of the European Union. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part (judgment in GSV, C‑74/13, EU:C:2014:243, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

39. That analysis is confirmed by the general scheme and purpose of Chapter 6, of which Article 75 EA forms part. That chapter implements the general obligation imposed on the Community institutions by Article 2(d) EA to ensure that all users in the Community receive a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear fuels (Case 7/71 Commission v France [1971] ECR 1003, paragraph 22). The effect of Article 75 EA is to remove substances which are the subject of the contract work operations referred to in that provision from the ambit of the provisions relating to the supply system (see Ruling 1/78 [1978] ECR 2151, paragraph 16).

23 It is settled case-law that, whilst those explanatory notes may be regarded as a valuable aid to the interpretation of the CN, they do not have legally binding force, so that it is necessary, where appropriate, to examine whether their content is in accordance with the actual provisions of the Common Customs Tariff and whether they alter the meaning of those provisions (see, in particular, Case C-35/93 Develop Dr Eisbein [1994] ECR I-2655, paragraph 21, Case C-201/96 LTM, cited above, paragraph 17, and Case C-328/97 Glob-Sped, cited above, paragraph 26).

21 The Court has stated on many occasions that the Explanatory Notes to the nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation Council constitute an important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Common Customs Tariff by the customs authorities of the Member States and as such may be considered a valid aid to the interpretation of the tariff. However, those notes do not have legally binding force so that, where appropriate, it is necessary to consider whether their content is in accordance with the actual provisions of the Common Customs Tariff and whether they alter the meaning of such provisions (see Joined Cases 69 and 70/76 Dittmeyer v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Waltershof [1977] ECR 231 and Case 798/79 Hauptzollamt Koeln-Rheinau v Chem-Tec [1980] ECR 2639).

48. In the context of the main proceedings, it should be borne in mind that Article 10(1) of Directive 90/425 confers on Member States the power to adopt measures to control foot-and-mouth disease in addition to those provided for in Directive 85/511, in particular, as in the present case, the power to order the slaughter of animals belonging to a holding adjacent to or within a specific radius of a holding containing infected animals ( Tempelman and van Schaijk , paragraph 52).

83. However, even if it is accepted that that is the real scope of the fifth question (see, to that effect, Case C-107/98 Teckal [1999] ECR I-8121, paragraphs 34 and 39), it is necessary to state that, as the Advocate General also observed in points 99 and 100 of her Opinion, there is nothing in the order for reference to suggest that the dispute in the main proceedings relates to an issue concerning either the obligation to give prior notice to the consumer with regard to any change in the annual rate of interest or the restitution of goods to the creditor which gives rise to unjustified enrichment of the latter.

34 Finally, according to settled case-law, it is for the Court alone, where questions are formulated imprecisely, to extract from all the information provided by the national court and from the documents in the main proceedings the points of Community law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject-matter of those proceedings (Case 251/83 Haug-Adrion v Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG [1984] ECR 4277, paragraph 9, and Case C-168/95 Arcaro [1996] ECR I-4705, paragraph 21).

28. The fact that the services are carried out by laboratory staff who are not qualified medical practitioners is irrelevant, inasmuch as it is not necessary for every aspect of therapeutic care to be provided by medical staff (see, to that effect, Case C‑141/00 Kügler [2002] ECR I‑6833, paragraph 41, and L.u.P. , paragraph 39).

55 In such a situation, the tenderer who has brought the action must be regarded as having a legitimate interest in the exclusion of the bid submitted by the successful tenderer, which may lead, where appropriate, to a finding that the contracting authority is unable to select a lawful bid (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 July 2013, Fastweb, C‑100/12, EU:C:2013:448, paragraph 33, and of 5 April 2016, PFE, C‑689/13, EU:C:2016:199, paragraph 24).

24 At paragraph 33 of the judgment in Fastweb (C‑100/12, EU:C:2013:448), the Court considered that a counterclaim filed by the successful tenderer cannot bring about the dismissal of an action for review brought by an unsuccessful tenderer where the validity of the bid submitted by each of the operators is challenged in the course of the same proceedings, given that, in such a situation, each competitor can claim a legitimate interest in the exclusion of the bid submitted by the other, which may lead to a finding that the contracting authority is unable to select a lawful bid.

104. Il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour que le Conseil bénéficie, pour l’application de l’article 108, paragraphe 2, troisième alinéa, TFUE, d’un large pouvoir d’appréciation dont l’exercice implique des évaluations complexes d’ordre économique et social, qui doivent être effectuées dans le contexte de l’Union. Dans ce cadre, le contrôle juridictionnel appliqué à l’exercice de ce pouvoir d’appréciation se limite à la vérification du respect des règles de procédure et de motivation ainsi qu’au contrôle de l’exactitude matérielle des faits retenus et de l’absence d’erreur de droit, d’erreur manifeste dans l’appréciation des faits ou de détournement de pouvoir (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 29 février 1996, Commission/Conseil, précité, points 18 et 19, ainsi que, par analogie, arrêt du 22 décembre 2008, Régie Networks, C‑333/07, Rec. p. I‑10807, point 78).

Il résulte également de la jurisprudence de la Cour que, lorsqu’une question de fait ou de droit ne fait pas l’objet du litige dont le Tribunal est saisi, il n’appartient pas à ce dernier de se prononcer sur cette question, sous peine de statuer ultra petita. Par conséquent, tout constat à cet égard par le Tribunal constitue un obiter dictum prononcé au-delà des limites dudit litige et ne tranche ni effectivement ni nécessairement un point de droit. Il est, dès lors, insusceptible d’être revêtu de l’autorité de la chose jugée (voir, en ce sens, arrêt ThyssenKrupp Nirosta/Commission, C‑352/09 P, EU:C:2011:191, points 129 à 132).

130. Having regard to the arguments raised before the General Court in that case, its task was limited to assessing whether or not the appellant, by making the statement of 23 July 1997, had waived its right to be heard specifically on the unlawful conduct of Thyssen Stahl.

En faisant application de cette jurisprudence au cas d’espèce, le Tribunal n’a commis aucune erreur de droit, étant donné que la Cour a déjà constaté que, du point de vue de l’accès au dossier administratif, les procédures de contrôle des aides d’État et celles de contrôle des opérations de concentration sont comparables et qu’il convient de reconnaître l’existence d’une présomption générale de confidentialité des documents afférents à ces procédures dans chacune de celles-ci (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 28 juin 2012, Commission/Éditions Odile Jacob, C‑404/10 P, EU:C:2012:393, points 117 à 123).

76. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite clear that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( PreussenElektra , paragraph 39, and Hartlauer , paragraph 25).

39 Nevertheless, the Court has also stated that, in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court, in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction (see, to that effect, Case 244/80 Foglia [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 21). The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Bosman, paragraph 61; Case C-36/99 Idéal Tourisme [2000] ECR I-6049, paragraph 20; Case C-322/98 Kachelmann [2000] ECR I-7505, paragraph 17).

87. Situations falling within the scope of Community law include those involving the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty, in particular those involving the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 18 EC (see, in particular, Grzelczyk , paragraph 33; D’Hoop , paragraph 29; Garcia Avello , paragraph 24; and Pusa , paragraph 17).

97 The Court has recalled that the national courts are required only to exclude the application of an unfair contractual term in order that it does not produce binding effects with regard to the consumer, without being authorised to revise its content. The contract must continue in existence, in principle, without any amendment other than that resulting from the deletion of the unfair terms, in so far as, in accordance with the rules of domestic law, such continuity of the contract is legally possible (judgment of 21 January 2015 in Unicaja Banco and Caixabank, C‑482/13, C‑484/13, C‑485/13 and C‑487/13, EU:C:2015:21, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

28. In that context, it should be borne in mind that, as regards the inferences to be drawn from the finding of unfairness of a contract provision between a consumer and a professional, it follows from the wording of Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 that national courts are merely required to exclude the application of an unfair contractual term in order that it may not produce binding effects with regard to the consumer, without being empowered to revise the content of that term. That contract must continue in existence, in principle, without any amendment other than that resulting from the deletion of the unfair terms, in so far as, in accordance with the rules of domestic law, such continuity of the contract is legally possible (judgments in Banco Español de Crédito , C‑618/10, EU:C:2012:349, paragraph 65, and in Asbeek Brusse and de Man Garabito , C‑488/11, EU:C:2013:341, paragraph 57).

40 In this connection, the Court has held that, when EU law guarantees a natural person the freedom to go to another Member State, the protection of that person from harm in the Member State in question, on the same basis as that of nationals and persons residing there, is a corollary of that freedom of movement (judgment of 2 February 1989, Cowan, C‑186/87, EU:C:1989:47, paragraph 17). In that context, recital 2 of Directive 2004/80 states that measures to facilitate compensation to victims of crimes should form part of the realisation of that objective.

36. Article 108 TFEU establishes different procedures according to whether the aid is existing or new. Whilst under Article 108(3) TFEU new aid must be notified to the Commission and may not be implemented until that procedure has led to a final decision, under Article 108(1) TFEU existing aid may be lawfully implemented so long as the Commission has made no finding of incompatibility (Case C‑262/11 Kremikovtzi [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

49. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the EC Treaty provides for different procedures according to whether aid is existing or new (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑47/91 Italy v Commission [1992] ECR I‑4145, paragraphs 22 to 24, and Case C‑44/93 Namur-Les assurances du crédit [1994] ECR I‑3829, paragraphs 10 to 12). Whilst under Article 88(3) EC new aid must be notified to the Commission and may not be implemented until that procedure has led to a final decision, under Article 88(1) EC existing aid may be lawfully implemented so long as the Commission has made no finding of incompatibility (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I‑877, paragraph 20; Case C‑372/97 Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I‑3679, paragraph 42; Case C‑298/00 P Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I‑4087, paragraph 47; and also Case C‑322/09 P NDSHT v Commission [2010] ECR I‑11911, paragraph 52 and the case‑law cited).

33. According to the case-law of the Court, the Community trade mark regime is an autonomous system with its own set of objectives and rules peculiar to it; it applies independently of any national system (see Budějovický Budvar , paragraph 36 and the case‑law cited).

25. That interpretation is the only one to ensure the coherence of the system and to permit the unqualified realisation of the objective pursued by the first paragraph of Article 7, which is to create conditions conducive to family reunification in the host Member State, first by enabling family members to be with a migrant worker and then after some time by consolidating their position there by granting them the right to obtain employment in that State (see, in particular, Case C-351/95 Kadiman [1997] ECR I-2133, paragraphs 34 to 36, and Ayaz , paragraph 41).

35 Accordingly, it provides, for the initial stage, that family members of a Turkish worker already duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member State may be authorized to join him and take up residence there so as to enable the family to be together. In order to deepen the integration of a migrant Turkish worker's family unit in the host Member State, it also grants those family members the right, after a specified time, to take up employment in that State.

41. The directive thus gives two definitions of medicinal product, one ‘by presentation’ and one ‘by function’. A product is a medicinal product if it falls within either of those definitions ( HLH Warenvertrieb and Orthica , paragraph 49).

47 The requirement that reasons be given must be assessed according to the circumstances of the case. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all of the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgment of 29 September 2011, Elf Aquitaine v Commission, C‑521/09 P, EU:C:2011:620, paragraph 150 and the case-law cited).

150. It is settled case-law that the requirement to state reasons must be assessed by reference to the circumstances of the case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, inter alia, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France , paragraph 63; Case C‑413/06 P Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala [2008] ECR I‑4951, paragraphs 166 and 178; and Deutsche Telekom v Commission , paragraph 131).

15 In Rompelman the Court held, at paragraph 22, that the economic activities referred to Article 4(1) may consist in several consecutive transactions and that preparatory acts, such as the acquisition of business assets and therefore the purchase of immovable property, must themselves be treated as constituting economic activity.

62. In that regard, the appellants are wrong to claim that the mere fact that a natural or legal person is directly and individually concerned necessarily indicates his interest in bringing proceedings. As is apparent from paragraphs 55 to 59 of the present judgment, an interest in bringing proceedings and locus standi are distinct conditions for admissibility which must be satisfied by a natural or legal person cumulatively in order to be admissible to bring an action for annulment under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments in Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission , C‑132/12 P, EU:C:2014:100, paragraphs 67 and 68, and Stichting Woonlinie and Others v Commission , C‑133/12 P, EU:C:2014:105, paragraphs 54 and 55).

55. Secondly, the appellants must, under the second limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, be concerned not only individually but also directly by the act which they are seeking to have annulled, in the sense that that act must directly affect the legal situation of those parties and leave no discretion to the authorities responsible for implementing that act, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from European Union law alone, without the application of any other intermediate rules (see, to that effect, Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina , paragraphs 48 and 49).

33. As the Swedish Government has pointed out, the health and life of humans rank foremost among the property or interests protected by Article 30 EC. It is for the Member States, in compliance with Community law and, in particular, with the principle of proportionality, to decide what degree of protection they wish to ensure, and the manner in which that degree can be achieved (Case C‑320/93 Ortscheit [1994] ECR I‑5243, paragraph 16; see also, to that effect, Heinonen , paragraph 45).

67 However, according to the case-law of the Court, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations may be relied on in order to challenge Community rules only to the extent that the Community itself has previously created a situation which can give rise to a legitimate expectation (see, for example, Case C-22/94 Irish Farmers Association and Others v Minister for Agriculture, Food and Forestry, Ireland and the Attorney General [1997] ECR I-1809, paragraph 19). In the case of foodstuffs intended for particular nutritional uses, Community rules have not previously created a situation which might give rise, on the part of Arkopharma, to a legitimate expectation on which Arkopharma could rely.

19 According to the consistent case-law of the Court, in the sphere of the common organization of the markets, whose purpose involves constant adjustments to meet changes in the economic situation, economic operators cannot legitimately expect that they will not be subject to restrictions arising out of future rules of market or structural policy. The principle of the protection of legitimate expectations may be invoked as against Community rules only to the extent that the Community itself has previously created a situation which can give rise to a legitimate expectation (see Case C-177/90 Kühn v Landwirtschaftskammer Weser-Ems [1992] ECR I-35, paragraphs 13 and 14, and Case C-63/93 Duff and Others v Minister for Agriculture and Food, Ireland, and the Attorney General [1996] ECR I-569, paragraph 20).

46. Nevertheless, pursuant to Articles 180 and 182 of the VAT Directive, a taxable person may be authorised to make a deduction even if he did not exercise his right during the period in which the right arose, subject to compliance with certain conditions and procedures determined by national legislation (see, to that effect, Ecotrade , paragraphs 42 and 43).

20 The content of those notes must therefore be in accordance with the provisions of the CN and may not alter their meaning (see judgment of 27 November 2008 in Metherma, C‑403/07, EU:C:2008:657, paragraph 48).

48. Furthermore, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court, the explanatory notes drawn up, as regards the CN, by the Commission and, as regards the HS, by the World Customs Organisation may be an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various headings but do not have legally binding force (see Case C-35/93 Develop Dr. Eisbein [1994] ECR I‑2655, paragraph 21, and Case C-400/05 B.A.S. Trucks [2007] ECR I‑311, paragraph 28). The content of those notes must therefore be in accordance with the provisions of the CN and may not alter their meaning (Case C-280/97 ROSE Elektrotechnik [1999] ECR I‑689, paragraph 23; Case C-495/03 Intermodal Transports [2005] ECR I‑8151, paragraph 48; and Case C‑445/04 Possehl Erzkontor [2005] ECR I‑10721, paragraph 20).

64. Lastly, as regards the alternative argument of the United Kingdom Government that failed asylum seekers such as the applicants in the main proceedings should not be allowed to rely on Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol, since any other interpretation would be tantamount to endorsing fraud or abuse, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, Community law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends (Case C-255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECR I‑1609, paragraph 68) and that the national courts may, case by case, take account – on the basis of objective evidence – of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of the persons concerned in order, where appropriate, to deny them the benefit of the provisions of Community law on which they seek to rely (see inter alia Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459, paragraph 25).

18. As regards the national rules relating to the determination of an individual’s standing and legal interest in bringing proceedings, the Court has held that Community law requires that such rules do not undermine the right to effective judicial protection when exercising the rights conferred by Community law (judgments in Joined Cases C-87/90 to C-89/90 Verholen and Others [1991] ECR I-3757, paragraph 24, and Case C-13/01 Safalero [2003] ECR I-8679, paragraph 50).

24 While it is, in principle, for national law to determine an individual' s standing and legal interest in bringing proceedings, Community law nevertheless requires that the national legislation does not undermine the right to effective judicial protection (see the judgments in Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651 and in Case 222/86 UNECTEF v Heylens [1987] ECR 4097) and the application of national legislation cannot render virtually impossible the exercise of the rights conferred by Community law (judgment in Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595).

46. Il ressort tout d’abord de la jurisprudence de la Cour que des considérations d’ordre administratif ne sauraient justifier une dérogation aux règles communautaires, ce d’autant plus lorsque ladite dérogation revient à exclure ou à restreindre l’exercice d’une des libertés fondamentales du droit communautaire (arrêts du 23 novembre 1999, Arblade e.a., C‑369/96 et C‑376/96, Rec. p. I‑8453, point 37, ainsi que du 3 octobre 2000, Corsten, C‑58/98, Rec. p. I‑7919, point 42).

30 As regards the first of the concepts, it should be recalled at the outset that the Court has consistently concluded from the wording of Article 12 of the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement of 12 September 1963 and Article 36 of the Additional Protocol, signed on 23 November 1970, annexed to that agreement and concluded by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2760/72 of 19 December 1972 (OJ 1973 C 113, p. 18), as well as from the objective of Decision No 1/80, that the principles enshrined in Articles 48 and 49 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Articles 39 EC and 40 EC) and Article 50 of the EC Treaty (now Article 41 EC) must be extended, so far as possible, to Turkish nationals who enjoy the rights conferred by Decision No 1/80 (see to that effect, inter alia, Case C-434/93 Bozkurt [1995] ECR I-1475, paragraphs 14, 19 and 20; Case C-171/95 Tetik [1997] ECR I-329, paragraphs 20 and 28; Birden, paragraph 23; and Case C-340/97 Nazli [2000] ECR I-957, paragraphs 50 to 55).

51 Article 36 of the Additional Protocol, signed on 23 November 1970, annexed to the Association Agreement and concluded by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2760/72 of 19 December 1972 (OJ 1973 C 113, p. 17, hereinafter the Additional Protocol) lays down the timetable for the progressive attainment of freedom of movement for workers between the Member States of the Community and Turkey and states that the Council of Association shall decide on the rules necessary to that end.

83. However, the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling, may, where appropriate, provide clarification designed to give the national court guidance in its assessment (see, inter alia, judgment in Fiamingo and Others , EU:C:2014:2044, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited). – Existence of measures preventing the misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts

32. It follows, as the Court has stated in particular in paragraph 36 of Case C‑85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I‑2691, that a person has the status of employed person within the meaning of Regulation No 1408/71 where he is covered, if only in respect of a single risk, compulsorily or on an optional basis, by a general or special social security scheme mentioned in Article 1(a) of Regulation No 1408/71, irrespective of the existence of an employment relationship.

36 So a person has the status of employed person within the meaning of Regulation No 1408/71 where he is covered, even if only in respect of a single risk, compulsorily or on an optional basis, by a general or special social security scheme mentioned in Article 1(a) of Regulation No 1408/71, irrespective of the existence of an employment relationship (see, on this point, Case 182/78 Pierik II [1979] ECR 1977, paragraphs 4 and 7, and Joined Cases 82/86 and 103/86 Laborero and Sabato [1987] ECR 3401, paragraph 17).

64. Lastly, as regards the alternative argument of the United Kingdom Government that failed asylum seekers such as the applicants in the main proceedings should not be allowed to rely on Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol, since any other interpretation would be tantamount to endorsing fraud or abuse, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, Community law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends (Case C-255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECR I‑1609, paragraph 68) and that the national courts may, case by case, take account – on the basis of objective evidence – of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of the persons concerned in order, where appropriate, to deny them the benefit of the provisions of Community law on which they seek to rely (see inter alia Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459, paragraph 25).

70. In that connection it is important to bear in mind that a restrictive measure can be considered to be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective pursued only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain that objective in a consistent and systematic manner (see, to that effect, Case C‑169/07 Hartlauer [2009] ECR I‑1721, paragraph 55; Joined Cases C‑171/07 and C-172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others [2009] ECR I-4171, paragraph 42; and Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International [2009] ECR I-7633, paragraphs 59 to 61).

60. In the present case, it is thus necessary to examine in particular whether the restriction of the provision of games of chance via the internet, imposed by the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, is suitable for achieving the objective or objectives invoked by the Member State concerned, and whether it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. In any event, those restrictions must be applied without discrimination (see, to that effect, Placanica and Others , paragraph 49).

19 As regards the context of which the first sentence of Article 33(2) of Regulation No 6/2002 is part, it should be observed, first of all, that the second sentence of that paragraph qualifies the rule set out in that first sentence as regards ‘third parties who have acquired rights’ in the registered Community design after the date of the legal act in question but who knew of the act at the date on which the rights were acquired. Article 33(3) establishes an exception to that rule in the case of a ‘person who acquires the registered Community design or a right concerning the registered Community design’ by way of transfer of the whole of the undertaking or by any other universal succession. Accordingly, an interpretation of Article 33(2) and (3) of Regulation No 6/2002 which is both literal and schematic gives support to the idea that it, as a whole, is intended to govern the enforceability of the legal acts referred to in Articles 28, 29 and 32 of the regulation in respect of third parties who have, or are likely to have, rights in the registered Community design (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 February 2016 in Hassan, C‑163/15, EU:C:2016:71, paragraph 20).

27. It should be noted at the outset that it is settled case-law that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be found in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the combined nomenclature and of the notes to the sections or chapters (see, inter alia, DFDS , paragraph 27; Case C‑495/03 Intermodal Transports [2005] ECR I‑8151, paragraph 47; and Case C-445/04 Possehl Erzkontor [2005] ECR I-10721, paragraph 19).

47. According to settled case-law, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be found in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and of the notes to the sections or chapters (see, inter alia, Case C-396/02 DFDS [2004] ECR I-8439, paragraph 27, and case-law cited).

32 In the specific context of the internet, the Court has, nonetheless, ruled, in a case relating to a natural person, that, in the event of an alleged infringement of personality rights by means of content placed online on a website, the person who considers that his rights have been infringed must have the option of bringing an action for damages, in respect of all the harm caused, before the courts of the Member State in which the centre of his interests is based (judgment of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and Others, C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:685, paragraph 52).

55 Thus, under that provision, the family members of a Turkish worker have, subject to compliance with the conditions set out therein, a right of their own of access to the labour force in the host Member State. In that regard, the Court has repeatedly held that the rights granted by the first paragraph of Article 7 to the family members of a Turkish worker with regard to employment in the Member State concerned necessarily imply the existence of a concomitant right of residence for the person concerned, without which the right of access to the labour force and actually to take up paid employment would be rendered totally ineffective (judgment of 19 July 2012, Dülger, C‑451/11, EU:C:2012:504, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

28. According to the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80, the family members of a Turkish worker have, subject to compliance with the conditions set out therein, a right of their own of access to the labour force in the host Member State. In that regard, the Court has repeatedly held that the rights granted by the first paragraph of Article 7 to the family members of a Turkish worker with regard to employment in the Member State concerned necessarily imply the existence of a concomitant right of residence for the person concerned, without which the right of access to the labour force and actually to take up paid employment would be rendered totally ineffective (see, inter alia, Case C-325/05 Derin [2007] ECR I-6495, paragraph 47, and Case C-303/08 Bozkurt [2010] ECR I-13445, paragraph 36).

80. As is clear from settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by Article 253 EC must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community Court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, in particular, Interporc v Commission , paragraph 55 and the case-law there cited).

45. According to the Court’s settled case-law, although it is for Member States to take the appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security, it does not follow that such measures are entirely outside the scope of Community law (see Case C‑273/97 Sirdar [1999] ECR I‑7403, paragraph 15, and Case C‑285/98 Kreil [2000] ECR I‑69, paragraph 15). As the Court has already held, the Treaty provides for derogations applicable in situations which may involve public safety, in particular, in Articles 30 EC, 39 EC, 46 EC, 58 EC, 64 EC, 296 EC and 297 EC, which deal with exceptional and clearly defined cases. It cannot be inferred from those articles that the Treaty contains an inherent general exception excluding all measures taken for reasons of public security from the scope of Community law. The recognition of the existence of such an exception. regardless of the specific requirements laid down by the Treaty, would be liable to impair the binding nature of Community law and its uniform application (see Case C‑186/01 Dory [2003] ECR I‑2479, paragraph 31 and case-law there cited).

15 The Court observes first of all that, as it held in paragraph 15 of its judgment of 26 October 1999 in Case C-273/97 Sirdar [1999] ECR I-0000, it is for the Member States, which have to adopt appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security, to take decisions on the organisation of their armed forces. It does not follow, however, that such decisions are bound to fall entirely outside the scope of Community law.

23. Dans la mesure où la République hellénique cherche à mettre en cause la recevabilité du recours du fait que la Commission n’a pas précisé s’il incombait à cet État membre, en ce qui concerne les modalités de départ à la retraite, de supprimer les conditions moins avantageuses pour les hommes ou d’imposer des conditions plus défavorables aux femmes, il convient de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, la Commission ne saurait être tenue d’indiquer dans l’avis motivé les mesures qui permettraient d’éliminer le manquement reproché (arrêt du 11 juillet 1991, Commission/Portugal, C‑247/89, Rec. p. I‑3659, point 22). Il en va de même pour la requête introduite devant la Cour.

37. The Commission’s argument that it follows from the case-law concerning exemptions that activities carried out upstream from those provided by the ultimate service provider are not exempt (Case 107/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 2655, paragraph 20; Case C‑240/99 Skandia [2001] ECR I‑1951, paragraphs 40 and 41; Case C‑235/00 CSC Financial Services [2001] ECR I‑10237, paragraphs 39 and 40; and Case C‑472/03 Arthur Andersen [2005] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 39), so that only medical tests carried out by laboratories on behalf of patients in the context of a direct contractual relationship with those patients comes within the scope of Article 13A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive, must also be rejected, as that case-law relates to the interpretation of other exemptions, the wording and objectives of which are different from those pursued by that provision (see, to that effect, Case 107/84 Commission v Germany , paragraph 13).

39 It is not necessary to consider the precise meaning of the word negotiation, which also appears in other provisions of the Sixth Directive, in particular, Article 13B(d)(1) to (4), in order to hold that, in the context of Article 13B(d)(5), it refers to the activity of an intermediary who does not occupy the position of any party to a contract relating to a financial product, and whose activity amounts to something other than the provision of contractual services typically undertaken by the parties to such contracts. Negotiation is a service rendered to, and remunerated by a contractual party as a distinct act of mediation. It may consist, amongst other things, in pointing out suitable opportunities for the conclusion of such a contract, making contact with another party or negotiating, in the name of and on behalf of a client, the detail of the payments to be made by either side. The purpose of negotiation is therefore to do all that is necessary in order for two parties to enter into a contract, without the negotiator having any interest of his own in the terms of the contract.

30. In order to ensure the protection of the rights conferred by the trade mark while making possible the further marketing of goods bearing a trade mark without the proprietor of the trade mark being able to oppose that, it is essential that the proprietor can control the first putting of those goods on the market in the EEA, irrespective of the fact that they may have first been marketed outside that area, that marketing having no exhaustive effect for the purposes of Article 7(1) of Directive 89/104 (see, to that effect, inter alia, Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel and Others , paragraphs 31 and 32 and the case‑law cited).

20. First, it is apparent from the significance of the discretion accorded to the Member States, referred to in paragraph 13 above, that the Commission’s power of review must be limited to determining whether the Member States have committed any manifest errors of assessment in designating events of major importance. In order to verify whether such an error of assessment has been committed, the Commission must therefore, inter alia, examine, carefully and impartially, all the relevant facts of the individual case, facts which support the conclusions reached (see, by analogy, Case C‑269/90 Technische Universität München [1991] ECR I‑5469, paragraph 14, and Case C‑77/09 Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços [2010] ECR I‑13533, paragraphs 56 and 57).

57. In particular, where a party claims that the institution competent in the matter has committed a manifest error of appraisal, the the courts of the European Union must verify whether that institution has examined, carefully and impartially, all the relevant facts of the individual case, facts which support the conclusions reached (see, inter alia, Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München [1991] ECR 1-5469, paragraph 14).

30 On this point, it must be noted that under Article 168a of the EC Treaty (now Article 225 EC) and Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice an appeal is limited to points of law and must be based on the grounds of lack of competence of the Court of First Instance, breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant, or infringement of Community law by the Court of First Instance (see, inter alia, Case C-136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraph 47, and Case C-7/95 P Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraph 18).

24. Nor can that finding be calle d into question by the fact, even if it is established, that, first, a good part of the Hanság site was already protected under the Habitats Directive in the Natura 2000 network and, secondly, the site has not suffered any deterioration. First, since the legal regimes of the Birds and Habitats Directives are separate, a Member State cannot exonerate itself from its obligations under Article 4(1) and (2) of the Birds Directive by relying on measures other than those prescribed by that directive (Case C‑235/04 Commission v Spain [2007] ECR I‑5415, paragraph 79). Second, the fact that the site concerned has not suffered any deterioration is not capable of affecting the obligation imposed on Member States to classify sites as SPAs (see, to similar effect, Case C-418/04 Commission v Ireland [2007] ECR I‑10947, paragraph 38). Incorrect delimitation of the Niedere Tauern SPA – Arguments of the parties

38. Thirdly, the obligation imposed on Member States to classify sites as SPAs cannot be avoided by the adoption of other special conservation measures (see, to that effect, Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 55).

24. As the Advocate General stated in point 31 of her Opinion, the quality of luxury goods such as the ones at issue in the main proceedings is not just the result of their material characteristics, but also of the allure and prestigious image which bestows on them an aura of luxury (see also, to that effect, Parfums Christian Dior , paragraph 45).

44. However, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, the principle of equal pay, like the general principle of non-discrimination which it embodies in a specific form, presupposes that the men and women to whom it applies are in identical or comparable situations (see Case C‑132/92 Roberts [1993] ECR I-5579 (‘ Birds Eye Walls ’), paragraph 17; Case C-342/93 Gillespie and Others [1996] ECR I-475, paragraphs 16 to 18; Abdoulaye and Others , cited above, paragraph 16; and Case C-206/00 Mouflin [2001] ECR I-10201, paragraph 28).

16 According to the case-law of the Court, the principle of equal pay, like the general principle of non-discrimination of which it is a particular expression, presupposes that male and female workers whom it covers are in comparable situations (see Gillespie, cited above, paragraphs 16 to 18).

43. It is appropriate to point out, secondly, that according to the Court’s settled case‑law, the first paragraph of Article 24 of Directive 93/37 lists, exhaustively, the grounds capable of justifying the exclusion of a contractor from participation in a contract which relate solely to its professional qualities. Moreover, the Court also added that Member States have the right to provide, in addition to the grounds for exclusion expressly referred to in that provision, for grounds for exclusion designed to ensure observance of the principles of equal treatment and transparency (see, to that effect, Case C‑213/07 Michaniki [2008] ECR I‑9999, paragraphs 43, 44 and 47, and Case C‑538/07 Assitur [2009] ECR I‑4219, paragraphs 20 and 21).

86. Article 87(1) EC defines State aid as aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. The concept of State aid within the meaning of that provision is wider than that of a subsidy because it embraces not only positive benefits, such as the subsidies themselves, but also measures which, in various forms, mitigate the normal burdens on the budget of an undertaking, and which therefore, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are of the same character and have the same effect. The supply of goods or services on preferential terms is one of the indirect advantages which have the same effects as (see Case C-276/02 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I‑8091, paragraph 24, and Joined Cases C‑341/06 P and C‑342/06 P Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and Others [2008] ECR I‑4777, paragraph 123).

24. Article 87(1) EC defines State aid which is governed by the EC Treaty as aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. The concept of aid within the meaning of that provision is wider than that of a subsidy because it embraces not only positive benefits, such as the subsidies themselves, but also measures which, in various forms, mitigate the normal burdens on the budget of an undertaking (see, inter alia, Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority [1961] ECR 1, 19; Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 13; Case C-256/97 DM Transport [1999] ECR I-3913, paragraph 19, and Case C-5/01 Belgium v Commission [2002] ECR I-11991, paragraph 32).

40 Thus, Article 37 requires that the organization and operation of the monopoly be arranged so as to exclude any discrimination between nationals of Member States as regards conditions of supply and outlets, so that trade in goods from other Member States is not put at a disadvantage, in law or in fact, in relation to that in domestic goods and that competition between the economies of the Member States is not distorted (see, to this effect, the judgment in Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 11).

64. Dans ces conditions, ne saurait affecter le manquement l’affirmation faite par cet État membre selon laquelle la procédure de récupération en cours relative au régime d’aides en cause n’a fait l’objet d’aucune contestation par la Commission (voir, en ce sens, arrêts Commission/Allemagne, C‑209/00, EU:C:2002:747, points 69 à 72, et Commission/Italie, C‑411/12, EU:C:2013:832, point 40).

70. In that regard, it should be noted that the only defence available to a Member State in opposing an application by the Commission under Article 88(2) EC for a declaration that it has failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations is to plead that it was absolutely impossible for it to implement the decision properly (see, inter alia , Case C-261/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2537, paragraph 23).

38. In those circumstances, in order to determine the market to which Article 2 refers, that provision must be interpreted in the light of the context in which it occurs and the objective pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, Case 292/82 Merck [1983] ECR 3781, paragraph 12; Case C-34/05 Schouten [2007] ECR I-1687, paragraph 25; Case C-466/07 Klarenberg [2009] ECR I-803, paragraph 37, and Case C-433/08 Yaesu Europe [2009] ECR I-11487, paragraph 24).

82. In that regard, it must first be observed that a national measure which reproduces or replaces, without adding new or additional specifications, existing technical regulations which, if adopted after the entry into force of Directive 83/189, have been duly notified to the Commission, cannot be regarded as a ‘draft’ technical regulation within the meaning of Article 1(9) of Directive 83/189 or, consequently, as subject to the obligation to notify (see Colim , cited above, paragraph 22). In the present case, the date of the entry into force of Directive 83/189 as regards the Kingdom of Sweden should be taken into account.

22 In that regard, it should be remembered that the aim of Directive 83/189 is to protect, by preventive monitoring, the free movement of goods, which is one of the foundations of the Community (Case C-13/96 Bic Benelux v Belgian State [1997] ECR I-1753, paragraph 19). That monitoring is designed to eliminate or reduce barriers to the free movement of goods that might result from technical regulations which the Member States propose to adopt. A national measure which reproduces or replaces, without adding new or additional specifications, existing technical regulations which, if adopted after the entry into force of Directive 83/189, have been duly notified to the Commission, cannot be regarded as a `draft' technical regulation within the meaning of Article 1(6) of Directive 83/189 or, consequently, as subject to the obligation to notify.

36. In the light of the need, referred to, inter alia, in recital 10 in the preamble to Regulation No 469/2009, to take into account all the interests at stake, including those of public health, if it were accepted that all subsequent marketing of an active ingredient in conjunction with an unlimited number of other active ingredients which do not constitute the subject-matter of the invention covered by the basic patent would confer entitlement to multiple SPCs, that would be contrary to the requirement to balance the interests of the pharmaceutical industry and those of public health as regards the encouragement of research within the European Union by the use of SPCs (see, to that effect, judgment in Actavis Group PTC and Actavis UK , EU:C:2013:833, paragraph 41).

79. Finally, so far as concerns the failure to state reasons that is pleaded by FLS Plast in this context, it has already been stated in paragraphs 73 to 75 of the present judgment that the General Court, taking account of the broad discretion available to the Commission in assessing the quality and usefulness of the cooperation provided by an undertaking, in particular by reference to the contributions made by other undertakings (see, to this effect, Case C‑328/05 P SGL Carbon v Commission EU:C:2007:277, paragraph 88), considered that the evidence and arguments put forward by FLS Plast to establish that its alleged abstention from substantially contesting the facts had assisted the Commission, or that that non‑contestation was at least comparable to that of Bonar, were insufficient. It is evident that the reasoning provided by the General Court in this regard enables FLS Plast to understand the reasons why the General Court rejected its line of argument and the Court of Justice to conduct its judicial review. This argument advanced by FLS Plast is therefore unfounded.

88. As regards, finally, SGL Carbon’s claim that the cooperation provided by it was undervalued by comparison with that of the other members of the cartel, it should be noted, as the Court of First Instance rightly pointed out at paragraph 371 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission enjoys a wide discretion in assessing the quality and usefulness of the cooperation provided by an undertaking, in particular by reference to the contributions made by other undertakings.

65. Furthermore, in the area of value added tax, the Court declared in Commission v Spain that there had been a failure to fulfil obligations on the ground that the Kingdom of Spain had not shown that the exemption from that tax on imports and acquisitions of arms, ammunition and equipment exclusively for military use, an exemption provided for by Spanish legislation, was justified, under Article 296(1)(b) EC, by the need to protect the essential interests of the security of that Member State ( Commission v Greece , paragraph 53).

34. The Court, for its part, has always emphasised that the public policy exception is a derogation from the fundamental principle of freedom of movement for persons, which must be interpreted strictly, and that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by the Member States (Case 36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219, paragraph 27; Bouchereau , paragraph 33; Calfa , paragraph 23; Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri [2004] ECR I-5257, paragraphs 64 and 65; and Case C-503/03 Commission v Spain , paragraph 45).

23 However, as the Court has repeatedly stated, the public policy exception, like all derogations from a fundamental principle of the Treaty, must be interpreted restrictively.

20 However it must be borne in mind that it is also clear from the case-law that, for the purposes of Article 4(2)(b) of Directive 69/335, a company's assets include all the property which the members have contributed, together with any increase in its value, and that a company which realises a profit and adds it to its reserves thereby increases its assets, whilst the assets of a company which incurs losses will decline (Siegen, cited above, paragraph 12).

69. This directive thus codified and expressly extended to the principle of equal treatment within the meaning of Directive 76/207 previous case-law according to which the burden of proof, which in principle lies with the worker, may shift when this is necessary to avoid depriving workers who appear to be the victims of discrimination of any effective means of enforcing the principle of equal pay. Accordingly, when a measure distinguishing between employees on the basis of their hours of work has in practice an adverse impact on a substantially greater percentage of members of one or other sex, it is for the employer to show that there are objective reasons which justify the difference in pay that has been found (see Case C-127/92 Enderby [1993] ECR I-5535, paragraphs 13, 14 and 18, and Case C-381/99 Brunnhofer [2001] ECR I-4961, paragraphs 52, 53 and 60).

14 However, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that the onus may shift when that is necessary to avoid depriving workers who appear to be the victims of discrimination of any effective means of enforcing the principle of equal pay. Accordingly, when a measure distinguishing between employees on the basis of their hours of work has in practice an adverse impact on substantially more members of one or other sex, that measure must be regarded as contrary to the objective pursued by Article 119 of the Treaty, unless the employer shows that it is based on objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex (Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus [1986] ECR 1607, at paragraph 31, Case C-33/89 Kowalska [1990] ECR I-2591, at paragraph 16, and C-184/89 Nimz [1991] ECR I-297, at paragraph 15). Similarly, where an undertaking applies a system of pay which is wholly lacking in transparency, it is for the employer to prove that his practice in the matter of wages is not discriminatory, if a female worker establishes, in relation to a relatively large number of employees, that the average pay for women is less than that for men (Case 109/88 Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199, at paragraph 16).

38 Under Article 7(1)(c) of the basic regulation, the investigation is to cover both dumping and injury resulting therefrom. The existence of sufficient evidence of dumping and the injury resulting therefrom is always a prerequisite for the opening of an investigation, within the meaning of Article 7, whether at the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding or in the course of a review of a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties (see Case C-216/91 Rima Eletrometalurgia v Council, cited above, paragraph 16).

17 The Court has held (in particular in Case C-41/90 Hoefner v Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 21) that in the context of competition law the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed.

21 It must be observed, in the context of competition law, first that the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed and, secondly, that employment procurement is an economic activity.

38. As the Court has repeatedly held, the right to deduct provided for in Article 167 et seq. of Directive 2006/112 is an integral part of the VAT scheme and in principle may not be limited. In particular, the right to deduct is exercisable immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I-1577, paragraph 43; Joined Cases C-439/04 and C-440/04 Kittel and Recolta Recycling [2006] ECR I-6161, paragraph 47; Case C-392/09 Uszodaépítő [2010] ECR I-8791, paragraph 34; and Commission v Hungary , paragraph 43).

18. With regard, more particularly, to the information that must be provided to the Court in an order for reference, that information does not serve only to enable the Court to provide answers which will be of use to the referring court; it must also enable the governments of the Member States, and other interested parties, to submit observations in accordance with Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. For those purposes, it is necessary that the national court should define the factual and legislative context of the questions which it is asking or, at the very least, explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based (see, to that effect, Case C‑345/06 Heinrich [2009] ECR I‑1659, paragraphs 30 and 31, and Case C‑42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International [2009] ECR I‑7633, paragraph 40).

31. The information provided in the order for reference must not only enable the Court to reply usefully but must also give the governments of the Member States and the other interested parties the opportunity to submit observations pursuant to Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. It is the Court’s duty to ensure that that opportunity is safeguarded, bearing in mind that under that provision only the orders for reference are notified to the interested parties (see, inter alia, Enirisorse , paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).

29. As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that Directive 2001/23 is applicable wherever, in the context of contractual relations, there is a change in the natural or legal person responsible for carrying on the business who incurs the obligations of an employer towards employees of the undertaking (see, Case C‑463/09 CLECE [2011] ECR I‑95, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

32. It must be pointed out in this regard that it follows from settled case-law that the purpose of Directive 2003/88 is to lay down minimum requirements intended to improve the living and working conditions of workers through approximation of national rules concerning, in particular, the duration of working time. That harmonisation at European Union level in relation to the organisation of working time is intended to guarantee better protection of the safety and health of workers by ensuring that they are entitled to minimum rest periods – particularly daily and weekly – and adequate breaks and by providing for a ceiling on the average duration of the working week (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I‑8835, paragraph 76; Case C‑14/04 Dellas and Others [2005] ECR I‑10253, paragraphs 40 and 41; and Case C‑484/04 Commission v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I‑7471, paragraphs 35 and 36).

35. So far as the purpose of Directive 93/104 is concerned, it is apparent from Article 118a of the EC Treaty (Articles 117 to 120 of the EC Treaty have been replaced by Articles 136 EC to 143 EC), which is the legal basis for that directive, from the first, fourth, seventh and eighth recitals in the preamble thereto, from the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, adopted at the meeting of the European Council held at Strasbourg on 9 December 1989, mentioned in Article 136 EC, point 8 and the first subparagraph of point 19 of which are referred to in the fourth recital in the preamble to the directive, and also from the express wording of Article 1(1) of the directive, that the latter’s purpose is to lay down minimum requirements intended to improve the living and working conditions of workers through approximation of national provisions concerning, in particular, the duration of working time (see, inter alia, Case C‑173/99 BECTU [2001] ECR I‑4881, paragraph 37, and Case C‑14/04 Dellas and Others [2005] ECR I-10253, paragraph 40).

34 According to settled case-law, the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity, on the one hand, to comply with its obligations under Community law and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the complaints made by the Commission. The subject-matter of an action brought under Article 169 of the Treaty is therefore delimited by the pre-litigation procedure provided for by that article. Consequently, the action cannot be founded on any complaints other than those formulated in the reasoned opinion (Case C-206/96 Commission v Luxembourg [1998] ECR I-3401, paragraph 13).

25. It is settled case‑law that, in the absence of provisions of EU law on the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, provided that those rules observe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (see, to that effect, Case C-429/09 Fuß [2010] ECR I‑12167, paragraph 72).

72. In that regard, it should be noted that, as is clear from the case-law referred to in paragraph 62 of the present judgment, it is for the Member States, in the absence of provisions of EU law on the matter, to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, provided that those rules observe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (see Case C‑312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I‑4599, paragraph 12; Impact , paragraph 46; and Case C‑63/08 Pontin [2009] ECR I‑10467, paragraph 43).

30. Where a legal situation does not fall within the scope of Union law, the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on it and any Charter provisions relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (see, to that effect, Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 22; and the orders in Sociedade Agrícola e Imobiliária da Quinta de S. Paio EU:C:2013:810, paragraph 20; Joined Cases C‑614/12 and C‑10/13 Dutka and Sajtos EU:C:2014:30, paragraph 15; and Case C‑332/13 Weigl EU:C:2014:31, paragraph 14).

41 In that regard, the Court has stated, first, that the concept of ‘public’ involves a certain de minimis threshold, which excludes from that concept groups of persons concerned which are too small, or insignificant. Second, in order to determine that number, the cumulative effect of making the works available to potential recipients should be taken into account. Thus, it is necessary to know not only how many persons have access to the same work at the same time, but also how many of them have access to it in succession (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C‑527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

44 In that regard, the Court has stated, first, that the concept of ‘public’ encompasses a certain de minimis threshold, which excludes from the concept groups of persons which are too small, or insignificant. Second, in order to determine that number, the cumulative effect of making the works available to potential recipients should be taken into account. Thus, it is relevant to know not only how many persons have access to the same work at the same time, but also how many of them have access to it in succession (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 March 2012, Phonographic Performance (Ireland), C‑162/10, EU:C:2012:141, paragraph 35; of 27 February 2014, OSA, C‑351/12, EU:C:2014:110, paragraph 28; and of 31 May 2016, Reha Training, C‑117/15, EU:C:2016:379, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

26. That directive lays down not only rules governing the procedures for granting general authorisations or rights to use radio frequencies or numbers and the content of those authorisations but also rules setting out the nature and scope of the financial payments related to those procedures which Member States may impose on undertakings in the electronic communications services sector (see judgments in Belgacom and Mobistar , C‑256/13 and C‑264/13, EU:C:2014:2149, paragraph 29, and Base Company , C‑346/13, EU:C:2015:649, paragraph 15).

62. It follows from the above that the interpretation according to which the concept of ‘executing Member State’ refers only to the Member State which carried out the last surrender of the person concerned reinforces the system of surrender established by the Framework Decision for the good of the area of freedom, security and justice, in accordance with the mutual confidence which must exist between the Member States. By limiting the situations in which the executing judicial authorities of the Member States involved in the successive surrenders of the same person may refuse to consent to the execution of a European arrest warrant, such an interpretation only facilitates the surrender of requested persons, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition set out in Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision, which constitutes the essential rule introduced by that decision (see, to that effect, Wolzenburg , paragraphs 58 and 59).

59. Indeed, by limiting the situations in which the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute a European arrest warrant, such legislation only facilitates the surrender of requested persons, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition set out in Article 1(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584, which constitutes the essential rule introduced by that decision.

29. The first point to be noted is that, according to settled case‑law, the statement of the reasons on which a judgment is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose the Court of First Instance’s thinking, so that the persons concerned can be apprised of the justification for the decision taken and the Court of Justice can exercise its power of review (see, inter alia, Case C‑259/96 P Council v de Nil and Impens [1998] ECR I‑2915, paragraphs 32 and 33, and Case C‑449/98 P IECC v Commission [2001] ECR I‑3875, paragraph 70).

70. As to the United Kingdom’s argument that the limiting of cross-undertakings could result in infringement of the right to property, the Court consistently acknowledges that the right to property is not an absolute right, but must be viewed in relation to its social function. Its exercise may therefore be restricted, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the right guaranteed (see, to this effect, Križan and Others , paragraph 113 and the case-law cited). Protection of the environment is one of those objectives and is therefore capable of justifying a restriction on the exercise of the right to property (see, also, to this effect, Križan and Others , paragraph 114 and the case-law cited).

113. However, the right to property is not an absolute right and must be viewed in relation to its social function. Consequently, its exercise may be restricted, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the right guaranteed (Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, paragraph 355, and Joined Cases C-379/08 and C-380/08 ERG and Others [2010] ECR I-2007, paragraph 80).

49. The letting of immovable property for the purposes of Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive essentially involves the landlord of property assigning to the tenant, in return for rent and for an agreed period, the right to occupy his property and to exclude other persons from it (see Case C-409/98 Mirror Group [2001] ECR I-7175, paragraph 31, and Case C-108/99 Cantor Fitzgerald International [2001] ECR I-7257, paragraph 21).

42. Lastly, it should also be noted that, since a Union citizen such as Mrs McCarthy is not covered by the concept of ‘beneficiary’ for the purposes of Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38, her spouse is not covered by that concept either, given that the rights conferred by that directive on the family members of a beneficiary of that directive are not autonomous rights of those family members, but derived rights, acquired through their status as members of the beneficiary’s family (see, in relation to instruments of European Union law prior to Directive 2004/38, Case C‑243/91 Taghavi [1992] ECR I‑4401, paragraph 7, and Eind , paragraph 23).

7 According to Article 2(1) of Regulation No 1408/71, its provisions apply to "employed or self-employed persons who are or have been subject to the legislation of one or more Member States and who are nationals of one of the Member States ... as well as to the members of their families and their survivors". As the Court held in its judgment in Case 40/76 Kermaschek v Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeit [1976] ECR 1669, under Regulation No 1408/71, members of a worker' s family can only claim derived rights, that is to say, rights acquired through their status as members of a worker' s family.

52 Although it is therefore for the Commission to prove an infringement of the Community rules, the Member State concerned must demonstrate that the Commission committed an error as to the financial consequences to be attributed to it (see, to this effect, Case 49/83 Luxembourg v Commission [1984] ECR 2931, paragraph 30).