Datasets:

ngarneau

/

link_prediction_contrastive

like 0

66. Various factors, set out in paragraphs 291 to 327 of the Kadi judgment, were advanced in support of the position stated by the Court in that judgment, and there has been no change in those factors which could justify reconsideration of that position, those factors being, essentially, bound up with the constitutional guarantee which is exercised, in a Union based on the rule of law (see Case C‑550/09 E and F [2010] ECR I‑6213, paragraph 44, and the judgment of 26 June 2012 in Case C‑335/09 P Poland v Commission [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 48), by judicial review of the lawfulness of all European Union measures, including those which, as in the present case, implement an international law measure, in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Union.

301. Admittedly, the Court has previously recognised that Article 234 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 307 EC) could, if the conditions for application have been satisfied, allow derogations even from primary law, for example from Article 113 of the EC Treaty on the common commercial policy (see, to that effect, Centro-Com , paragraphs 56 to 61).

36. Therefore, the information thus provided is sufficient to meet the requirements of the Court’s settled case-law (see, to that effect, Case C‑42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 40 and the case‑law cited) and to enable the Court to provide helpful replies to the referring court. Accordingly, the reference for a preliminary ruling is admissible. The first question

46. The Court has already held that a Member State may impose a registration tax on a motor vehicle registered in another Member State where that vehicle is intended to be used essentially in the first Member State on a permanent basis or where it is, in fact, used in that manner (see, to that effect, Cura Anlagen , paragraph 42; Commission v Denmark , paragraphs 75 to 78; Nadin and Nadin-Lux , paragraph 41; and Commission v Finland , paragraph 47, and the orders in van de Coevering , paragraph 24, and Vandermeir , paragraph 32).

77. In those circumstances, it is open to the Kingdom of Denmark to impose a registration tax on a vehicle made available to an employee who resides there by a company established in another Member State.

43. Moreover, Member States must, when transposing Directive 95/46, take care to rely on an interpretation of that directive which allows a fair balance to be struck between the various fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the EU legal order (see, by analogy, Case C‑275/06 Promusicae [2008] ECR I‑271, paragraph 68).

82. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice the legal link between an official and the administration is based upon the Staff Regulations and not upon a contract. Thus, the rights and obligations of officials may, subject to compliance with the requirements of Community law, be altered at any time by the legislature ( Centeno Mediavilla and Others v Commission , paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).

60. À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que le lien juridique entre les fonctionnaires et l’administration est de nature statutaire et non contractuelle (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 19 mars 1975, Gillet/Commission, 28/74, Rec. p. 463, point 4). Il en résulte que les droits et les obligations des fonctionnaires peuvent être modifiés à tout moment par le législateur.

45 Since the situation at issue in the main proceedings is not, therefore, governed by EU law, the provisions of the Charter, in particular, Articles 4 and 18 thereof, referred to in the questions of the referring court, do not apply to it (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 19, and of 27 March 2014, Torralbo Marcos, C‑265/13, EU:C:2014:187, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

69. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, citizenship of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to receive the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for (see, to that effect, Grzelczyk , paragraphs 30 and 31; Case C‑148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I‑11613, paragraphs 22 and 23; and Bidar , paragraph 31).

30 Within the sphere of application of the Treaty, such discrimination is, in principle, prohibited by Article 6. In the present case, Article 6 must be read in conjunction with the provisions of the Treaty concerning citizenship of the Union in order to determine its sphere of application.

27 The Commission claims that this is indeed the case and that consequently any difference in treatment based on sex would be permissible only if it were objectively justified. Statistical data based on the life expectancy of the two sexes do not, in its view, constitute an objective justification because they reflect averages calculated on the basis of the entire male and female population whereas the right to equal treatment in the matter of pay is a right given to employees individually and not because they belong to a particular class.

35. Finally, to regard a ‘flight’ within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 261/2004 as an outward and return journey would in fact have the effect of reducing the protection to be given to passengers under the regulation, which would be contrary to its objective of ensuring a high level of protection for passengers (see, to that effect, Case C‑344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2006] ECR I‑403, paragraph 69).

69. In light of the case-law cited above, it must be stated, first, that Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation No 261/2004 lay down precisely and clearly the obligations owed by an operating air carrier in the event of cancellation of, or a long delay to, a flight. The objective of those provisions is apparent, with equal clarity, from the first and second recitals in the preamble to the regulation, according to which action by the Community in the field of air transport should aim, among other things, at ensuring a high level of protection for passengers and take account of the requirements of consumer protection in general, inasmuch as cancellation of, or long delay to, flights causes serious inconvenience to passengers.

27 In particular, the Court has held that a national court, in assessing the facts characterising the transaction in question, must take into account among other things the type of undertaking or business concerned (judgment of 26 November 2015, Aira Pascual and Algeposa Terminales Ferroviarios, C‑509/14, EU:C:2015:781, paragraph 33).

80 According to settled case-law, the review of legality provided for in Article 263 TFEU entails the EU judicature conducting a review, in respect of both the law and the facts, of the contested decision in the light of the arguments relied on by an applicant, which means that it has the power to assess the evidence, annul the decision and to alter the amount of the fines (see judgment of 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

53. It is established case-law that the review of legality provided for in Article 263 TFEU involves review by the European Union judicature, in respect of both the law and the facts, of the arguments relied on by applicants against the contested decision, which means that it has the power to assess the evidence, annul the decision and to alter the amount of the fine (see, to that effect, Schindler Holding and Others v Commission EU:C:2013:522, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

17 THIS COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF ARTICLE 180 THUS CONFIRMS THE CONCLUSION THAT WHEN IN ARTICLE 179 MENTION IS MADE OF THE COMMUNITY THIS DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE BANK .

49. With regard, thirdly, to the procedure for the grant of the concessions at issue in the main proceedings, it must first be recalled that although, as European Union law now stands, service concessions are not governed by any of the directives by which the European Union legislature has regulated public procurement, the public authorities which grant such concessions are none the less bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaties, in particular Articles 43 EC and 49 EC, and with the consequent obligation of transparency (see, to that effect, Case C‑324/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress [2000] ECR I‑10745, paragraphs 60 and 61; Case C‑231/03 Coname [2005] ECR I‑7287, paragraphs 16 to 19; Case C‑458/03 Parking Brixen [2005] ECR I‑8585, paragraphs 46 to 48; Case C‑91/08 Wall [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 33; and Case C‑203/08 Sporting Exchange [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39).

39. As European Union law now stands, service concession contracts are not governed by any of the directives by which the Union legislature has regulated the field of public procurement. However, the public authorities concluding them are bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the EC Treaty in general, including Article 49 EC and, in particular, the principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality and with the consequent obligation of transparency (see, to that effect, Case C‑324/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress [2000] ECR I‑10745, paragraphs 60 to 62; Case C‑206/08 Eurawasser [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 44; and Case C‑91/08 Wall [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 33).

15 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that recourse to Article 100a as a legal basis is possible if the aim is to prevent the emergence of future obstacles to trade resulting from multifarious development of national laws provided that the emergence of such obstacles is likely and the measure in question is designed to prevent them (Case C-350/92 Spain v Council [1995] ECR I-1985, paragraph 35, and Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, paragraph 86).

36. Article 33 of the Sixth Directive does not, on the other hand, preclude the maintenance or introduction of a tax which does not display one of the essential characteristics of VAT (Case C‑130/96 Solisnor-Estaleiros Navais [1997] ECR I‑5053, paragraphs 19 and 20; GIL Insurance and Others , paragraph 34; and Banca Popolare di Cremona , paragraph 27).

20 The answer to the question submitted must therefore be that Article 33 of the Sixth Directive must be construed as not precluding the maintenance of a national charge having the characteristics of a stamp duty levied on works contracts and contracts for the supply of materials or any kind of consumer article, to the exclusion of a large portion of economic transactions in the Member State concerned.

48. Observance of the rights of the defence in a proceeding before the Commission, the aim of which is to impose a fine on an undertaking for infringement of the competition rules requires that the undertaking under investigation must have been afforded the opportunity to make known its views on the truth and relevance of the facts alleged and on the documents used by the Commission to support its claim that there has been an infringement of the Treaty ( Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , paragraph 66). Those rights are referred to in Article 41(2)(a) and (b) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

28. En premier lieu, il convient, d’emblée, de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante de la Cour, il résulte des articles 256 TFUE et 58, premier alinéa, du statut de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne que le Tribunal est seul compétent, d’une part, pour constater les faits, sauf dans le cas où l’inexactitude matérielle de ses constatations résulterait des pièces du dossier qui lui ont été soumises, et, d’autre part, pour apprécier ces faits. Lorsque le Tribunal a constaté ou apprécié les faits, la Cour est compétente pour exercer, en vertu de l’article 256 TFUE, un contrôle sur la qualification juridique de ces faits et les conséquences de droit qui en ont été tirées par le Tribunal (arrêts du 22 décembre 2008, British Aggregates/Commission, C-487/06 P, Rec. p. I-10515, point 96, ainsi que du 27 octobre 2011, Autriche/Scheucher‑Fleisch e.a., C-47/10 P, non encore publié au Recueil, point 57).

96. It is clear from Article 225 EC and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to find the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and, second, to assess those facts. When the Court of First Instance has found or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 225 EC to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see, inter alia, Case C‑551/03 P General Motors v Commission [2006] ECR I‑3173, paragraph 51, and Case C‑266/06 P Evonik Degussa v Commission and Council , judgment of 22 May 2008, not published in the ECR, paragraph 72).

59. As regards the third and fourth conditions, it must be observed that measures which, whatever their form, are likely directly or indirectly to favour certain undertakings or must be regarded as an economic advantage which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions are regarded as aid ( Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg , paragraph 84).

41. Such a difference in tax treatment of dividends between parent companies based on the place where they have their seat is liable to constitute a restriction of freedom of establishment, prohibited in principle by Articles 43 EC and 48 EC, in that it makes it less attractive for companies established in other Member States to exercise freedom of establishment and they may, in consequence, refrain from acquiring, creating or maintaining a subsidiary in the Member State which applies such different treatment (see, to that effect, Denkavit Internationaal and Denkavit France , paragraphs 29 and 30).

30. The tax measure at issue in the main proceedings makes it less attractive for companies established in other Member States to exercise freedom of establishment and they may, in consequence, refrain from acquiring, creating or maintaining a subsidiary in the State which adopts that measure (see, to that effect, Case C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst [2002] ECR I‑11779, paragraph 32, and Keller Holding , paragraph 35).

59. In that regard, it must be recalled that the Court has already held that the Member States are subject to special duties of action and abstention in a situation in which the Commission has submitted to the Council proposals which, although they have not been adopted by the Council, represent the point of departure for concerted Community action (see Case 804/79 Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR I-1045, paragraph 28).

32. In accordance with Article 28(1) of Regulation No 1408/71, those pensioners benefit from such sickness and maternity benefits as paid by the competent institution in their Member State of residence to the same extent that they would under the legislation of the State responsible for payment of the pension if they were resident in its territory (see, to that effect, van der Duin and ANOZ Zorgverzekeringen , paragraphs 40, 47 and 53, and van Delft and Others , paragraph 39).

40. Once a pensioner and the members of his family have subscribed to the system established by Article 28 of Regulation No 1408/71 by registering with the institution of the place of residence as Article 29 of Regulation No 574/72 requires, then, as the wording itself of Article 28 makes clear, that pensioner enjoys, for himself and his family, a right to benefits in kind provided as if the person concerned held a pension under the legislation of the Member State on whose territory he resides and were entitled to benefits in kind by virtue of that legislation.

33 Moreover, even if a temporary suspension of the undertaking's activity does not of itself preclude the possibility that a transfer has taken place (see Ny Mølle Kro, cited above, paragraph 19), the fact that the work was performed continuously, with no interruption or change in the manner of performance, is none the less a normal feature of transfers of undertakings.

36. As regards the actual rules for the organisation of the national authority’s access to those personal data in order to carry out its task of monitoring working conditions, it must be recalled that only the grant of access to authorities having powers in that field could be considered to be necessary within the meaning of Article 7(e) of Directive 95/46 (see, to that effect, Huber , paragraph 61).

61. As regards the detailed rules for the use of such a register for the purposes of the application of the legislation relating to the right of residence, only the grant of access to authorities having powers in that field could be considered to be necessary within the meaning of Article 7(e) of Directive 95/46.

49 As the Advocate General pointed out in point 37 of her Opinion, the good conduct guarantee thereby constitutes, as a pre-condition for getting any challenge examined, a limitation on the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter which, in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter can therefore be justified only if it is provided for by law, if it respects the essence of that right and, subject to the principle of proportionality, if it is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the EU or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others (see judgment of 4 May 2016, Pillbox 38, C‑477/14, EU:C:2016:324, paragraph 160).

188. As regards the condition linked to the operator’s professional experience, the Court of First Instance rightly noted in paragraph 140 of the judgment under appeal that it is necessary to examine whether or not the operator is a trader whose business activities consist mainly in import and export transactions and whether he had already gained some experience in the conduct of such transactions ( Söhl & Söhlke , paragraph 57).

57 As regards the professional experience of the trader, it is necessary to examine whether or not he is a trader whose business activities consist mainly in import and export transactions and whether he had already gained some experience in the conduct of such transactions.

20 The specific subject-matter of those rights, as governed by national legislation, is to ensure the protection of the moral and economic rights of their holders. The protection of moral rights enables authors and performers, in particular, to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of a work which would be prejudicial to their honour or reputation. Copyright and related rights are also economic in nature, in that they confer the right to exploit commercially the marketing of the protected work, particularly in the form of licences granted in return for payment of royalties (see the judgment in Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80 Musik-Vertrieb membran v GEMA [1981] ECR 147, paragraph 12).

47. In that context, whoever requests such a transfer must first establish that it is necessary. If it is demonstrated to be necessary, it is then for the institution concerned to determine that there is no reason to assume that that transfer might prejudice the legitimate interests of the data subject. If there is no such reason, the transfer requested must be made, whereas, if there is such a reason, the institution concerned must weigh the various competing interests in order to decide on the request for access (see, to that effect, the judgments in Commission v Bavarian Lager , C‑28/08 P, EU:C:2010:378, paragraphs 77 and 78, and Strack v Commission , C‑127/13 P, EU:C:2014:2250, paragraphs 107 and 108; see also, to the same effect, the judgment in Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert , C‑92/09 and C‑93/09, EU:C:2010:662, paragraph 85).

78. As Bavarian Lager has not provided any express and legitimate justification or any convincing argument in order to demonstrate the necessity for those personal data to be transferred, the Commission has not been able to weigh up the various interests of the parties concerned. Nor was it able to verify whether there was any reason to assume that the data subjects’ legitimate interests might be prejudiced, as required by Article 8(b) of Regulation No 45/2001.

42 In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that a large number of subscribers to Ziggo and XS4ALL have downloaded media files using the online sharing platform TPB. It is also clear from the observations submitted to the Court that this platform is used by a considerable number of persons, the operators of TPB claiming, on their online sharing platform, to have several dozens of millions of ‘peers’. In this respect, the communication at issue in the main proceedings covers, at the very least, all of the platform’s users. These users can access, at any time and simultaneously, the protected works which are shared by means of the platform. Thus, that communication is aimed at an indeterminate number of potential recipients and involves a large number of persons (see, to this effect, judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C‑527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

21 As the Court has held (see Case 170/84 Bilka v Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607; Barber, cited above, paragraph 12; Case C-109/91 Ten Oever v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor het Glazenwassers- en Schoonmaakbedrijf [1993] ECR I-4879, paragraph 8), the fact that certain benefits are paid after the termination of the employment relationship does not prevent them from being "pay" within the meaning of Article 119.

8 It is settled law that the concept of pay, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 119, comprises any consideration, whether in cash or in kind, whether immediate or future, provided that the worker receives it, albeit indirectly, in respect of his employment from his employer. The fact that certain benefits are paid after the end of the employment relationship does not prevent them from being pay within the meaning of Article 119 (see, in particular, the judgment in Barber, paragraph 12).

70. The exercise of police powers may not, under the second sentence of that provision, in particular, be considered equivalent to the exercise of border checks when the police measures do not have border control as an objective; are based on general police information and experience regarding possible threats to public security and aim, in particular, to combat cross-border crime; are devised and executed in a manner clearly distinct from systematic checks on persons at the external borders; and, lastly, are carried out on the basis of spot-checks.

27. In addition, it is clear from the structure and purpose of Decision No 1/80 that, at the current stage of development of freedom of movement for workers under the EEC-Turkey Association, that decision is essentially aimed at the progressive integration of Turkish workers in the host Member State through the pursuit of lawful employment which should be uninterrupted (see judgment in Abatay and Others , EU:C:2003:572, paragraph 90).

90. It is clear from the structure and the purpose of Decision No 1/80 that, at the current stage of the development of freedom of movement for workers under the EEC-Turkey Association and without prejudice to the particular position of family members authorised to join a Turkish worker already legally present in the territory of a Member State, that decision is essentially aimed at the progressive integration of Turkish workers into that territory through the pursuit of lawful employment which should be uninterrupted for one, three or four years, as the case may be, save in the cases of interruption of the employment relationship set out in Article 6(2) of that decision.

44 Finally, the directive has taken account of the effects which the organization of working time for which it provides may have on small and medium-sized undertakings. Thus, the second recital in the preamble to the directive refers to the overriding requirement not to hold back the development of such undertakings. Moreover, as the Court held in its judgment in Case C-189/91 Kirsammer-Hack v Sidal [1993] ECR I-6185, paragraph 34, by providing that directives adopted in the field of health and safety of workers are to avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints such as to hold back the creation and development of small and medium-sized undertakings, the second sentence of Article 118a(2) indicates that such undertakings may be the subject of special economic measures. Contrary to the view taken by the applicant, however, that provision does not prevent those undertakings from being subject to binding measures.

23 It must be observed, as a preliminary point, that the question expressly refers solely to Article 226(6) of Directive 2006/112. In order to give the referring tribunal a useful answer which will enable it to decide the dispute before it, the analysis to be performed should, however, also include Article 178(a) and Article 226(7) of Directive 2006/112. In this respect, it should be recalled that the Court’s duty is to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred by them to the Court (judgment of 16 July 2015, Abcur, C‑544/13 and C‑545/13, EU:C:2015:481, paragraph 33).

33. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in the context of the procedure established by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. Moreover, the Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of EU law which national courts require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts (judgments in eco cosmetics and Raiffeisenbank St. Georgen , C‑119/13 and C‑120/13, EU:C:2014:2144, paragraph 32, and Subdelegación del Gobierno en Guipuzkoa — Extranjeria , C‑38/14, EU:C:2015:260, paragraph 25).

31 The procedure provided for in Article 234 EC is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts by means of which the former provides the latter with interpretation of such Community law as is necessary for them to give judgment in cases upon which they are called to adjudicate (see Case C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher [1990] ECR I-4003, paragraph 18).

39. To require those who, among the residents of a Member State, are insured under the social security scheme of another Member State to finance, in addition, even if only partially, the social security scheme of the Member State of residence would give rise to unequal treatment under Article 13 of Regulation No 1408/71, since all other residents of the latter Member State are required to contribute only to its social security scheme (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v France , EU:C:2000:84, paragraphs 45 to 48, and Commission v France , EU:C:2000:85, paragraphs 42 to 45).

46 The rule laid down in Article 13 of Regulation No 1408/71 that the legislation of a single Member State is to apply in matters of social security is aimed specifically at eliminating unequal treatment which is the consequence of partial or total overlapping of the legislation.

36. In that regard, the reasons which may be invoked by a Member State by way of justification must be accompanied by appropriate evidence or by an analysis of the appropriateness and proportionality of the restrictive measure adopted by that State, and precise evidence enabling its arguments to be substantiated (Case C‑42/02 Lindman [2003] ECR I‑13519, paragraph 25; Case C‑8/02 Leichtle [2004] ECR I-2641, paragraph 45; Case C‑147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I‑5969, paragraph 63; Case C‑137/04 Rockler [2006] ECR I‑1441, paragraph 25; and Case C‑185/04 Öberg [2006] ECR I‑1453, paragraph 22).

51 As is apparent from recital 12 of Regulation No 2201/2003, that regulation was drawn up with the objective of meeting the best interests of the child and, to that end, it favours the criterion of proximity. The EU legislature, in effect, considered that the court geographically close to the child’s habitual residence is the court best placed to assess the measures to be taken in the interests of the child (judgment of 15 July 2010, Purrucker, C‑256/09, EU:C:2010:437, paragraph 91). According to that recital, jurisdiction should lie in the first place with the Member State of the child’s habitual residence, except in certain cases of a change in the child’s residence or pursuant to an agreement between the holders of parental responsibility.

91. As stated by the United Kingdom Government at the hearing, to accept the recognition and en forcement of measures within the scope of Article 20 of Regulation No 2201/2003 in all other Member States, including the State which has substantive jurisdiction, would, in addition, create a risk of circumvention of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by that regulation and of forum shopping, which would be contrary to the objectives pursued by that regulation and, in particular, to the objective of making sure that the best interests of the child are taken into consideration by ensuring that decisions concerning the child are taken by the court geographically close to his habitual residence, that court being regarded by the European Union legislature as the court best placed to assess the measures to be taken in the interests of the child.

61. In this latte r case, the customs authorities re-examine the declaration and assess whether the declarant’s claims are well founded, in the light of the information notified ( Overland Footwear, paragraph 51).

12 That provision makes any waiver of post-clearance recovery by the competent customs authorities subject to the fulfilment of three conditions. Provided that all those conditions are fulfilled, the person liable is entitled to waiver post-clearance recovery (see the judgments in Case C-348/89 Mecanarte-Metalúrgica de Lagoa [1991] ECR I-3277, paragraph 12, and Case 341/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199, paragraph 22.)

12 With respect to the first question, the Court has consistently held that Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1697/79 must be interpreted as meaning that if all the conditions laid down by that provision are fulfilled the person liable is entitled to the waiver of the recovery of the duty in question (see the judgments in Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199, paragraph 22, Case 378/87 Top Hit [1989] ECR 1359, paragraph 18 and Case 161/88 Binder [1989] ECR 2415, paragraph 16).

40. In the light of those considerations, the Court concluded that the Edinburgh Decision must be interpreted as defining the seat of the Parliament as the place where 12 ordinary plenary part-sessions must take place on a regular basis, including those during which the Parliament is to exercise the budgetary powers conferred upon it by the Treaty. By the same token, the Court held that additional plenary part-sessions cannot be scheduled for any other place of work unless the Parliament holds the 12 ordinary plenary part-sessions in Strasbourg, where it has its seat (see the judgment in France v Parliament , paragraph 29).

80. Consequently, the fact that Mr de Groot has Netherlands nationality cannot prevent him from relying on the rules relating to freedom of movement for workers as against the Member State of which he is a national, since he has exercised his right to freedom of movement and worked in another Member State (Terhoeve , paragraphs 27 to 29, and Sehrer , paragraph 29). Whether there is an obstacle to freedom of movement for workers

29 The fact that Mr Sehrer has German nationality cannot prevent him from relying on the rules relating to freedom of movement for workers against the Member State of which he is a national, since he has exercised his right to freedom of movement and worked in another Member State (Terhoeve, paragraphs 27, 28 and 29).

46. It should be pointed out, in that regard, that the Court of Justice can declare an appeal to be inadmissible where an event subsequent to the judgment of the General Court has removed its prejudicial effect for the appellant. An interest in bringing the appeal proceedings assumes that the appeal is likely, if successful, to procure an advantage to the party bringing it (see Case C-19/93 P Rendo and Others v Commission [1995] ECR I-3319, paragraph 13, and the orders in Case C-111/99 P Lech-Stahlwerke v Commission [2001] ECR I-727, paragraph 18, and Case C-503/07 P Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v Commission [2008] ECR I-2217, paragraph 48).

39 According to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of European Union law which national courts require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court by those courts (judgments of 19 September 2013, Betriu Montull, C‑5/12, EU:C:2013:571, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited, and of 13 February 2014, TSN and YTN, C‑512/11 and C‑513/11, EU:C:2014:73, paragraph 32).

40. In the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of European Union law which national courts require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court by those courts (see, inter alia, Case C‑243/09 Fuß [2010] ECR I‑9849, paragraph 39, and Case C‑342/12 Worten [2013] ECR I-0000, paragraph 30).

58. If that were not so, persons whose personal data has been or could be transferred to the third country concerned would be denied the right, guaranteed by Article 8(1) and (3) of the Charter, to lodge with the national supervisory authorities a claim for the purpose of protecting their fundamental rights (see, by analogy, judgment in Digital Rights Ireland and Others , C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, EU:C:2014:238, paragraph 68).

33 In so far as the referring court expresses uncertainty as to whether the objectives of Regulation No 805/2004 could lead to a different conclusion, it must be borne in mind that the primary objective of that legislation is, in accordance with Article 1 thereof, to create a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims in order to permit, by laying down minimum standards, the free circulation of judgments, court settlements and authentic instruments throughout all Member States without any intermediate proceedings needing to be brought in the Member State of enforcement prior to recognition of enforcement. However, given that the conditions for the application of the derogation from the common system of recognition of judgments established by that regulation are to be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 March 2012, G, C‑292/10, EU:C:2012:142, paragraph 64), that objective cannot call into question the interpretation of the scope of that regulation which follows from the wording of Article 7 thereof.

64. It is therefore apparent from the very wording of Regulation No 805/2004 that a judgment by default issued in circumstances where it is impossible to ascertain the domicile of the defendant cannot be certified as a European Enforcement Order. That conclusion also follows from an analysis of the objectives and scheme of that regulation. The regulation institutes a derogation from the common system of recognition of judgments, the conditions of which are, as a matter of principle, to be interpreted strictly.

79. Finally, as regards the argument relating to the incomplete provision of documents relating to the refused confirmatory applications, it must be recalled that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence, save where the facts or evidence are distorted (judgment in Rousse Industry v Commission , C‑271/13 P, EU:C:2014:175, paragraph 81). There will be distortion where, in particular, the General Court has manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of the evidence.

41. In particular, such an undertaking may demonstrate, for that purpose, either that its conduct is objectively necessary (see, to that effect, Case 311/84 CBEM [1985] ECR 3261, paragraph 27), or that the exclusionary effect produced may be counterbalanced, outweighed even, by advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit consumers (Case C‑95/04 P British Airways v Commission [2007] ECR I‑2331, paragraph 86, and TeliaSonera Sverige , paragraph 76).

27 IT MUST THEREFORE BE HELD IN ANSWER TO THE SECOND QUESTION THAT AN ABUSE WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 86 IS COMMITTED WHERE , WITHOUT ANY OBJECTIVE NECESSITY , AN UNDERTAKING HOLDING A DOMINANT POSITION ON A PARTICULAR MARKET RESERVES TO ITSELF OR TO AN UNDERTAKING BELONGING TO THE SAME GROUP AN ANCILLARY ACTIVITY WHICH MIGHT BE CARRIED OUT BY ANOTHER UNDERTAKING AS PART OF ITS ACTIVITIES ON A NEIGHBOURING BUT SEPARATE MARKET , WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF ELIMINATING ALL COMPETITION FROM SUCH UNDERTAKING .

28. In order to establish whether the principle of equivalence has been complied with in the case in the main proceedings, it is for the national court, which alone has direct knowledge of the procedural rules governing actions in the field of employment law, to consider both the purpose and the essential characteristics of allegedly similar domestic actions (see Levez , paragraphs 43; Preston and Others , paragraph 56; and Pontin , paragraph 45).

77. In addition, the Court has repeatedly held that the exception in the first paragraph of Article 45 EC must be restricted to activities which in themselves are directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority ( Reyners , paragraph 45; Thijssen , paragraph 8; Commission v Spain , paragraph 35; Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti , paragraph 46; Commission v Germany , paragraph 38; and Commission v Portugal , paragraph 36).

8 As a preliminary matter, it should be recalled that the first paragraph of Article 55 of the Treaty excludes from the application of the provisions on freedom of establishment activities which in a Member State are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority. Nevertheless, as the Court ruled in Reyners (cited above, at paragraph 45), the derogation provided for in Article 55 must be restricted to activities which in themselves are directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority.

45. Moreover, the Court must display special vigilance when, in the course of proceedings between individuals, a question is referred to it with a view to permitting the national court to decide whether the legislation of another Member State is in accordance with Community law (Foglia , paragraph 30).

31. Also, where there is a regulation on the common organisation of the market in a given area, the Member States are under an obligation to refrain from taking any measures which might undermine or create exceptions to it (Case C-1/96 Compassion in World Farming [1998] ECR I-1251, paragraph 41, and Case C-507/99 Denkavit [2002] ECR I-169, paragraph 32).

32 It should be observed at the outset that, where there is a regulation on the common organisation of the market in a given sector, the Member States are under an obligation to refrain from taking any measures which might undermine or create exceptions to it. Rules which interfere with the proper functioning of a common organisation of the market are also incompatible with such common organisation, even if the matter in question has not been exhaustively regulated by it (Case C-1/96 Compassion in World Farming [1998] ECR I-1251, paragraph 41).

81. The legality of a decision concerning State aid is to be assessed in the light of the information available to the Commission when the decision was adopted, especially where the decision in question is a decision not to raise objections to an aid scheme adopted at the end of the preliminary stage of the procedure for reviewing aid under Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty, such as the contested decision (see, to that effect, Nuova Agricast , paragraphs 54 and 55).

45. First, as the Court has held, the verb ‘to discard’ must be interpreted in the light of the aim of Directive 75/442, which, in the wording of the third recital in the preamble, is the protection of human health and the environment against harmful effects caused by the collection, transport, treatment, storage and tipping of waste, and that of Article 174(2) EC, which states that Community policy on the environment is to aim at a high level of protection and is to be based, in particular, on the precautionary principle and the principle that preventive action should be taken. The verb ‘to discard’, which determines the scope of ‘waste’, therefore cannot be interpreted restrictively (see to that effect Joined Cases C‑418/97 and C‑419/97 ARCO Chemie Nederland and Others [2000] ECR I‑4475, paragraphs 36 to 40).

36 It follows that the scope of the term waste turns on the meaning of the term discard (Case C-129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v Région Wallonne [1997] ECR I-7411, paragraph 26).

27. Furthermore, measures taken by a Member State, the aim or effect of which is to treat goods coming from other Member States less favourably and, in the absence of harmonisation of national legislation, obstacles to the free movement of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and/or marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods, even if those rules apply to all products alike, must be regarded as ‘measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports’ for the purposes of Article 34 TFEU (see, to that effect, Deutscher Apothekerverband , paragraph 67).

87. The fact remains, however, that the specific circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of public policy may vary from one Member State to another and from one era to another. The competent national authorities must therefore be allowed a margin of discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty (see Omega , paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

31. The fact remains, however, that the specific circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of public policy may vary from one country to another and from one era to another. The competent national authorities must therefore be allowed a margin of discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty ( Van Duyn , paragraph 18, and Bouchereau , paragraph 34).

49 In addition, under Article 273 of the VAT Directive, the Member States may impose other obligations which they deem necessary for the correct collection of the tax and for the prevention of evasion. However, the measures which the Member States may adopt under that provision must not go further than is necessary to attain such objectives. Therefore, they cannot be used in such a way that they would have the effect of systematically undermining the right to deduct VAT and, consequently, the neutrality of VAT (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 May 2008 in Ecotrade, C‑95/07 and C‑96/07, EU:C:2008:267, paragraph 66, and 21 June 2012 in Mahagében and Dávid, C‑80/11 and C‑142/11, EU:C:2012:373, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

117. As regards court proceedings, in the event that the person concerned challenges the lawfulness of the decision to list or maintain the listing of his name in Annex I to Regulation No 881/2002, the review by the Courts of the European Union must extend to whether rules as to procedure and rules as to competence, including whether or not the legal basis is adequate, are observed (see, to that effect, the Kadi judgment, paragraphs 121 to 236; see also, by analogy, the judgment of 13 March 2012 in Case C‑376/10 P Tay Za v Council [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 46 to 72).

62. According to the Court, such an interpretation of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC would give those provisions an excessively broad meaning and would fail to take any account at all of the requirement, imposed by their very wording, that the measures decided on the basis of those provisions must be taken against third countries ( Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission , paragraph 168).

55. Moreover, national legislation constitutes a restriction where it makes the pursuit of an activity subject to a condition which is linked to the economic or social needs for that activity, since it tends to limit the number of service providers (see, to that effect, Hartlauer , paragraph 36).

However, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be argued again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (judgments of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 51, and of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 47).

47. However, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of European Union law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be argued again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (Case C‑131/03 P Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission [2006] ECR I-7795, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

28. Au surplus, à supposer même qu’une lecture isolée et littérale du second alinéa de l’article 3, paragraphe 2, de la directive 92/57 puisse aboutir à l’interprétation préconisée par la République italienne du terme «comma», il n’en reste pas moins qu’une telle interprétation est inconciliable tant avec la structure et le contenu de l’article 3 de la directive 92/57, considéré dans son ensemble, qu’avec l’économie de cette directive dans laquelle cette disposition s’inscrit (voir en ce sens, notamment, arrêts du 27 octobre 1977, Bouchereau, 30/77, Rec. p. 1999, point 14; du 24 février 2000, Commission/France, C‑434/97, Rec. p. I‑1129, point 22, et du 7 décembre 2000, Italie/Commission, C‑482/98, Rec. p. I‑10861, point 49).

36. Although it does not dispute that Faxworld GbR is to be treated as a taxable person, the Commission shares the view taken by the German Government as regards that partnership’s right to deduct. Relying on the judgment in Abbey National , paragraph 28, which states that the right to deduct presupposes that the expenditure incurred in acquiring the output services was part of the cost components of the taxable transactions, the Commission argues that the deduction of input tax requires that taxable transactions be effected; Faxworld GbR, however, never intended to effect such transactions.

28 It follows from that principle, as well as from the rule that, in order to give rise to the right to deduct, the goods or services acquired must have a direct and immediate link with the taxable transactions, that the right to deduct the VAT borne by those goods or services presupposes that the expenditure incurred in acquiring them was part of the cost components of the taxable transactions. That expenditure must therefore form part of the costs of the output transactions which use the goods and services acquired. Consequently, those cost components must generally have arisen before the taxable person carried out the taxable transactions to which they relate (see Midland Bank, paragraph 30).

30. The consideration represented by the subsidy must, at the very least, be identifiable. It is not necessary for the subsidy to correspond exactly to the diminution in the price of the goods or services supplied. It is sufficient if the relationship between the diminution in price and the subsidy, which may be at a flat rate, is significant ( Office des produits wallons , paragraph 17).

23 In that regard, it is clear that under the Portuguese legislation capital companies are required to have increases in their share capital recorded in the Commercial Register and when that record is made to pay registration duties, the proceeds of which go to the Fund. The Fund bears not only the costs of setting up and operating the Commercial Register but also the operating costs of the National Register of Legal Persons, the payment of the fixed portion of the salaries payable to notaries and other legal officials, and, following authorisation from the Ministry of Justice, it covers other expenditure arising from the conduct of legal business (see Case C-56/98 Modelo [1999] ECR I-6427, paragraph 20).

20 According to the Portuguese Government, the Fund is responsible for paying the fixed portion of the salaries payable to notaries and other civil servants; it also meets the cost of training notaries and of acquiring office space and equipment for them; and, subject to authorisation from the Ministry of Justice, it covers other expenditure in the field of legal administration.

22 The Court explained in paragraph 27 of its judgment in Les Rapides Savoyards that recognition of the decisions of the authorities of the exporting country by the customs authorities of the Member States is necessary in order that the Community can, in turn, demand that the authorities of other countries with which it has concluded free-trade agreements accept the decisions taken by the customs authorities of the Member States concerning the origin of products exported from the Community to those non-member countries. The Court also pointed out that the functioning of that system does not encroach on the fiscal autonomy of the Community and its Member States or of the non-member countries concerned, since the rules laid down in the free-trade agreement in question were established on the basis of reciprocal obligations placing the parties on an equal footing in their dealings with each other (paragraph 29).

23 However, the scope of the Charter, in so far as the action of the Member States is concerned, is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. That provision confirms the Court’s settled case-law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (judgments of 27 March 2014 in Torralbo Marcos, C‑265/13, EU:C:2014:187, paragraphs 28 and 29, and 6 October 2015 in Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraphs 25 and 26).

25. It should be recalled that the Charter’s field of application so far as concerns action of the Member States is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law (judgment in Åkerberg Fransson , C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 17).

47. By way of such limitations and conditions, Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 provides that a Member State may require nationals of another Member State wishing to have the right of residence on its territory for a period of longer than three months without being economically active to have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State and sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of that Member State during their period of residence (see, to that effect, Case C‑480/08 Teixeira [2010] ECR I‑1107, paragraph 42).

35. In the first place, recital 1 in the preamble to Directive 2000/53 states that the directive seeks to minimise the impact of end-of-life vehicles on the environment, but does not provide for complete harmonisation and thus does not prevent Member States from adopting more stringent protective measures (see, inter alia, Case C-6/03 Deponiezweckverband Eiterköpfe [2005] ECR I-2753, paragraph 27). Such measures must, however, be compatible with the provisions of the EC Treaty and, inter alia, must not frustrate the achievement of the objective pursued in the second instance by that directive, namely to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortions of competition in the Union.

27. The first point to be noted is that the Community rules do not seek to effect complete harmonisation in the area of the environment. Even though Article 174 EC refers to certain Community objectives to be attained, Article 176 EC allows the Member States to introduce more stringent protective measures (Case C-318/98 Fornasar and Others [2000] ECR I-4785, paragraph 46). Article 176 EC makes such measures subject only to the conditions that they should be compatible with the Treaty and that they should be notified to the Commission.

35. It is clear from the Court’s case-law that a restriction on freedom of establishment is permissible only if it is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. It is further necessary, in such a case, that the restriction be appropriate to ensuring the attainment of the objective in question and not go beyond what is necessary to attain it (see Lidl Belgium , paragraph 27 and case-law cited).

36 Consequently, a clawback measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings must be established and applied in compliance with the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-63/93 Duff and Others [1996] ECR I-569, paragraph 34). Moreover, it must be proportionate to the aim pursued (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-22/94 Irish Farmers Association and Others [1997] ECR I-1809, paragraphs 30 and 31) and applied without discrimination (see, to that effect, in particular Klensch and Others, paragraph 8). Similarly, such a measure must respect fundamental rights, such as the right to property (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-2/92 Bostock [1994] ECR I-955, paragraphs 16 and 20) and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession (see, to that effect, in particular Joined Cases C-90/90 and C-91/90 Neu and Others [1991] ECR I-3617, paragraph 13).

13 In that respect, it must be stated that the freedom to pursue a trade or profession, which, according to the consistent case-law of the Court (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, paragraphs 31 to 33, and in Case 265/87 Schraeder v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237, paragraph 15), forms part of the general principles of Community law, includes, as a specific expression of that freedom, the freedom to choose whom to do business with. That freedom of choice would not be guaranteed if a change of dairy by a producer, of his own volition, were capable of leading to a reduction in his individual reference quantity as a result of the allocation of a part thereof to the national reserve, when no such reduction can be made where the producer continues to supply the same dairy. Rules to that effect would be such as to discourage producers from changing purchaser in order to supply the dairy offering them the most favourable conditions.

38. In this case, such a set-off against the tax due in the other Member State of the tax withheld at source in Italy is not guaranteed by Italian legislation. Set-off presupposes, in particular, that dividends coming from Italy are sufficiently taxed in the other Member State. As the Advocate General has pointed out in paragraphs 58 and 59 of her Opinion, if those dividends are not taxed, or are not sufficiently taxed, the sum withheld at source in Italy or a part thereof cannot be set off. In that case, the difference in treatment arising from the application of national legislation cannot be compensated for by applying provisions of the double taxation convention.

34. However, according to the case-law, a provision which is capable of restricting a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty, such as the free movement of goods, can be properly justified only if it is appropriate for securing the attainment of that objective and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, inter alia, Case C‑14/02 ATRAL [2003] ECR I‑4431, paragraph 64; Case C‑254/05 Commission v Belgium [2007] ECR I‑4269, paragraph 33; judgment of 13 March 2008 in Case C‑227/06 Commission v Belgium , paragraph 61; and Case C‑141/07 Commission v Germany [2008] ECR I‑6935, paragraph 48).

48. However, legislation which is such as to restrict a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty, such as the free movement of goods, can be justified only if it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (Case C‑14/02 ATRAL [2003] ECR I‑4431, paragraph 64; Case C‑254/05 Commission v Belgium [2007] ECR I‑4269, paragraph 33; judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 13 March 2008 in Case C‑227/06 Commission v Belgium , not published in the ECR, paragraph 61; and Case C‑265/06 Commission v Portugal [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 37).

18. The Member State concerned, for its part, cannot rebut the Commission's findings by mere assertions which are not substantiated by evidence of a reliable and operational supervisory system. If it is not able to show that they are inaccurate, the Commission's findings can give rise to serious doubts as to the existence of an adequate and effective series of supervisory measures and inspection procedures (Case C-253/97 Italy v Commission [1999] ECR I-7529, paragraph 7).

19 The principle of the right to deduct VAT is none the less subject to the derogation in Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive and, in particular, its second subparagraph. The Member States are thereby authorised to retain their existing legislation in regard to exclusion from the right of deduction until such time as the Council has adopted the provisions envisaged by that article (Case C-305/97 Royscot and Others [1999] ECR I-6671, paragraph 29).

29 However, as all the governments which submitted observations point out, it should be noted that the wording of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive makes it clear that the authorisation granted to Member States to retain their existing legislation in regard to exclusion from the right of deduction remains in force until such time as the Council has adopted the provisions envisaged by that article.

58. First, the Court of First Instance did not err in law in holding that the guidelines of the United Kingdom Patent Office which, according to the appellant, confirm the descriptive character of the silhouette of the fir tree for the goods in question, were of no relevance. As the Court of First Instance rightly observes, the Community trade mark regime is an autonomous system with its own set of rules and objectives peculiar to it and applies independently of any national system, and the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal must be evaluated solely on the basis of Regulation No 40/94, as it is interpreted by the Community Courts (see, to that effect, Case C-238/06 P Develey v OHIM [2007] ECR I‑9375, paragraphs 65 and 66).

63 The Kingdom of Belgium, relying on the judgment in AGF Belgium (C‑191/94, EU:C:1996:144, paragraphs 25 and 26), submits that the public utility services to which the contested contributions are linked satisfy the first condition set out in that regard in the Court’s case-law, namely that they are capable of being supplied to the EU institutions. In particular, the programmes on reasonable electricity and gas use include elements, inter alia subsidies, from which the EU institutions could benefit by putting in place energy efficiency measures. The Kingdom of Belgium cites to that effect a table setting out the amounts of the subsidies from which the EU institutions have benefited over several previous years.

25. As the Court has already held, the distinction between a tax intended to provide for the general expenses of public authorities and a due constituting consideration for a given service, which is recognized in the national law of various Member States, is expressly recognized by Article 3 of the Protocol (see Case 32/67 Van Leeuwen v Rotterdam [1968] ECR 43).

19. The Court has also held that the first subparagraph of Article 2(1) of the Second Directive simply repeats that obligation with respect to provisions or clauses in a policy excluding from insurance the use or driving of vehicles in particular cases (persons not authorised to drive the vehicle, persons not holding a driving licence, persons in breach of the statutory technical requirements concerning the condition and safety of the vehicle) ( Ruiz Bernáldez , paragraph 21).

87. That provision gives concrete expression to the principle of State liability for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of EU law for which the State can be held responsible. According to case-law developed since the adoption of Directive 89/665, but which is now consistent, that principle is inherent in the legal order of the Union. The Court has held that individuals harmed have a right to reparation where three conditions are met: the rule of EU law infringed must be intended to confer rights on them; the breach of that rule must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link between the breach and the loss or damage sustained by the individuals (Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 35; Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029, paragraphs 31 and 51; and Case C‑445/06 Danske Slagterier [2009] ECR I‑2119, paragraphs 19 and 20).

51. In such circumstances, Community law confers a right to reparation where three conditions are met: the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties.

41 Furthermore, the Court has ruled that, as the standstill clause in Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 is of the same kind as that contained in Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol, and as the objective pursued by those two clauses is identical, the interpretation of Article 41(1) must be equally valid as regards the standstill obligation which is the basis of Article 13 in relation to freedom of movement for workers (judgment in Commission v Netherlands, C‑92/07, EU:C:2010:228, paragraph 48).

57. In paragraph 96 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court, without committing an error of law, recalled that the principle of legality requires legislation to define clearly offences and the penalties which they attract (Case C‑413/08 P Lafarge v Commission [2010] ECR I‑5361, paragraph 94). In paragraph 99 of that judgment, it likewise did not commit an error of law in recalling the criteria for assessing the clarity of the law under the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, namely that the clarity of a law is assessed having regard not only to the wording of the relevant provision but also to the clarification provided by settled, published case-law (see, to this effect, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in G. v. France , 27 September 1995, § 25, Series A no. 325-B) and that the fact that a law confers a discretion is not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability, provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference (judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden , 25 February 1992, § 75, Series A no. 226-A).

94. As regards the complaint of alleged breach of the general principle that offences and penalties be strictly defined, it is appropriate to recall that that principle requires the law to define clearly offences and the penalties sanctioning them ( Evonik Degussa v Commission and Council , paragraph 39). According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the clarity of a law is assessed having regard not only to the wording of the relevant provision but also to the information provided by settled, published case-law (see, to that effect, its judgment of 27 September 1995 in G v France , Series A No 325-B, § 25). In addition, the fact that a law confers a discretion is not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability, provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference (see the judgment of 25 February 1992 in Margareta and Roger Andersson v Sweden , Series A No 226, § 75).

60. According to the Court’s case-law, health care establishments and infrastructure, pharmacies and opticians’ shops may be subject to planning, so as to ensure the provision of public health care which is adapted to the needs of the population, covers the entire territory and takes account of geographically isolated or otherwise disadvantaged regions (see, to that effect, judgments in Hartlauer , C‑169/07, EU:C:2009:141, paragraphs 51 and 52; Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez , C‑570/07 and C‑571/07, EU:C:2010:300, paragraph 70, and Ottica New Line di Accardi Vincenzo , C‑539/11, EU:C:2013:591, paragraphs 36 and 37).

132 Analysis of the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position must take account of the fact that an undertaking which has a very large market share and has held it for some time is in a position of strength which makes it an unavoidable trading partner (Hoffmann-La Roche, paragraph 41).

41FURTHERMORE ALTHOUGH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MARKET SHARES MAY VARY FROM ONE MARKET TO ANOTHER THE VIEW MAY LEGITIMATELY BE TAKEN THAT VERY LARGE SHARES ARE IN THEMSELVES , AND SAVE IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES , EVIDENCE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A DOMINANT POSITION . AN UNDERTAKING WHICH HAS A VERY LARGE MARKET SHARE AND HOLDS IT FOR SOME TIME , BY MEANS OF THE VOLUME OF PRODUCTION AND THE SCALE OF THE SUPPLY WHICH IT STANDS FOR - WITHOUT THOSE HAVING MUCH SMALLER MARKET SHARES BEING ABLE TO MEET RAPIDLY THE DEMAND FROM THOSE WHO WOULD LIKE TO BREAK AWAY FROM THE UNDERTAKING WHICH HAS THE LARGEST MARKET SHARE - IS BY VIRTUE OF THAT SHARE IN A POSITION OF STRENGTH WHICH MAKES IT AN UNAVOIDABLE TRADING PARTNER AND WHICH , ALREADY BECAUSE OF THIS SECURES FOR IT , AT THE VERY LEAST DURING RELATIVELY LONG PERIODS , THAT FREEDOM OF ACTION WHICH IS THE SPECIAL FEATURE OF A DOMINANT POSITION .

37 The Court has also previously held that the concept of ‘communication to the public’ includes two cumulative criteria, namely, an ‘act of communication’ of a work and the communication of that work to a ‘public’ (judgment of 19 November 2015 in SBS Belgium, C‑325/14, EU:C:2015:764, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).

34 In the third place, an express road is, according to that definition, a road reserved for automobile traffic accessible only from interchanges or controlled junctions and on which stopping and parking are prohibited. It does not follow from that definition that roads sited in urban areas would a priori be excluded. On the contrary, unless roads in built-up areas are expressly excluded, the words ‘express roads’ cover urban roads which have the characteristics set out in Annex II to the AGR (judgment of 25 July 2008, Ecologistas en Acción-CODA, C‑142/07, EU:C:2008:445, paragraph 31).

31. According to Annex II to the agreement, an express road is a road reserved for motor traffic accessible only from interchanges or controlled junctions and on which stopping and parking are prohibited on the running carriageway(s). It does not follow from that definition that roads sited in urban areas would a priori be excluded. On the contrary, unless roads in built-up areas are expressly excluded, the words ‘express roads’ cover urban roads which have the characteristics set out in that annex.

30. For the purposes of determining whether a product must be classified as a medicinal product or as a foodstuff within the meaning of the Community regulations, the competent national authority must decide on a case-by-case basis, taking account of all the characteristics of the product, in particular its composition, its pharmacological properties, to the extent to which they can be established in the present state of scientific knowledge, the manner in which it is used, the extent of its distribution, its familiarity to consumers and the risks which its use may entail (see Van Bennekom , cited above, paragraph 29; Case C-369/88 Delattre [1991] ECR I-1487, paragraphs 26 and 35; Case C-60/89 Monteil and Samanni [1991] ECR I-1547, paragraph 29; Case C-112/89 Upjohn (‘ Upjohn I ’) [1991] ECR I-1703, paragraph 23; Case C-290/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-3317, paragraph 17; and Case C-150/00 Commission v Austria [2004] ECR I-3891, paragraph 64).

34 That interpretation is borne out by the third, fourth, fifth and sixth recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 1247/92, from which it is clear that the intention of the legislature was to provide a specific system of coordination taking account of the special characteristics of certain benefits falling simultaneously within the categories of both social assistance and social security and treated, according to the Court's case-law, as social security benefits as regards workers already covered by the social security scheme of the State whose legislation is relied on (see, in particular, Newton and Snares). As the Advocate General has stated at point 24 of his Opinion, a benefit such as AA is indeed a benefit of that kind.

24 Consequently, the reply to the second question asked by the Social Security Commissioner must be that where an allowance for handicapped persons constitutes an invalidity benefit within the meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1408/71, Article 10 of that regulation precludes the withdrawal of that benefit on the sole ground that the recipient resides in the territory of a Member State other than that in which the institution responsible for payment is situated.

21. First, it is apparent from the significance of the discretion accorded to the Member States, referred to in paragraph 14 above, that the Commission’s power of review must be limited to determining whether the Member States have committed any manifest errors of assessment in designating events of major importance. In order to verify whether such an error of assessment has been committed, the Commission must therefore, inter alia, examine, carefully and impartially, all the relevant facts of the individual case, facts which support the conclusions reached (see, by analogy, Case C‑269/90 Technische Universität München [1991] ECR I‑5469, paragraph 14, and Case C‑77/09 Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços [2010] ECR I‑13533, paragraphs 56 and 57).

18. In that regard, it must be noted at the outset that the rule of special jurisdiction laid down, by way of derogation from the principle of jurisdiction of the courts of the place of domicile of the defendant, in Article 5(3) of the regulation is based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred, which justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings (Joined Cases C‑509/09 and C‑161/10 eDate Advertising and Others [2011] ECR I‑10269, paragraph 40).

40. It is settled case-law that the rule of special jurisdiction laid down, by way of derogation from the principle of jurisdiction of the courts of the place of domicile of the defendant, in Article 5(3) of the Regulation is based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred, which justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings ( Zuid‑Chemie , paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

79. With regard to the possibility of extrapolation to other regions of Portugal, the Court has already held that extrapolation of data is not prohibited in principle (see Case C-344/01 Germany v Commission [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 61). Such extrapolation must, however, always be justified by the evidence. In the present case, the fact that Alentejo constitutes the main cattle breeding region justifies that extrapolation.

25. With regard to Article 63 TFEU, it is settled case-law that, in the absence of a definition in the Treaty of ‘movement of capital’ within the meaning of Article 63(1) TFEU, the nomenclature which constitutes Annex I to Directive 88/361 retains an indicative value, even though that directive was adopted on the basis of Articles 69 and 70(1) of the EEC Treaty (Articles 67 to 73 of the EEC Treaty were replaced by Articles 73b to 73g of the EC Treaty, which themselves became Articles 56 EC to 60 EC), it being understood that, according to the third paragraph of the introduction to that annex, the nomenclature which it contains is not exhaustive as regards the notion of movements of capital (see, inter alia, Case C‑318/07 Persche [2009] ECR I‑359, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited; Case C‑182/08 Glaxo Wellcome [2009] ECR I‑8591, paragraph 39; Case C‑35/08 Busley and Cibrian Fernandez [2009] ECR I‑9807, paragraph 17; and Case C‑25/10 Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 15).

17. In that regard, the Court has consistently held that, in the absence of a definition in the Treaty of ‘movement of capital’ within the meaning of Article 56(1) EC, the nomenclature which constitutes Annex I to Directive 88/361 retains an indicative value, even though that directive was adopted on the basis of Articles 69 and 70(1) of the EEC Treaty (after amendment, Articles 69 and 70(1) of the EC Treaty, repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam), it being understood that, according to the third paragraph of the introduction to that annex, the nomenclature which it contains is not exhaustive as regards the notion of ‘movement of capital’ (see, inter alia, Case C‑386/04 Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer [2006] ECR I‑8203, paragraph 22 and case-law cited, and Case C‑67/08 Block [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 19).

36. With regard to the latter question, it must, however, be borne in mind that, in its judgment in Case C-244/08 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-130, paragraphs 31 and 32, the Court held that the expression ‘fixed establishment from which business transactions are effected’ in Article 1 of the Eighth Directive and, now, in Article 3(a) of Directive 2008/9, must be interpreted as regarding a non-resident taxable person as a person who does not have a fixed establishment carrying out taxable transactions in general. The existence of active transactions in the Member State concerned therefore constitutes the determining factor for exclusion of recourse to the Eighth Directive. Similarly, the Court has held that the term ‘transactions’ used in the phrase ‘from which business transactions are effected’ can affect only output transactions.

90. In that regard, it should be noted that national legislation that is restrictive from the point of view of Article 56 TFEU is also capable of limiting the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter. Likewise, the Court has already held that an unjustified or disproportionate restriction of the freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU is also not permitted under Article 52(1) of the Charter, in relation to Article 17 thereof ( Pfleger and Others , C‑390/12, EU:C:2014:281, paragraphs 57 and 59).

59. As the Advocate General states in points 63 to 70 of her Opinion, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, an unjustified or disproportionate restriction of the freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU is also not permitted under Article 52(1) of the Charter in relation to Articles 15 to 17 of the Charter.

52. It must, however, be recalled that, before making that judgment, the court which has jurisdiction must take into consideration the reasons for the decision of non-return and the evidence on which it is based (judgment in Povse , C‑211/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:400, paragraph 59).

40 Article 9(2) of Annex I to the Agreement establishes a specific rule intended to provide the employed person and the members of his family with the same tax concessions and welfare benefits as those available to national employed persons and members of their families. With regard to tax concessions, the Court has previously held that the principle of equal treatment, laid down in that provision, may also be relied on by a worker who is a national of a contracting party and has exercised his right to freedom of movement, with regard to his State of origin (judgment of 19 November 2015, Bukovansky, C‑241/14, EU:C:2015:766, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

36. In this regard, it should be noted that Article 9 of Annex I to the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, entitled ‘Equal treatment’, provides, in paragraph 2, a specific rule intended to provide the employed person and the members of his family with the same tax concessions and welfare benefits as those available to national employed persons and members of their families. In that context, it should be recalled that the Court has held that, with regard to tax concessions, the principle of equal treatment, laid down in that provision, may also be claimed by a worker who is a national of a Contracting Party, having exercised his right to free movement, with regard to his State of origin (see, to that effect, judgment in Ettwein , C‑425/11, EU:C:2013:121, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited and paragraphs 42 and 43).

63 Consequently, even in a case involving an earlier mark of weak distinctive character, the General Court may hold that there is a likelihood of confusion on account, in particular, of a similarity between the signs and between the goods or services covered (see, in particular, orders of 2 October 2014, Przedsiębiorstwo Handlowe Medox Lepiarz v OHIM, C‑91/14 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2261, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited, and of 7 May 2015, Adler Modemärkte v OHIM, C‑343/14 P, not published, EU:C:2015:310, paragraph 59).

48. First, as regards the interpretation of t he expression ‘on unlawful introduction’ of goods into the customs territory of the Community, in Article 202 and point (d) of the first paragraph of Article 233 of the Customs Code, it should be noted, first of all, that the unlawful introduction is completed at the moment at which the goods go beyond the first customs office situated inside that territory without those goods having been presented there (Case C‑459/07 Elshani [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 25).

25. It follows, as the Commission of the European Communities correctly contends, that the unlawful introduction of goods is completed at the moment at which those goods go beyond the first customs office situated inside the customs territory of the Community without those goods having been presented there.

34 In Case C-373/90 X [1992] ECR I-131, paragraphs 15 and 16, in which Directive 84/450 was in point, the Court held, inter alia, that it was for the national court to ascertain in the circumstances of the particular case and bearing in mind the consumers to which the advertising was addressed, whether advertising describing cars as new despite the fact that they had been registered for the purposes of importation, without ever having been driven on a road, could be misleading in so far as, on the one hand, it sought to conceal the fact that the cars advertised as new were registered before importation and, on the other hand, that fact would have deterred a significant number of consumers from making a purchase. The Court also held that advertising regarding the lower prices of the cars could be held to be misleading only if it were established that the decision to buy on the part of a significant number of consumers to whom the advertising in question was addressed was made in ignorance of the fact that the lower price of the vehicles was matched by a smaller number of accessories on the cars sold by the parallel importer.

47 In that regard, it should be observed that the principle of equality of arms is a corollary of the very concept of a fair hearing, which implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent, the harm caused by that imbalance having as a general rule to be proved by the person who suffered it (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 November 2012 in Otis and Others, C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraphs 71 and 72, and 17 July 2014 in Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García, C‑169/14, EU:C:2014:2099, paragraph 49).

49. It is settled case-law that the principle of equality of arms, together with, among others, the principle audi alteram partem , is no more than a corollary of the very concept of a fair hearing that implies an obligation to offer each party a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case in conditions that do not place it in a clearly less advantageous position compared with its opponent (see the judgment in Sweden v API and Commission , C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541, paragraph 88).

46. In this regard, in the absence of harmonisation of the national mechanisms for recovery of uncontested claims, the rules implementing national order for payment procedures are a matter for the national legal order, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States, on condition, however, that they are no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and do not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred on consumers by European Union law (principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, Mostaza Claro , paragraph 24, and Asturcom Telecomunicaciones , paragraph 38).

12 The Court considered that the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements was not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the meaning of Dassonville (Case 8/74 [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5), so long as those provisions applied to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affected in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States (paragraph 16).

15 HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT AN AGREEMENT MERELY AUTHORIZES THE CONCESSIONAIRE TO EXPLOIT SUCH A NATIONAL RULE OR DOES NOT PROHIBIT HIM FROM DOING SO, DOES NOT SUFFICE, IN ITSELF, TO RENDER THE AGREEMENT NULL AND VOID .

81. As regards the arguments put forward by the appellant in support of its second ground of appeal, it should be noted at the outset that the Court of First Instance was correct in finding at paragraph 71 of the judgment under appeal that failure to comply with the 10-day period prescribed in Article 20(5) of the basic regulation can result in annulment of the contested regulation only where there is a possibility that, due to that irregularity, the administrative procedure could have resulted in a different outcome and thus in fact adversely affected the applicant’s rights of defence (see, to that effect, Case 30/78 Distillers Company v Commission [1980] ECR 2229, paragraph 26; Case C‑142/87 Belgium v Commission, ‘Tubemeuse’ [1990] ECR I‑959, paragraph 48; and Case C‑194/99 P Thyssen Stahl v Commission [2003] ECR I‑10821, paragraph 31).

81. The project must also be adopted in detail, that is to say, in a sufficiently precise and definitive manner, so that the legislative act adopting the project must include, like a development consent, following their consideration by the legislature, all the elements of the project relevant to the environmental impact assessment (see WWF and Others , paragraph 59; Boxus and Others , paragraph 39; and Solvay and Others , paragraph 33). The legislative act must therefore demonstrate that the objectives of Directive 85/337 have been achieved as regards the project in question (see Linster , paragraph 56; Boxus and Others , paragraph 39; and Solvay and Others , paragraph 33).

39. The project must also be adopted in detail, that is to say, in a sufficiently precise and definitive manner, so that the legislative act adopting the project must include, like a development consent, following their consideration by the legislature, all the elements of the project relevant to the environmental impact assessment (see WWF and Others , paragraph 59). The legislative act must therefore demonstrate that the objectives of Directive 85/337 have been achieved as regards the project in question (see Linster , paragraph 56).

28. According to settled case-law, all measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of that freedom must be regarded as obstacles (see Case C‑55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I‑4165, paragraph 37, and Case C‑442/02 CaixaBank France [2004] ECR I‑8961, paragraph 11).

30 In Case 258/83 Brennero v Wendel [1984] ECR 3971, paragraph 15, it held that under the general scheme of the Convention and in the light of one of its principal objectives, namely to simplify procedures in the State in which enforcement is sought, that provision cannot be extended so as to enable an appeal in cassation to be lodged against a judgment other than that given on the appeal, such as a preliminary or interlocutory order requiring preliminary inquiries to be made.

15 THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 37 PROVIDES THAT THE JUDGMENT GIVEN ON THE APPEAL MAY BE CONTESTED ONLY BY AN APPEAL IN CASSATION AND , IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY , BY A RECHTSBESCHWERDE . UNDER THE GENERAL SCHEME OF THE CONVENTION , AND IN THE LIGHT OF ONE OF ITS PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES WHICH IS TO SIMPLIFY PROCEDURES IN THE STATE IN WHICH ENFORCEMENT IS SOUGHT , THAT PROVISION CANNOT BE EXTENDED SO AS TO ENABLE AN APPEAL IN CASSATION TO BE LODGED AGAINST A JUDGMENT OTHER THAN THAT GIVEN ON THE APPEAL , FOR INSTANCE AGAINST A PRELIMINARY OR INTERLOCUTORY ORDER REQUIRING PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES TO BE MADE .

43. The principle of fiscal neutrality cannot extend the scope of reduced rates of VAT to the supply of electronic books (see, to that effect, judgment in Zimmermann , C‑174/11, EU:C:2012:716, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). Point 6 of Annex III to the VAT Directive is not a provision which, unequivocally, extends the scope of reduced rates of VAT to the supply of electronic books. On the contrary, as is clear from paragraph 49 above, such a supply is not covered by that provision.

17 As regards, in particular, the argument based on the fact that the delay at issue resulted, inter alia, from the fact that the State and the autonomous communities have concurrent powers, it must be pointed out that, according to settled case-law, a State may not plead provisions and practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive (Case C-259/94 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-1947, paragraph 5).

5 According to the settled case-law of the Court (see, for example, the judgment in Case C-147/94 Commission v Spain [1995] ECR I-0000, at paragraph 5), a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive.

33 That provision implies that neither an initial entitlement, nor a continued entitlement, to the benefits, pensions or allowances referred to in the provision may be denied on the sole ground that the person concerned does not reside within the territory of the Member State in which the institution responsible for payment is situated (Joined Cases 379/85 to 381/85 and 93/86 Caisse Régionale d'Assurance Maladie Rhône-Alpes and Others v Giletti and Others [1987] ECR 955, paragraph 17).

37. According to settled case-law, while the Member States are required to provide legal remedies enabling the annulment of a decision of a contracting authority which infringes the law relating to public contracts, they are entitled in the light of the objective of rapidity pursued by Directive 89/665 to couple that type of review with reasonable limitation periods for bringing proceedings, so as to prevent the candidates and tenderers from being able, at any moment, to invoke infringements of that legislation, thus obliging the contracting authority to restart the entire procedure in order to correct such infringements (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C-470/99 Universale-Bau and Others [2002] ECR I-11617, paragraphs 74 to 78; Santex , paragraphs 51 and 52; Case C-241/06 Lämmerzahl [2007] ECR I‑8415, paragraphs 50 and 51; and Case C-406/08 Uniplex (UK) [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 38).

51. In particular, the Court noted that, whilst it is for the internal legal order of each Member State to establish time-limits in respect of the remedies intended to protect rights conferred by Community law on candidates and tenderers harmed by decisions of contracting authorities, those time-limits must not compromise the effectiveness of Directive 89/665, which seeks to guarantee that unlawful decisions of contracting authorities can be subjected to effective review which is as swift as possible (Universale-Bau , paragraphs 71, 72 and 74).

110. It is clear from the case-law of the Court (see, in particular, San Giorgio , paragraph 14; Dilexport , paragraphs 48, 52 and 54; and Michaïlidis , paragraphs 36 and 37) that the authority cannot merely establish that the charge was passed on to third parties and presume from that fact alone, or from the fact that the national legislation requires that the charge be incorporated in the selling price to consumers, that the economic burden which the charge represented for the taxable person is neutralised and that, consequently, repayment would automatically entail unjust enrichment of the trader.

38. That case-law, which was developed in relation to three-dimensional trade marks consisting of the appearance of the product itself, also applies where, as in the present case, the trade mark applied for is a figurative mark consisting of the two-dimensional representation of that product. In such a case, the mark likewise does not consist of a sign unrelated to the appearance of the products it covers ( Storck v OHIM , paragraph 29).

29. That case-law, which was developed in relation to three-dimensional trade marks consisting of the appearance of the product itself, also applies where, as in the present case, the trade mark applied for is a figurative mark consisting of the two-dimensional representation of that product. In such a case, the mark likewise does not consist of a sign unrelated to the appearance of the products it covers.

257. It follows from those principles that, subject to compliance with the upper limit provided for in that decision, which refers to total turnover (see Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 119), it is permissible for the Commission to take account of the turnover of the undertaking concerned in order to assess the gravity of the infringement when determining the amount of the fine, but that disproportionate importance must not be attributed to that turnover by comparison with other relevant factors.

28. The Court has specified that the relevance of that criterion was also confirmed by the International Convention on the simplification and harmonisation of customs procedures (Kyoto Convention), several annexes to which were accepted on behalf of the Community by Council Decision 77/415/EEC of 3 June 1977 (OJ 1977 L 166, p. 1 and 3), and the notes of which in relation to Rule 3 of Annex D.1 state that in practice the substantial processing criterion can be expressed by the ad valorem percentage rule, where either the percentage value of the materials utilised or the percentage of the value added reaches a specified level ( Brother International , paragraph 21).

21 The relevance of that criterion is moreover confirmed by the Kyoto Convention the notes of which in relation to Rule 3 of Annex D.1 state that in practice the substantial transformation criterion can be expressed by the ad valorem percentage rule, where either the percentage value of the materials utilized or the percentage of the value added reaches a specified level .

51. Since the derogations available under the derogating provisions in question are optional, European Union law does not require Member States to implement them in domestic law. In order to exercise the option provided for by those provisions to derogate, in certain circumstances, from the requirements laid down, inter alia, in Article 5 of the Working Time Directives, the Member States are required to make a choice to rely on it (see, by analogy, Case C‑102/08 SALIX Grundstücks‑Vermietungsgesellschaft [2009] ECR I‑4629, paragraphs 51, 52 and 55).

83 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

78. The Member States must not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with European Union law but also make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of an instrument of secondary legislation which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by the legal order of the European Union (see Parliament v Council , paragraph 105, and Detiček , paragraph 34).

24 As the Court stated in the context of the interpretation of the free-trade Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation signed in Brussels on 22 July 1972 and concluded and approved on behalf of the Community by virtue of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2840/72 of 19 December 1972 (OJ, English Special Edition 1972 (31 December) L 300, p. 286), which contains a Protocol 3 similar to that appended to the EEC-Austria Agreement, the determination of the origin of goods is based on a division of powers between the customs authorities of the parties to the Agreement inasmuch as origin is established by the authorities of the exporting State and the proper working of that system is monitored jointly by the authorities concerned on both sides (Case 218/83 Les Rapides Savoyards [1984] ECR 3105, paragraph 26).

85 So, in considering whether Article 100a was the proper legal basis, the Court must verify whether the measure whose validity is at issue in fact pursues the objectives stated by the Community legislature (see, in particular, Spain v Council, cited above, paragraphs 25 to 41, and Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-2405, paragraphs 10 to 21).

18 The Directive provides for the compulsory participation by all credit institutions in guarantee schemes providing cover up to ECU 20 000 for the aggregate deposits of each depositor with a credit institution in the event of deposits' being unavailable. Moreover the deposit-guarantee systems introduced by a Member State in accordance with Article 3(1) of the Directive are to cover depositors in branches set up by credit institutions in other Member States.

44. It should be added that, on the assumption that a Member State decides to adopt measures allowing the award of punitive damages to the person who has suffered discrimination, it is for the national legal system of each Member State to set the criteria for determining the extent of the penalty, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are respected (see, by analogy, judgments in Manfredi and Others , C‑295/04 to C‑298/04, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 92; Donau Chemie and Others , C‑536/11, EU:C:2013:366, paragraphs 25 to 27; and Hirmann , C‑174/12, EU:C:2013:856, paragraph 40).

32 It follows that the owner of a trade mark protected by the legislation of a Member State cannot rely on that legislation in order to oppose the importation or marketing of a product which was put on the market in another Member State by him or with his consent (see, in particular, Case 16/74 Centrafarm v Winthrop [1974] ECR 1183, paragraphs 7 to 11; HAG II, paragraph 12; and IHT Internationale Heiztechnik, paragraphs 33 and 34).

34 So, application of a national law which would give the trade-mark owner in the importing State the right to oppose the marketing of products which have been put into circulation in the exporting State by him or with his consent is precluded as contrary to Articles 30 and 36. This principle, known as the exhaustion of rights, applies where the owner of the trade mark in the importing State and the owner of the trade mark in the exporting State are the same or where, even if they are separate persons, they are economically linked. A number of situations are covered: products put into circulation by the same undertaking, by a licensee, by a parent company, by a subsidiary of the same group, or by an exclusive distributor.

32 It emerges from the case-law of the Court (see in particular the judgment in Case 250/85 Brother v Council cited above, at paragraph 18) that the purpose of constructing the normal value is to determine the selling price of a product as it would be if that product were sold in its country of origin or in the exporting country and consequently it is the expenses relating to sales on the domestic market which must be taken into account, even if that product is not sold there but is sold for export. Accordingly it must be held that the institutions were right to refuse to use data relating to a market other than the domestic market of the country of origin or exporting country.

53 In the present case, insofar as the Kingdom of Sweden has concluded double-taxation conventions with other Member States, there is no fiscal coherence in relation to any one taxpayer in establishing a strict correlation between the deferral of capital gains tax and the final taxation of the gain. Coherence is at another level, namely, the reciprocity of the rules applicable in the Contracting States in terms of the convention on the basis of connecting factors for the purposes of apportioning competence in tax matters. This the Member States remain free to determine in the absence of Community measures, as here (see, inter alia, Case C-80/94 Wielockx [1995] ECR I-2493, paragraph 24, and Saint Gobain ZN, cited above, paragraph 57).

24 As the Advocate General observed in point 54 of his Opinion, the effect of double-taxation conventions which, like the one referred to above, follow the OECD model is that the State taxes all pensions received by residents in its territory, whatever the State in which the contributions were paid, but, conversely, waives the right to tax pensions received abroad even if they derive from contributions paid in its territory which it treated as deductible. Fiscal cohesion has not therefore been established in relation to one and the same person by a strict correlation between the deductibility of contributions and the taxation of pensions but is shifted to another level, that of the reciprocity of the rules applicable in the Contracting States.

79 Moreover, it must be borne in mind, as the Court has consistently held, that when national courts apply domestic law, they are bound to interpret it, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of Directive 2008/48 in order to achieve the result sought by the directive and consequently comply with the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU. This obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law is inherent in the system of the FEU Treaty, since it permits national courts, for the matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when they determine the disputes before them (see, by analogy, judgment of 24 January 2012 in Dominguez, C‑282/10, EU:C:2012:33, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

65. A commitment of that type arises from Article 11 of the 1957 Agreement, as amended by the Exchange of Notes of 29 January and 13 March 1992 and by Article 6 of the 1978 Protocol. The Kingdom of the Netherlands has maintained that commitment despite the renegotiation of the 1957 Agreement which led to the Exchange of Notes of October 1992. By proceeding in that way, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has thus infringed the exclusive external competence of the Community which results from Article 1(3) of Regulation No 2409/92 (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark , paragraphs 97 to 100; Commission v Sweden , paragraphs 93 to 96; Commission v Finland , paragraphs 98 to 101; Commission v Belgium , paragraphs 110 to 113; Commission v Luxembourg , paragraphs 103 to 106; Commission v Austria , paragraphs 112 to 115, and Commission v Germany , paragraphs 123 to 126).

124 It follows from those provisions, taken together, that Regulation No 2409/92 has, indirectly but definitely, prohibited air carriers of non-member countries which operate in the Community from introducing new products or fares lower than the ones existing for identical products. By proceeding in that way, the Community legislature has limited the freedom of those carriers to set fares and rates, where they operate on intra-Community routes by virtue of the fifth-freedom rights which they enjoy. Accordingly, to the extent indicated in Article 1(3) of Regulation No 2409/92, the Community has acquired exclusive competence to enter into commitments with non-member countries relating to that limitation on the freedom of non-Community carriers to set fares and rates.

38. In that connection it should be noted that under Article 234 EC, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, when ruling on the interpretation or validity of Community provisions, the Court is empowered to do so only on the basis of the facts which the national court puts before it (see Case C-435/97 WWF and Others [1999] ECR I-5613, paragraph 31, and judgments cited).

24. In order to determine whether a single complex transaction, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is to be classified as a supply of goods or as a supply of services, it is necessary to identify its predominant elements (see, inter alia, Faaborg-Gelting Linien , paragraphs 12 and 14; Levob Verzekeringen and OV Bank , paragraph 27; and Aktiebolaget NN , paragraph 27). In that regard, it is clear from the case-law that a service must be regarded as ancillary to a principal service if it constitutes for customers not an aim in itself, but a means of better enjoying the principal service supplied (see Aktiebolaget NN , paragraph 28).

12 In order to determine whether such transactions constitute supplies of goods or supplies of services, regard must be had to all the circumstances in which the transaction in question takes place in order to identify its characteristic features.

14 However, in the context of the judicial cooperation established by Article 177 of the Treaty, the Court has the duty, inter alia, to interpret all provisions of Community law which national courts need in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts (see the judgment in Case C-280/91 Viessmann [1993] ECR I-971, paragraph 17).

33. Moreover, as is evident from recitals 2 and 12 in the preamble thereto, the purpose of Directive 2003/6 is to protect the integrity of the European Union financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in those markets. That confidence depends on, inter alia, investors being placed on an equal footing and protected against the improper use of insider information (see, to that effect, Case C-45/08 Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck [2009] ECR I-12073, paragraph 47, and Case C-445/09 IMC Securities [2011] ECR I-5917, paragraph 27).

27. In that respect, it should be noted that the purpose of Directive 2003/6 – as is reiterated, in particular, in recitals 2 and 12 in the preamble thereto – is to protect the integrity of EU financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in those markets. That confidence depends on, inter alia, investors being placed on an equal footing and protected against the improper use of insider information and price manipulations (see, to that effect, Case C‑45/08 Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 47).

38. As regards the level of domination of a specific market by the undertaking concerned necessary to establish the existence of abuse by that undertaking, it is clear from paragraph 79 of TeliaSonera that the dominant position referred to in Article 102 TFEU relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors and its customers.

28. In that respect, it is settled case-law that the rule of jurisdiction in Article 5(3) of that regulation is based on the existence of a particularly close connection between the dispute and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur, which justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons of the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings ( Melzer EU:C:2013:305, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

26. In that connection, according to settled case-law, the rule of special jurisdiction laid down in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 is based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur, which justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings (see, to that effect, Zuid‑Chemie , paragraph 24, and eDate Advertising and Others , paragraph 40).

40. As the Court has consistently held (see, in particular, Case C-360/87 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I-791, paragraph 13), Member States must, in order to secure the full implementation of directives in law and not only in fact, establish a specific legal framework in the area in question.

22. According to settled case-law of the Court, in the interpretation of a provision of EU law, account must be taken not only of its wording but also of the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part, and if appropriate of the origins of those rules (see, to that effect, judgments in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council , C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 50; Koushkaki , C‑84/12, EU:C:2013:862, paragraph 34; and Bouman , C‑114/13, EU:C:2015:81, paragraph 31).

34. In this connection, it is apparent from the Court’s settled case‑law that, in interpreting a provision of European Union law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (Case C‑466/07 Klarenberg [2009] ECR I‑803, paragraph 37, and Case C‑11/12 Maatschap L.A. en D.A.B. Langestraat en P. Langestraat-Troost [2012] ECR, paragraph 27).

21 The Court of Justice points out that the ECSC Treaty has provided two legal remedies enabling the Community' s liability to be put in issue and that it had already held that the existence of the specific provisions of Article 34 cannot debar an undertaking which regards itself as having suffered direct harm by reason of a Community decision which has not been declared void from seeking a declaration that the Community is liable on the basis of the first paragraph of Article 40. Nothing in the wording of that provision or in its general structure makes it possible to restrict its field of application solely to cases in which the issue does not relate to the illegality of decisions (judgment in Joined Cases C-363/88 and 364/88 Finsider and Falck v Commission [1992] ECR I-359, paragraphs 15 and 16).

63 Nevertheless, as such exceptions depart from the principle of the widest possible public access to documents, they must be interpreted and applied strictly (judgments of 18 December 2007, Sweden v Commission, C‑64/05 P, EU:C:2007:802, paragraph 66, and of 21 July 2011, Sweden v MyTravel and Commission, C‑506/08 P, EU:C:2011:496, paragraph 75).

66. On this point, it should be recalled, first, that in view of the objectives pursued by Regulation No 1049/2001, in particular the fact noted in recital 2 in the preamble that the public right of access to the documents of the institutions is connected with the democratic nature of those institutions and the fact that, as stated in recital 4 in the preamble and in Article 1, the purpose of the regulation is to give the public the widest possible right of access, the exceptions to that right set out in Article 4 of the regulation must be interpreted and applied strictly (see, to that effect, in relation to the legislation prior to Regulation No 1049/2001, Joined Cases C‑174/98 P and C‑189/98 P Netherlands and van der Wal v Commission [2000] ECR I‑1, paragraph 27; Council v Hautala , paragraphs 24 and 25; and, with reference to Regulation No 1049/2001, Case C‑266/05 P Sison v Council [2007] ECR I‑1233, paragraph 63).

82. It is common ground that the Cross Lough area was identified in both IBA 89 and IBA 2000 as being one of the most suitable areas for conservation of the sandwich tern, a species referred to in Annex I, according to the ornithological criteria drawn up in 1984 and 1995 respectively. It must accordingly be held that the area has featured among the most suitable areas for conservation of that species since 6 April 1981. Consequently, pursuant to the case-law resulting from the judgment in Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 62, Ireland should have classified that area as an SPA.

23. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the fact that the parties to the main action did not raise a point of European Union law before the referring court does not preclude the latter from bringing the matter before the Court of Justice. In providing that a request for a preliminary ruling may be submitted to the Court where ‘a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a member state’, the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU are not intended to restrict this procedure exclusively to cases where one or other of the parties to the main action has taken the initiative of raising a point concerning the interpretation or the validity of European Union law, but also extend to cases where a question of this kind is raised by the court or tribunal itself, which considers that a decision thereon by the Court of Justice is ‘necessary to enable it to give judgment’ (Case 126/80 Salonia [1981] ECR 1563, paragraph 7, and judgment of 8 March 2012 in Case C-251/11 Huet , paragraph 23).

23. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the fact that the parties to the main action did not raise a point of European Union law before the referring court does not preclude the latter from bringing the matter before the Court of Justice. In providing that a reference for a preliminary ruling may be submitted to the Court where ‘a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a member state’, the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU are not intended to restrict this procedure exclusively to cases where one or other of the parties to the main action has taken the initiative of raising a point concerning the interpretation or the validity of European Union law, but also extend to cases where a question of this kind is raised by the court or tribunal itself, which considers that a decision thereon by the Court of Justice is ‘necessary to enable it to give judgment’ (Case 126/80 Salonia [1981] ECR 1563, paragraph 7).

73 To answer the second question, it must be examined, first, whether the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty allows national legislation to take the value of a new vehicle as the basis for determining the taxable value of an imported used vehicle.

84 Finally, so far as concerns the measures required by the Commission but which are not provided for by the legislation in force, it need only be observed that Article 8(1) of Regulation No 729/70, which defines the principles according to which the Community and the Member States must ensure the implementation of Community decisions on agricultural intervention financed by the EAGGF and combat fraud and irregularities in relation to those operations (see Joined Cases 146/81, 192/81 and 193/81 BayWa, cited above, paragraph 13), imposes on the Member States the general obligation to take the measures necessary to satisfy themselves that the transactions financed by the EAGGF are actually carried out and are executed correctly, even if the specific Community act does not expressly provide for the adoption of particular supervisory measures (see Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission [1990] ECR I-2321, paragraphs 16 and 17).

16 In that connection, it should be emphasized that, even if the Community rules mentioned above do not expressly require Member States to introduce supervisory measures and inspection procedures such as those mentioned by the Commission, nevertheless that obligation may be implied from the fact that, under the rules in question, it is for the Member States to apply the arrangements for the premiums in issue and to organize a system of inspection and supervision .

56 It follows that essential provisions of the Wild Birds Directive, such as those of the second and third sentences of Article 7(4), have not in any event been completely, clearly and unambiguously transposed into the French rules (see, to that effect, Case 262/85 Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 39).

38. In the present case, while if there is disagreement between the parties over the legal basis actually used by the Council to adopt the contested decision, it is clearly apparent from the wording of that decision that it is based on Article 8(3) of Decision 2005/387 (see by analogy, judgment in Parliament v Council , C‑317/13 and C‑679/13, EU:C:2015:223, paragraphs 28 to 31).

28. It must be noted that those decisions do not refer to Article 34 EU and that in their recital they refer expressly to the FEU Treaty and to Article 8(3) of Decision 2005/387 as the legal bases.

22 A Member State may restrict such activities and the relevant professional training to men or to women, as appropriate. In such a case, as is clear from Article 9(2) of the Directive, Member States have a duty to assess periodically the activities concerned in order to decide whether, in the light of social developments, the derogation from the general scheme of the Directive may still be maintained (Johnston, paragraph 37, and Sirdar, paragraph 25).

53. It should first be borne in mind that the Community institutions have a wide discretion in the application of Article 109 of the OCT Decision (see, to that effect, Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission [1999] ECR I-769, paragraph 48, Case C‑110/97 Netherlands v Council [2001] ECR I‑8763, paragraph 61, and Case C‑301/97 Netherlands v Council [2001] ECR I‑8853, paragraph 73).

73 It should first be borne in mind that it is apparent from the Court's case-law that the Community institutions have been given a wide discretion in the application of Article 109 of the OCT Decision (see, to that effect, Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 48).

52. Moreover, Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38 requires that the family member of the Union citizen moving to or residing in a Member State other than that of which he is a national should accompany or join him, in order to be a beneficiary of the directive (see judgment in Iida , C‑40/11, EU:C:2012:691, paragraph 61).

71 It follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice, however, that the taking into account, by virtue of the principle of equal treatment, of differences between the undertakings that have participated in a single cartel (in particular with regard to the geographic scope of their respective involvement) for the purpose of assessing the gravity of an infringement need not necessarily occur when the multipliers for the ‘gravity of the infringement’ and for the ‘additional amount’ are set but may occur at another stage in the setting of the fine, such as when the basic amount of the fine is adjusted in the light of mitigating and aggravating circumstances under points 28 and 29 of the 2006 Guidelines (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 2013, Gosselin Group v Commission, C‑429/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:463, paragraphs 96 to 100, and of 11 July 2013, Team Relocations and Others v Commission, C‑444/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:464, paragraphs 104 and 105).

100. En effet, premièrement, conformément à la jurisprudence rappelée au point 90 du présent arrêt, le Tribunal a bien analysé la gravité de l’infraction telle qu’elle avait été commise par Gosselin ainsi que la pertinence, aux fins de l’octroi éventuel du bénéfice de circonstances atténuantes, du comportement individuellement adopté par celle-ci dans l’entente. Il convient, en particulier, de relever à cet égard que, tout en constatant, au point 182 de l’arrêt attaqué, que le point 29 des lignes directrices pour le calcul des amendes ne prévoyait pas expressément que le comportement dont cette société se prévalait puisse constituer une circonstance atténuante, le Tribunal a cependant apprécié si les circonstances particulières de l’espèce n’appelaient pas néanmoins une réduction de l’amende infligée à cette dernière, se conformant ainsi pleinement à la jurisprudence susmentionnée.

29. In that regard, the Court has stated not only that the place where the alleged dam age occurred within the meaning of that provision may vary according to the nature of the right allegedly infringed, but also that the likelihood of damage occurring in a particular Member State is subject to the condition that the right whose infringement is alleged is protected in that Member State (see judgment in Pinckney , EU:C:2013:635, paragraphs 32 and 33).

49 The rest of the case-law referred to by KCH is not decisive. In most of the cases referred to, the penalty is examined in the light of the principle of proportionality rather than the principle `nulla poena sine culpa' (cases cited above, Thyssen v Commission, paragraphs 18 to 22; Schumacher, paragraphs 25 to 31; Cereol Italia, paragraphs 13 to 27; National Farmers' Union and Others, paragraphs 49 to 55; and Molkereigenossenschaft Wiedergeltingen, paragraphs 33 to 45). As for the judgment in Estel v Commission, in paragraphs 38 to 43 of which the Court held that a steel company penalised by the Commission for having exceeded the production quota imposed on it had committed an error which was not excusable and that, accordingly, the Commission had not breached the principle `nulla poena sine culpa', that judgment was delivered in an area far removed from agricultural regulations and without the Court ruling explicitly on whether the penalty in question was of a criminal nature or not.

18 HOWEVER , THE COURT MUST CONSIDER WHETHER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE JUSTIFY THE AMOUNT OF THE FINE IMPOSED BY THE COMMISSION . IN THAT RESPECT , IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THE APPLICANT PLEADS A BREACH OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY , ON THE GROUND THAT THE COMMISSION IMPOSED A FINE EXCLUSIVELY ON THE BASIS OF AN ARITHMETICAL CALCULATION OF THE QUANTITY PRODUCED IN EXCESS OF THE QUOTA WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE .

23 Photographs are expressly referred to in subheading 49.11 B of the Common Customs Tariff . This subheading does not draw any distinction according to whether or not the photographs are of an artistic nature, and the Court has held ( in its judgment in Case 23/77 Westfaelischer Kunstverein, cited above, paragraph 5 ) that it is a residual heading which covers all artistic printed matter not listed or referred to in any other heading of the Common Customs Tariff .

39 Nevertheless, according to settled case-law, in determining the scope of any derogation from an individual right such as the equal treatment of men and women laid down by the Directive, due regard must be had to the principle of proportionality, which requires that derogations must remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the aim in view and that the principle of equal treatment be reconciled as far as possible with the requirements of the aim thus pursued (Johnston, paragraph 38; Sirdar, paragraph 26, and Kreil, paragraph 23).

38 IL CONVIENT DE RAPPELER EN OUTRE QUE , EN DETERMINANT LA PORTEE DE TOUTE DEROGATION A UN DROIT INDIVIDUEL , TEL QUE L ' EGALITE DE TRAITEMENT ENTRE HOMMES ET FEMMES , CONSACREE PAR LA DIRECTIVE , IL FAUT RESPECTER LE PRINCIPE DE PROPORTIONNALITE , QUI FAIT PARTIE DES PRINCIPES GENERAUX DU DROIT QUI SONT A LA BASE DE L ' ORDRE JURIDIQUE COMMUNAUTAIRE . CE PRINCIPE EXIGE QUE LES DEROGATIONS NE DEPASSENT PAS LES LIMITES DE CE QUI EST APPROPRIE ET NECESSAIRE POUR ATTEINDRE LE BUT RECHERCHE ET IL EXIGE DE CONCILIER , DANS TOUTE LA MESURE DU POSSIBLE , LE PRINCIPE D ' EGALITE DE TRAITEMENT AVEC LES EXIGENCES DE LA SECURITE PUBLIQUE QUI SONT DETERMINANTES POUR LES CONDITIONS D ' EXERCICE DE L ' ACTIVITE EN QUESTION .

37. As regards the review of legality, the Court has pointed out that the European Union judicature must carry it out on the basis of the evidence adduced by the applicant in support of the pleas in law put forward and that it cannot use the Commission’s margin of discretion – either as regards the choice of factors taken into account in the application of the criteria mentioned in the 1998 Guidelines or as regards the assessment of those factors – as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth review of the law and of the facts ( Chalkor v Commission , paragraph 62).

82. The first point to note is that it is ultimately for the national court, which has sole jurisdiction to assess the facts and interpret the national legislation, to determine whether and to what extent a legislative provision which, though applying independently of the sex of the worker, actually affects a considerably higher percentage of women than men is justified by objective reasons unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex (see, inter alia, Case 171/88 Rinner-Kühn [1989] ECR 2743, paragraph 15, and Seymour-Smith and Perez , paragraph 67).

67 In that respect, the first point to note is that it is ultimately for the national court, which has sole jurisdiction to assess the facts and interpret the national legislation, to determine whether and to what extent a legislative provision, which, though applying independently of the sex of the worker, actually affects a considerably higher percentage of women than men, is justified by objective reasons unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex (Case 171/88 Rinner-Kühn [1989] ECR 2743, paragraph 15).

44. Similarly, by systematically exempting works and development programmes and projects which are subject to a declaratory scheme from the procedure for assessing their implications for the site, a Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive (see, to that effect, Case C-241/08 Commission v France , paragraph 62).

70 Next, it must be examined whether such an act of reproduction was carried out for the purposes of making ‘citations’. In that regard, Article 20(1)(c) of Regulation No 6/2002 makes no reference to the law of the Member States on the concept of ‘citations’. However, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope normally to be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the EU; that interpretation must take into account not only the wording of the provision but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, judgments of 3 September 2014, Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds, C‑201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, paragraph 14, and of 10 December 2015, Lazar, C‑350/14, EU:C:2015:802, paragraph 21).

21. As a preliminary point, it must be noted, first, that, as regards the interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment in in Kásler and Káslerné Rábai , C‑26/13, EU:C:2014:282, paragraph 37). In accordance with settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment in Lanigan , C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

43. In considering that complaint, it must be borne in mind that each of the grounds for refusal to register listed in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 40/94 must be interpreted in the light of the public interest underlying them ( Henkel v OHIM , paragraph 45, and Case C‑173/04 P Deutsche SiSi-Werke v OHIM [2006] ECR I‑551, paragraph 59). The interest underlying Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation No 40/94 is to prevent trade mark law granting an undertaking a monopoly on technical solutions or functional characteristics of a product (see by analogy, with regard to the second indent of Article 3(1)(e) of Directive 89/104, Philips , paragraph 78, and Joined Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01 Linde and Others [2003] ECR I‑3161, paragraph 72).

32. However, the Court has also held that, in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court (see, to that effect, PreussenElektra , cited above, paragraph 39). The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in preliminary ruling proceedings requires the national court for its part to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to contribute to the administration of justice in the Member States and not to give opinions on general or hypothetical questions (Bosman , paragraph 60; Der Weduwe , paragraph 32, and Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins , paragraph 42).

60 Nevertheless, the Court has taken the view that, in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction, it should examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court. The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in the preliminary-ruling procedure requires the national court, for its part, to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to assist in the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions (see, inter alia, Case C-83/91 Meilicke v ADV/ORGA [1992] ECR I-4871, paragraph 25).

26 The Court stated, last, that the fact that a separate price for the alleged financial service is identified as such in the contract document and itemised separately in the invoices issued to customers is not of itself decisive, the Court holding that the fact that a single price is invoiced, or that separate prices were contractually stipulated, has no decisive significance for the purposes of determining whether it is necessary to find that there are two or more distinct transactions or only a single economic transaction (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 December 2010, Everything Everywhere, C‑276/09, EU:C:2010:730, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

48. However, if those traders can foresee the adoption of the Community measure which affects their interests, the benefit of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations cannot be invoked (Case C‑22/94 Irish Farmers Association and Others [1997] ECR I‑1809, paragraph 25, and Di Lenardo and Dilexport , cited above, paragraph 70).

70. Any trader on the part of whom an institution has promoted reasonable expectations may rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. However, if a prudent and circumspect trader could have foreseen that the adoption of a Community measure is likely to affect his interests, he cannot plead that principle if the measure is adopted (Case 265/85 Van den Bergh en Jurgens and Van Dijk Food Products v Commission [1987] ECR 1155, paragraph 44, and Case C-22/94 Irish Farmers Association and Others [1997] ECR I-1809, paragraph 25). Furthermore, while the principle of protection of legitimate expectations is one of the fundamental principles of the Community, traders are not justified in having a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by the Community institutions in the exercise of their discretionary power will be maintained, particularly in an area such as that of the common organisation of the markets, the objective of which involves constant adjustment to reflect changes in economic circumstances (see, in particular, Case C-104/97 P Atlanta v European Community [1999] ECR I-6983, paragraph 52).

24. As regards, in particular, termination of contracts, Article 17(1) of the directive requires Member States to put in place a mechanism for providing compensation to the commercial agent allowing them to choose between two options, either an indemnity determined according to the criteria set out in Article 17(2) or compensation according to the criteria set out in Article 17(3), namely, the system of compensation for damage (see, to that effect, judgments in Honyvem Informazioni Commerciali , C‑465/04, EU:C:2006:199, paragraph 20; Semen , C‑348/07, EU:C:2009:195, paragraph 15, and Unamar , C‑184/12, EU:C:2013:663, paragraph 40).

85. In this respect, the Court has had occasion to rule that the exception in the first paragraph of Article 45 EC does not extend to certain activities that are auxiliary or preparatory to the exercise of official authority (see, to that effect, Thijssen , paragraph 22; Commission v Spain , paragraph 38; Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti , paragraph 47; Commission v Germany , paragraph 38; and Commission v Portugal , paragraph 36), or to certain activities whose exercise, although involving contacts, even regular and organic, with the administrative or judicial authorities, or indeed cooperation, even compulsory, in their functioning, leaves their discretionary and decision-making powers intact (see, to that effect, Reyners , paragraphs 51 and 53), or to certain activities which do not involve the exercise of decision-making powers (see, to that effect, Thijssen , paragraphs 21 and 22; Case C‑393/05 Commission v Austria , paragraphs 36 and 42; Commission v Germany , paragraphs 38 and 44; and Commission v Portugal , paragraphs 36 and 41), powers of constraint (see, to that effect, inter alia, Commission v Spain , paragraph 37) or powers of coercion (see, to that effect, Case C‑47/02 Anker and Others [2003] ECR I‑10447, paragraph 61, and Commission v Portugal , paragraph 44).

38. Thus, according to settled case-law, derogation under those articles must be restricted to activities which, in themselves, are directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority (see Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti , cited above, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited), which excludes from being regarded as connected with the exercise of official authority, within the meaning of that derogation, functions that are merely auxiliary and preparatory vis-à-vis an entity which effectively exercises official authority by taking the final decision ( Thijssen , cited above, paragraph 22).

20 Article 33 of the Sixth Directive accordingly permits a Member State to maintain or introduce taxes, duties or charges on the supply of goods, the provision of services or imports only if they cannot be characterised as turnover taxes (see Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR 1343, paragraph 10).

24. It is settled case-law that the right to a refund of taxes levied by a Member State in breach of rules of EU law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by provisions of EU law prohibiting such taxes, as interpreted by the Court. The Member States are therefore in principle required to repay taxes levied in breach of EU law (judgments in Littlewoods Retail and Ot hers , C‑591/10, EU:C:2012:478, paragraph 24; Irimie , C‑565/11, EU:C:2013:250, paragraph 20; and Nicula , C‑331/13, EU:C:2014:2285, paragraph 27).

27. It is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court that the right to a refund of taxes levied by a Member State in breach of rules of EU law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on individuals by provisions of EU law prohibiting such taxes, as interpreted by the Court. A Member State is therefore in principle required to repay charges levied in breach of EU law (judgments in Littlewoods Retail and Others , C‑591/10, EU:C:2012:478, paragraph 24, and Irimie , C‑565/11, EU:C:2013:250, paragraph 20).

35. Accordingly, it is the Court’s established case-law that the freedom to provide services conferred by Article 56 TFEU on Member State nationals, and thus on European Union citizens, includes ‘passive’ freedom to provide services, namely the freedom for recipients of services to go to another Member State in order to receive a service there, without being hindered by restrictions ( Luisi and Carbone , paragraph 16; Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR 195, paragraph 15; Bickel and Franz , paragraph 15; Case C-348/96 Calfa [1999] ECR I-11, paragraph 16; and Case C‑215/03 Oulane [2005] ECR I‑1215, paragraph 37).

41 In the first place, if the declaration raises questions and if the Member States cannot reach agreement, in particular regarding the classification of laws or schemes within the scope of Regulations Nos 1408/71 and 883/2004, they may turn to the Administrative Commission, mentioned in Articles 80 and 81 of Regulation No 1408/71 and in Articles 71 and 72 of Regulation No 883/2004. In the second place, if that commission does not succeed in reconciling the points of view of the Member States on the question of the legislation applicable in the case in point, it is, where appropriate, for the Member State doubting the correctness of a declaration by another Member State to tell the Commission or, as a last resort, bring proceedings under Article 259 TFEU in order for the Court to examine, in the context of those proceedings, the question of the applicable legislation (see, to that effect, judgment in Banks and Others, EU:C:2000:169, paragraph 44).

44 Should the institutions concerned not reach agreement on, in particular, the question how the particular facts of a specific case are to be assessed and consequently on the question whether that case is covered by Article 14a(1)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71, it is open to them to refer the matter to the Administrative Commission (Fitzwilliam Executive Search, paragraph 57).

70. It should be observed that while guidelines such as those in the notices published by the Commission may indeed contribute to ensuring the transparency, predictability and legal certainty of that institution’s actions, it nevertheless remains the fact that exercise of the power conferred on the Court by Article 228(2) EC is not subject to the condition that the Commission adopts such rules, which in any event cannot bind the Court (see, in particular, Case C‑304/02 Commission v France , paragraph 85). That applies inter alia to the scale for the coefficient relating to the duration of the infringement and the criteria for determining that coefficient.

29. It follows that, if a public authority becomes a minority shareholder in a company limited by shares with wholly public capital for the purpose of awarding the management of a public service to that company, the control that the public authorities which are members of that company exercise over it may be categorised as similar to the control they exercise over their own departments when it is exercised by those authorities jointly ( Sea , paragraph 63).

63. It follows that, if a public authority becomes a minority shareholder in a company limited by shares with wholly public capital for the purpose of awarding the management of a public service to that company, the control that the public authorities which are members of that company exercise over it may be classified as similar to the control they exercise over their own departments when it is exercised by those authorities jointly.

20. The Court has already ruled that, in so far as Directive 93/42 constitutes a harmonisation measure adopted pursuant to Article 100a of the EEC Treaty (which became Article 100a of the EC Treaty; now, after amendment, Article 95 EC), it is intended to promote the free movement of medical devices which have been certified as being in compliance with that directive, precisely by replacing the various measures which have been taken in this field in the Member States, and which may amount to an obstacle to that free movement (Case C‑6/05 Medipac-Kazantzidis [2007] ECR I‑4557, paragraph 51).

38 In that regard, it should be borne in mind, first, that, pursuant to Article 168A of the EC Treaty (now Article 225 EC) and the first paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal may rely only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts. The appraisal by the Court of First Instance of the evidence put before it does not constitute, save where the clear sense of that evidence has been distorted, a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraphs 10 and 42).

10 It should be pointed out, before considering Hilti' s pleas, that the Court of Justice has consistently held that pursuant to Article 168A of the EEC Treaty and Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC an appeal may rely only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts (see, in particular, the judgments in Case C-283/90 P Vidrányi v Commission [1991] ECR I-4339, paragraph 12, and in Case C-346/90 P F. v Commission [1992] ECR I-2691, paragraph 7). The first plea

21. The Court has ruled previously that, in so far as the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings prohibits – under penalty of criminal sanction – the pursuit of activities in the betting and gaming sector without a licence or police authorisation issued by the State, it constitutes a restriction on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services ( Placanica and Others , paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

18 The Court has consistently held that the incompatibility of provisions of national law with provisions of the Treaty, even those directly applicable, can be definitively eliminated only by means of binding domestic provisions having the same legal force as those which require to be amended. Mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of a Member State' s obligations under the Treaty, since they maintain, for the persons concerned, a state of uncertainty as regards the extent of their rights as guaranteed by the Treaty (see in particular Case C-80/92 Commission v Belgium [1994] ECR I-1019, paragraph 20, and in Case C-307/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR I-2903, paragraph 13).

20 Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that, as the Court has consistently held, mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of a Member State' s obligations under the Treaty (see the judgment in Case C-381/92 Commission v Ireland [1994] ECR I-0000, at paragraph 7).

93. This conclusion is all the more compelling where the national legislation justifying the renewal of fixed-term contracts in cases of temporary replacement also pursues objectives recognised as being legitimate social policy objectives. As is clear from paragraph 87 of this judgment, the concept of ‘objective reason’ in clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement encompasses the pursuit of such objectives. Measures intended, inter alia, to offer protection for pregnancy and maternity and to enable men and women to reconcile their professional and family obligations pursue legitimate social policy objectives (see judgment in Kücük , EU:C:2012:39, paragraphs 32 and 33 and the case-law cited).

97 In that connection, it is important to emphasise first that the principle laid down in Article 3(1) of Decision No 3/80, prohibiting all discrimination based on nationality in the field covered by that decision, means that a Turkish national to whom that decision applies must be treated in the same way as nationals of the host Member State, so that the legislation of that Member State cannot impose upon such a Turkish national more or stricter conditions than those applicable to its own nationals (see, by analogy, Case 186/87 Cowan v Trésor Public [1989] ECR 195, paragraph 10, Kziber, paragraph 28, and Hallouzi-Choho, paragraphs 35 and 36, both cited above).

36 Accordingly, that principle requires that, in awarding social security benefits, the competent authorities of the Member State concerned must treat persons covered by Article 41(1) of the Agreement in the same way as nationals of that State, so that the national legislation at issue cannot impose upon those persons more or stricter conditions than those applicable to nationals of that Member State.

17 In that connection, it must be observed that, under Article 168a of the EC Treaty and Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, there is a right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law only, and the grounds on which the appeal lies include infringement of Community law by the Court of First Instance (see to that effect Case C-136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraph 47).

19. The Court has held that in order to classify a domestic tax measure as ‘selective’, it is necessary to begin by identifying and examining the common or ‘normal’ tax regime applicable in the Member State concerned. It is in relation to this common or ‘normal’ tax regime that it is necessary, secondly, to assess and determine whether any advantage granted by the tax measure at issue may be selective by demonstrating that the measure derogates from that common regime inasmuch as it differentiates between economic operators who, in light of the objective assigned to the tax system of the Member State concerned, are in a comparable factual and legal situation (see Joined Cases C‑78/08 to C‑80/08 Paint Graphos and Others [2011] ECR I‑7611, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

49. In order to classify a domestic tax measure as ‘selective’, it is necessary to begin by identifying and examining the common or ‘normal’ regime applicable in the Member State concerned. It is in relation to this common or ‘normal’ tax regime that it is necessary, secondly, to assess and determine whether any advantage granted by the tax measure at issue may be selective by demonstrating that the measure derogates from that common regime inasmuch as it differentiates between economic operators who, in light of the objective assigned to the tax system of the Member State concerned, are in a comparable factual and legal situation (see, to that effect, Case C‑88/03 Portugal v Commission [2006] ECR I‑7115, paragraph 56).

57. In the first of those cases, as submitted by the Czech Government and is apparent from the case‑law cited at paragraph 45 above, if Italian domestic law precludes the application of the 1986 agreement and the collective agreements at issue in the main proceedings, the Working Time Directives cannot, in themselves, be relied on against individuals to ensure such application (see also, by analogy, Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò v X [1987] ECR 2545, paragraphs 19 and 20; Joined Cases C‑387/02, C‑391/02 and C‑403/02 Berlusconi and Others [2005] ECR I‑3565, paragraphs 73 and 74; and Case C‑321/05 Kofoed [2007] ECR I‑5795, paragraph 42 and the case‑law cited).

26. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 39; Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/94 Cipolla and Others [2006] ECR I-11421, paragraph 25; Magoora , paragraph 23; and Mono Car Styling , paragraph 28).

39 Nevertheless, the Court has also stated that, in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court, in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction (see, to that effect, Case 244/80 Foglia [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 21). The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Bosman, paragraph 61; Case C-36/99 Idéal Tourisme [2000] ECR I-6049, paragraph 20; Case C-322/98 Kachelmann [2000] ECR I-7505, paragraph 17).

30. The Italian Government having, on various occasions, stressed that it is clear from national case‑law that agreements such as the agreements at issue must be classified as service concessions, it must be noted as a preliminary point that the definition of a public service contract is a matter of Community law, with the result that the classification of the agreements at issue under Italian law is irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether they fall within the scope of Directive 92/50 (see, to that effect, Case C‑264/03 Commission v France [2005] ECR I‑8831, paragraph 36, and Case C‑220/05 Auroux and Others [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 40).

55 Secondly, as regards whether the issue of a mobile call termination fees authorisation would affect trade between the Member States within the meaning of Article 7(3)(b) of the Framework Directive, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, a measure proposed by an NRA has such an effect on trade between Member States, within the meaning of that provision, if it may have, other than in an insignificant manner, an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on that trade (see, to that effect, judgment in Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej and Telefonia Dialog, C‑3/14, EU:C:2015:232, paragraphs 49 to 54 and 59). Recital 38 in the preamble to the Framework Directive states, moreover, that measures which may affect trade between Member States include, inter alia, measures which affect prices for users in other Member States.

49. Neither the Framework Directive nor the Specific Directives contains any definition of the notion of ‘affect[ing] trade between Member States’ for the purpose of Article 7(3)(b) of the Framework Directive. However, recital 38 in the preamble to that directive states that measures that could affect trade between Member States are measures that may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States in a manner which might create a barrier to the single market.

27. The first point to be noted is that it is not for the Court, in proceedings brought under Article 234 EC, to rule on the compatibility of national legislation with EU law. However, the Court does have jurisdiction to provide the national court with all the criteria for the interpretation of EU law necessary to enable that court to rule on such compatibility (see Case C‑414/02 Spedition Ulustrans [2004] ECR I‑8633, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

86. However, where the difference is of minor importance, appropriate labelling should be sufficient to provide the purchaser or consumer with the necessary information (see, inter alia , Case C-269/89 Bonfait [1990] ECR I-4169, paragraph 15; Case C-383/97 van der Laan [1999] ECR I-731, paragraph 24; Geffroy , paragraph 23; and Guimont , paragraph 31).

31 However, where the difference is of minor importance, appropriate labelling should be sufficient to provide the purchaser or consumer with the necessary information (Geffroy, paragraph 23).

68. In this respect, it must be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction to find the facts, save where a substantive inaccuracy in those findings is attributable to the documents submitted to it, and to appraise those facts. That appraisal thus does not, save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice in an appeal (see, inter alia, Case C‑470/00 P Parliament v Ripa di Meana and Others [2004] ECR I‑4167, paragraph 40, and the case‑law cited).

32. In that connection, the reference date which must be used for assessing whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations under Article 260(1) TFEU is that of the expiry of the period prescribed in the letter of formal notice issued under that provision (Case C‑610/10 Commission v Spain [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 67, and Case C‑241/11 Commission v Czech Republic [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 23). Where, however, the proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations were commenced on the basis of Article 228(2) EC, the reference date for assessing whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations is the date of expiry of the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion issued before entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, that is, December 2009 (see, to that effect, Case C‑496/09 Commission v Italy [2011] ECR I‑11483, paragraph 27).

67. As Article 260(2) TFEU removed from infringement proceedings the stage relating to the issuing of a reasoned opinion, as has been pointed out in paragraph 43 above, the reference date which must be used for assessing whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations is that of the expiry of the period prescribed in the letter of formal notice issued under that provision.

25. It follows that the fact of exempting all categories of establishments which engage in such lending from the obligation laid down in Article 5(1) of the directive would deprive authors of remuneration with which they could recoup their investments, with inevitable repercussions for the creation of new works (see Metronome Musik , paragraph 24). In those circumstances, a transposition of the directive that resulted in such an exemption for all categories of establishments would go directly against the objective of that directive.

38. In that context, Article 3 of Directive 98/5 undertakes a complete harmonisation of the preliminary conditions required for the exercise of the right of establishment conferred by that directive, providing that a lawyer who wishes to practise in a Member State other than that in which he obtained his professional qualification is obliged to register with the competent authority in that Member State, which must effect that registration ‘upon presentation of a certificate attesting to his registration with the competent authority of the home Member State’ (see, to that effect, Commission v Luxembourg , EU:C:2006:588, paragraphs 35 and 36, and Wilson , EU:C:2006:587, paragraphs 65 and 66).

35. In that context, Article 3 of Directive 98/5 provides that a lawyer who wishes to practise in a Member State other than that in which he obtained his professional qualification must register with the competent authority in that State, which must register him ‘upon presentation of a certificate attesting to his registration with the competent authority in the home Member State’.

42. The Court has already expressly held that providing security is less of a restriction on the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services than is the setting of a minimum share capital to ensure the protection of creditors ( Commission v Portugal , paragraph 55).

26. Both the notes which head the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the HS are important means of ensuring the uniform application of the tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (Joined Cases C‑362/07 and C‑363/07 Kip Europe and Others [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 27).

27. Both the notes which head the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the SH are important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see Case C‑11/93 Siemens Nixdorf [1994] ECR I‑1945, paragraph 12; Case C‑382/95 Techex [1997] ECR I‑7363, paragraph 12; Case C-339/98 Peacock [2000] ECR I-8947, paragraph 10; and Olicom , paragraph 17).

106. Compte tenu des éléments qui précèdent, il convient de constater que la procédure suivie devant le Tribunal a violé l’article 47, deuxième alinéa, de la Charte en ce qu’elle a méconnu les exigences liées au respect du délai de jugement raisonnable, ce qui constitue une violation suffisamment caractérisée d’une règle de droit ayant pour objet de conférer des droits aux particuliers (arrêt du 4 juillet 2000, Bergaderm et Goupil/Commission, C‑352/98 P, Rec. p. I‑5291, point 42).

27. In that connection, it must be recalled that the obligation of a Member State to take all the measures necessary to achieve the result prescribed by a directive is a binding obligation imposed by the third paragraph of Article 249 EC and by the directive itself (Case C-129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie [1997] ECR I-7411, paragraph 40).

40 It should be recalled at the outset that the obligation of a Member State to take all the measures necessary to achieve the result prescribed by a directive is a binding obligation imposed by the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty and by the directive itself (Case 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1977] ECR 113, paragraph 22; Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 48, and Case 72/95 Kraaijeveld and Others v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland [1996] ECR I-5403, paragraph 55). That duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, is binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (see Case C-106/89 Marleasing v Comercial Internacional de Alimentación [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8, and Kraaijeveld, cited above, paragraph 55).

28 However, when exercising that power the Federal Republic of Germany must comply with the rules of the Treaty, in particular those relating to freedom of movement for workers (see Case C-18/95 Terhoeve v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Particulieren/Ondernemingen Buitenland [1999] ECR I-345, paragraphs 34 and 35).

72 As regards restrictive measures, without going so far as to require a detailed response to the comments made by the person concerned, the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU entails in all circumstances, not least when the reasons stated for the EU measure represent reasons stated by an international body, that that statement of reasons identifies the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities consider that the person concerned must be subject to restrictive measures. The Courts of the European Union must, therefore, in particular determine whether the reasons relied on are sufficiently detailed and specific (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 116 and 118, and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 76).

118. The Courts of the European Union must, further, determine whether the competent European Union authority has complied with the procedural safeguards set out in paragraphs 111 to 114 of this judgment and the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU, as mentioned in paragraph 116 of this judgment, and, in particular, whether the reasons relied on are sufficiently detailed and specific.

64. According to that judgment, the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements, within the Member State of importation, is not such as to hinder trade between Member States so long as, first, those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and, secondly, they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States. The reason is that the application of such provisions is not such as to prevent access by the latter products to the market of the Member State of importation or to impede such access more than it impedes access by domestic products (Case C‑384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] ECR I‑1141, paragraph 37).

81. Although it is for the Commission, under Article 258 TFEU, to establish the existence of a failure to fulfil obligations, the Member States are none the less required, under Article 4(3) TEU, to facilitate the achievement of the Commission’s task of ensuring that the treaties and secondary legislation are applied. It follows that where the Commission has adduced sufficient evidence of certain matters in the territory of the defendant Member State, it is for that State to challenge in substance and in detail the information thus produced (see, to that effect, Case C‑365/97 Commission v Italy (‘San Rocco’) [1999] ECR I‑7773, paragraphs 84 to 86).

86 Since in the present case those investigations were ordered by the Ministry of the Environment, it is for the Italian Republic to challenge in substance and in detail the data produced by the Commission and to show that the conditions laid down in Article 2(1)(b)(iv) of the directive were met in the present case, that is to say, that only waste waters were discharged into the San Rocco valley.

20 The Court concluded (see Kziber, paragraph 23, and Yousfi, paragraph 17) that the provision was of direct effect, so that persons to whom it applied were entitled to rely on it before national courts. The scope of Article 41(1) of the Agreement

66 Article 6(3) of Directive 92/43 establishes a procedure, involving prior examination, that is founded on a stringent authorisation criterion which, incorporating the precautionary principle, makes it possible to prevent in an effective manner adverse effects on the integrity of protected sites due to the plans or projects envisaged, since that criterion obliges the competent national authorities to refuse authorisation for a plan or project where doubts remain as to the absence of adverse effects of those plans or projects on the integrity of such sites (see to that effect, in particular, judgments of 7 September 2004, Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging, C‑127/02, EU:C:2004:482, paragraphs 57 and 58, and of 14 January 2016, Grüne Liga Sachsen and Others, C‑399/14, EU:C:2016:10, paragraph 48).

57. So, where doubt remains as to the absence of adverse effects on the integrity of the site linked to the plan or project being considered, the competent authority will have to refuse authorisation.

47. The Court has stated that that approach is intended to apply only if there is a valid point of reference (see judgment in Specht and Others , C‑501/12 to C‑506/12, EU:C:2014:2005, paragraph 96). That is so in the case in the main proceedings.

32 Secondly, the Court has previously held that in respect of the value which must be substituted for the transaction value, Article 181a of the implementing regulation merely states that the customs authorities ‘need not determine the customs valuation … on the basis of the transaction value method’ but does not specify what other value is to be substituted for the transaction value in such a case (judgment of 28 February 2008 in Carboni e derivati, C263/06, EU:C:2008:128, paragraph 55).

55. Article 181a of the implementing regulation merely states that the customs authorities ‘need not determine the customs valuation … on the basis of the transaction value method’ but does not specify what other value is to be substituted for the transaction value in such a case.

17. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the need to provide an interpretation of EU law which will be of use to the referring court requires that court to define the factual and legislative context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, to explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based (see Case C‑380/05 Centro Europa 7 [2008] ECR I‑349, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited, and Case C‑384/08 Attanasio Group [2010] ECR I‑2055, paragraph 32).

80 Nor can an economic operator claim an acquired right or even a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by decisions taken by the Community institutions within the limits of their discretionary power will be maintained (Case 52/81 Faust v Commission [1982] ECR 3745, paragraph 27), especially if the existing situation is contrary to the rules of the common market.

27 THAT COMPLAINT MUST ALSO BE REJECTED . SINCE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS ENJOY A MARGIN OF DISCRETION IN THE CHOICE OF THE MEANS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE THEIR POLICIES , TRADERS ARE UNABLE TO CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION THAT AN EXISTING SITUATION WHICH IS CAPABLE OF BEING ALTERED BY DECISIONS TAKEN BY THOSE INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THEIR DISCRETIONARY POWER WILL BE MAINTAINED . IN THE PRESENT CASE , THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF A BREACH OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION , PARTICULARLY SINCE THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO ON 3 APRIL 1978 BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND THE PEOPLE ' S REPUBLIC OF CHINA , PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF 11 MAY 1978 ( OFFICIAL JOURNAL 1978 , L 123 , P . 2 ) WAS OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO ALERT TRADERS TO AN IMMINENT CHANGE OF DIRECTION IN THE COMMUNITY ' S COMMERCIAL POLICY AND , IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF THE COMMUNITY TO ACCORD EQUAL TREATMENT TO NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES , NO INFORMED TRADER WAS ENTITLED TO EXPECT THAT PATTERS OF TRADE EXISTING WHEN THE PROTECTIVE MEASURES WERE ADOPTED WOULD BE RESPECTED .

19. The documents to which the applicant refers are essentially of a political nature and cannot constitute an independent source of rights or obligations. The case-law shows that neither individual statements of position nor joint declarations of the Member States may be used for the purpose of interpreting a provision where their content is not reflected in its wording, and they therefore have no legal significance (see, in particular, Joined Cases C‑197/94 and C‑252/94 Bautiaa and Société française maritime [1996] ECR I‑505, paragraph 51, and Case C‑233/97 KappAhl [1998] ECR I‑8069, paragraph 23).

52 In that regard, it must be recalled that the fact that such a service is provided by electronic means, and in particular the fact that the transmission of the settlement file entails the automatic triggering of the payments or transfers under consideration, cannot alter the nature of the service provided and, therefore, does not affect the application of the exemption at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 June 1997, SDC, C‑2/95, EU:C:1997:278, paragraph 37).

37 It must be stated in regard to this point that the specific manner in which the service is performed, electronically, automatically or manually, does not affect the application of the exemption. The provisions in question make no distinction in this regard. Accordingly, the mere fact that a service is performed entirely by electronic means does not in itself prevent the exemption from applying to that service. If, on the other hand, the service entails only technical and electronic assistance to the person performing the essential, specific functions for the transactions covered by points 3 and 5 of Article 13B(d), it does not fulfil the conditions for exemption. That conclusion follows, however, from the nature of the service and not from the way in which it is performed.

17 The effect which an agreement might have on trade between Member States is to be appraised in particular by reference to the position and the importance of the parties on the market for the products concerned (Case 99/79 Lancôme and Cosparfrance Nederland v Etos [1980] ECR I-2511, paragraph 24). Thus, even an agreement imposing absolute territorial protection may escape the prohibition laid down in Article 85 if it affects the market only insignificantly, regard being had to the weak position of the persons concerned on the market in the products in question (Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique Diffusion Française and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 85).

18 On this point, it suffices to note that it is for the national court to determine whether, from the point of view of the national rules applicable to orders such as those sought in the main proceedings, the dispute before it is to be resolved on the basis of Article 36 of the Treaty or of Directive 89/104, Article 7 of which regulates the question of exhaustion of trade mark rights in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community. However, Article 7 of that directive, like Article 36 of the Treaty, is intended to reconcile the fundamental interest in protecting trade mark rights with the fundamental interest in the free movement of goods within the common market, so that those two provisions, which aim to achieve the same result, must be interpreted in the same way (Joined Cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others v Paranova [1996] ECR I-3457, paragraph 40; Joined Cases C-71/94, C-72/94 and C-73/94 Eurim-Pharm v Beiersdorf and Others [1996] ECR I-3603, paragraph 27, and Case C-232/94 MPA Pharma v Rhône-Poulenc Pharma [1996] ECR I-3671, paragraph 13). The questions

13 Next, as stated in the judgment of the Court today in Joined Cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others v Paranova, paragraph 40, Article 7 of the directive, like Article 36 of the Treaty, is intended to reconcile the fundamental interest in protecting trade mark rights with the fundamental interest in the free movement of goods within the common market, so that those two provisions, which pursue the same result, must be interpreted in the same way.

35. Second, EU law must be interpreted in the light of the relevant rules of international law, since international law is part of the European Union legal order and is binding on the institutions (see, to that effect, judgment in Racke , C‑162/96, EU:C:1998:293, paragraphs 45 and 46, and Kadi et Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission , C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 291).

39 By way of preliminary point, the Court proceeds on the assumption that, the court competent to adjudicate on the substance being the Tribunale di Bari, the Landgericht Koblenz did not by its judgment of 17 November 1998 exceed the limits, as interpreted by the Court, of the jurisdiction which it derived from Article 24 of the Brussels Convention (see Case C-391/95 Van Uden [1998] ECR I-7091, paragraphs 37 to 47, and Case C-99/96 Mietz [1999] ECR I-2277, paragraphs 42, 46 and 47).

42 In contrast, in the case of a judgment delivered solely by virtue of the jurisdiction provided for under Article 24 of the Convention and ordering interim payment of a contractual consideration, the Court ruled in Van Uden that such a judgment does not constitute a provisional measure within the meaning of Article 24 unless, first, repayment to the defendant of the sum awarded is guaranteed if the plaintiff is unsuccessful as regards the substance of his claim and, second, the measure ordered relates only to specific assets of the defendant located or to be located within the confines of the territorial jurisdiction of the court to which application is made.

48 The Commission supports the views set out by the German Government. In its opinion, the inspections in question are not regulated in a restrictive sense by Community law. Nor does Community law specify who is to bear the costs. For that reason, Member States may pass those costs on to the traders involved, within the limits set by the Court in its judgment in Denkavit. As those limits were not exceeded in this case, according to the findings made by the national court, the costs at issue are compatible with Regulations No 1624/76 and No 1725/79. In order not to fall within the category of charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties, however, charges must, in the Commission' s view, satisfy the conditions laid down by the Court in paragraph 8 of its judgment in Case 18/87 Commission v Germany [1988] ECR 5427, that is to say, they must be prescribed by Community law in the general interest of the Community, they must be obligatory and uniform for all the products concerned and they must not exceed the actual costs of the inspections in connection with which they are charged. The Commission considers that those conditions are satisfied in this case.