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30. Second, as regards the provisions of the Treaty concerning the free movement of capital, it is true that the Court has, in paragraphs 20 to 22 of its judgment in Lenz , held that, in so far as the taxation of income from capital at a definitive tax rate of 25% or at a rate reduced by half is subject, under the national legislation, to a condition that the source of that income is in Austria, the legislation not only has the effect of deterring taxpayers living in Austria from investing their capital in companies established outside that Member State, but also produces a restrictive effect in relation to those companies, inasmuch as it constitutes an obstacle to their raising capital within Austria. According to the Court, such legislation constitutes a restriction on the free movement of capital which is, in principle, prohibited by Article 56(1) EC.

20. In this case, the tax legislation at issue has the effect of deterring taxpayers living in Austria from investing their capital in companies established in another Member State. The legislation allows such a taxpayer, in respect of the taxation of his domestic revenue from capital, to choose between definitive taxation at the fixed rate of 25% and ordinary income tax at a rate reduced by half, whereas his revenue from capital originating in another Member State is subject to the application of ordinary income tax, the rate of which may be as much as 50%.

54. According to the Court’s case-law, social security benefits must be regarded, irrespective of characteristics peculiar to the various national laws, as being of the same kind when their purpose and object together with the basis on which they are calculated and the conditions for granting them are identical. On the other hand, characteristics which are purely formal cannot be regarded as relevant criteria for the purpose of classifying benefits (see, inter alia, Case 171/82 Valentini EU:C:1983:189, paragraph 13, and Case C‑102/91 Knoch EU:C:1992:303, paragraph 40).

42. According to settled case-law, the concept of ‘grounds’ for the purposes of Clause 5.1(a) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work must be understood as referring to precise and concrete circumstances characterising a given activity, which are therefore capable, in that particular context, of justifying the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts. Those circumstances may result, in particular, from the specific nature of the tasks to be performed under such contracts and from the inherent characteristics of those tasks or, as the case may be, from pursuit of a legitimate social-policy objective of a Member State (Case C-212/04 Adeneler and Others [2006] ECR I‑6057, paragraphs 69 and 70, and Case C‑307/05 Del Cerro Alonso [2007] ECR I‑7109, paragraph 53).

53. The Court held that that concept of ‘objective reasons’ must be understood as referring to precise and concrete circumstances characterising a given activity, which are therefore capable, in that particular context, of justifying the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts. Those circumstances may result, in particular, from the specific nature of the tasks for the performance of which such contracts have been concluded and from the inherent characteristics of those tasks or, as the case may be, from pursuit of a legitimate social-policy objective of a Member State ( Adeneler and Others , paragraphs 69 and 70).

32 The first observation to be made is that although, as Community law stands at present, direct taxation does not as such fall within the purview of the Community, the powers retained by the Member States must be exercised consistently with Community law (see inter alia Case C-279/93 Finanzamt Köln - Altstadt v Roland Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225, paragraph 21).

62. As to the Commission’s argument that European Union law does not provide for the exhaustion of the distribution right in the case of services, it must be recalled that the objective of the principle of the exhaustion of the right of distribution of works protected by copyright is, in order to avoid partitioning of markets, to limit restrictions of the distribution of those works to what is necessary to safeguard the specific subject-matter of the intellectual property concerned (see, to that effect, Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik [1998] ECR I-1953, paragraph 14; Case C-61/97 FDV [1998] ECR I-5171, paragraph 13; and Football Association Premier League and Others , paragraph 106).

14 That principle is expressed in the settled case-law of the Court of Justice according to which, whilst Article 36 of the EC Treaty allows derogations from the fundamental principle of the free movement of goods by reason of rights recognised by national legislation in relation to the protection of industrial and commercial property, such derogations are allowed only to the extent to which they are justified by the fact that they safeguard the rights which constitute the specific subject-matter of that property. However, the exclusive right guaranteed by the legislation of a Member State on industrial and commercial property is exhausted when a product has been lawfully distributed on the market in another Member State by the actual proprietor of the right or with his consent (see in particular Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80 Musik-Vertrieb Membran and K-tel International v GEMA [1981] ECR 147, paragraphs 10 and 15, and Case 58/80 Dansk Supermarked v Imerco [1981] ECR 181, paragraph 11).

35 Moreover, contrary to the Commission’s submissions, the fact that the measure is attributable to the Member State concerned, as established in paragraph 22 above, does not mean that it may be inferred that that Member State exercises a dominant influence over an undertaking in which it is the majority shareholder, within the meaning of the judgment of 16 May 2002, France v Commission (C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraphs 38 and 39). There is nothing in the State’s conduct as legislator to suggest that it exercised such influence in its capacity as majority shareholder in an undertaking.

28. It is clear from paragraphs 43 and 44 of Bronner that, in order to determine whether a product or service is indispensable for enabling an undertaking to carry on business in a particular market, it must be determined whether there are products or services which constitute alternative solutions, even if they are less advantageous, and whether there are technical, legal or economic obstacles capable of making it impossible or at least unreasonably difficult for any undertaking seeking to operate in the market to create, possibly in cooperation with other operators, the alternative products or services. According to paragraph 46 of Bronner , in order to accept the existence of economic obstacles, it must be established, at the very least, that the creation of those products or services is not economically viable for production on a scale comparable to that of the undertaking which controls the existing product or service.

43 In the first place, it is undisputed that other methods of distributing daily newspapers, such as by post and through sale in shops and at kiosks, even though they may be less advantageous for the distribution of certain newspapers, exist and are used by the publishers of those daily newspapers.

42. It is true that, according to the Court’s case‑law relating to public contracts awarded in accordance with all the provisions of the various public procurement directives which preceded the adoption of the Directive, the purpose of the requirement to inform tenderers in advance of the award criteria and, where possible, of their relative weighting, is to ensure that the principles of equal treatment and transparency are complied with (see, inter alia, Case C‑470/99 Universale‑Bau and Others [2002] ECR I‑11617, paragraph 98, and Case C‑331/04 ATI EAC and Viaggi di Maio and Others [2005] ECR I‑10109, paragraphs 22 to 24).

29 Thus, the services provided by an IGP come within the exemption provided for in Article 132(1)(f) of Directive 2006/112 where the provision of those services contributes directly to the exercise of activities in the public interest referred to in Article 132 of that directive (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 October 2016, TMD, C‑412/15, EU:C:2016:738, paragraphs 31 to 33).

33 Having regard to the foregoing, the supply of human blood, including the supply of plasma which is a component of blood, must come under the exemption provided for in Article 132(1)(d) of Directive 2006/112 where that supply contributes directly to activities in the public interest, that is to say, where the plasma supplied is used directly for healthcare or for therapeutic purposes.

25 The second derogation applies to agreements necessary for attainment of the objectives set out in Article 39 of the Treaty. That description implies that it must be demonstrated that the agreement is necessary for attainment of all those objectives (see Case 71/74 Frubo v Commission [1975] ECR 563, paragraphs 24, 25 and 26).

34. According to settled case-law, national measures capable of hindering intra-Community trade may be justified by the objective of protection of the environment and combating fraud provided that the measures in question are proportionate to the aim pursued (see, in particular, Case C‑265/06 Commission v Portugal [2008] ECR I‑2245, paragraph 38; Commission v Luxembourg , paragraph 38; and Case C‑142/05 Mickelsson and Roos [2009] ECR I‑4273, paragraph 32).

32. Furthermore, according to settled case-law, national measures capable of hindering intra-Community trade may be justified by the objective of protection of the environment provided that the measures in question are proportionate to the aim pursued (see Case C-524/07 Commission v Austria [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

24. In that connection, as regards Directive 2003/88, it should be noted that, as the Advocate General maintains in point 29 of his Opinion, that directive makes no reference to the term ‘worker’ as appearing in Directive 89/391, or to the definition of that term under national legislation (see, to that effect, judgment in Union syndicale Solidaires Isère , C‑428/09, EU:C:2010:612, paragraph 27).

63. Pour ce faire, les raisons justificatives susceptibles d’être invoquées par un État membre doivent être accompagnées des preuves appropriées ou d’une analyse de l’aptitude et de la proportionnalité de la mesure restrictive adoptée par cet État, ainsi que des éléments précis permettant d’étayer son argumentation (arrêts du 13 novembre 2003, Lindman, C‑42/02, Rec. p. I‑13519, point 25; du 18 mars 2004, Leichtle, C‑8/02, Rec. p. I‑2641, point 45; du 7 juillet 2005, Commission/Autriche, C‑147/03, Rec. p. I‑5969, point 63; du 16 février 2006, Rockler, C‑137/04, Rec. p. I‑1441, point 25, et Öberg, C‑185/04, Rec. p. I‑1453, point 22, ainsi que du 7 juin 2007, Commission/Belgique, précité, point 36).

45. However, the reasons which may be invoked by a Member State by way of justification must be accompanied by an analysis of the appropriateness and proportionality of the restrictive measure adopted by that State.

87 In that context, it must, however, be noted that, when they set out detailed procedural rules for legal actions intended to ensure the protection of rights conferred by Directive 2000/60, the Member States must ensure compliance with the right to an effective remedy and to a fair hearing, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, which constitutes a reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgment of 27 September 2017, Puškár, C‑73/16, EU:C:2017:725, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

72. Consequently, as regards measures that must be thus adopted during the period between the date of signature of the Treaty of Accession and the date when the accession takes effect, the institutions are fully aware of the imminent accession of new Member States, and the latter have the opportunity to assert their interests where necessary, in particular through the information and consultation procedure (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 39/81, 43/81, 85/81 and 88/81 Halyvourgiki and Helleniki Halyvourgia v Commission [1982] ECR 593, paragraph 10, and Parliament v Council , paragraph 66).

66. Rather, as regards acts that must be thus adopted during the period between the date of signature of the Treaty of Accession and the date when the accession takes effect, the Community institutions are fully aware of the imminent accession of new Member States whilst the latter have the opportunity to assert their interests where necessary, in particular through the information and consultation procedure (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 39/81, 43/81, 85/81 and 88/81 Halyvourgiki and Helleniki Halyvourgia v Commission [1982] ECR 593, paragraph 10).

17. Freedom of establishment, which Article 43 EC grants to Community nationals and which includes the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, under the same conditions as those laid down for its own nationals by the law of the Member State in which such establishment is effected, entails, in accordance with Article 48 EC, for companies formed pursuant to the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the European Community, the right to exercise their activity in the Member State concerned through a subsidiary, a branch or an agency (see, inter alia, Case C‑307/97 Saint‑Gobain ZN [1999] ECR I‑6161, paragraph 35, and Marks & Spencer , paragraph 30).

32. In the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. Moreover, the Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of European Union law which national courts require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts (see, inter alia, Case C‑45/06 Campina [2007] ECR I‑2089, paragraphs 30 and 31; Case C‑243/09 Fuß [2013] ECR, paragraph 39; and Case C-342/12 Worten [2013] ECR, paragraph 30).

30. However, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of European Union law which national courts require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑45/06 Campina [2007] ECR I‑2089, paragraphs 30 and 31, and Case C‑243/09 Fuß [2010] ECR I‑9849, paragraph 39).

114. Il convient de rappeler, à titre liminaire, que l’application d’une astreinte et d’une somme forfaitaire dépend de l’aptitude de chacune à remplir l’objectif poursuivi en fonction des circonstances de l’espèce et que, dans ces conditions, il n’est pas exclu de recourir aux deux types de sanctions prévues (voir arrêt Commission/Grèce, C‑369/07, EU:C:2009:428, point 141)

23. Thus, the exemption of an intra-Community supply in the Member State of departure of the intra-Community dispatch or transport of goods, which has, as its corollary, an intra-Community acquisition that is taxed in the Member State of arrival of the goods dispatched or transported, enables double taxation and, therefore, infringement of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT to be avoided (see, to that effect, Case C‑409/04 Teleos and Others [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 24 and 25).

25. It follows that the exemption of an intra-Community supply corresponding to an intra-Community acquisition enables double taxation and, therefore, infringement of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT, to be avoided. The first and second questions

31 The procedure provided for in Article 234 EC is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts by means of which the former provides the latter with interpretation of such Community law as is necessary for them to give judgment in cases upon which they are called to adjudicate (see Case C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher [1990] ECR I-4003, paragraph 18).

10. It must be pointed out in this regard that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation obtaining in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, judgments of 8 May 2008 in Case C‑233/07 Commission v Portugal , paragraph 31, and 3 September 2009 in Case C‑527/08 Commission v United Kingdom , paragraph 9).

31. Selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé. Les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (arrêt du 25 octobre 2007, Commission/Grèce, C‑440/06, point 16).

32. As regards the interest of that licensee and proprietor in profiting from the rights attached to those marks, it must be pointed out that the sale of composite bottles allows it to realise the economic value of the marks relating to those bottles. The Court has already held that a sale which allows the realisation of the economic value of a mark exhausts the exclusive rights conferred by Directive 89/104 (see, inter alia, Case C‑16/03 Peak Holding [2004] ECR I-11313, paragraph 40).

65. In that regard, according to settled case-law, fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, whose observance the Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories (see, to that effect, Case 44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR 3727, paragraph 15). The ECHR has special significance in that respect (see, among others, Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Commission [2001] ECR I-1611, paragraph 37, and Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, paragraph 25).

15 THE COURT ALSO EMPHASIZED IN THE JUDGMENT CITED , AND LATER IN THE JUDGMENT OF 14 MAY 1974 , NOLD ( 1974 ) ECR 491 , THAT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FORM AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW , THE OBSERVANCE OF WHICH IT ENSURES ; THAT IN SAFEGUARDING THOSE RIGHTS , THE COURT IS BOUND TO DRAW INSPIRATION FROM CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS COMMON TO THE MEMBER STATES , SO THAT MEASURES WHICH ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS RECOGNIZED BY THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THOSE STATES ARE UNACCEPTABLE IN THE COMMUNITY ; AND THAT , SIMILARLY , INTERNATIONAL TREATIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON WHICH THE MEMBER STATES HAVE COLLABORATED OR OF WHICH THEY ARE SIGNATORIES , CAN SUPPLY GUIDELINES WHICH SHOULD BE FOLLOWED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF COMMUNITY LAW . THAT CONCEPTION WAS LATER RECOGNIZED BY THE JOINT DECLARATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT , THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION OF 5 APRIL 1977 , WHICH , AFTER RECALLING THE CASE-LAW OF THE COURT , REFERS ON THE ONE HAND TO THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE MEMBER STATES AND ON THE OTHER HAND TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF 4 NOVEMBER 1950 ( OFFICIAL JOURNAL C 103 , 1977 , P . 1 ).

91 In those circumstances, the fact, even supposing that it were to be established, that some of the activities referred to in paragraph 86 above are not prohibited by international humanitarian law could not be decisive in any event, inasmuch as the application of Common Position 2001/931 and Regulation No 2580/2001 does not depend on classifications stemming from international humanitarian law (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 January 2014, Diakité, C‑285/12, EU:C:2014:39, paragraphs 24 to 26).

61 The Court has held that Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures, including decisions refusing a right of residence to the family members of a Union citizen, which have the effect of depriving Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status (judgments of 8 March 2011, Ruiz Zambrano, C‑34/09, EU:C:2011:124, paragraph 42, and of 6 December 2012, O and Others, C‑356/11 and C‑357/11, EU:C:2012:776, paragraph 45).

45. On that basis the Court has held that Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures, including refusals to grant rights of residence to family members of a Union citizen, which have the effect of denying Union citizens the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by their status (see Ruiz Zambrano , paragraph 42).

66 That conclusion is, moreover, consistent with Article 3(r) and Article 131 of the Treaty, which provide that the Community is to promote the economic and social development of the OCTs, but without that promotion implying an obligation to give them privileged treatment (see Case C-390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 38).

70. In this respect it should be noted that the provisions of Regulation No 1408/71 enacted to give effect to Article 48 TFEU must be interpreted in the light of the objective of that article, which is to contribute to the establishment of the greatest possible freedom of movement for migrant workers (see, inter alia, Case 10/78 Belbouab [1978] ECR 1915, paragraph 5; Jauch , paragraph 20; Hosse , paragraph 24; and Case C‑287/05 Hendrix [2007] ECR I‑6909, paragraph 52).

20 As the Court has consistently held (see, for example, Case 284/84 Spruyt [1986] ECR 685, paragraphs 18 and 19), the provisions of Regulation No 1408/71 adopted to give effect to Article 51 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 42 EC) must be interpreted in the light of the objective of that article, which is to contribute to the establishment of the greatest possible freedom of movement for migrant workers. The aim of Articles 48 and 49 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Articles 39 EC and 40 EC), Article 50 of the EC Treaty (now Article 41 EC) and Article 51 of the Treaty would not be attained if, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom of movement, workers were to lose the social security advantages guaranteed them by the legislation of one Member State, especially where those advantages represent the counterpart of contributions which they have paid.

41. Similarly, in Case C-299/90 Hepp [1991] ECR I-4301, paragraph 20, which concerned a situation in which the customs authorities had included in the customs value of imported goods the buying commission paid by the importer on the basis of a separate invoice, not referred to in the declaration of customs value, the Court held that the net price alone declared by the importer constituted the customs value for the purposes of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1224/80 and that the buying commission was not to be included in that value.

33 It admittedly follows from those considerations that the Union legislature intended that, without being able to call into question observance of the rules of private international law, representation of insurance undertakings under Article 4(5) of Directive 2000/26 includes the duty to allow injured parties validly to bring proceedings before national courts for compensation for damage. In that context, the claims representative’s sufficient powers must include the authority to accept service of judicial documents (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 October 2013, Spedition Welter, C‑306/12, EU:C:2013:650, paragraphs 23 and 24).

24. Excluding that authority would indeed deprive Directive 2009/103 of one of its purposes. As noted by the Advocate General at point 32 of his Opinion, the purpose of the claims representative is specifically, in accordance with Directive 2009/103’s stated aims, to make the steps to be taken by accident victims easier, in particular to allow them to make a claim in their own language. It would therefore be contrary to those objectives to deprive those victims, once the preliminary formalities have been carried out directly with the claims representative, and given that they have a direct right of action against the insurance undertaking, of the possibility of serving judicial documents on that representative in order to bring an action for compensation before the court which has international jurisdiction.

35. According to settled case-law, in an action for failure to fulfil obligations it is for the Commission to prove the allegation that the obligation has not been fulfilled. It is the Commission which must provide the Court with the evidence necessary for the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and it may not rely on any presumption (see, inter alia, Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands [1982] ECR 1791, paragraph 6, and Case C-194/01 Commission v Austria [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 34).

19. In the case of companies, their registered office for the purposes of Article 48 EC serves, in the same way as nationality in the case of individuals, as the connecting factor with the legal system of a State. Acceptance of the proposition that the Member State in which a subsidiary seeks to establish itself may freely apply different treatment merely by reason of the fact that the registered office of its parent company is situated in another Member State would deprive Article 43 EC of all meaning (see, to that effect, Case C‑330/91 Commerzbank [1993] ECR I‑4017, paragraph 13; Metallgesellschaft and Others , paragraph 42; and Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation , paragraph 37). Freedom of establishment thus aims to guarantee the benefit of national treatment in the host Member State, by prohibiting any discrimination based on the place in which companies have their seat (see, to that effect, Saint‑Gobain ZN , paragraph 35, and Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation , paragraph 37).

13 As the Court held in its judgment in Case C-270/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 273, at paragraph 18, the freedom of establishment which Article 52 grants to nationals of a Member State, and which entails the right for them to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the Member State where such establishment is effected, includes, pursuant to Article 58 of the EEC Treaty, the right of companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community to pursue their activities in the Member State concerned through a branch or agency. With regard to companies, it should be noted in this context that it is their seat in the abovementioned sense that serves as the connecting factor within the legal system of a particular State, like nationality in the case of natural persons. In the same judgment the Court held that acceptance of the proposition that the Member State in which a company seeks to establish itself may freely apply to it different treatment solely by reason of the fact that its seat is situated in another Member State would deprive the provision of all meaning.

28 As for the notion of ‘place where the harmful event occurred or may occur’ in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, as the Court has already held, those words are intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it, so that the defendant may be sued, at the option of the applicant, in the courts for either of those places (see in relation to pollution, judgment of 30 November 1976 in Bier, 21/76, EU:C:1976:166, paragraphs 24 and 25; in relation to counterfeiting, judgment of 5 June 2014 in Coty Germany, C‑360/12, EU:C:2014:1318, paragraphs 46; in relation to company directors’ contracts, judgment of 10 September 2015 in Holterman Ferho Exploitatie and Others, C‑47/14, EU:C:2015:574, paragraph 72).

63. Furthermore, the Court has already held that the tax situation of an investment vehicle’s shareholders is irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether or not national legislation is discriminatory when the distinguishing criterion for determining the tax treatment applicable, established by the national legislation at issue, is not the tax situation of the shareholder but solely the status of the investment vehicle, namely whether or not it is resident (see, to this effect, judgment in Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others , C‑338/11 to C‑347/11, EU:C:2012:286, paragraphs 28 and 41).

41. On the other hand, in the cases in the main proceedings, the distinguishing criterion for determining the tax treatment applicable, established by the national legislation at issue, is not the tax situation of the shareholder but solely the status of the UCITS, namely whether or not it is resident.

34 Lastly, it is clear from the judgment in Case C-190/89 Rich [1991] ECR I-3855, at paragraph 26, that if, by virtue of its subject-matter, a dispute falls outside the scope of the Convention, the existence of a preliminary issue which the court must resolve in order to determine the dispute cannot, whatever that issue may be, justify application of the Convention.

37. It must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, where European Union law lacks precision, it is effectively for the Member States, when they transpose a directive, to ensure that it is fully effective, whilst retaining a broad discretion as to the choice of methods (see, inter alia, Case C‑216/05 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I‑10787, paragraph 26).

26. That provision must be interpreted as meaning that Member States have the obligation, when they transpose a directive, to ensure that it is fully effective, whilst retaining a broad discretion as to the choice of methods (see, to that effect, Case C‑208/90 Emmott [1991] ECR I‑4269, paragraph 18).

46. In that judgment, the Court set out the settled case-law, according to which both the notes which head the chapters of the CN and the Explanatory Notes to the WCO Nomenclature are important means of ensuring the uniform application of the common customs tariff and, as such, may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see Siemens Nixdorf , C‑11/93, EU:C:1994:206, paragraph 12, and Kamino International Logistics EU:C:2009:105, paragraph 32).

131. With regard to pensions, it must be noted that, according to the settled case-law of the Court in relation to Article 119 of the Treaty, or, with effect from 1 May 1999, in relation to Article 141 EC, which concern the principle of equal treatment of men and women in relation to pay, the term ‘pay’ within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 141(2) EC covers pensions which depend on the employment relationship between worker and employer, excluding those deriving from a statutory scheme, to the financing of which workers, employers and possibly the public authorities contribute in a measure determined less by the employment relationship than by considerations of social policy (see, in particular, Case 80/70 Defrenne [1971] ECR 445, paragraphs 7 and 8; Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus [1986] ECR 1607, paragraphs 16 to 22; Case C‑262/88 Barber [1990] ECR I‑1889, paragraphs 22 to 28; and Joined Cases C‑4/02 and C‑5/02 Schönheit and Becker [2003] ECR I‑12575, paragraphs 56 to 64).

24 In order to answer the second question, therefore, it is necessary to ascertain whether those considerations also apply to contracted-out private occupational schemes such as that referred to in this case .

29. It follows that a national legislative provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings, insofar as its scope consists solely of providing that, by derogation from the common law, it is possible to renew permits for operating landfills already authorised at the date of entry into force of the waste management plan in the Member State concerned for the same plots of land, even if that land is not included in the plan, cannot, of itself, be regarded as an organised and coherent system for achieving the objectives inherent in a ‘waste management plan’, within the meaning of Article 7(1) of Directive 75/442 (see, to that effect, Case C‑387/97 Commission v Greece EU:C:2000:356, paragraph 76).

32. As regards Eurest’s argument that it dismissed Ms Chacón Navas without reference to the fact that she was absent from work on grounds of sickness because, at that time, her services were no longer necessary, it must be recalled that, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, which are based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, any assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court. Similarly, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C‑326/00 IKA [2003] ECR I‑1703, paragraph 27, and Case C‑145/03 Keller [2005] ECR I‑2529, paragraph 33).

27. However, it should be remembered that, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, which is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, any assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court (see inter alia Case 36/79 Denkavit Futtermittel [1979] ECR 3439, paragraph 12, and Case C-235/95 Dumon and Froment [1998] ECR I-4531, paragraph 25). Similarly, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see inter alia Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59).

42 Whilst it is true that debt-collection agencies are not subject to legal regulation in France, the fact that one Member State imposes less strict rules than another Member State does not mean that the latter's rules are disproportionate and hence incompatible with Community law (Case C-348/93 Alpine Investments v Minister van Financiën [1995] ECR I-1141, paragraph 51).

155. Also, as has been correctly pointed out by the Parliament, the Council and the parties intervening in support of them, the discretion enjoyed by the competent authorities in determining the balance to be struck between freedom of expression and the objectives in the public interest which are referred to in Article 10(2) of the ECHR varies for each of the goals justifying restrictions on that freedom and depends on the nature of the activities in question. When a certain amount of discretion is available, review is limited to an examination of the reasonableness and proportionality of the interference. This holds true for the commercial use of freedom of expression in a field as complex and fluctuating as advertising (see, in particular, Karner , paragraph 51).

51. It is common ground that the discretion enjoyed by the national authorities in determining the balance to be struck between freedom of expression and the abovementioned objectives varies for each of the goals justifying restrictions on that freedom and depends on the nature of the activities in question. When the exercise of the freedom does not contribute to a discussion of public interest and, in addition, arises in a context in which the Member States have a certain amount of discretion, review is limited to an examination of the reasonableness and proportionality of the interference. This holds true for the commercial use of freedom of expression, particularly in a field as complex and fluctuating as advertising (see, to that effect, Case C-245/01 RTL Television [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 73; judgments of the ECHR of 20 November 1989, Markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann , Reports of Judgments and Decisions series A No 165, paragraph 33; and of 28 June 2001, VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland , Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-VI, paragraphs 69 to 70).

67 According to settled case-law, Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 does not make the recognition of the rights it confers on Turkish workers subject to any condition connected with the reason the right to enter, work or reside was initially granted (Kus, paragraphs 21 to 23, Günaydin, paragraph 52, and, by analogy, Case C-355/93 Eroglu v Land Baden-Württemberg [1994] ECR I-5113, paragraph 22).

20. It is appropriate to recall that exemptions are independent concepts of Community law which must be placed in the general context of the common system of VAT introduced by the Sixth Directive (see in particular Case C-2/95 SDC [1997] ECR I-3017, paragraph 21; Case C-141/00 Kügler [2002] ECR I-6833, paragraph 25; and Cimber Air , paragraph 23). Furthermore, exemptions from VAT must, as was stated in paragraph 15 of this judgment, be interpreted strictly.

23. Exemptions constitute independent concepts of Community law which must be placed in the general context of the common system of VAT introduced by the Sixth Directive (see in particular Case 235/85 Commission v Netherlands [1987] ECR 1471, paragraph 18; Case C-2/95 SDC [1997] ECR I-3017, paragraph 21; and Case C-141/00 Küg ler [2002] ECR I-6833, paragraph 25).

29. Or, force est de constater que l’article 8, paragraphe 4, de la loi relative à l’impôt sur les sociétés constitue une entrave à la liberté d’établissement étant donné qu’une société établie au Danemark, qui transfère des actifs à l’étranger, dans les Îles Féroé ou au Groenland, est imposée sur les plus-values latentes, alors qu’un transfert similaire au Danemark ne donne pas lieu à l’imposition.

78. In the present case, in addition to the considerations set out at paragraphs 68 to 74 above, account must be taken of Ireland’s ability to pay as it stands in the light of the latest economic data submitted for appraisal by the Court (see, to that effect, Case C‑407/09 Commission v Greece , paragraph 42). Thus, it is necessary to take account of recent trends in inflation and the GDP of that Member State at the time of the Court’s examination of the facts (see Case C‑610/10 Commission v Spain , paragraph 131).

131. As regards the Kingdom of Spain’s ability to pay, it is necessary to take into account recent trends in inflation and the GDP of that Member State at the time of the Court’s examination of the facts.

29. In the absence of a definition in the EC Treaty of ‘movement of capital’ for the purposes of Article 56(1) EC, the Court has previously recognised the nomenclature annexed to Directive 88/361 as having indicative value, even though the latter was adopted on the basis of Articles 69 and 70(1) of the EEC Treaty (subsequently, Articles 69 and 70(1) of the EC Treaty, repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam), subject to the qualification, contained in the introduction to the nomenclature, that the list set out therein is not exhaustive (see, in particular, Case C‑513/03 van Hilten‑van der Heijden [2006] ECR I‑1957, paragraph 39; Case C‑452/04 Fidi um Finanz [2006] ECR I‑9521, paragraph 41; Federconsumatori and Others , paragraph 20; and Case C‑256/06 Jäger [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 24).

78. As to the circumstances in which an entity that is not the author of an infringement can nevertheless be penalised for that infringement, this situation arises if the entity that has committed the infringement has ceased to exist in law (see, to that effect, Commission v Anic Partecipazioni , paragraph 145).

145 In complaining that the Court of First Instance attributed responsibility for the infringement to it although it had transferred its polypropylene business to Monte, Anic is disregarding the principle of personal responsibility and neglecting the decisive factor, identifiable from the case-law of the Court of Justice (see to this effect Suiker Unie and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 80 and 84), that the `economic continuity' test can only apply where the legal person responsible for running the undertaking has ceased to exist in law after the infringement has been committed. It also follows that the application of these tests is not contrary in any way to the principle of legal certainty.

13 It is apparent from the documents submitted to the Court that, by this question, raised before the Court delivered its judgment of 10 September 1996 in Case C-222/94 Commission v United Kingdom [1996] ECR I-4025, the Raad van State in effect seeks to ascertain the criteria for determining which broadcasters come within a Member State's jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 2(1) of the Directive.

43. A Member State is therefore in a position to check whether contributions have actually been paid by one of its taxpayers to an insurance company established in another Member State. In addition, there is nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer to provide such proof as they may consider necessary in order to determine whether the conditions for deducting contributions provided for in the legislation at issue have been met and, consequently, whether to allow the deduction requested (see, to that effect, Bachmann , paragraphs 18 and 20, Commission v Belgium , paragraphs 11 and 13, and Danner , paragraph 50).

11 As regards the effectiveness of fiscal control, it is to be observed that Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation (Official Journal 1977 L 336, p. 15, hereinafter referred to as "the Directive") may be invoked by a Member State in order to check whether payments have been made in another Member State where, as in this case, it is necessary, in order correctly to assess the income tax, to take account of those payments (Article 1(1)).

29 Concerning the second limb of the Commission's second complaint, it should be recalled that, although many purification plans limited to the regional level may in principle constitute a plan within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Directive, the sum of the documents submitted by a Member State must in any event reveal an overall plan that reflects a comprehensive and coherent approach (see, to that effect, Case C-58/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-4983, paragraph 25; Case C-207/97 Commission v Belgium [1999] ECR I-275, paragraph 40).

69. Furthermore, the Court has considered that, even though the provisions of the Treaty concerning freedom of establishment are directed mainly to ensuring that foreign nationals and companies are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation which also comes within the definition contained in Article 48 EC. The rights guaranteed by Articles 43 EC to 48 EC would be rendered meaningless if the Member State of origin could prohibit undertakings from leaving in order to establish themselves in another Member State ( Daily Mail and General Trust , paragraph 16).

16 Even though those provisions are directed mainly to ensuring that foreign nationals and companies are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation which comes within the definition contained in Article 58 . As the Commission rightly observed, the rights guaranteed by Articles 52 et seq . would be rendered meaningless if the Member State of origin could prohibit undertakings from leaving in order to establish themselves in another Member State . In regard to natural persons, the right to leave their territory for that purpose is expressly provided for in Directive 73/148, which is the subject of the second question referred to the Court .

24. Moreover, the Court has already held that, having regard to the discretionary power conferred on them by Article 217(2) of the Customs Code, the Member States can provide that the entry in the accounts of the amount of duty resulting from a customs debt may be effected by the entry of that amount on the record which is drawn up by the competent customs authorities for the purpose of establishing an infringement of the applicable customs legislation, such as the authorities referred to in Article 267 of the General Law on Customs and Excise Duty, coordinated by the Royal Decree of 18 July 1977 ( Belgisch Staatsblad , 21 September 1977, p. 11425), confirmed by the Law of 6 July 1978 on Customs and Excise Duty ( Belgisch Staatsblad , 12 August 1978, p. 9013) (Case C‑126/08 Distillerie Smeets Hasselt and Others [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25).

48 It must, however, also be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, a mere similarity in the wording of a provision of one of the Treaties establishing the Communities and of an international agreement between the Community and a non-member country is not sufficient to give to the wording of that agreement the same meaning as it has in the Treaties (see Case 270/80 Polydor and RSO Records [1982] ECR 329, paragraphs 14 to 21; Case 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641, paragraphs 29 to 31; Case C-312/91 Metalsa [1993] ECR I-3751, paragraphs 11 to 20).

15 The Court based that interpretation in particular on the view that such a disproportion could have the effect of jeopardizing the free movement of goods within the Community and would thus be incompatible with Article 95 of the Treaty, the interpretation of which must take account of the aims of the Treaty, as laid down in Articles 2 and 3, which include, first, the establishment of a common market involving the elimination of all obstacles to trade in order to merge the national markets into a single market bringing about conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal market (paragraphs 23 and 24).

42 In that context, it noted that, given that the hyperlink and the website to which it refers give access to the protected work using the same technical means, namely the internet, such a link must be directed to a new public. Where that is not the case, in particular, due to the fact that the work is already freely available to all internet users on another website with the authorisation of the copyright holders, that act cannot be categorised as a ‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29. Indeed, as soon as and as long as that work is freely available on the website to which the hyperlink allows access, it must be considered that, where the copyright holders of that work have consented to such a communication, they have included all internet users as the public (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 February 2014, Svensson and Others, EU:C:2014:76, paragraphs 24 to 28, and order of 21 October 2014, BestWater International, C‑348/13, not published, EU:C:2014:2315, paragraphs 15, 16 and 18).

42 It is settled case-law of the Court that the interpretation of the terms used to define the exemptions must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions, guarantee their effects and comply with the principle of fiscal neutrality (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 March 2013, PFC Clinic, C‑91/12, EU:C:2013:198, paragraph 23).

23. With respect to those points, it must be recalled from the outset that the terms used to specify the exemptions in Article 132 of the VAT Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all goods and services supplied for consideration by a taxable person. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions and comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality. Thus, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 132 should be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effect (see by analogy, in particular, Case C‑86/09 Future Health Technologies [2010] ECR I‑5215, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

19. In the present case, it should first be borne in mind that, in paragraph 102 of Italy v Commission , cited above, regarding the principle of legitimate expectation, the Court pointed out that, by a notice published in the Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ 1983 C 318, p. 3), the Commission had informed potential recipients of State aid of the risk attaching to any aid granted to them illegally, in that they might have to refund the aid (see Case C-5/89 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3437, paragraph 15).

26 In that regard, it should be remembered that Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation (OJ 1977 L 336, p. 15) can be invoked by a Member State in order to obtain from the competent authorities of another Member State all the information enabling it to ascertain the correct amount of income tax. In addition, there is nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer himself to produce the proof which they consider necessary to assess whether or not the deduction requested should be allowed (see Bachmann and Commission v Belgium, cited above, at respectively paragraphs 18 and 20 and paragraphs 11 and 13).

18 As regards the effectiveness of fiscal controls, it should be observed that Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation (Official Journal 1977 L 336, p. 15, hereinafter referred to as "the Directive") may be invoked by a Member State in order to check whether payments have been made in another Member State where it is necessary, as in the main proceedings in this case, for those payments to be taken into account in order correctly to assess the income tax payable (Article 1(1) ).

27. That is the situation where the sign is used by the third party in relation to his goods or services in such a way that consumers are liable to interpret it as designating the origin of the goods or services in question. In such a case, the use of the sign is liable to imperil the essential function of the mark, since, for the trade mark to be able to fulfil its essential role in the system of undistorted competition which the EC Treaty seeks to establish and maintain, it must offer a guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it have been manufactured or supplied under the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their quality (see, to that effect, Arsenal Football Club , paragraph 48 and the case-law cited, and paragraphs 56 to 59).

31. In that regard, it is also clear from the case-law of the Court that, in relation to direct taxes, the situations of residents and of non-residents in a State are generally not comparable, because the income received in the territory of a State by a non-resident is in most cases only a part of his total income, which is concentrated at his place of residence, and because a non-resident’s personal ability to pay tax, determined by reference to his aggregate income and his personal and family circumstances, is easier to assess at the place where his personal and financial interests are centred, which in general is the place where he has his usual abode (judgment in Wallentin , C‑169/03, EU:C:2004:403, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).

15. As the Court has held, in relation to direct taxes, the situations of residents and of non-residents are generally not comparable, because the income received in the territory of a State by a non-resident is in most cases only a part of his total income, which is concentrated at his place of residence, and because a non-resident’s personal ability to pay tax, determined by reference to his aggregate income and his personal and family circumstances, is easier to assess at the place where his personal and financial interests are centred, which in general is the place where he has his usual abode ( Schumacker , cited above, paragraphs 31 and 32; Case C-391/97 Gschwind [1999] ECR I-5451, paragraph 22; Case C-87/99 Zurstrassen [2000] ECR I-3337, paragraph 21, and Gerritse , cited above, paragraph 43).

69. According to settled case-law (see, in particular, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame , paragraph 51; Hedley Lomas , paragraph 25; Case C-424/97 Haim [2000] ECR I‑5123, paragraph 36; and Case C-63/01 Evans [2003] ECR I‑14447, paragraph 83), for a Member State to incur liability for damage caused to individuals by a breach of Community law it is necessary that: – the rule of law infringed should be intended to confer rights on individuals; – the breach should be sufficiently serious; – there should be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation incumbent on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties.

28 Indeed, it is clear from the consistent case-law of the Court of Justice that, where the Court decides that there is no need to give judgment in an action which has ceased to have any purpose, it is not necessary for it to examine the admissibility of that action (see, in particular, the judgment in Joined Cases C-15/91 and C-108/91 Buckl and Others v Commission [1992] ECR I-6061, paragraphs 14 to 17, and the order of 10 June 1993 in Case C-41/92 Liberal Democrats v Parliament [1993] ECR I-3153, paragraph 4).

17 According to the case-law (see in particular the judgment in Case 8/71 Komponistenverband v Commission [1971] ECR 705, paragraph 2), Article 175 refers to failure to act in the sense of failure to take a decision or to define a position, not the adoption of a measure different from that desired or considered necessary by the persons concerned.

56 In such a situation, each of the two Member States is confronted with the same practical difficulties in organising the transfer as those that it would have had to confront if the transfer had been carried out immediately following the acceptance of the take charge or take back request and should thus have the same six week period in which to determine the practical details of the transfer and carry out that transfer (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 January 2009, Petrosian, C‑19/08, EU:C:2009:41, paragraphs 43 and 44).

25. The Court has stated in this respect that in view of the establishment of citizenship of the Union and the interpretation in the case-law of the right to equal treatment enjoyed by citizens of the Union, it was no longer possible to exclude from the scope of Article  39(2) EC – which expresses the fundamental principle of equal treatment, guaranteed by Article 12 EC – a benefit of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour market of a Member State (see Collins , paragraph 63, and Case C-258/04 Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275, paragraph 22).

22. The Court has already held that, in view of the establishment of citizenship of the Union and the interpretation of the right to equal treatment enjoyed by citizens of the Union, it is no longer possible to exclude from the scope of Article 39(2) EC a benefit of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour market of a Member State (Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703, paragraph 63).

22 As the Court has already pointed out on many occasions, those characteristics are as follows: VAT applies generally to transactions relating to goods or services; it is proportional to the price of those goods or services, irrespective of the number of transactions which take place; it is charged at each stage of the production and distribution process; and, finally, it is imposed on the added value of goods and services, the tax payable on a transaction being calculated after deduction of the tax paid on the previous transaction (inter alia, Case 252/86 Bergandi v Directeur Général des Impôts [1988] ECR 1343, paragraph 15; Bozzi, cited above, paragraph 12; and Solisnor-Estaleiros Navais, cited above, paragraph 14).

62 Against that background, as is clear from paragraph 34 of the present judgment, the very existence of the right to paid annual leave cannot be subject to any preconditions whatsoever, that right being conferred directly on the worker by Directive 2003/88. Thus, as regards the case in the main proceedings, it is irrelevant whether or not, over the years, Mr King made requests for paid annual leave (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 June 2014, Bollacke, C‑118/13, EU:C:2014:1755, paragraphs 27 and 28).

28. Indeed, on the one hand, that entitlement is conferred directly by the directive without the worker concerned having to take any steps in this regard and, secondly, that entitlement does not depend on conditions other than those which are explicitly provided in the directive, so that the fact that the worker has not previously applied for an allowance in lieu under Article 7(2) of that directive is entirely irrelevant.

53. Rules which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of movement therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom even if they apply without regard to the nationality of the workers concerned (see, inter alia, Case C-318/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-6957, paragraph 115).

18 In the case of contracts of employment, however, abandonment of the criterion of reference to the law applicable to the contract for the purpose of determining the place of performance and preferring the place where the acts constituting performance of the relevant obligation were localised could be justified by the particular characteristics of this type of contract (see Mulox IBC, paragraph 15). These had already led the Court to hold that, in the case of such contracts, the obligation to be taken into consideration for the purpose of applying Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention is always the obligation which characterises the contract, namely the employee's obligation to carry out the work stipulated (see, in particular, Case 133/81 Ivenel v Schwab [1982] ECR 1891, paragraph 20, and Mulox IBC, paragraph 14).

14 However, no such problem arises in relation to contracts of employment. The Court has consistently held that, in view of the specific nature of contracts of that kind (Case 133/81 Ivenel v Schwab [1982] ECR 1891, paragraph 20, Case 266/85 Shenavai v Kreischer [1987] ECR 239, paragraph 11, and Case 32/88 Six Constructions v Humbert [1989] ECR 341, paragraph 10), the obligation to be taken into consideration for the purposes of the application of Article 5(1) of the Convention to contracts of employment is always the obligation which characterizes such contracts, namely the employee' s obligation to carry out the work stipulated.

74. It follows that the statement in paragraph 26 of the judgment under appeal, by which the General Court restricts itself to looking back at consistent guidance from the case-law, contains no error of law.

27. As the Court has already pointed out, the purpose of the Directive is to lay down a number of rules on the holding, movement and monitoring of products subject to excise duty, in particular so as to ensure that chargeability of excise duties is identical in all the Member States ( EMU Tabac and Others , paragraph 22; Case C-325/99 Van de Water [2001] ECR I-2729, paragraph 39; and Case C-395/00 Cipriani [2002] ECR I-11877, paragraph 41).

41. It must be observed that the purpose of the Directive is to lay down a number of rules on the holding, movement and monitoring of products subject to excise duty (Case C-296/95 EMU Tabac and Others [1998] ECR I-1605, paragraph 22).

34. As is apparent from paragraph 31 of the judgment in Commission v Germany , a fee charged pursuant to that provision cannot take the form of a standard amount, with the result that the overall amount will be apt to vary from case to case according to the actual costs incurred by the competent authority in respect of veterinary inspections and controls in particular establishments.

58. Furthermore, the Court has already held that the fundamental principle of VAT neutrality requires that deduction of input VAT be allowed if the substantive requirements are satisfied, even if the taxable person has failed to comply with some of the formal requirements (see, to that effect, judgments in Ecotrade , C‑95/07 and C‑96/07, EU:C:2008:267 paragraph 63; in Uszodaépítő , C‑392/09, EU:C:2010:569, paragraph 39; in Nidera Handelscompagnie , C‑385/09, EU:C:2010:627, paragraphs 42 and 43; and in Idexx Laboratories Italia , C‑590/13, EU:C:2014:2429, paragraph 38).

38. Thirdly, it is apparent from paragraph 63 of the judgment in Ecotrade (EU:C:2008:267) and from the Court’s subsequent case-law (see, inter alia, judgments in Uszodaépítő , C‑392/09, EU:C:2010:569, paragraph 39; Nidera Handelscompagnie , C‑385/09, EU:C:2010:627, paragraph 42; EMS-Bulgaria Transport , C‑284/11, EU:C:2012:458, paragraph 62; and Fatorie , EU:C:2014:50, paragraph 35) that, in the context of the reverse charge procedure, the fundamental principle of fiscal neutrality requires deduction of input tax to be allowed if the substantive requirements are satisfied, even if the taxable person has failed to comply with some of the formal requirements.

69 Consequently, the referring court cannot, in the main proceedings, validly claim that it is impossible for it to interpret the provision of national law at issue in a manner that is compatible with EU law, for the sole reason that that provision has been interpreted, by Varhoven kasatsionen sad (Supreme Court of Appeal), in a way that is not compatible with EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 April 2016, DI, C‑441/14, EU:C:2016:278, paragraph 34).

58. The Court has also held that a Member State can fulfil such an obligation to recover only if the measures adopted by it are appropriate for the purpose of establishing the normal conditions of competition which were distorted by the grant of the unlawful aid the recovery of which has been ordered by a Commission decision (see, Case C‑209/00 Commission v Germany , paragraph 35, and Scott and Kimberly Clark , paragraph 22).

35. It follows from the above that a Member State can fulfil such an obligation to recover only if the measures adopted by it are suitable to re-establish the normal conditions of competition which were distorted by the grant of the illegal aid and are consistent with the relevant provisions of Community law.

43 The Court has held that that article must be interpreted as meaning that a provision of an act duly adopted on the basis of the EU Treaty before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which lays down detailed rules for the adoption of other measures, continues to produce its legal effects until it is repealed, annulled or amended, and permits the adoption of those measures in accordance with the procedure which it defines (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 April 2015, Parliament v Council, C‑540/13, EU:C:2015:224, paragraph 47, and of 10 September 2015, Parliament v Council, C‑363/14, EU:C:2015:579, paragraph 70).

34. À titre liminaire, il y a lieu de rappeler qu’il résulte de l’article 38, paragraphe 1, sous c), du règlement de procédure de la Cour et de la jurisprudence relative à cette disposition que toute requête introductive d’instance doit indiquer l’objet du litige ainsi que l’exposé sommaire des moyens et que cette indication doit être suffisamment claire et précise pour permettre à la partie défenderesse de préparer sa défense et à la Cour d’exercer son contrôle. Il en découle que les éléments essentiels de fait et de droit sur lesquels un recours est fondé doivent ressortir d’une façon cohérente et compréhensible du texte même de la requête et que les conclusions contenues dans cette dernière doivent être formulées de manière non équivoque afin d’éviter que la Cour ne statue ultra petita ou bien n’omette de statuer sur un grief (voir, notamment, arrêts du 12 février 2009, Commission/Pologne, C-475/07, point 43, et du 16 juillet 2009, Commission/Pologne, C-165/08, Rec. p. I‑6843, point 42).

43. À cet égard, il y a lieu de rappeler qu’il résulte de l’article 38, paragraphe 1, sous c), du règlement de procédure de la Cour et de la jurisprudence y relative que toute requête introductive d’instance doit indiquer l’objet du litige ainsi que l’exposé sommaire des moyens et que cette indication doit être suffisamment claire et précise pour permettre à la partie défenderesse de préparer sa défense et à la Cour d’exercer son contrôle. Il en découle que les éléments essentiels de fait et de droit sur lesquels un recours est fondé doivent ressortir d’une façon cohérente et compréhensible du texte de la requête elle-même et que les conclusions de cette dernière doivent être formulées de manière non équivoque afin d’éviter que la Cour ne statue ultra petita ou bien n’omette de statuer sur un grief (voir, notamment, arrêts du 26 avril 2007, Commission/Finlande, C‑195/04, Rec. p. I‑3351, point 22; du 21 février 2008, Commission/Italie, C‑412/04, Rec. p. I‑619, point 103, et du 20 novembre 2008, Commission/Irlande, C‑66/06, point 30).

48. A measure which restricts the free movement of workers can be accepted only if it pursues a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. Even if that were so, application of that measure would still have to be such as to ensure achievement of the objective in question and not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose (see, inter alia, ITC, paragraph 37, and Olympique Lyonnais , paragraph 38).

30. According to settled case‑law, the prohibition of measures having equivalent effect to restrictions which is set out in Article 28 EC covers all rules enacted by the Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra‑Community trade (see, inter alia, Case C ‑ 420/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I‑6445, paragraph 25; Case C‑192/01 Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR I‑9693, paragraph 39; Case C-41/02 Commission v Netherlands [2004] ECR I-11375, paragraph 39 and the case‑law cited; and Case C‑147/04 De Groot en Slot Allium and Bejo Zaden [2006] ECR I‑245, paragraph 71).

39. The prohibition on measures having equivalent effect to restrictions set out in Article 30 of the Treaty covers all commercial rules enacted by the Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade (see, in particular, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5; Commission v Denmark , paragraph 39; and Commission v France , paragraph 22).

50 With regard to the question whether Article 16 of the Charter precludes the possibility, for a NRA, to require an operator to update its prices on an annual basis and to submit them for periodic monitoring, it is appropriate to recall that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, the protection afforded by that provision covers the freedom to exercise an economic or commercial activity, freedom of contract and free competition. In addition, freedom of contract includes, in particular, the freedom to choose with whom to do business and the freedom to determine the price of a service. However, the freedom to conduct a business does not constitute an absolute prerogative, but must be viewed in relation to its function in society (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 January 2013, Sky Österreich, C‑283/11, EU:C:2013:28, paragraphs 42, 43, 45 and the case-law cited, and of 17 October 2013, Schaible, C‑101/12, EU:C:2013:661, paragraphs 25 and 28).

27. It must be borne in mind, finally, that, if the export declarations were initially accepted by the competent authorities and if it appears on the basis of findings made after that acceptance that the exporter at issue was not entitled to a refund, the penalty laid down in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 3665/87 must, in principle, be imposed ( AOB Reuter , paragraphs 27 and 30).

30. In those circumstances, it is necessary to apply the sanction provided for under Article 11(1)(a) of Regulation No 3665/87, unless one of the exceptions as exhaustively defined in the third subparagraph of Article 11(1) applies.

87. The Court has consistently held that, in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State, pursuant to the principle of the procedural autonomy of those legal systems, to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law ( Impact , paragraph 44, and Joined Cases C‑378/07 to C‑380/07 Angelidaki and Others [2009] ECR I‑ 3071, paragraph 173).

28. With regard to the right to paid annual leave, as is clear from the terms of Directive 2003/88 and the case-law of the Court, it is for the Member States to lay down, in their domestic legislation, conditions for the exercise and implementation of that right, by prescribing the specific circumstances in which workers may exercise the right, without making the very existence of that right, which derives directly from Directive 93/104, subject to any preconditions whatsoever (see, to that effect, BECTU , paragraph 53).

53 The expression in accordance with the conditions for entitlement to, and granting of, such leave laid down by national legislation and/or practice must therefore be construed as referring only to the arrangements for paid annual leave adopted in the various Member States. As the Advocate General observed in point 34 of his Opinion, although they are free to lay down, in their domestic legislation, conditions for the exercise and implementation of the right to paid annual leave, by prescribing the specific circumstances in which workers may exercise that right, which is theirs in respect of all the periods of work completed, Member States are not entitled to make the existence of that right, which derives directly from Directive 93/104, subject to any preconditions whatsoever.

38. Such an obligation amounts to a restriction on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. First, it contains a condition of minimum share capital (see, inter alia, by analogy, Commission v Portugal , paragraphs 53 and 54, and Case C‑514/03 Commission v Spain [2006] ECR I‑963, paragraph 36) and, second, as the Netherlands Government observed, it forces private operators wishing to pursue the activities at issue in the main proceedings to incorporate (see, by analogy, Commission v Portugal , paragraphs 41 and 42, and Commission v Spain , paragraph 31). Thus, a provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings impedes or renders less attractive, within the meaning of the case‑law set out at paragraphs 35 and 36 of this judgment, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services laid down in Articles 43 EC and 49 EC respectively.

81 Thus, it is following a schematic interpretation of the relevant EU rules that the Court of Justice interpreted those rules as meaning that, as from 2000, the Commission is required to comply with a legal time limit when adopting a decision on financial corrections (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 56 to 82, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 56 to 82).

82. Consequently, it must be held that, as from 2000, the Commission is obliged to comply with a time-limit for adopting a decision on financial corrections.

46. Thus, by adopting the BerlBesÜG, the national legislature reformed the system for the remuneration of Land Berlin civil servants and judges. That law provided, in order to ensure that the acquired rights of existing judges are maintained, a transitional derogation in their regard, whereby a step or transitional step was immediately allocated to such judges (see, to that effect, judgment in Specht and Others , C‑501/12 to C‑506/12, C‑540/12 and C‑541/12, EU:C:2014:2005, paragraphs 72 and 73).

25. First, Article 17(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive, which also uses the terms ‘due or paid’, as shown in paragraph 19 of this judgment, must be understood as meaning that the question whether the VAT due on the earlier or later sale of the goods concerned has or has not been paid to the public purse is irrelevant to the taxable person’s right to deduct (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑354/03, C‑355/03 and C‑484/03 Optigen and Others [2006] ECR I‑483, paragraph 54).

54. The question whether the VAT on the earlier or later sale of the goods concerned to the end-user has or has not been paid to the public purse is irrelevant to the right of the taxable person to deduct input VAT (see, to that effect, the order of the Court in Case C-395/02 Transport Service [2004] ECR I-1991, paragraph 26). The Court has consistently held that, according to the fundamental principle which underlies the common system of VAT, and which follows from Article 2 of the First and Sixth Directives, VAT applies to each transaction by way of production or distribution after deduction of the VAT directly borne by the various cost components (see, inter alia, Case C-98/98 Midland Bank [2000] ECR I-4177, paragraph 29, and Zita Modes , cited above, paragraph 37).

34. As regards the criteria for assessment, the Court has held that, where the first person acquiring the goods has obtained the right to dispose of the goods as owner in the Member State of the first supply, expresses his intention to transport those goods to another Member State and presents his VAT identification number attributed by that other State, the intra-Community transport should be ascribed to the first supply, on condition that the right to dispose of the goods as owner has been transferred to the second person acquiring the goods in the Member State of destination of the intra-Community transport (see Euro Tyre Holding , paragraphs 44 and 45).

53. Those guarantees of independence and impartiality require rules, particularly as regards the composition of the body and the appointment, length of service and the grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members, in order to dismiss any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it (see, in that regard, Dorsch Consult , paragraph 36; Köllensperger and Atzwanger , paragraphs 20 to 23; and De Coster , paragraphs 18 to 21; see also, to that effect, Eur Court HR De Cubber v. Belgium , judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A No 86, § 24).

20 As the Advocate General observes in point 25 of his Opinion, the TVergG does not contain any specific provisions on challenges to, or withdrawals by, members of the Landesvergabeamt.

25 It should be noted at the outset that the fact that the national court has, formally speaking, worded the question referred for a preliminary ruling with reference to certain provisions of EU law does not preclude the Court from providing to the national court all the elements of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in its questions (judgments of 10 September 2014, Kušionová, C‑34/13, EU:C:2014:2189, paragraph 71, and of 15 February 2017, W and V, C‑499/15, EU:C:2017:118, paragraph 45).

59 In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, when applying the private creditor test, the Commission must carry out an overall assessment, taking into account all relevant evidence in the case enabling it to determine whether the recipient company would manifestly not have obtained comparable facilities from such a private creditor (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 January 2013, Frucona Košice v Commission, C‑73/11 P, EU:C:2013:32, paragraph 73, and of 21 March 2013, Commission v Buczek Automotive, C‑405/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:186, paragraph 47).

73. It is therefore for the Commission to carry out an overall assessment, taking into account all relevant ev idence in the case enabling it to determine whether the recipient company would manifestly not have obtained comparable facilities from such a private creditor (see, to that effect, Commission v EDF , paragraph 86).

56. Given the reference to ‘acts’ in general, the subject matter of those limbs of Article 263 is any European Union act which produces binding legal effects (see, to that effect, Case 60/81 IBM v Commission [1981] ECR 2639, paragraph 9; Case C‑521/06 P Athinaïki Techniki v Commission [2008] ECR I‑5829, paragraph 29; Case C-322/09 P NDSHT v Commission [2010] ECR I‑11911, paragraph 45; and Joined Cases C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P Deutsche Post v Commission [2011] ECR I‑9639, paragraphs 36 to 38). That concept therefore covers acts of general application, legislative or otherwise, and individual acts. The second limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU specifies that if the natural or legal person who brings the action for annulment is not a person to whom the contested act is addressed, the admissibility of the action is subject to the condition that the act is of direct and individual concern to that person.

70. Also, it is apparent from the case-law that it is for the party who is seeking to rely on the lateness of an application to demonstrate from which date the time-limit, for the filing of that application, should run. (see, to that effect, Case 108/79 Belfiore v Commission [1980] ECR 1769, paragraph 7, and Case C-403/05 Parliament v Commission ECR I-9045, paragraph 35).

35. It should be added that while the Commission asserts that it replied to the Parliament’s request by letter of 22 June 2005, it has, however, adduced no evidence that the Parliament actually received a copy of the contested decision on that date. The letters and informal exchanges between institutions to which the Commission refers cannot be regarded as decisive in that context. In addition, the Commission has been unable to refute the Parliament’s assertion that the information derived from those informal contacts was not sufficiently precise to enable it to acquire full knowledge of the content of, and reasons for, the contested decision.

56. In that regard, it is, however, to be borne in mind that, in proceedings under Article 226 EC for failure to fulfil obligations, it is for the Commission to prove the alleged failure by placing before the Court all the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled (see, in particular, Case C‑160/08 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited).

68. Therefore, the national court must, first of all, take account of the fact that the purpose of the proof of the place where the offence or irregularity is committed is to contest the jurisdiction of the Member State which recovers the duties and taxes while identifying the Member State which will have jurisdiction to recover those duties where the presumption as to the place of the offence or irregularity is considered to be rebutted ( BGL , paragraph 54).

54. With respect to the period within which such proof must be furnished, it must be noted that the purpose of that proof is to contest the jurisdiction of the Member State which recovers the customs duties while identifying the Member State which will have jurisdiction to recover those duties where the presumption as to the place of the offence or irregularity is considered to be rebutted.

42. As the Advocate General explains in points 100 to 104 of his Opinion, the system of references for a preliminary ruling is based on a dialogue between one court and another, the initiation of which depends entirely on the national court’s assessment as to whether a reference is appropriate and necessary (see, to this effect, Case 126/80 Salonia [1981] ECR 1563, paragraph 7).

23 Directive 77/187 is applicable wherever, in the context of contractual relations, there is a change in the natural or legal person who is responsible for carrying on the business and who incurs the obligations of an employer towards employees of the undertaking. Thus, there is no need, in order for the directive to be applicable, for there to be any direct contractual relationship between the transferor and the transferee: the transfer may also take place in two stages, through the intermediary of a third party such as the owner or the person putting up the capital (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-171/94 and C-172/94 Merckx and Neuhuys [1996] ECR I-1253, paragraphs 28 to 30, and Süzen, cited above, paragraph 12).

29. The Court has therefore held that the Directive applies to the termination of a lease of a restaurant followed by the conclusion of a new management contract with another operator (Case 324/86 Tellerup v Daddy ' s Dance Hall [1988] ECR 739), the termination of a lease followed by a sale by the owner (Case 101/87 Bork International v Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark [1988] ECR 3057), and also a situation in which a public authority ceases to grant subsidies to a legal person thereby bringing about the full and definitive termination of its activities in order to transfer them to another legal person with a similar aim ( Redmond Stichting , cited above).

122 As far as, in particular, the probative value of notarial instruments is concerned, it must be pointed out that that value derives from the rules on evidence laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure. The probative force conferred by law on a particular document thus has no direct effect on whether the activity which includes the drawing up of the document is in itself directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority, as required by the case-law (judgment of 1 December 2011, Commission v Netherlands, C‑157/09, not published, EU:C:2011:794, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).

31. In that regard, it must be stated that the third indent of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive refers not to professions, such as those of lawyers, consultants, accountants or engineers, but to services. The Community legislature has used the professions mentioned in that provision as a means of defining the categories of services to which it refers (see von Hoffmann , paragraph 15). The expression ‘other similar services’ refers not to some common feature of the disparate activities mentioned in the third indent of Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive but to services similar to those of each of those activities, viewed separately. A service must thus be regarded as similar to those of one of the activities mentioned in that provision when they both serve the same purpose (see, to that effect, Case C‑167/95 Linthorst, Pouwels en Scheres [1997] ECR I‑1195, paragraphs 19 to 22, and von Hoffmann , paragraphs 20 and 21).

19 The third possible hypothesis in this case is services of `consultants, engineers, consultancy bureaux, lawyers, accountants and other similar services' [third indent of Article 9(2)(e)].

16 In so far as that question requires an examination of the legal status under national law of the company concerned, it should first be pointed out that although the Court has no jurisdiction under Article 177 of the Treaty to apply the relevant rule of Community law to a particular dispute and thus to judge a provision of national law by reference to that rule it may, in the framework of the judicial cooperation provided for by that article and on the basis of the material presented to it, provide the national court with an interpretation of Community law which may be useful to it in assessing the effects of the provision in question (Case 20/87 Gauchard [1987] ECR 4879, paragraph 5). The first part of the first question

17. According to well-established case-law of the Court, the mere creation of a dominant position through the grant of special or exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 86(1) EC is not in itself incompatible with Article 82 EC. A Member State will be in breach of the prohibitions laid down by those two provisions only if the undertaking in question, merely by exercising the special or exclusive rights conferred upon it, is led to abuse its dominant position or where such rights are liable to create a situation in which that undertaking is led to commit such abuses (Case C-209/98 Sydhavnens Sten & Grus [2000] ECR I‑3743, paragraph 66; Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner [2001] ECR I-8089, paragraph 39); and Case C-451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti [2006] ECR I‑2941, paragraph 23).

66 It must be borne in mind that merely creating a dominant position by the grant special or exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the Treaty is not in itself incompatible with Article 86 of the Treaty. A Member State is in breach of the prohibitions contained in those two provisions only if the undertaking in question, merely by exercising the exclusive rights granted to it, is led to abuse its dominant position or when such rights are liable to create a situation in which that undertaking is led to commit such abuses (see, for example, Joined Cases C-115/97 to C-117/97 Brentjens' [1999] ECR I-6025, paragraph 93).

14 It must be observed at the outset that only intervention undertaken in accordance with the Community rules in the framework of the common organisation of agricultural markets is to be financed by the EAGGF (see Case C-247/98 Greece v Commission [2001] ECR I-1, paragraph 7, and Case C-278/98 Netherlands v Commission [2001] ECR I-1501, paragraph 38).

69. In assessing those risks, the referring court must take into consideration, first, the fact that the link between the training of future health professionals and the objective of maintaining a balanced high-quality medical service open to all is only indirect and the causal relationship less well established than in the case of the link between the objective of public health and the activity of health professionals who are already present on the market (see Hartlauer , paragraphs 51 to 53, and Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others , paragraphs 34 to 40). The assessment of such a link will depend inter alia on a prospective analysis which will have to extrapolate on the basis of a number of contingent and uncertain factors and take into account the future development of the health sector concerned, but also depend on an analysis of the situation at the outset, that is to say, as it currently stands.

53. From that point of view, it is permissible for a Member State to organise medical care in such a way that it gives priority to a system of benefits in kind, so that all patients have easy access, throughout national territory, to the services of contractual practitioners.

52 The Court of First Instance was also correct, in reliance on the settled case-law of the Court of Justice (see Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission [1990] ECR I-395, paragraph 33), to hold, in paragraph 77 of the contested judgment, that [t]he proper functioning of the common market in steel clearly involves the obvious need for constant adjustments to fluctuations in the economic situation and economic operators cannot claim a vested right to the maintenance of the legal situation existing at a given time. British Steel could not legitimately expect that a given legal situation would remain unchanged even though the economic conditions in the steel market were subject to changes which, in some cases, called for specific measures of adjustment.

34. To establish whether there is a transfer within the meaning of Directive 77/187, it is necessary to assess whether the unit in question retains its identity, which follows in particular from the fact that its operation is actually continued or resumed by the new employer, with the same or similar economic activities (see Case 24/85 Spijkers [1986] ECR 1119, paragraphs 11, 12 and 15, and Case C‑48/94 Rygaard [1995] ECR I-2745, paragraphs 15 and 16).

12 CONSEQUENTLY , A TRANSFER OF AN UNDERTAKING , BUSINESS OR PART OF A BUSINESS DOES NOT OCCUR MERELY BECAUSE ITS ASSETS ARE DISPOSED OF . INSTEAD IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER , IN A CASE SUCH AS THE PRESENT , WHETHER THE BUSINESS WAS DISPOSED OF AS A GOING CONCERN , AS WOULD BE INDICATED , INTER ALIA , BY THE FACT THAT ITS OPERATION WAS ACTUALLY CONTINUED OR RESUMED BY THE NEW EMPLOYER , WITH THE SAME OR SIMILAR ACTIVITIES .

93. This conclusion is all the more compelling where the national legislation justifying the renewal of fixed-term contracts in cases of temporary replacement also pursues objectives recognised as being legitimate social policy objectives. As is clear from paragraph 87 of this judgment, the concept of ‘objective reason’ in clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement encompasses the pursuit of such objectives. Measures intended, inter alia, to offer protection for pregnancy and maternity and to enable men and women to reconcile their professional and family obligations pursue legitimate social policy objectives (see judgment in Kücük , EU:C:2012:39, paragraphs 32 and 33 and the case-law cited).

22. It should be noted at the outset that Regulation No 1408/71 implements Article 42 EC, which provides for coordination of national social security legislation rather than harmonisation. Substantive and procedural differences between the social security systems of individual Member States, and hence in the rights of persons working there, are therefore unaffected by that provision (see, in particular, Case 41/84 Pinna [1986] ECR 1, paragraph 20; Case C‑340/94 de Jaeck [1997] ECR I‑461, paragraph 18; and Case C‑208/07 von Chamier-Glisczinski [2009] ECR I‑6095, paragraph 84).

18 Article 51 of the EC Treaty, which the regulation implements, provides for the coordination, not the harmonization, of the legislations of the Member States. Substantive and procedural differences between the social security systems of individual Member States, and hence in the rights of persons working there, are therefore unaffected by that provision (see, in particular, Case 41/84 Pinna v Caisse d'Allocations Familiales de la Savoie [1986] ECR 1, paragraph 20).

30 In that regard, it should, however, be noted that neither the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union nor the Rules of Procedure make provision for the interested parties referred to in Article 23 of the Statute to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 September 2014, Vnuk, C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146, paragraph 30).

31. The reference for a preliminary ruling, likewise, cannot be held inadmissible because the answers to the questions referred are clear, as Total alleges, from existing well-established Community and national case‑law. Even assuming that the questions referred are materially identical to questions which have already been ruled upon in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling in an analogous case, that circumstance in no way prevents the national court from referring questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling and does not result in the Court lacking jurisdiction to rule on those questions (see, to that effect, Case 283/81 CILFIT and Others [1982] ECR 3415, paragraphs 13 and 15). However, in such a case, the Court may, pursuant to Article 104(3) of its Rules of Procedure, after hearing the Advocate General, at any time give its decision by reasoned order in which reference is made to its previous judgment or to the relevant case-law.

15 HOWEVER , IT MUST NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT IN ALL SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES NATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS , INCLUDING THOSE REFERRED TO IN THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 , REMAIN ENTIRELY AT LIBERTY TO BRING A MATTER BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE IF THEY CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE TO DO SO .

67 In the present case, it is apparent, first, that provisions such as those at issue in the main proceedings, either in themselves, or as interpreted by the Irish courts, do not fall within the concept of ‘technical specification’ within the meaning of Article 1(3) of Directive 98/34. That concept covers only national measures which refer to a product or its packaging as such and thus lay down one of the characteristics required of a product (judgment of 10 July 2014, Ivansson and Others, C‑307/13, EU:C:2014:2058, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited). That is clearly not the case for a requirement which applies, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, generally to the sale of all products.

68. S’agissant des moyens invoqués par la République hellénique pour sa défense, il y a lieu de relever que, selon une jurisprudence constante de la Cour, le seul moyen de défense susceptible d’être invoqué par un État membre contre un recours en manquement introduit par la Commission sur le fondement de l’article 108, paragraphe 2, TFUE est celui tiré d’une impossibilité absolue d’exécuter correctement la décision en cause (voir, notamment, arrêts du 20 septembre 2007, Commission/Espagne, C‑177/06, Rec. p. I‑7689, point 46; du 13 novembre 2008, Commission/France, C‑214/07, Rec. p. I‑8357, point 44, et du 14 juillet 2011, Commission/Italie, précité, point 33).

46. According to settled case-law, the only defence available to a Member State in opposing an application by the Commission under Article 88(2) EC for a declaration that it has failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations is to plead that it was absolutely impossible for it properly to implement the decision (see, inter alia, Commission v France , paragraph 23, Commission v Spain , paragraph 45, and Case C-415/03 Commission v Greece [2005] ECR I-3875, paragraph 35).

36. In accordance with Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/109, the directive applies to third-country nationals residing legally in the territory of a Member State. Unlike Directive 2004/38 (see Joined Cases C‑424/10 and C‑425/10 Ziolkowski and Szeja [2011] ECR I‑14035, paragraphs 46 and 47), Directive 2003/109 does not lay down the conditions which the residence of those nationals must satisfy for them to be regarded as legally resident in the territory of a Member State. It follows that those conditions are governed by national law alone.

65. However, the Court of Justice, which is called on to provide answers of use to the national court, may provide guidance based on the documents relating to the main proceedings and on the written and oral observations which have been submitted to it, in order to enable the national court to give judgment (Case C‑187/00 Kutz-Bauer [2003] ECR I‑2741, paragraph 52, and Schönheit and Becker , paragraph 83).

83. However, although in preliminary ruling proceedings it is for the national court to establish whether such objective factors exist in the particular case before it, the Court of Justice, which is called on to provide answers of use to the national court, may provide guidance based on the documents relating to the main proceedings and on the written and oral observations which have been submitted to it, in order to enable the national court to give judgment (Case C-278/93 Freers and Speckmann [1996] ECR I-1165, paragraph 24, Seymour-Smith and Perez , paragraph 68, and Case C-187/00 Kutz-Bauer [2003] ECR I-2741, paragraph 52).

19. As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that the objective of Regulation No 1408/71, as stated in the second and fourth recitals in the preamble, is to ensure free movement of employed and self-employed persons within the European Community, while respecting the special characteristics of national social security legislation. To that end, as is clear from the 5th, 6th and 10th recitals, that regulation upholds the principle of equality of treatment of workers under the various national legislation and seeks to guarantee the equality of treatment of all workers occupied on the territory of a Member State as effectively as possible and not to penalise workers who exercise their right to free movement (see Case C-68/99 Commission v Germany [2001] ECR I-1865, paragraphs 22 and 23, and Case C-249/04 Allard [2005] ECR I-4535, paragraph 31).

27. Second, an argument based on the need to safeguard the cohesion of a tax system must be examined in the light of the objective pursued by the tax legislation in question ( Manninen , paragraph 43).

43. The case-law further shows that an argument based on the need to safeguard the cohesion of a tax system must be examined in the light of the objective pursued by the tax legislation in question (Case C-9/02 De Lasteyrie du Saillant [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 67).

25 According to the Court’s settled case-law, the tax levied on inheritances, which consist of the transfer to one or more persons of assets left by a deceased person, comes within the scope of the FEU Treaty provisions on movements of capital, save where the constituent elements of inheritances are confined to a single Member State (judgments of 23 February 2006 in van Hilten-van der Heijden, C‑513/03, EU:C:2006:131, paragraph 42; of 17 January 2008 in Jäger, C‑256/06, EU:C:2008:20, paragraph 25; of 17 October 2013 in Welte, C‑181/12, EU:C:2013:662, paragraph 20; and of 3 September 2014 in Commission v Spain, C‑127/12, not published, EU:C:2014:2130, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

14 It must be stated first of all that due consultation of the Parliament in the cases provided for by the Treaty constitutes an essential formal requirement breach of which renders the measure concerned void. Effective participation of the Parliament in the legislative process of the Community, in accordance with the procedures laid down by the Treaty, represents an essential factor in the institutional balance intended by the Treaty. This function reflects the fundamental democratic principle that the people should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-21/94 Parliament v Council [1995] ECR I-1827, paragraph 17).

17 It must first of all be borne in mind that due consultation of the Parliament in the cases provided for by the Treaty constitutes an essential formal requirement breach of which renders the measure concerned void (see, for example, the judgment in Case 417/93 Parliament v Council [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 9). The effective participation of the Parliament in the legislative process of the Community, in accordance with the procedures laid down by the Treaty, represents an essential factor in the institutional balance intended by the Treaty. Such power reflects the fundamental democratic principle that the people should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly (see, for example, the judgment in Case C-65/93 Parliament v Council [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 21).

104. As regards the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, it should be stated that, in view of the mandatory nature of the supervision of State aid by the Commission under Article 88 EC, undertakings to which aid has been granted may not, in principle, entertain a legitimate expectation that the aid is lawful unless it has been granted in compliance with the procedure laid down in that article (Case C-169/95 Spain v Commission [1997] ECR I-135, paragraph 51, and Case C-24/95 Alcan Deutschland [1997] ECR I-1591, paragraph 25).

56 It must be pointed out, in the third place, that, according to the well-established case-law of the Court, the parent company to which the unlawful conduct of its subsidiary is attributed is held individually liable for an infringement of the EU competition rules which it is itself deemed to have infringed, because of the decisive influence which it exercised over the subsidiary and by which it was able to determine the subsidiary’s conduct on the market (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 July 1972, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, 48/69, EU:C:1972:70, paragraphs 140 and 141; of 16 November 2000, Metsä-Serla and Others v Commission, C‑294/98 P, EU:C:2000:632, paragraphs 28 and 34; of 26 November 2013, Kendrion v Commission, C‑50/12 P, EU:C:2013:771, paragraph 55; of 10 April 2014, Commission and Others v Siemens Österreich and Others, C‑231/11 P to C‑233/11 P, EU:C:2014:256, paragraph 49; and of 8 May 2014, Bolloré v Commission, C‑414/12 P, not published, EU:C:2014:301, paragraph 44).

55. À titre liminaire, il convient de rappeler que tant la responsabilité de Kendrion, en tant que société mère, que celle de Fardem Packaging, en tant qu’ancienne filiale, reposent sur le fait que ces sociétés faisaient toutes deux partie de l’entité économique qui a enfreint l’article 81 CE. Ainsi que l’a relevé le Tribunal au point 26 de l’arrêt attaqué, la requérante est, de ce fait, censée avoir commis elle‑même l’infraction aux règles de concurrence du droit de l’Union.

91. In those circumstances, it has not been shown that the Council’s error prevented the effective participation of the Parliament in the procedure in question or interfered with the conditions in which the Parliament performs its duties (see, to that effect, judgments in Parliament v Council , C‑392/95, EU:C:1997:289, paragraph 14, and Parliament v Council , C‑658/11, EU:C:2014:2025, paragraph 81).

26 First, it should be observed that, according to settled case-law, although the introductory sentence of Article 13(A)(1) of the Sixth Directive states that Member States are to lay down the conditions for exemptions in order to ensure the correct and straightforward application of the exemptions and to prevent any possible evasion, avoidance or abuse, those conditions cannot affect the definition of the subject-matter of the exemptions envisaged (see, in particular, Case C-124/96 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-2501, paragraphs 11 and 12). From that point of view, the subjection to, or exemption from, VAT of a specific transaction cannot depend on its classification in national law.

11 It should be observed in that regard that the conditions which may be laid down pursuant to Article 13(A)(1) of the Sixth Directive to do not in any way affect the definition of the subject-matter of the exemptions envisaged by that provision (Case 8/81 Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53, paragraph 32).

36. Toutefois, il ressort d’une jurisprudence constante qu’une réglementation ou pratique nationale qui constitue une mesure d’effet équivalent à des restrictions quantitatives ne peut être justifiée que par l’une des raisons d’intérêt général énumérées à l’article 30 CE ou par des exigences impératives (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 5 février 2004, Commission/Italie, C‑270/02, Rec. p. I‑1559, point 21, et Commission/Pays-Bas, précité, point 75). Dans l’un et l’autre cas, la mesure nationale doit être propre à garantir la réalisation de l’objectif poursuivi et ne pas aller au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour qu’il soit atteint (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 20 juin 2002, Radiosistemi, C‑388/00 et C‑429/00, Rec. p. I‑5845, points 40 à 42; du 8 mai 2003, ATRAL, C‑14/02, Rec. p. I‑4431, point 64, ainsi que Commission/Finlande, précité, point 38).

36. Although, as Greencore argues, the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to review the assessment of the facts made by the Court of First Instance, it does have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 225 EC to review the definition of the legal nature of those facts and the determination of the legal consequences made by the Court of First Instance (see, to that effect, Case C-136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others [1994] ECR I-1981, paragraph 49, and Case C-7/95 P John Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraph 21).

49 The Court of First Instance thus has exclusive jurisdiction to find the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it. In the present case the findings of the Court of First Instance relating to the events which preceded the adoption of Regulation No 3294/88 (paragraph 11 of the judgment), which are not challenged, can no longer be questioned. The Court of First Instance has also exclusive jurisdiction to assess those facts. In the present case the same is true of its assessment that the transmission on 23 December 1985 by the Commission to the Council of the second proposal relating to weightings could have taken place more speedily so that the legislation could have been adopted as early as 1 January 1984 (paragraph 39 of the judgment). On the other hand, when the Court of First Instance has found or assessed facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to exercise the review required of it by Article 168a of the EEC Treaty provided that the Court of First Instance has defined their legal nature and determined the legal consequences. In the present case that applies to the assessment by the Court of First Instance that the slowness of the preparatory procedure constituted a fault (paragraph 39 of the judgment).

37 It is true that, at paragraph 29 of that judgment, the Court held that the taking into account by the national legislation whose conditions are fulfilled of periods completed under the legislation of another Member State is excluded by Article 49 as regards the calculation of the amount of the pension.

69. In those circumstances, on the same grounds as those given in paragraphs 88 to 107 of the judgment in Specht and Others (C‑501/12 to C‑506/12, C‑540/12 and C‑541/12, EU:C:2014:2005), the answer to Question 4 is as follows: – in circumstances such as those of the case before the referring court, EU law does not require judges who have been discriminated against to be retrospectively granted an amount equal to the difference between the pay actually received and that corresponding to the highest step in their grade; – it is for the referring court to ascertain whether all the conditions laid down by the case-law of the Court are met for the Federal Republic of Germany to have incurred liability under EU law. Question 5

103. In order to determine whether an infringement of Article 2 of Directive 2000/78 on the part of the Member State concerned was sufficiently serious in the cases before it, the national court must take into account the fact that the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of that directive allows Member States freedom to make provision for measures that involve differences in treatment directly based on age, and broad discretion in their choice, not only to pursue a particular aim in the field of social and employment policy, but also in the definition of measures capable of achieving it.

34. En effet, ainsi que le Tribunal l’a relevé au point 52 de l’arrêt attaqué, une aide permettant de réaliser une formation qui aurait de toute façon été mise en œuvre par l’entreprise bénéficiaire, sans l’obtention de ladite aide, viserait, en réalité, à libérer une entreprise des coûts qu’elle aurait dû normalement supporter dans le cadre de sa gestion courante ou de ses activités normales. Or, les aides au fonctionnement, à savoir les aides qui visent à libérer une entreprise desdits coûts, faussent en principe les conditions de concurrence (voir arrêt du 19 septembre 2000, Allemagne/Commission, C‑156/98, Rec. p. I‑6857, point 30 et jurisprudence citée).

66. In accordance with settled case‑law, the judicial protection of natural or legal persons who are unable, by reason of the conditions for admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, directly to challenge Community measures of the type of the contested decision, must be effectively guaranteed by a right of action before national courts. The latter are required, in accordance with the principle of cooperation in good faith laid down by Article 10 EC, so far as possible, to interpret and apply national procedural rules governing the exercise of rights of action in a way that enables those persons to challenge before the courts the legality of any decision or other national measure relating to the application to them of a Community act such as that at issue, by pleading the invalidity of such an act and by asking them to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on validity (see Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council , paragraphs 40 to 42, and Commission v Jégo-Quéré , paragraphs 30 to 32; see also C‑15/06 P Regione Siciliana v Commission , paragraph 39).

41 Thus it is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right to effective judicial protection.

50 In that regard, the Court has already held that information, before concluding a contract, on the terms of the contract and the consequences of concluding it is of fundamental importance for a consumer. It is on the basis of that information in particular that the consumer decides whether he wishes to be bound by the terms previously drawn up by the seller or supplier (judgment of 21 March 2013, RWE Vertrieb, C‑92/11, EU:C:2013:180, paragraph 44).

145. That being so, while the Court of First Instance must not substitute its own economic assessment for that of the Commission for the purposes of applying the substantive rules of the Regulation, that does not mean that the Community judicature must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature. Not only must the Community judicature establish, among other things, whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it (see, to that effect, Commission v Tetra Laval , paragraph 39, and Spain v Lenzing , paragraphs 56 and 57).

56. As regards the argument that the Court of First Instance exceeded the limits of its power of review established by case-law in an area giving rise to complex economic assessments, it must be borne in mind, first of all, that, whilst the Court recognises that the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the Community judicature must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature (Case C‑12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I‑987, paragraph 39).

78. In that connection, it must be borne in mind that the deduction system under the Sixth Directive is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that they are themselves subject in principle to VAT (see, in particular, Case C-408/98 Abbey National [2001] ECR I-1361, paragraph 24, and Zita Modes , paragraph 38).

77. Nevertheless, the Court has also held that, in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court, in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction ( Varec , paragraph 24 and the case-law cited). The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose or where the problem is hypothetical (see, in particular, PreussenElektra , paragraph 39, and Laval un Partneri , paragraph 46).

46. Nevertheless, the Court has also held that, in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court, in order to confirm its own jurisdiction (see, to that effect, Case 244/80 Foglia [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 21). The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I‑2099, paragraph 39; Case C‑390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I‑607, paragraph 19, and Conseil général de la Vienne , paragraph 20).

15 Thus an economic operator who has been encouraged by a Community measure to suspend marketing of milk for a limited period in the general interest and against payment of a premium may, therefore, legitimately expect not to be subject, upon the expiry of his undertaking, to restrictions which affect him specifically precisely because he availed himself of the possibilities offered by the Community rules (see the judgments in Mulder, paragraph 24, and Von Deetzen, paragraph 13, both cited above). On the other hand, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations does not preclude, in the case of a scheme such as that concerning the additional levy, the imposition of restrictions on a producer by reason of the fact that he has not marketed milk or has marketed only a reduced quantity of milk during a period prior to the entry into force of that scheme, in consequence of a decision which he freely took without being encouraged to do so by a Community measure.

42. It should first be recalled that Directive 77/799 may be relied on by a Member State in order to obtain from the competent authorities of another Member State all the information enabling it to ascertain the correct amount of income tax (see Case C-55/98 Vestergaard [1999] ECR I-7641, paragraph 26), or all the information it considers necessary to ascertain the correct amount of income tax payable by a taxpayer according to the legislation which it applies (see Wielockx , cited above, paragraph 26, and Danner , paragraph 49).

26 In that regard, it should be remembered that Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation (OJ 1977 L 336, p. 15) can be invoked by a Member State in order to obtain from the competent authorities of another Member State all the information enabling it to ascertain the correct amount of income tax. In addition, there is nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer himself to produce the proof which they consider necessary to assess whether or not the deduction requested should be allowed (see Bachmann and Commission v Belgium, cited above, at respectively paragraphs 18 and 20 and paragraphs 11 and 13).

52. Moreover, as the Court has already stated, in choosing the appropriate solution for guaranteeing that the objective of Directive 76/207 is attained, the Member States must ensure that infringements of Community law are penalised under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of domestic law of a similar nature and importance (Case 68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965, paragraph 24, and Case C-180/95 Draehmpaehl [1997] ECR I-2195, paragraph 29). That reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to infringements of Community law of a similar nature and importance.

21 It is true that, as the Italian Government contends, the Court in its aforesaid judgment in Commission v Italy (at paragraph 14) mentioned the possibility under Italian law for a person to make a declaration in his own name and on behalf of another person. It must be stated, however, that this judgment merely establishes that the fact that that possibility operates by way of a legal fiction contained in the second paragraph of Article 56 of the Code or by way of the legal concept of "indirect representation" cannot be regarded as the determining factor in assessing whether it is equivalent to a quantitative restriction on the formalities in question.

14 HAVING DUE REGARD TO THOSE STATEMENTS THE COURT FINDS THAT THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS IN QUESTION IS COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR WORDING . IT FOLLOWS THAT SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES ARE OPEN TO THE OWNER OF GOODS FOR HAVING THE CUSTOMS DECLARATION MADE BY A THIRD PARTY WITHOUT BEING REQUIRED , AS THE COMMISSION MAINTAINS , TO HAVE RECOURSE TO AN AGENT . THE FACT THAT THIS POSSIBILITY OPERATES BY WAY OF THE LEGAL FICTION CONTAINED IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 56 OF THE CODE AND TREATS AS OWNER THE PERSON WHO PRESENTS THE GOODS OR MAKES THE DECLARATION IN HIS CAPACITY AS HAVING POSSESSION OF THEM OR BY WAY OF THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF ' ' INDIRECT AGENT ' ' , WHEREBY THE DECLARANT ACTS ON BEHALF OF THE OWNER BUT IN HIS OWN NAME AND IS JOINTLY LIABLE WITH THE OWNER RATHER THAN ACTING UNDER THE AUTHORITY CONFERRED ON HIM BY THE OWNER , CANNOT BE REGARDED AS DECISIVE IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE REQUIREMENTS IN QUESTION ARE EQUIVALENT TO A QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION . THE FACT THAT THE OWNER CANNOT EMPLOY AN AGENT WHO NEITHER HAS POSSESSION OF THE GOODS NOR IS IN A POSITION TO PRESENT THEM TO THE CUSTOMS BUT THAT IN THIS CASE THE OWNER HAS TO HAVE RECOURSE TO A SELF-EMPLOYED OR EMPLOYEE CUSTOMS AGENT CANNOT CONSTITUTE A MEASURE HAVING EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO A QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION SINCE THE OTHER MEANS OF MAKING THE DECLARATION OFFER HIM AN EFFECTIVE AND REASONABLE CHOICE ALLOWING HIM , IF HE THINKS IT IS IN HIS INTEREST , TO AVOID HAVING TO HAVE RECOURSE TO A PROFESSIONAL CUSTOMS AGENT .

35. Il ressort d’une jurisprudence constante de la Cour que l’État membre destinataire d’une décision l’obligeant à récupérer des aides illégales est tenu, en vertu de l’article 249 CE, de prendre toutes les mesures propres à assurer l’exécution de cette décision (arrêt du 5 octobre 2006, Commission/France, C‑232/05, Rec. p. I‑10071, point 42 et jurisprudence citée).

29. It must however be pointed out that the lack of a declaration that, for certain elements of a designation, the protection conferred by Article 13 of Regulation No 2081/92 was not requested, cannot constitute a sufficient basis for determining the scope of that protection (see, to that effect, Chiciak and Fol , paragraph 37).

37 Even if Article 13 of the 1992 regulation were to mean that, in the absence of specific circumstances pointing to the contrary, the protection afforded by that provision covers not only the compound designation as a whole, but also each of its constituent parts, provided they are not generic or common terms, that provision could not constitute a sufficient basis for interpreting the 1996 regulation as meaning that, in the absence of a footnote, each constituent part of the compound name is protected.

27 It accordingly follows from the Court’s case-law that, first, exceptions to that freedom must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 June 1974, Reyners, 2/74, EU:C:1974:68, paragraphs 43 to 55, and of 1 February 2017, Commission v Hungary, C‑392/15, EU:C:2017:73, paragraph 106 and the case-law cited), second, while the provisions of the Treaty relating to that freedom are aimed at ensuring the benefit of national treatment in the host Member State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated in accordance with its legislation (judgments of 27 September 1988, Daily Mail and General Trust, 81/87, EU:C:1988:456, paragraph 16, and of 21 May 2015, Verder LabTec, C‑657/13, EU:C:2015:331, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited) and, third, the concept of establishment within the meaning of the Treaty is a very broad one, allowing an EU national to participate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the economic life of a Member State other than his State of origin and to profit therefrom, so contributing to economic and social interpenetration within the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 1995, Gebhard, C‑55/94, EU:C:1995:411, paragraph 25).

27. On the other hand, if those courts or tribunals consider that recourse to European Union law is necessary to enable them to decide a case, Article 267 TFEU imposes, in principle, an obligation on them to refer to the Court of Justice any question of interpretation which may arise (see Cilfit and Others , paragraphs 11 to 20).

16 FINALLY , THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY LAW MAY BE SO OBVIOUS AS TO LEAVE NO SCOPE FOR ANY REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE QUESTION RAISED IS TO BE RESOLVED . BEFORE IT COMES TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SUCH IS THE CASE , THE NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL MUST BE CONVINCED THAT THE MATTER IS EQUALLY OBVIOUS TO THE COURTS OF THE OTHER MEMBER STATES AND TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE . ONLY IF THOSE CONDITIONS ARE SATISFIED , MAY THE NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL REFRAIN FROM SUBMITTING THE QUESTION TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND TAKE UPON ITSELF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESOLVING IT .

20 In that regard, it should be recalled that the referring court has clearly stated, as is apparent from paragraph 17 above, that its questions concern solely the legal classification of the service at issue and not a finding or assessment of the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings. The classification under EU law of facts established by that court involves, however, the interpretation of EU law for which, in the context of the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 December 2015, Banif Plus Bank, C‑312/14, EU:C:2015:794, paragraphs 51 and 52).

59. Consequently, even on the assumption that, as KÖGÁZ and Others and Vodafone have claimed, the HIPA is generally applied in the municipalities which have introduced it, that would not suffice to classify a tax such as the HIPA as a turnover tax within the meaning of Article 33 of the Sixth Directive, inasmuch as it is not levied on transactions in a manner comparable to VAT (see, to that effect, Pelzl and Others , paragraph 27).

27 Thus, even on the assumption that the charges at issue in the main proceedings are generally or almost generally applicable in the federal Länder in question, that would not suffice for them to be classified as turnover taxes within the meaning of Article 33 of the Sixth Directive, inasmuch as they are not levied on commercial transactions in a manner comparable to VAT.

33 In that regard, it must be recalled that a measure is purely confirmatory of an existing measure if it contains no new factors as compared with the existing measure (judgment of 3 April 2014, Commission v Netherlands and ING Groep, C‑224/12 P, EU:C:2014:213, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).

32 It should be borne in mind that, under Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure, an appeal must give a precise indication of the aspects of the judgment appealed against which are complained of, together with the legal arguments put forward in support of the claim that it should be set aside (see the order of 24 April 1996 in Case C-87/95 P CNPAAP v Council [1996] ECR I-2003, paragraph 29, and the judgment in Case C-138/95 P Campo Ebro and Others v Council [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 60).

60 Under Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure, however, an appeal must give a precise indication of the aspects of the judgment appealed against which are complained of, together with the legal arguments put forward in support of the claim that it should be set aside (order of 24 April 1996 in Case C-87/95 P CNPAAP v Council [1996] ECR I-2003, paragraph 29).

45. According to settled case-law, the principle of legal certainty requires that rules of law be clear and precise and predictable in their effect, so that interested parties can ascertain their position in situations and legal relationships governed by EU law (see judgments in France Télécom v Commission , C‑81/10 P, EU:C:2011:811, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited, and in LVK — 56 , C‑643/11, EU:C:2013:55, paragraph 51).

49 However, it should be remembered that relations between the Member States and the Community institutions are governed, under Article 10 EC, by a principle of loyal cooperation. That principle not only requires the Member States to take all the measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law, but also imposes on the Community institutions and the Member States mutual duties of loyal cooperation (see order in Zwartveld and Others, cited above, paragraph 17). Therefore, if a national court needs information that only the Commission can provide, the principle of loyal cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC will, in principle, require the Commission when requested to do so by the national court to provide that information as soon as possible, unless refusal to provide such information is justified by overriding reasons relating to the need to avoid any interference with the functioning and independence of the Community or to safeguard its interests (see, to that effect, order in Zwartveld and Others, cited above, paragraphs 24 and 25; Case C-234/89 Delimitis [1991] ECR I-935, paragraph 53; and Case C-39/94 SFEI and Others [1996] ECR I-3547, paragraph 50).

53 It should be noted in this context that it is always open to a national court, within the limits of the applicable national procedural rules and subject to Article 214 of the Treaty, to seek information from the Commission on the state of any procedure which the Commission may have set in motion and as to the likelihood of its giving an official ruling on the agreement in issue pursuant to Regulation No 17. Under the same conditions, the national court may contact the Commission where the concrete application of Article 85(1) or of Article 86 raises particular difficulties, in order to obtain the economic and legal information which that institution can supply to it. Under Article 5 of the Treaty, the Commission is bound by a duty of sincere cooperation with the judicial authorities of the Member State, who are responsible for ensuring that Community law is applied and respected in the national legal system (Order of 13 July 1990 in Case C-2/88, Zwartveld [1990] ECR I-3365, paragraph 18).

33 First of all, and without there being any need to ascertain whether the change made by the contested regulation is one of substance, it must be recalled that the Community institutions enjoy a margin of discretion in their choice of the means needed to achieve the common commercial policy (see, to this effect, Case 245/81 Edeka Zentrale v Germany [1982] ECR 2745, paragraph 27; Case 52/81 Faust v Commission [1982] ECR 3745, paragraph 27; Case 256/84 Koyo Seiko v Council [1987] ECR 1899, paragraph 20; Case 258/84 Nippon Seiko v Council [1987] ECR 1923, paragraph 34, and Case 260/84 Minebea v Council [1987] ECR 1975, paragraph 28).

20. Secondly, the rights granted by the second paragraph of Article 7 to the child of a Turkish worker with regard to employment in the Member State concerned necessarily imply the existence of a concomitant right of residence for that child, without which the right to have access to the employment market and actually to take up salaried employment would be rendered totally ineffective ( Eroglu , paragraphs 20 and 23, and Akman , paragraph 24).

24 Secondly, it must be noted that the rights conferred by the second paragraph of Article 7 on the child of a Turkish worker with regard to employment in the Member State concerned necessarily imply the existence of a concomitant right of residence for that child, without which the right to have access to the employment market and to actually take up salaried employment would be rendered totally ineffective (Eroglu, cited above, paragraphs 20 and 23).

41. Under Article 15(2) of Directive 2008/115, the initial detention of a third-country national, which may not exceed six months, must be ordered by administrative or judicial authorities, in writing with reasons being given in fact and in law for the detention decision (see, to that effect, G. and R. , C‑383/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:533, paragraph 29).

62. Consequently, in the main proceedings, it is only if and in so far as, pursuant to the EU and FEU Treaties, the European Union has assumed the powers previously exercised by its Member States in the field, as set out in paragraphs 57 to 59 of the present judgment, to which that international convention applies that the convention’s provisions would have the effect of binding the European Union (see, to this effect, International Fruit Company and Others , paragraph 18; Case C‑379/92 Peralta [1994] ECR I‑3453, paragraph 16; and Case C‑301/08 Bogiatzi [2009] ECR I‑10185, paragraph 25).

18 IT THEREFORE APPEARS THAT, IN SO FAR AS UNDER THE EEC TREATY THE COMMUNITY HAS ASSUMED THE POWERS PREVIOUSLY EXERCISED BY MEMBER STATES IN THE AREA GOVERNED BY THE GENERAL AGREEMENT, THE PROVISIONS OF THAT AGREEMENT HAVE THE EFFECT OF BINDING THE COMMUNITY .

40 Nor can the Kingdom of Belgium successfully argue that the General Court also erred in law in finding, in paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal, that the public health objective of the obligation to carry out BSE screening tests is not sufficient to rule out the categorisation of the State funding of those tests as State aid. It is settled case-law that Article 107(1) TFEU does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes or their aims but defines them in relation to their effects (see, inter alia, judgment of 15 November 2011 in Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 87).

25 First of all, it is apparent from the wording of Article 202(3) of the code that the EU legislature intended to give a broad definition of the persons capable of being regarded as debtors of the customs debt in the event of the unlawful introduction of goods subject to import duties and that it also intended to lay down exhaustively the conditions for determining who are the debtors of customs debt (see judgments of 23 September 2004, Spedition Ulustrans, C‑414/02, EU:C:2004:551, paragraphs 25 and 39; of 3 March 2005 in Papismedov and Others, C‑195/03, EU:C:2005:131, paragraph 38; and of 17 November 2011, Jestel, C‑454/10, EU:C:2011:752, paragraphs 12 and 13).

25. In the first place, it is clear from the wording of Article 202(3) of the Customs Code that the Community legislature intended to give a broad definition of the persons capable of being regarded as debtors of the customs debt, in cases of unlawful introduction of goods subject to import duties, without thereby rendering the employer automatically a co-debtor of the employee’s customs debt.

19 A provision such as the one at issue in the main proceedings obviously entails direct discrimination on the basis of nationality. Under that provision, a Member State does not require its own nationals to furnish security even if they have no assets or residence in that State.

21 In those circumstances it must be pointed out that, if the relevant provisions of domestic law cannot be interpreted in conformity with Directive 92/13, the persons concerned may, in accordance with the appropriate procedures under domestic law, claim compensation for the damage incurred owing to the failure to transpose the directive within the time prescribed (Dorsch Consult, cited above, paragraph 45; on the question of Member States' liability in the event of non-transposition of a directive see, in particular, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I-5357 and Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others [1996] ECR I-4845).

45 If the relevant domestic provisions cannot be interpreted in conformity with Directive 92/50, the persons concerned, using the appropriate domestic law procedures, may claim compensation for the damage incurred owing to the failure to transpose the directive within the time prescribed (see, in particular, the judgment in Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others [1996] ECR I-4845).

77 In arriving at that conclusion the Court first reiterated that the concept of pay, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 119, comprises any consideration, whether in cash or in kind, whether immediate or future, provided that the worker receives it, albeit indirectly, from his employer in respect of his employment (paragraph 28).

69. Moreover, whilst acknowledging that the position occupied by Mr Alevizos in the Greek Air Force before his temporary posting to a position in NATO might fall within the concept of ‘employment in the public service’ within the meaning of Article 39(4) EC in so far as it involves direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the State or of other public authorities (see, to that effect, Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 3881, paragraph 10; Case C‑290/94 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I‑3285, paragraph 2; Case C‑47/02 Anker and Others [2003] ECR I‑10447, paragraph 58), it must be noted that, taking account of the fundamental nature, in the scheme of the EC Treaty, of the principles of freedom of movement and equality of treatment of workers within the Community, the exceptions made by that provision cannot have a scope going beyond the aim in view of which that derogation was included ( Sotgiu , paragraph 4).

58. It covers posts which involve direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the State or of other public authorities and thus presume on the part of those occupying them the existence of a special relationship of allegiance to the State and reciprocity of rights and duties which form the foundation of the bond of nationality ( Commission v Belgium , paragraph 10, and Commission v Greece , cited above, paragraph 2).

36 Secondly, Article 10(1) must be interpreted in the light of the general principle of the right of undertakings to the protection of their business secrets, a principle which finds expression in Article 214 of the Treaty and various provisions of Regulation No 17, such as Articles 19(3), 20(2) and 21(2) (see the judgment in Case 53/85 AKZO Chemie v Commission [1986] ECR 1965, paragraph 28).

29. The Court has already held that such a restriction exists if a prior authorisation scheme has the effect of preventing or restricting the exercise of voting rights attached to shares held since these constitute one of the principal means for the shareholder to participate actively in the management of an undertaking or in its control (see, to that effect, as regards the rules on the free movement of capital, judgment of 14 February 2008 in Case C‑274/06 Commission v Spain , paragraphs 21 to 24).

22. En effet, la DA 27 prévoit, dans une phase initiale, une suspension des droits de vote afférents aux actions détenues par des entités publiques dans les entreprises espagnoles opérant dans le secteur énergétique qui exclut, pour une catégorie particulière d’investisseurs, pendant une période de deux mois, toute participation effective à la gestion et au contrôle desdites entreprises.

27 It must borne in mind at the outset that, as the Court has held on several occasions (see the judgments in Case 21/76 Bier v Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, cited above, paragraph 11, Case C-220/88 Dumez France and Tracoba [1990] ECR I-49, paragraph 17, Case C-68/93 Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance [1995] ECR I-415, paragraph 19, and Case C-364/93 Marinari v Lloyds Bank and Another [1995] ECR I-2719, paragraph 10), the rule of special jurisdiction in Article 5(3) of the Convention, the choice of which is a matter for the plaintiff, is based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and courts other than those of the State of the defendant's domicile which justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings.

46 As regards a prior administrative authorisation scheme such as that forming the subject-matter of the Commission's main complaint, as contained in head (a) of the form of order sought by it, and relating to Article 2(1) of Decree No 93-1298, the Court has previously held that such a scheme must be proportionate to the aim pursued, inasmuch as the same objective could not be attained by less restrictive measures, in particular a system of declarations ex post facto (see, to that effect, Sanz de Lera, paragraphs 23 to 28; Konle, paragraph 44; and Case C-205/99 Analir and Others [2001] ECR I-1271, paragraph 35). Such a scheme must be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance to the undertakings concerned, and all persons affected by a restrictive measure of that type must have a legal remedy available to them (Analir, cited above, paragraph 38).

35 Second, for a prior administrative authorisation scheme to be justified, it must also be demonstrated that such a scheme is necessary in order to be able to impose public service obligations and that it is proportionate to the aim pursued, inasmuch as the same objective could not be attained by measures less restrictive of the freedom to provide services, in particular a system of declarations ex post facto (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 and C-250/94 Sanz de Lera [1995] ECR I-4821, paragraphs 23 to 28).

107. Such a security does not deprive genuinely interested undertakings of the possibility of exporting sugar to the Community. Whilst the amount of the security must admittedly be paid to obtain the import licences, that sum is reimbursed to the undertaking if the import operation is carried out (see, to that effect, Case C-110/97 Netherlands v Council , paragraph 132).

76. It follows from the foregoing considerations that, by entering into or maintaining in force, despite the renegotiation of the 1957 Agreement, international commitments concerning air fares and rates charged by carriers designated by the United States on intra-Community routes and concerning CRSs offered for use or used on Netherlands territory, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5 of the Treaty and under Regulations Nos 2409/92 and 2299/89 (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark , paragraphs 110 to 112; Commission v Sweden , paragraphs 106 to 108; Commission v Finland , paragraphs 111 to 113; Commission v Belgium , paragraphs 124 to 126; Commission v Luxembourg , paragraphs 116 to 118; Commission v Austria , paragraphs 124 to 126, and Commission v Germany , paragraphs 135 to 137). Failure to fulfil obligations arising from infringement of Article 52 of the Treaty Arguments of the parties

112 It follows from the foregoing considerations that, by entering into international commitments concerning air fares and rates charged by carriers designated by the United States of America on intra-Community routes and concerning CRSs offered for use or used in Danish territory, the Kingdom of Denmark has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5 of the Treaty and under Regulations Nos 2409/92 and 2299/89. Infringement of Article 52 of the Treaty Arguments of the parties

32. According to settled case‑law, all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade within the European Union are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU (see, inter alia, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5, and Case C‑110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I‑519, paragraph 33).

36 As the Court has repeatedly held, the right to deduct provided for in Article 167 et seq. of Directive 2006/112 is an integral part of the VAT scheme and in principle may not be limited. In particular, the right to deduct is exercisable immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs (see, inter alia, judgments of 21 March 2000, Gabalfrisa and Others, C‑110/98 to C‑147/98, EU:C:2000:145, paragraph 43, and of 21 June 2012, Mahagében and Dávid, C‑80/11 and C‑142/11, EU:C:2012:373, paragraph 38).

38. As the Court has repeatedly held, the right to deduct provided for in Article 167 et seq. of Directive 2006/112 is an integral part of the VAT scheme and in principle may not be limited. In particular, the right to deduct is exercisable immediately in respect of all the taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I-1577, paragraph 43; Joined Cases C-439/04 and C-440/04 Kittel and Recolta Recycling [2006] ECR I-6161, paragraph 47; Case C-392/09 Uszodaépítő [2010] ECR I-8791, paragraph 34; and Commission v Hungary , paragraph 43).

60. Thus, there is no obligation, for national authorities informed of possible fraud consisting of the disposal on the internal market of C sugar which has been the subject of an export declaration, to inform the producer that it could incur liability to a charge under Article 3 of Regulation No 2670/81, even where it was not involved in carrying out the fraudulent acts (see, by way of analogy, De Haan , paragraph 36).

56. It should be noted at the outset that the Court has already held, with regard to the activities of vehicle inspection centres carried out by private bodies in Portugal, that the decision whether or not to certify roadworthiness lacked the decision-making independence inherent in the exercise of public authority powers and was taken in the context of State supervision (see judgment in Commission v Portugal , C‑438/08, EU:C:2009:651, paragraph 41). Moreover, the Court has held that those bodies do not, in connection with their activities, have any power of coercion, as the right to impose penalties for failure to comply with the rules on vehicle inspection belongs to the police and judicial authorities (see judgment in Commission v Portugal , C‑438/08, EU:C:2009:651, paragraph 44).

48. In the present case, the justification put forward by the Portuguese Republic during the pre‑litigation procedure relates to the need to ensure road safety, which, according to settled case‑law, constitutes an overriding reason relating to the public interest (see, in particular, Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 77, and Case C‑110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 60).

26. According to settled case-law, the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU is based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, with the result that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see, inter alia, the judgment in Hoesch Metals and Alloys , C‑373/08, EU:C:2010:68, paragraph 59).

32. Directive 80/987 is intended to guarantee employees a minimum level of protection under European Union law in the event of the insolvency of their employer (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑6/90 and C‑9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I‑5357, paragraph 3, and Case C-69/08 Visciano [2009] ECR I‑6741, paragraph 27), without prejudice, in accordance with its Article 9, to more favourable provisions which the Member States may apply or introduce (see, to that effect, Case C‑160/01 Mau [2003] ECR I‑4791, paragraph 32, and Case C‑278/05 Robins and Others [2007] ECR I‑1053, paragraph 40).

32. In that regard, it is sufficient to note that Directive 80/987, as is pointed out in Article 9, does not affect the option of Member States to apply or introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions which are more favourable to employees. It is for the Federal Republic of Germany to increase the guarantee period appropriately, if it sees fit. Legal consequences of the fact that the rules for calculating the guarantee period laid down by national law do not correspond to those required by Community law

54 The Court has consistently held that, in order that an agreement between undertakings may affect trade between Member States, it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact that it may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States, such as might prejudice the realization of the aim of a single market in all the Member States (see Case 42/84 Remia v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, paragraph 22). Accordingly, the effect on intra-Community trade is normally the result of a combination of several factors which, taken separately, are not necessarily decisive.

42. However, the Member States are required, under Article 10 EC, to facilitate the achievement of the Commission’s tasks, which consist in particular, pursuant to Article 211 EC, in ensuring that the provisions of the Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied (Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 7, and Case C-408/97 Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 16).

16 However, it is also clear from the case-law of the Court that it is for the Member States, under Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10 EC) to facilitate the achievement of the Commission's tasks, which consist in particular, pursuant to Article 155 of the EC Treaty (now Article 211 EC), in ensuring that the provisions of the Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied (Case 272/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 4875, paragraph 30).

61. It must be added that undertakings involved in an administrative procedure in which fines may be imposed for infringement of the Community competition rules cannot acquire a legitimate expectation that the Commission will not exceed the level of fines previously imposed or of a particular method of calculating the fines. The Court has stated in particular that the undertakings in question must take account of the possibility that the Commission may decide at any time to raise the level of the fines by reference to that applied in the past (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425, paragraphs 228 and 229).

26 As the Court has repeatedly held, the only possible decisive criterion is whether the pension is paid to the worker by reason of the employment relationship between him and his former employer, that is to say, the criterion of employment based on the wording of Article 119 of the Treaty itself (Beune, paragraph 43; and Case C-147/95 DEI v Evrenopoulos [1997] ECR I-2057, paragraph 19).

43 Indeed, it follows from all that has been said above that the only possible decisive criterion is whether the pension is paid to the worker by reason of the employment relationship between him and his former employer, that is to say the criterion of employment based on the wording of Article 119 itself.

26. However, it has also held that the conclusion that the proprietor may not rely on the rights conferred by the trade mark in order to oppose the marketing under his trade mark of products repackaged by an importer amounts to conferring on the importer certain rights which in normal circumstances are reserved for the trade mark proprietor himself. Consequently, in the interests of the proprietor as owner of the trade mark, and to protect him against any misuse, those rights must be recognised only in so far as the importer also complies with a number of other requirements (see, to that effect, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others , paragraphs 68 and 69, and MPA Pharma , paragraphs 40 and 41).

112. In that regard, it is the case, as is clear from settled case-law, that the Commission enjoys a broad discretion as regards the method for calculating fines. That method, set out in the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (OJ 1998 C 9, p. 3), displays flexibility in a number of ways, enabling the Commission to exercise its discretion in accordance with Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 (see, to that effect, Case C‑308/04 P SGL Carbon v Commission [2006] ECR I‑5977, paragraphs 46 and 47, and Case C‑407/04 P Dalmine v Commission [2007] ECR I‑829, paragraph 133).

46. It has been consistently held (see, in particular, Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraphs 240 to 243, and the case‑law cited) that the Commission enjoys a wide discretion as regards the method used for calculating fines and that it can, in this respect, take account of numerous factors, whilst complying with the ceiling on turnover laid down in Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17.

22 As Regulation No 1186/2009 does not provide a definition of the term ‘normal residence’ as used in Article 3 thereof, it is necessary, for the purpose of determining the scope of that provision, to take account of its wording, context and objectives (judgment in Angerer, C‑477/13, EU:C:2015:239, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

46 The fact that the offer of goods or services is made on a not-for-profit basis does not prevent the entity which carries out those operations on the market from being considered an undertaking, since that offer exists in competition with that of other operators which do seek to make a profit (judgment of 1 July 2008, MOTOE, C‑49/07, EU:C:2008:376, paragraph 27).

27. As regards the effect that the fact that ELPA does not seek to make a profit may have on that classification, it should be noted that, in Case C‑222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I‑289, paragraphs 122 and 123), the Court stated that the fact that the offer of goods or services is made without profit motive does not prevent the entity which carries out those operations on the market from being considered an undertaking, since that offer exists in competition with that of other operators which do seek to make a profit.

77. It is clear from the case-law that the Court may, exceptionally, taking account of the serious difficulties which its judgment may create as regards events in the past, be moved to restrict the possibility for all persons concerned of relying on the interpretation which the Court gives to a provision in response to a reference for a preliminary ruling,. A restriction of that kind may be permitted only by the Court, in the actual judgment ruling upon the interpretation sought (see inter alia Barber , paragraph 41, and Case C‑292/04 Meilicke and Others [2007] ECR I‑000, paragraph 36).

100. In the absence of a Treaty definition of ‘movement of capital’ for the purposes of Article 56(1) EC, the Court has previously recognised the nomenclature annexed to Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty [article repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam] (OJ 1988 L 178, p. 5) as having indicative value. Movements of capital within the meaning of Article 56(1) EC therefore include direct investments, that is to say, as that nomenclature and the related explanatory notes show, investments of any kind undertaken by natural or legal persons and which serve to establish or maintain lasting and direct links between the persons providing the capital and the undertakings to which that capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity (see, to that effect, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraphs 179 to 181; Case C‑112/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 18; and A , paragraph 46).

181. As that list and the relative explanatory notes show, the concept of direct investments concerns investments of any kind undertaken by natural or legal persons and which serve to establish or maintain lasting and direct links between the persons providing the capital and the undertakings to which that capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity.

31 Although that directive does not seek to harmonise the penalties applicable in the event of a term being found to be unfair in the context of those actions, Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 nevertheless requires the Member States to ensure that adequate and effective means exist to bring an end to the use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers (judgment in Invitel, C‑472/10, EU:C:2012:242, paragraph 35).

16 According to consistent case-law, the terms used in Article 21 of the Convention in order to determine whether a situation of lis pendens arises must be regarded as independent (Case C-406/92 The `Tatry' [1994] ECR I-5439, paragraph 30).

30 Moreover, as the Advocate General noted in his Opinion (paragraph 14), it follows by implication from that judgment that the question whether the parties are the same cannot depend on the procedural position of each of them in the two actions, and that the plaintiff in the first action may be the defendant in the second.

26. De même, il a été jugé que, dans ces conditions, le fait d’exiger le paiement de la taxe VM, à l’occasion de la première utilisation sur le réseau routier néerlandais de véhicules non immatriculés aux Pays-Bas, est justifié à l’instar du paiement de la taxe due à l’occasion de l’immatriculation d’un véhicule aux Pays-Bas, pour autant que ladite taxe tient compte, ainsi qu’il semble résulter de la loi de 1992, de la dépréciation du véhicule au moment de cette première utilisation (voir arrêt van Putten e.a., précité, point 51, ainsi que ordonnance Notermans-Boddenberg, précitée, point 28).

42. In addition, such a condition constitutes a restriction within the meaning of Article 43 EC, since it prevents Community operators that are natural persons from setting up a secondary establishment in Portugal (see, to that effect, Case 107/83 Klopp [1984] ECR 2971, paragraph 19, and Case 143/87 Stanton [1988] ECR 3877, paragraph 11).

19 THAT FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT IS NOT CONFINED TO THE RIGHT TO CREATE A SINGLE ESTABLISHMENT WITHIN THE COMMUNITY IS CONFIRMED BY THE VERY WORDS OF ARTICLE 52 OF THE TREATY , ACCORDING TO WHICH THE PROGRESSIVE ABOLITION OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT APPLIES TO RESTRICTIONS ON THE SETTING UP OF AGENCIES , BRANCHES OR SUBSIDIARIES BY NATIONALS OF ANY MEMBER STATE ESTABLISHED IN THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE . THAT RULE MUST BE REGARDED AS A SPECIFIC STATEMENT OF A GENERAL PRINCIPLE , APPLICABLE EQUALLY TO THE LIBERAL PROFESSIONS , ACCORDING TO WHICH THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT INCLUDES FREEDOM TO SET UP AND MAINTAIN , SUBJECT TO OBSERVANCE OF THE PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT , MORE THAN ONE PLACE OF WORK WITHIN THE COMMUNITY .

20. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, if the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter is to be effective, on the one hand, the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him is based, either by reading the decision itself or by requesting and obtaining notification of those reasons, so as to make it possible for him to defend his rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in his applying to the court with jurisdiction. On the other, the court with jurisdiction must have the power to require the authority concerned to provide that information, in order to put that court fully in a position in which it may carry out the review of the lawfulness of the national decision in question (see to that effect, judgment in ZZ , EU:C:2013:363, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

30. Accordingly, the Court has ruled in particular that Article 49 EC precludes the application of any national rule making reimbursement of medical costs incurred in another Member State subject to a system of prior authorisation where it is apparent that such a system deters, or prevents, insured persons from approaching providers of medical services established in Member States other than the State of insurance, save where the barrier to the freedom to provide services to which it gives rise is justifiable under one of the derogations allowed by the EC Treaty (see, to that effect, Kohll , paragraphs 33 to 36; Smits and Peerbooms , paragraphs 62, 69 and 71; and Müller‑Fauré and Van Riet , paragraphs 44 and 45).

34 While the national rules at issue in the main proceedings do not deprive insured persons of the possibility of approaching a provider of services established in another Member State, they do nevertheless make reimbursement of the costs incurred in that Member State subject to prior authorisation, and deny such reimbursement to insured persons who have not obtained that authorisation. Costs incurred in the State of insurance are not, however, subject to that authorisation.

67. As to whether a lump sum payment should be imposed, it should also be pointed out that this must, in each individual case, depend on all the relevant factors pertaining to both the particular nature of the infringement established and the individual conduct of the Member State involved in the procedure instigated pursuant to Article 260 TFEU (see Case C‑121/07 Commission v France , paragraph 62).

43. It follows that, if the examination of the conditions for the application of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 has shown that there is some similarity between the signs at issue, the General Court must, in order to ascertain, this time, whether the conditions for the application of paragraph 5 of that article are satisfied, examine whether, on account of the presence of other relevant factors such as the renown or reputation of the earlier mark, the relevant public is capable of establishing a link between those signs (see, to that effect, judgment in Intra-Presse v OHIM , C‑581/13 P and C‑582/13 P, EU:C:2014:2387, paragraph 73).

73. According to the same case-law, Article 8(5) of Regulation No 40/94, like Article 8(1)(b), is manifestly inapplicable where the General Court rules out any similarity between the marks at issue. It is only if there is some similarity, even faint, between the marks at issue that the General Court must carry out an overall assessment in order to ascertain whether, notwithstanding the low degree of similarity between them, there is, on account of the presence of other relevant factors such as the reputation or recognition enjoyed by the earlier mark, a likelihood of confusion or a link made between those marks by the relevant public ( Ferrero v OHIM , EU:C:2011:177, paragraph 66).

16 In that regard, the Court has already held that it must in principle confine its examination to the matters which the referring court has decided to submit to it in its request for a preliminary ruling. Thus, as regards the application of the relevant national legislation, the Court must proceed on the basis of the situation which the referring court considers to be established (judgment of 8 June 2016,Hünnebeck, C‑479/14, EU:C:2016:412, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited). It is clear from the settled case-law of the Court that questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance (judgment of 8 December 2016, Eurosaneamientos and Others, C‑532/15 and C‑538/15, EU:C:2016:932, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

103. The Court of Justice has indeed held that national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements that, first, apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory, and, secondly, affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and those from other Member States are not liable to hinder, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the meaning of the case-law initiated by Dassonville (8/74, EU:C:1974:82) (see, inter alia, judgments in Keck and Mithouard , C‑267/91 and C‑268/91, EU:C:1993:905, paragraph 16, and in Ahokainen and Leppik , C‑434/04, EU:C:2006:609, paragraph 19).

16 By contrast, contrary to what has previously been decided, the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment (Case 8/74 [1974] ECR 837), so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States.

82 Accordingly, by contrast with the benefits provided by organisations charged with the management of compulsory social security schemes of the kind referred to in Poucet and Pistre, cited above, the amount of the benefits provided by the Fund depends on the financial results of the investments made by it, in respect of which it is subject, like an insurance company, to supervision by the Insurance Board.

102 In that regard, first, it should be recalled that preventing and combating money laundering and terrorist financing constitute a legitimate aim capable of justifying a barrier to the freedom to provide services (judgment in Jyske Bank Gibraltar, C‑212/11, EU:C:2013:270, paragraphs 62 to 64 and 85 and the case-law cited).

85. It follows from all the above considerations that the answer to the question submitted is that: – Article 22(2) of Directive 2005/60 must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State which requires credit institutions to communicate the information required for the purpose of combating money laundering and terrorist financing directly to the FIU of that Member State where the institutions carry out their activities in that State under the freedom to provide services, to the extent that that legislation does not compromise the effectiveness of that directive and of Decision 2000/642; – Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding such legislation if the latter is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest, secures the attainment of the aim in view and does not go beyond that which is necessary in order to attain it, and is applied in a non-discriminatory manner, which it is for the national court to ascertain taking account of the following considerations: – such legislation is appropriate to attain the aim of preventing money laundering and terrorist financing if it enables the Member State concerned effectively to supervise and suspend suspicious financial transactions concluded by credit institutions offering their services in the national territory and, if appropriate, to pursue and punish those responsible; – the obligation imposed by that legislation on credit institutions carrying out their activities under the freedom to provide services may constitute a proportionate measure in pursuit of that aim in the absence, at the time of the facts in the main proceedings, of any effective mechanism guaranteeing full and complete cooperation between FIUs. Costs

52. However, the Court has accepted that national legislation may constitute a justified restriction on a fundamental freedom when it is dictated by reasons of an economic nature in the pursuit of an objective in the public interest (see, to that effect, Case C‑141/07 Commission v Germany [2008] ECR I‑6935, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).

25. Moreover, as the Commission contends, if the procedure in question is, in fact, intended mostly to protect consumers, the Italian Government has also failed to show in what way that procedure is necessary and proportionate to that objective. Less restrictive measures exist for the prevention of such residual risks as misleading consumers, such as notification of the marketing of the product in question of the competent authority by the manufacturer or distributor of that product together with transmission of a model of the labelling and the obligation requiring the manufacturer or the distributor of that product to furnish, if necessary, evidence of the accuracy of the factual data appearing on the label (see, to that effect, Case C-77/97 Unilever [1999] ECR I-431, paragraph 35, and Case C-221/00 Commission v Austria [2003] ECR I-1007, paragraphs 49 and 52).

35 It is possible to ensure the protection of consumers, public health and fair trading by adopting measures which are less restrictive of the free movement of goods than the automatic exclusion of advertising by a system that prohibits the advertising of substances not expressly listed in the Kosmetikverordnung. Thus, the controls exercised by the national authorities could take the form, inter alia, of an obligation requiring the manufacturer or distributor of the product in question, in the event of any uncertainty, to furnish evidence of the accuracy of the advertisements concerned, in the manner provided for by Article 6 of Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising (OJ 1984 L 250, p. 17).

16. It must be recalled that, to be caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU, an agreement must have ‘as [its] object or effect’ the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. According to established case-law since the judgment in LTM (56/65, EU:C:1996:38), the alternative nature of that requirement, indicated by the conjunction ‘or’, leads, first of all, to the need to consider the precise object of the agreement in the economic context in which it is to be applied (see, inter alia, judgments in Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique , C‑439/09, EU:C:2011:649, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited, and Allianz Hungária Biztosító and Others , C‑32/11, EU:C:2013:160, paragraph 33).

26 In that regard, first, the producers and exporters of the product in question which have been charged with practising dumping on the basis of information relating to their business activities may be individually concerned (see, to that effect, judgment in Valimar, C‑374/12, EU:C:2014:2231, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

30. Regulations imposing an anti-dumping duty, although by their nature and scope of a legislative nature, may be of direct and individual concern to those producers and exporters of the product in question who are charged with practising dumping on the basis of information originating from their business activities. Generally, that is the case with those exporters and producers who are able to establish that they were identified in the measures adopted by the Commission and the Council or were concerned by the preliminary investigations (see, to that effect, judgment in Allied Corporation and Others v Commission , 239/82 and 275/82, EU:C:1984:68, paragraphs 11 and 12).

49. Secondly, the Court of First Instance was correct in holding, in paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal, that registrations already made in Member States are only factors which may merely be taken into consideration, without being given decisive weight, for the purposes of registering a Community trade mark (see, to that effect, with regard to registration of national trade marks in various Member States by application of Directive 89/104, Henkel , paragraphs 62 and 63). It is appropriate to add that there is no provision in Regulation No 40/94 requiring OHIM or, on appeal, the Court of First Instance, to come to the same conclusions as those arrived at by national authorities in similar circumstances (see, to that effect, DKV v OHIM , paragraph 39).

58. In this respect, the Court has held that the exercise of the rights conferred by EU law is not made impossible in practice or excessively difficult merely by the fact that a procedure for the judicial review of decisions of the administrative authorities does not allow complete review of those decisions. However, also according to that case-law, any national judicial review procedure must none the less enable the court or tribunal hearing an application for annulment of such a decision to apply effectively the relevant principles and rules of EU law when reviewing the lawfulness of the decision (see, to that effect, judgments in Upjohn , C‑120/97, EU:C:1999:14, paragraphs 30, 35 and 36, and HLH Warenvertrieb and Orthica , C‑211/03, C‑299/03 and C‑316/03 to C‑318/03, EU:C:2005:370, paragraphs 75 to 77). Judicial review that is limited as regards the assessment of certain questions of fact is thus compatible with EU law, on condition that it enables the court or tribunal hearing an application for annulment of such a decision to apply effectively the relevant principles and rules of EU law when reviewing the lawfulness of the decision (see, to that effect, judgment in HLH Warenvertrieb and Orthica , C‑211/03, C‑299/03 and C‑316/03 to C‑318/03, EU:C:2005:370, paragraph 79).

77. The Court none the less observed, at paragraph 36 of the judgment in Upjohn II , that any national procedure for judicial review of decisions of national authorities revoking marketing authorisations must enable the court or tribunal seised of an application for annulment of such a decision effectively to apply the relevant principles and rules of Community law when reviewing its legality.

68. It should also be added that the fact that the Cantine were interveners in the proceedings relating to the security brought by DAI before the Italian courts did not prevent them from bringing parallel proceedings to establish liability before the Court of Justice under Article 235 EC. That provision specifically confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Community Courts to hear actions for compensation under the second paragraph of Article 288 EC brought against the Community (see, inter alia, Joined Cases 106/87 to 120/87 Asteris and Others [1988] ECR 5515, paragraph 15).

49. In that regard, the scheme of part-time work for older employees is intended to reduce the normal working time, either by reducing the working hours at a uniform rate throughout the entire period concerned (part-time model), or by allowing the person concerned to cease work at an earlier date (two-stage model). In each case the scheme affects the exercise of the occupation of the workers concerned by adjusting their working time (see, to that effect, Case C-187/00 Kutz-Bauer [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 44).

44. In that regard, the scheme of part-time work for older employees is intended to reduce the normal working time, either by reducing the working hours at a uniform rate throughout the entire period concerned, or by allowing the person concerned to cease work at an earlier date. In each case the scheme affects the exercise of the occupation of the workers concerned by adjusting their working time.

44. Where goods or services acquired by a taxable person are used for purposes of transactions that are exempt or do not fall within the scope of VAT, no output tax can be collected or input tax deducted (see Case C‑184/04 Uudenkaupungin kaupunki [2006] ECR I‑3039, paragraph 24, and Vereniging Noordelijke Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie , paragraph 28).

56 According to settled case-law, the purpose of the first paragraph of Article 234 of the Treaty is to make clear, in accordance with the principles of international law, that application of the Treaty does not affect the commitment of the Member State concerned to respect the rights of non-member States under an earlier agreement and to comply with its corresponding obligations (see Case C-324/93 Evans Medical and Macfarlan Smith [1995] ECR I-563, paragraph 27).

27 However, as the judgment in Case C-158/91 Levy [1993] ECR I-4287 explains, the purpose of the first paragraph of Article 234 of the Treaty is to make clear, in accordance with the principles of international law, that application of the Treaty does not affect the commitment of the Member State concerned to respect the rights of non-member States under an earlier agreement and to comply with its corresponding obligations.

52. It follows that, in exercising that power, the Member State concerned must put forward concrete, objective and verifiable evidence of a serious risk of evasion, avoidance or abuse (see, to that effect, Italy v Commission , paragraph 52) and that the conditions laid down by that Member State by virtue of the power thus conferred on it cannot go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective.

32 As the Court held in paragraph 63 of its judgment in Martínez Sala, cited above, a citizen of the European Union, lawfully resident in the territory of a host Member State, can rely on Article 6 of the Treaty in all situations which fall within the scope ratione materiae of Community law.

63 It follows that a citizen of the European Union, such as the appellant in the main proceedings, lawfully resident in the territory of the host Member State, can rely on Article 6 of the Treaty in all situations which fall within the scope ratione materiae of Community law, including the situation where that Member State delays or refuses to grant to that claimant a benefit that is provided to all persons lawfully resident in the territory of that State on the ground that the claimant is not in possession of a document which nationals of that same State are not required to have and the issue of which may be delayed or refused by the authorities of that State.

31 The same applies to obligations arising between two jointly and severally liable debtors, such as the parties to the main proceedings, and in particular to the possibility for a jointly and severally liable debtor who has paid, in whole or in part, the other debtor’s share in the common debt to reclaim the amount thus paid by bringing a recourse claim (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 October 2016, Kostanjevec, C‑185/15, EU:C:2016:763, paragraph 38). As the Advocate General has observed in point 31 of his Opinion, given that the purpose of the action in the main proceedings is itself linked to the existence of that contract, it would be artificial, for the purposes of the application of Regulation No 1215/2012, to separate those legal relationships from the contract which gave rise to them and on which they are based.