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9d1ad4ec8c47-4 | FIN6 has used credentials stolen from various systems on which it gathered usernames and password hashes.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)(Citation: Visa FIN6 Feb 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.003|Archive via Custom Method|
FIN6 has encoded data gathered from the victim with a simple substitution cipher and single-byte XOR using the 0xAA key, and Base64 with character permutation.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro FIN6 October 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560|Archive Collected Data|Following data collection,
FIN6 has compressed log files into a ZIP archive prior to staging and exfiltration.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1573.002|Asymmetric Cryptography|
FIN6 used the Plink command-line utility to create SSH tunnels to C2 servers.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1068|Exploitation for Privilege Escalation|
FIN6 has used tools to exploit Windows vulnerabilities in order to escalate privileges. The tools targeted CVE-2013-3660, CVE-2011-2005, and CVE-2010-4398, all of which could allow local users to access kernel-level privileges.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory|
FIN6 has used
Windows Credential Editor for credential dumping.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)
FIN6 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for various malware it uses, including downloaders known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD and | FIN6.md |
9d1ad4ec8c47-5 | FIN6 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for various malware it uses, including downloaders known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD and
FrameworkPOS.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
FIN6 has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence for its downloader tools known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network,Office 365,Azure AD,IaaS,Google Workspace|T1059|Command and Scripting Interpreter|
FIN6 has used scripting to iterate through a list of compromised PoS systems, copy data to a log file, and remove the original data files.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1087.002|Domain Account|
FIN6 has used Metasploit’s
PsExec NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the victim's Active Directory database.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1018|Remote System Discovery|
FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft's built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers,Network|T1046|Network Service Discovery|
FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft's built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell| | FIN6.md |
9d1ad4ec8c47-6 | FIN6 has used PowerShell to gain access to merchant's networks, and a Metasploit PowerShell module to download and execute shellcode and to set up a local listener.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)(Citation: Visa FIN6 Feb 2019)| | FIN6.md |
ba5976cbfaeb-0 | FIN7 - G0046
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:09.460Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T03:51:04.185Z
Contributors: Edward Millington
Aliases
FIN7,GOLD NIAGARA,ITG14,Carbon Spider
Description
FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013 primarily targeting the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. A portion of
FIN7 was run out of a front company called Combi Security. Since 2020
FIN7 shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of
REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside.
FIN7 may be linked to the
Carbanak Group, but there appears to be several groups using
Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)
Techniques Used
FIN7 actors have mailed USB drives to potential victims containing malware that downloads and installs various backdoors, including in some cases for ransomware operations.(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1005|Data from Local System|
FIN7 has collected files and other sensitive information from a compromised network.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1567.002|Exfiltration to Cloud Storage|
FIN7 has exfiltrated stolen data to the MEGA file sharing site.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1021.005|VNC| | FIN7.md |
ba5976cbfaeb-1 | FIN7 has used TightVNC to control compromised hosts.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,IaaS|T1486|Data Encrypted for Impact|
FIN7 has encrypted virtual disk volumes on ESXi servers using a version of Darkside ransomware.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1210|Exploitation of Remote Services|
FIN7 has exploited ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) against vulnerable domain controllers.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1021.001|Remote Desktop Protocol|
FIN7 has used RDP to move laterally in victim environments.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)
|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS|T1021.004|SSH|
FIN7 has used SSH to move laterally through victim environments.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts|
FIN7 has harvested valid administrative credentials for lateral movement.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1558.003|Kerberoasting|
FIN7 has used Kerberoasting for credential access and to enable lateral movement.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location| | FIN7.md |
ba5976cbfaeb-2 | FIN7 has attempted to run Darkside ransomware with the filename sleep.exe.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
FIN7 has conducted broad phishing campaigns using malicious links.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link|
FIN7 has used malicious links to lure victims into downloading malware.(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
FIN7 has used WMI to install malware on targeted systems.(Citation: eSentire FIN7 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
FIN7 has registered look-alike domains for use in phishing campaigns.(Citation: eSentire FIN7 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1008|Fallback Channels|
FIN7's Harpy backdoor malware can use DNS as a backup channel for C2 if HTTP fails.(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1587.001|Malware|
FIN7 has developed malware for use in operations, including the creation of infected removable media.(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Oct 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.007|JavaScript| | FIN7.md |
ba5976cbfaeb-3 | FIN7 used JavaScript scripts to help perform tasks on the victim's machine.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: Flashpoint FIN 7 March 2019)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1571|Non-Standard Port|
FIN7 has used port-protocol mismatches on ports such as 53, 80, 443, and 8080 during C2.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
FIN7 used VBS scripts to help perform tasks on the victim's machine.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: Flashpoint FIN 7 March 2019)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
FIN7 used the command prompt to launch commands on the victim’s machine.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: Flashpoint FIN 7 March 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1497.002|User Activity Based Checks|
FIN7 used images embedded into document lures that only activate the payload when a user double clicks to avoid sandboxes.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
FIN7 sent spearphishing emails with either malicious Microsoft Documents or RTF files attached.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: DOJ FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: Flashpoint FIN 7 March 2019)(Citation: eSentire FIN7 July 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1125|Video Capture| | FIN7.md |
ba5976cbfaeb-4 | FIN7 created a custom video recording capability that could be used to monitor operations in the victim's environment.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: DOJ FIN7 Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1543.003|Windows Service|
FIN7 created new Windows services and added them to the startup directories for persistence.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|macOS,Windows|T1553.002|Code Signing|
FIN7 has signed
Carbanak payloads with legally purchased code signing certificates.
FIN7 has also digitally signed their phishing documents, backdoors and other staging tools to bypass security controls.(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network,Office 365,Azure AD,IaaS,Google Workspace|T1059|Command and Scripting Interpreter|
FIN7 used SQL scripts to help perform tasks on the victim's machine.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: Flashpoint FIN 7 March 2019)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
FIN7 lured victims to double-click on images in the attachments they sent which would then execute the hidden LNK file.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: eSentire FIN7 July 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102.002|Bidirectional Communication|
FIN7 used legitimate services like Google Docs, Google Scripts, and Pastebin for C2.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.004|DNS| | FIN7.md |
ba5976cbfaeb-5 | FIN7 has performed C2 using DNS via A, OPT, and TXT records.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1113|Screen Capture|
FIN7 captured screenshots and desktop video recordings.(Citation: DOJ FIN7 Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.010|Command Obfuscation|
FIN7 has used fragmented strings, environment variables, standard input (stdin), and native character-replacement functionalities to obfuscate commands.(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1559.002|Dynamic Data Exchange|
FIN7 spear phishing campaigns have included malicious Word documents with DDE execution.(Citation: CyberScoop FIN7 Oct 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1218.005|Mshta|
FIN7 has used mshta.exe to execute VBScript to execute malicious code on victim systems.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
FIN7 used a PowerShell script to launch shellcode that retrieved an additional payload.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: Morphisec FIN7 June 2017)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task| | FIN7.md |
ba5976cbfaeb-6 | FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: Morphisec FIN7 June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: Flashpoint FIN 7 March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
FIN7 has downloaded additional malware to execute on the victim's machine, including by using a PowerShell script to launch shellcode that retrieves an additional payload.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: DOJ FIN7 Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1546.011|Application Shimming|
FIN7 has used application shim databases for persistence.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Shim Databases)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1036.004|Masquerade Task or Service|
FIN7 has created a scheduled task named “AdobeFlashSync” to establish persistence.(Citation: Morphisec FIN7 June 2017)| | FIN7.md |
91041801a327-0 | FIN8 - G0061
Created: 2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T03:52:13.089Z
Contributors: Daniyal Naeem, BT Security
Aliases
FIN8
Description
FIN8 is a financially motivated threat group known to launch tailored spearphishing campaigns targeting the retail, restaurant, and hospitality industries. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)
Techniques Used
FIN8 has injected malicious code into a new svchost.exe process.(Citation: Bitdefender FIN8 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
FIN8 has used HTTPS for command and control.(Citation: Bitdefender FIN8 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1546.003|Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription|
FIN8 has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender FIN8 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1134.001|Token Impersonation/Theft|
FIN8 has used a malicious framework designed to impersonate the lsass.exe/vmtoolsd.exe token.(Citation: Bitdefender FIN8 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102|Web Service|
FIN8 has used
FIN8 has retrieved a list of trusted domains by using
Nltest.exe /domain_trusts
FIN8 has used emails with malicious links to lure victims into installing malware.(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)(Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File| | FIN8.md |
91041801a327-1 | FIN8 has used malicious e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing malware.(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)(Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1068|Exploitation for Privilege Escalation|
FIN8 has exploited the CVE-2016-0167 local vulnerability.(Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
FIN8's malicious spearphishing payloads use WMI to launch malware and spawn cmd.exe execution.
FIN8 has also used WMIC for lateral movement as well as during and post compromise cleanup activities.(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)(Citation: Bitdefender FIN8 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
FIN8 has used scheduled tasks to maintain RDP backdoors.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.001|Archive via Utility|
FIN8 has used RAR to compress collected data before exfiltration.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1573.002|Asymmetric Cryptography|
FIN8 has used the Plink utility to tunnel RDP back to C2 infrastructure.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
FIN8 has used remote code execution to download subsequent payloads.(Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)(Citation: Bitdefender FIN8 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.001|Remote Desktop Protocol| | FIN8.md |
91041801a327-2 | FIN8 has used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1112|Modify Registry|
FIN8 has deleted Registry keys during post compromise cleanup activities.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS|T1074.002|Remote Data Staging|
FIN8 aggregates staged data from a network into a single location.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.010|Command Obfuscation|
FIN8 has used environment variables and standard input (stdin) to obfuscate command-line arguments.
FIN8 also obfuscates malicious macros delivered as payloads.(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)(Citation: Bitdefender FIN8 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.002|SMB/Windows Admin Shares|
FIN8 has attempted to map to C$ on enumerated hosts to test the scope of their current credentials/context.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1018|Remote System Discovery|
FIN8 has used
dsquery and other Active Directory utilities to enumerate hosts; they have also used
FIN8 has used Registry keys to detect and avoid executing in potential sandboxes.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1070.001|Clear Windows Event Logs|
FIN8 has cleared logs during post compromise cleanup activities.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1048.003|Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol| | FIN8.md |
91041801a327-3 | FIN8 has used FTP to exfiltrate collected data.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion|
FIN8 has deleted tmp and prefetch files during post compromise cleanup activities.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory|
FIN8 harvests credentials using Invoke-Mimikatz or Windows Credentials Editor (WCE).(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing links to malicious documents with embedded macros.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts|
FIN8 has used valid accounts for persistence and lateral movement.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing Word documents with embedded malicious macros.(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)(Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
FIN8's malicious spearphishing payloads are executed as
PowerShell.
FIN8 has also used
PowerShell for lateral movement and credential access.(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)(Citation: Bitdefender FIN8 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell| | FIN8.md |
91041801a327-4 | FIN8 has used a Batch file to automate frequently executed post compromise cleanup activities.(Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)
FIN8 has also executed commands remotely via
cmd.(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)(Citation: Bitdefender FIN8 July 2021)| | FIN8.md |
824bc7e5d484-0 | Fox Kitten - G0117
Created: 2020-12-21T21:49:47.307Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T03:53:37.888Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Fox Kitten,UNC757,Parisite,Pioneer Kitten
Description
Fox Kitten is threat actor with a suspected nexus to the Iranian government that has been active since at least 2017 against entities in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America. Fox Kitten has targeted multiple industrial verticals including oil and gas, technology, government, defense, healthcare, manufacturing, and engineering.(Citation: ClearkSky Fox Kitten February 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike PIONEER KITTEN August 2020)(Citation: Dragos PARISITE )(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)
Techniques Used
Fox Kitten has base64 encoded scripts to avoid detection.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102|Web Service|
Fox Kitten has used Amazon Web Services to host C2.(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1585.001|Social Media Accounts|
Fox Kitten has used a Twitter account to communicate with ransomware victims.(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1585|Establish Accounts|
Fox Kitten has created KeyBase accounts to communicate with ransomware victims.(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)(Citation: Check Point Pay2Key November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1090|Proxy| | Fox_Kitten.md |
824bc7e5d484-1 | Fox Kitten has used the open source reverse proxy tools including FRPC and Go Proxy to establish connections from C2 to local servers.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)(Citation: Check Point Pay2Key November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1136.001|Local Account|
Fox Kitten has created a local user account with administrator privileges.(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1110|Brute Force|
Fox Kitten has brute forced RDP credentials.(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network,Office 365,Azure AD,IaaS,Google Workspace|T1059|Command and Scripting Interpreter|
Fox Kitten has used a Perl reverse shell to communicate with C2.(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.001|Archive via Utility|
Fox Kitten has used 7-Zip to archive data.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Fox Kitten has downloaded additional tools including
PsExec directly to endpoints.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|IaaS,SaaS|T1530|Data from Cloud Storage|
Fox Kitten has obtained files from the victim's cloud storage instances.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1005|Data from Local System| | Fox_Kitten.md |
824bc7e5d484-2 | Fox Kitten has searched local system resources to access sensitive documents.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1039|Data from Network Shared Drive|
Fox Kitten has searched network shares to access sensitive documents.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS,SaaS,Office 365,Google Workspace,IaaS|T1213|Data from Information Repositories|
Fox Kitten has accessed victim security and IT environments and Microsoft Teams to mine valuable information.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1021.005|VNC|
Fox Kitten has installed TightVNC server and client on compromised servers and endpoints for lateral movement.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS|T1021.004|SSH|
Fox Kitten has used the PuTTY and Plink tools for lateral movement.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.002|SMB/Windows Admin Shares|
Fox Kitten has used valid accounts to access SMB shares.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1217|Browser Information Discovery|
Fox Kitten has used Google Chrome bookmarks to identify internal resources and assets.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.001|Remote Desktop Protocol| | Fox_Kitten.md |
824bc7e5d484-3 | Fox Kitten has used RDP to log in and move laterally in the target environment.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1087.002|Domain Account|
Fox Kitten has used the Softerra LDAP browser to browse documentation on service accounts.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1087.001|Local Account|
Fox Kitten has accessed ntuser.dat and UserClass.dat on compromised hosts.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1012|Query Registry|
Fox Kitten has accessed Registry hives ntuser.dat and UserClass.dat.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1018|Remote System Discovery|
Fox Kitten has used Angry IP Scanner to detect remote systems.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|
Fox Kitten has used WizTree to obtain network files and directory listings.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.003|NTDS|
Fox Kitten has used Volume Shadow Copy to access credential information from NTDS.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1552.001|Credentials In Files| | Fox_Kitten.md |
824bc7e5d484-4 | Fox Kitten has accessed files to gain valid credentials.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555.005|Password Managers|
Fox Kitten has used scripts to access credential information from the KeePass database.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory|
Fox Kitten has used prodump to dump credentials from LSASS.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1036.004|Masquerade Task or Service|
Fox Kitten has named the task for a reverse proxy lpupdate to appear legitimate.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Fox Kitten has base64 encoded payloads to avoid detection.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Fox Kitten has used PowerShell scripts to access credential data.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Fox Kitten has named binaries and configuration files svhost and dllhost respectively to appear legitimate.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1546.008|Accessibility Features|
Fox Kitten has used sticky keys to launch a command prompt.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task| | Fox_Kitten.md |
824bc7e5d484-5 | Fox Kitten has used Scheduled Tasks for persistence and to load and execute a reverse proxy binary.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Fox Kitten has used cmd.exe likely as a password changing mechanism.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS,Network|T1505.003|Web Shell|
Fox Kitten has installed web shells on compromised hosts to maintain access.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts|
Fox Kitten has used valid credentials with various services during lateral movement.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers,Network|T1046|Network Service Discovery|
Fox Kitten has used tools including NMAP to conduct broad scanning to identify open ports.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1572|Protocol Tunneling|
Fox Kitten has used protocol tunneling for communication and RDP activity on compromised hosts through the use of open source tools such as
Ngrok and custom tool SSHMinion.(Citation: CrowdStrike PIONEER KITTEN August 2020)(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Network,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1190|Exploit Public-Facing Application| | Fox_Kitten.md |
824bc7e5d484-6 | Fox Kitten has exploited known vulnerabilities in Fortinet, PulseSecure, and Palo Alto VPN appliances.(Citation: ClearkSky Fox Kitten February 2020)(Citation: Dragos PARISITE )(Citation: CrowdStrike PIONEER KITTEN August 2020)(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1210|Exploitation of Remote Services|
Fox Kitten has exploited known vulnerabilities in remote services including RDP.(Citation: ClearkSky Fox Kitten February 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike PIONEER KITTEN August 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)| | Fox_Kitten.md |
4873e8a7a0a3-0 | GALLIUM - G0093
Created: 2019-07-18T20:47:50.050Z
Modified: 2022-08-12T21:26:22.303Z
Contributors: Daniyal Naeem, BT Security,Cybereason Nocturnus, @nocturnus
Aliases
GALLIUM,Operation Soft Cell
Description
GALLIUM is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targeting telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam. Security researchers have identified GALLIUM as a likely Chinese state-sponsored group, based in part on tools used and TTPs commonly associated with Chinese threat actors.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 PingPull Jun 2022)
Techniques Used
GALLIUM has used Taiwan-based servers that appear to be exclusive to
GALLIUM.(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1570|Lateral Tool Transfer|
GALLIUM has used
PsExec to move laterally between hosts in the target network.(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
GALLIUM has used a variety of widely-available tools, which in some cases they modified to add functionality and/or subvert antimalware solutions.(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows|T1553.002|Code Signing|
GALLIUM has used stolen certificates to sign its tools including those from Whizzimo LLC.(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1041|Exfiltration Over C2 Channel|
GALLIUM used Web shells and | GALLIUM.md |
4873e8a7a0a3-1 | GALLIUM used Web shells and
HTRAN for C2 and to exfiltrate data.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.005|Indicator Removal from Tools|
GALLIUM ensured each payload had a unique hash, including by using different types of packers.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1550.002|Pass the Hash|
GALLIUM used dumped hashes to authenticate to other machines via pass the hash.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1005|Data from Local System|
GALLIUM collected data from the victim's local system, including password hashes from the SAM hive in the Registry.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1018|Remote System Discovery|
GALLIUM used a modified version of
NBTscan to identify available NetBIOS name servers over the network as well as
GALLIUM has used VPN services, including SoftEther VPN, to access and maintain persistence in victim environments.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.001|Archive via Utility|
GALLIUM used WinRAR to compress and encrypt stolen data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1074.001|Local Data Staging|
GALLIUM compressed and staged files in multi-part archives in the Recycle Bin prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information| | GALLIUM.md |
4873e8a7a0a3-2 | GALLIUM used a modified version of
HTRAN in which they obfuscated strings such as debug messages in an apparent attempt to evade detection.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1090.002|External Proxy|
GALLIUM used a modified version of
HTRAN to redirect connections between networks.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1027.002|Software Packing|
GALLIUM packed some payloads using different types of packers, both known and custom.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
GALLIUM established persistence for
PoisonIvy by created a scheduled task.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1036.003|Rename System Utilities|
GALLIUM used a renamed cmd.exe file to evade detection.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
GALLIUM dropped additional tools to victims during their operation, including portqry.exe, a renamed cmd.exe file, winrar, and
HTRAN.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1033|System Owner/User Discovery|
GALLIUM used
GALLIUM used
GALLIUM used
NBTscan to identify available NetBIOS name servers.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory|
GALLIUM used a modified version of
Mimikatz along with a PowerShell-based | GALLIUM.md |
4873e8a7a0a3-3 | GALLIUM used a modified version of
Mimikatz along with a PowerShell-based
Mimikatz to dump credentials on the victim machines.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.002|Security Account Manager|
GALLIUM used
GALLIUM used the Windows command shell to execute commands.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
GALLIUM used WMI for execution to assist in lateral movement as well as for installing tools across multiple assets.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
GALLIUM used PowerShell for execution to assist in lateral movement as well as for dumping credentials stored on compromised machines.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS,Network|T1505.003|Web Shell|
GALLIUM used Web shells to persist in victim environments and assist in execution and exfiltration.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1136.002|Domain Account|
GALLIUM created high-privileged domain user accounts to maintain access to victim networks.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts|
GALLIUM leveraged valid accounts to maintain access to a victim network.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1574.002|DLL Side-Loading|
GALLIUM used DLL side-loading to covertly load | GALLIUM.md |
4873e8a7a0a3-4 | GALLIUM used DLL side-loading to covertly load
PoisonIvy into memory on the victim machine.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Network,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1190|Exploit Public-Facing Application|
GALLIUM exploited a publicly-facing servers including Wildfly/JBoss servers to gain access to the network.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)| | GALLIUM.md |
d9fc3549a483-0 | Gallmaker - G0084
Created: 2019-01-30T14:26:42.897Z
Modified: 2020-03-30T19:04:47.798Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Gallmaker
Description
Gallmaker is a cyberespionage group that has targeted victims in the Middle East and has been active since at least December 2017. The group has mainly targeted victims in the defense, military, and government sectors.(Citation: Symantec Gallmaker Oct 2018)
Techniques Used
Gallmaker has used WinZip, likely to archive data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Symantec Gallmaker Oct 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Gallmaker sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.(Citation: Symantec Gallmaker Oct 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Gallmaker sent victims a lure document with a warning that asked victims to “enable content” for execution.(Citation: Symantec Gallmaker Oct 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Gallmaker used PowerShell to download additional payloads and for execution.(Citation: Symantec Gallmaker Oct 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1559.002|Dynamic Data Exchange|
Gallmaker attempted to exploit Microsoft’s DDE protocol in order to gain access to victim machines and for execution.(Citation: Symantec Gallmaker Oct 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Gallmaker obfuscated shellcode used during execution.(Citation: Symantec Gallmaker Oct 2018)| | Gallmaker.md |
40c14a533669-0 | Gamaredon Group - G0047
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:09.849Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T04:29:39.915Z
Contributors: ESET,Trend Micro Incorporated
Aliases
Gamaredon Group,IRON TILDEN,Primitive Bear,ACTINIUM,Armageddon,Shuckworm,DEV-0157
Description
Gamaredon Group is a suspected Russian cyber espionage threat group that has targeted military, NGO, judiciary, law enforcement, and non-profit organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name Gamaredon Group comes from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon", which was detected in the adversary's early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)
In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed Gamaredon Group to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18.(Citation: Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)
Techniques Used
Gamaredon Group has used obfuscated or encrypted scripts.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1016.001|Internet Connection Discovery|
Gamaredon Group has tested connectivity between a compromised machine and a C2 server using
Ping with commands such as
Gamaredon Group has used
Gamaredon Group has used legitimate process names to hide malware including
Gamaredon Group has used
Gamaredon Group has incorporated dynamic DNS domains in its infrastructure.(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.001|Upload Malware| | Gamaredon_Group.md |
40c14a533669-1 | Gamaredon Group has incorporated dynamic DNS domains in its infrastructure.(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.001|Upload Malware|
Gamaredon Group has registered domains to stage payloads.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
Gamaredon Group has registered multiple domains to facilitate payload staging and C2.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Gamaredon Group has used obfuscated PowerShell scripts for staging.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS|T1485|Data Destruction|
Gamaredon Group has used tools to delete files and folders from victims' desktops and profiles.(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1491.001|Internal Defacement|
Gamaredon Group has left taunting images and messages on the victims' desktops as proof of system access.(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
Gamaredon Group has used WMI to execute scripts used for discovery.(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|
Gamaredon Group has used tools to enumerate processes on target hosts including Process Explorer.(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1021.005|VNC| | Gamaredon_Group.md |
40c14a533669-2 | Gamaredon Group has used VNC tools, including UltraVNC, to remotely interact with compromised hosts.(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.011|Rundll32|
Gamaredon Group malware has used rundll32 to launch additional malicious components.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Linux,macOS|T1080|Taint Shared Content|
Gamaredon Group has injected malicious macros into all Word and Excel documents on mapped network drives.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1039|Data from Network Shared Drive|
Gamaredon Group malware has collected Microsoft Office documents from mapped network drives.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,IaaS,SaaS|T1119|Automated Collection|
Gamaredon Group has deployed scripts on compromised systems that automatically scan for interesting documents.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1020|Automated Exfiltration|
Gamaredon Group has used modules that automatically upload gathered documents to the C2 server.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1106|Native API|
Gamaredon Group malware has used
Gamaredon Group has inserted malicious macros into existing documents, providing persistence when they are reopened.
Gamaredon Group has loaded the group's previously delivered VBA project by relaunching Microsoft Outlook with the
Gamaredon Group has delivered self-extracting 7z archive files within malicious document attachments.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1112|Modify Registry| | Gamaredon_Group.md |
40c14a533669-3 | Gamaredon Group has removed security settings for VBA macro execution by changing registry values
Gamaredon Group has used an Outlook VBA module on infected systems to send phishing emails with malicious attachments to other employees within the organization.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Containers,IaaS|T1562.001|Disable or Modify Tools|
Gamaredon Group has delivered macros which can tamper with Microsoft Office security settings.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|
Gamaredon Group macros can scan for Microsoft Word and Excel files to inject with additional malicious macros.
Gamaredon Group has also used its backdoors to automatically list interesting files (such as Office documents) found on a system.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.001|Binary Padding|
Gamaredon Group has obfuscated .NET executables by inserting junk code.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.004|Compile After Delivery|
Gamaredon Group has compiled the source code for a downloader directly on the infected system using the built-in
Gamaredon Group has created scheduled tasks to launch executables after a designated number of minutes have passed.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102|Web Service|
Gamaredon Group has used GitHub repositories for downloaders which will be obtained by the group's .NET executable on the compromised system.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1559.001|Component Object Model| | Gamaredon_Group.md |
40c14a533669-4 | Gamaredon Group malware can insert malicious macros into documents using a
Gamaredon Group has collected files from infected systems and uploaded them to a C2 server.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1113|Screen Capture|
Gamaredon Group's malware can take screenshots of the compromised computer every minute.(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Gamaredon Group has delivered spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to targets.(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Gamaredon Group has attempted to get users to click on Office attachments with malicious macros embedded.(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1221|Template Injection|
Gamaredon Group has used DOCX files to download malicious DOT document templates and has used RTF template injection to download malicious payloads.(Citation: Proofpoint RTF Injection) | Gamaredon_Group.md |
40c14a533669-5 | Gamaredon Group has used DOCX files to download malicious DOT document templates and has used RTF template injection to download malicious payloads.(Citation: Proofpoint RTF Injection)
Gamaredon Group can also inject malicious macros or remote templates into documents already present on compromised systems.(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
Gamaredon Group has embedded malicious macros in document templates, which executed VBScript.
Gamaredon Group has also delivered Microsoft Outlook VBA projects with embedded macros.(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
Gamaredon Group tools decrypted additional payloads from the C2.
Gamaredon Group has also decoded base64-encoded source code of a downloader.(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Gamaredon Group tools have registered Run keys in the registry to give malicious VBS files persistence.(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion| | Gamaredon_Group.md |
40c14a533669-6 | Gamaredon Group tools can delete files used during an operation.(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1120|Peripheral Device Discovery|
Gamaredon Group tools have contained an application to check performance of USB flash drives.
Gamaredon Group has also used malware to scan for removable drives.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1041|Exfiltration Over C2 Channel|A
Gamaredon Group file stealer can transfer collected files to a hardcoded C2 server.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1025|Data from Removable Media|A
Gamaredon Group file stealer has the capability to steal data from newly connected logical volumes on a system, including USB drives.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Gamaredon Group has used HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Gamaredon Group has used various batch scripts to establish C2 and download additional files. | Gamaredon_Group.md |
40c14a533669-7 | Gamaredon Group has used various batch scripts to establish C2 and download additional files.
Gamaredon Group's backdoor malware has also been written to a batch file.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1033|System Owner/User Discovery|A
Gamaredon Group file stealer can gather the victim's username to send to a C2 server.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Gamaredon Group has downloaded additional malware and tools onto a compromised host.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|A
Gamaredon Group file stealer can gather the victim's computer name and drive serial numbers to send to a C2 server.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: CERT-EE Gamaredon January 2021)| | Gamaredon_Group.md |
b59967d7b702-0 | GCMAN - G0036
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:05.611Z
Modified: 2020-03-30T19:03:44.853Z
Contributors:
Aliases
GCMAN
Description
GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services. (Citation: Securelist GCMAN)
Techniques Used
|Matrix|Domain|Platform|Technique ID|Technique Name|Use|
| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1021.005|VNC|GCMAN uses VNC for lateral movement.(Citation: Securelist GCMAN)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS|T1021.004|SSH|GCMAN uses Putty for lateral movement.(Citation: Securelist GCMAN)| | GCMAN.md |
ece684920986-0 | GOLD SOUTHFIELD - G0115
Created: 2020-09-22T19:41:27.845Z
Modified: 2023-03-28T20:49:53.223Z
Contributors: Thijn Bukkems, Amazon
Aliases
GOLD SOUTHFIELD,Pinchy Spider
Description
GOLD SOUTHFIELD is a financially motivated threat group active since at least 2018 that operates the REvil Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS). GOLD SOUTHFIELD provides backend infrastructure for affiliates recruited on underground forums to perpetrate high value deployments. By early 2020, GOLD SOUTHFIELD started capitalizing on the new trend of stealing data and further extorting the victim to pay for their data to not get publicly leaked.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SOUTHFIELD)(Citation: CrowdStrike Evolution of Pinchy Spider July 2021)
Techniques Used
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has staged and executed PowerShell scripts on compromised hosts.(Citation: Tetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.010|Command Obfuscation|
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has executed base64 encoded PowerShell scripts on compromised hosts.(Citation: Tetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1113|Screen Capture|
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used the remote monitoring and management tool ConnectWise to obtain screen captures from victim's machines.(Citation: Tetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1219|Remote Access Software|
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used the cloud-based remote management and monitoring tool "ConnectWise Control" to deploy
REvil.(Citation: Tetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1195.002|Compromise Software Supply Chain| | GOLD_SOUTHFIELD.md |
ece684920986-1 | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has distributed ransomware by backdooring software installers via a strategic web compromise of the site hosting Italian WinRAR.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SOUTHFIELD)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,IaaS,Network,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1190|Exploit Public-Facing Application|
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has exploited Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities for initial compromise.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,SaaS,Office 365,Google Workspace|T1566|Phishing|
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has conducted malicious spam (malspam) campaigns to gain access to victim's machines.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Office 365|T1199|Trusted Relationship|
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has breached Managed Service Providers (MSP's) to deliver malware to MSP customers.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Linux,Containers,macOS|T1133|External Remote Services|
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used publicly-accessible RDP and remote management and monitoring (RMM) servers to gain access to victim machines.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019) | | GOLD_SOUTHFIELD.md |
cfd977948772-0 | Gorgon Group - G0078
Created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
Modified: 2021-10-12T21:57:25.847Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Gorgon Group
Description
Gorgon Group is a threat group consisting of members who are suspected to be Pakistan-based or have other connections to Pakistan. The group has performed a mix of criminal and targeted attacks, including campaigns against government organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States. (Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)
Techniques Used
Gorgon Group has obtained and used tools such as
QuasarRAT and
Remcos.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1564.003|Hidden Window|
Gorgon Group has used
PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden. (Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
Gorgon Group malware can decode contents from a payload that was Base64 encoded and write the contents to a file.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Gorgon Group malware can download additional files from C2 servers.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1055.002|Portable Executable Injection|
Gorgon Group malware can download a remote access tool,
ShiftyBug, and inject into another process.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1055.012|Process Hollowing| | Gorgon_Group.md |
cfd977948772-1 | ShiftyBug, and inject into another process.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1055.012|Process Hollowing|
Gorgon Group malware can use process hollowing to inject one of its trojans into another process.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Gorgon Group sent emails to victims with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
Gorgon Group has used macros in
Spearphishing Attachments as well as executed VBScripts on victim machines.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Containers,IaaS|T1562.001|Disable or Modify Tools|
Gorgon Group malware can attempt to disable security features in Microsoft Office and Windows Defender using the
Gorgon Group malware can use cmd.exe to download and execute payloads and to execute commands on the system.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.009|Shortcut Modification|
Gorgon Group malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Gorgon Group malware can use PowerShell commands to download and execute a payload and open a decoy document on the victim’s machine.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder| | Gorgon_Group.md |
cfd977948772-2 | Gorgon Group malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1106|Native API|
Gorgon Group malware can leverage the Windows API call, CreateProcessA(), for execution.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Gorgon Group attempted to get users to launch malicious Microsoft Office attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1112|Modify Registry|
Gorgon Group malware can deactivate security mechanisms in Microsoft Office by editing several keys and values under | Gorgon_Group.md |
5daefd89c141-0 | Group5 - G0043
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:08.304Z
Modified: 2020-03-30T19:07:39.812Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Group5
Description
Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. (Citation: Citizen Lab Group5)
Techniques Used
|Matrix|Domain|Platform|Technique ID|Technique Name|Use|
| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|Group5 disguised its malicious binaries with several layers of obfuscation, including encrypting the files.(Citation: Citizen Lab Group5)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion|Malware used by Group5 is capable of remotely deleting files from victims.(Citation: Citizen Lab Group5)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1113|Screen Capture|Malware used by Group5 is capable of watching the victim's screen.(Citation: Citizen Lab Group5)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1056.001|Keylogging|Malware used by Group5 is capable of capturing keystrokes.(Citation: Citizen Lab Group5)| | Group5.md |
ae4b646b8d48-0 | HAFNIUM - G0125
Created: 2021-03-03T19:40:47.280Z
Modified: 2023-04-10T21:54:46.756Z
Contributors: Daniyal Naeem, BT Security,Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group,Mayuresh Dani, Qualys,Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys,Vinayak Wadhwa, SAFE Security
Aliases
HAFNIUM,Operation Exchange Marauder
Description
HAFNIUM is a likely state-sponsored cyber espionage group operating out of China that has been active since at least January 2021. HAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the US across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)
Techniques Used
HAFNIUM has collected data and files from a compromised machine.(Citation: Rapid7 HAFNIUM Mar 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1564.001|Hidden Files and Directories|
HAFNIUM has hidden files on a compromised host.(Citation: Rapid7 HAFNIUM Mar 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|
HAFNIUM has searched file contents on a compromised host.(Citation: Rapid7 HAFNIUM Mar 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery|
HAFNIUM has collected IP information via IPInfo.(Citation: Rapid7 HAFNIUM Mar 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1016.001|Internet Connection Discovery|
HAFNIUM has checked for network connectivity from a compromised host using
HAFNIUM has used
HAFNIUM has used
HAFNIUM has enumerated domain controllers using | HAFNIUM.md |
ae4b646b8d48-1 | HAFNIUM has checked for network connectivity from a compromised host using
HAFNIUM has used
HAFNIUM has used
HAFNIUM has enumerated domain controllers using
HAFNIUM has granted privileges to domain accounts.(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
HAFNIUM has used
HAFNIUM has used
HAFNIUM has downloaded malware and tools--including Nishang and PowerCat--onto a compromised host.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)(Citation: Rapid7 HAFNIUM Mar 2021) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,Network|T1095|Non-Application Layer Protocol|
HAFNIUM has used TCP for C2.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1132.001|Standard Encoding|
HAFNIUM has used ASCII encoding for C2 traffic.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1078.003|Local Accounts|
HAFNIUM has used the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM account to create files on Exchange servers.(Citation: FireEye Exchange Zero Days March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1590.005|IP Addresses|
HAFNIUM has obtained IP addresses for publicly-accessible Exchange servers.(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1136.002|Domain Account|
HAFNIUM has created domain accounts.(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1590|Gather Victim Network Information| | HAFNIUM.md |
ae4b646b8d48-2 | HAFNIUM has created domain accounts.(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1590|Gather Victim Network Information|
HAFNIUM gathered the fully qualified domain names (FQDNs) for targeted Exchange servers in the victim's environment.(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.003|NTDS|
HAFNIUM has stolen copies of the Active Directory database (NTDS.DIT).(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589.002|Email Addresses|
HAFNIUM has collected e-mail addresses for users they intended to target.(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.001|Archive via Utility|
HAFNIUM has used 7-Zip and WinRAR to compress stolen files for exfiltration.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
HAFNIUM has used the Exchange Power Shell module
HAFNIUM has used web shells to export mailbox data.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory|
HAFNIUM has used
HAFNIUM has deployed multiple web shells on compromised servers including SIMPLESEESHARP, SPORTSBALL,
China Chopper, and | HAFNIUM.md |
ae4b646b8d48-3 | HAFNIUM has used
HAFNIUM has deployed multiple web shells on compromised servers including SIMPLESEESHARP, SPORTSBALL,
China Chopper, and
ASPXSpy.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: FireEye Exchange Zero Days March 2021)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task)(Citation: Rapid7 HAFNIUM Mar 2021) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.003|Virtual Private Server|
HAFNIUM has operated from leased virtual private servers (VPS) in the United States.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1592.004|Client Configurations|
HAFNIUM has interacted with Office 365 tenants to gather details regarding target's environments.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1567.002|Exfiltration to Cloud Storage|
HAFNIUM has exfiltrated data to file sharing sites, including MEGA.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
HAFNIUM has used open-source C2 frameworks, including Covenant.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.006|Web Services|
HAFNIUM has acquired web services for use in C2 and exfiltration.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Network,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1190|Exploit Public-Facing Application| | HAFNIUM.md |
ae4b646b8d48-4 | HAFNIUM has exploited CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 to compromise on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server, enabling access to email accounts and installation of additional malware.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: FireEye Exchange Zero Days March 2021)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) | | HAFNIUM.md |
ae40915e7d43-0 | HEXANE - G1001
Created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T04:43:59.082Z
Contributors: Dragos Threat Intelligence,Mindaugas Gudzis, BT Security
Aliases
HEXANE,Lyceum,Siamesekitten,Spirlin
Description
HEXANE is a cyber espionage threat group that has targeted oil & gas, telecommunications, aviation, and internet service provider organizations since at least 2017. Targeted companies have been located in the Middle East and Africa, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia. HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to APT33 and OilRig but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity.(Citation: Dragos Hexane)(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)(Citation: Accenture Lyceum Targets November 2021)
Techniques Used
HEXANE has acquired, and sometimes customized, open source tools such as
Mimikatz,
Empire, VNC remote access software, and DIG.net.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)(Citation: Zscaler Lyceum DnsSystem June 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518|Software Discovery|
HEXANE has enumerated programs installed on an infected machine.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
HEXANE has collected the hostname of a compromised machine.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer| | HEXANE.md |
ae40915e7d43-1 | HEXANE has downloaded additional payloads and malicious scripts onto a compromised host.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102.002|Bidirectional Communication|
HEXANE has used cloud services, including OneDrive, for C2.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1567.002|Exfiltration to Cloud Storage|
HEXANE has used cloud services, including OneDrive, for data exfiltration.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1583.002|DNS Server|
HEXANE has set up custom DNS servers to send commands to compromised hosts via TXT records.(Citation: Zscaler Lyceum DnsSystem June 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1018|Remote System Discovery|
HEXANE has used
HEXANE has used
Ping and
HEXANE has used
netstat to monitor connections to specific ports.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1016.001|Internet Connection Discovery|
HEXANE has used tools including
BITSAdmin to test internet connectivity from compromised hosts.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
HEXANE has used a scheduled task to establish persistence for a keylogger.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
HEXANE has used a VisualBasic script named
HEXANE has used a | HEXANE.md |
ae40915e7d43-2 | HEXANE has used a VisualBasic script named
HEXANE has used a
Mimikatz-based tool and a PowerShell script to steal passwords from Google Chrome.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|
HEXANE has enumerated processes on targeted systems.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1069.001|Local Groups|
HEXANE has run
HEXANE has run
HEXANE has run
HEXANE has established email accounts for use in domain registration including for ProtonMail addresses.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.010|Command Obfuscation|
HEXANE has used Base64-encoded scripts.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1608.001|Upload Malware|
HEXANE has staged malware on fraudulent websites set up to impersonate targeted organizations.(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1585.001|Social Media Accounts|
HEXANE has established fraudulent LinkedIn accounts impersonating HR department employees to target potential victims with fake job offers.(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1534|Internal Spearphishing|
HEXANE has conducted internal spearphishing attacks against executives, HR, and IT personnel to gain information and access.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1589|Gather Victim Identity Information| | HEXANE.md |
ae40915e7d43-3 | HEXANE has identified specific potential victims at targeted organizations.(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1591.004|Identify Roles|
HEXANE has identified executives, HR, and IT staff at victim organizations for further targeting.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
HEXANE has registered and operated domains for campaigns, often using a security or web technology theme or impersonating the targeted organization.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)(Citation: Dragos Hexane)(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1589.002|Email Addresses|
HEXANE has targeted executives, human resources staff, and IT personnel for spearphishing.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)
|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1021.001|Remote Desktop Protocol|
HEXANE has used remote desktop sessions for lateral movement.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1010|Application Window Discovery|
HEXANE has used a PowerShell-based keylogging tool to capture the window title.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1056.001|Keylogging|
HEXANE has used a PowerShell-based keylogger named
HEXANE has used PowerShell-based tools and scripts for discovery and collection on compromised hosts.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky APT Trends Q1 April 2021)(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File| | HEXANE.md |
ae40915e7d43-4 | HEXANE has relied on victim's executing malicious file attachments delivered via email or embedded within actor-controlled websites to deliver malware.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)(Citation: Dragos Hexane)(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)(Citation: Zscaler Lyceum DnsSystem June 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1586.002|Email Accounts|
HEXANE has used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1110|Brute Force|
HEXANE has used brute force attacks to compromise valid credentials.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers|T1110.003|Password Spraying|
HEXANE has used password spraying attacks to obtain valid credentials.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)| | HEXANE.md |
1d3af94e958c-0 | Higaisa - G0126
Created: 2021-03-05T18:54:56.267Z
Modified: 2021-04-22T02:12:43.892Z
Contributors: Daniyal Naeem, BT Security
Aliases
Higaisa
Description
Higaisa is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. Higaisa has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. Higaisa was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)(Citation: PTSecurity Higaisa 2020)
Techniques Used
Higaisa has used VBScript code on the victim's machine.(Citation: PTSecurity Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1106|Native API|
Higaisa has called various native OS APIs.(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1574.002|DLL Side-Loading|
Higaisa’s JavaScript file used a legitimate Microsoft Office 2007 package to side-load the
Higaisa used a payload that creates a hidden window.(Citation: PTSecurity Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|
Higaisa’s shellcode attempted to find the process ID of the current process.(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1029|Scheduled Transfer|
Higaisa sent the victim computer identifier in a User-Agent string back to the C2 server every 10 minutes.(Citation: PTSecurity Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery| | Higaisa.md |
1d3af94e958c-1 | Higaisa collected the system volume serial number, GUID, and computer name.(Citation: PTSecurity Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution|
Higaisa has exploited CVE-2018-0798 for execution.(Citation: PTSecurity Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Higaisa used malicious e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing LNK files.(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
Higaisa dropped and added
Higaisa has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Network|T1124|System Time Discovery|
Higaisa used a function to gather the current time.(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Higaisa added a spoofed binary to the start-up folder for persistence.(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Higaisa used
Higaisa used JavaScript to execute additional files.(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)(Citation: PTSecurity Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1036.004|Masquerade Task or Service|
Higaisa named a shellcode loader binary | Higaisa.md |
1d3af94e958c-2 | Higaisa named a shellcode loader binary
Higaisa used certutil to decode Base64 binaries at runtime and a 16-byte XOR key to decrypt data.(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1220|XSL Script Processing|
Higaisa used an XSL file to run VBScript code.(Citation: PTSecurity Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Higaisa used Base64 encoded compressed payloads.(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1090.001|Internal Proxy|
Higaisa discovered system proxy settings and used them if available.(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Higaisa used HTTP and HTTPS to send data back to its C2 server.(Citation: Malwarebytes Higaisa 2020)(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1001.003|Protocol Impersonation|
Higaisa used a FakeTLS session for C2 communications.(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1573.001|Symmetric Cryptography|
Higaisa used AES-128 to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery|
Higaisa used | Higaisa.md |
1d3af94e958c-3 | Higaisa used
Higaisa exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.001|Binary Padding|
Higaisa performed padding with null bytes before calculating its hash.(Citation: Zscaler Higaisa 2020)| | Higaisa.md |
72885bec5ed4-0 | Inception - G0100
Created: 2020-05-08T17:01:04.058Z
Modified: 2021-10-12T23:21:06.480Z
Contributors: Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB
Aliases
Inception,Inception Framework,Cloud Atlas
Description
Inception is a cyber espionage group active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple industries and governmental entities primarily in Russia, but has also been active in the United States and throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.(Citation: Unit 42 Inception November 2018)(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)
Techniques Used
Inception has obtained and used open-source tools such as
LaZagne.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518|Software Discovery|
Inception has enumerated installed software on compromised systems.(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.005|Mshta|
Inception has used malicious HTA files to drop and execute malware.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1005|Data from Local System|
Inception used a file hunting plugin to collect .txt, .pdf, .xls or .doc files from the infected host.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Inception has used PowerShell to execute malicious commands and payloads.(Citation: Unit 42 Inception November 2018)(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic| | Inception.md |
72885bec5ed4-1 | Inception has used VBScript to execute malicious commands and payloads.(Citation: Unit 42 Inception November 2018)(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1221|Template Injection|
Inception has used decoy documents to load malicious remote payloads via HTTP.(Citation: Unit 42 Inception November 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Inception has encrypted malware payloads dropped on victim machines with AES and RC4 encryption.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|
Inception used a file listing plugin to collect information about file and directories both on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution|
Inception has exploited CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-1761, CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802 for execution.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas August 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Inception November 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Inception has used HTTP, HTTPS, and WebDav in network communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)(Citation: Unit 42 Inception November 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555.003|Credentials from Web Browsers| | Inception.md |
72885bec5ed4-2 | Inception used a browser plugin to steal passwords and sessions from Internet Explorer, Chrome, Opera, Firefox, Torch, and Yandex.(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Inception lured victims into clicking malicious files for machine reconnaissance and to execute malware.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas August 2019)(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Inception November 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1090.003|Multi-hop Proxy|
Inception used chains of compromised routers to proxy C2 communications between them and cloud service providers.(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Inception has maintained persistence by modifying Registry run key value
Inception has encrypted network communications with AES.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1069.002|Domain Groups|
Inception has used specific malware modules to gather domain membership.(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.010|Regsvr32|
Inception has ensured persistence at system boot by setting the value
Inception has incorporated at least five different cloud service providers into their C2 infrastructure including CloudMe.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|
Inception has used a reconnaissance module to identify active processes and other associated loaded modules.(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery| | Inception.md |
72885bec5ed4-3 | Inception has used a reconnaissance module to gather information about the operating system and hardware on the infected host.(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Inception has used weaponized documents attached to spearphishing emails for reconnaissance and initial compromise.(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas December 2014)(Citation: Symantec Inception Framework March 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Inception November 2018)(Citation: Kaspersky Cloud Atlas August 2019)| | Inception.md |
68e0df3c7c24-0 | IndigoZebra - G0136
Created: 2021-09-24T21:41:34.797Z
Modified: 2021-10-16T02:06:06.404Z
Contributors: Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India,Yoshihiro Kori, NEC Corporation,Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India
Aliases
IndigoZebra
Description
IndigoZebra is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has been targeting Central Asian governments since at least 2014.(Citation: HackerNews IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017)
Techniques Used
IndigoZebra has compromised legitimate email accounts to use in their spearphishing operations.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
IndigoZebra has established domains, some of which were designed to look like official government domains, for their operations.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
IndigoZebra has downloaded additional files and tools from its C2 server.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
IndigoZebra has acquired open source tools such as
NBTscan and Meterpreter for their operations.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
IndigoZebra sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments that urged recipients to review modifications in the file which would trigger the attack.(Citation: HackerNews IndigoZebra July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment| | IndigoZebra.md |
68e0df3c7c24-1 | IndigoZebra sent spearphishing emails containing malicious password-protected RAR attachments.(Citation: HackerNews IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.006|Web Services|
IndigoZebra created Dropbox accounts for their operations.(Citation: HackerNews IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)| | IndigoZebra.md |
38ae47e5f08e-0 | Indrik Spider - G0119
Created: 2021-01-06T17:46:35.134Z
Modified: 2022-09-15T19:49:18.799Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Indrik Spider,Evil Corp
Description
Indrik Spider is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2014. Indrik Spider initially started with the Dridex banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using BitPaymer, WastedLocker, and Hades ransomware.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)
Techniques Used
Indrik Spider has stored collected date in a .tmp file.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Indrik Spider has attempted to get users to click on a malicious zipped file.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1018|Remote System Discovery|
Indrik Spider has used PowerView to enumerate all Windows Server, Windows Server 2003, and Windows 7 instances in the Active Directory database.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1070.001|Clear Windows Event Logs|
Indrik Spider has used
Cobalt Strike to empty log files.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1489|Service Stop|
Indrik Spider has used
PsExec to stop services prior to the execution of ransomware.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.007|JavaScript| | Indrik_Spider.md |
38ae47e5f08e-1 | Indrik Spider has used malicious JavaScript files for several components of their attack.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory|
Indrik Spider used
Cobalt Strike to carry out credential dumping using ProcDump.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Network|T1136|Create Account|
Indrik Spider used
Indrik Spider used
PsExec to leverage Windows Defender to disable scanning of all downloaded files and to restrict real-time monitoring.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
Indrik Spider has used WMIC to execute commands on remote computers.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1007|System Service Discovery|
Indrik Spider has used the win32_service WMI class to retrieve a list of services from the system.(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Indrik Spider has used batch scripts on victim's machines.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Indrik Spider has used PowerShell
Empire for execution of malware.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1078.002|Domain Accounts|
Indrik Spider has collected credentials from infected systems, including domain accounts.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer| | Indrik_Spider.md |
38ae47e5f08e-2 | Indrik Spider has downloaded additional scripts, malware, and tools onto a compromised host.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Symantec WastedLocker June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Indrik Spider used fake updates for FlashPlayer plugin and Google Chrome as initial infection vectors.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,IaaS|T1486|Data Encrypted for Impact|
Indrik Spider has encrypted domain-controlled systems using
BitPaymer.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1484.001|Group Policy Modification|
Indrik Spider has used Group Policy Objects to deploy batch scripts.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1584.004|Server|
Indrik Spider has served fake updates via legitimate websites that have been compromised.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018) | | Indrik_Spider.md |
470224a432c1-0 | Ke3chang - G0004
Created: 2017-05-31T21:31:47.177Z
Modified: 2022-07-22T18:52:32.762Z
Contributors: Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India,Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India,Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation
Aliases
Ke3chang,APT15,Mirage,Vixen Panda,GREF,Playful Dragon,RoyalAPT,NICKEL
Description
Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. Ke3chang has targeted oil, government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since at least 2010.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)
Techniques Used
Ke3chang has used implants to collect the system language ID of a compromised machine.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Google Workspace|T1078.004|Cloud Accounts|
Ke3chang has used compromised credentials to sign into victims’ Microsoft 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Ke3chang has used tools to download files to compromised machines.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1020|Automated Exfiltration|
Ke3chang has performed frequent and scheduled data exfiltration from compromised networks.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,IaaS,SaaS|T1119|Automated Collection| | Ke3chang.md |
470224a432c1-1 | Ke3chang has performed frequent and scheduled data collection from victim networks.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.003|NTDS|
Ke3chang has used NTDSDump and other password dumping tools to gather credentials.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1033|System Owner/User Discovery|
Ke3chang has used implants capable of collecting the signed-in username.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Ke3chang has dropped their malware into legitimate installed software paths including:
Ke3chang has used Base64-encoded shellcode strings.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
Ke3chang has deobfuscated Base64-encoded shellcode strings prior to loading them.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts|
Ke3chang has used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Network,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1190|Exploit Public-Facing Application|
Ke3chang has compromised networks by exploiting Internet-facing applications, including vulnerable Microsoft Exchange and SharePoint servers.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1587.001|Malware|
Ke3chang has developed custom malware that allowed them to maintain persistence on victim networks.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool| | Ke3chang.md |
470224a432c1-2 | Ke3chang has developed custom malware that allowed them to maintain persistence on victim networks.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
Ke3chang has obtained and used tools such as
Mimikatz.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.004|LSA Secrets|
Ke3chang has dumped credentials, including by using gsecdump.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.002|Security Account Manager|
Ke3chang has dumped credentials, including by using gsecdump.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1087.001|Local Account|
Ke3chang performs account discovery using commands such as
Ke3chang malware RoyalDNS has used DNS for C2.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1036.002|Right-to-Left Override|
Ke3chang has used the right-to-left override character in spearphishing attachment names to trick targets into executing .scr and .exe files.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1543.003|Windows Service|
Ke3chang backdoor RoyalDNS established persistence through adding a service called
Ke3chang has used network scanning and enumeration tools, including
Ping.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Office 365|T1213.002|Sharepoint| | Ke3chang.md |
470224a432c1-3 | Ping.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Office 365|T1213.002|Sharepoint|
Ke3chang used a SharePoint enumeration and data dumping tool known as spwebmember.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Ke3chang malware including RoyalCli and BS2005 have communicated over HTTP with the C2 server through Internet Explorer (IE) by using the COM interface IWebBrowser2.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1056.001|Keylogging|
Ke3chang has used keyloggers.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1558.001|Golden Ticket|
Ke3chang has used
Mimikatz to generate Kerberos golden tickets.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1569.002|Service Execution|
Ke3chang has used a tool known as RemoteExec (similar to
PsExec) to remotely execute batch scripts and binaries.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Ke3chang has used batch scripts in its malware to install persistence mechanisms.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|Several
Ke3chang backdoors achieved persistence by adding a Run key.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Office 365,Windows,Google Workspace|T1114.002|Remote Email Collection| | Ke3chang.md |
470224a432c1-4 | Ke3chang has used compromised credentials and a .NET tool to dump data from Microsoft Exchange mailboxes.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,Containers,macOS|T1133|External Remote Services|
Ke3chang has gained access through VPNs including with compromised accounts and stolen VPN certificates.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1087.002|Domain Account|
Ke3chang performs account discovery using commands such as
Ke3chang gathered information and files from local directories for exfiltration.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.002|SMB/Windows Admin Shares|
Ke3chang actors have been known to copy files to the network shares of other computers to move laterally.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560|Archive Collected Data|The
Ke3chang group has been known to compress data before exfiltration.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1007|System Service Discovery|
Ke3chang performs service discovery using
Ke3chang has dumped credentials, including by using
Mimikatz.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
Ke3chang performs operating system information discovery using
Ke3chang performs discovery of permission groups
Ke3chang has performed local network configuration discovery using
Ke3chang performs local network connection discovery using
Ke3chang performs process discovery using | Ke3chang.md |
470224a432c1-5 | Ke3chang performs operating system information discovery using
Ke3chang performs discovery of permission groups
Ke3chang has performed local network configuration discovery using
Ke3chang performs local network connection discovery using
Ke3chang performs process discovery using
Ke3chang uses command-line interaction to search files and directories.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.001|Archive via Utility|
Ke3chang is known to use 7Zip and RAR with passwords to encrypt data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1041|Exfiltration Over C2 Channel|
Ke3chang transferred compressed and encrypted RAR files containing exfiltration through the established backdoor command and control channel during operations.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network,Office 365,Azure AD,IaaS,Google Workspace|T1059|Command and Scripting Interpreter|Malware used by
Ke3chang can run commands on the command-line interface.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)| | Ke3chang.md |
78b07f7c632e-0 | Kimsuky - G0094
Created: 2019-08-26T15:03:02.577Z
Modified: 2022-11-30T22:53:00.875Z
Contributors: Taewoo Lee, KISA,Dongwook Kim, KISA
Aliases
Kimsuky,STOLEN PENCIL,Thallium,Black Banshee,Velvet Chollima
Description
Kimsuky is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially focused on targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, and individuals identified as experts in various fields, and expanded its operations to include the United States, Russia, Europe, and the UN. Kimsuky has focused its intelligence collection activities on foreign policy and national security issues related to the Korean peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)
Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: EST Kimsuky SmokeScreen April 2019)(Citation: AhnLab Kimsuky Kabar Cobra Feb 2019)
North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
Techniques Used
Kimsuky has used tools such as the MailFetch mail crawler to collect victim emails (excluding spam) from online services via IMAP.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1567.002|Exfiltration to Cloud Storage| | Kimsuky.md |
78b07f7c632e-1 | Kimsuky has exfiltrated stolen files and data to actor-controlled Blogspot accounts.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102.002|Bidirectional Communication|
Kimsuky has used Blogspot pages for C2.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1012|Query Registry|
Kimsuky has obtained specific Registry keys and values on a compromised host.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1136.001|Local Account|
Kimsuky has created accounts with
Kimsuky has added accounts to specific groups with
Kimsuky has run
Kimsuky has checked for the presence of antivirus software with
Kimsuky has executed malware with
Kimsuky has downloaded additional malware with scheduled tasks.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1111|Multi-Factor Authentication Interception|
Kimsuky has used a proprietary tool to intercept one time passwords required for two-factor authentication.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Kimsuky has renamed malware to legitimate names such as
Kimsuky has sent internal spearphishing emails for lateral movement after stealing victim information.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589.003|Employee Names|
Kimsuky has collected victim employee name information.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1593.002|Search Engines|
Kimsuky has searched for vulnerabilities, tools, and geopolitical trends on Google to target victims.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1591|Gather Victim Org Information| | Kimsuky.md |
78b07f7c632e-2 | Kimsuky has collected victim organization information including but not limited to organization hierarchy, functions, press releases, and others.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1594|Search Victim-Owned Websites|
Kimsuky has searched for information on the target company's website.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1585.002|Email Accounts|
Kimsuky has created email accounts for phishing operations.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.004|Server|
Kimsuky has purchased hosting servers with virtual currency and prepaid cards.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1587.001|Malware|
Kimsuky has developed its own unique malware such as MailFetch.py for use in operations.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1584.001|Domains|
Kimsuky has compromised legitimate sites and used them to distribute malware.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.005|Exploits|
Kimsuky has obtained exploit code for various CVEs.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link|
Kimsuky has lured victims into clicking malicious links.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1585.001|Social Media Accounts|
Kimsuky has created social media accounts to monitor news and security trends as well as potential targets.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Network,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1190|Exploit Public-Facing Application| | Kimsuky.md |
78b07f7c632e-3 | Kimsuky has exploited various vulnerabilities for initial access, including Microsoft Exchange vulnerability CVE-2020-0688.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Kimsuky has executed Windows commands by using
Kimsuky has used
Kimsuky has used a file injector DLL to spawn a benign process on the victim's system and inject the malicious payload into it via process hollowing.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036|Masquerading|
Kimsuky has disguised its C2 addresses as the websites of shopping malls, governments, universities, and others.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery|
Kimsuky has used
Kimsuky has used an information gathering module that will hide an AV software window from the victim.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.001|Upload Malware|
Kimsuky has used Blogspot to host malicious content such as beacons, file exfiltrators, and implants.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.006|Web Services|
Kimsuky has hosted content used for targeting efforts via web services such as Blogspot.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Kimsuky has used HTTP GET and POST requests for C2.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information| | Kimsuky.md |
78b07f7c632e-4 | Kimsuky has decoded malicious VBScripts using Base64.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.001|Archive via Utility|
Kimsuky has used QuickZip to archive stolen files before exfiltration.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1007|System Service Discovery|
Kimsuky has used an instrumentor script to gather the names of all services running on a victim's system.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|
Kimsuky can gather a list of all processes running on a victim's machine.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
Kimsuky has obtained and used tools such as Nirsoft WebBrowserPassVIew,
Mimikatz, and
PsExec.(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589.002|Email Addresses|
Kimsuky has collected valid email addresses that were subsequently used in spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1027.002|Software Packing|
Kimsuky has packed malware with UPX.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1552.001|Credentials In Files|
Kimsuky has used tools that are capable of obtaining credentials from saved mail.(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.001|Remote Desktop Protocol| | Kimsuky.md |
78b07f7c632e-5 | Kimsuky has used RDP for direct remote point-and-click access.(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1078.003|Local Accounts|
Kimsuky has used a tool called GREASE to add a Windows admin account in order to allow them continued access via RDP.(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1593.001|Social Media|
Kimsuky has used Twitter to monitor potential victims and to prepare targeted phishing e-mails.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Kimsuky has downloaded additional scripts, tools, and malware onto victim systems.(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1074.001|Local Data Staging|
Kimsuky has staged collected data files under
Kimsuky has used pass the hash for authentication to remote access software used in C2.(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.006|Timestomp|
Kimsuky has manipulated timestamps for creation or compilation dates to defeat anti-forensics.(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Office 365,Windows,Google Workspace,macOS,Linux|T1114.003|Email Forwarding Rule|
Kimsuky has set auto-forward rules on victim's e-mail accounts.(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.003|Mail Protocols| | Kimsuky.md |
78b07f7c632e-6 | Kimsuky has used e-mail to send exfiltrated data to C2 servers.(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1059.006|Python|
Kimsuky has used a macOS Python implant to gather data as well as MailFetcher.py code to automatically collect email data.(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network,IaaS|T1040|Network Sniffing|
Kimsuky has used the Nirsoft SniffPass network sniffer to obtain passwords sent over non-secure protocols.(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1557|Adversary-in-the-Middle|
Kimsuky has used modified versions of PHProxy to examine web traffic between the victim and the accessed website.(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS,Network|T1505.003|Web Shell|
Kimsuky has used modified versions of open source PHP web shells to maintain access, often adding "Dinosaur" references within the code.(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory|
Kimsuky has gathered credentials using
Mimikatz and ProcDump.(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1112|Modify Registry| | Kimsuky.md |
78b07f7c632e-7 | Kimsuky has modified Registry settings for default file associations to enable all macros and for persistence.(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,Containers,macOS|T1133|External Remote Services|
Kimsuky has used RDP to establish persistence.(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1036.004|Masquerade Task or Service|
Kimsuky has disguised services to appear as benign software or related to operating system functions.(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.007|JavaScript|
Kimsuky has used JScript for logging and downloading additional tools.(Citation: VirusBulletin Kimsuky October 2019)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.002|File Transfer Protocols|
Kimsuky has used FTP to download additional malware to the target machine.(Citation: VirusBulletin Kimsuky October 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1598.003|Spearphishing Link|
Kimsuky has used links in e-mail to steal account information.(Citation: VirusBulletin Kimsuky October 2019)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1586.002|Email Accounts|
Kimsuky has compromised email accounts to send spearphishing e-mails.(Citation: VirusBulletin Kimsuky October 2019)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1587|Develop Capabilities| | Kimsuky.md |
78b07f7c632e-8 | Kimsuky created and used a mailing toolkit to use in spearphishing attacks.(Citation: VirusBulletin Kimsuky October 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Kimsuky has obfuscated binary strings including the use of XOR encryption and Base64 encoding.(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)(Citation: VirusBulletin Kimsuky October 2019)
Kimsuky has also modified the first byte of DLL implants targeting victims to prevent recognition of the executable file format.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Kimsuky has used attempted to lure victims into opening malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)(Citation: VirusBulletin Kimsuky October 2019)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
Kimsuky has used Visual Basic to download malicious payloads.(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)(Citation: VirusBulletin Kimsuky October 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)
Kimsuky has also used malicious VBA macros within maldocs disguised as forms that trigger when a victim types any content into the lure.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows|T1553.002|Code Signing| | Kimsuky.md |
78b07f7c632e-9 | Kimsuky has signed files with the name EGIS CO,. Ltd..(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
Kimsuky has registered domains to spoof targeted organizations and trusted third parties.(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)(Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Group September 2020)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1562.004|Disable or Modify System Firewall|
Kimsuky has been observed disabling the system firewall.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
Kimsuky has sent spearphishing emails containing a link to a document that contained malicious macros or took the victim to an actor-controlled domain.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1041|Exfiltration Over C2 Channel|
Kimsuky has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1543.003|Windows Service|
Kimsuky has created new services for persistence.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery| | Kimsuky.md |
78b07f7c632e-10 | Kimsuky has enumerated drives, OS type, OS version, and other information using a script or the "systeminfo" command.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Containers,IaaS|T1562.001|Disable or Modify Tools|
Kimsuky has been observed turning off Windows Security Center and can hide the AV software window from the view of the infected user.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1055|Process Injection|
Kimsuky has used Win7Elevate to inject malicious code into explorer.exe.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.003|Archive via Custom Method|
Kimsuky has used RC4 encryption before exfil.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Kimsuky has placed scripts in the startup folder for persistence and modified the
Kimsuky has deleted the exfiltrated data on disk after transmission.
Kimsuky has also used an instrumentor script to terminate browser processes running on an infected system and then delete the cookie files on disk.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|
Kimsuky has the ability to enumerate all files and directories on an infected system.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell| | Kimsuky.md |
78b07f7c632e-11 | Kimsuky has executed a variety of PowerShell scripts.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555.003|Credentials from Web Browsers|
Kimsuky has used browser extensions including Google Chrome to steal passwords and cookies from browsers.
Kimsuky has also used Nirsoft's WebBrowserPassView tool to dump the passwords obtained from victims.(Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1005|Data from Local System|
Kimsuky has collected Office, PDF, and HWP documents from its victims.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1176|Browser Extensions|
Kimsuky has used Google Chrome browser extensions to infect victims and to steal passwords and cookies.(Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018)(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1219|Remote Access Software|
Kimsuky has used a modified TeamViewer client as a command and control channel.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1056.001|Keylogging| | Kimsuky.md |
78b07f7c632e-12 | Kimsuky has used a PowerShell-based keylogger as well as a tool called MECHANICAL to log keystrokes.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.005|Mshta|
Kimsuky has used mshta.exe to run malicious scripts on the system.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1546.001|Change Default File Association|
Kimsuky has a HWP document stealer module which changes the default program association in the registry to open HWP documents.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Kimsuky has used emails containing Word, Excel and/or HWP (Hangul Word Processor) documents in their spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: Zdnet Kimsuky Dec 2018)(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: ThreatConnect Kimsuky September 2020)(Citation: VirusBulletin Kimsuky October 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)| | Kimsuky.md |
686d0984e5e0-0 | LAPSUS$ - G1004
Created: 2022-06-09T19:14:31.327Z
Modified: 2023-04-11T00:01:29.232Z
Contributors: David Hughes, BT Security,Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group,Flavio Costa, Cisco
Aliases
LAPSUS$,DEV-0537
Description
LAPSUS$ is cyber criminal threat group that has been active since at least mid-2021. LAPSUS$ specializes in large-scale social engineering and extortion operations, including destructive attacks without the use of ransomware. The group has targeted organizations globally, including in the government, manufacturing, higher education, energy, healthcare, technology, telecommunications, and media sectors.(Citation: BBC LAPSUS Apr 2022)(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)(Citation: UNIT 42 LAPSUS Mar 2022)
Techniques Used
LAPSUS$ has targeted various collaboration tools like Slack, Teams, JIRA, Confluence, and others to hunt for exposed credentials to support privilege escalation and lateral movement.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1586.002|Email Accounts|
LAPSUS$ has payed employees, suppliers, and business partners of target organizations for credentials.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Office 365,Linux,macOS,IaaS,SaaS,Azure AD,Google Workspace|T1621|Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation|
LAPSUS$ has spammed target users with MFA prompts in the hope that the legitimate user will grant necessary approval.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1090|Proxy|
LAPSUS$ has leverage NordVPN for its egress points when targeting intended victims.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.001|Malware| | LAPSUS$.md |
686d0984e5e0-1 | LAPSUS$ acquired and used the Redline password stealer in their operations.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589.002|Email Addresses|
LAPSUS$ has gathered employee email addresses, including personal accounts, for social engineering and initial access efforts.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1591.002|Business Relationships|
LAPSUS$ has gathered detailed knowledge of an organization's supply chain relationships.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1591.004|Identify Roles|
LAPSUS$ has gathered detailed knowledge of team structures within a target organization.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS|T1485|Data Destruction|
LAPSUS$ has deleted the target's systems and resources both on-premises and in the cloud.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Office 365,Windows,Google Workspace,macOS,Linux|T1114.003|Email Forwarding Rule|
LAPSUS$ has set an Office 365 tenant level mail transport rule to send all mail in and out of the targeted organization to the newly created account.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS|T1531|Account Access Removal|
LAPSUS$ has removed a targeted organization's global admin accounts to lock the organization out of all access.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Office 365,IaaS,SaaS,Google Workspace,Azure AD|T1098.003|Additional Cloud Roles| | LAPSUS$.md |
686d0984e5e0-2 | LAPSUS$ has added the global admin role to accounts they have created in the targeted organization's cloud instances.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Azure AD,Office 365,IaaS,Google Workspace,SaaS|T1136.003|Cloud Account|
LAPSUS$ has created global admin accounts in the targeted organization's cloud instances to gain persistence.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Google Workspace|T1078.004|Cloud Accounts|
LAPSUS$ has used compromised credentials to access cloud assets within a target organization.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|IaaS|T1578.003|Delete Cloud Instance|
LAPSUS$ has deleted the target's systems and resources in the cloud to trigger the organization's incident and crisis response process.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|IaaS|T1578.002|Create Cloud Instance|
LAPSUS$ has created new virtual machines within the target's cloud environment after leveraging credential access to cloud assets.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.003|Virtual Private Server|
LAPSUS$ has used VPS hosting providers for infrastructure.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589|Gather Victim Identity Information|
LAPSUS$ has gathered detailed information of target employees to enhance their social engineering lures.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS,IaaS,Containers|T1204|User Execution|
LAPSUS$ has recruited target organization employees or contractors who provide credentials and approve an associated MFA prompt, or install remote management software onto a corporate workstation, allowing | LAPSUS$.md |
686d0984e5e0-3 | LAPSUS$ has recruited target organization employees or contractors who provide credentials and approve an associated MFA prompt, or install remote management software onto a corporate workstation, allowing
LAPSUS$ to take control of an authenticated system.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.003|NTDS|
LAPSUS$ has used Windows built-in tool
LAPSUS$ has used DCSync attacks to gather credentials for privilege escalation routines.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1005|Data from Local System|
LAPSUS$ uploaded sensitive files, information, and credentials from a targeted organization for extortion or public release.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1069.002|Domain Groups|
LAPSUS$ has used the AD Explorer tool to enumerate groups on a victim's network.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1087.002|Domain Account|
LAPSUS$ has used the AD Explorer tool to enumerate users on a victim's network.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS,SaaS,Office 365,Google Workspace,IaaS|T1213|Data from Information Repositories|
LAPSUS$ has searched a victim's network for organization collaboration channels like MS Teams or Slack to discover further high-privilege account credentials.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|SaaS|T1213.003|Code Repositories|
LAPSUS$ has searched a victim's network for code repositories like GitLab and GitHub to discover further high-privilege account credentials.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Office 365|T1213.002|Sharepoint| | LAPSUS$.md |
686d0984e5e0-4 | LAPSUS$ has searched a victim's network for collaboration platforms like SharePoint to discover further high-privilege account credentials.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|SaaS|T1213.001|Confluence|
LAPSUS$ has searched a victim's network for collaboration platforms like Confluence and JIRA to discover further high-privilege account credentials.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1068|Exploitation for Privilege Escalation|
LAPSUS$ has exploited unpatched vulnerabilities on internally accessible servers including JIRA, GitLab, and Confluence for privilege escalation.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1111|Multi-Factor Authentication Interception|
LAPSUS$ has replayed stolen session token and passwords to trigger simple-approval MFA prompts in hope of the legitimate user will grant necessary approval.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts|
LAPSUS$ has used compromised credentials and/or session tokens to gain access into a victim's VPN, VDI, RDP, and IAMs.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,Containers,macOS|T1133|External Remote Services|
LAPSUS$ has gained access to internet-facing systems and applications, including virtual private network (VPN), remote desktop protocol (RDP), and virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) including Citrix. (Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1593.003|Code Repositories| | LAPSUS$.md |
686d0984e5e0-5 | LAPSUS$ has searched public code repositories for exposed credentials.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1597.002|Purchase Technical Data|
LAPSUS$ has purchased credentials and session tokens from criminal underground forums.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555.003|Credentials from Web Browsers|
LAPSUS$ has obtained passwords and session tokens with the use of the Redline password stealer.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Office 365|T1199|Trusted Relationship|
LAPSUS$ has accessed internet-facing identity providers such as Azure Active Directory and Okta to target specific organizations.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589.001|Credentials|
LAPSUS$ has gathered user identities and credentials to gain initial access to a victim's organization; the group has also called an organization's help desk to reset a target's credentials.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
LAPSUS$ has obtained tools such as AD Explorer inspection software for their operations.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)| | LAPSUS$.md |
09890f2fe314-0 | Lazarus Group - G0032
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:03.807Z
Modified: 2023-03-30T19:01:41.451Z
Contributors: Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet,Dragos Threat Intelligence
Aliases
Lazarus Group,Labyrinth Chollima,HIDDEN COBRA,Guardians of Peace,ZINC,NICKEL ACADEMY
Description
Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)
North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as Andariel, APT37, APT38, and Kimsuky.
Techniques Used
Lazarus Group has used a custom hashing method to resolve APIs used in shellcode.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1036.004|Masquerade Task or Service|
Lazarus Group has used a scheduled task named
Lazarus Group has restored malicious
KernelCallbackTable code to its original state after the process execution flow has been hijacked.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|macOS,Linux,Windows|T1620|Reflective Code Loading|
Lazarus Group has changed memory protection permissions then overwritten in memory DLL function code with shellcode, which was later executed via
KernelCallbackTable hijacking. | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-1 | Lazarus Group has changed memory protection permissions then overwritten in memory DLL function code with shellcode, which was later executed via
KernelCallbackTable hijacking.
Lazarus Group has also used shellcode within macros to decrypt and manually map DLLs into memory at runtime.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
Lazarus Group has used shellcode within macros to decrypt and manually map DLLs and shellcode into memory at runtime.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1104|Multi-Stage Channels|
Lazarus Group has used multi-stage malware components that inject later stages into separate processes.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1218|System Binary Proxy Execution|
Lazarus Group lnk files used for persistence have abused the Windows Update Client (
Lazarus Group has used GitHub as C2, pulling hosted image payloads then committing command execution output to files in specific directories.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1218.005|Mshta|
Lazarus Group has used
Lazarus Group persistence mechanisms have used
Lazarus Group has renamed system utilities such as
Lazarus Group has replaced
Lazarus Group has abused the
Lazarus Group has routinely deleted log files on a compromised router, including automatic log deletion through the use of the logrotate utility.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1585.001|Social Media Accounts| | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-2 | Lazarus Group has created new Twitter accounts to conduct social engineering against potential victims.(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1566.003|Spearphishing via Service|
Lazarus Group has used social media platforms, including LinkedIn and Twitter, to send spearphishing messages.(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1584.004|Server|
Lazarus Group has compromised servers to stage malicious tools.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1591|Gather Victim Org Information|
Lazarus Group has studied publicly available information about a targeted organization to tailor spearphishing efforts against specific departments and/or individuals.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1585.002|Email Accounts|
Lazarus Group has created new email accounts for spearphishing operations.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
Lazarus Group has obtained a variety of tools for their operations, including
Responder and PuTTy PSCP.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1589.002|Email Addresses|
Lazarus Group collected email addresses belonging to various departments of a targeted organization which were used in follow-on phishing campaigns.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1218.011|Rundll32|
Lazarus Group has used rundll32 to execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|macOS,Windows|T1553.002|Code Signing| | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-3 | Lazarus Group has digitally signed malware and utilities to evade detection.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1557.001|LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay|
Lazarus Group executed
Responder using the command
Lazarus Group has sent malicious links to victims via email.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1049|System Network Connections Discovery|
Lazarus Group has used
Lazarus Group has used nmap from a router VM to scan ports on systems within the restricted segment of an enterprise network.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
Lazarus Group has used
Lazarus Group has used administrator credentials to gain access to restricted network segments.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
Lazarus Group has used VBA and embedded macros in Word documents to execute malicious code.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Lazarus Group has used PowerShell to execute commands and malicious code.(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1090.001|Internal Proxy|
Lazarus Group has used a compromised router to serve as a proxy between a victim network's corporate and restricted segments.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1106|Native API|
Lazarus Group has used the Windows API | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-4 | Lazarus Group has used the Windows API
Lazarus Group has also used various, often lesser known, functions to perform various types of Discovery and
Process Injection.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS|T1021.004|SSH|
Lazarus Group used SSH and the PuTTy PSCP utility to gain access to a restricted segment of a compromised network.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Lazarus Group has renamed malicious code to disguise it as Microsoft's narrator and other legitimate files.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1583.006|Web Services|
Lazarus Group has hosted malicious downloads on Github.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1588.004|Digital Certificates|
Lazarus Group has obtained SSL certificates for their C2 domains.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1587.001|Malware|
Lazarus Group has developed custom malware for use in their operations.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
Lazarus Group has acquired domains related to their campaigns to act as distribution points and C2 channels.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1571|Non-Standard Port|Some | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-5 | Lazarus Group malware uses a list of ordered port numbers to choose a port for C2 traffic, creating port-protocol mismatches.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.003|Archive via Custom Method|A
Lazarus Group malware sample encrypts data using a simple byte based XOR operation prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1491.001|Internal Defacement|
Lazarus Group replaced the background wallpaper of systems with a threatening image after rendering the system unbootable with a
Disk Structure Wipe.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1562.004|Disable or Modify System Firewall|Various
Lazarus Group malware modifies the Windows firewall to allow incoming connections or disable it entirely using
netsh. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1001.003|Protocol Impersonation|
Lazarus Group malware also uses a unique form of communication encryption known as FakeTLS that mimics TLS but uses a different encryption method, potentially evading SSL traffic inspection/decryption.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell| | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-6 | Lazarus Group malware uses cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus) A Destover-like variant used by
Lazarus Group uses a batch file mechanism to delete its binaries from the system.(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1529|System Shutdown/Reboot|
Lazarus Group has rebooted systems after destroying files and wiping the MBR on infected systems.(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS|T1485|Data Destruction|
Lazarus Group has used a custom secure delete function to overwrite file contents with data from heap memory.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1561.001|Disk Content Wipe|
Lazarus Group has used malware like WhiskeyAlfa to overwrite the first 64MB of every drive with a mix of static and random buffers. A similar process is then used to wipe content in logical drives and, finally, attempt to wipe every byte of every sector on every drive. WhiskeyBravo can be used to overwrite the first 4.9MB of physical drives. WhiskeyDelta can overwrite the first 132MB or 1.5MB of each drive with random data from heap memory.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1561.002|Disk Structure Wipe| | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-7 | Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT overwrites and deletes the Master Boot Record (MBR) on the victim's machine and has possessed MBR wiper malware since at least 2009.(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1489|Service Stop|
Lazarus Group has stopped the MSExchangeIS service to render Exchange contents inaccessible to users.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Lazarus Group has attempted to get users to launch a malicious Microsoft Word attachment delivered via a spearphishing email.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Lazarus Group has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution|
Lazarus Group has exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2018-4878 for execution.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Network|T1124|System Time Discovery|A Destover-like implant used by
Lazarus Group can obtain the current system time and send it to the C2 server.(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,SaaS|T1189|Drive-by Compromise|
Lazarus Group delivered | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-8 | Lazarus Group delivered
RATANKBA and other malicious code to victims via a compromised legitimate website.(Citation: RATANKBA)(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1132.001|Standard Encoding|A
Lazarus Group malware sample encodes data with base64.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1547.009|Shortcut Modification|
Lazarus Group malware has maintained persistence on a system by creating a LNK shortcut in the user’s Startup folder.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1055.001|Dynamic-link Library Injection|A
Lazarus Group malware sample performs reflective DLL injection.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Lazarus Group has conducted C2 over HTTP and HTTPS.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1564.001|Hidden Files and Directories| | Lazarus_Group.md |