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09890f2fe314-9 | Lazarus Group has used a VBA Macro to set its file attributes to System and Hidden and has named files with a dot prefix to hide them from the Finder application.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1090.002|External Proxy|
Lazarus Group has used multiple proxies to obfuscate network traffic from victims.(Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1134.002|Create Process with Token|
Lazarus Group keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call
Lazarus Group malware enumerates logged-on users.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1021.001|Remote Desktop Protocol|
Lazarus Group malware SierraCharlie uses RDP for propagation.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers|T1110.003|Password Spraying|
Lazarus Group malware attempts to connect to Windows shares for lateral movement by using a generated list of usernames, which center around permutations of the username Administrator, and weak passwords.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation| | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-10 | Lazarus Group has used WMIC for discovery as well as to execute payloads for persistence and lateral movement.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1008|Fallback Channels|
Lazarus Group malware SierraAlfa sends data to one of the hard-coded C2 servers chosen at random, and if the transmission fails, chooses a new C2 server to attempt the transmission again.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1048.003|Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol|
Lazarus Group malware SierraBravo-Two generates an email message via SMTP containing information about newly infected victims.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1005|Data from Local System|
Lazarus Group has collected data and files from compromised networks.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,Windows|T1542.003|Bootkit|
Lazarus Group malware WhiskeyAlfa-Three modifies sector 0 of the Master Boot Record (MBR) to ensure that the malware will persist even if a victim machine shuts down.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1056.001|Keylogging| | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-11 | Lazarus Group malware KiloAlfa contains keylogging functionality.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1041|Exfiltration Over C2 Channel|
Lazarus Group has exfiltrated data and files over a C2 channel through its various tools and malware.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1021.002|SMB/Windows Admin Shares|
Lazarus Group malware SierraAlfa accesses the
Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR and used RomeoDelta malware to archive specified directories in .zip format, encrypt the .zip file, and upload it to C2. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Lazarus Group has maintained persistence by loading malicious code into a startup folder or by adding a Registry Run key.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1074.001|Local Data Staging|
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is saved in the %TEMP% directory, then compressed, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer| | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-12 | Lazarus Group has downloaded files, malware, and tools from its C2 onto a compromised host.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)(Citation: ESET Twitter Ida Pro Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1012|Query Registry|
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia checks Registry keys within HKCU and HKLM to determine if certain applications are present, including SecureCRT, Terminal Services, RealVNC, TightVNC, UltraVNC, Radmin, mRemote, TeamViewer, FileZilla, pcAnyware, and Remote Desktop. Another
Lazarus Group malware sample checks for the presence of the following Registry key:
Lazarus Group malware families gather a list of running processes on a victim system and send it to their C2 server. A Destover-like variant used by
Lazarus Group also gathers process times.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1010|Application Window Discovery|
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server the title of the window for each running process. The KilaAlfa keylogger also reports the title of the window in the foreground.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.002|Archive via Library| | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-13 | Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is compressed with Zlib, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Containers,IaaS|T1562.001|Disable or Modify Tools|
Lazarus Group malware TangoDelta attempts to terminate various processes associated with McAfee. Additionally,
Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT disables the Microsoft Windows System Event Notification and Alerter services.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018). |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery|
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server information about the first network interface card’s configuration, including IP address, gateways, subnet mask, DHCP information, and whether WINS is available.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1543.003|Windows Service|Several
Lazarus Group malware families install themselves as new services.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1573.001|Symmetric Cryptography|Several
Lazarus Group malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another
Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other
Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads. | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-14 | Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other
Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads.
Lazarus Group has also used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|Several
Lazarus Group malware families collect information on the type and version of the victim OS, as well as the victim computer name and CPU information. A Destover-like variant used by
Lazarus Group also collects disk space information and sends it to its C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion|
Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim.
Lazarus Group also uses secure file deletion to delete files from the victim.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.006|Timestomp|Several | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-15 | Lazarus Group malware families use timestomping, including modifying the last write timestamp of a specified Registry key to a random date, as well as copying the timestamp for legitimate .exe files (such as calc.exe or mspaint.exe) to its dropped files.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,SaaS,Network|T1098|Account Manipulation|
Lazarus Group malware WhiskeyDelta-Two contains a function that attempts to rename the administrator’s account.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|
Lazarus Group malware can use a common function to identify target files by their extension, and some also enumerate files and directories, including a Destover-like variant that lists files and gathers information for all drives.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Lazarus Group has used multiple types of encryption and encoding for their payloads, including AES, Caracachs, RC4, XOR, Base64, and other tricks such as creating aliases in code for
Native API function names.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: Qualys LolZarus)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Engineering Workstation,Human-Machine Interface,Control Server,Data Historian|T0865|Spearphishing Attachment| | Lazarus_Group.md |
09890f2fe314-16 | Lazarus Group has been observed targeting organizations using spearphishing documents with embedded malicious payloads. (Citation: Novetta Threat Research Group February 2016) Highly targeted spear phishing campaigns have been conducted against a U.S. electric grid company. (Citation: Eduard Kovacs March 2018)| | Lazarus_Group.md |
5f03510d0ccc-0 | LazyScripter - G0140
Created: 2021-11-24T19:26:27.305Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T04:49:29.731Z
Contributors: Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India,Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India,Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation
Aliases
LazyScripter
Description
LazyScripter is threat group that has mainly targeted the airlines industry since at least 2018, primarily using open-source toolsets.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)
Techniques Used
LazyScripter has established GitHub accounts to host its toolsets.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
LazyScripter has used dynamic DNS providers to create legitimate-looking subdomains for C2.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.001|Upload Malware|
LazyScripter has hosted open-source remote access Trojans used in its operations in GitHub.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.001|Malware|
LazyScripter has used a variety of open-source remote access Trojans for its operations.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
LazyScripter had downloaded additional tools to a compromised host.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link|
LazyScripter has relied upon users clicking on links to malicious files.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File| | LazyScripter.md |
5f03510d0ccc-1 | LazyScripter has lured users to open malicious email attachments.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.007|JavaScript|
LazyScripter has used JavaScript in its attacks.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036|Masquerading|
LazyScripter has used several different security software icons to disguise executables.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.004|DNS|
LazyScripter has leveraged dynamic DNS providers for C2 communications.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.011|Rundll32|
LazyScripter has used
Koadic stagers.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.005|Mshta|
LazyScripter has used
Koadic stagers.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102|Web Service|
LazyScripter has used GitHub to host its payloads to operate spam campaigns.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
LazyScripter has used VBScript to execute malicious code.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
LazyScripter has used PowerShell scripts to execute malicious code.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder| | LazyScripter.md |
5f03510d0ccc-2 | LazyScripter has achieved persistence via writing a PowerShell script to the autorun registry key.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.010|Command Obfuscation|
LazyScripter has leveraged the BatchEncryption tool to perform advanced batch script obfuscation and encoding techniques.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
LazyScripter has used batch files to deploy open-source and multi-stage RATs.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
LazyScripter has used spam emails that contain a link that redirects the victim to download a malicious document.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
LazyScripter has used spam emails weaponized with archive or document files as its initial infection vector.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)| | LazyScripter.md |
006a2acee797-0 | Leafminer - G0077
Created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T04:50:51.782Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Leafminer,Raspite
Description
Leafminer is an Iranian threat group that has targeted government organizations and business entities in the Middle East since at least early 2017. (Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)
Techniques Used
Leafminer has obtained and used tools such as
LaZagne,
Mimikatz,
PsExec, and
MailSniper.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555.003|Credentials from Web Browsers|
Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555|Credentials from Password Stores|
Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.005|Cached Domain Credentials|
Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.004|LSA Secrets|
Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1552.001|Credentials In Files|
Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1055.013|Process Doppelgänging|
Leafminer has used | Leafminer.md |
006a2acee797-1 | Leafminer has used
Process Doppelgänging to evade security software while deploying tools on compromised systems.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.007|JavaScript|
Leafminer infected victims using JavaScript code.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1136.001|Local Account|
Leafminer used a tool called Imecab to set up a persistent remote access account on the victim machine.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Office 365,Windows,Google Workspace|T1114.002|Remote Email Collection|
Leafminer used a tool called MailSniper to search through the Exchange server mailboxes for keywords.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|
Leafminer used a tool called MailSniper to search for files on the desktop and another utility called Sobolsoft to extract attachments from EML files.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.010|Command Obfuscation|
Leafminer obfuscated scripts that were used on victim machines.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,SaaS|T1189|Drive-by Compromise|
Leafminer has infected victims using watering holes.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers|T1110.003|Password Spraying|
Leafminer used a tool called Total SMB BruteForcer to perform internal password spraying.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory| | Leafminer.md |
006a2acee797-2 | Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne and Mimikatz.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1018|Remote System Discovery|
Leafminer used Microsoft’s Sysinternals tools to gather detailed information about remote systems.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers,Network|T1046|Network Service Discovery|
Leafminer scanned network services to search for vulnerabilities in the victim system.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)| | Leafminer.md |
3db222ada3f4-0 | Leviathan - G0065
Created: 2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z
Modified: 2022-04-15T15:15:51.198Z
Contributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.
Aliases
Leviathan,MUDCARP,Kryptonite Panda,Gadolinium,BRONZE MOHAWK,TEMP.Jumper,APT40,TEMP.Periscope
Description
Leviathan is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021) Active since at least 2009, Leviathan has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)
Techniques Used
Leviathan has utilized techniques like reflective DLL loading to write a DLL into memory and load a shell that provides backdoor access to the victim.(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1559.002|Dynamic Data Exchange|
Leviathan has utilized OLE as a method to insert malicious content inside various phishing documents. (Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1041|Exfiltration Over C2 Channel|
Leviathan has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,SaaS|T1189|Drive-by Compromise| | Leviathan.md |
3db222ada3f4-1 | Leviathan has infected victims using watering holes.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1572|Protocol Tunneling|
Leviathan has used protocol tunneling to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1090.003|Multi-hop Proxy|
Leviathan has used multi-hop proxies to disguise the source of their malicious traffic.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560|Archive Collected Data|
Leviathan has archived victim's data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS|T1074.002|Remote Data Staging|
Leviathan has staged data remotely prior to exfiltration.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1586.001|Social Media Accounts|
Leviathan has compromised social media accounts to conduct social engineering attacks.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,Containers,macOS|T1133|External Remote Services|
Leviathan has used external remote services such as virtual private networks (VPN) to gain initial access.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts| | Leviathan.md |
3db222ada3f4-2 | Leviathan has obtained valid accounts to gain initial access.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1534|Internal Spearphishing|
Leviathan has conducted internal spearphishing within the victim's environment for lateral movement.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1586.002|Email Accounts|
Leviathan has compromised email accounts to conduct social engineering attacks.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.003|Steganography|
Leviathan has used steganography to hide stolen data inside other files stored on Github.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
Leviathan has established domains that impersonate legitimate entities to use for targeting efforts. (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589.001|Credentials|
Leviathan has collected compromised credentials to use for targeting efforts.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1585.001|Social Media Accounts|
Leviathan has created new social media accounts for targeting efforts.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1585.002|Email Accounts|
Leviathan has created new email accounts for targeting efforts.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory| | Leviathan.md |
3db222ada3f4-3 | Leviathan has used publicly available tools to dump password hashes, including ProcDump and WCE.(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link|
Leviathan has sent spearphishing email links attempting to get a user to click.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1567.002|Exfiltration to Cloud Storage|
Leviathan has used an uploader known as LUNCHMONEY that can exfiltrate files to Dropbox.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS,Network|T1505.003|Web Shell|
Leviathan relies on web shells for an initial foothold as well as persistence into the victim's systems.(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.001|Remote Desktop Protocol|
Leviathan has targeted RDP credentials and used it to move through the victim environment.(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1003|OS Credential Dumping|
Leviathan has used publicly available tools to dump password hashes, including
HOMEFRY.(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS|T1021.004|SSH|
Leviathan used ssh for internal reconnaissance.(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell| | Leviathan.md |
3db222ada3f4-4 | Leviathan used ssh for internal reconnaissance.(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Leviathan has used PowerShell for execution.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
Leviathan has used WMI for execution.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102.003|One-Way Communication|
Leviathan has received C2 instructions from user profiles created on legitimate websites such as Github and TechNet.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Leviathan has sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments, including .rtf, .doc, and .xls files.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1074.001|Local Data Staging|
Leviathan has used C:\Windows\Debug and C:\Perflogs as staging directories.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution| | Leviathan.md |
3db222ada3f4-5 | Leviathan has exploited multiple Microsoft Office and .NET vulnerabilities for execution, including CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-8759, and CVE-2017-11882.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1197|BITS Jobs|
Leviathan has used
BITSAdmin to download additional tools.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Leviathan has sent spearphishing attachments attempting to get a user to click.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.001|Binary Padding|
Leviathan has inserted garbage characters into code, presumably to avoid anti-virus detection.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1546.003|Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription|
Leviathan has used WMI for persistence.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
Leviathan has used a DLL known as SeDll to decrypt and execute other JavaScript backdoors.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
Leviathan has used VBScript.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.010|Regsvr32| | Leviathan.md |
3db222ada3f4-6 | Leviathan has used VBScript.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.010|Regsvr32|
Leviathan has used regsvr32 for execution.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
Leviathan has sent spearphishing emails with links, often using a fraudulent lookalike domain and stolen branding.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Leviathan has obfuscated code using base64 and gzip compression.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows|T1553.002|Code Signing|
Leviathan has used stolen code signing certificates to sign malware.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Leviathan has downloaded additional scripts and files from adversary-controlled servers.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Leviathan has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.009|Shortcut Modification|
Leviathan has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)| | Leviathan.md |
175af522cc76-0 | LuminousMoth - G1014
Created: 2023-02-23T15:31:38.829Z
Modified: 2023-04-17T21:49:16.371Z
Contributors: Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet,Zaw Min Htun, @Z3TAE
Aliases
LuminousMoth
Description
LuminousMoth is a Chinese-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least October 2020. LuminousMoth has targeted high-profile organizations, including government entities, in Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Some security researchers have concluded there is a connection between LuminousMoth and Mustang Panda based on similar targeting and TTPs, as well as network infrastructure overlaps.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)
Techniques Used
LuminousMoth has signed their malware with a valid digital signature.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.001|Upload Malware|
LuminousMoth has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.005|Link Target|
LuminousMoth has created a link to a Dropbox file that has been used in their spear-phishing operations.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1587.001|Malware|
LuminousMoth has used unique malware for information theft and exfiltration.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1112|Modify Registry| | LuminousMoth.md |
175af522cc76-1 | LuminousMoth has used malware that adds Registry keys for persistence.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1041|Exfiltration Over C2 Channel|
LuminousMoth has used malware that exfiltrates stolen data to its C2 server.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
LuminousMoth has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence for their tools.(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1030|Data Transfer Size Limits|
LuminousMoth has split archived files into multiple parts to bypass a 5MB limit.(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1033|System Owner/User Discovery|
LuminousMoth has used a malicious DLL to collect the username from compromised hosts.(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1005|Data from Local System|
LuminousMoth has collected files and data from compromised machines.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|
LuminousMoth has used malware that scans for files in the Documents, Desktop, and Download folders and in other drives.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool| | LuminousMoth.md |
175af522cc76-2 | LuminousMoth has obtained an ARP spoofing tool from GitHub.(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560|Archive Collected Data|
LuminousMoth has manually archived stolen files from victim machines before exfiltration.(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.004|Drive-by Target|
LuminousMoth has redirected compromised machines to an actor-controlled webpage through HTML injection.(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1557.002|ARP Cache Poisoning|
LuminousMoth has used ARP spoofing to redirect a compromised machine to an actor-controlled website.(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1567.002|Exfiltration to Cloud Storage|
LuminousMoth has exfiltrated data to Google Drive.(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
LuminousMoth has downloaded additional malware and tools onto a compromised host.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
LuminousMoth has used HTTP for C2.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1564.001|Hidden Files and Directories| | LuminousMoth.md |
175af522cc76-3 | LuminousMoth has used malware to store malicious binaries in hidden directories on victim's USB drives.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1091|Replication Through Removable Media|
LuminousMoth has used malicious DLLs to spread malware to connected removable USB drives on infected machines.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1539|Steal Web Session Cookie|
LuminousMoth has used an unnamed post-exploitation tool to steal cookies from the Chrome browser.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
LuminousMoth has disguised their exfiltration malware as
LuminousMoth has used malicious DLLs that setup persistence in the Registry Key
LuminousMoth has used legitimate executables such as
LuminousMoth has lured victims into clicking malicious Dropbox download links delivered through spearphishing.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
LuminousMoth has sent spearphishing emails containing a malicious Dropbox download link.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.004|Digital Certificates|
LuminousMoth has used a valid digital certificate for some of their malware.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.001|Malware|
LuminousMoth has obtained and used malware such as | LuminousMoth.md |
175af522cc76-4 | LuminousMoth has obtained and used malware such as
Cobalt Strike.(Citation: Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021)(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)| | LuminousMoth.md |
7335bf93c794-0 | Machete - G0095
Created: 2019-09-13T12:37:10.394Z
Modified: 2021-10-06T19:26:47.988Z
Contributors: Matias Nicolas Porolli, ESET
Aliases
Machete,APT-C-43,El Machete
Description
Machete is a suspected Spanish-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2010. It has primarily focused its operations within Latin America, with a particular emphasis on Venezuela, but also in the US, Europe, Russia, and parts of Asia. Machete generally targets high-profile organizations such as government institutions, intelligence services, and military units, as well as telecommunications and power companies.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)
Techniques Used
Machete has distributed
Machete through a fake blog website.(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
Machete has embedded malicious macros within spearphishing attachments to download additional files.(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Machete has used batch files to initiate additional downloads of malicious files.(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.007|Msiexec|
Machete has used msiexec to install the
Machete malware.(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Machete's
Machete MSI installer has masqueraded as a legitimate Adobe Acrobat Reader installer.(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
Machete has created scheduled tasks to maintain | Machete.md |
7335bf93c794-1 | Machete has created scheduled tasks to maintain
Machete's persistence.(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link|
Machete has has relied on users opening malicious links delivered through spearphishing to execute malware.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Machete has relied on users opening malicious attachments delivered through spearphishing to execute malware.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1059.006|Python|
Machete used multiple compiled Python scripts on the victim’s system.
Machete's main backdoor
Machete is also written in Python.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
Machete has sent phishing emails that contain a link to an external server with ZIP and RAR archives.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Machete has delivered spearphishing emails that contain a zipped file with malicious contents.(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)| | Machete.md |
779bb1cbc187-0 | Magic Hound - G0059
Created: 2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z
Modified: 2023-01-13T21:18:18.077Z
Contributors: Anastasios Pingios,Bryan Lee,Daniyal Naeem, BT Security
Aliases
Magic Hound,TA453,COBALT ILLUSION,Charming Kitten,ITG18,Phosphorus,Newscaster,APT35
Description
Magic Hound is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted European, U.S., and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, academics, journalists, and organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering campaigns since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021)
Techniques Used
Magic Hound has used base64-encoded commands.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,SaaS,Network|T1098|Account Manipulation|
Magic Hound has added a user named DefaultAccount to the Administrators and Remote Desktop Users groups.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1570|Lateral Tool Transfer|
Magic Hound has copied tools within a compromised network using RDP.(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1016.001|Internet Connection Discovery| | Magic_Hound.md |
779bb1cbc187-1 | Magic Hound has conducted a network call out to a specific website as part of their initial discovery activity.(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1591.001|Determine Physical Locations|
Magic Hound has collected location information from visitors to their phishing sites.(Citation: Google Iran Threats October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1562.002|Disable Windows Event Logging|
Magic Hound has executed scripts to disable the event log service.(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1482|Domain Trust Discovery|
Magic Hound has used a web shell to execute
Magic Hound has used an encrypted http proxy in C2 communications.(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1036.004|Masquerade Task or Service|
Magic Hound has named a malicious script CacheTask.bat to mimic a legitimate task.(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,IaaS|T1486|Data Encrypted for Impact|
Magic Hound has used BitLocker and DiskCryptor to encrypt targeted workstations. (Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers,Network|T1046|Network Service Discovery|
Magic Hound has used KPortScan 3.0 to perform SMB, RDP, and LDAP scanning.(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1078.002|Domain Accounts|
Magic Hound has used domain administrator accounts after dumping LSASS process memory.(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1090|Proxy| | Magic_Hound.md |
779bb1cbc187-2 | Magic Hound has used Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) for RDP traffic.(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1572|Protocol Tunneling|
Magic Hound has used Plink to tunnel RDP over SSH.(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers|T1078.001|Default Accounts|
Magic Hound enabled and used the default system managed account, DefaultAccount, via
Magic Hound has used
Ping for discovery on targeted networks.(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1592.002|Software|
Magic Hound has captured the user-agent strings from visitors to their phishing sites.(Citation: Google Iran Threats October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1590.005|IP Addresses|
Magic Hound has captured the IP addresses of visitors to their phishing sites.(Citation: Google Iran Threats October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1567|Exfiltration Over Web Service|
Magic Hound has used the Telegram API
Magic Hound has used Remote Desktop Services to copy tools on targeted systems.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1049|System Network Connections Discovery|
Magic Hound has used quser.exe to identify existing RDP connections.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.011|Rundll32| | Magic_Hound.md |
779bb1cbc187-3 | Magic Hound has used rundll32.exe to execute MiniDump from comsvcs.dll when dumping LSASS memory.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1136.001|Local Account|
Magic Hound has created local accounts named
Magic Hound has used Powershell to discover email accounts.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
Magic Hound has used a tool to run
Magic Hound has added the following rule to a victim's Windows firewall to allow RDP traffic -
Magic Hound has modified Registry settings for security tools.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1070.003|Clear Command History|
Magic Hound has removed mailbox export requests from compromised Exchange servers.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Office 365,Windows,Google Workspace|T1114.002|Remote Email Collection|
Magic Hound has exported emails from compromised Exchange servers including through use of the cmdlet
Magic Hound has used a web shell to exfiltrate a ZIP file containing a dump of LSASS memory on a compromised machine.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Office 365,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers,Network|T1562|Impair Defenses|
Magic Hound has disabled LSA protection on compromised hosts using
Magic Hound has used
Magic Hound has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence and execution.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Containers,IaaS|T1562.001|Disable or Modify Tools| | Magic_Hound.md |
779bb1cbc187-4 | Magic Hound has disabled antivirus services on targeted systems in order to upload malicious payloads.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS,Network|T1505.003|Web Shell|
Magic Hound has used multiple web shells to gain execution.(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,SaaS|T1189|Drive-by Compromise|
Magic Hound has conducted watering-hole attacks through media and magazine websites.(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.006|Web Services|
Magic Hound has acquired Amazon S3 buckets to use in C2.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1595.002|Vulnerability Scanning|
Magic Hound has conducted widespread scanning to identify public-facing systems vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228 in Log4j and ProxyShell vulnerabilities; CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 in on-premises MS Exchange Servers; and CVE-2018-13379 in Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPNs.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Network,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1190|Exploit Public-Facing Application| | Magic_Hound.md |
779bb1cbc187-5 | Magic Hound has exploited the Log4j utility (CVE-2021-44228), on-premises MS Exchange servers via "ProxyShell" (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207), and Fortios SSL VPNs (CVE-2018-13379).(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: Cybereason PowerLess February 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589.002|Email Addresses|
Magic Hound has identified high-value email accounts in academia, journalism, NGO's, foreign policy, and national security for targeting.(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021)(Citation: Google Iran Threats October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589|Gather Victim Identity Information|
Magic Hound has acquired mobile phone numbers of potential targets, possibly for mobile malware or additional phishing operations.(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
Magic Hound has obtained and used tools like
Havij,
sqlmap, Metasploit,
Mimikatz, and Plink.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link|
Magic Hound has attempted to lure victims into opening malicious links embedded in emails.(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File| | Magic_Hound.md |
779bb1cbc187-6 | Magic Hound has attempted to lure victims into opening malicious email attachments.(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1585.001|Social Media Accounts|
Magic Hound has created fake LinkedIn and other social media accounts to contact targets and convince them--through messages and voice communications--to open malicious links.(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1584.001|Domains|
Magic Hound has used compromised domains to host links targeted to specific phishing victims.(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Google Iran Threats October 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
Magic Hound has registered fraudulent domains such as "mail-newyorker.com" and "news12.com.recover-session-service.site" to target specific victims with phishing attacks.(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1598.003|Spearphishing Link|
Magic Hound has used SMS and email messages with links designed to steal credentials or track victims.(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021)(Citation: Google Iran Threats October 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Office 365,Google Workspace,macOS,Linux|T1114|Email Collection|
Magic Hound has compromised email credentials in order to steal sensitive data.(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1586.002|Email Accounts| | Magic_Hound.md |
779bb1cbc187-7 | Magic Hound has compromised email credentials in order to steal sensitive data.(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1586.002|Email Accounts|
Magic Hound has compromised personal email accounts through the use of legitimate credentials and gathered additional victim information.(Citation: IBM ITG18 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1585.002|Email Accounts|
Magic Hound has established email accounts using fake personas for spearphishing operations.(Citation: IBM ITG18 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589.001|Credentials|
Magic Hound gathered credentials from two victims that they then attempted to validate across 75 different websites.
Magic Hound has also collected credentials from over 900 Fortinet VPN servers in the US, Europe, and Israel.(Citation: IBM ITG18 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1566.003|Spearphishing via Service|
Magic Hound used various social media channels (such as LinkedIn) as well as messaging services (such as WhatsApp) to spearphish victims.(Citation: SecureWorks Mia Ash July 2017)(Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1571|Non-Standard Port|
Magic Hound malware has communicated with its C2 server over TCP ports 4443 and 10151 using HTTP.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Office 365,Google Workspace|T1098.002|Additional Email Delegate Permissions| | Magic_Hound.md |
779bb1cbc187-8 | Magic Hound granted compromised email accounts read access to the email boxes of additional targeted accounts. The group then was able to authenticate to the intended victim's OWA (Outlook Web Access) portal and read hundreds of email communications for information on Middle East organizations.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071|Application Layer Protocol|
Magic Hound malware has used IRC for C2.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1564.003|Hidden Window|
Magic Hound malware has a function to determine whether the C2 server wishes to execute the newly dropped file in a hidden window.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1114.001|Local Email Collection|
Magic Hound has collected .PST archives.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.001|Archive via Utility|
Magic Hound has used gzip to archive dumped LSASS process memory and RAR to stage and compress local folders.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory|
Magic Hound has stolen domain credentials by dumping LSASS process memory using Task Manager, comsvcs.dll, and from a Microsoft Active Directory Domain Controller using
Mimikatz.(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link| | Magic_Hound.md |
779bb1cbc187-9 | Magic Hound has sent malicious URL links through email to victims. In some cases the URLs were shortened or linked to Word documents with malicious macros that executed PowerShells scripts to download
Pupy.(Citation: Secureworks Cobalt Gypsy Feb 2017)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion|
Magic Hound has deleted and overwrote files to cover tracks.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
Magic Hound malware has used a PowerShell command to check the victim system architecture to determine if it is an x64 machine. Other malware has obtained the OS version, UUID, and computer/host name to send to the C2 server.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery|
Magic Hound malware gathers the victim's local IP address, MAC address, and external IP address.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Magic Hound has used the command-line interface for code execution.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information| | Magic_Hound.md |
779bb1cbc187-10 | Magic Hound malware has used base64-encoded files and has also encrypted embedded strings with AES.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|
Magic Hound malware can list running processes.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Magic Hound has used HTTP for C2.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1113|Screen Capture|
Magic Hound malware can take a screenshot and upload the file to its C2 server.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Magic Hound has used PowerShell for execution and privilege escalation.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1056.001|Keylogging|
Magic Hound malware is capable of keylogging.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery| | Magic_Hound.md |
779bb1cbc187-11 | Magic Hound malware can list a victim's logical drives and the type, as well the total/free space of the fixed devices. Other malware can list a directory's contents.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102.002|Bidirectional Communication|
Magic Hound malware can use a SOAP Web service to communicate with its C2 server.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Magic Hound malware has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
Magic Hound malware has used VBS scripts for execution.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1033|System Owner/User Discovery|
Magic Hound malware has obtained the victim username and sent it to the C2 server.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Magic Hound has downloaded additional code and files from servers onto victims.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: DFIR Report APT35 ProxyShell March 2022)(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021)| | Magic_Hound.md |
0b1206c3df03-0 | menuPass - G0045
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:09.054Z
Modified: 2023-03-23T15:06:31.019Z
Contributors: Edward Millington,Michael Cox
Aliases
menuPass,Cicada,POTASSIUM,Stone Panda,APT10,Red Apollo,CVNX,HOGFISH
Description
menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)
menuPass has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.(Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013)(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)
Techniques Used
menuPass has used
Wevtutil to remove PowerShell execution logs.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows|T1553.002|Code Signing|
menuPass has resized and added data to the certificate table to enable the signing of modified files with legitimate signatures.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Network,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1190|Exploit Public-Facing Application| | menuPass.md |
0b1206c3df03-1 | menuPass has leveraged vulnerabilities in Pulse Secure VPNs to hijack sessions.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
menuPass has used and modified open-source tools like
Impacket,
Mimikatz, and
pwdump.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1568.001|Fast Flux DNS|
menuPass has used dynamic DNS service providers to host malicious domains.(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
menuPass has registered malicious domains for use in intrusion campaigns.(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|
menuPass has searched compromised systems for folders of interest including those related to HR, audit and expense, and meeting memos.(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1106|Native API|
menuPass has used native APIs including
menuPass has used Ntdsutil to dump credentials.(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1210|Exploitation of Remote Services|
menuPass has used tools to exploit the ZeroLogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472).(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,IaaS,SaaS|T1119|Automated Collection|
menuPass has used the Csvde tool to collect Active Directory files and data.(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.004|InstallUtil|
menuPass has used | menuPass.md |
0b1206c3df03-2 | menuPass has used
menuPass has used a modified version of pentesting tools wmiexec.vbs and secretsdump.py to dump credentials.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: Github AD-Pentest-Script)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1036.003|Rename System Utilities|
menuPass has renamed
certutil and moved it to a different location on the system to avoid detection based on use of the tool.(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036|Masquerading|
menuPass has used
esentutl to change file extensions to their true type that were masquerading as .txt files.(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS|T1074.002|Remote Data Staging|
menuPass has staged data on remote MSP systems or other victim networks prior to exfiltration.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1056.001|Keylogging|
menuPass has used key loggers to steal usernames and passwords.(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1005|Data from Local System|
menuPass has collected various files from the compromised computers.(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)
|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560|Archive Collected Data|
menuPass has encrypted files and information before exfiltration.(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location| | menuPass.md |
0b1206c3df03-3 | menuPass has been seen changing malicious files to appear legitimate.(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1055.012|Process Hollowing|
menuPass has used process hollowing in iexplore.exe to load the
RedLeaves implant.(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion|A
menuPass macro deletes files after it has decoded and decompressed them.(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
menuPass has encoded strings in its malware with base64 as well as with a simple, single-byte XOR obfuscation using key 0x40.(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
menuPass has used
certutil in a macro to decode base64-encoded content contained in a dropper document attached to an email. The group has also used
UPPERCUT.(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File| | menuPass.md |
0b1206c3df03-4 | menuPass has attempted to get victims to open malicious files such as Windows Shortcuts (.lnk) and/or Microsoft Office documents, sent via email as part of spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
menuPass has sent malicious Office documents via email as part of spearphishing campaigns as well as executables disguised as documents.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Office 365|T1199|Trusted Relationship|
menuPass has used legitimate access granted to Managed Service Providers in order to access victims of interest.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1049|System Network Connections Discovery|
menuPass has used
menuPass stages data prior to exfiltration in multi-part archives, often saved in the Recycle Bin.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts| | menuPass.md |
0b1206c3df03-5 | menuPass has used valid accounts including shared between Managed Service Providers and clients to move between the two environments.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
menuPass uses
PowerSploit to inject shellcode into PowerShell.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers,Network|T1046|Network Service Discovery|
menuPass has used tcping.exe, similar to
Ping, to probe port status on systems of interest.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS|T1021.004|SSH|
menuPass has used Putty Secure Copy Client (PSCP) to transfer data.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
menuPass has used a modified version of pentesting script wmiexec.vbs, which logs into a remote machine using WMI.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: Github AD-Pentest-Script)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1039|Data from Network Shared Drive|
menuPass has collected data from remote systems by mounting network shares with
menuPass uses scripts to enumerate IP ranges on the victim network.
menuPass has also issued the command
PlugX implant to gather information about remote systems on the network.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.002|Security Account Manager| | menuPass.md |
0b1206c3df03-6 | menuPass has used a modified version of pentesting tools wmiexec.vbs and secretsdump.py to dump credentials.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: Github AD-Pentest-Script)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery|
menuPass has used several tools to scan for open NetBIOS nameservers and enumerate NetBIOS sessions.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1574.001|DLL Search Order Hijacking|
menuPass has used DLL search order hijacking.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
menuPass executes commands using a command-line interface and reverse shell. The group has used a modified version of pentesting script wmiexec.vbs to execute commands.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: Github AD-Pentest-Script)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)
menuPass has used malicious macros embedded inside Office documents to execute files.(Citation: Accenture Hogfish April 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1087.002|Domain Account|
menuPass has used the Microsoft administration tool csvde.exe to export Active Directory data.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.001|Archive via Utility|
menuPass has compressed files before exfiltration using TAR and RAR.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1574.002|DLL Side-Loading| | menuPass.md |
0b1206c3df03-7 | menuPass has used DLL side-loading to launch versions of Mimikatz and PwDump6 as well as
UPPERCUT.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)(Citation: Symantec Cicada November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
menuPass has used a script (atexec.py) to execute a command on a target machine via Task Scheduler.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.001|Remote Desktop Protocol|
menuPass has used RDP connections to move across the victim network.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1090.002|External Proxy|
menuPass has used a global service provider's IP as a proxy for C2 traffic from a victim.(Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
menuPass has installed updates and new malware on victims.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)| | menuPass.md |
1821a6d36921-0 | Metador - G1013
Created: 2023-01-25T23:57:51.818Z
Modified: 2023-04-14T12:25:35.434Z
Contributors: Massimiliano Romano, BT Security,Sittikorn Sangrattanapitak
Aliases
Metador
Description
Metador is a suspected cyber espionage group that was first reported in September 2022. Metador has targeted a limited number of telecommunication companies, internet service providers, and universities in the Middle East and Africa. Security researchers named the group Metador based on the "I am meta" string in one of the group's malware samples and the expectation of Spanish-language responses from C2 servers.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)
Techniques Used
Metador has encrypted their payloads.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion|
Metador has quickly deleted
Metador has used Microsoft's Console Debugger in some of their operations.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Metador has downloaded tools and malware onto a compromised system.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Metador has used the Windows command line to execute commands.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1546.003|Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription|
Metador has established persistence through the use of a WMI event subscription combined with unusual living-off-the-land binaries such as
Metador has used unique malware in their operations, including
metaMain and
Mafalda.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,Network|T1095|Non-Application Layer Protocol| | Metador.md |
1821a6d36921-1 | Mafalda.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,Network|T1095|Non-Application Layer Protocol|
Metador has used TCP for C2.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Metador has used HTTP for C2.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)| | Metador.md |
ebb191402572-0 | Moafee - G0002
Created: 2017-05-31T21:31:46.025Z
Modified: 2020-03-30T19:09:42.298Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Moafee
Description
Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. (Citation: Haq 2014)
Techniques Used
|Matrix|Domain|Platform|Technique ID|Technique Name|Use|
| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.001|Binary Padding|Moafee has been known to employ binary padding.(Citation: Haq 2014)| | Moafee.md |
749a02e55b24-0 | Mofang - G0103
Created: 2020-05-12T21:23:59.021Z
Modified: 2020-05-29T03:30:39.739Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Mofang
Description
Mofang is a likely China-based cyber espionage group, named for its frequent practice of imitating a victim's infrastructure. This adversary has been observed since at least May 2012 conducting focused attacks against government and critical infrastructure in Myanmar, as well as several other countries and sectors including military, automobile, and weapons industries.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)
Techniques Used
Mofang delivered spearphishing emails with malicious links included.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link|
Mofang's spearphishing emails required a user to click the link to connect to a compromised website.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Mofang delivered spearphishing emails with malicious documents, PDFs, or Excel files attached.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Mofang's malicious spearphishing attachments required a user to open the file after receiving.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Mofang has compressed the
ShimRat executable within malicious email attachments.
Mofang has also encrypted payloads before they are downloaded to victims.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)| | Mofang.md |
2b8a54a6d9e8-0 | Molerats - G0021
Created: 2017-05-31T21:31:55.093Z
Modified: 2021-04-27T20:16:16.057Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Molerats,Operation Molerats,Gaza Cybergang
Description
Molerats is an Arabic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.(Citation: DustySky)(Citation: DustySky2)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)
Techniques Used
Molerats has used msiexec.exe to execute an MSI payload.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
Molerats has created scheduled tasks to persistently run VBScripts.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
Molerats decompresses ZIP files once on the victim machine.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Molerats used PowerShell implants on target machines.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.007|JavaScript|
Molerats used various implants, including those built with JS, on target machines.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic| | Molerats.md |
2b8a54a6d9e8-1 | Molerats used various implants, including those built with VBScript, on target machines.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious links included.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word and PDF attachments.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Molerats has sent malicious files via email that tricked users into clicking Enable Content to run an embedded macro and to download malicious archives.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link|
Molerats has sent malicious links via email trick users into opening a RAR archive and running an executable.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Molerats has delivered compressed executables within ZIP files to victims.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer| | Molerats.md |
2b8a54a6d9e8-2 | Molerats used executables to download malicious files from different sources.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Molerats saved malicious files within the AppData and Startup folders to maintain persistence.(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows|T1553.002|Code Signing|
Molerats has used forged Microsoft code-signing certificates on malware.(Citation: FireEye Operation Molerats)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555.003|Credentials from Web Browsers|
Molerats used the public tool BrowserPasswordDump10 to dump passwords saved in browsers on victims.(Citation: DustySky)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|
Molerats actors obtained a list of active processes on the victim and sent them to C2 servers.(Citation: DustySky)| | Molerats.md |
642e1d5369a0-0 | Moses Staff - G1009
Created: 2022-08-11T22:47:27.686Z
Modified: 2022-10-24T18:50:12.653Z
Contributors: Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation,Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India,Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India
Aliases
Moses Staff
Description
Moses Staff is a suspected Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Israeli companies since at least September 2021. Moses Staff openly stated their motivation in attacking Israeli companies is to cause damage by leaking stolen sensitive data and encrypting the victim's networks without a ransom demand.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
Security researchers assess Moses Staff is politically motivated, and has targeted government, finance, travel, energy, manufacturing, and utility companies outside of Israel as well, including those in Italy, India, Germany, Chile, Turkey, the UAE, and the US.(Citation: Cybereason StrifeWater Feb 2022)
Techniques Used
Moses Staff has used batch scripts that can disable the Windows firewall on specific remote machines.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.002|SMB/Windows Admin Shares|
Moses Staff has used batch scripts that can enable SMB on a compromised host.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1087.001|Local Account|
Moses Staff has collected the administrator username from a compromised host.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows|T1553.002|Code Signing|
Moses Staff has used signed drivers from an open source tool called DiskCryptor to evade detection.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Moses Staff has downloaded and installed web shells to following path | Moses_Staff.md |
642e1d5369a0-1 | Moses Staff has downloaded and installed web shells to following path
Moses Staff collected information about the infected host, including the machine names and OS architecture.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)
|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery|
Moses Staff has collected the domain name of a compromised network.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Moses Staff has used obfuscated web shells in their operations.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1587.001|Malware|
Moses Staff has built malware, such as
DCSrv and
PyDCrypt, for targeting victims' machines.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
Moses Staff has used the commercial tool DiskCryptor.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS,Network|T1505.003|Web Shell|
Moses Staff has dropped a web shell onto a compromised system.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Network,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1190|Exploit Public-Facing Application|
Moses Staff has exploited known vulnerabilities in public-facing infrastructure such as Microsoft Exchange Servers.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021)| | Moses_Staff.md |
739698724b8c-0 | MuddyWater - G0069
Created: 2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T04:59:16.032Z
Contributors: Ozer Sarilar, @ozersarilar, STM,Daniyal Naeem, BT Security
Aliases
MuddyWater,Earth Vetala,MERCURY,Static Kitten,Seedworm,TEMP.Zagros
Description
MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).(Citation: CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022) Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022)
Techniques Used
MuddyWater maintains persistence on victim networks through side-loading dlls to trick legitimate programs into running malware.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1573.001|Symmetric Cryptography|
MuddyWater has used AES to encrypt C2 responses.(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Network,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1190|Exploit Public-Facing Application|
MuddyWater has exploited the Microsoft Exchange memory corruption vulnerability (CVE-2020-0688).(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1210|Exploitation of Remote Services| | MuddyWater.md |
739698724b8c-1 | MuddyWater has exploited the Microsoft Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472).(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1074.001|Local Data Staging|
MuddyWater has stored a decoy PDF file within a victim's
MuddyWater has used JavaScript files to execute its
POWERSTATS payload.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Containers,IaaS|T1562.001|Disable or Modify Tools|
MuddyWater can disable the system's local proxy settings.(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1219|Remote Access Software|
MuddyWater has used a legitimate application, ScreenConnect, to manage systems remotely and move laterally.(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518|Software Discovery|
MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for Skype connectivity on the target machine.(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1049|System Network Connections Discovery|
MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for Skype connections on the target machine.(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1059.006|Python|
MuddyWater has used developed tools in Python including
Out1.(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1087.002|Domain Account| | MuddyWater.md |
739698724b8c-2 | Out1.(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1087.002|Domain Account|
MuddyWater has used
MuddyWater has sent targeted spearphishing e-mails with malicious links.(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link|
MuddyWater has distributed URLs in phishing e-mails that link to lure documents.(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589.002|Email Addresses|
MuddyWater has specifically targeted government agency employees with spearphishing e-mails.(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102.002|Bidirectional Communication|
MuddyWater has used web services including OneHub to distribute remote access tools.(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|MuddyWater has made use of legitimate tools ConnectWise and Remote Utilities to gain access to target environment.(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.006|Web Services|
MuddyWater has used file sharing services including OneHub to distribute tools.(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1041|Exfiltration Over C2 Channel|
MuddyWater has used C2 infrastructure to receive exfiltrated data.(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task| | MuddyWater.md |
739698724b8c-3 | MuddyWater has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence.(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Office 365|T1137.001|Office Template Macros|
MuddyWater has used a Word Template, Normal.dotm, for persistence.(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1132.001|Standard Encoding|
MuddyWater has used tools to encode C2 communications including Base64 encoding.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution|
MuddyWater has exploited the Office vulnerability CVE-2017-0199 for execution.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
MuddyWater has used HTTP for C2 communications.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555|Credentials from Password Stores|
MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with
LaZagne and other tools, including by dumping passwords saved in victim email.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.005|Cached Domain Credentials|
MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with
LaZagne.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.004|LSA Secrets|
MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with | MuddyWater.md |
739698724b8c-4 | MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with
LaZagne.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
MuddyWater has used VBScript files to execute its
POWERSTATS payload, as well as macros.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: MuddyWater TrendMicro June 2018)(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.003|Steganography|
MuddyWater has stored obfuscated JavaScript code in an image file named temp.jpg.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555.003|Credentials from Web Browsers|
MuddyWater has run tools including Browser64 to steal passwords saved in victim web browsers.(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1104|Multi-Stage Channels|
MuddyWater has used one C2 to obtain enumeration scripts and monitor web logs, but a different C2 to send data back.(Citation: Talos MuddyWater May 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.004|Compile After Delivery| | MuddyWater.md |
739698724b8c-5 | MuddyWater has used the .NET csc.exe tool to compile executables from downloaded C# code.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1033|System Owner/User Discovery|
MuddyWater has used malware that can collect the victim’s username.(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery|
MuddyWater has used malware to collect the victim’s IP address and domain name.(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1113|Screen Capture|
MuddyWater has used malware that can capture screenshots of the victim’s machine.(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518.001|Security Software Discovery|
MuddyWater has used malware to check running processes against a hard-coded list of security tools often used by malware researchers.(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
MuddyWater has used malware that can collect the victim’s OS version and machine name.(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater May 2019)(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1559.002|Dynamic Data Exchange|
MuddyWater has used malware that can execute PowerShell scripts via DDE.(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery| | MuddyWater.md |
739698724b8c-6 | MuddyWater has used malware to obtain a list of running processes on the system.(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|
MuddyWater has used malware that checked if the ProgramData folder had folders or files with the keywords "Kasper," "Panda," or "ESET."(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
MuddyWater has used malware that can upload additional files to the victim’s machine.(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
MuddyWater has used a custom tool for creating reverse shells.(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1559.001|Component Object Model|
MuddyWater has used malware that has the capability to execute malicious code via COM, DCOM, and Outlook.(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1552.001|Credentials In Files|
MuddyWater has run a tool that steals passwords saved in victim email.(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.001|Archive via Utility| | MuddyWater.md |
739698724b8c-7 | MuddyWater has used the native Windows cabinet creation tool, makecab.exe, likely to compress stolen data to be uploaded.(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged WMI for execution and querying host information.(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater May 2019)(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1090.002|External Proxy|
MuddyWater has controlled
POWERSTATS from behind a proxy network to obfuscate the C2 location.(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)
MuddyWater has used a series of compromised websites that victims connected to randomly to relay information to command and control (C2).(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.011|Rundll32|
MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged rundll32.exe in a Registry Run key to execute a .dll.(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1548.002|Bypass User Account Control|
MuddyWater uses various techniques to bypass UAC.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File| | MuddyWater.md |
739698724b8c-8 | MuddyWater has attempted to get users to enable macros and launch malicious Microsoft Word documents delivered via spearphishing emails.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater May 2019)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory|
MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with
Mimikatz and procdump64.exe.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
MuddyWater has disguised malicious executables and used filenames and Registry key names associated with Windows Defender.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater May 2019)(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
MuddyWater decoded base64-encoded PowerShell commands using a VBS file.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: MuddyWater TrendMicro June 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell| | MuddyWater.md |
739698724b8c-9 | MuddyWater has used PowerShell for execution.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: MuddyWater TrendMicro June 2018)(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater May 2019)(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.003|CMSTP|
MuddyWater has used CMSTP.exe and a malicious INF to execute its
POWERSTATS payload.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.005|Mshta|
MuddyWater has used mshta.exe to execute its
POWERSTATS payload and to pass a PowerShell one-liner for execution.(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
MuddyWater has compromised third parties and used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails with targeted attachments to recipients.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021) (Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
MuddyWater has added Registry Run key | MuddyWater.md |
739698724b8c-10 | MuddyWater has added Registry Run key
MuddyWater has used Daniel Bohannon’s Invoke-Obfuscation framework and obfuscated PowerShell scripts.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: GitHub Invoke-Obfuscation) The group has also used other obfuscation methods, including Base64 obfuscation of VBScripts and PowerShell commands.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)(Citation: Securelist MuddyWater Oct 2018)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater May 2019)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022)| | MuddyWater.md |
7f9e2280ef0a-0 | Mustang Panda - G0129
Created: 2021-04-12T15:56:28.861Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T22:01:13.781Z
Contributors: Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet
Aliases
Mustang Panda,TA416,RedDelta,BRONZE PRESIDENT
Description
Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that was first observed in 2017 but may have been conducting operations since at least 2014. Mustang Panda has targeted government entities, nonprofits, religious, and other non-governmental organizations in the U.S., Europe, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among others.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)
Techniques Used
Mustang Panda has delivered web bugs to profile their intended targets.(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.001|Upload Malware|
Mustang Panda has hosted malicious payloads on DropBox including
PlugX.(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102|Web Service|
Mustang Panda has used DropBox URLs to deliver variants of
PlugX.(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1585.002|Email Accounts|
Mustang Panda has leveraged the legitimate email marketing service SMTP2Go for phishing campaigns.(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608|Stage Capabilities|
Mustang Panda has used servers under their control to validate tracking pixels sent to phishing victims.(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1036.007|Double File Extension| | Mustang_Panda.md |
7f9e2280ef0a-1 | Mustang Panda has used an additional filename extension to hide the true file type.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.003|Archive via Custom Method|
Mustang Panda has encrypted documents with RC4 prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Avira Mustang Panda January 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.004|InstallUtil|
Mustang Panda has used
Mustang Panda has used a customized
PlugX variant which could spread through USB connections.(Citation: Avira Mustang Panda January 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1052.001|Exfiltration over USB|
Mustang Panda has used a customized
PlugX variant which could exfiltrate documents from air-gapped networks.(Citation: Avira Mustang Panda January 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1049|System Network Connections Discovery|
Mustang Panda has used
Mustang Panda has gathered system information using
Mustang Panda has used spearphishing attachments to deliver initial access payloads.(Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 November 2020)(Citation: Google TAG Ukraine Threat Landscape March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Mustang Panda has used names like
PlugX, and a file named
Cobalt Strike payload.(Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.001|Binary Padding|
Mustang Panda has used junk code within their DLL files to hinder analysis.(Citation: Avira Mustang Panda January 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|
Mustang Panda has used | Mustang_Panda.md |
7f9e2280ef0a-2 | Mustang Panda has used
Mustang Panda has encrypted C2 communications with RC4.(Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery|
Mustang Panda has used
Mustang Panda has downloaded additional executables following the initial infection stage.(Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Mustang Panda has created the registry key
Mustang Panda's
PlugX variant has created a hidden folder on USB drives named
Mustang Panda has searched the entire target system for DOC, DOCX, PPT, PPTX, XLS, XLSX, and PDF files.(Citation: Avira Mustang Panda January 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
Mustang Panda has delivered malicious links to their intended targets.(Citation: McAfee Dianxun March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,IaaS,SaaS|T1119|Automated Collection|
Mustang Panda used custom batch scripts to collect files automatically from a targeted system.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1219|Remote Access Software|
Mustang Panda has installed TeamViewer on targeted systems.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.003|NTDS|
Mustang Panda has used vssadmin to create a volume shadow copy and retrieve the NTDS.dit file.
Mustang Panda has also used
Mustang Panda has stored collected credential files in | Mustang_Panda.md |
7f9e2280ef0a-3 | Mustang Panda has used vssadmin to create a volume shadow copy and retrieve the NTDS.dit file.
Mustang Panda has also used
Mustang Panda has stored collected credential files in
Mustang Panda has also stored documents for exfiltration in a hidden folder on USB drives.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citation: Avira Mustang Panda January 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion|
Mustang Panda will delete their tools and files, and kill processes after their objectives are reached.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
Mustang Panda have acquired C2 domains prior to operations.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020)(Citation: McAfee Dianxun March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1546.003|Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription|
Mustang Panda's custom ORat tool uses a WMI event consumer to maintain persistence.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.005|Mshta|
Mustang Panda has used mshta.exe to launch collection scripts.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.001|Archive via Utility|
Mustang Panda has used RAR to create password-protected archives of collected documents prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citation: Avira Mustang Panda January 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518|Software Discovery|
Mustang Panda has searched the victim system for the | Mustang_Panda.md |
7f9e2280ef0a-4 | Mustang Panda has searched the victim system for the
Mustang Panda has created a scheduled task to execute additional malicious software, as well as maintain persistence.(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citation: McAfee Dianxun March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Mustang Panda has executed HTA files via cmd.exe, and used batch scripts for collection.(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Avira Mustang Panda January 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1574.002|DLL Side-Loading|
Mustang Panda has used a legitimately signed executable to execute a malicious payload within a DLL file.(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 November 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
Mustang Panda has executed PowerShell scripts via WMI.(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Mustang Panda has communicated with its C2 via HTTP POST requests.(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020)(Citation: McAfee Dianxun March 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link| | Mustang_Panda.md |
7f9e2280ef0a-5 | Mustang Panda has sent malicious links including links directing victims to a Google Drive folder.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: McAfee Dianxun March 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution|
Mustang Panda has exploited CVE-2017-0199 in Microsoft Word to execute code.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Mustang Panda has delivered initial payloads hidden using archives and encoding measures.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 November 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Mustang Panda has sent malicious files requiring direct victim interaction to execute.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Avira Mustang Panda January 2020)(Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020)(Citation: Google TAG Ukraine Threat Landscape March 2022)(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Mustang Panda has used malicious PowerShell scripts to enable execution.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic| | Mustang_Panda.md |
7f9e2280ef0a-6 | Mustang Panda has embedded VBScript components in LNK files to download additional files and automate collection.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)| | Mustang_Panda.md |
6144d1f40fa1-0 | Naikon - G0019
Created: 2017-05-31T21:31:54.232Z
Modified: 2021-08-19T18:23:23.507Z
Contributors: Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet
Aliases
Naikon
Description
Naikon is assessed to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).(Citation: CameraShy) Active since at least 2010, Naikon has primarily conducted operations against government, military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well as against international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).(Citation: CameraShy)(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)
While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.(Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)
Techniques Used
Naikon renamed a malicious service
Naikon has modified a victim's Windows Run registry to establish persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Naikon has disguised malicious programs as Google Chrome, Adobe, and VMware executables.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers,Network|T1046|Network Service Discovery|
Naikon has used the LadonGo scanner to scan target networks.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1018|Remote System Discovery|
Naikon has used a netbios scanner for remote machine identification.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation| | Naikon.md |
6144d1f40fa1-1 | Naikon has used a netbios scanner for remote machine identification.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
Naikon has used WMIC.exe for lateral movement.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
Naikon has used schtasks.exe for lateral movement in compromised networks.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1078.002|Domain Accounts|
Naikon has used administrator credentials for lateral movement in compromised networks.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Naikon has used malicious e-mail attachments to deliver malware.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Naikon has convinced victims to open malicious attachments to execute malware.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Office 365|T1137.006|Add-ins|
Naikon has used the RoyalRoad exploit builder to drop a second stage loader, intel.wll, into the Word Startup folder on the compromised host.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1574.002|DLL Side-Loading|
Naikon has used DLL side-loading to load malicious DLL's into legitimate executables.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518.001|Security Software Discovery|
Naikon uses commands such as
Naikon uses commands such as | Naikon.md |
6ccc01f361f7-0 | Nomadic Octopus - G0133
Created: 2021-08-24T17:04:27.002Z
Modified: 2022-09-02T18:03:55.294Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Nomadic Octopus,DustSquad
Description
Nomadic Octopus is a Russian-speaking cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted Central Asia, including local governments, diplomatic missions, and individuals, since at least 2014. Nomadic Octopus has been observed conducting campaigns involving Android and Windows malware, mainly using the Delphi programming language, and building custom variants.(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)
Techniques Used
Nomadic Octopus as attempted to lure victims into clicking on malicious attachments within spearphishing emails.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1564.003|Hidden Window|
Nomadic Octopus executed PowerShell in a hidden window.(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Nomadic Octopus has used PowerShell for execution.(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Nomadic Octopus has used malicious macros to download additional files to the victim's machine.(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Nomadic Octopus used
Nomadic Octopus attempted to make
Octopus appear as a Telegram Messenger with a Russian interface.(Citation: Securelist Octopus Oct 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment| | Nomadic_Octopus.md |
6ccc01f361f7-1 | Nomadic Octopus has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.(Citation: Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018)(Citation: ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018)| | Nomadic_Octopus.md |
10216f382bb1-0 | OilRig - G0049
Created: 2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z
Modified: 2023-02-06T20:58:52.317Z
Contributors: Robert Falcone,Bryan Lee,Dragos Threat Intelligence
Aliases
OilRig,COBALT GYPSY,IRN2,APT34,Helix Kitten,Evasive Serpens
Description
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)
Techniques Used
OilRig has used tools to identify if a mouse is connected to a targeted system.(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
OilRig has used VBSscipt macros for execution on compromised hosts.(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1497.001|System Checks|
OilRig has used macros to verify if a mouse is connected to a compromised machine.(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036|Masquerading| | OilRig.md |
10216f382bb1-1 | OilRig has used .doc file extensions to mask malicious executables.(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1555.004|Windows Credential Manager|
OilRig has used credential dumping tool named VALUEVAULT to steal credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Office 365|T1137.004|Outlook Home Page|
OilRig has abused the Outlook Home Page feature for persistence.
OilRig has also used CVE-2017-11774 to roll back the initial patch designed to protect against Home Page abuse.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
OilRig has used macros to deliver malware such as
QUADAGENT and
OopsIE.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: OilRig ISMAgent July 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Nov 2018)
OilRig has used batch scripts.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: OilRig ISMAgent July 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555.003|Credentials from Web Browsers|
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as
LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019) | OilRig.md |
10216f382bb1-2 | OilRig has also used tool named PICKPOCKET to dump passwords from web browsers.(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555|Credentials from Password Stores|
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as
LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1003.005|Cached Domain Credentials|
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as
LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1003.004|LSA Secrets|
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as
LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1069.002|Domain Groups|
OilRig has used
OilRig has run | OilRig.md |
10216f382bb1-3 | OilRig has used
OilRig has run
OilRig has delivered malicious links to achieve execution on the target system.(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.004|DNS|
OilRig has used DNS for C2 including the publicly available
OilRig has used the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1566.003|Spearphishing via Service|
OilRig has used LinkedIn to send spearphishing links.(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1552.001|Credentials In Files|
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as
LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
OilRig has sent spearphising emails with malicious links to potential victims.(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task| | OilRig.md |
10216f382bb1-4 | OilRig has created scheduled tasks that run a VBScript to execute a payload on victim machines.(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers,Network|T1046|Network Service Discovery|
OilRig has used the publicly available tool SoftPerfect Network Scanner as well as a custom tool called GOLDIRONY to conduct network scanning.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
OilRig has sent spearphising emails with malicious attachments to potential victims using compromised and/or spoofed email accounts.(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
OilRig has used WMI for execution.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1218.001|Compiled HTML File|
OilRig has used a CHM payload to load and execute another malicious file once delivered to a victim.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File| | OilRig.md |
10216f382bb1-5 | OilRig has delivered macro-enabled documents that required targets to click the "enable content" button to execute the payload on the system.(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
OilRig can download remote files onto victims.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1056.001|Keylogging|
OilRig has used keylogging tools called KEYPUNCH and LONGWATCH.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)
OilRig has used brute force techniques to obtain credentials.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1573.002|Asymmetric Cryptography|
OilRig used the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Linux,Containers,macOS|T1133|External Remote Services|
OilRig uses remote services such as VPN, Citrix, or OWA to persist in an environment.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,IaaS,Network|T1201|Password Policy Discovery|
OilRig has used net.exe in a script with
OilRig has a tool called CANDYKING to capture a screenshot of user's desktop.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery| | OilRig.md |
10216f382bb1-6 | OilRig has run
OilRig has exfiltrated data over FTP separately from its primary C2 channel over DNS.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1012|Query Registry|
OilRig has used
OilRig has used Remote Desktop Protocol for lateral movement. The group has also used tunneling tools to tunnel RDP into the environment.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1033|System Owner/User Discovery|
OilRig has run
OilRig has used web shells, often to maintain access to a victim network.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,IaaS,SaaS|T1119|Automated Collection|
OilRig has used automated collection.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1069.001|Local Groups|
OilRig has used
OilRig has used PowerShell scripts for execution, including use of a macro to run a PowerShell command to decode file contents.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts| | OilRig.md |
10216f382bb1-7 | OilRig has used compromised credentials to access other systems on a victim network.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network,Office 365,Azure AD,IaaS,Google Workspace|T1059|Command and Scripting Interpreter|
OilRig has used various types of scripting for execution.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: OilRig ISMAgent July 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS|T1021.004|SSH|
OilRig has used Putty to access compromised systems.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory|
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as
Mimikatz to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
OilRig has run | OilRig.md |
10216f382bb1-8 | OilRig has run
OilRig has encrypted and encoded data in its malware, including by using base64.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|
OilRig has run
OilRig has deleted files associated with their payload after execution.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1007|System Service Discovery|
OilRig has used
OilRig has used HTTP for C2.(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT34 July 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1008|Fallback Channels|
OilRig malware ISMAgent falls back to its DNS tunneling mechanism if it is unable to reach the C2 server over HTTP.(Citation: OilRig ISMAgent July 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|A
OilRig macro has run a PowerShell command to decode file contents.
OilRig has also used
certutil to decode base64-encoded files on victims.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1087.002|Domain Account|
OilRig has run | OilRig.md |
10216f382bb1-9 | OilRig has run
OilRig has used
OilRig has tested malware samples to determine AV detection and subsequently modified the samples to ensure AV evasion.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Engineering Workstation|T0853|Scripting|
OilRig has embedded a macro within spearphishing attachments that has been made up of both a VBScript and a PowerShell script.(Citation: Robert Falcone, Bryan Lee May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Control Server,Data Historian,Engineering Workstation,Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED,Human-Machine Interface,Input/Output Server,Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay|T0859|Valid Accounts|
OilRig utilized stolen credentials to gain access to victim machines.(Citation: Dragos)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Engineering Workstation,Human-Machine Interface,Control Server,Data Historian|T0865|Spearphishing Attachment|
OilRig used spearphishing emails with malicious Microsoft Excel spreadsheet attachments. (Citation: Robert Falcone, Bryan Lee May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|None|T0817|Drive-by Compromise|
OilRig has been seen utilizing watering hole attacks to collect credentials which could be used to gain access into ICS networks. (Citation: Eduard Kovacs May 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Human-Machine Interface,Control Server,Data Historian,Engineering Workstation|T0869|Standard Application Layer Protocol|
OilRig communicated with its command and control using HTTP requests. (Citation: Robert Falcone, Bryan Lee May 2016)| | OilRig.md |
74193952ee70-0 | Orangeworm - G0071
Created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
Modified: 2021-10-26T22:29:09.327Z
Contributors: Elger Vinicius S. Rodrigues, @elgervinicius, CYBINT Centre
Aliases
Orangeworm
Description
Orangeworm is a group that has targeted organizations in the healthcare sector in the United States, Europe, and Asia since at least 2015, likely for the purpose of corporate espionage.(Citation: Symantec Orangeworm April 2018)
Techniques Used
|Matrix|Domain|Platform|Technique ID|Technique Name|Use|
| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.002|SMB/Windows Admin Shares|Orangeworm has copied its backdoor across open network shares, including ADMIN$, C$WINDOWS, D$WINDOWS, and E$WINDOWS.(Citation: Symantec Orangeworm April 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|Orangeworm has used HTTP for C2.(Citation: Symantec Orangeworm IOCs April 2018)| | Orangeworm.md |
8e3f07b290f6-0 | Patchwork - G0040
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:07.145Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T05:08:20.780Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Patchwork,Hangover Group,Dropping Elephant,Chinastrats,MONSOON,Operation Hangover
Description
Patchwork is a cyber espionage group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Patchwork has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. Patchwork was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S. think tank groups in March and April of 2018.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork) (Citation: Symantec Patchwork)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)
Techniques Used
Patchwork has used embedded image tags (known as web bugs) with unique, per-recipient tracking links in their emails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened messages.(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
Patchwork has obtained and used open-source tools such as
QuasarRAT.(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1587.002|Code Signing Certificates|
Patchwork has created self-signed certificates from fictitious and spoofed legitimate software companies that were later used to sign malware.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link| | Patchwork.md |
8e3f07b290f6-1 | Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to try to get users to click, download and open malicious files.(Citation: Symantec Patchwork)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1197|BITS Jobs|
Patchwork has used BITS jobs to download malicious payloads.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows|T1553.002|Code Signing|
Patchwork has signed malware with self-signed certificates from fictitious and spoofed legitimate software companies.(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
Patchwork used Visual Basic Scripts (VBS) on victim machines.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560|Archive Collected Data|
Patchwork encrypted the collected files' path with AES and then encoded them with base64.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1112|Modify Registry|A
Patchwork payload deletes Resiliency Registry keys created by Microsoft Office applications in an apparent effort to trick users into thinking there were no issues during application runs.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1574.002|DLL Side-Loading|A
Patchwork .dll that contains
BADNEWS is loaded and executed using DLL side-loading.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1559.002|Dynamic Data Exchange|
Patchwork leveraged the DDE protocol to deliver their malware.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.005|Indicator Removal from Tools| | Patchwork.md |
8e3f07b290f6-2 | Patchwork apparently altered
NDiskMonitor samples by adding four bytes of random letters in a likely attempt to change the file hashes.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion|
Patchwork removed certain files and replaced them so they could not be retrieved.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.010|Command Obfuscation|
Patchwork has obfuscated a script with Crypto Obfuscator.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Patchwork embedded a malicious macro in a Word document and lured the victim to click on an icon to execute the malware.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1074.001|Local Data Staging|
Patchwork copied all targeted files to a directory called index that was eventually uploaded to the C&C server.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.001|Binary Padding|
Patchwork apparently altered
NDiskMonitor samples by adding four bytes of random letters in a likely attempt to change the file hashes.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|A
Patchwork file stealer can run a TaskScheduler DLL to add persistence.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,IaaS,SaaS|T1119|Automated Collection|
Patchwork developed a file stealer to search C:\ and collect files with certain extensions. | Patchwork.md |
8e3f07b290f6-3 | Patchwork developed a file stealer to search C:\ and collect files with certain extensions.
Patchwork also executed a script to enumerate all drives, store them as a list, and upload generated files to the C2 server.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,SaaS|T1189|Drive-by Compromise|
Patchwork has used watering holes to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.(Citation: Symantec Patchwork)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.(Citation: Symantec Patchwork)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Patchwork has used spearphishing with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)(Citation: Securelist Dropping Elephant)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution| | Patchwork.md |
8e3f07b290f6-4 | Patchwork uses malicious documents to deliver remote execution exploits as part of. The group has previously exploited CVE-2017-8570, CVE-2012-1856, CVE-2014-4114, CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11882, and CVE-2015-1641.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)(Citation: Securelist Dropping Elephant)(Citation: Symantec Patchwork)(Citation: PaloAlto Patchwork Mar 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102.001|Dead Drop Resolver|
Patchwork hides base64-encoded and encrypted C2 server locations in comments on legitimate websites.(Citation: Securelist Dropping Elephant)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1055.012|Process Hollowing|A
Patchwork payload uses process hollowing to hide the UAC bypass vulnerability exploitation inside svchost.exe.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|A
Patchwork payload has searched all fixed drives on the victim for files matching a specified list of extensions.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1027.002|Software Packing|A
Patchwork payload was packed with UPX.(Citation: Securelist Dropping Elephant)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Patchwork payloads download additional files from the C2 server.(Citation: Securelist Dropping Elephant)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1033|System Owner/User Discovery| | Patchwork.md |
8e3f07b290f6-5 | Patchwork collected the victim username and whether it was running as admin, then sent the information to its C2 server.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.001|Remote Desktop Protocol|
Patchwork attempted to use RDP to move laterally.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Patchwork has added the path of its second-stage malware to the startup folder to achieve persistence. One of its file stealers has also persisted by adding a Registry Run key.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518.001|Security Software Discovery|
Patchwork scanned the “Program Files” directories for a directory with the string “Total Security” (the installation path of the “360 Total Security” antivirus tool).(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
Patchwork collected the victim computer name, OS version, and architecture type and sent the information to its C2 server.
Patchwork also enumerated all available drives on the victim's machine.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Patchwork installed its payload in the startup programs folder as "Baidu Software Update." The group also adds its second stage payload to the startup programs as “Net Monitor."(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork) They have also dropped
QuasarRAT binaries as files named microsoft_network.exe and crome.exe.(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555.003|Credentials from Web Browsers| | Patchwork.md |
8e3f07b290f6-6 | Patchwork dumped the login data database from
Patchwork used Base64 to encode C2 traffic.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Patchwork ran a reverse shell with Meterpreter.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)
Patchwork used JavaScript code and .SCT files on victim machines.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Patchwork used
PowerSploit to download payloads, run a reverse shell, and execute malware on the victim's machine.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1548.002|Bypass User Account Control|
Patchwork bypassed User Access Control (UAC).(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1005|Data from Local System|
Patchwork collected and exfiltrated files from the infected system.(Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork)| | Patchwork.md |
18eb60e48f15-0 | PittyTiger - G0011
Created: 2017-05-31T21:31:50.198Z
Modified: 2021-10-12T23:11:41.368Z
Contributors:
Aliases
PittyTiger
Description
PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.(Citation: Bizeul 2014)(Citation: Villeneuve 2014)
Techniques Used
|Matrix|Domain|Platform|Technique ID|Technique Name|Use|
| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|PittyTiger has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz and gsecdump.(Citation: Bizeul 2014)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts|PittyTiger attempts to obtain legitimate credentials during operations.(Citation: Bizeul 2014)| | PittyTiger.md |
94b80677d9ed-0 | PLATINUM - G0068
Created: 2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z
Modified: 2021-04-22T00:39:49.529Z
Contributors: Ryan Becwar
Aliases
PLATINUM
Description
PLATINUM is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)
Techniques Used
PLATINUM has renamed rar.exe to avoid detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Platinum Masquerade)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
PLATINUM has transferred files using the Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT) Serial-over-LAN (SOL) channel.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1056.001|Keylogging|
PLATINUM has used several different keyloggers.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,SaaS|T1189|Drive-by Compromise|
PLATINUM has sometimes used drive-by attacks against vulnerable browser plugins.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1055|Process Injection|
PLATINUM has used various methods of process injection including hot patching.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1068|Exploitation for Privilege Escalation|
PLATINUM has leveraged a zero-day vulnerability to escalate privileges.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory| | PLATINUM.md |
94b80677d9ed-1 | PLATINUM has used keyloggers that are also capable of dumping credentials.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
PLATINUM has sent spearphishing emails with attachments to victims as its primary initial access vector.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1056.004|Credential API Hooking|
PLATINUM is capable of using Windows hook interfaces for information gathering such as credential access.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,Network|T1095|Non-Application Layer Protocol|
PLATINUM has used the Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT) Serial-over-LAN (SOL) channel for command and control.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
PLATINUM has attempted to get users to open malicious files by sending spearphishing emails with attachments to victims.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)| | PLATINUM.md |