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52406e558db5-0 | POLONIUM - G1005
Created: 2022-07-01T19:07:04.253Z
Modified: 2022-08-10T12:31:10.192Z
Contributors:
Aliases
POLONIUM
Description
POLONIUM is a Lebanon-based group that has primarily targeted Israeli organizations, including critical manufacturing, information technology, and defense industry companies, since at least February 2022. Security researchers assess POLONIUM has coordinated their operations with multiple actors affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), based on victim overlap as well as common techniques and tooling.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)
Techniques Used
POLONIUM has exfiltrated stolen data to
POLONIUM-owned OneDrive and Dropbox accounts.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
POLONIUM has obtained and used tools such as AirVPN and plink in their operations.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102.002|Bidirectional Communication|
POLONIUM has used OneDrive and DropBox for C2.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1090|Proxy|
POLONIUM has used the AirVPN service for operational activity.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts|
POLONIUM has used valid compromised credentials to gain access to victim environments.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Office 365|T1199|Trusted Relationship| | POLONIUM.md |
52406e558db5-1 | POLONIUM has used compromised credentials from an IT company to target downstream customers including a law firm and aviation company.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.006|Web Services|
POLONIUM has created and used legitimate Microsoft OneDrive accounts for their operations.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)| | POLONIUM.md |
ca13bced986c-0 | Poseidon Group - G0033
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:04.179Z
Modified: 2020-03-18T20:25:54.945Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Poseidon Group
Description
Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm. (Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)
Techniques Used
Poseidon Group searches for administrator accounts on both the local victim machine and the network.(Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1003|OS Credential Dumping|
Poseidon Group conducts credential dumping on victims, with a focus on obtaining credentials belonging to domain and database servers.(Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1087.002|Domain Account|
Poseidon Group searches for administrator accounts on both the local victim machine and the network.(Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|The
Poseidon Group's Information Gathering Tool (IGT) includes PowerShell components.(Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Poseidon Group tools attempt to spoof anti-virus processes as a means of self-defense.(Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|After compromising a victim,
Poseidon Group lists all running processes.(Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1049|System Network Connections Discovery| | Poseidon_Group.md |
ca13bced986c-1 | Poseidon Group lists all running processes.(Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1049|System Network Connections Discovery|
Poseidon Group obtains and saves information about victim network interfaces and addresses.(Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1007|System Service Discovery|After compromising a victim,
Poseidon Group discovers all running services.(Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)| | Poseidon_Group.md |
79f6c51c8a1f-0 | PROMETHIUM - G0056
Created: 2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z
Modified: 2020-10-22T18:12:48.893Z
Contributors:
Aliases
PROMETHIUM,StrongPity
Description
PROMETHIUM is an activity group focused on espionage that has been active since at least 2012. The group has conducted operations globally with a heavy emphasis on Turkish targets. PROMETHIUM has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics.(Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016)(Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)
Techniques Used
PROMETHIUM has created self-signed certificates to sign malicious installers.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1587.003|Digital Certificates|
PROMETHIUM has created self-signed digital certificates for use in HTTPS C2 traffic.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1543.003|Windows Service|
PROMETHIUM has created new services and modified existing services for persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1036.004|Masquerade Task or Service|
PROMETHIUM has named services to appear legitimate.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1078.003|Local Accounts|
PROMETHIUM has created admin accounts on a compromised host.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1205.001|Port Knocking| | PROMETHIUM.md |
79f6c51c8a1f-1 | PROMETHIUM has used a script that configures the knockd service and firewall to only accept C2 connections from systems that use a specified sequence of knock ports.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
PROMETHIUM has attempted to get users to execute compromised installation files for legitimate software including compression applications, security software, browsers, file recovery applications, and other tools and utilities.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
PROMETHIUM has disguised malicious installer files by bundling them with legitimate software installers.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows|T1553.002|Code Signing|
PROMETHIUM has signed code with self-signed certificates.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
PROMETHIUM has used Registry run keys to establish persistence.(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,SaaS|T1189|Drive-by Compromise|
PROMETHIUM has used watering hole attacks to deliver malicious versions of legitimate installers.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)| | PROMETHIUM.md |
ac03e0477f6f-0 | Putter Panda - G0024
Created: 2017-05-31T21:31:56.785Z
Modified: 2020-03-30T19:15:04.771Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Putter Panda,APT2,MSUpdater
Description
Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD). (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)
Techniques Used
|Matrix|Domain|Platform|Technique ID|Technique Name|Use|
| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Containers,IaaS|T1562.001|Disable or Modify Tools|Malware used by Putter Panda attempts to terminate processes corresponding to two components of Sophos Anti-Virus (SAVAdminService.exe and SavService.exe).(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1055.001|Dynamic-link Library Injection|An executable dropped onto victims by Putter Panda aims to inject the specified DLL into a process that would normally be accessing the network, including Outlook Express (msinm.exe), Outlook (outlook.exe), Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe), and Firefox (firefox.exe).(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|A dropper used by Putter Panda installs itself into the ASEP Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with a value named McUpdate.(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|Droppers used by Putter Panda use RC4 or a 16-byte XOR key consisting of the bytes 0xA0 – 0xAF to obfuscate payloads.(Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)| | Putter_Panda.md |
db88265285ed-0 | Rancor - G0075
Created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
Modified: 2020-03-30T19:15:49.217Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Rancor
Description
Rancor is a threat group that has led targeted campaigns against the South East Asia region. Rancor uses politically-motivated lures to entice victims to open malicious documents. (Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)
Techniques Used
Rancor has used VBS scripts as well as embedded macros for execution.(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.007|Msiexec|
Rancor has used
Rancor has used HTTP for C2.(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Rancor has used cmd.exe to execute commmands.(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Rancor has downloaded additional malware, including by using
certutil.(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Rancor attempted to get users to click on an embedded macro within a Microsoft Office Excel document to launch their malware.(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Rancor has attached a malicious document to an email to gain initial access.(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
Rancor launched a scheduled task to gain persistence using the | Rancor.md |
6d95b3f93fe7-0 | Rocke - G0106
Created: 2020-05-26T14:20:20.623Z
Modified: 2020-06-19T20:41:21.215Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Rocke
Description
Rocke is an alleged Chinese-speaking adversary whose primary objective appeared to be cryptojacking, or stealing victim system resources for the purposes of mining cryptocurrency. The name Rocke comes from the email address "[email protected]" used to create the wallet which held collected cryptocurrency. Researchers have detected overlaps between Rocke and the Iron Cybercrime Group, though this attribution has not been confirmed.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)
Techniques Used
Rocke has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to hook libc functions in order to hide the installed dropper and mining software in process lists.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071|Application Layer Protocol|
Rocke issued wget requests from infected systems to the C2.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102|Web Service|
Rocke has used Pastebin, Gitee, and GitLab for Command and Control.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
Rocke has extracted tar.gz files after downloading them from a C2 server.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Rocke has used shell scripts which download mining executables and saves them with the filename "java".(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS|T1574.006|Dynamic Linker Hijacking| | Rocke.md |
6d95b3f93fe7-1 | Rocke has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to hook libc functions in order to hide the installed dropper and mining software in process lists.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1059.006|Python|
Rocke has used Python-based malware to install and spread their coinminer.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Rocke has modified UPX headers after packing files to break unpackers.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.004|Compile After Delivery|
Rocke has compiled malware, delivered to victims as .c files, with the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC).(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS|T1021.004|SSH|
Rocke has spread its coinminer via SSH.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1552.004|Private Keys|
Rocke has used SSH private keys on the infected machine to spread its coinminer throughout a network.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
Rocke has used uname -m to collect the name and information about the infected system's kernel.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS|T1070.002|Clear Linux or Mac System Logs|
Rocke has cleared log files within the /var/log/ folder.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1496|Resource Hijacking| | Rocke.md |
6d95b3f93fe7-2 | Rocke has distributed cryptomining malware.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Rocke January 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Network,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1190|Exploit Public-Facing Application|
Rocke exploited Apache Struts, Oracle WebLogic (CVE-2017-10271), and Adobe ColdFusion (CVE-2017-3066) vulnerabilities to deliver malware.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Rocke January 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Rocke used malware to download additional malicious files to the target system.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Linux|T1059.004|Unix Shell|
Rocke used shell scripts to run commands which would obtain persistence and execute the cryptocurrency mining malware.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS|T1053.003|Cron|
Rocke installed a cron job that downloaded and executed files from the C2.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Rocke January 2019)(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Rocke has executed wget and curl commands to Pastebin over the HTTPS protocol.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers,Network|T1046|Network Service Discovery|
Rocke conducted scanning for exposed TCP port 7001 as well as SSH and Redis servers.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1562.004|Disable or Modify System Firewall| | Rocke.md |
6d95b3f93fe7-3 | Rocke used scripts which killed processes and added firewall rules to block traffic related to other cryptominers.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518.001|Security Software Discovery|
Rocke used scripts which detected and uninstalled antivirus software.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Rocke January 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Containers,IaaS|T1562.001|Disable or Modify Tools|
Rocke used scripts which detected and uninstalled antivirus software.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Rocke January 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1564.001|Hidden Files and Directories|
Rocke downloaded a file "libprocesshider", which could hide files on the target system.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Rocke January 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1018|Remote System Discovery|
Rocke has looked for IP addresses in the known_hosts file on the infected system and attempted to SSH into them.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Rocke's miner has created UPX-packed files in the Windows Start Menu Folder.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1055.002|Portable Executable Injection|
Rocke's miner, "TermsHost.exe", evaded defenses by injecting itself into Windows processes, including Notepad.exe.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1027.002|Software Packing| | Rocke.md |
6d95b3f93fe7-4 | Rocke's miner has created UPX-packed files in the Windows Start Menu Folder.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Rocke January 2019)(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102.001|Dead Drop Resolver|
Rocke has used Pastebin to check the version of beaconing malware and redirect to another Pastebin hosting updated malware.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion|
Rocke has deleted files on infected machines.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|
Rocke can detect a running process's PID on the infected machine.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Linux|T1222.002|Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification|
Rocke has changed file permissions of files so they could not be modified.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.006|Timestomp|
Rocke has changed the time stamp of certain files.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1037|Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts|
Rocke has installed an "init.d" startup script to maintain persistence.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux|T1543.002|Systemd Service|
Rocke has installed a systemd service script to maintain persistence.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1571|Non-Standard Port| | Rocke.md |
6d95b3f93fe7-5 | Rocke's miner connects to a C2 server using port 51640.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) | | Rocke.md |
cf83ab8fff12-0 | RTM - G0048
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:10.206Z
Modified: 2020-05-12T22:16:44.650Z
Contributors: Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB
Aliases
RTM
Description
RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM). (Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)
Techniques Used
RTM has attempted to lure victims into opening e-mail attachments to execute malicious code.(Citation: Group IB RTM August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1574.001|DLL Search Order Hijacking|
RTM has used search order hijacking to force TeamViewer to load a malicious DLL.(Citation: Group IB RTM August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1219|Remote Access Software|
RTM has used a modified version of TeamViewer and Remote Utilities for remote access.(Citation: Group IB RTM August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
RTM has used Registry run keys to establish persistence for the
RTM Trojan and other tools, such as a modified version of TeamViewer remote desktop software.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: Group IB RTM August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
RTM has used spearphishing attachments to distribute its malware.(Citation: Group IB RTM August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,SaaS|T1189|Drive-by Compromise|
RTM has distributed its malware via the RIG and SUNDOWN exploit kits, as well as online advertising network
RTM has used an RSS feed on Livejournal to update a list of encrypted C2 server names.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)| | RTM.md |
00893c406753-0 | Sandworm Team - G0034
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:04.588Z
Modified: 2023-03-08T22:12:31.238Z
Contributors: Dragos Threat Intelligence
Aliases
Sandworm Team,ELECTRUM,Telebots,IRON VIKING,BlackEnergy (Group),Quedagh,Voodoo Bear,IRIDIUM
Description
Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This group has been active since at least 2009.(Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)(Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)
In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018)
Techniques Used
Sandworm Team has used the commercially available tool RemoteExec for agentless remote code execution.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.010|Command Obfuscation| | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-1 | Sandworm Team has used ROT13 encoding, AES encryption and compression with the zlib library for their Python-based backdoor.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows|T1003.003|NTDS|
Sandworm Team has used
Sandworm Team has used
Prestige ransomware to encrypt data at targeted organizations in transportation and related logistics industries in Ukraine and Poland.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1584.005|Botnet|
Sandworm Team has used a large-scale botnet to target Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) network devices.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
Sandworm Team has used
Impacket’s WMIexec module for remote code execution and VBScript to run WMI queries.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows|T1021.002|SMB/Windows Admin Shares|
Sandworm Team has copied payloads to the
Sandworm Team has used
Prestige ransomware--to an Active Directory Domain Controller and distributed via the Default Domain Group Policy Object.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1136.002|Domain Account|
Sandworm Team has created new domain accounts on an ICS access server.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS,Network|T1505.003|Web Shell|
Sandworm Team has used webshells including | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-2 | Sandworm Team has used webshells including
P.A.S. Webshell to maintain access to victim networks.(Citation: ANSSI Sandworm January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1589.002|Email Addresses|
Sandworm Team has obtained valid emails addresses while conducting research against target organizations that were subsequently used in spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1589.003|Employee Names|
Sandworm Team's research of potential victim organizations included the identification and collection of employee information.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1598.003|Spearphishing Link|
Sandworm Team has crafted spearphishing emails with hyperlinks designed to trick unwitting recipients into revealing their account credentials.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1592.002|Software|
Sandworm Team has researched software code to enable supply-chain operations, most notably for the 2017
NotPetya attack.
Sandworm Team also collected a list of computers using specific software as part of its targeting efforts.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1593|Search Open Websites/Domains|
Sandworm Team researched Ukraine's unique legal entity identifier (called an "EDRPOU" number), including running queries on the EDRPOU website, in preparation for the
NotPetya attack. | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-3 | Sandworm Team researched Ukraine's unique legal entity identifier (called an "EDRPOU" number), including running queries on the EDRPOU website, in preparation for the
NotPetya attack.
Sandworm Team has also researched third-party websites to help it craft credible spearphishing emails.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1005|Data from Local System|
Sandworm Team has exfiltrated internal documents, files, and other data from compromised hosts.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1033|System Owner/User Discovery|
Sandworm Team has collected the username from a compromised host.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|
Sandworm Team has enumerated files on a compromised host.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1591.002|Business Relationships|In preparation for its attack against the 2018 Winter Olympics,
Sandworm Team conducted online research of partner organizations listed on an official PyeongChang Olympics partnership site.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1595.002|Vulnerability Scanning| | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-4 | Sandworm Team has scanned network infrastructure for vulnerabilities as part of its operational planning.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1588.006|Vulnerabilities|In 2017,
Sandworm Team conducted technical research related to vulnerabilities associated with websites used by the Korean Sport and Olympic Committee, a Korean power company, and a Korean airport.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
Sandworm Team has acquired open-source tools for their operations, including
Invoke-PSImage, which was used to establish an encrypted channel from a compromised host to
Sandworm Team's C2 server in preparation for the 2018 Winter Olympics attack, as well as
Impacket and RemoteExec, which were used in their 2022
Prestige operations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Sandworm Team has used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1049|System Network Connections Discovery|
Sandworm Team had gathered user, IP address, and server data related to RDP sessions on a compromised host. It has also accessed network diagram files useful for understanding how a host's network was configured.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1078.002|Domain Accounts| | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-5 | Sandworm Team has used stolen credentials to access administrative accounts within the domain.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1594|Search Victim-Owned Websites|
Sandworm Team has conducted research against potential victim websites as part of its operational planning.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS|T1491.002|External Defacement|
Sandworm Team defaced approximately 15,000 websites belonging to Georgian government, non-government, and private sector organizations in 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1590.001|Domain Properties|
Sandworm Team conducted technical reconnaissance of the Parliament of Georgia's official internet domain prior to its 2019 attack.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers|T1499|Endpoint Denial of Service|
Sandworm Team temporarily disrupted service to Georgian government, non-government, and private sector websites after compromising a Georgian web hosting provider in 2019.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1583.004|Server|
Sandworm Team has leased servers from resellers instead of leasing infrastructure directly from hosting companies to enable its operations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains| | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-6 | Sandworm Team has registered domain names and created URLs that are often designed to mimic or spoof legitimate websites, such as email login pages, online file sharing and storage websites, and password reset pages.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
Sandworm Team has crafted phishing emails containing malicious hyperlinks.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link|
Sandworm Team has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on malicious hyperlinks within emails crafted to resemble trustworthy senders.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Office 365|T1199|Trusted Relationship|
Sandworm Team has used dedicated network connections from one victim organization to gain unauthorized access to a separate organization.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1585.002|Email Accounts|
Sandworm Team has created email accounts that mimic legitimate organizations for its spearphishing operations.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1585.001|Social Media Accounts|
Sandworm Team has established social media accounts to disseminate victim internal-only documents and other sensitive data.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|PRE|T1587.001|Malware|
Sandworm Team has developed malware for its operations, including malicious mobile applications and destructive malware such as
NotPetya and | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-7 | Sandworm Team has developed malware for its operations, including malicious mobile applications and destructive malware such as
NotPetya and
Olympic Destroyer.(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1018|Remote System Discovery|
Sandworm Team has used a tool to query Active Directory using LDAP, discovering information about computers listed in AD.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows,Office 365,Google Workspace|T1087.003|Email Account|
Sandworm Team used malware to enumerate email settings, including usernames and passwords, from the M.E.Doc application.(Citation: ESET Telebots July 2017) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
Sandworm Team used a backdoor to enumerate information about the infected system's operating system.(Citation: ESET Telebots July 2017)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows|T1218.011|Rundll32|
Sandworm Team used a backdoor which could execute a supplied DLL using rundll32.exe.(Citation: ESET Telebots July 2017) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1195.002|Compromise Software Supply Chain|
Sandworm Team has distributed | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-8 | Sandworm Team has distributed
NotPetya by compromising the legitimate Ukrainian accounting software M.E.Doc and replacing a legitimate software update with a malicious one.(Citation: Secureworks NotPetya June 2017)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1571|Non-Standard Port|
Sandworm Team has used port 6789 to accept connections on the group's SSH server.(Citation: ESET BlackEnergy Jan 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1219|Remote Access Software|
Sandworm Team has used remote administration tools or remote industrial control system client software for execution and to maliciously release electricity breakers.(Citation: US-CERT Ukraine Feb 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows,Linux,Containers,macOS|T1133|External Remote Services|
Sandworm Team has used Dropbear SSH with a hardcoded backdoor password to maintain persistence within the target network.
Sandworm Team has also used VPN tunnels established in legitimate software company infrastructure to gain access to internal networks of that software company's users.(Citation: ESET BlackEnergy Jan 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: ANSSI Sandworm January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
Sandworm Team has created VBScripts to run an SSH server.(Citation: ESET BlackEnergy Jan 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts| | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-9 | Sandworm Team have used previously acquired legitimate credentials prior to attacks.(Citation: US-CERT Ukraine Feb 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1561.002|Disk Structure Wipe|
Sandworm Team has used the
BlackEnergy KillDisk component to corrupt the infected system's master boot record.(Citation: US-CERT Ukraine Feb 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS|T1485|Data Destruction|
Sandworm Team has used the
BlackEnergy KillDisk component to overwrite files on Windows-based Human-Machine Interfaces. (Citation: US-CERT Ukraine Feb 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Sandworm Team has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on spearphishing attachments and enabling malicious macros embedded within files.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Sandworm Team has avoided detection by naming a malicious binary explorer.exe.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102.002|Bidirectional Communication|
Sandworm Team has used the Telegram Bot API from Telegram Messenger to send and receive commands to its Python backdoor. | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-10 | Sandworm Team has used the Telegram Bot API from Telegram Messenger to send and receive commands to its Python backdoor.
Sandworm Team also used legitimate M.E.Doc software update check requests for sending and receiving commands and hosted malicious payloads on putdrive.com.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Sandworm Team has pushed additional malicious tools onto an infected system to steal user credentials, move laterally, and destroy data.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555.003|Credentials from Web Browsers|
Sandworm Team's CredRaptor tool can collect saved passwords from various internet browsers.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory|
Sandworm Team has used its plainpwd tool, a modified version of
Mimikatz, and comsvcs.dll to dump Windows credentials from system memory.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1056.001|Keylogging|
Sandworm Team has used a keylogger to capture keystrokes by using the SetWindowsHookEx function.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network,IaaS|T1040|Network Sniffing| | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-11 | Sandworm Team has used intercepter-NG to sniff passwords in network traffic.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1087.002|Domain Account|
Sandworm Team has used a tool to query Active Directory using LDAP, discovering information about usernames listed in AD.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1041|Exfiltration Over C2 Channel|
Sandworm Team has sent system information to its C2 server using HTTP.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
Sandworm Team's VBS backdoor can decode Base64-encoded data and save it to the %TEMP% folder. The group also decrypted received information using the Triple DES algorithm and decompresses it using GZip.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots July 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion|
Sandworm Team has used backdoors that can delete files used in an attack from an infected system.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots July 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool connects to the designated C2 server via HTTP.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1090|Proxy| | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-12 | Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool can create an internal proxy server to redirect traffic from the adversary-controlled C2 to internal servers which may not be connected to the internet, but are interconnected locally.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1132.001|Standard Encoding|
Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool uses base64 encoding and HTML tags for the communication traffic between the C2 server.(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution|
Sandworm Team has exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft PowerPoint via OLE objects (CVE-2014-4114) and Microsoft Word via crafted TIFF images (CVE-2013-3906).(Citation: iSight Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro Sandworm October 2014)(Citation: McAfee Sandworm November 2013)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Sandworm Team has delivered malicious Microsoft Office attachments via spearphishing emails.(Citation: iSight Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US-CERT Ukraine Feb 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots Dec 2016)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Sandworm Team has used Base64 encoding within malware variants.(Citation: iSight Sandworm Oct 2014)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Control Server,Data Historian,Engineering Workstation,Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED,Human-Machine Interface,Input/Output Server,Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay|T0859|Valid Accounts|In the Ukraine 2015 Incident, | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-13 | Sandworm Team used the credentials of valid accounts to interact with client applications and access employee workstations hosting HMI applications. (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016)(Citation: Dragos)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|None|T0884|Connection Proxy|
Sandworm Team establishes an internal proxy prior to the installation of backdoors within the network. (Citation: Dragos Inc. June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Human-Machine Interface|T0819|Exploit Public-Facing Application|
Sandworm Team actors exploited vulnerabilities in GE's Cimplicity HMI and Advantech/Broadwin WebAccess HMI software which had been directly exposed to the internet. (Citation: ICS-CERT December 2014) (Citation: ICS CERT September 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED|T0855|Unauthorized Command Message|In the Ukraine 2015 Incident,
Sandworm Team issued unauthorized commands to substation breakers after gaining control of operator workstations and accessing a distribution management system (DMS) client application. (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay,Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED,Input/Output Server|T0857|System Firmware|In the Ukraine 2015 Incident,
Sandworm Team developed and used malicious firmware to render communication devices inoperable. (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Control Server,Input/Output Server|T0822|External Remote Services|In the Ukraine 2015 Incident, | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-14 | Sandworm Team harvested VPN worker credentials and used them to remotely log into control system networks. (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016) (Citation: Zetter, Kim March 2016) (Citation: ICS-CERT February 2016) (Citation: John Hultquist January 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED|T0816|Device Restart/Shutdown|In the 2015 attack on the Ukrainian power grid, the
Sandworm Team scheduled disconnects of uninterruptable power supply (UPS) systems so that when power was disconnected from the substations, the devices would shut down and service could not be recovered. (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Engineering Workstation,Human-Machine Interface,Control Server,Data Historian|T0865|Spearphishing Attachment|In the Ukraine 2015 incident,
Sandworm Team sent spearphishing attachments to three energy distribution companies containing malware to gain access to victim systems. (Citation: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED,Input/Output Server,Device Configuration/Parameters|T0804|Block Reporting Message|In the Ukraine 2015 Incident,
Sandworm Team blocked reporting messages by using malicious firmware to render communication devices inoperable. (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED,Device Configuration/Parameters|T0803|Block Command Message|In the Ukraine 2015 Incident, | Sandworm_Team.md |
00893c406753-15 | Sandworm Team blocked command messages by using malicious firmware to render communication devices inoperable. (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Human-Machine Interface|T0823|Graphical User Interface|In the Ukraine 2015 Incident,
Sandworm Team utilized HMI GUIs in the SCADA environment to open breakers. (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack,mobile-attack|Control Server,Data Historian,Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED,Human-Machine Interface,Input/Output Server|T0807|Command-Line Interface|
Sandworm Team uses the MS-SQL server xp_cmdshell command, and PowerShell to execute commands. (Citation: Dragos October 2018)| | Sandworm_Team.md |
6791d261d991-0 | Scarlet Mimic - G0029
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:00.677Z
Modified: 2020-03-30T19:16:53.144Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Scarlet Mimic
Description
Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
Techniques Used
|Matrix|Domain|Platform|Technique ID|Technique Name|Use|
| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1036.002|Right-to-Left Override|Scarlet Mimic has used the left-to-right override character in self-extracting RAR archive spearphishing attachment file names.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)| | Scarlet_Mimic.md |
d07437e8c8b5-0 | SideCopy - G1008
Created: 2022-08-07T13:52:07.791Z
Modified: 2022-10-24T18:51:09.213Z
Contributors: Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India,Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation,Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India
Aliases
SideCopy
Description
SideCopy is a Pakistani threat group that has primarily targeted South Asian countries, including Indian and Afghani government personnel, since at least 2019. SideCopy's name comes from its infection chain that tries to mimic that of Sidewinder, a suspected Indian threat group.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)
Techniques Used
SideCopy has used compromised domains to host its malicious payloads.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518|Software Discovery|
SideCopy has collected browser information from a compromised host.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1598.002|Spearphishing Attachment|
SideCopy has crafted generic lures for spam campaigns to collect emails and credentials for targeting efforts.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1584.001|Domains|
SideCopy has compromised domains for some of their infrastructure, including for C2 and staging malware.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
SideCopy has identified the OS version of a compromised host.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,IaaS|T1614|System Location Discovery| | SideCopy.md |
d07437e8c8b5-1 | SideCopy has identified the country location of a compromised host.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery|
SideCopy has identified the IP address of a compromised host.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.005|Mshta|
SideCopy has utilized
SideCopy has executed malware by calling the API function
SideCopy has used a legitimate DLL file name,
SideCopy has used a malicious loader DLL file to execute the
SideCopy uses a loader DLL file to collect AV product names from an infected host.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
SideCopy has sent Microsoft Office Publisher documents to victims that have embedded malicious macros that execute an hta file via calling
SideCopy has delivered trojanized executables via spearphishing emails that contacts actor-controlled servers to download malicious payloads.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
SideCopy has attempted to lure victims into clicking on malicious embedded archive files sent via spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
SideCopy has sent spearphishing emails with malicious hta file attachments.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)| | SideCopy.md |
dd56eec78157-0 | Sidewinder - G0121
Created: 2021-01-27T15:57:11.183Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T05:31:54.382Z
Contributors: Lacework Labs,Daniyal Naeem, BT Security
Aliases
Sidewinder,T-APT-04,Rattlesnake
Description
Sidewinder is a suspected Indian threat actor group that has been active since at least 2012. They have been observed targeting government, military, and business entities throughout Asia, primarily focusing on Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Afghanistan.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends April 2018)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)
Techniques Used
Sidewinder has used base64 encoding for scripts.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Sidewinder has named malicious files
Sidewinder has lured targets to click on malicious links to gain execution in the target environment.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518.001|Security Software Discovery|
Sidewinder has used the Windows service
Sidewinder has used the ActiveXObject utility to create OLE objects to obtain execution through Internet Explorer.(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.005|Mshta|
Sidewinder has used | Sidewinder.md |
dd56eec78157-1 | Sidewinder has used
Sidewinder has lured targets to click on malicious files to gain execution in the target environment.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Sidewinder has added paths to executables in the Registry to establish persistence.(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,IaaS,SaaS|T1119|Automated Collection|
Sidewinder has used tools to automatically collect system and network configuration information.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1020|Automated Exfiltration|
Sidewinder has configured tools to automatically send collected files to attacker controlled servers.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Sidewinder has used HTTP in C2 communications.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518|Software Discovery|
Sidewinder has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery| | Sidewinder.md |
dd56eec78157-2 | Sidewinder has used malware to collect information on files and directories.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1074.001|Local Data Staging|
Sidewinder has collected stolen files in a temporary folder in preparation for exfiltration.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery|
Sidewinder has used malware to collect information on network interfaces, including the MAC address.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Network|T1124|System Time Discovery|
Sidewinder has used tools to obtain the current system time.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|
Sidewinder has used tools to identify running processes on the victim's machine.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
Sidewinder has used tools to collect the computer name, OS version, installed hotfixes, as well as information regarding the memory and processor on a compromised host.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1033|System Owner/User Discovery|
Sidewinder has used tools to identify the user of a compromised host.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information| | Sidewinder.md |
dd56eec78157-3 | Sidewinder has used base64 encoding and ECDH-P256 encryption for payloads.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1574.002|DLL Side-Loading|
Sidewinder has used DLL side-loading to drop and execute malicious payloads including the hijacking of the legitimate Windows application file rekeywiz.exe.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.007|JavaScript|
Sidewinder has used JavaScript to drop and execute malware loaders.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder COVID-19 June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Sidewinder has used PowerShell to drop and execute malware loaders.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
Sidewinder has used VBScript to drop and execute malware loaders.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution|
Sidewinder has exploited vulnerabilities to gain execution including CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2020-0674.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Sidewinder has used LNK files to download remote files to the victim's network.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment| | Sidewinder.md |
dd56eec78157-4 | Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious attachments often crafted for specific targets.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious links often crafted for specific targets.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1598.002|Spearphishing Attachment|
Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious attachments that lead victims to credential harvesting websites.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)(Citation: Rewterz Sidewinder APT April 2020)(Citation: Cyble Sidewinder September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1598.003|Spearphishing Link|
Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious links to credential harvesting websites.(Citation: ATT Sidewinder January 2021)| | Sidewinder.md |
268466a68244-0 | Silence - G0091
Created: 2019-05-24T17:57:36.491Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T05:34:46.346Z
Contributors: Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB
Aliases
Silence,Whisper Spider
Description
Silence is a financially motivated threat actor targeting financial institutions in different countries. The group was first seen in June 2016. Their main targets reside in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Poland and Kazakhstan. They compromised various banking systems, including the Russian Central Bank's Automated Workstation Client, ATMs, and card processing.(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)
Techniques Used
Silence has obtained and modified versions of publicly-available tools like
Empire and
PsExec.(Citation: Group IB Silence Aug 2019) (Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1571|Non-Standard Port|
Silence has used port 444 when sending data about the system from the client to the server.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1090.002|External Proxy|
Silence has used ProxyBot, which allows the attacker to redirect traffic from the current node to the backconnect server via Sock4\Socks5.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1072|Software Deployment Tools|
Silence has used RAdmin, a remote software tool used to remotely control workstations and ATMs.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1055|Process Injection|
Silence has injected a DLL library containing a Trojan into the fwmain32.exe process.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Silence has used | Silence.md |
268466a68244-1 | Silence has used
Silence has downloaded additional modules and malware to victim’s machines.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.001|Remote Desktop Protocol|
Silence has used RDP for lateral movement.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1018|Remote System Discovery|
Silence has used Nmap to scan the corporate network, build a network topology, and identify vulnerable hosts.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory|
Silence has used the Farse6.1 utility (based on
Mimikatz) to extract credentials from lsass.exe.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1112|Modify Registry|
Silence can create, delete, or modify a specified Registry key or value.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Silence has named its backdoor "WINWORD.exe".(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts|
Silence has used compromised credentials to log on to other systems and escalate privileges.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows|T1553.002|Code Signing|
Silence has used a valid certificate to sign their primary loader Silence.Downloader (aka TrueBot).(Citation: Group IB Silence Aug 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell| | Silence.md |
268466a68244-2 | Silence has used PowerShell to download and execute payloads.(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.007|JavaScript|
Silence has used JS scripts.(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Silence has sent emails with malicious DOCX, CHM, LNK and ZIP attachments. (Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
Silence has used scheduled tasks to stage its operation.(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
Silence has used VBS scripts.(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1569.002|Service Execution|
Silence has used
Winexe to install a service on the remote system.(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Silence has used Windows command-line to run commands.(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Silence attempts to get users to launch malicious attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.001|Compiled HTML File| | Silence.md |
268466a68244-3 | Silence has weaponized CHM files in their phishing campaigns.(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)(Citation: Group IB Silence Aug 2019)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1106|Native API|
Silence has leveraged the Windows API, including using CreateProcess() or ShellExecute(), to perform a variety of tasks.(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.010|Command Obfuscation|
Silence has used environment variable string substitution for obfuscation.(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion|
Silence has deleted artifacts, including scheduled tasks, communicates files from the C2 and other logs.(Citation: Cyber Forensicator Silence Jan 2019)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1113|Screen Capture|
Silence can capture victim screen activity.(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1125|Video Capture|
Silence has been observed making videos of victims to observe bank employees day to day activities.(Citation: SecureList Silence Nov 2017)(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018)| | Silence.md |
44fd44c06e27-0 | Silent Librarian - G0122
Created: 2021-02-03T16:36:38.145Z
Modified: 2021-04-21T12:02:00.278Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Silent Librarian,TA407,COBALT DICKENS
Description
Silent Librarian is a group that has targeted research and proprietary data at universities, government agencies, and private sector companies worldwide since at least 2013. Members of Silent Librarian are known to have been affiliated with the Iran-based Mabna Institute which has conducted cyber intrusions at the behest of the government of Iran, specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)(Citation: Phish Labs Silent Librarian)(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)
Techniques Used
Silent Librarian has cloned victim organization login pages and staged them for later use in credential harvesting campaigns.
Silent Librarian has also made use of a variety of URL shorteners for these staged websites.(Citation: Secureworks COBALT DICKENS September 2019)(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
Silent Librarian has obtained free and publicly available tools including SingleFile and HTTrack to copy login pages of targeted organizations.(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT DICKENS September 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.004|Digital Certificates|
Silent Librarian has obtained free Let's Encrypt SSL certificates for use on their phishing pages.(Citation: Phish Labs Silent Librarian)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT DICKENS September 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1585.002|Email Accounts| | Silent_Librarian.md |
44fd44c06e27-1 | Silent Librarian has established e-mail accounts to receive e-mails forwarded from compromised accounts.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Office 365,Google Workspace,macOS,Linux|T1114|Email Collection|
Silent Librarian has exfiltrated entire mailboxes from compromised accounts.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Office 365,Windows,Google Workspace,macOS,Linux|T1114.003|Email Forwarding Rule|
Silent Librarian has set up auto forwarding rules on compromised e-mail accounts.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589.002|Email Addresses|
Silent Librarian has collected e-mail addresses from targeted organizations from open Internet searches.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589.003|Employee Names|
Silent Librarian has collected lists of names for individuals from targeted organizations.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers|T1110.003|Password Spraying|
Silent Librarian has used collected lists of names and e-mail accounts to use in password spraying attacks against private sector targets.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts|
Silent Librarian has used compromised credentials to obtain unauthorized access to online accounts.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains| | Silent_Librarian.md |
44fd44c06e27-2 | Silent Librarian has used compromised credentials to obtain unauthorized access to online accounts.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
Silent Librarian has acquired domains to establish credential harvesting pages, often spoofing the target organization and using free top level domains .TK, .ML, .GA, .CF, and .GQ.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)(Citation: Phish Labs Silent Librarian)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT DICKENS August 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT DICKENS September 2019)(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1594|Search Victim-Owned Websites|
Silent Librarian has searched victim's websites to identify the interests and academic areas of targeted individuals and to scrape source code, branding, and organizational contact information for phishing pages.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)(Citation: Phish Labs Silent Librarian)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1598.003|Spearphishing Link|
Silent Librarian has used links in e-mails to direct victims to credential harvesting websites designed to appear like the targeted organization's login page.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)(Citation: Phish Labs Silent Librarian)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT DICKENS August 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019)(Citation: Secureworks COBALT DICKENS September 2019)(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)| | Silent_Librarian.md |
15d79cb68f84-0 | SilverTerrier - G0083
Created: 2019-01-29T21:36:59.793Z
Modified: 2020-05-19T23:26:11.780Z
Contributors:
Aliases
SilverTerrier
Description
SilverTerrier is a Nigerian threat group that has been seen active since 2014. SilverTerrier mainly targets organizations in high technology, higher education, and manufacturing.(Citation: Unit42 SilverTerrier 2018)(Citation: Unit42 SilverTerrier 2016)
Techniques Used
|Matrix|Domain|Platform|Technique ID|Technique Name|Use|
| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.002|File Transfer Protocols|SilverTerrier uses FTP for C2 communications.(Citation: Unit42 SilverTerrier 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|SilverTerrier uses HTTP for C2 communications.(Citation: Unit42 SilverTerrier 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.003|Mail Protocols|SilverTerrier uses SMTP for C2 communications.(Citation: Unit42 SilverTerrier 2018)| | SilverTerrier.md |
21ffa2192adb-0 | Sowbug - G0054
Created: 2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z
Modified: 2020-03-30T02:46:16.483Z
Contributors: Alan Neville, @abnev
Aliases
Sowbug
Description
Sowbug is a threat group that has conducted targeted attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia, particularly government entities, since at least 2015. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)
Techniques Used
Sowbug named its tools to masquerade as Windows or Adobe Reader software, such as by using the file name adobecms.exe and the directory
Sowbug has used command line during its intrusions.(Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1039|Data from Network Shared Drive|
Sowbug extracted Word documents from a file server on a victim network.(Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1135|Network Share Discovery|
Sowbug listed remote shared drives that were accessible from a victim.(Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1003|OS Credential Dumping|
Sowbug has used credential dumping tools.(Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.001|Archive via Utility|
Sowbug extracted documents and bundled them into a RAR archive.(Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1056.001|Keylogging|
Sowbug has used keylogging tools.(Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery| | Sowbug.md |
21ffa2192adb-1 | Sowbug identified and extracted all Word documents on a server by using a command containing * .doc and *.docx. The actors also searched for documents based on a specific date range and attempted to identify all installed software on a victim.(Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
Sowbug obtained OS version and hardware configuration from a victim.(Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)| | Sowbug.md |
e4bac029abb1-0 | Stealth Falcon - G0038
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:06.390Z
Modified: 2020-11-23T18:57:19.208Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Stealth Falcon
Description
Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed. (Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)
Techniques Used
Stealth Falcon malware gathers passwords from the Windows Credential Vault.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555.003|Credentials from Web Browsers|
Stealth Falcon malware gathers passwords from multiple sources, including Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Chrome.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|
Stealth Falcon malware gathers a list of running processes.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1005|Data from Local System|
Stealth Falcon malware gathers data from the local victim system.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1041|Exfiltration Over C2 Channel|After data is collected by
Stealth Falcon malware, it is exfiltrated over the existing C2 channel.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555|Credentials from Password Stores|
Stealth Falcon malware gathers passwords from multiple sources, including Windows Credential Vault and Outlook.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network,Office 365,Azure AD,IaaS,Google Workspace|T1059|Command and Scripting Interpreter| | Stealth_Falcon.md |
e4bac029abb1-1 | Stealth Falcon malware uses WMI to script data collection and command execution on the victim.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1573.001|Symmetric Cryptography|
Stealth Falcon malware encrypts C2 traffic using RC4 with a hard-coded key.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Stealth Falcon malware communicates with its C2 server via HTTPS.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Stealth Falcon malware uses PowerShell commands to perform various functions, including gathering system information via WMI and executing commands from its C2 server.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1033|System Owner/User Discovery|
Stealth Falcon malware gathers the registered user and primary owner name via WMI.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
Stealth Falcon malware gathers system information via WMI, including the system directory, build number, serial number, version, manufacturer, model, and total physical memory.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
Stealth Falcon malware creates a scheduled task entitled “IE Web Cache” to execute a malicious file hourly.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1047|Windows Management Instrumentation|
Stealth Falcon malware gathers system information via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery| | Stealth_Falcon.md |
e4bac029abb1-2 | Stealth Falcon malware gathers the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) table from the victim.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1012|Query Registry|
Stealth Falcon malware attempts to determine the installed version of .NET by querying the Registry.(Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)| | Stealth_Falcon.md |
f0abe6683af5-0 | Strider - G0041
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:07.541Z
Modified: 2020-06-29T01:43:19.374Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Strider,ProjectSauron
Description
Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda.(Citation: Symantec Strider Blog)(Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog)
Techniques Used
|Matrix|Domain|Platform|Technique ID|Technique Name|Use|
| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1564.005|Hidden File System|Strider has used a hidden file system that is stored as a file on disk.(Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Full Report)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1556.002|Password Filter DLL|Strider has registered its persistence module on domain controllers as a Windows LSA (Local System Authority) password filter to acquire credentials any time a domain, local user, or administrator logs in or changes a password.(Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Full Report)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1090.001|Internal Proxy|Strider has used local servers with both local network and Internet access to act as internal proxy nodes to exfiltrate data from other parts of the network without direct Internet access.(Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog)| | Strider.md |
da43b7645314-0 | Suckfly - G0039
Created: 2017-05-31T21:32:06.777Z
Modified: 2022-04-15T16:27:38.682Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Suckfly
Description
Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. (Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016)
Techniques Used
|Matrix|Domain|Platform|Technique ID|Technique Name|Use|
| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers,Network|T1046|Network Service Discovery|Suckfly the victim's internal network for hosts with ports 8080, 5900, and 40 open.(Citation: Symantec Suckfly May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|Several tools used by Suckfly have been command-line driven.(Citation: Symantec Suckfly May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1003|OS Credential Dumping|Suckfly used a signed credential-dumping tool to obtain victim account credentials.(Citation: Symantec Suckfly May 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows|T1553.002|Code Signing|Suckfly has used stolen certificates to sign its malware.(Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts|Suckfly used legitimate account credentials that they dumped to navigate the internal victim network as though they were the legitimate account owner.(Citation: Symantec Suckfly May 2016)| | Suckfly.md |
01a8cd266e99-0 | TA459 - G0062
Created: 2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z
Modified: 2020-03-30T19:22:32.962Z
Contributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.
Aliases
TA459
Description
TA459 is a threat group believed to operate out of China that has targeted countries including Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and others. (Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)
Techniques Used
|Matrix|Domain|Platform|Technique ID|Technique Name|Use|
| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution|TA459 has exploited Microsoft Word vulnerability CVE-2017-0199 for execution.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|TA459 has a VBScript for execution.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|TA459 has targeted victims using spearphishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|TA459 has used PowerShell for execution of a payload.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|TA459 has attempted to get victims to open malicious Microsoft Word attachment sent via spearphishing.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)| | TA459.md |
416317a7678d-0 | TA505 - G0092
Created: 2019-05-28T15:54:17.213Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T05:38:20.381Z
Contributors:
Aliases
TA505,Hive0065
Description
TA505 is a cyber criminal group that has been active since at least 2014. TA505 is known for frequently changing malware, driving global trends in criminal malware distribution, and ransomware campaigns involving Clop.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 June 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019)(Citation: NCC Group TA505)(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020)
Techniques Used
TA505 has used base64 encoded PowerShell commands.(Citation: Cybereason TA505 April 2019)(Citation: Deep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Containers,IaaS|T1562.001|Disable or Modify Tools|
TA505 has used malware to disable Windows Defender.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.001|Upload Malware|
TA505 has staged malware on actor-controlled domains.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1106|Native API|
TA505 has deployed payloads that use Windows API calls on a compromised host.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.001|Malware|
TA505 has used malware such as
Azorult and
Cobalt Strike in their operations.(Citation: NCC Group TA505)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
TA505 has used a variety of tools in their operations, including
AdFind,
BloodHound,
Mimikatz, and | TA505.md |
416317a7678d-1 | TA505 has used a variety of tools in their operations, including
AdFind,
BloodHound,
Mimikatz, and
PowerSploit.(Citation: NCC Group TA505)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
TA505 has decrypted packed DLLs with an XOR key.(Citation: NCC Group TA505)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1112|Modify Registry|
TA505 has used malware to disable Windows Defender through modification of the Registry.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
TA505 has registered domains to impersonate services such as Dropbox to distribute malware.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1553.005|Mark-of-the-Web Bypass|
TA505 has used .iso files to deploy malicious .lnk files.(Citation: TrendMicro TA505 Aug 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1055.001|Dynamic-link Library Injection|
TA505 has been seen injecting a DLL into winword.exe.(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
TA505 has used HTTP to communicate with C2 nodes.(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1027.002|Software Packing|
TA505 has used UPX to obscure malicious code.(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1078.002|Domain Accounts|
TA505 has used stolen domain admin accounts to compromise additional hosts.(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers|T1069|Permission Groups Discovery| | TA505.md |
416317a7678d-2 | TA505 has used TinyMet to enumerate members of privileged groups.(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)
TA505 has also run
TA505 has used the tool EmailStealer to steal and send lists of e-mail addresses to a remote server.(Citation: Trend Micro TA505 June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1568.001|Fast Flux DNS|
TA505 has used fast flux to mask botnets by distributing payloads across multiple IPs.(Citation: Trend Micro TA505 June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
TA505 has executed commands using
TA505 has used JavaScript for code execution.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link|
TA505 has used lures to get users to click links in emails and attachments. For example,
TA505 makes their malware look like legitimate Microsoft Word documents, .pdf and/or .lnk files. (Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 June 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019)(Citation: Cybereason TA505 April 2019)(Citation: ProofPoint SettingContent-ms July 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Mar 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro TA505 June 2019)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555.003|Credentials from Web Browsers|
TA505 has used malware to gather credentials from Internet Explorer.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer| | TA505.md |
416317a7678d-3 | TA505 has downloaded additional malware to execute on victim systems.(Citation: Cybereason TA505 April 2019)(Citation: Deep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019)(Citation: ProofPoint SettingContent-ms July 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows|T1553.002|Code Signing|
TA505 has signed payloads with code signing certificates from Thawte and Sectigo.(Citation: Cybereason TA505 April 2019)(Citation: Deep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro TA505 June 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.011|Rundll32|
TA505 has leveraged
TA505 has used
TA505 has used lures to get users to enable content in malicious attachments and execute malicious files contained in archives. For example,
TA505 makes their malware look like legitimate Microsoft Word documents, .pdf and/or .lnk files. (Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 June 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019)(Citation: Cybereason TA505 April 2019)(Citation: ProofPoint SettingContent-ms July 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Mar 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro TA505 June 2019)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
TA505 has password-protected malicious Word documents.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1552.001|Credentials In Files|
TA505 has used malware to gather credentials from FTP clients and Outlook.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,IaaS|T1486|Data Encrypted for Impact|
TA505 has used a wide variety of ransomware, such as | TA505.md |
416317a7678d-4 | TA505 has used a wide variety of ransomware, such as
Clop, Locky, Jaff, Bart, Philadelphia, and GlobeImposter, to encrypt victim files and demand a ransom payment.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
TA505 has used VBS for code execution.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro TA505 June 2019)(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
TA505 has used PowerShell to download and execute malware and reconnaissance scripts.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: ProofPoint SettingContent-ms July 2018)(Citation: Cybereason TA505 April 2019)(Citation: Deep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
TA505 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro TA505 June 2019)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1559.002|Dynamic Data Exchange|
TA505 has leveraged malicious Word documents that abused DDE.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment| | TA505.md |
416317a7678d-5 | TA505 has used spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to initially compromise victims.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 June 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019)(Citation: Cybereason TA505 April 2019)(Citation: ProofPoint SettingContent-ms July 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Mar 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro TA505 June 2019)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 October 2019)(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020)| | TA505.md |
9baaa52dbb8b-0 | TA551 - G0127
Created: 2021-03-19T21:04:00.692Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T05:40:21.255Z
Contributors: Shuhei Sasada, Cyber Defense Institute, Inc,Ryo Tamura, SecureBrain Corporation,Shotaro Hamamoto, NEC Solution Innovators, Ltd,Yusuke Niwa, ITOCHU Corporation,Takuma Matsumoto, LAC Co., Ltd
Aliases
TA551,GOLD CABIN,Shathak
Description
TA551 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2018. (Citation: Secureworks GOLD CABIN) The group has primarily targeted English, German, Italian, and Japanese speakers through email-based malware distribution campaigns. (Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)
Techniques Used
TA551 has used mshta.exe to execute malicious payloads.(Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
TA551 has prompted users to enable macros within spearphishing attachments to install malware.(Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
TA551 has sent spearphishing attachments with password protected ZIP files.(Citation: Unit 42 Valak July 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD CABIN)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
TA551 has used
TA551 has used a DGA to generate URLs from executed macros.(Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD CABIN)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1589.002|Email Addresses| | TA551.md |
9baaa52dbb8b-1 | TA551 has used spoofed company emails that were acquired from email clients on previously infected hosts to target other individuals.(Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
TA551 has retrieved DLLs and installer binaries for malware execution from C2.(Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.003|Steganography|
TA551 has hidden encoded data for malware DLLs in a PNG.(Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
TA551 has used HTTP for C2 communications.(Citation: Unit 42 Valak July 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.011|Rundll32|
TA551 has used rundll32.exe to load malicious DLLs.(Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1218.010|Regsvr32|
TA551 has used regsvr32.exe to load malicious DLLs.(Citation: Unit 42 Valak July 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1132.001|Standard Encoding|
TA551 has used encoded ASCII text for initial C2 communications.(Citation: Unit 42 Valak July 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036|Masquerading|
TA551 has masked malware DLLs as dat and jpg files.(Citation: Unit 42 TA551 Jan 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.010|Command Obfuscation|
TA551 has used obfuscated variable names in a JavaScript configuration file.(Citation: Unit 42 Valak July 2020)| | TA551.md |
cbfb93d0d9a2-0 | TeamTNT - G0139
Created: 2021-10-01T01:57:31.229Z
Modified: 2022-10-19T21:35:03.147Z
Contributors: Will Thomas, Cyjax,Darin Smith, Cisco
Aliases
TeamTNT
Description
TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.(Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021)
Techniques Used
TeamTNT has leveraged AWS CLI to enumerate cloud environments with compromised credentials.(Citation: Talos TeamTNT)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1569|System Services|
TeamTNT has created system services to execute cryptocurrency mining software.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
TeamTNT has used a script that decodes a Base64-encoded version of WeaveWorks Scope.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|
TeamTNT has used a script that checks
TeamTNT has sent locally staged files with collected credentials to C2 servers using cURL.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1074.001|Local Data Staging| | TeamTNT.md |
cbfb93d0d9a2-1 | TeamTNT has aggregated collected credentials in text files before exfiltrating.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1007|System Service Discovery|
TeamTNT has searched for services such as Alibaba Cloud Security's aliyun service and BMC Helix Cloud Security's bmc-agent service in order to disable them.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1120|Peripheral Device Discovery|
TeamTNT has searched for attached VGA devices using lspci.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
TeamTNT has replaced .dockerd and .dockerenv with their own scripts and cryptocurrency mining software.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036|Masquerading|
TeamTNT has disguised their scripts with docker-related file names.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1552.004|Private Keys|
TeamTNT has searched for unsecured SSH keys.(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
TeamTNT has the
TeamTNT has developed custom malware such as
Hildegard.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,Containers|T1611|Escape to Host|
TeamTNT has deployed privileged containers that mount the filesystem of victim machine.(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Containers|T1609|Container Administration Command|
TeamTNT executed | TeamTNT.md |
cbfb93d0d9a2-2 | TeamTNT executed
Hildegard through the kubelet API run command and by executing commands on running containers.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,Containers,macOS|T1133|External Remote Services|
TeamTNT has used open-source tools such as Weave Scope to target exposed Docker API ports and gain initial access to victim environments.(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)
TeamTNT has also targeted exposed kubelets for Kubernetes environments.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS|T1021.004|SSH|
TeamTNT has used SSH to connect back to victim machines.(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)
TeamTNT has also used SSH to transfer tools and payloads onto victim hosts and execute them.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1496|Resource Hijacking|
TeamTNT has deployed XMRig Docker images to mine cryptocurrency.(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)
TeamTNT has also infected Docker containers and Kubernetes clusters with XMRig, and used RainbowMiner and lolMiner for mining cryptocurrency.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.001|Upload Malware|
TeamTNT has uploaded backdoored Docker images to Docker Hub.(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1136.001|Local Account|
TeamTNT has created local privileged users on victim machines.(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers,Network|T1046|Network Service Discovery| | TeamTNT.md |
cbfb93d0d9a2-3 | TeamTNT has used masscan to search for open Docker API ports and Kubernetes clusters.(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)
TeamTNT has also used malware that utilizes zmap and zgrab to search for vulnerable services in cloud environments.(Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|IaaS,Containers|T1204.003|Malicious Image|
TeamTNT has relied on users to download and execute malicious Docker images.(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1552.001|Credentials In Files|
TeamTNT has searched for unsecured AWS credentials and Docker API credentials.(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1219|Remote Access Software|
TeamTNT has established tmate sessions for C2 communications.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
TeamTNT has obtained domains to host their payloads.(Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Containers|T1610|Deploy Container|
TeamTNT has deployed different types of containers into victim environments to facilitate execution.(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)
TeamTNT has also transferred cryptocurrency mining software to Kubernetes clusters discovered within local IP address ranges.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
TeamTNT has the | TeamTNT.md |
cbfb93d0d9a2-4 | TeamTNT has the
TeamTNT has also used a custom user agent HTTP header in shell scripts.(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1070.003|Clear Command History|
TeamTNT has cleared command history with
TeamTNT has run
TeamTNT has also used
TeamTNT has checked for running containers with
TeamTNT has also searched for Kubernetes pods running in a local network.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1595.001|Scanning IP Blocks|
TeamTNT has scanned specific lists of target IP addresses.(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|IaaS|T1552.005|Cloud Instance Metadata API|
TeamTNT has queried the AWS instance metadata service for credentials.(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux|T1543.002|Systemd Service|
TeamTNT has established persistence through the creation of a cryptocurrency mining system service using
TeamTNT has encrypted its binaries via AES and encoded files using Base64.(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1057|Process Discovery|
TeamTNT has searched for rival malware and removes it if found.(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)
TeamTNT has also searched for running processes containing the strings aliyun or liyun to identify machines running Alibaba Cloud Security tools.(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1595.002|Vulnerability Scanning|
TeamTNT has scanned for vulnerabilities in IoT devices and other related resources such as the Docker API.(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Linux|T1222.002|Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification|
TeamTNT has modified the permissions on binaries with | TeamTNT.md |
cbfb93d0d9a2-5 | TeamTNT has modified the permissions on binaries with
TeamTNT has enumerated the host machine’s IP address.(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1014|Rootkit|
TeamTNT has used rootkits such as the open-source Diamorphine rootkit and their custom bots to hide cryptocurrency mining activities on the machine.(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT) (Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1027.002|Software Packing|
TeamTNT has used UPX and Ezuri packer to pack its binaries.(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Linux|T1059.004|Unix Shell|
TeamTNT has used shell scripts for execution.(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1543.003|Windows Service|
TeamTNT has used malware that adds cryptocurrency miners as a service.(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071|Application Layer Protocol|
TeamTNT has used an IRC bot for C2 communications.(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
TeamTNT has used batch scripts to download tools and executing cryptocurrency miners.(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
TeamTNT has executed PowerShell commands in batch scripts.(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder| | TeamTNT.md |
cbfb93d0d9a2-6 | TeamTNT has added batch scripts to the startup folder.(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518.001|Security Software Discovery|
TeamTNT has searched for security products on infected machines.(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
TeamTNT has searched for system version, architecture, disk partition, logical volume, and hostname information.(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Containers,IaaS|T1562.001|Disable or Modify Tools|
TeamTNT has disabled and uninstalled security tools such as Alibaba, Tencent, and BMC cloud monitoring agents on cloud-based infrastructure.(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion|
TeamTNT has used a payload that removes itself after running.
TeamTNT also has deleted locally staged files for collecting credentials or scan results for local IP addresses after exfiltrating them.(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,IaaS,Network|T1098.004|SSH Authorized Keys|
TeamTNT has added RSA keys in
TeamTNT has leveraged iplogger.org to send collected data back to C2.(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS|T1070.002|Clear Linux or Mac System Logs|
TeamTNT has removed system logs from
TeamTNT has disabled | TeamTNT.md |
f96cd771d592-0 | TEMP.Veles - G0088
Created: 2019-04-16T15:14:38.533Z
Modified: 2022-11-30T22:46:40.135Z
Contributors: Dragos Threat Intelligence
Aliases
TEMP.Veles,XENOTIME
Description
TEMP.Veles is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019)
Techniques Used
TEMP.Veles has obtained and used tools such as
Mimikatz and
PsExec.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|PRE|T1583.003|Virtual Private Server|
TEMP.Veles has used Virtual Private Server (VPS) infrastructure.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1571|Non-Standard Port|
TEMP.Veles has used port-protocol mismatches on ports such as 443, 4444, 8531, and 50501 during C2.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.005|Indicator Removal from Tools|
TEMP.Veles has modified files based on the open-source project cryptcat in an apparent attempt to decrease AV detection rates.(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
TEMP.Veles has used a publicly-available PowerShell-based tool, WMImplant.(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018) The group has also used PowerShell to perform | TEMP.Veles.md |
f96cd771d592-1 | TEMP.Veles has used a publicly-available PowerShell-based tool, WMImplant.(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018) The group has also used PowerShell to perform
Timestomping.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS,Network|T1505.003|Web Shell|
TEMP.Veles has planted Web shells on Outlook Exchange servers.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Linux,Containers,macOS|T1133|External Remote Services|
TEMP.Veles has used a VPN to persist in the victim environment.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1021.001|Remote Desktop Protocol|
TEMP.Veles utilized RDP throughout an operation.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts|
TEMP.Veles has used compromised VPN accounts.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS|T1021.004|SSH|
TEMP.Veles has relied on encrypted SSH-based tunnels to transfer tools and for remote command/program execution.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1074.001|Local Data Staging|
TEMP.Veles has created staging folders in directories that were infrequently used by legitimate users or processes.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion| | TEMP.Veles.md |
f96cd771d592-2 | TEMP.Veles routinely deleted tools, logs, and other files after they were finished with them.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.006|Timestomp|
TEMP.Veles used timestomping to modify the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute on tools.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1053.005|Scheduled Task|
TEMP.Veles has used scheduled task XML triggers.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Windows|T1546.012|Image File Execution Options Injection|
TEMP.Veles has modified and added entries within
TEMP.Veles has used
Mimikatz and a custom tool, SecHack, to harvest credentials. (Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
TEMP.Veles has renamed files to look like legitimate files, such as Windows update files or Schneider Electric application files.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)
|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Engineering Workstation,Human-Machine Interface,Control Server|T0886|Remote Services|
TEMP.Veles utilized remote desktop protocol (RDP) jump boxes to move into the ICS environment. (Citation: Dragos December 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|None|T0817|Drive-by Compromise|
TEMP.Veles utilizes watering hole websites to target industrial employees. (Citation: Chris Bing May 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Control Server,Data Historian,Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED,Human-Machine Interface,Input/Output Server,Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay|T0862|Supply Chain Compromise| | TEMP.Veles.md |
f96cd771d592-3 | TEMP.Veles targeted several ICS vendors and manufacturers. (Citation: Dragos Threat Intelligence August 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack,ics-attack|Control Server,Data Historian,Engineering Workstation,Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED,Human-Machine Interface,Input/Output Server,Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay|T0859|Valid Accounts|
TEMP.Veles used valid credentials when laterally moving through RDP jump boxes into the ICS environment. (Citation: Dragos December 2017)| | TEMP.Veles.md |
f7ce2087f3c9-0 | The White Company - G0089
Created: 2019-05-02T00:08:18.314Z
Modified: 2020-03-30T19:24:52.290Z
Contributors:
Aliases
The White Company
Description
The White Company is a likely state-sponsored threat actor with advanced capabilities. From 2017 through 2018, the group led an espionage campaign called Operation Shaheen targeting government and military organizations in Pakistan.(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018)
Techniques Used
The White Company has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments to victims.(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
The White Company has used phishing lure documents that trick users into opening them and infecting their computers.(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution|
The White Company has taken advantage of a known vulnerability in Microsoft Word (CVE 2012-0158) to execute code.(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1027.002|Software Packing|
The White Company has obfuscated their payloads through packing.(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1070.004|File Deletion|
The White Company has the ability to delete its malware entirely from the target system.(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518.001|Security Software Discovery| | The_White_Company.md |
f7ce2087f3c9-1 | The White Company has checked for specific antivirus products on the target’s computer, including Kaspersky, Quick Heal, AVG, BitDefender, Avira, Sophos, Avast!, and ESET.(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Network|T1124|System Time Discovery|
The White Company has checked the current date on the victim system.(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018)| | The_White_Company.md |
45d83e496ce4-0 | Threat Group-1314 - G0028
Created: 2017-05-31T21:31:59.120Z
Modified: 2020-03-19T21:58:20.831Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Threat Group-1314,TG-1314
Description
Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure. (Citation: Dell TG-1314)
Techniques Used
|Matrix|Domain|Platform|Technique ID|Technique Name|Use|
| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---| :---|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|Threat Group-1314 actors spawned shells on remote systems on a victim network to execute commands.(Citation: Dell TG-1314)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.002|SMB/Windows Admin Shares|Threat Group-1314 actors mapped network drives using net use.(Citation: Dell TG-1314)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1078.002|Domain Accounts|Threat Group-1314 actors used compromised domain credentials for the victim's endpoint management platform, Altiris, to move laterally.(Citation: Dell TG-1314)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1072|Software Deployment Tools|Threat Group-1314 actors used a victim's endpoint management platform, Altiris, for lateral movement.(Citation: Dell TG-1314)| | Threat_Group-1314.md |
3505384b1d08-0 | Threat Group-3390 - G0027
Created: 2017-05-31T21:31:58.518Z
Modified: 2023-03-29T16:53:17.235Z
Contributors: Daniyal Naeem, BT Security,Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet
Aliases
Threat Group-3390,Earth Smilodon,TG-3390,Emissary Panda,BRONZE UNION,APT27,Iron Tiger,LuckyMouse
Description
Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.(Citation: Dell TG-3390) The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)
Techniques Used
Threat Group-3390 has obtained stolen valid certificates, including from VMProtect and the Chinese instant messaging application Youdu, for their operations.(Citation: Lunghi Iron Tiger Linux)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
Threat Group-3390 has registered domains for C2.(Citation: Lunghi Iron Tiger Linux)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Network,Linux,macOS,Containers|T1190|Exploit Public-Facing Application|
Threat Group-3390 has exploited the Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2019-0604 and CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 in Exchange Server.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1555.005|Password Managers|
Threat Group-3390 obtained a KeePass database from a compromised host.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1033|System Owner/User Discovery| | Threat_Group-3390.md |
3505384b1d08-1 | Threat Group-3390 has used
Threat Group-3390 has packed malware and tools, including using VMProtect.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.001|Upload Malware|
Threat Group-3390 has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1567.002|Exfiltration to Cloud Storage|
Threat Group-3390 has exfiltrated stolen data to Dropbox.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1195.002|Compromise Software Supply Chain|
Threat Group-3390 has compromised the Able Desktop installer to gain access to victim's environments.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Office 365|T1199|Trusted Relationship|
Threat Group-3390 has compromised third party service providers to gain access to victim's environments.(Citation: Profero APT27 December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Threat Group-3390 has used e-mail to deliver malicious attachments to victims.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Threat Group-3390 has lured victims into opening malicious files containing malware.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1588.002|Tool|
Threat Group-3390 has obtained and used tools such as
Impacket,
pwdump,
Mimikatz,
gsecdump,
NBTscan, and | Threat_Group-3390.md |
3505384b1d08-2 | Threat Group-3390 has obtained and used tools such as
Impacket,
pwdump,
Mimikatz,
gsecdump,
NBTscan, and
Windows Credential Editor.(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)(Citation: Dell TG-3390)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.002|Upload Tool|
Threat Group-3390 has staged tools, including
gsecdump and WCE, on previously compromised websites.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.004|Drive-by Target|
Threat Group-3390 has embedded malicious code into websites to screen a potential victim's IP address and then exploit their browser if they are of interest.(Citation: Gallagher 2015)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.002|Security Account Manager|
Threat Group-3390 actors have used
gsecdump to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.001|LSASS Memory|
Threat Group-3390 actors have used a modified version of
Mimikatz called Wrapikatz to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS|T1074.002|Remote Data Staging|
Threat Group-3390 has moved staged encrypted archives to Internet-facing servers that had previously been compromised with
China Chopper prior to exfiltration.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution| | Threat_Group-3390.md |
3505384b1d08-3 | Threat Group-3390 has exploited CVE-2018-0798 in Equation Editor.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1210|Exploitation of Remote Services|
Threat Group-3390 has exploited MS17-010 to move laterally to other systems on the network.(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS,Network|T1505.003|Web Shell|
Threat Group-3390 has used a variety of Web shells.(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1543.003|Windows Service|
Threat Group-3390's malware can create a new service, sometimes naming it after the config information, to gain persistence.(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)(Citation: Lunghi Iron Tiger Linux)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1012|Query Registry|A
Threat Group-3390 tool can read and decrypt stored Registry values.(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder|
Threat Group-3390's malware can add a Registry key to
Threat Group-3390 tool can use a public UAC bypass method to elevate privileges.(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|A
Threat Group-3390 tool can encrypt payloads using XOR.
Threat Group-3390 malware is also obfuscated using Metasploit’s shikata_ga_nai encoder as well as compressed with LZNT1 compression.(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1112|Modify Registry|A | Threat_Group-3390.md |
3505384b1d08-4 | Threat Group-3390 tool has created new Registry keys under
Threat Group-3390 malware deobfuscates and decompresses code that was encoded with Metasploit’s shikata_ga_nai encoder as well as compressed with LZNT1 compression.(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS,SaaS|T1189|Drive-by Compromise|
Threat Group-3390 has extensively used strategic web compromises to target victims.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1574.001|DLL Search Order Hijacking|
Threat Group-3390 has performed DLL search order hijacking to execute their payload.(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1055.012|Process Hollowing|A
Threat Group-3390 tool can spawn
Threat Group-3390 tool can use WMI to execute a binary.(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1018|Remote System Discovery|
Threat Group-3390 has used the
Threat Group-3390 malware has used HTTP for C2.(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery|
Threat Group-3390 actors use
NBTscan to discover vulnerable systems.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,IaaS,SaaS|T1119|Automated Collection|
Threat Group-3390 ran a command to compile an archive of file types of interest from the victim user's directories.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1068|Exploitation for Privilege Escalation| | Threat_Group-3390.md |
3505384b1d08-5 | Threat Group-3390 has used CVE-2014-6324 and CVE-2017-0213 to escalate privileges.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)(Citation: Profero APT27 December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Threat Group-3390 has used command-line interfaces for execution.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1562.002|Disable Windows Event Logging|
Threat Group-3390 has used appcmd.exe to disable logging on a victim server.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1070.005|Network Share Connection Removal|
Threat Group-3390 has detached network shares after exfiltrating files, likely to evade detection.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Threat Group-3390 has used PowerShell for execution.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1049|System Network Connections Discovery|
Threat Group-3390 has used
Threat Group-3390 has used
Threat Group-3390 has deleted existing logs and exfiltrated file archives from a victim.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1021.006|Windows Remote Management|
Threat Group-3390 has used WinRM to enable remote execution.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,Containers,macOS|T1133|External Remote Services| | Threat_Group-3390.md |
3505384b1d08-6 | Threat Group-3390 actors look for and use VPN profiles during an operation to access the network using external VPN services.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)
Threat Group-3390 has also obtained OWA account credentials during intrusions that it subsequently used to attempt to regain access when evicted from a victim network.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1560.002|Archive via Library|
Threat Group-3390 has used RAR to compress, encrypt, and password-protect files prior to exfiltration.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1030|Data Transfer Size Limits|
Threat Group-3390 actors have split RAR files for exfiltration into parts.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1074.001|Local Data Staging|
Threat Group-3390 has locally staged encrypted archives for later exfiltration efforts.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace,Containers,Network|T1078|Valid Accounts|
Threat Group-3390 actors obtain legitimate credentials using a variety of methods and use them to further lateral movement on victim networks.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1005|Data from Local System|
Threat Group-3390 ran a command to compile an archive of file types of interest from the victim user's directories.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Threat Group-3390 has downloaded additional malware and tools, including through the use of | Threat_Group-3390.md |
3505384b1d08-7 | Threat Group-3390 has downloaded additional malware and tools, including through the use of
Threat Group-3390 actors use the Hunter tool to conduct network service discovery for vulnerable systems.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1003.004|LSA Secrets|
Threat Group-3390 actors have used
gsecdump to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1056.001|Keylogging|
Threat Group-3390 actors installed a credential logger on Microsoft Exchange servers.
Threat Group-3390 also leveraged the reconnaissance framework, ScanBox, to capture keystrokes.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1053.002|At|
Threat Group-3390 actors use
at to schedule tasks to run self-extracting RAR archives, which install
HTTPBrowser or
PlugX on other victims on a network.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1574.002|DLL Side-Loading|
Threat Group-3390 has used DLL side-loading, including by using legitimate Kaspersky antivirus variants as well as | Threat_Group-3390.md |
9646df93f378-0 | Thrip - G0076
Created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
Modified: 2021-10-12T20:13:42.274Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Thrip
Description
Thrip is an espionage group that has targeted satellite communications, telecoms, and defense contractor companies in the U.S. and Southeast Asia. The group uses custom malware as well as "living off the land" techniques. (Citation: Symantec Thrip June 2018)
Techniques Used
Thrip has obtained and used tools such as
Mimikatz and
PsExec.(Citation: Symantec Thrip June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1048.003|Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol|
Thrip has used WinSCP to exfiltrate data from a targeted organization over FTP.(Citation: Symantec Thrip June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1219|Remote Access Software|
Thrip used a cloud-based remote access software called LogMeIn for their attacks.(Citation: Symantec Thrip June 2018)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Thrip leveraged PowerShell to run commands to download payloads, traverse the compromised networks, and carry out reconnaissance.(Citation: Symantec Thrip June 2018)| | Thrip.md |
9c86e2818661-0 | Tonto Team - G0131
Created: 2021-05-05T17:18:25.987Z
Modified: 2022-01-27T17:51:41.433Z
Contributors:
Aliases
Tonto Team,Earth Akhlut,BRONZE HUNTLEY,CactusPete,Karma Panda
Description
Tonto Team is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States since at least 2009; by 2020 they expanded operations to include other Asian as well as Eastern European countries. Tonto Team has targeted government, military, energy, mining, financial, education, healthcare, and technology organizations, including through the Heartbeat Campaign (2009-2012) and Operation Bitter Biscuit (2017).(Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020)(Citation: ESET Exchange Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye Chinese Espionage October 2019)(Citation: ARS Technica China Hack SK April 2017)(Citation: Trend Micro HeartBeat Campaign January 2013)(Citation: Talos Bisonal 10 Years March 2020)
Techniques Used
Tonto Team has routed their traffic through an external server in order to obfuscate their location.(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1068|Exploitation for Privilege Escalation|
Tonto Team has exploited CVE-2019-0803 and MS16-032 to escalate privileges.(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1135|Network Share Discovery|
Tonto Team has used tools such as
NBTscan to enumerate network shares.(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1003|OS Credential Dumping| | Tonto_Team.md |
9c86e2818661-1 | NBTscan to enumerate network shares.(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1003|OS Credential Dumping|
Tonto Team has used a variety of credential dumping tools.(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1059.006|Python|
Tonto Team has used Python-based tools for execution.(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux,Network|T1056.001|Keylogging|
Tonto Team has used keylogging tools in their operations.(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1210|Exploitation of Remote Services|
Tonto Team has used EternalBlue exploits for lateral movement.(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1069.001|Local Groups|
Tonto Team has used the
Tonto Team has used a first stage web shell after compromising a vulnerable Exchange server.(Citation: ESET Exchange Mar 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.001|PowerShell|
Tonto Team has used PowerShell to download additional payloads.(Citation: ESET Exchange Mar 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Tonto Team has downloaded malicious DLLs which served as a
ShadowPad loader.(Citation: ESET Exchange Mar 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1574.001|DLL Search Order Hijacking|
Tonto Team abuses a legitimate and signed Microsoft executable to launch a malicious DLL.(Citation: ESET Exchange Mar 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment| | Tonto_Team.md |
9c86e2818661-2 | Tonto Team has delivered payloads via spearphishing attachments.(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution|
Tonto Team has exploited Microsoft vulnerabilities, including CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-8174, CVE-2018-0802, CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2019-9489 CVE-2020-8468, and CVE-2018-0798 to enable execution of their delivered malicious payloads.(Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020)(Citation: Talos Bisonal 10 Years March 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Tonto Team has relied on user interaction to open their malicious RTF documents.(Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020) | | Tonto_Team.md |
e08caf1f4de6-0 | Transparent Tribe - G0134
Created: 2021-09-02T15:14:33.738Z
Modified: 2022-09-22T20:27:21.053Z
Contributors: Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India,Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India,Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation
Aliases
Transparent Tribe,COPPER FIELDSTONE,APT36,Mythic Leopard,ProjectM
Description
Transparent Tribe is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)
Techniques Used
Transparent Tribe has used websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with
Crimson,
njRAT, and other malicious tools.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Office 365,SaaS,Google Workspace|T1566.002|Spearphishing Link|
Transparent Tribe has embedded links to malicious downloads in e-mails.(Citation: Talos Oblique RAT March 2021)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.001|Malicious Link|
Transparent Tribe has directed users to open URLs hosting malicious content.(Citation: Talos Oblique RAT March 2021)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1564.001|Hidden Files and Directories|
Transparent Tribe can hide legitimate directories and replace them with malicious copies of the same name.(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location| | Transparent_Tribe.md |
e08caf1f4de6-1 | Transparent Tribe can mimic legitimate Windows directories by using the same icons and names.(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1568|Dynamic Resolution|
Transparent Tribe has used dynamic DNS services to set up C2.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.005|Visual Basic|
Transparent Tribe has crafted VBS-based malicious documents.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.001|Domains|
Transparent Tribe has registered domains to mimic file sharing, government, defense, and research websites for use in targeted campaigns.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1584.001|Domains|
Transparent Tribe has compromised domains for use in targeted malicious campaigns.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1608.004|Drive-by Target|
Transparent Tribe has set up websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with
Crimson,
njRAT, and other malicious tools.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Transparent Tribe has sent spearphishing e-mails with attachments to deliver malicious payloads.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)(Citation: Talos Oblique RAT March 2021)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File| | Transparent_Tribe.md |
e08caf1f4de6-2 | Transparent Tribe has used weaponized documents in e-mail to compromise targeted systems.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)(Citation: Talos Oblique RAT March 2021)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)(Citation: Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution|
Transparent Tribe has crafted malicious files to exploit CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2010-3333 for execution.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Transparent Tribe has dropped encoded executables on compromised hosts.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)| | Transparent_Tribe.md |
17f30a764cdd-0 | Tropic Trooper - G0081
Created: 2019-01-29T20:17:48.717Z
Modified: 2021-04-26T14:15:15.610Z
Contributors: Edward Millington,Bart Parys
Aliases
Tropic Trooper,Pirate Panda,KeyBoy
Description
Tropic Trooper is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Tropic Trooper focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)
Techniques Used
Tropic Trooper has deleted dropper files on an infected system using command scripts.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1049|System Network Connections Discovery|
Tropic Trooper has tested if the localhost network is available and other connection capability on an infected system using command scripts.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1059.003|Windows Command Shell|
Tropic Trooper has used Windows command scripts.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1016|System Network Configuration Discovery|
Tropic Trooper has used scripts to collect the host's network topology.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Network|T1082|System Information Discovery|
Tropic Trooper has detected a target system’s OS version and system volume information.(Citation: TrendMicro TropicTrooper 2015)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,IaaS,SaaS|T1119|Automated Collection| | Tropic_Trooper.md |
17f30a764cdd-1 | Tropic Trooper has collected information automatically using the adversary's
USBferry attack.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1083|File and Directory Discovery|
Tropic Trooper has monitored files' modified time.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1052.001|Exfiltration over USB|
Tropic Trooper has exfiltrated data using USB storage devices.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1020|Automated Exfiltration|
Tropic Trooper has used a copy function to automatically exfiltrate sensitive data from air-gapped systems using USB storage.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1078.003|Local Accounts|
Tropic Trooper has used known administrator account credentials to execute the backdoor directly.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1036.005|Match Legitimate Name or Location|
Tropic Trooper has hidden payloads in Flash directories and fake installer files.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Azure AD,Office 365,SaaS,IaaS,Linux,macOS,Google Workspace|T1518|Software Discovery|
Tropic Trooper's backdoor could list the infected system's installed software.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.004|DNS| | Tropic_Trooper.md |
17f30a764cdd-2 | Tropic Trooper's backdoor has communicated to the C2 over the DNS protocol.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1573|Encrypted Channel|
Tropic Trooper has encrypted traffic with the C2 to prevent network detection.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1106|Native API|
Tropic Trooper has used multiple Windows APIs including HttpInitialize, HttpCreateHttpHandle, and HttpAddUrl.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS,Network|T1505.003|Web Shell|
Tropic Trooper has started a web service in the target host and wait for the adversary to connect, acting as a web shell.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1132.001|Standard Encoding|
Tropic Trooper has used base64 encoding to hide command strings delivered from the C2.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1091|Replication Through Removable Media|
Tropic Trooper has attempted to transfer
USBferry from an infected USB device by copying an Autorun function to the target machine.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1105|Ingress Tool Transfer|
Tropic Trooper has used a delivered trojan to download additional files.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027.003|Steganography|
Tropic Trooper has used JPG files with encrypted payloads to mask their backdoor routines and evade detection.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.001|Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder| | Tropic_Trooper.md |
17f30a764cdd-3 | Tropic Trooper has created shortcuts in the Startup folder to establish persistence.(Citation: Anomali Pirate Panda April 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.001|Web Protocols|
Tropic Trooper has used HTTP in communication with the C2.(Citation: Anomali Pirate Panda April 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1204.002|Malicious File|
Tropic Trooper has lured victims into executing malware via malicious e-mail attachments.(Citation: Anomali Pirate Panda April 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1543.003|Windows Service|
Tropic Trooper has installed a service pointing to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Network|T1033|System Owner/User Discovery|
Tropic Trooper used
Tropic Trooper used
Tropic Trooper used
Tropic Trooper has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools.(Citation: CitizenLab KeyBoy Nov 2016)(Citation: Anomali Pirate Panda April 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1203|Exploitation for Client Execution|
Tropic Trooper has executed commands through Microsoft security vulnerabilities, including CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2012-0158.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1055.001|Dynamic-link Library Injection| | Tropic_Trooper.md |
17f30a764cdd-4 | Tropic Trooper has injected a DLL backdoor into dllhost.exe and svchost.exe.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1027|Obfuscated Files or Information|
Tropic Trooper has encrypted configuration files.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1573.002|Asymmetric Cryptography|
Tropic Trooper has used SSL to connect to C2 servers.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|macOS,Windows,Linux|T1566.001|Spearphishing Attachment|
Tropic Trooper sent spearphishing emails that contained malicious Microsoft Office and fake installer file attachments.(Citation: Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016)(Citation: TrendMicro TropicTrooper 2015)(Citation: CitizenLab Tropic Trooper Aug 2018)(Citation: Anomali Pirate Panda April 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1564.001|Hidden Files and Directories|
Tropic Trooper has created a hidden directory under
Tropic Trooper delivered malicious documents with the XLSX extension, typically used by OpenXML documents, but the file itself was actually an OLE (XLS) document.(Citation: Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1140|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information|
Tropic Trooper used shellcode with an XOR algorithm to decrypt a payload. | Tropic_Trooper.md |
17f30a764cdd-5 | Tropic Trooper used shellcode with an XOR algorithm to decrypt a payload.
Tropic Trooper also decrypted image files which contained a payload.(Citation: Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1547.004|Winlogon Helper DLL|
Tropic Trooper has created the Registry key
Tropic Trooper is capable of enumerating the running processes on the system using
Tropic Trooper can search for anti-virus software running on the system.(Citation: Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016)| | Tropic_Trooper.md |
0ec9e27477c7-0 | Turla - G0010
Created: 2017-05-31T21:31:49.816Z
Modified: 2023-03-22T05:41:28.428Z
Contributors: Matthieu Faou, ESET,Edward Millington
Aliases
Turla,IRON HUNTER,Group 88,Belugasturgeon,Waterbug,WhiteBear,Snake,Krypton,Venomous Bear
Description
Turla is a Russian-based threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies since 2004. Heightened activity was seen in mid-2015. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns and leveraging in-house tools and malware. Turla’s espionage platform is mainly used against Windows machines, but has also been seen used against macOS and Linux machines.(Citation: Kaspersky Turla)(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)(Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018)
Techniques Used
Turla has modify Registry values to store payloads.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)(Citation: Symantec Waterbug Jun 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1090.001|Internal Proxy|
Turla has compromised internal network systems to act as a proxy to forward traffic to C2.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows|T1615|Group Policy Discovery|
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover Group Policy details using the
Turla has obtained and customized publicly-available tools like
Mimikatz.(Citation: Symantec Waterbug Jun 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.007|JavaScript| | Turla.md |
0ec9e27477c7-1 | Mimikatz.(Citation: Symantec Waterbug Jun 2019)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS,Linux|T1059.007|JavaScript|
Turla has used various JavaScript-based backdoors.(Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018) |
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,macOS|T1553.006|Code Signing Policy Modification|
Turla has modified variables in kernel memory to turn off Driver Signature Enforcement after exploiting vulnerabilities that obtained kernel mode privileges.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Windows,Linux,macOS|T1016.001|Internet Connection Discovery|
Turla has used
Turla has exploited vulnerabilities in the VBoxDrv.sys driver to obtain kernel mode privileges.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,Windows,macOS|T1059.006|Python|
Turla has used IronPython scripts as part of the
IronNetInjector toolchain to drop payloads.(Citation: Unit 42 IronNetInjector February 2021 )|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1071.003|Mail Protocols|
Turla has used multiple backdoors which communicate with a C2 server via email attachments.(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows,Containers|T1078.003|Local Accounts|
Turla has abused local accounts that have the same password across the victim’s network.(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|PRE|T1583.006|Web Services|
Turla has created web accounts including Dropbox and GitHub for C2 and document exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020)|
|mitre-attack|enterprise-attack|Linux,macOS,Windows|T1102|Web Service| | Turla.md |