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The attempt to create a public consciousness over disability within contemporary culture only serves to commodify and destroy the Other vampirically

The docile body, through simulacra, mutates the materiality of the body into iconography designed to enter and refuse entrance to a controlled system of embodiment inclusion that constitute contemporary quests for diversity reassert white-washed commodification of “The Other” Otherness is offered as a new delight, more intense, more satisfying than normal ways of doing and feeling race and ethnicity, within commodity culture, become the “spice that can liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture The kitsch aesthetic—though some disabled subjects may be “able” to manoeuvre passing—is exclusively an ableist aesthetic. This incorporates the disenfranchisement of racialized, sexualized, and less-moneyed Others due to their missing of corresponding cherished traits the emancipation of slaves was restricted to the liberation of able-bodied slaves disabled African Americans often remained chained to serving their white masters As an iconographic ideology of subjectivity “an inappropriate style obfuscates the content” “the a priori insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent is more than an attempt to rationalize political discourse; it stands as a condition of sincerity that restricts available forms of democratic action” In normate kitsch culture, coherence and competence are a matter of readability and simulacra an “inappropriate” (non-normative) style not only obfuscates the content, but is misunderstood as lack of content, void of sentience. The true function of kitsch is “to curtain off”, above all, the reality of “shit and death”— while simultaneously killing difference off In this politico-aesthetic stringency, any slight deviation is hyperbolized, monstrosized, and stigmatized. Yet mass normality thrusts hegemony into a realm of lacklustre predictability—a prosaic daze Entertainment and art are “outs” in which the real of human variation are spectacularized, fetishized, and freaked—and as such, presented as outside of human discourse. Othered bodies are adorned and gawked at Because there is no recognition, accountability, or justice connected to arts preoccupation of disability the value embedded in disability aesthetics is a decontextualized flirting with difference in the safe space of misty, unarticulated representation in order to abandon the encounter less bored. Disability aesthetics is yet another spice that seasons normate culture. Art is the kitschy way to encounter difference differences will be continually commodified and offered up as new dishes to enhance the white palate the Other will be eaten, consumed, and forgotten” disability is placed as an object of consumption, always and continually being eaten by the norm.

The body mutates materiality inclusion that constitute for diversity reassert white-washed commodification of “The Other”. Otherness is a new delight intense satisfying way of doing and feeling ethnicity, within commodity culture, become the “spice that can liven up the dull dish that is culture The kitsch aesthetic is an ableist aesthetic This incorporates the disenfranchisement of Others In normate culture competence are a matter of readability an “inappropriate” (non-normative) style obfuscates the content void of sentience The function of kitsch is “to curtain off”, the reality of “shit and death while simultaneously killing difference off any slight deviation is stigmatized Othered bodies are adorned and gawked at Because there is no recognition connected to arts preoccupation of disability the value embedded in disability is a decontextualized flirting with difference in the safe space of misty, unarticulated representation to abandon the encounter less bored. Disability aesthetics is a spice that seasons normate culture differences will be continually commodified and offered up as new dishes to enhance the white palate the Other will be eaten, consumed, and forgotten disability is placed as an object of consumption, always and continually being eaten by the norm.

The docile body, through simulacra, mutates the materiality of the body into iconography. It transforms the body into a coding process, designed to enter and refuse entrance to a meticulously controlled system of embodiment. Davide Panagia (2006) claims, “our understandings of political life are informed by our aesthetic sensibilities” (p. 2). The normative aesthetic of standardization acts as metaphor for ableist values and notions of what it means to be human. In the article “Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance”, bell hooks (1992) critiques how the modes of inclusion that constitute contemporary quests for diversity reassert an ahistorical account of white-washed commodification of “The Other”. hooks argues: “The commodification of Otherness has been so successful because it is offered as a new delight, more intense, more satisfying than normal ways of doing and feeling” (1992, p. 21). She goes on to explain how race and ethnicity, within commodity culture, become the “spice, seasoning that can liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture” (1992, p. 21). hooks’s notion of delight and satisfaction found in racial Otherness articulates how the design of normate commodity culture is built around the mass production of “familiarity”, in which the docile body mushrooms into the realm of omnipresence. The normalization of contemporary culture inverts democratic citizenship to simulacratic citizenship, reduces the phenomenology of existence, and shrinks modes of doing and feeling into the sum total of replication (of ableist embodiment) and consumption (of internalizing, purchasing, and enforcing ableist embodiment). [Continues] There are many forms of disability that inhibit the ability to enact the compulsory embodiment of normate kitsch scripture. The kitsch aesthetic—though some disabled subjects may be “able” to manoeuvre passing—is exclusively an ableist aesthetic. This incorporates the disenfranchisement of racialized, sexualized, and less-moneyed Others due to their missing of corresponding cherished traits. For example, in climates where whiteness is considered an essential trait, people of colour will be framed as deficient; in climates where heterosexuality is perceived as an essential trait, queer people will be contextualized under the rubric of impairment; in a capitalistic culture that valorizes economic competitiveness, having low income or not engaging in the paid economy will be constructed as blemished. Jim Downs (2008) provides a poignant example of kitsch as an exclusively ableist form of cultural mobility when he explicates the ways in which the emancipation of slaves was restricted to the liberation of able-bodied slaves. While able-bodied people of colour were able to physically leave the plantation and join the workforce, disabled African Americans who were physically unable to exit the plantation, and were unaccounted for in the paid workforce, often remained chained to their previous duties of serving their white masters. Thus, what is known as the end of slavery was, more specifically, the end of slavery for able-bodied people of colour. Tamar Mayer (2000) discusses the Zionist invention of “The Muscle Jew” as born out of the need to “free the Jews of Europe from their constant battles with anti-Semitism” by constructing a hyper-able-bodied soldier, with the body of a gymnast, as the New Jew. Nordau, one of the leaders of Zionism, claimed that “ghetto Jews”, with their “limp” and “frail” bodies and relationship to intellectualism and the arts, likened them to “degenerates” (2000, p. 286–287). In so doing, Nordau, along with other Zionists, conceptualized the emancipation from anti-Semitism as possible by escaping comparability with degeneracy through the brute force of able-bodied kitsch embodiment, which was simultaneously utilized as the basis and symbol for the Jewish nation-state. Accordingly, able-bodiedness sometimes conceptually or materially ameliorates the level of disenfranchisement an individual will endure. The end of slavery, along with the Muscle Jew, is indicative of the divergent ways in which the prioritization of the body as machinery of power has been expressed when considering intersectional identities, oppression, and emancipation. As an iconographic ideology of subjectivity, embodied normality does not just encapsulate the physical appearance of the body as machinery of power, but also the meticulous control of the machine as a whole. The objective of Davide Panagia’s (2006) text, “A Poetics of Political Thinking”, is to be “attuned to the normative dimensions of the technologies of evaluation …of competence that govern political participation” (p. 9). Within normative modes of ethical political thought, Panagia explains how “an inappropriate style obfuscates the content” (2006, p. 11). He continues, arguing “the a priori insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent is more than an attempt to rationalize political discourse; it stands as a condition of sincerity that restricts available forms of democratic action” (2006, p. 17). The insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent depends on the a priori assumption that coherence is a definable, knowable phenomenon. But the only way in which coherence can be seamlessly identified and enforced is through the regulation of a particular style, that is, through the process of replication and standardization, deemed appropriate. Accordingly, “the kind of language we use, its tone, cadence, and appearance–carry ethical weight in that they count as systems of control that qualify access to the institutions of power in our political systems” (Panagia, 2006, p. 9). In the milieu of normate kitsch culture, coherence and competence are a matter of readability and simulacra. Embodiments that deviate from the hyper-real presence of docile subjectivity are thus perceived as a severe and rare mutation from the dominance of the norm, interpreted as incoherent, chaotic, and faulty. An example of this is the story of a quadriplegic women, Ruth, who communicated by smiling, frowning, making vocalizations, and facial expressions (Stefans, 1993). Once her parents became elderly, Ruth was sent to an institution in which she was labelled “imbecile” and treated as if she was not sentient. It was through forming bonds with other residents that Ruth began to communicate again with others. The staff did not notice Ruth communicating because “she had been presented to them as an imbecile” (Stefans, 1993, p. 1). Once, by sheer chance, two attendants in the room noticed Ruth communicating. It was from this that Ruth was given a communication board. Now Ruth has started a family and is writing her memoirs. In “A Voice Unheard: The Latimer Case and People with Disabilities”, Ruth Enns (1999) discusses how Laura and Robert Latimer turned down a recommended surgery for their daughter, Tracy, on the basis that it would result in her being “mutilated” (p. 3). In court, after Tracy’s murder, Enns argues that the defence’s description of Tracy’s never-to-be surgery was, “grotesquely dehumanizing: ‘in effect sawing off the leg but cosmetically leaving it dangling there’” (1999, p. 12). Enns argues that this articulation framed Tracy in such a way that her “leg would not have been a part of her body, as though she had been a collection of defective body parts and the surgery would have rendered her life even less valuable than before” (1999, p. 12). In the second trial, the defence added that her leg would be “flailing around there” and “flopping” (1999, p. 12). Robert Latimer, on the other hand, was constructed as benevolent in murdering his daughter, his motives were “normal human instinct…the only reasonable course” (1999, p. 12). The experiences of Ruth and Tracy articulate the ways in which an “inappropriate” (non-normative) style—whether linguistic and/or physical—not only obfuscates the content, but is misunderstood as lack of content, void of sentience. The true function of kitsch is “to curtain off”, above all, the reality of “shit and death”— while simultaneously killing difference off (Foster, 2005, p. 29). In this milieu of politico-aesthetic stringency, any slight deviation from the perceived norm is hyperbolized, monstrosized, and stigmatized. Yet inevitably, the tight rigidity of mass normality thrusts hegemony into a realm of lacklustre predictability—a prosaic daze, in which it becomes more and more difficult to feel. Thus, subjects who fall under the rubric of normality may feel burdened by the banality of their object of mimicry and consumption, and thus learn to manage and internalize the weight of obligation involved in adhering to kitsch. Because kitschy cuisine cannot satisfy the complexities and various longings of the human appetite for existence, racialized and disabled Others have been the spice and the seasoning that liven up the dull dish of white-washed, ableist predictability. Portholes of temporary escapism and release become a necessary fixture within the construct of normate culture. The effect of “consumer cannibalism” not only “displaces the Other but denies the significance of that Other’s history through a process of decontextualization” (hooks, 1992, p. 31). Entertainment and art are “outs” in which the real and commonness of human variation are spectacularized, fetishized, and freaked—and as such, presented as outside of human discourse. Othered bodies are simultaneously adorned and gawked at through the voyeuristic gaze of the various and versatile, high and low, cultural texts of the secularized arts. As hooks claims, “fantasies about the Other can be continually exploited…such exploitation will occur in a manner that re-inscribes and maintains the status quo” (1992, p. 22). Because there is no recognition, accountability, or justice connected to arts preoccupation and favouring of disability as its primary aesthetic, the value embedded in disability aesthetics is a decontextualized flirting with difference in the safe space of misty, unarticulated representation in order to abandon the encounter less bored. Disability aesthetics is yet another spice that seasons normate culture. Art is the kitschy way to encounter difference. hooks’s greatest fear is that “cultural, ethnic, and racial differences will be continually commodified and offered up as new dishes to enhance the white palate—that the Other will be eaten, consumed, and forgotten” (1992, p. 39). I share her alarm as it is presented with disability aesthetics, in which disability is placed as an object of consumption, always and continually being eaten by the norm.

<h4><strong>The attempt to create a public consciousness over disability within contemporary culture only serves to commodify and destroy the Other vampirically</h4><p></strong>Julia Frances Gruson-<strong>Wood ‘09<u>. “Aleism Kitsch: The Aesthetics of Disability-Related Ethics.” Critical Disability Discourse, 1 (2009).</p><p><mark>The</mark> docile <mark>body</mark>, through simulacra, <mark>mutates</mark> the <mark>materiality</mark> of the body into iconography</u></strong>. It transforms the body into a coding process, <u><strong>designed to enter and refuse entrance to a</u></strong> meticulously <u><strong>controlled system of embodiment</u></strong>. Davide Panagia (2006) claims, “our understandings of political life are informed by our aesthetic sensibilities” (p. 2). The normative aesthetic of standardization acts as metaphor for ableist values and notions of what it means to be human. In the article “Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance”, bell hooks (1992) critiques how the modes of <u><strong><mark>inclusion that constitute</mark> contemporary quests <mark>for diversity reassert</u></strong></mark> an ahistorical account of <u><strong><mark>white-washed commodification of “The Other”</u></strong>.</mark> hooks argues: “The commodification of <u><strong><mark>Otherness</u></strong></mark> has been so successful because it <u><strong><mark>is</mark> offered as <mark>a new delight</mark>, more <mark>intense</mark>, more <mark>satisfying</mark> than normal <mark>way</mark>s <mark>of doing and feeling</u></strong></mark>” (1992, p. 21). She goes on to explain how <u><strong>race and <mark>ethnicity, within commodity culture, become the “spice</u></strong></mark>, seasoning <u><strong><mark>that can liven up the dull dish that is</mark> mainstream white <mark>culture</u></strong></mark>” (1992, p. 21). hooks’s notion of delight and satisfaction found in racial Otherness articulates how the design of normate commodity culture is built around the mass production of “familiarity”, in which the docile body mushrooms into the realm of omnipresence. The normalization of contemporary culture inverts democratic citizenship to simulacratic citizenship, reduces the phenomenology of existence, and shrinks modes of doing and feeling into the sum total of replication (of ableist embodiment) and consumption (of internalizing, purchasing, and enforcing ableist embodiment). [Continues] There are many forms of disability that inhibit the ability to enact the compulsory embodiment of normate kitsch scripture. <u><strong><mark>The kitsch aesthetic</mark>—though some disabled subjects may be “able” to manoeuvre passing—<mark>is</mark> exclusively <mark>an ableist aesthetic</mark>. <mark>This incorporates the disenfranchisement of</mark> racialized, sexualized, and less-moneyed <mark>Others</mark> due to their missing of corresponding cherished traits</u></strong>. For example, in climates where whiteness is considered an essential trait, people of colour will be framed as deficient; in climates where heterosexuality is perceived as an essential trait, queer people will be contextualized under the rubric of impairment; in a capitalistic culture that valorizes economic competitiveness, having low income or not engaging in the paid economy will be constructed as blemished. Jim Downs (2008) provides a poignant example of kitsch as an exclusively ableist form of cultural mobility when he explicates the ways in which <u><strong>the emancipation of slaves was restricted to the liberation of able-bodied slaves</u></strong>. While able-bodied people of colour were able to physically leave the plantation and join the workforce, <u><strong>disabled African Americans</u></strong> who were physically unable to exit the plantation, and were unaccounted for in the paid workforce, <u><strong>often remained chained to</u></strong> their previous duties of <u><strong>serving their white masters</u></strong>. Thus, what is known as the end of slavery was, more specifically, the end of slavery for able-bodied people of colour. Tamar Mayer (2000) discusses the Zionist invention of “The Muscle Jew” as born out of the need to “free the Jews of Europe from their constant battles with anti-Semitism” by constructing a hyper-able-bodied soldier, with the body of a gymnast, as the New Jew. Nordau, one of the leaders of Zionism, claimed that “ghetto Jews”, with their “limp” and “frail” bodies and relationship to intellectualism and the arts, likened them to “degenerates” (2000, p. 286–287). In so doing, Nordau, along with other Zionists, conceptualized the emancipation from anti-Semitism as possible by escaping comparability with degeneracy through the brute force of able-bodied kitsch embodiment, which was simultaneously utilized as the basis and symbol for the Jewish nation-state. Accordingly, able-bodiedness sometimes conceptually or materially ameliorates the level of disenfranchisement an individual will endure. The end of slavery, along with the Muscle Jew, is indicative of the divergent ways in which the prioritization of the body as machinery of power has been expressed when considering intersectional identities, oppression, and emancipation. <u><strong>As an iconographic ideology of subjectivity</u></strong>, embodied normality does not just encapsulate the physical appearance of the body as machinery of power, but also the meticulous control of the machine as a whole. The objective of Davide Panagia’s (2006) text, “A Poetics of Political Thinking”, is to be “attuned to the normative dimensions of the technologies of evaluation …of competence that govern political participation” (p. 9). Within normative modes of ethical political thought, Panagia explains how <u><strong>“an inappropriate style obfuscates the content”</u></strong> (2006, p. 11). He continues, arguing <u><strong>“the a priori insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent is more than an attempt to rationalize political discourse; it stands as a condition of sincerity that restricts available forms of democratic action”</u></strong> (2006, p. 17). The insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent depends on the a priori assumption that coherence is a definable, knowable phenomenon. But the only way in which coherence can be seamlessly identified and enforced is through the regulation of a particular style, that is, through the process of replication and standardization, deemed appropriate. Accordingly, “the kind of language we use, its tone, cadence, and appearance–carry ethical weight in that they count as systems of control that qualify access to the institutions of power in our political systems” (Panagia, 2006, p. 9). <u><strong><mark>In</u></strong></mark> the milieu of <u><strong><mark>normate</mark> kitsch <mark>culture</mark>, coherence and <mark>competence are a matter of readability</mark> and simulacra</u></strong>. Embodiments that deviate from the hyper-real presence of docile subjectivity are thus perceived as a severe and rare mutation from the dominance of the norm, interpreted as incoherent, chaotic, and faulty. An example of this is the story of a quadriplegic women, Ruth, who communicated by smiling, frowning, making vocalizations, and facial expressions (Stefans, 1993). Once her parents became elderly, Ruth was sent to an institution in which she was labelled “imbecile” and treated as if she was not sentient. It was through forming bonds with other residents that Ruth began to communicate again with others. The staff did not notice Ruth communicating because “she had been presented to them as an imbecile” (Stefans, 1993, p. 1). Once, by sheer chance, two attendants in the room noticed Ruth communicating. It was from this that Ruth was given a communication board. Now Ruth has started a family and is writing her memoirs. In “A Voice Unheard: The Latimer Case and People with Disabilities”, Ruth Enns (1999) discusses how Laura and Robert Latimer turned down a recommended surgery for their daughter, Tracy, on the basis that it would result in her being “mutilated” (p. 3). In court, after Tracy’s murder, Enns argues that the defence’s description of Tracy’s never-to-be surgery was, “grotesquely dehumanizing: ‘in effect sawing off the leg but cosmetically leaving it dangling there’” (1999, p. 12). Enns argues that this articulation framed Tracy in such a way that her “leg would not have been a part of her body, as though she had been a collection of defective body parts and the surgery would have rendered her life even less valuable than before” (1999, p. 12). In the second trial, the defence added that her leg would be “flailing around there” and “flopping” (1999, p. 12). Robert Latimer, on the other hand, was constructed as benevolent in murdering his daughter, his motives were “normal human instinct…the only reasonable course” (1999, p. 12). The experiences of Ruth and Tracy articulate the ways in which <u><strong><mark>an “inappropriate” (non-normative) style</u></strong></mark>—whether linguistic and/or physical—<u><strong>not only <mark>obfuscates the content</mark>, but is misunderstood as lack of content, <mark>void of sentience</mark>. <mark>The</mark> true <mark>function of kitsch is “to curtain off”,</mark> above all, <mark>the reality of “shit and death</mark>”— <mark>while simultaneously killing difference off</u></strong></mark> (Foster, 2005, p. 29). <u><strong>In this</u></strong> milieu of <u><strong>politico-aesthetic stringency, <mark>any slight deviation</u></strong></mark> from the perceived norm <u><strong><mark>is</mark> hyperbolized, monstrosized, and <mark>stigmatized</mark>. Yet</u></strong> inevitably, the tight rigidity of <u><strong>mass normality thrusts hegemony into a realm of lacklustre predictability—a prosaic daze</u></strong>, in which it becomes more and more difficult to feel. Thus, subjects who fall under the rubric of normality may feel burdened by the banality of their object of mimicry and consumption, and thus learn to manage and internalize the weight of obligation involved in adhering to kitsch. Because kitschy cuisine cannot satisfy the complexities and various longings of the human appetite for existence, racialized and disabled Others have been the spice and the seasoning that liven up the dull dish of white-washed, ableist predictability. Portholes of temporary escapism and release become a necessary fixture within the construct of normate culture. The effect of “consumer cannibalism” not only “displaces the Other but denies the significance of that Other’s history through a process of decontextualization” (hooks, 1992, p. 31). <u><strong>Entertainment and art are “outs” in which the real</u></strong> and commonness <u><strong>of human variation are spectacularized, fetishized, and freaked—and as such, presented as outside of human discourse. <mark>Othered bodies are</u></strong></mark> simultaneously <u><strong><mark>adorned and gawked at</u></strong></mark> through the voyeuristic gaze of the various and versatile, high and low, cultural texts of the secularized arts. As hooks claims, “fantasies about the Other can be continually exploited…such exploitation will occur in a manner that re-inscribes and maintains the status quo” (1992, p. 22). <u><strong><mark>Because there is no recognition</mark>, accountability, or justice <mark>connected to arts preoccupation</u></strong></mark> and favouring <u><strong><mark>of disability</u></strong></mark> as its primary aesthetic, <u><strong><mark>the value embedded in disability</mark> aesthetics <mark>is a decontextualized flirting with difference in the safe space of misty, unarticulated representation </mark>in order <mark>to abandon the encounter less bored. Disability aesthetics is </mark>yet <mark>a</mark>nother <mark>spice that seasons normate culture</mark>. Art is the kitschy way to encounter difference</u></strong>. hooks’s greatest fear is that “cultural, ethnic, and racial <u><strong><mark>differences will be continually commodified and offered up as new dishes to enhance the white palate</u></strong></mark>—that <u><strong><mark>the Other will be eaten, consumed, and forgotten</mark>”</u></strong> (1992, p. 39). I share her alarm as it is presented with disability aesthetics, in which <u><strong><mark>disability is placed as an object of consumption, always and continually being eaten by the norm.</p></u></strong></mark>

Julia Frances Gruson-Wood ‘09. “Aleism Kitsch: The Aesthetics of Disability-Related Ethics.” Critical Disability Discourse, 1 (2009).

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Julia Frances Gruson-Wood ‘09. “Aleism Kitsch: The Aesthetics of Disability-Related Ethics.” Critical Disability Discourse, 1 (2009). fulltext: The docile body, through simulacra, mutates the materiality of the body into iconography. It transforms the body into a coding process, designed to enter and refuse entrance to a meticulously controlled system of embodiment. Davide Panagia (2006) claims, “our understandings of political life are informed by our aesthetic sensibilities” (p. 2). The normative aesthetic of standardization acts as metaphor for ableist values and notions of what it means to be human. In the article “Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance”, bell hooks (1992) critiques how the modes of inclusion that constitute contemporary quests for diversity reassert an ahistorical account of white-washed commodification of “The Other”. hooks argues: “The commodification of Otherness has been so successful because it is offered as a new delight, more intense, more satisfying than normal ways of doing and feeling” (1992, p. 21). She goes on to explain how race and ethnicity, within commodity culture, become the “spice, seasoning that can liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture” (1992, p. 21). hooks’s notion of delight and satisfaction found in racial Otherness articulates how the design of normate commodity culture is built around the mass production of “familiarity”, in which the docile body mushrooms into the realm of omnipresence. The normalization of contemporary culture inverts democratic citizenship to simulacratic citizenship, reduces the phenomenology of existence, and shrinks modes of doing and feeling into the sum total of replication (of ableist embodiment) and consumption (of internalizing, purchasing, and enforcing ableist embodiment). [Continues] There are many forms of disability that inhibit the ability to enact the compulsory embodiment of normate kitsch scripture. The kitsch aesthetic—though some disabled subjects may be “able” to manoeuvre passing—is exclusively an ableist aesthetic. This incorporates the disenfranchisement of racialized, sexualized, and less-moneyed Others due to their missing of corresponding cherished traits. For example, in climates where whiteness is considered an essential trait, people of colour will be framed as deficient; in climates where heterosexuality is perceived as an essential trait, queer people will be contextualized under the rubric of impairment; in a capitalistic culture that valorizes economic competitiveness, having low income or not engaging in the paid economy will be constructed as blemished. Jim Downs (2008) provides a poignant example of kitsch as an exclusively ableist form of cultural mobility when he explicates the ways in which the emancipation of slaves was restricted to the liberation of able-bodied slaves. While able-bodied people of colour were able to physically leave the plantation and join the workforce, disabled African Americans who were physically unable to exit the plantation, and were unaccounted for in the paid workforce, often remained chained to their previous duties of serving their white masters. Thus, what is known as the end of slavery was, more specifically, the end of slavery for able-bodied people of colour. Tamar Mayer (2000) discusses the Zionist invention of “The Muscle Jew” as born out of the need to “free the Jews of Europe from their constant battles with anti-Semitism” by constructing a hyper-able-bodied soldier, with the body of a gymnast, as the New Jew. Nordau, one of the leaders of Zionism, claimed that “ghetto Jews”, with their “limp” and “frail” bodies and relationship to intellectualism and the arts, likened them to “degenerates” (2000, p. 286–287). In so doing, Nordau, along with other Zionists, conceptualized the emancipation from anti-Semitism as possible by escaping comparability with degeneracy through the brute force of able-bodied kitsch embodiment, which was simultaneously utilized as the basis and symbol for the Jewish nation-state. Accordingly, able-bodiedness sometimes conceptually or materially ameliorates the level of disenfranchisement an individual will endure. The end of slavery, along with the Muscle Jew, is indicative of the divergent ways in which the prioritization of the body as machinery of power has been expressed when considering intersectional identities, oppression, and emancipation. As an iconographic ideology of subjectivity, embodied normality does not just encapsulate the physical appearance of the body as machinery of power, but also the meticulous control of the machine as a whole. The objective of Davide Panagia’s (2006) text, “A Poetics of Political Thinking”, is to be “attuned to the normative dimensions of the technologies of evaluation …of competence that govern political participation” (p. 9). Within normative modes of ethical political thought, Panagia explains how “an inappropriate style obfuscates the content” (2006, p. 11). He continues, arguing “the a priori insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent is more than an attempt to rationalize political discourse; it stands as a condition of sincerity that restricts available forms of democratic action” (2006, p. 17). The insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent depends on the a priori assumption that coherence is a definable, knowable phenomenon. But the only way in which coherence can be seamlessly identified and enforced is through the regulation of a particular style, that is, through the process of replication and standardization, deemed appropriate. Accordingly, “the kind of language we use, its tone, cadence, and appearance–carry ethical weight in that they count as systems of control that qualify access to the institutions of power in our political systems” (Panagia, 2006, p. 9). In the milieu of normate kitsch culture, coherence and competence are a matter of readability and simulacra. Embodiments that deviate from the hyper-real presence of docile subjectivity are thus perceived as a severe and rare mutation from the dominance of the norm, interpreted as incoherent, chaotic, and faulty. An example of this is the story of a quadriplegic women, Ruth, who communicated by smiling, frowning, making vocalizations, and facial expressions (Stefans, 1993). Once her parents became elderly, Ruth was sent to an institution in which she was labelled “imbecile” and treated as if she was not sentient. It was through forming bonds with other residents that Ruth began to communicate again with others. The staff did not notice Ruth communicating because “she had been presented to them as an imbecile” (Stefans, 1993, p. 1). Once, by sheer chance, two attendants in the room noticed Ruth communicating. It was from this that Ruth was given a communication board. Now Ruth has started a family and is writing her memoirs. In “A Voice Unheard: The Latimer Case and People with Disabilities”, Ruth Enns (1999) discusses how Laura and Robert Latimer turned down a recommended surgery for their daughter, Tracy, on the basis that it would result in her being “mutilated” (p. 3). In court, after Tracy’s murder, Enns argues that the defence’s description of Tracy’s never-to-be surgery was, “grotesquely dehumanizing: ‘in effect sawing off the leg but cosmetically leaving it dangling there’” (1999, p. 12). Enns argues that this articulation framed Tracy in such a way that her “leg would not have been a part of her body, as though she had been a collection of defective body parts and the surgery would have rendered her life even less valuable than before” (1999, p. 12). In the second trial, the defence added that her leg would be “flailing around there” and “flopping” (1999, p. 12). Robert Latimer, on the other hand, was constructed as benevolent in murdering his daughter, his motives were “normal human instinct…the only reasonable course” (1999, p. 12). The experiences of Ruth and Tracy articulate the ways in which an “inappropriate” (non-normative) style—whether linguistic and/or physical—not only obfuscates the content, but is misunderstood as lack of content, void of sentience. The true function of kitsch is “to curtain off”, above all, the reality of “shit and death”— while simultaneously killing difference off (Foster, 2005, p. 29). In this milieu of politico-aesthetic stringency, any slight deviation from the perceived norm is hyperbolized, monstrosized, and stigmatized. Yet inevitably, the tight rigidity of mass normality thrusts hegemony into a realm of lacklustre predictability—a prosaic daze, in which it becomes more and more difficult to feel. Thus, subjects who fall under the rubric of normality may feel burdened by the banality of their object of mimicry and consumption, and thus learn to manage and internalize the weight of obligation involved in adhering to kitsch. Because kitschy cuisine cannot satisfy the complexities and various longings of the human appetite for existence, racialized and disabled Others have been the spice and the seasoning that liven up the dull dish of white-washed, ableist predictability. Portholes of temporary escapism and release become a necessary fixture within the construct of normate culture. The effect of “consumer cannibalism” not only “displaces the Other but denies the significance of that Other’s history through a process of decontextualization” (hooks, 1992, p. 31). Entertainment and art are “outs” in which the real and commonness of human variation are spectacularized, fetishized, and freaked—and as such, presented as outside of human discourse. Othered bodies are simultaneously adorned and gawked at through the voyeuristic gaze of the various and versatile, high and low, cultural texts of the secularized arts. As hooks claims, “fantasies about the Other can be continually exploited…such exploitation will occur in a manner that re-inscribes and maintains the status quo” (1992, p. 22). Because there is no recognition, accountability, or justice connected to arts preoccupation and favouring of disability as its primary aesthetic, the value embedded in disability aesthetics is a decontextualized flirting with difference in the safe space of misty, unarticulated representation in order to abandon the encounter less bored. Disability aesthetics is yet another spice that seasons normate culture. Art is the kitschy way to encounter difference. hooks’s greatest fear is that “cultural, ethnic, and racial differences will be continually commodified and offered up as new dishes to enhance the white palate—that the Other will be eaten, consumed, and forgotten” (1992, p. 39). I share her alarm as it is presented with disability aesthetics, in which disability is placed as an object of consumption, always and continually being eaten by the norm. [/INST] <h4><strong>The attempt to create a public consciousness over disability within contemporary culture only serves to commodify and destroy the Other vampirically</h4><p></strong>Julia Frances Gruson-<strong>Wood ‘09<u>. “Aleism Kitsch: The Aesthetics of Disability-Related Ethics.” Critical Disability Discourse, 1 (2009).</p><p><mark>The</mark> docile <mark>body</mark>, through simulacra, <mark>mutates</mark> the <mark>materiality</mark> of the body into iconography</u></strong>. It transforms the body into a coding process, <u><strong>designed to enter and refuse entrance to a</u></strong> meticulously <u><strong>controlled system of embodiment</u></strong>. Davide Panagia (2006) claims, “our understandings of political life are informed by our aesthetic sensibilities” (p. 2). The normative aesthetic of standardization acts as metaphor for ableist values and notions of what it means to be human. In the article “Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance”, bell hooks (1992) critiques how the modes of <u><strong><mark>inclusion that constitute</mark> contemporary quests <mark>for diversity reassert</u></strong></mark> an ahistorical account of <u><strong><mark>white-washed commodification of “The Other”</u></strong>.</mark> hooks argues: “The commodification of <u><strong><mark>Otherness</u></strong></mark> has been so successful because it <u><strong><mark>is</mark> offered as <mark>a new delight</mark>, more <mark>intense</mark>, more <mark>satisfying</mark> than normal <mark>way</mark>s <mark>of doing and feeling</u></strong></mark>” (1992, p. 21). She goes on to explain how <u><strong>race and <mark>ethnicity, within commodity culture, become the “spice</u></strong></mark>, seasoning <u><strong><mark>that can liven up the dull dish that is</mark> mainstream white <mark>culture</u></strong></mark>” (1992, p. 21). hooks’s notion of delight and satisfaction found in racial Otherness articulates how the design of normate commodity culture is built around the mass production of “familiarity”, in which the docile body mushrooms into the realm of omnipresence. The normalization of contemporary culture inverts democratic citizenship to simulacratic citizenship, reduces the phenomenology of existence, and shrinks modes of doing and feeling into the sum total of replication (of ableist embodiment) and consumption (of internalizing, purchasing, and enforcing ableist embodiment). [Continues] There are many forms of disability that inhibit the ability to enact the compulsory embodiment of normate kitsch scripture. <u><strong><mark>The kitsch aesthetic</mark>—though some disabled subjects may be “able” to manoeuvre passing—<mark>is</mark> exclusively <mark>an ableist aesthetic</mark>. <mark>This incorporates the disenfranchisement of</mark> racialized, sexualized, and less-moneyed <mark>Others</mark> due to their missing of corresponding cherished traits</u></strong>. For example, in climates where whiteness is considered an essential trait, people of colour will be framed as deficient; in climates where heterosexuality is perceived as an essential trait, queer people will be contextualized under the rubric of impairment; in a capitalistic culture that valorizes economic competitiveness, having low income or not engaging in the paid economy will be constructed as blemished. Jim Downs (2008) provides a poignant example of kitsch as an exclusively ableist form of cultural mobility when he explicates the ways in which <u><strong>the emancipation of slaves was restricted to the liberation of able-bodied slaves</u></strong>. While able-bodied people of colour were able to physically leave the plantation and join the workforce, <u><strong>disabled African Americans</u></strong> who were physically unable to exit the plantation, and were unaccounted for in the paid workforce, <u><strong>often remained chained to</u></strong> their previous duties of <u><strong>serving their white masters</u></strong>. Thus, what is known as the end of slavery was, more specifically, the end of slavery for able-bodied people of colour. Tamar Mayer (2000) discusses the Zionist invention of “The Muscle Jew” as born out of the need to “free the Jews of Europe from their constant battles with anti-Semitism” by constructing a hyper-able-bodied soldier, with the body of a gymnast, as the New Jew. Nordau, one of the leaders of Zionism, claimed that “ghetto Jews”, with their “limp” and “frail” bodies and relationship to intellectualism and the arts, likened them to “degenerates” (2000, p. 286–287). In so doing, Nordau, along with other Zionists, conceptualized the emancipation from anti-Semitism as possible by escaping comparability with degeneracy through the brute force of able-bodied kitsch embodiment, which was simultaneously utilized as the basis and symbol for the Jewish nation-state. Accordingly, able-bodiedness sometimes conceptually or materially ameliorates the level of disenfranchisement an individual will endure. The end of slavery, along with the Muscle Jew, is indicative of the divergent ways in which the prioritization of the body as machinery of power has been expressed when considering intersectional identities, oppression, and emancipation. <u><strong>As an iconographic ideology of subjectivity</u></strong>, embodied normality does not just encapsulate the physical appearance of the body as machinery of power, but also the meticulous control of the machine as a whole. The objective of Davide Panagia’s (2006) text, “A Poetics of Political Thinking”, is to be “attuned to the normative dimensions of the technologies of evaluation …of competence that govern political participation” (p. 9). Within normative modes of ethical political thought, Panagia explains how <u><strong>“an inappropriate style obfuscates the content”</u></strong> (2006, p. 11). He continues, arguing <u><strong>“the a priori insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent is more than an attempt to rationalize political discourse; it stands as a condition of sincerity that restricts available forms of democratic action”</u></strong> (2006, p. 17). The insistence that one’s utterances always be coherent depends on the a priori assumption that coherence is a definable, knowable phenomenon. But the only way in which coherence can be seamlessly identified and enforced is through the regulation of a particular style, that is, through the process of replication and standardization, deemed appropriate. Accordingly, “the kind of language we use, its tone, cadence, and appearance–carry ethical weight in that they count as systems of control that qualify access to the institutions of power in our political systems” (Panagia, 2006, p. 9). <u><strong><mark>In</u></strong></mark> the milieu of <u><strong><mark>normate</mark> kitsch <mark>culture</mark>, coherence and <mark>competence are a matter of readability</mark> and simulacra</u></strong>. Embodiments that deviate from the hyper-real presence of docile subjectivity are thus perceived as a severe and rare mutation from the dominance of the norm, interpreted as incoherent, chaotic, and faulty. An example of this is the story of a quadriplegic women, Ruth, who communicated by smiling, frowning, making vocalizations, and facial expressions (Stefans, 1993). Once her parents became elderly, Ruth was sent to an institution in which she was labelled “imbecile” and treated as if she was not sentient. It was through forming bonds with other residents that Ruth began to communicate again with others. The staff did not notice Ruth communicating because “she had been presented to them as an imbecile” (Stefans, 1993, p. 1). Once, by sheer chance, two attendants in the room noticed Ruth communicating. It was from this that Ruth was given a communication board. Now Ruth has started a family and is writing her memoirs. In “A Voice Unheard: The Latimer Case and People with Disabilities”, Ruth Enns (1999) discusses how Laura and Robert Latimer turned down a recommended surgery for their daughter, Tracy, on the basis that it would result in her being “mutilated” (p. 3). In court, after Tracy’s murder, Enns argues that the defence’s description of Tracy’s never-to-be surgery was, “grotesquely dehumanizing: ‘in effect sawing off the leg but cosmetically leaving it dangling there’” (1999, p. 12). Enns argues that this articulation framed Tracy in such a way that her “leg would not have been a part of her body, as though she had been a collection of defective body parts and the surgery would have rendered her life even less valuable than before” (1999, p. 12). In the second trial, the defence added that her leg would be “flailing around there” and “flopping” (1999, p. 12). Robert Latimer, on the other hand, was constructed as benevolent in murdering his daughter, his motives were “normal human instinct…the only reasonable course” (1999, p. 12). The experiences of Ruth and Tracy articulate the ways in which <u><strong><mark>an “inappropriate” (non-normative) style</u></strong></mark>—whether linguistic and/or physical—<u><strong>not only <mark>obfuscates the content</mark>, but is misunderstood as lack of content, <mark>void of sentience</mark>. <mark>The</mark> true <mark>function of kitsch is “to curtain off”,</mark> above all, <mark>the reality of “shit and death</mark>”— <mark>while simultaneously killing difference off</u></strong></mark> (Foster, 2005, p. 29). <u><strong>In this</u></strong> milieu of <u><strong>politico-aesthetic stringency, <mark>any slight deviation</u></strong></mark> from the perceived norm <u><strong><mark>is</mark> hyperbolized, monstrosized, and <mark>stigmatized</mark>. Yet</u></strong> inevitably, the tight rigidity of <u><strong>mass normality thrusts hegemony into a realm of lacklustre predictability—a prosaic daze</u></strong>, in which it becomes more and more difficult to feel. Thus, subjects who fall under the rubric of normality may feel burdened by the banality of their object of mimicry and consumption, and thus learn to manage and internalize the weight of obligation involved in adhering to kitsch. Because kitschy cuisine cannot satisfy the complexities and various longings of the human appetite for existence, racialized and disabled Others have been the spice and the seasoning that liven up the dull dish of white-washed, ableist predictability. Portholes of temporary escapism and release become a necessary fixture within the construct of normate culture. The effect of “consumer cannibalism” not only “displaces the Other but denies the significance of that Other’s history through a process of decontextualization” (hooks, 1992, p. 31). <u><strong>Entertainment and art are “outs” in which the real</u></strong> and commonness <u><strong>of human variation are spectacularized, fetishized, and freaked—and as such, presented as outside of human discourse. <mark>Othered bodies are</u></strong></mark> simultaneously <u><strong><mark>adorned and gawked at</u></strong></mark> through the voyeuristic gaze of the various and versatile, high and low, cultural texts of the secularized arts. As hooks claims, “fantasies about the Other can be continually exploited…such exploitation will occur in a manner that re-inscribes and maintains the status quo” (1992, p. 22). <u><strong><mark>Because there is no recognition</mark>, accountability, or justice <mark>connected to arts preoccupation</u></strong></mark> and favouring <u><strong><mark>of disability</u></strong></mark> as its primary aesthetic, <u><strong><mark>the value embedded in disability</mark> aesthetics <mark>is a decontextualized flirting with difference in the safe space of misty, unarticulated representation </mark>in order <mark>to abandon the encounter less bored. Disability aesthetics is </mark>yet <mark>a</mark>nother <mark>spice that seasons normate culture</mark>. Art is the kitschy way to encounter difference</u></strong>. hooks’s greatest fear is that “cultural, ethnic, and racial <u><strong><mark>differences will be continually commodified and offered up as new dishes to enhance the white palate</u></strong></mark>—that <u><strong><mark>the Other will be eaten, consumed, and forgotten</mark>”</u></strong> (1992, p. 39). I share her alarm as it is presented with disability aesthetics, in which <u><strong><mark>disability is placed as an object of consumption, always and continually being eaten by the norm.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

U.S. concession on marijuana is critical to resolving internal OAS disputes

the Organization of American States has always borne a reputation as Washington’s lackey But the OAS just sent the western hemisphere a message the White House would rather not hear It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence That conclusion by OAS , is one that a growing number of Latin American governments which might legalize marijuana this year — are urging the Obama Administration to accept Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it harder to ignore. It will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana is in reality an “exit” drug. it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug Most Latin American leaders — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — already made it clear to President Obama at last year’s Summit of the Americas in that it’s high time to ask whether marijuana legalization might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.) the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. The OAS concludes trends in the hemisphere “lean toward legalization of the production, sale and use of marijuana decisions in this area will need to be taken.” Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies have jointly called for marijuana legalization Now that the OAS has joined that chorus, both the White House and the U.S. Congress need to join the discussion with more open ears.

the O A S has always borne a reputation as Washington’s lackey. the OAS just sent the western hemisphere a message It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it hard to ignore. Most Latin American leaders already made it clear to Obama that it’s time to legaliz The OAS concludes trends lean toward legalization of marijuana Now that the OAS has joined that chorus the White House and Congress need to join the discussion

On the Latin American street, the Organization of American States has always borne a reputation, often undeserved, as Washington’s lackey. But the OAS, based in Washington, just sent the western hemisphere a message the White House would rather not hear: It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence. That conclusion, from a study presented last Friday in Bogotá, Colombia, by OAS Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza, is one that a growing number of Latin American governments — including Uruguay, which might legalize marijuana this year — are urging the Obama Administration to accept. Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it harder to ignore. But even as Insulza and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos were hailing the OAS report last week, something else was brewing in Bogotá that could further undermine resistance to pot legalization. The Colombian capital is about to start a program that uses marijuana to wean junkies off bazuco, a cheap but fiercely addictive cocaine paste. It will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana — which legalization opponents still insist is a “gateway” to harder drugs like cocaine and heroin — is in reality an “exit” drug. If so, it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug, far more comparable to alcohol than it is, say, to crystal meth. (MORE: Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and Mexico Can Win the Drug War) As Miami Herald South America correspondent Jim Wyss recently wrote from Bogotá, “For the most desperate [bazuco] users, the cannabis cure may be the only way out.” Or as one social worker told Wyss, “We want people to quit a substance that is very, very damaging and transition to something less dangerous and which will allow them to function in society.” Critics say the effort will just turn bazuco zombies into potheads. But for years now, similar projects in countries like Brazil, Jamaica and most recently Canada have indicated that marijuana is in fact an effective exit drug. In British Columbia last fall, a team of U.S. and Canadian addiction researchers determined that “clinical trials on cannabis substitution for problematic substance abuse appear justified.” That doesn’t mean we should all start smoking herb like Harold and Kumar. The fact that a glass of hot bourbon can relieve common cold symptoms doesn’t mean we should all start drinking Manhattans, either. But affirming marijuana as an exit drug would lead us to reconsider one of modern society’s most glaring double standards: booze good, pot bad. It would reinforce the notion that moderate marijuana use is not more perilous than moderate alcohol consumption. According to studies, in fact, pot smoking in some cases can be a preferable alternative to drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. (MORE: The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect) So why do we waste so many resources (almost $10 billion each year in the U.S. alone) as well as lives hunting down marijuana users and sellers? The OAS’s $2 million report “The Drug Problem in the Americas” seems to ask the same thing. It is not an outright call for marijuana legalization. It is, as Insulza said in Bogotá, “the beginning of a long-awaited discussion” about “more realistic [drug war] policies.” Most Latin American leaders — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — already made it clear to President Obama at last year’s Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, that it’s high time to ask whether marijuana legalization might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem. (Studies indicate it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.) Insulza acknowledged the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. The 400-page OAS study itself concludes that trends in the hemisphere “lean toward decriminalization or legalization of the production, sale and use of marijuana. Sooner or later, decisions in this area will need to be taken.” Santos, who is widely considered Washington’s closest ally in Latin America today, has not yet endorsed legalization, but he said the report should help drug-war battered countries like his “seek better solutions” than the conventional interdiction strategy Washington still pushes. Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies — Brazil, Mexico and Colombia — have jointly called for marijuana legalization. In the U.S., the states of Washington and Colorado last fall voted to legalize pot. Now that the OAS has joined that chorus, both the White House and the U.S. Congress need to join the discussion with more open ears.

<h4>U.S. concession on marijuana is critical to resolving internal OAS disputes</h4><p>Tim <strong>Padgett 13</strong> WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America, “OAS to White House and Hemisphere: It’s High Time to Consider Legalizing Pot”, http://world.time.com/2013/05/22/key-regional-organization-pushes-white-house-to-debate-legalizing-pot/<u><strong>, AB</p><p></u></strong>On the Latin American street, <u><mark>the O</mark>rganization of <mark>A</mark>merican <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has always borne a reputation</u></mark>, often undeserved, <u><mark>as Washington’s</u> <u>lackey</u>.</mark> <u>But <mark>the OAS</u></mark>, based in Washington, <u><mark>just sent the western hemisphere a message</mark> the White House would rather not hear</u>: <u><strong><mark>It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana</strong></mark> as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence</u>. <u>That conclusion</u>, from a study presented last Friday in Bogotá, Colombia, <u>by OAS</u> Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza<u>, is one that a growing number of Latin American governments</u> — including Uruguay, <u>which</u> <u>might legalize marijuana this year — are <strong>urging</strong> the <strong>Obama</strong> Administration</u> <u><strong>to accept</u></strong>. <u><mark>Having the motion seconded by <strong>Washington’s “lackey”</strong> makes it hard</mark>er <mark>to ignore.</mark> </u>But even as Insulza and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos were hailing the OAS report last week, something else was brewing in Bogotá that could further undermine resistance to pot legalization. The Colombian capital is about to start a program that uses marijuana to wean junkies off bazuco, a cheap but fiercely addictive cocaine paste. <u>It</u> <u>will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana</u> — which legalization opponents still insist is a “gateway” to harder drugs like cocaine and heroin — <u>is in reality an “exit” drug.</u> If so, <u>it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug</u>, far more comparable to alcohol than it is, say, to crystal meth. (MORE: Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and Mexico Can Win the Drug War) As Miami Herald South America correspondent Jim Wyss recently wrote from Bogotá, “For the most desperate [bazuco] users, the cannabis cure may be the only way out.” Or as one social worker told Wyss, “We want people to quit a substance that is very, very damaging and transition to something less dangerous and which will allow them to function in society.” Critics say the effort will just turn bazuco zombies into potheads. But for years now, similar projects in countries like Brazil, Jamaica and most recently Canada have indicated that marijuana is in fact an effective exit drug. In British Columbia last fall, a team of U.S. and Canadian addiction researchers determined that “clinical trials on cannabis substitution for problematic substance abuse appear justified.” That doesn’t mean we should all start smoking herb like Harold and Kumar. The fact that a glass of hot bourbon can relieve common cold symptoms doesn’t mean we should all start drinking Manhattans, either. But affirming marijuana as an exit drug would lead us to reconsider one of modern society’s most glaring double standards: booze good, pot bad. It would reinforce the notion that moderate marijuana use is not more perilous than moderate alcohol consumption. According to studies, in fact, pot smoking in some cases can be a preferable alternative to drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. (MORE: The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect) So why do we waste so many resources (almost $10 billion each year in the U.S. alone) as well as lives hunting down marijuana users and sellers? The OAS’s $2 million report “The Drug Problem in the Americas” seems to ask the same thing. It is not an outright call for marijuana legalization. It is, as Insulza said in Bogotá, “the beginning of a long-awaited discussion” about “more realistic [drug war] policies.” <u><mark>Most Latin American leaders</mark> — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — <mark>already made it clear to</mark> President <mark>Obama</mark> at last year’s Summit of the Americas in</u> Cartagena, Colombia, <u><mark>that it’s <strong></mark>high <mark>time</strong> to </mark>ask whether marijuana <mark>legaliz</mark>ation might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem</u>. (Studies indicate <u>it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.)</u> Insulza acknowledged <u>the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. <mark>The</u></mark> 400-page <u><mark>OAS</u></mark> study itself <u><mark>concludes</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>trends</strong></mark> in the hemisphere “<strong><mark>lean toward</mark> </u></strong>decriminalization or<u><strong> <mark>legalization</strong></mark> <mark>of </mark>the production, sale and use of <mark>marijuana</u></mark>. Sooner or later, <u><strong>decisions in this area will need to be taken.”</u></strong> Santos, who is widely considered Washington’s closest ally in Latin America today, has not yet endorsed legalization, but he said the report should help drug-war battered countries like his “seek better solutions” than the conventional interdiction strategy Washington still pushes. <u>Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies</u> — Brazil, Mexico and Colombia — <u><strong>have jointly called for marijuana legalization</u></strong>. In the U.S., the states of Washington and Colorado last fall voted to legalize pot. <u><strong><mark>Now that the OAS has joined that chorus</mark>, both <mark>the White House and</mark> the U.S. <mark>Congress need to join the discussion</mark> with more open ears.</p></u></strong>

Tim Padgett 13 WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America, “OAS to White House and Hemisphere: It’s High Time to Consider Legalizing Pot”, http://world.time.com/2013/05/22/key-regional-organization-pushes-white-house-to-debate-legalizing-pot/, AB

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Tim Padgett 13 WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America, “OAS to White House and Hemisphere: It’s High Time to Consider Legalizing Pot”, http://world.time.com/2013/05/22/key-regional-organization-pushes-white-house-to-debate-legalizing-pot/, AB fulltext: On the Latin American street, the Organization of American States has always borne a reputation, often undeserved, as Washington’s lackey. But the OAS, based in Washington, just sent the western hemisphere a message the White House would rather not hear: It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence. That conclusion, from a study presented last Friday in Bogotá, Colombia, by OAS Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza, is one that a growing number of Latin American governments — including Uruguay, which might legalize marijuana this year — are urging the Obama Administration to accept. Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it harder to ignore. But even as Insulza and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos were hailing the OAS report last week, something else was brewing in Bogotá that could further undermine resistance to pot legalization. The Colombian capital is about to start a program that uses marijuana to wean junkies off bazuco, a cheap but fiercely addictive cocaine paste. It will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana — which legalization opponents still insist is a “gateway” to harder drugs like cocaine and heroin — is in reality an “exit” drug. If so, it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug, far more comparable to alcohol than it is, say, to crystal meth. (MORE: Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and Mexico Can Win the Drug War) As Miami Herald South America correspondent Jim Wyss recently wrote from Bogotá, “For the most desperate [bazuco] users, the cannabis cure may be the only way out.” Or as one social worker told Wyss, “We want people to quit a substance that is very, very damaging and transition to something less dangerous and which will allow them to function in society.” Critics say the effort will just turn bazuco zombies into potheads. But for years now, similar projects in countries like Brazil, Jamaica and most recently Canada have indicated that marijuana is in fact an effective exit drug. In British Columbia last fall, a team of U.S. and Canadian addiction researchers determined that “clinical trials on cannabis substitution for problematic substance abuse appear justified.” That doesn’t mean we should all start smoking herb like Harold and Kumar. The fact that a glass of hot bourbon can relieve common cold symptoms doesn’t mean we should all start drinking Manhattans, either. But affirming marijuana as an exit drug would lead us to reconsider one of modern society’s most glaring double standards: booze good, pot bad. It would reinforce the notion that moderate marijuana use is not more perilous than moderate alcohol consumption. According to studies, in fact, pot smoking in some cases can be a preferable alternative to drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. (MORE: The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect) So why do we waste so many resources (almost $10 billion each year in the U.S. alone) as well as lives hunting down marijuana users and sellers? The OAS’s $2 million report “The Drug Problem in the Americas” seems to ask the same thing. It is not an outright call for marijuana legalization. It is, as Insulza said in Bogotá, “the beginning of a long-awaited discussion” about “more realistic [drug war] policies.” Most Latin American leaders — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — already made it clear to President Obama at last year’s Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, that it’s high time to ask whether marijuana legalization might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem. (Studies indicate it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.) Insulza acknowledged the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. The 400-page OAS study itself concludes that trends in the hemisphere “lean toward decriminalization or legalization of the production, sale and use of marijuana. Sooner or later, decisions in this area will need to be taken.” Santos, who is widely considered Washington’s closest ally in Latin America today, has not yet endorsed legalization, but he said the report should help drug-war battered countries like his “seek better solutions” than the conventional interdiction strategy Washington still pushes. Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies — Brazil, Mexico and Colombia — have jointly called for marijuana legalization. In the U.S., the states of Washington and Colorado last fall voted to legalize pot. Now that the OAS has joined that chorus, both the White House and the U.S. Congress need to join the discussion with more open ears. [/INST] <h4>U.S. concession on marijuana is critical to resolving internal OAS disputes</h4><p>Tim <strong>Padgett 13</strong> WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America, “OAS to White House and Hemisphere: It’s High Time to Consider Legalizing Pot”, http://world.time.com/2013/05/22/key-regional-organization-pushes-white-house-to-debate-legalizing-pot/<u><strong>, AB</p><p></u></strong>On the Latin American street, <u><mark>the O</mark>rganization of <mark>A</mark>merican <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has always borne a reputation</u></mark>, often undeserved, <u><mark>as Washington’s</u> <u>lackey</u>.</mark> <u>But <mark>the OAS</u></mark>, based in Washington, <u><mark>just sent the western hemisphere a message</mark> the White House would rather not hear</u>: <u><strong><mark>It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana</strong></mark> as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence</u>. <u>That conclusion</u>, from a study presented last Friday in Bogotá, Colombia, <u>by OAS</u> Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza<u>, is one that a growing number of Latin American governments</u> — including Uruguay, <u>which</u> <u>might legalize marijuana this year — are <strong>urging</strong> the <strong>Obama</strong> Administration</u> <u><strong>to accept</u></strong>. <u><mark>Having the motion seconded by <strong>Washington’s “lackey”</strong> makes it hard</mark>er <mark>to ignore.</mark> </u>But even as Insulza and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos were hailing the OAS report last week, something else was brewing in Bogotá that could further undermine resistance to pot legalization. The Colombian capital is about to start a program that uses marijuana to wean junkies off bazuco, a cheap but fiercely addictive cocaine paste. <u>It</u> <u>will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana</u> — which legalization opponents still insist is a “gateway” to harder drugs like cocaine and heroin — <u>is in reality an “exit” drug.</u> If so, <u>it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug</u>, far more comparable to alcohol than it is, say, to crystal meth. (MORE: Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and Mexico Can Win the Drug War) As Miami Herald South America correspondent Jim Wyss recently wrote from Bogotá, “For the most desperate [bazuco] users, the cannabis cure may be the only way out.” Or as one social worker told Wyss, “We want people to quit a substance that is very, very damaging and transition to something less dangerous and which will allow them to function in society.” Critics say the effort will just turn bazuco zombies into potheads. But for years now, similar projects in countries like Brazil, Jamaica and most recently Canada have indicated that marijuana is in fact an effective exit drug. In British Columbia last fall, a team of U.S. and Canadian addiction researchers determined that “clinical trials on cannabis substitution for problematic substance abuse appear justified.” That doesn’t mean we should all start smoking herb like Harold and Kumar. The fact that a glass of hot bourbon can relieve common cold symptoms doesn’t mean we should all start drinking Manhattans, either. But affirming marijuana as an exit drug would lead us to reconsider one of modern society’s most glaring double standards: booze good, pot bad. It would reinforce the notion that moderate marijuana use is not more perilous than moderate alcohol consumption. According to studies, in fact, pot smoking in some cases can be a preferable alternative to drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. (MORE: The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect) So why do we waste so many resources (almost $10 billion each year in the U.S. alone) as well as lives hunting down marijuana users and sellers? The OAS’s $2 million report “The Drug Problem in the Americas” seems to ask the same thing. It is not an outright call for marijuana legalization. It is, as Insulza said in Bogotá, “the beginning of a long-awaited discussion” about “more realistic [drug war] policies.” <u><mark>Most Latin American leaders</mark> — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — <mark>already made it clear to</mark> President <mark>Obama</mark> at last year’s Summit of the Americas in</u> Cartagena, Colombia, <u><mark>that it’s <strong></mark>high <mark>time</strong> to </mark>ask whether marijuana <mark>legaliz</mark>ation might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem</u>. (Studies indicate <u>it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.)</u> Insulza acknowledged <u>the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. <mark>The</u></mark> 400-page <u><mark>OAS</u></mark> study itself <u><mark>concludes</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>trends</strong></mark> in the hemisphere “<strong><mark>lean toward</mark> </u></strong>decriminalization or<u><strong> <mark>legalization</strong></mark> <mark>of </mark>the production, sale and use of <mark>marijuana</u></mark>. Sooner or later, <u><strong>decisions in this area will need to be taken.”</u></strong> Santos, who is widely considered Washington’s closest ally in Latin America today, has not yet endorsed legalization, but he said the report should help drug-war battered countries like his “seek better solutions” than the conventional interdiction strategy Washington still pushes. <u>Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies</u> — Brazil, Mexico and Colombia — <u><strong>have jointly called for marijuana legalization</u></strong>. In the U.S., the states of Washington and Colorado last fall voted to legalize pot. <u><strong><mark>Now that the OAS has joined that chorus</mark>, both <mark>the White House and</mark> the U.S. <mark>Congress need to join the discussion</mark> with more open ears.</p></u></strong> </s>

U.S. concession on marijuana is critical to resolving internal OAS disputes

the Organization of American States has always borne a reputation as Washington’s lackey But the OAS just sent the western hemisphere a message the White House would rather not hear It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence That conclusion by OAS , is one that a growing number of Latin American governments which might legalize marijuana this year — are urging the Obama Administration to accept Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it harder to ignore. It will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana is in reality an “exit” drug. it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug Most Latin American leaders — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — already made it clear to President Obama at last year’s Summit of the Americas in that it’s high time to ask whether marijuana legalization might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.) the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. The OAS concludes trends in the hemisphere “lean toward legalization of the production, sale and use of marijuana decisions in this area will need to be taken.” Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies have jointly called for marijuana legalization Now that the OAS has joined that chorus, both the White House and the U.S. Congress need to join the discussion with more open ears.

the O A S has always borne a reputation as Washington’s lackey. the OAS just sent the western hemisphere a message It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it hard to ignore. Most Latin American leaders already made it clear to Obama that it’s time to legaliz The OAS concludes trends lean toward legalization of marijuana Now that the OAS has joined that chorus the White House and Congress need to join the discussion

On the Latin American street, the Organization of American States has always borne a reputation, often undeserved, as Washington’s lackey. But the OAS, based in Washington, just sent the western hemisphere a message the White House would rather not hear: It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence. That conclusion, from a study presented last Friday in Bogotá, Colombia, by OAS Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza, is one that a growing number of Latin American governments — including Uruguay, which might legalize marijuana this year — are urging the Obama Administration to accept. Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it harder to ignore. But even as Insulza and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos were hailing the OAS report last week, something else was brewing in Bogotá that could further undermine resistance to pot legalization. The Colombian capital is about to start a program that uses marijuana to wean junkies off bazuco, a cheap but fiercely addictive cocaine paste. It will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana — which legalization opponents still insist is a “gateway” to harder drugs like cocaine and heroin — is in reality an “exit” drug. If so, it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug, far more comparable to alcohol than it is, say, to crystal meth. (MORE: Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and Mexico Can Win the Drug War) As Miami Herald South America correspondent Jim Wyss recently wrote from Bogotá, “For the most desperate [bazuco] users, the cannabis cure may be the only way out.” Or as one social worker told Wyss, “We want people to quit a substance that is very, very damaging and transition to something less dangerous and which will allow them to function in society.” Critics say the effort will just turn bazuco zombies into potheads. But for years now, similar projects in countries like Brazil, Jamaica and most recently Canada have indicated that marijuana is in fact an effective exit drug. In British Columbia last fall, a team of U.S. and Canadian addiction researchers determined that “clinical trials on cannabis substitution for problematic substance abuse appear justified.” That doesn’t mean we should all start smoking herb like Harold and Kumar. The fact that a glass of hot bourbon can relieve common cold symptoms doesn’t mean we should all start drinking Manhattans, either. But affirming marijuana as an exit drug would lead us to reconsider one of modern society’s most glaring double standards: booze good, pot bad. It would reinforce the notion that moderate marijuana use is not more perilous than moderate alcohol consumption. According to studies, in fact, pot smoking in some cases can be a preferable alternative to drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. (MORE: The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect) So why do we waste so many resources (almost $10 billion each year in the U.S. alone) as well as lives hunting down marijuana users and sellers? The OAS’s $2 million report “The Drug Problem in the Americas” seems to ask the same thing. It is not an outright call for marijuana legalization. It is, as Insulza said in Bogotá, “the beginning of a long-awaited discussion” about “more realistic [drug war] policies.” Most Latin American leaders — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — already made it clear to President Obama at last year’s Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, that it’s high time to ask whether marijuana legalization might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem. (Studies indicate it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.) Insulza acknowledged the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. The 400-page OAS study itself concludes that trends in the hemisphere “lean toward decriminalization or legalization of the production, sale and use of marijuana. Sooner or later, decisions in this area will need to be taken.” Santos, who is widely considered Washington’s closest ally in Latin America today, has not yet endorsed legalization, but he said the report should help drug-war battered countries like his “seek better solutions” than the conventional interdiction strategy Washington still pushes. Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies — Brazil, Mexico and Colombia — have jointly called for marijuana legalization. In the U.S., the states of Washington and Colorado last fall voted to legalize pot. Now that the OAS has joined that chorus, both the White House and the U.S. Congress need to join the discussion with more open ears.

<h4>U.S. concession on marijuana is critical to resolving internal OAS disputes</h4><p>Tim <strong>Padgett 13</strong> WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America, “OAS to White House and Hemisphere: It’s High Time to Consider Legalizing Pot”, http://world.time.com/2013/05/22/key-regional-organization-pushes-white-house-to-debate-legalizing-pot/<u><strong>, AB</p><p></u></strong>On the Latin American street, <u><strong><mark>the O</mark>rganization of <mark>A</mark>merican <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has always borne a reputation</u></strong></mark>, often undeserved, <u><strong><mark>as Washington’s</u></strong> <u><strong>lackey</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>But <mark>the OAS</u></strong></mark>, based in Washington, <u><strong><mark>just sent the western hemisphere a message</mark> the White House would rather not hear</u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana</mark> as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence</u></strong>. <u><strong>That conclusion</u></strong>, from a study presented last Friday in Bogotá, Colombia, <u><strong>by OAS</u></strong> Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza<u><strong>, is one that a growing number of Latin American governments</u></strong> — including Uruguay, <u><strong>which</u></strong> <u><strong>might legalize marijuana this year — are urging the Obama Administration</u></strong> <u><strong>to accept</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it hard</mark>er <mark>to ignore.</mark> </u></strong>But even as Insulza and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos were hailing the OAS report last week, something else was brewing in Bogotá that could further undermine resistance to pot legalization. The Colombian capital is about to start a program that uses marijuana to wean junkies off bazuco, a cheap but fiercely addictive cocaine paste. <u><strong>It</u></strong> <u><strong>will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana</u></strong> — which legalization opponents still insist is a “gateway” to harder drugs like cocaine and heroin — <u><strong>is in reality an “exit” drug.</u></strong> If so, <u><strong>it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug</u></strong>, far more comparable to alcohol than it is, say, to crystal meth. (MORE: Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and Mexico Can Win the Drug War) As Miami Herald South America correspondent Jim Wyss recently wrote from Bogotá, “For the most desperate [bazuco] users, the cannabis cure may be the only way out.” Or as one social worker told Wyss, “We want people to quit a substance that is very, very damaging and transition to something less dangerous and which will allow them to function in society.” Critics say the effort will just turn bazuco zombies into potheads. But for years now, similar projects in countries like Brazil, Jamaica and most recently Canada have indicated that marijuana is in fact an effective exit drug. In British Columbia last fall, a team of U.S. and Canadian addiction researchers determined that “clinical trials on cannabis substitution for problematic substance abuse appear justified.” That doesn’t mean we should all start smoking herb like Harold and Kumar. The fact that a glass of hot bourbon can relieve common cold symptoms doesn’t mean we should all start drinking Manhattans, either. But affirming marijuana as an exit drug would lead us to reconsider one of modern society’s most glaring double standards: booze good, pot bad. It would reinforce the notion that moderate marijuana use is not more perilous than moderate alcohol consumption. According to studies, in fact, pot smoking in some cases can be a preferable alternative to drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. (MORE: The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect) So why do we waste so many resources (almost $10 billion each year in the U.S. alone) as well as lives hunting down marijuana users and sellers? The OAS’s $2 million report “The Drug Problem in the Americas” seems to ask the same thing. It is not an outright call for marijuana legalization. It is, as Insulza said in Bogotá, “the beginning of a long-awaited discussion” about “more realistic [drug war] policies.” <u><strong><mark>Most Latin American leaders</mark> — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — <mark>already made it clear to</mark> President <mark>Obama</mark> at last year’s Summit of the Americas in</u></strong> Cartagena, Colombia, <u><strong><mark>that it’s </mark>high <mark>time to </mark>ask whether marijuana <mark>legaliz</mark>ation might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem</u></strong>. (Studies indicate <u><strong>it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.)</u></strong> Insulza acknowledged <u><strong>the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. <mark>The</u></strong></mark> 400-page <u><strong><mark>OAS</u></strong></mark> study itself <u><strong><mark>concludes</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>trends</mark> in the hemisphere “<mark>lean toward</mark> </u></strong>decriminalization or<u><strong> <mark>legalization</mark> <mark>of </mark>the production, sale and use of <mark>marijuana</u></strong></mark>. Sooner or later, <u><strong>decisions in this area will need to be taken.”</u></strong> Santos, who is widely considered Washington’s closest ally in Latin America today, has not yet endorsed legalization, but he said the report should help drug-war battered countries like his “seek better solutions” than the conventional interdiction strategy Washington still pushes. <u><strong>Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies</u></strong> — Brazil, Mexico and Colombia — <u><strong>have jointly called for marijuana legalization</u></strong>. In the U.S., the states of Washington and Colorado last fall voted to legalize pot. <u><strong><mark>Now that the OAS has joined that chorus</mark>, both <mark>the White House and</mark> the U.S. <mark>Congress need to join the discussion</mark> with more open ears.</p></u></strong>

Tim Padgett 13 WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America, “OAS to White House and Hemisphere: It’s High Time to Consider Legalizing Pot”, http://world.time.com/2013/05/22/key-regional-organization-pushes-white-house-to-debate-legalizing-pot/, AB

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Tim Padgett 13 WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America, “OAS to White House and Hemisphere: It’s High Time to Consider Legalizing Pot”, http://world.time.com/2013/05/22/key-regional-organization-pushes-white-house-to-debate-legalizing-pot/, AB fulltext: On the Latin American street, the Organization of American States has always borne a reputation, often undeserved, as Washington’s lackey. But the OAS, based in Washington, just sent the western hemisphere a message the White House would rather not hear: It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence. That conclusion, from a study presented last Friday in Bogotá, Colombia, by OAS Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza, is one that a growing number of Latin American governments — including Uruguay, which might legalize marijuana this year — are urging the Obama Administration to accept. Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it harder to ignore. But even as Insulza and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos were hailing the OAS report last week, something else was brewing in Bogotá that could further undermine resistance to pot legalization. The Colombian capital is about to start a program that uses marijuana to wean junkies off bazuco, a cheap but fiercely addictive cocaine paste. It will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana — which legalization opponents still insist is a “gateway” to harder drugs like cocaine and heroin — is in reality an “exit” drug. If so, it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug, far more comparable to alcohol than it is, say, to crystal meth. (MORE: Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and Mexico Can Win the Drug War) As Miami Herald South America correspondent Jim Wyss recently wrote from Bogotá, “For the most desperate [bazuco] users, the cannabis cure may be the only way out.” Or as one social worker told Wyss, “We want people to quit a substance that is very, very damaging and transition to something less dangerous and which will allow them to function in society.” Critics say the effort will just turn bazuco zombies into potheads. But for years now, similar projects in countries like Brazil, Jamaica and most recently Canada have indicated that marijuana is in fact an effective exit drug. In British Columbia last fall, a team of U.S. and Canadian addiction researchers determined that “clinical trials on cannabis substitution for problematic substance abuse appear justified.” That doesn’t mean we should all start smoking herb like Harold and Kumar. The fact that a glass of hot bourbon can relieve common cold symptoms doesn’t mean we should all start drinking Manhattans, either. But affirming marijuana as an exit drug would lead us to reconsider one of modern society’s most glaring double standards: booze good, pot bad. It would reinforce the notion that moderate marijuana use is not more perilous than moderate alcohol consumption. According to studies, in fact, pot smoking in some cases can be a preferable alternative to drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. (MORE: The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect) So why do we waste so many resources (almost $10 billion each year in the U.S. alone) as well as lives hunting down marijuana users and sellers? The OAS’s $2 million report “The Drug Problem in the Americas” seems to ask the same thing. It is not an outright call for marijuana legalization. It is, as Insulza said in Bogotá, “the beginning of a long-awaited discussion” about “more realistic [drug war] policies.” Most Latin American leaders — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — already made it clear to President Obama at last year’s Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, that it’s high time to ask whether marijuana legalization might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem. (Studies indicate it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.) Insulza acknowledged the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. The 400-page OAS study itself concludes that trends in the hemisphere “lean toward decriminalization or legalization of the production, sale and use of marijuana. Sooner or later, decisions in this area will need to be taken.” Santos, who is widely considered Washington’s closest ally in Latin America today, has not yet endorsed legalization, but he said the report should help drug-war battered countries like his “seek better solutions” than the conventional interdiction strategy Washington still pushes. Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies — Brazil, Mexico and Colombia — have jointly called for marijuana legalization. In the U.S., the states of Washington and Colorado last fall voted to legalize pot. Now that the OAS has joined that chorus, both the White House and the U.S. Congress need to join the discussion with more open ears. [/INST] <h4>U.S. concession on marijuana is critical to resolving internal OAS disputes</h4><p>Tim <strong>Padgett 13</strong> WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America, “OAS to White House and Hemisphere: It’s High Time to Consider Legalizing Pot”, http://world.time.com/2013/05/22/key-regional-organization-pushes-white-house-to-debate-legalizing-pot/<u><strong>, AB</p><p></u></strong>On the Latin American street, <u><strong><mark>the O</mark>rganization of <mark>A</mark>merican <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>has always borne a reputation</u></strong></mark>, often undeserved, <u><strong><mark>as Washington’s</u></strong> <u><strong>lackey</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>But <mark>the OAS</u></strong></mark>, based in Washington, <u><strong><mark>just sent the western hemisphere a message</mark> the White House would rather not hear</u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>It’s time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana</mark> as one means of reducing harrowing drug violence</u></strong>. <u><strong>That conclusion</u></strong>, from a study presented last Friday in Bogotá, Colombia, <u><strong>by OAS</u></strong> Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza<u><strong>, is one that a growing number of Latin American governments</u></strong> — including Uruguay, <u><strong>which</u></strong> <u><strong>might legalize marijuana this year — are urging the Obama Administration</u></strong> <u><strong>to accept</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Having the motion seconded by Washington’s “lackey” makes it hard</mark>er <mark>to ignore.</mark> </u></strong>But even as Insulza and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos were hailing the OAS report last week, something else was brewing in Bogotá that could further undermine resistance to pot legalization. The Colombian capital is about to start a program that uses marijuana to wean junkies off bazuco, a cheap but fiercely addictive cocaine paste. <u><strong>It</u></strong> <u><strong>will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana</u></strong> — which legalization opponents still insist is a “gateway” to harder drugs like cocaine and heroin — <u><strong>is in reality an “exit” drug.</u></strong> If so, <u><strong>it will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively benign drug</u></strong>, far more comparable to alcohol than it is, say, to crystal meth. (MORE: Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and Mexico Can Win the Drug War) As Miami Herald South America correspondent Jim Wyss recently wrote from Bogotá, “For the most desperate [bazuco] users, the cannabis cure may be the only way out.” Or as one social worker told Wyss, “We want people to quit a substance that is very, very damaging and transition to something less dangerous and which will allow them to function in society.” Critics say the effort will just turn bazuco zombies into potheads. But for years now, similar projects in countries like Brazil, Jamaica and most recently Canada have indicated that marijuana is in fact an effective exit drug. In British Columbia last fall, a team of U.S. and Canadian addiction researchers determined that “clinical trials on cannabis substitution for problematic substance abuse appear justified.” That doesn’t mean we should all start smoking herb like Harold and Kumar. The fact that a glass of hot bourbon can relieve common cold symptoms doesn’t mean we should all start drinking Manhattans, either. But affirming marijuana as an exit drug would lead us to reconsider one of modern society’s most glaring double standards: booze good, pot bad. It would reinforce the notion that moderate marijuana use is not more perilous than moderate alcohol consumption. According to studies, in fact, pot smoking in some cases can be a preferable alternative to drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. (MORE: The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect) So why do we waste so many resources (almost $10 billion each year in the U.S. alone) as well as lives hunting down marijuana users and sellers? The OAS’s $2 million report “The Drug Problem in the Americas” seems to ask the same thing. It is not an outright call for marijuana legalization. It is, as Insulza said in Bogotá, “the beginning of a long-awaited discussion” about “more realistic [drug war] policies.” <u><strong><mark>Most Latin American leaders</mark> — whose countries suffer the bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war — <mark>already made it clear to</mark> President <mark>Obama</mark> at last year’s Summit of the Americas in</u></strong> Cartagena, Colombia, <u><strong><mark>that it’s </mark>high <mark>time to </mark>ask whether marijuana <mark>legaliz</mark>ation might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem</u></strong>. (Studies indicate <u><strong>it could rob Mexico’s narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.)</u></strong> Insulza acknowledged <u><strong>the current “disposition” throughout the Americas to “deal with the legalization issue,” and he called for “greater flexibility” on the part of nations like the U.S. <mark>The</u></strong></mark> 400-page <u><strong><mark>OAS</u></strong></mark> study itself <u><strong><mark>concludes</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>trends</mark> in the hemisphere “<mark>lean toward</mark> </u></strong>decriminalization or<u><strong> <mark>legalization</mark> <mark>of </mark>the production, sale and use of <mark>marijuana</u></strong></mark>. Sooner or later, <u><strong>decisions in this area will need to be taken.”</u></strong> Santos, who is widely considered Washington’s closest ally in Latin America today, has not yet endorsed legalization, but he said the report should help drug-war battered countries like his “seek better solutions” than the conventional interdiction strategy Washington still pushes. <u><strong>Former presidents of three of Latin America’s largest economies</u></strong> — Brazil, Mexico and Colombia — <u><strong>have jointly called for marijuana legalization</u></strong>. In the U.S., the states of Washington and Colorado last fall voted to legalize pot. <u><strong><mark>Now that the OAS has joined that chorus</mark>, both <mark>the White House and</mark> the U.S. <mark>Congress need to join the discussion</mark> with more open ears.</p></u></strong> </s>

The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the socia a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect the power of knowledge, objectified the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university semiotic insurrectionaries blasted their way out so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything

Universities may serve as progressive this does not detract from the military and corporate research and social conditioning within their walls they serve as machines for concentration of privilege a hyper educated society can only exist by the intense exploitation of the third world liberal seminars obfuscate that they are complicit in death and destruction Social death is banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our lack of meaning the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy modern cities are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are enrolling in a cemetery the cemeteries of a nation which has an absolute fixation with zombies The event is counter-offensive it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by perfecting its critiques, has generated its own antithesis zombies mark the dead end of capitalism’s accumulation because they embody this to excess they are the ideal resistance a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic Liberal student activists are most invested in the fate of the university they are insistent on saving the University when life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living Zombie Politics are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains knowledge, objectified the living dead awaken a passion for vertiginous disidentification at the core of our culture is the exclusion of the dead we risk failing to see that our lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates semiotic insurrectionaries burst into reality like a scream an anti-discourse that cannot be caught they resist every interpretation no longer denoting anything

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other. Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50] In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice: "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56]

<h4>The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable</h4><p><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley 10<u><mark> (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620) </p><p>Universities may serve as progressive </mark>sites of inquiry in some cases, yet <mark>this does not detract from the</mark> great deal of <mark>military and corporate research</mark>, economic planning <mark>and</mark>, perhaps most importantly, <mark>social conditioning</mark> occurring <mark>within their walls</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>they serve as</mark> intense <mark>machines for</mark> the <mark>concentration of privilege</mark>; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts</u></strong>, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since <u><strong><mark>a hyper educated</mark>, stable <mark>society</mark> along Western lines <mark>can only exist by the intense exploitation of</mark> labor and resources in <mark>the third world</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; <mark>liberal seminars</mark> only serve to <mark>obfuscate</mark> the fact <mark>that they are</mark> themselves <mark>complicit in</mark> the <mark>death and destruction</mark> waged on a daily basis</u></strong>. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “<u><strong><mark>Social death is</mark> our <mark>banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our</mark> own <mark>lack of meaning</u></strong></mark>.”[43] Our conception of the <u><strong>social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy</u></strong></mark>. Baudrillard writes that “<u><strong>The cemetery no longer exists because <mark>modern cities</mark> have entirely taken over their function: they <mark>are ghost towns, cities of death</u></strong></mark>. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, <u><strong><mark>ours is a culture of death</u></strong></mark>.”[44] <u><strong><mark>By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are</mark> resigning ourselves to <mark>enrolling in</u></strong></mark> what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls <u><strong><mark>a cemetery</mark>, a necropolis to rival no other</u></strong>. Yet <u><strong>herein lies the punch line. We are studying in <mark>the cemeteries of a nation which has</mark> a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; <mark>an absolute fixation with zombies</mark>.</u></strong> So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “<u><strong><mark>The event</mark> itself <mark>is counter-offensive</mark> and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, <mark>it reintroduces negativity and death</u></strong></mark>.”[45] <u><strong><mark>The University, by</mark> totalizing itself and <mark>perfecting its critiques, has</mark> spontaneously <mark>generated its own antithesis</mark>. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent.</u></strong> According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “<u><strong><mark>zombies mark the dead end</mark> or zero degree <mark>of capitalism’s</mark> logic of endless consumption and ever expanding <mark>accumulation</mark>, precisely <mark>because they embody this</mark> logic so literally and <mark>to</mark> such <mark>excess</u></strong></mark>.”[46] In that sense, <u><strong><mark>they are</mark> almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as <mark>the ideal</mark> form of <mark>resistance</mark> to the socia</u></strong>l: “they know that there is no liberation, and that <u><strong><mark>a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic</mark>, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization</u></strong>.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, <u><strong>students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction</u></strong>; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] <u><strong><mark>Liberal student activists</mark> fear the incursions the most, as they <mark>are</mark> in many ways the <mark>most invested in the fate of the</mark> contemporary <mark>university</u></strong></mark>; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For <u><strong><mark>they are insistent on saving the University</mark>, on staying ‘alive’, even <mark>when</mark> their version of <mark>life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living</mark>, when it is as good as social death</u></strong>. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, <u><strong>human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise</u></strong>.[50] In reality, “<u><strong><mark>Zombie Politics</mark> are something to be championed, because they <mark>are the politics of a multitude</u></strong></mark>, an inclusive mass of political subjects, <u><strong><mark>seeking to consume brains</u></strong></mark>. Yet <u><strong>brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect</u></strong>”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “<u><strong>the power of <mark>knowledge, objectified</u></strong></mark>.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that <u><strong><mark>the living dead</mark> are not radically Other so much as they serve to <mark>awaken a passion</mark> for otherness and <mark>for vertiginous disidentification</mark> that is already latent within our own selves</u></strong>.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "<u><strong><mark>at the</mark> very <mark>core</mark> of the 'rationality' <mark>of our culture</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>is</mark> an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: <mark>the exclusion of the dead</mark> and of death</u></strong>."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that <u><strong>power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence</u></strong>. If we are to continue to use this conception, <u><strong><mark>we risk failing to see that our</mark> very <mark>lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence</u></strong></mark>. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] <u><strong>Perhaps the reevaluation of <mark>zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates</mark> of hell, the cemetery-university</u></strong>. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about <u><strong><mark>semiotic insurrectionaries</u></strong></mark> might suffice: "They <u><strong>blasted their way out</u></strong> however, <u><strong>so as to <mark>burst into reality like a scream</mark>, an interjection, <mark>an anti-discourse</mark>, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element <mark>that cannot be caught</mark> by any organized discourse</u></strong>. Invincible due to their own poverty, <u><strong><mark>they resist every interpretation</mark> and every connotation, <mark>no longer denoting</mark> anyone or <mark>anything</u></strong></mark>."[56]</p>

Occupied UC Berkeley 10 (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Occupied UC Berkeley 10 (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620) fulltext: Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other. Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50] In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice: "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56] [/INST] <h4>The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable</h4><p><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley 10<u><mark> (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620) </p><p>Universities may serve as progressive </mark>sites of inquiry in some cases, yet <mark>this does not detract from the</mark> great deal of <mark>military and corporate research</mark>, economic planning <mark>and</mark>, perhaps most importantly, <mark>social conditioning</mark> occurring <mark>within their walls</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>they serve as</mark> intense <mark>machines for</mark> the <mark>concentration of privilege</mark>; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts</u></strong>, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since <u><strong><mark>a hyper educated</mark>, stable <mark>society</mark> along Western lines <mark>can only exist by the intense exploitation of</mark> labor and resources in <mark>the third world</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; <mark>liberal seminars</mark> only serve to <mark>obfuscate</mark> the fact <mark>that they are</mark> themselves <mark>complicit in</mark> the <mark>death and destruction</mark> waged on a daily basis</u></strong>. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “<u><strong><mark>Social death is</mark> our <mark>banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our</mark> own <mark>lack of meaning</u></strong></mark>.”[43] Our conception of the <u><strong>social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy</u></strong></mark>. Baudrillard writes that “<u><strong>The cemetery no longer exists because <mark>modern cities</mark> have entirely taken over their function: they <mark>are ghost towns, cities of death</u></strong></mark>. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, <u><strong><mark>ours is a culture of death</u></strong></mark>.”[44] <u><strong><mark>By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are</mark> resigning ourselves to <mark>enrolling in</u></strong></mark> what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls <u><strong><mark>a cemetery</mark>, a necropolis to rival no other</u></strong>. Yet <u><strong>herein lies the punch line. We are studying in <mark>the cemeteries of a nation which has</mark> a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; <mark>an absolute fixation with zombies</mark>.</u></strong> So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “<u><strong><mark>The event</mark> itself <mark>is counter-offensive</mark> and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, <mark>it reintroduces negativity and death</u></strong></mark>.”[45] <u><strong><mark>The University, by</mark> totalizing itself and <mark>perfecting its critiques, has</mark> spontaneously <mark>generated its own antithesis</mark>. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent.</u></strong> According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “<u><strong><mark>zombies mark the dead end</mark> or zero degree <mark>of capitalism’s</mark> logic of endless consumption and ever expanding <mark>accumulation</mark>, precisely <mark>because they embody this</mark> logic so literally and <mark>to</mark> such <mark>excess</u></strong></mark>.”[46] In that sense, <u><strong><mark>they are</mark> almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as <mark>the ideal</mark> form of <mark>resistance</mark> to the socia</u></strong>l: “they know that there is no liberation, and that <u><strong><mark>a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic</mark>, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization</u></strong>.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, <u><strong>students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction</u></strong>; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] <u><strong><mark>Liberal student activists</mark> fear the incursions the most, as they <mark>are</mark> in many ways the <mark>most invested in the fate of the</mark> contemporary <mark>university</u></strong></mark>; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For <u><strong><mark>they are insistent on saving the University</mark>, on staying ‘alive’, even <mark>when</mark> their version of <mark>life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living</mark>, when it is as good as social death</u></strong>. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, <u><strong>human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise</u></strong>.[50] In reality, “<u><strong><mark>Zombie Politics</mark> are something to be championed, because they <mark>are the politics of a multitude</u></strong></mark>, an inclusive mass of political subjects, <u><strong><mark>seeking to consume brains</u></strong></mark>. Yet <u><strong>brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect</u></strong>”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “<u><strong>the power of <mark>knowledge, objectified</u></strong></mark>.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that <u><strong><mark>the living dead</mark> are not radically Other so much as they serve to <mark>awaken a passion</mark> for otherness and <mark>for vertiginous disidentification</mark> that is already latent within our own selves</u></strong>.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "<u><strong><mark>at the</mark> very <mark>core</mark> of the 'rationality' <mark>of our culture</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>is</mark> an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: <mark>the exclusion of the dead</mark> and of death</u></strong>."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that <u><strong>power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence</u></strong>. If we are to continue to use this conception, <u><strong><mark>we risk failing to see that our</mark> very <mark>lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence</u></strong></mark>. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] <u><strong>Perhaps the reevaluation of <mark>zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates</mark> of hell, the cemetery-university</u></strong>. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about <u><strong><mark>semiotic insurrectionaries</u></strong></mark> might suffice: "They <u><strong>blasted their way out</u></strong> however, <u><strong>so as to <mark>burst into reality like a scream</mark>, an interjection, <mark>an anti-discourse</mark>, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element <mark>that cannot be caught</mark> by any organized discourse</u></strong>. Invincible due to their own poverty, <u><strong><mark>they resist every interpretation</mark> and every connotation, <mark>no longer denoting</mark> anyone or <mark>anything</u></strong></mark>."[56]</p> </s>

Authorize means

to give power or permission to (someone or something) to give legal or official approval to or for (something)

to give legal or official approval for something That’s Merriam Webster 14

: to give power or permission to (someone or something) : to give legal or official approval to or for (something) That’s Merriam Webster 14 [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authorize]

<h4>Authorize means</h4><p>au·tho·rize verb \ˈȯ-thə-ˌrīz\</p><p>: <u><strong>to give power or permission to (someone or something)</p><p></u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>to give legal or official approval </mark>to or <mark>for</mark> (<mark>something</mark>)</p><p></u><mark>That’s Merriam Webster 14</strong></mark> [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authorize]</p>

au·tho·rize verb \ˈȯ-thə-ˌrīz\

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: au·tho·rize verb \ˈȯ-thə-ˌrīz\ fulltext: : to give power or permission to (someone or something) : to give legal or official approval to or for (something) That’s Merriam Webster 14 [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authorize] [/INST] <h4>Authorize means</h4><p>au·tho·rize verb \ˈȯ-thə-ˌrīz\</p><p>: <u><strong>to give power or permission to (someone or something)</p><p></u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>to give legal or official approval </mark>to or <mark>for</mark> (<mark>something</mark>)</p><p></u><mark>That’s Merriam Webster 14</strong></mark> [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authorize]</p> </s>

Their acceptance of the “multiplicity of identity” in the 1AC trades off with a Universalist class analysis

If we focus on Western societies for a moment again, which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of the class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems They fight to reduce suffering, but the background of it cannot be addressed adequately within the political frame of identity politics we are fighting our PC battles for the right of ethnic minor - ities, of gays and lesbians, of different lifestyles, while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for the unrestrained development of capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible: in the predominant form of postmodern ‘cultural criticism’, the very mention of capitalism as a world system tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’, ‘fundamentalism’, and so on The price of this depoliticization of the economy is that the domain of pol - itics itself is in a way depoliticized: political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities and the tolerance of differences The class and commodity structure of capitalism is overdetermining society as a whole, and it is this overdetermination which identity politics is repressing Class antagonism certainly appears as one in the series of social antagonisms, but it is simultaneously the specific antagonism which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others Identity politics reduces the question concerning economy to one among several questions on an equal level Two fatal consequences follow from this Firstly, the narratives about a trans - formation from an essentialist Marxism to a postmodern Marxism hide the fact that this break with essentialism relates to an actual his - torical process. The multitude and non-essentialist manifold which is celebrated by the new left is something which has fundamentally only become possible through capital’s constant transgression of its own limits Secondly, and related to the former point, the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism The passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism to postmodern con - tingent politics is part of the global change in the very nature of capitalist soci - ety The central question after this conclusion becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism for a way to think revolutionary change Postmodern identity politics on this background appears to be fundamentally apolitical. It is exactly characterised by the caretaking of particular interests, and this is not fundamentally changed by form - ing rainbow coalitions or the like The lack of a focus on econ - omy in postmodern identity politics means that it is simply not politi - cal enough The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all, which in turn means that the new left are not capable of distinguishing between the contingency that is made possible within a given order and the exclusions on which this order rests The right to narrate which is the point of departure of identity politics, is blocking the universalisation of specific demands Identity politics seems to be able to legitimise anything, which is why Žižek opts for Lenin and the right to truth rather than the right to narrate Capital treats life forms as a colonial master treats the natives: they are studied carefully and respected there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and thereby the division of groups that need special treat - ment: lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end? Postmodernists’ do not seem to have an answer for that Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised The issue is not how specific a group and its demands are, but whether these may serve as a radical criti - cism of a given formation or not Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game so that such trumps lose their significance.

which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems the background cannot be addressed within the frame of identity politics we are fighting our PC battles for minor - ities gays and lesbians while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible the very mention of capitalism tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’ The price of this depoliticization of the economy political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities Identity politics reduces the economy to one among several questions fatal consequences follow from this the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism The central question becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism identity politics appears to be fundamentally apolitical The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all The right to narrate is blocking the universalisation of specific demands there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and the division of groups lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end? Postmodernists’ do not have an answer for that. Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised. Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game

If we focus on Western societies for a moment again, which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics. The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of the class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems. They fight to reduce suffering, but the background of it cannot be addressed adequately within the political frame of identity politics. We can therefore place identity politics and multiculturalism in a broader, political context: So we are fighting our PC battles for the right of ethnic minor - ities, of gays and lesbians, of different lifestyles, and so forth, while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for the unrestrained development of capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible: in the predominant form of postmodern ‘cultural criticism’, the very mention of capitalism as a world system tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’, ‘fundamentalism’, and so on. The price of this depoliticization of the economy is that the domain of pol - itics itself is in a way depoliticized: political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities and the tolerance of differences. (Žižek 1999: 218) The class and commodity structure of capitalism is overdetermining society as a whole, and it is this overdetermination which identity politics is repressing. ‘Class antagonism certainly appears as one in the series of social antagonisms, but it is simultaneously the specific antagonism which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity.’ (Žižek 2000c: 320). Identity politics reduces the question concerning economy to one among several questions on an equal level. Two fatal consequences follow from this. Firstly, the narratives about a trans - formation from an essentialist Marxism to a postmodern Marxism hide the fact that this break with essentialism relates to an actual his - torical process. The multitude and non-essentialist manifold which is celebrated by the new left is something which has fundamentally only become possible through capital’s constant transgression of its own limits. Secondly, and related to the former point, the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism. When Laclau and others with him give the reader a choice between class struggle (Marxism) or postmodernity (iden - tity politics), then the problem is not only that they make the wrong choice (i.e. deny Marxism), but also, and more fundamentally, that they do not see that capital itself has become postmodern. And fur - ther, that there is a speculative connection between capitalism and postmodern identity politics. The latter serves postmodern capitalism as its perfect superstructure. The passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism to postmodern con - tingent politics (in Laclau), or the passage from sexual essen - tialism to contingent gender-formation (in Butler), or – a fur - ther example – the passage from metaphysician to ironist in Richard Rorty, is not a simple epistemological progress but part of the global change in the very nature of capitalist soci - ety. (Žižek 2000a: 106) The central question after this conclusion becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism for a way to think revolutionary change. We earlier defined the political as the process in which par - ticular demands are elevated from being an expression of particular interests to being demands of a universal restructuring of the societal order. Postmodern identity politics on this background appears to be fundamentally apolitical. It is exactly characterised by the caretaking of particular interests, and this is not fundamentally changed by form - ing rainbow coalitions or the like. What these ‘policies’ basically do, and this is what makes them reactionary, is to reinforce already exist - ing social positions (Žižek 1999: 208). The lack of a focus on econ - omy in postmodern identity politics means that it is simply not politi - cal enough. The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all, which in turn means that the new left, exemplified by Laclau, Butler, and Rorty, are not capable of distinguishing between the contingency that is made possible within a given order and the exclusions on which this order rests (Žižek 2000a: 108). The right to narrate, which is the point of departure of identity politics, is blocking the universalisation of specific demands. We have already discussed that. But there are other problems as well. Identity politics is morally blind. Yes, all ‘progressives’ support the rights of gays and lesbians. But what about the right of bikers to their lifestyle – driving Harleys really fast, being tattooed and controlling drug sales. Should young guests in night clubs have a right to take drugs – this is a kind of lifestyle as well, isn’t it? Do parents have a right to circumcise their daughters if it is part of their tradition to do so? Or should the Nazis have a right to march through town, spread propaganda and recruit young supporters? Identity politics seems to be able to legitimise anything, which is why Žižek opts for Lenin and the right to truth rather than the right to narrate (Žižek 2002b: 177). Capital treats life forms as a colonial master treats the natives: they are studied carefully and respected. Moral involvement is never at stake – one could rather speak of indifference. Another problem is that there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and thereby the division of groups that need special treat - ment: lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end? ‘Postmodernists’ do not seem to have an answer for that. Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised. The issue is not how specific a group and its demands are, but whether these may serve as a radical criti - cism of a given formation or not (Žižek 1999: 203– 204). What also seems to be forgotten is that anti-essentialism and relativism make for a position of strength, i.e. a position that can only be taken from a privileged, distanced position of supervision. It is the position from which all substantial positioning can be dismissed as essentialism, fundamentalism, primitivism, dogmatism or similar ‘isms’. The antiessentialist position is imagined to be an unprejudiced, neutral posi - tion. But this ‘neutrality’ is fake. It is a kind of ‘universalism’ which in reality supports only one given and particular societal order – cap - italism (Žižek 2001d: 103). The reference to objectively given eco - nomic limitations or ‘Development’ as it is called today seems to be the card that trumps everything. If it is played, there seems to be no way around adjusting and renouncing. Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game so that such trumps lose their significance.

<h4>Their acceptance of the “multiplicity of identity” in the 1AC trades off with a Universalist class analysis </h4><p><strong><mark>Bjerre & Lausten ’10</strong></mark> Henrik Jøker Bjerre is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are moral philosophy, sociology and psychoa - nalysis. His publications include Kantian Deeds (Continuum, 2010). Carsten Bagge Laustsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are terrorism, political theology, political thought and modern social theory. He has previously published The Culture of Exception. Sociology Facing the Camp (Routledge, 2005, with Bülent Diken) and Sociology through the Projector (Routledge, 2008, with Bülent Diken). Humanities Insights : The Subject of Politics : Slavoj Žižek’s Political Philosophy. Penrith, GBR: Humanities-Ebooks, LLP, 2010. p 96-99. Copyright © 2010. Humanities-Ebooks, LLP. All rights reserved. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/wayne/Doc?id=10567330&ppg=20<u><strong>, accessed via e-book @ Wayne State, online, jj</p><p>If we focus on Western societies for a moment again, <mark>which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of</mark> the <mark>class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>They fight to reduce suffering, but <mark>the background</mark> of it <mark>cannot be addressed</mark> adequately <mark>within the</mark> political <mark>frame of identity politics</u></strong></mark>. We can therefore place identity politics and multiculturalism in a broader, political context: So <u><strong><mark>we are fighting our PC battles for</mark> the right of ethnic <mark>minor - ities</mark>, of <mark>gays and lesbians</mark>, of different lifestyles,</u></strong> and so forth, <u><strong><mark>while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for</mark> the unrestrained development of <mark>capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible</mark>: in the predominant form of postmodern ‘cultural criticism’, <mark>the very mention of capitalism</mark> as a world system <mark>tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’</mark>, ‘fundamentalism’, and so on</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The price of this depoliticization of the economy</mark> is that the domain of pol - itics itself is in a way depoliticized: <mark>political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities </mark>and the tolerance of differences</u></strong>. (Žižek 1999: 218) <u><strong>The class and commodity structure of capitalism is overdetermining society as a whole, and it is this overdetermination which identity politics is repressing</u></strong>. ‘<u><strong>Class antagonism</u></strong> <u><strong>certainly appears as one in the series of social antagonisms, but it is simultaneously the specific antagonism which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others</u></strong>. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity.’ (Žižek 2000c: 320). <u><strong><mark>Identity politics</mark> <mark>reduces the</mark> question concerning <mark>economy to one among several questions</mark> on an equal level</u></strong>. <u><strong>Two <mark>fatal consequences follow from this</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Firstly, the narratives about a trans - formation from an essentialist Marxism to a postmodern Marxism hide the fact that this break with essentialism relates to an actual his - torical process. The multitude and non-essentialist manifold which is celebrated by the new left is something which has fundamentally only become possible through capital’s constant transgression of its own limits</u></strong>. <u><strong>Secondly, and related to the former point, <mark>the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism</u></strong></mark>. When Laclau and others with him give the reader a choice between class struggle (Marxism) or postmodernity (iden - tity politics), then the problem is not only that they make the wrong choice (i.e. deny Marxism), but also, and more fundamentally, that they do not see that capital itself has become postmodern. And fur - ther, that there is a speculative connection between capitalism and postmodern identity politics. The latter serves postmodern capitalism as its perfect superstructure. <u><strong>The passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism to postmodern con - tingent politics</u></strong> (in Laclau), or the passage from sexual essen - tialism to contingent gender-formation (in Butler), or – a fur - ther example – the passage from metaphysician to ironist in Richard Rorty, <u><strong>is</u></strong> not a simple epistemological progress but <u><strong>part of the global change in the very nature of capitalist soci - ety</u></strong>. (Žižek 2000a: 106) <u><strong><mark>The central question</mark> after this conclusion <mark>becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism</mark> for a way to think revolutionary change</u></strong>. We earlier defined the political as the process in which par - ticular demands are elevated from being an expression of particular interests to being demands of a universal restructuring of the societal order. <u><strong>Postmodern <mark>identity politics</mark> on this background <mark>appears to be fundamentally apolitical</mark>. It is exactly characterised by the caretaking of particular interests, and this is not fundamentally changed by form - ing rainbow coalitions or the like</u></strong>. What these ‘policies’ basically do, and this is what makes them reactionary, is to reinforce already exist - ing social positions (Žižek 1999: 208). <u><strong>The lack of a focus on econ - omy in postmodern identity politics means that it is simply not politi - cal enough</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all</mark>, which in turn means that the new left</u></strong>, exemplified by Laclau, Butler, and Rorty, <u><strong>are not capable of distinguishing between the contingency that is made possible within a given order and the exclusions on which this order rests</u></strong> (Žižek 2000a: 108). <u><strong><mark>The right to narrate</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>which is the point of departure of identity politics, <mark>is blocking the universalisation of specific demands</u></strong></mark>. We have already discussed that. But there are other problems as well. Identity politics is morally blind. Yes, all ‘progressives’ support the rights of gays and lesbians. But what about the right of bikers to their lifestyle – driving Harleys really fast, being tattooed and controlling drug sales. Should young guests in night clubs have a right to take drugs – this is a kind of lifestyle as well, isn’t it? Do parents have a right to circumcise their daughters if it is part of their tradition to do so? Or should the Nazis have a right to march through town, spread propaganda and recruit young supporters? <u><strong>Identity politics seems to be able to legitimise anything, which is why Žižek opts for Lenin and the right to truth rather than the right to narrate</u></strong> (Žižek 2002b: 177). <u><strong>Capital treats life forms as a colonial master treats the natives: they are studied carefully and respected</u></strong>. Moral involvement is never at stake – one could rather speak of indifference. Another problem is that <u><strong><mark>there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and</mark> thereby <mark>the division of groups</mark> that need special treat - ment: <mark>lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end?</u></strong></mark> ‘<u><strong><mark>Postmodernists’ do not</mark> seem to <mark>have an answer for that</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>The issue is not how specific a group and its demands are, but whether these may serve as a radical criti - cism of a given formation or not</u></strong> (Žižek 1999: 203– 204). What also seems to be forgotten is that anti-essentialism and relativism make for a position of strength, i.e. a position that can only be taken from a privileged, distanced position of supervision. It is the position from which all substantial positioning can be dismissed as essentialism, fundamentalism, primitivism, dogmatism or similar ‘isms’. The antiessentialist position is imagined to be an unprejudiced, neutral posi - tion. But this ‘neutrality’ is fake. It is a kind of ‘universalism’ which in reality supports only one given and particular societal order – cap - italism (Žižek 2001d: 103). The reference to objectively given eco - nomic limitations or ‘Development’ as it is called today seems to be the card that trumps everything. If it is played, there seems to be no way around adjusting and renouncing. <u><strong><mark>Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game</mark> so that such trumps lose their significance.</p></u></strong>

Bjerre & Lausten ’10 Henrik Jøker Bjerre is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are moral philosophy, sociology and psychoa - nalysis. His publications include Kantian Deeds (Continuum, 2010). Carsten Bagge Laustsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are terrorism, political theology, political thought and modern social theory. He has previously published The Culture of Exception. Sociology Facing the Camp (Routledge, 2005, with Bülent Diken) and Sociology through the Projector (Routledge, 2008, with Bülent Diken). Humanities Insights : The Subject of Politics : Slavoj Žižek’s Political Philosophy. Penrith, GBR: Humanities-Ebooks, LLP, 2010. p 96-99. Copyright © 2010. Humanities-Ebooks, LLP. All rights reserved. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/wayne/Doc?id=10567330&ppg=20, accessed via e-book @ Wayne State, online, jj

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Bjerre & Lausten ’10 Henrik Jøker Bjerre is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are moral philosophy, sociology and psychoa - nalysis. His publications include Kantian Deeds (Continuum, 2010). Carsten Bagge Laustsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are terrorism, political theology, political thought and modern social theory. He has previously published The Culture of Exception. Sociology Facing the Camp (Routledge, 2005, with Bülent Diken) and Sociology through the Projector (Routledge, 2008, with Bülent Diken). Humanities Insights : The Subject of Politics : Slavoj Žižek’s Political Philosophy. Penrith, GBR: Humanities-Ebooks, LLP, 2010. p 96-99. Copyright © 2010. Humanities-Ebooks, LLP. All rights reserved. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/wayne/Doc?id=10567330&ppg=20, accessed via e-book @ Wayne State, online, jj fulltext: If we focus on Western societies for a moment again, which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics. The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of the class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems. They fight to reduce suffering, but the background of it cannot be addressed adequately within the political frame of identity politics. We can therefore place identity politics and multiculturalism in a broader, political context: So we are fighting our PC battles for the right of ethnic minor - ities, of gays and lesbians, of different lifestyles, and so forth, while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for the unrestrained development of capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible: in the predominant form of postmodern ‘cultural criticism’, the very mention of capitalism as a world system tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’, ‘fundamentalism’, and so on. The price of this depoliticization of the economy is that the domain of pol - itics itself is in a way depoliticized: political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities and the tolerance of differences. (Žižek 1999: 218) The class and commodity structure of capitalism is overdetermining society as a whole, and it is this overdetermination which identity politics is repressing. ‘Class antagonism certainly appears as one in the series of social antagonisms, but it is simultaneously the specific antagonism which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity.’ (Žižek 2000c: 320). Identity politics reduces the question concerning economy to one among several questions on an equal level. Two fatal consequences follow from this. Firstly, the narratives about a trans - formation from an essentialist Marxism to a postmodern Marxism hide the fact that this break with essentialism relates to an actual his - torical process. The multitude and non-essentialist manifold which is celebrated by the new left is something which has fundamentally only become possible through capital’s constant transgression of its own limits. Secondly, and related to the former point, the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism. When Laclau and others with him give the reader a choice between class struggle (Marxism) or postmodernity (iden - tity politics), then the problem is not only that they make the wrong choice (i.e. deny Marxism), but also, and more fundamentally, that they do not see that capital itself has become postmodern. And fur - ther, that there is a speculative connection between capitalism and postmodern identity politics. The latter serves postmodern capitalism as its perfect superstructure. The passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism to postmodern con - tingent politics (in Laclau), or the passage from sexual essen - tialism to contingent gender-formation (in Butler), or – a fur - ther example – the passage from metaphysician to ironist in Richard Rorty, is not a simple epistemological progress but part of the global change in the very nature of capitalist soci - ety. (Žižek 2000a: 106) The central question after this conclusion becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism for a way to think revolutionary change. We earlier defined the political as the process in which par - ticular demands are elevated from being an expression of particular interests to being demands of a universal restructuring of the societal order. Postmodern identity politics on this background appears to be fundamentally apolitical. It is exactly characterised by the caretaking of particular interests, and this is not fundamentally changed by form - ing rainbow coalitions or the like. What these ‘policies’ basically do, and this is what makes them reactionary, is to reinforce already exist - ing social positions (Žižek 1999: 208). The lack of a focus on econ - omy in postmodern identity politics means that it is simply not politi - cal enough. The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all, which in turn means that the new left, exemplified by Laclau, Butler, and Rorty, are not capable of distinguishing between the contingency that is made possible within a given order and the exclusions on which this order rests (Žižek 2000a: 108). The right to narrate, which is the point of departure of identity politics, is blocking the universalisation of specific demands. We have already discussed that. But there are other problems as well. Identity politics is morally blind. Yes, all ‘progressives’ support the rights of gays and lesbians. But what about the right of bikers to their lifestyle – driving Harleys really fast, being tattooed and controlling drug sales. Should young guests in night clubs have a right to take drugs – this is a kind of lifestyle as well, isn’t it? Do parents have a right to circumcise their daughters if it is part of their tradition to do so? Or should the Nazis have a right to march through town, spread propaganda and recruit young supporters? Identity politics seems to be able to legitimise anything, which is why Žižek opts for Lenin and the right to truth rather than the right to narrate (Žižek 2002b: 177). Capital treats life forms as a colonial master treats the natives: they are studied carefully and respected. Moral involvement is never at stake – one could rather speak of indifference. Another problem is that there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and thereby the division of groups that need special treat - ment: lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end? ‘Postmodernists’ do not seem to have an answer for that. Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised. The issue is not how specific a group and its demands are, but whether these may serve as a radical criti - cism of a given formation or not (Žižek 1999: 203– 204). What also seems to be forgotten is that anti-essentialism and relativism make for a position of strength, i.e. a position that can only be taken from a privileged, distanced position of supervision. It is the position from which all substantial positioning can be dismissed as essentialism, fundamentalism, primitivism, dogmatism or similar ‘isms’. The antiessentialist position is imagined to be an unprejudiced, neutral posi - tion. But this ‘neutrality’ is fake. It is a kind of ‘universalism’ which in reality supports only one given and particular societal order – cap - italism (Žižek 2001d: 103). The reference to objectively given eco - nomic limitations or ‘Development’ as it is called today seems to be the card that trumps everything. If it is played, there seems to be no way around adjusting and renouncing. Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game so that such trumps lose their significance. [/INST] <h4>Their acceptance of the “multiplicity of identity” in the 1AC trades off with a Universalist class analysis </h4><p><strong><mark>Bjerre & Lausten ’10</strong></mark> Henrik Jøker Bjerre is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are moral philosophy, sociology and psychoa - nalysis. His publications include Kantian Deeds (Continuum, 2010). Carsten Bagge Laustsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are terrorism, political theology, political thought and modern social theory. He has previously published The Culture of Exception. Sociology Facing the Camp (Routledge, 2005, with Bülent Diken) and Sociology through the Projector (Routledge, 2008, with Bülent Diken). Humanities Insights : The Subject of Politics : Slavoj Žižek’s Political Philosophy. Penrith, GBR: Humanities-Ebooks, LLP, 2010. p 96-99. Copyright © 2010. Humanities-Ebooks, LLP. All rights reserved. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/wayne/Doc?id=10567330&ppg=20<u><strong>, accessed via e-book @ Wayne State, online, jj</p><p>If we focus on Western societies for a moment again, <mark>which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of</mark> the <mark>class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>They fight to reduce suffering, but <mark>the background</mark> of it <mark>cannot be addressed</mark> adequately <mark>within the</mark> political <mark>frame of identity politics</u></strong></mark>. We can therefore place identity politics and multiculturalism in a broader, political context: So <u><strong><mark>we are fighting our PC battles for</mark> the right of ethnic <mark>minor - ities</mark>, of <mark>gays and lesbians</mark>, of different lifestyles,</u></strong> and so forth, <u><strong><mark>while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for</mark> the unrestrained development of <mark>capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible</mark>: in the predominant form of postmodern ‘cultural criticism’, <mark>the very mention of capitalism</mark> as a world system <mark>tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’</mark>, ‘fundamentalism’, and so on</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The price of this depoliticization of the economy</mark> is that the domain of pol - itics itself is in a way depoliticized: <mark>political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities </mark>and the tolerance of differences</u></strong>. (Žižek 1999: 218) <u><strong>The class and commodity structure of capitalism is overdetermining society as a whole, and it is this overdetermination which identity politics is repressing</u></strong>. ‘<u><strong>Class antagonism</u></strong> <u><strong>certainly appears as one in the series of social antagonisms, but it is simultaneously the specific antagonism which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others</u></strong>. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity.’ (Žižek 2000c: 320). <u><strong><mark>Identity politics</mark> <mark>reduces the</mark> question concerning <mark>economy to one among several questions</mark> on an equal level</u></strong>. <u><strong>Two <mark>fatal consequences follow from this</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Firstly, the narratives about a trans - formation from an essentialist Marxism to a postmodern Marxism hide the fact that this break with essentialism relates to an actual his - torical process. The multitude and non-essentialist manifold which is celebrated by the new left is something which has fundamentally only become possible through capital’s constant transgression of its own limits</u></strong>. <u><strong>Secondly, and related to the former point, <mark>the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism</u></strong></mark>. When Laclau and others with him give the reader a choice between class struggle (Marxism) or postmodernity (iden - tity politics), then the problem is not only that they make the wrong choice (i.e. deny Marxism), but also, and more fundamentally, that they do not see that capital itself has become postmodern. And fur - ther, that there is a speculative connection between capitalism and postmodern identity politics. The latter serves postmodern capitalism as its perfect superstructure. <u><strong>The passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism to postmodern con - tingent politics</u></strong> (in Laclau), or the passage from sexual essen - tialism to contingent gender-formation (in Butler), or – a fur - ther example – the passage from metaphysician to ironist in Richard Rorty, <u><strong>is</u></strong> not a simple epistemological progress but <u><strong>part of the global change in the very nature of capitalist soci - ety</u></strong>. (Žižek 2000a: 106) <u><strong><mark>The central question</mark> after this conclusion <mark>becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism</mark> for a way to think revolutionary change</u></strong>. We earlier defined the political as the process in which par - ticular demands are elevated from being an expression of particular interests to being demands of a universal restructuring of the societal order. <u><strong>Postmodern <mark>identity politics</mark> on this background <mark>appears to be fundamentally apolitical</mark>. It is exactly characterised by the caretaking of particular interests, and this is not fundamentally changed by form - ing rainbow coalitions or the like</u></strong>. What these ‘policies’ basically do, and this is what makes them reactionary, is to reinforce already exist - ing social positions (Žižek 1999: 208). <u><strong>The lack of a focus on econ - omy in postmodern identity politics means that it is simply not politi - cal enough</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all</mark>, which in turn means that the new left</u></strong>, exemplified by Laclau, Butler, and Rorty, <u><strong>are not capable of distinguishing between the contingency that is made possible within a given order and the exclusions on which this order rests</u></strong> (Žižek 2000a: 108). <u><strong><mark>The right to narrate</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>which is the point of departure of identity politics, <mark>is blocking the universalisation of specific demands</u></strong></mark>. We have already discussed that. But there are other problems as well. Identity politics is morally blind. Yes, all ‘progressives’ support the rights of gays and lesbians. But what about the right of bikers to their lifestyle – driving Harleys really fast, being tattooed and controlling drug sales. Should young guests in night clubs have a right to take drugs – this is a kind of lifestyle as well, isn’t it? Do parents have a right to circumcise their daughters if it is part of their tradition to do so? Or should the Nazis have a right to march through town, spread propaganda and recruit young supporters? <u><strong>Identity politics seems to be able to legitimise anything, which is why Žižek opts for Lenin and the right to truth rather than the right to narrate</u></strong> (Žižek 2002b: 177). <u><strong>Capital treats life forms as a colonial master treats the natives: they are studied carefully and respected</u></strong>. Moral involvement is never at stake – one could rather speak of indifference. Another problem is that <u><strong><mark>there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and</mark> thereby <mark>the division of groups</mark> that need special treat - ment: <mark>lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end?</u></strong></mark> ‘<u><strong><mark>Postmodernists’ do not</mark> seem to <mark>have an answer for that</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>The issue is not how specific a group and its demands are, but whether these may serve as a radical criti - cism of a given formation or not</u></strong> (Žižek 1999: 203– 204). What also seems to be forgotten is that anti-essentialism and relativism make for a position of strength, i.e. a position that can only be taken from a privileged, distanced position of supervision. It is the position from which all substantial positioning can be dismissed as essentialism, fundamentalism, primitivism, dogmatism or similar ‘isms’. The antiessentialist position is imagined to be an unprejudiced, neutral posi - tion. But this ‘neutrality’ is fake. It is a kind of ‘universalism’ which in reality supports only one given and particular societal order – cap - italism (Žižek 2001d: 103). The reference to objectively given eco - nomic limitations or ‘Development’ as it is called today seems to be the card that trumps everything. If it is played, there seems to be no way around adjusting and renouncing. <u><strong><mark>Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game</mark> so that such trumps lose their significance.</p></u></strong> </s>

SCENARIO 1 – Border Disputes

<h4><strong>SCENARIO 1 – Border Disputes</h4></strong>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4><strong>SCENARIO 1 – Border Disputes</h4></strong> </s>

SCENARIO 1 – Border Disputes

<h4><strong>SCENARIO 1 – Border Disputes</h4></strong>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4><strong>SCENARIO 1 – Border Disputes</h4></strong> </s>

Their form of sentimental politics commodifies and vampirically drains the oppressed of value

, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668) In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption explains why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. the postsentimental modality challenges what storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom insistence that subjects "bargain" for redemption with their own mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream. whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs or ghosts of whiteness, which involve religious traditions of self-loathing and cultural traditions confusing happiness with analgesia. The politico-sentimental uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, thereby making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful, objectified, cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are, in some way, fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift and emancipation Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life This presumption explains why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. The desire for unconflictedness might motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. the postsentimental modality challenges what storytelling have come to stand for the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of trauma as models for having and remembering collective experience in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is a condition of that violence. They cut the complexity of human motives "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth insistence that subjects "bargain" for redemption with their own mortification violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream. whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs of whiteness, which involve self-loathing and confusing happiness with analgesia. The politico-sentimental uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

(Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668) What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption, that the terms of consent are transhistorical once true feeling is shared, explains in part why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, the postsentimental modality also challenges what literature and storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience.20 Currently, as in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. Baldwin asserts that the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence. Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her insistence that subjects "bargain" for heavenly redemption with their own physical and spiritual mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs or ghosts of whiteness, which involve religious traditions of self-loathing and cultural traditions confusing happiness with analgesia. The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 The politico-sentimental novel uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, thereby making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful, objectified, cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are, in some way, fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

<h4>Their form of sentimental politics commodifies and vampirically drains the oppressed of value </h4><p><strong>Berlant ‘98<u> </p><p></u></strong>(Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature<u>, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668)</p><p></u>What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. <u><strong><mark>In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift</mark>, amelioration, <mark>and emancipation</mark>, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus</mark> to <mark>a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life</mark> into being. <mark>This presumption</u></strong></mark>, that the terms of consent are transhistorical once true feeling is shared, <u><strong><mark>explains</u></strong></mark> in part <u><strong><mark>why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance.</u></strong></mark> Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. <u><strong><mark>The desire for unconflictedness might</mark> very well <mark>motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed.</u></strong></mark> What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, <u><strong><mark>the postsentimental modality</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>challenges what</u></strong></mark> literature and <u><strong><mark>storytelling have come to stand for</mark> in the creation of sentimental national subjects</u></strong> across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which <u><strong><mark>the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of</mark> the Holocaust and <mark>trauma as models for having and remembering collective</mark> social <mark>experience</u></strong></mark>.20 Currently, as <u><strong><mark>in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence.</u></strong></mark> Baldwin asserts that <u><strong><mark>the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is</mark> precisely <mark>a condition of that violence</u>.</strong></mark> Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." <u><strong><mark>They cut the complexity of human motives</mark> and self-understanding <mark>"down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the</mark> social and <mark>material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has</mark>, or doesn't have, <mark>on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth</mark>, justice, and freedom</u></strong>.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her <u><strong><mark>insistence that subjects "bargain" for</u></strong></mark> heavenly <u><strong><mark>redemption with their own</u></strong></mark> physical and spiritual <u><strong><mark>mortification</mark>, merely and <mark>violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it.</u></strong></mark> Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. <u><strong><mark>This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he</mark> elsewhere <mark>calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.</u></strong></mark>23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, <u><strong><mark>whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs</mark> or ghosts <mark>of whiteness, which involve</mark> religious traditions of <mark>self-loathing and</mark> cultural traditions <mark>confusing happiness with analgesia.</u></strong></mark> The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 <u><strong><mark>The politico-sentimental</u></strong></mark> novel <u><strong><mark>uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject,</mark> thereby <mark>making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject</u></strong></mark>. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. <u><strong><mark>This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful</mark>, objectified, <mark>cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are</mark>, in some way, <mark>fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.</p></u></strong></mark>

Berlant ‘98

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Berlant ‘98 fulltext: (Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668) What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption, that the terms of consent are transhistorical once true feeling is shared, explains in part why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, the postsentimental modality also challenges what literature and storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience.20 Currently, as in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. Baldwin asserts that the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence. Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her insistence that subjects "bargain" for heavenly redemption with their own physical and spiritual mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs or ghosts of whiteness, which involve religious traditions of self-loathing and cultural traditions confusing happiness with analgesia. The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 The politico-sentimental novel uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, thereby making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful, objectified, cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are, in some way, fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image. [/INST] <h4>Their form of sentimental politics commodifies and vampirically drains the oppressed of value </h4><p><strong>Berlant ‘98<u> </p><p></u></strong>(Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature<u>, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668)</p><p></u>What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. <u><strong><mark>In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift</mark>, amelioration, <mark>and emancipation</mark>, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus</mark> to <mark>a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life</mark> into being. <mark>This presumption</u></strong></mark>, that the terms of consent are transhistorical once true feeling is shared, <u><strong><mark>explains</u></strong></mark> in part <u><strong><mark>why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance.</u></strong></mark> Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. <u><strong><mark>The desire for unconflictedness might</mark> very well <mark>motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed.</u></strong></mark> What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, <u><strong><mark>the postsentimental modality</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>challenges what</u></strong></mark> literature and <u><strong><mark>storytelling have come to stand for</mark> in the creation of sentimental national subjects</u></strong> across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which <u><strong><mark>the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of</mark> the Holocaust and <mark>trauma as models for having and remembering collective</mark> social <mark>experience</u></strong></mark>.20 Currently, as <u><strong><mark>in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence.</u></strong></mark> Baldwin asserts that <u><strong><mark>the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is</mark> precisely <mark>a condition of that violence</u>.</strong></mark> Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." <u><strong><mark>They cut the complexity of human motives</mark> and self-understanding <mark>"down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the</mark> social and <mark>material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has</mark>, or doesn't have, <mark>on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth</mark>, justice, and freedom</u></strong>.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her <u><strong><mark>insistence that subjects "bargain" for</u></strong></mark> heavenly <u><strong><mark>redemption with their own</u></strong></mark> physical and spiritual <u><strong><mark>mortification</mark>, merely and <mark>violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it.</u></strong></mark> Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. <u><strong><mark>This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he</mark> elsewhere <mark>calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.</u></strong></mark>23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, <u><strong><mark>whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs</mark> or ghosts <mark>of whiteness, which involve</mark> religious traditions of <mark>self-loathing and</mark> cultural traditions <mark>confusing happiness with analgesia.</u></strong></mark> The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 <u><strong><mark>The politico-sentimental</u></strong></mark> novel <u><strong><mark>uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject,</mark> thereby <mark>making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject</u></strong></mark>. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. <u><strong><mark>This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful</mark>, objectified, <mark>cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are</mark>, in some way, <mark>fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

The impact is large scale structural violence, escalating systemic warfare and environmental destruction

an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq Greek economy in ruins escalation of global food prices bee colonies in global extinction 925 million hungry in 2010 the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on Sounds like a ticking time bomb it is. massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something Gilding explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now. We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism. a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose. Adaptability, modifications, and displacement constitute the very essence of capitalism. Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat. one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness. all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; choices abound, and yet they all lead us down one path and through the golden gates of capitalist heaven. outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for there is no choice when everything is expendable. There is nothing substantial about the future when all you can do is survive by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength with the people around you. All the rest is false hope. each and every one of us has certain skills that can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic. our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.

economic meltdown frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business prolonged war in Iraq Greek economy in ruins escalation of global food prices bee colonies in extinction 925 million hungry five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than the poorest 416 million planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather Sounds like a ticking time bomb it is. massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the Holocaust two world wars genocides in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur 1 million left homeless and 316,000 killed in Haiti We are in the last decade where we can do something We do not see the crisis for what it is we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of capitalism Adaptability, modifications, and displacement constitute the essence of capitalism. choices abound, and they all lead us down through the golden gates of capitalist heaven. there is no choice when everything is expendable. all you can do is survive each and every one of us has skills to making the solutions to climate change effective and realistic our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is. It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3 The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now. We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism.”5 The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose.6 Adaptability, modifications, and displacement, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, constitute the very essence of capitalism. Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat. Under capitalism, one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness. By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; choices abound, and yet they all lead us down one path and through the golden gates of capitalist heaven. For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure – myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage – outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for there is no choice when everything is expendable. There is nothing substantial about the future when all you can do is survive by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength, stamina, and courage with the people around you. All the rest is false hope. In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that each and every one of us has certain skills that can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic. In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.

<h4>The impact is large scale structural violence, escalating systemic warfare and environmental destruction </h4><p><strong>Parr ’13</strong> (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics<u>, pp. 145-147)</p><p></u>A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: <u><strong>an <mark>economic meltdown</mark>; a <mark>frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business</u></strong></mark> as President George W Bush exited the White House; <u><strong>a <mark>prolonged</mark>, costly, and unjustified <mark>war in Iraq</u></strong></mark>; the <u><strong><mark>Greek economy in ruins</u></strong></mark>; an <u><strong><mark>escalation of global food prices</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>bee colonies in</mark> global <mark>extinction</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>925 million hungry</u></strong></mark> reported <u><strong>in 2010</u></strong>; as of 2005, <u><strong>the world's <mark>five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than</mark> that of <mark>the poorest 416 million</mark> people</u></strong>, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; <u><strong>a <mark>planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather</mark> conditions; and the list goes on and on</u></strong> and on.2 <u><strong><mark>Sounds like a ticking time bomb</u></strong></mark>, doesn't it? Well <u><strong><mark>it is.</mark> </u></strong>It is shameful to think that <u><strong><mark>massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison</mark> the 6 million murdered during <mark>the Holocaust</mark>; the millions killed in <mark>two world wars</mark>; the <mark>genocides in</mark> the former <mark>Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur</mark>; the <mark>1 million left homeless and</mark> the <mark>316,000 killed</mark> by the 2010 earthquake <mark>in Haiti</mark>.</u></strong> The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3 The real issue climate change poses is that <u><strong>we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>We are in the last decade where we can do something</u></strong></mark> about the situation. Paul <u><strong>Gilding</u></strong>, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, <u><strong>explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure</u></strong>;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 <u><strong>Once we move higher than 2°C of warming,</u></strong> which is what is <u><strong>projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will</u></strong> begin to <u><strong>kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now. <mark>We do not see the crisis for what it is</mark>; <mark>we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with</mark>.</u></strong> This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, <u><strong><mark>the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of</mark> the capital and its model: <mark>capitalism</mark>.</u></strong>”5 The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, <u><strong>a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose.</u></strong>6 <u><strong><mark>Adaptability, modifications, and displacement</u></strong></mark>, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, <u><strong><mark>constitute the</mark> very <mark>essence of capitalism.</mark> Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat.</u></strong> Under capitalism, <u><strong>one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it</u></strong>, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. <u><strong>In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon</u></strong> here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, <u><strong>although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness.</u></strong> By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how <u><strong>all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; <mark>choices abound, and</mark> yet <mark>they all lead us down</mark> one path and <mark>through the golden gates of capitalist heaven.</mark> </u></strong>For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure – myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage – <u><strong>outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for <mark>there is no choice when everything is expendable.</mark> There is nothing substantial about the future when <mark>all you can do is survive</mark> by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength</u></strong>, stamina, and courage <u><strong>with the people around you. All the rest is false hope.</u></strong> In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that <u><strong><mark>each and every one of us has</mark> certain <mark>skills</mark> that can contribute <mark>to making the solutions</mark> that we introduce in response <mark>to climate change</mark> and environmental degradation more <mark>effective and</mark> more <mark>realistic</mark>.</u></strong> In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: <u><strong><mark>our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.</p></u></strong></mark>

Parr ’13 (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics, pp. 145-147)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Parr ’13 (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics, pp. 145-147) fulltext: A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is. It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3 The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now. We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism.”5 The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose.6 Adaptability, modifications, and displacement, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, constitute the very essence of capitalism. Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat. Under capitalism, one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness. By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; choices abound, and yet they all lead us down one path and through the golden gates of capitalist heaven. For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure – myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage – outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for there is no choice when everything is expendable. There is nothing substantial about the future when all you can do is survive by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength, stamina, and courage with the people around you. All the rest is false hope. In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that each and every one of us has certain skills that can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic. In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over. [/INST] <h4>The impact is large scale structural violence, escalating systemic warfare and environmental destruction </h4><p><strong>Parr ’13</strong> (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics<u>, pp. 145-147)</p><p></u>A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: <u><strong>an <mark>economic meltdown</mark>; a <mark>frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business</u></strong></mark> as President George W Bush exited the White House; <u><strong>a <mark>prolonged</mark>, costly, and unjustified <mark>war in Iraq</u></strong></mark>; the <u><strong><mark>Greek economy in ruins</u></strong></mark>; an <u><strong><mark>escalation of global food prices</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>bee colonies in</mark> global <mark>extinction</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>925 million hungry</u></strong></mark> reported <u><strong>in 2010</u></strong>; as of 2005, <u><strong>the world's <mark>five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than</mark> that of <mark>the poorest 416 million</mark> people</u></strong>, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; <u><strong>a <mark>planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather</mark> conditions; and the list goes on and on</u></strong> and on.2 <u><strong><mark>Sounds like a ticking time bomb</u></strong></mark>, doesn't it? Well <u><strong><mark>it is.</mark> </u></strong>It is shameful to think that <u><strong><mark>massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison</mark> the 6 million murdered during <mark>the Holocaust</mark>; the millions killed in <mark>two world wars</mark>; the <mark>genocides in</mark> the former <mark>Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur</mark>; the <mark>1 million left homeless and</mark> the <mark>316,000 killed</mark> by the 2010 earthquake <mark>in Haiti</mark>.</u></strong> The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3 The real issue climate change poses is that <u><strong>we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>We are in the last decade where we can do something</u></strong></mark> about the situation. Paul <u><strong>Gilding</u></strong>, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, <u><strong>explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure</u></strong>;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 <u><strong>Once we move higher than 2°C of warming,</u></strong> which is what is <u><strong>projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will</u></strong> begin to <u><strong>kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now. <mark>We do not see the crisis for what it is</mark>; <mark>we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with</mark>.</u></strong> This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, <u><strong><mark>the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of</mark> the capital and its model: <mark>capitalism</mark>.</u></strong>”5 The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, <u><strong>a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose.</u></strong>6 <u><strong><mark>Adaptability, modifications, and displacement</u></strong></mark>, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, <u><strong><mark>constitute the</mark> very <mark>essence of capitalism.</mark> Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat.</u></strong> Under capitalism, <u><strong>one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it</u></strong>, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. <u><strong>In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon</u></strong> here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, <u><strong>although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness.</u></strong> By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how <u><strong>all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; <mark>choices abound, and</mark> yet <mark>they all lead us down</mark> one path and <mark>through the golden gates of capitalist heaven.</mark> </u></strong>For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure – myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage – <u><strong>outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for <mark>there is no choice when everything is expendable.</mark> There is nothing substantial about the future when <mark>all you can do is survive</mark> by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength</u></strong>, stamina, and courage <u><strong>with the people around you. All the rest is false hope.</u></strong> In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that <u><strong><mark>each and every one of us has</mark> certain <mark>skills</mark> that can contribute <mark>to making the solutions</mark> that we introduce in response <mark>to climate change</mark> and environmental degradation more <mark>effective and</mark> more <mark>realistic</mark>.</u></strong> In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: <u><strong><mark>our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

***Legalization advocates concede LEGISLATIVE ACTION is the MOST LIKELY way marijuana legalization would occur -- NOT a referendum

The long, hard fight by marijuana advocates to make headway toward legalizing pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope this year in the U.S. Congress in the form of the HR 499 bill which is gaining supporters by the week The legislation proposes changes to federal law regarding marijuana remove it from its list of controlled substances and instead leave it to the states to regulate The bill continues to gain support in Congress Legalization advocates are focusing a lot of attention and energy on the bill, propping it up as the best hope such a piece of legislation has had the timing may be good for such a full-bore push public opinion is moving quickly in the direction of legalizing marijuana, and that in fact 52 percent of people asked in the survey said they support legalization

The fight by marijuana advocates toward legalizing pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope in the HR 499 which is gaining supporters by the week. The legislation proposes to remove it from its list of controlled substances and leave it to the states to regulate The bill continues to gain support Legalization advocates are focusing attention and energy propping it up as the best hope a piece of legislation has had the timing may be good for such a full push public opinion is moving in the direction of legalizing marijuana 52 percent support legalization

Connor Adams, senior award winning journalist for the International Business Times, April 05th 2013, “Will HR 499 Pot Bill Finally Legalize Marijuana In America?”, http://www.ibtimes.com/will-hr-499-pot-bill-finally-legalize-marijuana-america-1174909, AB The long, hard fight by marijuana advocates to make some headway toward legalizing, or at least decriminalizing, pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope this year in the U.S. Congress in the form of the HR 499 bill, which is gaining supporters by the week. The proposed legislation, officially known as the Ending Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, proposes a range of changes to federal law regarding marijuana, including directing the federal government to decriminalize weed and remove it from its list of controlled substances, and instead leave it to the states to regulate it in a manner similar to the way it oversees the tobacco and liquor markets. The bill -- which was introduced Feb. 5 by U.S. Rep. Jared Polis, a Colorado Democrat -- has remained in the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations since Feb. 28, but it continues to gain support in Congress. Its 12th and 13th co-sponsors signed on to back the legislation on March 18, and even one Republican representative, Dana Rohrbacher of California, is currently co-sponsoring the bill. Legalization advocates are focusing a lot of attention and energy on the bill, propping it up as the best hope such a piece of legislation has had in some time. Meanwhile, NORML and other groups are encouraging their members and other, unaffiliated friends of pot to take action in hopes of convincing their elected representatives that a large percentage of the American public supports the proposed policy. It appears that the timing may be good for such a full-bore push, as a poll released Thursday by the Pew Research Center shows that public opinion is moving quickly in the direction of legalizing marijuana, and that in fact 52 percent of people asked in the survey said they support legalization, versus 45 percent who oppose it. Last year's Pew study found a markedly lower level of support, with 50 percent of people opposing legalization and just 45 percent supporting it.

<h4><strong>***Legalization advocates concede LEGISLATIVE ACTION is the MOST LIKELY way marijuana legalization would occur -- NOT a referendum </h4><p>Sheets 13</p><p></strong>Connor Adams, senior award winning journalist for the International Business Times, April 05th 2013, “Will HR 499 Pot Bill Finally Legalize Marijuana In America?”, http://www.ibtimes.com/will-hr-499-pot-bill-finally-legalize-marijuana-america-1174909, AB</p><p><u><strong><mark>The</mark> long, hard <mark>fight by marijuana advocates</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to</u></strong> <u><strong>make</u></strong> some <u><strong>headway <mark>toward legalizing</u></strong></mark>, or at least decriminalizing, <u><strong><mark>pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope</mark> this year in the U.S. Congress</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>in</mark> the form of <mark>the HR 499</mark> bill</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>which is gaining supporters by the week</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> proposed <u><strong><mark>legislation</u></strong></mark>, officially known as the Ending Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, <u><strong><mark>proposes</u></strong></mark> a range of <u><strong>changes <mark>to</mark> federal law regarding marijuana</u></strong>, including directing the federal government to decriminalize weed and <u><strong><mark>remove it from</mark> <mark>its list of</mark> <mark>controlled substances</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> instead <mark>leave it to the states to regulate</u></strong></mark> it in a manner similar to the way it oversees the tobacco and liquor markets. <u><strong><mark>The bill</u></strong></mark> -- which was introduced Feb. 5 by U.S. Rep. Jared Polis, a Colorado Democrat -- has remained in the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations since Feb. 28, but it <u><strong><mark>continues to gain support</mark> in Congress</u></strong>. Its 12th and 13th co-sponsors signed on to back the legislation on March 18, and even one Republican representative, Dana Rohrbacher of California, is currently co-sponsoring the bill. <u><strong><mark>Legalization advocates</mark> <mark>are focusing</mark> a lot of <mark>attention and energy</mark> on the bill, <mark>propping it up as the best hope</mark> such <mark>a piece of legislation has had</mark> </u></strong>in some time. Meanwhile, NORML and other groups are encouraging their members and other, unaffiliated friends of pot to take action in hopes of convincing their elected representatives that a large percentage of the American public supports the proposed policy. It appears that <u><strong><mark>the timing may be good for such a full</mark>-bore <mark>push</u></strong></mark>, as a poll released Thursday by the Pew Research Center shows that <u><strong><mark>public</mark> <mark>opinion is moving</mark> quickly <mark>in the direction of legalizing marijuana</mark>, and that in fact <mark>52 percent</mark> of people asked in the survey said they <mark>support legalization</u></strong></mark>, versus 45 percent who oppose it. Last year's Pew study found a markedly lower level of support, with 50 percent of people opposing legalization and just 45 percent supporting it.</p>

Sheets 13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Sheets 13 fulltext: Connor Adams, senior award winning journalist for the International Business Times, April 05th 2013, “Will HR 499 Pot Bill Finally Legalize Marijuana In America?”, http://www.ibtimes.com/will-hr-499-pot-bill-finally-legalize-marijuana-america-1174909, AB The long, hard fight by marijuana advocates to make some headway toward legalizing, or at least decriminalizing, pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope this year in the U.S. Congress in the form of the HR 499 bill, which is gaining supporters by the week. The proposed legislation, officially known as the Ending Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, proposes a range of changes to federal law regarding marijuana, including directing the federal government to decriminalize weed and remove it from its list of controlled substances, and instead leave it to the states to regulate it in a manner similar to the way it oversees the tobacco and liquor markets. The bill -- which was introduced Feb. 5 by U.S. Rep. Jared Polis, a Colorado Democrat -- has remained in the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations since Feb. 28, but it continues to gain support in Congress. Its 12th and 13th co-sponsors signed on to back the legislation on March 18, and even one Republican representative, Dana Rohrbacher of California, is currently co-sponsoring the bill. Legalization advocates are focusing a lot of attention and energy on the bill, propping it up as the best hope such a piece of legislation has had in some time. Meanwhile, NORML and other groups are encouraging their members and other, unaffiliated friends of pot to take action in hopes of convincing their elected representatives that a large percentage of the American public supports the proposed policy. It appears that the timing may be good for such a full-bore push, as a poll released Thursday by the Pew Research Center shows that public opinion is moving quickly in the direction of legalizing marijuana, and that in fact 52 percent of people asked in the survey said they support legalization, versus 45 percent who oppose it. Last year's Pew study found a markedly lower level of support, with 50 percent of people opposing legalization and just 45 percent supporting it. [/INST] <h4><strong>***Legalization advocates concede LEGISLATIVE ACTION is the MOST LIKELY way marijuana legalization would occur -- NOT a referendum </h4><p>Sheets 13</p><p></strong>Connor Adams, senior award winning journalist for the International Business Times, April 05th 2013, “Will HR 499 Pot Bill Finally Legalize Marijuana In America?”, http://www.ibtimes.com/will-hr-499-pot-bill-finally-legalize-marijuana-america-1174909, AB</p><p><u><strong><mark>The</mark> long, hard <mark>fight by marijuana advocates</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to</u></strong> <u><strong>make</u></strong> some <u><strong>headway <mark>toward legalizing</u></strong></mark>, or at least decriminalizing, <u><strong><mark>pot at the federal level is experiencing a glimmer of hope</mark> this year in the U.S. Congress</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>in</mark> the form of <mark>the HR 499</mark> bill</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>which is gaining supporters by the week</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> proposed <u><strong><mark>legislation</u></strong></mark>, officially known as the Ending Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, <u><strong><mark>proposes</u></strong></mark> a range of <u><strong>changes <mark>to</mark> federal law regarding marijuana</u></strong>, including directing the federal government to decriminalize weed and <u><strong><mark>remove it from</mark> <mark>its list of</mark> <mark>controlled substances</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> instead <mark>leave it to the states to regulate</u></strong></mark> it in a manner similar to the way it oversees the tobacco and liquor markets. <u><strong><mark>The bill</u></strong></mark> -- which was introduced Feb. 5 by U.S. Rep. Jared Polis, a Colorado Democrat -- has remained in the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations since Feb. 28, but it <u><strong><mark>continues to gain support</mark> in Congress</u></strong>. Its 12th and 13th co-sponsors signed on to back the legislation on March 18, and even one Republican representative, Dana Rohrbacher of California, is currently co-sponsoring the bill. <u><strong><mark>Legalization advocates</mark> <mark>are focusing</mark> a lot of <mark>attention and energy</mark> on the bill, <mark>propping it up as the best hope</mark> such <mark>a piece of legislation has had</mark> </u></strong>in some time. Meanwhile, NORML and other groups are encouraging their members and other, unaffiliated friends of pot to take action in hopes of convincing their elected representatives that a large percentage of the American public supports the proposed policy. It appears that <u><strong><mark>the timing may be good for such a full</mark>-bore <mark>push</u></strong></mark>, as a poll released Thursday by the Pew Research Center shows that <u><strong><mark>public</mark> <mark>opinion is moving</mark> quickly <mark>in the direction of legalizing marijuana</mark>, and that in fact <mark>52 percent</mark> of people asked in the survey said they <mark>support legalization</u></strong></mark>, versus 45 percent who oppose it. Last year's Pew study found a markedly lower level of support, with 50 percent of people opposing legalization and just 45 percent supporting it.</p> </s>

Vote negative to endorse a tactic for mass mobilization to legalize cannabis in opposition to racial oppression and the use of incarceration to maintain a racial caste system.

<h4><strong>Vote negative to endorse a tactic for mass mobilization to legalize cannabis in opposition to racial oppression and the use of incarceration to maintain a racial caste system.</h4></strong>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4><strong>Vote negative to endorse a tactic for mass mobilization to legalize cannabis in opposition to racial oppression and the use of incarceration to maintain a racial caste system.</h4></strong> </s>

They are coming now despite economic integration

Despite constant presidential summits proclaiming a new era of Latin American economic integration and political brotherhood, an escalation of border conflicts in recent weeks should draw alarm bells everywhere escalating tensions between several Latin American countries over century-old border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures, but are also affecting talks on trade, investment and security issues with the region U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts. it is always a concern when partners and allies in this hemisphere have tensions with each other. It complicates cooperation. Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because no extra-regional interlocutor will be very interested in conducting a negotiation when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”

Despite summits proclaiming Latin American economic integration an escalation of border conflicts should draw alarm bells escalating tensions between Latin American countries over border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures but are affecting talks on trade, investment and security with the region it is a concern when partners have tensions It complicates cooperation no extra-regional interlocutor will be interested in conducting a negotiation

Despite constant presidential summits proclaiming a new era of Latin American economic integration and political brotherhood, an escalation of border conflicts in recent weeks should draw alarm bells everywhere.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, escalating tensions between several Latin American countries over century-old border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures, but are also affecting talks on trade, investment and security issues with the region. U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste. Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “it is always a concern when partners and allies in this hemisphere have tensions with each other. It complicates cooperation.”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because no extra-regional interlocutor will be very interested in conducting a negotiation when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”

<h4><strong>They are coming now despite economic integration</h4><p></strong>Andres <strong>Oppenheimer 13</strong> Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25th, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/</p><p><u><mark>Despite </mark>constant presidential <mark>summits proclaiming </mark>a new era of <mark>Latin American economic integration</mark> and political brotherhood, <mark>an <strong>escalation of border conflicts</strong></mark> in recent weeks <strong><mark>should draw alarm bells</strong></mark> everywhere</u>.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, <u><strong><mark>escalating tensions</strong> between</mark> several <mark>Latin American countries <strong>over</strong></mark> century-old <strong><mark>border disputes are</strong> not only resulting in growing <strong>military expenditures</strong></mark>, <mark>but are</mark> also <mark>affecting talks on trade, investment and security</mark> issues <mark>with the region</u></mark>. <u>U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.</u>¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste. Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “<u><mark>it is </mark>always<mark> a concern when partners </mark>and allies in this hemisphere <mark>have tensions </mark>with each other. <mark>It</mark> <mark>complicates cooperation</mark>.</u>”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ <u>Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because <strong><mark>no extra-regional interlocutor</strong> will be </mark>very <mark>interested in <strong>conducting a negotiation</strong> </mark>when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”</p></u>

Andres Oppenheimer 13 Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25th, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Andres Oppenheimer 13 Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25th, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/ fulltext: Despite constant presidential summits proclaiming a new era of Latin American economic integration and political brotherhood, an escalation of border conflicts in recent weeks should draw alarm bells everywhere.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, escalating tensions between several Latin American countries over century-old border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures, but are also affecting talks on trade, investment and security issues with the region. U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste. Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “it is always a concern when partners and allies in this hemisphere have tensions with each other. It complicates cooperation.”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because no extra-regional interlocutor will be very interested in conducting a negotiation when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.” [/INST] <h4><strong>They are coming now despite economic integration</h4><p></strong>Andres <strong>Oppenheimer 13</strong> Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25th, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/</p><p><u><mark>Despite </mark>constant presidential <mark>summits proclaiming </mark>a new era of <mark>Latin American economic integration</mark> and political brotherhood, <mark>an <strong>escalation of border conflicts</strong></mark> in recent weeks <strong><mark>should draw alarm bells</strong></mark> everywhere</u>.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, <u><strong><mark>escalating tensions</strong> between</mark> several <mark>Latin American countries <strong>over</strong></mark> century-old <strong><mark>border disputes are</strong> not only resulting in growing <strong>military expenditures</strong></mark>, <mark>but are</mark> also <mark>affecting talks on trade, investment and security</mark> issues <mark>with the region</u></mark>. <u>U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.</u>¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste. Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “<u><mark>it is </mark>always<mark> a concern when partners </mark>and allies in this hemisphere <mark>have tensions </mark>with each other. <mark>It</mark> <mark>complicates cooperation</mark>.</u>”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ <u>Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because <strong><mark>no extra-regional interlocutor</strong> will be </mark>very <mark>interested in <strong>conducting a negotiation</strong> </mark>when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”</p></u> </s>

They are coming now despite economic integration

Despite constant presidential summits proclaiming a new era of Latin American economic integration and political brotherhood, an escalation of border conflicts in recent weeks should draw alarm bells everywhere escalating tensions between several Latin American countries over century-old border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures, but are also affecting talks on trade, investment and security issues with the region U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts. it is always a concern when partners and allies in this hemisphere have tensions with each other. It complicates cooperation. Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because no extra-regional interlocutor will be very interested in conducting a negotiation when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”

Despite summits proclaiming Latin American economic integration an escalation of border conflicts should draw alarm bells escalating tensions between Latin American countries over border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures but are affecting talks on trade, investment and security with the region it is a concern when partners have tensions It complicates cooperation no extra-regional interlocutor will be interested in conducting a negotiation

Despite constant presidential summits proclaiming a new era of Latin American economic integration and political brotherhood, an escalation of border conflicts in recent weeks should draw alarm bells everywhere.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, escalating tensions between several Latin American countries over century-old border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures, but are also affecting talks on trade, investment and security issues with the region. U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste. Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “it is always a concern when partners and allies in this hemisphere have tensions with each other. It complicates cooperation.”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because no extra-regional interlocutor will be very interested in conducting a negotiation when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”

<h4><strong>They are coming now despite economic integration</h4><p></strong>Andres <strong>Oppenheimer 13</strong> Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25th, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/</p><p><u><strong><mark>Despite </mark>constant presidential <mark>summits proclaiming </mark>a new era of <mark>Latin American economic integration</mark> and political brotherhood, <mark>an escalation of border conflicts</mark> in recent weeks <mark>should draw alarm bells</mark> everywhere</u></strong>.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, <u><strong><mark>escalating tensions between</mark> several <mark>Latin American countries over</mark> century-old <mark>border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures</mark>, <mark>but are</mark> also <mark>affecting talks on trade, investment and security</mark> issues <mark>with the region</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.</u></strong>¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste. Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “<u><strong><mark>it is </mark>always<mark> a concern when partners </mark>and allies in this hemisphere <mark>have tensions </mark>with each other. <mark>It</mark> <mark>complicates cooperation</mark>.</u></strong>”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ <u><strong>Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because <mark>no extra-regional interlocutor will be </mark>very <mark>interested in conducting a negotiation </mark>when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”</p></u></strong>

Andres Oppenheimer 13 Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25th, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Andres Oppenheimer 13 Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25th, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/ fulltext: Despite constant presidential summits proclaiming a new era of Latin American economic integration and political brotherhood, an escalation of border conflicts in recent weeks should draw alarm bells everywhere.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, escalating tensions between several Latin American countries over century-old border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures, but are also affecting talks on trade, investment and security issues with the region. U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste. Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “it is always a concern when partners and allies in this hemisphere have tensions with each other. It complicates cooperation.”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because no extra-regional interlocutor will be very interested in conducting a negotiation when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.” [/INST] <h4><strong>They are coming now despite economic integration</h4><p></strong>Andres <strong>Oppenheimer 13</strong> Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25th, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/</p><p><u><strong><mark>Despite </mark>constant presidential <mark>summits proclaiming </mark>a new era of <mark>Latin American economic integration</mark> and political brotherhood, <mark>an escalation of border conflicts</mark> in recent weeks <mark>should draw alarm bells</mark> everywhere</u></strong>.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, <u><strong><mark>escalating tensions between</mark> several <mark>Latin American countries over</mark> century-old <mark>border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures</mark>, <mark>but are</mark> also <mark>affecting talks on trade, investment and security</mark> issues <mark>with the region</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.</u></strong>¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste. Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “<u><strong><mark>it is </mark>always<mark> a concern when partners </mark>and allies in this hemisphere <mark>have tensions </mark>with each other. <mark>It</mark> <mark>complicates cooperation</mark>.</u></strong>”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ <u><strong>Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because <mark>no extra-regional interlocutor will be </mark>very <mark>interested in conducting a negotiation </mark>when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”</p></u></strong> </s>

Vote negative as a strategy to uncover the banal nature of the university -- The insurrection is here and we refuse to believe that debate will make the university a better place. Of course our role as debaters necessarily implicates us, but that is precisely the point—we reject and destroy scholarship within the academy

There’s a contradiction at the heart of all academic political theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a sort of commodity Thus academic emancipatory theory reveals itself as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention but rather only as a moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia it functions as another line on the CVand is one strategy through which the university system carries out its self-reproduction It thus functions the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics as something like a commodity within the academic system. The function is not to intervene in the broader political system despite how we think about our work but rather to carry out yet another iteration of the academic discourse Were the aim political change then the discourse would have to find a way to reach outside the academy, but this is precisely what academic political theory cannot do due to the presentation structure To produce political change, the academic would have to sacrifice his or her erudition or scholarship They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication scholasticism presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse and the content; they want to produce change emancipatory academic political discourse is thus that it is formally and functionally apolitical it simply reproduces its own discourse and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields and no, the classroom doesn’t count recognition of this paradox might be why we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish the academic fantasy of a avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for the people The idea of the intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy would be a little less pompous and self-righteous

There’s a contradiction at the heart of all academic theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a commodity emancipatory theory reveals itself as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention but rather only as a moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia it functions as a strategy through which the university carries out self-reproduction It functions as a commodity The function is not to intervene in the broader political system– despite how we think about our work –but rather to carry out yet another iteration of discourse Were the aim political change discourse would have to find a way outside the academy but theory cannot do due to the structure To produce political change, the academic would have to sacrifice scholarship They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication emancipatory academic political discourse is apolitical it simply reproduces its own discourse and no, the classroom doesn’t count

There’s a sort of Hegelian contradiction at the heart of all academic political theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. In a nutshell, the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a sort of commodity. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in academicjournals that few have access to, in a jargon that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at conferencesthat only other academics generally attend. Thus, academic emancipatory political theory reveals itself in its truth as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention at all, but rather only as a move or moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia. That is, it functions as another line on the CVand is one strategy through which the university system carries out its autopoiesis or self-reproduction across time. It thus functions– the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics, but how things function –as something like a commodity within the academic system. The function is not to intervene in the broader political system– despite what all of us doing political theory say and how we think about our work –but rather to carry out yet another iteration of the academic discourse (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities). Were the aim political change, then the discourse would have to find a way to reach outside the academy, but this is precisely what academic political theory cannot do due to the publication and presentation structure, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. To produce political change, the academic political theorist would have to sacrifice his or her erudition or scholarship, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval scholasticism that only schoolmen can appreciate, which presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse– only other experts can understand it –and the content; they want to produce change). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse. The paradox of emancipatory academic political discourse is thus that it is formally and functionally apolitical. At the level of its intention or what it says it aims to effect political change and intervention, but at the level of what it does, it simply reproduces its own discourse and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields (and no, the classroom doesn’t count). Unconscious recognition of this paradox might be why, in some corners, we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish “the party”. The party is the academic fantasy of a philosopher-king or an academic avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for all those “dopes and illiterate” that characterize the people (somehow the issue of how the party eventually becomes an end in itself, aimed solely at perpetuating itself, thereby divorcing itself from the people never gets addressed by these neo-totalitarians). The idea of the party and of the intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox I’ve recognized here and of the political theorist that genuinely wants to produce change while also recognizing that the sociological structure of the academy can’t meet those requirements. Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy for reproducing the university discourse would be a little less pompous and self-righteous, but everyone has to feel important and like their the best thing since sliced bread, I guess.

<h4>Vote negative as a strategy to uncover the banal nature of the university -- The insurrection is here and we refuse to believe that debate will make the university a better place. Of course our role as debaters necessarily implicates us, but that is precisely the point—we reject and destroy scholarship within the academy </h4><p><strong>Bryant 13</strong>—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/)</p><p><u><strong><mark>There’s a</u></strong></mark> sort of Hegelian <u><strong><mark>contradiction at the heart of all academic</mark> political <mark>theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory.</u></strong></mark> In a nutshell, <u><strong><mark>the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a</mark> sort of <mark>commodity</u></strong></mark>. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in academicjournals that few have access to, in a jargon that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at conferencesthat only other academics generally attend. <u><strong>Thus</u></strong>, <u><strong>academic <mark>emancipatory</u></strong></mark> political <u><strong><mark>theory reveals itself</u></strong></mark> in its truth <u><strong><mark>as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention</mark> </u></strong>at all, <u><strong><mark>but rather only as a</mark> </u></strong>move or <u><strong><mark>moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia</u></strong></mark>. That is, <u><strong><mark>it functions</mark> <mark>as</mark> <mark>a</mark>nother line on the CVand is one <mark>strategy through which the university</mark> system <mark>carries</mark> <mark>out</mark> its</u></strong> autopoiesis or <u><strong><mark>self-reproduction</u></strong></mark> across time. <u><strong><mark>It </mark>thus <mark>functions</u></strong></mark>– <u><strong>the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics</u></strong>, but how things function –<u><strong><mark>as</mark> something like <mark>a commodity</mark> within the academic system. <mark>The function is not to intervene in the broader political system</u></strong>– <u><strong>despite</u></strong></mark> what all of us doing political theory say and <u><strong><mark>how we think about our work</u></strong> –<u><strong>but rather to carry out yet another iteration of</mark> the academic <mark>discourse</u></strong></mark> (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities). <u><strong><mark>Were the aim political change</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>then the <mark>discourse would have to find a way</mark> to reach <mark>outside the academy</mark>, <mark>but</mark> this is precisely what academic political <mark>theory cannot do due to the</mark> </u></strong>publication and <u><strong>presentation <mark>structure</u></strong></mark>, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. <u><strong><mark>To produce political change, the academic</u></strong></mark> political theorist <u><strong><mark>would have to sacrifice</mark> his or her erudition or <mark>scholarship</u></strong></mark>, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. <u><strong><mark>They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication</u></strong></mark>. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval <u><strong>scholasticism</u></strong> that only schoolmen can appreciate, which <u><strong>presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse</u></strong>– only other experts can understand it –<u><strong>and the content; they want to produce change</u></strong>). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse. The paradox of <u><strong><mark>emancipatory academic political discourse</mark> is thus that it <mark>is</mark> formally and functionally</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>apolitical</u></strong></mark>. At the level of its intention or what it says it aims to effect political change and intervention, but at the level of what it does, <u><strong><mark>it simply reproduces its own discourse</mark> and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields</u></strong> (<u><strong><mark>and no, the classroom doesn’t count</u></strong></mark>). Unconscious <u><strong>recognition of this paradox might be why</u></strong>, in some corners, <u><strong>we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish</u></strong> “the party”. The party is <u><strong>the academic fantasy of a </u></strong>philosopher-king or an academic <u><strong>avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for </u></strong>all those “dopes and illiterate” that characterize <u><strong>the people</u></strong> (somehow the issue of how the party eventually becomes an end in itself, aimed solely at perpetuating itself, thereby divorcing itself from the people never gets addressed by these neo-totalitarians). <u><strong>The idea of the</u></strong> party and of the <u><strong>intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox</u></strong> I’ve recognized here and of the political theorist that genuinely wants to produce change while also recognizing that the sociological structure of the academy can’t meet those requirements. <u><strong>Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy</u></strong> for reproducing the university discourse <u><strong>would be a little less pompous and self-righteous</u></strong>, but everyone has to feel important and like their the best thing since sliced bread, I guess.</p>

Bryant 13—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Bryant 13—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/) fulltext: There’s a sort of Hegelian contradiction at the heart of all academic political theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. In a nutshell, the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a sort of commodity. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in academicjournals that few have access to, in a jargon that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at conferencesthat only other academics generally attend. Thus, academic emancipatory political theory reveals itself in its truth as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention at all, but rather only as a move or moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia. That is, it functions as another line on the CVand is one strategy through which the university system carries out its autopoiesis or self-reproduction across time. It thus functions– the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics, but how things function –as something like a commodity within the academic system. The function is not to intervene in the broader political system– despite what all of us doing political theory say and how we think about our work –but rather to carry out yet another iteration of the academic discourse (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities). Were the aim political change, then the discourse would have to find a way to reach outside the academy, but this is precisely what academic political theory cannot do due to the publication and presentation structure, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. To produce political change, the academic political theorist would have to sacrifice his or her erudition or scholarship, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval scholasticism that only schoolmen can appreciate, which presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse– only other experts can understand it –and the content; they want to produce change). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse. The paradox of emancipatory academic political discourse is thus that it is formally and functionally apolitical. At the level of its intention or what it says it aims to effect political change and intervention, but at the level of what it does, it simply reproduces its own discourse and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields (and no, the classroom doesn’t count). Unconscious recognition of this paradox might be why, in some corners, we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish “the party”. The party is the academic fantasy of a philosopher-king or an academic avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for all those “dopes and illiterate” that characterize the people (somehow the issue of how the party eventually becomes an end in itself, aimed solely at perpetuating itself, thereby divorcing itself from the people never gets addressed by these neo-totalitarians). The idea of the party and of the intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox I’ve recognized here and of the political theorist that genuinely wants to produce change while also recognizing that the sociological structure of the academy can’t meet those requirements. Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy for reproducing the university discourse would be a little less pompous and self-righteous, but everyone has to feel important and like their the best thing since sliced bread, I guess. [/INST] <h4>Vote negative as a strategy to uncover the banal nature of the university -- The insurrection is here and we refuse to believe that debate will make the university a better place. Of course our role as debaters necessarily implicates us, but that is precisely the point—we reject and destroy scholarship within the academy </h4><p><strong>Bryant 13</strong>—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/)</p><p><u><strong><mark>There’s a</u></strong></mark> sort of Hegelian <u><strong><mark>contradiction at the heart of all academic</mark> political <mark>theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory.</u></strong></mark> In a nutshell, <u><strong><mark>the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a</mark> sort of <mark>commodity</u></strong></mark>. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in academicjournals that few have access to, in a jargon that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at conferencesthat only other academics generally attend. <u><strong>Thus</u></strong>, <u><strong>academic <mark>emancipatory</u></strong></mark> political <u><strong><mark>theory reveals itself</u></strong></mark> in its truth <u><strong><mark>as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention</mark> </u></strong>at all, <u><strong><mark>but rather only as a</mark> </u></strong>move or <u><strong><mark>moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia</u></strong></mark>. That is, <u><strong><mark>it functions</mark> <mark>as</mark> <mark>a</mark>nother line on the CVand is one <mark>strategy through which the university</mark> system <mark>carries</mark> <mark>out</mark> its</u></strong> autopoiesis or <u><strong><mark>self-reproduction</u></strong></mark> across time. <u><strong><mark>It </mark>thus <mark>functions</u></strong></mark>– <u><strong>the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics</u></strong>, but how things function –<u><strong><mark>as</mark> something like <mark>a commodity</mark> within the academic system. <mark>The function is not to intervene in the broader political system</u></strong>– <u><strong>despite</u></strong></mark> what all of us doing political theory say and <u><strong><mark>how we think about our work</u></strong> –<u><strong>but rather to carry out yet another iteration of</mark> the academic <mark>discourse</u></strong></mark> (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities). <u><strong><mark>Were the aim political change</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>then the <mark>discourse would have to find a way</mark> to reach <mark>outside the academy</mark>, <mark>but</mark> this is precisely what academic political <mark>theory cannot do due to the</mark> </u></strong>publication and <u><strong>presentation <mark>structure</u></strong></mark>, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. <u><strong><mark>To produce political change, the academic</u></strong></mark> political theorist <u><strong><mark>would have to sacrifice</mark> his or her erudition or <mark>scholarship</u></strong></mark>, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. <u><strong><mark>They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication</u></strong></mark>. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval <u><strong>scholasticism</u></strong> that only schoolmen can appreciate, which <u><strong>presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse</u></strong>– only other experts can understand it –<u><strong>and the content; they want to produce change</u></strong>). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse. The paradox of <u><strong><mark>emancipatory academic political discourse</mark> is thus that it <mark>is</mark> formally and functionally</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>apolitical</u></strong></mark>. At the level of its intention or what it says it aims to effect political change and intervention, but at the level of what it does, <u><strong><mark>it simply reproduces its own discourse</mark> and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields</u></strong> (<u><strong><mark>and no, the classroom doesn’t count</u></strong></mark>). Unconscious <u><strong>recognition of this paradox might be why</u></strong>, in some corners, <u><strong>we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish</u></strong> “the party”. The party is <u><strong>the academic fantasy of a </u></strong>philosopher-king or an academic <u><strong>avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for </u></strong>all those “dopes and illiterate” that characterize <u><strong>the people</u></strong> (somehow the issue of how the party eventually becomes an end in itself, aimed solely at perpetuating itself, thereby divorcing itself from the people never gets addressed by these neo-totalitarians). <u><strong>The idea of the</u></strong> party and of the <u><strong>intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox</u></strong> I’ve recognized here and of the political theorist that genuinely wants to produce change while also recognizing that the sociological structure of the academy can’t meet those requirements. <u><strong>Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy</u></strong> for reproducing the university discourse <u><strong>would be a little less pompous and self-righteous</u></strong>, but everyone has to feel important and like their the best thing since sliced bread, I guess.</p> </s>

Its predictable - politicians publically advocate a national referendum on legalization

When the people of Colorado and Washington made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the lower house of congress politicians spoke of holding a national referendum in three years

When Colorado and Washington made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the house politicians spoke of holding a national referendum

Daniel, research coordinator at the Drug Policy Alliance and writer for the Huffington Post, January 10th, “Legalization in US spurs debate throughout Americas”, http://www.westcoastleaf.net/?p=5178, AB When the people of Colorado and Washington made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world — especially in Latin America, where it has given new energy to the struggle to end drug prohibition. Just hours after the election, politicians from across Mexico’s political spectrum demanded that Mexico end the drug war or to legalize marijuana itself. A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the lower house of congress, while other politicians spoke of holding a national referendum in three years. “The prohibitionist paradigm is a complete failure,” said the bill’s author, Fernando Belaunzaran, of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). “All this has done is spur more violence, the business continues … and the country that has paid the highest costs is Mexico.”

<h4><strong>Its predictable - politicians publically advocate a national referendum on legalization</h4><p>Robelo 13 </p><p></strong>Daniel, research coordinator at the Drug Policy Alliance and writer for the Huffington Post, January 10th, “Legalization in US spurs debate throughout Americas”, http://www.westcoastleaf.net/?p=5178, AB </p><p><u><strong><mark>When</mark> the people of <mark>Colorado and Washington</mark> <mark>made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world</u></strong></mark> — especially in Latin America, where it has given new energy to the struggle to end drug prohibition. Just hours after the election, politicians from across Mexico’s political spectrum demanded that Mexico end the drug war or to legalize marijuana itself. <u><strong><mark>A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the</mark> lower <mark>house</mark> of congress</u></strong>, while other <u><strong><mark>politicians</mark> <mark>spoke of holding a national referendum </mark>in three years</u></strong>. “The prohibitionist paradigm is a complete failure,” said the bill’s author, Fernando Belaunzaran, of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). “All this has done is spur more violence, the business continues … and the country that has paid the highest costs is Mexico.”</p>

Robelo 13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Robelo 13 fulltext: Daniel, research coordinator at the Drug Policy Alliance and writer for the Huffington Post, January 10th, “Legalization in US spurs debate throughout Americas”, http://www.westcoastleaf.net/?p=5178, AB When the people of Colorado and Washington made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world — especially in Latin America, where it has given new energy to the struggle to end drug prohibition. Just hours after the election, politicians from across Mexico’s political spectrum demanded that Mexico end the drug war or to legalize marijuana itself. A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the lower house of congress, while other politicians spoke of holding a national referendum in three years. “The prohibitionist paradigm is a complete failure,” said the bill’s author, Fernando Belaunzaran, of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). “All this has done is spur more violence, the business continues … and the country that has paid the highest costs is Mexico.” [/INST] <h4><strong>Its predictable - politicians publically advocate a national referendum on legalization</h4><p>Robelo 13 </p><p></strong>Daniel, research coordinator at the Drug Policy Alliance and writer for the Huffington Post, January 10th, “Legalization in US spurs debate throughout Americas”, http://www.westcoastleaf.net/?p=5178, AB </p><p><u><strong><mark>When</mark> the people of <mark>Colorado and Washington</mark> <mark>made history by legalizing marijuana, their vote reverberated around the world</u></strong></mark> — especially in Latin America, where it has given new energy to the struggle to end drug prohibition. Just hours after the election, politicians from across Mexico’s political spectrum demanded that Mexico end the drug war or to legalize marijuana itself. <u><strong><mark>A bill to legally regulate cannabis was introduced into the</mark> lower <mark>house</mark> of congress</u></strong>, while other <u><strong><mark>politicians</mark> <mark>spoke of holding a national referendum </mark>in three years</u></strong>. “The prohibitionist paradigm is a complete failure,” said the bill’s author, Fernando Belaunzaran, of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). “All this has done is spur more violence, the business continues … and the country that has paid the highest costs is Mexico.”</p> </s>

Our alternative is to organize politics around unconditional resistance to capitalism & refuse the 1AC’s evacuation of universalism. This is a question of non-permutable starting points; only prior critical interrogation of economic relations lays the groundwork for radical politics

class antagonism or struggle is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, class, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself. class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms. In his terms, class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the fantasy of capital but have done little to uncover its reality. Those post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements want revolution without revolution; His strategic focus on capitalist exploitation rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions and effects, regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken The critical pedagogical act is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures—these lawless laws of capital—be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?

class antagonism is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements want revolution without revolution strategic focus on capitalist exploitation rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken The critical pedagogical act is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis

Žižek challenges the relativism of the gender-race-class grid of reflexive positionality when he claims that class antagonism or struggle is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, class, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself. In other words, class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series. He notes that "the economy is at one and the same time the genus and one of its own species" (Totalitarianism 193). In what I consider to be his most important work to date, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (coauthored with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality and argues that class struggle itself enables the proliferation of new political subjectivities (albeit subjectivities that ironically relegate class struggle to a secondary role). As Marx argued, class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms. Thus, according to Žižek, class struggle is not "the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding" ("Repeating" 16-17). In his terms, class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism). He further argues that the split between the classes is even more radical today than during the times of industrial class divisions. He takes the position that post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the fantasy of capital (vis-à-vis the endless deferral of pleasure) but have done little to uncover its reality. Those post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements (such as Laclau and Mouffe) want revolution without revolution; in contrast, Žižek calls for movements that relate to the larger totality of capitalist social relations and that challenge the very matter and antimatter of capital's social universe. His strategic focus on capitalist exploitation (while often confusing and inconsistent) rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one: "The problem is not how our precious particular identity should be kept safe from global capitalism. The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level. This whole problematic is a false one" (Olson and Worsham 281). What Žižek sets himself against is the particular experience or political argument. An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts" ("Repeating" 4-5). Here he echoes Wood, who argues that capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations" ("Identity" 29). He also echoes critical educators such as Paulo Freire, who argues against the position that experiences of the oppressed speak for themselves. All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions and effects, regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken. They are to be read with, against, and upon the scientific concepts produced by the revolutionary Marxist tradition. The critical pedagogical act of interro-gating experiences is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle. History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures—these lawless laws of capital—be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?

<h4>Our alternative is to organize politics around unconditional resistance to capitalism & refuse the 1AC’s evacuation of universalism. This is a question of non-permutable starting points; only prior critical interrogation of economic relations lays the groundwork for radical politics </h4><p><u><strong><mark>McLaren ‘06</u></strong></mark> (Peter, University of California, “Slavoj Žižek's Naked Politics: Opting for the Impossible, A Secondary Elaboration”, JAC, http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V21_I3_McLaren.htm<u><strong>, jj)</p><p></u></strong>Žižek challenges the relativism of the gender-race-class grid of reflexive positionality when he claims that <u><strong><mark>class antagonism</mark> or struggle <mark>is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race,</mark> class, <mark>gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself</mark>.</u></strong> In other words, <u><strong><mark>class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series</u></strong></mark>. He notes that "the economy is at one and the same time the genus and one of its own species" (Totalitarianism 193). In what I consider to be his most important work to date, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (coauthored with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), <u><strong><mark>Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality</u></strong></mark> and argues that class struggle itself enables the proliferation of new political subjectivities (albeit subjectivities that ironically relegate class struggle to a secondary role). As Marx argued, <u><strong>class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms.</u></strong> Thus, according to Žižek, class struggle is not "the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding" ("Repeating" 16-17). <u><strong>In his terms, <mark>class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism</u></strong></mark>). He further argues that the split between the classes is even more radical today than during the times of industrial class divisions. He takes the position that <u><strong>post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the fantasy of capital</u></strong> (vis-à-vis the endless deferral of pleasure) <u><strong>but have done little to uncover its reality.</u></strong> <u><strong>Those <mark>post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements</u></strong></mark> (such as Laclau and Mouffe) <u><strong><mark>want revolution without revolution</mark>;</u></strong> in contrast, Žižek calls for movements that relate to the larger totality of capitalist social relations and that challenge the very matter and antimatter of capital's social universe. <u><strong>His <mark>strategic focus on capitalist exploitation</u></strong></mark> (while often confusing and inconsistent) <u><strong><mark>rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one</u></strong></mark>: "The problem is not how our precious particular identity should be kept safe from global capitalism. <u><strong><mark>The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level</u></strong></mark>. This whole problematic is a false one" (Olson and Worsham 281). What Žižek sets himself against is the particular experience or political argument. <u><strong>An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts</u></strong>" ("Repeating" 4-5). Here he echoes Wood, who argues that <u><strong>capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations</u></strong>" ("Identity" 29). He also echoes critical educators such as Paulo Freire, who argues against the position that experiences of the oppressed speak for themselves. <u><strong><mark>All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions</mark> and effects, <mark>regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken</u></strong></mark>. They are to be read with, against, and upon the scientific concepts produced by the revolutionary Marxist tradition. <u><strong><mark>The critical pedagogical act</u></strong></mark> of interro-gating experiences <u><strong><mark>is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. <mark>The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations?</mark> <mark>How can these structures</mark>—these lawless laws of capital—<mark>be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis</mark> into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?</p><p></u></strong> </p>

McLaren ‘06 (Peter, University of California, “Slavoj Žižek's Naked Politics: Opting for the Impossible, A Secondary Elaboration”, JAC, http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V21_I3_McLaren.htm, jj)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: McLaren ‘06 (Peter, University of California, “Slavoj Žižek's Naked Politics: Opting for the Impossible, A Secondary Elaboration”, JAC, http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V21_I3_McLaren.htm, jj) fulltext: Žižek challenges the relativism of the gender-race-class grid of reflexive positionality when he claims that class antagonism or struggle is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, class, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself. In other words, class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series. He notes that "the economy is at one and the same time the genus and one of its own species" (Totalitarianism 193). In what I consider to be his most important work to date, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (coauthored with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality and argues that class struggle itself enables the proliferation of new political subjectivities (albeit subjectivities that ironically relegate class struggle to a secondary role). As Marx argued, class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms. Thus, according to Žižek, class struggle is not "the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding" ("Repeating" 16-17). In his terms, class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism). He further argues that the split between the classes is even more radical today than during the times of industrial class divisions. He takes the position that post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the fantasy of capital (vis-à-vis the endless deferral of pleasure) but have done little to uncover its reality. Those post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements (such as Laclau and Mouffe) want revolution without revolution; in contrast, Žižek calls for movements that relate to the larger totality of capitalist social relations and that challenge the very matter and antimatter of capital's social universe. His strategic focus on capitalist exploitation (while often confusing and inconsistent) rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one: "The problem is not how our precious particular identity should be kept safe from global capitalism. The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level. This whole problematic is a false one" (Olson and Worsham 281). What Žižek sets himself against is the particular experience or political argument. An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts" ("Repeating" 4-5). Here he echoes Wood, who argues that capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations" ("Identity" 29). He also echoes critical educators such as Paulo Freire, who argues against the position that experiences of the oppressed speak for themselves. All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions and effects, regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken. They are to be read with, against, and upon the scientific concepts produced by the revolutionary Marxist tradition. The critical pedagogical act of interro-gating experiences is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle. History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures—these lawless laws of capital—be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all? [/INST] <h4>Our alternative is to organize politics around unconditional resistance to capitalism & refuse the 1AC’s evacuation of universalism. This is a question of non-permutable starting points; only prior critical interrogation of economic relations lays the groundwork for radical politics </h4><p><u><strong><mark>McLaren ‘06</u></strong></mark> (Peter, University of California, “Slavoj Žižek's Naked Politics: Opting for the Impossible, A Secondary Elaboration”, JAC, http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V21_I3_McLaren.htm<u><strong>, jj)</p><p></u></strong>Žižek challenges the relativism of the gender-race-class grid of reflexive positionality when he claims that <u><strong><mark>class antagonism</mark> or struggle <mark>is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race,</mark> class, <mark>gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself</mark>.</u></strong> In other words, <u><strong><mark>class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series</u></strong></mark>. He notes that "the economy is at one and the same time the genus and one of its own species" (Totalitarianism 193). In what I consider to be his most important work to date, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (coauthored with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), <u><strong><mark>Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality</u></strong></mark> and argues that class struggle itself enables the proliferation of new political subjectivities (albeit subjectivities that ironically relegate class struggle to a secondary role). As Marx argued, <u><strong>class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms.</u></strong> Thus, according to Žižek, class struggle is not "the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding" ("Repeating" 16-17). <u><strong>In his terms, <mark>class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism</u></strong></mark>). He further argues that the split between the classes is even more radical today than during the times of industrial class divisions. He takes the position that <u><strong>post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the fantasy of capital</u></strong> (vis-à-vis the endless deferral of pleasure) <u><strong>but have done little to uncover its reality.</u></strong> <u><strong>Those <mark>post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements</u></strong></mark> (such as Laclau and Mouffe) <u><strong><mark>want revolution without revolution</mark>;</u></strong> in contrast, Žižek calls for movements that relate to the larger totality of capitalist social relations and that challenge the very matter and antimatter of capital's social universe. <u><strong>His <mark>strategic focus on capitalist exploitation</u></strong></mark> (while often confusing and inconsistent) <u><strong><mark>rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one</u></strong></mark>: "The problem is not how our precious particular identity should be kept safe from global capitalism. <u><strong><mark>The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level</u></strong></mark>. This whole problematic is a false one" (Olson and Worsham 281). What Žižek sets himself against is the particular experience or political argument. <u><strong>An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts</u></strong>" ("Repeating" 4-5). Here he echoes Wood, who argues that <u><strong>capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations</u></strong>" ("Identity" 29). He also echoes critical educators such as Paulo Freire, who argues against the position that experiences of the oppressed speak for themselves. <u><strong><mark>All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions</mark> and effects, <mark>regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken</u></strong></mark>. They are to be read with, against, and upon the scientific concepts produced by the revolutionary Marxist tradition. <u><strong><mark>The critical pedagogical act</u></strong></mark> of interro-gating experiences <u><strong><mark>is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. <mark>The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations?</mark> <mark>How can these structures</mark>—these lawless laws of capital—<mark>be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis</mark> into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?</p><p></u></strong> </p> </s>

The term “marijuana” recreates historically racist rhetoric and should be replaced with cannabis

The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in cannabis culture Many organizations publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of cannabis why has the word gained publicity as a racist term? Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist as a word in American culture. Rather, “cannabis” was used in Between the years of 1910 and 1920 890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war. Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption The idea of smoking cannabis entered mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. Aftermath 1930s: The Great Depression hit the United States, Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants in the South Americans began to treat cannabis and the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. 29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” Anslinger spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences Anslinger testified Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” Anslinger specifically used the term “marijuana” when campaigning against the plant, adding to the development of the herb’s new “foreign” identity Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines Though the word “marijuana” is the most common name for cannabis its history is deeply steeped in race, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction to the American lexicon

The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in culture. organizations denounced the M word” in favor of cannabis the word gained publicity as a racist term Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist in American culture Rather cannabis” was used the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. Anslinger used the term “marijuana adding to the herb’s new “foreign” identity Though the word marijuana is common its history is deeply steeped in race the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction

http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in cannabis culture. Many well-known organizations such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of our favorite plant’s Latinate name, cannabis. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, why has the word gained publicity as a racist term? To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist as a word in American culture. Rather, “cannabis” was used, most often in reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: Between the years of 1910 and 1920, over 890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war. Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption. The idea of smoking cannabis entered mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. 1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The Aftermath 1930s: The Great Depression had just hit the United States, and Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants (particularly in the South) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white Americans began to treat cannabis (and, arguably, the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, 29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, Anslinger used the recent development of the movie theater to spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences. In one documented incident, Anslinger testified before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." In another statement, Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, Anslinger specifically used the term “marijuana” when campaigning against the plant, adding to the development of the herb’s new “foreign” identity. Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. Though the word “marijuana” is the most common name for cannabis in the United States today, its history is deeply steeped in race, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution. Some argue that using the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction to the American lexicon.

<h4>The term “marijuana” recreates historically racist rhetoric and should be replaced<strong> with cannabis </h4><p>Leafly 14</p><p></strong>http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB </p><p><u><strong><mark>The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in</mark> cannabis <mark>culture</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>Many</u></strong> well-known <u><strong><mark>organizations</u></strong></mark> such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have <u><strong>publicly <mark>denounced</mark> “<mark>the M word” in favor of</u></strong></mark> our favorite plant’s Latinate name, <u><strong><mark>cannabis</u></strong></mark>. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, <u><strong>why has <mark>the word</mark> <mark>gained publicity as a racist term</mark>? </u></strong>To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: <u><strong><mark>Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t</mark> <mark>exist</mark> as a word <mark>in American</mark> <mark>culture</mark>. <mark>Rather</mark>, “<mark>cannabis” was used</u></strong></mark>, most often <u><strong>in</u></strong> reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: <u><strong>Between the years of 1910 and 1920</u></strong>, over <u><strong>890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war.</u></strong> <u><strong>Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption</u></strong>. <u><strong>The idea of smoking cannabis entered</u></strong> <u><strong>mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. </u></strong>1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The <u><strong>Aftermath</u></strong> <u><strong>1930s: The Great Depression</u></strong> had just <u><strong>hit the United States,</u></strong> and <u><strong>Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants</u></strong> (particularly <u><strong>in the South</u></strong>) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white <u><strong>Americans began to treat cannabis</u></strong> (<u><strong>and</u></strong>, arguably, <u><strong><mark>the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals.</mark> </u></strong>In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, <u><strong>29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” </u></strong>Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, <u><strong>Anslinger</u></strong> used the recent development of the movie theater to <u><strong>spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences</u></strong>. In one documented incident, <u><strong>Anslinger</u></strong> <u><strong>testified</u></strong> before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… <u><strong>Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." </u></strong>In another statement, <u><strong>Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” </u></strong>In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, <u><strong><mark>Anslinger</mark> specifically <mark>used the term “marijuana</mark>” when campaigning against the plant, <mark>adding to the</mark> development of the <mark>herb’s</mark> <mark>new “foreign” identity</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines</u></strong> and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. <u><strong><mark>Though the word</mark> “<mark>marijuana</mark>” <mark>is</mark> the most <mark>common</mark> name for cannabis</u></strong> in the United States today, <u><strong><mark>its history is deeply steeped in race</mark>, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution</u></strong>. Some argue that using <u><strong><mark>the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans</u></strong></mark>, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. <u><strong><mark>Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word</mark> yourself, <mark>it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications</mark> <mark>of its introduction</mark> to the American lexicon</u></strong>. </p>

Leafly 14

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Leafly 14 fulltext: http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in cannabis culture. Many well-known organizations such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of our favorite plant’s Latinate name, cannabis. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, why has the word gained publicity as a racist term? To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist as a word in American culture. Rather, “cannabis” was used, most often in reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: Between the years of 1910 and 1920, over 890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war. Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption. The idea of smoking cannabis entered mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. 1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The Aftermath 1930s: The Great Depression had just hit the United States, and Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants (particularly in the South) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white Americans began to treat cannabis (and, arguably, the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, 29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, Anslinger used the recent development of the movie theater to spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences. In one documented incident, Anslinger testified before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." In another statement, Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, Anslinger specifically used the term “marijuana” when campaigning against the plant, adding to the development of the herb’s new “foreign” identity. Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. Though the word “marijuana” is the most common name for cannabis in the United States today, its history is deeply steeped in race, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution. Some argue that using the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction to the American lexicon. [/INST] <h4>The term “marijuana” recreates historically racist rhetoric and should be replaced<strong> with cannabis </h4><p>Leafly 14</p><p></strong>http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB </p><p><u><strong><mark>The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in</mark> cannabis <mark>culture</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>Many</u></strong> well-known <u><strong><mark>organizations</u></strong></mark> such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have <u><strong>publicly <mark>denounced</mark> “<mark>the M word” in favor of</u></strong></mark> our favorite plant’s Latinate name, <u><strong><mark>cannabis</u></strong></mark>. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, <u><strong>why has <mark>the word</mark> <mark>gained publicity as a racist term</mark>? </u></strong>To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: <u><strong><mark>Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t</mark> <mark>exist</mark> as a word <mark>in American</mark> <mark>culture</mark>. <mark>Rather</mark>, “<mark>cannabis” was used</u></strong></mark>, most often <u><strong>in</u></strong> reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: <u><strong>Between the years of 1910 and 1920</u></strong>, over <u><strong>890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war.</u></strong> <u><strong>Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption</u></strong>. <u><strong>The idea of smoking cannabis entered</u></strong> <u><strong>mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. </u></strong>1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The <u><strong>Aftermath</u></strong> <u><strong>1930s: The Great Depression</u></strong> had just <u><strong>hit the United States,</u></strong> and <u><strong>Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants</u></strong> (particularly <u><strong>in the South</u></strong>) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white <u><strong>Americans began to treat cannabis</u></strong> (<u><strong>and</u></strong>, arguably, <u><strong><mark>the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals.</mark> </u></strong>In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, <u><strong>29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” </u></strong>Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, <u><strong>Anslinger</u></strong> used the recent development of the movie theater to <u><strong>spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences</u></strong>. In one documented incident, <u><strong>Anslinger</u></strong> <u><strong>testified</u></strong> before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… <u><strong>Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." </u></strong>In another statement, <u><strong>Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” </u></strong>In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, <u><strong><mark>Anslinger</mark> specifically <mark>used the term “marijuana</mark>” when campaigning against the plant, <mark>adding to the</mark> development of the <mark>herb’s</mark> <mark>new “foreign” identity</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines</u></strong> and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. <u><strong><mark>Though the word</mark> “<mark>marijuana</mark>” <mark>is</mark> the most <mark>common</mark> name for cannabis</u></strong> in the United States today, <u><strong><mark>its history is deeply steeped in race</mark>, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution</u></strong>. Some argue that using <u><strong><mark>the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans</u></strong></mark>, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. <u><strong><mark>Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word</mark> yourself, <mark>it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications</mark> <mark>of its introduction</mark> to the American lexicon</u></strong>. </p> </s>

OAS is critical to resolve South American instability and border disputes

boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike economic problems that characterise the region could give rise to international conflicts over resources and migration The domestic political and social situation in many Latin American countries could generate internal conflicts fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict resolution generated political crises throughout the history of the southern part of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks Among these the OAS is the most universal including all countries in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions: The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant since the Summit process has provided guidance for action in the sphere of security The OAS security structure was designed for collective security operations and for dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes The legalist tradition is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it The OAS has had success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict Investigative commissions offer assessments and indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy It has also been a major forum for the process of generating regional norms on security regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality The use of military capabilities is extremely rare The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution The OAS has become active in fostering confidence-building measures and has continued its work on the dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts the OAS remains an important pillar of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution norms developed are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict the norm of information sharing and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords

boundary disputes exist economic problems give rise to international conflicts The situation could generate internal conflicts fragility of domestic mechanisms for resolution generated political crises throughout the history of the Americas. the OAS is the most universal, including all countries The OAS was designed for collective security and dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation. The OAS has had success in preventing conflicts from escalating It has been a major forum for generating regional norms on security The use of military capabilities is extremely rare The OAS has become active in confidence-building measures and continued its dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict in preventing intra-state conflicts. the OAS remains an important pillar of peaceful solution of disputes the OAS prevented international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts

Nevertheless, one must remember that boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike, and the social and economic problems that characterise the region could give rise to international conflicts over resources and migration. The domestic political and social situation in many Latin American countries could generate internal conflicts. The fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict resolution and the state apparatus in general has generated political crises throughout the history of the southern part of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks: Among these institutions, the OAS is the most universal, including all countries in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions: the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant for the purposes of this article since the Summit process has provided guidance beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty for action in the sphere of security. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ The OAS security structure was designed for collective security operations and for dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation. Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. The legalist tradition, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ The OAS has had some success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating (Shaw 2004: 96). This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua between 1948 and 1979, and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969. It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict since its creation. Investigative commissions were created in a number of cases to offer assessments and sometimes indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy. It has also been a major forum for the process of generating regional norms on security, regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality. The use of military capabilities is extremely rare. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability or status quo in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. The OAS has become active in fostering confidence-building measures and land-mine clearing, and has continued its work on the dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts. In addition, the OAS remains an important pillar of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Secondly, I will show that the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate, particularly after the 1990s, in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts. I have pointed out that in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict. The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution. ¶ Three norms developed partly within the organisation are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict; the norm of information sharing built into the confidence-building agenda; and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords.

<h4>OAS is critical to resolve South American instability and border disputes </h4><p>Monica <strong>Herz 08</strong>, Director of the Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, April</p><p>Nevertheless, one must remember that <u><strong><mark>boundary disputes exist </mark>today</strong> and were sources of conflict in the past.</u> The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently <u>drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike</u>, and the social and <u><mark>economic problems </mark>that characterise the region could <mark>give rise to <strong>international conflicts</strong></mark> over resources and migration</u>. <u><mark>The</mark> domestic political and social <mark>situation</mark> in many Latin American countries <mark>could generate internal conflicts</u></mark>. The <u><mark>fragility of domestic mechanisms for</mark> conflict <mark>resolution</u></mark> and the state apparatus in general has <u><mark>generated <strong>political crises throughout the history</strong></mark> of the southern part <mark>of the Americas.</u></mark> <u>Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term</u>. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that <u>the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks</u>: <u>Among these</u> institutions, <u><mark>the OAS is the <strong>most universal</u></strong>, <u>including all countries</mark> in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place</u>. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. <u>The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework</u>. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two <u>specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions:</u> the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ <u>The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant </u>for the purposes of this article <u>since the Summit process has provided <strong>guidance</u></strong> beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty <u><strong>for action in the sphere of security</u></strong>. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ <u><mark>The OAS </mark>security structure <mark>was designed for collective security </mark>operations <mark>and </mark>for <strong><mark>dispute settlement</strong> through <strong>diplomatic consultation</u></strong>.</mark> Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – <u>an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes</u>. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. <u>The legalist tradition</u>, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, <u>is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it</u>. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ <u><mark>The OAS has had</u> </mark>some <u><mark>success in</mark> reducing regional tensions and <strong><mark>preventing conflicts from escalating</u></strong></mark> (Shaw 2004: 96). <u>This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua</u> between 1948 and 1979, <u>and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador</u> in 1969. <u>It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict</u> since its creation. <u>Investigative commissions</u> were created in a number of cases to <u>offer assessments and</u> sometimes <u>indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy</u>. <u><mark>It has </mark>also <mark>been a major forum for </mark>the process of <strong><mark>generating regional norms on security</u></strong></mark>, <u>regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality</u>. <u><mark>The use of military capabilities is extremely rare</u></mark>. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. <u>The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability</u> or status quo <u>in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution</u>. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. <u><mark>The OAS has become active in</mark> fostering <mark>confidence-building measures</u></mark> and land-mine clearing, <u><mark>and</mark> has <mark>continued its </mark>work on the <strong><mark>dialogue on border disputes</strong> and attempts to prevent conflict</u></mark>. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that <u>the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an <strong>active role <mark>in preventing intra-state conflicts</u></strong>.</mark> In addition, <u><mark>the OAS remains an <strong>important pillar</strong> of</mark> the norm of <mark>peaceful solution of disputes</u></mark>, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, <u>one can see these norms functioning as <strong>preventive diplomacy mechanisms</u></strong>. Secondly, I will show that <u><mark>the OAS prevented</mark> a number of <mark>international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and <strong>was essential</strong> in diffusing several crises</u></mark>. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ <u><strong><mark>The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states</u></strong></mark>. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that <u>the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate</u>, particularly after the 1990s, <u>in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role <mark>in preventing the <strong>escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts</u></strong></mark>. I have pointed out that <u>in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict</u>. <u>The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution</u>. ¶ Three <u>norms developed</u> partly within the organisation <u>are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict</u>; <u>the norm of information sharing</u> built into the confidence-building agenda; <u>and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability</u>, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ <u>I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile</u>. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. <u>This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords</u>. </p>

Monica Herz 08, Director of the Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, April

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Monica Herz 08, Director of the Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, April fulltext: Nevertheless, one must remember that boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike, and the social and economic problems that characterise the region could give rise to international conflicts over resources and migration. The domestic political and social situation in many Latin American countries could generate internal conflicts. The fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict resolution and the state apparatus in general has generated political crises throughout the history of the southern part of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks: Among these institutions, the OAS is the most universal, including all countries in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions: the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant for the purposes of this article since the Summit process has provided guidance beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty for action in the sphere of security. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ The OAS security structure was designed for collective security operations and for dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation. Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. The legalist tradition, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ The OAS has had some success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating (Shaw 2004: 96). This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua between 1948 and 1979, and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969. It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict since its creation. Investigative commissions were created in a number of cases to offer assessments and sometimes indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy. It has also been a major forum for the process of generating regional norms on security, regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality. The use of military capabilities is extremely rare. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability or status quo in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. The OAS has become active in fostering confidence-building measures and land-mine clearing, and has continued its work on the dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts. In addition, the OAS remains an important pillar of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Secondly, I will show that the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate, particularly after the 1990s, in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts. I have pointed out that in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict. The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution. ¶ Three norms developed partly within the organisation are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict; the norm of information sharing built into the confidence-building agenda; and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords. [/INST] <h4>OAS is critical to resolve South American instability and border disputes </h4><p>Monica <strong>Herz 08</strong>, Director of the Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, April</p><p>Nevertheless, one must remember that <u><strong><mark>boundary disputes exist </mark>today</strong> and were sources of conflict in the past.</u> The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently <u>drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike</u>, and the social and <u><mark>economic problems </mark>that characterise the region could <mark>give rise to <strong>international conflicts</strong></mark> over resources and migration</u>. <u><mark>The</mark> domestic political and social <mark>situation</mark> in many Latin American countries <mark>could generate internal conflicts</u></mark>. The <u><mark>fragility of domestic mechanisms for</mark> conflict <mark>resolution</u></mark> and the state apparatus in general has <u><mark>generated <strong>political crises throughout the history</strong></mark> of the southern part <mark>of the Americas.</u></mark> <u>Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term</u>. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that <u>the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks</u>: <u>Among these</u> institutions, <u><mark>the OAS is the <strong>most universal</u></strong>, <u>including all countries</mark> in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place</u>. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. <u>The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework</u>. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two <u>specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions:</u> the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ <u>The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant </u>for the purposes of this article <u>since the Summit process has provided <strong>guidance</u></strong> beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty <u><strong>for action in the sphere of security</u></strong>. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ <u><mark>The OAS </mark>security structure <mark>was designed for collective security </mark>operations <mark>and </mark>for <strong><mark>dispute settlement</strong> through <strong>diplomatic consultation</u></strong>.</mark> Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – <u>an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes</u>. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. <u>The legalist tradition</u>, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, <u>is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it</u>. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ <u><mark>The OAS has had</u> </mark>some <u><mark>success in</mark> reducing regional tensions and <strong><mark>preventing conflicts from escalating</u></strong></mark> (Shaw 2004: 96). <u>This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua</u> between 1948 and 1979, <u>and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador</u> in 1969. <u>It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict</u> since its creation. <u>Investigative commissions</u> were created in a number of cases to <u>offer assessments and</u> sometimes <u>indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy</u>. <u><mark>It has </mark>also <mark>been a major forum for </mark>the process of <strong><mark>generating regional norms on security</u></strong></mark>, <u>regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality</u>. <u><mark>The use of military capabilities is extremely rare</u></mark>. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. <u>The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability</u> or status quo <u>in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution</u>. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. <u><mark>The OAS has become active in</mark> fostering <mark>confidence-building measures</u></mark> and land-mine clearing, <u><mark>and</mark> has <mark>continued its </mark>work on the <strong><mark>dialogue on border disputes</strong> and attempts to prevent conflict</u></mark>. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that <u>the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an <strong>active role <mark>in preventing intra-state conflicts</u></strong>.</mark> In addition, <u><mark>the OAS remains an <strong>important pillar</strong> of</mark> the norm of <mark>peaceful solution of disputes</u></mark>, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, <u>one can see these norms functioning as <strong>preventive diplomacy mechanisms</u></strong>. Secondly, I will show that <u><mark>the OAS prevented</mark> a number of <mark>international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and <strong>was essential</strong> in diffusing several crises</u></mark>. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ <u><strong><mark>The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states</u></strong></mark>. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that <u>the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate</u>, particularly after the 1990s, <u>in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role <mark>in preventing the <strong>escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts</u></strong></mark>. I have pointed out that <u>in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict</u>. <u>The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution</u>. ¶ Three <u>norms developed</u> partly within the organisation <u>are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict</u>; <u>the norm of information sharing</u> built into the confidence-building agenda; <u>and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability</u>, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ <u>I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile</u>. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. <u>This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords</u>. </p> </s>

OAS is critical to resolve South American instability and border disputes

boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike economic problems that characterise the region could give rise to international conflicts over resources and migration The domestic political and social situation in many Latin American countries could generate internal conflicts fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict resolution generated political crises throughout the history of the southern part of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks Among these the OAS is the most universal including all countries in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions: The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant since the Summit process has provided guidance for action in the sphere of security The OAS security structure was designed for collective security operations and for dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes The legalist tradition is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it The OAS has had success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict Investigative commissions offer assessments and indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy It has also been a major forum for the process of generating regional norms on security regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality The use of military capabilities is extremely rare The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution The OAS has become active in fostering confidence-building measures and has continued its work on the dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts the OAS remains an important pillar of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution norms developed are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict the norm of information sharing and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords

boundary disputes exist economic problems give rise to international conflicts The situation could generate internal conflicts fragility of domestic mechanisms for resolution generated political crises throughout the history of the Americas. the OAS is the most universal, including all countries The OAS was designed for collective security and dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation. The OAS has had success in preventing conflicts from escalating It has been a major forum for generating regional norms on security The use of military capabilities is extremely rare The OAS has become active in confidence-building measures and continued its dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict in preventing intra-state conflicts. the OAS remains an important pillar of peaceful solution of disputes the OAS prevented international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts

Nevertheless, one must remember that boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike, and the social and economic problems that characterise the region could give rise to international conflicts over resources and migration. The domestic political and social situation in many Latin American countries could generate internal conflicts. The fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict resolution and the state apparatus in general has generated political crises throughout the history of the southern part of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks: Among these institutions, the OAS is the most universal, including all countries in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions: the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant for the purposes of this article since the Summit process has provided guidance beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty for action in the sphere of security. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ The OAS security structure was designed for collective security operations and for dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation. Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. The legalist tradition, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ The OAS has had some success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating (Shaw 2004: 96). This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua between 1948 and 1979, and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969. It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict since its creation. Investigative commissions were created in a number of cases to offer assessments and sometimes indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy. It has also been a major forum for the process of generating regional norms on security, regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality. The use of military capabilities is extremely rare. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability or status quo in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. The OAS has become active in fostering confidence-building measures and land-mine clearing, and has continued its work on the dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts. In addition, the OAS remains an important pillar of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Secondly, I will show that the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate, particularly after the 1990s, in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts. I have pointed out that in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict. The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution. ¶ Three norms developed partly within the organisation are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict; the norm of information sharing built into the confidence-building agenda; and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords.

<h4>OAS is critical to resolve South American instability and border disputes </h4><p>Monica <strong>Herz 08</strong>, Director of the Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, April</p><p>Nevertheless, one must remember that <u><strong><mark>boundary disputes exist </mark>today and were sources of conflict in the past.</u></strong> The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently <u><strong>drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike</u></strong>, and the social and <u><strong><mark>economic problems </mark>that characterise the region could <mark>give rise to international conflicts</mark> over resources and migration</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> domestic political and social <mark>situation</mark> in many Latin American countries <mark>could generate internal conflicts</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>fragility of domestic mechanisms for</mark> conflict <mark>resolution</u></strong></mark> and the state apparatus in general has <u><strong><mark>generated political crises throughout the history</mark> of the southern part <mark>of the Americas.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term</u></strong>. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that <u><strong>the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks</u></strong>: <u><strong>Among these</u></strong> institutions, <u><strong><mark>the OAS is the most universal</u></strong>, <u><strong>including all countries</mark> in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place</u></strong>. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. <u><strong>The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework</u></strong>. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two <u><strong>specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions:</u></strong> the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ <u><strong>The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant </u></strong>for the purposes of this article <u><strong>since the Summit process has provided guidance</u></strong> beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty <u><strong>for action in the sphere of security</u></strong>. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ <u><strong><mark>The OAS </mark>security structure <mark>was designed for collective security </mark>operations <mark>and </mark>for <mark>dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation</u></strong>.</mark> Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – <u><strong>an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes</u></strong>. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. <u><strong>The legalist tradition</u></strong>, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, <u><strong>is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it</u></strong>. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ <u><strong><mark>The OAS has had</u></strong> </mark>some <u><strong><mark>success in</mark> reducing regional tensions and <mark>preventing conflicts from escalating</u></strong></mark> (Shaw 2004: 96). <u><strong>This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua</u></strong> between 1948 and 1979, <u><strong>and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador</u></strong> in 1969. <u><strong>It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict</u></strong> since its creation. <u><strong>Investigative commissions</u></strong> were created in a number of cases to <u><strong>offer assessments and</u></strong> sometimes <u><strong>indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>It has </mark>also <mark>been a major forum for </mark>the process of <mark>generating regional norms on security</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The use of military capabilities is extremely rare</u></strong></mark>. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. <u><strong>The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability</u></strong> or status quo <u><strong>in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution</u></strong>. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. <u><strong><mark>The OAS has become active in</mark> fostering <mark>confidence-building measures</u></strong></mark> and land-mine clearing, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> has <mark>continued its </mark>work on the <mark>dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict</u></strong></mark>. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that <u><strong>the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role <mark>in preventing intra-state conflicts</u></strong>.</mark> In addition, <u><strong><mark>the OAS remains an important pillar of</mark> the norm of <mark>peaceful solution of disputes</u></strong></mark>, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, <u><strong>one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms</u></strong>. Secondly, I will show that <u><strong><mark>the OAS prevented</mark> a number of <mark>international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises</u></strong></mark>. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ <u><strong><mark>The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states</u></strong></mark>. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that <u><strong>the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate</u></strong>, particularly after the 1990s, <u><strong>in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role <mark>in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts</u></strong></mark>. I have pointed out that <u><strong>in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict</u></strong>. <u><strong>The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution</u></strong>. ¶ Three <u><strong>norms developed</u></strong> partly within the organisation <u><strong>are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict</u></strong>; <u><strong>the norm of information sharing</u></strong> built into the confidence-building agenda; <u><strong>and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability</u></strong>, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ <u><strong>I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile</u></strong>. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. <u><strong>This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords</u></strong>. </p>

Monica Herz 08, Director of the Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, April

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Monica Herz 08, Director of the Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, April fulltext: Nevertheless, one must remember that boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike, and the social and economic problems that characterise the region could give rise to international conflicts over resources and migration. The domestic political and social situation in many Latin American countries could generate internal conflicts. The fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict resolution and the state apparatus in general has generated political crises throughout the history of the southern part of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks: Among these institutions, the OAS is the most universal, including all countries in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions: the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant for the purposes of this article since the Summit process has provided guidance beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty for action in the sphere of security. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ The OAS security structure was designed for collective security operations and for dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation. Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. The legalist tradition, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ The OAS has had some success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating (Shaw 2004: 96). This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua between 1948 and 1979, and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969. It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict since its creation. Investigative commissions were created in a number of cases to offer assessments and sometimes indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy. It has also been a major forum for the process of generating regional norms on security, regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality. The use of military capabilities is extremely rare. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability or status quo in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. The OAS has become active in fostering confidence-building measures and land-mine clearing, and has continued its work on the dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts. In addition, the OAS remains an important pillar of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Secondly, I will show that the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate, particularly after the 1990s, in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts. I have pointed out that in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict. The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution. ¶ Three norms developed partly within the organisation are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict; the norm of information sharing built into the confidence-building agenda; and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords. [/INST] <h4>OAS is critical to resolve South American instability and border disputes </h4><p>Monica <strong>Herz 08</strong>, Director of the Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, April</p><p>Nevertheless, one must remember that <u><strong><mark>boundary disputes exist </mark>today and were sources of conflict in the past.</u></strong> The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently <u><strong>drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike</u></strong>, and the social and <u><strong><mark>economic problems </mark>that characterise the region could <mark>give rise to international conflicts</mark> over resources and migration</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> domestic political and social <mark>situation</mark> in many Latin American countries <mark>could generate internal conflicts</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>fragility of domestic mechanisms for</mark> conflict <mark>resolution</u></strong></mark> and the state apparatus in general has <u><strong><mark>generated political crises throughout the history</mark> of the southern part <mark>of the Americas.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term</u></strong>. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that <u><strong>the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks</u></strong>: <u><strong>Among these</u></strong> institutions, <u><strong><mark>the OAS is the most universal</u></strong>, <u><strong>including all countries</mark> in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place</u></strong>. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. <u><strong>The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework</u></strong>. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two <u><strong>specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions:</u></strong> the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ <u><strong>The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant </u></strong>for the purposes of this article <u><strong>since the Summit process has provided guidance</u></strong> beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty <u><strong>for action in the sphere of security</u></strong>. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ <u><strong><mark>The OAS </mark>security structure <mark>was designed for collective security </mark>operations <mark>and </mark>for <mark>dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation</u></strong>.</mark> Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – <u><strong>an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes</u></strong>. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. <u><strong>The legalist tradition</u></strong>, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, <u><strong>is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it</u></strong>. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ <u><strong><mark>The OAS has had</u></strong> </mark>some <u><strong><mark>success in</mark> reducing regional tensions and <mark>preventing conflicts from escalating</u></strong></mark> (Shaw 2004: 96). <u><strong>This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua</u></strong> between 1948 and 1979, <u><strong>and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador</u></strong> in 1969. <u><strong>It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict</u></strong> since its creation. <u><strong>Investigative commissions</u></strong> were created in a number of cases to <u><strong>offer assessments and</u></strong> sometimes <u><strong>indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>It has </mark>also <mark>been a major forum for </mark>the process of <mark>generating regional norms on security</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The use of military capabilities is extremely rare</u></strong></mark>. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. <u><strong>The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability</u></strong> or status quo <u><strong>in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution</u></strong>. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. <u><strong><mark>The OAS has become active in</mark> fostering <mark>confidence-building measures</u></strong></mark> and land-mine clearing, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> has <mark>continued its </mark>work on the <mark>dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict</u></strong></mark>. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that <u><strong>the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role <mark>in preventing intra-state conflicts</u></strong>.</mark> In addition, <u><strong><mark>the OAS remains an important pillar of</mark> the norm of <mark>peaceful solution of disputes</u></strong></mark>, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, <u><strong>one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms</u></strong>. Secondly, I will show that <u><strong><mark>the OAS prevented</mark> a number of <mark>international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises</u></strong></mark>. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ <u><strong><mark>The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states</u></strong></mark>. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that <u><strong>the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate</u></strong>, particularly after the 1990s, <u><strong>in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role <mark>in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts</u></strong></mark>. I have pointed out that <u><strong>in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict</u></strong>. <u><strong>The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution</u></strong>. ¶ Three <u><strong>norms developed</u></strong> partly within the organisation <u><strong>are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict</u></strong>; <u><strong>the norm of information sharing</u></strong> built into the confidence-building agenda; <u><strong>and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability</u></strong>, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ <u><strong>I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile</u></strong>. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. <u><strong>This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords</u></strong>. </p> </s>

The process of discoursing suffering within the academia gives way to a bureaucratization of the Other’s suffering which further entrenches domination while positioning the affirmative as savior -- ensures imperial intervention

suffering when appropriated for ossesses no experiential meaning launch-pads for intervention no point The politics of discoursing suffering therefore is a politics of the theorist to be solved by the theorist prescription is divorced from experience becomes secondary to the philosopher’ imperial recognition, response and intervention as commodity to be exploited depoliticised experience technical/bureaucratic interventions every call should’-assertions crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity should should should should should democratise institutions the list, goes on the ways of the world remain the normalities of business-as-usual

People suffer.17 This is a simple truth that takes little effort to state. Neither does the analysis of structures, of processes, of histories, of suffering require any accountable engagement on our part with suffering bodies (save perhaps in our field-work phase of enquiry as we seek data) nor with any of the vectors of violence whose complex intersections in historical time give material, embodied content to what we, in distance, name suffering. Put differently, the suffering condition when appropriated for the purposes of ossesses no experiential meaning. Whilst lip service is paid to‘voices of suffering’, voices as such are absented of experiential truth or ontological-political significance in any objectification of suffering as condition;voices are retained instead (perhaps, again, through the inclusion of some choice quotes of wretchedness, accumulated as data from the field) as theory’s justificatory launch-pads for intervention. At no point, for most of us theorists, is the suffering voice the voice of theory. Indeed, as Gayatri Spivak (1988) so trenchantly affirmed, the ‘subaltern cannot speak’!18 The politics of discoursing suffering therefore is a politics of the theorist, suffering a problem to be solved by the theorist, where prescription is divorced from experience, theory from the relationality of violence and its local, day-to-day, normal and norm-alised infliction. At best, those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down of whatever benign ‘solution’ theory may purport tooffer, post its lengthy journeys through intellectual and policy interrogations, as suffering is validated (or otherwise), its structural causation identified (or otherwise), its alleviation interrogated for many a disputed appropriateness of response (or otherwise).19 Having served the purpose of instigating theory suffering itselfbecomes secondary to the politics of the ‘theorist/philosopher’ – the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other - of imperial recognition, response and intervention.20 Thus are offered rationalised solutions to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may indeed be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present, laying as it were, immanent, latent, awaiting (re)discovery. The theorist becomes the technician, the expert wielder of knowledge and strategic wisdom, to overcome the problem of suffering, perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning.Thus, for example, suffering, as human rights violations becomes the result of inadequate understanding of rights-scope and obligations (Craven 2007; Alston and Quinn 1987), or of the conceptual essence of rights itself, or of the allocation of resources.21 Or, to refer to another example of theory-talk (where the legacy of Levinas is apparent), suffering, as global injustice, becomes a problem of reformulating political affinities within the new meta-game of globalisation as methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck 2005),22 towards ‘global citizenship’ to overcome the limits of anachronistic notions of political identities and responsibilities (Dower and Williams 2002), of ‘social connection models (Young 2006), or of the ‘ethics of assistance’ (Chatterjee 2004), or of cosmopolitan care, responsibility, and the politics of redistribution and institutional reform (Pogge 2008). In these examples of discoursing suffering, thinking sufferingand its alleviation, true to the ‘problem of the passage’ in Levinasian thought (Wolcher 2003),23 becomes rational work, and the technocratic, even bureaucratic, measuring of suffering and its (appropriate) responses becomes the practical implication of theory; the constant fluctuations of betrayals and aspirations, always with some justification close at hand, only serving to further entrench theLevinasian injunction to responsibility - for further endeavours of thinking-hope, tofurther serve the cause of salvation for the lost souls of ‘strangers’, as Wheeler (2000) so poignantly put it. Suffering, as condition, as commodity to be exploited, asdepoliticised category rather than experience, as a technical/bureaucratic/managerial problem to be solved, remains therefore the ever-present alibi forlegitimate interventions amidst constant (and inevitable) disappointments. Acorrupt, violent, imperial, global order(ing) of social relations becomes also the saviour, constantly revitalised and called unto renewed being, every call (Douzinas 2007b).24 For all the repeated urgings for the expansion of its boundaries, to repair the various denials of exteriority, totality, it seems, is little affected.25 How, therefore, do we account for the constant supply of suffering (through the cruelties of the world) that continues to move the demand for suffering-based thinking (despite these cruelties)? How might the apparent inconsequentiality of so much humanisation in the pervasiveness of inhumanity demand our critical self-reflection as we engage in the politics of hope? We make a huge assumption - we who theorise alleviatory possibilities out of the suffering condition - that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed. With this assumption, we attempt to think our way out of (continuing) betrayals to enable the realisation of promises we wish to believe in. Good promises they seemingly are: the promise to eliminate poverty; to end starvation; to realise education for all; the list goes on. We ask the question, what prevents the realisation of these promises? What might enable the realisation of these promises? How much more resources? What kind of political institutions? With so many questions, and perhaps 21 to assuage our faith in the consequentiality of our thoughts, follows the so many ‘should’-assertions that crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity – that the world community should respond to suffering; should expend the necessary (miniscule) resources that would alleviate chronic deprivation; shouldredress prevailing inequalities and injustices within the global economic order; should prioritise human rights in world trade and economic relations, shouldenforce legal regimes to hold transnational corporations responsible, shouldreform and democratise international institutions, the list, again, goes on. As do, notwithstanding all of these manifold ‘shoulds’, the ways of the world in which betrayals remain the normalities of business-as-usual (Robinson and Tormey 2009).

<h4>The process of discoursing suffering within the academia gives way to a bureaucratization of the Other’s suffering which further entrenches domination while positioning the affirmative as savior -- ensures imperial intervention</h4><p>Jayan Nayar 13, PhD from the University of Cambridge and Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, gz</p><p>People suffer.17 This is a simple truth that takes little effort to state. Neither does the analysis of structures, of processes, of histories, of suffering require any accountable engagement on our part with suffering bodies (save perhaps in our field-work phase of enquiry as we seek data) nor with any of the vectors of violence whose complex intersections in historical time give material, embodied content to what we, in distance, name suffering. Put differently, the <u><strong>suffering</u></strong> condition <u><strong>when appropriated for</u></strong> the purposes of <u><strong>ossesses no experiential meaning</u></strong>. Whilst lip service is paid to‘voices of suffering’, voices as such are absented of experiential truth or ontological-political significance in any objectification of suffering as condition;voices are retained instead (perhaps, again, through the inclusion of some choice quotes of wretchedness, accumulated as data from the field) as theory’s justificatory <u><strong>launch-pads for intervention</u></strong>. At <u><strong>no point</u></strong>, for most of us theorists, is the suffering voice the voice of theory. Indeed, as Gayatri Spivak (1988) so trenchantly affirmed, the ‘subaltern cannot speak’!18 <u><strong>The politics of</u></strong> <u><strong>discoursing</u></strong> <u><strong>suffering</u></strong> <u><strong>therefore</u></strong> <u><strong>is a politics of the theorist</u></strong>, suffering a problem <u><strong>to be solved by the theorist</u></strong>, where <u><strong>prescription is divorced from experience</u></strong>, theory from the relationality of violence and its local, day-to-day, normal and norm-alised infliction. At best, those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down of whatever benign ‘solution’ theory may purport tooffer, post its lengthy journeys through intellectual and policy interrogations, as suffering is validated (or otherwise), its structural causation identified (or otherwise), its alleviation interrogated for many a disputed appropriateness of response (or otherwise).19 Having served the purpose of instigating theory suffering itself<u><strong>becomes secondary to the</u></strong> politics of the ‘theorist/<u><strong>philosopher’</u></strong> – the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other - of <u><strong>imperial recognition, response and intervention</u></strong>.20 Thus are offered rationalised solutions to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may indeed be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present, laying as it were, immanent, latent, awaiting (re)discovery. The theorist becomes the technician, the expert wielder of knowledge and strategic wisdom, to overcome the problem of suffering, perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning.Thus, for example, suffering, as human rights violations becomes the result of inadequate understanding of rights-scope and obligations (Craven 2007; Alston and Quinn 1987), or of the conceptual essence of rights itself, or of the allocation of resources.21 Or, to refer to another example of theory-talk (where the legacy of Levinas is apparent), suffering, as global injustice, becomes a problem of reformulating political affinities within the new meta-game of globalisation as methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck 2005),22 towards ‘global citizenship’ to overcome the limits of anachronistic notions of political identities and responsibilities (Dower and Williams 2002), of ‘social connection models (Young 2006), or of the ‘ethics of assistance’ (Chatterjee 2004), or of cosmopolitan care, responsibility, and the politics of redistribution and institutional reform (Pogge 2008). In these examples of discoursing suffering, thinking sufferingand its alleviation, true to the ‘problem of the passage’ in Levinasian thought (Wolcher 2003),23 becomes rational work, and the technocratic, even bureaucratic, measuring of suffering and its (appropriate) responses becomes the practical implication of theory; the constant fluctuations of betrayals and aspirations, always with some justification close at hand, only serving to further entrench theLevinasian injunction to responsibility - for further endeavours of thinking-hope, tofurther serve the cause of salvation for the lost souls of ‘strangers’, as Wheeler (2000) so poignantly put it. Suffering, as condition, <u><strong>as commodity to be exploited</u></strong>, as<u><strong>depoliticised</u></strong> category rather than <u><strong>experience</u></strong>, as a <u><strong>technical/bureaucratic</u></strong>/managerial problem to be solved, remains therefore the ever-present alibi forlegitimate <u><strong>interventions</u></strong> amidst constant (and inevitable) disappointments. Acorrupt, violent, imperial, global order(ing) of social relations becomes also the saviour, constantly revitalised and called unto renewed being, <u><strong>every call</u></strong> (Douzinas 2007b).24 For all the repeated urgings for the expansion of its boundaries, to repair the various denials of exteriority, totality, it seems, is little affected.25 How, therefore, do we account for the constant supply of suffering (through the cruelties of the world) that continues to move the demand for suffering-based thinking (despite these cruelties)? How might the apparent inconsequentiality of so much humanisation in the pervasiveness of inhumanity demand our critical self-reflection as we engage in the politics of hope? We make a huge assumption - we who theorise alleviatory possibilities out of the suffering condition - that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed. With this assumption, we attempt to think our way out of (continuing) betrayals to enable the realisation of promises we wish to believe in. Good promises they seemingly are: the promise to eliminate poverty; to end starvation; to realise education for all; the list goes on. We ask the question, what prevents the realisation of these promises? What might enable the realisation of these promises? How much more resources? What kind of political institutions? With so many questions, and perhaps 21 to assuage our faith in the consequentiality of our thoughts, follows the so many ‘<u><strong>should’-assertions</u></strong> that <u><strong>crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity</u></strong> – that the world community <u><strong>should</u></strong> respond to suffering; <u><strong>should</u></strong> expend the necessary (miniscule) resources that would alleviate chronic deprivation; <u><strong>should</u></strong>redress prevailing inequalities and injustices within the global economic order; should prioritise human rights in world trade and economic relations, <u><strong>should</u></strong>enforce legal regimes to hold transnational corporations responsible, <u><strong>should</u></strong>reform and <u><strong>democratise</u></strong> international <u><strong>institutions</u></strong>, <u><strong>the list,</u></strong> again, <u><strong>goes on</u></strong>. As do, notwithstanding all of these manifold ‘shoulds’, <u><strong>the ways of the world</u></strong> in which betrayals <u><strong>remain the normalities of business-as-usual</u></strong> (Robinson and Tormey 2009).</p>

Jayan Nayar 13, PhD from the University of Cambridge and Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, gz

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Jayan Nayar 13, PhD from the University of Cambridge and Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, gz fulltext: People suffer.17 This is a simple truth that takes little effort to state. Neither does the analysis of structures, of processes, of histories, of suffering require any accountable engagement on our part with suffering bodies (save perhaps in our field-work phase of enquiry as we seek data) nor with any of the vectors of violence whose complex intersections in historical time give material, embodied content to what we, in distance, name suffering. Put differently, the suffering condition when appropriated for the purposes of ossesses no experiential meaning. Whilst lip service is paid to‘voices of suffering’, voices as such are absented of experiential truth or ontological-political significance in any objectification of suffering as condition;voices are retained instead (perhaps, again, through the inclusion of some choice quotes of wretchedness, accumulated as data from the field) as theory’s justificatory launch-pads for intervention. At no point, for most of us theorists, is the suffering voice the voice of theory. Indeed, as Gayatri Spivak (1988) so trenchantly affirmed, the ‘subaltern cannot speak’!18 The politics of discoursing suffering therefore is a politics of the theorist, suffering a problem to be solved by the theorist, where prescription is divorced from experience, theory from the relationality of violence and its local, day-to-day, normal and norm-alised infliction. At best, those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down of whatever benign ‘solution’ theory may purport tooffer, post its lengthy journeys through intellectual and policy interrogations, as suffering is validated (or otherwise), its structural causation identified (or otherwise), its alleviation interrogated for many a disputed appropriateness of response (or otherwise).19 Having served the purpose of instigating theory suffering itselfbecomes secondary to the politics of the ‘theorist/philosopher’ – the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other - of imperial recognition, response and intervention.20 Thus are offered rationalised solutions to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may indeed be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present, laying as it were, immanent, latent, awaiting (re)discovery. The theorist becomes the technician, the expert wielder of knowledge and strategic wisdom, to overcome the problem of suffering, perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning.Thus, for example, suffering, as human rights violations becomes the result of inadequate understanding of rights-scope and obligations (Craven 2007; Alston and Quinn 1987), or of the conceptual essence of rights itself, or of the allocation of resources.21 Or, to refer to another example of theory-talk (where the legacy of Levinas is apparent), suffering, as global injustice, becomes a problem of reformulating political affinities within the new meta-game of globalisation as methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck 2005),22 towards ‘global citizenship’ to overcome the limits of anachronistic notions of political identities and responsibilities (Dower and Williams 2002), of ‘social connection models (Young 2006), or of the ‘ethics of assistance’ (Chatterjee 2004), or of cosmopolitan care, responsibility, and the politics of redistribution and institutional reform (Pogge 2008). In these examples of discoursing suffering, thinking sufferingand its alleviation, true to the ‘problem of the passage’ in Levinasian thought (Wolcher 2003),23 becomes rational work, and the technocratic, even bureaucratic, measuring of suffering and its (appropriate) responses becomes the practical implication of theory; the constant fluctuations of betrayals and aspirations, always with some justification close at hand, only serving to further entrench theLevinasian injunction to responsibility - for further endeavours of thinking-hope, tofurther serve the cause of salvation for the lost souls of ‘strangers’, as Wheeler (2000) so poignantly put it. Suffering, as condition, as commodity to be exploited, asdepoliticised category rather than experience, as a technical/bureaucratic/managerial problem to be solved, remains therefore the ever-present alibi forlegitimate interventions amidst constant (and inevitable) disappointments. Acorrupt, violent, imperial, global order(ing) of social relations becomes also the saviour, constantly revitalised and called unto renewed being, every call (Douzinas 2007b).24 For all the repeated urgings for the expansion of its boundaries, to repair the various denials of exteriority, totality, it seems, is little affected.25 How, therefore, do we account for the constant supply of suffering (through the cruelties of the world) that continues to move the demand for suffering-based thinking (despite these cruelties)? How might the apparent inconsequentiality of so much humanisation in the pervasiveness of inhumanity demand our critical self-reflection as we engage in the politics of hope? We make a huge assumption - we who theorise alleviatory possibilities out of the suffering condition - that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed. With this assumption, we attempt to think our way out of (continuing) betrayals to enable the realisation of promises we wish to believe in. Good promises they seemingly are: the promise to eliminate poverty; to end starvation; to realise education for all; the list goes on. We ask the question, what prevents the realisation of these promises? What might enable the realisation of these promises? How much more resources? What kind of political institutions? With so many questions, and perhaps 21 to assuage our faith in the consequentiality of our thoughts, follows the so many ‘should’-assertions that crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity – that the world community should respond to suffering; should expend the necessary (miniscule) resources that would alleviate chronic deprivation; shouldredress prevailing inequalities and injustices within the global economic order; should prioritise human rights in world trade and economic relations, shouldenforce legal regimes to hold transnational corporations responsible, shouldreform and democratise international institutions, the list, again, goes on. As do, notwithstanding all of these manifold ‘shoulds’, the ways of the world in which betrayals remain the normalities of business-as-usual (Robinson and Tormey 2009). [/INST] <h4>The process of discoursing suffering within the academia gives way to a bureaucratization of the Other’s suffering which further entrenches domination while positioning the affirmative as savior -- ensures imperial intervention</h4><p>Jayan Nayar 13, PhD from the University of Cambridge and Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, gz</p><p>People suffer.17 This is a simple truth that takes little effort to state. Neither does the analysis of structures, of processes, of histories, of suffering require any accountable engagement on our part with suffering bodies (save perhaps in our field-work phase of enquiry as we seek data) nor with any of the vectors of violence whose complex intersections in historical time give material, embodied content to what we, in distance, name suffering. Put differently, the <u><strong>suffering</u></strong> condition <u><strong>when appropriated for</u></strong> the purposes of <u><strong>ossesses no experiential meaning</u></strong>. Whilst lip service is paid to‘voices of suffering’, voices as such are absented of experiential truth or ontological-political significance in any objectification of suffering as condition;voices are retained instead (perhaps, again, through the inclusion of some choice quotes of wretchedness, accumulated as data from the field) as theory’s justificatory <u><strong>launch-pads for intervention</u></strong>. At <u><strong>no point</u></strong>, for most of us theorists, is the suffering voice the voice of theory. Indeed, as Gayatri Spivak (1988) so trenchantly affirmed, the ‘subaltern cannot speak’!18 <u><strong>The politics of</u></strong> <u><strong>discoursing</u></strong> <u><strong>suffering</u></strong> <u><strong>therefore</u></strong> <u><strong>is a politics of the theorist</u></strong>, suffering a problem <u><strong>to be solved by the theorist</u></strong>, where <u><strong>prescription is divorced from experience</u></strong>, theory from the relationality of violence and its local, day-to-day, normal and norm-alised infliction. At best, those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down of whatever benign ‘solution’ theory may purport tooffer, post its lengthy journeys through intellectual and policy interrogations, as suffering is validated (or otherwise), its structural causation identified (or otherwise), its alleviation interrogated for many a disputed appropriateness of response (or otherwise).19 Having served the purpose of instigating theory suffering itself<u><strong>becomes secondary to the</u></strong> politics of the ‘theorist/<u><strong>philosopher’</u></strong> – the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other - of <u><strong>imperial recognition, response and intervention</u></strong>.20 Thus are offered rationalised solutions to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may indeed be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present, laying as it were, immanent, latent, awaiting (re)discovery. The theorist becomes the technician, the expert wielder of knowledge and strategic wisdom, to overcome the problem of suffering, perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning.Thus, for example, suffering, as human rights violations becomes the result of inadequate understanding of rights-scope and obligations (Craven 2007; Alston and Quinn 1987), or of the conceptual essence of rights itself, or of the allocation of resources.21 Or, to refer to another example of theory-talk (where the legacy of Levinas is apparent), suffering, as global injustice, becomes a problem of reformulating political affinities within the new meta-game of globalisation as methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck 2005),22 towards ‘global citizenship’ to overcome the limits of anachronistic notions of political identities and responsibilities (Dower and Williams 2002), of ‘social connection models (Young 2006), or of the ‘ethics of assistance’ (Chatterjee 2004), or of cosmopolitan care, responsibility, and the politics of redistribution and institutional reform (Pogge 2008). In these examples of discoursing suffering, thinking sufferingand its alleviation, true to the ‘problem of the passage’ in Levinasian thought (Wolcher 2003),23 becomes rational work, and the technocratic, even bureaucratic, measuring of suffering and its (appropriate) responses becomes the practical implication of theory; the constant fluctuations of betrayals and aspirations, always with some justification close at hand, only serving to further entrench theLevinasian injunction to responsibility - for further endeavours of thinking-hope, tofurther serve the cause of salvation for the lost souls of ‘strangers’, as Wheeler (2000) so poignantly put it. Suffering, as condition, <u><strong>as commodity to be exploited</u></strong>, as<u><strong>depoliticised</u></strong> category rather than <u><strong>experience</u></strong>, as a <u><strong>technical/bureaucratic</u></strong>/managerial problem to be solved, remains therefore the ever-present alibi forlegitimate <u><strong>interventions</u></strong> amidst constant (and inevitable) disappointments. Acorrupt, violent, imperial, global order(ing) of social relations becomes also the saviour, constantly revitalised and called unto renewed being, <u><strong>every call</u></strong> (Douzinas 2007b).24 For all the repeated urgings for the expansion of its boundaries, to repair the various denials of exteriority, totality, it seems, is little affected.25 How, therefore, do we account for the constant supply of suffering (through the cruelties of the world) that continues to move the demand for suffering-based thinking (despite these cruelties)? How might the apparent inconsequentiality of so much humanisation in the pervasiveness of inhumanity demand our critical self-reflection as we engage in the politics of hope? We make a huge assumption - we who theorise alleviatory possibilities out of the suffering condition - that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed. With this assumption, we attempt to think our way out of (continuing) betrayals to enable the realisation of promises we wish to believe in. Good promises they seemingly are: the promise to eliminate poverty; to end starvation; to realise education for all; the list goes on. We ask the question, what prevents the realisation of these promises? What might enable the realisation of these promises? How much more resources? What kind of political institutions? With so many questions, and perhaps 21 to assuage our faith in the consequentiality of our thoughts, follows the so many ‘<u><strong>should’-assertions</u></strong> that <u><strong>crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity</u></strong> – that the world community <u><strong>should</u></strong> respond to suffering; <u><strong>should</u></strong> expend the necessary (miniscule) resources that would alleviate chronic deprivation; <u><strong>should</u></strong>redress prevailing inequalities and injustices within the global economic order; should prioritise human rights in world trade and economic relations, <u><strong>should</u></strong>enforce legal regimes to hold transnational corporations responsible, <u><strong>should</u></strong>reform and <u><strong>democratise</u></strong> international <u><strong>institutions</u></strong>, <u><strong>the list,</u></strong> again, <u><strong>goes on</u></strong>. As do, notwithstanding all of these manifold ‘shoulds’, <u><strong>the ways of the world</u></strong> in which betrayals <u><strong>remain the normalities of business-as-usual</u></strong> (Robinson and Tormey 2009).</p> </s>

That outweighs the aff EVEN IF they win full weight of their impact and the root cause debate—capitalism subsumes the oppression they outline and externally results in invisible violence against billions globally-- that’s Parr. This question of self-orientation comes first

given the contemporary exhaustion of the socio-political imagination under the hegemony of liberal-democratic capitalism, the liberation of thinking itself from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better. Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete action must be inverted given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, one must resist succumbing to the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all such rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are ideologically co-opted by it.

given the exhaustion of the socio-political under capitalism the liberation of thinking from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better. action must be inverted one must resist the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are co-opted by it.

The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, given the contemporary exhaustion of the socio-political imagination under the hegemony of liberal-democratic capitalism, he sees the liberation of thinking itself from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better. In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete action (thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") must be inverted given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, one must resist succumbing to the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all such rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are ideologically co-opted by it.

<h4>That outweighs the aff EVEN IF they win full weight of their impact and the root cause debate—capitalism subsumes the oppression they outline and externally results in invisible violence against billions globally-- that’s Parr<u>.</u> This question of self-orientation comes first</h4><p><u><strong>Johnston ’04</u></strong> <strong>(Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)</p><p></strong>The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, <u><strong><mark>given the</mark> contemporary <mark>exhaustion of the socio-political </mark>imagination <mark>under</mark> the hegemony of liberal-democratic <mark>capitalism</mark>,</u></strong> he sees <u><strong><mark>the liberation of thinking </mark>itself <mark>from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better.</u></strong></mark> In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that <u><strong>Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete <mark>action</mark> </u></strong>(thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") <u><strong><mark>must be inverted</mark> given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, <mark>one must resist</mark> succumbing to <mark>the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all </mark>such <mark>rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are</mark> ideologically <mark>co-opted by it.</p></u></strong></mark>

Johnston ’04 (Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Johnston ’04 (Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society) fulltext: The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, given the contemporary exhaustion of the socio-political imagination under the hegemony of liberal-democratic capitalism, he sees the liberation of thinking itself from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better. In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete action (thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") must be inverted given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, one must resist succumbing to the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all such rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are ideologically co-opted by it. [/INST] <h4>That outweighs the aff EVEN IF they win full weight of their impact and the root cause debate—capitalism subsumes the oppression they outline and externally results in invisible violence against billions globally-- that’s Parr<u>.</u> This question of self-orientation comes first</h4><p><u><strong>Johnston ’04</u></strong> <strong>(Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)</p><p></strong>The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, <u><strong><mark>given the</mark> contemporary <mark>exhaustion of the socio-political </mark>imagination <mark>under</mark> the hegemony of liberal-democratic <mark>capitalism</mark>,</u></strong> he sees <u><strong><mark>the liberation of thinking </mark>itself <mark>from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better.</u></strong></mark> In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that <u><strong>Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete <mark>action</mark> </u></strong>(thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") <u><strong><mark>must be inverted</mark> given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, <mark>one must resist</mark> succumbing to <mark>the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all </mark>such <mark>rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are</mark> ideologically <mark>co-opted by it.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

Delay of marijuana initiatives to the general election is central topic education -- Alaska proves

A ballot initiative that could make Alaska the third U.S. state to legalize recreational marijuana will go before voters in a general election in November rather than in August The means that a broader swath of the public is likely to vote on the issue than if it had gone before voters as scheduled

A ballot initiative that could make Alaska legalize marijuana will go before voters in a general election rather than in August The means a broader swath of the public is likely vote than if it had gone before voters as scheduled

(Reuters) - A ballot initiative that could make Alaska the third U.S. state to legalize recreational marijuana will go before voters in a general election in November rather than in August as previously scheduled, officials said on Monday. The move means that a broader swath of the public is likely to vote on the issue than if it had gone before voters as scheduled during a state primary election in August.

<h4><strong>Delay of marijuana initiatives to the general election is central topic education -- Alaska proves </h4><p>Quinn 14</p><p></strong>Steve, Rueters correspondent, April 22nd 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/us-usa-alaska-election-idUSBREA3L05820140422, “Alaska pot legalization vote pushed back to November”, AB </p><p>(Reuters) - <u><strong><mark>A ballot initiative that could make Alaska </mark>the third U.S. state to <mark>legalize </mark>recreational <mark>marijuana will go before voters in a general election</mark> in November <mark>rather than in August</u></strong></mark> as previously scheduled, officials said on Monday. <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> move <u><strong><mark>means</mark> that <mark>a broader swath of the public is likely</mark> to <mark>vote</mark> on the issue <mark>than if it had gone before voters as scheduled</u></strong></mark> during a state primary election in August.</p>

Quinn 14 Steve, Rueters correspondent, April 22nd 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/us-usa-alaska-election-idUSBREA3L05820140422, “Alaska pot legalization vote pushed back to November”, AB

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Quinn 14 Steve, Rueters correspondent, April 22nd 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/us-usa-alaska-election-idUSBREA3L05820140422, “Alaska pot legalization vote pushed back to November”, AB fulltext: (Reuters) - A ballot initiative that could make Alaska the third U.S. state to legalize recreational marijuana will go before voters in a general election in November rather than in August as previously scheduled, officials said on Monday. The move means that a broader swath of the public is likely to vote on the issue than if it had gone before voters as scheduled during a state primary election in August. [/INST] <h4><strong>Delay of marijuana initiatives to the general election is central topic education -- Alaska proves </h4><p>Quinn 14</p><p></strong>Steve, Rueters correspondent, April 22nd 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/us-usa-alaska-election-idUSBREA3L05820140422, “Alaska pot legalization vote pushed back to November”, AB </p><p>(Reuters) - <u><strong><mark>A ballot initiative that could make Alaska </mark>the third U.S. state to <mark>legalize </mark>recreational <mark>marijuana will go before voters in a general election</mark> in November <mark>rather than in August</u></strong></mark> as previously scheduled, officials said on Monday. <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> move <u><strong><mark>means</mark> that <mark>a broader swath of the public is likely</mark> to <mark>vote</mark> on the issue <mark>than if it had gone before voters as scheduled</u></strong></mark> during a state primary election in August.</p> </s>

The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in an opposition against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed) but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words The predicament we face in the West Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper?

The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in oppositional against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return claims of oppression and victimization are used to guilt-trip and to control; affirmations of diversities that are made in the name of righteousness create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is not their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed but the privilege that accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper

(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

<h4><u><strong>The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion</h4><p></u>Chow</strong> – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - <strong>1993</p><p></strong>(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) </p><p><u>While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary</u> for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. <u><mark>The question</u></mark> for me <u><mark>is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony</u></mark> (a question that positions them <u><mark>in</mark> an <mark>opposition</u>al</mark> light <u><mark>against dominant power</u></mark> and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), <u><mark>but <strong>how they can resist</u></strong></mark>, as Michel Foucault said, “<u><mark>the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse</u></mark>.’ “ Putting it another way, <u><mark>how do intellectuals struggle against <strong>a hegemony which already includes them</u></strong></mark> and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? <u>As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,”</u> <u>and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and <mark>as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, <strong>many</strong> deep-rooted, <strong>politically reactionary forces return</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to haunt us.</u></strong> <u>Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested <strong><mark>claims</strong></mark> <strong><mark>of oppression and victimization</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>are used</u></strong></mark> merely <u><strong><mark>to guilt-trip and to control</strong>; </mark>sexist and racist re<mark>affirmations of </mark>sexual and racial <mark>diversities that are made</mark> merely <mark>in the name of righteousness</mark>—all these forces <mark>create new “solidarities whose ideological premises <strong>remain unquestioned</u></strong></mark>. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. <u>The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense,</u> <u>We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are <strong>battles of words</u></strong>. <u><mark>Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are</mark> </u>most certainly <u><strong><mark>not</u></strong></mark> directly<u> <strong><mark>changing the</strong></mark> </u>downtrodden<u> <strong><mark>lives of those who seek</strong></mark> </u>their<u> <strong><mark>survival</strong></mark> </u>in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike.<u> <mark>What academic intellectuals must confront is</mark> thus <mark>not their</mark> </u>victimization by society at large (<u>or their <mark>victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed</mark>)</u>, <u><mark>but the</mark> power, wealth, and <mark>privilege that</mark> Ironically <mark>accumulate <strong>from their</strong> “oppositional” <strong>viewpoint</strong></mark>, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words</u>. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) <u>The predicament we face in the West</u>, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, <u>Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business</u>, . . . <u>he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen.</u> “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? <u><mark>How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses</u></mark>, <u><mark>when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper</mark>?</u> How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?</p>

Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993 fulltext: (Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense? [/INST] <h4><u><strong>The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion</h4><p></u>Chow</strong> – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - <strong>1993</p><p></strong>(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) </p><p><u>While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary</u> for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. <u><mark>The question</u></mark> for me <u><mark>is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony</u></mark> (a question that positions them <u><mark>in</mark> an <mark>opposition</u>al</mark> light <u><mark>against dominant power</u></mark> and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), <u><mark>but <strong>how they can resist</u></strong></mark>, as Michel Foucault said, “<u><mark>the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse</u></mark>.’ “ Putting it another way, <u><mark>how do intellectuals struggle against <strong>a hegemony which already includes them</u></strong></mark> and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? <u>As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,”</u> <u>and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and <mark>as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, <strong>many</strong> deep-rooted, <strong>politically reactionary forces return</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to haunt us.</u></strong> <u>Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested <strong><mark>claims</strong></mark> <strong><mark>of oppression and victimization</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>are used</u></strong></mark> merely <u><strong><mark>to guilt-trip and to control</strong>; </mark>sexist and racist re<mark>affirmations of </mark>sexual and racial <mark>diversities that are made</mark> merely <mark>in the name of righteousness</mark>—all these forces <mark>create new “solidarities whose ideological premises <strong>remain unquestioned</u></strong></mark>. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. <u>The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense,</u> <u>We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are <strong>battles of words</u></strong>. <u><mark>Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are</mark> </u>most certainly <u><strong><mark>not</u></strong></mark> directly<u> <strong><mark>changing the</strong></mark> </u>downtrodden<u> <strong><mark>lives of those who seek</strong></mark> </u>their<u> <strong><mark>survival</strong></mark> </u>in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike.<u> <mark>What academic intellectuals must confront is</mark> thus <mark>not their</mark> </u>victimization by society at large (<u>or their <mark>victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed</mark>)</u>, <u><mark>but the</mark> power, wealth, and <mark>privilege that</mark> Ironically <mark>accumulate <strong>from their</strong> “oppositional” <strong>viewpoint</strong></mark>, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words</u>. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) <u>The predicament we face in the West</u>, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, <u>Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business</u>, . . . <u>he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen.</u> “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? <u><mark>How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses</u></mark>, <u><mark>when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper</mark>?</u> How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?</p> </s>

Latin American instability causes nuclear war

the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony. the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran His financial and material assistance has revitalized a moribund FARC and incorporated it with the insurgent force of the Bolivarian revolution. He has promoted asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. chaos in a region that in the future will see the proliferation of nothing but more adverse conditions: authoritarianism, further anarchy, insurgency, local and international terrorism, rogue states' involvement, and other negative elements such as an arms race and nuclear activity. The continent's current economic prosperity, is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries. the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it. the deterioration to this extent has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it. the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent. the Bolivarian revolution will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place, The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue. The effects of authoritarianism, the destruction of the State, and the proliferation of non-state actors and rogue States are likely to continue their course if no one moves to counter them. Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised.

financial and material assistance revitalized FARC and incorporated it the Bolivarian revolution. He promoted asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. chaos in a region that will see the proliferation of authoritarianism anarchy, insurgency international terrorism rogue states' an arms race and nuclear activity the deterioration has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it The effects of authoritarianism and the proliferation of non-state actors are likely to continue if no one moves to counter them.

The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forces—the drug cartels—existed before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise to power in 1999. But the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony. It has inspired governments to follow its model and has gained admirers among groups and movements through- out Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region and now around the globe. Indeed, the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran. His financial and material assistance has revitalized a moribund FARC and incorporated it with the insurgent force of the Bolivarian revolution. He has promoted Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspects—asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory, giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders. These partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create chaos in a region that in the future will see the proliferation of nothing but more adverse conditions: authoritarianism, further anarchy, insurgency, local and international terrorism, rogue states' involvement, and other negative elements such as an arms race and nuclear activity. The continent's current economic prosperity, about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries. Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning, where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the facts with a technical perspective—for example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfare—they might not perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt, predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se. Instead, it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it. Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, the deterioration of democracy to this extent has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it. The United States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent. As stated in chapter 9, however, the Bolivarian revolution will not die along with Chavez. It will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place, not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue. The effects of authoritarianism, the destruction of the State, and the proliferation of non-state actors and rogue States are likely to continue their course if no one moves to counter them. As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or guilt. Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised.

<h4>Latin American instability causes nuclear war </h4><p>Luis <strong>Fleishmann 13</strong> Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City and Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University Honors College, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States,” May 31st 2013, <u>#SPS</p><p></u>The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forces—the drug cartels—existed before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise to power in 1999. But <u>the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony.</u> It has inspired governments to follow its model and has gained admirers among groups and movements through- out Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region and now around the globe. Indeed, <u>the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran</u>. <u>His <mark>financial and material assistance </mark>has <mark>revitalized </mark>a moribund <mark>FARC and incorporated it </mark>with the insurgent force of <mark>the Bolivarian revolution.</u></mark> <u><mark>He </mark>has <mark>promoted</u></mark> Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspects—<u><strong><mark>asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation.</u></strong></mark> Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory, giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders. These partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create <u><mark>chaos in a region that </mark>in the future <mark>will see the proliferation of</mark> nothing but more adverse conditions: <mark>authoritarianism</mark>, further <mark>anarchy, insurgency</mark>, local and <mark>international terrorism</mark>, <mark>rogue states'</mark> involvement, and other negative elements such as <mark>an arms race and <strong>nuclear activity</strong></mark>.</u> <u>The continent's</u> <u>current economic prosperity,</u> about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, <u>is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries.</u> Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning, where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the facts with a technical perspective—for example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfare—they might not perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt, predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, <u>the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se</u>. Instead, <u>it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it.</u> Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, <u><mark>the deterioration</mark> </u>of democracy<u> to this extent <mark>has security implications insofar as <strong>external forces</strong> can penetrate it</mark>.</u> The United States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, <u>the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent.</u> As stated in chapter 9, however, <u>the Bolivarian revolution</u> will not die along with Chavez. It <u>will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place,</u> not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. <u>The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue.</u> <u><mark>The effects of authoritarianism</mark>, the destruction of the State, <mark>and the proliferation of non-state actors</mark> and rogue States <mark>are likely to continue </mark>their course <mark>if no one moves to counter them.</u></mark> As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or guilt. <u>Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised. </p></u>

Luis Fleishmann 13 Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City and Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University Honors College, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States,” May 31st 2013, #SPS

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Luis Fleishmann 13 Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City and Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University Honors College, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States,” May 31st 2013, #SPS fulltext: The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forces—the drug cartels—existed before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise to power in 1999. But the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony. It has inspired governments to follow its model and has gained admirers among groups and movements through- out Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region and now around the globe. Indeed, the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran. His financial and material assistance has revitalized a moribund FARC and incorporated it with the insurgent force of the Bolivarian revolution. He has promoted Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspects—asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory, giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders. These partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create chaos in a region that in the future will see the proliferation of nothing but more adverse conditions: authoritarianism, further anarchy, insurgency, local and international terrorism, rogue states' involvement, and other negative elements such as an arms race and nuclear activity. The continent's current economic prosperity, about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries. Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning, where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the facts with a technical perspective—for example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfare—they might not perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt, predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se. Instead, it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it. Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, the deterioration of democracy to this extent has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it. The United States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent. As stated in chapter 9, however, the Bolivarian revolution will not die along with Chavez. It will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place, not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue. The effects of authoritarianism, the destruction of the State, and the proliferation of non-state actors and rogue States are likely to continue their course if no one moves to counter them. As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or guilt. Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised. [/INST] <h4>Latin American instability causes nuclear war </h4><p>Luis <strong>Fleishmann 13</strong> Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City and Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University Honors College, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States,” May 31st 2013, <u>#SPS</p><p></u>The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forces—the drug cartels—existed before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise to power in 1999. But <u>the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony.</u> It has inspired governments to follow its model and has gained admirers among groups and movements through- out Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region and now around the globe. Indeed, <u>the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran</u>. <u>His <mark>financial and material assistance </mark>has <mark>revitalized </mark>a moribund <mark>FARC and incorporated it </mark>with the insurgent force of <mark>the Bolivarian revolution.</u></mark> <u><mark>He </mark>has <mark>promoted</u></mark> Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspects—<u><strong><mark>asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation.</u></strong></mark> Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory, giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders. These partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create <u><mark>chaos in a region that </mark>in the future <mark>will see the proliferation of</mark> nothing but more adverse conditions: <mark>authoritarianism</mark>, further <mark>anarchy, insurgency</mark>, local and <mark>international terrorism</mark>, <mark>rogue states'</mark> involvement, and other negative elements such as <mark>an arms race and <strong>nuclear activity</strong></mark>.</u> <u>The continent's</u> <u>current economic prosperity,</u> about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, <u>is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries.</u> Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning, where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the facts with a technical perspective—for example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfare—they might not perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt, predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, <u>the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se</u>. Instead, <u>it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it.</u> Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, <u><mark>the deterioration</mark> </u>of democracy<u> to this extent <mark>has security implications insofar as <strong>external forces</strong> can penetrate it</mark>.</u> The United States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, <u>the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent.</u> As stated in chapter 9, however, <u>the Bolivarian revolution</u> will not die along with Chavez. It <u>will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place,</u> not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. <u>The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue.</u> <u><mark>The effects of authoritarianism</mark>, the destruction of the State, <mark>and the proliferation of non-state actors</mark> and rogue States <mark>are likely to continue </mark>their course <mark>if no one moves to counter them.</u></mark> As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or guilt. <u>Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised. </p></u> </s>

Latin American instability causes nuclear war

the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony. the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran His financial and material assistance has revitalized a moribund FARC and incorporated it with the insurgent force of the Bolivarian revolution. He has promoted asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. chaos in a region that in the future will see the proliferation of nothing but more adverse conditions: authoritarianism, further anarchy, insurgency, local and international terrorism, rogue states' involvement, and other negative elements such as an arms race and nuclear activity. The continent's current economic prosperity, is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries. the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it. the deterioration to this extent has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it. the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent. the Bolivarian revolution will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place, The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue. The effects of authoritarianism, the destruction of the State, and the proliferation of non-state actors and rogue States are likely to continue their course if no one moves to counter them. Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised.

financial and material assistance revitalized FARC and incorporated it the Bolivarian revolution. He promoted asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. chaos in a region that will see the proliferation of authoritarianism anarchy, insurgency international terrorism rogue states' an arms race and nuclear activity the deterioration has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it The effects of authoritarianism and the proliferation of non-state actors are likely to continue if no one moves to counter them.

The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forces—the drug cartels—existed before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise to power in 1999. But the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony. It has inspired governments to follow its model and has gained admirers among groups and movements through- out Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region and now around the globe. Indeed, the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran. His financial and material assistance has revitalized a moribund FARC and incorporated it with the insurgent force of the Bolivarian revolution. He has promoted Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspects—asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory, giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders. These partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create chaos in a region that in the future will see the proliferation of nothing but more adverse conditions: authoritarianism, further anarchy, insurgency, local and international terrorism, rogue states' involvement, and other negative elements such as an arms race and nuclear activity. The continent's current economic prosperity, about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries. Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning, where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the facts with a technical perspective—for example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfare—they might not perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt, predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se. Instead, it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it. Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, the deterioration of democracy to this extent has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it. The United States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent. As stated in chapter 9, however, the Bolivarian revolution will not die along with Chavez. It will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place, not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue. The effects of authoritarianism, the destruction of the State, and the proliferation of non-state actors and rogue States are likely to continue their course if no one moves to counter them. As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or guilt. Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised.

<h4>Latin American instability causes nuclear war </h4><p>Luis <strong>Fleishmann 13</strong> Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City and Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University Honors College, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States,” May 31st 2013, <u><strong>#SPS</p><p></u></strong>The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forces—the drug cartels—existed before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise to power in 1999. But <u><strong>the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony.</u></strong> It has inspired governments to follow its model and has gained admirers among groups and movements through- out Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region and now around the globe. Indeed, <u><strong>the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran</u></strong>. <u><strong>His <mark>financial and material assistance </mark>has <mark>revitalized </mark>a moribund <mark>FARC and incorporated it </mark>with the insurgent force of <mark>the Bolivarian revolution.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>He </mark>has <mark>promoted</u></strong></mark> Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspects—<u><strong><mark>asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation.</u></strong></mark> Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory, giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders. These partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create <u><strong><mark>chaos in a region that </mark>in the future <mark>will see the proliferation of</mark> nothing but more adverse conditions: <mark>authoritarianism</mark>, further <mark>anarchy, insurgency</mark>, local and <mark>international terrorism</mark>, <mark>rogue states'</mark> involvement, and other negative elements such as <mark>an arms race and nuclear activity</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>The continent's</u></strong> <u><strong>current economic prosperity,</u></strong> about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, <u><strong>is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries.</u></strong> Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning, where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the facts with a technical perspective—for example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfare—they might not perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt, predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, <u><strong>the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se</u></strong>. Instead, <u><strong>it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it.</u></strong> Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, <u><strong><mark>the deterioration</mark> </u></strong>of democracy<u><strong> to this extent <mark>has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it</mark>.</u></strong> The United States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, <u><strong>the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent.</u></strong> As stated in chapter 9, however, <u><strong>the Bolivarian revolution</u></strong> will not die along with Chavez. It <u><strong>will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place,</u></strong> not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. <u><strong>The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The effects of authoritarianism</mark>, the destruction of the State, <mark>and the proliferation of non-state actors</mark> and rogue States <mark>are likely to continue </mark>their course <mark>if no one moves to counter them.</u></strong></mark> As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or guilt. <u><strong>Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised. </p></u></strong>

Luis Fleishmann 13 Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City and Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University Honors College, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States,” May 31st 2013, #SPS

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Luis Fleishmann 13 Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City and Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University Honors College, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States,” May 31st 2013, #SPS fulltext: The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forces—the drug cartels—existed before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise to power in 1999. But the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony. It has inspired governments to follow its model and has gained admirers among groups and movements through- out Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region and now around the globe. Indeed, the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran. His financial and material assistance has revitalized a moribund FARC and incorporated it with the insurgent force of the Bolivarian revolution. He has promoted Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspects—asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation. Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory, giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders. These partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create chaos in a region that in the future will see the proliferation of nothing but more adverse conditions: authoritarianism, further anarchy, insurgency, local and international terrorism, rogue states' involvement, and other negative elements such as an arms race and nuclear activity. The continent's current economic prosperity, about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries. Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning, where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the facts with a technical perspective—for example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfare—they might not perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt, predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se. Instead, it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it. Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, the deterioration of democracy to this extent has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it. The United States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent. As stated in chapter 9, however, the Bolivarian revolution will not die along with Chavez. It will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place, not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue. The effects of authoritarianism, the destruction of the State, and the proliferation of non-state actors and rogue States are likely to continue their course if no one moves to counter them. As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or guilt. Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised. [/INST] <h4>Latin American instability causes nuclear war </h4><p>Luis <strong>Fleishmann 13</strong> Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City and Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University Honors College, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States,” May 31st 2013, <u><strong>#SPS</p><p></u></strong>The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forces—the drug cartels—existed before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise to power in 1999. But <u><strong>the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy, liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony.</u></strong> It has inspired governments to follow its model and has gained admirers among groups and movements through- out Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region and now around the globe. Indeed, <u><strong>the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in Colombia and has made alliances with Iran</u></strong>. <u><strong>His <mark>financial and material assistance </mark>has <mark>revitalized </mark>a moribund <mark>FARC and incorporated it </mark>with the insurgent force of <mark>the Bolivarian revolution.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>He </mark>has <mark>promoted</u></strong></mark> Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspects—<u><strong><mark>asymmetric warfare and nuclear cooperation.</u></strong></mark> Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory, giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders. These partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create <u><strong><mark>chaos in a region that </mark>in the future <mark>will see the proliferation of</mark> nothing but more adverse conditions: <mark>authoritarianism</mark>, further <mark>anarchy, insurgency</mark>, local and <mark>international terrorism</mark>, <mark>rogue states'</mark> involvement, and other negative elements such as <mark>an arms race and nuclear activity</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>The continent's</u></strong> <u><strong>current economic prosperity,</u></strong> about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, <u><strong>is not enough to counteract the detrimental effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries.</u></strong> Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning, where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the facts with a technical perspective—for example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfare—they might not perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt, predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, <u><strong>the breakdown of democracy in the continent is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se</u></strong>. Instead, <u><strong>it is the inevitable result when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from corrupting it.</u></strong> Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, <u><strong><mark>the deterioration</mark> </u></strong>of democracy<u><strong> to this extent <mark>has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it</mark>.</u></strong> The United States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, <u><strong>the United States lost the ability to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent.</u></strong> As stated in chapter 9, however, <u><strong>the Bolivarian revolution</u></strong> will not die along with Chavez. It <u><strong>will endure and survive because of the structures and practices he has left in place,</u></strong> not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. <u><strong>The United States should not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The effects of authoritarianism</mark>, the destruction of the State, <mark>and the proliferation of non-state actors</mark> and rogue States <mark>are likely to continue </mark>their course <mark>if no one moves to counter them.</u></strong></mark> As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or guilt. <u><strong>Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised. </p></u></strong> </s>

K turns the case -- notions of productivity is the PROXIMATE cause of your impacts

disabled people are marginalised and excluded from 'mainstream' society our understanding of the processes of exclusion is grounded in time and history disabled people are socially excluded because they are deemed unproductive and so hinder the progress of capital accumulation. the role of disabled people within society radically altered with the onset of the industrial revolution and the shift from the land to the factory. Disabled people unable to be as productive as their able-bodied counterparts were excluded or marginalised from the production process. exclusionary processes were reinforced by the State through ideologies of individualism (disability is an individual rather than societal problem Oliver views disability as a social construct used to maintain capitalist concerns, with the experiences of disability determined by the economy

disabled people are marginalised and excluded from 'mainstream' society disabled people are socially excluded because they are deemed unproductive and so hinder the progress of capital accumulation the role of disabled people within society radically altered with the onset of the industrial revolution and the shift from the land to the factory Disabled people unable to be as productive as their able-bodied counterparts were excluded or marginalised from the production process exclusionary processes were reinforced by the State through ideologies of individualism disability is an individual rather than societal problem disability as a social construct used to maintain capitalist concerns the experiences of disability determined by the econom

It is now generally recognised that disabled people are marginalised and excluded from 'mainstream' society. Disabled people represent one of the poorest groups in Western society. Apart from being excluded and marginalised from the workplace disabled people are often segregated within schooling, unable to find suitable housing, and have restricted access to public transport (Oliver, 1996). In general, our understanding of the processes of exclusion is grounded in time and history. For example, adopting a Marxist (materialist) approach, Michael Oliver (1990) has sought to demonstrate that disabled people are socially excluded because they are deemed unproductive and so hinder the progress of capital accumulation. He suggests that the role of disabled people within society radically altered with the onset of the industrial revolution and the shift from the land to the factory. Disabled people unable to be as productive as their able-bodied counterparts were excluded or marginalised from the production process. He argues that exclusionary processes were reinforced by the State through ideologies of individualism (disability is an individual rather than societal problem) and medicalisation (the need for disability to be treated). As such, Oliver (1990) views disability as a social construct used to maintain capitalist concerns, with the experiences of disability determined by the economy (Oliver, 1996). A Marxist or political economy approach is not, however, the only way to try and explain the bases of social exclusion.

<h4>K turns the case -- notions of productivity is the PROXIMATE cause of your impacts </h4><p><strong><mark>Kitchin 98</mark> (Rob, Director of NIRSA and Chairperson of the Irish Social Sciences Platform, “'Out of place', 'Knowing one's place': Space, power and the exclusion of disabled people,” Disability & Society13. 3, June, http://search.proquest.com/docview/195770262?accountid=11836) </p><p></strong>It is now generally recognised that <u><strong><mark>disabled people are marginalised and excluded from 'mainstream' society</u></strong></mark>. Disabled people represent one of the poorest groups in Western society. Apart from being excluded and marginalised from the workplace disabled people are often segregated within schooling, unable to find suitable housing, and have restricted access to public transport (Oliver, 1996). In general, <u>our understanding of the processes of exclusion is grounded in time and history</u>. For example, adopting a Marxist (materialist) approach, Michael Oliver (1990) has sought to demonstrate that <u><strong><mark>disabled people are socially excluded because they are deemed unproductive and so hinder the progress of capital accumulation</strong></mark>.</u> He suggests that <u><strong><mark>the role of disabled people within society radically altered with the onset of the industrial revolution and the shift from the land to the factory</strong></mark>. <strong><mark>Disabled people unable to be as productive as their able-bodied counterparts were excluded or marginalised from the production process</strong></mark>.</u> He argues that <u><mark>exclusionary processes were reinforced by the State through ideologies of individualism</mark> (<strong><mark>disability is an individual rather than societal problem</u></strong></mark>) and medicalisation (the need for disability to be treated). As such, <u>Oliver</u> (1990) <u>views <strong><mark>disability as a social construct used to maintain capitalist concerns</strong></mark>, with <strong><mark>the experiences of disability determined by the econom</strong></mark>y</u> (Oliver, 1996). A Marxist or political economy approach is not, however, the only way to try and explain the bases of social exclusion. </p>

Kitchin 98 (Rob, Director of NIRSA and Chairperson of the Irish Social Sciences Platform, “'Out of place', 'Knowing one's place': Space, power and the exclusion of disabled people,” Disability & Society13. 3, June, http://search.proquest.com/docview/195770262?accountid=11836)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Kitchin 98 (Rob, Director of NIRSA and Chairperson of the Irish Social Sciences Platform, “'Out of place', 'Knowing one's place': Space, power and the exclusion of disabled people,” Disability & Society13. 3, June, http://search.proquest.com/docview/195770262?accountid=11836) fulltext: It is now generally recognised that disabled people are marginalised and excluded from 'mainstream' society. Disabled people represent one of the poorest groups in Western society. Apart from being excluded and marginalised from the workplace disabled people are often segregated within schooling, unable to find suitable housing, and have restricted access to public transport (Oliver, 1996). In general, our understanding of the processes of exclusion is grounded in time and history. For example, adopting a Marxist (materialist) approach, Michael Oliver (1990) has sought to demonstrate that disabled people are socially excluded because they are deemed unproductive and so hinder the progress of capital accumulation. He suggests that the role of disabled people within society radically altered with the onset of the industrial revolution and the shift from the land to the factory. Disabled people unable to be as productive as their able-bodied counterparts were excluded or marginalised from the production process. He argues that exclusionary processes were reinforced by the State through ideologies of individualism (disability is an individual rather than societal problem) and medicalisation (the need for disability to be treated). As such, Oliver (1990) views disability as a social construct used to maintain capitalist concerns, with the experiences of disability determined by the economy (Oliver, 1996). A Marxist or political economy approach is not, however, the only way to try and explain the bases of social exclusion. [/INST] <h4>K turns the case -- notions of productivity is the PROXIMATE cause of your impacts </h4><p><strong><mark>Kitchin 98</mark> (Rob, Director of NIRSA and Chairperson of the Irish Social Sciences Platform, “'Out of place', 'Knowing one's place': Space, power and the exclusion of disabled people,” Disability & Society13. 3, June, http://search.proquest.com/docview/195770262?accountid=11836) </p><p></strong>It is now generally recognised that <u><strong><mark>disabled people are marginalised and excluded from 'mainstream' society</u></strong></mark>. Disabled people represent one of the poorest groups in Western society. Apart from being excluded and marginalised from the workplace disabled people are often segregated within schooling, unable to find suitable housing, and have restricted access to public transport (Oliver, 1996). In general, <u>our understanding of the processes of exclusion is grounded in time and history</u>. For example, adopting a Marxist (materialist) approach, Michael Oliver (1990) has sought to demonstrate that <u><strong><mark>disabled people are socially excluded because they are deemed unproductive and so hinder the progress of capital accumulation</strong></mark>.</u> He suggests that <u><strong><mark>the role of disabled people within society radically altered with the onset of the industrial revolution and the shift from the land to the factory</strong></mark>. <strong><mark>Disabled people unable to be as productive as their able-bodied counterparts were excluded or marginalised from the production process</strong></mark>.</u> He argues that <u><mark>exclusionary processes were reinforced by the State through ideologies of individualism</mark> (<strong><mark>disability is an individual rather than societal problem</u></strong></mark>) and medicalisation (the need for disability to be treated). As such, <u>Oliver</u> (1990) <u>views <strong><mark>disability as a social construct used to maintain capitalist concerns</strong></mark>, with <strong><mark>the experiences of disability determined by the econom</strong></mark>y</u> (Oliver, 1996). A Marxist or political economy approach is not, however, the only way to try and explain the bases of social exclusion. </p> </s>

Second is liberalism – the inclusion of supposed radical knowledge into debate instills institutional legitimacy which creates a smooth space for the academy to continue hegemonic practices of distancing from the subaltern -- leads to endless imperial warfare and structural violence -- their notion of “inclusion” becomes a laboratory for governmentality

Empires of knowledge rest on the foundation of racial statecraft, militarized science, and enduring notions of civilizational superiority imperial cartographies” can be traced through the meshed contours of research methods and scholarly theories as they are staked out in the pragmatic mappings of conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire expert knowledge on “other” cultures and civilizations has been a cornerstone of the development of academic disciplines and used in the management of “difference” within the nation as well as the conquest and management of native populations by the United States, here and overseas educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for inclusion and civilization “there,” on the periphery, became a laboratory for new regimes of governmentality “here,” within the immediate territorial borders of the United States If universities of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes must also be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” being constructed by disciplines such as anthropology Theoretical constructions of categories such as “savage” and “primitive” helped create the very scaffoldings of European and later U.S. imperial cartographies what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States During World War I some archaeologists worked as spies to literally offer “on ground geographical knowledges” that were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles It is World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. The Manhattan Project and the development of the atom bomb sealed this intimate and soon inextricable link between scientific research and militarism It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field As U.S. and Allied forces launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they recognized that they needed condensed, accelerated training about the geographies and peoples they were encountering linguistic anthropology created the capacity for “quickly learning and teaching the languages of the new theatres of warfare Army Specialized Training Programs were established on 227 college and university campuses, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state anthropologists at the Bureau of Indian Affairs monitored and influenced war-related opinion on Native American reservations anthropologists were involved in studying Japanese American communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the concentration camps Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities McCarthyism and a new wave of political repression ensured that questions were not asked about the business of war—or the reasons that the business of war was also becoming an academic business This intersection of Department of Defense, Pentagon, and research university interests resulted in massive amounts of funding and shifted the fiscal nature of universities’ state patronage from land-grant, agricultural resources to the huge war chest of the defense establishment in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations the CIA supported social science research throughout the 1950s and 1960s to perfect psychological torture techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—and after 9/11, became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq

Empires of knowledge rest on racial statecraft, militarized science, and civilizational superiority imperial cartographies” can be traced through scholarly theories staked out in conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire expert knowledge on “other” cultures has been a cornerstone of the management of “difference” as well as the conquest of native populations inclusion “there,” became governmentality “here,” universities must be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” constructed by anthropology constructions such as “savage” helped create the scaffoldings of imperial cartographies During World War I archaeologists worked as spies to offer “on ground geographical knowledges The Manhattan Project and the bomb sealed this inextricable link between research and militarism U.S. forces recognized they needed training about the peoples they were encountering linguistic anthropology created the capacity for teaching the languages of warfare Army Specialized Training Programs were established on 227 campuses anthropologists monitored Native American reservations were involved in studying Japanese American concentration camps McCarthyism ensured questions were not asked about the reasons the business of war was becoming an academic business This intersection of D o D Pentagon, and research interests shifted the fiscal nature of patronage to the defense establishment the CIA supported research to perfect psychological torture social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations and became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq

Empires of knowledge rest on the foundation of racial statecraft, militarized science, and enduring notions of civilizational superiority. What we call “imperial cartographies” can be traced through the meshed contours of research methods and scholarly theories as they are staked out in the pragmatic mappings of conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire.14 It is important to note that expert knowledge on “other” cultures and civilizations has been a cornerstone of the development of academic disciplines and used in the management of “difference” within the nation as well as the conquest and management of native populations by the United States, here and overseas. For example, Victor Bascara examines an early iteration (and a model, perhaps) of what Bill Readings has called the “Americanization” of the university. 15 Bascara’s chapter on the imperial universities founded in the U.S.-controlled territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after 1898 demonstrates how educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission. Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for inclusion and civilization “there,” on the periphery, became a laboratory for new regimes of governmentality “here,” within the immediate territorial borders of the United States. If universities of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes must also be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” being constructed by disciplines such as anthropology. Late nineteenth-century anthropology emerged through centuries-old scientific curiosity (and debates) about human difference as well as the administrative imperatives of other imperial powers, such as Britain.16 Theoretical constructions of categories such as “savage” and “primitive” were not mere reflections of ivory tower ruminations about human origins and human science or “cultural” essences but helped create the very scaffoldings of European and later U.S. imperial cartographies.17 If these constructions of racial hierarchy shaped the curricular and disciplinary consensus about difference in the imperial university, then what can we say about institutional research practices that explicitly furthered state projects, especially during times of internal and external crises, such as war? In other words, what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States, as demonstrated by González’s fascinating research on the contemporary Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence programs that target students of color. While this volume does not explore the fuller histories of the relationship between the U.S. academy and war efforts throughout the twentieth century, we gesture to some historical “plottings” that signal an enduring coimplication between the institutionalized practices of the military and the academy. It is this deep historicized process of normalization that has created the dominant “consensus” and “silence” in the imperial university in the post-9/11 period. During World War I, for instance, some archaeologists worked as spies to literally offer “on ground geographical knowledges” that, as David Price argues, were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles.”18 This involvement, however, created controversy when Franz Boas, the preeminent anthropologist, protested the involvement of anthropologists with U.S. military intelligence.19 Though Boas was not supported by a majority of his colleagues, the controversy has shaped the debates about the politics and ethics of anthropologists’ relationship to military intelligence to this day, as addressed in González’s chapter and by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists within the American Anthropological Association. The imperial university was deeply embroiled in issues of war, labor, and protest throughout the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier Red Scare. World War I and its aftermath saw the targeting and deportation of anarchists and antiwar socialists during the infamous Palmer Raids in a period of heightened nationalism and repression. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was cofounded in 1915 by John Dewey and Arthur Lovejoy; the latter resigned from Stanford University over a controversy regarding the abuse of immigrant labor by the industrialist Stanford family.20 In 1940, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22 It is, of course, World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. The Manhattan Project and the development of the atom bomb sealed this intimate and soon inextricable link between scientific research and militarism. As R. C. Lewontin powerfully suggests, “It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field. It is there, not in the Nevada desert, that Henry Moore’s ambiguous fusion of a mushroom cloud and a death’s head memorializes the Bomb.”23 As U.S. and Allied forces launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they recognized that they needed condensed, accelerated training about the geographies and peoples they were encountering. Ironically, it was the Boasian commitment to field-based linguistic anthropology that created the capacity for “quickly learning and teaching the languages of the new theatres of warfare.”24 Further, Army Specialized Training Programs (ASTPs) were established on 227 college and university campuses, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces. These booklets summarized a region’s geographical history and included gems of “cultural advice” such as “not approaching Egyptian women” and “not concluding that East Indian men holding hands are homosexuals,” 26 early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. If the distilled study of “other cultures,” enabled by academic expertise, became important for warcraft in external theaters, other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state. For instance, anthropologists at the Bureau of Indian Affairs monitored and influenced war-related opinion on Native American reservations. 27 Some anthropologists were involved in studying Japanese American communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the concentration camps set up by the War Relocation Authority, “one of the most publicly visible and volatile topics relating to anthropology’s war time contributions.”28 Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world. By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured. Noam Chomsky has argued that by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history.”29 Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities.30 Warnings about the dangers of this deep alliance between the U.S. military and intelligence, civil society, and the academy came not only from the margins but also from the Oval Office itself. Dwight Eisenhower prophetically warned about consequences of the immense power inhered in what he called the “military-industrial complex.” Interestingly, in an earlier draft of this famous speech, he had apparently inserted the word “academic” in the now famous mantra of power, but it was deleted.31 It was another politician, William Fulbright, who issued a clear warning of the dangers of academic collusion with the militarized state when he stated, “In lending itself too much for the purpose of government, a university fails its higher purpose.”32 These concerns about the narrowing of the sphere of democratic debate were also being raised by distinguished scholars (such as Hannah Arendt and John Dewey33) but McCarthyism and a new wave of political repression ensured that questions were not asked about the business of war—or the reasons that the business of war was also becoming an academic business.34 This intersection of Department of Defense, Pentagon, and research university interests resulted in massive amounts of funding and shifted the fiscal nature of universities’ state patronage from land-grant, agricultural resources to the huge war chest of the defense establishment. This fiscal patronage was both overt and covert, involving individual academics and departments across the disciplines, not just the sciences, with support from military grants. Chomsky, for example, remembers that in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations.”35 As González points out in his chapter, “the CIA supported social science research throughout the 1950s and 1960s to perfect psychological torture techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education.”36 At the height of the Cold War, social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—and after 9/11, became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq.37

<h4><u>Second is liberalism</u> – the inclusion of supposed radical knowledge into debate instills institutional legitimacy which creates a smooth space for the academy to continue hegemonic practices of distancing from the subaltern -- leads to <u>endless imperial warfare</u> and structural violence -- their notion of “inclusion” becomes a laboratory for governmentality </h4><p><strong>Chatterjee and Maira 14</strong> (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 14-18) gz</p><p><u><strong><mark>Empires of knowledge rest on</mark> the foundation of <mark>racial statecraft, militarized science, and</mark> enduring notions of <mark>civilizational superiority</u></strong></mark>. What we call “<u><strong><mark>imperial cartographies” can be traced through</mark> the meshed contours of research methods and <mark>scholarly theories</mark> as they are <mark>staked out in</mark> the pragmatic mappings of <mark>conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire</u></strong></mark>.14 It is important to note that <u><strong><mark>expert knowledge on “other” cultures</mark> and civilizations <mark>has been a cornerstone of</mark> the development of academic disciplines and used in <mark>the management of “difference”</mark> within the nation <mark>as well as the conquest</mark> and management <mark>of native populations</mark> by the United States, here and overseas</u></strong>. For example, Victor Bascara examines an early iteration (and a model, perhaps) of what Bill Readings has called the “Americanization” of the university. 15 Bascara’s chapter on the imperial universities founded in the U.S.-controlled territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after 1898 demonstrates how <u><strong>educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission</u></strong>. <u><strong>Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for <mark>inclusion</mark> and civilization <mark>“there,”</mark> on the periphery, <mark>became</mark> a laboratory for new regimes of <mark>governmentality “here,”</mark> within the immediate territorial borders of the United States</u></strong>. <u><strong>If <mark>universities</mark> of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes <mark>must </mark>also <mark>be understood within the epistemologies of “othering”</mark> being <mark>constructed by</mark> disciplines such as <mark>anthropology</u></strong></mark>. Late nineteenth-century anthropology emerged through centuries-old scientific curiosity (and debates) about human difference as well as the administrative imperatives of other imperial powers, such as Britain.16 <u><strong>Theoretical <mark>constructions</mark> of categories <mark>such as “savage”</mark> and “primitive”</u></strong> were not mere reflections of ivory tower ruminations about human origins and human science or “cultural” essences but <u><strong><mark>helped create the</mark> very <mark>scaffoldings of</mark> European and later U.S. <mark>imperial cartographies</u></strong></mark>.17 If these constructions of racial hierarchy shaped the curricular and disciplinary consensus about difference in the imperial university, then what can we say about institutional research practices that explicitly furthered state projects, especially during times of internal and external crises, such as war? In other words, <u><strong>what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States</u></strong>, as demonstrated by González’s fascinating research on the contemporary Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence programs that target students of color. While this volume does not explore the fuller histories of the relationship between the U.S. academy and war efforts throughout the twentieth century, we gesture to some historical “plottings” that signal an enduring coimplication between the institutionalized practices of the military and the academy. It is this deep historicized process of normalization that has created the dominant “consensus” and “silence” in the imperial university in the post-9/11 period. <u><strong><mark>During World War I</u></strong></mark>, for instance, <u><strong>some <mark>archaeologists worked as spies to</mark> literally <mark>offer “on ground geographical knowledges</mark>” that</u></strong>, as David Price argues, <u><strong>were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles</u></strong>.”18 This involvement, however, created controversy when Franz Boas, the preeminent anthropologist, protested the involvement of anthropologists with U.S. military intelligence.19 Though Boas was not supported by a majority of his colleagues, the controversy has shaped the debates about the politics and ethics of anthropologists’ relationship to military intelligence to this day, as addressed in González’s chapter and by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists within the American Anthropological Association. The imperial university was deeply embroiled in issues of war, labor, and protest throughout the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier Red Scare. World War I and its aftermath saw the targeting and deportation of anarchists and antiwar socialists during the infamous Palmer Raids in a period of heightened nationalism and repression. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was cofounded in 1915 by John Dewey and Arthur Lovejoy; the latter resigned from Stanford University over a controversy regarding the abuse of immigrant labor by the industrialist Stanford family.20 In 1940, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22 <u><strong>It is</u></strong>, of course, <u><strong>World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. <mark>The Manhattan Project and the</mark> development of the atom <mark>bomb sealed this</mark> intimate and soon <mark>inextricable link</mark> <mark>between</mark> scientific <mark>research and militarism</u></strong></mark>. As R. C. Lewontin powerfully suggests, “<u><strong>It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field</u></strong>. It is there, not in the Nevada desert, that Henry Moore’s ambiguous fusion of a mushroom cloud and a death’s head memorializes the Bomb.”23 <u><strong>As <mark>U.S.</mark> and Allied <mark>forces</mark> launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they <mark>recognized</mark> that <mark>they needed</mark> condensed, accelerated <mark>training about the</mark> geographies and <mark>peoples they were encountering</u></strong></mark>. Ironically, it was the Boasian commitment to field-based <u><strong><mark>linguistic anthropology</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>created the capacity for</mark> “quickly learning and <mark>teaching the languages of</mark> the new theatres of <mark>warfare</u></strong></mark>.”24 Further, <u><strong><mark>Army Specialized Training Programs</u></strong></mark> (ASTPs) <u><strong><mark>were established on 227</mark> college and university <mark>campuses</mark>, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces</u></strong>. These booklets summarized a region’s geographical history and included gems of “cultural advice” such as “not approaching Egyptian women” and “not concluding that East Indian men holding hands are homosexuals,” 26 <u><strong>early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. </u></strong>If the distilled study of “other cultures,” enabled by academic expertise, became important for warcraft in external theaters, <u><strong>other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state</u></strong>. For instance, <u><strong><mark>anthropologists</mark> at the Bureau of Indian Affairs <mark>monitored</mark> and influenced war-related opinion on <mark>Native American reservations</u></strong></mark>. 27 Some <u><strong>anthropologists <mark>were involved in studying</mark> <mark>Japanese American</mark> communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the <mark>concentration camps</u></strong></mark> set up by the War Relocation Authority, “one of the most publicly visible and volatile topics relating to anthropology’s war time contributions.”28 <u><strong>Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world</u></strong>. <u><strong>By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured</u></strong>. Noam Chomsky has argued that <u><strong>by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history</u></strong>.”29 <u><strong>Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities</u></strong>.30 Warnings about the dangers of this deep alliance between the U.S. military and intelligence, civil society, and the academy came not only from the margins but also from the Oval Office itself. Dwight Eisenhower prophetically warned about consequences of the immense power inhered in what he called the “military-industrial complex.” Interestingly, in an earlier draft of this famous speech, he had apparently inserted the word “academic” in the now famous mantra of power, but it was deleted.31 It was another politician, William Fulbright, who issued a clear warning of the dangers of academic collusion with the militarized state when he stated, “In lending itself too much for the purpose of government, a university fails its higher purpose.”32 These concerns about the narrowing of the sphere of democratic debate were also being raised by distinguished scholars (such as Hannah Arendt and John Dewey33) but <u><strong><mark>McCarthyism</mark> and a new wave of political repression <mark>ensured</mark> that <mark>questions were not asked about</mark> the business of war—or <mark>the reasons</mark> that <mark>the business of war was</mark> also <mark>becoming an academic business</u></strong></mark>.34 <u><strong><mark>This intersection of D</mark>epartment <mark>o</mark>f <mark>D</mark>efense, <mark>Pentagon, and research </mark>university <mark>interests </mark>resulted in massive amounts of funding and <mark>shifted the fiscal nature of</mark> universities’ state <mark>patronage</mark> from land-grant, agricultural resources <mark>to the</mark> huge war chest of the <mark>defense establishment</u></strong></mark>. This fiscal patronage was both overt and covert, involving individual academics and departments across the disciplines, not just the sciences, with support from military grants. Chomsky, for example, remembers that <u><strong>in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations</u></strong>.”35 As González points out in his chapter, “<u><strong><mark>the CIA supported</mark> social science <mark>research</mark> throughout the 1950s and 1960s <mark>to perfect psychological torture</mark> techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education</u></strong>.”36 At the height of the Cold War, <u><strong><mark>social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations</mark>—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—<mark>and</mark> after 9/11, <mark>became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq</u></strong></mark>.37</p>

Chatterjee and Maira 14 (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 14-18) gz

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Chatterjee and Maira 14 (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 14-18) gz fulltext: Empires of knowledge rest on the foundation of racial statecraft, militarized science, and enduring notions of civilizational superiority. What we call “imperial cartographies” can be traced through the meshed contours of research methods and scholarly theories as they are staked out in the pragmatic mappings of conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire.14 It is important to note that expert knowledge on “other” cultures and civilizations has been a cornerstone of the development of academic disciplines and used in the management of “difference” within the nation as well as the conquest and management of native populations by the United States, here and overseas. For example, Victor Bascara examines an early iteration (and a model, perhaps) of what Bill Readings has called the “Americanization” of the university. 15 Bascara’s chapter on the imperial universities founded in the U.S.-controlled territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after 1898 demonstrates how educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission. Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for inclusion and civilization “there,” on the periphery, became a laboratory for new regimes of governmentality “here,” within the immediate territorial borders of the United States. If universities of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes must also be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” being constructed by disciplines such as anthropology. Late nineteenth-century anthropology emerged through centuries-old scientific curiosity (and debates) about human difference as well as the administrative imperatives of other imperial powers, such as Britain.16 Theoretical constructions of categories such as “savage” and “primitive” were not mere reflections of ivory tower ruminations about human origins and human science or “cultural” essences but helped create the very scaffoldings of European and later U.S. imperial cartographies.17 If these constructions of racial hierarchy shaped the curricular and disciplinary consensus about difference in the imperial university, then what can we say about institutional research practices that explicitly furthered state projects, especially during times of internal and external crises, such as war? In other words, what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States, as demonstrated by González’s fascinating research on the contemporary Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence programs that target students of color. While this volume does not explore the fuller histories of the relationship between the U.S. academy and war efforts throughout the twentieth century, we gesture to some historical “plottings” that signal an enduring coimplication between the institutionalized practices of the military and the academy. It is this deep historicized process of normalization that has created the dominant “consensus” and “silence” in the imperial university in the post-9/11 period. During World War I, for instance, some archaeologists worked as spies to literally offer “on ground geographical knowledges” that, as David Price argues, were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles.”18 This involvement, however, created controversy when Franz Boas, the preeminent anthropologist, protested the involvement of anthropologists with U.S. military intelligence.19 Though Boas was not supported by a majority of his colleagues, the controversy has shaped the debates about the politics and ethics of anthropologists’ relationship to military intelligence to this day, as addressed in González’s chapter and by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists within the American Anthropological Association. The imperial university was deeply embroiled in issues of war, labor, and protest throughout the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier Red Scare. World War I and its aftermath saw the targeting and deportation of anarchists and antiwar socialists during the infamous Palmer Raids in a period of heightened nationalism and repression. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was cofounded in 1915 by John Dewey and Arthur Lovejoy; the latter resigned from Stanford University over a controversy regarding the abuse of immigrant labor by the industrialist Stanford family.20 In 1940, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22 It is, of course, World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. The Manhattan Project and the development of the atom bomb sealed this intimate and soon inextricable link between scientific research and militarism. As R. C. Lewontin powerfully suggests, “It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field. It is there, not in the Nevada desert, that Henry Moore’s ambiguous fusion of a mushroom cloud and a death’s head memorializes the Bomb.”23 As U.S. and Allied forces launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they recognized that they needed condensed, accelerated training about the geographies and peoples they were encountering. Ironically, it was the Boasian commitment to field-based linguistic anthropology that created the capacity for “quickly learning and teaching the languages of the new theatres of warfare.”24 Further, Army Specialized Training Programs (ASTPs) were established on 227 college and university campuses, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces. These booklets summarized a region’s geographical history and included gems of “cultural advice” such as “not approaching Egyptian women” and “not concluding that East Indian men holding hands are homosexuals,” 26 early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. If the distilled study of “other cultures,” enabled by academic expertise, became important for warcraft in external theaters, other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state. For instance, anthropologists at the Bureau of Indian Affairs monitored and influenced war-related opinion on Native American reservations. 27 Some anthropologists were involved in studying Japanese American communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the concentration camps set up by the War Relocation Authority, “one of the most publicly visible and volatile topics relating to anthropology’s war time contributions.”28 Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world. By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured. Noam Chomsky has argued that by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history.”29 Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities.30 Warnings about the dangers of this deep alliance between the U.S. military and intelligence, civil society, and the academy came not only from the margins but also from the Oval Office itself. Dwight Eisenhower prophetically warned about consequences of the immense power inhered in what he called the “military-industrial complex.” Interestingly, in an earlier draft of this famous speech, he had apparently inserted the word “academic” in the now famous mantra of power, but it was deleted.31 It was another politician, William Fulbright, who issued a clear warning of the dangers of academic collusion with the militarized state when he stated, “In lending itself too much for the purpose of government, a university fails its higher purpose.”32 These concerns about the narrowing of the sphere of democratic debate were also being raised by distinguished scholars (such as Hannah Arendt and John Dewey33) but McCarthyism and a new wave of political repression ensured that questions were not asked about the business of war—or the reasons that the business of war was also becoming an academic business.34 This intersection of Department of Defense, Pentagon, and research university interests resulted in massive amounts of funding and shifted the fiscal nature of universities’ state patronage from land-grant, agricultural resources to the huge war chest of the defense establishment. This fiscal patronage was both overt and covert, involving individual academics and departments across the disciplines, not just the sciences, with support from military grants. Chomsky, for example, remembers that in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations.”35 As González points out in his chapter, “the CIA supported social science research throughout the 1950s and 1960s to perfect psychological torture techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education.”36 At the height of the Cold War, social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—and after 9/11, became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq.37 [/INST] <h4><u>Second is liberalism</u> – the inclusion of supposed radical knowledge into debate instills institutional legitimacy which creates a smooth space for the academy to continue hegemonic practices of distancing from the subaltern -- leads to <u>endless imperial warfare</u> and structural violence -- their notion of “inclusion” becomes a laboratory for governmentality </h4><p><strong>Chatterjee and Maira 14</strong> (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 14-18) gz</p><p><u><strong><mark>Empires of knowledge rest on</mark> the foundation of <mark>racial statecraft, militarized science, and</mark> enduring notions of <mark>civilizational superiority</u></strong></mark>. What we call “<u><strong><mark>imperial cartographies” can be traced through</mark> the meshed contours of research methods and <mark>scholarly theories</mark> as they are <mark>staked out in</mark> the pragmatic mappings of <mark>conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire</u></strong></mark>.14 It is important to note that <u><strong><mark>expert knowledge on “other” cultures</mark> and civilizations <mark>has been a cornerstone of</mark> the development of academic disciplines and used in <mark>the management of “difference”</mark> within the nation <mark>as well as the conquest</mark> and management <mark>of native populations</mark> by the United States, here and overseas</u></strong>. For example, Victor Bascara examines an early iteration (and a model, perhaps) of what Bill Readings has called the “Americanization” of the university. 15 Bascara’s chapter on the imperial universities founded in the U.S.-controlled territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after 1898 demonstrates how <u><strong>educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission</u></strong>. <u><strong>Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for <mark>inclusion</mark> and civilization <mark>“there,”</mark> on the periphery, <mark>became</mark> a laboratory for new regimes of <mark>governmentality “here,”</mark> within the immediate territorial borders of the United States</u></strong>. <u><strong>If <mark>universities</mark> of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes <mark>must </mark>also <mark>be understood within the epistemologies of “othering”</mark> being <mark>constructed by</mark> disciplines such as <mark>anthropology</u></strong></mark>. Late nineteenth-century anthropology emerged through centuries-old scientific curiosity (and debates) about human difference as well as the administrative imperatives of other imperial powers, such as Britain.16 <u><strong>Theoretical <mark>constructions</mark> of categories <mark>such as “savage”</mark> and “primitive”</u></strong> were not mere reflections of ivory tower ruminations about human origins and human science or “cultural” essences but <u><strong><mark>helped create the</mark> very <mark>scaffoldings of</mark> European and later U.S. <mark>imperial cartographies</u></strong></mark>.17 If these constructions of racial hierarchy shaped the curricular and disciplinary consensus about difference in the imperial university, then what can we say about institutional research practices that explicitly furthered state projects, especially during times of internal and external crises, such as war? In other words, <u><strong>what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States</u></strong>, as demonstrated by González’s fascinating research on the contemporary Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence programs that target students of color. While this volume does not explore the fuller histories of the relationship between the U.S. academy and war efforts throughout the twentieth century, we gesture to some historical “plottings” that signal an enduring coimplication between the institutionalized practices of the military and the academy. It is this deep historicized process of normalization that has created the dominant “consensus” and “silence” in the imperial university in the post-9/11 period. <u><strong><mark>During World War I</u></strong></mark>, for instance, <u><strong>some <mark>archaeologists worked as spies to</mark> literally <mark>offer “on ground geographical knowledges</mark>” that</u></strong>, as David Price argues, <u><strong>were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles</u></strong>.”18 This involvement, however, created controversy when Franz Boas, the preeminent anthropologist, protested the involvement of anthropologists with U.S. military intelligence.19 Though Boas was not supported by a majority of his colleagues, the controversy has shaped the debates about the politics and ethics of anthropologists’ relationship to military intelligence to this day, as addressed in González’s chapter and by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists within the American Anthropological Association. The imperial university was deeply embroiled in issues of war, labor, and protest throughout the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier Red Scare. World War I and its aftermath saw the targeting and deportation of anarchists and antiwar socialists during the infamous Palmer Raids in a period of heightened nationalism and repression. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was cofounded in 1915 by John Dewey and Arthur Lovejoy; the latter resigned from Stanford University over a controversy regarding the abuse of immigrant labor by the industrialist Stanford family.20 In 1940, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22 <u><strong>It is</u></strong>, of course, <u><strong>World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. <mark>The Manhattan Project and the</mark> development of the atom <mark>bomb sealed this</mark> intimate and soon <mark>inextricable link</mark> <mark>between</mark> scientific <mark>research and militarism</u></strong></mark>. As R. C. Lewontin powerfully suggests, “<u><strong>It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field</u></strong>. It is there, not in the Nevada desert, that Henry Moore’s ambiguous fusion of a mushroom cloud and a death’s head memorializes the Bomb.”23 <u><strong>As <mark>U.S.</mark> and Allied <mark>forces</mark> launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they <mark>recognized</mark> that <mark>they needed</mark> condensed, accelerated <mark>training about the</mark> geographies and <mark>peoples they were encountering</u></strong></mark>. Ironically, it was the Boasian commitment to field-based <u><strong><mark>linguistic anthropology</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>created the capacity for</mark> “quickly learning and <mark>teaching the languages of</mark> the new theatres of <mark>warfare</u></strong></mark>.”24 Further, <u><strong><mark>Army Specialized Training Programs</u></strong></mark> (ASTPs) <u><strong><mark>were established on 227</mark> college and university <mark>campuses</mark>, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces</u></strong>. These booklets summarized a region’s geographical history and included gems of “cultural advice” such as “not approaching Egyptian women” and “not concluding that East Indian men holding hands are homosexuals,” 26 <u><strong>early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. </u></strong>If the distilled study of “other cultures,” enabled by academic expertise, became important for warcraft in external theaters, <u><strong>other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state</u></strong>. For instance, <u><strong><mark>anthropologists</mark> at the Bureau of Indian Affairs <mark>monitored</mark> and influenced war-related opinion on <mark>Native American reservations</u></strong></mark>. 27 Some <u><strong>anthropologists <mark>were involved in studying</mark> <mark>Japanese American</mark> communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the <mark>concentration camps</u></strong></mark> set up by the War Relocation Authority, “one of the most publicly visible and volatile topics relating to anthropology’s war time contributions.”28 <u><strong>Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world</u></strong>. <u><strong>By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured</u></strong>. Noam Chomsky has argued that <u><strong>by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history</u></strong>.”29 <u><strong>Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities</u></strong>.30 Warnings about the dangers of this deep alliance between the U.S. military and intelligence, civil society, and the academy came not only from the margins but also from the Oval Office itself. Dwight Eisenhower prophetically warned about consequences of the immense power inhered in what he called the “military-industrial complex.” Interestingly, in an earlier draft of this famous speech, he had apparently inserted the word “academic” in the now famous mantra of power, but it was deleted.31 It was another politician, William Fulbright, who issued a clear warning of the dangers of academic collusion with the militarized state when he stated, “In lending itself too much for the purpose of government, a university fails its higher purpose.”32 These concerns about the narrowing of the sphere of democratic debate were also being raised by distinguished scholars (such as Hannah Arendt and John Dewey33) but <u><strong><mark>McCarthyism</mark> and a new wave of political repression <mark>ensured</mark> that <mark>questions were not asked about</mark> the business of war—or <mark>the reasons</mark> that <mark>the business of war was</mark> also <mark>becoming an academic business</u></strong></mark>.34 <u><strong><mark>This intersection of D</mark>epartment <mark>o</mark>f <mark>D</mark>efense, <mark>Pentagon, and research </mark>university <mark>interests </mark>resulted in massive amounts of funding and <mark>shifted the fiscal nature of</mark> universities’ state <mark>patronage</mark> from land-grant, agricultural resources <mark>to the</mark> huge war chest of the <mark>defense establishment</u></strong></mark>. This fiscal patronage was both overt and covert, involving individual academics and departments across the disciplines, not just the sciences, with support from military grants. Chomsky, for example, remembers that <u><strong>in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations</u></strong>.”35 As González points out in his chapter, “<u><strong><mark>the CIA supported</mark> social science <mark>research</mark> throughout the 1950s and 1960s <mark>to perfect psychological torture</mark> techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education</u></strong>.”36 At the height of the Cold War, <u><strong><mark>social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations</mark>—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—<mark>and</mark> after 9/11, <mark>became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq</u></strong></mark>.37</p> </s>

They cause serial policy failure.

Governmentality creates a market for policy serial policy failure--the fate of all policy--compels a continuous search for new analysis Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that policy will overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life governance installs inequitable distributions of danger through the ways in which life is problematized by it

Governmentality creates a market for policy serial policy failure the fate of all policy compels a continuous search for new analysis Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that policy will overcome Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which governance problematizes life governance installs inequitable distributions of danger

More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

<h4>They cause serial policy failure.</h4><p><strong>Dillon and Reid 00</strong> (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25(1))</p><p>More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem.<u> <mark>Governmentality</mark> </u>thereby<u> <mark>creates a market for policy</u></mark>, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet<u> <mark>serial policy failure</mark>--<mark>the fate</u></mark> and the fuel <u><mark>of all policy</mark>--<mark>compels</u></mark> them into <u><mark>a continuous search for</u></mark> the <u><mark>new analysis</u></mark> that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] <u><mark>Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that</mark> </u>science and <u><mark>policy</u></mark>--and policy science--<u><mark>will</mark> </u>ultimately<u> <mark>overcome</mark>. <mark>Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which</mark> global <mark>governance</mark> encounters and <mark>problematizes life</u></mark> as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal<u> <mark>governance</mark> </u>is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately<u> <mark>installs</mark> </u>socially specific and radically<u> <mark>inequitable distributions of</mark> </u>wealth, opportunity, and mortal<u> <mark>danger</mark> </u>both locally and globally<u> through the </u>very detailed<u> ways in which life is</u> variously (policy) <u>problematized by it</u>. </p>

Dillon and Reid 00 (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25(1))

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Dillon and Reid 00 (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25(1)) fulltext: More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. [/INST] <h4>They cause serial policy failure.</h4><p><strong>Dillon and Reid 00</strong> (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25(1))</p><p>More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem.<u> <mark>Governmentality</mark> </u>thereby<u> <mark>creates a market for policy</u></mark>, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet<u> <mark>serial policy failure</mark>--<mark>the fate</u></mark> and the fuel <u><mark>of all policy</mark>--<mark>compels</u></mark> them into <u><mark>a continuous search for</u></mark> the <u><mark>new analysis</u></mark> that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] <u><mark>Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that</mark> </u>science and <u><mark>policy</u></mark>--and policy science--<u><mark>will</mark> </u>ultimately<u> <mark>overcome</mark>. <mark>Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which</mark> global <mark>governance</mark> encounters and <mark>problematizes life</u></mark> as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal<u> <mark>governance</mark> </u>is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately<u> <mark>installs</mark> </u>socially specific and radically<u> <mark>inequitable distributions of</mark> </u>wealth, opportunity, and mortal<u> <mark>danger</mark> </u>both locally and globally<u> through the </u>very detailed<u> ways in which life is</u> variously (policy) <u>problematized by it</u>. </p> </s>

SCENARIO 2 – Energy and Proliferation

<h4>SCENARIO 2 – Energy and Proliferation </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>SCENARIO 2 – Energy and Proliferation </h4> </s>

SCENARIO 2 – Energy and Proliferation

<h4>SCENARIO 2 – Energy and Proliferation </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>SCENARIO 2 – Energy and Proliferation </h4> </s>

The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the socia a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction Liberal student activists fear the incursions the mostf, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect the power of knowledge, objectified the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university semiotic insurrectionaries blasted their way out so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything

Universities may serve as progressive this does not detract from the military and corporate research and social conditioning within their walls they serve as machines for concentration of privilege a hyper educated society can only exist by the intense exploitation of the third world liberal seminars obfuscate that they are complicit in death and destruction Social death is banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our lack of meaning the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy modern cities are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are enrolling in a cemetery the cemeteries of a nation which has an absolute fixation with zombies The event is counter-offensive it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by perfecting its critiques, has generated its own antithesis zombies mark the dead end of capitalism’s accumulation because they embody this to excess they are the ideal resistance a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic Liberal student activists are most invested in the fate of the university they are insistent on saving the University when life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living Zombie Politics are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains knowledge, objectified the living dead awaken a passion for vertiginous disidentification at the core of our culture is the exclusion of the dead we risk failing to see that our lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates semiotic insurrectionaries burst into reality like a scream an anti-discourse that cannot be caught they resist every interpretation no longer denoting anything

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other. Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the mostf, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50] In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice: "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56]

<h4>The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable</h4><p><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley 10</strong> (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620) </p><p><u><strong><mark>Universities may serve as progressive </mark>sites of inquiry in some cases, yet <mark>this does not detract from the</mark> great deal of <mark>military and corporate research</mark>, economic planning <mark>and</mark>, perhaps most importantly, <mark>social conditioning</mark> occurring <mark>within their walls</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>they serve as</mark> intense <mark>machines for</mark> the <mark>concentration of privilege</mark>; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts</u></strong>, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since <u><strong><mark>a hyper educated</mark>, stable <mark>society</mark> along Western lines <mark>can only exist by the intense exploitation of</mark> labor and resources in <mark>the third world</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; <mark>liberal seminars</mark> only serve to <mark>obfuscate</mark> the fact <mark>that they are</mark> themselves <mark>complicit in</mark> the <mark>death and destruction</mark> waged on a daily basis</u></strong>. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “<u><strong><mark>Social death is</mark> our <mark>banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our</mark> own <mark>lack of meaning</u></strong></mark>.”[43] Our conception of the <u><strong>social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy</u></strong></mark>. Baudrillard writes that “<u><strong>The cemetery no longer exists because <mark>modern cities</mark> have entirely taken over their function: they <mark>are ghost towns, cities of death</u></strong></mark>. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, <u><strong><mark>ours is a culture of death</u></strong></mark>.”[44] <u><strong><mark>By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are</mark> resigning ourselves to <mark>enrolling in</u></strong></mark> what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls <u><strong><mark>a cemetery</mark>, a necropolis to rival no other</u></strong>. Yet <u><strong>herein lies the punch line. We are studying in <mark>the cemeteries of a nation which has</mark> a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; <mark>an absolute fixation with zombies</mark>.</u></strong> So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “<u><strong><mark>The event</mark> itself <mark>is counter-offensive</mark> and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, <mark>it reintroduces negativity and death</u></strong></mark>.”[45] <u><strong><mark>The University, by</mark> totalizing itself and <mark>perfecting its critiques, has</mark> spontaneously <mark>generated its own antithesis</mark>. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent.</u></strong> According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “<u><strong><mark>zombies mark the dead end</mark> or zero degree <mark>of capitalism’s</mark> logic of endless consumption and ever expanding <mark>accumulation</mark>, precisely <mark>because they embody this</mark> logic so literally and <mark>to</mark> such <mark>excess</u></strong></mark>.”[46] In that sense, <u><strong><mark>they are</mark> almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as <mark>the ideal</mark> form of <mark>resistance</mark> to the socia</u></strong>l: “they know that there is no liberation, and that <u><strong><mark>a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic</mark>, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization</u></strong>.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, <u><strong>students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction</u></strong>; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] <u><strong><mark>Liberal student activists</mark> fear the incursions the mostf, as they <mark>are</mark> in many ways the <mark>most invested in the fate of the</mark> contemporary <mark>university</u></strong></mark>; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For <u><strong><mark>they are insistent on saving the University</mark>, on staying ‘alive’, even <mark>when</mark> their version of <mark>life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living</mark>, when it is as good as social death</u></strong>. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, <u><strong>human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise</u></strong>.[50] In reality, “<u><strong><mark>Zombie Politics</mark> are something to be championed, because they <mark>are the politics of a multitude</u></strong></mark>, an inclusive mass of political subjects, <u><strong><mark>seeking to consume brains</u></strong></mark>. Yet <u><strong>brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect</u></strong>”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “<u><strong>the power of <mark>knowledge, objectified</u></strong></mark>.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that <u><strong><mark>the living dead</mark> are not radically Other so much as they serve to <mark>awaken a passion</mark> for otherness and <mark>for vertiginous disidentification</mark> that is already latent within our own selves</u></strong>.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "<u><strong><mark>at the</mark> very <mark>core</mark> of the 'rationality' <mark>of our culture</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>is</mark> an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: <mark>the exclusion of the dead</mark> and of death</u></strong>."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that <u><strong>power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence</u></strong>. If we are to continue to use this conception, <u><strong><mark>we risk failing to see that our</mark> very <mark>lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence</u></strong></mark>. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] <u><strong>Perhaps the reevaluation of <mark>zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates</mark> of hell, the cemetery-university</u></strong>. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about <u><strong><mark>semiotic insurrectionaries</u></strong></mark> might suffice: "They <u><strong>blasted their way out</u></strong> however, <u><strong>so as to <mark>burst into reality like a scream</mark>, an interjection, <mark>an anti-discourse</mark>, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element <mark>that cannot be caught</mark> by any organized discourse</u></strong>. Invincible due to their own poverty, <u><strong><mark>they resist every interpretation</mark> and every connotation, <mark>no longer denoting</mark> anyone or <mark>anything</u></strong></mark>."[56]</p>

Occupied UC Berkeley 10 (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Occupied UC Berkeley 10 (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620) fulltext: Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other. Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the mostf, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50] In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice: "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56] [/INST] <h4>The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable</h4><p><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley 10</strong> (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620) </p><p><u><strong><mark>Universities may serve as progressive </mark>sites of inquiry in some cases, yet <mark>this does not detract from the</mark> great deal of <mark>military and corporate research</mark>, economic planning <mark>and</mark>, perhaps most importantly, <mark>social conditioning</mark> occurring <mark>within their walls</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>they serve as</mark> intense <mark>machines for</mark> the <mark>concentration of privilege</mark>; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts</u></strong>, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since <u><strong><mark>a hyper educated</mark>, stable <mark>society</mark> along Western lines <mark>can only exist by the intense exploitation of</mark> labor and resources in <mark>the third world</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; <mark>liberal seminars</mark> only serve to <mark>obfuscate</mark> the fact <mark>that they are</mark> themselves <mark>complicit in</mark> the <mark>death and destruction</mark> waged on a daily basis</u></strong>. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “<u><strong><mark>Social death is</mark> our <mark>banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our</mark> own <mark>lack of meaning</u></strong></mark>.”[43] Our conception of the <u><strong>social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy</u></strong></mark>. Baudrillard writes that “<u><strong>The cemetery no longer exists because <mark>modern cities</mark> have entirely taken over their function: they <mark>are ghost towns, cities of death</u></strong></mark>. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, <u><strong><mark>ours is a culture of death</u></strong></mark>.”[44] <u><strong><mark>By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are</mark> resigning ourselves to <mark>enrolling in</u></strong></mark> what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls <u><strong><mark>a cemetery</mark>, a necropolis to rival no other</u></strong>. Yet <u><strong>herein lies the punch line. We are studying in <mark>the cemeteries of a nation which has</mark> a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; <mark>an absolute fixation with zombies</mark>.</u></strong> So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “<u><strong><mark>The event</mark> itself <mark>is counter-offensive</mark> and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, <mark>it reintroduces negativity and death</u></strong></mark>.”[45] <u><strong><mark>The University, by</mark> totalizing itself and <mark>perfecting its critiques, has</mark> spontaneously <mark>generated its own antithesis</mark>. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent.</u></strong> According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “<u><strong><mark>zombies mark the dead end</mark> or zero degree <mark>of capitalism’s</mark> logic of endless consumption and ever expanding <mark>accumulation</mark>, precisely <mark>because they embody this</mark> logic so literally and <mark>to</mark> such <mark>excess</u></strong></mark>.”[46] In that sense, <u><strong><mark>they are</mark> almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as <mark>the ideal</mark> form of <mark>resistance</mark> to the socia</u></strong>l: “they know that there is no liberation, and that <u><strong><mark>a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic</mark>, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization</u></strong>.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, <u><strong>students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction</u></strong>; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] <u><strong><mark>Liberal student activists</mark> fear the incursions the mostf, as they <mark>are</mark> in many ways the <mark>most invested in the fate of the</mark> contemporary <mark>university</u></strong></mark>; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For <u><strong><mark>they are insistent on saving the University</mark>, on staying ‘alive’, even <mark>when</mark> their version of <mark>life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living</mark>, when it is as good as social death</u></strong>. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, <u><strong>human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise</u></strong>.[50] In reality, “<u><strong><mark>Zombie Politics</mark> are something to be championed, because they <mark>are the politics of a multitude</u></strong></mark>, an inclusive mass of political subjects, <u><strong><mark>seeking to consume brains</u></strong></mark>. Yet <u><strong>brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect</u></strong>”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “<u><strong>the power of <mark>knowledge, objectified</u></strong></mark>.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that <u><strong><mark>the living dead</mark> are not radically Other so much as they serve to <mark>awaken a passion</mark> for otherness and <mark>for vertiginous disidentification</mark> that is already latent within our own selves</u></strong>.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "<u><strong><mark>at the</mark> very <mark>core</mark> of the 'rationality' <mark>of our culture</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>is</mark> an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: <mark>the exclusion of the dead</mark> and of death</u></strong>."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that <u><strong>power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence</u></strong>. If we are to continue to use this conception, <u><strong><mark>we risk failing to see that our</mark> very <mark>lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence</u></strong></mark>. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] <u><strong>Perhaps the reevaluation of <mark>zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates</mark> of hell, the cemetery-university</u></strong>. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about <u><strong><mark>semiotic insurrectionaries</u></strong></mark> might suffice: "They <u><strong>blasted their way out</u></strong> however, <u><strong>so as to <mark>burst into reality like a scream</mark>, an interjection, <mark>an anti-discourse</mark>, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element <mark>that cannot be caught</mark> by any organized discourse</u></strong>. Invincible due to their own poverty, <u><strong><mark>they resist every interpretation</mark> and every connotation, <mark>no longer denoting</mark> anyone or <mark>anything</u></strong></mark>."[56]</p> </s>

This process ensures endless error replication and locks the Other into a constant state of oppression

Suffering, as a witnessed condition of others, serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of (still colonial) theory production, both individually for the theory-producer as s/he progresses through professional and academic career paths, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured these are mega-industries whose reach covers vast spans of the (neo/post)colonised/integrated/globalised, world where the desires of civil-isation in the form of expertise accumulation and accreditation are peddled in the name of education and training Suffering does indeed generate surplus value. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption Neither do we have to suffer the inconvenience of the material nature of bodies that suffer contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality! suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account in any way, to any one real embodiment of suffering (in)Humanity; the suffering-Other plays her part well in this, and importantly, remains in her place compliantly. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.

Suffering serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of colonial) theory for the theory-producer s/he progresses through academic career paths these are mega-industries whose reach covers the colonised world Suffering does indeed generate surplus value There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer Neither do we have to suffer the material nature of bodies that suffer Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account to any real embodiment of suffering the suffering-Other remains in her place compliantly

Suffering, as a witnessed condition of others, serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of (still colonial) theory production, both individually for the theory-producer as s/he progresses through professional and academic career paths, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured.15 And these are mega-industries whose reach covers vast spans of the (neo/post)colonised/integrated/globalised, world where the desires of civil-isation in the form of expertise accumulation and accreditation are peddled in the name of education and training. There are no losses in this economic enterprise of exploiting the suffering condition as commodity, only profits. Suffering does indeed generate surplus value. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption.16 Neither do we have to suffer the inconvenience of the material nature of bodies that suffer contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality! And most advantageously, suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account in any way, to any one real embodiment of suffering (in)Humanity; the suffering-Other plays her part well in this, and importantly, remains in her place compliantly. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.

<h4>This process ensures endless error replication and locks the Other into a constant state of oppression </h4><p><strong>Nayar 13</strong> (Jayan Nayar, PhD from the University of Cambridge, Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001975<u><strong>) gz</p><p><mark>Suffering</mark>, as a witnessed condition of others, <mark>serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of</mark> (still <mark>colonial) theory</mark> production, both individually <mark>for the theory-producer</mark> as <mark>s/he progresses through</mark> professional and <mark>academic career paths</mark>, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured</u></strong>.15 And <u><strong><mark>these are mega-industries whose reach covers</mark> vast spans of <mark>the</mark> (neo/post)<mark>colonised</mark>/integrated/globalised, <mark>world </mark>where the desires of civil-isation in the form of expertise accumulation and accreditation are peddled in the name of education and training</u></strong>. There are no losses in this economic enterprise of exploiting the suffering condition as commodity, only profits. <u><strong><mark>Suffering does indeed generate surplus value</mark>. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. <mark>There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer</mark> seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption</u></strong>.16 <u><strong><mark>Neither</u></strong> <u><strong>do we have to suffer</mark> the inconvenience of <mark>the material nature of bodies that suffer</mark> contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality!</u></strong> And most advantageously, <u><strong>suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? <mark>Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account</mark> in any way, <mark>to any</mark> one <mark>real embodiment of suffering</mark> (in)Humanity; <mark>the suffering-Other</mark> plays her part well in this, and importantly, <mark>remains in her place compliantly</mark>. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.</p></u></strong>

Nayar 13 (Jayan Nayar, PhD from the University of Cambridge, Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001975) gz

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Nayar 13 (Jayan Nayar, PhD from the University of Cambridge, Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001975) gz fulltext: Suffering, as a witnessed condition of others, serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of (still colonial) theory production, both individually for the theory-producer as s/he progresses through professional and academic career paths, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured.15 And these are mega-industries whose reach covers vast spans of the (neo/post)colonised/integrated/globalised, world where the desires of civil-isation in the form of expertise accumulation and accreditation are peddled in the name of education and training. There are no losses in this economic enterprise of exploiting the suffering condition as commodity, only profits. Suffering does indeed generate surplus value. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption.16 Neither do we have to suffer the inconvenience of the material nature of bodies that suffer contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality! And most advantageously, suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account in any way, to any one real embodiment of suffering (in)Humanity; the suffering-Other plays her part well in this, and importantly, remains in her place compliantly. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect. [/INST] <h4>This process ensures endless error replication and locks the Other into a constant state of oppression </h4><p><strong>Nayar 13</strong> (Jayan Nayar, PhD from the University of Cambridge, Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001975<u><strong>) gz</p><p><mark>Suffering</mark>, as a witnessed condition of others, <mark>serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of</mark> (still <mark>colonial) theory</mark> production, both individually <mark>for the theory-producer</mark> as <mark>s/he progresses through</mark> professional and <mark>academic career paths</mark>, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured</u></strong>.15 And <u><strong><mark>these are mega-industries whose reach covers</mark> vast spans of <mark>the</mark> (neo/post)<mark>colonised</mark>/integrated/globalised, <mark>world </mark>where the desires of civil-isation in the form of expertise accumulation and accreditation are peddled in the name of education and training</u></strong>. There are no losses in this economic enterprise of exploiting the suffering condition as commodity, only profits. <u><strong><mark>Suffering does indeed generate surplus value</mark>. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. <mark>There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer</mark> seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption</u></strong>.16 <u><strong><mark>Neither</u></strong> <u><strong>do we have to suffer</mark> the inconvenience of <mark>the material nature of bodies that suffer</mark> contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality!</u></strong> And most advantageously, <u><strong>suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? <mark>Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account</mark> in any way, <mark>to any</mark> one <mark>real embodiment of suffering</mark> (in)Humanity; <mark>the suffering-Other</mark> plays her part well in this, and importantly, <mark>remains in her place compliantly</mark>. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.</p></u></strong> </s>

Rhetoric and consciousness is insufficient to solve -- material action is needed - if we win a risk that the nature of the affirmative necessarily pacifies material action then this completely turns the aff

Disabled people typically experience disadvantage in relation to employment and social participation and subordinated to oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement Disability demands redistribution of goods In contrast to other oppressed groups, disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice Whatever the size, it is an extra cost to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences Whilst these differences’ can be presented as the result of ableist discourses this does not solve the problem. The problems disabled people face require more than ideological change, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change

Disabled people experience oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement Disability demands redistribution of goods disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice it is an extra cost to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences. Whilst these differences’ can be presented as the result of ableist discourses this does not solve the problem. The problems require more than ideological change, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change

Disabled people typically experience disadvantage in relation to the market and capitalism, and they have to a large extent been excluded from employment and from equal social participation, respect and wealth (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 26). On top of these materialist disadvantages, disabled people are stigmatized as deviant and undesirable, and also subordinated to various oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). Disability is rooted in the economic structures of society and demands redistribution of goods and wealth. In contrast to some other oppressed groups, disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice. This extra help might be small – for example, allowing a student with dyslexia extra time in an examination – through to complex interventions such as facilitated communication, a job support worker or 24-hour personal assistance. Whatever the size, it is an extra cost both to employers and to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences. Without an acceptance of these differences it is hard to see how we could move forward. Whilst these ‘real differences’ can be presented as the result of dominant ableist discourses where disabled people’s needs are regarded as extra cost, this does not solve the problem. The problems disabled people face require more than ideological change, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change.

<h4><strong>Rhetoric and consciousness is insufficient to solve -- material action is needed - if we win a risk that the nature of the affirmative necessarily pacifies material action then this completely turns the aff </h4><p></strong>Simo Vehmas and<strong> Watson ’13</strong>, “Moral Wrongs, Disadvantages, and Disability: A Critique of Critical Disability Studies.” Disability and Society. 2013.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Disabled people</mark> typically <mark>experience</mark> disadvantage in relation to</u></strong> the market and capitalism, and they have to a large extent been excluded from <u><strong>employment and</u></strong> from equal <u><strong>social participation</u></strong>, respect and wealth (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 26). On top of these materialist disadvantages, disabled people are stigmatized as deviant and undesirable, <u><strong>and</u></strong> also <u><strong>subordinated to</u></strong> various <u><strong><mark>oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement</u></strong></mark> (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). <u><strong><mark>Disability</u></strong></mark> is rooted in the economic structures of society and <u><strong><mark>demands redistribution of goods</u></strong></mark> and wealth. <u><strong>In contrast to</u></strong> some <u><strong>other oppressed groups, <mark>disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice</u></strong></mark>. This extra help might be small – for example, allowing a student with dyslexia extra time in an examination – through to complex interventions such as facilitated communication, a job support worker or 24-hour personal assistance. <u><strong>Whatever the size, <mark>it is an extra cost</u></strong></mark> both to employers and <u><strong><mark>to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences</u></strong>.</mark> Without an acceptance of these differences it is hard to see how we could move forward. <u><strong><mark>Whilst these</u></strong></mark> ‘real <u><strong><mark>differences’ can be presented as the result of</u></strong></mark> dominant <u><strong><mark>ableist discourses</u></strong></mark> where disabled people’s needs are regarded as extra cost, <u><strong><mark>this does not solve the problem. The problems</mark> disabled people face <mark>require more than ideological change, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change</u></strong></mark>.</p>

Simo Vehmas and Watson ’13, “Moral Wrongs, Disadvantages, and Disability: A Critique of Critical Disability Studies.” Disability and Society. 2013.

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Simo Vehmas and Watson ’13, “Moral Wrongs, Disadvantages, and Disability: A Critique of Critical Disability Studies.” Disability and Society. 2013. fulltext: Disabled people typically experience disadvantage in relation to the market and capitalism, and they have to a large extent been excluded from employment and from equal social participation, respect and wealth (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 26). On top of these materialist disadvantages, disabled people are stigmatized as deviant and undesirable, and also subordinated to various oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). Disability is rooted in the economic structures of society and demands redistribution of goods and wealth. In contrast to some other oppressed groups, disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice. This extra help might be small – for example, allowing a student with dyslexia extra time in an examination – through to complex interventions such as facilitated communication, a job support worker or 24-hour personal assistance. Whatever the size, it is an extra cost both to employers and to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences. Without an acceptance of these differences it is hard to see how we could move forward. Whilst these ‘real differences’ can be presented as the result of dominant ableist discourses where disabled people’s needs are regarded as extra cost, this does not solve the problem. The problems disabled people face require more than ideological change, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change. [/INST] <h4><strong>Rhetoric and consciousness is insufficient to solve -- material action is needed - if we win a risk that the nature of the affirmative necessarily pacifies material action then this completely turns the aff </h4><p></strong>Simo Vehmas and<strong> Watson ’13</strong>, “Moral Wrongs, Disadvantages, and Disability: A Critique of Critical Disability Studies.” Disability and Society. 2013.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Disabled people</mark> typically <mark>experience</mark> disadvantage in relation to</u></strong> the market and capitalism, and they have to a large extent been excluded from <u><strong>employment and</u></strong> from equal <u><strong>social participation</u></strong>, respect and wealth (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 26). On top of these materialist disadvantages, disabled people are stigmatized as deviant and undesirable, <u><strong>and</u></strong> also <u><strong>subordinated to</u></strong> various <u><strong><mark>oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement</u></strong></mark> (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). <u><strong><mark>Disability</u></strong></mark> is rooted in the economic structures of society and <u><strong><mark>demands redistribution of goods</u></strong></mark> and wealth. <u><strong>In contrast to</u></strong> some <u><strong>other oppressed groups, <mark>disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice</u></strong></mark>. This extra help might be small – for example, allowing a student with dyslexia extra time in an examination – through to complex interventions such as facilitated communication, a job support worker or 24-hour personal assistance. <u><strong>Whatever the size, <mark>it is an extra cost</u></strong></mark> both to employers and <u><strong><mark>to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences</u></strong>.</mark> Without an acceptance of these differences it is hard to see how we could move forward. <u><strong><mark>Whilst these</u></strong></mark> ‘real <u><strong><mark>differences’ can be presented as the result of</u></strong></mark> dominant <u><strong><mark>ableist discourses</u></strong></mark> where disabled people’s needs are regarded as extra cost, <u><strong><mark>this does not solve the problem. The problems</mark> disabled people face <mark>require more than ideological change, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change</u></strong></mark>.</p> </s>

Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny

Nietzsche considered roles" as "external," phenomena symptomatic of estrangement persons in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in fabrications to obtain advancement They are so absorbed in simulating role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing [destroying] overconcern about possible consequences and dialogue about what others might expect rotation of "masks" reduces persons to simulacra One adopts "many roles," playing them " superficially Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine This type of actor cannot plan for the long term Superficiality rules Nietzsche feared the simulated versions. they are "violent exploitative, , arrogant according to circumstances The combination of desperate conforming overreaching and ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant

Nietzsche considered roles" as "external," phenomena symptomatic of estrangement persons in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in fabrications to obtain advancement They are so absorbed in simulating role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term Superficiality rules Nietzsche feared the simulated versions they are "violent, exploitative arrogant according to circumstances The combination of desperate conforming overreaching and ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing [destroying] overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

<h4><u><strong>Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny </h4><p></u>Antonio 95</strong> (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)</p><p>According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," <u><mark>Nietzsche</mark> </u>said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He <u><mark>considered</mark> </u>"<u><mark>roles" as "external,"</mark> </u>"surface," or "foreground" <u><mark>phenomena</mark> </u>and viewed close personal identification with them as <u><mark>symptomatic of estrangement</u></mark>. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that <u><mark>persons</mark> </u>(especially male professionals) <u><mark>in</mark> <mark>specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and</mark> <mark>engage in</mark> </u>gross<u> <mark>fabrications to obtain advancement</u></mark>. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" <u><mark>They are so</mark> </u>thoroughly <u><mark>absorbed in simulating</mark> </u>effective<u> <mark>role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity.</u></mark> The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, <u>spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing [destroying] overconcern about possible </u>causes, meanings, and <u>consequences </u>of acts <u>and </u>unending internal <u>dialogue about what others might </u>think,<u> expect</u>, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous <u>rotation of </u>socially appropriate <u>"masks" reduces persons to </u>hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or <u>simulacra</u>. <u>One adopts "many roles," playing them "</u>badly and <u>superficially</u>" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" <u>Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine </u>article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. <u><mark>This type of actor cannot plan for the long term</u></mark> or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). <u><mark>Superficiality rules </u></mark>in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. <u><mark>Nietzsche</mark> </u>respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply<u> <mark>feared the</mark> </u>new <u><mark>simulated versions</mark>. </u>Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; <u><mark>they are "violent</u>,</mark> envious,<u> <mark>exploitative</mark>, </u>scheming, fawning, cringing<u>, <mark>arrogant</u></mark>, all<u> <mark>according to</mark> <mark>circumstances</u></mark>. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. <u><mark>The</mark> </u>deadly<u> <mark>combination</mark> <mark>of desperate conforming</mark> </u>and<u> <mark>overreaching</mark> <mark>and</mark> </u>untrammeled<u> <mark>ressentiment</mark> <mark>paves the way for a new type of tyrant</mark> </u>(Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).</p>

Antonio 95 (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Antonio 95 (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,) fulltext: According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing [destroying] overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4). [/INST] <h4><u><strong>Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny </h4><p></u>Antonio 95</strong> (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)</p><p>According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," <u><mark>Nietzsche</mark> </u>said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He <u><mark>considered</mark> </u>"<u><mark>roles" as "external,"</mark> </u>"surface," or "foreground" <u><mark>phenomena</mark> </u>and viewed close personal identification with them as <u><mark>symptomatic of estrangement</u></mark>. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that <u><mark>persons</mark> </u>(especially male professionals) <u><mark>in</mark> <mark>specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and</mark> <mark>engage in</mark> </u>gross<u> <mark>fabrications to obtain advancement</u></mark>. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" <u><mark>They are so</mark> </u>thoroughly <u><mark>absorbed in simulating</mark> </u>effective<u> <mark>role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity.</u></mark> The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, <u>spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing [destroying] overconcern about possible </u>causes, meanings, and <u>consequences </u>of acts <u>and </u>unending internal <u>dialogue about what others might </u>think,<u> expect</u>, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous <u>rotation of </u>socially appropriate <u>"masks" reduces persons to </u>hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or <u>simulacra</u>. <u>One adopts "many roles," playing them "</u>badly and <u>superficially</u>" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" <u>Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine </u>article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. <u><mark>This type of actor cannot plan for the long term</u></mark> or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). <u><mark>Superficiality rules </u></mark>in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. <u><mark>Nietzsche</mark> </u>respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply<u> <mark>feared the</mark> </u>new <u><mark>simulated versions</mark>. </u>Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; <u><mark>they are "violent</u>,</mark> envious,<u> <mark>exploitative</mark>, </u>scheming, fawning, cringing<u>, <mark>arrogant</u></mark>, all<u> <mark>according to</mark> <mark>circumstances</u></mark>. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. <u><mark>The</mark> </u>deadly<u> <mark>combination</mark> <mark>of desperate conforming</mark> </u>and<u> <mark>overreaching</mark> <mark>and</mark> </u>untrammeled<u> <mark>ressentiment</mark> <mark>paves the way for a new type of tyrant</mark> </u>(Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).</p> </s>

The aff’s biological understanding of life and death turns the body into a diseased object in need of continual mortification. The attempted securitization of a subject results in violent control of objects viewed as inert

The irreversibility of biological death is a modern fact of science specific to our culture Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death we must try to see the radical indeterminacy of life and death the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order Death is not a due payment it is a nuance of life; or, life is a nuance of death our modern idea of death is controlled by representations of the machine and the function A machine either works or it does not the biological machine is either dead or alive The symbolic order is ignorant of this And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself There is no longer any objective progress here: the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane death articulates life, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither life nor death can any longer be assigned a given end: there is no possible definition of death. We are living within evolutionist thought, which states that we go from Life to death: this is the illusion of the subject that sustains both biology and metaphysics The subject's identity is continually falling apart But this death is not at all biological. At the symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual conscious subject does death take on an irreversible meaning. Even here, death is not an event, but a myth experienced as anticipation. The subject needs a myth of its end to form its identity. In reality, the subject is never there it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution, an end­less cycle impelled by death This death, everywhere in life, must be conjured up and localised in a precise point of time and a precise place: the body In biological death, death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition. this duality is death itself, since it objectifies the body as residual, as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying It is according to the mind that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death Biology lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics but it no longer declares this it has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and on the world; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism

The irreversibility of biological death is a modern fact of science specific to our culture. Every other culture says death begins before death life goes on after we must try to see the radical indeterminacy Death is a nuance of life our modern idea is controlled by representations death articulates life it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death life nor death can be assigned a given end there is no definition of death We are living within evolutionist thought this is the illusion of the subject Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual subject does death take on irreversible meaning. death is not an event, but a myth The subject needs a myth of its end to form its identity. the subject is never there it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution an end­less cycle impelled by death This death must be conjured up and localised in a precise point death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. death objectifies the body as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying Biology has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and world

The irreversibility of biological death, its objective and punctual character, is a modern fact of science. It is specific to our culture. Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, we must try to see the radical indeterminacy of life and death, and the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order. Death is not a due payment [echeance], it is a nuance of life; or, life is a nuance of death. But our modern idea of death is controlled by a very different system of representations: that of the machine and the function. A machine either works or it does not. Thus the biological machine is either dead or alive. The symbolic order is ignorant of this digital abstraction. And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? There is no longer any objective progress here: something of the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane.] It is quite another thing to say that death articulates life, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life: for then it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither life nor death can any longer be assigned a given end: there is therefore no punctuality nor any possible definition of death. We are living entirely within evolutionist thought, which states that we go from Life to death: this is the illusion of the subject that sustains both biology and metaphysics (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] The subject's identity is continually falling apart, falling into God's forgetting. But this death is not at all biological. At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). At the other, symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible. Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual conscious subject does death take on an irreversible meaning. Even here, death is not an event, but a myth experienced as anticipation. The subject needs a myth of its end, as of its origin, to form its identity. In reality, the subject is never there: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution, an end­less cycle impelled by death. This death, everywhere in life, must be conjured up and localised in a precise point of time and a precise place: the body. In biological death, death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition. In a certain sense, this duality is death itself, since it objectifies the body as residual, as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. It is according to the mind, this imaginary schizz, that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. Biology lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics, but it no longer declares this. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, it has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and on the world; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.'

<h4><u><strong>The aff’s biological understanding of life and death turns the body into a diseased object in need of continual mortification. The attempted securitization of a subject results in violent control of objects viewed as inert </h4><p></u>Baudrillard ’76</strong> (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The irreversibility of biological death</u></strong></mark>, its objective and punctual character, <u><strong><mark>is a modern fact of science</u></strong></mark>. It is <u><strong><mark>specific to our culture</u></strong>. <u><strong>Every other culture says</mark> that <mark>death begins before death</mark>, that <mark>life goes on after</mark> life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death</u></strong>. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, <u><strong><mark>we must try to see the radical indeterminacy</mark> of life and death</u></strong>, and <u><strong>the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Death</mark> is not a due payment</u></strong> [echeance], <u><strong>it <mark>is a nuance of life</mark>; or, life is a nuance of death</u></strong>. But <u><strong><mark>our modern idea</mark> of death <mark>is controlled by</u></strong></mark> a very different system of <u><strong><mark>representations</u></strong></mark>: that <u><strong>of the machine and the function</u></strong>. <u><strong>A machine either works or it does not</u></strong>. Thus <u><strong>the biological machine is either dead or alive</u></strong>. <u><strong>The symbolic order is ignorant of this</u></strong> digital abstraction. <u><strong>And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth</u></strong>, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, <u><strong>death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself</u></strong>: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? <u><strong>There is no longer any objective progress here: </u></strong>something of <u><strong>the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane</u></strong>.] It is quite another thing to say that <u><strong><mark>death articulates life</mark>, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life</u></strong>: for then <u><strong><mark>it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death</mark>, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither <mark>life nor death can</mark> any longer <mark>be assigned a given end</mark>: <mark>there is</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>no</u></strong></mark> punctuality nor any <u><strong>possible <mark>definition of death</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>We are living</u></strong></mark> entirely <u><strong><mark>within evolutionist thought</mark>, which states that we go from Life to death: <mark>this is the illusion of the subject</mark> that sustains both biology and metaphysics</u></strong> (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] <u><strong>The subject's identity is continually falling apart</u></strong>, falling into God's forgetting. <u><strong>But this death is not at all biological.</u></strong> At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). <u><strong>At the</u></strong> other, <u><strong>symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual </mark>conscious <mark>subject does death take on</mark> an <mark>irreversible meaning.</mark> Even here, <mark>death is not an event, but a myth</mark> experienced as anticipation. <mark>The subject needs a myth of its end</u></strong></mark>, as of its origin, <u><strong><mark>to form its identity.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In reality, <mark>the subject is never there</u></strong></mark>: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, <u><strong><mark>it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution</mark>, <mark>an end­less cycle impelled by death</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This death</mark>, everywhere in life, <mark>must be conjured up and localised in a precise point</mark> of time and a precise place: the body</u></strong>. <u><strong>In biological death, <mark>death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other.</mark> The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition.</u></strong> In a certain sense, <u><strong>this duality is <mark>death</mark> itself, since it <mark>objectifies the body</mark> as residual, <mark>as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying</u></strong></mark>. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. <u><strong>It is according to the mind</u></strong>, this imaginary schizz, <u><strong>that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death</u></strong>. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. <u><strong><mark>Biology</mark> lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics</u></strong>, <u><strong>but it no longer declares this</u></strong>. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, <u><strong>it <mark>has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and</mark> on the <mark>world</mark>; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism</u></strong>. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.'</p>

Baudrillard ’76 (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Baudrillard ’76 (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160) fulltext: The irreversibility of biological death, its objective and punctual character, is a modern fact of science. It is specific to our culture. Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, we must try to see the radical indeterminacy of life and death, and the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order. Death is not a due payment [echeance], it is a nuance of life; or, life is a nuance of death. But our modern idea of death is controlled by a very different system of representations: that of the machine and the function. A machine either works or it does not. Thus the biological machine is either dead or alive. The symbolic order is ignorant of this digital abstraction. And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? There is no longer any objective progress here: something of the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane.] It is quite another thing to say that death articulates life, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life: for then it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither life nor death can any longer be assigned a given end: there is therefore no punctuality nor any possible definition of death. We are living entirely within evolutionist thought, which states that we go from Life to death: this is the illusion of the subject that sustains both biology and metaphysics (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] The subject's identity is continually falling apart, falling into God's forgetting. But this death is not at all biological. At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). At the other, symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible. Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual conscious subject does death take on an irreversible meaning. Even here, death is not an event, but a myth experienced as anticipation. The subject needs a myth of its end, as of its origin, to form its identity. In reality, the subject is never there: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution, an end­less cycle impelled by death. This death, everywhere in life, must be conjured up and localised in a precise point of time and a precise place: the body. In biological death, death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition. In a certain sense, this duality is death itself, since it objectifies the body as residual, as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. It is according to the mind, this imaginary schizz, that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. Biology lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics, but it no longer declares this. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, it has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and on the world; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.' [/INST] <h4><u><strong>The aff’s biological understanding of life and death turns the body into a diseased object in need of continual mortification. The attempted securitization of a subject results in violent control of objects viewed as inert </h4><p></u>Baudrillard ’76</strong> (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The irreversibility of biological death</u></strong></mark>, its objective and punctual character, <u><strong><mark>is a modern fact of science</u></strong></mark>. It is <u><strong><mark>specific to our culture</u></strong>. <u><strong>Every other culture says</mark> that <mark>death begins before death</mark>, that <mark>life goes on after</mark> life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death</u></strong>. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, <u><strong><mark>we must try to see the radical indeterminacy</mark> of life and death</u></strong>, and <u><strong>the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Death</mark> is not a due payment</u></strong> [echeance], <u><strong>it <mark>is a nuance of life</mark>; or, life is a nuance of death</u></strong>. But <u><strong><mark>our modern idea</mark> of death <mark>is controlled by</u></strong></mark> a very different system of <u><strong><mark>representations</u></strong></mark>: that <u><strong>of the machine and the function</u></strong>. <u><strong>A machine either works or it does not</u></strong>. Thus <u><strong>the biological machine is either dead or alive</u></strong>. <u><strong>The symbolic order is ignorant of this</u></strong> digital abstraction. <u><strong>And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth</u></strong>, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, <u><strong>death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself</u></strong>: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? <u><strong>There is no longer any objective progress here: </u></strong>something of <u><strong>the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane</u></strong>.] It is quite another thing to say that <u><strong><mark>death articulates life</mark>, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life</u></strong>: for then <u><strong><mark>it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death</mark>, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither <mark>life nor death can</mark> any longer <mark>be assigned a given end</mark>: <mark>there is</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>no</u></strong></mark> punctuality nor any <u><strong>possible <mark>definition of death</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>We are living</u></strong></mark> entirely <u><strong><mark>within evolutionist thought</mark>, which states that we go from Life to death: <mark>this is the illusion of the subject</mark> that sustains both biology and metaphysics</u></strong> (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] <u><strong>The subject's identity is continually falling apart</u></strong>, falling into God's forgetting. <u><strong>But this death is not at all biological.</u></strong> At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). <u><strong>At the</u></strong> other, <u><strong>symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual </mark>conscious <mark>subject does death take on</mark> an <mark>irreversible meaning.</mark> Even here, <mark>death is not an event, but a myth</mark> experienced as anticipation. <mark>The subject needs a myth of its end</u></strong></mark>, as of its origin, <u><strong><mark>to form its identity.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In reality, <mark>the subject is never there</u></strong></mark>: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, <u><strong><mark>it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution</mark>, <mark>an end­less cycle impelled by death</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This death</mark>, everywhere in life, <mark>must be conjured up and localised in a precise point</mark> of time and a precise place: the body</u></strong>. <u><strong>In biological death, <mark>death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other.</mark> The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition.</u></strong> In a certain sense, <u><strong>this duality is <mark>death</mark> itself, since it <mark>objectifies the body</mark> as residual, <mark>as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying</u></strong></mark>. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. <u><strong>It is according to the mind</u></strong>, this imaginary schizz, <u><strong>that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death</u></strong>. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. <u><strong><mark>Biology</mark> lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics</u></strong>, <u><strong>but it no longer declares this</u></strong>. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, <u><strong>it <mark>has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and</mark> on the <mark>world</mark>; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism</u></strong>. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.'</p> </s>

Their form of sentimental politics commodifies and vampirically drains the oppressed of value

, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668) In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption explains why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. the postsentimental modality challenges what storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom insistence that subjects "bargain" for redemption with their own mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream. whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs or ghosts of whiteness, which involve religious traditions of self-loathing and cultural traditions confusing happiness with analgesia. The politico-sentimental uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, thereby making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful, objectified, cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are, in some way, fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift and emancipation Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life This presumption explains why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. The desire for unconflictedness might motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. the postsentimental modality challenges what storytelling have come to stand for the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of trauma as models for having and remembering collective experience in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is a condition of that violence. They cut the complexity of human motives "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth insistence that subjects "bargain" for redemption with their own mortification violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream. whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs of whiteness, which involve self-loathing and confusing happiness with analgesia. The politico-sentimental uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

(Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668) What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption, that the terms of consent are transhistorical once true feeling is shared, explains in part why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, the postsentimental modality also challenges what literature and storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience.20 Currently, as in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. Baldwin asserts that the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence. Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her insistence that subjects "bargain" for heavenly redemption with their own physical and spiritual mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs or ghosts of whiteness, which involve religious traditions of self-loathing and cultural traditions confusing happiness with analgesia. The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 The politico-sentimental novel uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, thereby making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful, objectified, cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are, in some way, fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

<h4>Their form of sentimental politics commodifies and vampirically drains the oppressed of value </h4><p><strong>Berlant ‘98<u> </p><p></u></strong>(Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature<u>, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668)</p><p></u>What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. <u><strong><mark>In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift</mark>, amelioration, <mark>and emancipation</mark>, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus</mark> to <mark>a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life</mark> into being. <mark>This presumption</u></strong></mark>, that the terms of consent are transhistorical once true feeling is shared, <u><strong><mark>explains</u></strong></mark> in part <u><strong><mark>why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance.</u></strong></mark> Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. <u><strong><mark>The desire for unconflictedness might</mark> very well <mark>motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed.</u></strong></mark> What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, <u><strong><mark>the postsentimental modality</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>challenges what</u></strong></mark> literature and <u><strong><mark>storytelling have come to stand for</mark> in the creation of sentimental national subjects</u></strong> across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which <u><strong><mark>the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of</mark> the Holocaust and <mark>trauma as models for having and remembering collective</mark> social <mark>experience</u></strong></mark>.20 Currently, as <u><strong><mark>in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence.</u></strong></mark> Baldwin asserts that <u><strong><mark>the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is</mark> precisely <mark>a condition of that violence</u>.</strong></mark> Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." <u><strong><mark>They cut the complexity of human motives</mark> and self-understanding <mark>"down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the</mark> social and <mark>material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has</mark>, or doesn't have, <mark>on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth</mark>, justice, and freedom</u></strong>.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her <u><strong><mark>insistence that subjects "bargain" for</u></strong></mark> heavenly <u><strong><mark>redemption with their own</u></strong></mark> physical and spiritual <u><strong><mark>mortification</mark>, merely and <mark>violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it.</u></strong></mark> Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. <u><strong><mark>This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he</mark> elsewhere <mark>calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.</u></strong></mark>23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, <u><strong><mark>whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs</mark> or ghosts <mark>of whiteness, which involve</mark> religious traditions of <mark>self-loathing and</mark> cultural traditions <mark>confusing happiness with analgesia.</u></strong></mark> The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 <u><strong><mark>The politico-sentimental</u></strong></mark> novel <u><strong><mark>uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject,</mark> thereby <mark>making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject</u></strong></mark>. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. <u><strong><mark>This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful</mark>, objectified, <mark>cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are</mark>, in some way, <mark>fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.</p></u></strong></mark>

Berlant ‘98

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Berlant ‘98 fulltext: (Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668) What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption, that the terms of consent are transhistorical once true feeling is shared, explains in part why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, the postsentimental modality also challenges what literature and storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience.20 Currently, as in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. Baldwin asserts that the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence. Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her insistence that subjects "bargain" for heavenly redemption with their own physical and spiritual mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs or ghosts of whiteness, which involve religious traditions of self-loathing and cultural traditions confusing happiness with analgesia. The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 The politico-sentimental novel uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, thereby making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful, objectified, cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are, in some way, fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image. [/INST] <h4>Their form of sentimental politics commodifies and vampirically drains the oppressed of value </h4><p><strong>Berlant ‘98<u> </p><p></u></strong>(Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature<u>, Vol. 70, No. 3, No More Separate Spheres! (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668)</p><p></u>What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. <u><strong><mark>In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift</mark>, amelioration, <mark>and emancipation</mark>, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus</mark> to <mark>a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life</mark> into being. <mark>This presumption</u></strong></mark>, that the terms of consent are transhistorical once true feeling is shared, <u><strong><mark>explains</u></strong></mark> in part <u><strong><mark>why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance.</u></strong></mark> Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. <u><strong><mark>The desire for unconflictedness might</mark> very well <mark>motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed.</u></strong></mark> What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, <u><strong><mark>the postsentimental modality</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>challenges what</u></strong></mark> literature and <u><strong><mark>storytelling have come to stand for</mark> in the creation of sentimental national subjects</u></strong> across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which <u><strong><mark>the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of</mark> the Holocaust and <mark>trauma as models for having and remembering collective</mark> social <mark>experience</u></strong></mark>.20 Currently, as <u><strong><mark>in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence.</u></strong></mark> Baldwin asserts that <u><strong><mark>the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is</mark> precisely <mark>a condition of that violence</u>.</strong></mark> Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." <u><strong><mark>They cut the complexity of human motives</mark> and self-understanding <mark>"down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the</mark> social and <mark>material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has</mark>, or doesn't have, <mark>on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth</mark>, justice, and freedom</u></strong>.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her <u><strong><mark>insistence that subjects "bargain" for</u></strong></mark> heavenly <u><strong><mark>redemption with their own</u></strong></mark> physical and spiritual <u><strong><mark>mortification</mark>, merely and <mark>violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it.</u></strong></mark> Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. <u><strong><mark>This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he</mark> elsewhere <mark>calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.</u></strong></mark>23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, <u><strong><mark>whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs</mark> or ghosts <mark>of whiteness, which involve</mark> religious traditions of <mark>self-loathing and</mark> cultural traditions <mark>confusing happiness with analgesia.</u></strong></mark> The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 <u><strong><mark>The politico-sentimental</u></strong></mark> novel <u><strong><mark>uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject,</mark> thereby <mark>making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject</u></strong></mark>. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. <u><strong><mark>This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful</mark>, objectified, <mark>cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are</mark>, in some way, <mark>fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

Relations are key to solve warming, resource conflict and nuclear proliferation

If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper safeguards the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions, four changes made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary First, the key challenges faced such as securing sustainable energy supplies combating and adapting to climate change, have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region The process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting societies contribute and all will experience its consequences. The solutions ranging from developing alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.

If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive the costs will be high, in terms of growing risks Without a partnership nuclear tech may be adopted widely without proper safeguards the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries rather than through mutual learning and coordination. key challenges such as securing sustainable energy supplies combating and adapting to climate change cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region The process of combating and adapting to climate change exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. The solutions from alternative fuels to ecological shocks require cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.

If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources. It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions, and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits. Today, four changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary. First, the key challenges faced by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— such as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and adapting to climate change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future. For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. The process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting societies contribute to the problem to different degrees, and all will experience its consequences. The solutions—ranging from developing alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.

<h4>Relations are key to solve warming, resource conflict and nuclear proliferation</h4><p>Ernesto <strong>Zedillo 8</strong>, Professor of International Economics, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World”, Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, November </p><p><u><mark>If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive</mark>, <mark>the costs</mark> to the United States and its neighbors <strong><mark>will be high, in terms of</mark> </strong>both <mark>growing <strong>risks</mark> and missed opportunities</strong>.</u> <u><strong><mark>Without a partnership</strong></mark>,</u> the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful<u> <mark>nuclear tech</mark>nology<mark> may be adopted </mark>more <mark>widely</mark>, but <strong><mark>without proper safeguards</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase.</mark> <mark>Adaptation to climate</mark> change <mark>will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>rather than through </mark>more effective efforts based on <mark>mutual learning and coordination</u>.</mark> Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources. It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. <u>Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions,</u> and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits. Today, <u>four changes</u> in the region have <u>made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary</u>. <u>First, the <strong><mark>key challenges</strong></mark> faced</u> by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— <u><mark>such as securing sustainable energy supplies</u></mark>, <u><strong><mark>combating and adapting to climate change</strong></mark>, </u>and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—<u>have become so complex and deeply transnational that <strong>they <mark>cannot be managed</strong> or overcome <strong>by any single country.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Washington needs partners in the LAC region</u></strong></mark> with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future. For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. <u><mark>The process of combating and adapting to climate change </mark>also <mark>exemplifies the need for a <strong>hemispheric partnership</strong>.</mark> All carbon-emitting societies contribute </u>to the problem to different degrees, <u>and all will experience its consequences. <mark>The solutions</u></mark>—<u>ranging <mark>from</mark> developing <mark>alternative fuels to</mark> adapting to <mark>ecological shocks</mark>—all <mark>require</mark> sustained <strong><mark>cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.</p></u></strong></mark>

Ernesto Zedillo 8, Professor of International Economics, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World”, Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, November

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ernesto Zedillo 8, Professor of International Economics, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World”, Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, November fulltext: If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources. It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions, and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits. Today, four changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary. First, the key challenges faced by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— such as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and adapting to climate change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future. For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. The process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting societies contribute to the problem to different degrees, and all will experience its consequences. The solutions—ranging from developing alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries. [/INST] <h4>Relations are key to solve warming, resource conflict and nuclear proliferation</h4><p>Ernesto <strong>Zedillo 8</strong>, Professor of International Economics, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World”, Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, November </p><p><u><mark>If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive</mark>, <mark>the costs</mark> to the United States and its neighbors <strong><mark>will be high, in terms of</mark> </strong>both <mark>growing <strong>risks</mark> and missed opportunities</strong>.</u> <u><strong><mark>Without a partnership</strong></mark>,</u> the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful<u> <mark>nuclear tech</mark>nology<mark> may be adopted </mark>more <mark>widely</mark>, but <strong><mark>without proper safeguards</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase.</mark> <mark>Adaptation to climate</mark> change <mark>will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>rather than through </mark>more effective efforts based on <mark>mutual learning and coordination</u>.</mark> Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources. It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. <u>Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions,</u> and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits. Today, <u>four changes</u> in the region have <u>made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary</u>. <u>First, the <strong><mark>key challenges</strong></mark> faced</u> by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— <u><mark>such as securing sustainable energy supplies</u></mark>, <u><strong><mark>combating and adapting to climate change</strong></mark>, </u>and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—<u>have become so complex and deeply transnational that <strong>they <mark>cannot be managed</strong> or overcome <strong>by any single country.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Washington needs partners in the LAC region</u></strong></mark> with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future. For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. <u><mark>The process of combating and adapting to climate change </mark>also <mark>exemplifies the need for a <strong>hemispheric partnership</strong>.</mark> All carbon-emitting societies contribute </u>to the problem to different degrees, <u>and all will experience its consequences. <mark>The solutions</u></mark>—<u>ranging <mark>from</mark> developing <mark>alternative fuels to</mark> adapting to <mark>ecological shocks</mark>—all <mark>require</mark> sustained <strong><mark>cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

Relations are key to solve warming, resource conflict and nuclear proliferation

If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper safeguards the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions, four changes made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary First, the key challenges faced such as securing sustainable energy supplies combating and adapting to climate change, have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region The process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting societies contribute and all will experience its consequences. The solutions ranging from developing alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.

If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive the costs will be high, in terms of growing risks Without a partnership nuclear tech may be adopted widely without proper safeguards the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries rather than through mutual learning and coordination. key challenges such as securing sustainable energy supplies combating and adapting to climate change cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region The process of combating and adapting to climate change exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. The solutions from alternative fuels to ecological shocks require cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.

If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources. It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions, and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits. Today, four changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary. First, the key challenges faced by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— such as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and adapting to climate change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future. For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. The process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting societies contribute to the problem to different degrees, and all will experience its consequences. The solutions—ranging from developing alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.

<h4>Relations are key to solve warming, resource conflict and nuclear proliferation</h4><p>Ernesto <strong>Zedillo 8</strong>, Professor of International Economics, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World”, Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, November </p><p><u><strong><mark>If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive</mark>, <mark>the costs</mark> to the United States and its neighbors <mark>will be high, in terms of</mark> both <mark>growing risks</mark> and missed opportunities.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Without a partnership</mark>,</u></strong> the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful<u><strong> <mark>nuclear tech</mark>nology<mark> may be adopted </mark>more <mark>widely</mark>, but <mark>without proper safeguards</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase.</mark> <mark>Adaptation to climate</mark> change <mark>will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>rather than through </mark>more effective efforts based on <mark>mutual learning and coordination</u></strong>.</mark> Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources. It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. <u><strong>Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions,</u></strong> and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits. Today, <u><strong>four changes</u></strong> in the region have <u><strong>made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary</u></strong>. <u><strong>First, the <mark>key challenges</mark> faced</u></strong> by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— <u><strong><mark>such as securing sustainable energy supplies</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>combating and adapting to climate change</mark>, </u></strong>and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—<u><strong>have become so complex and deeply transnational that they <mark>cannot be managed or overcome by any single country.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Washington needs partners in the LAC region</u></strong></mark> with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future. For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. <u><strong><mark>The process of combating and adapting to climate change </mark>also <mark>exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership.</mark> All carbon-emitting societies contribute </u></strong>to the problem to different degrees, <u><strong>and all will experience its consequences. <mark>The solutions</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>ranging <mark>from</mark> developing <mark>alternative fuels to</mark> adapting to <mark>ecological shocks</mark>—all <mark>require</mark> sustained <mark>cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.</p></u></strong></mark>

Ernesto Zedillo 8, Professor of International Economics, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World”, Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, November

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ernesto Zedillo 8, Professor of International Economics, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World”, Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, November fulltext: If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources. It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions, and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits. Today, four changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary. First, the key challenges faced by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— such as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and adapting to climate change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future. For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. The process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting societies contribute to the problem to different degrees, and all will experience its consequences. The solutions—ranging from developing alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries. [/INST] <h4>Relations are key to solve warming, resource conflict and nuclear proliferation</h4><p>Ernesto <strong>Zedillo 8</strong>, Professor of International Economics, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World”, Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, November </p><p><u><strong><mark>If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive</mark>, <mark>the costs</mark> to the United States and its neighbors <mark>will be high, in terms of</mark> both <mark>growing risks</mark> and missed opportunities.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Without a partnership</mark>,</u></strong> the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful<u><strong> <mark>nuclear tech</mark>nology<mark> may be adopted </mark>more <mark>widely</mark>, but <mark>without proper safeguards</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase.</mark> <mark>Adaptation to climate</mark> change <mark>will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>rather than through </mark>more effective efforts based on <mark>mutual learning and coordination</u></strong>.</mark> Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources. It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. <u><strong>Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions,</u></strong> and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits. Today, <u><strong>four changes</u></strong> in the region have <u><strong>made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary</u></strong>. <u><strong>First, the <mark>key challenges</mark> faced</u></strong> by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— <u><strong><mark>such as securing sustainable energy supplies</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>combating and adapting to climate change</mark>, </u></strong>and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—<u><strong>have become so complex and deeply transnational that they <mark>cannot be managed or overcome by any single country.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>Washington needs partners in the LAC region</u></strong></mark> with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future. For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. <u><strong><mark>The process of combating and adapting to climate change </mark>also <mark>exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership.</mark> All carbon-emitting societies contribute </u></strong>to the problem to different degrees, <u><strong>and all will experience its consequences. <mark>The solutions</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>ranging <mark>from</mark> developing <mark>alternative fuels to</mark> adapting to <mark>ecological shocks</mark>—all <mark>require</mark> sustained <mark>cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

That de-radicalizes black theory and turns the case

with the lure of progress, more black people are participating in debate, more black judges, more conceptual debates about blackness. There comes a deradicalization of what black theory and what black people are supposed to do and represent. Despite our pretense, debate is still a very privileged world. It’s a pretend world where black people can have their queerness, their feebleness, their faux radicality recognized. For actual oppressed people, people who can’t afford debate, who have no knowledge of debate, who fight against actual mechanisms of state, who are not recognized, these very same qualities mean death. So in debate rounds we get to act, we’re the conduits of this black suffering. The demographic increase in debate, however, it’s kind of brought about a new morality that’s committed to fighting for inclusion, intellectual space, our expanded ideas of home. But in this I think we miss the extent of our dependency on white recognition it’s through our appeal to white men and women, our need for their recognition, for their ballot, that frames the ultimate message of our pessimism, We’re fundamentally dependent on how the white mind situates itself conceptually to the project of diversification. We appeal to their sympathy, or worse yet, to the intersectional empathies the true radicality of black people debating points to the negation of white comprehension of black ideas of liberation not their assimilation or recognition of them. So these ideas of us saying we have progressed fundamentally rooted in how white people see us

with lure of progress, more black people are in debate, more black judges, more debates about blackness. comes a deradicalization of black theory and black people debate is a very privileged world. It’s a pretend world where black people can have their queerness, feebleness, faux radicality recognized. For actual oppressed people, people who can’t afford debate, who have no knowledge of debate, who fight against actual mechanisms of state these same qualities mean death The demographic increase in debate ’s fighting for intellectual space, in this we miss our dependency on white recognition. it’s our appeal to white men and women for their ballot, that frames our pessimism We’re dependent on how the white mind situates itself We appeal to their sympathy, or worse yet, to intersectional empathies the radicality of black people debating points to the negation of white comprehension of black ideas not assimilation or recognition of them. these ideas saying we have progressed fundamentally rooted in how white people see us

However, with the lure of progress, more black people are participating in debate, more black judges, more conceptual debates about blackness. There comes a deradicalization of what black theory and what black people are supposed to do and represent. Despite our pretense, debate is still a very privileged world. It’s a pretend world where black people can have their queerness, their feebleness, their faux radicality recognized. For actual oppressed people, people who can’t afford debate, who have no knowledge of debate, who fight against actual mechanisms of state, who are not recognized, these very same qualities mean death. So in debate rounds we get to act, we’re the conduits of this black suffering. The demographic increase in the black population in debate, however, it’s kind of brought about a new morality that’s committed to fighting for inclusion, intellectual space, our expanded ideas of home. But in this I think we miss the extent of our dependency on white recognition. That white judge in the back of the room that’s comprehending and assimilating our goals with their own liberal and progressive existence. In other words, it’s through our appeal to white men and women, our need for their recognition, for their ballot, that frames the ultimate message of our pessimism, our gender critiques, our colonial analysis. We’re fundamentally dependent on how the white mind situates itself conceptually to the project of diversification. We appeal to their sympathy, or worse yet, to the intersectional empathies of whites as the gauge of the transformative potentialities of black theory and historic black thought. So in these spaces real radicality does not come from an appeal to white recognition, but the rejection of it. In the declaration that black knowledge or black theory or black accounts of existence in all of the economic and sexual plurality of our thought is the radicality comes from the idea that we think that those questions can be answered in the annals of how black people have historically thought about themselves. It need not depend on our alliances or allegiances with white liberals rationalizing their own existence as justifiable through their endorsement or alliances with what we think about ourselves or black people’s situation in the world. Black debate should ultimately move to the rejection of white education – adjudication if black theory is about the liberation of black people and a move to definitions of knowledge or cells or concepts that don’t currently exist then how can we expect the dilapidated ideas of white sentimentality projected from an archaic and racialized whiteness to understand or even comprehend the interrelatedness of propositions that are beyond their present being. How they understand something that is beyond their very own existence the true radicality of black people debating points to the negation of white comprehension of black ideas of liberation not their assimilation or recognition of them. So these ideas of us saying we have progressed fundamentally rooted in how white people see us is a problem.

<h4>That de-radicalizes black theory and turns the case</h4><p><strong>Curry ’13</strong> (Curry, Texas A&M University Philosophy Professor, 2013 Tommy, “Dr. Tommy Curry on the importance of debate for blacks” Uploaded Oct 3, 2013, 2:15 - 4:39 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMmkPhvDK2E#t=174 Accessed 3/30/24)</p><p>However, <u><strong><mark>with </mark>the <mark>lure of progress, more black people are</mark> participating <mark>in debate, more black judges, more</mark> conceptual <mark>debates about blackness. </mark>There <mark>comes a deradicalization</mark> <mark>of</mark> what <mark>black theory and</mark> what <mark>black people</mark> are supposed to do and represent. Despite our pretense, <mark>debate is</mark> still <mark>a very privileged world. It’s a pretend world where black people can have their queerness, </mark>their <mark>feebleness, </mark>their <mark>faux radicality recognized. For actual oppressed people, people who can’t afford debate, who have no knowledge of debate, who fight against actual mechanisms of state</mark>, who are not recognized, <mark>these</mark> very <mark>same qualities mean death</mark>. So in debate rounds we get to act, we’re the conduits of this black suffering. <mark>The demographic increase in</u></strong></mark> the black population in <u><strong><mark>debate</mark>, however, it<mark>’s</mark> kind of brought about a new morality that’s committed to <mark>fighting for</mark> inclusion, <mark>intellectual space,</mark> our expanded ideas of home. But <mark>in this</mark> I think <mark>we miss</mark> the extent of <mark>our dependency on white recognition</u></strong>.</mark> That white judge in the back of the room that’s comprehending and assimilating our goals with their own liberal and progressive existence. In other words, <u><strong><mark>it’s</mark> through <mark>our appeal to white men and women</mark>, our need for their recognition, <mark>for their ballot, that frames</mark> the ultimate message of <mark>our pessimism</mark>,</u></strong> our gender critiques, our colonial analysis. <u><strong><mark>We’re</mark> fundamentally <mark>dependent on how the white mind situates itself</mark> conceptually to the project of diversification. <mark>We appeal to their sympathy, or worse yet, to </mark>the <mark>intersectional empathies</u></strong></mark> of whites as the gauge of the transformative potentialities of black theory and historic black thought. So in these spaces real radicality does not come from an appeal to white recognition, but the rejection of it. In the declaration that black knowledge or black theory or black accounts of existence in all of the economic and sexual plurality of our thought is the radicality comes from the idea that we think that those questions can be answered in the annals of how black people have historically thought about themselves. It need not depend on our alliances or allegiances with white liberals rationalizing their own existence as justifiable through their endorsement or alliances with what we think about ourselves or black people’s situation in the world. Black debate should ultimately move to the rejection of white education – adjudication if black theory is about the liberation of black people and a move to definitions of knowledge or cells or concepts that don’t currently exist then how can we expect the dilapidated ideas of white sentimentality projected from an archaic and racialized whiteness to understand or even comprehend the interrelatedness of propositions that are beyond their present being. How they understand something that is beyond their very own existence <u><strong><mark>the</mark> true <mark>radicality of black people debating points to the negation of white comprehension of black ideas</mark> of liberation <mark>not</mark> their <mark>assimilation or recognition of them.</mark> So <mark>these ideas </mark>of us <mark>saying we have progressed fundamentally rooted in how white people see us</mark> </u></strong>is a problem.</p>

Curry ’13 (Curry, Texas A&M University Philosophy Professor, 2013 Tommy, “Dr. Tommy Curry on the importance of debate for blacks” Uploaded Oct 3, 2013, 2:15 - 4:39 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMmkPhvDK2E#t=174 Accessed 3/30/24)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Curry ’13 (Curry, Texas A&M University Philosophy Professor, 2013 Tommy, “Dr. Tommy Curry on the importance of debate for blacks” Uploaded Oct 3, 2013, 2:15 - 4:39 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMmkPhvDK2E#t=174 Accessed 3/30/24) fulltext: However, with the lure of progress, more black people are participating in debate, more black judges, more conceptual debates about blackness. There comes a deradicalization of what black theory and what black people are supposed to do and represent. Despite our pretense, debate is still a very privileged world. It’s a pretend world where black people can have their queerness, their feebleness, their faux radicality recognized. For actual oppressed people, people who can’t afford debate, who have no knowledge of debate, who fight against actual mechanisms of state, who are not recognized, these very same qualities mean death. So in debate rounds we get to act, we’re the conduits of this black suffering. The demographic increase in the black population in debate, however, it’s kind of brought about a new morality that’s committed to fighting for inclusion, intellectual space, our expanded ideas of home. But in this I think we miss the extent of our dependency on white recognition. That white judge in the back of the room that’s comprehending and assimilating our goals with their own liberal and progressive existence. In other words, it’s through our appeal to white men and women, our need for their recognition, for their ballot, that frames the ultimate message of our pessimism, our gender critiques, our colonial analysis. We’re fundamentally dependent on how the white mind situates itself conceptually to the project of diversification. We appeal to their sympathy, or worse yet, to the intersectional empathies of whites as the gauge of the transformative potentialities of black theory and historic black thought. So in these spaces real radicality does not come from an appeal to white recognition, but the rejection of it. In the declaration that black knowledge or black theory or black accounts of existence in all of the economic and sexual plurality of our thought is the radicality comes from the idea that we think that those questions can be answered in the annals of how black people have historically thought about themselves. It need not depend on our alliances or allegiances with white liberals rationalizing their own existence as justifiable through their endorsement or alliances with what we think about ourselves or black people’s situation in the world. Black debate should ultimately move to the rejection of white education – adjudication if black theory is about the liberation of black people and a move to definitions of knowledge or cells or concepts that don’t currently exist then how can we expect the dilapidated ideas of white sentimentality projected from an archaic and racialized whiteness to understand or even comprehend the interrelatedness of propositions that are beyond their present being. How they understand something that is beyond their very own existence the true radicality of black people debating points to the negation of white comprehension of black ideas of liberation not their assimilation or recognition of them. So these ideas of us saying we have progressed fundamentally rooted in how white people see us is a problem. [/INST] <h4>That de-radicalizes black theory and turns the case</h4><p><strong>Curry ’13</strong> (Curry, Texas A&M University Philosophy Professor, 2013 Tommy, “Dr. Tommy Curry on the importance of debate for blacks” Uploaded Oct 3, 2013, 2:15 - 4:39 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMmkPhvDK2E#t=174 Accessed 3/30/24)</p><p>However, <u><strong><mark>with </mark>the <mark>lure of progress, more black people are</mark> participating <mark>in debate, more black judges, more</mark> conceptual <mark>debates about blackness. </mark>There <mark>comes a deradicalization</mark> <mark>of</mark> what <mark>black theory and</mark> what <mark>black people</mark> are supposed to do and represent. Despite our pretense, <mark>debate is</mark> still <mark>a very privileged world. It’s a pretend world where black people can have their queerness, </mark>their <mark>feebleness, </mark>their <mark>faux radicality recognized. For actual oppressed people, people who can’t afford debate, who have no knowledge of debate, who fight against actual mechanisms of state</mark>, who are not recognized, <mark>these</mark> very <mark>same qualities mean death</mark>. So in debate rounds we get to act, we’re the conduits of this black suffering. <mark>The demographic increase in</u></strong></mark> the black population in <u><strong><mark>debate</mark>, however, it<mark>’s</mark> kind of brought about a new morality that’s committed to <mark>fighting for</mark> inclusion, <mark>intellectual space,</mark> our expanded ideas of home. But <mark>in this</mark> I think <mark>we miss</mark> the extent of <mark>our dependency on white recognition</u></strong>.</mark> That white judge in the back of the room that’s comprehending and assimilating our goals with their own liberal and progressive existence. In other words, <u><strong><mark>it’s</mark> through <mark>our appeal to white men and women</mark>, our need for their recognition, <mark>for their ballot, that frames</mark> the ultimate message of <mark>our pessimism</mark>,</u></strong> our gender critiques, our colonial analysis. <u><strong><mark>We’re</mark> fundamentally <mark>dependent on how the white mind situates itself</mark> conceptually to the project of diversification. <mark>We appeal to their sympathy, or worse yet, to </mark>the <mark>intersectional empathies</u></strong></mark> of whites as the gauge of the transformative potentialities of black theory and historic black thought. So in these spaces real radicality does not come from an appeal to white recognition, but the rejection of it. In the declaration that black knowledge or black theory or black accounts of existence in all of the economic and sexual plurality of our thought is the radicality comes from the idea that we think that those questions can be answered in the annals of how black people have historically thought about themselves. It need not depend on our alliances or allegiances with white liberals rationalizing their own existence as justifiable through their endorsement or alliances with what we think about ourselves or black people’s situation in the world. Black debate should ultimately move to the rejection of white education – adjudication if black theory is about the liberation of black people and a move to definitions of knowledge or cells or concepts that don’t currently exist then how can we expect the dilapidated ideas of white sentimentality projected from an archaic and racialized whiteness to understand or even comprehend the interrelatedness of propositions that are beyond their present being. How they understand something that is beyond their very own existence <u><strong><mark>the</mark> true <mark>radicality of black people debating points to the negation of white comprehension of black ideas</mark> of liberation <mark>not</mark> their <mark>assimilation or recognition of them.</mark> So <mark>these ideas </mark>of us <mark>saying we have progressed fundamentally rooted in how white people see us</mark> </u></strong>is a problem.</p> </s>

Perm fails—focus on particular violent acts is a lure that causes ideological mystification and means we only address symptoms not the root cause of violence

looking at the problem of violence awry there is something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation with it: the overpowering horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims inexorably function as a lure which prevents us from thinking The only appropriate approach seems to be one which permits violence kept at a distance Let's think about the fake sense of urgency that pervades the left-liberal humanitarian discourse on violence: in it, abstraction and graphic (pseudo)concreteness coexist in the staging of the scene of violence A woman is raped every six seconds in this country" and "In the time it takes you to read this paragraph, ten children will die of hunger" are just two examples There is a fundamental anti-theoretical edge to these urgent injunctions. There is no time to reflect: we have to act now. Through this fake sense of urgency, the post-industrial rich, living in their secluded virtual world, not only do not ignore the harsh reality outside their area – they actively refer to it all the time Against this fake urgency, we might want A critical analysis of the present global constellation – one which offers no clear solution, no "practical" advice on what to do, and provides no light at the end of the tunnel, since one is well aware that this light might belong to a train crashing towards us – usually meets with reproach: "Do you mean we should do nothing? Just sit and wait?" One should gather the courage to answer: "YES, precisely that!" the only truly "practical" thing to do is to resist the temptation to engage immediately and to "wait and see" by means of a patient, critical analysis this is what we should do today when we find ourselves bombarded with mediatic images of violence. We need to "learn, learn, and learn" what causes this violence

looking at the problem of violence awry there is something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation with it: the overpowering horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims function as a lure which prevents us from thinking The only appropriate approach seems to be one which permits violence kept at a distance Let's think about the fake sense of urgency that pervades the left-liberal humanitarian discourse on violence In the time it takes you to read this paragraph, ten children will die of hunger" are examples There is a fundamental anti-theoretical edge to these urgent injunctions There is no time to reflect: we have to act now Against this fake urgency, we might want A critical analysis of the present global constellation – one which offers no clear solution, no "practical" advice on what to do, and provides no light at the end of the tunnel usually meets with reproach: "Do you mean we should do nothing? Just sit and wait?" One should gather the courage to answer: "YES, precisely that!" the only truly "practical" thing to do is to resist the temptation to engage immediately and to "wait and see" by means of a patient, critical analysis this is what we should do today when we find ourselves bombarded with images of violence. We need to "learn, learn, and learn" what causes this violence.

Instead of confronting violence directly, the present book casts six sideways glances. There are reasons for looking at the problem of violence awry. My underlying premise is that there is something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation with it: the overpowering horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims inexorably function as a lure which prevents us from thinking. A dispassionate conceptual development of the typology of violence must by definition ignore its traumatic impact. Yet there is a sense in which a cold analysis of violence somehow reproduces and participates in its horror. A distinction needs to be made, as well, between (factual) truth and truthfulness: what renders a report of a raped woman (or any other narrative of a trauma) truthful is its very factual unreliability, its confusion, its inconsistency. If the victim were able to report on her painful and humiliating experience in a clear manner, with all the data arranged in a consistent order, this very quality would make us suspicious of its truth. The problem here is part of the solution: the very factual deficiencies of the traumatised subject's report on her experience bear witness to the truthfulness of her report, since they signal that the reported content "contaminated" the manner of reporting it. The same holds, of course, for the so-called unreliability of the verbal reports of Holocaust survivors: the witness able to offer a clear narrative of his camp experience would disqualify himself by virtue of that clarity.2 The only appropriate approach to my subject thus seems to be one which permits variations on violence kept at a distance out of respect towards its victims. Adorno's famous saying, it seems, needs correction: it is not poetry that is impossible after Auschwitz, but rather prose.3 Realistic prose fails, where the poetic evocation of the unbearable atmosphere of a camp succeeds. That is to say, when Adorno declares poetry impossible (or, rather, barbaric) after Auschwitz, this impossibility is an enabling impossibility: poetry is always, by definition, "about" something that cannot be addressed directly, only alluded to. One shouldn't be afraid to take this a step further and refer to the old saying that music comes in when words fail. There may well be some truth in the common wisdom that, in a kind of historical premonition, the music of Schoenberg articulated the anxieties and nightmares of Auschwitz before the event took place. In her memoirs, Anna Akhmatova describes what happened to her when, at the height of the Stalinist purges, she was waiting in the long queue in front of the Leningrad prison to learn about her arrested son Lev: One day somebody in the crowd identified me. Standing behind me was a young woman, with lips blue from the cold, who had of course never heard me called by name before. Now she started out of the torpor common to us all and asked me in a whisper (everyone whispered there), "Can you describe this?" And I said, "I can." Then something like a smile passed fleetingly over what had once been her face.4 The key question, of course, is what kind of description is intended here? Surely it is not a realistic description of the situation, but what Wallace Stevens called "description without place," which is what is proper to art. This is not a description which locates its content in a historical space and time, but a description which creates, as the background of the phenomena it describes, an inexistent (virtual) space of its own, so that what appears in it is not an appearance sustained by the depth of reality behind it, but a decontextualised appearance, an appearance which fully coincides with real being. To quote Stevens again: "What it seems it is and in such seeming all things are." Such an artistic description "is not a sign for something that lies outside its form."5 Rather, it extracts from the confused reality its own inner form in the same way that Schoenberg "extracted" the inner form of totalitarian terror. He evoked the way this terror affects subjectivity. Does this recourse to artistic description imply that we are in danger of regressing to a contemplative attitude that somehow betrays the urgency to "do something" about the depicted horrors? Let's think about the fake sense of urgency that pervades the left-liberal humanitarian discourse on violence: in it, abstraction and graphic (pseudo)concreteness coexist in the staging of the scene of violence – against women, blacks, the homeless, gays... "A woman is raped every six seconds in this country" and "In the time it takes you to read this paragraph, ten children will die of hunger" are just two examples. Underlying all this is a hypocritical sentiment of moral outrage. Just this kind of pseudo-urgency was exploited by Starbucks a couple of years ago when, at store entrances, posters greeting customers pointed out that a portion of the chain's profits went into health-care for the children of Guatemala, the source of their coffee, the inference being that with every cup you drink, you save a child's life. There is a fundamental anti-theoretical edge to these urgent injunctions. There is no time to reflect: we have to act now. Through this fake sense of urgency, the post-industrial rich, living in their secluded virtual world, not only do not deny or ignore the harsh reality outside their area – they actively refer to it all the time. As Bill Gates recently put it: "What do computers matter when millions are still unnecessarily dying of dysentery?" Against this fake urgency, we might want to place Marx's wonderful letter to Engels of 1870, when, for a brief moment, it seemed that a European revolution was again at the gates. Marx's letter conveys his sheer panic: can't the revolutionaries wait for a couple of years? He hasn't yet finished his Capital. A critical analysis of the present global constellation – one which offers no clear solution, no "practical" advice on what to do, and provides no light at the end of the tunnel, since one is well aware that this light might belong to a train crashing towards us – usually meets with reproach: "Do you mean we should do nothing? Just sit and wait?" One should gather the courage to answer: "YES, precisely that!" There are situations when the only truly "practical" thing to do is to resist the temptation to engage immediately and to "wait and see" by means of a patient, critical analysis. Engagement seems to exert its pressure on us from all directions. In a well-known passage from his Existentialism and Humanism, Sartre deployed the dilemma of a young man in France in 1942, torn between the duty to help his lone, ill mother and the duty to enter the Resistance and fight the Germans; Sartre's point is, of course, that there is no a priori answer to this dilemma. The young man needs to make a decision grounded only in his own abyssal freedom and assume full responsibility for it.6 An obscene third way out of the dilemma would have been to advise the young man to tell his mother that he will join the Resistance, and to tell his Resistance friends that he will take care of his mother, while, in reality, withdrawing to a secluded place and studying... There is more than cheap cynicism in this advice. It brings to mind a well-known Soviet joke about Lenin. Under socialism, Lenin's advice to young people, his answer to what they should do, was "Learn, learn, and learn." This was evoked at all times and displayed on all school walls. The joke goes: Marx, Engels, and Lenin are asked whether they would prefer to have a wife or a mistress. As expected, Marx, rather conservative in private matters, answers, "A wife!" while Engels, more of a bon vivant, opts for a mistress. To everyone's surprise, Lenin says, "I'd like to have both!" Why? Is there a hidden stripe of decadent jouisseur behind his austere revolutionary image? No-he explains: "So that I can tell my wife that I am going to my mistress, and my mistress that I have to be with my wife..." "And then, what do you do?" "I go to a solitary place to learn, learn, and learn!" Is this not exactly what Lenin did after the catastrophe of 1914? He withdrew to a lonely place in Switzerland, where he "learned, learned, and learned," reading Hegel's logic. And this is what we should do today when we find ourselves bombarded with mediatic images of violence. We need to "learn, learn, and learn" what causes this violence.

<h4>Perm fails—focus on particular violent acts <u>is a lure</u> that causes ideological mystification and means we only address symptoms not the root cause of violence</h4><p><strong><mark>Žižek ’8</strong></mark> (Slavoj, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Big Ideas // Small Books, 2008, p. 3-8) [m leap]</p><p>Instead of confronting violence directly, the present book casts six sideways glances. There are reasons for <u><strong><mark>looking at the problem of violence awry</u></strong></mark>. My underlying premise is that <u><strong><mark>there is something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation with it: the overpowering horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims</mark> inexorably <mark>function as a lure which prevents us from thinking</u></strong></mark>. A dispassionate conceptual development of the typology of violence must by definition ignore its traumatic impact. Yet there is a sense in which a cold analysis of violence somehow reproduces and participates in its horror. A distinction needs to be made, as well, between (factual) truth and truthfulness: what renders a report of a raped woman (or any other narrative of a trauma) truthful is its very factual unreliability, its confusion, its inconsistency. If the victim were able to report on her painful and humiliating experience in a clear manner, with all the data arranged in a consistent order, this very quality would make us suspicious of its truth. The problem here is part of the solution: the very factual deficiencies of the traumatised subject's report on her experience bear witness to the truthfulness of her report, since they signal that the reported content "contaminated" the manner of reporting it. The same holds, of course, for the so-called unreliability of the verbal reports of Holocaust survivors: the witness able to offer a clear narrative of his camp experience would disqualify himself by virtue of that clarity.2 <u><strong><mark>The only appropriate approach</mark> </u></strong>to my subject thus <u><strong><mark>seems to be one which permits</u></strong></mark> variations on <u><strong><mark>violence kept at a distance</mark> </u></strong>out of respect towards its victims. Adorno's famous saying, it seems, needs correction: it is not poetry that is impossible after Auschwitz, but rather prose.3 Realistic prose fails, where the poetic evocation of the unbearable atmosphere of a camp succeeds. That is to say, when Adorno declares poetry impossible (or, rather, barbaric) after Auschwitz, this impossibility is an enabling impossibility: poetry is always, by definition, "about" something that cannot be addressed directly, only alluded to. One shouldn't be afraid to take this a step further and refer to the old saying that music comes in when words fail. There may well be some truth in the common wisdom that, in a kind of historical premonition, the music of Schoenberg articulated the anxieties and nightmares of Auschwitz before the event took place. In her memoirs, Anna Akhmatova describes what happened to her when, at the height of the Stalinist purges, she was waiting in the long queue in front of the Leningrad prison to learn about her arrested son Lev: One day somebody in the crowd identified me. Standing behind me was a young woman, with lips blue from the cold, who had of course never heard me called by name before. Now she started out of the torpor common to us all and asked me in a whisper (everyone whispered there), "Can you describe this?" And I said, "I can." Then something like a smile passed fleetingly over what had once been her face.4 The key question, of course, is what kind of description is intended here? Surely it is not a realistic description of the situation, but what Wallace Stevens called "description without place," which is what is proper to art. This is not a description which locates its content in a historical space and time, but a description which creates, as the background of the phenomena it describes, an inexistent (virtual) space of its own, so that what appears in it is not an appearance sustained by the depth of reality behind it, but a decontextualised appearance, an appearance which fully coincides with real being. To quote Stevens again: "What it seems it is and in such seeming all things are." Such an artistic description "is not a sign for something that lies outside its form."5 Rather, it extracts from the confused reality its own inner form in the same way that Schoenberg "extracted" the inner form of totalitarian terror. He evoked the way this terror affects subjectivity. Does this recourse to artistic description imply that we are in danger of regressing to a contemplative attitude that somehow betrays the urgency to "do something" about the depicted horrors? <u><strong><mark>Let's think about the fake sense of urgency that pervades the left-liberal humanitarian discourse on violence</mark>: in it, abstraction and graphic (pseudo)concreteness coexist in the staging of the scene of violence</u></strong> – against women, blacks, the homeless, gays... "<u><strong>A woman is raped every six seconds in this country" and "<mark>In the time it takes you to read this paragraph, ten children will die of hunger" are</mark> just two <mark>examples</u></strong></mark>. Underlying all this is a hypocritical sentiment of moral outrage. Just this kind of pseudo-urgency was exploited by Starbucks a couple of years ago when, at store entrances, posters greeting customers pointed out that a portion of the chain's profits went into health-care for the children of Guatemala, the source of their coffee, the inference being that with every cup you drink, you save a child's life. <u><strong><mark>There is a fundamental anti-theoretical edge to these urgent injunctions</mark>. <mark>There is no time to reflect: we have to act now</mark>. Through this fake sense of urgency, the post-industrial rich, living in their secluded virtual world, not only do not </u></strong>deny or<u><strong> ignore the harsh reality outside their area – they actively refer to it all the time</u></strong>. As Bill Gates recently put it: "What do computers matter when millions are still unnecessarily dying of dysentery?" <u><strong><mark>Against this fake urgency, we might want</u></strong></mark> to place Marx's wonderful letter to Engels of 1870, when, for a brief moment, it seemed that a European revolution was again at the gates. Marx's letter conveys his sheer panic: can't the revolutionaries wait for a couple of years? He hasn't yet finished his Capital. <u><strong><mark>A critical analysis of the present global constellation – one which offers no clear solution, no "practical" advice on what to do, and provides no light at the end of the tunnel</mark>, since one is well aware that this light might belong to a train crashing towards us – <mark>usually meets with reproach: "Do you mean we should do nothing? Just sit and wait?" One should gather the courage to answer: "YES, precisely that!"</mark> </u></strong>There are situations when <u><strong><mark>the only truly "practical" thing to do is to resist the temptation to engage immediately and to "wait and see" by means of a patient, critical analysis</u></strong></mark>. Engagement seems to exert its pressure on us from all directions. In a well-known passage from his Existentialism and Humanism, Sartre deployed the dilemma of a young man in France in 1942, torn between the duty to help his lone, ill mother and the duty to enter the Resistance and fight the Germans; Sartre's point is, of course, that there is no a priori answer to this dilemma. The young man needs to make a decision grounded only in his own abyssal freedom and assume full responsibility for it.6 An obscene third way out of the dilemma would have been to advise the young man to tell his mother that he will join the Resistance, and to tell his Resistance friends that he will take care of his mother, while, in reality, withdrawing to a secluded place and studying... There is more than cheap cynicism in this advice. It brings to mind a well-known Soviet joke about Lenin. Under socialism, Lenin's advice to young people, his answer to what they should do, was "Learn, learn, and learn." This was evoked at all times and displayed on all school walls. The joke goes: Marx, Engels, and Lenin are asked whether they would prefer to have a wife or a mistress. As expected, Marx, rather conservative in private matters, answers, "A wife!" while Engels, more of a bon vivant, opts for a mistress. To everyone's surprise, Lenin says, "I'd like to have both!" Why? Is there a hidden stripe of decadent jouisseur behind his austere revolutionary image? No-he explains: "So that I can tell my wife that I am going to my mistress, and my mistress that I have to be with my wife..." "And then, what do you do?" "I go to a solitary place to learn, learn, and learn!" Is this not exactly what Lenin did after the catastrophe of 1914? He withdrew to a lonely place in Switzerland, where he "learned, learned, and learned," reading Hegel's logic. And <u><strong><mark>this is what we should do today when we find ourselves bombarded with</mark> mediatic <mark>images of violence. We need to "learn, learn, and learn" what causes this violence</u></strong>.</p></mark>

Žižek ’8 (Slavoj, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Big Ideas // Small Books, 2008, p. 3-8) [m leap]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Žižek ’8 (Slavoj, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Big Ideas // Small Books, 2008, p. 3-8) [m leap] fulltext: Instead of confronting violence directly, the present book casts six sideways glances. There are reasons for looking at the problem of violence awry. My underlying premise is that there is something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation with it: the overpowering horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims inexorably function as a lure which prevents us from thinking. A dispassionate conceptual development of the typology of violence must by definition ignore its traumatic impact. Yet there is a sense in which a cold analysis of violence somehow reproduces and participates in its horror. A distinction needs to be made, as well, between (factual) truth and truthfulness: what renders a report of a raped woman (or any other narrative of a trauma) truthful is its very factual unreliability, its confusion, its inconsistency. If the victim were able to report on her painful and humiliating experience in a clear manner, with all the data arranged in a consistent order, this very quality would make us suspicious of its truth. The problem here is part of the solution: the very factual deficiencies of the traumatised subject's report on her experience bear witness to the truthfulness of her report, since they signal that the reported content "contaminated" the manner of reporting it. The same holds, of course, for the so-called unreliability of the verbal reports of Holocaust survivors: the witness able to offer a clear narrative of his camp experience would disqualify himself by virtue of that clarity.2 The only appropriate approach to my subject thus seems to be one which permits variations on violence kept at a distance out of respect towards its victims. Adorno's famous saying, it seems, needs correction: it is not poetry that is impossible after Auschwitz, but rather prose.3 Realistic prose fails, where the poetic evocation of the unbearable atmosphere of a camp succeeds. That is to say, when Adorno declares poetry impossible (or, rather, barbaric) after Auschwitz, this impossibility is an enabling impossibility: poetry is always, by definition, "about" something that cannot be addressed directly, only alluded to. One shouldn't be afraid to take this a step further and refer to the old saying that music comes in when words fail. There may well be some truth in the common wisdom that, in a kind of historical premonition, the music of Schoenberg articulated the anxieties and nightmares of Auschwitz before the event took place. In her memoirs, Anna Akhmatova describes what happened to her when, at the height of the Stalinist purges, she was waiting in the long queue in front of the Leningrad prison to learn about her arrested son Lev: One day somebody in the crowd identified me. Standing behind me was a young woman, with lips blue from the cold, who had of course never heard me called by name before. Now she started out of the torpor common to us all and asked me in a whisper (everyone whispered there), "Can you describe this?" And I said, "I can." Then something like a smile passed fleetingly over what had once been her face.4 The key question, of course, is what kind of description is intended here? Surely it is not a realistic description of the situation, but what Wallace Stevens called "description without place," which is what is proper to art. This is not a description which locates its content in a historical space and time, but a description which creates, as the background of the phenomena it describes, an inexistent (virtual) space of its own, so that what appears in it is not an appearance sustained by the depth of reality behind it, but a decontextualised appearance, an appearance which fully coincides with real being. To quote Stevens again: "What it seems it is and in such seeming all things are." Such an artistic description "is not a sign for something that lies outside its form."5 Rather, it extracts from the confused reality its own inner form in the same way that Schoenberg "extracted" the inner form of totalitarian terror. He evoked the way this terror affects subjectivity. Does this recourse to artistic description imply that we are in danger of regressing to a contemplative attitude that somehow betrays the urgency to "do something" about the depicted horrors? Let's think about the fake sense of urgency that pervades the left-liberal humanitarian discourse on violence: in it, abstraction and graphic (pseudo)concreteness coexist in the staging of the scene of violence – against women, blacks, the homeless, gays... "A woman is raped every six seconds in this country" and "In the time it takes you to read this paragraph, ten children will die of hunger" are just two examples. Underlying all this is a hypocritical sentiment of moral outrage. Just this kind of pseudo-urgency was exploited by Starbucks a couple of years ago when, at store entrances, posters greeting customers pointed out that a portion of the chain's profits went into health-care for the children of Guatemala, the source of their coffee, the inference being that with every cup you drink, you save a child's life. There is a fundamental anti-theoretical edge to these urgent injunctions. There is no time to reflect: we have to act now. Through this fake sense of urgency, the post-industrial rich, living in their secluded virtual world, not only do not deny or ignore the harsh reality outside their area – they actively refer to it all the time. As Bill Gates recently put it: "What do computers matter when millions are still unnecessarily dying of dysentery?" Against this fake urgency, we might want to place Marx's wonderful letter to Engels of 1870, when, for a brief moment, it seemed that a European revolution was again at the gates. Marx's letter conveys his sheer panic: can't the revolutionaries wait for a couple of years? He hasn't yet finished his Capital. A critical analysis of the present global constellation – one which offers no clear solution, no "practical" advice on what to do, and provides no light at the end of the tunnel, since one is well aware that this light might belong to a train crashing towards us – usually meets with reproach: "Do you mean we should do nothing? Just sit and wait?" One should gather the courage to answer: "YES, precisely that!" There are situations when the only truly "practical" thing to do is to resist the temptation to engage immediately and to "wait and see" by means of a patient, critical analysis. Engagement seems to exert its pressure on us from all directions. In a well-known passage from his Existentialism and Humanism, Sartre deployed the dilemma of a young man in France in 1942, torn between the duty to help his lone, ill mother and the duty to enter the Resistance and fight the Germans; Sartre's point is, of course, that there is no a priori answer to this dilemma. The young man needs to make a decision grounded only in his own abyssal freedom and assume full responsibility for it.6 An obscene third way out of the dilemma would have been to advise the young man to tell his mother that he will join the Resistance, and to tell his Resistance friends that he will take care of his mother, while, in reality, withdrawing to a secluded place and studying... There is more than cheap cynicism in this advice. It brings to mind a well-known Soviet joke about Lenin. Under socialism, Lenin's advice to young people, his answer to what they should do, was "Learn, learn, and learn." This was evoked at all times and displayed on all school walls. The joke goes: Marx, Engels, and Lenin are asked whether they would prefer to have a wife or a mistress. As expected, Marx, rather conservative in private matters, answers, "A wife!" while Engels, more of a bon vivant, opts for a mistress. To everyone's surprise, Lenin says, "I'd like to have both!" Why? Is there a hidden stripe of decadent jouisseur behind his austere revolutionary image? No-he explains: "So that I can tell my wife that I am going to my mistress, and my mistress that I have to be with my wife..." "And then, what do you do?" "I go to a solitary place to learn, learn, and learn!" Is this not exactly what Lenin did after the catastrophe of 1914? He withdrew to a lonely place in Switzerland, where he "learned, learned, and learned," reading Hegel's logic. And this is what we should do today when we find ourselves bombarded with mediatic images of violence. We need to "learn, learn, and learn" what causes this violence. [/INST] <h4>Perm fails—focus on particular violent acts <u>is a lure</u> that causes ideological mystification and means we only address symptoms not the root cause of violence</h4><p><strong><mark>Žižek ’8</strong></mark> (Slavoj, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Big Ideas // Small Books, 2008, p. 3-8) [m leap]</p><p>Instead of confronting violence directly, the present book casts six sideways glances. There are reasons for <u><strong><mark>looking at the problem of violence awry</u></strong></mark>. My underlying premise is that <u><strong><mark>there is something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation with it: the overpowering horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims</mark> inexorably <mark>function as a lure which prevents us from thinking</u></strong></mark>. A dispassionate conceptual development of the typology of violence must by definition ignore its traumatic impact. Yet there is a sense in which a cold analysis of violence somehow reproduces and participates in its horror. A distinction needs to be made, as well, between (factual) truth and truthfulness: what renders a report of a raped woman (or any other narrative of a trauma) truthful is its very factual unreliability, its confusion, its inconsistency. If the victim were able to report on her painful and humiliating experience in a clear manner, with all the data arranged in a consistent order, this very quality would make us suspicious of its truth. The problem here is part of the solution: the very factual deficiencies of the traumatised subject's report on her experience bear witness to the truthfulness of her report, since they signal that the reported content "contaminated" the manner of reporting it. The same holds, of course, for the so-called unreliability of the verbal reports of Holocaust survivors: the witness able to offer a clear narrative of his camp experience would disqualify himself by virtue of that clarity.2 <u><strong><mark>The only appropriate approach</mark> </u></strong>to my subject thus <u><strong><mark>seems to be one which permits</u></strong></mark> variations on <u><strong><mark>violence kept at a distance</mark> </u></strong>out of respect towards its victims. Adorno's famous saying, it seems, needs correction: it is not poetry that is impossible after Auschwitz, but rather prose.3 Realistic prose fails, where the poetic evocation of the unbearable atmosphere of a camp succeeds. That is to say, when Adorno declares poetry impossible (or, rather, barbaric) after Auschwitz, this impossibility is an enabling impossibility: poetry is always, by definition, "about" something that cannot be addressed directly, only alluded to. One shouldn't be afraid to take this a step further and refer to the old saying that music comes in when words fail. There may well be some truth in the common wisdom that, in a kind of historical premonition, the music of Schoenberg articulated the anxieties and nightmares of Auschwitz before the event took place. In her memoirs, Anna Akhmatova describes what happened to her when, at the height of the Stalinist purges, she was waiting in the long queue in front of the Leningrad prison to learn about her arrested son Lev: One day somebody in the crowd identified me. Standing behind me was a young woman, with lips blue from the cold, who had of course never heard me called by name before. Now she started out of the torpor common to us all and asked me in a whisper (everyone whispered there), "Can you describe this?" And I said, "I can." Then something like a smile passed fleetingly over what had once been her face.4 The key question, of course, is what kind of description is intended here? Surely it is not a realistic description of the situation, but what Wallace Stevens called "description without place," which is what is proper to art. This is not a description which locates its content in a historical space and time, but a description which creates, as the background of the phenomena it describes, an inexistent (virtual) space of its own, so that what appears in it is not an appearance sustained by the depth of reality behind it, but a decontextualised appearance, an appearance which fully coincides with real being. To quote Stevens again: "What it seems it is and in such seeming all things are." Such an artistic description "is not a sign for something that lies outside its form."5 Rather, it extracts from the confused reality its own inner form in the same way that Schoenberg "extracted" the inner form of totalitarian terror. He evoked the way this terror affects subjectivity. Does this recourse to artistic description imply that we are in danger of regressing to a contemplative attitude that somehow betrays the urgency to "do something" about the depicted horrors? <u><strong><mark>Let's think about the fake sense of urgency that pervades the left-liberal humanitarian discourse on violence</mark>: in it, abstraction and graphic (pseudo)concreteness coexist in the staging of the scene of violence</u></strong> – against women, blacks, the homeless, gays... "<u><strong>A woman is raped every six seconds in this country" and "<mark>In the time it takes you to read this paragraph, ten children will die of hunger" are</mark> just two <mark>examples</u></strong></mark>. Underlying all this is a hypocritical sentiment of moral outrage. Just this kind of pseudo-urgency was exploited by Starbucks a couple of years ago when, at store entrances, posters greeting customers pointed out that a portion of the chain's profits went into health-care for the children of Guatemala, the source of their coffee, the inference being that with every cup you drink, you save a child's life. <u><strong><mark>There is a fundamental anti-theoretical edge to these urgent injunctions</mark>. <mark>There is no time to reflect: we have to act now</mark>. Through this fake sense of urgency, the post-industrial rich, living in their secluded virtual world, not only do not </u></strong>deny or<u><strong> ignore the harsh reality outside their area – they actively refer to it all the time</u></strong>. As Bill Gates recently put it: "What do computers matter when millions are still unnecessarily dying of dysentery?" <u><strong><mark>Against this fake urgency, we might want</u></strong></mark> to place Marx's wonderful letter to Engels of 1870, when, for a brief moment, it seemed that a European revolution was again at the gates. Marx's letter conveys his sheer panic: can't the revolutionaries wait for a couple of years? He hasn't yet finished his Capital. <u><strong><mark>A critical analysis of the present global constellation – one which offers no clear solution, no "practical" advice on what to do, and provides no light at the end of the tunnel</mark>, since one is well aware that this light might belong to a train crashing towards us – <mark>usually meets with reproach: "Do you mean we should do nothing? Just sit and wait?" One should gather the courage to answer: "YES, precisely that!"</mark> </u></strong>There are situations when <u><strong><mark>the only truly "practical" thing to do is to resist the temptation to engage immediately and to "wait and see" by means of a patient, critical analysis</u></strong></mark>. Engagement seems to exert its pressure on us from all directions. In a well-known passage from his Existentialism and Humanism, Sartre deployed the dilemma of a young man in France in 1942, torn between the duty to help his lone, ill mother and the duty to enter the Resistance and fight the Germans; Sartre's point is, of course, that there is no a priori answer to this dilemma. The young man needs to make a decision grounded only in his own abyssal freedom and assume full responsibility for it.6 An obscene third way out of the dilemma would have been to advise the young man to tell his mother that he will join the Resistance, and to tell his Resistance friends that he will take care of his mother, while, in reality, withdrawing to a secluded place and studying... There is more than cheap cynicism in this advice. It brings to mind a well-known Soviet joke about Lenin. Under socialism, Lenin's advice to young people, his answer to what they should do, was "Learn, learn, and learn." This was evoked at all times and displayed on all school walls. The joke goes: Marx, Engels, and Lenin are asked whether they would prefer to have a wife or a mistress. As expected, Marx, rather conservative in private matters, answers, "A wife!" while Engels, more of a bon vivant, opts for a mistress. To everyone's surprise, Lenin says, "I'd like to have both!" Why? Is there a hidden stripe of decadent jouisseur behind his austere revolutionary image? No-he explains: "So that I can tell my wife that I am going to my mistress, and my mistress that I have to be with my wife..." "And then, what do you do?" "I go to a solitary place to learn, learn, and learn!" Is this not exactly what Lenin did after the catastrophe of 1914? He withdrew to a lonely place in Switzerland, where he "learned, learned, and learned," reading Hegel's logic. And <u><strong><mark>this is what we should do today when we find ourselves bombarded with</mark> mediatic <mark>images of violence. We need to "learn, learn, and learn" what causes this violence</u></strong>.</p></mark> </s>

B SUBPOINT - Their reps ensure no value to life

Security is another form of control, life blackmailed with the afterlife 'security forces' range from life assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force this is above all the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system in this symbolic the gift-exchange is the challenge to one's own life , and is carried out through death. Not because it expresses the individual's asocial rebellion but because it carries a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our social principle. they die the only death the system authorizes This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying.

Security is control life blackmailed with the afterlife this the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system the gift-exchange t expresses the individual's asocial rebellion but because it carries a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our social principle. they die the only death the system authorizes

Security is another form of social control, in the form of life blackmailed with the afterlife. It is universally present for us today, and 'security forces' range from life assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force .39 'Belt up' says an advertising slogan for seatbelts. Of course, security, like ecology, is an industrial business extending its cover up to the level of the species: a convertibility of accident, disease and pollution into capitalist surplus profit is operative everywhere. But this is above all a question of the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death, which everybody dreams of, as the darkness beneath their instinct of conservation. It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system. Again, in this symbolic short-circuit, the gift-exchange is the challenge to oneself and one's own life , and is carried out through death. Not because it expresses the individual's asocial rebellion (the defection of one or millions of individuals does not infringe the law of the system at all), but because it carries in it a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our own social repressive principle. To bury death beneath the contrary myth of security, it is necessary to exhaust the gift-exchange. Is it so that men might live that the demand for death must be exhausted? No, but in order that they die the only death the system authorizes: The livings are separated from their dead, who no longer exchange anything but the form of their afterlife, under the sign of comprehensive insurance. Thus car safety· mummified in his helmet, his seatbelt, all the paraphernalia of security , wrapped up in the security myth, the driver is nothing but a corpse, closed up in another, non-mythic, death , as neutral and objective a s technology, noiseless and expertly crafted. Riveted to his machine, glued to the spot in it, he no longer runs the risk of dying, since he is already dead. This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying.

<h4>B SUBPOINT - Their reps ensure no value to life </h4><p>Jean <strong>Baudrillard 76 <u></strong>(“Symbolic exchange and Death,” pg. 167)</p><p><mark>Security is </mark>another form of </u>social <u><mark>control</mark>,</u> in the form of <u><mark>life blackmailed with the afterlife</u></mark>. It is universally present for us today, and <u>'security forces' range from life assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force </u>.39 'Belt up' says an advertising slogan for seatbelts. Of course, security, like ecology, is an industrial business extending its cover up to the level of the species: a convertibility of accident, disease and pollution into capitalist surplus profit is operative everywhere. But <u><mark>this </mark>is above all</u> a question of <u><mark>the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death</u></mark>, which everybody dreams of, as the darkness beneath their instinct of conservation. <u><mark>It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system</u></mark>. Again, <u>in this symbolic </u>short-circuit, <u><mark>the gift-exchange </mark>is the challenge to </u>oneself and<u> one's own life , and is carried out through death. Not because i<mark>t expresses the individual's asocial rebellion </u></mark>(the defection of one or millions of individuals does not infringe the law of the system at all), <u><mark>but because it carries </u></mark>in it <u><mark>a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our </u></mark>own<u> <mark>social</mark> </u>repressive <u><mark>principle.</mark> </u>To bury death beneath the contrary myth of security, it is necessary to exhaust the gift-exchange. Is it so that men might live that the demand for death must be exhausted? No, but in order that <u><mark>they die the only death the system authorizes</u></mark>: The livings are separated from their dead, who no longer exchange anything but the form of their afterlife, under the sign of comprehensive insurance. Thus car safety· mummified in his helmet, his seatbelt, all the paraphernalia of security , wrapped up in the security myth, the driver is nothing but a corpse, closed up in another, non-mythic, death , as neutral and objective a s technology, noiseless and expertly crafted. Riveted to his machine, glued to the spot in it, he no longer runs the risk of dying, since he is already dead. <u><strong>This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying.</p></u></strong>

Jean Baudrillard 76 (“Symbolic exchange and Death,” pg. 167)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Jean Baudrillard 76 (“Symbolic exchange and Death,” pg. 167) fulltext: Security is another form of social control, in the form of life blackmailed with the afterlife. It is universally present for us today, and 'security forces' range from life assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force .39 'Belt up' says an advertising slogan for seatbelts. Of course, security, like ecology, is an industrial business extending its cover up to the level of the species: a convertibility of accident, disease and pollution into capitalist surplus profit is operative everywhere. But this is above all a question of the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death, which everybody dreams of, as the darkness beneath their instinct of conservation. It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system. Again, in this symbolic short-circuit, the gift-exchange is the challenge to oneself and one's own life , and is carried out through death. Not because it expresses the individual's asocial rebellion (the defection of one or millions of individuals does not infringe the law of the system at all), but because it carries in it a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our own social repressive principle. To bury death beneath the contrary myth of security, it is necessary to exhaust the gift-exchange. Is it so that men might live that the demand for death must be exhausted? No, but in order that they die the only death the system authorizes: The livings are separated from their dead, who no longer exchange anything but the form of their afterlife, under the sign of comprehensive insurance. Thus car safety· mummified in his helmet, his seatbelt, all the paraphernalia of security , wrapped up in the security myth, the driver is nothing but a corpse, closed up in another, non-mythic, death , as neutral and objective a s technology, noiseless and expertly crafted. Riveted to his machine, glued to the spot in it, he no longer runs the risk of dying, since he is already dead. This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying. [/INST] <h4>B SUBPOINT - Their reps ensure no value to life </h4><p>Jean <strong>Baudrillard 76 <u></strong>(“Symbolic exchange and Death,” pg. 167)</p><p><mark>Security is </mark>another form of </u>social <u><mark>control</mark>,</u> in the form of <u><mark>life blackmailed with the afterlife</u></mark>. It is universally present for us today, and <u>'security forces' range from life assurance and social security to the car seatbelt by way of the state security police force </u>.39 'Belt up' says an advertising slogan for seatbelts. Of course, security, like ecology, is an industrial business extending its cover up to the level of the species: a convertibility of accident, disease and pollution into capitalist surplus profit is operative everywhere. But <u><mark>this </mark>is above all</u> a question of <u><mark>the worst repression, which consists in dispossessing you of your own death</u></mark>, which everybody dreams of, as the darkness beneath their instinct of conservation. <u><mark>It is necessary to rob every one of the last possibility of giving themselves their own death as the last 'great escape' from a life laid down by the system</u></mark>. Again, <u>in this symbolic </u>short-circuit, <u><mark>the gift-exchange </mark>is the challenge to </u>oneself and<u> one's own life , and is carried out through death. Not because i<mark>t expresses the individual's asocial rebellion </u></mark>(the defection of one or millions of individuals does not infringe the law of the system at all), <u><mark>but because it carries </u></mark>in it <u><mark>a principle of sociality that is radically antagonistic to our </u></mark>own<u> <mark>social</mark> </u>repressive <u><mark>principle.</mark> </u>To bury death beneath the contrary myth of security, it is necessary to exhaust the gift-exchange. Is it so that men might live that the demand for death must be exhausted? No, but in order that <u><mark>they die the only death the system authorizes</u></mark>: The livings are separated from their dead, who no longer exchange anything but the form of their afterlife, under the sign of comprehensive insurance. Thus car safety· mummified in his helmet, his seatbelt, all the paraphernalia of security , wrapped up in the security myth, the driver is nothing but a corpse, closed up in another, non-mythic, death , as neutral and objective a s technology, noiseless and expertly crafted. Riveted to his machine, glued to the spot in it, he no longer runs the risk of dying, since he is already dead. <u><strong>This is the secret of security, like a steak under cellophane: to surround you with a sarcophagus in order to prevent you from dying.</p></u></strong> </s>

This form of pedagogical ascription of suffering turns the case

educational research and much of social science research has been concerned with documenting damage, or empirically substantiating the oppression and pain of Native communities, urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded or proven in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably take the form of additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this theory of change1 as both colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and because it requires disenfranchised communities to position themselves as both singularly defective and powerless to make change Eve has observed that “won” reparations rarely become reality, and that communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken. at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields. much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. many individual scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars Hartman discusses how recognizing the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slaveowning class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human new laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous with injury” while simultaneously authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. “[T]he recognition of humanity require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person” slave-as-victim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. “Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of subjugation and pained existence?”

educational and social science research has been concerned with documenting damage, or empirically substantiating the pain of disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These take the form of political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this as colonial because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and requires disenfranchised communities to position themselves as powerless to make change reparations rarely become reality, and communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken. at the center is the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s fascination with retelling pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and consumptive implacability. pain narratives are what the academy is about. No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. in such a way that it has become mine, my own. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. the forces say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak your pain” new laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous with injury” while simultaneously authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. slave-as-victim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence.

Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that educational research and much of social science research has been concerned with documenting damage, or empirically substantiating the oppression and pain of Native communities, urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded or proven in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably take the form of additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this theory of change1 as both colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and because it requires disenfranchised communities to position themselves as both singularly defective and powerless to make change (2010). Finally, Eve has observed that “won” reparations rarely become reality, and that in many cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken. Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields. We observe that much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. (p. 343) Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. Further, this passage describes the ways in which the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” (hooks, 1990, p. 343). The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars (Hartman, 1997, 2007; Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya Hartman (1997) discusses how recognizing the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slaveowning class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human (Hartman, 2007). In response, new laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous with injury” (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), while simultaneously authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” (p. 55). Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. “[T]he recognition of humanity require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person” (p. 55). Furthermore, Hartman describes how slave-as-victim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. Applying Hartman’s analysis, we note how the agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. Hartman asks, “Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of subjugation and pained existence?” (p. 55).

<h4>This form of pedagogical ascription of suffering turns the case </h4><p><strong>Tuck and Yang 14 </strong>(Eve Tuck – professor of educational studies and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, K Wayne Yang – professor of ethnic studies at UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf) </p><p>Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that <u><strong><mark>educational </mark>research <mark>and</mark> much of <mark>social science research has been concerned with documenting damage, or empirically substantiating the </mark>oppression and <mark>pain of</mark> Native communities, urban communities, and other <mark>disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded</mark> or proven <mark>in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These </mark>reparations presumably <mark>take the form of</mark> additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, <mark>political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this </mark>theory of change1 <mark>as</mark> both <mark>colonial </mark>and flawed, <mark>because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and </mark>because it <mark>requires disenfranchised communities to position themselves as</mark> both singularly defective and <mark>powerless to make change</u></strong></mark> (2010). Finally, <u><strong>Eve has observed that “won” <mark>reparations rarely become reality, and</mark> that</u></strong> in many cases, <u><strong><mark>communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken.</mark> </u></strong>Similarly, <u><strong><mark>at the center </mark>of the analysis in this chapter <mark>is </mark>a concern with <mark>the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s </mark>demonstrated <mark>fascination with </mark>telling and <mark>retelling </mark>narratives of <mark>pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and </mark>for its <mark>consumptive implacability. </mark>Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised”</u></strong> (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) <u><strong>is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields.</u></strong> We observe that <u><strong>much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice.</u></strong> At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while <u><strong>many individual scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of <mark>pain narratives </mark>and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they <mark>are </mark>indeed <mark>what the academy is about.</mark> </u></strong>In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: <u><strong><mark>No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself.</mark> No need to hear your voice. <mark>Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. </mark>Tell it back to you <mark>in such a way that it has become mine, my own. </mark>Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. <mark>I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk.</mark> </u></strong>(p. 343) Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of <u><strong>social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain.</u></strong> Further, this passage describes the ways in which <u><strong>the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins.</u></strong> <u><strong>The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet <mark>the forces </mark>that invite those on the margins to speak also <mark>say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. </mark>Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. <mark>Only speak your pain”</u></strong></mark> (hooks, 1990, p. 343). <u><strong>The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars</u></strong> (Hartman, 1997, 2007; Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya <u><strong>Hartman</u></strong> (1997) <u><strong>discusses how recognizing the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slaveowning class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human</u></strong> (Hartman, 2007). In response, <u><strong><mark>new laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous with injury”</u></strong></mark> (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), <u><strong><mark>while simultaneously authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection”</u></strong></mark> (p. 55). <u><strong><mark>Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>“[T]he recognition of humanity require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person”</u></strong> (p. 55). Furthermore, Hartman describes how <u><strong><mark>slave-as-victim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal.</u></strong></mark> Applying Hartman’s analysis, we note how the <u><strong><mark>agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence.</u></strong></mark> Hartman asks, <u><strong>“Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of subjugation and pained existence?”</u></strong> (p. 55).</p>

Tuck and Yang 14 (Eve Tuck – professor of educational studies and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, K Wayne Yang – professor of ethnic studies at UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Tuck and Yang 14 (Eve Tuck – professor of educational studies and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, K Wayne Yang – professor of ethnic studies at UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf) fulltext: Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that educational research and much of social science research has been concerned with documenting damage, or empirically substantiating the oppression and pain of Native communities, urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded or proven in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably take the form of additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this theory of change1 as both colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and because it requires disenfranchised communities to position themselves as both singularly defective and powerless to make change (2010). Finally, Eve has observed that “won” reparations rarely become reality, and that in many cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken. Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields. We observe that much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. (p. 343) Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. Further, this passage describes the ways in which the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” (hooks, 1990, p. 343). The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars (Hartman, 1997, 2007; Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya Hartman (1997) discusses how recognizing the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slaveowning class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human (Hartman, 2007). In response, new laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous with injury” (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), while simultaneously authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” (p. 55). Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. “[T]he recognition of humanity require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person” (p. 55). Furthermore, Hartman describes how slave-as-victim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. Applying Hartman’s analysis, we note how the agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. Hartman asks, “Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of subjugation and pained existence?” (p. 55). [/INST] <h4>This form of pedagogical ascription of suffering turns the case </h4><p><strong>Tuck and Yang 14 </strong>(Eve Tuck – professor of educational studies and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, K Wayne Yang – professor of ethnic studies at UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf) </p><p>Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that <u><strong><mark>educational </mark>research <mark>and</mark> much of <mark>social science research has been concerned with documenting damage, or empirically substantiating the </mark>oppression and <mark>pain of</mark> Native communities, urban communities, and other <mark>disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded</mark> or proven <mark>in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These </mark>reparations presumably <mark>take the form of</mark> additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, <mark>political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this </mark>theory of change1 <mark>as</mark> both <mark>colonial </mark>and flawed, <mark>because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and </mark>because it <mark>requires disenfranchised communities to position themselves as</mark> both singularly defective and <mark>powerless to make change</u></strong></mark> (2010). Finally, <u><strong>Eve has observed that “won” <mark>reparations rarely become reality, and</mark> that</u></strong> in many cases, <u><strong><mark>communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken.</mark> </u></strong>Similarly, <u><strong><mark>at the center </mark>of the analysis in this chapter <mark>is </mark>a concern with <mark>the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s </mark>demonstrated <mark>fascination with </mark>telling and <mark>retelling </mark>narratives of <mark>pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and </mark>for its <mark>consumptive implacability. </mark>Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised”</u></strong> (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) <u><strong>is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields.</u></strong> We observe that <u><strong>much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice.</u></strong> At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while <u><strong>many individual scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of <mark>pain narratives </mark>and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they <mark>are </mark>indeed <mark>what the academy is about.</mark> </u></strong>In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: <u><strong><mark>No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself.</mark> No need to hear your voice. <mark>Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. </mark>Tell it back to you <mark>in such a way that it has become mine, my own. </mark>Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. <mark>I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk.</mark> </u></strong>(p. 343) Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of <u><strong>social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain.</u></strong> Further, this passage describes the ways in which <u><strong>the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins.</u></strong> <u><strong>The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet <mark>the forces </mark>that invite those on the margins to speak also <mark>say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. </mark>Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. <mark>Only speak your pain”</u></strong></mark> (hooks, 1990, p. 343). <u><strong>The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars</u></strong> (Hartman, 1997, 2007; Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya <u><strong>Hartman</u></strong> (1997) <u><strong>discusses how recognizing the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slaveowning class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human</u></strong> (Hartman, 2007). In response, <u><strong><mark>new laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous with injury”</u></strong></mark> (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), <u><strong><mark>while simultaneously authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection”</u></strong></mark> (p. 55). <u><strong><mark>Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>“[T]he recognition of humanity require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person”</u></strong> (p. 55). Furthermore, Hartman describes how <u><strong><mark>slave-as-victim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal.</u></strong></mark> Applying Hartman’s analysis, we note how the <u><strong><mark>agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence.</u></strong></mark> Hartman asks, <u><strong>“Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of subjugation and pained existence?”</u></strong> (p. 55).</p> </s>

The AFF’s understanding of death as the biological end of life denies the symbolic meaning of death. They are a politics of security against death, which allows for value judgments based on bodily coding- that’s the foundation for all violence based on exclusion

Symbolic exchange suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism Regimes based on symbolic exchange are replaced by regimes based on equivalence Ceremony gives way to spectacle Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value. To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation But this is bound to fail. General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. What is fatal to it is reversibility Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’ . Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity, with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange Gift-exchange is radically subversive of the system This is because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed Death plays a central role what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death should not be seen here in purely literal terms , but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and of value which returns things to a state of indeterminacy Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, as well as physical death indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify. the west’s idea of a biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the sociality of death. the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women and so on – to particular segregated situations The original exclusion was of the dead – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies” This first split and exclusion forms the basis, or archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death. death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity This requires an idea of death as an end. It is counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. The internalisation of the idea of the subject or the soul alienates us from our bodies, It creates a split between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. It also individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others. The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death. The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. In the case of death, we still ‘exchange’ with the dead through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. We no longer have living, mortal relationships with objects either. They are reduced to the instrumental. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us Symbolic exchange is based on a game, When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existenc Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. “We all” become dead, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited. The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life. People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production In modern societies, death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society. People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it becomes unintelligible Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it. murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value. this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies there is not a social improvement here. People are effectively being killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. even when capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination

Symbolic exchange suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism. symbolic exchange are replaced by equivalence It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. this is bound to fail. The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’ Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups it did the same thing to itself first what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death Death should not be seen in purely literal terms. but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and value Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility as well as physical death indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. the west’s idea of a biological death is an idealist illusion the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women The original exclusion was of the dead This first split and exclusion forms the basis for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view is constructed on the model of the human body as a machine This requires an idea of death as an end counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. Modern systems no longer know how to die The internalisation of the idea of the subject alienates us It individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. we still ‘exchange’ with the dead We no longer have living relationships with objects They are reduced to the instrumental Symbolic exchange is based on a game When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development. “We all” become dead The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society People no longer expect their own death. it becomes unintelligible This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must only die if law allow it. People are killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for life or death serves the reproduction of domination.

Symbolic exchange – or rather, its suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism. Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. Regimes based on symbolic exchange (differences are exchangeable and related) are replaced by regimes based on equivalence (everything is, or means, the same). Ceremony gives way to spectacle, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value. To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life). But this is bound to fail. General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death. The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. What is fatal to it is, rather, reversibility. Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead. Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder. Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity, with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups. But for Baudrillard, it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. Gift-exchange is radically subversive of the system. This is not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system. According to Baudrillard, the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death Death plays a central role in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death should not be seen here in purely literal terms. Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body, but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and of value – which returns things to a state of indeterminacy. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, as well as physical death. According to Baudrillard, indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify. Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, the west’s idea of a biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the sociality of death. Poststructuralists generally maintain that the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions. For Baudrillard, the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded. After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women and so on – to particular segregated situations. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. The original exclusion was of the dead – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”. This first split and exclusion forms the basis, or archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death. Baudrillard suggests that death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity. The subject needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. This requires an idea of death as an end. It is counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. The internalisation of the idea of the subject or the soul alienates us from our bodies, voices and so on. It creates a split, as Stirner would say, between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. It also individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others. The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death. The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. In the case of death, we still ‘exchange’ with the dead through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. We no longer have living, mortal relationships with objects either. They are reduced to the instrumental. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us. Symbolic exchange is based on a game, with game-like rules. When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existence. Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development. In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is illusory. For Baudrillard, any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. “We all” become dead, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited. The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life. People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. For Baudrillard, capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production, and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. In modern societies, death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society. For example, elderly people are excluded from society. People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it becomes unintelligible. It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed through ritual. Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it. Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value. Baudrillard sees this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies. For Baudrillard, there is not a social improvement here. People are effectively being killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. On the other hand, even when capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated. The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination.

<h4><u><strong>The AFF’s understanding of death as the biological end of life denies the symbolic meaning of death. They are a politics of security against death, which allows for value judgments based on bodily coding- that’s the foundation for all violence based on exclusion </h4><p></u>Robinson 12</strong> (Andrew, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, “Jean Baudrillard: The Rise of Capitalism & the Exclusion of Death”, March 30, http:((ceasefiremagazine.co.uk(in-theory-baudrillard-2)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Symbolic exchange</mark> </u></strong>– or rather, its <u><strong><mark>suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism</u></strong>.</mark> Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. <u><strong>Regimes based on <mark>symbolic exchange</u></strong></mark> (differences are exchangeable and related) <u><strong><mark>are replaced by</mark> regimes based on <mark>equivalence</u></strong></mark> (everything is, or means, the same). <u><strong>Ceremony gives way to spectacle</u></strong>, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. <u><strong>Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. <mark>It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same.</mark> Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value.</u></strong> <u><strong>To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value.</u></strong> This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death.</mark> Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation</u></strong>. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life). <u><strong>But <mark>this is bound to fail.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death.</mark> Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly</u></strong>. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. <u><strong><mark>Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living</u></strong></mark>. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. <u><strong>And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity</u></strong> – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes <u><strong>desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic.</u></strong> Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. <u><strong>What is fatal to it is</u></strong>, rather, <u><strong>reversibility</u></strong>. <u><strong>Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed</u></strong>. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. <u><strong>The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’</u></strong></mark>, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder<u><strong>. <mark>Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with</mark> monstrosity, with <mark>radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups</u></strong></mark>. But for Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>it did the same thing to itself first</mark> – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange</u></strong>. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. <u><strong>Gift-exchange is radically subversive of the system</u></strong>. <u><strong>This is</u></strong> not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is <u><strong>because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system</u></strong>. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong>the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at</u></strong> <u><strong>bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed</u></strong>, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death <u><strong>Death plays a central role</u></strong> in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death</mark>. <mark>Death should not be seen</mark> here <mark>in purely literal terms</u>.</strong></mark> Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body<u><strong>, <mark>but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and</mark> of <mark>value</u></strong></mark> – <u><strong>which returns things to a state of indeterminacy</u></strong>. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. <u><strong><mark>Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility</mark>, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, <mark>as well as physical death</u></strong></mark>. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological</mark>. They see it as <mark>an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb.</mark> And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify.</u></strong> Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>the west’s idea of a biological</mark>, material <mark>death is</mark> actually <mark>an idealist illusion</mark>, ignoring the sociality of death.</u></strong> Poststructuralists generally maintain that <u><strong><mark>the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions</u></strong></mark>. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women </mark>and so on – to particular segregated situations</u></strong>. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. <u><strong><mark>The original exclusion was of the dead</mark> – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This first split and exclusion forms the basis</mark>, or archetype, <mark>for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death</mark>. </u></strong>Baudrillard suggests that <u><strong><mark>death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead.</u></strong> <u><strong>The modern view</mark> of death <mark>is constructed on the model of the</mark> machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The <mark>human body</mark> is treated <mark>as a machine</u></strong></mark> which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. <u><strong>The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity</u></strong>. The subject needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. <u><strong><mark>This requires an idea of death as an end</mark>. It is <mark>counterposed to the immortality of social institutions.</u></strong></mark> In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. <u><strong><mark>Modern systems</mark>, especially bureaucracies, <mark>no longer know how to die</mark> – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. <mark>The internalisation of the idea of the subject</mark> or the soul <mark>alienates us</mark> from our bodies,</u></strong> voices and so on. <u><strong>It creates a split</u></strong>, as Stirner would say, <u><strong>between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. <mark>It</mark> also <mark>individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others</mark>.</u></strong> The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. <u><strong>The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In the case of death, <mark>we still ‘exchange’ with the dead</mark> through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. <mark>We no longer have living</mark>, mortal <mark>relationships with objects </mark>either. <mark>They are reduced to the instrumental</mark>. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Symbolic exchange is based on a game</mark>,</u></strong> with game-like rules. <u><strong><mark>When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place.</mark> It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existenc</u></strong>e. <u><strong>Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, <mark>westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies</mark> and revolutionary aspirations; <mark>the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development</u></strong>.</mark> In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is illusory. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. <mark>“We all” become dead</mark>, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. <mark>The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power.</mark> <mark>Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited</mark>. <mark>The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life</mark>. <mark>People are compelled to survive so as to become useful.</u></strong></mark> For Baudrillard, <u><strong>capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production</u></strong>, and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. <u><strong>In modern societies, <mark>death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society</mark>.</u></strong> For example, elderly people are excluded from society. <u><strong><mark>People no longer expect their own death.</mark> As a result, <mark>it becomes unintelligible</u></strong></mark>. It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed through ritual. <u><strong>Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. <mark>This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must </mark>not die – at least not in any old way. We may <mark>only die if law </mark>and medicine <mark>allow it.</u></strong></mark> Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, <u><strong>murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value.</u></strong> Baudrillard sees <u><strong>this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies</u></strong>. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>there is not a social improvement here. <mark>People are </mark>effectively being<mark> killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value.</u></strong></mark> On the other hand, <u><strong>even when <mark>capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant</mark>, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette</u></strong>. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated. <u><strong><mark>The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for</mark> as long as ‘his’ <mark>life or death serves the reproduction of domination</u></strong>.</p></mark>

Robinson 12 (Andrew, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, “Jean Baudrillard: The Rise of Capitalism & the Exclusion of Death”, March 30, http:((ceasefiremagazine.co.uk(in-theory-baudrillard-2)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Robinson 12 (Andrew, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, “Jean Baudrillard: The Rise of Capitalism & the Exclusion of Death”, March 30, http:((ceasefiremagazine.co.uk(in-theory-baudrillard-2) fulltext: Symbolic exchange – or rather, its suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism. Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. Regimes based on symbolic exchange (differences are exchangeable and related) are replaced by regimes based on equivalence (everything is, or means, the same). Ceremony gives way to spectacle, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value. To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life). But this is bound to fail. General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death. The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. What is fatal to it is, rather, reversibility. Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead. Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder. Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity, with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups. But for Baudrillard, it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. Gift-exchange is radically subversive of the system. This is not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system. According to Baudrillard, the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death Death plays a central role in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death should not be seen here in purely literal terms. Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body, but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and of value – which returns things to a state of indeterminacy. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, as well as physical death. According to Baudrillard, indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify. Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, the west’s idea of a biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the sociality of death. Poststructuralists generally maintain that the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions. For Baudrillard, the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded. After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women and so on – to particular segregated situations. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. The original exclusion was of the dead – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”. This first split and exclusion forms the basis, or archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death. Baudrillard suggests that death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity. The subject needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. This requires an idea of death as an end. It is counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. The internalisation of the idea of the subject or the soul alienates us from our bodies, voices and so on. It creates a split, as Stirner would say, between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. It also individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others. The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death. The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. In the case of death, we still ‘exchange’ with the dead through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. We no longer have living, mortal relationships with objects either. They are reduced to the instrumental. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us. Symbolic exchange is based on a game, with game-like rules. When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existence. Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development. In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is illusory. For Baudrillard, any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. “We all” become dead, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited. The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life. People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. For Baudrillard, capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production, and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. In modern societies, death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society. For example, elderly people are excluded from society. People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it becomes unintelligible. It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed through ritual. Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it. Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value. Baudrillard sees this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies. For Baudrillard, there is not a social improvement here. People are effectively being killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. On the other hand, even when capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated. The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination. [/INST] <h4><u><strong>The AFF’s understanding of death as the biological end of life denies the symbolic meaning of death. They are a politics of security against death, which allows for value judgments based on bodily coding- that’s the foundation for all violence based on exclusion </h4><p></u>Robinson 12</strong> (Andrew, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, “Jean Baudrillard: The Rise of Capitalism & the Exclusion of Death”, March 30, http:((ceasefiremagazine.co.uk(in-theory-baudrillard-2)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Symbolic exchange</mark> </u></strong>– or rather, its <u><strong><mark>suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism</u></strong>.</mark> Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. <u><strong>Regimes based on <mark>symbolic exchange</u></strong></mark> (differences are exchangeable and related) <u><strong><mark>are replaced by</mark> regimes based on <mark>equivalence</u></strong></mark> (everything is, or means, the same). <u><strong>Ceremony gives way to spectacle</u></strong>, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. <u><strong>Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. <mark>It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same.</mark> Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value.</u></strong> <u><strong>To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value.</u></strong> This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death.</mark> Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation</u></strong>. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life). <u><strong>But <mark>this is bound to fail.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death.</mark> Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly</u></strong>. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. <u><strong><mark>Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living</u></strong></mark>. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. <u><strong>And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity</u></strong> – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes <u><strong>desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic.</u></strong> Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. <u><strong>What is fatal to it is</u></strong>, rather, <u><strong>reversibility</u></strong>. <u><strong>Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed</u></strong>. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. <u><strong>The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’</u></strong></mark>, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder<u><strong>. <mark>Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with</mark> monstrosity, with <mark>radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups</u></strong></mark>. But for Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>it did the same thing to itself first</mark> – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange</u></strong>. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. <u><strong>Gift-exchange is radically subversive of the system</u></strong>. <u><strong>This is</u></strong> not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is <u><strong>because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system</u></strong>. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong>the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at</u></strong> <u><strong>bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed</u></strong>, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death <u><strong>Death plays a central role</u></strong> in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death</mark>. <mark>Death should not be seen</mark> here <mark>in purely literal terms</u>.</strong></mark> Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body<u><strong>, <mark>but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and</mark> of <mark>value</u></strong></mark> – <u><strong>which returns things to a state of indeterminacy</u></strong>. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. <u><strong><mark>Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility</mark>, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, <mark>as well as physical death</u></strong></mark>. According to Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological</mark>. They see it as <mark>an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb.</mark> And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify.</u></strong> Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>the west’s idea of a biological</mark>, material <mark>death is</mark> actually <mark>an idealist illusion</mark>, ignoring the sociality of death.</u></strong> Poststructuralists generally maintain that <u><strong><mark>the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions</u></strong></mark>. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women </mark>and so on – to particular segregated situations</u></strong>. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. <u><strong><mark>The original exclusion was of the dead</mark> – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This first split and exclusion forms the basis</mark>, or archetype, <mark>for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death</mark>. </u></strong>Baudrillard suggests that <u><strong><mark>death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead.</u></strong> <u><strong>The modern view</mark> of death <mark>is constructed on the model of the</mark> machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The <mark>human body</mark> is treated <mark>as a machine</u></strong></mark> which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. <u><strong>The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity</u></strong>. The subject needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. <u><strong><mark>This requires an idea of death as an end</mark>. It is <mark>counterposed to the immortality of social institutions.</u></strong></mark> In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. <u><strong><mark>Modern systems</mark>, especially bureaucracies, <mark>no longer know how to die</mark> – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. <mark>The internalisation of the idea of the subject</mark> or the soul <mark>alienates us</mark> from our bodies,</u></strong> voices and so on. <u><strong>It creates a split</u></strong>, as Stirner would say, <u><strong>between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. <mark>It</mark> also <mark>individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others</mark>.</u></strong> The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. <u><strong>The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>In the case of death, <mark>we still ‘exchange’ with the dead</mark> through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. <mark>We no longer have living</mark>, mortal <mark>relationships with objects </mark>either. <mark>They are reduced to the instrumental</mark>. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Symbolic exchange is based on a game</mark>,</u></strong> with game-like rules. <u><strong><mark>When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place.</mark> It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existenc</u></strong>e. <u><strong>Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, <mark>westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies</mark> and revolutionary aspirations; <mark>the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development</u></strong>.</mark> In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is illusory. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. <mark>“We all” become dead</mark>, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. <mark>The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power.</mark> <mark>Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited</mark>. <mark>The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life</mark>. <mark>People are compelled to survive so as to become useful.</u></strong></mark> For Baudrillard, <u><strong>capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production</u></strong>, and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. <u><strong>In modern societies, <mark>death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society</mark>.</u></strong> For example, elderly people are excluded from society. <u><strong><mark>People no longer expect their own death.</mark> As a result, <mark>it becomes unintelligible</u></strong></mark>. It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed through ritual. <u><strong>Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. <mark>This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must </mark>not die – at least not in any old way. We may <mark>only die if law </mark>and medicine <mark>allow it.</u></strong></mark> Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, <u><strong>murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value.</u></strong> Baudrillard sees <u><strong>this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies</u></strong>. For Baudrillard, <u><strong>there is not a social improvement here. <mark>People are </mark>effectively being<mark> killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value.</u></strong></mark> On the other hand, <u><strong>even when <mark>capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant</mark>, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette</u></strong>. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated. <u><strong><mark>The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for</mark> as long as ‘his’ <mark>life or death serves the reproduction of domination</u></strong>.</p></mark> </s>

Resource conflict and warming cause extinction

The release of carbon is changing our climate at a rapid rate that it threatens our survival and presence on earth. The implications of climate change are the single most significant threat to life on earth we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. the science is sound We know of the national and global security risks that are a result of global warming It has led to an increase in natural disasters climate change is affecting human displacement people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms Climate change affects all natural systems it affects water and weather patterns It contributes to desertification, deforestation and acidification of the oceans sea levels rise but river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating As glaciers melt, there is an albedo effect which is a double whammy of less temperature because of less ice This means there is less reflection of the sun’s light The planet already adapted to climate change at a pace that it can be managed human intervention has accelerated the pace dramatically increased temperature coupled with severe weather and changes in water distribution will create uneven threats to our agricultural systems foster and the spread of diseases Rising sea levels will threaten half the planet the impact is not only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries but also would lead to conflict and thus impact national security Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of resources climate change will force countries to act for national survival the Pentagon An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario painted a picture of turmoil because global warming accelerated the CNA convened a board of 11 generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change The team found climate change was a serious threat to national security Europe would experience fracturing because of border migration Africa would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the U S The Middle East would experience a “loss of food and water security will increase pressure to emigrate across borders Asia would suffer from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease. In 2014 CNA convened a Military Advisory Board to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change The report concludes climate change is no longer a future threat but occurring right now appeal to the entire government build resilience to form agreements to stabilize climate change and integrate climate change across strategy and planning Actions by the U S have been insufficient Strengthening resilience is critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only improvements in resilience are accompanied by agreements on ways to stabilize climate change the Pentagon’s report describes a coming climate Armageddon A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons countries rendered uninhabitable borders patrolled by armies firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home Demands for access to water and farmland backed up with nuclear weapons The analysis highlighted not only the physical manifestations but also the impacts that threaten to unravel decades of economic development which will foster conflict Climate change is global

changing climate threatens survival on earth. warming has led to an increase in natural disasters desertification deforestation and acidification human intervention has accelerated the pace dramatically threats to our agricultural systems foster the spread of diseases Rising sea levels will threaten half the planet the impact would lead to conflict Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of resources climate change was a serious threat to national security Europe Africa The Middle East Asia would suffer climate change is occurring right now build resilience integrate climate change across strategy and planning A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons countries rendered uninhabitable borders patrolled by armies backed up with nuclear weapons

Our planet is 4.5 billion years old. If that whole time was to be reflected on a single one-year calendar then the dinosaurs died off sometime late in the afternoon of December 27th and modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago, or at around lunchtime on December 28th. Therefore, human life on earth is very recent. Sometime on December 28th humans made the first fires – wood fires – neutral in the carbon balance. Now reflect on those most recent 200,000 years again on a single one-year calendar and you might be surprised to learn that the industrial revolution began only a few hours ago during the middle of the afternoon on December 31st, 250 years ago, coinciding with the discovery of underground carbon fuels. Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. The release of this carbon – however – is changing our climate at such a rapid rate that it threatens our survival and presence on earth. It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short time. The implications of climate change are the single most significant threat to life on earth and, put simply, we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; the science is sound. We know of the complex set of interrelated national and global security risks that are a result of global warming and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late. Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. It has already led to an increase in natural disasters including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that climate change is already affecting human displacement; reportedly 36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters. Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms. Climate change affects all natural systems. It impacts temperature and consequently it affects water and weather patterns. It contributes to desertification, deforestation and acidification of the oceans. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, sea levels rise but perennial river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating. As glaciers and polar ice caps melt, there is an albedo effect, which is a double whammy of less temperature regulation because of less surface area of ice present. This means that less absorption occurs and also there is less reflection of the sun’s light. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far. The planet has already adapted itself to dramatic climate change including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and at a pace that it can be managed. It is human intervention that has accelerated the pace dramatically: An increased surface temperature, coupled with more severe weather and changes in water distribution will create uneven threats to our agricultural systems and will foster and support the spread of insect borne diseases like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. Rising sea levels will increasingly threaten our coastal population and infrastructure centers and with more than 3.5 billion people – half the planet – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations. Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus the impact is not only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries as mentioned, but also would lead to conflict and thus impact national security. Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of those available resources. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because climate change will force countries to act for national survival; the so-called Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by the Pentagon titled: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It painted a picture of a world in turmoil because global warming had accelerated. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006 the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) – Institute of Public Research – convened a board of 11 senior retired generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. The team found that climate change was a serious threat to national security and that it was: “most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism.” The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. Europe would experience some fracturing because of border migration. Africa would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the United States. The Middle East would experience a “loss of food and water security (which) will increase pressure to emigrate across borders.” Asia would suffer from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease.” In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. In May 2014, CNA again convened a Military Advisory Board but this time to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change. The report concludes that climate change is no longer a future threat but occurring right now and the authors appeal to the security community, the entire government and the American people to not only build resilience against projected climate change impacts but to form agreements to stabilize climate change and also to integrate climate change across all strategy and planning. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because “time and tide wait for no man.” The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that: Actions by the United States and the international community have been insufficient to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. Strengthening resilience to climate impacts already locked into the system is critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only if improvements in resilience are accompanied by actionable agreements on ways to stabilize climate change. The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of the Pentagon’s alleged report describes a coming climate Armageddon which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described: A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons. Whole countries rendered uninhabitable. The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The borders of the U.S. and Australia patrolled by armies firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. Demands for access to water and farmland backed up with nuclear weapons. The CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar analysis by the World Bank which highlighted not only the physical manifestations of climate change, but also the significant human impacts that threaten to unravel decades of economic development, which will ultimately foster conflict. Climate change is the quintessential “Tragedy of the Commons,” where the cumulative impact of many individual actions (carbon emission in this case) is not seen as linked to the marginal gains available to each individual action and not seen as cause and effect. It is simultaneously huge, yet amorphous and nearly invisible from day to day. It is occurring very fast in geologic time terms, but in human time it is (was) slow and incremental. Among environmental problems, it is uniquely global. With our planet and culture figuratively and literally honeycombed with a reliance on fossil fuels, we face systemic challenges in changing the reliance across multiple layers of consumption, investment patterns, and political decisions; it will be hard to fix!

<h4>Resource conflict and warming cause extinction </h4><p><strong>Sharp and Kennedy, 14</strong> – is an associate professor on the faculty of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA). A former British Army Colonel he retired in 2006 and emigrated to the U.S. Since joining NESA in 2010, he has focused on Yemen and Lebanon, and also supported NESA events into Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and Qatar. He is the faculty lead for NESA’s work supporting theUAE National Defense College through an ongoing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. He also directs the Network of Defense and Staff Colleges (NDSC) which aims to provide best practice support to regional professional military and security sector education development and reform. Prior to joining NESA, he served for 4 years as an assistant professor at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at National Defense University where he wrote and taught a Masters' Degree syllabus for a program concentration in Conflict Management of Stability Operations and also taught strategy, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and also created an International Homeland Defense Fellowship program. At CISA he also designed, wrote and taught courses supporting the State Department's Civilian Response Corps utilizing conflict management approaches. Bob served 25 years in the British Army and was personally decorated by Her Majesty the Queen twice. Aftergraduating from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst in 1981, he served in command and staff roles on operations in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Gulf War 1, Afghanistan, and Cyprus. He has worked in policy and technical staff appointments in the UK Ministry of Defense and also UK Defense Intelligence plus several multi-national organizations including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In his later career, he specialized in intelligence. He is a 2004 distinguished graduate of the National War College and holds a masters degree in National Security Strategy from National Defense University, Washington, D.C. AND is a renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA on carbon policy and markets (Robert and Edward, 8-22, “Climate Change and Implications for National Security” http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/08/22/climate-change-implications-national-security/)djm</p><p>Our planet is 4.5 billion years old. If that whole time was to be reflected on a single one-year calendar then the dinosaurs died off sometime late in the afternoon of December 27th and modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago, or at around lunchtime on December 28th. Therefore, human life on earth is very recent. Sometime on December 28th humans made the first fires – wood fires – neutral in the carbon balance. Now reflect on those most recent 200,000 years again on a single one-year calendar and you might be surprised to learn that the industrial revolution began only a few hours ago during the middle of the afternoon on December 31st, 250 years ago, coinciding with the discovery of underground carbon fuels. Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. <u>The release of</u> this <u>carbon</u> – however – <u>is <mark>changing </mark>our <mark>climate</mark> at</u> such <u>a rapid rate that</u> <u><strong>it <mark>threatens</mark> our <mark>survival </mark>and presence <mark>on earth.</mark> </u></strong>It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short time. <u>The implications of climate change are</u> <u><strong>the single most significant threat to life on earth</u></strong> and, put simply, <u>we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. </u>This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; <u>the science is sound</u>. <u>We know of the</u> complex set of interrelated <u>national and global security risks that are a</u> <u><strong>result of global <mark>warming</u></strong></mark> and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late. Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. <u>It <mark>has</u></mark> already <u><mark>led to an increase in <strong>natural disasters</u></strong></mark> including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that <u>climate change is</u> already <u>affecting human displacement</u>; reportedly 36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters. Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of <u>people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms</u>. <u>Climate change affects</u> <u><strong>all natural systems</u></strong>. It impacts temperature and consequently <u>it affects water and <strong>weather patterns</u></strong>. <u>It contributes to <strong><mark>desertification</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>deforestation</strong></mark> <mark>and</mark> <strong><mark>acidification</mark> of</strong> the <strong>oceans</u></strong>. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, <u>sea levels rise but</u> perennial <u>river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating</u>. <u>As glaciers</u> and polar ice caps <u>melt, there is an albedo effect</u>, <u>which is a <strong>double whammy of less temperature</u></strong> regulation <u>because of less</u> surface area of <u>ice</u> present. <u>This</u> <u>means</u> that less absorption occurs and also <u>there is less reflection of the sun’s light</u>. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far. <u>The planet</u> has <u>already adapted</u> itself <u>to</u> dramatic <u>climate change</u> including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and <u>at a pace that it can be managed</u>. It is <u><strong><mark>human intervention</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>has accelerated the pace dramatically</u></strong></mark>: An <u>increased</u> surface <u>temperature</u>, <u>coupled with</u> more <u>severe weather and changes in</u> <u>water distribution will create uneven <strong><mark>threats</strong> to our</u> <u><strong>agricultural systems</u></strong></mark> and will <u><mark>foster</mark> and</u> support <u><mark>the spread of</u></mark> insect borne <u><strong><mark>diseases</u></strong></mark> like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. <u><strong><mark>Rising sea levels will</u></strong></mark> increasingly <u><strong><mark>threaten</u></strong></mark> our coastal population and infrastructure centers and with more than 3.5 billion people – <u><strong><mark>half the planet</u></strong></mark> – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations. Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus <u><strong><mark>the impact</mark> is</strong> not</u> <u>only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries</u> as mentioned, <u>but also <mark>would</u> <u><strong>lead to conflict </mark>and thus impact national security</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of</u></strong></mark> those available <u><strong><mark>resources</u></strong></mark>. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because <u>climate change will force countries to act for national survival</u>; the so-called Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by <u>the Pentagon</u> titled: <u>An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario</u> and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It <u>painted a picture of</u> a world in <u>turmoil because global warming</u> had <u>accelerated</u>. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006 <u>the</u> Center for Naval Analyses (<u>CNA</u>) – Institute of Public Research – <u>convened a board of 11</u> senior retired <u>generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change</u>. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. <u>The team found</u> that <u><mark>climate change</u> <u><strong>was a serious threat to national security</u></strong></mark> and that it was: “most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism.” The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. <u><strong><mark>Europe</strong></mark> would experience</u> some <u>fracturing because of border migration</u>. <u><strong><mark>Africa</u></strong></mark> <u>would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u><strong><mark>The Middle East</u></strong></mark> <u>would experience a “loss of food and water security</u> (which) <u>will increase pressure to emigrate across borders</u>.” <u><strong><mark>Asia</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>would suffer</mark> from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease.</u>” In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. <u>In</u> May <u>2014</u>, <u>CNA</u> again <u>convened a Military Advisory Board</u> but this time <u>to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change</u>. <u>The report</u> <u><strong>concludes</u></strong> that <u><mark>climate change is </mark>no longer a future threat</u> <u><strong>but <mark>occurring right now</u></strong></mark> and the authors <u>appeal to</u> the security community, <u>the entire government</u> and the American people to not only <u><strong><mark>build resilience</u></strong></mark> against projected climate change impacts but <u>to form agreements to stabilize climate change</u> <u>and</u> also to <u><strong><mark>integrate climate change across</u></strong></mark> all <u><strong><mark>strategy and planning</u></strong></mark>. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because “time and tide wait for no man.” The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that: <u>Actions by the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates and the international community <u>have been insufficient</u> to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. <u>Strengthening resilience</u> to climate impacts already locked into the system <u>is critical, but this will reduce <strong>long-term risk only</u></strong> if <u>improvements in resilience</u> <u>are accompanied by</u> actionable <u>agreements on ways to stabilize climate change</u>. The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of <u>the Pentagon’s </u>alleged <u>report</u> <u>describes a coming <strong>climate Armageddon</u></strong> which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described: <u><strong><mark>A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons</u></strong></mark>. Whole <u><strong><mark>countries rendered uninhabitable</u></strong></mark>. The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The <u><mark>borders</u></mark> of the U.S. and Australia <u><mark>patrolled by armies</mark> firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home</u>. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. <u>Demands for access to water and farmland <mark>backed up with <strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>. <u>The</u> CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar <u>analysis</u> by the World Bank which <u>highlighted not only the physical manifestations</u> of climate change, <u>but also the</u> significant human <u>impacts that threaten to unravel</u> <u><strong>decades of economic development</u></strong>, <u><strong>which will</u></strong> ultimately <u><strong>foster conflict</u></strong>. <u>Climate change is </u>the quintessential “Tragedy of the Commons,” where the cumulative impact of many individual actions (carbon emission in this case) is not seen as linked to the marginal gains available to each individual action and not seen as cause and effect. It is simultaneously huge, yet amorphous and nearly invisible from day to day. It is occurring very fast in geologic time terms, but in human time it is (was) slow and incremental. Among environmental problems, it is uniquely <u>global</u>. With our planet and culture figuratively and literally honeycombed with a reliance on fossil fuels, we face systemic challenges in changing the reliance across multiple layers of consumption, investment patterns, and political decisions; it will be hard to fix!</p>

Sharp and Kennedy, 14 – is an associate professor on the faculty of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA). A former British Army Colonel he retired in 2006 and emigrated to the U.S. Since joining NESA in 2010, he has focused on Yemen and Lebanon, and also supported NESA events into Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and Qatar. He is the faculty lead for NESA’s work supporting theUAE National Defense College through an ongoing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. He also directs the Network of Defense and Staff Colleges (NDSC) which aims to provide best practice support to regional professional military and security sector education development and reform. Prior to joining NESA, he served for 4 years as an assistant professor at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at National Defense University where he wrote and taught a Masters' Degree syllabus for a program concentration in Conflict Management of Stability Operations and also taught strategy, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and also created an International Homeland Defense Fellowship program. At CISA he also designed, wrote and taught courses supporting the State Department's Civilian Response Corps utilizing conflict management approaches. Bob served 25 years in the British Army and was personally decorated by Her Majesty the Queen twice. Aftergraduating from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst in 1981, he served in command and staff roles on operations in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Gulf War 1, Afghanistan, and Cyprus. He has worked in policy and technical staff appointments in the UK Ministry of Defense and also UK Defense Intelligence plus several multi-national organizations including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In his later career, he specialized in intelligence. He is a 2004 distinguished graduate of the National War College and holds a masters degree in National Security Strategy from National Defense University, Washington, D.C. AND is a renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA on carbon policy and markets (Robert and Edward, 8-22, “Climate Change and Implications for National Security” http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/08/22/climate-change-implications-national-security/)djm

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Sharp and Kennedy, 14 – is an associate professor on the faculty of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA). A former British Army Colonel he retired in 2006 and emigrated to the U.S. Since joining NESA in 2010, he has focused on Yemen and Lebanon, and also supported NESA events into Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and Qatar. He is the faculty lead for NESA’s work supporting theUAE National Defense College through an ongoing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. He also directs the Network of Defense and Staff Colleges (NDSC) which aims to provide best practice support to regional professional military and security sector education development and reform. Prior to joining NESA, he served for 4 years as an assistant professor at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at National Defense University where he wrote and taught a Masters' Degree syllabus for a program concentration in Conflict Management of Stability Operations and also taught strategy, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and also created an International Homeland Defense Fellowship program. At CISA he also designed, wrote and taught courses supporting the State Department's Civilian Response Corps utilizing conflict management approaches. Bob served 25 years in the British Army and was personally decorated by Her Majesty the Queen twice. Aftergraduating from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst in 1981, he served in command and staff roles on operations in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Gulf War 1, Afghanistan, and Cyprus. He has worked in policy and technical staff appointments in the UK Ministry of Defense and also UK Defense Intelligence plus several multi-national organizations including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In his later career, he specialized in intelligence. He is a 2004 distinguished graduate of the National War College and holds a masters degree in National Security Strategy from National Defense University, Washington, D.C. AND is a renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA on carbon policy and markets (Robert and Edward, 8-22, “Climate Change and Implications for National Security” http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/08/22/climate-change-implications-national-security/)djm fulltext: Our planet is 4.5 billion years old. If that whole time was to be reflected on a single one-year calendar then the dinosaurs died off sometime late in the afternoon of December 27th and modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago, or at around lunchtime on December 28th. Therefore, human life on earth is very recent. Sometime on December 28th humans made the first fires – wood fires – neutral in the carbon balance. Now reflect on those most recent 200,000 years again on a single one-year calendar and you might be surprised to learn that the industrial revolution began only a few hours ago during the middle of the afternoon on December 31st, 250 years ago, coinciding with the discovery of underground carbon fuels. Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. The release of this carbon – however – is changing our climate at such a rapid rate that it threatens our survival and presence on earth. It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short time. The implications of climate change are the single most significant threat to life on earth and, put simply, we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; the science is sound. We know of the complex set of interrelated national and global security risks that are a result of global warming and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late. Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. It has already led to an increase in natural disasters including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that climate change is already affecting human displacement; reportedly 36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters. Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms. Climate change affects all natural systems. It impacts temperature and consequently it affects water and weather patterns. It contributes to desertification, deforestation and acidification of the oceans. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, sea levels rise but perennial river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating. As glaciers and polar ice caps melt, there is an albedo effect, which is a double whammy of less temperature regulation because of less surface area of ice present. This means that less absorption occurs and also there is less reflection of the sun’s light. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far. The planet has already adapted itself to dramatic climate change including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and at a pace that it can be managed. It is human intervention that has accelerated the pace dramatically: An increased surface temperature, coupled with more severe weather and changes in water distribution will create uneven threats to our agricultural systems and will foster and support the spread of insect borne diseases like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. Rising sea levels will increasingly threaten our coastal population and infrastructure centers and with more than 3.5 billion people – half the planet – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations. Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus the impact is not only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries as mentioned, but also would lead to conflict and thus impact national security. Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of those available resources. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because climate change will force countries to act for national survival; the so-called Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by the Pentagon titled: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It painted a picture of a world in turmoil because global warming had accelerated. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006 the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) – Institute of Public Research – convened a board of 11 senior retired generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. The team found that climate change was a serious threat to national security and that it was: “most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism.” The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. Europe would experience some fracturing because of border migration. Africa would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the United States. The Middle East would experience a “loss of food and water security (which) will increase pressure to emigrate across borders.” Asia would suffer from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease.” In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. In May 2014, CNA again convened a Military Advisory Board but this time to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change. The report concludes that climate change is no longer a future threat but occurring right now and the authors appeal to the security community, the entire government and the American people to not only build resilience against projected climate change impacts but to form agreements to stabilize climate change and also to integrate climate change across all strategy and planning. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because “time and tide wait for no man.” The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that: Actions by the United States and the international community have been insufficient to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. Strengthening resilience to climate impacts already locked into the system is critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only if improvements in resilience are accompanied by actionable agreements on ways to stabilize climate change. The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of the Pentagon’s alleged report describes a coming climate Armageddon which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described: A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons. Whole countries rendered uninhabitable. The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The borders of the U.S. and Australia patrolled by armies firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. Demands for access to water and farmland backed up with nuclear weapons. The CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar analysis by the World Bank which highlighted not only the physical manifestations of climate change, but also the significant human impacts that threaten to unravel decades of economic development, which will ultimately foster conflict. Climate change is the quintessential “Tragedy of the Commons,” where the cumulative impact of many individual actions (carbon emission in this case) is not seen as linked to the marginal gains available to each individual action and not seen as cause and effect. It is simultaneously huge, yet amorphous and nearly invisible from day to day. It is occurring very fast in geologic time terms, but in human time it is (was) slow and incremental. Among environmental problems, it is uniquely global. With our planet and culture figuratively and literally honeycombed with a reliance on fossil fuels, we face systemic challenges in changing the reliance across multiple layers of consumption, investment patterns, and political decisions; it will be hard to fix! [/INST] <h4>Resource conflict and warming cause extinction </h4><p><strong>Sharp and Kennedy, 14</strong> – is an associate professor on the faculty of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA). A former British Army Colonel he retired in 2006 and emigrated to the U.S. Since joining NESA in 2010, he has focused on Yemen and Lebanon, and also supported NESA events into Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and Qatar. He is the faculty lead for NESA’s work supporting theUAE National Defense College through an ongoing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. He also directs the Network of Defense and Staff Colleges (NDSC) which aims to provide best practice support to regional professional military and security sector education development and reform. Prior to joining NESA, he served for 4 years as an assistant professor at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at National Defense University where he wrote and taught a Masters' Degree syllabus for a program concentration in Conflict Management of Stability Operations and also taught strategy, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and also created an International Homeland Defense Fellowship program. At CISA he also designed, wrote and taught courses supporting the State Department's Civilian Response Corps utilizing conflict management approaches. Bob served 25 years in the British Army and was personally decorated by Her Majesty the Queen twice. Aftergraduating from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst in 1981, he served in command and staff roles on operations in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Gulf War 1, Afghanistan, and Cyprus. He has worked in policy and technical staff appointments in the UK Ministry of Defense and also UK Defense Intelligence plus several multi-national organizations including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In his later career, he specialized in intelligence. He is a 2004 distinguished graduate of the National War College and holds a masters degree in National Security Strategy from National Defense University, Washington, D.C. AND is a renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA on carbon policy and markets (Robert and Edward, 8-22, “Climate Change and Implications for National Security” http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/08/22/climate-change-implications-national-security/)djm</p><p>Our planet is 4.5 billion years old. If that whole time was to be reflected on a single one-year calendar then the dinosaurs died off sometime late in the afternoon of December 27th and modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago, or at around lunchtime on December 28th. Therefore, human life on earth is very recent. Sometime on December 28th humans made the first fires – wood fires – neutral in the carbon balance. Now reflect on those most recent 200,000 years again on a single one-year calendar and you might be surprised to learn that the industrial revolution began only a few hours ago during the middle of the afternoon on December 31st, 250 years ago, coinciding with the discovery of underground carbon fuels. Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. <u>The release of</u> this <u>carbon</u> – however – <u>is <mark>changing </mark>our <mark>climate</mark> at</u> such <u>a rapid rate that</u> <u><strong>it <mark>threatens</mark> our <mark>survival </mark>and presence <mark>on earth.</mark> </u></strong>It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short time. <u>The implications of climate change are</u> <u><strong>the single most significant threat to life on earth</u></strong> and, put simply, <u>we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. </u>This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; <u>the science is sound</u>. <u>We know of the</u> complex set of interrelated <u>national and global security risks that are a</u> <u><strong>result of global <mark>warming</u></strong></mark> and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late. Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. <u>It <mark>has</u></mark> already <u><mark>led to an increase in <strong>natural disasters</u></strong></mark> including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that <u>climate change is</u> already <u>affecting human displacement</u>; reportedly 36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters. Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of <u>people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms</u>. <u>Climate change affects</u> <u><strong>all natural systems</u></strong>. It impacts temperature and consequently <u>it affects water and <strong>weather patterns</u></strong>. <u>It contributes to <strong><mark>desertification</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>deforestation</strong></mark> <mark>and</mark> <strong><mark>acidification</mark> of</strong> the <strong>oceans</u></strong>. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, <u>sea levels rise but</u> perennial <u>river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating</u>. <u>As glaciers</u> and polar ice caps <u>melt, there is an albedo effect</u>, <u>which is a <strong>double whammy of less temperature</u></strong> regulation <u>because of less</u> surface area of <u>ice</u> present. <u>This</u> <u>means</u> that less absorption occurs and also <u>there is less reflection of the sun’s light</u>. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far. <u>The planet</u> has <u>already adapted</u> itself <u>to</u> dramatic <u>climate change</u> including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and <u>at a pace that it can be managed</u>. It is <u><strong><mark>human intervention</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>has accelerated the pace dramatically</u></strong></mark>: An <u>increased</u> surface <u>temperature</u>, <u>coupled with</u> more <u>severe weather and changes in</u> <u>water distribution will create uneven <strong><mark>threats</strong> to our</u> <u><strong>agricultural systems</u></strong></mark> and will <u><mark>foster</mark> and</u> support <u><mark>the spread of</u></mark> insect borne <u><strong><mark>diseases</u></strong></mark> like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. <u><strong><mark>Rising sea levels will</u></strong></mark> increasingly <u><strong><mark>threaten</u></strong></mark> our coastal population and infrastructure centers and with more than 3.5 billion people – <u><strong><mark>half the planet</u></strong></mark> – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations. Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus <u><strong><mark>the impact</mark> is</strong> not</u> <u>only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries</u> as mentioned, <u>but also <mark>would</u> <u><strong>lead to conflict </mark>and thus impact national security</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of</u></strong></mark> those available <u><strong><mark>resources</u></strong></mark>. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because <u>climate change will force countries to act for national survival</u>; the so-called Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by <u>the Pentagon</u> titled: <u>An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario</u> and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It <u>painted a picture of</u> a world in <u>turmoil because global warming</u> had <u>accelerated</u>. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006 <u>the</u> Center for Naval Analyses (<u>CNA</u>) – Institute of Public Research – <u>convened a board of 11</u> senior retired <u>generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change</u>. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. <u>The team found</u> that <u><mark>climate change</u> <u><strong>was a serious threat to national security</u></strong></mark> and that it was: “most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism.” The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. <u><strong><mark>Europe</strong></mark> would experience</u> some <u>fracturing because of border migration</u>. <u><strong><mark>Africa</u></strong></mark> <u>would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u><strong><mark>The Middle East</u></strong></mark> <u>would experience a “loss of food and water security</u> (which) <u>will increase pressure to emigrate across borders</u>.” <u><strong><mark>Asia</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>would suffer</mark> from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease.</u>” In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. <u>In</u> May <u>2014</u>, <u>CNA</u> again <u>convened a Military Advisory Board</u> but this time <u>to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change</u>. <u>The report</u> <u><strong>concludes</u></strong> that <u><mark>climate change is </mark>no longer a future threat</u> <u><strong>but <mark>occurring right now</u></strong></mark> and the authors <u>appeal to</u> the security community, <u>the entire government</u> and the American people to not only <u><strong><mark>build resilience</u></strong></mark> against projected climate change impacts but <u>to form agreements to stabilize climate change</u> <u>and</u> also to <u><strong><mark>integrate climate change across</u></strong></mark> all <u><strong><mark>strategy and planning</u></strong></mark>. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because “time and tide wait for no man.” The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that: <u>Actions by the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates and the international community <u>have been insufficient</u> to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. <u>Strengthening resilience</u> to climate impacts already locked into the system <u>is critical, but this will reduce <strong>long-term risk only</u></strong> if <u>improvements in resilience</u> <u>are accompanied by</u> actionable <u>agreements on ways to stabilize climate change</u>. The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of <u>the Pentagon’s </u>alleged <u>report</u> <u>describes a coming <strong>climate Armageddon</u></strong> which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described: <u><strong><mark>A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons</u></strong></mark>. Whole <u><strong><mark>countries rendered uninhabitable</u></strong></mark>. The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The <u><mark>borders</u></mark> of the U.S. and Australia <u><mark>patrolled by armies</mark> firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home</u>. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. <u>Demands for access to water and farmland <mark>backed up with <strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>. <u>The</u> CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar <u>analysis</u> by the World Bank which <u>highlighted not only the physical manifestations</u> of climate change, <u>but also the</u> significant human <u>impacts that threaten to unravel</u> <u><strong>decades of economic development</u></strong>, <u><strong>which will</u></strong> ultimately <u><strong>foster conflict</u></strong>. <u>Climate change is </u>the quintessential “Tragedy of the Commons,” where the cumulative impact of many individual actions (carbon emission in this case) is not seen as linked to the marginal gains available to each individual action and not seen as cause and effect. It is simultaneously huge, yet amorphous and nearly invisible from day to day. It is occurring very fast in geologic time terms, but in human time it is (was) slow and incremental. Among environmental problems, it is uniquely <u>global</u>. With our planet and culture figuratively and literally honeycombed with a reliance on fossil fuels, we face systemic challenges in changing the reliance across multiple layers of consumption, investment patterns, and political decisions; it will be hard to fix!</p> </s>

Resource conflict and warming cause extinction

The release of carbon is changing our climate at a rapid rate that it threatens our survival and presence on earth. The implications of climate change are the single most significant threat to life on earth we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. the science is sound We know of the national and global security risks that are a result of global warming It has led to an increase in natural disasters climate change is affecting human displacement people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms Climate change affects all natural systems it affects water and weather patterns It contributes to desertification, deforestation and acidification of the oceans sea levels rise but river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating As glaciers melt, there is an albedo effect which is a double whammy of less temperature because of less ice This means there is less reflection of the sun’s light The planet already adapted to climate change at a pace that it can be managed human intervention has accelerated the pace dramatically increased temperature coupled with severe weather and changes in water distribution will create uneven threats to our agricultural systems foster and the spread of diseases Rising sea levels will threaten half the planet the impact is not only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries but also would lead to conflict and thus impact national security Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of resources climate change will force countries to act for national survival the Pentagon An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario painted a picture of turmoil because global warming accelerated the CNA convened a board of 11 generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change The team found climate change was a serious threat to national security Europe would experience fracturing because of border migration Africa would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the U S The Middle East would experience a “loss of food and water security will increase pressure to emigrate across borders Asia would suffer from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease. In 2014 CNA convened a Military Advisory Board to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change The report concludes climate change is no longer a future threat but occurring right now appeal to the entire government build resilience to form agreements to stabilize climate change and integrate climate change across strategy and planning Actions by the U S have been insufficient Strengthening resilience is critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only improvements in resilience are accompanied by agreements on ways to stabilize climate change the Pentagon’s report describes a coming climate Armageddon A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons countries rendered uninhabitable borders patrolled by armies firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home Demands for access to water and farmland backed up with nuclear weapons The analysis highlighted not only the physical manifestations but also the impacts that threaten to unravel decades of economic development which will foster conflict Climate change is global

changing climate threatens survival on earth. warming has led to an increase in natural disasters desertification deforestation and acidification human intervention has accelerated the pace dramatically threats to our agricultural systems foster the spread of diseases Rising sea levels will threaten half the planet the impact would lead to conflict Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of resources climate change was a serious threat to national security Europe Africa The Middle East Asia would suffer climate change is occurring right now build resilience integrate climate change across strategy and planning A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons countries rendered uninhabitable borders patrolled by armies backed up with nuclear weapons

Our planet is 4.5 billion years old. If that whole time was to be reflected on a single one-year calendar then the dinosaurs died off sometime late in the afternoon of December 27th and modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago, or at around lunchtime on December 28th. Therefore, human life on earth is very recent. Sometime on December 28th humans made the first fires – wood fires – neutral in the carbon balance. Now reflect on those most recent 200,000 years again on a single one-year calendar and you might be surprised to learn that the industrial revolution began only a few hours ago during the middle of the afternoon on December 31st, 250 years ago, coinciding with the discovery of underground carbon fuels. Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. The release of this carbon – however – is changing our climate at such a rapid rate that it threatens our survival and presence on earth. It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short time. The implications of climate change are the single most significant threat to life on earth and, put simply, we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; the science is sound. We know of the complex set of interrelated national and global security risks that are a result of global warming and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late. Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. It has already led to an increase in natural disasters including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that climate change is already affecting human displacement; reportedly 36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters. Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms. Climate change affects all natural systems. It impacts temperature and consequently it affects water and weather patterns. It contributes to desertification, deforestation and acidification of the oceans. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, sea levels rise but perennial river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating. As glaciers and polar ice caps melt, there is an albedo effect, which is a double whammy of less temperature regulation because of less surface area of ice present. This means that less absorption occurs and also there is less reflection of the sun’s light. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far. The planet has already adapted itself to dramatic climate change including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and at a pace that it can be managed. It is human intervention that has accelerated the pace dramatically: An increased surface temperature, coupled with more severe weather and changes in water distribution will create uneven threats to our agricultural systems and will foster and support the spread of insect borne diseases like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. Rising sea levels will increasingly threaten our coastal population and infrastructure centers and with more than 3.5 billion people – half the planet – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations. Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus the impact is not only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries as mentioned, but also would lead to conflict and thus impact national security. Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of those available resources. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because climate change will force countries to act for national survival; the so-called Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by the Pentagon titled: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It painted a picture of a world in turmoil because global warming had accelerated. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006 the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) – Institute of Public Research – convened a board of 11 senior retired generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. The team found that climate change was a serious threat to national security and that it was: “most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism.” The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. Europe would experience some fracturing because of border migration. Africa would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the United States. The Middle East would experience a “loss of food and water security (which) will increase pressure to emigrate across borders.” Asia would suffer from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease.” In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. In May 2014, CNA again convened a Military Advisory Board but this time to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change. The report concludes that climate change is no longer a future threat but occurring right now and the authors appeal to the security community, the entire government and the American people to not only build resilience against projected climate change impacts but to form agreements to stabilize climate change and also to integrate climate change across all strategy and planning. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because “time and tide wait for no man.” The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that: Actions by the United States and the international community have been insufficient to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. Strengthening resilience to climate impacts already locked into the system is critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only if improvements in resilience are accompanied by actionable agreements on ways to stabilize climate change. The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of the Pentagon’s alleged report describes a coming climate Armageddon which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described: A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons. Whole countries rendered uninhabitable. The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The borders of the U.S. and Australia patrolled by armies firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. Demands for access to water and farmland backed up with nuclear weapons. The CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar analysis by the World Bank which highlighted not only the physical manifestations of climate change, but also the significant human impacts that threaten to unravel decades of economic development, which will ultimately foster conflict. Climate change is the quintessential “Tragedy of the Commons,” where the cumulative impact of many individual actions (carbon emission in this case) is not seen as linked to the marginal gains available to each individual action and not seen as cause and effect. It is simultaneously huge, yet amorphous and nearly invisible from day to day. It is occurring very fast in geologic time terms, but in human time it is (was) slow and incremental. Among environmental problems, it is uniquely global. With our planet and culture figuratively and literally honeycombed with a reliance on fossil fuels, we face systemic challenges in changing the reliance across multiple layers of consumption, investment patterns, and political decisions; it will be hard to fix!

<h4>Resource conflict and warming cause extinction </h4><p><strong>Sharp and Kennedy, 14</strong> – is an associate professor on the faculty of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA). A former British Army Colonel he retired in 2006 and emigrated to the U.S. Since joining NESA in 2010, he has focused on Yemen and Lebanon, and also supported NESA events into Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and Qatar. He is the faculty lead for NESA’s work supporting theUAE National Defense College through an ongoing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. He also directs the Network of Defense and Staff Colleges (NDSC) which aims to provide best practice support to regional professional military and security sector education development and reform. Prior to joining NESA, he served for 4 years as an assistant professor at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at National Defense University where he wrote and taught a Masters' Degree syllabus for a program concentration in Conflict Management of Stability Operations and also taught strategy, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and also created an International Homeland Defense Fellowship program. At CISA he also designed, wrote and taught courses supporting the State Department's Civilian Response Corps utilizing conflict management approaches. Bob served 25 years in the British Army and was personally decorated by Her Majesty the Queen twice. Aftergraduating from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst in 1981, he served in command and staff roles on operations in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Gulf War 1, Afghanistan, and Cyprus. He has worked in policy and technical staff appointments in the UK Ministry of Defense and also UK Defense Intelligence plus several multi-national organizations including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In his later career, he specialized in intelligence. He is a 2004 distinguished graduate of the National War College and holds a masters degree in National Security Strategy from National Defense University, Washington, D.C. AND is a renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA on carbon policy and markets (Robert and Edward, 8-22, “Climate Change and Implications for National Security” http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/08/22/climate-change-implications-national-security/)djm</p><p>Our planet is 4.5 billion years old. If that whole time was to be reflected on a single one-year calendar then the dinosaurs died off sometime late in the afternoon of December 27th and modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago, or at around lunchtime on December 28th. Therefore, human life on earth is very recent. Sometime on December 28th humans made the first fires – wood fires – neutral in the carbon balance. Now reflect on those most recent 200,000 years again on a single one-year calendar and you might be surprised to learn that the industrial revolution began only a few hours ago during the middle of the afternoon on December 31st, 250 years ago, coinciding with the discovery of underground carbon fuels. Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. <u><strong>The release of</u></strong> this <u><strong>carbon</u></strong> – however – <u><strong>is <mark>changing </mark>our <mark>climate</mark> at</u></strong> such <u><strong>a rapid rate that</u></strong> <u><strong>it <mark>threatens</mark> our <mark>survival </mark>and presence <mark>on earth.</mark> </u></strong>It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short time. <u><strong>The implications of climate change are</u></strong> <u><strong>the single most significant threat to life on earth</u></strong> and, put simply, <u><strong>we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. </u></strong>This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; <u><strong>the science is sound</u></strong>. <u><strong>We know of the</u></strong> complex set of interrelated <u><strong>national and global security risks that are a</u></strong> <u><strong>result of global <mark>warming</u></strong></mark> and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late. Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. <u><strong>It <mark>has</u></strong></mark> already <u><strong><mark>led to an increase in natural disasters</u></strong></mark> including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that <u><strong>climate change is</u></strong> already <u><strong>affecting human displacement</u></strong>; reportedly 36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters. Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of <u><strong>people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms</u></strong>. <u><strong>Climate change affects</u></strong> <u><strong>all natural systems</u></strong>. It impacts temperature and consequently <u><strong>it affects water and weather patterns</u></strong>. <u><strong>It contributes to <mark>desertification</mark>, <mark>deforestation</mark> <mark>and</mark> <mark>acidification</mark> of the oceans</u></strong>. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, <u><strong>sea levels rise but</u></strong> perennial <u><strong>river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating</u></strong>. <u><strong>As glaciers</u></strong> and polar ice caps <u><strong>melt, there is an albedo effect</u></strong>, <u><strong>which is a double whammy of less temperature</u></strong> regulation <u><strong>because of less</u></strong> surface area of <u><strong>ice</u></strong> present. <u><strong>This</u></strong> <u><strong>means</u></strong> that less absorption occurs and also <u><strong>there is less reflection of the sun’s light</u></strong>. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far. <u><strong>The planet</u></strong> has <u><strong>already adapted</u></strong> itself <u><strong>to</u></strong> dramatic <u><strong>climate change</u></strong> including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and <u><strong>at a pace that it can be managed</u></strong>. It is <u><strong><mark>human intervention</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>has accelerated the pace dramatically</u></strong></mark>: An <u><strong>increased</u></strong> surface <u><strong>temperature</u></strong>, <u><strong>coupled with</u></strong> more <u><strong>severe weather and changes in</u></strong> <u><strong>water distribution will create uneven <mark>threats to our</u></strong> <u><strong>agricultural systems</u></strong></mark> and will <u><strong><mark>foster</mark> and</u></strong> support <u><strong><mark>the spread of</u></strong></mark> insect borne <u><strong><mark>diseases</u></strong></mark> like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. <u><strong><mark>Rising sea levels will</u></strong></mark> increasingly <u><strong><mark>threaten</u></strong></mark> our coastal population and infrastructure centers and with more than 3.5 billion people – <u><strong><mark>half the planet</u></strong></mark> – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations. Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus <u><strong><mark>the impact</mark> is not</u></strong> <u><strong>only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries</u></strong> as mentioned, <u><strong>but also <mark>would</u></strong> <u><strong>lead to conflict </mark>and thus impact national security</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of</u></strong></mark> those available <u><strong><mark>resources</u></strong></mark>. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because <u><strong>climate change will force countries to act for national survival</u></strong>; the so-called Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by <u><strong>the Pentagon</u></strong> titled: <u><strong>An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario</u></strong> and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It <u><strong>painted a picture of</u></strong> a world in <u><strong>turmoil because global warming</u></strong> had <u><strong>accelerated</u></strong>. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006 <u><strong>the</u></strong> Center for Naval Analyses (<u><strong>CNA</u></strong>) – Institute of Public Research – <u><strong>convened a board of 11</u></strong> senior retired <u><strong>generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change</u></strong>. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. <u><strong>The team found</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>climate change</u></strong> <u><strong>was a serious threat to national security</u></strong></mark> and that it was: “most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism.” The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. <u><strong><mark>Europe</mark> would experience</u></strong> some <u><strong>fracturing because of border migration</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Africa</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates. <u><strong><mark>The Middle East</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>would experience a “loss of food and water security</u></strong> (which) <u><strong>will increase pressure to emigrate across borders</u></strong>.” <u><strong><mark>Asia</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>would suffer</mark> from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease.</u></strong>” In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. <u><strong>In</u></strong> May <u><strong>2014</u></strong>, <u><strong>CNA</u></strong> again <u><strong>convened a Military Advisory Board</u></strong> but this time <u><strong>to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change</u></strong>. <u><strong>The report</u></strong> <u><strong>concludes</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>climate change is </mark>no longer a future threat</u></strong> <u><strong>but <mark>occurring right now</u></strong></mark> and the authors <u><strong>appeal to</u></strong> the security community, <u><strong>the entire government</u></strong> and the American people to not only <u><strong><mark>build resilience</u></strong></mark> against projected climate change impacts but <u><strong>to form agreements to stabilize climate change</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> also to <u><strong><mark>integrate climate change across</u></strong></mark> all <u><strong><mark>strategy and planning</u></strong></mark>. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because “time and tide wait for no man.” The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that: <u><strong>Actions by the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates and the international community <u><strong>have been insufficient</u></strong> to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. <u><strong>Strengthening resilience</u></strong> to climate impacts already locked into the system <u><strong>is critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only</u></strong> if <u><strong>improvements in resilience</u></strong> <u><strong>are accompanied by</u></strong> actionable <u><strong>agreements on ways to stabilize climate change</u></strong>. The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of <u><strong>the Pentagon’s </u></strong>alleged <u><strong>report</u></strong> <u><strong>describes a coming climate Armageddon</u></strong> which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described: <u><strong><mark>A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons</u></strong></mark>. Whole <u><strong><mark>countries rendered uninhabitable</u></strong></mark>. The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The <u><strong><mark>borders</u></strong></mark> of the U.S. and Australia <u><strong><mark>patrolled by armies</mark> firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home</u></strong>. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. <u><strong>Demands for access to water and farmland <mark>backed up with nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The</u></strong> CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar <u><strong>analysis</u></strong> by the World Bank which <u><strong>highlighted not only the physical manifestations</u></strong> of climate change, <u><strong>but also the</u></strong> significant human <u><strong>impacts that threaten to unravel</u></strong> <u><strong>decades of economic development</u></strong>, <u><strong>which will</u></strong> ultimately <u><strong>foster conflict</u></strong>. <u><strong>Climate change is </u></strong>the quintessential “Tragedy of the Commons,” where the cumulative impact of many individual actions (carbon emission in this case) is not seen as linked to the marginal gains available to each individual action and not seen as cause and effect. It is simultaneously huge, yet amorphous and nearly invisible from day to day. It is occurring very fast in geologic time terms, but in human time it is (was) slow and incremental. Among environmental problems, it is uniquely <u><strong>global</u></strong>. With our planet and culture figuratively and literally honeycombed with a reliance on fossil fuels, we face systemic challenges in changing the reliance across multiple layers of consumption, investment patterns, and political decisions; it will be hard to fix!</p>

Sharp and Kennedy, 14 – is an associate professor on the faculty of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA). A former British Army Colonel he retired in 2006 and emigrated to the U.S. Since joining NESA in 2010, he has focused on Yemen and Lebanon, and also supported NESA events into Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and Qatar. He is the faculty lead for NESA’s work supporting theUAE National Defense College through an ongoing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. He also directs the Network of Defense and Staff Colleges (NDSC) which aims to provide best practice support to regional professional military and security sector education development and reform. Prior to joining NESA, he served for 4 years as an assistant professor at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at National Defense University where he wrote and taught a Masters' Degree syllabus for a program concentration in Conflict Management of Stability Operations and also taught strategy, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and also created an International Homeland Defense Fellowship program. At CISA he also designed, wrote and taught courses supporting the State Department's Civilian Response Corps utilizing conflict management approaches. Bob served 25 years in the British Army and was personally decorated by Her Majesty the Queen twice. Aftergraduating from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst in 1981, he served in command and staff roles on operations in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Gulf War 1, Afghanistan, and Cyprus. He has worked in policy and technical staff appointments in the UK Ministry of Defense and also UK Defense Intelligence plus several multi-national organizations including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In his later career, he specialized in intelligence. He is a 2004 distinguished graduate of the National War College and holds a masters degree in National Security Strategy from National Defense University, Washington, D.C. AND is a renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA on carbon policy and markets (Robert and Edward, 8-22, “Climate Change and Implications for National Security” http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/08/22/climate-change-implications-national-security/)djm

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Sharp and Kennedy, 14 – is an associate professor on the faculty of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA). A former British Army Colonel he retired in 2006 and emigrated to the U.S. Since joining NESA in 2010, he has focused on Yemen and Lebanon, and also supported NESA events into Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and Qatar. He is the faculty lead for NESA’s work supporting theUAE National Defense College through an ongoing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. He also directs the Network of Defense and Staff Colleges (NDSC) which aims to provide best practice support to regional professional military and security sector education development and reform. Prior to joining NESA, he served for 4 years as an assistant professor at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at National Defense University where he wrote and taught a Masters' Degree syllabus for a program concentration in Conflict Management of Stability Operations and also taught strategy, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and also created an International Homeland Defense Fellowship program. At CISA he also designed, wrote and taught courses supporting the State Department's Civilian Response Corps utilizing conflict management approaches. Bob served 25 years in the British Army and was personally decorated by Her Majesty the Queen twice. Aftergraduating from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst in 1981, he served in command and staff roles on operations in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Gulf War 1, Afghanistan, and Cyprus. He has worked in policy and technical staff appointments in the UK Ministry of Defense and also UK Defense Intelligence plus several multi-national organizations including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In his later career, he specialized in intelligence. He is a 2004 distinguished graduate of the National War College and holds a masters degree in National Security Strategy from National Defense University, Washington, D.C. AND is a renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA on carbon policy and markets (Robert and Edward, 8-22, “Climate Change and Implications for National Security” http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/08/22/climate-change-implications-national-security/)djm fulltext: Our planet is 4.5 billion years old. If that whole time was to be reflected on a single one-year calendar then the dinosaurs died off sometime late in the afternoon of December 27th and modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago, or at around lunchtime on December 28th. Therefore, human life on earth is very recent. Sometime on December 28th humans made the first fires – wood fires – neutral in the carbon balance. Now reflect on those most recent 200,000 years again on a single one-year calendar and you might be surprised to learn that the industrial revolution began only a few hours ago during the middle of the afternoon on December 31st, 250 years ago, coinciding with the discovery of underground carbon fuels. Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. The release of this carbon – however – is changing our climate at such a rapid rate that it threatens our survival and presence on earth. It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short time. The implications of climate change are the single most significant threat to life on earth and, put simply, we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; the science is sound. We know of the complex set of interrelated national and global security risks that are a result of global warming and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late. Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. It has already led to an increase in natural disasters including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that climate change is already affecting human displacement; reportedly 36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters. Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms. Climate change affects all natural systems. It impacts temperature and consequently it affects water and weather patterns. It contributes to desertification, deforestation and acidification of the oceans. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, sea levels rise but perennial river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating. As glaciers and polar ice caps melt, there is an albedo effect, which is a double whammy of less temperature regulation because of less surface area of ice present. This means that less absorption occurs and also there is less reflection of the sun’s light. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far. The planet has already adapted itself to dramatic climate change including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and at a pace that it can be managed. It is human intervention that has accelerated the pace dramatically: An increased surface temperature, coupled with more severe weather and changes in water distribution will create uneven threats to our agricultural systems and will foster and support the spread of insect borne diseases like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. Rising sea levels will increasingly threaten our coastal population and infrastructure centers and with more than 3.5 billion people – half the planet – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations. Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus the impact is not only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries as mentioned, but also would lead to conflict and thus impact national security. Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of those available resources. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because climate change will force countries to act for national survival; the so-called Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by the Pentagon titled: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It painted a picture of a world in turmoil because global warming had accelerated. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006 the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) – Institute of Public Research – convened a board of 11 senior retired generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. The team found that climate change was a serious threat to national security and that it was: “most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism.” The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. Europe would experience some fracturing because of border migration. Africa would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the United States. The Middle East would experience a “loss of food and water security (which) will increase pressure to emigrate across borders.” Asia would suffer from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease.” In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. In May 2014, CNA again convened a Military Advisory Board but this time to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change. The report concludes that climate change is no longer a future threat but occurring right now and the authors appeal to the security community, the entire government and the American people to not only build resilience against projected climate change impacts but to form agreements to stabilize climate change and also to integrate climate change across all strategy and planning. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because “time and tide wait for no man.” The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that: Actions by the United States and the international community have been insufficient to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. Strengthening resilience to climate impacts already locked into the system is critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only if improvements in resilience are accompanied by actionable agreements on ways to stabilize climate change. The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of the Pentagon’s alleged report describes a coming climate Armageddon which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described: A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons. Whole countries rendered uninhabitable. The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The borders of the U.S. and Australia patrolled by armies firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. Demands for access to water and farmland backed up with nuclear weapons. The CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar analysis by the World Bank which highlighted not only the physical manifestations of climate change, but also the significant human impacts that threaten to unravel decades of economic development, which will ultimately foster conflict. Climate change is the quintessential “Tragedy of the Commons,” where the cumulative impact of many individual actions (carbon emission in this case) is not seen as linked to the marginal gains available to each individual action and not seen as cause and effect. It is simultaneously huge, yet amorphous and nearly invisible from day to day. It is occurring very fast in geologic time terms, but in human time it is (was) slow and incremental. Among environmental problems, it is uniquely global. With our planet and culture figuratively and literally honeycombed with a reliance on fossil fuels, we face systemic challenges in changing the reliance across multiple layers of consumption, investment patterns, and political decisions; it will be hard to fix! [/INST] <h4>Resource conflict and warming cause extinction </h4><p><strong>Sharp and Kennedy, 14</strong> – is an associate professor on the faculty of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA). A former British Army Colonel he retired in 2006 and emigrated to the U.S. Since joining NESA in 2010, he has focused on Yemen and Lebanon, and also supported NESA events into Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Palestine and Qatar. He is the faculty lead for NESA’s work supporting theUAE National Defense College through an ongoing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. He also directs the Network of Defense and Staff Colleges (NDSC) which aims to provide best practice support to regional professional military and security sector education development and reform. Prior to joining NESA, he served for 4 years as an assistant professor at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at National Defense University where he wrote and taught a Masters' Degree syllabus for a program concentration in Conflict Management of Stability Operations and also taught strategy, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and also created an International Homeland Defense Fellowship program. At CISA he also designed, wrote and taught courses supporting the State Department's Civilian Response Corps utilizing conflict management approaches. Bob served 25 years in the British Army and was personally decorated by Her Majesty the Queen twice. Aftergraduating from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst in 1981, he served in command and staff roles on operations in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Gulf War 1, Afghanistan, and Cyprus. He has worked in policy and technical staff appointments in the UK Ministry of Defense and also UK Defense Intelligence plus several multi-national organizations including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In his later career, he specialized in intelligence. He is a 2004 distinguished graduate of the National War College and holds a masters degree in National Security Strategy from National Defense University, Washington, D.C. AND is a renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA on carbon policy and markets (Robert and Edward, 8-22, “Climate Change and Implications for National Security” http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/08/22/climate-change-implications-national-security/)djm</p><p>Our planet is 4.5 billion years old. If that whole time was to be reflected on a single one-year calendar then the dinosaurs died off sometime late in the afternoon of December 27th and modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago, or at around lunchtime on December 28th. Therefore, human life on earth is very recent. Sometime on December 28th humans made the first fires – wood fires – neutral in the carbon balance. Now reflect on those most recent 200,000 years again on a single one-year calendar and you might be surprised to learn that the industrial revolution began only a few hours ago during the middle of the afternoon on December 31st, 250 years ago, coinciding with the discovery of underground carbon fuels. Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. <u><strong>The release of</u></strong> this <u><strong>carbon</u></strong> – however – <u><strong>is <mark>changing </mark>our <mark>climate</mark> at</u></strong> such <u><strong>a rapid rate that</u></strong> <u><strong>it <mark>threatens</mark> our <mark>survival </mark>and presence <mark>on earth.</mark> </u></strong>It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short time. <u><strong>The implications of climate change are</u></strong> <u><strong>the single most significant threat to life on earth</u></strong> and, put simply, <u><strong>we are not doing enough to rectify the damage. </u></strong>This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; <u><strong>the science is sound</u></strong>. <u><strong>We know of the</u></strong> complex set of interrelated <u><strong>national and global security risks that are a</u></strong> <u><strong>result of global <mark>warming</u></strong></mark> and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late. Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. <u><strong>It <mark>has</u></strong></mark> already <u><strong><mark>led to an increase in natural disasters</u></strong></mark> including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that <u><strong>climate change is</u></strong> already <u><strong>affecting human displacement</u></strong>; reportedly 36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters. Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of <u><strong>people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms</u></strong>. <u><strong>Climate change affects</u></strong> <u><strong>all natural systems</u></strong>. It impacts temperature and consequently <u><strong>it affects water and weather patterns</u></strong>. <u><strong>It contributes to <mark>desertification</mark>, <mark>deforestation</mark> <mark>and</mark> <mark>acidification</mark> of the oceans</u></strong>. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, <u><strong>sea levels rise but</u></strong> perennial <u><strong>river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating</u></strong>. <u><strong>As glaciers</u></strong> and polar ice caps <u><strong>melt, there is an albedo effect</u></strong>, <u><strong>which is a double whammy of less temperature</u></strong> regulation <u><strong>because of less</u></strong> surface area of <u><strong>ice</u></strong> present. <u><strong>This</u></strong> <u><strong>means</u></strong> that less absorption occurs and also <u><strong>there is less reflection of the sun’s light</u></strong>. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far. <u><strong>The planet</u></strong> has <u><strong>already adapted</u></strong> itself <u><strong>to</u></strong> dramatic <u><strong>climate change</u></strong> including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and <u><strong>at a pace that it can be managed</u></strong>. It is <u><strong><mark>human intervention</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>has accelerated the pace dramatically</u></strong></mark>: An <u><strong>increased</u></strong> surface <u><strong>temperature</u></strong>, <u><strong>coupled with</u></strong> more <u><strong>severe weather and changes in</u></strong> <u><strong>water distribution will create uneven <mark>threats to our</u></strong> <u><strong>agricultural systems</u></strong></mark> and will <u><strong><mark>foster</mark> and</u></strong> support <u><strong><mark>the spread of</u></strong></mark> insect borne <u><strong><mark>diseases</u></strong></mark> like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. <u><strong><mark>Rising sea levels will</u></strong></mark> increasingly <u><strong><mark>threaten</u></strong></mark> our coastal population and infrastructure centers and with more than 3.5 billion people – <u><strong><mark>half the planet</u></strong></mark> – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations. Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus <u><strong><mark>the impact</mark> is not</u></strong> <u><strong>only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries</u></strong> as mentioned, <u><strong>but also <mark>would</u></strong> <u><strong>lead to conflict </mark>and thus impact national security</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of</u></strong></mark> those available <u><strong><mark>resources</u></strong></mark>. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because <u><strong>climate change will force countries to act for national survival</u></strong>; the so-called Climate Wars. As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by <u><strong>the Pentagon</u></strong> titled: <u><strong>An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario</u></strong> and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It <u><strong>painted a picture of</u></strong> a world in <u><strong>turmoil because global warming</u></strong> had <u><strong>accelerated</u></strong>. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems. In 2006 <u><strong>the</u></strong> Center for Naval Analyses (<u><strong>CNA</u></strong>) – Institute of Public Research – <u><strong>convened a board of 11</u></strong> senior retired <u><strong>generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change</u></strong>. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. <u><strong>The team found</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>climate change</u></strong> <u><strong>was a serious threat to national security</u></strong></mark> and that it was: “most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism.” The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. <u><strong><mark>Europe</mark> would experience</u></strong> some <u><strong>fracturing because of border migration</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Africa</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates. <u><strong><mark>The Middle East</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>would experience a “loss of food and water security</u></strong> (which) <u><strong>will increase pressure to emigrate across borders</u></strong>.” <u><strong><mark>Asia</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>would suffer</mark> from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease.</u></strong>” In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy. <u><strong>In</u></strong> May <u><strong>2014</u></strong>, <u><strong>CNA</u></strong> again <u><strong>convened a Military Advisory Board</u></strong> but this time <u><strong>to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change</u></strong>. <u><strong>The report</u></strong> <u><strong>concludes</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>climate change is </mark>no longer a future threat</u></strong> <u><strong>but <mark>occurring right now</u></strong></mark> and the authors <u><strong>appeal to</u></strong> the security community, <u><strong>the entire government</u></strong> and the American people to not only <u><strong><mark>build resilience</u></strong></mark> against projected climate change impacts but <u><strong>to form agreements to stabilize climate change</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> also to <u><strong><mark>integrate climate change across</u></strong></mark> all <u><strong><mark>strategy and planning</u></strong></mark>. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because “time and tide wait for no man.” The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that: <u><strong>Actions by the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates and the international community <u><strong>have been insufficient</u></strong> to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. <u><strong>Strengthening resilience</u></strong> to climate impacts already locked into the system <u><strong>is critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only</u></strong> if <u><strong>improvements in resilience</u></strong> <u><strong>are accompanied by</u></strong> actionable <u><strong>agreements on ways to stabilize climate change</u></strong>. The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of <u><strong>the Pentagon’s </u></strong>alleged <u><strong>report</u></strong> <u><strong>describes a coming climate Armageddon</u></strong> which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described: <u><strong><mark>A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons</u></strong></mark>. Whole <u><strong><mark>countries rendered uninhabitable</u></strong></mark>. The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The <u><strong><mark>borders</u></strong></mark> of the U.S. and Australia <u><strong><mark>patrolled by armies</mark> firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home</u></strong>. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. <u><strong>Demands for access to water and farmland <mark>backed up with nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The</u></strong> CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar <u><strong>analysis</u></strong> by the World Bank which <u><strong>highlighted not only the physical manifestations</u></strong> of climate change, <u><strong>but also the</u></strong> significant human <u><strong>impacts that threaten to unravel</u></strong> <u><strong>decades of economic development</u></strong>, <u><strong>which will</u></strong> ultimately <u><strong>foster conflict</u></strong>. <u><strong>Climate change is </u></strong>the quintessential “Tragedy of the Commons,” where the cumulative impact of many individual actions (carbon emission in this case) is not seen as linked to the marginal gains available to each individual action and not seen as cause and effect. It is simultaneously huge, yet amorphous and nearly invisible from day to day. It is occurring very fast in geologic time terms, but in human time it is (was) slow and incremental. Among environmental problems, it is uniquely <u><strong>global</u></strong>. With our planet and culture figuratively and literally honeycombed with a reliance on fossil fuels, we face systemic challenges in changing the reliance across multiple layers of consumption, investment patterns, and political decisions; it will be hard to fix!</p> </s>

The demand for recognition of the aff’s articulation of suffering by a ballot creates a wounded attachment—identity constituted by a vengeful redress for injuries caused by the same dominant structures they demand recognition from—this reestablishes the hegemony of racism as necessary to comprehend and address the suffering of subjugated bodies and maintains the violence of humanism

pg 11-13, dml) Pain is discursively mobilized on behalf of bodies that are constructed as unable to speak their pain Humanitarian discourse risks to affirm the speechlessness of those suffering under its exclusionary mechanisms through the discursive articula‐ tion of unspeakable pain in “other bodies.” The articulation and recognition of suffering within the intimate public sphere is not tantamount to the oppressed subject’s emancipation from it “[T]he recognition by the dominant culture of publicized subaltern suffering is frequently (mis)taken as a big step toward the amelioration of that suffering. It is a baby step, if that Recognition is a double‐edged process within discourse itself—a rhetorical maneu‐ ver that constructs pain as an “exceptional” and “unspeak‐ able” phenomenon changing the rules of discourse toward inclusion a fundamental ambivalence that emerges when identities and their claims to social recognition are predomi‐ nantly depending on a “logics of pain” minority discourses and the hegemonic institutions recognizing them pursue a “moralizing politics” that aims at developing a righteous critique of power from the perspective of the injured [and thus] delimits a specific site of blame for suffering by constituting sovereign subjects as responsible for the “injury” It fixes the identities of the injured and the injuring as social positions Both marginalized and hegemonic discourses rely on the politicization of personal experiences of pain, a strategy that leads to a problematic “wounded attachment” within identitarian discourse, an equation of identity and trauma Politicized identity enunciates itself only by entrenching pain in its politics a politics of recrimination that seeks to avenge the hurt even while it reaffirms it, discursively codifies it Claims to pain may produce subjectivities that are identified, normalized, and ultimately marginalized through that pain the “discursive codification” happening points to a mechanism intrinsic to the performative process of articulating pain narratives of painful experience evoke a particular notion of the body that is “nondiscursive” even when social construction is adopted as method ‘feelings’ and ‘experiences’ acquire a status that is politically if not ontologically essentialist the mobilization of pain as nondiscursive as a crucial discursive maneuver within hegemonic recognitions of pain in marginalized bodies.

Pain is discursively mobilized The articulation and recognition of suffering within the public sphere is not tantamount to emancipation recognition by the dominant culture is a baby step, if that a fundamental ambivalence that emerges when identities and their claims to social recognition are depending on a “logics of pain a “moralizing politics” aims at developing a righteous critique of power from the perspective of the injured [and delimits a specific site of blame for suffering It fixes the identities of the injured and the injuring as social positions discourses rely on the politicization of personal experiences of pain, that leads to a problematic “wounded attachment” within identitarian discourse, an equation of identity and trauma: “Politicized identity enunciates itself in a politics of recrimination that seeks to avenge the hurt even while it reaffirms it, Claims to pain may produce subjectivities that are identified, normalized, and ultimately marginalized through that pain narratives of painful experience evoke a particular notion of the body that is “nondiscursive”: even when social construction is adopted as method experiences’ acquire a status that is politically if not ontologically essentialist

(Simon, “WHAT IS DOLOROLOGY?”, American Dolorologies pg 11-13, dml) Apart from these historical frames, which will be investigated in the fol‐ lowing chapters, my analysis of the discursive mobilization of pain further implies a crucial epistemological consideration that speaks to contemporary theoretical and political constellations. While American Dolorologies pri‐ marily proposes a historicizing genealogy to present‐day diagnoses such as “wound culture” or “trauma culture,” the ambivalences of pain’s evocation also partakes in debates that surround late modern narratives of pain and their political deployment. One crucial aspect concerns the ongoing identi‐ fication of painful experience with the “nondiscursive”—what Elaine Scarry in her classic book The Body in Pain has called pain’s “unspeakability” (1985, 4).17 As pointed out in relation to James Young Simpson’s compassionate recognition of slave pain and female pain, sentimental discourse installs a fundamental discontinuity between “being in pain” and “speaking” it: the sympathetic doctor articulates an experience, which those suffering can only utter in “shrieking.” Pain, in other words, is discursively mobilized on behalf of bodies that are constructed as unable to speak their pain. Humanitarian discourse in other words risks to affirm the speechlessness of those suffering under its exclusionary mechanisms precisely through the discursive articula‐ tion of unspeakable pain in “other bodies.” The articulation and recognition of pain and suffering within the intimate public sphere therefore is not tantamount to the oppressed subject’s emancipation from it, as Lauren Berlant’s polemic points out: “[T]he recognition by the dominant culture of certain sites of publicized subaltern suffering is frequently (mis)taken as a big step toward the amelioration of that suffering. It is a baby step, if that” (2000, 33). Recognition, I propose, is rather a double‐edged process of “promise and damage” (Seitler 2003, 83) within discourse itself—a rhetorical maneu‐ ver that simultaneously constructs pain as an “exceptional” and “unspeak‐ able” phenomenon changing the rules of discourse toward inclusion, and reinscribes the norms of recognition, experience, and the intelligibility of bodies and subjects. This perspective takes up contemporary criticism of the problematic linkage of minority discourses with narratives of trauma and the representational and political dilemmas arising from this connection. Feminist scholars18 have diagnosed and criticized this nexus—termed by some as the victimology‐tradition of feminism19—and its function within late modern cultural economies. All detect a fundamental ambivalence that emerges when identities and their claims to social recognition are predomi‐ nantly depending on a “logics of pain” (Bell 2000, 60). Especially Wendy Brown’s influential States of Injury (1995) has explored the nexus of pain and subjectivity as the central problem of contemporary identity politics. In her argument, minority discourses and the hegemonic institutions recognizing them increasingly pursue a “moralizing politics” that aims at developing a righteous critique of power from the perspective of the injured [and thus] delimits a specific site of blame for suffering by constituting sovereign subjects and events as responsible for the “injury” of social subordination. It fixes the identities of the injured and the injuring as social positions. (Brown 1995, 27) Both marginalized and hegemonic discourses therefore rely on the politicization of personal experiences of pain, a strategy that for Brown leads to a problematic “wounded attachment” within identitarian discourse, an equation of identity and trauma: “Politicized identity . . . enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing pain in its politics. . . . a politics of recrimination that seeks to avenge the hurt even while it reaffirms it, discursively codifies it” (ibid., 74; my italics). Claims to pain not only may intervene in hegemonic discourse (and thus empower the project of identity politics), but also produce subjectivities that are identified, normalized, and ultimately marginalized through that pain.20 While this dialectic is crucial to the historical mobilizations of pain within sentimental discourse,21 Brown‘s observation on the “discursive codification” happening in testimonies of hurt, pain, and suffering points to a mechanism intrinsic to the performative process of articulating pain. As she argues on narratives of painful experience articulated within vari‐ ous strands of feminism, these always evoke a particular notion of the body that is “nondiscursive”: “Within the confessional frame, even when social construction is adopted as method . . . ‘feelings’ and ‘experiences’ acquire a status that is politically if not ontologically essentialist—beyond hermeneu‐ tics” (ibid., 42). While the evocation of pain as something beyond discourse or hermeneutics poses an intricate problematic to antiessentialist politics,22 the same mechanism—the mobilization of pain as nondiscursive—interests my project as a crucial discursive maneuver within hegemonic recognitions of pain in marginalized bodies.

<h4>The demand for <u>recognition</u> of the aff’s articulation of suffering by a ballot creates a <u>wounded attachment</u>—identity constituted by a <u>vengeful redress</u> for injuries caused by the <u>same dominant structures they demand recognition from</u>—this reestablishes the hegemony of racism as necessary to comprehend and address the suffering of subjugated bodies and maintains the violence of humanism</h4><p><strong>Strick 14</strong>—Postdoctoral Researcher at the Center for Literary and Cultural Research Berlin</p><p>(Simon, “WHAT IS DOLOROLOGY?”, American Dolorologies<u><strong> pg 11-13, dml)</p><p></u></strong>Apart from these historical frames, which will be investigated in the fol‐ lowing chapters, my analysis of the discursive mobilization of pain further implies a crucial epistemological consideration that speaks to contemporary theoretical and political constellations. While American Dolorologies pri‐ marily proposes a historicizing genealogy to present‐day diagnoses such as “wound culture” or “trauma culture,” the ambivalences of pain’s evocation also partakes in debates that surround late modern narratives of pain and their political deployment. One crucial aspect concerns the ongoing identi‐ fication of painful experience with the “nondiscursive”—what Elaine Scarry in her classic book The Body in Pain has called pain’s “unspeakability” (1985, 4).17 As pointed out in relation to James Young Simpson’s compassionate recognition of slave pain and female pain, sentimental discourse installs a fundamental discontinuity between “being in pain” and “speaking” it: the sympathetic doctor articulates an experience, which those suffering can only utter in “shrieking.” <u><strong><mark>Pain</u></strong></mark>, in other words, <u><strong><mark>is discursively mobilized</mark> on behalf of bodies that are constructed as unable to speak their pain</u></strong>. <u><strong>Humanitarian discourse</u></strong> in other words <u><strong>risks to affirm the speechlessness of those suffering under its exclusionary mechanisms</u></strong> precisely <u><strong>through the discursive articula‐ tion of unspeakable pain in “other bodies.” <mark>The articulation and recognition of</u></strong></mark> pain and <u><strong><mark>suffering</u></strong> <u><strong>within the </mark>intimate <mark>public sphere</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>is not tantamount to</mark> the oppressed subject’s <mark>emancipation</mark> from it</u></strong>, as Lauren Berlant’s polemic points out: <u><strong>“[T]he <mark>recognition by the dominant culture</u></strong></mark> of certain sites <u><strong>of publicized subaltern suffering is frequently (mis)taken as a big step toward the amelioration of that suffering. It <mark>is a baby step, if that</u></strong></mark>” (2000, 33). <u><strong>Recognition</u></strong>, I propose, <u><strong>is</u></strong> rather <u><strong>a double‐edged process</u></strong> of “promise and damage” (Seitler 2003, 83) <u><strong>within discourse itself—a rhetorical maneu‐ ver that</u></strong> simultaneously <u><strong>constructs pain as an “exceptional” and “unspeak‐ able” phenomenon changing the rules of discourse toward inclusion</u></strong>, and reinscribes the norms of recognition, experience, and the intelligibility of bodies and subjects. This perspective takes up contemporary criticism of the problematic linkage of minority discourses with narratives of trauma and the representational and political dilemmas arising from this connection. Feminist scholars18 have diagnosed and criticized this nexus—termed by some as the victimology‐tradition of feminism19—and its function within late modern cultural economies. All detect <u><strong><mark>a fundamental ambivalence that emerges when identities and their claims to social recognition are</mark> predomi‐ nantly <mark>depending on a “logics of pain</mark>”</u></strong> (Bell 2000, 60). Especially Wendy Brown’s influential States of Injury (1995) has explored the nexus of pain and subjectivity as the central problem of contemporary identity politics. In her argument, <u><strong>minority discourses and the hegemonic institutions recognizing them</u></strong> increasingly<strong> <u>pursue <mark>a “moralizing politics”</mark> that <mark>aims at</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>developing a righteous critique of power from the perspective of the injured [and </mark>thus] <mark>delimits a specific site of blame for suffering</mark> by constituting sovereign subjects</u></strong> and events <u><strong>as responsible for the “injury”</u></strong> of social subordination. <u><strong><mark>It fixes the identities of the injured and the injuring as social positions</u></strong></mark>. (Brown 1995, 27) <u><strong>Both marginalized and hegemonic <mark>discourses</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>rely on the politicization of personal experiences of pain,</mark> a strategy <mark>that</u></strong></mark> for Brown <u><strong><mark>leads to a problematic “wounded attachment” within identitarian discourse, an equation of identity and trauma</u></strong>: “<u><strong>Politicized identity</u></strong></mark> . . . <u><strong><mark>enunciates itself</u></strong></mark>, makes claims for itself, <u><strong>only by entrenching</u></strong>, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing <u><strong>pain <mark>in</mark> its politics</u></strong>. . . . <u><strong><mark>a politics of recrimination that seeks to avenge the hurt even while it reaffirms it,</mark> discursively codifies it</u></strong>” (ibid., 74; my italics). <u><strong><mark>Claims to pain</u></strong></mark> not only <u><strong><mark>may</u></strong></mark> intervene in hegemonic discourse (and thus empower the project of identity politics), but also <u><strong><mark>produce subjectivities that are identified, normalized, and ultimately marginalized through that pain</u></strong></mark>.20 While this dialectic is crucial to the historical mobilizations of pain within sentimental discourse,21 Brown‘s observation on <u><strong>the “discursive codification” happening</u></strong> in testimonies of hurt, pain, and suffering <u><strong>points to a mechanism intrinsic to the performative process of articulating pain</u></strong>. As she argues on <u><strong><mark>narratives of painful experience</u></strong></mark> articulated within vari‐ ous strands of feminism, these always <u><strong><mark>evoke a particular notion of the body that is “nondiscursive”</u></strong>:</mark> “Within the confessional frame, <u><strong><mark>even when social construction is adopted as method</u></strong></mark> . . . <u><strong>‘feelings’ and ‘<mark>experiences’ acquire a status that is politically if not ontologically essentialist</u></strong></mark>—beyond hermeneu‐ tics” (ibid., 42). While the evocation of pain as something beyond discourse or hermeneutics poses an intricate problematic to antiessentialist politics,22 the same mechanism—<u><strong>the mobilization of pain as nondiscursive</u></strong>—interests my project <u><strong>as a crucial discursive maneuver within hegemonic recognitions of pain in marginalized bodies.</p></u></strong>

Strick 14—Postdoctoral Researcher at the Center for Literary and Cultural Research Berlin

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Strick 14—Postdoctoral Researcher at the Center for Literary and Cultural Research Berlin fulltext: (Simon, “WHAT IS DOLOROLOGY?”, American Dolorologies pg 11-13, dml) Apart from these historical frames, which will be investigated in the fol‐ lowing chapters, my analysis of the discursive mobilization of pain further implies a crucial epistemological consideration that speaks to contemporary theoretical and political constellations. While American Dolorologies pri‐ marily proposes a historicizing genealogy to present‐day diagnoses such as “wound culture” or “trauma culture,” the ambivalences of pain’s evocation also partakes in debates that surround late modern narratives of pain and their political deployment. One crucial aspect concerns the ongoing identi‐ fication of painful experience with the “nondiscursive”—what Elaine Scarry in her classic book The Body in Pain has called pain’s “unspeakability” (1985, 4).17 As pointed out in relation to James Young Simpson’s compassionate recognition of slave pain and female pain, sentimental discourse installs a fundamental discontinuity between “being in pain” and “speaking” it: the sympathetic doctor articulates an experience, which those suffering can only utter in “shrieking.” Pain, in other words, is discursively mobilized on behalf of bodies that are constructed as unable to speak their pain. Humanitarian discourse in other words risks to affirm the speechlessness of those suffering under its exclusionary mechanisms precisely through the discursive articula‐ tion of unspeakable pain in “other bodies.” The articulation and recognition of pain and suffering within the intimate public sphere therefore is not tantamount to the oppressed subject’s emancipation from it, as Lauren Berlant’s polemic points out: “[T]he recognition by the dominant culture of certain sites of publicized subaltern suffering is frequently (mis)taken as a big step toward the amelioration of that suffering. It is a baby step, if that” (2000, 33). Recognition, I propose, is rather a double‐edged process of “promise and damage” (Seitler 2003, 83) within discourse itself—a rhetorical maneu‐ ver that simultaneously constructs pain as an “exceptional” and “unspeak‐ able” phenomenon changing the rules of discourse toward inclusion, and reinscribes the norms of recognition, experience, and the intelligibility of bodies and subjects. This perspective takes up contemporary criticism of the problematic linkage of minority discourses with narratives of trauma and the representational and political dilemmas arising from this connection. Feminist scholars18 have diagnosed and criticized this nexus—termed by some as the victimology‐tradition of feminism19—and its function within late modern cultural economies. All detect a fundamental ambivalence that emerges when identities and their claims to social recognition are predomi‐ nantly depending on a “logics of pain” (Bell 2000, 60). Especially Wendy Brown’s influential States of Injury (1995) has explored the nexus of pain and subjectivity as the central problem of contemporary identity politics. In her argument, minority discourses and the hegemonic institutions recognizing them increasingly pursue a “moralizing politics” that aims at developing a righteous critique of power from the perspective of the injured [and thus] delimits a specific site of blame for suffering by constituting sovereign subjects and events as responsible for the “injury” of social subordination. It fixes the identities of the injured and the injuring as social positions. (Brown 1995, 27) Both marginalized and hegemonic discourses therefore rely on the politicization of personal experiences of pain, a strategy that for Brown leads to a problematic “wounded attachment” within identitarian discourse, an equation of identity and trauma: “Politicized identity . . . enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing pain in its politics. . . . a politics of recrimination that seeks to avenge the hurt even while it reaffirms it, discursively codifies it” (ibid., 74; my italics). Claims to pain not only may intervene in hegemonic discourse (and thus empower the project of identity politics), but also produce subjectivities that are identified, normalized, and ultimately marginalized through that pain.20 While this dialectic is crucial to the historical mobilizations of pain within sentimental discourse,21 Brown‘s observation on the “discursive codification” happening in testimonies of hurt, pain, and suffering points to a mechanism intrinsic to the performative process of articulating pain. As she argues on narratives of painful experience articulated within vari‐ ous strands of feminism, these always evoke a particular notion of the body that is “nondiscursive”: “Within the confessional frame, even when social construction is adopted as method . . . ‘feelings’ and ‘experiences’ acquire a status that is politically if not ontologically essentialist—beyond hermeneu‐ tics” (ibid., 42). While the evocation of pain as something beyond discourse or hermeneutics poses an intricate problematic to antiessentialist politics,22 the same mechanism—the mobilization of pain as nondiscursive—interests my project as a crucial discursive maneuver within hegemonic recognitions of pain in marginalized bodies. [/INST] <h4>The demand for <u>recognition</u> of the aff’s articulation of suffering by a ballot creates a <u>wounded attachment</u>—identity constituted by a <u>vengeful redress</u> for injuries caused by the <u>same dominant structures they demand recognition from</u>—this reestablishes the hegemony of racism as necessary to comprehend and address the suffering of subjugated bodies and maintains the violence of humanism</h4><p><strong>Strick 14</strong>—Postdoctoral Researcher at the Center for Literary and Cultural Research Berlin</p><p>(Simon, “WHAT IS DOLOROLOGY?”, American Dolorologies<u><strong> pg 11-13, dml)</p><p></u></strong>Apart from these historical frames, which will be investigated in the fol‐ lowing chapters, my analysis of the discursive mobilization of pain further implies a crucial epistemological consideration that speaks to contemporary theoretical and political constellations. While American Dolorologies pri‐ marily proposes a historicizing genealogy to present‐day diagnoses such as “wound culture” or “trauma culture,” the ambivalences of pain’s evocation also partakes in debates that surround late modern narratives of pain and their political deployment. One crucial aspect concerns the ongoing identi‐ fication of painful experience with the “nondiscursive”—what Elaine Scarry in her classic book The Body in Pain has called pain’s “unspeakability” (1985, 4).17 As pointed out in relation to James Young Simpson’s compassionate recognition of slave pain and female pain, sentimental discourse installs a fundamental discontinuity between “being in pain” and “speaking” it: the sympathetic doctor articulates an experience, which those suffering can only utter in “shrieking.” <u><strong><mark>Pain</u></strong></mark>, in other words, <u><strong><mark>is discursively mobilized</mark> on behalf of bodies that are constructed as unable to speak their pain</u></strong>. <u><strong>Humanitarian discourse</u></strong> in other words <u><strong>risks to affirm the speechlessness of those suffering under its exclusionary mechanisms</u></strong> precisely <u><strong>through the discursive articula‐ tion of unspeakable pain in “other bodies.” <mark>The articulation and recognition of</u></strong></mark> pain and <u><strong><mark>suffering</u></strong> <u><strong>within the </mark>intimate <mark>public sphere</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>is not tantamount to</mark> the oppressed subject’s <mark>emancipation</mark> from it</u></strong>, as Lauren Berlant’s polemic points out: <u><strong>“[T]he <mark>recognition by the dominant culture</u></strong></mark> of certain sites <u><strong>of publicized subaltern suffering is frequently (mis)taken as a big step toward the amelioration of that suffering. It <mark>is a baby step, if that</u></strong></mark>” (2000, 33). <u><strong>Recognition</u></strong>, I propose, <u><strong>is</u></strong> rather <u><strong>a double‐edged process</u></strong> of “promise and damage” (Seitler 2003, 83) <u><strong>within discourse itself—a rhetorical maneu‐ ver that</u></strong> simultaneously <u><strong>constructs pain as an “exceptional” and “unspeak‐ able” phenomenon changing the rules of discourse toward inclusion</u></strong>, and reinscribes the norms of recognition, experience, and the intelligibility of bodies and subjects. This perspective takes up contemporary criticism of the problematic linkage of minority discourses with narratives of trauma and the representational and political dilemmas arising from this connection. Feminist scholars18 have diagnosed and criticized this nexus—termed by some as the victimology‐tradition of feminism19—and its function within late modern cultural economies. All detect <u><strong><mark>a fundamental ambivalence that emerges when identities and their claims to social recognition are</mark> predomi‐ nantly <mark>depending on a “logics of pain</mark>”</u></strong> (Bell 2000, 60). Especially Wendy Brown’s influential States of Injury (1995) has explored the nexus of pain and subjectivity as the central problem of contemporary identity politics. In her argument, <u><strong>minority discourses and the hegemonic institutions recognizing them</u></strong> increasingly<strong> <u>pursue <mark>a “moralizing politics”</mark> that <mark>aims at</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>developing a righteous critique of power from the perspective of the injured [and </mark>thus] <mark>delimits a specific site of blame for suffering</mark> by constituting sovereign subjects</u></strong> and events <u><strong>as responsible for the “injury”</u></strong> of social subordination. <u><strong><mark>It fixes the identities of the injured and the injuring as social positions</u></strong></mark>. (Brown 1995, 27) <u><strong>Both marginalized and hegemonic <mark>discourses</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>rely on the politicization of personal experiences of pain,</mark> a strategy <mark>that</u></strong></mark> for Brown <u><strong><mark>leads to a problematic “wounded attachment” within identitarian discourse, an equation of identity and trauma</u></strong>: “<u><strong>Politicized identity</u></strong></mark> . . . <u><strong><mark>enunciates itself</u></strong></mark>, makes claims for itself, <u><strong>only by entrenching</u></strong>, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing <u><strong>pain <mark>in</mark> its politics</u></strong>. . . . <u><strong><mark>a politics of recrimination that seeks to avenge the hurt even while it reaffirms it,</mark> discursively codifies it</u></strong>” (ibid., 74; my italics). <u><strong><mark>Claims to pain</u></strong></mark> not only <u><strong><mark>may</u></strong></mark> intervene in hegemonic discourse (and thus empower the project of identity politics), but also <u><strong><mark>produce subjectivities that are identified, normalized, and ultimately marginalized through that pain</u></strong></mark>.20 While this dialectic is crucial to the historical mobilizations of pain within sentimental discourse,21 Brown‘s observation on <u><strong>the “discursive codification” happening</u></strong> in testimonies of hurt, pain, and suffering <u><strong>points to a mechanism intrinsic to the performative process of articulating pain</u></strong>. As she argues on <u><strong><mark>narratives of painful experience</u></strong></mark> articulated within vari‐ ous strands of feminism, these always <u><strong><mark>evoke a particular notion of the body that is “nondiscursive”</u></strong>:</mark> “Within the confessional frame, <u><strong><mark>even when social construction is adopted as method</u></strong></mark> . . . <u><strong>‘feelings’ and ‘<mark>experiences’ acquire a status that is politically if not ontologically essentialist</u></strong></mark>—beyond hermeneu‐ tics” (ibid., 42). While the evocation of pain as something beyond discourse or hermeneutics poses an intricate problematic to antiessentialist politics,22 the same mechanism—<u><strong>the mobilization of pain as nondiscursive</u></strong>—interests my project <u><strong>as a crucial discursive maneuver within hegemonic recognitions of pain in marginalized bodies.</p></u></strong> </s>

This implicates their role of the ballot argument -- the notion of their Chandler evidence is based upon the demand to create an “inclusive community” Inclusion of their narration in the debate space is an empty act of tolerance that ensures that nothing really changes

postcolonial studies" tend to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of the colonized minorities' "right to narrate" their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms which repress "otherness," at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the Other rooted in our intolerance toward the "Stranger in Ourselves," in our inability to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves The politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudo-psychoanalytic drama of the subject The true corruption of American academia is not primarily financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals but conceptual practically all of the "radical" academics silently count on the long-term stability of the American capitalist model If there is a thing they are genuinely horrified of, it is a radical shattering of the (relatively) safe life environment of the "symbolic classes" in the developed Western societies. Their excessive Politically Correct zeal when dealing with sexism, racism is ultimately a defense against their own innermost identification, a kind of compulsive ritual whose hidden logic is: Let's talk as much as possible about the necessity of a radical change to make sure that nothing will really change!" pseudo-radical academic Leftists adopt toward the Third Way the attitude of utter disdain, while their own radicality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obligates no one to anything determinate What we get instead of the universal truth is a multitude of perspectives or narratives stories we tell ourselves about ourselves and the ultimate goal is to guarantee the neutral space in which this multitude of narratives can peacefully coexist in which everyone, from ethnic to sexual minorities, will have the right and possibility to tell his/her story.

postcolonial studies" tend to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of colonized minorities' "right to narrate" their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms which repress "otherness at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the Other The politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudo-psychoanalytic drama of the subject The true corruption of American academia is not financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals but conceptual Let's talk as much as possible about the necessity of a radical change to make sure that nothing will really change their own radicality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obligates no one to anything determinate What we get instead of the universal truth is a multitude of narratives stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, and the ultimate goal is to guarantee the neutral space in which this multitude of narratives can peacefully coexist, in which everyone, from ethnic to sexual minorities, will have the right and possibility to tell story

Let us take two predominant topics of to day's American radical academia: postcolonial and queer (gay) studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, "postcolonial studies" tend to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of the colonized minorities' "right to narrate" their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms which repress "otherness," so that, at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the Other, and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in our intolerance toward the "Stranger in Ourselves," in our inability to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves. The politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudo-psychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to confront its inner traumas ... The true corruption of American academia is not primarily financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals (myself included – up to a point), but conceptual: notions of "European" critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of Cultural Studies chic. My personal experience is that practically all of the "radical" academics silently count on the long-term stability of the American capitalist model, with the secure tenured position as their ultimate professional goal (a surprising number of them even play on the stock market). If there is a thing they are genuinely horrified of, it is a radical shattering of the (relatively) safe life environment of the "symbolic classes" in the developed Western societies. Their excessive Politically Correct zeal when dealing with sexism, racism, Third World sweatshops, etc., is thus ultimately a defense against their own innermost identification, a kind of compulsive ritual whose hidden logic is: "Let's talk as much as possible about the necessity of a radical change to make sure that nothing will really change!" Symptomatic here is the journal October: when you ask one of the editors to what the title refers, they will half-confidentially signal that it is, of course, that October – in this way, one can indulge in the jargonistic analyses of modern art, with the hidden assurance that one is somehow retaining the link with the radical revolutionary past ... With regard to this radical chic, the first gesture toward Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be that of praise: they at least play their game straight and are honest in their acceptance of global capitalist coordinates, in contrast to the pseudo-radical academic Leftists who adopt toward the Third Way the attitude of utter disdain, while their own radicality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obligates no one to anything determinate. II. From Human to Animal Rights We live in the "postmodern" era in which truth claims as such are dismissed as an expression of hidden power mechanisms – as the reborn pseudo-Nietzscheans like to emphasize, truth is a lie which is most efficient in asserting our will to power. The very question "Is it true?" apropos of some statement is supplanted by another question: "Under what power conditions can this statement be uttered?" What we get instead of the universal truth is a multitude of perspectives, or, as it is fashionable to put it today, of "narratives" – not only of literature, but also of politics, religion, science, they are all different narratives, stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, and the ultimate goal of ethics is to guarantee the neutral space in which this multitude of narratives can peacefully coexist, in which everyone, from ethnic to sexual minorities, will have the right and possibility to tell his/her story. The two philosophers of today's global capitalism are the two great Left-liberal "progressives," Richard Rorty and Peter Singer – honest in their respective stances. Rorty defines the basic coordinates: the fundamental dimension of a human being is the ability to suffer, to experience pain and humiliation – consequently, since humans are symbolic animals, the fundamental right is the right to narrate one's experience of suffering and humiliation.2 Singer then provides the Darwinian background.3

<h4>This implicates their role of the ballot argument -- the notion of their Chandler evidence is based upon the demand to create an “inclusive community” Inclusion of their narration in the debate space is an empty act of tolerance that ensures that nothing really changes</h4><p><strong><mark>Zizek 8</strong></mark>—Institute for Social Sciences, Ljubljana (Slavoj, The Prospects of Radical Politics Today, Int’l Journal of Baudrillard Studies, 5;1)</p><p>Let us take two predominant topics of to day's American radical academia: postcolonial and queer (gay) studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, "<u><strong><mark>postcolonial studies" tend to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of</mark> the <mark>colonized minorities' "right to narrate" their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms which repress "otherness</mark>,"</u></strong> so that, <u><strong><mark>at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the Other</u></strong></mark>, and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is <u><strong>rooted in our intolerance toward the "Stranger in Ourselves," in our inability to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudo-psychoanalytic drama of the subject</u></strong></mark> unable to confront its inner traumas ... <u><strong><mark>The true corruption of American academia is not</mark> primarily <mark>financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals</u></strong></mark> (myself included – up to a point), <u><strong><mark>but conceptual</u></strong></mark>: notions of "European" critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of Cultural Studies chic. My personal experience is that <u><strong>practically all of the "radical" academics silently count on the long-term stability of the American capitalist model</u></strong>, with the secure tenured position as their ultimate professional goal (a surprising number of them even play on the stock market). <u><strong>If there is a thing they are genuinely horrified of, it is a radical shattering of the (relatively) safe life environment of the "symbolic classes" in the developed Western societies. Their excessive Politically Correct zeal when dealing with sexism, racism</u></strong>, Third World sweatshops, etc., <u><strong>is</u></strong> thus <u><strong>ultimately a defense against their own innermost identification, a kind of compulsive ritual whose hidden logic is: </u></strong>"<u><strong><mark>Let's talk as much as possible about the necessity of a radical change to make sure that nothing will really change</mark>!" </u></strong>Symptomatic here is the journal October: when you ask one of the editors to what the title refers, they will half-confidentially signal that it is, of course, that October – in this way, one can indulge in the jargonistic analyses of modern art, with the hidden assurance that one is somehow retaining the link with the radical revolutionary past ... With regard to this radical chic, the first gesture toward Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be that of praise: they at least play their game straight and are honest in their acceptance of global capitalist coordinates, in contrast to the <u><strong>pseudo-radical academic Leftists</u></strong> who <u><strong>adopt toward the Third Way the attitude of utter disdain, while <mark>their own radicality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obligates no one to anything determinate</u></strong></mark>. II. From Human to Animal Rights We live in the "postmodern" era in which truth claims as such are dismissed as an expression of hidden power mechanisms – as the reborn pseudo-Nietzscheans like to emphasize, truth is a lie which is most efficient in asserting our will to power. The very question "Is it true?" apropos of some statement is supplanted by another question: "Under what power conditions can this statement be uttered?" <u><strong><mark>What we get instead of the universal truth is a multitude of </mark>perspectives</u></strong>, <u><strong>or</u></strong>, as it is fashionable to put it today, of "<u><strong><mark>narratives</u></strong></mark>" – not only of literature, but also of politics, religion, science, they are all different narratives, <u><strong><mark>stories we tell ourselves about ourselves</u></strong>, <u><strong>and the ultimate goal</u></strong></mark> of ethics <u><strong><mark>is to guarantee the neutral space in which this multitude of narratives can peacefully coexist</u></strong>, <u><strong>in which everyone, from ethnic to sexual minorities, will have the right and possibility to tell</mark> his/her <mark>story</mark>. </u></strong>The two philosophers of today's global capitalism are the two great Left-liberal "progressives," Richard Rorty and Peter Singer – honest in their respective stances. Rorty defines the basic coordinates: the fundamental dimension of a human being is the ability to suffer, to experience pain and humiliation – consequently, since humans are symbolic animals, the fundamental right is the right to narrate one's experience of suffering and humiliation.2 Singer then provides the Darwinian background.3 </p>

Zizek 8—Institute for Social Sciences, Ljubljana (Slavoj, The Prospects of Radical Politics Today, Int’l Journal of Baudrillard Studies, 5;1)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Zizek 8—Institute for Social Sciences, Ljubljana (Slavoj, The Prospects of Radical Politics Today, Int’l Journal of Baudrillard Studies, 5;1) fulltext: Let us take two predominant topics of to day's American radical academia: postcolonial and queer (gay) studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, "postcolonial studies" tend to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of the colonized minorities' "right to narrate" their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms which repress "otherness," so that, at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the Other, and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in our intolerance toward the "Stranger in Ourselves," in our inability to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves. The politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudo-psychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to confront its inner traumas ... The true corruption of American academia is not primarily financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals (myself included – up to a point), but conceptual: notions of "European" critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of Cultural Studies chic. My personal experience is that practically all of the "radical" academics silently count on the long-term stability of the American capitalist model, with the secure tenured position as their ultimate professional goal (a surprising number of them even play on the stock market). If there is a thing they are genuinely horrified of, it is a radical shattering of the (relatively) safe life environment of the "symbolic classes" in the developed Western societies. Their excessive Politically Correct zeal when dealing with sexism, racism, Third World sweatshops, etc., is thus ultimately a defense against their own innermost identification, a kind of compulsive ritual whose hidden logic is: "Let's talk as much as possible about the necessity of a radical change to make sure that nothing will really change!" Symptomatic here is the journal October: when you ask one of the editors to what the title refers, they will half-confidentially signal that it is, of course, that October – in this way, one can indulge in the jargonistic analyses of modern art, with the hidden assurance that one is somehow retaining the link with the radical revolutionary past ... With regard to this radical chic, the first gesture toward Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be that of praise: they at least play their game straight and are honest in their acceptance of global capitalist coordinates, in contrast to the pseudo-radical academic Leftists who adopt toward the Third Way the attitude of utter disdain, while their own radicality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obligates no one to anything determinate. II. From Human to Animal Rights We live in the "postmodern" era in which truth claims as such are dismissed as an expression of hidden power mechanisms – as the reborn pseudo-Nietzscheans like to emphasize, truth is a lie which is most efficient in asserting our will to power. The very question "Is it true?" apropos of some statement is supplanted by another question: "Under what power conditions can this statement be uttered?" What we get instead of the universal truth is a multitude of perspectives, or, as it is fashionable to put it today, of "narratives" – not only of literature, but also of politics, religion, science, they are all different narratives, stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, and the ultimate goal of ethics is to guarantee the neutral space in which this multitude of narratives can peacefully coexist, in which everyone, from ethnic to sexual minorities, will have the right and possibility to tell his/her story. The two philosophers of today's global capitalism are the two great Left-liberal "progressives," Richard Rorty and Peter Singer – honest in their respective stances. Rorty defines the basic coordinates: the fundamental dimension of a human being is the ability to suffer, to experience pain and humiliation – consequently, since humans are symbolic animals, the fundamental right is the right to narrate one's experience of suffering and humiliation.2 Singer then provides the Darwinian background.3 [/INST] <h4>This implicates their role of the ballot argument -- the notion of their Chandler evidence is based upon the demand to create an “inclusive community” Inclusion of their narration in the debate space is an empty act of tolerance that ensures that nothing really changes</h4><p><strong><mark>Zizek 8</strong></mark>—Institute for Social Sciences, Ljubljana (Slavoj, The Prospects of Radical Politics Today, Int’l Journal of Baudrillard Studies, 5;1)</p><p>Let us take two predominant topics of to day's American radical academia: postcolonial and queer (gay) studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, "<u><strong><mark>postcolonial studies" tend to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of</mark> the <mark>colonized minorities' "right to narrate" their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms which repress "otherness</mark>,"</u></strong> so that, <u><strong><mark>at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the Other</u></strong></mark>, and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is <u><strong>rooted in our intolerance toward the "Stranger in Ourselves," in our inability to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudo-psychoanalytic drama of the subject</u></strong></mark> unable to confront its inner traumas ... <u><strong><mark>The true corruption of American academia is not</mark> primarily <mark>financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals</u></strong></mark> (myself included – up to a point), <u><strong><mark>but conceptual</u></strong></mark>: notions of "European" critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of Cultural Studies chic. My personal experience is that <u><strong>practically all of the "radical" academics silently count on the long-term stability of the American capitalist model</u></strong>, with the secure tenured position as their ultimate professional goal (a surprising number of them even play on the stock market). <u><strong>If there is a thing they are genuinely horrified of, it is a radical shattering of the (relatively) safe life environment of the "symbolic classes" in the developed Western societies. Their excessive Politically Correct zeal when dealing with sexism, racism</u></strong>, Third World sweatshops, etc., <u><strong>is</u></strong> thus <u><strong>ultimately a defense against their own innermost identification, a kind of compulsive ritual whose hidden logic is: </u></strong>"<u><strong><mark>Let's talk as much as possible about the necessity of a radical change to make sure that nothing will really change</mark>!" </u></strong>Symptomatic here is the journal October: when you ask one of the editors to what the title refers, they will half-confidentially signal that it is, of course, that October – in this way, one can indulge in the jargonistic analyses of modern art, with the hidden assurance that one is somehow retaining the link with the radical revolutionary past ... With regard to this radical chic, the first gesture toward Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be that of praise: they at least play their game straight and are honest in their acceptance of global capitalist coordinates, in contrast to the <u><strong>pseudo-radical academic Leftists</u></strong> who <u><strong>adopt toward the Third Way the attitude of utter disdain, while <mark>their own radicality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obligates no one to anything determinate</u></strong></mark>. II. From Human to Animal Rights We live in the "postmodern" era in which truth claims as such are dismissed as an expression of hidden power mechanisms – as the reborn pseudo-Nietzscheans like to emphasize, truth is a lie which is most efficient in asserting our will to power. The very question "Is it true?" apropos of some statement is supplanted by another question: "Under what power conditions can this statement be uttered?" <u><strong><mark>What we get instead of the universal truth is a multitude of </mark>perspectives</u></strong>, <u><strong>or</u></strong>, as it is fashionable to put it today, of "<u><strong><mark>narratives</u></strong></mark>" – not only of literature, but also of politics, religion, science, they are all different narratives, <u><strong><mark>stories we tell ourselves about ourselves</u></strong>, <u><strong>and the ultimate goal</u></strong></mark> of ethics <u><strong><mark>is to guarantee the neutral space in which this multitude of narratives can peacefully coexist</u></strong>, <u><strong>in which everyone, from ethnic to sexual minorities, will have the right and possibility to tell</mark> his/her <mark>story</mark>. </u></strong>The two philosophers of today's global capitalism are the two great Left-liberal "progressives," Richard Rorty and Peter Singer – honest in their respective stances. Rorty defines the basic coordinates: the fundamental dimension of a human being is the ability to suffer, to experience pain and humiliation – consequently, since humans are symbolic animals, the fundamental right is the right to narrate one's experience of suffering and humiliation.2 Singer then provides the Darwinian background.3 </p> </s>

C SUBPOINT - The PARADOX OF RISK makes this issue NOT resolvable by weighing the plan.

If risk is  defined by potential loss, even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as loss goes to infinity risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down uncertainty is a precondition for catastrophies. without a warning we find meteorites. tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11. we do not know the most serious future threat, even absurd scenarios gain plausibility. By a chain , improbable events are linked "Although likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the impression is plausibility . The connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda was presented and refuted,  but this did not prevent the improbable yet possible connection Rumsfeld said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."

If risk is  defined by potential loss, even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as loss goes to infinity risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down even absurd scenarios gain plausibility. By a chain improbable events Although likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the impression is plausibility The connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda was refuted,  but this did not prevent the connection Rumsfeld said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence

The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to  "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. If the risk of terrorism is  defined in traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then  the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of  probabilities. The reason is that even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss goes to infinity.^o  The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to  overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences  beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution  of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches  infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there  is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down. Under the historical con-  dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could  be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be  achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new  condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since  knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely  absent.  The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter-  rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It  represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management  framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty.  Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; uncertainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophies. In particular, cata-  strophes happen at once, without a warning, but with major impli-  cations for the world polity. In this category, we find the impact of  meteorites. Mars attacks, the tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11.  To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the  formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap-  pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action  could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that  can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe  points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio-  nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the  responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre-  empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro-  phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was  responsible and whether it could have been prevented.  This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there  are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur-  ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex-  ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US  administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of  countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment  of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur-  rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the  security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties.  Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob-  lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate  dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply  nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New  Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that  "most striking is the fact that we do not even know who or what will  constitute the most serious future threat, "^i In order to cope with  this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote,  to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The  decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in  which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current  events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards"  and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They  justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability-  based defense planning strategy.53  The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that  even the most absurd scenarios can gain plausibility. By construct-  ing a chain of potentialities, improbable events are linked and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable.  "Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the residual impression is one of plausibility. "54 This so-called Oth-  ello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq.   The connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that the  US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin-  ning. False evidence was again and again presented and refuted,  but this did not prevent the administration from presenting as the  main rationale for war the improbable yet possible connection  between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet  possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear  weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald Rumsfeld  famously said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."  This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer-  tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where  security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.

<h4>C SUBPOINT - <strong>The PARADOX OF RISK makes this issue NOT resolvable by weighing the plan. </h4><p>Kessler 2008</strong> (Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232)</p><p>The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to  "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. <u><mark>If</u></mark> the <u><mark>risk</u></mark> of terrorism <u><mark>is  defined</mark> </u>in traditional terms <u><mark>by</mark> </u>probability and <u><mark>potential loss,</mark> </u>then  the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of  probabilities. The reason is that <u><mark>even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as</mark> </u>the measure of <u><mark>loss goes to infinity</u></mark>.^o  The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to  overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences  beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution  of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches  infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there  is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and <u><mark>risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down</u></mark>. Under the historical con-  dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could  be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be  achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new  condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since  knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely  absent.  The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter-  rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It  represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management  framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty.  Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; <u>uncertainty is a </u>crucial <u>precondition for catastrophies.</u> In particular, cata-  strophes happen at once, <u>without a warning</u>, but with major impli-  cations for the world polity. In this category, <u>we find </u>the impact of  <u>meteorites. </u>Mars attacks, the <u>tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11.</u>  To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the  formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap-  pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action  could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that  can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe  points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio-  nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the  responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre-  empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro-  phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was  responsible and whether it could have been prevented.  This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there  are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur-  ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex-  ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US  administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of  countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment  of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur-  rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the  security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties.  Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob-  lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate  dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply  nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New  Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that  "most striking is the fact that <u>we do not </u>even <u>know </u>who or what will  constitute <u>the most serious future threat, </u>"^i In order to cope with  this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote,  to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The  decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in  which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current  events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards"  and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They  justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability-  based defense planning strategy.53  The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that  <u><mark>even</mark> </u>the most <u><mark>absurd scenarios</mark> </u>can <u><mark>gain plausibility. By</mark> </u>construct-  ing <u><mark>a chain</mark> </u>of potentialities<u>, <mark>improbable events</mark> are linked </u>and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable.  <u>"<mark>Although</mark> </u>the <u><mark>likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the</mark> </u>residual <u><mark>impression is</mark> </u>one of <u><mark>plausibility</u></mark>. "54 This so-called Oth-  ello effect has been effective in the dawn of<u> </u>the recent war in Iraq<u>.</u>   <u><mark>The connection between Saddam</mark> </u>Hussein <u><mark>and Al Qaeda</mark> </u>that the  US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin-  ning. False evidence <u><mark>was</mark> </u>again and again <u>presented and <mark>refuted,  but this did not prevent</mark> </u>the administration from presenting as the  main rationale for war <u><mark>the</mark> improbable yet possible <mark>connection</mark>  </u>between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet  possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear  weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald <u><mark>Rumsfeld</mark> </u> famously <u><mark>said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence</mark>."</u>  This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer-  tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where  security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.</p>

Kessler 2008 (Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Kessler 2008 (Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232) fulltext: The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to  "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. If the risk of terrorism is  defined in traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then  the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of  probabilities. The reason is that even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss goes to infinity.^o  The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to  overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences  beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution  of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches  infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there  is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down. Under the historical con-  dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could  be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be  achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new  condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since  knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely  absent.  The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter-  rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It  represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management  framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty.  Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; uncertainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophies. In particular, cata-  strophes happen at once, without a warning, but with major impli-  cations for the world polity. In this category, we find the impact of  meteorites. Mars attacks, the tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11.  To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the  formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap-  pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action  could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that  can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe  points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio-  nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the  responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre-  empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro-  phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was  responsible and whether it could have been prevented.  This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there  are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur-  ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex-  ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US  administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of  countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment  of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur-  rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the  security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties.  Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob-  lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate  dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply  nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New  Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that  "most striking is the fact that we do not even know who or what will  constitute the most serious future threat, "^i In order to cope with  this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote,  to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The  decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in  which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current  events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards"  and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They  justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability-  based defense planning strategy.53  The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that  even the most absurd scenarios can gain plausibility. By construct-  ing a chain of potentialities, improbable events are linked and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable.  "Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the residual impression is one of plausibility. "54 This so-called Oth-  ello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq.   The connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that the  US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin-  ning. False evidence was again and again presented and refuted,  but this did not prevent the administration from presenting as the  main rationale for war the improbable yet possible connection  between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet  possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear  weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald Rumsfeld  famously said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."  This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer-  tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where  security problems can be assessed with relative certainty. [/INST] <h4>C SUBPOINT - <strong>The PARADOX OF RISK makes this issue NOT resolvable by weighing the plan. </h4><p>Kessler 2008</strong> (Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” Alternatives 33 (2008), 211-232)</p><p>The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to  "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. <u><mark>If</u></mark> the <u><mark>risk</u></mark> of terrorism <u><mark>is  defined</mark> </u>in traditional terms <u><mark>by</mark> </u>probability and <u><mark>potential loss,</mark> </u>then  the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of  probabilities. The reason is that <u><mark>even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as</mark> </u>the measure of <u><mark>loss goes to infinity</u></mark>.^o  The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to  overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences  beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution  of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches  infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there  is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and <u><mark>risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down</u></mark>. Under the historical con-  dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could  be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be  achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new  condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since  knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely  absent.  The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter-  rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It  represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management  framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty.  Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; <u>uncertainty is a </u>crucial <u>precondition for catastrophies.</u> In particular, cata-  strophes happen at once, <u>without a warning</u>, but with major impli-  cations for the world polity. In this category, <u>we find </u>the impact of  <u>meteorites. </u>Mars attacks, the <u>tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11.</u>  To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the  formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap-  pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action  could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that  can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe  points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio-  nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the  responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre-  empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro-  phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was  responsible and whether it could have been prevented.  This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there  are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur-  ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex-  ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US  administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of  countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment  of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur-  rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the  security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties.  Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob-  lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate  dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply  nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New  Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that  "most striking is the fact that <u>we do not </u>even <u>know </u>who or what will  constitute <u>the most serious future threat, </u>"^i In order to cope with  this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote,  to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The  decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in  which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current  events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards"  and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They  justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability-  based defense planning strategy.53  The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that  <u><mark>even</mark> </u>the most <u><mark>absurd scenarios</mark> </u>can <u><mark>gain plausibility. By</mark> </u>construct-  ing <u><mark>a chain</mark> </u>of potentialities<u>, <mark>improbable events</mark> are linked </u>and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable.  <u>"<mark>Although</mark> </u>the <u><mark>likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step,  the</mark> </u>residual <u><mark>impression is</mark> </u>one of <u><mark>plausibility</u></mark>. "54 This so-called Oth-  ello effect has been effective in the dawn of<u> </u>the recent war in Iraq<u>.</u>   <u><mark>The connection between Saddam</mark> </u>Hussein <u><mark>and Al Qaeda</mark> </u>that the  US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin-  ning. False evidence <u><mark>was</mark> </u>again and again <u>presented and <mark>refuted,  but this did not prevent</mark> </u>the administration from presenting as the  main rationale for war <u><mark>the</mark> improbable yet possible <mark>connection</mark>  </u>between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet  possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear  weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald <u><mark>Rumsfeld</mark> </u> famously <u><mark>said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence</mark>."</u>  This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer-  tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where  security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.</p> </s>

Politics of life affirmation deprives death of value - that destroys all value-making capacity and joy

What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself. death is the source of value. The fact that life has an end means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite it depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject The struggle to assert the importance of death – the act of being in love with death is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns. This is why Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life. Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist. The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. The limit of this project is its own infinitude. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. the space for the creation of value disappears. But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.

We must imagine there is an appeal in death itself. death is the source of value. Without the value that death provides, neither love ice cream friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have worth Having infinite time we have no incentive to opt for these experiences We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. experience depends on the limits of finitude The struggle to assert the importance of death is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself They privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death which But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation death provides life becomes bereft of value The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from not from scarcity or death. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object We seek satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the structure this infinite universe is established through repression Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate.

On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims of imperialist power.
 4 We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself. Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because death is the source of value.5 The fact that life has an end, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth whatsoever. Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, it nonetheless depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. The struggle to assert the importance of death – the act of being in love with death, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.6 This is exactly why Martin Heidegger attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death, which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value.8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.9 Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.10 The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much. The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. The limit of this project is, paradoxically, its own infinitude. It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite -the infinite of modernity- depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, the space for the creation of value disappears. Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.

<h4><u><strong>Politics of life affirmation deprives death of value - that destroys all value-making capacity and joy </h4><p></u>McGowan 13</strong> (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 223-227)</p><p>On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. <u><strong>What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.</u></strong>3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. <u><strong>Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims</u></strong> of imperialist power.
 4 <u><strong><mark>We must imagine</mark> that for subjects such as these <mark>there is an appeal in death itself.</mark> </u></strong>Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because <u><strong><mark>death is the source of value.</u></strong></mark>5 <u><strong>The fact that life has an end</u></strong>, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, <u><strong>means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. <mark>Without the value that death provides, neither love</mark> nor <mark>ice cream</mark> nor <mark>friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have</mark> any special <mark>worth</u></strong></mark> whatsoever. <u><strong><mark>Having</mark> an <mark>infinite</mark> amount of <mark>time</mark>, <mark>we</mark> would <mark>have no incentive to opt for these experiences</mark> rather than other ones. <mark>We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living.</mark> Even though enjoyment itself is an <mark>experience</mark> of the infinite</u></strong>, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, <u><strong>it</u></strong> nonetheless <u><strong><mark>depends on the limits of finitude</mark>. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject</u></strong>, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. <u><strong><mark>The struggle to assert the importance of death</mark> – the act of being in love with death</u></strong>, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – <u><strong><mark>is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.</u></strong></mark>6 <u><strong>This is</u></strong> exactly <u><strong>why</u></strong> Martin <u><strong>Heidegger</u></strong> attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger <u><strong>sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us.</u></strong> As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. <u><strong><mark>By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters</mark> to us. But of course the <mark>partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself</mark>. <mark>They</mark> simply <mark>privilege life over death</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and see the world in terms of life</mark> <mark>rather than death</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>which</mark> would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. <mark>But this is not what happens.</mark> <mark>By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world.</mark> <mark>Without the mediation</mark> that <mark>death provides</mark>, the system of pure <mark>life becomes</mark> a system utterly <mark>bereft of value</mark>.</u></strong>8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. <u><strong>Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.</u></strong>9 <u><strong>Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion.</u></strong> The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. <u><strong>After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.</u></strong>10 <u><strong>The same dynamic is visible with capitalism.</u></strong> As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 <u><strong>Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much.</u></strong> The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. <u><strong><mark>The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from</mark> excess, <mark>not from scarcity or death.</u></strong></mark> Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. <u><strong>The limit of this project is</u></strong>, paradoxically, <u><strong>its own infinitude.</u></strong> It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. <u><strong><mark>We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object</mark> and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite</u></strong> -the infinite of modernity- <u><strong>depends on a fundamental misrecognition.</u></strong> We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. <u><strong><mark>We seek</mark> the commodity that would finally bring us complete <mark>satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the</mark> commodity <mark>structure</u></strong></mark>, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, <u><strong>scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory</u></strong>, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, <u><strong>the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies</u></strong>; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. <u><strong>The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death.</u></strong> As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, <u><strong>the space for the creation of value disappears.</u></strong> Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 <u><strong>But <mark>this infinite universe is established through</mark> the <mark>repression</mark> of finitude. <mark>Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate.</u></strong></mark> As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 <u><strong>Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.</u></strong> </p>

McGowan 13 (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 223-227)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: McGowan 13 (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 223-227) fulltext: On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims of imperialist power.
 4 We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself. Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because death is the source of value.5 The fact that life has an end, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth whatsoever. Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, it nonetheless depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. The struggle to assert the importance of death – the act of being in love with death, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.6 This is exactly why Martin Heidegger attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death, which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value.8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.9 Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.10 The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much. The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. The limit of this project is, paradoxically, its own infinitude. It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite -the infinite of modernity- depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, the space for the creation of value disappears. Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses. [/INST] <h4><u><strong>Politics of life affirmation deprives death of value - that destroys all value-making capacity and joy </h4><p></u>McGowan 13</strong> (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 223-227)</p><p>On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. <u><strong>What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.</u></strong>3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. <u><strong>Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims</u></strong> of imperialist power.
 4 <u><strong><mark>We must imagine</mark> that for subjects such as these <mark>there is an appeal in death itself.</mark> </u></strong>Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because <u><strong><mark>death is the source of value.</u></strong></mark>5 <u><strong>The fact that life has an end</u></strong>, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, <u><strong>means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. <mark>Without the value that death provides, neither love</mark> nor <mark>ice cream</mark> nor <mark>friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have</mark> any special <mark>worth</u></strong></mark> whatsoever. <u><strong><mark>Having</mark> an <mark>infinite</mark> amount of <mark>time</mark>, <mark>we</mark> would <mark>have no incentive to opt for these experiences</mark> rather than other ones. <mark>We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living.</mark> Even though enjoyment itself is an <mark>experience</mark> of the infinite</u></strong>, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, <u><strong>it</u></strong> nonetheless <u><strong><mark>depends on the limits of finitude</mark>. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject</u></strong>, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. <u><strong><mark>The struggle to assert the importance of death</mark> – the act of being in love with death</u></strong>, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – <u><strong><mark>is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.</u></strong></mark>6 <u><strong>This is</u></strong> exactly <u><strong>why</u></strong> Martin <u><strong>Heidegger</u></strong> attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger <u><strong>sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us.</u></strong> As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. <u><strong><mark>By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters</mark> to us. But of course the <mark>partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself</mark>. <mark>They</mark> simply <mark>privilege life over death</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and see the world in terms of life</mark> <mark>rather than death</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>which</mark> would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. <mark>But this is not what happens.</mark> <mark>By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world.</mark> <mark>Without the mediation</mark> that <mark>death provides</mark>, the system of pure <mark>life becomes</mark> a system utterly <mark>bereft of value</mark>.</u></strong>8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. <u><strong>Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.</u></strong>9 <u><strong>Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion.</u></strong> The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. <u><strong>After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.</u></strong>10 <u><strong>The same dynamic is visible with capitalism.</u></strong> As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 <u><strong>Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much.</u></strong> The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. <u><strong><mark>The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from</mark> excess, <mark>not from scarcity or death.</u></strong></mark> Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. <u><strong>The limit of this project is</u></strong>, paradoxically, <u><strong>its own infinitude.</u></strong> It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. <u><strong><mark>We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object</mark> and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite</u></strong> -the infinite of modernity- <u><strong>depends on a fundamental misrecognition.</u></strong> We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. <u><strong><mark>We seek</mark> the commodity that would finally bring us complete <mark>satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the</mark> commodity <mark>structure</u></strong></mark>, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, <u><strong>scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory</u></strong>, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, <u><strong>the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies</u></strong>; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. <u><strong>The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death.</u></strong> As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, <u><strong>the space for the creation of value disappears.</u></strong> Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 <u><strong>But <mark>this infinite universe is established through</mark> the <mark>repression</mark> of finitude. <mark>Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate.</u></strong></mark> As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 <u><strong>Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.</u></strong> </p> </s>

The affirmatives rhetoric of resistance towards power relations misunderstands the modern ways in which power operates. Power no longer resonates on a fixed, sovereign center that can be located by critique, rather, it exists as a product of simulation that is constantly expanding, innovating and self-regenerating. Their critique only dignifies power's claim on reality by creating a pulsing flow of libidinal, revolutionary desire which does nothing more than replicate and expand the logic of Capital --- polemical negation exposes not the truth of power's reality, but the truth of its simulation

Baudrillard pronounces reality dead a murder of the real The crime was almost perfect Almost perfect, except that the play of appearances betrays the secret: that there is nothing behind the play of appearances. Baudrillard can be understood at two levels as a critique of critique and as a polemic against critique Marx haunts both as the unnamed counter-force to the rhetoric of resistance in the form of energy, circulation, flow desire. "Foucault" was already a name for radical modes of historical analysis: "archaeology" and "genealogy." In Foucault's name, History became a matter and problem of discourse and representation Power was seen as a discourse-effect Because discourse is de-centered and circulatory the model of power and thus its critique now turned on notions of dispersal, diffusion and flow over and against the prior model of power as a fixed entity—the sovereign center—of historical, social, and political reality. Baudrillard takes this Foucauldian premise as his starting point The appearance of discourse necessitates a new theoretical economy that, like the loss of the gold standard in the monetary economy must presume the dissolution of the concept of reality as the foundational principle of any and all critical and historiographic production if it is possible to talk with such definitive understanding about power sexuality the body and discipline it is because at some point all this here and now is over with History is now in "a state of simulation." What the truth-effects of Foucault's discourse produces as all discourse does are forms of power: it "is a mirror of the powers it describes." Foucault's historiography is charged with ultimately mythologizing power into a truth a reality The very process of critique thus inflates the sphere of power a power that for Baudrillard is solely the power or power's appearance The acknowledgment of this complicity with power however is what is missing in those who follow in Foucault's footsteps The Foucauldians "pass right by this mythic arrangement to end up with the truth, nothing but the truth What is needed is to expose not the truth of power's reality, but the truth of its simulation Foucault unmasks all the final or causal illusions concerning power, but he does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power itself It is this order of the simulacrum of power that Baudrillard announces as the contemporary crisis for critical resistance [A]fter a ceaseless expansion of several centuries [power is brutally exploding the sphere of power [and desire] is in the process of contracting from a star to a red dwarf, and then to black hole absorbing all the substance of the real Puffed up and valorized by organs like critique the sphere of simulacral power ceaselessly expands Critique dignifies power's claim on reality which in turn legitimates the continuance of critique Power and critique are thus trapped, for Baudrillard, in an unending self-regenerating, tautological spiral whose very movement perpetuates the reality-principle upon which the dialectic feeds Baudrillard not only critiques the state of critique but also the model of intellectual resistance it prescribes Resistance in body-politic is to take the form of novel ceaseless territorializing and deterritorializing fluxes continuous and polymorphous investments and divestments: a pulsing flow of libidinal, revolutionary desire is to sweep across and liberate social, psychical, sexual, and ultimately, political economies. this scheme can do nothing more than replicate and expand the logic of Capital This compulsion toward liquidity, flow, and an accelerated circulation of what is sexual or pertaining to the body is the exact replica of the force which rules market value: capital must circulate, gravity and any fixed point must disappear the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction. (3940) Opposing this critical strategy Baudrillard points to the unreality of money today its virtuality as a sign of the virtuality of the power/resistance social economy To recognize the virtual of Capital is the starting point for rethinking resistance From the immanence of liberalism to economic determinism there corresponds a "secret" history of the unreality of God, political power, and money Like a massive conspiracy the unreality of power has neither been openly acknowledged by power-elites but more problematically it has never been acknowledged by its critics Baudrillard's gesture amounts to a critique of critique the philosophical aim of the work as a critique of critique seems to run amuck in a crucial sense If by Forget Foucault Baudrillard means "forget critique," then what are we to make of Baudrillard's critique of reality? Does not Baudrillard's critique of reality do precisely what he accuses Foucault of doing with respect to power and Deleuze with respect to desire? Perhaps this apparent inconsistency is only an inconsistency insofar as it is solely critique that Baudrillard is doing in addition to a critique of critique Baudrillard is engaged in a polemic against critique For Baudrillard is nothing if not polemical and the aims of polemic and of critique belong to different orders of thought Polemic is not mere discussion It is impassioned. A polemic is war-like It does not seek to reach common ground Its aim is to overcome the opponent—to forget [them] him This fall from critique into polemic is not simply, or not only, a fall from philosophical grace into sophistry It is a fall into the beauty of writing into a writing enriched by polemic, paradox, and irony a writing marked by what Baudrillard describes as a "giddiness." (82-83) this is an incisive and urgent call to rethink the Foucauldian/Deleuzian belief in the revolutionary potential and potency of unbridled desire, liquidity, spontaneity, novelty, and ceaseless flow. Baudrillard rightly asks Is this not also the language of capital? "Desire is never far from capital," Perhaps Forget Foucault is a covert call for a return to Marx; a Marx after the murder of the real and the collapse of critique.

Baudrillard can be understood as a critique of critique and as a polemic against critique Marx haunts both as the counter-force to the rhetoric of resistance In Foucault's name Power was seen as discourse-effect Because discourse is de-centered power and its critique turned on notions of dispersal and flow over the prior model of power as fixed the sovereign center of reality The appearance of discourse necessitates a economy that like the loss of the gold standard in the economy must presume the dissolution of reality as the foundational principle of all critical production if it is possible to talk with such understanding about power sexuality the body, and discipline it is because this is over the effects of discourse produces as all discourse does are forms of power: it "is a mirror of the powers it describes." The very process of critique thus inflates the sphere of power The acknowledgment of this complicity with power is what is missing Foucauldians pass right by this arrangement to end up with nothing but the truth What is needed is to expose not the truth of power's reality but the truth of its simulation Foucault unmasks power but does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power itself is this power that Baudrillard announces as the crisis for resistance [A]fter a ceaseless expansion power is brutally exploding Puffed up and valorized by organs like critique power ceaselessly expands Critique dignifies power's claim on reality which legitimates the continuance of critique Power and critique are trapped in an unending self-regenerating, tautological spiral Baudrillard not only critiques the state of critique but the model of intellectual resistance it prescribes Resistance in body-politic is to take the form of novel ceaseless flux continuous investments a pulsing flow of revolutionary desire to liberate social sexual and political economies this scheme can do nothing more than replicate and expand the logic of Capital. This compulsion toward flow, and an accelerated what is sexual or pertaining to the body is the exact replica of the market capital must circulate any fixed point must disappear the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction Opposing this critical strategy Baudrillard points to the unreality of money its virtuality To recognize the virtual of Capital is the starting point for rethinking resistance the unreality of power and money has neither been acknowledged by critics the aim of critique of critique seems to run amuck If Baudrillard means "forget critique," then what are we to make of Baudrillard's critique this inconsistency is only an inconsistency insofar as it is solely critique that Baudrillard is doing Baudrillard is engaged in a polemic against critique the aims of polemic and critique belong to different orders of thought Polemic is discussion It is impassioned. A polemic is war-like It does not seek to reach common ground Its aim is to overcome the opponent—to forget [them] This fall from critique into polemic is not a fall into sophistry It is a fall into beauty enriched by polemic, paradox, and irony as a "giddiness." this is a urgent call to rethink belief in the revolutionary potential Is this not also the language of capital?

It was bold, to say the least, when in 1976 Jean Baudrillard sent his essay Forget Foucault to Critique where Foucault was an editor. Like a latter-day Zarathustra, Baudrillard pronounces not God, but what's just as shocking, reality dead; a murder of the real. The crime, he would later claim, was almost perfect. Almost perfect, except that the play of appearances betrays the secret: that there is nothing behind the play of appearances. These now familiar, yet still unsettling, motifs of Baudrillard's thought come to the fore in this biting, brilliant and bitter indictment of Foucault the man and name for a body of thought that in 1976 had achieved the respect of the French Academy and the intellectual avant-garde. Critique rejected the essay thereby securing for Baudrillard a succes de scandale. I will suggest that the essay can be understood at two levels: as a critique of critique and as a polemic against critique. Marx, I believe, haunts both as the unnamed counter-force to the then newly emergent poststructuralist rhetoric of resistance in the form of energy, circulation, flow... desire. In 1976, "Foucault" was already a name for radical modes of historical analysis: "archaeology" and "genealogy." In Foucault's name, History became a matter and problem of discourse and representation. Power, in turn, was seen as a discourse-effect. Because discourse is de-centered and circulatory, the model of power and thus its critique now turned on notions of dispersal, diffusion and flow over and against the prior model of power as a fixed entity—the sovereign center—of historical, social, and political reality. Baudrillard takes this Foucauldian premise as his starting point. The appearance of discourse on the scene of history necessitates, thinks Baudrillard, a new theoretical economy that, like the loss of the gold standard in the monetary economy, must presume the dissolution of the concept of reality, or more precisely the reality-principle, as the foundational principle and guarantor of any and all critical and historiographic production. In this respect, Baudrillard takes Foucault's elaborate historical narratives as symptomatic of the solely symbolic status of historical reality for us today. Baudrillard writes: "if it is possible to... talk with such definitive understanding about power, sexuality, the body, and discipline, even down to their most delicate metamorphoses, it is because at some point all this here and now is over with." (30) History is now in "a state of simulation." (72) The texture and beauty of Foucault's writing—a beauty that Baudrillard describes as being "too beautiful to be true" (30) —is what betrays this simulacral dimension. "Foucault's is not... a discourse of truth but a mythic discourse in the strong sense of the word, and I secretly believe that it has no illusions about the effect of truth it produces." (30) What the truth-effects of Foucault's discourse produces, as all discourse does, are forms of power: it "is a mirror of the powers it describes." (30) Thus, Foucault's historiography is charged with ultimately mythologizing power into a truth, or we could say, a reality. The very process of critique thus inflates the sphere of power—a power that for Baudrillard is solely the power or power's appearance. The acknowledgment of this complicity with power, however, "is what is missing in those who follow in Foucault's footsteps." (30) The Foucauldians "pass right by this mythic arrangement to end up with the truth, nothing but the truth." (30) What is needed, according to Baudrillard, is to expose not the truth of power's reality, but the truth of its simulation. "Foucault unmasks all the final or causal illusions concerning power, but he does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power itself." (50) It is this order of the simulacrum of power —that Baudrillard announces as the contemporary crisis for critical resistance. [A]fter a ceaseless expansion of several centuries [power] is brutally exploding [and consequently]... the sphere of power [and desire] is in the process of contracting from a star of first magnitude to a red dwarf, and then to black hole absorbing all the substance of the real. (59) Puffed up and valorized by organs like critique, the sphere of simulacral power ceaselessly expands. "Do you think that power, economy, sex—all the real's big numbers would have stood up one single instant without a fascination to support them?" (54) Critique dignifies power's claim on reality, which in turn legitimates the continuance of critique. Power and critique are thus trapped, for Baudrillard, in an unending, self-regenerating, tautological spiral whose very movement perpetuates the reality-principle upon which the dialectic feeds. Baudrillard not only critiques the state of critique in 1976, but also the model of intellectual resistance it prescribes. Here he also takes aim at Deleuze—seeing a suspect "collusion" between Foucauldian models of power and Deleuzian models of desire. "Foucault... has helped establish a systematic notion of power along the same operational lines as desire, just as Deleuze established a notion of desire along the lines of future forms of power." (36) Resistance in the Foucauldian/Deleuzian body-politic is to take the form of novel, ceaseless territorializing and deterritorializing fluxes, continuous and polymorphous investments and divestments: a pulsing flow of libidinal, revolutionary desire is to sweep across and liberate social, psychical, sexual, and ultimately, political economies. For Baudrillard, however, this scheme can do nothing more than replicate and expand the logic of Capital. This compulsion toward liquidity, flow, and an accelerated circulation of what is psychic, sexual or pertaining to the body is the exact replica of the force which rules market value: capital must circulate, gravity and any fixed point must disappear, the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction. (3940) Opposing this critical strategy, Baudrillard points to the unreality of money today, we might say its virtuality, as a sign of the virtuality of the power/resistance social economy. To recognize the virtual of Capital is, then, the starting point, thinks Baudrillard, for rethinking resistance as well. This secret of power’s lack of existence that the great politicians shared also belongs to the great bankers, who know that money is nothing, that money does not exist; and it also belonged to the great theologians and the inquisitors who knew that God does not exist, that God is dead. (64) From the transcendental political theology of Christendom to the immanence of liberalism, to economic determinism, there corresponds, Baudrillard asserts, a "secret" history of the unreality of God, political power, and money. Like a massive conspiracy perpetrated on history itself, the unreality of power (in all its forms) has neither been openly acknowledged by power-elites, but more problematically it has never been acknowledged by its critics. Considering that the essay was intended for the readership of Critique, Baudrillard's gesture amounts to a critique of critique, which, if it had been published in Critique, would have been the irony of ironies. While the irony is profound, the philosophical aim of the work—as a critique of critique—seems to run amuck in a crucial sense. If by Forget Foucault Baudrillard means "forget critique," then what are we to make of Baudrillard's critique of reality? Does not Baudrillard's critique of reality do precisely what he accuses Foucault of doing with respect to power and Deleuze with respect to desire? Does not Baudrillard's critique of reality reestablish, if only negatively, the philosophical claim of reality all over again; and as such does not his thought still operate within the horizon of the reality-principle, polemically spinning its wheels? Perhaps this apparent inconsistency is only an inconsistency insofar as it is solely critique that Baudrillard is doing. I would suggest that in addition to a critique of critique, Baudrillard is engaged in a polemic against critique. For Baudrillard is nothing if not polemical, and the aims of polemic and of critique belong to different orders of thought though they can, as they do in his essay, intersect. Polemic is not mere discussion. It is impassioned. A polemic, as its ancient Greek root meaning, polemikos denotes, is war-like. It does not seek to reach common ground. Its aim is to overcome the opponent—to forget [them] him. This fall from critique into polemic is not simply, or not only, a fall from philosophical grace into sophistry. It is a fall into the beauty of writing; into a writing enriched by polemic, paradox, and irony—a writing marked by what Baudrillard describes (in his interview with with Sylvere Lotringer included as an appendix and ironically titled, "Forget Baudrillard"), as a "giddiness." (82-83) It is unfortunate that this "giddiness" at times overwhelms what is, I believe, an incisive and urgent call to rethink the Foucauldian/Deleuzian belief in the revolutionary potential and potency of unbridled desire, liquidity, spontaneity, novelty, and ceaseless flow. Baudrillard rightly asks: Is this not also the language of capital? "Desire is never far from capital," (55) Baudrillard writes, and Baudrillard, one might say, is never far from Marx. Perhaps Forget Foucault, then, is a covert call for a return to Marx; a Marx for us today after the murder of the real and the collapse of critique.

<h4>The affirmatives rhetoric of resistance towards power relations misunderstands the modern ways in which power operates. Power no longer resonates on a fixed, sovereign center that can be located by critique, rather, it exists as a product of simulation that is constantly expanding, innovating and self-regenerating. Their critique only dignifies power's claim on reality by creating a pulsing flow of libidinal, revolutionary desire which does nothing more than replicate and expand the logic of Capital --- polemical negation exposes not the truth of power's reality, but the truth of its simulation </h4><p>Jonathan <strong>Fardy 12</strong>, PhD candidate at the University of Western Ontario of Canada and member of the Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism, “Review of Forget Foucault by Jean Baudrillard”, Foucault Studies, Issue 13, May 2012, pp. 184-187, [AB]</p><p>It was bold, to say the least, when in 1976 Jean Baudrillard sent his essay Forget Foucault to Critique where Foucault was an editor. Like a latter-day Zarathustra, <u><strong>Baudrillard pronounces</u></strong> not God, but what's just as shocking, <u><strong>reality dead</u></strong>; <u><strong>a murder of the real</u></strong>. <u><strong>The crime</u></strong>, he would later claim, <u><strong>was almost perfect</u></strong>. <u><strong>Almost perfect, except that the play of appearances betrays the secret: that there is nothing behind the play of appearances. </u></strong>These now familiar, yet still unsettling, motifs of Baudrillard's thought come to the fore in this biting, brilliant and bitter indictment of Foucault the man and name for a body of thought that in 1976 had achieved the respect of the French Academy and the intellectual avant-garde. Critique rejected the essay thereby securing for <u><strong><mark>Baudrillard</u></strong></mark> a succes de scandale. </p><p>I will suggest that the essay <u><strong><mark>can be understood</mark> at two levels</u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>as a critique of critique and as a polemic against critique</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Marx</u></strong></mark>, I believe, <u><strong><mark>haunts</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>both as the</mark> unnamed <mark>counter-force to the</u></strong></mark> then newly emergent poststructuralist <u><strong><mark>rhetoric of resistance</mark> in the form of energy, circulation, flow</u></strong>... <u><strong>desire. </p><p></u></strong>In 1976, <u><strong>"Foucault" was already a name for radical modes of historical analysis: "archaeology" and "genealogy." <mark>In Foucault's name</mark>, History became a matter and problem of discourse and representation</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Power</u></strong></mark>, in turn, <u><strong><mark>was seen as</mark> a <mark>discourse-effect</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Because discourse is de-centered</mark> and circulatory</u></strong>, <u><strong>the model of <mark>power and</mark> thus <mark>its critique</mark> now <mark>turned on notions of dispersal</mark>, diffusion <mark>and flow over</mark> and against <mark>the</mark> <mark>prior model of power as</mark> a <mark>fixed</mark> entity—<mark>the sovereign center</mark>—<mark>of</mark> historical, social, and political <mark>reality</mark>. </p><p>Baudrillard takes this Foucauldian premise as his starting point</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The appearance of discourse</u></strong></mark> on the scene of history <u><strong><mark>necessitates</u></strong></mark>, thinks Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>a</mark> new theoretical <mark>economy that</mark>, <mark>like the loss of the gold standard in the</mark> monetary <mark>economy</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>must presume the dissolution of</mark> the concept of <mark>reality</u></strong></mark>, or more precisely the reality-principle, <u><strong><mark>as the foundational principle</u></strong></mark> and guarantor <u><strong><mark>of</mark> any and <mark>all critical</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and historiographic</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>production</u></strong></mark>. In this respect, Baudrillard takes Foucault's elaborate historical narratives as symptomatic of the solely symbolic status of historical reality for us today. Baudrillard writes: "<u><strong><mark>if it is possible to</u></strong></mark>... <u><strong><mark>talk with such</mark> definitive <mark>understanding about power</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>sexuality</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the body</u></strong>, <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>discipline</u></strong></mark>, even down to their most delicate metamorphoses, <u><strong><mark>it is because</mark> at some point all <mark>this</mark> here and now <mark>is over</mark> with</u></strong>." (30) </p><p><u><strong>History is now in "a state of simulation."</u></strong> (72) The texture and beauty of Foucault's writing—a beauty that Baudrillard describes as being "too beautiful to be true" (30) —is what betrays this simulacral dimension. "Foucault's is not... a discourse of truth but a mythic discourse in the strong sense of the word, and I secretly believe that it has no illusions about the effect of truth it produces." (30) <u><strong>What <mark>the</mark> truth-<mark>effects of</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Foucault's <mark>discourse produces</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>as all discourse does</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>are forms of power: it "is a mirror of the powers it describes."</u></strong></mark> (30) Thus, <u><strong>Foucault's</u></strong> <u><strong>historiography is charged with ultimately mythologizing power into a truth</u></strong>, or we could say, <u><strong>a reality</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The very process of critique thus inflates the sphere of power</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>a power that for Baudrillard is solely the power or power's appearance</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>acknowledgment of this complicity with power</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>however</u></strong>, "<u><strong><mark>is what is missing</mark> in those who follow in Foucault's footsteps</u></strong>." (30) <u><strong>The <mark>Foucauldians</mark> "<mark>pass right by this</mark> mythic <mark>arrangement</mark> <mark>to end up with</mark> the truth, <mark>nothing but the truth</u></strong></mark>." (30) </p><p><u><strong><mark>What is needed</u></strong></mark>, according to Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>is to expose</mark> <mark>not the truth of power's reality</mark>, <mark>but the truth of its simulation</u></strong></mark>. "<u><strong><mark>Foucault unmasks</mark> all</u></strong> <u><strong>the final or causal illusions concerning <mark>power</mark>, <mark>but</mark> he <mark>does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power itself</u></strong></mark>." (50) <u><strong>It <mark>is this</mark> order of</u></strong> <u><strong>the simulacrum of <mark>power</u></strong></mark> —<u><strong><mark>that Baudrillard announces as the</mark> contemporary <mark>crisis for</mark> critical <mark>resistance</u></strong></mark>. </p><p><u><strong><mark>[A]fter a ceaseless expansion</mark> of several centuries [<mark>power</u></strong></mark>] <u><strong><mark>is brutally exploding</u></strong></mark> [and consequently]... <u><strong>the sphere of power [and desire] is in</u></strong> <u><strong>the process of contracting from a star </u></strong>of first magnitude <u><strong>to a red dwarf, and then to black hole absorbing all the substance of the real</u></strong>. (59) </p><p><u><strong><mark>Puffed up and valorized by organs like critique</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>the sphere of simulacral</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>power ceaselessly expands</u></strong></mark>. "Do you think that power, economy, sex—all the real's big numbers would have stood up one single instant without a fascination to support them?" (54) <u><strong><mark>Critique</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>dignifies power's</mark> <mark>claim on reality</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>which</mark> in turn <mark>legitimates the continuance of critique</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Power and critique are</mark> thus <mark>trapped</mark>, for Baudrillard,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>in an unending</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>self-regenerating, tautological spiral</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>whose very movement perpetuates the reality-principle upon which the dialectic feeds</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Baudrillard not only critiques the state of critique</u></strong></mark> in 1976, <u><strong><mark>but</mark> also <mark>the model of intellectual resistance it prescribes</u></strong></mark>. Here he also takes aim at Deleuze—seeing a suspect "collusion" between Foucauldian models of power and Deleuzian models of desire. "Foucault... has helped establish a systematic notion of power along the same operational lines as desire, just as Deleuze established a notion of desire along the lines of future forms of power." (36) </p><p><u><strong><mark>Resistance in</u></strong></mark> the Foucauldian/Deleuzian <u><strong><mark>body-politic is to take the form of novel</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>ceaseless</mark> territorializing and deterritorializing <mark>flux</mark>es</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>continuous</mark> and polymorphous <mark>investments</mark> and divestments: <mark>a pulsing flow of</mark> libidinal, <mark>revolutionary desire</mark> is <mark>to</mark> sweep across and <mark>liberate</mark> <mark>social</mark>, psychical, <mark>sexual</mark>, <mark>and</mark> ultimately, <mark>political economies</mark>.</u></strong> For Baudrillard, however, <u><strong><mark>this scheme can do nothing more than replicate and expand the logic of Capital</u></strong>.</mark> </p><p><u><strong><mark>This compulsion toward</mark> liquidity, <mark>flow, and an accelerated</mark> circulation of <mark>what is</mark> </u></strong>psychic,<u><strong> <mark>sexual or pertaining to the body</mark> <mark>is the</mark> <mark>exact replica</mark> <mark>of the</mark> force which rules <mark>market</mark> value: <mark>capital must circulate</mark>, gravity and <mark>any fixed point must disappear</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction</mark>. (3940)</p><p><mark>Opposing this critical strategy</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>Baudrillard points to the unreality of money</mark> today</u></strong>, we might say <u><strong><mark>its virtuality</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>as a sign of the virtuality of the power/resistance social economy</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>To recognize the virtual of Capital is</u></strong></mark>, then, <u><strong><mark>the starting point</u></strong></mark>, thinks Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>for rethinking resistance</mark> </u></strong>as well.<u><strong> </p><p></u></strong>This secret of power’s lack of existence that the great politicians shared also belongs to the great bankers, who know that money is nothing, that money does not exist; and it also belonged to the great theologians and the inquisitors who knew that God does not exist, that God is dead. (64) </p><p><u><strong>From</u></strong> the transcendental political theology of Christendom to <u><strong>the immanence of liberalism</u></strong>, <u><strong>to economic determinism</u></strong>, <u><strong>there corresponds</u></strong>, Baudrillard asserts, <u><strong>a "secret" history</u></strong> <u><strong>of <mark>the unreality of</mark> God, political <mark>power</mark>, <mark>and money</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Like a massive conspiracy</u></strong> perpetrated on history itself, <u><strong>the unreality of power</u></strong> (in all its forms) <u><strong><mark>has neither been</mark> openly <mark>acknowledged</mark> by power-elites</u></strong>, <u><strong>but more problematically</u></strong> <u><strong>it</u></strong> <u><strong>has never been acknowledged <mark>by</mark> its <mark>critics</u></strong></mark>. Considering that the essay was intended for the readership of Critique, <u><strong>Baudrillard's gesture amounts to a critique of critique</u></strong>, which, if it had been published in Critique, would have been the irony of ironies. </p><p>While the irony is profound, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> philosophical <mark>aim of</mark> the work</u></strong>—<u><strong>as a <mark>critique of critique</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>seems to run amuck</mark> in a crucial sense</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>If</mark> by Forget Foucault <mark>Baudrillard means "forget critique,"</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>then what are we to make of Baudrillard's critique</mark> of reality?</u></strong> <u><strong>Does not Baudrillard's critique of reality do precisely what he accuses Foucault of doing with respect to power and Deleuze with respect to desire?</u></strong> Does not Baudrillard's critique of reality reestablish, if only negatively, the philosophical claim of reality all over again; and as such does not his thought still operate within the horizon of the reality-principle, polemically spinning its wheels? </p><p><u><strong>Perhaps <mark>this</mark> apparent <mark>inconsistency is only an inconsistency</mark> <mark>insofar as it is solely critique that Baudrillard is doing</u></strong></mark>. I would suggest that <u><strong>in addition to a critique of critique</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>Baudrillard is engaged in a polemic against critique</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>For Baudrillard is nothing if not polemical</u></strong>, <u><strong>and <mark>the aims of polemic and</mark> of <mark>critique belong to different orders of thought</u></strong></mark> though they can, as they do in his essay, intersect. </p><p><u><strong><mark>Polemic is</mark> not mere <mark>discussion</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>It is impassioned. A polemic</u></strong></mark>, as its ancient Greek root meaning, polemikos denotes, <u><strong><mark>is war-like</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>It does not seek to reach common ground</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Its aim is to overcome the opponent—to forget [them]</mark> him</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This fall from critique</mark> <mark>into polemic is not</mark> simply, or not only, <mark>a fall</mark> from philosophical grace <mark>into sophistry</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>It is a fall into</mark> the <mark>beauty</mark> of writing</u></strong>; <u><strong>into a writing <mark>enriched</mark> <mark>by polemic, paradox, and irony</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>a writing marked by what Baudrillard describes</u></strong> (in his interview with with Sylvere Lotringer included as an appendix and ironically titled, "Forget Baudrillard"), <u><strong><mark>as a "giddiness."</mark> (82-83) </p><p></u></strong>It is unfortunate that <u><strong><mark>this</u></strong></mark> "giddiness" at times overwhelms what <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong></mark>, I believe, <u><strong><mark>a</mark>n incisive and <mark>urgent call to rethink</mark> the Foucauldian/Deleuzian</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>belief in the revolutionary potential</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and potency of unbridled desire, liquidity, spontaneity, novelty, and ceaseless flow.</u></strong> <u><strong>Baudrillard rightly asks</u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>Is this not also the language of capital?</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>"Desire is never far from capital,"</u></strong> (55) Baudrillard writes, and Baudrillard, one might say, is never far from Marx. <u><strong>Perhaps Forget Foucault</u></strong>, then, <u><strong>is a covert call for a return to Marx; a Marx</u></strong> for us today <u><strong>after the murder of the real and the collapse of critique. </p></u></strong>

Jonathan Fardy 12, PhD candidate at the University of Western Ontario of Canada and member of the Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism, “Review of Forget Foucault by Jean Baudrillard”, Foucault Studies, Issue 13, May 2012, pp. 184-187, [AB]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Jonathan Fardy 12, PhD candidate at the University of Western Ontario of Canada and member of the Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism, “Review of Forget Foucault by Jean Baudrillard”, Foucault Studies, Issue 13, May 2012, pp. 184-187, [AB] fulltext: It was bold, to say the least, when in 1976 Jean Baudrillard sent his essay Forget Foucault to Critique where Foucault was an editor. Like a latter-day Zarathustra, Baudrillard pronounces not God, but what's just as shocking, reality dead; a murder of the real. The crime, he would later claim, was almost perfect. Almost perfect, except that the play of appearances betrays the secret: that there is nothing behind the play of appearances. These now familiar, yet still unsettling, motifs of Baudrillard's thought come to the fore in this biting, brilliant and bitter indictment of Foucault the man and name for a body of thought that in 1976 had achieved the respect of the French Academy and the intellectual avant-garde. Critique rejected the essay thereby securing for Baudrillard a succes de scandale. I will suggest that the essay can be understood at two levels: as a critique of critique and as a polemic against critique. Marx, I believe, haunts both as the unnamed counter-force to the then newly emergent poststructuralist rhetoric of resistance in the form of energy, circulation, flow... desire. In 1976, "Foucault" was already a name for radical modes of historical analysis: "archaeology" and "genealogy." In Foucault's name, History became a matter and problem of discourse and representation. Power, in turn, was seen as a discourse-effect. Because discourse is de-centered and circulatory, the model of power and thus its critique now turned on notions of dispersal, diffusion and flow over and against the prior model of power as a fixed entity—the sovereign center—of historical, social, and political reality. Baudrillard takes this Foucauldian premise as his starting point. The appearance of discourse on the scene of history necessitates, thinks Baudrillard, a new theoretical economy that, like the loss of the gold standard in the monetary economy, must presume the dissolution of the concept of reality, or more precisely the reality-principle, as the foundational principle and guarantor of any and all critical and historiographic production. In this respect, Baudrillard takes Foucault's elaborate historical narratives as symptomatic of the solely symbolic status of historical reality for us today. Baudrillard writes: "if it is possible to... talk with such definitive understanding about power, sexuality, the body, and discipline, even down to their most delicate metamorphoses, it is because at some point all this here and now is over with." (30) History is now in "a state of simulation." (72) The texture and beauty of Foucault's writing—a beauty that Baudrillard describes as being "too beautiful to be true" (30) —is what betrays this simulacral dimension. "Foucault's is not... a discourse of truth but a mythic discourse in the strong sense of the word, and I secretly believe that it has no illusions about the effect of truth it produces." (30) What the truth-effects of Foucault's discourse produces, as all discourse does, are forms of power: it "is a mirror of the powers it describes." (30) Thus, Foucault's historiography is charged with ultimately mythologizing power into a truth, or we could say, a reality. The very process of critique thus inflates the sphere of power—a power that for Baudrillard is solely the power or power's appearance. The acknowledgment of this complicity with power, however, "is what is missing in those who follow in Foucault's footsteps." (30) The Foucauldians "pass right by this mythic arrangement to end up with the truth, nothing but the truth." (30) What is needed, according to Baudrillard, is to expose not the truth of power's reality, but the truth of its simulation. "Foucault unmasks all the final or causal illusions concerning power, but he does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power itself." (50) It is this order of the simulacrum of power —that Baudrillard announces as the contemporary crisis for critical resistance. [A]fter a ceaseless expansion of several centuries [power] is brutally exploding [and consequently]... the sphere of power [and desire] is in the process of contracting from a star of first magnitude to a red dwarf, and then to black hole absorbing all the substance of the real. (59) Puffed up and valorized by organs like critique, the sphere of simulacral power ceaselessly expands. "Do you think that power, economy, sex—all the real's big numbers would have stood up one single instant without a fascination to support them?" (54) Critique dignifies power's claim on reality, which in turn legitimates the continuance of critique. Power and critique are thus trapped, for Baudrillard, in an unending, self-regenerating, tautological spiral whose very movement perpetuates the reality-principle upon which the dialectic feeds. Baudrillard not only critiques the state of critique in 1976, but also the model of intellectual resistance it prescribes. Here he also takes aim at Deleuze—seeing a suspect "collusion" between Foucauldian models of power and Deleuzian models of desire. "Foucault... has helped establish a systematic notion of power along the same operational lines as desire, just as Deleuze established a notion of desire along the lines of future forms of power." (36) Resistance in the Foucauldian/Deleuzian body-politic is to take the form of novel, ceaseless territorializing and deterritorializing fluxes, continuous and polymorphous investments and divestments: a pulsing flow of libidinal, revolutionary desire is to sweep across and liberate social, psychical, sexual, and ultimately, political economies. For Baudrillard, however, this scheme can do nothing more than replicate and expand the logic of Capital. This compulsion toward liquidity, flow, and an accelerated circulation of what is psychic, sexual or pertaining to the body is the exact replica of the force which rules market value: capital must circulate, gravity and any fixed point must disappear, the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction. (3940) Opposing this critical strategy, Baudrillard points to the unreality of money today, we might say its virtuality, as a sign of the virtuality of the power/resistance social economy. To recognize the virtual of Capital is, then, the starting point, thinks Baudrillard, for rethinking resistance as well. This secret of power’s lack of existence that the great politicians shared also belongs to the great bankers, who know that money is nothing, that money does not exist; and it also belonged to the great theologians and the inquisitors who knew that God does not exist, that God is dead. (64) From the transcendental political theology of Christendom to the immanence of liberalism, to economic determinism, there corresponds, Baudrillard asserts, a "secret" history of the unreality of God, political power, and money. Like a massive conspiracy perpetrated on history itself, the unreality of power (in all its forms) has neither been openly acknowledged by power-elites, but more problematically it has never been acknowledged by its critics. Considering that the essay was intended for the readership of Critique, Baudrillard's gesture amounts to a critique of critique, which, if it had been published in Critique, would have been the irony of ironies. While the irony is profound, the philosophical aim of the work—as a critique of critique—seems to run amuck in a crucial sense. If by Forget Foucault Baudrillard means "forget critique," then what are we to make of Baudrillard's critique of reality? Does not Baudrillard's critique of reality do precisely what he accuses Foucault of doing with respect to power and Deleuze with respect to desire? Does not Baudrillard's critique of reality reestablish, if only negatively, the philosophical claim of reality all over again; and as such does not his thought still operate within the horizon of the reality-principle, polemically spinning its wheels? Perhaps this apparent inconsistency is only an inconsistency insofar as it is solely critique that Baudrillard is doing. I would suggest that in addition to a critique of critique, Baudrillard is engaged in a polemic against critique. For Baudrillard is nothing if not polemical, and the aims of polemic and of critique belong to different orders of thought though they can, as they do in his essay, intersect. Polemic is not mere discussion. It is impassioned. A polemic, as its ancient Greek root meaning, polemikos denotes, is war-like. It does not seek to reach common ground. Its aim is to overcome the opponent—to forget [them] him. This fall from critique into polemic is not simply, or not only, a fall from philosophical grace into sophistry. It is a fall into the beauty of writing; into a writing enriched by polemic, paradox, and irony—a writing marked by what Baudrillard describes (in his interview with with Sylvere Lotringer included as an appendix and ironically titled, "Forget Baudrillard"), as a "giddiness." (82-83) It is unfortunate that this "giddiness" at times overwhelms what is, I believe, an incisive and urgent call to rethink the Foucauldian/Deleuzian belief in the revolutionary potential and potency of unbridled desire, liquidity, spontaneity, novelty, and ceaseless flow. Baudrillard rightly asks: Is this not also the language of capital? "Desire is never far from capital," (55) Baudrillard writes, and Baudrillard, one might say, is never far from Marx. Perhaps Forget Foucault, then, is a covert call for a return to Marx; a Marx for us today after the murder of the real and the collapse of critique. [/INST] <h4>The affirmatives rhetoric of resistance towards power relations misunderstands the modern ways in which power operates. Power no longer resonates on a fixed, sovereign center that can be located by critique, rather, it exists as a product of simulation that is constantly expanding, innovating and self-regenerating. Their critique only dignifies power's claim on reality by creating a pulsing flow of libidinal, revolutionary desire which does nothing more than replicate and expand the logic of Capital --- polemical negation exposes not the truth of power's reality, but the truth of its simulation </h4><p>Jonathan <strong>Fardy 12</strong>, PhD candidate at the University of Western Ontario of Canada and member of the Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism, “Review of Forget Foucault by Jean Baudrillard”, Foucault Studies, Issue 13, May 2012, pp. 184-187, [AB]</p><p>It was bold, to say the least, when in 1976 Jean Baudrillard sent his essay Forget Foucault to Critique where Foucault was an editor. Like a latter-day Zarathustra, <u><strong>Baudrillard pronounces</u></strong> not God, but what's just as shocking, <u><strong>reality dead</u></strong>; <u><strong>a murder of the real</u></strong>. <u><strong>The crime</u></strong>, he would later claim, <u><strong>was almost perfect</u></strong>. <u><strong>Almost perfect, except that the play of appearances betrays the secret: that there is nothing behind the play of appearances. </u></strong>These now familiar, yet still unsettling, motifs of Baudrillard's thought come to the fore in this biting, brilliant and bitter indictment of Foucault the man and name for a body of thought that in 1976 had achieved the respect of the French Academy and the intellectual avant-garde. Critique rejected the essay thereby securing for <u><strong><mark>Baudrillard</u></strong></mark> a succes de scandale. </p><p>I will suggest that the essay <u><strong><mark>can be understood</mark> at two levels</u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>as a critique of critique and as a polemic against critique</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Marx</u></strong></mark>, I believe, <u><strong><mark>haunts</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>both as the</mark> unnamed <mark>counter-force to the</u></strong></mark> then newly emergent poststructuralist <u><strong><mark>rhetoric of resistance</mark> in the form of energy, circulation, flow</u></strong>... <u><strong>desire. </p><p></u></strong>In 1976, <u><strong>"Foucault" was already a name for radical modes of historical analysis: "archaeology" and "genealogy." <mark>In Foucault's name</mark>, History became a matter and problem of discourse and representation</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Power</u></strong></mark>, in turn, <u><strong><mark>was seen as</mark> a <mark>discourse-effect</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Because discourse is de-centered</mark> and circulatory</u></strong>, <u><strong>the model of <mark>power and</mark> thus <mark>its critique</mark> now <mark>turned on notions of dispersal</mark>, diffusion <mark>and flow over</mark> and against <mark>the</mark> <mark>prior model of power as</mark> a <mark>fixed</mark> entity—<mark>the sovereign center</mark>—<mark>of</mark> historical, social, and political <mark>reality</mark>. </p><p>Baudrillard takes this Foucauldian premise as his starting point</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The appearance of discourse</u></strong></mark> on the scene of history <u><strong><mark>necessitates</u></strong></mark>, thinks Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>a</mark> new theoretical <mark>economy that</mark>, <mark>like the loss of the gold standard in the</mark> monetary <mark>economy</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>must presume the dissolution of</mark> the concept of <mark>reality</u></strong></mark>, or more precisely the reality-principle, <u><strong><mark>as the foundational principle</u></strong></mark> and guarantor <u><strong><mark>of</mark> any and <mark>all critical</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and historiographic</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>production</u></strong></mark>. In this respect, Baudrillard takes Foucault's elaborate historical narratives as symptomatic of the solely symbolic status of historical reality for us today. Baudrillard writes: "<u><strong><mark>if it is possible to</u></strong></mark>... <u><strong><mark>talk with such</mark> definitive <mark>understanding about power</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>sexuality</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the body</u></strong>, <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>discipline</u></strong></mark>, even down to their most delicate metamorphoses, <u><strong><mark>it is because</mark> at some point all <mark>this</mark> here and now <mark>is over</mark> with</u></strong>." (30) </p><p><u><strong>History is now in "a state of simulation."</u></strong> (72) The texture and beauty of Foucault's writing—a beauty that Baudrillard describes as being "too beautiful to be true" (30) —is what betrays this simulacral dimension. "Foucault's is not... a discourse of truth but a mythic discourse in the strong sense of the word, and I secretly believe that it has no illusions about the effect of truth it produces." (30) <u><strong>What <mark>the</mark> truth-<mark>effects of</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Foucault's <mark>discourse produces</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>as all discourse does</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>are forms of power: it "is a mirror of the powers it describes."</u></strong></mark> (30) Thus, <u><strong>Foucault's</u></strong> <u><strong>historiography is charged with ultimately mythologizing power into a truth</u></strong>, or we could say, <u><strong>a reality</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The very process of critique thus inflates the sphere of power</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>a power that for Baudrillard is solely the power or power's appearance</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>acknowledgment of this complicity with power</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>however</u></strong>, "<u><strong><mark>is what is missing</mark> in those who follow in Foucault's footsteps</u></strong>." (30) <u><strong>The <mark>Foucauldians</mark> "<mark>pass right by this</mark> mythic <mark>arrangement</mark> <mark>to end up with</mark> the truth, <mark>nothing but the truth</u></strong></mark>." (30) </p><p><u><strong><mark>What is needed</u></strong></mark>, according to Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>is to expose</mark> <mark>not the truth of power's reality</mark>, <mark>but the truth of its simulation</u></strong></mark>. "<u><strong><mark>Foucault unmasks</mark> all</u></strong> <u><strong>the final or causal illusions concerning <mark>power</mark>, <mark>but</mark> he <mark>does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power itself</u></strong></mark>." (50) <u><strong>It <mark>is this</mark> order of</u></strong> <u><strong>the simulacrum of <mark>power</u></strong></mark> —<u><strong><mark>that Baudrillard announces as the</mark> contemporary <mark>crisis for</mark> critical <mark>resistance</u></strong></mark>. </p><p><u><strong><mark>[A]fter a ceaseless expansion</mark> of several centuries [<mark>power</u></strong></mark>] <u><strong><mark>is brutally exploding</u></strong></mark> [and consequently]... <u><strong>the sphere of power [and desire] is in</u></strong> <u><strong>the process of contracting from a star </u></strong>of first magnitude <u><strong>to a red dwarf, and then to black hole absorbing all the substance of the real</u></strong>. (59) </p><p><u><strong><mark>Puffed up and valorized by organs like critique</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>the sphere of simulacral</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>power ceaselessly expands</u></strong></mark>. "Do you think that power, economy, sex—all the real's big numbers would have stood up one single instant without a fascination to support them?" (54) <u><strong><mark>Critique</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>dignifies power's</mark> <mark>claim on reality</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>which</mark> in turn <mark>legitimates the continuance of critique</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Power and critique are</mark> thus <mark>trapped</mark>, for Baudrillard,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>in an unending</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>self-regenerating, tautological spiral</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>whose very movement perpetuates the reality-principle upon which the dialectic feeds</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Baudrillard not only critiques the state of critique</u></strong></mark> in 1976, <u><strong><mark>but</mark> also <mark>the model of intellectual resistance it prescribes</u></strong></mark>. Here he also takes aim at Deleuze—seeing a suspect "collusion" between Foucauldian models of power and Deleuzian models of desire. "Foucault... has helped establish a systematic notion of power along the same operational lines as desire, just as Deleuze established a notion of desire along the lines of future forms of power." (36) </p><p><u><strong><mark>Resistance in</u></strong></mark> the Foucauldian/Deleuzian <u><strong><mark>body-politic is to take the form of novel</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>ceaseless</mark> territorializing and deterritorializing <mark>flux</mark>es</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>continuous</mark> and polymorphous <mark>investments</mark> and divestments: <mark>a pulsing flow of</mark> libidinal, <mark>revolutionary desire</mark> is <mark>to</mark> sweep across and <mark>liberate</mark> <mark>social</mark>, psychical, <mark>sexual</mark>, <mark>and</mark> ultimately, <mark>political economies</mark>.</u></strong> For Baudrillard, however, <u><strong><mark>this scheme can do nothing more than replicate and expand the logic of Capital</u></strong>.</mark> </p><p><u><strong><mark>This compulsion toward</mark> liquidity, <mark>flow, and an accelerated</mark> circulation of <mark>what is</mark> </u></strong>psychic,<u><strong> <mark>sexual or pertaining to the body</mark> <mark>is the</mark> <mark>exact replica</mark> <mark>of the</mark> force which rules <mark>market</mark> value: <mark>capital must circulate</mark>, gravity and <mark>any fixed point must disappear</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction</mark>. (3940)</p><p><mark>Opposing this critical strategy</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>Baudrillard points to the unreality of money</mark> today</u></strong>, we might say <u><strong><mark>its virtuality</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>as a sign of the virtuality of the power/resistance social economy</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>To recognize the virtual of Capital is</u></strong></mark>, then, <u><strong><mark>the starting point</u></strong></mark>, thinks Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>for rethinking resistance</mark> </u></strong>as well.<u><strong> </p><p></u></strong>This secret of power’s lack of existence that the great politicians shared also belongs to the great bankers, who know that money is nothing, that money does not exist; and it also belonged to the great theologians and the inquisitors who knew that God does not exist, that God is dead. (64) </p><p><u><strong>From</u></strong> the transcendental political theology of Christendom to <u><strong>the immanence of liberalism</u></strong>, <u><strong>to economic determinism</u></strong>, <u><strong>there corresponds</u></strong>, Baudrillard asserts, <u><strong>a "secret" history</u></strong> <u><strong>of <mark>the unreality of</mark> God, political <mark>power</mark>, <mark>and money</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Like a massive conspiracy</u></strong> perpetrated on history itself, <u><strong>the unreality of power</u></strong> (in all its forms) <u><strong><mark>has neither been</mark> openly <mark>acknowledged</mark> by power-elites</u></strong>, <u><strong>but more problematically</u></strong> <u><strong>it</u></strong> <u><strong>has never been acknowledged <mark>by</mark> its <mark>critics</u></strong></mark>. Considering that the essay was intended for the readership of Critique, <u><strong>Baudrillard's gesture amounts to a critique of critique</u></strong>, which, if it had been published in Critique, would have been the irony of ironies. </p><p>While the irony is profound, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> philosophical <mark>aim of</mark> the work</u></strong>—<u><strong>as a <mark>critique of critique</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>seems to run amuck</mark> in a crucial sense</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>If</mark> by Forget Foucault <mark>Baudrillard means "forget critique,"</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>then what are we to make of Baudrillard's critique</mark> of reality?</u></strong> <u><strong>Does not Baudrillard's critique of reality do precisely what he accuses Foucault of doing with respect to power and Deleuze with respect to desire?</u></strong> Does not Baudrillard's critique of reality reestablish, if only negatively, the philosophical claim of reality all over again; and as such does not his thought still operate within the horizon of the reality-principle, polemically spinning its wheels? </p><p><u><strong>Perhaps <mark>this</mark> apparent <mark>inconsistency is only an inconsistency</mark> <mark>insofar as it is solely critique that Baudrillard is doing</u></strong></mark>. I would suggest that <u><strong>in addition to a critique of critique</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>Baudrillard is engaged in a polemic against critique</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>For Baudrillard is nothing if not polemical</u></strong>, <u><strong>and <mark>the aims of polemic and</mark> of <mark>critique belong to different orders of thought</u></strong></mark> though they can, as they do in his essay, intersect. </p><p><u><strong><mark>Polemic is</mark> not mere <mark>discussion</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>It is impassioned. A polemic</u></strong></mark>, as its ancient Greek root meaning, polemikos denotes, <u><strong><mark>is war-like</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>It does not seek to reach common ground</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Its aim is to overcome the opponent—to forget [them]</mark> him</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This fall from critique</mark> <mark>into polemic is not</mark> simply, or not only, <mark>a fall</mark> from philosophical grace <mark>into sophistry</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>It is a fall into</mark> the <mark>beauty</mark> of writing</u></strong>; <u><strong>into a writing <mark>enriched</mark> <mark>by polemic, paradox, and irony</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>a writing marked by what Baudrillard describes</u></strong> (in his interview with with Sylvere Lotringer included as an appendix and ironically titled, "Forget Baudrillard"), <u><strong><mark>as a "giddiness."</mark> (82-83) </p><p></u></strong>It is unfortunate that <u><strong><mark>this</u></strong></mark> "giddiness" at times overwhelms what <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong></mark>, I believe, <u><strong><mark>a</mark>n incisive and <mark>urgent call to rethink</mark> the Foucauldian/Deleuzian</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>belief in the revolutionary potential</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and potency of unbridled desire, liquidity, spontaneity, novelty, and ceaseless flow.</u></strong> <u><strong>Baudrillard rightly asks</u></strong>: <u><strong><mark>Is this not also the language of capital?</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>"Desire is never far from capital,"</u></strong> (55) Baudrillard writes, and Baudrillard, one might say, is never far from Marx. <u><strong>Perhaps Forget Foucault</u></strong>, then, <u><strong>is a covert call for a return to Marx; a Marx</u></strong> for us today <u><strong>after the murder of the real and the collapse of critique. </p></u></strong> </s>

Proliferation causes nuclear war

The humanity has inched closer to the precipice of an all-out nuclear war than ever before, closer than it was even at the height of the historic Cold War standoff between the US and the Soviet Union. The main reason is the erosion of the non-proliferation regime experts say. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been continuously bashed as "unfair," but it is in fact the exclusive geopolitical environment and ensuing nuclear responsibility of a handful of states that has so far kept mankind away from the total wipeout. The theory of reciprocal deterrence wasn’t there all the time. A long two decades after the A-bomb was invented, the powers who had it in their arsenals thought of it as fair game, a weapon you could actually use in a conflict, rather than a deterrent. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have never even applied for "nuclear club" Volatility has spread, though South Asia plays a separate role in it. 30 to 40 countries are on their way towards nuclear status. Many of them are inches away, like Germany, Japan and Canada, who could have had an A-bomb long ago – but simply didn’t wish to. The Sunni Saudi Arabia has hinted it will make a bomb the moment the Shiite Iran lays its hands on one. Nuclear terrorism is another problem Terrorists can’t make a nuke. But they do know how to pit countries and eventually provoke them to an inadequate response. There’s no lacking of short-sighted politicians who can take that last step, for instance Republican Senator Steve Buyer who nudged the government after 9/11 to nuke Tora Bora caves, instead of sending a task force to Afghanistan. "A nuclear conflict will have dramatic consequences for all of us, because nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. They are not selective. A nuclear attack in the Middle East would be most tragic, first of all, because of its huge oil fields, and a burning oil field is a big trouble. Secondly, any strike on the Middle East

humanity has inched closer to the precipice of an all-out nuclear war than ever before The main reason is the erosion of the non-proliferation regime The N P T is in fact the exclusive geopolitical environment and ensuing nuclear responsibility Volatility has spread 30 to 40 countries are on their way towards nuclear status. Nuclear terrorism is a problem Terrorists pit countries and provoke them to a response.

Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists The humanity has inched closer to the precipice of an all-out nuclear war than ever before, closer than it was even at the height of the historic Cold War standoff between the US and the Soviet Union. The main reason for this is the ongoing erosion of the non-proliferation regime, experts say. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been continuously bashed as "unfair," but it is in fact the exclusive geopolitical environment and ensuing nuclear responsibility of a handful of states that has so far kept mankind away from the total wipeout. The theory of reciprocal deterrence wasn’t there all the time. A long two decades after the A-bomb was invented, the powers who had it in their arsenals thought of it as fair game, a weapon you could actually use in a conflict, rather than a deterrent. The Cuban Missile Crisis came as a wakeup call. It brought home the danger of nuclear weapons and led to the non-proliferation regime as conceived by the so-called "nuclear club," which included the Soviet Union, the US, Britain, France and China. Under the NPT, only countries that made and set off a nuclear bomb prior to January 1, 1967 were granted the status of a nuclear power. Washington, London and Moscow were the first to sign the treaty in 1968, with Paris and Beijing committing themselves to it years later. But all of the signatories abided by the rules. Those times have passed. NPT controls have become so loose and new nuclear powers so numerous, there’s no counting them anymore. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have never even applied for "nuclear club" membership. On the contrary, they created their own shadow club with no rules. The official club with all its nukes poses less threat to the human race than this bunch of neophytes. Volatility has spread, though South Asia plays a separate role in it. "Some South Asian countries have a full arsenal of nukes," says Pyotr Topychkanov, a senior researcher at the International Security Center of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences. "They have enough nuclear warheads and vehicles. They have only one equal in the Middle East, which is Israel. Iran has no nuclear weapons yet." "The same is true of North Korea, which has weapon-grade fissile nuclear materials. They have built and tested explosive devices, but it’s still a long way to fully-fledged nukes for them." "The countries that really cause concern are India, Pakistan and China. China and Pakistan are longtime partners, including their nuclear agenda. India borders on China and Pakistan and is certainly aware of this partnership. It doesn’t have faith in either. Were a conflict to spark off, it would be trilateral and include not only India and Pakistan, but India, Pakistan and China." About 30 to 40 countries are on their way towards nuclear status. Many of them are inches away, like Germany, Japan and Canada, who could have had an A-bomb long ago – but simply didn’t wish to. The Sunni Saudi Arabia has hinted it will make a bomb the moment the Shiite Iran lays its hands on one. The principle of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation was formulated back in 1965, when Pakistan’s foreign chief Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said: "There’s a Christian bomb, a Jewish bomb and now even a Hindu bomb. It’s high time we got a Muslim bomb." Nuclear terrorism is yet another problem. Terrorists can’t make a nuke. But they do know how to pit countries and eventually provoke them to an inadequate response. There’s no lacking of short-sighted politicians who can take that last step, for instance Republican Senator Steve Buyer who nudged the government after 9/11 to nuke Tora Bora caves, instead of sending a task force to Afghanistan. In that sense, the threat of a full-scale nuclear war has transformed into the menace of a local nuclear conflict, or even a string of them. You shouldn’t be lulled by their seeming locality though, since a precise nuclear strike will be felt globally, says PIR Center Internet Project Director Andrei Baklitsky. "A nuclear conflict will have dramatic consequences for all of us, because nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. They are not selective. A nuclear attack in the Middle East would be most tragic, first of all, because of its huge oil fields, and a burning oil field is a big trouble. Secondly, any strike on the Middle East will skyrocket oil prices across the world and plunge the global economy back into an even worse economic crisis that before. The consequences of using an A-bomb in an Indo-Pakistani conflict would be just as grave for these densely populated countries, driving millions of refugees out of their homes and turning agriculture lands into barren wastes." Unfortunately, the world is home to many paradoxes. Despite a drop in amounts of nuclear weapons worldwide, the collapse of the bipolar world has made the risk of a manmade apocalypse palpable.

<h4>Proliferation causes nuclear war</h4><p>Sergei <strong>Duz 14</strong>, Voice of Russia correspondent, “Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists”, http://voiceofrussia.com/2014_01_02/Nuclear-war-more-likely-than-ever-threat-comes-from-South-Asia-and-nuke-terrorists-1915/, January 2nd </p><p>Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists <u>The <strong><mark>humanity has inched closer to</strong></mark> <mark>the precipice of an <strong>all-out nuclear war than ever before</strong></mark>, closer than it was even at the height of the historic Cold War standoff between the US and the Soviet Union. <strong><mark>The main reason</u></strong></mark> for this <u><strong><mark>is the</u></strong></mark> ongoing <u><strong><mark>erosion of the non-proliferation regime</u></strong></mark>, <u>experts say. <mark>The</mark> <mark>N</mark>on-<mark>P</mark>roliferation <mark>T</mark>reaty has been continuously bashed as "unfair," but it <mark>is in fact the exclusive geopolitical environment and ensuing nuclear responsibility</mark> of a handful of states that has so far kept mankind away from the total wipeout. The theory of reciprocal deterrence wasn’t there all the time. A long two decades after the A-bomb was invented, the powers who had it in their arsenals thought of it as fair game, a weapon you could actually use in a conflict, rather than a deterrent. </u>The Cuban Missile Crisis came as a wakeup call. It brought home the danger of nuclear weapons and led to the non-proliferation regime as conceived by the so-called "nuclear club," which included the Soviet Union, the US, Britain, France and China. Under the NPT, only countries that made and set off a nuclear bomb prior to January 1, 1967 were granted the status of a nuclear power. Washington, London and Moscow were the first to sign the treaty in 1968, with Paris and Beijing committing themselves to it years later. But all of the signatories abided by the rules. Those times have passed. NPT controls have become so loose and new nuclear powers so numerous, there’s no counting them anymore. <u>India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have never even applied for "nuclear club"</u> membership. On the contrary, they created their own shadow club with no rules. The official club with all its nukes poses less threat to the human race than this bunch of neophytes. <u><mark>Volatility has spread</mark>, though South Asia plays a separate role in it. </u>"Some South Asian countries have a full arsenal of nukes," says Pyotr Topychkanov, a senior researcher at the International Security Center of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences. "They have enough nuclear warheads and vehicles. They have only one equal in the Middle East, which is Israel. Iran has no nuclear weapons yet." "The same is true of North Korea, which has weapon-grade fissile nuclear materials. They have built and tested explosive devices, but it’s still a long way to fully-fledged nukes for them." "The countries that really cause concern are India, Pakistan and China. China and Pakistan are longtime partners, including their nuclear agenda. India borders on China and Pakistan and is certainly aware of this partnership. It doesn’t have faith in either. Were a conflict to spark off, it would be trilateral and include not only India and Pakistan, but India, Pakistan and China." About <u><strong><mark>30 to 40 countries are on their way towards nuclear status.</u></strong></mark> <u>Many of them are inches away, like Germany, Japan and Canada, who could have had an A-bomb long ago – but simply didn’t wish to. The Sunni Saudi Arabia has hinted it will make a bomb the moment the Shiite Iran lays its hands on one. </u>The principle of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation was formulated back in 1965, when Pakistan’s foreign chief Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said: "There’s a Christian bomb, a Jewish bomb and now even a Hindu bomb. It’s high time we got a Muslim bomb." <u><strong><mark>Nuclear terrorism is</u></strong></mark> yet <u><strong><mark>a</mark>nother<mark> problem</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Terrorists</mark> can’t make a nuke. But they do know how to <mark>pit countries and </mark>eventually <strong><mark>provoke them</strong> to a</mark>n<mark> </mark>inadequate <mark>response.</mark> There’s no lacking of short-sighted politicians who can take that last step, for instance Republican Senator Steve Buyer who nudged the government after 9/11 to nuke Tora Bora caves, instead of sending a task force to Afghanistan. </u>In that sense, the threat of a full-scale nuclear war has transformed into the menace of a local nuclear conflict, or even a string of them. You shouldn’t be lulled by their seeming locality though, since a precise nuclear strike will be felt globally, says PIR Center Internet Project Director Andrei Baklitsky. <u>"A nuclear conflict will have dramatic consequences for all of us, because nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. They are not selective. A nuclear attack in the Middle East would be most tragic, first of all, because of its huge oil fields, and a burning oil field is a big trouble. Secondly, any strike on the Middle East </u>will skyrocket oil prices across the world and plunge the global economy back into an even worse economic crisis that before. The consequences of using an A-bomb in an Indo-Pakistani conflict would be just as grave for these densely populated countries, driving millions of refugees out of their homes and turning agriculture lands into barren wastes." Unfortunately, the world is home to many paradoxes. Despite a drop in amounts of nuclear weapons worldwide, the collapse of the bipolar world has made the risk of a manmade apocalypse palpable.</p>

Sergei Duz 14, Voice of Russia correspondent, “Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists”, http://voiceofrussia.com/2014_01_02/Nuclear-war-more-likely-than-ever-threat-comes-from-South-Asia-and-nuke-terrorists-1915/, January 2nd

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Sergei Duz 14, Voice of Russia correspondent, “Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists”, http://voiceofrussia.com/2014_01_02/Nuclear-war-more-likely-than-ever-threat-comes-from-South-Asia-and-nuke-terrorists-1915/, January 2nd fulltext: Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists The humanity has inched closer to the precipice of an all-out nuclear war than ever before, closer than it was even at the height of the historic Cold War standoff between the US and the Soviet Union. The main reason for this is the ongoing erosion of the non-proliferation regime, experts say. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been continuously bashed as "unfair," but it is in fact the exclusive geopolitical environment and ensuing nuclear responsibility of a handful of states that has so far kept mankind away from the total wipeout. The theory of reciprocal deterrence wasn’t there all the time. A long two decades after the A-bomb was invented, the powers who had it in their arsenals thought of it as fair game, a weapon you could actually use in a conflict, rather than a deterrent. The Cuban Missile Crisis came as a wakeup call. It brought home the danger of nuclear weapons and led to the non-proliferation regime as conceived by the so-called "nuclear club," which included the Soviet Union, the US, Britain, France and China. Under the NPT, only countries that made and set off a nuclear bomb prior to January 1, 1967 were granted the status of a nuclear power. Washington, London and Moscow were the first to sign the treaty in 1968, with Paris and Beijing committing themselves to it years later. But all of the signatories abided by the rules. Those times have passed. NPT controls have become so loose and new nuclear powers so numerous, there’s no counting them anymore. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have never even applied for "nuclear club" membership. On the contrary, they created their own shadow club with no rules. The official club with all its nukes poses less threat to the human race than this bunch of neophytes. Volatility has spread, though South Asia plays a separate role in it. "Some South Asian countries have a full arsenal of nukes," says Pyotr Topychkanov, a senior researcher at the International Security Center of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences. "They have enough nuclear warheads and vehicles. They have only one equal in the Middle East, which is Israel. Iran has no nuclear weapons yet." "The same is true of North Korea, which has weapon-grade fissile nuclear materials. They have built and tested explosive devices, but it’s still a long way to fully-fledged nukes for them." "The countries that really cause concern are India, Pakistan and China. China and Pakistan are longtime partners, including their nuclear agenda. India borders on China and Pakistan and is certainly aware of this partnership. It doesn’t have faith in either. Were a conflict to spark off, it would be trilateral and include not only India and Pakistan, but India, Pakistan and China." About 30 to 40 countries are on their way towards nuclear status. Many of them are inches away, like Germany, Japan and Canada, who could have had an A-bomb long ago – but simply didn’t wish to. The Sunni Saudi Arabia has hinted it will make a bomb the moment the Shiite Iran lays its hands on one. The principle of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation was formulated back in 1965, when Pakistan’s foreign chief Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said: "There’s a Christian bomb, a Jewish bomb and now even a Hindu bomb. It’s high time we got a Muslim bomb." Nuclear terrorism is yet another problem. Terrorists can’t make a nuke. But they do know how to pit countries and eventually provoke them to an inadequate response. There’s no lacking of short-sighted politicians who can take that last step, for instance Republican Senator Steve Buyer who nudged the government after 9/11 to nuke Tora Bora caves, instead of sending a task force to Afghanistan. In that sense, the threat of a full-scale nuclear war has transformed into the menace of a local nuclear conflict, or even a string of them. You shouldn’t be lulled by their seeming locality though, since a precise nuclear strike will be felt globally, says PIR Center Internet Project Director Andrei Baklitsky. "A nuclear conflict will have dramatic consequences for all of us, because nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. They are not selective. A nuclear attack in the Middle East would be most tragic, first of all, because of its huge oil fields, and a burning oil field is a big trouble. Secondly, any strike on the Middle East will skyrocket oil prices across the world and plunge the global economy back into an even worse economic crisis that before. The consequences of using an A-bomb in an Indo-Pakistani conflict would be just as grave for these densely populated countries, driving millions of refugees out of their homes and turning agriculture lands into barren wastes." Unfortunately, the world is home to many paradoxes. Despite a drop in amounts of nuclear weapons worldwide, the collapse of the bipolar world has made the risk of a manmade apocalypse palpable. [/INST] <h4>Proliferation causes nuclear war</h4><p>Sergei <strong>Duz 14</strong>, Voice of Russia correspondent, “Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists”, http://voiceofrussia.com/2014_01_02/Nuclear-war-more-likely-than-ever-threat-comes-from-South-Asia-and-nuke-terrorists-1915/, January 2nd </p><p>Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists <u>The <strong><mark>humanity has inched closer to</strong></mark> <mark>the precipice of an <strong>all-out nuclear war than ever before</strong></mark>, closer than it was even at the height of the historic Cold War standoff between the US and the Soviet Union. <strong><mark>The main reason</u></strong></mark> for this <u><strong><mark>is the</u></strong></mark> ongoing <u><strong><mark>erosion of the non-proliferation regime</u></strong></mark>, <u>experts say. <mark>The</mark> <mark>N</mark>on-<mark>P</mark>roliferation <mark>T</mark>reaty has been continuously bashed as "unfair," but it <mark>is in fact the exclusive geopolitical environment and ensuing nuclear responsibility</mark> of a handful of states that has so far kept mankind away from the total wipeout. The theory of reciprocal deterrence wasn’t there all the time. A long two decades after the A-bomb was invented, the powers who had it in their arsenals thought of it as fair game, a weapon you could actually use in a conflict, rather than a deterrent. </u>The Cuban Missile Crisis came as a wakeup call. It brought home the danger of nuclear weapons and led to the non-proliferation regime as conceived by the so-called "nuclear club," which included the Soviet Union, the US, Britain, France and China. Under the NPT, only countries that made and set off a nuclear bomb prior to January 1, 1967 were granted the status of a nuclear power. Washington, London and Moscow were the first to sign the treaty in 1968, with Paris and Beijing committing themselves to it years later. But all of the signatories abided by the rules. Those times have passed. NPT controls have become so loose and new nuclear powers so numerous, there’s no counting them anymore. <u>India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have never even applied for "nuclear club"</u> membership. On the contrary, they created their own shadow club with no rules. The official club with all its nukes poses less threat to the human race than this bunch of neophytes. <u><mark>Volatility has spread</mark>, though South Asia plays a separate role in it. </u>"Some South Asian countries have a full arsenal of nukes," says Pyotr Topychkanov, a senior researcher at the International Security Center of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences. "They have enough nuclear warheads and vehicles. They have only one equal in the Middle East, which is Israel. Iran has no nuclear weapons yet." "The same is true of North Korea, which has weapon-grade fissile nuclear materials. They have built and tested explosive devices, but it’s still a long way to fully-fledged nukes for them." "The countries that really cause concern are India, Pakistan and China. China and Pakistan are longtime partners, including their nuclear agenda. India borders on China and Pakistan and is certainly aware of this partnership. It doesn’t have faith in either. Were a conflict to spark off, it would be trilateral and include not only India and Pakistan, but India, Pakistan and China." About <u><strong><mark>30 to 40 countries are on their way towards nuclear status.</u></strong></mark> <u>Many of them are inches away, like Germany, Japan and Canada, who could have had an A-bomb long ago – but simply didn’t wish to. The Sunni Saudi Arabia has hinted it will make a bomb the moment the Shiite Iran lays its hands on one. </u>The principle of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation was formulated back in 1965, when Pakistan’s foreign chief Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said: "There’s a Christian bomb, a Jewish bomb and now even a Hindu bomb. It’s high time we got a Muslim bomb." <u><strong><mark>Nuclear terrorism is</u></strong></mark> yet <u><strong><mark>a</mark>nother<mark> problem</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Terrorists</mark> can’t make a nuke. But they do know how to <mark>pit countries and </mark>eventually <strong><mark>provoke them</strong> to a</mark>n<mark> </mark>inadequate <mark>response.</mark> There’s no lacking of short-sighted politicians who can take that last step, for instance Republican Senator Steve Buyer who nudged the government after 9/11 to nuke Tora Bora caves, instead of sending a task force to Afghanistan. </u>In that sense, the threat of a full-scale nuclear war has transformed into the menace of a local nuclear conflict, or even a string of them. You shouldn’t be lulled by their seeming locality though, since a precise nuclear strike will be felt globally, says PIR Center Internet Project Director Andrei Baklitsky. <u>"A nuclear conflict will have dramatic consequences for all of us, because nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. They are not selective. A nuclear attack in the Middle East would be most tragic, first of all, because of its huge oil fields, and a burning oil field is a big trouble. Secondly, any strike on the Middle East </u>will skyrocket oil prices across the world and plunge the global economy back into an even worse economic crisis that before. The consequences of using an A-bomb in an Indo-Pakistani conflict would be just as grave for these densely populated countries, driving millions of refugees out of their homes and turning agriculture lands into barren wastes." Unfortunately, the world is home to many paradoxes. Despite a drop in amounts of nuclear weapons worldwide, the collapse of the bipolar world has made the risk of a manmade apocalypse palpable.</p> </s>

Proliferation causes nuclear war

The humanity has inched closer to the precipice of an all-out nuclear war than ever before, closer than it was even at the height of the historic Cold War standoff between the US and the Soviet Union. The main reason is the erosion of the non-proliferation regime experts say. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been continuously bashed as "unfair," but it is in fact the exclusive geopolitical environment and ensuing nuclear responsibility of a handful of states that has so far kept mankind away from the total wipeout. The theory of reciprocal deterrence wasn’t there all the time. A long two decades after the A-bomb was invented, the powers who had it in their arsenals thought of it as fair game, a weapon you could actually use in a conflict, rather than a deterrent. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have never even applied for "nuclear club" Volatility has spread, though South Asia plays a separate role in it. 30 to 40 countries are on their way towards nuclear status. Many of them are inches away, like Germany, Japan and Canada, who could have had an A-bomb long ago – but simply didn’t wish to. The Sunni Saudi Arabia has hinted it will make a bomb the moment the Shiite Iran lays its hands on one. Nuclear terrorism is another problem Terrorists can’t make a nuke. But they do know how to pit countries and eventually provoke them to an inadequate response. There’s no lacking of short-sighted politicians who can take that last step, for instance Republican Senator Steve Buyer who nudged the government after 9/11 to nuke Tora Bora caves, instead of sending a task force to Afghanistan. "A nuclear conflict will have dramatic consequences for all of us, because nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. They are not selective. A nuclear attack in the Middle East would be most tragic, first of all, because of its huge oil fields, and a burning oil field is a big trouble. Secondly, any strike on the Middle East

humanity has inched closer to the precipice of an all-out nuclear war than ever before The main reason is the erosion of the non-proliferation regime The N P T is in fact the exclusive geopolitical environment and ensuing nuclear responsibility Volatility has spread 30 to 40 countries are on their way towards nuclear status. Nuclear terrorism is a problem Terrorists pit countries and provoke them to a response.

Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists The humanity has inched closer to the precipice of an all-out nuclear war than ever before, closer than it was even at the height of the historic Cold War standoff between the US and the Soviet Union. The main reason for this is the ongoing erosion of the non-proliferation regime, experts say. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been continuously bashed as "unfair," but it is in fact the exclusive geopolitical environment and ensuing nuclear responsibility of a handful of states that has so far kept mankind away from the total wipeout. The theory of reciprocal deterrence wasn’t there all the time. A long two decades after the A-bomb was invented, the powers who had it in their arsenals thought of it as fair game, a weapon you could actually use in a conflict, rather than a deterrent. The Cuban Missile Crisis came as a wakeup call. It brought home the danger of nuclear weapons and led to the non-proliferation regime as conceived by the so-called "nuclear club," which included the Soviet Union, the US, Britain, France and China. Under the NPT, only countries that made and set off a nuclear bomb prior to January 1, 1967 were granted the status of a nuclear power. Washington, London and Moscow were the first to sign the treaty in 1968, with Paris and Beijing committing themselves to it years later. But all of the signatories abided by the rules. Those times have passed. NPT controls have become so loose and new nuclear powers so numerous, there’s no counting them anymore. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have never even applied for "nuclear club" membership. On the contrary, they created their own shadow club with no rules. The official club with all its nukes poses less threat to the human race than this bunch of neophytes. Volatility has spread, though South Asia plays a separate role in it. "Some South Asian countries have a full arsenal of nukes," says Pyotr Topychkanov, a senior researcher at the International Security Center of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences. "They have enough nuclear warheads and vehicles. They have only one equal in the Middle East, which is Israel. Iran has no nuclear weapons yet." "The same is true of North Korea, which has weapon-grade fissile nuclear materials. They have built and tested explosive devices, but it’s still a long way to fully-fledged nukes for them." "The countries that really cause concern are India, Pakistan and China. China and Pakistan are longtime partners, including their nuclear agenda. India borders on China and Pakistan and is certainly aware of this partnership. It doesn’t have faith in either. Were a conflict to spark off, it would be trilateral and include not only India and Pakistan, but India, Pakistan and China." About 30 to 40 countries are on their way towards nuclear status. Many of them are inches away, like Germany, Japan and Canada, who could have had an A-bomb long ago – but simply didn’t wish to. The Sunni Saudi Arabia has hinted it will make a bomb the moment the Shiite Iran lays its hands on one. The principle of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation was formulated back in 1965, when Pakistan’s foreign chief Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said: "There’s a Christian bomb, a Jewish bomb and now even a Hindu bomb. It’s high time we got a Muslim bomb." Nuclear terrorism is yet another problem. Terrorists can’t make a nuke. But they do know how to pit countries and eventually provoke them to an inadequate response. There’s no lacking of short-sighted politicians who can take that last step, for instance Republican Senator Steve Buyer who nudged the government after 9/11 to nuke Tora Bora caves, instead of sending a task force to Afghanistan. In that sense, the threat of a full-scale nuclear war has transformed into the menace of a local nuclear conflict, or even a string of them. You shouldn’t be lulled by their seeming locality though, since a precise nuclear strike will be felt globally, says PIR Center Internet Project Director Andrei Baklitsky. "A nuclear conflict will have dramatic consequences for all of us, because nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. They are not selective. A nuclear attack in the Middle East would be most tragic, first of all, because of its huge oil fields, and a burning oil field is a big trouble. Secondly, any strike on the Middle East will skyrocket oil prices across the world and plunge the global economy back into an even worse economic crisis that before. The consequences of using an A-bomb in an Indo-Pakistani conflict would be just as grave for these densely populated countries, driving millions of refugees out of their homes and turning agriculture lands into barren wastes." Unfortunately, the world is home to many paradoxes. Despite a drop in amounts of nuclear weapons worldwide, the collapse of the bipolar world has made the risk of a manmade apocalypse palpable.

<h4>Proliferation causes nuclear war</h4><p>Sergei <strong>Duz 14</strong>, Voice of Russia correspondent, “Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists”, http://voiceofrussia.com/2014_01_02/Nuclear-war-more-likely-than-ever-threat-comes-from-South-Asia-and-nuke-terrorists-1915/, January 2nd </p><p>Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists <u><strong>The <mark>humanity has inched closer to</mark> <mark>the precipice of an all-out nuclear war than ever before</mark>, closer than it was even at the height of the historic Cold War standoff between the US and the Soviet Union. <mark>The main reason</u></strong></mark> for this <u><strong><mark>is the</u></strong></mark> ongoing <u><strong><mark>erosion of the non-proliferation regime</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>experts say. <mark>The</mark> <mark>N</mark>on-<mark>P</mark>roliferation <mark>T</mark>reaty has been continuously bashed as "unfair," but it <mark>is in fact the exclusive geopolitical environment and ensuing nuclear responsibility</mark> of a handful of states that has so far kept mankind away from the total wipeout. The theory of reciprocal deterrence wasn’t there all the time. A long two decades after the A-bomb was invented, the powers who had it in their arsenals thought of it as fair game, a weapon you could actually use in a conflict, rather than a deterrent. </u></strong>The Cuban Missile Crisis came as a wakeup call. It brought home the danger of nuclear weapons and led to the non-proliferation regime as conceived by the so-called "nuclear club," which included the Soviet Union, the US, Britain, France and China. Under the NPT, only countries that made and set off a nuclear bomb prior to January 1, 1967 were granted the status of a nuclear power. Washington, London and Moscow were the first to sign the treaty in 1968, with Paris and Beijing committing themselves to it years later. But all of the signatories abided by the rules. Those times have passed. NPT controls have become so loose and new nuclear powers so numerous, there’s no counting them anymore. <u><strong>India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have never even applied for "nuclear club"</u></strong> membership. On the contrary, they created their own shadow club with no rules. The official club with all its nukes poses less threat to the human race than this bunch of neophytes. <u><strong><mark>Volatility has spread</mark>, though South Asia plays a separate role in it. </u></strong>"Some South Asian countries have a full arsenal of nukes," says Pyotr Topychkanov, a senior researcher at the International Security Center of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences. "They have enough nuclear warheads and vehicles. They have only one equal in the Middle East, which is Israel. Iran has no nuclear weapons yet." "The same is true of North Korea, which has weapon-grade fissile nuclear materials. They have built and tested explosive devices, but it’s still a long way to fully-fledged nukes for them." "The countries that really cause concern are India, Pakistan and China. China and Pakistan are longtime partners, including their nuclear agenda. India borders on China and Pakistan and is certainly aware of this partnership. It doesn’t have faith in either. Were a conflict to spark off, it would be trilateral and include not only India and Pakistan, but India, Pakistan and China." About <u><strong><mark>30 to 40 countries are on their way towards nuclear status.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Many of them are inches away, like Germany, Japan and Canada, who could have had an A-bomb long ago – but simply didn’t wish to. The Sunni Saudi Arabia has hinted it will make a bomb the moment the Shiite Iran lays its hands on one. </u></strong>The principle of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation was formulated back in 1965, when Pakistan’s foreign chief Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said: "There’s a Christian bomb, a Jewish bomb and now even a Hindu bomb. It’s high time we got a Muslim bomb." <u><strong><mark>Nuclear terrorism is</u></strong></mark> yet <u><strong><mark>a</mark>nother<mark> problem</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Terrorists</mark> can’t make a nuke. But they do know how to <mark>pit countries and </mark>eventually <mark>provoke them to a</mark>n<mark> </mark>inadequate <mark>response.</mark> There’s no lacking of short-sighted politicians who can take that last step, for instance Republican Senator Steve Buyer who nudged the government after 9/11 to nuke Tora Bora caves, instead of sending a task force to Afghanistan. </u></strong>In that sense, the threat of a full-scale nuclear war has transformed into the menace of a local nuclear conflict, or even a string of them. You shouldn’t be lulled by their seeming locality though, since a precise nuclear strike will be felt globally, says PIR Center Internet Project Director Andrei Baklitsky. <u><strong>"A nuclear conflict will have dramatic consequences for all of us, because nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. They are not selective. A nuclear attack in the Middle East would be most tragic, first of all, because of its huge oil fields, and a burning oil field is a big trouble. Secondly, any strike on the Middle East </u></strong>will skyrocket oil prices across the world and plunge the global economy back into an even worse economic crisis that before. The consequences of using an A-bomb in an Indo-Pakistani conflict would be just as grave for these densely populated countries, driving millions of refugees out of their homes and turning agriculture lands into barren wastes." Unfortunately, the world is home to many paradoxes. Despite a drop in amounts of nuclear weapons worldwide, the collapse of the bipolar world has made the risk of a manmade apocalypse palpable.</p>

Sergei Duz 14, Voice of Russia correspondent, “Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists”, http://voiceofrussia.com/2014_01_02/Nuclear-war-more-likely-than-ever-threat-comes-from-South-Asia-and-nuke-terrorists-1915/, January 2nd

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Sergei Duz 14, Voice of Russia correspondent, “Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists”, http://voiceofrussia.com/2014_01_02/Nuclear-war-more-likely-than-ever-threat-comes-from-South-Asia-and-nuke-terrorists-1915/, January 2nd fulltext: Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists The humanity has inched closer to the precipice of an all-out nuclear war than ever before, closer than it was even at the height of the historic Cold War standoff between the US and the Soviet Union. The main reason for this is the ongoing erosion of the non-proliferation regime, experts say. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been continuously bashed as "unfair," but it is in fact the exclusive geopolitical environment and ensuing nuclear responsibility of a handful of states that has so far kept mankind away from the total wipeout. The theory of reciprocal deterrence wasn’t there all the time. A long two decades after the A-bomb was invented, the powers who had it in their arsenals thought of it as fair game, a weapon you could actually use in a conflict, rather than a deterrent. The Cuban Missile Crisis came as a wakeup call. It brought home the danger of nuclear weapons and led to the non-proliferation regime as conceived by the so-called "nuclear club," which included the Soviet Union, the US, Britain, France and China. Under the NPT, only countries that made and set off a nuclear bomb prior to January 1, 1967 were granted the status of a nuclear power. Washington, London and Moscow were the first to sign the treaty in 1968, with Paris and Beijing committing themselves to it years later. But all of the signatories abided by the rules. Those times have passed. NPT controls have become so loose and new nuclear powers so numerous, there’s no counting them anymore. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have never even applied for "nuclear club" membership. On the contrary, they created their own shadow club with no rules. The official club with all its nukes poses less threat to the human race than this bunch of neophytes. Volatility has spread, though South Asia plays a separate role in it. "Some South Asian countries have a full arsenal of nukes," says Pyotr Topychkanov, a senior researcher at the International Security Center of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences. "They have enough nuclear warheads and vehicles. They have only one equal in the Middle East, which is Israel. Iran has no nuclear weapons yet." "The same is true of North Korea, which has weapon-grade fissile nuclear materials. They have built and tested explosive devices, but it’s still a long way to fully-fledged nukes for them." "The countries that really cause concern are India, Pakistan and China. China and Pakistan are longtime partners, including their nuclear agenda. India borders on China and Pakistan and is certainly aware of this partnership. It doesn’t have faith in either. Were a conflict to spark off, it would be trilateral and include not only India and Pakistan, but India, Pakistan and China." About 30 to 40 countries are on their way towards nuclear status. Many of them are inches away, like Germany, Japan and Canada, who could have had an A-bomb long ago – but simply didn’t wish to. The Sunni Saudi Arabia has hinted it will make a bomb the moment the Shiite Iran lays its hands on one. The principle of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation was formulated back in 1965, when Pakistan’s foreign chief Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said: "There’s a Christian bomb, a Jewish bomb and now even a Hindu bomb. It’s high time we got a Muslim bomb." Nuclear terrorism is yet another problem. Terrorists can’t make a nuke. But they do know how to pit countries and eventually provoke them to an inadequate response. There’s no lacking of short-sighted politicians who can take that last step, for instance Republican Senator Steve Buyer who nudged the government after 9/11 to nuke Tora Bora caves, instead of sending a task force to Afghanistan. In that sense, the threat of a full-scale nuclear war has transformed into the menace of a local nuclear conflict, or even a string of them. You shouldn’t be lulled by their seeming locality though, since a precise nuclear strike will be felt globally, says PIR Center Internet Project Director Andrei Baklitsky. "A nuclear conflict will have dramatic consequences for all of us, because nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. They are not selective. A nuclear attack in the Middle East would be most tragic, first of all, because of its huge oil fields, and a burning oil field is a big trouble. Secondly, any strike on the Middle East will skyrocket oil prices across the world and plunge the global economy back into an even worse economic crisis that before. The consequences of using an A-bomb in an Indo-Pakistani conflict would be just as grave for these densely populated countries, driving millions of refugees out of their homes and turning agriculture lands into barren wastes." Unfortunately, the world is home to many paradoxes. Despite a drop in amounts of nuclear weapons worldwide, the collapse of the bipolar world has made the risk of a manmade apocalypse palpable. [/INST] <h4>Proliferation causes nuclear war</h4><p>Sergei <strong>Duz 14</strong>, Voice of Russia correspondent, “Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists”, http://voiceofrussia.com/2014_01_02/Nuclear-war-more-likely-than-ever-threat-comes-from-South-Asia-and-nuke-terrorists-1915/, January 2nd </p><p>Nuclear war more likely than ever: threat comes from South Asia and nuke terrorists <u><strong>The <mark>humanity has inched closer to</mark> <mark>the precipice of an all-out nuclear war than ever before</mark>, closer than it was even at the height of the historic Cold War standoff between the US and the Soviet Union. <mark>The main reason</u></strong></mark> for this <u><strong><mark>is the</u></strong></mark> ongoing <u><strong><mark>erosion of the non-proliferation regime</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>experts say. <mark>The</mark> <mark>N</mark>on-<mark>P</mark>roliferation <mark>T</mark>reaty has been continuously bashed as "unfair," but it <mark>is in fact the exclusive geopolitical environment and ensuing nuclear responsibility</mark> of a handful of states that has so far kept mankind away from the total wipeout. The theory of reciprocal deterrence wasn’t there all the time. A long two decades after the A-bomb was invented, the powers who had it in their arsenals thought of it as fair game, a weapon you could actually use in a conflict, rather than a deterrent. </u></strong>The Cuban Missile Crisis came as a wakeup call. It brought home the danger of nuclear weapons and led to the non-proliferation regime as conceived by the so-called "nuclear club," which included the Soviet Union, the US, Britain, France and China. Under the NPT, only countries that made and set off a nuclear bomb prior to January 1, 1967 were granted the status of a nuclear power. Washington, London and Moscow were the first to sign the treaty in 1968, with Paris and Beijing committing themselves to it years later. But all of the signatories abided by the rules. Those times have passed. NPT controls have become so loose and new nuclear powers so numerous, there’s no counting them anymore. <u><strong>India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have never even applied for "nuclear club"</u></strong> membership. On the contrary, they created their own shadow club with no rules. The official club with all its nukes poses less threat to the human race than this bunch of neophytes. <u><strong><mark>Volatility has spread</mark>, though South Asia plays a separate role in it. </u></strong>"Some South Asian countries have a full arsenal of nukes," says Pyotr Topychkanov, a senior researcher at the International Security Center of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences. "They have enough nuclear warheads and vehicles. They have only one equal in the Middle East, which is Israel. Iran has no nuclear weapons yet." "The same is true of North Korea, which has weapon-grade fissile nuclear materials. They have built and tested explosive devices, but it’s still a long way to fully-fledged nukes for them." "The countries that really cause concern are India, Pakistan and China. China and Pakistan are longtime partners, including their nuclear agenda. India borders on China and Pakistan and is certainly aware of this partnership. It doesn’t have faith in either. Were a conflict to spark off, it would be trilateral and include not only India and Pakistan, but India, Pakistan and China." About <u><strong><mark>30 to 40 countries are on their way towards nuclear status.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Many of them are inches away, like Germany, Japan and Canada, who could have had an A-bomb long ago – but simply didn’t wish to. The Sunni Saudi Arabia has hinted it will make a bomb the moment the Shiite Iran lays its hands on one. </u></strong>The principle of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation was formulated back in 1965, when Pakistan’s foreign chief Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said: "There’s a Christian bomb, a Jewish bomb and now even a Hindu bomb. It’s high time we got a Muslim bomb." <u><strong><mark>Nuclear terrorism is</u></strong></mark> yet <u><strong><mark>a</mark>nother<mark> problem</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Terrorists</mark> can’t make a nuke. But they do know how to <mark>pit countries and </mark>eventually <mark>provoke them to a</mark>n<mark> </mark>inadequate <mark>response.</mark> There’s no lacking of short-sighted politicians who can take that last step, for instance Republican Senator Steve Buyer who nudged the government after 9/11 to nuke Tora Bora caves, instead of sending a task force to Afghanistan. </u></strong>In that sense, the threat of a full-scale nuclear war has transformed into the menace of a local nuclear conflict, or even a string of them. You shouldn’t be lulled by their seeming locality though, since a precise nuclear strike will be felt globally, says PIR Center Internet Project Director Andrei Baklitsky. <u><strong>"A nuclear conflict will have dramatic consequences for all of us, because nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. They are not selective. A nuclear attack in the Middle East would be most tragic, first of all, because of its huge oil fields, and a burning oil field is a big trouble. Secondly, any strike on the Middle East </u></strong>will skyrocket oil prices across the world and plunge the global economy back into an even worse economic crisis that before. The consequences of using an A-bomb in an Indo-Pakistani conflict would be just as grave for these densely populated countries, driving millions of refugees out of their homes and turning agriculture lands into barren wastes." Unfortunately, the world is home to many paradoxes. Despite a drop in amounts of nuclear weapons worldwide, the collapse of the bipolar world has made the risk of a manmade apocalypse palpable.</p> </s>

The 1AC presents a scene of a modern day lynching. Their representations of pain and suffering create a traumatic phenomenon, which instead of finding value in the dead resituates the black body as a phobogenic object.

Cameron is on his way from the nearby town to which - for his own safety - he had been taken over night. He's face down on the floor of a police car but he can hear the voices of the newsboys selling their papers: 'Read all about it! Mob lynches two Negroes here last night! Read all about it! Extra! Extra! Extra! The day before, rumours of a lynch mob had been front-page news Now the papers are carrying scenes of the lynching they had advertised Cameron is forced to look. Telling him to 'take a look at the news', one of his jailers thrusts a newspaper into Cameron's face. 'On the front page' 'was a picture of Tommy and Abe with ropes around their necks, swinging from the-limbs of a tree. Below them were many upturned faces, pointing and laughing at the spectacle' A spectacle that fuels his rage against 'every white person in the world' That rage is part of the power of an image which preserves not only the horror of the black men's bodies - a horror which Cameron is forced to see again as the detectives drive past the hanging tree - but the pleasure of the mob: grinning, pointing, challenging any black man who has to look at this image. Why show Cameron that photo? what does that showing tell us about the positioning of the black man as both victim and spectator of lynching in a racist culture? Could Cameron look at that image without seeing himself? (He was, I think, supposed to see himself: let's not underestimate the sadism generating, and generated by, the killing of black men.) Can any black man resist the identification with a dead black body written into an image which reproduces the divisions of racist culture by showing white men pointing and laughing? the identification can be irresistible It is not only that the history of lynching in the United States is one that black men are forced to engage the photographs come to play a key part in the history, and experience, of lynching in the United States

Cameron is on his way from the nearby town He's face down on the floor of a police car but he can hear the newsboys selling papers: 'Read all about it! Mob lynches two Negroes here last night! Read all about it! Extra! Extra! Extra!' The day before, rumours of a lynch mob had been front-page Cameron is forced to look one of his jailers thrusts a newspaper into Cameron's face. 'On the front page' 'was a picture of Tommy and Abe with ropes around their necks Below were upturned faces, pointing and laughing at the spectacle' That rage is part of the power of an image which preserves not only the horror of the black men's bodies but the pleasure of the mob any black man who has to look at this image. Why show that photo? what does that showing tell us about the positioning of the black man as both victim and spectator Could Cameron look at that image without seeing himself? (He was supposed to see himself: let's not underestimate the sadism generating, and generated by, the killing of black men.) Can any black man resist identification with a dead black body written into an image which reproduces the divisions of racist culture identification can be irresistible

The next day, 8 August 1930, Cameron is on his way from Huntington, the nearby town to which - for his own safety - he had been taken over night. He's face down on the floor of a police car but he can hear the voices of the newsboys selling their papers: 'Read all about it! Mob lynches two Negroes here last night! Read all about it! Extra! Extra! Extra!' (ibid.: 84). The day before, rumours of a lynch mob had been front-page news (details of the Marion lynching were broadcast over the radio throughout the Midwest). Now the papers are carrying scenes of the lynching they had advertised - and, once again, Cameron is forced to look. Telling him to 'take a look at the news', one of his jailers thrusts a newspaper into Cameron's face. 'On the front page', Cameron recalls, 'was a picture of Tommy and Abe with ropes around their necks, swinging from the-limbs of a tree. Below them were many upturned faces, pointing and laughing at the spectacle' (ibid.: 84). A spectacle, one that blurs Cameron's vision with anger, fuels his rage against 'every white person in the world' - as if the circulation of the photograph universalises the violence, and racism, of the lynch mob across the white community. And turns Cameron himself into a 'one-man mob inside. I wanted to kill a white man! Any white man would do!' (ibid.: 85). That rage is part of the power of an image which preserves not only the horror of the black men's bodies - a horror which Cameron is forced to see again as the detectives drive past the hanging tree - but the pleasure of the mob: grinning, pointing, challenging Cameron and, by extension, any black man who has to look at this image. Why show Cameron that photo? Or, more precisely, what does that showing tell us about the positioning of the black man as both victim and spectator - spectator as victim - of lynching in a racist culture? Could Cameron look at that image without seeing himself? (He was, I think, supposed to see himself: let's not underestimate the sadism generating, and generated by, the killing of black men.) Can any black man resist the identification with a dead black body written into an image which reproduces the divisions of racist culture by showing white men pointing and laughing? At that point, I would suggest, the identification can be irresistible. To read James Cameron's A Time of Terror, first published in 1982, is to take on a terrible, and fantasmatic, legacy. It is not only that the history of lynching in the United States is one that black men are forced to engage (that history is central to the various chapters of this book); but, as a black man who survived the scene of lynching, who lived to tell his own story, Cameron is a rare figure in that history: a voice echoing across the decades, come to haunt his readers as he himself remains haunted by the 'echo-like' voice which saved him so many years ago. Is it possible? Do I believe him? The sound of that voice - whose? Cameron's? - carries the desperate imaginings of more than half a century, imprinting itself on his awareness like a photographic plate. Crucial to Cameron's role in contemporary African-American attempts to tell a story which has not been told, voice and image are also central to the event which has to become story - the voice which only Cameron hears, the photographs which, as I want to show, come to play a key part in the history, and experience, of lynching in the United States.

<h4>The 1AC presents a scene of a modern day lynching. Their representations of pain and suffering create a traumatic phenomenon, which instead of finding value in the dead resituates the black body as a phobogenic object.</h4><p><strong>Marriott, 2k</strong> – associate professor in the History of Consciousness Department at UC Santa Cruz (David, “On Black Men,” Edinburgh University Press, pgs. 3-5)//eek</p><p>The next day, 8 August 1930, <u><strong><mark>Cameron is on his way from</mark> </u></strong>Huntington, <u><strong><mark>the nearby town</mark> to which - for his own safety - he had been taken over night. <mark>He's face down on the floor of a police car but he can hear the</mark> voices of the <mark>newsboys selling</mark> their <mark>papers: 'Read all about it! Mob lynches two Negroes here last night! Read all about it! Extra! Extra! Extra!</u></strong>'</mark> (ibid.: 84). <u><strong><mark>The day before, rumours of a lynch mob had been front-page</mark> news</u></strong> (details of the Marion lynching were broadcast over the radio throughout the Midwest). <u><strong>Now the papers are carrying scenes of the lynching they had advertised</u></strong> - and, once again, <u><strong><mark>Cameron is forced to look</mark>. Telling him to 'take a look at the news', <mark>one of his jailers thrusts a newspaper into Cameron's face. 'On the front page'</u></strong></mark>, Cameron recalls, <u><strong><mark>'was a picture of Tommy and Abe with ropes around their necks</mark>, swinging from the-limbs of a tree. <mark>Below</mark> them <mark>were</mark> many <mark>upturned faces, pointing and laughing at the spectacle'</u></strong></mark> (ibid.: 84). <u><strong>A spectacle</u></strong>, one <u><strong>that</u></strong> blurs Cameron's vision with anger, <u><strong>fuels his rage against 'every white person in the world'</u></strong> - as if the circulation of the photograph universalises the violence, and racism, of the lynch mob across the white community. And turns Cameron himself into a 'one-man mob inside. I wanted to kill a white man! Any white man would do!' (ibid.: 85). <u><strong><mark>That rage is part of the power of an image which preserves not only the horror of the black men's bodies</mark> - a horror which Cameron is forced to see again as the detectives drive past the hanging tree - <mark>but the pleasure of the mob</mark>: grinning, pointing, challenging</u></strong> Cameron and, by extension, <u><strong><mark>any black man who has to look at this image. Why show </mark>Cameron <mark>that photo?</u></strong></mark> Or, more precisely, <u><strong><mark>what does that showing tell us about the positioning of the black man as both victim and spectator</u></strong></mark> - spectator as victim - <u><strong>of lynching in a racist culture? <mark>Could Cameron look at that image without seeing himself? (He was</mark>, I think, <mark>supposed to see himself: let's not underestimate the sadism generating, and generated by, the killing of black men.) Can any black man resist </mark>the <mark>identification with a dead black body written into an image which reproduces the divisions of racist culture</mark> by showing white men pointing and laughing?</u></strong> At that point, I would suggest, <u><strong>the <mark>identification can be irresistible</u></strong></mark>. To read James Cameron's A Time of Terror, first published in 1982, is to take on a terrible, and fantasmatic, legacy. <u><strong>It is not only that the history of lynching in the United States is one that black men are forced to engage</u></strong> (that history is central to the various chapters of this book); but, as a black man who survived the scene of lynching, who lived to tell his own story, Cameron is a rare figure in that history: a voice echoing across the decades, come to haunt his readers as he himself remains haunted by the 'echo-like' voice which saved him so many years ago. Is it possible? Do I believe him? The sound of that voice - whose? Cameron's? - carries the desperate imaginings of more than half a century, imprinting itself on his awareness like a photographic plate. Crucial to Cameron's role in contemporary African-American attempts to tell a story which has not been told, voice and image are also central to the event which has to become story - the voice which only Cameron hears, <u><strong>the photographs</u></strong> which, as I want to show, <u><strong>come to play a key part in the history, and experience, of lynching in the United States</u></strong>.</p>

Marriott, 2k – associate professor in the History of Consciousness Department at UC Santa Cruz (David, “On Black Men,” Edinburgh University Press, pgs. 3-5)//eek

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Marriott, 2k – associate professor in the History of Consciousness Department at UC Santa Cruz (David, “On Black Men,” Edinburgh University Press, pgs. 3-5)//eek fulltext: The next day, 8 August 1930, Cameron is on his way from Huntington, the nearby town to which - for his own safety - he had been taken over night. He's face down on the floor of a police car but he can hear the voices of the newsboys selling their papers: 'Read all about it! Mob lynches two Negroes here last night! Read all about it! Extra! Extra! Extra!' (ibid.: 84). The day before, rumours of a lynch mob had been front-page news (details of the Marion lynching were broadcast over the radio throughout the Midwest). Now the papers are carrying scenes of the lynching they had advertised - and, once again, Cameron is forced to look. Telling him to 'take a look at the news', one of his jailers thrusts a newspaper into Cameron's face. 'On the front page', Cameron recalls, 'was a picture of Tommy and Abe with ropes around their necks, swinging from the-limbs of a tree. Below them were many upturned faces, pointing and laughing at the spectacle' (ibid.: 84). A spectacle, one that blurs Cameron's vision with anger, fuels his rage against 'every white person in the world' - as if the circulation of the photograph universalises the violence, and racism, of the lynch mob across the white community. And turns Cameron himself into a 'one-man mob inside. I wanted to kill a white man! Any white man would do!' (ibid.: 85). That rage is part of the power of an image which preserves not only the horror of the black men's bodies - a horror which Cameron is forced to see again as the detectives drive past the hanging tree - but the pleasure of the mob: grinning, pointing, challenging Cameron and, by extension, any black man who has to look at this image. Why show Cameron that photo? Or, more precisely, what does that showing tell us about the positioning of the black man as both victim and spectator - spectator as victim - of lynching in a racist culture? Could Cameron look at that image without seeing himself? (He was, I think, supposed to see himself: let's not underestimate the sadism generating, and generated by, the killing of black men.) Can any black man resist the identification with a dead black body written into an image which reproduces the divisions of racist culture by showing white men pointing and laughing? At that point, I would suggest, the identification can be irresistible. To read James Cameron's A Time of Terror, first published in 1982, is to take on a terrible, and fantasmatic, legacy. It is not only that the history of lynching in the United States is one that black men are forced to engage (that history is central to the various chapters of this book); but, as a black man who survived the scene of lynching, who lived to tell his own story, Cameron is a rare figure in that history: a voice echoing across the decades, come to haunt his readers as he himself remains haunted by the 'echo-like' voice which saved him so many years ago. Is it possible? Do I believe him? The sound of that voice - whose? Cameron's? - carries the desperate imaginings of more than half a century, imprinting itself on his awareness like a photographic plate. Crucial to Cameron's role in contemporary African-American attempts to tell a story which has not been told, voice and image are also central to the event which has to become story - the voice which only Cameron hears, the photographs which, as I want to show, come to play a key part in the history, and experience, of lynching in the United States. [/INST] <h4>The 1AC presents a scene of a modern day lynching. Their representations of pain and suffering create a traumatic phenomenon, which instead of finding value in the dead resituates the black body as a phobogenic object.</h4><p><strong>Marriott, 2k</strong> – associate professor in the History of Consciousness Department at UC Santa Cruz (David, “On Black Men,” Edinburgh University Press, pgs. 3-5)//eek</p><p>The next day, 8 August 1930, <u><strong><mark>Cameron is on his way from</mark> </u></strong>Huntington, <u><strong><mark>the nearby town</mark> to which - for his own safety - he had been taken over night. <mark>He's face down on the floor of a police car but he can hear the</mark> voices of the <mark>newsboys selling</mark> their <mark>papers: 'Read all about it! Mob lynches two Negroes here last night! Read all about it! Extra! Extra! Extra!</u></strong>'</mark> (ibid.: 84). <u><strong><mark>The day before, rumours of a lynch mob had been front-page</mark> news</u></strong> (details of the Marion lynching were broadcast over the radio throughout the Midwest). <u><strong>Now the papers are carrying scenes of the lynching they had advertised</u></strong> - and, once again, <u><strong><mark>Cameron is forced to look</mark>. Telling him to 'take a look at the news', <mark>one of his jailers thrusts a newspaper into Cameron's face. 'On the front page'</u></strong></mark>, Cameron recalls, <u><strong><mark>'was a picture of Tommy and Abe with ropes around their necks</mark>, swinging from the-limbs of a tree. <mark>Below</mark> them <mark>were</mark> many <mark>upturned faces, pointing and laughing at the spectacle'</u></strong></mark> (ibid.: 84). <u><strong>A spectacle</u></strong>, one <u><strong>that</u></strong> blurs Cameron's vision with anger, <u><strong>fuels his rage against 'every white person in the world'</u></strong> - as if the circulation of the photograph universalises the violence, and racism, of the lynch mob across the white community. And turns Cameron himself into a 'one-man mob inside. I wanted to kill a white man! Any white man would do!' (ibid.: 85). <u><strong><mark>That rage is part of the power of an image which preserves not only the horror of the black men's bodies</mark> - a horror which Cameron is forced to see again as the detectives drive past the hanging tree - <mark>but the pleasure of the mob</mark>: grinning, pointing, challenging</u></strong> Cameron and, by extension, <u><strong><mark>any black man who has to look at this image. Why show </mark>Cameron <mark>that photo?</u></strong></mark> Or, more precisely, <u><strong><mark>what does that showing tell us about the positioning of the black man as both victim and spectator</u></strong></mark> - spectator as victim - <u><strong>of lynching in a racist culture? <mark>Could Cameron look at that image without seeing himself? (He was</mark>, I think, <mark>supposed to see himself: let's not underestimate the sadism generating, and generated by, the killing of black men.) Can any black man resist </mark>the <mark>identification with a dead black body written into an image which reproduces the divisions of racist culture</mark> by showing white men pointing and laughing?</u></strong> At that point, I would suggest, <u><strong>the <mark>identification can be irresistible</u></strong></mark>. To read James Cameron's A Time of Terror, first published in 1982, is to take on a terrible, and fantasmatic, legacy. <u><strong>It is not only that the history of lynching in the United States is one that black men are forced to engage</u></strong> (that history is central to the various chapters of this book); but, as a black man who survived the scene of lynching, who lived to tell his own story, Cameron is a rare figure in that history: a voice echoing across the decades, come to haunt his readers as he himself remains haunted by the 'echo-like' voice which saved him so many years ago. Is it possible? Do I believe him? The sound of that voice - whose? Cameron's? - carries the desperate imaginings of more than half a century, imprinting itself on his awareness like a photographic plate. Crucial to Cameron's role in contemporary African-American attempts to tell a story which has not been told, voice and image are also central to the event which has to become story - the voice which only Cameron hears, <u><strong>the photographs</u></strong> which, as I want to show, <u><strong>come to play a key part in the history, and experience, of lynching in the United States</u></strong>.</p> </s>

The 1AC’s insistence on the flux of identity ontologizes fluidity – making materialist understandings of structural fixidity impossible

Notions of ‘flow’, ‘fluidity’, and ‘liquidity’ have become commonplace metaphors for distinguishing today’s mobile, globalized world-system from that of previous eras. This concept is remarkably common within social theory flows are deployed to grasp the social ontology of recent modernity’ that is, they are used: to comprehend, variously: the permeable, protean nature of social space; the intrinsic mobility both of agents and of social processes and relations and the phenomenology of modern social existence It is this ontologization of fluidity that I designate the metaphysics of flux, metaphysical arguments must be recognized as such, so that they can be judged on their own merits; social theorists too often abstain altogether from engaging with metaphysics, instead attempting to cut ‘all relations with philosophy, that fanciful and nonempirical discipline which represents the lowly infancy of the now mature social sciences the very notion of flows is almost entirely metaphysical in conten the metaphysics of flux is not problematic because it is metaphysical in nature but rather because it attempts to theoretically substantiate the empirical observation of increased speed and mobility through a series of broad and often unjustifiably ahistorical ontological propositions. it unjustly privileges the category of becoming over that of being and, as a result, both reifies an ideology of immateriality that does not adequately reflect the material nature of production and distribution, and makes it difficult to conceive forms of political praxis that do not further entrench the accelerating tendencies of the network society The metaphysics of flux brackets out the importance of stasis in understanding our world: on the one hand, that of objects, whose existence is inherently substantial despite the changes that may occur to them over time, and on the other, the human capacity for reason, and our ability to create universal categories in order to rationally assess our lifeworld

Notions of ‘flow’, ‘fluidity’, and ‘liquidity’ have become commonplace for today’s globalized world-system flows are deployed to grasp the social ontology of recent modernity’ to comprehen he permeable, protean nature of social space; the intrinsic mobility of agents and of social processes and relations social theorists mpting to cut ‘all relations with philosophy the very notion of flows is almost entirely metaphysical in content broad and often unjustifiably ahistorical ontological propositions privileges the category of becoming over that of being and reifies an ideology of immateriality that does not adequately reflect the material nature of production and distribution, and makes it difficult to conceive political praxis that do not further entrench the accelerating tendencies of network society

Notions of ‘flow’, ‘fluidity’, and ‘liquidity’ have become commonplace metaphors for distinguishing today’s mobile, globalized world-system from that of previous eras. Our ‘society is constructed around flows’, states Manuel Castells (2010: 442), who is surely most responsible for popularizing such an image: flows of capital, flows of information, flows of technology, flows of organizational interaction, flows of images, sounds, and symbols. Flows are not just one element of the social organization: they are the expression of processes dominating our economic, political, and symbolic life. This concept is remarkably common within social theory, appearing in the work of Manuel DeLanda (1992), Stephen Bertman (1998: 122), Zygmunt Bauman (2000), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), John Urry (2000), Scott Lash (2002), Steven Shaviro (2003), and Christian Fuchs (2011), among many others. In all of these cases, flows are, as John Tomlinson (2007: 75) argues, ‘deployed to grasp the social ontology of recent modernity’ – that is, they are used: to comprehend, variously: the permeable, protean nature of social space; the intrinsic mobility both of agents and of social processes and relations (as in the flows around a network); and the phenomenology of modern social existence. This latter, not only in terms of the common experience of mobility and deterritorialization, but also in terms of the constant dissolution of fixity in value, and of a different ‘texture’ of life. It is this ontologization of fluidity that I designate the metaphysics of flux, a concept that I will examine further throughout the course of this article. The term ‘metaphysics’ is used here as Kant (2004: 15) defines it, that which is ‘based upon neither outer experience, which constitutes the source of physics proper, nor inner, which provides the foundation of empirical psychology’. In other words, that which lies beyond all human ability to directly perceive it. While I largely agree with Jacques Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence, my intention is not to deconstruct the concept of metaphysics as a whole. Rather, I argue that metaphysical arguments must be recognized as such, so that they can be judged on their own merits; as Latour (2005: 51) argues, social theorists too often abstain altogether from engaging with metaphysics, instead attempting to cut ‘all relations with philosophy, that fanciful and nonempirical discipline which represents the lowly infancy of the now mature social sciences’. Yet in my view, the very notion of flows is almost entirely metaphysical in content. In this article, I will posit that the metaphysics of flux is not problematic because it is metaphysical in nature but rather because it attempts to theoretically substantiate the empirical observation of increased speed and mobility through a series of broad and often unjustifiably ahistorical ontological propositions. In doing so, it unjustly privileges the category of becoming over that of being and, as a result, both reifies an ideology of immateriality that does not adequately reflect the material nature of production and distribution, and makes it difficult to conceive forms of political praxis that do not further entrench the accelerating tendencies of the network society. The metaphysics of flux brackets out the importance of stasis in understanding our world: on the one hand, that of objects, whose existence is inherently substantial despite the changes that may occur to them over time, and on the other, the human capacity for reason, and our ability to create universal categories in order to rationally assess our lifeworld.

<h4>The 1AC’s insistence on the flux of identity ontologizes fluidity – making materialist understandings of structural fixidity impossible</h4><p><strong>Sutherland<u> </u>13<u> [Thomas Sutherland, “Liquid Networks and the Metaphysics of Flux: Ontologies of Flow in an Age of Speed and Mobility.” Theory Culture Society 2013 30: 3 originally published online 9 April 2013 | prs]</p><p><mark>Notions of ‘flow’, ‘fluidity’, and ‘liquidity’ have become commonplace</mark> metaphors <mark>for</mark> distinguishing <mark>today’s</mark> mobile, <mark>globalized world-system</mark> from that of previous eras.</u></strong> Our ‘society is constructed around flows’, states Manuel Castells (2010: 442), who is surely most responsible for popularizing such an image: flows of capital, flows of information, flows of technology, flows of organizational interaction, flows of images, sounds, and symbols. Flows are not just one element of the social organization: they are the expression of processes dominating our economic, political, and symbolic life. <u><strong>This concept is remarkably common within social theory</u></strong>, appearing in the work of Manuel DeLanda (1992), Stephen Bertman (1998: 122), Zygmunt Bauman (2000), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), John Urry (2000), Scott Lash (2002), Steven Shaviro (2003), and Christian Fuchs (2011), among many others. In all of these cases, <u><strong><mark>flows are</u></strong></mark>, as John Tomlinson (2007: 75) argues, ‘<u><strong><mark>deployed to grasp the social ontology of recent modernity’</u></strong></mark> – <u><strong>that is, they are used: <mark>to comprehen</mark>d, variously: t<mark>he permeable, protean nature of social space; the intrinsic mobility</mark> both <mark>of agents and of social processes and relations</u></strong></mark> (as in the flows around a network); <u><strong>and the phenomenology of modern social existence</u></strong>. This latter, not only in terms of the common experience of mobility and deterritorialization, but also in terms of the constant dissolution of fixity in value, and of a different ‘texture’ of life. <u><strong>It is this ontologization of fluidity that I designate the metaphysics of flux,</u></strong> a concept that I will examine further throughout the course of this article. The term ‘metaphysics’ is used here as Kant (2004: 15) defines it, that which is ‘based upon neither outer experience, which constitutes the source of physics proper, nor inner, which provides the foundation of empirical psychology’. In other words, that which lies beyond all human ability to directly perceive it. While I largely agree with Jacques Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence, my intention is not to deconstruct the concept of metaphysics as a whole. Rather, I argue that <u><strong>metaphysical arguments must be recognized as such, so that they can be judged on their own merits;</u></strong> as Latour (2005: 51) argues, <u><strong><mark>social theorists</mark> too often abstain altogether from engaging with metaphysics, instead atte<mark>mpting to cut ‘all relations with philosophy</mark>, that fanciful and nonempirical discipline which represents the lowly infancy of the now mature social sciences</u></strong>’. Yet in my view, <u><strong><mark>the very notion of flows is almost entirely metaphysical in conten</u></strong>t</mark>. In this article, I will posit that <u><strong>the metaphysics of flux is not problematic because it is metaphysical in nature but rather because it attempts to theoretically substantiate the empirical observation of increased speed and mobility through a series of <mark>broad and often unjustifiably ahistorical ontological propositions</mark>.</u></strong> In doing so, <u><strong>it unjustly <mark>privileges the</mark> <mark>category of becoming over that of being and</mark>, as a result, both <mark>reifies an ideology of immateriality</mark> <mark>that does not adequately reflect the material nature of production and distribution, and makes it difficult to conceive</mark> forms of <mark>political praxis that do not further entrench the accelerating tendencies</mark> <mark>of </mark>the <mark>network society</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The metaphysics of flux brackets out the importance of stasis in understanding our world:</u></strong> <u><strong>on the one hand, that of objects, whose existence is inherently substantial despite the changes that may occur to them over time, and on the other, the human capacity for reason, and our ability to create universal categories in order to rationally assess our lifeworld</u></strong>. </p>

Sutherland 13 [Thomas Sutherland, “Liquid Networks and the Metaphysics of Flux: Ontologies of Flow in an Age of Speed and Mobility.” Theory Culture Society 2013 30: 3 originally published online 9 April 2013 | prs]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Sutherland 13 [Thomas Sutherland, “Liquid Networks and the Metaphysics of Flux: Ontologies of Flow in an Age of Speed and Mobility.” Theory Culture Society 2013 30: 3 originally published online 9 April 2013 | prs] fulltext: Notions of ‘flow’, ‘fluidity’, and ‘liquidity’ have become commonplace metaphors for distinguishing today’s mobile, globalized world-system from that of previous eras. Our ‘society is constructed around flows’, states Manuel Castells (2010: 442), who is surely most responsible for popularizing such an image: flows of capital, flows of information, flows of technology, flows of organizational interaction, flows of images, sounds, and symbols. Flows are not just one element of the social organization: they are the expression of processes dominating our economic, political, and symbolic life. This concept is remarkably common within social theory, appearing in the work of Manuel DeLanda (1992), Stephen Bertman (1998: 122), Zygmunt Bauman (2000), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), John Urry (2000), Scott Lash (2002), Steven Shaviro (2003), and Christian Fuchs (2011), among many others. In all of these cases, flows are, as John Tomlinson (2007: 75) argues, ‘deployed to grasp the social ontology of recent modernity’ – that is, they are used: to comprehend, variously: the permeable, protean nature of social space; the intrinsic mobility both of agents and of social processes and relations (as in the flows around a network); and the phenomenology of modern social existence. This latter, not only in terms of the common experience of mobility and deterritorialization, but also in terms of the constant dissolution of fixity in value, and of a different ‘texture’ of life. It is this ontologization of fluidity that I designate the metaphysics of flux, a concept that I will examine further throughout the course of this article. The term ‘metaphysics’ is used here as Kant (2004: 15) defines it, that which is ‘based upon neither outer experience, which constitutes the source of physics proper, nor inner, which provides the foundation of empirical psychology’. In other words, that which lies beyond all human ability to directly perceive it. While I largely agree with Jacques Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence, my intention is not to deconstruct the concept of metaphysics as a whole. Rather, I argue that metaphysical arguments must be recognized as such, so that they can be judged on their own merits; as Latour (2005: 51) argues, social theorists too often abstain altogether from engaging with metaphysics, instead attempting to cut ‘all relations with philosophy, that fanciful and nonempirical discipline which represents the lowly infancy of the now mature social sciences’. Yet in my view, the very notion of flows is almost entirely metaphysical in content. In this article, I will posit that the metaphysics of flux is not problematic because it is metaphysical in nature but rather because it attempts to theoretically substantiate the empirical observation of increased speed and mobility through a series of broad and often unjustifiably ahistorical ontological propositions. In doing so, it unjustly privileges the category of becoming over that of being and, as a result, both reifies an ideology of immateriality that does not adequately reflect the material nature of production and distribution, and makes it difficult to conceive forms of political praxis that do not further entrench the accelerating tendencies of the network society. The metaphysics of flux brackets out the importance of stasis in understanding our world: on the one hand, that of objects, whose existence is inherently substantial despite the changes that may occur to them over time, and on the other, the human capacity for reason, and our ability to create universal categories in order to rationally assess our lifeworld. [/INST] <h4>The 1AC’s insistence on the flux of identity ontologizes fluidity – making materialist understandings of structural fixidity impossible</h4><p><strong>Sutherland<u> </u>13<u> [Thomas Sutherland, “Liquid Networks and the Metaphysics of Flux: Ontologies of Flow in an Age of Speed and Mobility.” Theory Culture Society 2013 30: 3 originally published online 9 April 2013 | prs]</p><p><mark>Notions of ‘flow’, ‘fluidity’, and ‘liquidity’ have become commonplace</mark> metaphors <mark>for</mark> distinguishing <mark>today’s</mark> mobile, <mark>globalized world-system</mark> from that of previous eras.</u></strong> Our ‘society is constructed around flows’, states Manuel Castells (2010: 442), who is surely most responsible for popularizing such an image: flows of capital, flows of information, flows of technology, flows of organizational interaction, flows of images, sounds, and symbols. Flows are not just one element of the social organization: they are the expression of processes dominating our economic, political, and symbolic life. <u><strong>This concept is remarkably common within social theory</u></strong>, appearing in the work of Manuel DeLanda (1992), Stephen Bertman (1998: 122), Zygmunt Bauman (2000), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), John Urry (2000), Scott Lash (2002), Steven Shaviro (2003), and Christian Fuchs (2011), among many others. In all of these cases, <u><strong><mark>flows are</u></strong></mark>, as John Tomlinson (2007: 75) argues, ‘<u><strong><mark>deployed to grasp the social ontology of recent modernity’</u></strong></mark> – <u><strong>that is, they are used: <mark>to comprehen</mark>d, variously: t<mark>he permeable, protean nature of social space; the intrinsic mobility</mark> both <mark>of agents and of social processes and relations</u></strong></mark> (as in the flows around a network); <u><strong>and the phenomenology of modern social existence</u></strong>. This latter, not only in terms of the common experience of mobility and deterritorialization, but also in terms of the constant dissolution of fixity in value, and of a different ‘texture’ of life. <u><strong>It is this ontologization of fluidity that I designate the metaphysics of flux,</u></strong> a concept that I will examine further throughout the course of this article. The term ‘metaphysics’ is used here as Kant (2004: 15) defines it, that which is ‘based upon neither outer experience, which constitutes the source of physics proper, nor inner, which provides the foundation of empirical psychology’. In other words, that which lies beyond all human ability to directly perceive it. While I largely agree with Jacques Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence, my intention is not to deconstruct the concept of metaphysics as a whole. Rather, I argue that <u><strong>metaphysical arguments must be recognized as such, so that they can be judged on their own merits;</u></strong> as Latour (2005: 51) argues, <u><strong><mark>social theorists</mark> too often abstain altogether from engaging with metaphysics, instead atte<mark>mpting to cut ‘all relations with philosophy</mark>, that fanciful and nonempirical discipline which represents the lowly infancy of the now mature social sciences</u></strong>’. Yet in my view, <u><strong><mark>the very notion of flows is almost entirely metaphysical in conten</u></strong>t</mark>. In this article, I will posit that <u><strong>the metaphysics of flux is not problematic because it is metaphysical in nature but rather because it attempts to theoretically substantiate the empirical observation of increased speed and mobility through a series of <mark>broad and often unjustifiably ahistorical ontological propositions</mark>.</u></strong> In doing so, <u><strong>it unjustly <mark>privileges the</mark> <mark>category of becoming over that of being and</mark>, as a result, both <mark>reifies an ideology of immateriality</mark> <mark>that does not adequately reflect the material nature of production and distribution, and makes it difficult to conceive</mark> forms of <mark>political praxis that do not further entrench the accelerating tendencies</mark> <mark>of </mark>the <mark>network society</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The metaphysics of flux brackets out the importance of stasis in understanding our world:</u></strong> <u><strong>on the one hand, that of objects, whose existence is inherently substantial despite the changes that may occur to them over time, and on the other, the human capacity for reason, and our ability to create universal categories in order to rationally assess our lifeworld</u></strong>. </p> </s>

D SUBPOINT -- The affirmative paves over structural violence as a product of securitization and locks in social and environmental tension---culminates in extinction and makes war inevitable

human society can survive only in a lasting real peace arms race and militarisation have escalated many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression racial discrimination organised injustice and in the degradation of human environment the “war against Nature and large-scale pollution of our environment Behind “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns which tend to generate social as well as international tensions paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars The prerequisites of a lasting peace involve not only demilitarisation, but also a and elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of inequalities, exploitation and oppression Peace requires a process of emancipation peace cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced the question is not about “sustainability of development” but about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of [hu]mankind we live in an almost permanent crisis The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated Earth can no longer afford to have two parts: the rich, privileged on the one hand, and the poor, deprived on the other

“invisible wars” are suffered by the poor manifested in mass , poverty starvation and oppression, and degradation of environment Behind “invisible wars” we find striking international inequities which generate social as well as international tensions paving the way for “visible” wars The prerequisites of a lasting peace involve demilitarisation and elimination of the causes of “invisible wars”, of structural bases of oppression peace cannot be safeguarded when some suffer invisible wars no ecological balance can be ensured, unless inequalities are reduced. the question is about the survival of [hu]mankind we live in permanent cris selfish behaviour paves the way for the final catastrophe human society cannot survive unless intra-society and international inequalities are eliminated

It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of [hu]mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

<h4><strong>D SUBPOINT -- The affirmative paves over structural violence as a product of securitization and locks in social and environmental tension---culminates in extinction and makes war inevitable </h4><p>Szentes 8</p><p></strong>Tamás Szentes 8, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf</p><p>It’ s a common place that <u><strong>human society can survive</u></strong> and develop <u><strong>only in a lasting real peace</u></strong>. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --<u><strong>arms race and militarisation have</u></strong> not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but <u><strong>escalated</u></strong> and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --<u>many <mark>“invisible wars” are suffered by the poor</u></mark> and oppressed people, <u><mark>manifested in mass </mark>misery<mark>, poverty</mark>, unemployment, homelessness, <mark>starvation</u></mark> and malnutrition, <u><strong>epidemics and poor health conditions,</u></strong> <u>exploitation <mark>and oppression</u>,</mark> <u><strong>racial</u></strong> and other <u><strong>discrimination</u></strong>, physical terror, <u><strong>organised injustice</u></strong>, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., <u><mark>and</u></mark> last but not least, <u>in the <mark>degradation of </mark>human <mark>environment</u></mark>, which means that --<u><strong>the “war against Nature</u></strong>”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, <u><strong>and large-scale pollution of our environment</u></strong>, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. <u><mark>Behind</mark> </u>global terrorism and <u><mark>“invisible wars” we find striking international </mark>and intrasociety <mark>inequities</mark> and distorted development patterns</u> , <u><mark>which</mark> tend to <strong><mark>generate social as well as international tensions</u></strong></mark>, thus <u><strong><mark>paving the way for</strong></mark> unrest and <strong><mark>“visible” wars</u></strong></mark>. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. <u><strong><mark>The prerequisites of a lasting peace</u></strong></mark> between and within societies <u><strong><mark>involve </mark>not only</u></strong> - though, of course, necessarily - <u><strong><mark>demilitarisation</mark>, but also a</u></strong> systematic <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> gradual <u><strong><mark>elimination of the</mark> roots of violence, of the <mark>causes of “invisible wars”, of</mark> the <mark>structural</mark> and institutional <mark>bases of</u></strong></mark> large-scale international and intra-society <u><strong>inequalities,</u></strong> <u><strong>exploitation and <mark>oppression</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Peace requires a process of</u></strong> social and national <u><strong>emancipation</u></strong>, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, <u><mark>peace</mark> </u>is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and <u><mark>cannot be safeguarded</mark> in one part of the world <mark>when some</mark> others <mark>suffer</mark> visible or <mark>invisible wars</u></mark>. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, <u><mark>no ecological balance can be ensured, unless</mark> the deep international development gap and intra-society <mark>inequalities are </mark>substantially <mark>reduced</u>.</mark> Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, <u><mark>the</u></mark> actual <u><mark>question is </mark>not about “sustainability of development” but</u> rather <u><strong><mark>about the </mark>“sustainability of human life”,</u></strong> <u><strong>i.e. <mark>survival of [hu]mankind</u></strong></mark> – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, <u><strong><mark>we live in</mark> an</u></strong> <u><strong>almost <mark>permanent cris</mark>is</u></strong> of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. <u>The narrow-minded, election-oriented, <mark>selfish behaviour </mark>motivated by thirst for power and wealth,</u> which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, <u><mark>paves the way for the final</mark>, last <mark>catastrophe</u></mark>. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. <u>Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, <strong><mark>human society cannot survive unless</strong></mark> such profound <strong><mark>intra-society and international inequalities</strong></mark> prevailing today <strong><mark>are</strong></mark> soon <strong><mark>eliminated</u></strong></mark>. Like a single spacecraft, the <u><strong>Earth can no longer afford to have</u></strong> a 'crew' divided into <u>two parts: the rich, privileged</u>, wellfed, well-educated, <u>on the one hand, and the poor, deprived</u>, starving, sick and uneducated, <u>on the other</u>. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.</p>

Szentes 8 Tamás Szentes 8, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Szentes 8 Tamás Szentes 8, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf fulltext: It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of [hu]mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment. [/INST] <h4><strong>D SUBPOINT -- The affirmative paves over structural violence as a product of securitization and locks in social and environmental tension---culminates in extinction and makes war inevitable </h4><p>Szentes 8</p><p></strong>Tamás Szentes 8, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf</p><p>It’ s a common place that <u><strong>human society can survive</u></strong> and develop <u><strong>only in a lasting real peace</u></strong>. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --<u><strong>arms race and militarisation have</u></strong> not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but <u><strong>escalated</u></strong> and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --<u>many <mark>“invisible wars” are suffered by the poor</u></mark> and oppressed people, <u><mark>manifested in mass </mark>misery<mark>, poverty</mark>, unemployment, homelessness, <mark>starvation</u></mark> and malnutrition, <u><strong>epidemics and poor health conditions,</u></strong> <u>exploitation <mark>and oppression</u>,</mark> <u><strong>racial</u></strong> and other <u><strong>discrimination</u></strong>, physical terror, <u><strong>organised injustice</u></strong>, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., <u><mark>and</u></mark> last but not least, <u>in the <mark>degradation of </mark>human <mark>environment</u></mark>, which means that --<u><strong>the “war against Nature</u></strong>”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, <u><strong>and large-scale pollution of our environment</u></strong>, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. <u><mark>Behind</mark> </u>global terrorism and <u><mark>“invisible wars” we find striking international </mark>and intrasociety <mark>inequities</mark> and distorted development patterns</u> , <u><mark>which</mark> tend to <strong><mark>generate social as well as international tensions</u></strong></mark>, thus <u><strong><mark>paving the way for</strong></mark> unrest and <strong><mark>“visible” wars</u></strong></mark>. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. <u><strong><mark>The prerequisites of a lasting peace</u></strong></mark> between and within societies <u><strong><mark>involve </mark>not only</u></strong> - though, of course, necessarily - <u><strong><mark>demilitarisation</mark>, but also a</u></strong> systematic <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> gradual <u><strong><mark>elimination of the</mark> roots of violence, of the <mark>causes of “invisible wars”, of</mark> the <mark>structural</mark> and institutional <mark>bases of</u></strong></mark> large-scale international and intra-society <u><strong>inequalities,</u></strong> <u><strong>exploitation and <mark>oppression</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Peace requires a process of</u></strong> social and national <u><strong>emancipation</u></strong>, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, <u><mark>peace</mark> </u>is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and <u><mark>cannot be safeguarded</mark> in one part of the world <mark>when some</mark> others <mark>suffer</mark> visible or <mark>invisible wars</u></mark>. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, <u><mark>no ecological balance can be ensured, unless</mark> the deep international development gap and intra-society <mark>inequalities are </mark>substantially <mark>reduced</u>.</mark> Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, <u><mark>the</u></mark> actual <u><mark>question is </mark>not about “sustainability of development” but</u> rather <u><strong><mark>about the </mark>“sustainability of human life”,</u></strong> <u><strong>i.e. <mark>survival of [hu]mankind</u></strong></mark> – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, <u><strong><mark>we live in</mark> an</u></strong> <u><strong>almost <mark>permanent cris</mark>is</u></strong> of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. <u>The narrow-minded, election-oriented, <mark>selfish behaviour </mark>motivated by thirst for power and wealth,</u> which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, <u><mark>paves the way for the final</mark>, last <mark>catastrophe</u></mark>. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. <u>Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, <strong><mark>human society cannot survive unless</strong></mark> such profound <strong><mark>intra-society and international inequalities</strong></mark> prevailing today <strong><mark>are</strong></mark> soon <strong><mark>eliminated</u></strong></mark>. Like a single spacecraft, the <u><strong>Earth can no longer afford to have</u></strong> a 'crew' divided into <u>two parts: the rich, privileged</u>, wellfed, well-educated, <u>on the one hand, and the poor, deprived</u>, starving, sick and uneducated, <u>on the other</u>. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.</p> </s>

Contention 2 is the UN

<h4>Contention 2 is the UN</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Contention 2 is the UN</h4> </s>

The drive for survival destroys the intensity of life and reduces life to its lowest common denominator -- the alternative is to reject the affirmative -- this intimate encounter with death is enough to rupture the form of politics that structures

The sacrificer both destroys and survives. sacrifice is not subterfuge. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. There is no sacrifice,” “unless the one performing it identifies, , with the victim” otherness that is partly sameness, , meeting death is a need, and we must remain as spectators. , critical revaluation of values renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Death cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped through a mirror, to use Perseus’s trick against Medusa. The safety that theater provides, knowing that we will remain alive, enables us to get a taste of death Life loses in interest, when the highest stake may not be risked. . We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but indispensable, paralyzed by the thought of disaster the tendency to exclude death from life brings many other renunciations and exclusions. Sacrifice, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators “The sacred horror “opens , like a theater curtain, and every limited meaning is transfigured The presence of death, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and (violence) melts, the mediation of the intellect , and life is felt at its fullest. intimacy: moments of excess and fusion of beings Survival, , has a price. It limits our life. the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. not so much a negation of life, as an affirmation of the intimate opposed to the normal order of things rejected. the economy of value and future-oriented calculations stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life The need for duration,” “conceals life from us to meet death is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us human.

The sacrificer both destroys and survives. . Sacrifice burns like a sun, We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. , meeting death we remain as spectators. revaluation of values renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Death cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped through a mirror, Perseus’s trick against Medusa. The safety that theater provides, knowing that we will remain alive, enables us to get a taste of death Life loses in interest, when the highest stake may not be risked. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but indispensable, paralyzed by the thought of disaster the tendency to exclude death from life brings many other renunciations and exclusions. Sacrifice brings together life in its fullness and annihilation “The sacred horror “opens , like a theater curtain, and every meaning is transfigured The presence of death, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and (violence) melts life is felt at its fullest. Survival limits our life. the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. Sacrifice is an affirmation of the intimate opposed to the normal order of things the economy of value and future-oriented calculations stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life to meet death is necessary if life is to have value, and is what makes us human.

Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). The sacrificer both destroys and survives. Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that sacrifice is not a simulacrum, not a mere subterfuge. In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “There is no sacrifice,” writes Denis Hollier, “unless the one performing it identifies, in the end, with the victim” (166). Thus it is through identification, through otherness that is partly sameness, that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly, meeting death is a need, not uncalled-for. We must meet death, and we must remain as spectators. Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved, accompanied by the critical revaluation of values, which renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social. Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. Death perhaps cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped sideways, indirectly, vicariously through a mirror, to use Perseus’s ancient trick against Medusa. The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. The safety that theater provides, of essentially knowing that we will remain alive, emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically enables us to really get a taste of death. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked. It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a disaster should occur. Thus the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. Sacrifice, Bataille says, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. “The sacred horror,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It “opens itself, like a theater curtain, on to a realm beyond this world” and every limited meaning is transfigured in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist. The presence of death, which he interprets in a more earthly manner, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and other related elements (violence) bring life closer to a state where individuality melts, the mediation of the intellect between us and the world lessens, and life is felt at its fullest. Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or intimacy: “immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are moments of excess and of fusion of beings (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. Survival, he tells us, has a price. It limits our life. As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. “The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “The need for duration,” in the words of Bataille, “conceals life from us” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity to meet death is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us human. But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things.

<h4>The drive for survival destroys the intensity of life and reduces life to<u><strong> its lowest common denominator -- the alternative is to reject the affirmative -- this intimate encounter with death is enough to rupture the form of politics that structures </h4><p></u>Razinsky 9</strong> (Liran, Lecturer, The Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies, Bar-llan University, Professor of Philosophy @ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88)</p><p>Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). <u><mark>The sacrificer both destroys and survives. </u></mark>Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that <u>sacrifice is not</u> a simulacrum, not a mere <u>subterfuge. </u>In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators<mark>.<u> Sacrifice burns like a sun, </mark>spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, </u>and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). <u><mark>We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. </u></mark>Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “<u>There is no sacrifice,” </u>writes Denis Hollier,<u> “unless the one performing it identifies, </u>in the end<u>, with the victim”</u> (166). Thus it is through identification, through <u>otherness that is partly sameness, </u>that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly<u><mark>, meeting death </mark>is a need, </u>not uncalled-for. We must meet death,<u> and <mark>we </mark>must <mark>remain as spectators. </u></mark>Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved<u>,</u> accompanied by the <u>critical <mark>revaluation of values</u></mark>, which <u><mark>renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.”</u></mark> Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social.<u> </u>Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. <u><mark>Death </u></mark>perhaps <u><mark>cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped</u></mark> sideways, indirectly, vicariously <u><mark>through a mirror, </mark>to use <mark>Perseus’s </u></mark>ancient <u><mark>trick against Medusa. </u></mark>The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. <u><mark>The safety that theater provides, </u></mark>of essentially <u><mark>knowing that we will remain alive, </u></mark>emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically<u><mark> enables us to </u></mark>really <u><mark>get a taste of death</u></mark>. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. <u><strong><mark>Life</strong> </u></mark>is impoverished, it <u><strong><mark>loses in interest, when the highest stake</strong> </u></mark>in the game of living, life itself, <u><strong><mark>may not be risked.</strong> </u></mark>It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us<u>. <mark>We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but</u></mark> in fact <u><mark>indispensable, </u></mark>such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are <u><mark>paralyzed by the thought of </u></mark>who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a <u><mark>disaster </u></mark>should occur. Thus <u><mark>the tendency to exclude death from</u></mark> our calculations in <u><mark>life brings </u></mark>in its train <u><mark>many other renunciations and exclusions. </u></mark>Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. <u><mark>Sacrifice</mark>, </u>Bataille says, <u><mark>brings together life in its fullness and </mark>the <mark>annihilation </mark>of life. We are not mere spectators </u>in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. <u><mark>“The sacred horror</u></mark>,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It <u><mark>“opens </u></mark>itself<u><mark>, like a theater curtain, </u></mark>on to a realm beyond this world” <u><mark>and every </mark>limited <mark>meaning is transfigured</u></mark> in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist.<u> <mark>The presence of death, </u></mark>which he interprets in a more earthly manner,<u> <mark>is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and </u></mark>other related elements <u><mark>(violence) </u></mark>bring life closer to a state where individuality <u><mark>melts</mark>, the mediation of the intellect </u>between us and the world lessens<u>, and <mark>life is felt at its fullest. </u></mark>Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or<u> intimacy: </u>“immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are <u>moments of excess and </u>of <u>fusion of beings</u> (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. <u><mark>Survival</mark>, </u>he tells us<u>, has a price. It <mark>limits our life.</u></mark> As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for <u><strong><mark>the threat of death</strong>: it</u> <u><strong>ruins value</strong> where value is only assured through duration.</u></mark> It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). <u><mark>Sacrifice is</mark> the opposite of production</u> <u>and</u> <u>accumulation. </u>Death is <u>not</u> <u>so much</u> <u>a negation of life, as </u>it is <u><mark>an affirmation of the intimate </u></mark>order of life, which is <u><mark>opposed to the normal order of things</u></mark> and is therefore <u>rejected. </u>“The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely <u><mark>the economy of value and future-oriented calculations </u></mark>that <u><mark>stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life</u></mark>. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “<u>The need for duration,” </u>in the words of Bataille, <u>“conceals life from us</u>” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity <u><mark>to meet death</u></mark> is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death <u><mark>is necessary if life is to have </mark>its full <mark>value, and is </mark>part of <mark>what makes us human.</u></mark> But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things. </p>

Razinsky 9 (Liran, Lecturer, The Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies, Bar-llan University, Professor of Philosophy @ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Razinsky 9 (Liran, Lecturer, The Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies, Bar-llan University, Professor of Philosophy @ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88) fulltext: Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). The sacrificer both destroys and survives. Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that sacrifice is not a simulacrum, not a mere subterfuge. In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “There is no sacrifice,” writes Denis Hollier, “unless the one performing it identifies, in the end, with the victim” (166). Thus it is through identification, through otherness that is partly sameness, that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly, meeting death is a need, not uncalled-for. We must meet death, and we must remain as spectators. Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved, accompanied by the critical revaluation of values, which renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social. Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. Death perhaps cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped sideways, indirectly, vicariously through a mirror, to use Perseus’s ancient trick against Medusa. The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. The safety that theater provides, of essentially knowing that we will remain alive, emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically enables us to really get a taste of death. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked. It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a disaster should occur. Thus the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. Sacrifice, Bataille says, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. “The sacred horror,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It “opens itself, like a theater curtain, on to a realm beyond this world” and every limited meaning is transfigured in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist. The presence of death, which he interprets in a more earthly manner, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and other related elements (violence) bring life closer to a state where individuality melts, the mediation of the intellect between us and the world lessens, and life is felt at its fullest. Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or intimacy: “immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are moments of excess and of fusion of beings (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. Survival, he tells us, has a price. It limits our life. As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. “The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “The need for duration,” in the words of Bataille, “conceals life from us” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity to meet death is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us human. But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things. [/INST] <h4>The drive for survival destroys the intensity of life and reduces life to<u><strong> its lowest common denominator -- the alternative is to reject the affirmative -- this intimate encounter with death is enough to rupture the form of politics that structures </h4><p></u>Razinsky 9</strong> (Liran, Lecturer, The Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies, Bar-llan University, Professor of Philosophy @ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88)</p><p>Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). <u><mark>The sacrificer both destroys and survives. </u></mark>Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that <u>sacrifice is not</u> a simulacrum, not a mere <u>subterfuge. </u>In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators<mark>.<u> Sacrifice burns like a sun, </mark>spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, </u>and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). <u><mark>We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. </u></mark>Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “<u>There is no sacrifice,” </u>writes Denis Hollier,<u> “unless the one performing it identifies, </u>in the end<u>, with the victim”</u> (166). Thus it is through identification, through <u>otherness that is partly sameness, </u>that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly<u><mark>, meeting death </mark>is a need, </u>not uncalled-for. We must meet death,<u> and <mark>we </mark>must <mark>remain as spectators. </u></mark>Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved<u>,</u> accompanied by the <u>critical <mark>revaluation of values</u></mark>, which <u><mark>renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.”</u></mark> Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social.<u> </u>Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. <u><mark>Death </u></mark>perhaps <u><mark>cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped</u></mark> sideways, indirectly, vicariously <u><mark>through a mirror, </mark>to use <mark>Perseus’s </u></mark>ancient <u><mark>trick against Medusa. </u></mark>The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. <u><mark>The safety that theater provides, </u></mark>of essentially <u><mark>knowing that we will remain alive, </u></mark>emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically<u><mark> enables us to </u></mark>really <u><mark>get a taste of death</u></mark>. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. <u><strong><mark>Life</strong> </u></mark>is impoverished, it <u><strong><mark>loses in interest, when the highest stake</strong> </u></mark>in the game of living, life itself, <u><strong><mark>may not be risked.</strong> </u></mark>It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us<u>. <mark>We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but</u></mark> in fact <u><mark>indispensable, </u></mark>such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are <u><mark>paralyzed by the thought of </u></mark>who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a <u><mark>disaster </u></mark>should occur. Thus <u><mark>the tendency to exclude death from</u></mark> our calculations in <u><mark>life brings </u></mark>in its train <u><mark>many other renunciations and exclusions. </u></mark>Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. <u><mark>Sacrifice</mark>, </u>Bataille says, <u><mark>brings together life in its fullness and </mark>the <mark>annihilation </mark>of life. We are not mere spectators </u>in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. <u><mark>“The sacred horror</u></mark>,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It <u><mark>“opens </u></mark>itself<u><mark>, like a theater curtain, </u></mark>on to a realm beyond this world” <u><mark>and every </mark>limited <mark>meaning is transfigured</u></mark> in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist.<u> <mark>The presence of death, </u></mark>which he interprets in a more earthly manner,<u> <mark>is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and </u></mark>other related elements <u><mark>(violence) </u></mark>bring life closer to a state where individuality <u><mark>melts</mark>, the mediation of the intellect </u>between us and the world lessens<u>, and <mark>life is felt at its fullest. </u></mark>Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or<u> intimacy: </u>“immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are <u>moments of excess and </u>of <u>fusion of beings</u> (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. <u><mark>Survival</mark>, </u>he tells us<u>, has a price. It <mark>limits our life.</u></mark> As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for <u><strong><mark>the threat of death</strong>: it</u> <u><strong>ruins value</strong> where value is only assured through duration.</u></mark> It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). <u><mark>Sacrifice is</mark> the opposite of production</u> <u>and</u> <u>accumulation. </u>Death is <u>not</u> <u>so much</u> <u>a negation of life, as </u>it is <u><mark>an affirmation of the intimate </u></mark>order of life, which is <u><mark>opposed to the normal order of things</u></mark> and is therefore <u>rejected. </u>“The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely <u><mark>the economy of value and future-oriented calculations </u></mark>that <u><mark>stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life</u></mark>. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “<u>The need for duration,” </u>in the words of Bataille, <u>“conceals life from us</u>” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity <u><mark>to meet death</u></mark> is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death <u><mark>is necessary if life is to have </mark>its full <mark>value, and is </mark>part of <mark>what makes us human.</u></mark> But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things. </p> </s>

We must exhaust the 1AC through an act of radical passivity which forces the system to commit suicide – such a project is necessary to prevent the absorption of all resistance into the furthering of the sovereign juridical matrix

Time is in the mind The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level we are here touching upon a crucial point Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide So hostages are taken On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity No need for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it it was party to its own destruction . The West has become suicidal, and declared war on itself In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism adopt the mode of passivity A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years the most powerful weapon has been suicide 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal The exchange between life and money could be deserted exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.

Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as energetic mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy reality is absorbed by hyperreality and simulation We must therefore reconstruct the entire law brain is the market The prolif of simulacra has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising have submitted the energies permanent mobilization exhaustion is the only way of escape: Nothing, can avoid the symbolic obligation, The system must itself commit suicide in response to the challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken , from which every moral consideration victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial ac No need for a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects The West has become suicidal exhaustion is seen as the inability body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: exhaustion could become a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much , and outrageously too much during the last thirty years is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa The exchange between life and money could be deserted, exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out economic growth the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth

Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level. I think that we are here touching upon a crucial point. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions. But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation. Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...] The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2) Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality. And the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely.
 The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape: Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.

<h4>We must exhaust the 1AC through an act of radical passivity which forces the system to commit suicide – such a project is necessary to prevent the absorption of all resistance into the furthering of the sovereign juridical matrix</h4><p>Franco <strong>Berardi 11</strong>, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, <u><strong>pg. 104-108</p><p>Time is in the mind</u></strong>. <u><strong>The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level</u></strong>. I think that <u><strong>we are here touching upon a crucial point</u></strong>. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. <u><strong><mark>Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation</mark> <mark>as</mark> an <mark>energetic</mark> process: <mark>mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective</mark> subjectivation in the age of the revolutions</u></strong>. <u><strong>But in our age <mark>energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization</mark> and financial games</u></strong>, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation. Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, <u><strong>the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction</u></strong>. <u><strong>It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object</u></strong>: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...] The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. <u><strong>Today <mark>the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy</mark>, and every <mark>reality is absorbed by </mark>the <mark>hyperreality</mark> of the code <mark>and simulation</u></strong></mark>. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. <u><strong><mark>We must therefore reconstruct the entire</mark> genealogy of the <mark>law</mark> of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system</u></strong>. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. <u><strong>The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra</u></strong>. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2) Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. <u><strong>The <mark>brain is the market</mark>, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality</u></strong>. And <u><strong>the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely</u></strong>.
 The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. <u><strong><mark>The prolif</mark>eration <mark>of simulacra</mark> in the info-sphere <mark>has saturated the space of attention and imagination</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Advertising</mark> and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), <mark>have submitted the energies</mark> of the social psyche to <mark>permanent mobilization</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Exhaustion follows, and <mark>exhaustion is the only way of escape</u></strong>: <u><strong>Nothing, </mark>not even the system, <mark>can avoid the symbolic obligation, </mark>and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains</u></strong>. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. <u><strong><mark>The system must itself commit suicide in response to the</mark> multiplied <mark>challenge of death and suicide</u></strong>. <u><strong>So hostages are taken</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>On the symbolic or sacrificial plane<mark>, from which every moral consideration</mark> of the innocence of the <mark>victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute</mark>, the alter-ego of the terrorist, <mark>the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial ac</mark>t</u></strong>. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. <u><strong>Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity</u></strong>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: <u><strong><mark>No need</u></strong></mark>, then, <u><strong><mark>for a</mark> death drive or a <mark>destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects</mark>.</u></strong> Very logically – inexorably – <u><strong>the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it</u></strong>. And <u><strong>it was party to its own destruction</u></strong>. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can<u><strong>. <mark>The West</u></strong></mark>, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), <u><strong><mark>has become suicidal</mark>, and declared war on itself</u></strong>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. <u><strong>In the activist view <mark>exhaustion is seen as the inability</mark> of the social <mark>body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared:</mark> deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle</u></strong>. But <u><strong><mark>exhaustion could</mark> also <mark>become </mark>the beginning of a slow movement towards <mark>a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption</u></strong>. <u><strong>Radicalism could abandon</mark> the mode of <mark>activism</u></strong>, and <u><strong>adopt the mode of passivity</u></strong>. <u><strong>A radical passivity would</mark> definitely <mark>threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The mother of all the bubbles, <mark>the work bubble, would finally deflate</u></strong>. <u><strong>We have been working too much</mark> during the last three or four centuries<mark>, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years</u></strong></mark>. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that <u><strong>the most powerful weapon has been suicide</u></strong>. <u><strong>9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony</u></strong>. And <u><strong>they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. </u></strong>The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. <u><strong>Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere</u></strong>. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that <u><strong>it <mark>is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa</mark>l</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The exchange between life and money could be deserted</u></strong>,</mark> and <u><strong><mark>exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal</mark> from the sphere of economic exchange</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out</mark> the law of <mark>economic growth</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The self-organization of <mark>the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong>start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.</p></u></strong>

Franco Berardi 11, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 104-108

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Franco Berardi 11, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 104-108 fulltext: Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level. I think that we are here touching upon a crucial point. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions. But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation. Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...] The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2) Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality. And the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely.
 The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape: Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good. [/INST] <h4>We must exhaust the 1AC through an act of radical passivity which forces the system to commit suicide – such a project is necessary to prevent the absorption of all resistance into the furthering of the sovereign juridical matrix</h4><p>Franco <strong>Berardi 11</strong>, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, <u><strong>pg. 104-108</p><p>Time is in the mind</u></strong>. <u><strong>The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level</u></strong>. I think that <u><strong>we are here touching upon a crucial point</u></strong>. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. <u><strong><mark>Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation</mark> <mark>as</mark> an <mark>energetic</mark> process: <mark>mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective</mark> subjectivation in the age of the revolutions</u></strong>. <u><strong>But in our age <mark>energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization</mark> and financial games</u></strong>, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation. Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, <u><strong>the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction</u></strong>. <u><strong>It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object</u></strong>: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...] The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. <u><strong>Today <mark>the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy</mark>, and every <mark>reality is absorbed by </mark>the <mark>hyperreality</mark> of the code <mark>and simulation</u></strong></mark>. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. <u><strong><mark>We must therefore reconstruct the entire</mark> genealogy of the <mark>law</mark> of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system</u></strong>. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. <u><strong>The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra</u></strong>. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2) Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. <u><strong>The <mark>brain is the market</mark>, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality</u></strong>. And <u><strong>the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely</u></strong>.
 The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. <u><strong><mark>The prolif</mark>eration <mark>of simulacra</mark> in the info-sphere <mark>has saturated the space of attention and imagination</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Advertising</mark> and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), <mark>have submitted the energies</mark> of the social psyche to <mark>permanent mobilization</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Exhaustion follows, and <mark>exhaustion is the only way of escape</u></strong>: <u><strong>Nothing, </mark>not even the system, <mark>can avoid the symbolic obligation, </mark>and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains</u></strong>. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. <u><strong><mark>The system must itself commit suicide in response to the</mark> multiplied <mark>challenge of death and suicide</u></strong>. <u><strong>So hostages are taken</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>On the symbolic or sacrificial plane<mark>, from which every moral consideration</mark> of the innocence of the <mark>victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute</mark>, the alter-ego of the terrorist, <mark>the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial ac</mark>t</u></strong>. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. <u><strong>Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity</u></strong>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: <u><strong><mark>No need</u></strong></mark>, then, <u><strong><mark>for a</mark> death drive or a <mark>destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects</mark>.</u></strong> Very logically – inexorably – <u><strong>the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it</u></strong>. And <u><strong>it was party to its own destruction</u></strong>. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can<u><strong>. <mark>The West</u></strong></mark>, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), <u><strong><mark>has become suicidal</mark>, and declared war on itself</u></strong>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. <u><strong>In the activist view <mark>exhaustion is seen as the inability</mark> of the social <mark>body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared:</mark> deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle</u></strong>. But <u><strong><mark>exhaustion could</mark> also <mark>become </mark>the beginning of a slow movement towards <mark>a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption</u></strong>. <u><strong>Radicalism could abandon</mark> the mode of <mark>activism</u></strong>, and <u><strong>adopt the mode of passivity</u></strong>. <u><strong>A radical passivity would</mark> definitely <mark>threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The mother of all the bubbles, <mark>the work bubble, would finally deflate</u></strong>. <u><strong>We have been working too much</mark> during the last three or four centuries<mark>, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years</u></strong></mark>. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that <u><strong>the most powerful weapon has been suicide</u></strong>. <u><strong>9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony</u></strong>. And <u><strong>they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. </u></strong>The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. <u><strong>Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere</u></strong>. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that <u><strong>it <mark>is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa</mark>l</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The exchange between life and money could be deserted</u></strong>,</mark> and <u><strong><mark>exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal</mark> from the sphere of economic exchange</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out</mark> the law of <mark>economic growth</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The self-organization of <mark>the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong>start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.</p></u></strong> </s>

Current soft defections are building political momentum for full-scale defections from the regime

several forms of soft defections from the regime and decriminalization scenarios have evolved. The most known are, the coffee shops in the Netherlands, the medical marijuana schemes, and the cannabis social clubs experimentation and these three models sort of have reached the limit of what you can possibly defend with applying the most flexible interpretation of the treaty system These tensions between countries seeking more flexibility than treaties allow and the UN drug control system are likely to increase further because the trends towards kind of these regulations , it appears to be irreversible, There are more states here that preparing referenda, but also, in some other countries, things are slowly but surely moving in that direction in the preparations that are now starting for the UN Special Session . It is a normal thing for an international treaty regime to evolv

several forms of soft defections and decriminalization scenarios have evolved. The most known are coffee shops in the Netherlands medical marijuana and cannabis social clubs these models have reached the limit of what you can defend with applying the most flexible interpretation of the treaty system These tensions are likely to increase further because the trends towards kind of these regulations it appears to be irreversible It is normal for a treaty regime to evolve

But also, in places where cannabis became more popular in the decades thereafter -- yeah, several forms of soft defections from the regime and decriminalization scenarios have evolved. The most known ones are, I guess, the coffee shops in the Netherlands, the medical marijuana schemes, also, here in the U.S. were implemented in such a way that it goes beyond the pure medical use, and the cannabis social clubs in especially Spain, but also in some -- now some other countries. So, all these three models now have legal difficulties to be defended, but also, in terms of implementation, both the medical marijuana schemes in some states, at least, here, but also, it’s happening now with the cannabis clubs in Spain. There is a certain legal space used, but then implemented in such a way that it goes way beyond the legal space on the basis of which is justified. So yeah, that experimentation and these three models sort of have reached the limit of what you can possibly defend with applying the most flexible interpretation of the treaty system. So, that’s where we are arriving now. No? Because these decades of doubts and policy experimentation, these soft defections, legal hypocrisy have now reached a point where legal regulation is actually starting to happen and gaining political acceptability, even if it breaches the UN conventions. These tensions between countries seeking more flexibility than treaties allow and the UN drug control system are likely to increase further, because the trends towards kind of these regulations, in my view, it appears to be irreversible, and I don't see it really going the other way. There are more states here that preparing referenda, but also, in some other countries, things are slowly but surely moving in that direction. As Wells already explained, the U.S. is hesitant to acknowledge that -- the legal regulation in two states which is now happening, is actually a direct violation of the treaty system. Uruguay is also trying to find a defense to argue that it is acceptable. And yeah, what’s starting to happen is that countries are digging a trench around the convention and the regime. Now, also, in the preparations that are now starting for the UN Special Session, out of the fear, you know, that this is sort of the last line of defense. The holding in place, the last straw of the damaged façade of the broken global drug control consensus. This fear must be overcome. It is a normal thing for an international treaty regime to evolve. This system itself has evolved a few times, at least. In 1972, it was the U.S. initiative to start a whole series of amendments of the 1961 treaty, adding the next treaty was another example of an evolving system, because originally, the single convention was meant to be the single convention -- the only one.

<h4>Current soft defections are building political momentum for full-scale defections from the regime</h4><p><strong>Jelsma, 10/17/14 - </strong>Director, Drugs and Democracy Program Transnational Institute<strong> </strong>(“INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE U.S. TREND TOWARDS LEGAL MARIJUANA” Brookings Event Transcript http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/10/17-international-impacts-marijuana/20141017_legal_marijuana_transcript.pdf</p><p>But also, in places where cannabis became more popular in the decades thereafter -- yeah, <u><strong><mark>several forms of soft defections</mark> from the regime <mark>and decriminalization scenarios have evolved. The most known</u></strong></mark> ones <u><strong><mark>are</mark>,</u></strong> I guess, <u><strong>the <mark>coffee shops in the Netherlands</mark>, the <mark>medical marijuana</mark> schemes,</u></strong> also, here in the U.S. were implemented in such a way that it goes beyond the pure medical use, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> the <mark>cannabis social clubs</u></strong></mark> in especially Spain, but also in some -- now some other countries. So, all these three models now have legal difficulties to be defended, but also, in terms of implementation, both the medical marijuana schemes in some states, at least, here, but also, it’s happening now with the cannabis clubs in Spain. There is a certain legal space used, but then implemented in such a way that it goes way beyond the legal space on the basis of which is justified. So yeah, that <u><strong>experimentation and <mark>these</mark> three <mark>models</mark> sort of <mark>have reached the limit of what you can </mark>possibly <mark>defend with applying the most</mark> <mark>flexible interpretation of the treaty system</u></strong></mark>. So, that’s where we are arriving now. No? Because these decades of doubts and policy experimentation, these soft defections, legal hypocrisy have now reached a point where legal regulation is actually starting to happen and gaining political acceptability, even if it breaches the UN conventions. <u><strong><mark>These tensions</mark> between countries seeking more flexibility than treaties allow and the UN drug control system <mark>are likely to increase further</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>because the trends towards kind of these regulations</u></strong></mark>, in my view<u><strong>, <mark>it appears to be irreversible</mark>,</u></strong> and I don't see it really going the other way. <u><strong>There are more states here that preparing referenda, but also, in some other countries, things are slowly but surely moving in that direction</u></strong>. As Wells already explained, the U.S. is hesitant to acknowledge that -- the legal regulation in two states which is now happening, is actually a direct violation of the treaty system. Uruguay is also trying to find a defense to argue that it is acceptable. And yeah, what’s starting to happen is that countries are digging a trench around the convention and the regime. Now, also, <u><strong>in the preparations that are now starting for the UN Special Session</u></strong>, out of the fear, you know, that this is sort of the last line of defense. The holding in place, the last straw of the damaged façade of the broken global drug control consensus. This fear must be overcome<u><strong>. <mark>It is</mark> a <mark>normal</mark> thing <mark>for a</mark>n international <mark>treaty regime to evolv</u></strong>e</mark>. This system itself has evolved a few times, at least. In 1972, it was the U.S. initiative to start a whole series of amendments of the 1961 treaty, adding the next treaty was another example of an evolving system, because originally, the single convention was meant to be the single convention -- the only one.</p><p> </p>

Jelsma, 10/17/14 - Director, Drugs and Democracy Program Transnational Institute (“INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE U.S. TREND TOWARDS LEGAL MARIJUANA” Brookings Event Transcript http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/10/17-international-impacts-marijuana/20141017_legal_marijuana_transcript.pdf

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Jelsma, 10/17/14 - Director, Drugs and Democracy Program Transnational Institute (“INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE U.S. TREND TOWARDS LEGAL MARIJUANA” Brookings Event Transcript http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/10/17-international-impacts-marijuana/20141017_legal_marijuana_transcript.pdf fulltext: But also, in places where cannabis became more popular in the decades thereafter -- yeah, several forms of soft defections from the regime and decriminalization scenarios have evolved. The most known ones are, I guess, the coffee shops in the Netherlands, the medical marijuana schemes, also, here in the U.S. were implemented in such a way that it goes beyond the pure medical use, and the cannabis social clubs in especially Spain, but also in some -- now some other countries. So, all these three models now have legal difficulties to be defended, but also, in terms of implementation, both the medical marijuana schemes in some states, at least, here, but also, it’s happening now with the cannabis clubs in Spain. There is a certain legal space used, but then implemented in such a way that it goes way beyond the legal space on the basis of which is justified. So yeah, that experimentation and these three models sort of have reached the limit of what you can possibly defend with applying the most flexible interpretation of the treaty system. So, that’s where we are arriving now. No? Because these decades of doubts and policy experimentation, these soft defections, legal hypocrisy have now reached a point where legal regulation is actually starting to happen and gaining political acceptability, even if it breaches the UN conventions. These tensions between countries seeking more flexibility than treaties allow and the UN drug control system are likely to increase further, because the trends towards kind of these regulations, in my view, it appears to be irreversible, and I don't see it really going the other way. There are more states here that preparing referenda, but also, in some other countries, things are slowly but surely moving in that direction. As Wells already explained, the U.S. is hesitant to acknowledge that -- the legal regulation in two states which is now happening, is actually a direct violation of the treaty system. Uruguay is also trying to find a defense to argue that it is acceptable. And yeah, what’s starting to happen is that countries are digging a trench around the convention and the regime. Now, also, in the preparations that are now starting for the UN Special Session, out of the fear, you know, that this is sort of the last line of defense. The holding in place, the last straw of the damaged façade of the broken global drug control consensus. This fear must be overcome. It is a normal thing for an international treaty regime to evolve. This system itself has evolved a few times, at least. In 1972, it was the U.S. initiative to start a whole series of amendments of the 1961 treaty, adding the next treaty was another example of an evolving system, because originally, the single convention was meant to be the single convention -- the only one. [/INST] <h4>Current soft defections are building political momentum for full-scale defections from the regime</h4><p><strong>Jelsma, 10/17/14 - </strong>Director, Drugs and Democracy Program Transnational Institute<strong> </strong>(“INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE U.S. TREND TOWARDS LEGAL MARIJUANA” Brookings Event Transcript http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/10/17-international-impacts-marijuana/20141017_legal_marijuana_transcript.pdf</p><p>But also, in places where cannabis became more popular in the decades thereafter -- yeah, <u><strong><mark>several forms of soft defections</mark> from the regime <mark>and decriminalization scenarios have evolved. The most known</u></strong></mark> ones <u><strong><mark>are</mark>,</u></strong> I guess, <u><strong>the <mark>coffee shops in the Netherlands</mark>, the <mark>medical marijuana</mark> schemes,</u></strong> also, here in the U.S. were implemented in such a way that it goes beyond the pure medical use, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> the <mark>cannabis social clubs</u></strong></mark> in especially Spain, but also in some -- now some other countries. So, all these three models now have legal difficulties to be defended, but also, in terms of implementation, both the medical marijuana schemes in some states, at least, here, but also, it’s happening now with the cannabis clubs in Spain. There is a certain legal space used, but then implemented in such a way that it goes way beyond the legal space on the basis of which is justified. So yeah, that <u><strong>experimentation and <mark>these</mark> three <mark>models</mark> sort of <mark>have reached the limit of what you can </mark>possibly <mark>defend with applying the most</mark> <mark>flexible interpretation of the treaty system</u></strong></mark>. So, that’s where we are arriving now. No? Because these decades of doubts and policy experimentation, these soft defections, legal hypocrisy have now reached a point where legal regulation is actually starting to happen and gaining political acceptability, even if it breaches the UN conventions. <u><strong><mark>These tensions</mark> between countries seeking more flexibility than treaties allow and the UN drug control system <mark>are likely to increase further</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>because the trends towards kind of these regulations</u></strong></mark>, in my view<u><strong>, <mark>it appears to be irreversible</mark>,</u></strong> and I don't see it really going the other way. <u><strong>There are more states here that preparing referenda, but also, in some other countries, things are slowly but surely moving in that direction</u></strong>. As Wells already explained, the U.S. is hesitant to acknowledge that -- the legal regulation in two states which is now happening, is actually a direct violation of the treaty system. Uruguay is also trying to find a defense to argue that it is acceptable. And yeah, what’s starting to happen is that countries are digging a trench around the convention and the regime. Now, also, <u><strong>in the preparations that are now starting for the UN Special Session</u></strong>, out of the fear, you know, that this is sort of the last line of defense. The holding in place, the last straw of the damaged façade of the broken global drug control consensus. This fear must be overcome<u><strong>. <mark>It is</mark> a <mark>normal</mark> thing <mark>for a</mark>n international <mark>treaty regime to evolv</u></strong>e</mark>. This system itself has evolved a few times, at least. In 1972, it was the U.S. initiative to start a whole series of amendments of the 1961 treaty, adding the next treaty was another example of an evolving system, because originally, the single convention was meant to be the single convention -- the only one.</p><p> </p> </s>

Every round matters—every blockade, every barricade and every occupation broadcasts our message. Even if we fail, our call will remain.

To occupy a building, to lock it down against the police, is therefore to subtract ourselves, as much as possible, from the protocols and rules and property relations which govern us, which determine who goes where, and when, and how. To close it down means to open it up – to annul its administration by a cruel and indifferent set of powers The university is already occupied by capital and the state and its autocratic regime of “emergency powers Our goal is straightforward: to broadcast from this space the simple truth that, yes, it is possible to take what was never yours It is not just possible; as the current arrangement of things becomes evermore incapable of providing for us it is necessary we will use this space as a staging ground for the generalization of this principle, here and elsewhere, a staging ground for the occupation of another building, and another, and another, for the continuation of the strike and its extension beyond the university If we fail this time, if we fall short, so be it. The call will remain.

To occupy a building is to subtract ourselves from the rules which determine who goes where, and when, and how. To close it down means to open it up Our goal is straightforward: to broadcast the truth that it is possible to take what was never yours It is not just possible it is necessary will use this space as a staging ground for the generalization of this principle a staging ground for the occupation of another building another strike beyond the university If we fail this time, if we fall short, so be it. The call will remain.

To occupy a building, to lock it down against the police, is therefore to subtract ourselves, as much as possible, from the protocols and rules and property relations which govern us, which determine who goes where, and when, and how. To close it down means to open it up – to annul its administration by a cruel and indifferent set of powers, in order that those of us inside (and those who join us) can determine, freely and of our own volition, how and for whom it is to be used. The university is already occupied—occupied by capital and the state and its autocratic regime of “emergency powers.” Of course, taking over a building is simply the first step, since our real target is not this or that edifice but a system of social relations. If possible, once this space has been fully emancipated, once we successfully defend ourselves against the police and administrators who themselves defend, mercilessly, the inegalitarian protocols of the university, the rule of the budget and its calculated exclusions, then we can open the doors to all who wish to join us, we can come and go freely and let others take our place in determining how the space is used. But we stand no chance of doing so under police watch, having sat down in the building with the doors open, ready to get dragged out five or six hours or a day later. Once our numbers are sufficient to hold a space indefinitely, then we can dispense with locks. Our goal is straightforward: to broadcast from this space the simple truth that, yes, it is possible to take what was never yours, yes, it is possible for workers to take over their workplaces in the face of mass layoffs; for communities where two-thirds of the houses stand empty, foreclosed by banks swollen with government largesse, to take over those houses and give them to all who need a place to live. It is not just possible; as the current arrangement of things becomes evermore incapable of providing for us, it is necessary. We are guided by a simple maxim: omnia sunt communia, everything belongs to everybody, as a famous heretic once said. This is the only property of things which we respect. If possible, we will use this space as a staging ground for the generalization of this principle, here and elsewhere, a staging ground for the occupation of another building, and another, and another, for the continuation of the strike and its extension beyond the university. ///Then we can decide not what we want but what we will do. If we fail this time, if we fall short, so be it. The call will remain.

<h4><u><strong>Every round matters—every blockade, every barricade and every occupation broadcasts our message. Even if we fail, our call will remain.</h4><p></u><mark>Anti-Capital Projects</strong></mark>. “Anti-Capital Projects: Questions & Answers.” Anti-Capital Projects. 11-19-<strong>20<mark>09</strong></mark>. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/anti-capital-projects/</p><p><u><strong><mark>To occupy a building</mark>, to lock it down against the police, <mark>is</mark> therefore <mark>to subtract ourselves</mark>, as much as possible, <mark>from the</mark> protocols and <mark>rules</mark> and property relations which govern us, <mark>which determine who goes where, and when, and how. To close it down means to open it up</mark> – to annul its administration by a cruel and indifferent set of powers</u></strong>, in order that those of us inside (and those who join us) can determine, freely and of our own volition, how and for whom it is to be used. <u><strong>The university is already</u></strong> occupied—<u><strong>occupied by capital and the state and its autocratic regime of “emergency powers</u></strong>.” Of course, taking over a building is simply the first step, since our real target is not this or that edifice but a system of social relations. If possible, once this space has been fully emancipated, once we successfully defend ourselves against the police and administrators who themselves defend, mercilessly, the inegalitarian protocols of the university, the rule of the budget and its calculated exclusions, then we can open the doors to all who wish to join us, we can come and go freely and let others take our place in determining how the space is used. But we stand no chance of doing so under police watch, having sat down in the building with the doors open, ready to get dragged out five or six hours or a day later. Once our numbers are sufficient to hold a space indefinitely, then we can dispense with locks. <u><strong><mark>Our goal is straightforward: to broadcast</mark> from this space <mark>the</mark> simple <mark>truth that</mark>, yes, <mark>it is possible to take what was never yours</u></strong></mark>, yes, it is possible for workers to take over their workplaces in the face of mass layoffs; for communities where two-thirds of the houses stand empty, foreclosed by banks swollen with government largesse, to take over those houses and give them to all who need a place to live. <u><strong><mark>It is not just possible</mark>; as the current arrangement of things becomes evermore incapable of providing for us</u></strong>,<u><strong><mark> it is necessary</u></strong></mark>. We are guided by a simple maxim: omnia sunt communia, everything belongs to everybody, as a famous heretic once said. This is the only property of things which we respect. If possible, <u><strong>we <mark>will use this space as a staging ground for the generalization of this principle</mark>, here and elsewhere, <mark>a staging ground for the occupation of another building</mark>, and another, and <mark>another</mark>, for the continuation of the <mark>strike</mark> and its extension <mark>beyond the university</u></strong></mark>. ///Then we can decide not what we want but what we will do. <u><strong><mark>If we fail this time, if we fall short, so be it. The call will remain.</mark> </p></u></strong>

Anti-Capital Projects. “Anti-Capital Projects: Questions & Answers.” Anti-Capital Projects. 11-19-2009. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/anti-capital-projects/

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Anti-Capital Projects. “Anti-Capital Projects: Questions & Answers.” Anti-Capital Projects. 11-19-2009. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/anti-capital-projects/ fulltext: To occupy a building, to lock it down against the police, is therefore to subtract ourselves, as much as possible, from the protocols and rules and property relations which govern us, which determine who goes where, and when, and how. To close it down means to open it up – to annul its administration by a cruel and indifferent set of powers, in order that those of us inside (and those who join us) can determine, freely and of our own volition, how and for whom it is to be used. The university is already occupied—occupied by capital and the state and its autocratic regime of “emergency powers.” Of course, taking over a building is simply the first step, since our real target is not this or that edifice but a system of social relations. If possible, once this space has been fully emancipated, once we successfully defend ourselves against the police and administrators who themselves defend, mercilessly, the inegalitarian protocols of the university, the rule of the budget and its calculated exclusions, then we can open the doors to all who wish to join us, we can come and go freely and let others take our place in determining how the space is used. But we stand no chance of doing so under police watch, having sat down in the building with the doors open, ready to get dragged out five or six hours or a day later. Once our numbers are sufficient to hold a space indefinitely, then we can dispense with locks. Our goal is straightforward: to broadcast from this space the simple truth that, yes, it is possible to take what was never yours, yes, it is possible for workers to take over their workplaces in the face of mass layoffs; for communities where two-thirds of the houses stand empty, foreclosed by banks swollen with government largesse, to take over those houses and give them to all who need a place to live. It is not just possible; as the current arrangement of things becomes evermore incapable of providing for us, it is necessary. We are guided by a simple maxim: omnia sunt communia, everything belongs to everybody, as a famous heretic once said. This is the only property of things which we respect. If possible, we will use this space as a staging ground for the generalization of this principle, here and elsewhere, a staging ground for the occupation of another building, and another, and another, for the continuation of the strike and its extension beyond the university. ///Then we can decide not what we want but what we will do. If we fail this time, if we fall short, so be it. The call will remain. [/INST] <h4><u><strong>Every round matters—every blockade, every barricade and every occupation broadcasts our message. Even if we fail, our call will remain.</h4><p></u><mark>Anti-Capital Projects</strong></mark>. “Anti-Capital Projects: Questions & Answers.” Anti-Capital Projects. 11-19-<strong>20<mark>09</strong></mark>. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/anti-capital-projects/</p><p><u><strong><mark>To occupy a building</mark>, to lock it down against the police, <mark>is</mark> therefore <mark>to subtract ourselves</mark>, as much as possible, <mark>from the</mark> protocols and <mark>rules</mark> and property relations which govern us, <mark>which determine who goes where, and when, and how. To close it down means to open it up</mark> – to annul its administration by a cruel and indifferent set of powers</u></strong>, in order that those of us inside (and those who join us) can determine, freely and of our own volition, how and for whom it is to be used. <u><strong>The university is already</u></strong> occupied—<u><strong>occupied by capital and the state and its autocratic regime of “emergency powers</u></strong>.” Of course, taking over a building is simply the first step, since our real target is not this or that edifice but a system of social relations. If possible, once this space has been fully emancipated, once we successfully defend ourselves against the police and administrators who themselves defend, mercilessly, the inegalitarian protocols of the university, the rule of the budget and its calculated exclusions, then we can open the doors to all who wish to join us, we can come and go freely and let others take our place in determining how the space is used. But we stand no chance of doing so under police watch, having sat down in the building with the doors open, ready to get dragged out five or six hours or a day later. Once our numbers are sufficient to hold a space indefinitely, then we can dispense with locks. <u><strong><mark>Our goal is straightforward: to broadcast</mark> from this space <mark>the</mark> simple <mark>truth that</mark>, yes, <mark>it is possible to take what was never yours</u></strong></mark>, yes, it is possible for workers to take over their workplaces in the face of mass layoffs; for communities where two-thirds of the houses stand empty, foreclosed by banks swollen with government largesse, to take over those houses and give them to all who need a place to live. <u><strong><mark>It is not just possible</mark>; as the current arrangement of things becomes evermore incapable of providing for us</u></strong>,<u><strong><mark> it is necessary</u></strong></mark>. We are guided by a simple maxim: omnia sunt communia, everything belongs to everybody, as a famous heretic once said. This is the only property of things which we respect. If possible, <u><strong>we <mark>will use this space as a staging ground for the generalization of this principle</mark>, here and elsewhere, <mark>a staging ground for the occupation of another building</mark>, and another, and <mark>another</mark>, for the continuation of the <mark>strike</mark> and its extension <mark>beyond the university</u></strong></mark>. ///Then we can decide not what we want but what we will do. <u><strong><mark>If we fail this time, if we fall short, so be it. The call will remain.</mark> </p></u></strong> </s>

The notion of performativity leads to liberal commodiciation

autobiography is a lucrative commodity In our culture the public avidly consume personal stories No matter how unruly the self that it records, an autobiographical performance transforms that self into a form of "property in a moneyed economy we must be skeptical of the assertion that the outsiders' splendid publication record is itself sufficient evidence of the success of their endeavor While successful autobiography may be momentous for the individual this success has a limited impact on culture the transformation of outsider authors into "success stories" subverts outsiders' radical intentions by constituting them as exemplary participants within contemporary culture, willing to market even themselves to academic consumers Although they style themselves cultural critics, the storytellers generally do not reflect on the meaning of their own commercial success, nor ponder its entanglement with the cultural values they claim to resist for the most part, they seem content simply to take advantage of the peculiarly American license "to have your dissent and make it too

autobiography is a lucrative commodity an autobiographical performance transforms that self into a form of "property in a moneyed economy the transformation of outsider authors into "success stories" subverts outsiders' radical intentions by constituting them as exemplary participants within contemporary culture, willing to market even themselves to academic consumers storytellers seem content "to have your dissent and make it too

Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229) Although Williams is quick to detect insensitivity and bigotry in remarks made by strangers, colleagues, and friends, her taste for irony fails her when it comes to reflection on her relationship with her readers and the material benefits that her autobiographical performances have earned for her. n196 Perhaps Williams should be more inclined to thank, rather than reprimand, her editors for behaving as readers of autobiography invariably do. When we examine this literary faux pas - the incongruity between Williams's condemnation of her editors and the professional benefits their publication secured her - we detect yet another contradiction between the outsiders' use of autobiography and their desire to transform culture radically. Lejeune's characterization of autobiography as a "contract" reminds us that autobiography is a lucrative commodity. In our culture, members of the reading public avidly consume personal stories, n197 which surely explains why first-rate law journals and academic presses have been eager to market outsider narratives. No matter how unruly the self that it records, an autobiographical performance transforms that self into a form of "property in a moneyed economy" n198 and into a valuable intellectual [*1283] asset in an academy that requires its members to publish. n199 Accordingly, we must be skeptical of the assertion that the outsiders' splendid publication record is itself sufficient evidence of the success of their endeavor.. n200 Certainly, publication of a best seller may transform its author's life, with the resulting commercial success and academic renown. n201 As one critic of autobiography puts it, "failures do not get published." n202 While writing a successful autobiography may be momentous for the individual author, this success has a limited impact on culture. Indeed, the transformation of outsider authors into "success stories" subverts outsiders' radical intentions by constituting them as exemplary participants within contemporary culture, willing to market even themselves to literary and academic consumers. n203 What good does this transformation do for outsiders who are less fortunate and less articulate than middle-class law professors? n204 Although they style themselves cultural critics, the [*1284] storytellers generally do not reflect on the meaning of their own commercial success, nor ponder its entanglement with the cultural values they claim to resist.Rather, for the most part, they seem content simply to take advantage of the peculiarly American license, identified by Professor Sacvan Bercovitch, "to have your dissent and make it too." n205

<h4><u>The notion of performativity leads to liberal commodiciation </h4><p></u><strong>Coughlin 95</p><p></strong>Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)</p><p>Although Williams is quick to detect insensitivity and bigotry in remarks made by strangers, colleagues, and friends, her taste for irony fails her when it comes to reflection on her relationship with her readers and the material benefits that her autobiographical performances have earned for her. n196 Perhaps Williams should be more inclined to thank, rather than reprimand, her editors for behaving as readers of autobiography invariably do. When we examine this literary faux pas - the incongruity between Williams's condemnation of her editors and the professional benefits their publication secured her - we detect yet another contradiction between the outsiders' use of autobiography and their desire to transform culture radically. Lejeune's characterization of autobiography as a "contract" reminds us that <u><strong><mark>autobiography is a lucrative commodity</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>In our culture</u></strong>, members of <u><strong>the</u></strong> reading <u><strong>public</u></strong> <u><strong>avidly</u></strong> <u><strong>consume personal stories</u></strong>, n197 which surely explains why first-rate law journals and academic presses have been eager to market outsider narratives. <u><strong>No matter how unruly the self that it records, <mark>an autobiographical performance transforms that self into a form of "property in a moneyed economy</u></strong></mark>" n198 and into a valuable intellectual [*1283] asset in an academy that requires its members to publish. n199 Accordingly, <u><strong>we must be skeptical of the assertion that the outsiders' splendid publication record is itself sufficient evidence of the success of their endeavor</u></strong>.. n200 Certainly, publication of a best seller may transform its author's life, with the resulting commercial success and academic renown. n201 As one critic of autobiography puts it, "failures do not get published." n202 <u><strong>While</u></strong> writing a <u><strong>successful autobiography may be momentous for the individual</u></strong> author, <u><strong>this</u></strong> <u><strong>success has a limited impact on culture</u></strong>. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>the transformation of outsider authors into "success stories" subverts outsiders' radical intentions by constituting them as exemplary participants within contemporary culture, willing to market even themselves</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>to</u></strong></mark> literary and <u><strong><mark>academic consumers</u></strong></mark>. n203 What good does this transformation do for outsiders who are less fortunate and less articulate than middle-class law professors? n204 <u><strong>Although they style themselves cultural critics, the</u></strong> [*1284] <u><strong><mark>storytellers</mark> generally do not reflect on the meaning of their own commercial success, nor ponder its entanglement with the cultural values they claim to resist</u></strong>.Rather, <u><strong>for the most part, they <mark>seem content </mark>simply to take advantage of the peculiarly American license</u></strong>, identified by Professor Sacvan Bercovitch, <u><strong><mark>"to have your dissent and make it too</u></strong></mark>." n205</p>

Coughlin 95

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Coughlin 95 fulltext: Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229) Although Williams is quick to detect insensitivity and bigotry in remarks made by strangers, colleagues, and friends, her taste for irony fails her when it comes to reflection on her relationship with her readers and the material benefits that her autobiographical performances have earned for her. n196 Perhaps Williams should be more inclined to thank, rather than reprimand, her editors for behaving as readers of autobiography invariably do. When we examine this literary faux pas - the incongruity between Williams's condemnation of her editors and the professional benefits their publication secured her - we detect yet another contradiction between the outsiders' use of autobiography and their desire to transform culture radically. Lejeune's characterization of autobiography as a "contract" reminds us that autobiography is a lucrative commodity. In our culture, members of the reading public avidly consume personal stories, n197 which surely explains why first-rate law journals and academic presses have been eager to market outsider narratives. No matter how unruly the self that it records, an autobiographical performance transforms that self into a form of "property in a moneyed economy" n198 and into a valuable intellectual [*1283] asset in an academy that requires its members to publish. n199 Accordingly, we must be skeptical of the assertion that the outsiders' splendid publication record is itself sufficient evidence of the success of their endeavor.. n200 Certainly, publication of a best seller may transform its author's life, with the resulting commercial success and academic renown. n201 As one critic of autobiography puts it, "failures do not get published." n202 While writing a successful autobiography may be momentous for the individual author, this success has a limited impact on culture. Indeed, the transformation of outsider authors into "success stories" subverts outsiders' radical intentions by constituting them as exemplary participants within contemporary culture, willing to market even themselves to literary and academic consumers. n203 What good does this transformation do for outsiders who are less fortunate and less articulate than middle-class law professors? n204 Although they style themselves cultural critics, the [*1284] storytellers generally do not reflect on the meaning of their own commercial success, nor ponder its entanglement with the cultural values they claim to resist.Rather, for the most part, they seem content simply to take advantage of the peculiarly American license, identified by Professor Sacvan Bercovitch, "to have your dissent and make it too." n205 [/INST] <h4><u>The notion of performativity leads to liberal commodiciation </h4><p></u><strong>Coughlin 95</p><p></strong>Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)</p><p>Although Williams is quick to detect insensitivity and bigotry in remarks made by strangers, colleagues, and friends, her taste for irony fails her when it comes to reflection on her relationship with her readers and the material benefits that her autobiographical performances have earned for her. n196 Perhaps Williams should be more inclined to thank, rather than reprimand, her editors for behaving as readers of autobiography invariably do. When we examine this literary faux pas - the incongruity between Williams's condemnation of her editors and the professional benefits their publication secured her - we detect yet another contradiction between the outsiders' use of autobiography and their desire to transform culture radically. Lejeune's characterization of autobiography as a "contract" reminds us that <u><strong><mark>autobiography is a lucrative commodity</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>In our culture</u></strong>, members of <u><strong>the</u></strong> reading <u><strong>public</u></strong> <u><strong>avidly</u></strong> <u><strong>consume personal stories</u></strong>, n197 which surely explains why first-rate law journals and academic presses have been eager to market outsider narratives. <u><strong>No matter how unruly the self that it records, <mark>an autobiographical performance transforms that self into a form of "property in a moneyed economy</u></strong></mark>" n198 and into a valuable intellectual [*1283] asset in an academy that requires its members to publish. n199 Accordingly, <u><strong>we must be skeptical of the assertion that the outsiders' splendid publication record is itself sufficient evidence of the success of their endeavor</u></strong>.. n200 Certainly, publication of a best seller may transform its author's life, with the resulting commercial success and academic renown. n201 As one critic of autobiography puts it, "failures do not get published." n202 <u><strong>While</u></strong> writing a <u><strong>successful autobiography may be momentous for the individual</u></strong> author, <u><strong>this</u></strong> <u><strong>success has a limited impact on culture</u></strong>. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>the transformation of outsider authors into "success stories" subverts outsiders' radical intentions by constituting them as exemplary participants within contemporary culture, willing to market even themselves</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>to</u></strong></mark> literary and <u><strong><mark>academic consumers</u></strong></mark>. n203 What good does this transformation do for outsiders who are less fortunate and less articulate than middle-class law professors? n204 <u><strong>Although they style themselves cultural critics, the</u></strong> [*1284] <u><strong><mark>storytellers</mark> generally do not reflect on the meaning of their own commercial success, nor ponder its entanglement with the cultural values they claim to resist</u></strong>.Rather, <u><strong>for the most part, they <mark>seem content </mark>simply to take advantage of the peculiarly American license</u></strong>, identified by Professor Sacvan Bercovitch, <u><strong><mark>"to have your dissent and make it too</u></strong></mark>." n205</p> </s>

Images of famine simply reinforce the power structures of imperialism that enables famine in the first place.

The African f 19 . In place of assumptions about the naturalized shortages, famines were recognized as human productions, engendered by asymmetrical power relations as by the continent’s ecology. in this period, however, images of African famine. In the European imagination, “Africa” (itself a mythical unity) has been produced as a site of cultural, moral, and spatial difference, populated by “barbarians and the generally underdeveloped. With a historical pedigree ranging across various media and stretching . In particular, the nineteenth-century ”—either lone individuals or a seething mass, victimized, hungry, staring blankly for a pitying audience far away. These images portray a particular kind of helplessness that reinforces colonial relations of power. With their focus firmly on women and children, these pictures offer up icons of a feminized and infantilized place, a place that is passive, pathetic, and demanding of help from those with the capacity to intervene. They are manifest most obviously in the mother-and-child images that have dominated both still photography and video footage of famines. The imaging of famine remains controversial, as the remarks of Claire Short, the British Secretary of State for International Development, in April 1998 indicate. In response war and famine in the Sudan, Short lambasted those British aid agencies that had authorized a public appeal to raise funds for emergency relief. This appeal, with its well-established imagery of starvation, was counterproductive. Speaking at a seminar on disasters and the media, she protested that “the pictures hurt and upset [the public] but they feel it keeps coming around and it seems to be hopeless and they flinch and turn away.” The end result, Short claimed, was despair and hopelessness among the donor public, confirming the position of Africa as a place of hunger and misery, in which political

In place of assumptions about the naturalized shortages, famines were recognized as human productions, engendered by asymmetrical power relations images of famine has been produced as a site of difference, populated by “barbarians and the underdeveloped These images portray helplessness that reinforces colonial relations these offer up a feminized place that is pathetic, and demanding of help from those with the capacity to intervene In response to famine in the Sudan British agencies appeal to raise funds . This appeal, with its imagery of starvation, was counterproductive she protested that “the pictures upset [the public The end result was hopelessness confirming the position as a place of hunger in which

The African food crises of the 1980s fundamentally transformed the academic consensus on the nature of famine. In place of timeworn assumptions about the naturalized occurrence of shortages, famines were recognized as human productions, engendered as much by asymmetrical power relations in the economic, political, and social environment as by the continent’s ecology. What did not change in this period, however, were the images of African famine. In the European imagination, “Africa” (itself a mythical unity) has been produced as a site of cultural, moral, and spatial difference, populated by “barbarians,” “heathens,” “primitives,” “savages,” and the generally underdeveloped. With a historical pedigree ranging across various media and stretching from the first encounters to contemporary international relations scholarship, this discursive economy makes available the interpretative resources for subsequent imagery. In particular, the nineteenth-century intersection of anthropology, colonialism, and photography gave a powerful technological boost to already-existing conceptions hospitable to the new power relations. When these resources intersect with a disaster such as famine, the end result is a “global visual field of often quite standardized representational practices”—either lone individuals or a seething mass, victimized, hungry, staring blankly for a pitying audience far away. These images portray a particular kind of helplessness that reinforces colonial relations of power. With their focus firmly on women and children, these pictures offer up icons of a feminized and infantilized place, a place that is passive, pathetic, and demanding of help from those with the capacity to intervene. They are manifest most obviously in the mother-and-child images that have dominated both still photography and video footage of famines. The imaging of famine remains controversial, as the remarks of Claire Short, the British Secretary of State for International Development, in April 1998 indicate. In pressing for a political response from the international community to war and famine in the Sudan, Short lambasted those British aid agencies that had authorized a public appeal to raise funds for emergency relief. This appeal, with its well-established imagery of starvation, was, in Short’s view, counterproductive. Speaking at a seminar on disasters and the media, she protested that “the pictures hurt and upset [the public] but they feel it keeps coming around and it seems to be hopeless and they flinch and turn away.” The end result, Short claimed, was despair and hopelessness among the donor public, confirming the position of Africa as a place of hunger and misery, in which political solutions to the crisis cannot be found.

<h4><u>Images of famine simply reinforce the power structures of imperialism that enables famine in the first place.</h4><p></u><strong>Campbell 3<u></strong> (David, Professor of IR at Newcastle, “salgado and the Sahel: Documentary Photography and the imaging of famine” rituals of mediation: International politics and social meaning 2003 pg 69-70)</p><p>The African f</u>ood crises of the <u>19</u>80s fundamentally transformed the academic consensus on the nature of famine<u>. <strong><mark>In place of</u></strong></mark> timeworn<u> <strong><mark>assumptions about the naturalized</u></strong> </mark>occurrence of<mark> <u><strong>shortages, famines were recognized as human productions, engendered</u></strong></mark> as much <u><strong><mark>by asymmetrical power relations</u></strong></mark> in the economic, political, and social environment<u> as by the continent’s ecology. </u>What did not change<u> in this period, however, </u>were the <u><strong><mark>images of</u></strong></mark> <u>African <strong><mark>famine</strong></mark>. In the European imagination, “Africa” (itself a mythical unity) <strong><mark>has been produced as a site of</strong></mark> cultural, moral, and spatial <strong><mark>difference, populated by “barbarians</u></strong></mark>,” “heathens,” “primitives,” “savages,” <u><strong><mark>and the </mark>generally <mark>underdeveloped</strong></mark>. With a historical pedigree ranging across various media and stretching </u>from the first encounters to contemporary international relations scholarship, this discursive economy makes available the interpretative resources for subsequent imagery<u>. In particular, the nineteenth-century </u>intersection of anthropology, colonialism, and photography gave a powerful technological boost to already-existing conceptions hospitable to the new power relations. When these resources intersect with a disaster such as famine, the end result is a “global visual field of often quite standardized representational practices<u>”—either lone individuals or a seething mass, victimized, hungry, staring blankly for a pitying audience far away. <strong><mark>These images portray</mark> a particular kind of <mark>helplessness that reinforces colonial relations</mark> of power.</strong> With their focus firmly on women and children, <strong><mark>these</strong></mark> pictures <strong><mark>offer up</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>icons of</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>a feminized</u></mark> <u>and infantilized</u> <u><mark>place</mark>, a place</u> <u><mark>that is</u></mark> <u>passive,</u> <u><mark>pathetic, and</u></mark> <u><mark>demanding of help from those with the capacity to intervene</strong></mark>. They are manifest most obviously in the mother-and-child images that have dominated both still photography and video footage of famines. The imaging of famine remains controversial, as the remarks of Claire Short, the British Secretary of State for International Development, in April 1998 indicate. <strong><mark>In</u></strong></mark> pressing for a political <u><strong><mark>response</u></strong> </mark>from the international community <mark>to<u></mark> war and <strong><mark>famine in the Sudan</strong></mark>, Short lambasted those <strong><mark>British </mark>aid <mark>agencies</mark> that had authorized a public <mark>appeal to raise funds</mark> for emergency relief<mark>. This appeal, with its </mark>well-established <mark>imagery of starvation, was</u></strong></mark>, in Short’s view,<u><strong> <mark>counterproductive</strong></mark>. Speaking at a seminar on disasters and the media, <strong><mark>she protested that “the pictures</mark> hurt and <mark>upset [the public</strong></mark>] but they feel it keeps coming around and it seems to be hopeless and they flinch and turn away.” <strong><mark>The end result</mark>, Short claimed, <mark>was</mark> despair and <mark>hopelessness</strong></mark> among the donor public, <strong><mark>confirming the position</strong></mark> of Africa <strong><mark>as a place of hunger</mark> and misery, <mark>in which </mark>political </u>solutions to the crisis cannot be found.</p></strong>

Campbell 3 (David, Professor of IR at Newcastle, “salgado and the Sahel: Documentary Photography and the imaging of famine” rituals of mediation: International politics and social meaning 2003 pg 69-70)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Campbell 3 (David, Professor of IR at Newcastle, “salgado and the Sahel: Documentary Photography and the imaging of famine” rituals of mediation: International politics and social meaning 2003 pg 69-70) fulltext: The African food crises of the 1980s fundamentally transformed the academic consensus on the nature of famine. In place of timeworn assumptions about the naturalized occurrence of shortages, famines were recognized as human productions, engendered as much by asymmetrical power relations in the economic, political, and social environment as by the continent’s ecology. What did not change in this period, however, were the images of African famine. In the European imagination, “Africa” (itself a mythical unity) has been produced as a site of cultural, moral, and spatial difference, populated by “barbarians,” “heathens,” “primitives,” “savages,” and the generally underdeveloped. With a historical pedigree ranging across various media and stretching from the first encounters to contemporary international relations scholarship, this discursive economy makes available the interpretative resources for subsequent imagery. In particular, the nineteenth-century intersection of anthropology, colonialism, and photography gave a powerful technological boost to already-existing conceptions hospitable to the new power relations. When these resources intersect with a disaster such as famine, the end result is a “global visual field of often quite standardized representational practices”—either lone individuals or a seething mass, victimized, hungry, staring blankly for a pitying audience far away. These images portray a particular kind of helplessness that reinforces colonial relations of power. With their focus firmly on women and children, these pictures offer up icons of a feminized and infantilized place, a place that is passive, pathetic, and demanding of help from those with the capacity to intervene. They are manifest most obviously in the mother-and-child images that have dominated both still photography and video footage of famines. The imaging of famine remains controversial, as the remarks of Claire Short, the British Secretary of State for International Development, in April 1998 indicate. In pressing for a political response from the international community to war and famine in the Sudan, Short lambasted those British aid agencies that had authorized a public appeal to raise funds for emergency relief. This appeal, with its well-established imagery of starvation, was, in Short’s view, counterproductive. Speaking at a seminar on disasters and the media, she protested that “the pictures hurt and upset [the public] but they feel it keeps coming around and it seems to be hopeless and they flinch and turn away.” The end result, Short claimed, was despair and hopelessness among the donor public, confirming the position of Africa as a place of hunger and misery, in which political solutions to the crisis cannot be found. [/INST] <h4><u>Images of famine simply reinforce the power structures of imperialism that enables famine in the first place.</h4><p></u><strong>Campbell 3<u></strong> (David, Professor of IR at Newcastle, “salgado and the Sahel: Documentary Photography and the imaging of famine” rituals of mediation: International politics and social meaning 2003 pg 69-70)</p><p>The African f</u>ood crises of the <u>19</u>80s fundamentally transformed the academic consensus on the nature of famine<u>. <strong><mark>In place of</u></strong></mark> timeworn<u> <strong><mark>assumptions about the naturalized</u></strong> </mark>occurrence of<mark> <u><strong>shortages, famines were recognized as human productions, engendered</u></strong></mark> as much <u><strong><mark>by asymmetrical power relations</u></strong></mark> in the economic, political, and social environment<u> as by the continent’s ecology. </u>What did not change<u> in this period, however, </u>were the <u><strong><mark>images of</u></strong></mark> <u>African <strong><mark>famine</strong></mark>. In the European imagination, “Africa” (itself a mythical unity) <strong><mark>has been produced as a site of</strong></mark> cultural, moral, and spatial <strong><mark>difference, populated by “barbarians</u></strong></mark>,” “heathens,” “primitives,” “savages,” <u><strong><mark>and the </mark>generally <mark>underdeveloped</strong></mark>. With a historical pedigree ranging across various media and stretching </u>from the first encounters to contemporary international relations scholarship, this discursive economy makes available the interpretative resources for subsequent imagery<u>. In particular, the nineteenth-century </u>intersection of anthropology, colonialism, and photography gave a powerful technological boost to already-existing conceptions hospitable to the new power relations. When these resources intersect with a disaster such as famine, the end result is a “global visual field of often quite standardized representational practices<u>”—either lone individuals or a seething mass, victimized, hungry, staring blankly for a pitying audience far away. <strong><mark>These images portray</mark> a particular kind of <mark>helplessness that reinforces colonial relations</mark> of power.</strong> With their focus firmly on women and children, <strong><mark>these</strong></mark> pictures <strong><mark>offer up</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>icons of</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>a feminized</u></mark> <u>and infantilized</u> <u><mark>place</mark>, a place</u> <u><mark>that is</u></mark> <u>passive,</u> <u><mark>pathetic, and</u></mark> <u><mark>demanding of help from those with the capacity to intervene</strong></mark>. They are manifest most obviously in the mother-and-child images that have dominated both still photography and video footage of famines. The imaging of famine remains controversial, as the remarks of Claire Short, the British Secretary of State for International Development, in April 1998 indicate. <strong><mark>In</u></strong></mark> pressing for a political <u><strong><mark>response</u></strong> </mark>from the international community <mark>to<u></mark> war and <strong><mark>famine in the Sudan</strong></mark>, Short lambasted those <strong><mark>British </mark>aid <mark>agencies</mark> that had authorized a public <mark>appeal to raise funds</mark> for emergency relief<mark>. This appeal, with its </mark>well-established <mark>imagery of starvation, was</u></strong></mark>, in Short’s view,<u><strong> <mark>counterproductive</strong></mark>. Speaking at a seminar on disasters and the media, <strong><mark>she protested that “the pictures</mark> hurt and <mark>upset [the public</strong></mark>] but they feel it keeps coming around and it seems to be hopeless and they flinch and turn away.” <strong><mark>The end result</mark>, Short claimed, <mark>was</mark> despair and <mark>hopelessness</strong></mark> among the donor public, <strong><mark>confirming the position</strong></mark> of Africa <strong><mark>as a place of hunger</mark> and misery, <mark>in which </mark>political </u>solutions to the crisis cannot be found.</p></strong> </s>

Legalization doesn’t release the current people incarcerated from jail

<h4>Legalization doesn’t release the current people incarcerated from jail </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Legalization doesn’t release the current people incarcerated from jail </h4> </s>

Double Bind! - Either

<h4>Double Bind! - Either</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Double Bind! - Either</h4> </s>

The UN Drug Conventions will collapse now --- defections are inevitable absent legalization

Decades of doubts, soft defections, legal hypocrisy and experimentation have now reached the point where de jure legal regulation of the whole cannabis market is gaining political acceptability, even if it violates certain outdated elements of the UN conventions. Tensions between countries seeking more flexibility as well as with countries strongly in favour of defending the status quo, are likely to further increase. This seems inevitable because the trend towards cannabis regulation appears irreversible and is rapidly gaining more support across the Americas as well as in Europe In the untidy conflict of procedural and political constraints on treaty reforms versus the movement towards a more flexible global drug control regime the system will likely go through a period of legally dubious interpretations and questionable if not at times hypocritical justifications for national reforms. And the situation is unlikely to change until a tipping point is reached and a group of like-minded countries is ready to engage in the challenge to reconcile the multiple and increasing legal inconsistencies and disputes The question is now no longer whether or not there is a need to reassess and modernize the UN drug control system, but rather when and how The question is if a mechanism can be found soon enough to deal with the growing tensions and to transform the current system in an orderly fashion If not, a critical mass of dissenters will soon feel forced to opt out of the current system’s strictures, and, using any of the available reservation, modification or denunciation options, use or create a legal mechanism or interpretation to pursue the drug policy reforms

Decades of defections hypocrisy and experimentation have reached the point where legal regulation of the cannabis market is gaining acceptability, even if it violates outdated elements of the UN conventions. Tensions are likely to further increase. This seems inevitable because the trend towards regulation appears irreversible and is rapidly gaining more support the situation is unlikely to change until a tipping point is reached The question is now no longer whether there is a need to modernize the UN system, but rather when and how. The question is if a mechanism can be found soon to deal with the growing tensions If not, a critical mass of dissenters will soon opt out of the current system

Decades of doubts, soft defections, legal hypocrisy and policy experimentation have now reached the point where de jure legal regulation of the whole cannabis market is gaining political acceptability, even if it violates certain outdated elements of the UN conventions. Tensions between countries seeking more flexibility and the UN drug control system and its specialized agencies, as well as with countries strongly in favour of defending the status quo, are likely to further increase. This seems inevitable because the trend towards cannabis regulation appears irreversible and is rapidly gaining more support across the Americas, as well as among many local authorities in Europe that have to face the difficulties and consequences¶ of implementing current control mechanisms.¶ In the untidy conflict of procedural and political constraints on treaty reforms versus the movement towards a¶ modernized more flexible global drug control regime, the system will likely go through a period of legally dubious interpretations and questionable if not at times hypocritical justifications for national reforms. And the situation is unlikely to change until a tipping point is reached and a group of like-minded countries is ready to engage in the challenge to reconcile the multiple and increasing legal inconsistencies and disputes. The question appearing on the international policy agenda is now no longer whether or not there is a need to reassess and modernize the UN drug control system, but rather when and how. The question is if a mechanism can be found soon enough to deal with the growing tensions and to transform the current system in an orderly fashion into ¶ one more adaptable to local concerns and priorities, and ¶ one that is more compatible with basic scientific norms and UN standards of today. If not, a critical mass of dissenters will soon feel forced to opt out of the current system’s strictures, and, using any of the available reservation, modification or denunciation options, use or create a legal mechanism or interpretation to pursue the drug policy reforms they are convinced will most protect the health and safety of their people.

<h4>The UN Drug Conventions will collapse now --- defections are inevitable absent legalization </h4><p>Martin <strong>Jelsma, 14</strong>, co-oordinated TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, w/ Tom Blickman, “The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition¶ the History of cannabis in the UN drug control system and options for reform: Treaty reform options,” http://www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_ch4.pdf </p><p><u><mark>Decades of</mark> doubts, soft <mark>defections</mark>,</u> <u>legal <mark>hypocrisy and</u></mark> policy <u><mark>experimentation have</mark> now <mark>reached the point where</u> <u></mark>de jure <mark>legal regulation of the</mark> whole <mark>cannabis market is gaining</mark> political <mark>acceptability, even if it violates</mark> certain <mark>outdated elements of the UN conventions. Tensions</mark> between countries seeking more flexibility </u>and the UN drug control system and its specialized agencies, <u>as well as with countries strongly in favour of defending the status quo, <mark>are <strong>likely to further increase</strong>.</u> <u>This seems inevitable because the <strong>trend towards</mark> cannabis <mark>regulation appears irreversible</strong> and is rapidly gaining more support</mark> across the Americas</u>, <u>as well as</u> among many local authorities <u>in Europe</u> that have to face the difficulties and consequences¶ of implementing current control mechanisms.¶ <u>In the untidy conflict of procedural and political constraints on treaty reforms versus the movement towards a</u>¶ modernized <u>more flexible global drug control regime</u>, <u>the system will likely go through a period of legally dubious interpretations and questionable if not at times hypocritical justifications for national reforms. And <strong><mark>the situation is unlikely to change until a tipping point is reached</strong></mark> and a group of like-minded countries is ready to engage in the challenge to reconcile the multiple and increasing legal inconsistencies and disputes</u>. <u><mark>The question</mark> </u>appearing on the international policy agenda <u> <mark>is now no longer whether</mark> or not <mark>there is a need to</mark> reassess and <mark>modernize the UN</mark> drug control <mark>system, <strong>but rather when and how</u></strong>. <u>The question is if a mechanism can be found soon</mark> enough <mark>to deal with the growing tensions</mark> and to transform the current system in an orderly fashion</u> into ¶ one more adaptable to local concerns and priorities, and ¶ one that is more compatible with basic scientific norms and UN standards of today. <u><mark>If not, <strong>a critical mass of dissenters will soon</mark> feel forced to <mark>opt out of the current system</mark>’s strictures,</strong> and, using any of the available reservation, modification or denunciation options, use or create a legal mechanism or interpretation to pursue the drug policy reforms </u>they are convinced will most protect the health and safety of their people.</p>

Martin Jelsma, 14, co-oordinated TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, w/ Tom Blickman, “The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition¶ the History of cannabis in the UN drug control system and options for reform: Treaty reform options,” http://www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_ch4.pdf

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Martin Jelsma, 14, co-oordinated TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, w/ Tom Blickman, “The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition¶ the History of cannabis in the UN drug control system and options for reform: Treaty reform options,” http://www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_ch4.pdf fulltext: Decades of doubts, soft defections, legal hypocrisy and policy experimentation have now reached the point where de jure legal regulation of the whole cannabis market is gaining political acceptability, even if it violates certain outdated elements of the UN conventions. Tensions between countries seeking more flexibility and the UN drug control system and its specialized agencies, as well as with countries strongly in favour of defending the status quo, are likely to further increase. This seems inevitable because the trend towards cannabis regulation appears irreversible and is rapidly gaining more support across the Americas, as well as among many local authorities in Europe that have to face the difficulties and consequences¶ of implementing current control mechanisms.¶ In the untidy conflict of procedural and political constraints on treaty reforms versus the movement towards a¶ modernized more flexible global drug control regime, the system will likely go through a period of legally dubious interpretations and questionable if not at times hypocritical justifications for national reforms. And the situation is unlikely to change until a tipping point is reached and a group of like-minded countries is ready to engage in the challenge to reconcile the multiple and increasing legal inconsistencies and disputes. The question appearing on the international policy agenda is now no longer whether or not there is a need to reassess and modernize the UN drug control system, but rather when and how. The question is if a mechanism can be found soon enough to deal with the growing tensions and to transform the current system in an orderly fashion into ¶ one more adaptable to local concerns and priorities, and ¶ one that is more compatible with basic scientific norms and UN standards of today. If not, a critical mass of dissenters will soon feel forced to opt out of the current system’s strictures, and, using any of the available reservation, modification or denunciation options, use or create a legal mechanism or interpretation to pursue the drug policy reforms they are convinced will most protect the health and safety of their people. [/INST] <h4>The UN Drug Conventions will collapse now --- defections are inevitable absent legalization </h4><p>Martin <strong>Jelsma, 14</strong>, co-oordinated TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, w/ Tom Blickman, “The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition¶ the History of cannabis in the UN drug control system and options for reform: Treaty reform options,” http://www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_ch4.pdf </p><p><u><mark>Decades of</mark> doubts, soft <mark>defections</mark>,</u> <u>legal <mark>hypocrisy and</u></mark> policy <u><mark>experimentation have</mark> now <mark>reached the point where</u> <u></mark>de jure <mark>legal regulation of the</mark> whole <mark>cannabis market is gaining</mark> political <mark>acceptability, even if it violates</mark> certain <mark>outdated elements of the UN conventions. Tensions</mark> between countries seeking more flexibility </u>and the UN drug control system and its specialized agencies, <u>as well as with countries strongly in favour of defending the status quo, <mark>are <strong>likely to further increase</strong>.</u> <u>This seems inevitable because the <strong>trend towards</mark> cannabis <mark>regulation appears irreversible</strong> and is rapidly gaining more support</mark> across the Americas</u>, <u>as well as</u> among many local authorities <u>in Europe</u> that have to face the difficulties and consequences¶ of implementing current control mechanisms.¶ <u>In the untidy conflict of procedural and political constraints on treaty reforms versus the movement towards a</u>¶ modernized <u>more flexible global drug control regime</u>, <u>the system will likely go through a period of legally dubious interpretations and questionable if not at times hypocritical justifications for national reforms. And <strong><mark>the situation is unlikely to change until a tipping point is reached</strong></mark> and a group of like-minded countries is ready to engage in the challenge to reconcile the multiple and increasing legal inconsistencies and disputes</u>. <u><mark>The question</mark> </u>appearing on the international policy agenda <u> <mark>is now no longer whether</mark> or not <mark>there is a need to</mark> reassess and <mark>modernize the UN</mark> drug control <mark>system, <strong>but rather when and how</u></strong>. <u>The question is if a mechanism can be found soon</mark> enough <mark>to deal with the growing tensions</mark> and to transform the current system in an orderly fashion</u> into ¶ one more adaptable to local concerns and priorities, and ¶ one that is more compatible with basic scientific norms and UN standards of today. <u><mark>If not, <strong>a critical mass of dissenters will soon</mark> feel forced to <mark>opt out of the current system</mark>’s strictures,</strong> and, using any of the available reservation, modification or denunciation options, use or create a legal mechanism or interpretation to pursue the drug policy reforms </u>they are convinced will most protect the health and safety of their people.</p> </s>

Now is the key time for a policy shift

the war on drugs has led to public health crises, mass incarceration, corruption, and black market–fueled violence. Governments have begun calling for a new approach, and reforms in some countries have spurred unprecedented momentum for change Pressed by drug war–fatigued Latin American leaders, the UN General Assembly plans to hold a review of the drug control system in 2016.¶ The UNGASS, is a meeting of UN member states to assess the world’s drug control priorities. Why does this summit matter?¶ International debates on drugs are rarely more than reaffirmations of the established system. But 2016 is different. Never before have so many governments voiced displeasure with the international drug control regime. Never before, have citizens passed regulatory proposals via referenda Never before have the health benefits of harm reduction approaches been clearer. there is significant dissent at the local, national, and international levels UNGASS 2016 is an unparalleled opportunity to put an end to the horrors of the drug war and instead prioritize health, human rights, and safety If this event is slated for 2016, why are we talking about it now?¶ As with all UN summits, the preparatory work begins well in advance. The content, priorities, and strategies are determined years ahead of time . Change is possible, and the process is starting now.

the war on drugs has led to health crises and violence Governments have begun calling for a new approach, and reforms have spurred unprecedented momentum for change the UN plans to review the system in 2016 debates on drugs are rarely more than reaffirmations But 2016 is different. Never before have so many governments voiced displeasure Never before have the health benefits of harm reduction been clearer there is significant dissent UNGASS 2016 is an unparalleled opportunity to put an end to the drug war and instead prioritize health with all UN summits, The strategies are determined years ahead of time the process is starting now.

Over the last few decades, the international war on drugs has led to public health crises, mass incarceration, corruption, and black market–fueled violence. Governments have begun calling for a new approach, and reforms in some countries have spurred unprecedented momentum for change. Pressed by drug war–fatigued Latin American leaders, the UN General Assembly plans to hold a review of the drug control system in 2016.¶ What is UNGASS?¶ The United Nations General Assembly Special Session, or UNGASS, is a meeting of UN member states to assess and debate global issues such as health, gender, or in this case, the world’s drug control priorities. The last time a special session on drugs was held, in 1998, its focus was the total elimination of drugs from the world. Today, political leaders and citizens are pushing to rethink that ineffective and dangerous approach.¶ Why does this summit matter?¶ International debates on drugs are rarely more than reaffirmations of the established system. But 2016 is different. Never before have so many governments voiced displeasure with the international drug control regime. Never before, to this degree, have citizens put drug law reform on the agenda and passed regulatory proposals via referenda or by popular campaigns. Never before have the health benefits of harm reduction approaches—which prevent overdose and transmission of diseases like HIV—been clearer. For the first time, there is significant dissent at the local, national, and international levels.¶ UNGASS 2016 is an unparalleled opportunity to put an end to the horrors of the drug war and instead prioritize health, human rights, and safety. ¶ But what does a UN meeting like this have to do with ordinary people’s lives?¶ The simple fact is that if your government wants to introduce drug policy reform, it may have to wrestle with the stewards of the drug control system in the UN.¶ For example, in the early 1990s, Switzerland faced a major drug problem. The country had open-air drug scenes and one of the highest rates of HIV in Western Europe. Rather than traditional, unsuccessful criminal justice approaches, the government pioneered health services such as heroin prescription, supervised consumption rooms, and community-based treatment. The Swiss people approved this policy through a series of referenda.¶ The results were eye-opening.¶ The number of new heroin users declined from 850 in 1990 to 150 in 2002; drug-related deaths declined by more than 50 percent between 1991 and 2004; levels of new HIV infections dropped 87 percent in 10 years, and there was a 90 percent reduction of property crime committed by people who use drugs.¶ However, rather than lauding these successes, the UN’s drug panel (the International Narcotics Control Board), accused the Swiss government of “aiding and/or abetting the commission of crimes involving illegal drug possession and use, as well as other criminal offences, including drug trafficking.”¶ When Uruguay experimented with new cannabis policies, the International Narcotics Control Board’s president went even further, accusing Uruguay of demonstrating “pirate attitudes.” This kind of insult against a country is extremely rare for a body of its kind.¶ In addition to criticism, some of these officials have a history of applauding some of the worst excesses in drug control. For example, after Bulgaria introduced a law that made possession of tiny amounts of drugs punishable with mandatory incarceration for as long as 15 years, the International Narcotics Control Board praised Bulgaria’s “political commitment and the will to deal with drug abuse.” ¶ While condemnation from these bodies may not deter powerful countries, it can discourage smaller nations from experimenting with alternative approaches.¶ If this event is slated for 2016, why are we talking about it now?¶ As with all UN summits, the preparatory work begins well in advance. The content, priorities, and strategies are determined months and years ahead of time. That’s why it’s time for people to speak out and tell their governments that the status quo is not acceptable. Change is possible, and the process is starting now.

<h4>Now is the key time for a policy shift </h4><p><strong>OSF 14<u>, Open Society Foundation, EXPLAINERS: What Is UNGASS 2016?, March, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/what-ungass-2016</p><p></u></strong>Over the last few decades, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> </u></strong>international <u><strong><mark>war on drugs has led to</mark> public <mark>health crises</mark>, mass incarceration, corruption, <mark>and</mark> black market–fueled <mark>violence</mark>. <mark>Governments have begun calling for a new approach, and reforms</mark> in some countries <mark>have spurred unprecedented momentum for change</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Pressed by drug war–fatigued Latin American leaders, <mark>the UN</mark> General Assembly <mark>plans to</mark> hold a <mark>review</mark> of <mark>the</mark> drug control <mark>system in 2016</mark>.¶</u></strong> What is UNGASS?¶ <u><strong>The </u></strong>United Nations General Assembly Special Session, or <u><strong>UNGASS,</u></strong> <u><strong>is a meeting of UN member states to assess</u></strong> and debate global issues such as health, gender, or in this case, <u><strong>the world’s drug control priorities.</u></strong> The last time a special session on drugs was held, in 1998, its focus was the total elimination of drugs from the world. Today, political leaders and citizens are pushing to rethink that ineffective and dangerous approach.¶ <u><strong>Why does this summit matter?¶ International <mark>debates on drugs are rarely more than reaffirmations</mark> of the established system. <mark>But 2016 is different.</u></strong> <u><strong>Never before have so many governments voiced displeasure</mark> with the international drug control regime. Never before,</u></strong> to this degree, <u><strong>have citizens </u></strong>put drug law reform on the agenda and <u><strong>passed regulatory proposals via referenda </u></strong>or by popular campaigns. <u><strong><mark>Never before have the health benefits of harm reduction</mark> approaches</u></strong>—which prevent overdose and transmission of diseases like HIV—<u><strong><mark>been clearer</mark>. </u></strong>For the first time, <u><strong><mark>there is significant dissent</mark> at the local, national, and international levels</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong><mark>UNGASS 2016 is an unparalleled opportunity to put an end to the</mark> horrors of the <mark>drug war and instead prioritize health</mark>, human rights, and safety</u></strong>. ¶ But what does a UN meeting like this have to do with ordinary people’s lives?¶ The simple fact is that if your government wants to introduce drug policy reform, it may have to wrestle with the stewards of the drug control system in the UN.¶ For example, in the early 1990s, Switzerland faced a major drug problem. The country had open-air drug scenes and one of the highest rates of HIV in Western Europe. Rather than traditional, unsuccessful criminal justice approaches, the government pioneered health services such as heroin prescription, supervised consumption rooms, and community-based treatment. The Swiss people approved this policy through a series of referenda.¶ The results were eye-opening.¶ The number of new heroin users declined from 850 in 1990 to 150 in 2002; drug-related deaths declined by more than 50 percent between 1991 and 2004; levels of new HIV infections dropped 87 percent in 10 years, and there was a 90 percent reduction of property crime committed by people who use drugs.¶ However, rather than lauding these successes, the UN’s drug panel (the International Narcotics Control Board), accused the Swiss government of “aiding and/or abetting the commission of crimes involving illegal drug possession and use, as well as other criminal offences, including drug trafficking.”¶ When Uruguay experimented with new cannabis policies, the International Narcotics Control Board’s president went even further, accusing Uruguay of demonstrating “pirate attitudes.” This kind of insult against a country is extremely rare for a body of its kind.¶ In addition to criticism, some of these officials have a history of applauding some of the worst excesses in drug control. For example, after Bulgaria introduced a law that made possession of tiny amounts of drugs punishable with mandatory incarceration for as long as 15 years, the International Narcotics Control Board praised Bulgaria’s “political commitment and the will to deal with drug abuse.” ¶ While condemnation from these bodies may not deter powerful countries, it can discourage smaller nations from experimenting with alternative approaches.¶ <u><strong>If this event is slated for 2016, why are we talking about it now?¶ As <mark>with all UN summits,</mark> the preparatory work begins well in advance.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The</mark> content, priorities, and <mark>strategies are determined</u></strong></mark> months and <u><strong><mark>years ahead of time</u></strong></mark>. That’s why it’s time for people to speak out and tell their governments that the status quo is not acceptable<u><strong>. Change is possible, and <mark>the process is starting now.</p></u></strong></mark>

OSF 14, Open Society Foundation, EXPLAINERS: What Is UNGASS 2016?, March, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/what-ungass-2016

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: OSF 14, Open Society Foundation, EXPLAINERS: What Is UNGASS 2016?, March, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/what-ungass-2016 fulltext: Over the last few decades, the international war on drugs has led to public health crises, mass incarceration, corruption, and black market–fueled violence. Governments have begun calling for a new approach, and reforms in some countries have spurred unprecedented momentum for change. Pressed by drug war–fatigued Latin American leaders, the UN General Assembly plans to hold a review of the drug control system in 2016.¶ What is UNGASS?¶ The United Nations General Assembly Special Session, or UNGASS, is a meeting of UN member states to assess and debate global issues such as health, gender, or in this case, the world’s drug control priorities. The last time a special session on drugs was held, in 1998, its focus was the total elimination of drugs from the world. Today, political leaders and citizens are pushing to rethink that ineffective and dangerous approach.¶ Why does this summit matter?¶ International debates on drugs are rarely more than reaffirmations of the established system. But 2016 is different. Never before have so many governments voiced displeasure with the international drug control regime. Never before, to this degree, have citizens put drug law reform on the agenda and passed regulatory proposals via referenda or by popular campaigns. Never before have the health benefits of harm reduction approaches—which prevent overdose and transmission of diseases like HIV—been clearer. For the first time, there is significant dissent at the local, national, and international levels.¶ UNGASS 2016 is an unparalleled opportunity to put an end to the horrors of the drug war and instead prioritize health, human rights, and safety. ¶ But what does a UN meeting like this have to do with ordinary people’s lives?¶ The simple fact is that if your government wants to introduce drug policy reform, it may have to wrestle with the stewards of the drug control system in the UN.¶ For example, in the early 1990s, Switzerland faced a major drug problem. The country had open-air drug scenes and one of the highest rates of HIV in Western Europe. Rather than traditional, unsuccessful criminal justice approaches, the government pioneered health services such as heroin prescription, supervised consumption rooms, and community-based treatment. The Swiss people approved this policy through a series of referenda.¶ The results were eye-opening.¶ The number of new heroin users declined from 850 in 1990 to 150 in 2002; drug-related deaths declined by more than 50 percent between 1991 and 2004; levels of new HIV infections dropped 87 percent in 10 years, and there was a 90 percent reduction of property crime committed by people who use drugs.¶ However, rather than lauding these successes, the UN’s drug panel (the International Narcotics Control Board), accused the Swiss government of “aiding and/or abetting the commission of crimes involving illegal drug possession and use, as well as other criminal offences, including drug trafficking.”¶ When Uruguay experimented with new cannabis policies, the International Narcotics Control Board’s president went even further, accusing Uruguay of demonstrating “pirate attitudes.” This kind of insult against a country is extremely rare for a body of its kind.¶ In addition to criticism, some of these officials have a history of applauding some of the worst excesses in drug control. For example, after Bulgaria introduced a law that made possession of tiny amounts of drugs punishable with mandatory incarceration for as long as 15 years, the International Narcotics Control Board praised Bulgaria’s “political commitment and the will to deal with drug abuse.” ¶ While condemnation from these bodies may not deter powerful countries, it can discourage smaller nations from experimenting with alternative approaches.¶ If this event is slated for 2016, why are we talking about it now?¶ As with all UN summits, the preparatory work begins well in advance. The content, priorities, and strategies are determined months and years ahead of time. That’s why it’s time for people to speak out and tell their governments that the status quo is not acceptable. Change is possible, and the process is starting now. [/INST] <h4>Now is the key time for a policy shift </h4><p><strong>OSF 14<u>, Open Society Foundation, EXPLAINERS: What Is UNGASS 2016?, March, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/what-ungass-2016</p><p></u></strong>Over the last few decades, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> </u></strong>international <u><strong><mark>war on drugs has led to</mark> public <mark>health crises</mark>, mass incarceration, corruption, <mark>and</mark> black market–fueled <mark>violence</mark>. <mark>Governments have begun calling for a new approach, and reforms</mark> in some countries <mark>have spurred unprecedented momentum for change</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Pressed by drug war–fatigued Latin American leaders, <mark>the UN</mark> General Assembly <mark>plans to</mark> hold a <mark>review</mark> of <mark>the</mark> drug control <mark>system in 2016</mark>.¶</u></strong> What is UNGASS?¶ <u><strong>The </u></strong>United Nations General Assembly Special Session, or <u><strong>UNGASS,</u></strong> <u><strong>is a meeting of UN member states to assess</u></strong> and debate global issues such as health, gender, or in this case, <u><strong>the world’s drug control priorities.</u></strong> The last time a special session on drugs was held, in 1998, its focus was the total elimination of drugs from the world. Today, political leaders and citizens are pushing to rethink that ineffective and dangerous approach.¶ <u><strong>Why does this summit matter?¶ International <mark>debates on drugs are rarely more than reaffirmations</mark> of the established system. <mark>But 2016 is different.</u></strong> <u><strong>Never before have so many governments voiced displeasure</mark> with the international drug control regime. Never before,</u></strong> to this degree, <u><strong>have citizens </u></strong>put drug law reform on the agenda and <u><strong>passed regulatory proposals via referenda </u></strong>or by popular campaigns. <u><strong><mark>Never before have the health benefits of harm reduction</mark> approaches</u></strong>—which prevent overdose and transmission of diseases like HIV—<u><strong><mark>been clearer</mark>. </u></strong>For the first time, <u><strong><mark>there is significant dissent</mark> at the local, national, and international levels</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong><mark>UNGASS 2016 is an unparalleled opportunity to put an end to the</mark> horrors of the <mark>drug war and instead prioritize health</mark>, human rights, and safety</u></strong>. ¶ But what does a UN meeting like this have to do with ordinary people’s lives?¶ The simple fact is that if your government wants to introduce drug policy reform, it may have to wrestle with the stewards of the drug control system in the UN.¶ For example, in the early 1990s, Switzerland faced a major drug problem. The country had open-air drug scenes and one of the highest rates of HIV in Western Europe. Rather than traditional, unsuccessful criminal justice approaches, the government pioneered health services such as heroin prescription, supervised consumption rooms, and community-based treatment. The Swiss people approved this policy through a series of referenda.¶ The results were eye-opening.¶ The number of new heroin users declined from 850 in 1990 to 150 in 2002; drug-related deaths declined by more than 50 percent between 1991 and 2004; levels of new HIV infections dropped 87 percent in 10 years, and there was a 90 percent reduction of property crime committed by people who use drugs.¶ However, rather than lauding these successes, the UN’s drug panel (the International Narcotics Control Board), accused the Swiss government of “aiding and/or abetting the commission of crimes involving illegal drug possession and use, as well as other criminal offences, including drug trafficking.”¶ When Uruguay experimented with new cannabis policies, the International Narcotics Control Board’s president went even further, accusing Uruguay of demonstrating “pirate attitudes.” This kind of insult against a country is extremely rare for a body of its kind.¶ In addition to criticism, some of these officials have a history of applauding some of the worst excesses in drug control. For example, after Bulgaria introduced a law that made possession of tiny amounts of drugs punishable with mandatory incarceration for as long as 15 years, the International Narcotics Control Board praised Bulgaria’s “political commitment and the will to deal with drug abuse.” ¶ While condemnation from these bodies may not deter powerful countries, it can discourage smaller nations from experimenting with alternative approaches.¶ <u><strong>If this event is slated for 2016, why are we talking about it now?¶ As <mark>with all UN summits,</mark> the preparatory work begins well in advance.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The</mark> content, priorities, and <mark>strategies are determined</u></strong></mark> months and <u><strong><mark>years ahead of time</u></strong></mark>. That’s why it’s time for people to speak out and tell their governments that the status quo is not acceptable<u><strong>. Change is possible, and <mark>the process is starting now.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

The 1AC is founded on vampirism of the suffering to nourish the psyche of the West – their politics necessarily forefronts theories, methods, and explanations mired in the suffering of others by way of unconscious prefabricated politics of charity cannibalism. They advance projects of understanding which reproduce and feed off fantasies of the suffering other resulting in inevitable exploitation and decimation. All of this plays out like a market: their depictions of suffering exchange for your ballot and a symbolic economy is reproduced in the moment of decision which ultimately creates a DEMAND for more suffering, turns the case.

We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of people which serves as psychological nourishment for our daily lives The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Other people's destitution becomes our playground our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point when we run out of disasters from elsewhere the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up , the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity.

We must denounce the sentimental exploitation of charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and : a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of people which serves as psychological nourishment for our daily lives The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe our efforts to alleviate it function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's catastrophes We need this drug, And the poor countries are the best suppliers We provide them, , with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point when we run out of disasters from elsewhere the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' ['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground. Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself, in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbered in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case, the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. The argument here is that there is a line of objective progress and everyone is supposed to pass through its various stages (we find the same eyewash with regard to the evolution of species and in that evolutionism which unilaterally sanctions the superiority of the human race). In the light of current upheavals, which put an end to any idea of history as a linear process, there are no longer either developed or under-developed peoples. Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity. In actual fact, it is their good fortune to be able to escape from evolution just at the point when we no longer know where it is leading. In any case, a majority of these peoples, including those of Eastern Europe, do not seem keen to enter this evolutionist modernity, and their weight in the balance is certainly no small factor in the West's repudiation of its own history, of its own utopias and its own modernity. It might be said that the routes of violence, historical or otherwise, are being turned around and that the viruses now pass from South to North, there being every chance that, five hundred years after America was conquered, 1992 and the end of the century will mark the comeback of the defeated and the sudden reversal of that modernity. The sense of pride is no longer on the side of wealth but of poverty, of those who - fortunately for them - have nothing to repent, and may indeed glory in being privileged in terms of catastrophes. Admittedly, this is a privilege they could hardly renounce, even if they wished to, but natural disasters merely reinforce the sense of guilt felt towards them by the wealthy – by those whom God visibly scorns since he no longer even strikes them down. One day it will be the Whites themselves who will give up their whiteness. It is a good bet that repentance will reach its highest pitch with the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of the Americas. We are going to have to lift the curse of the defeated - but symbolically victorious - peoples, which is insinuating itself five hundred years later, by way of repentance, into the heart of the white race.

<h4>The 1AC is founded on vampirism of the suffering to nourish the psyche of the West – their politics necessarily forefronts theories, methods, and explanations mired in the suffering of others by way of unconscious prefabricated politics of charity cannibalism. They advance projects of understanding which reproduce and feed off fantasies of the suffering other resulting in inevitable exploitation and decimation. All of this plays out like a market: their depictions of suffering exchange for your ballot and a symbolic economy is reproduced in the moment of decision which ultimately creates a DEMAND for more suffering, turns the case.</h4><p><strong>Baudrillard 94 </strong>(Jean, ex-Prof of Sociology at Paris X, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-70)</p><p>We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' ['autre monde]. <u><strong><mark>We must</u></strong></mark> <u>today <strong><mark>denounce the</strong></mark> moral and <strong><mark>sentimental exploitation of</strong></mark> that poverty - <strong><mark>charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence</strong></mark>. <mark>The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution</mark> which <mark>has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and</mark>, at the same time, of our charitable condescension<mark>: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience</mark>.</u> We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that <u><strong><mark>material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of people</u></strong></mark>s, <u><strong><mark>which serves as psychological nourishment for</u></strong></mark> the rich countries and media nourishment for <u><strong><mark>our daily lives</u></strong></mark>. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. <u><mark>The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world </mark>as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. <mark>The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North,</mark> for its part, <mark>specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe</mark>.</u> Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. <u><strong>Other people's destitution becomes our</u></strong> adventure <u><strong>playground</u></strong>. Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of <u><strong><mark>our</strong></mark> own <strong><mark>efforts to alleviate it</strong></mark> (which, in fact, merely <strong><mark>function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market</strong></mark>); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that<mark> extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel <strong>essential to the moral</strong> and sentimental <strong>equilibrium of the West</u></strong></mark>. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? <u><mark>Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's </mark>human and natural <mark>catastrophes</u></mark> (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). <u><mark>We need this drug, </mark>which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. <mark>And the poor countries are the best suppliers</mark> </u>- as, indeed, they are of other drugs. <u><mark>We provide them, </mark>through our media<mark>, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies.</u> <u></mark>Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. <strong><mark>But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point</u></strong></mark>, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, <u><strong><mark>when we run out of disasters from elsewhere</u></strong></mark> or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, <u><strong><mark>the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself</u></strong></mark>, in order <u><strong><mark>to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it</u></strong></mark> even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and <u>Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. <mark>The</u> <u><strong>'disaster show' goes on without any let-up</u></strong></mark> and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbered in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case<u>, <mark>the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success</mark>. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. </u>The argument here is that there is a line of objective progress and everyone is supposed to pass through its various stages (we find the same eyewash with regard to the evolution of species and in that evolutionism which unilaterally sanctions the superiority of the human race). In the light of current upheavals, which put an end to any idea of history as a linear process, there are no longer either developed or under-developed peoples. <u>Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity.</u> In actual fact, it is their good fortune to be able to escape from evolution just at the point when we no longer know where it is leading. In any case, a majority of these peoples, including those of Eastern Europe, do not seem keen to enter this evolutionist modernity, and their weight in the balance is certainly no small factor in the West's repudiation of its own history, of its own utopias and its own modernity. It might be said that the routes of violence, historical or otherwise, are being turned around and that the viruses now pass from South to North, there being every chance that, five hundred years after America was conquered, 1992 and the end of the century will mark the comeback of the defeated and the sudden reversal of that modernity. The sense of pride is no longer on the side of wealth but of poverty, of those who - fortunately for them - have nothing to repent, and may indeed glory in being privileged in terms of catastrophes. Admittedly, this is a privilege they could hardly renounce, even if they wished to, but natural disasters merely reinforce the sense of guilt felt towards them by the wealthy – by those whom God visibly scorns since he no longer even strikes them down. One day it will be the Whites themselves who will give up their whiteness. It is a good bet that repentance will reach its highest pitch with the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of the Americas. We are going to have to lift the curse of the defeated - but symbolically victorious - peoples, which is insinuating itself five hundred years later, by way of repentance, into the heart of the white race. </p>

Baudrillard 94 (Jean, ex-Prof of Sociology at Paris X, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-70)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Baudrillard 94 (Jean, ex-Prof of Sociology at Paris X, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-70) fulltext: We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' ['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground. Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself, in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbered in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case, the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. The argument here is that there is a line of objective progress and everyone is supposed to pass through its various stages (we find the same eyewash with regard to the evolution of species and in that evolutionism which unilaterally sanctions the superiority of the human race). In the light of current upheavals, which put an end to any idea of history as a linear process, there are no longer either developed or under-developed peoples. Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity. In actual fact, it is their good fortune to be able to escape from evolution just at the point when we no longer know where it is leading. In any case, a majority of these peoples, including those of Eastern Europe, do not seem keen to enter this evolutionist modernity, and their weight in the balance is certainly no small factor in the West's repudiation of its own history, of its own utopias and its own modernity. It might be said that the routes of violence, historical or otherwise, are being turned around and that the viruses now pass from South to North, there being every chance that, five hundred years after America was conquered, 1992 and the end of the century will mark the comeback of the defeated and the sudden reversal of that modernity. The sense of pride is no longer on the side of wealth but of poverty, of those who - fortunately for them - have nothing to repent, and may indeed glory in being privileged in terms of catastrophes. Admittedly, this is a privilege they could hardly renounce, even if they wished to, but natural disasters merely reinforce the sense of guilt felt towards them by the wealthy – by those whom God visibly scorns since he no longer even strikes them down. One day it will be the Whites themselves who will give up their whiteness. It is a good bet that repentance will reach its highest pitch with the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of the Americas. We are going to have to lift the curse of the defeated - but symbolically victorious - peoples, which is insinuating itself five hundred years later, by way of repentance, into the heart of the white race. [/INST] <h4>The 1AC is founded on vampirism of the suffering to nourish the psyche of the West – their politics necessarily forefronts theories, methods, and explanations mired in the suffering of others by way of unconscious prefabricated politics of charity cannibalism. They advance projects of understanding which reproduce and feed off fantasies of the suffering other resulting in inevitable exploitation and decimation. All of this plays out like a market: their depictions of suffering exchange for your ballot and a symbolic economy is reproduced in the moment of decision which ultimately creates a DEMAND for more suffering, turns the case.</h4><p><strong>Baudrillard 94 </strong>(Jean, ex-Prof of Sociology at Paris X, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-70)</p><p>We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' ['autre monde]. <u><strong><mark>We must</u></strong></mark> <u>today <strong><mark>denounce the</strong></mark> moral and <strong><mark>sentimental exploitation of</strong></mark> that poverty - <strong><mark>charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence</strong></mark>. <mark>The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution</mark> which <mark>has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and</mark>, at the same time, of our charitable condescension<mark>: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience</mark>.</u> We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that <u><strong><mark>material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of people</u></strong></mark>s, <u><strong><mark>which serves as psychological nourishment for</u></strong></mark> the rich countries and media nourishment for <u><strong><mark>our daily lives</u></strong></mark>. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. <u><mark>The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world </mark>as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. <mark>The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North,</mark> for its part, <mark>specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe</mark>.</u> Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. <u><strong>Other people's destitution becomes our</u></strong> adventure <u><strong>playground</u></strong>. Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of <u><strong><mark>our</strong></mark> own <strong><mark>efforts to alleviate it</strong></mark> (which, in fact, merely <strong><mark>function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market</strong></mark>); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that<mark> extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel <strong>essential to the moral</strong> and sentimental <strong>equilibrium of the West</u></strong></mark>. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? <u><mark>Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's </mark>human and natural <mark>catastrophes</u></mark> (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). <u><mark>We need this drug, </mark>which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. <mark>And the poor countries are the best suppliers</mark> </u>- as, indeed, they are of other drugs. <u><mark>We provide them, </mark>through our media<mark>, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies.</u> <u></mark>Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. <strong><mark>But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point</u></strong></mark>, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, <u><strong><mark>when we run out of disasters from elsewhere</u></strong></mark> or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, <u><strong><mark>the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself</u></strong></mark>, in order <u><strong><mark>to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it</u></strong></mark> even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and <u>Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. <mark>The</u> <u><strong>'disaster show' goes on without any let-up</u></strong></mark> and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbered in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case<u>, <mark>the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success</mark>. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. </u>The argument here is that there is a line of objective progress and everyone is supposed to pass through its various stages (we find the same eyewash with regard to the evolution of species and in that evolutionism which unilaterally sanctions the superiority of the human race). In the light of current upheavals, which put an end to any idea of history as a linear process, there are no longer either developed or under-developed peoples. <u>Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity.</u> In actual fact, it is their good fortune to be able to escape from evolution just at the point when we no longer know where it is leading. In any case, a majority of these peoples, including those of Eastern Europe, do not seem keen to enter this evolutionist modernity, and their weight in the balance is certainly no small factor in the West's repudiation of its own history, of its own utopias and its own modernity. It might be said that the routes of violence, historical or otherwise, are being turned around and that the viruses now pass from South to North, there being every chance that, five hundred years after America was conquered, 1992 and the end of the century will mark the comeback of the defeated and the sudden reversal of that modernity. The sense of pride is no longer on the side of wealth but of poverty, of those who - fortunately for them - have nothing to repent, and may indeed glory in being privileged in terms of catastrophes. Admittedly, this is a privilege they could hardly renounce, even if they wished to, but natural disasters merely reinforce the sense of guilt felt towards them by the wealthy – by those whom God visibly scorns since he no longer even strikes them down. One day it will be the Whites themselves who will give up their whiteness. It is a good bet that repentance will reach its highest pitch with the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of the Americas. We are going to have to lift the curse of the defeated - but symbolically victorious - peoples, which is insinuating itself five hundred years later, by way of repentance, into the heart of the white race. </p> </s>

Turns case

Contrary to the outsiders' claim that their personalized discourse infuses law with their distinctive experiences and perspectives those who participate in autobiographical discourse speak not in a different voice, but in a common voice that reflects their membership in a culture devoted to liberal values the practice of writing about one's own self reflects a belief in the autonomous individual because it appeals to readers' fascination with the self-sufficiency, resiliency and uniqueness autobiographical discourse is a co-opted instrument for the social reforms envisioned by the outsiders By affirming the myths of individual success autobiography reproduces the political, economic, social and psychological structures that attend such success outsider autobiographies unwittingly deflect attention from collective social responsibility and thwart the development of collective solutions for the eradication of racist and sexist harms Although we suspect the author oppose liberal individualism, her decision to register her experience in autobiographical discourse will have a significant effect on the self she reproduces theorists remarked the tendency of autobiographical discourse to override radical authorial intention Even where the autobiographer self-consciously determines to resist liberal ideology the relentless individualism of the genre subordinates" her political critique. when an author assumes the task of defining her own subjectivity she invariably reproduces herself as a character with whom culture already is well-acquainted the pressures exerted by the literary market surely play a significant role The autobiographer who desires a benefit from her performance must adopt a persona that is intelligible, if not enticing, to her audience the outsider narratives capitalize on, rather than subvert, autobiographical protagonists that serve the values of liberalism

those who participate in autobiographical discourse speak in a voice that reflects a culture devoted to liberal values writing about one's self reflects a belief in the autonomous individual autobiographical discourse is a co-opted, instrument for the reforms envisioned By affirming the myths of individual success autobiography reproduces the political, economic, social and psychological structures autobiographies deflect attention from collective social responsibility and thwart collective solutions for the eradication of racist and sexist harms Although the author oppose individualism, autobiographical discourse will have a significant effect on the self she reproduces autobiographical discourse override radical authorial intention Even where the autobiographer self-consciously determines to resist liberal ideology the relentless individualism of the genre subordinates" her political critique The autobiographer who desires a benefit from her performance must adopt a persona that is intelligible to her audience narratives capitalize on autobiographical protagonists that serve the values of liberalism

Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229) IV. The Autobiographical Self The outsider narratives do not reflect on another feature of autobiographical discourse that is perhaps the most significant obstacle to their goal to bring to law an understanding of the human self that will supersede the liberal individual. Contrary to the outsiders' claim that their personalized discourse infuses law with their distinctive experiences and political perspectives, numerous historians and critics of autobiography have insisted that those who participate in autobiographical discourse speak not in a different voice, but in a common voice that reflects their membership in a culture devoted to liberal values. n206 As Sacvan Bercovitch puts it, American cultural ideals, including specifically the mythic connection between the "heroic individual ... [and] the values of free enterprise," are "epitomized in autobiography." n207 In his seminal essay on the subject, Professor Georges Gusdorf makes an observation that seems like a prescient warning to outsiders who would appropriate autobiography as their voice. He remarks that the practice of writing about one's own self reflects a belief in the autonomous individual, which is "peculiar to Western man, a concern that has been of good use in his systematic conquest of the [*1285] universe and that he has communicated to men of other cultures; but those men will thereby have been annexed by a sort of intellectual colonizing to a mentality that was not their own." n208 Similarly, Albert Stone, a critic of American autobiography, argues that autobiographical performances celebrate the Western ideal of individualism, "which places the self at the center of its world." n209 Stone begins to elucidate the prescriptive character of autobiographical discourse as he notes with wonder "the tenacious social ideal whose persistence is all the more significant when found repeated in personal histories of Afro-Americans, immigrants, penitentiary prisoners, and others whose claims to full individuality have often been denied by our society." n210 Precisely because it appeals to readers' fascination with the self-sufficiency, resiliency and uniqueness of the totemic individual privileged by liberal political theory, there is a risk that autobiographical discourse is a fallible, even co-opted, instrument for the social reforms envisioned by the outsiders. By affirming the myths of individual success in our culture, autobiography reproduces the [*1286] political, economic, social and psychological structures that attend such success. n211 In this light, the outsider autobiographies unwittingly deflect attention from collective social responsibility and thwart the development of collective solutions for the eradication of racist and sexist harms. Although we may suspect in some cases that the author's own sense of self was shaped by a community whose values oppose those of liberal individualism, her decision to register her experience in autobiographical discourse will have a significant effect on the self she reproduces. n212 Her story will solicit the public's attention to the life of one individual, and it will privilege her individual desires and rights above the needs and obligations of a collectivity. Moreover, literary theorists have remarked the tendency of autobiographical discourse to override radical authorial intention. Even where the autobiographer self-consciously determines to resist liberal ideology and represents her life story as the occasion to announce an alternative political theory, "the relentless individualism of the genre subordinates" her political critique. n213 Inevitably, at least within American culture, the personal narrative engrosses the readers' imagination. Fascinated by the travails and triumphs of the developing autobiographical self, readers tend to construe the text's political and social observations only as another aspect of the author's personality. Paradoxically, although autobiography is the product of a culture that cultivates human individuality, the genre seems to make available only a limited number of autobiographical protagonists. n214 Many theorists have noticed that when an author assumes the task of defining her own, unique subjectivity, she invariably reproduces herself as a character with whom culture already is well-acquainted. n215 While a variety of forces coerce the autobiographer [*1287] to conform to culturally sanctioned human models, n216 the pressures exerted by the literary market surely play a significant role. The autobiographer who desires a material benefit from her performance must adopt a persona that is intelligible, if not enticing, to her audience. n217 As I will illustrate in the sections that follow, the outsider narratives capitalize on, rather than subvert, autobiographical protagonists that serve the values of liberalism.

<h4>Turns case</h4><p><strong>Coughlin 95</p><p></strong>Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)</p><p>IV. The Autobiographical Self The outsider narratives do not reflect on another feature of autobiographical discourse that is perhaps the most significant obstacle to their goal to bring to law an understanding of the human self that will supersede the liberal individual. <u><strong>Contrary to the</u></strong> <u><strong>outsiders' claim that their personalized discourse infuses law with their distinctive experiences</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> political <u><strong>perspectives</u></strong>, numerous historians and critics of autobiography have insisted that <u><strong><mark>those who participate</mark> <mark>in</u></strong> <u><strong>autobiographical discourse</mark> <mark>speak </mark>not in a different voice, but <mark>in a </mark>common <mark>voice that</u></strong> <u><strong>reflects </mark>their membership in <mark>a culture devoted to liberal values</u></strong></mark>. n206 As Sacvan Bercovitch puts it, American cultural ideals, including specifically the mythic connection between the "heroic individual ... [and] the values of free enterprise," are "epitomized in autobiography." n207 In his seminal essay on the subject, Professor Georges Gusdorf makes an observation that seems like a prescient warning to outsiders who would appropriate autobiography as their voice. He remarks that <u><strong>the practice of <mark>writing about one's</mark> own <mark>self reflects a belief in the autonomous individual</u></strong></mark>, which is "peculiar to Western man, a concern that has been of good use in his systematic conquest of the [*1285] universe and that he has communicated to men of other cultures; but those men will thereby have been annexed by a sort of intellectual colonizing to a mentality that was not their own." n208 Similarly, Albert Stone, a critic of American autobiography, argues that autobiographical performances celebrate the Western ideal of individualism, "which places the self at the center of its world." n209 Stone begins to elucidate the prescriptive character of autobiographical discourse as he notes with wonder "the tenacious social ideal whose persistence is all the more significant when found repeated in personal histories of Afro-Americans, immigrants, penitentiary prisoners, and others whose claims to full individuality have often been denied by our society." n210 Precisely <u><strong>because it appeals to readers' fascination with the self-sufficiency, resiliency and uniqueness</u></strong> of the totemic individual privileged by liberal political theory, there is a risk that <u><strong><mark>autobiographical discourse is a</mark> </u></strong>fallible, even <u><strong><mark>co-opted</u></strong>, <u><strong>instrument for the </mark>social <mark>reforms envisioned</mark> by the outsiders</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>By affirming the myths of individual success</u></strong></mark> in our culture, <u><strong><mark>autobiography reproduces the</u></strong></mark> [*1286] <u><strong><mark>political, economic, social and</mark> <mark>psychological structures </mark>that attend such success</u></strong>. n211 In this light, the <u><strong>outsider <mark>autobiographies</mark> unwittingly <mark>deflect attention from collective</mark> <mark>social responsibility and thwart</mark> the development of <mark>collective solutions for the eradication of racist</mark> <mark>and sexist</mark> <mark>harms</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Although</mark> we</u></strong> may <u><strong>suspect</u></strong> in some cases that <u><strong><mark>the author</u></strong></mark>'s own sense of self was shaped by a community whose values <u><strong><mark>oppose</u></strong></mark> those of <u><strong>liberal <mark>individualism, </mark>her decision to register her experience in <mark>autobiographical discourse will have a significant effect on the self she reproduces</u></strong></mark>. n212 Her story will solicit the public's attention to the life of one individual, and it will privilege her individual desires and rights above the needs and obligations of a collectivity. Moreover, literary <u><strong>theorists</u></strong> have <u><strong>remarked the tendency of <mark>autobiographical discourse</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to <mark>override radical authorial intention</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Even where the autobiographer self-consciously determines to resist liberal ideology</u></strong></mark> and represents her life story as the occasion to announce an alternative political theory, "<u><strong><mark>the relentless individualism of the genre subordinates" her political critique</mark>.</u></strong> n213 Inevitably, at least within American culture, the personal narrative engrosses the readers' imagination. Fascinated by the travails and triumphs of the developing autobiographical self, readers tend to construe the text's political and social observations only as another aspect of the author's personality. Paradoxically, although autobiography is the product of a culture that cultivates human individuality, the genre seems to make available only a limited number of autobiographical protagonists. n214 Many theorists have noticed that <u><strong>when an author assumes the task of defining her own</u></strong>, unique <u><strong>subjectivity</u></strong>, <u><strong>she invariably reproduces herself as a character with whom culture already is well-acquainted</u></strong>. n215 While a variety of forces coerce the autobiographer [*1287] to conform to culturally sanctioned human models, n216 <u><strong>the pressures exerted by the literary market surely play a significant role</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The autobiographer who desires a</u></strong></mark> material <u><strong><mark>benefit from her performance must adopt a persona that is intelligible</mark>, if not enticing, <mark>to her audience</u></strong></mark>. n217 As I will illustrate in the sections that follow, <u><strong>the outsider <mark>narratives capitalize on</mark>, rather than subvert, <mark>autobiographical protagonists that serve the values of liberalism</u></mark>.</p></strong>

Coughlin 95

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Coughlin 95 fulltext: Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229) IV. The Autobiographical Self The outsider narratives do not reflect on another feature of autobiographical discourse that is perhaps the most significant obstacle to their goal to bring to law an understanding of the human self that will supersede the liberal individual. Contrary to the outsiders' claim that their personalized discourse infuses law with their distinctive experiences and political perspectives, numerous historians and critics of autobiography have insisted that those who participate in autobiographical discourse speak not in a different voice, but in a common voice that reflects their membership in a culture devoted to liberal values. n206 As Sacvan Bercovitch puts it, American cultural ideals, including specifically the mythic connection between the "heroic individual ... [and] the values of free enterprise," are "epitomized in autobiography." n207 In his seminal essay on the subject, Professor Georges Gusdorf makes an observation that seems like a prescient warning to outsiders who would appropriate autobiography as their voice. He remarks that the practice of writing about one's own self reflects a belief in the autonomous individual, which is "peculiar to Western man, a concern that has been of good use in his systematic conquest of the [*1285] universe and that he has communicated to men of other cultures; but those men will thereby have been annexed by a sort of intellectual colonizing to a mentality that was not their own." n208 Similarly, Albert Stone, a critic of American autobiography, argues that autobiographical performances celebrate the Western ideal of individualism, "which places the self at the center of its world." n209 Stone begins to elucidate the prescriptive character of autobiographical discourse as he notes with wonder "the tenacious social ideal whose persistence is all the more significant when found repeated in personal histories of Afro-Americans, immigrants, penitentiary prisoners, and others whose claims to full individuality have often been denied by our society." n210 Precisely because it appeals to readers' fascination with the self-sufficiency, resiliency and uniqueness of the totemic individual privileged by liberal political theory, there is a risk that autobiographical discourse is a fallible, even co-opted, instrument for the social reforms envisioned by the outsiders. By affirming the myths of individual success in our culture, autobiography reproduces the [*1286] political, economic, social and psychological structures that attend such success. n211 In this light, the outsider autobiographies unwittingly deflect attention from collective social responsibility and thwart the development of collective solutions for the eradication of racist and sexist harms. Although we may suspect in some cases that the author's own sense of self was shaped by a community whose values oppose those of liberal individualism, her decision to register her experience in autobiographical discourse will have a significant effect on the self she reproduces. n212 Her story will solicit the public's attention to the life of one individual, and it will privilege her individual desires and rights above the needs and obligations of a collectivity. Moreover, literary theorists have remarked the tendency of autobiographical discourse to override radical authorial intention. Even where the autobiographer self-consciously determines to resist liberal ideology and represents her life story as the occasion to announce an alternative political theory, "the relentless individualism of the genre subordinates" her political critique. n213 Inevitably, at least within American culture, the personal narrative engrosses the readers' imagination. Fascinated by the travails and triumphs of the developing autobiographical self, readers tend to construe the text's political and social observations only as another aspect of the author's personality. Paradoxically, although autobiography is the product of a culture that cultivates human individuality, the genre seems to make available only a limited number of autobiographical protagonists. n214 Many theorists have noticed that when an author assumes the task of defining her own, unique subjectivity, she invariably reproduces herself as a character with whom culture already is well-acquainted. n215 While a variety of forces coerce the autobiographer [*1287] to conform to culturally sanctioned human models, n216 the pressures exerted by the literary market surely play a significant role. The autobiographer who desires a material benefit from her performance must adopt a persona that is intelligible, if not enticing, to her audience. n217 As I will illustrate in the sections that follow, the outsider narratives capitalize on, rather than subvert, autobiographical protagonists that serve the values of liberalism. [/INST] <h4>Turns case</h4><p><strong>Coughlin 95</p><p></strong>Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)</p><p>IV. The Autobiographical Self The outsider narratives do not reflect on another feature of autobiographical discourse that is perhaps the most significant obstacle to their goal to bring to law an understanding of the human self that will supersede the liberal individual. <u><strong>Contrary to the</u></strong> <u><strong>outsiders' claim that their personalized discourse infuses law with their distinctive experiences</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> political <u><strong>perspectives</u></strong>, numerous historians and critics of autobiography have insisted that <u><strong><mark>those who participate</mark> <mark>in</u></strong> <u><strong>autobiographical discourse</mark> <mark>speak </mark>not in a different voice, but <mark>in a </mark>common <mark>voice that</u></strong> <u><strong>reflects </mark>their membership in <mark>a culture devoted to liberal values</u></strong></mark>. n206 As Sacvan Bercovitch puts it, American cultural ideals, including specifically the mythic connection between the "heroic individual ... [and] the values of free enterprise," are "epitomized in autobiography." n207 In his seminal essay on the subject, Professor Georges Gusdorf makes an observation that seems like a prescient warning to outsiders who would appropriate autobiography as their voice. He remarks that <u><strong>the practice of <mark>writing about one's</mark> own <mark>self reflects a belief in the autonomous individual</u></strong></mark>, which is "peculiar to Western man, a concern that has been of good use in his systematic conquest of the [*1285] universe and that he has communicated to men of other cultures; but those men will thereby have been annexed by a sort of intellectual colonizing to a mentality that was not their own." n208 Similarly, Albert Stone, a critic of American autobiography, argues that autobiographical performances celebrate the Western ideal of individualism, "which places the self at the center of its world." n209 Stone begins to elucidate the prescriptive character of autobiographical discourse as he notes with wonder "the tenacious social ideal whose persistence is all the more significant when found repeated in personal histories of Afro-Americans, immigrants, penitentiary prisoners, and others whose claims to full individuality have often been denied by our society." n210 Precisely <u><strong>because it appeals to readers' fascination with the self-sufficiency, resiliency and uniqueness</u></strong> of the totemic individual privileged by liberal political theory, there is a risk that <u><strong><mark>autobiographical discourse is a</mark> </u></strong>fallible, even <u><strong><mark>co-opted</u></strong>, <u><strong>instrument for the </mark>social <mark>reforms envisioned</mark> by the outsiders</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>By affirming the myths of individual success</u></strong></mark> in our culture, <u><strong><mark>autobiography reproduces the</u></strong></mark> [*1286] <u><strong><mark>political, economic, social and</mark> <mark>psychological structures </mark>that attend such success</u></strong>. n211 In this light, the <u><strong>outsider <mark>autobiographies</mark> unwittingly <mark>deflect attention from collective</mark> <mark>social responsibility and thwart</mark> the development of <mark>collective solutions for the eradication of racist</mark> <mark>and sexist</mark> <mark>harms</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Although</mark> we</u></strong> may <u><strong>suspect</u></strong> in some cases that <u><strong><mark>the author</u></strong></mark>'s own sense of self was shaped by a community whose values <u><strong><mark>oppose</u></strong></mark> those of <u><strong>liberal <mark>individualism, </mark>her decision to register her experience in <mark>autobiographical discourse will have a significant effect on the self she reproduces</u></strong></mark>. n212 Her story will solicit the public's attention to the life of one individual, and it will privilege her individual desires and rights above the needs and obligations of a collectivity. Moreover, literary <u><strong>theorists</u></strong> have <u><strong>remarked the tendency of <mark>autobiographical discourse</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to <mark>override radical authorial intention</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Even where the autobiographer self-consciously determines to resist liberal ideology</u></strong></mark> and represents her life story as the occasion to announce an alternative political theory, "<u><strong><mark>the relentless individualism of the genre subordinates" her political critique</mark>.</u></strong> n213 Inevitably, at least within American culture, the personal narrative engrosses the readers' imagination. Fascinated by the travails and triumphs of the developing autobiographical self, readers tend to construe the text's political and social observations only as another aspect of the author's personality. Paradoxically, although autobiography is the product of a culture that cultivates human individuality, the genre seems to make available only a limited number of autobiographical protagonists. n214 Many theorists have noticed that <u><strong>when an author assumes the task of defining her own</u></strong>, unique <u><strong>subjectivity</u></strong>, <u><strong>she invariably reproduces herself as a character with whom culture already is well-acquainted</u></strong>. n215 While a variety of forces coerce the autobiographer [*1287] to conform to culturally sanctioned human models, n216 <u><strong>the pressures exerted by the literary market surely play a significant role</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The autobiographer who desires a</u></strong></mark> material <u><strong><mark>benefit from her performance must adopt a persona that is intelligible</mark>, if not enticing, <mark>to her audience</u></strong></mark>. n217 As I will illustrate in the sections that follow, <u><strong>the outsider <mark>narratives capitalize on</mark>, rather than subvert, <mark>autobiographical protagonists that serve the values of liberalism</u></mark>.</p></strong> </s>

The link turn is empirically denied - alarmism is high now and responses to warming are low

the American public has been faced with steadily increasing amounts of communication regarding climate change. Large majorities of Americans believe that global warming is real and consider it a serious problem, yet global warming remains a low priority large-scale policy changes or even a precursory conversation about overhauling the energy economy have been slow in coming. Meanwhile, climate scientists and others concerned about global warming have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency

the American public has been faced with increasing communication regarding climate change Large majorities believe global warming is real yet global warming remains a low priority Meanwhile climate scientists and others have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency

Since the release of Al Gore's award-winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, the American public has been faced with steadily increasing amounts of communication regarding climate change. Leiserowitz (2007) concludes, "Large majorities of Americans believe that global warming is real and consider it a serious problem, yet global warming remains a low priority relative to other national and environmental issues" (p. 44). Though the USA emits a shockingly disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases, large-scale policy changes or even a precursory conversation about overhauling the energy economy have been slow in coming. Meanwhile, climate scientists and others concerned about global warming have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency (Moser & Dilling, 2004).

<h4>The<strong> </strong>link turn is empirically denied - alarmism is high now and responses to warming are low</h4><p><strong>Foust and Murphy 2009</strong> (Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167 )</p><p>Since the release of Al Gore's award-winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, <u><strong><mark>the American public has been faced with</mark> steadily <mark>increasing</mark> amounts of <mark>communication regarding climate change</mark>.</u></strong> Leiserowitz (2007) concludes, "<u><strong><mark>Large</mark> <mark>majorities</mark> of Americans <mark>believe</mark> that <mark>global warming is real</mark> and consider it a serious problem, <mark>yet global warming remains a low priority</u></strong></mark> relative to other national and environmental issues" (p. 44). Though the USA emits a shockingly disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases, <u><strong>large-scale policy changes or even a precursory conversation about overhauling the energy economy have been slow in coming. <mark>Meanwhile</mark>, <mark>climate scientists and others</mark> concerned about global warming <mark>have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency</u></strong></mark> (Moser & Dilling, 2004).</p>

Foust and Murphy 2009 (Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167 )

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Foust and Murphy 2009 (Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167 ) fulltext: Since the release of Al Gore's award-winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, the American public has been faced with steadily increasing amounts of communication regarding climate change. Leiserowitz (2007) concludes, "Large majorities of Americans believe that global warming is real and consider it a serious problem, yet global warming remains a low priority relative to other national and environmental issues" (p. 44). Though the USA emits a shockingly disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases, large-scale policy changes or even a precursory conversation about overhauling the energy economy have been slow in coming. Meanwhile, climate scientists and others concerned about global warming have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency (Moser & Dilling, 2004). [/INST] <h4>The<strong> </strong>link turn is empirically denied - alarmism is high now and responses to warming are low</h4><p><strong>Foust and Murphy 2009</strong> (Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167 )</p><p>Since the release of Al Gore's award-winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, <u><strong><mark>the American public has been faced with</mark> steadily <mark>increasing</mark> amounts of <mark>communication regarding climate change</mark>.</u></strong> Leiserowitz (2007) concludes, "<u><strong><mark>Large</mark> <mark>majorities</mark> of Americans <mark>believe</mark> that <mark>global warming is real</mark> and consider it a serious problem, <mark>yet global warming remains a low priority</u></strong></mark> relative to other national and environmental issues" (p. 44). Though the USA emits a shockingly disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases, <u><strong>large-scale policy changes or even a precursory conversation about overhauling the energy economy have been slow in coming. <mark>Meanwhile</mark>, <mark>climate scientists and others</mark> concerned about global warming <mark>have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency</u></strong></mark> (Moser & Dilling, 2004).</p> </s>

The United States should legalize nearly all marihuana in the United States.

<h4>The United States should legalize nearly all marihuana<strong> </strong>in the United States<strong>.</h4></strong>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>The United States should legalize nearly all marihuana<strong> </strong>in the United States<strong>.</h4></strong> </s>

A.) the harms to the 1AC are true and they cannot solve for extinction before they control the levers of power

<h4>A.) the harms to the 1AC are true and they cannot solve for extinction before they control the levers of power </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>A.) the harms to the 1AC are true and they cannot solve for extinction before they control the levers of power </h4> </s>

Legalization doesn't solve racial disparities

The legalization and decriminalization of marijuana cuts down on pot-related arrests but neither policy solves the massive racial disparities within those arrests according to a new report from the C J C J CJCJ looked at five states that relaxed their marijuana laws in the past five years Two of those states completely legalized marijuana Marijuana rates for all races dropped But black people were still nearly five times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than other races even though black and white Americans use drugs and sell them at similar rates

legalization and decrim cuts down on arrests, but neither policy solves the racial disparities within those arrests according to a new report from the CJCJ Two states completely legalized marijuana black people were still nearly five times more likely to be arrested than other races even though white Americans use at similar rates

The legalization and decriminalization of marijuana cuts down on pot-related arrests, but neither policy solves the massive racial disparities within those arrests, according to a new report from the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. CJCJ looked at five states — California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Washington — that have relaxed their marijuana laws in the past five years. Two of those states (Colorado and Washington) completely legalized possession of small amount of marijuana for adults 21 and older, while the rest loosened or repealed criminal penalties for small amounts across all ages. Marijuana-related arrest rates for all races dropped by roughly two-thirds in four of the five states (Washington didn't have available data). But black people were still nearly five times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than other races, even though black and white Americans use drugs and sell them at similar rates.

<h4>Legalization doesn't solve racial disparities</h4><p>German <strong>Lopez 14</strong>, Writing Fellow @ VOX - specialist in covering the drug war, “<u><strong><mark>Marijuana legalization doesn't solve racial disparities in the criminal justice system</u></strong></mark>”, September 26th 2014, http://www.vox.com/2014/9/26/6846095/marijuana-legalization-cuts-down-on-arrests-but-not-racial-disparities, AB </p><p><u><strong>The <mark>legalization and decrim</mark>inalization of marijuana <mark>cuts down on</mark> pot-related <mark>arrests</u></strong>, <u><strong>but neither policy solves the</mark> massive <mark>racial disparities within those arrests</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>according to a</u></strong> <u><strong>new report</u></strong> <u><strong>from the</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>C</u></strong>enter on <u><strong>J</u></strong>uvenile and <u><strong>C</u></strong>riminal <u><strong>J</u></strong>ustice. <u><strong><mark>CJCJ</mark> looked at five states</u></strong> — California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Washington — <u><strong>that</u></strong> have <u><strong>relaxed their marijuana laws in the past five years</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Two</mark> of those <mark>states</u></strong></mark> (Colorado and Washington) <u><strong><mark>completely legalized</mark> </u></strong>possession of small amount of <u><strong><mark>marijuana</u></strong></mark> for adults 21 and older, while the rest loosened or repealed criminal penalties for small amounts across all ages. <u><strong>Marijuana</u></strong>-related arrest <u><strong>rates for all races dropped</u></strong> by roughly two-thirds in four of the five states (Washington didn't have available data). <u><strong>But <mark>black people were still nearly five times more likely to be arrested</mark> for marijuana possession <mark>than other races</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>even though</mark> black and <mark>white Americans use</mark> drugs and sell them <mark>at similar rates</u></strong></mark>.</p>

German Lopez 14, Writing Fellow @ VOX - specialist in covering the drug war, “Marijuana legalization doesn't solve racial disparities in the criminal justice system”, September 26th 2014, http://www.vox.com/2014/9/26/6846095/marijuana-legalization-cuts-down-on-arrests-but-not-racial-disparities, AB

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: German Lopez 14, Writing Fellow @ VOX - specialist in covering the drug war, “Marijuana legalization doesn't solve racial disparities in the criminal justice system”, September 26th 2014, http://www.vox.com/2014/9/26/6846095/marijuana-legalization-cuts-down-on-arrests-but-not-racial-disparities, AB fulltext: The legalization and decriminalization of marijuana cuts down on pot-related arrests, but neither policy solves the massive racial disparities within those arrests, according to a new report from the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. CJCJ looked at five states — California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Washington — that have relaxed their marijuana laws in the past five years. Two of those states (Colorado and Washington) completely legalized possession of small amount of marijuana for adults 21 and older, while the rest loosened or repealed criminal penalties for small amounts across all ages. Marijuana-related arrest rates for all races dropped by roughly two-thirds in four of the five states (Washington didn't have available data). But black people were still nearly five times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than other races, even though black and white Americans use drugs and sell them at similar rates. [/INST] <h4>Legalization doesn't solve racial disparities</h4><p>German <strong>Lopez 14</strong>, Writing Fellow @ VOX - specialist in covering the drug war, “<u><strong><mark>Marijuana legalization doesn't solve racial disparities in the criminal justice system</u></strong></mark>”, September 26th 2014, http://www.vox.com/2014/9/26/6846095/marijuana-legalization-cuts-down-on-arrests-but-not-racial-disparities, AB </p><p><u><strong>The <mark>legalization and decrim</mark>inalization of marijuana <mark>cuts down on</mark> pot-related <mark>arrests</u></strong>, <u><strong>but neither policy solves the</mark> massive <mark>racial disparities within those arrests</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>according to a</u></strong> <u><strong>new report</u></strong> <u><strong>from the</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>C</u></strong>enter on <u><strong>J</u></strong>uvenile and <u><strong>C</u></strong>riminal <u><strong>J</u></strong>ustice. <u><strong><mark>CJCJ</mark> looked at five states</u></strong> — California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Washington — <u><strong>that</u></strong> have <u><strong>relaxed their marijuana laws in the past five years</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Two</mark> of those <mark>states</u></strong></mark> (Colorado and Washington) <u><strong><mark>completely legalized</mark> </u></strong>possession of small amount of <u><strong><mark>marijuana</u></strong></mark> for adults 21 and older, while the rest loosened or repealed criminal penalties for small amounts across all ages. <u><strong>Marijuana</u></strong>-related arrest <u><strong>rates for all races dropped</u></strong> by roughly two-thirds in four of the five states (Washington didn't have available data). <u><strong>But <mark>black people were still nearly five times more likely to be arrested</mark> for marijuana possession <mark>than other races</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>even though</mark> black and <mark>white Americans use</mark> drugs and sell them <mark>at similar rates</u></strong></mark>.</p> </s>

US drug reform is key -- the plan is a signal toward a health based approach to drugs

the Global Commission on Drug Policy urged the world to recognize that the war on drugs has failed and to consider policies that would reduce violence sitting presidents and premiers, mainly from Latin America, have called for a review of the entire drug control system and for drug-control reform to figure prominently in the international agenda. the UN will debate the drug control regime in 2016 Botticelli needs to speak louder, engaging the American apparatus in big debates. On many fronts, those debates are proceeding without U.S. leadership. Without engagement from Washington, the debate risks lurching and stalling. This is where Botticelli’s agency has so far fallen short. Momentum for these changes will continue and the U.S. government could be a critical force in making them take hold. If action follows the new vernacular, then it represents the beginning of something very important. We just need the government to take major steps toward realizing health-based approaches to drugs, and to assert its support for humane policies on the international stage.

the UN will debate the drug control regime in 2016 Botticelli needs to speak louder, engaging the American apparatus in big debates. On many fronts, those debates are proceeding without U.S. leadership. Without engagement from Washington, the debate risks lurching and stalling. Momentum for these changes will continue and the U.S. government could be a critical force in making them take hold. action represents the beginning of something very important. We need steps toward health-based approaches to drugs

More than three years ago, the Global Commission on Drug Policy urged the world to recognize that the war on drugs has failed and to consider policies that would reduce violence, decrease mass incarceration, and promote health. Since then, sitting presidents and premiers, mainly from Latin America, have called for a review of the entire drug control system and for drug-control reform to figure prominently in the international agenda. For example, the UN will debate the drug control regime in 2016, and the Organization of American States (OAS) will make drug policy a central theme of its meeting in mid-September. The OAS meeting could be a particularly important moment for the United States to meaningfully engage in the debate. It would come as the White House welcomes a new drug czar, Michael Botticelli, who may bring fresh thinking to the role. Botticelli has a background in public health, which is critical for the job. In addition, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, which Botticelli is heading, now says it can support health-based approaches to drugs, moving away from the “war on drugs” terminology. The office has also spoken out in favor of common-sense interventions, like the distribution of the overdose-reversing drug naloxone. But Botticelli needs to speak louder, engaging the American apparatus in big debates. On many fronts, those debates are proceeding without U.S. leadership. In early September, the Global Commission on Drug Policy—composed of leaders in the fields of politics, business, and the arts—put forward a new set of recommendations on drug policy. They urge governments to: Put health first and provide adequate resources for health services; Ensure access to essential medicines and pain control; End the senseless criminalization and incarceration of minor, non-violent drug offenders and target strategies to help dependent people access treatment; Consider regulation of drug markets to undermine the staggering profits reaped by criminal gangs; Adapt enforcement strategies to target the most violent and disruptive criminal groups rather than punish low-level players; Refuse to shy away from the transformative potential of responsible regulation. Many of these recommendations are already in force in other parts of the world or are slowly taking shape in local jurisdictions here. They are far from radical. Latin American leaders pushing the issue are clearly hoping for some cooperation from the United States. Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos, for example, has consistently affirmed that the search for alternatives should include discussions about legalization—but that all decisions should reflect international consensus. Without engagement from Washington, the debate risks lurching and stalling. This is where Botticelli’s agency has so far fallen short. Despite its support for health-based interventions, the office seems more ambivalent about sweeping reforms such as the sensible regulation of drugs like cannabis or even support for the words “harm reduction” in international documents. Momentum for these changes will continue at OAS and beyond, and the U.S. government could be a critical force in making them take hold. If action follows the new vernacular, then it represents the beginning of something very important. We just need the government to take major steps toward realizing health-based approaches to drugs, and to assert its support for humane policies on the international stage. That could make Botticelli’s appointment herald a new era for people who use drugs, and for their communities.

<h4>US drug reform is key -- the plan is a signal toward a health based approach to drugs </h4><p>Kasia <strong>Sempruch</strong> <strong>14</strong> director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Program, "The Debate on Drugs Is Moving Forward. Will the U.S. Get Left Behind?" Global Drug Policy Program, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/will-united-states-lead-or-follow-international-drug-reform, 9/19</p><p>More than three years ago, <u>the Global Commission on Drug Policy urged the world to recognize that the war on drugs has failed and to consider policies that would reduce violence</u>, decrease mass incarceration, and promote health. Since then, <u>sitting presidents and premiers, mainly from Latin America, have called for a review of the entire drug control system and for drug-control reform to figure prominently in the international agenda.</u> For example, <u><mark>the UN will debate the drug control regime in 2016</u></mark>, and the Organization of American States (OAS) will make drug policy a central theme of its meeting in mid-September. The OAS meeting could be a particularly important moment for the United States to meaningfully engage in the debate. It would come as the White House welcomes a new drug czar, Michael Botticelli, who may bring fresh thinking to the role. Botticelli has a background in public health, which is critical for the job. In addition, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, which Botticelli is heading, now says it can support health-based approaches to drugs, moving away from the “war on drugs” terminology. The office has also spoken out in favor of common-sense interventions, like the distribution of the overdose-reversing drug naloxone. But <u><mark>Botticelli needs to speak louder, engaging the American apparatus in big debates.</u> <u>On many fronts, <strong>those debates are proceeding without U.S. leadership.</mark> </u></strong>In early September, the Global Commission on Drug Policy—composed of leaders in the fields of politics, business, and the arts—put forward a new set of recommendations on drug policy. They urge governments to: Put health first and provide adequate resources for health services; Ensure access to essential medicines and pain control; End the senseless criminalization and incarceration of minor, non-violent drug offenders and target strategies to help dependent people access treatment; Consider regulation of drug markets to undermine the staggering profits reaped by criminal gangs; Adapt enforcement strategies to target the most violent and disruptive criminal groups rather than punish low-level players; Refuse to shy away from the transformative potential of responsible regulation. Many of these recommendations are already in force in other parts of the world or are slowly taking shape in local jurisdictions here. They are far from radical. Latin American leaders pushing the issue are clearly hoping for some cooperation from the United States. Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos, for example, has consistently affirmed that the search for alternatives should include discussions about legalization—but that all decisions should reflect international consensus. <u><mark>Without engagement from Washington, the debate risks lurching and stalling.</u></mark> <u>This is where Botticelli’s agency has so far fallen short.</u> Despite its support for health-based interventions, the office seems more ambivalent about sweeping reforms such as the sensible regulation of drugs like cannabis or even support for the words “harm reduction” in international documents. <u><mark>Momentum for these changes will continue</u></mark> at OAS and beyond, <u><mark>and the U.S. government could be a <strong>critical force in making them take hold</strong>.</mark> If <mark>action</mark> follows the new vernacular, then it <mark>represents the beginning of something very important.</mark> <mark>We</mark> just <mark>need</mark> the government to take major <mark>steps toward</mark> realizing <mark>health-based approaches to drugs</mark>, and to assert its support for humane policies on the international stage.</u> That could make Botticelli’s appointment herald a new era for people who use drugs, and for their communities.</p>

Kasia Sempruch 14 director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Program, "The Debate on Drugs Is Moving Forward. Will the U.S. Get Left Behind?" Global Drug Policy Program, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/will-united-states-lead-or-follow-international-drug-reform, 9/19

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Kasia Sempruch 14 director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Program, "The Debate on Drugs Is Moving Forward. Will the U.S. Get Left Behind?" Global Drug Policy Program, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/will-united-states-lead-or-follow-international-drug-reform, 9/19 fulltext: More than three years ago, the Global Commission on Drug Policy urged the world to recognize that the war on drugs has failed and to consider policies that would reduce violence, decrease mass incarceration, and promote health. Since then, sitting presidents and premiers, mainly from Latin America, have called for a review of the entire drug control system and for drug-control reform to figure prominently in the international agenda. For example, the UN will debate the drug control regime in 2016, and the Organization of American States (OAS) will make drug policy a central theme of its meeting in mid-September. The OAS meeting could be a particularly important moment for the United States to meaningfully engage in the debate. It would come as the White House welcomes a new drug czar, Michael Botticelli, who may bring fresh thinking to the role. Botticelli has a background in public health, which is critical for the job. In addition, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, which Botticelli is heading, now says it can support health-based approaches to drugs, moving away from the “war on drugs” terminology. The office has also spoken out in favor of common-sense interventions, like the distribution of the overdose-reversing drug naloxone. But Botticelli needs to speak louder, engaging the American apparatus in big debates. On many fronts, those debates are proceeding without U.S. leadership. In early September, the Global Commission on Drug Policy—composed of leaders in the fields of politics, business, and the arts—put forward a new set of recommendations on drug policy. They urge governments to: Put health first and provide adequate resources for health services; Ensure access to essential medicines and pain control; End the senseless criminalization and incarceration of minor, non-violent drug offenders and target strategies to help dependent people access treatment; Consider regulation of drug markets to undermine the staggering profits reaped by criminal gangs; Adapt enforcement strategies to target the most violent and disruptive criminal groups rather than punish low-level players; Refuse to shy away from the transformative potential of responsible regulation. Many of these recommendations are already in force in other parts of the world or are slowly taking shape in local jurisdictions here. They are far from radical. Latin American leaders pushing the issue are clearly hoping for some cooperation from the United States. Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos, for example, has consistently affirmed that the search for alternatives should include discussions about legalization—but that all decisions should reflect international consensus. Without engagement from Washington, the debate risks lurching and stalling. This is where Botticelli’s agency has so far fallen short. Despite its support for health-based interventions, the office seems more ambivalent about sweeping reforms such as the sensible regulation of drugs like cannabis or even support for the words “harm reduction” in international documents. Momentum for these changes will continue at OAS and beyond, and the U.S. government could be a critical force in making them take hold. If action follows the new vernacular, then it represents the beginning of something very important. We just need the government to take major steps toward realizing health-based approaches to drugs, and to assert its support for humane policies on the international stage. That could make Botticelli’s appointment herald a new era for people who use drugs, and for their communities. [/INST] <h4>US drug reform is key -- the plan is a signal toward a health based approach to drugs </h4><p>Kasia <strong>Sempruch</strong> <strong>14</strong> director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Program, "The Debate on Drugs Is Moving Forward. Will the U.S. Get Left Behind?" Global Drug Policy Program, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/will-united-states-lead-or-follow-international-drug-reform, 9/19</p><p>More than three years ago, <u>the Global Commission on Drug Policy urged the world to recognize that the war on drugs has failed and to consider policies that would reduce violence</u>, decrease mass incarceration, and promote health. Since then, <u>sitting presidents and premiers, mainly from Latin America, have called for a review of the entire drug control system and for drug-control reform to figure prominently in the international agenda.</u> For example, <u><mark>the UN will debate the drug control regime in 2016</u></mark>, and the Organization of American States (OAS) will make drug policy a central theme of its meeting in mid-September. The OAS meeting could be a particularly important moment for the United States to meaningfully engage in the debate. It would come as the White House welcomes a new drug czar, Michael Botticelli, who may bring fresh thinking to the role. Botticelli has a background in public health, which is critical for the job. In addition, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, which Botticelli is heading, now says it can support health-based approaches to drugs, moving away from the “war on drugs” terminology. The office has also spoken out in favor of common-sense interventions, like the distribution of the overdose-reversing drug naloxone. But <u><mark>Botticelli needs to speak louder, engaging the American apparatus in big debates.</u> <u>On many fronts, <strong>those debates are proceeding without U.S. leadership.</mark> </u></strong>In early September, the Global Commission on Drug Policy—composed of leaders in the fields of politics, business, and the arts—put forward a new set of recommendations on drug policy. They urge governments to: Put health first and provide adequate resources for health services; Ensure access to essential medicines and pain control; End the senseless criminalization and incarceration of minor, non-violent drug offenders and target strategies to help dependent people access treatment; Consider regulation of drug markets to undermine the staggering profits reaped by criminal gangs; Adapt enforcement strategies to target the most violent and disruptive criminal groups rather than punish low-level players; Refuse to shy away from the transformative potential of responsible regulation. Many of these recommendations are already in force in other parts of the world or are slowly taking shape in local jurisdictions here. They are far from radical. Latin American leaders pushing the issue are clearly hoping for some cooperation from the United States. Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos, for example, has consistently affirmed that the search for alternatives should include discussions about legalization—but that all decisions should reflect international consensus. <u><mark>Without engagement from Washington, the debate risks lurching and stalling.</u></mark> <u>This is where Botticelli’s agency has so far fallen short.</u> Despite its support for health-based interventions, the office seems more ambivalent about sweeping reforms such as the sensible regulation of drugs like cannabis or even support for the words “harm reduction” in international documents. <u><mark>Momentum for these changes will continue</u></mark> at OAS and beyond, <u><mark>and the U.S. government could be a <strong>critical force in making them take hold</strong>.</mark> If <mark>action</mark> follows the new vernacular, then it <mark>represents the beginning of something very important.</mark> <mark>We</mark> just <mark>need</mark> the government to take major <mark>steps toward</mark> realizing <mark>health-based approaches to drugs</mark>, and to assert its support for humane policies on the international stage.</u> That could make Botticelli’s appointment herald a new era for people who use drugs, and for their communities.</p> </s>

US diplomats are undermining reforms. Only federal legalization will force them to put their diplomatic clout behind reforming UN drug treaties

Mike Trace -- whose CV includes current chair of the [IDPC], former deputy UK drug czar and a spell at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime is well equipped to tackle questions There's a sense of America's need to "do penance," for leading the world down the path of prohibition They got us into this mess what are they going to do to get us out of it?" The US has long been one of the world's "main harm reduction resistors The US spends by far the most money on drug issues and has immense diplomatic clout, international networks and expertise at its disposal. So a change of tack would have a correspondingly big worldwide impact The trouble is Trace is "pessimistic about cultural change within US government institutions Recent noises from the US [ONDCP] pay lip-service to a progressive approach In the wake of Washington and Colorado, US diplomats The US role in these discussions now is they've been engaging quiet "intellectual gymnastics" to explain why their country still isn't breaking the international treaties that maintain drug prohibition arguing that the US federal government isn't in breach

There's a sense of America's need to "do penance for leading the world down the path of prohibition diplomatic clout, international networks and expertise at its disposal. a change of tack would have a correspondingly big worldwide impact. Recent noises from the US ] pay lip-service to a progressive approach In the wake of Washington , they've been engaging quiet "intellectual gymnastics

Mike Trace -- whose lengthy CV includes current chairman of the International Drug Policy Consortium [IDPC], former deputy UK drug czar and a spell at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna -- is well equipped to tackle such questions. After attending the UN in New York yesterday for an event concerning UNGASS 2016, he was invited by P2PH to give a speech about America's changing international role. There's a sense of America's need to "do penance," he began, for leading the world down the path of prohibition. "They got us into this mess -- what are they going to do to get us out of it?" Experience and science, he continued, show that "the vast majority of drug use is not harmful," and that "most people who use drugs are not a threat to anyone, certainly not to society." Rather, he said, the settings and legal consequences of drug use -- as dictated by policy -- cause the majority of drug-related harms. The US has long been one of the world's "main harm reduction resistors." There are grounds for optimism. The US, Trace noted, spends by far the most money on drug issues and has immense diplomatic clout, international networks and expertise at its disposal. So a change of tack would have a correspondingly big worldwide impact. The trouble is, the US drug war machine has the turning circle of an oil tanker. Trace is "pessimistic about the speak of cultural change within US government institutions." In particular, the DEA, he said, is "a massive, expensive agency -- a redundant agency -- that really needs to get smaller." "Bless 'em," he said of DEA officials. "If you talk to them, they have no idea of the drug policy debates going on." Slowly, though, change is happening. Recent noises from the US Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP] pay lip-service, at least, to a progressive approach ("I keep looking for the word 'mistake' in these speeches..." said Trace). But we mustn't forget, Trace urged, America's "Number One issue: the hundreds of thousands of people who are going to sleep in a prison tonight" for nonviolent drug offenses. The US has begun telling the world that incarceration isn't the best way to deal with drug problems -- while continuing to incarcerate more people for drug-related reasons than anyone else. In the wake of Washington and Colorado, US diplomats, usually so assertive, Trace said, have been reluctant to draw attention to an awkward new reality: "The US role in these discussions now is keeping its head down -- not natural territory!" Instead, they've been engaging in some quiet "intellectual gymnastics" to explain why their country still isn't, in fact, breaking the international treaties that maintain drug prohibition: arguing that the US federal government isn't in breach, or that get-out clauses provide for exceptions based on constitutional necessities.

<h4>US diplomats are undermining reforms. Only federal legalization will force them to put their diplomatic clout behind reforming UN drug treaties </h4><p><strong>Godfrey 14</strong> – Editor-in-chief of Substance.com [Will Godfrey, “Will the US Start to Use Its Power Over World Drug Laws for Good?,” <u>Huffington Post</u><strong>, Posted: Updated: 09/15/2014 5:59 am EDT, pg. http://tinyurl.com/ks4xktl </p><p><u>Mike Trace -- whose</u></strong> lengthy <u><strong>CV includes current chair</u></strong>man <u><strong>of the </u></strong>International Drug Policy Consortium<u><strong> [IDPC], former deputy UK drug czar and a spell at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime</u></strong> in Vienna -- <u><strong>is well equipped to tackle</u></strong> such<u><strong> questions</u></strong>. After attending the UN in New York yesterday for an event concerning UNGASS 2016, he was invited by P2PH to give a speech about America's changing international role. <u><strong><mark>There's a sense of America's need to "do penance</mark>,"</u></strong> he began, <u><strong><mark>for leading the world down the path of prohibition</u></strong></mark>. "<u><strong>They got us into this mess</u></strong> -- <u><strong>what are they going to do to get us out of it?"</u></strong> Experience and science, he continued, show that "the vast majority of drug use is not harmful," and that "most people who use drugs are not a threat to anyone, certainly not to society." Rather, he said, the settings and legal consequences of drug use -- as dictated by policy -- cause the majority of drug-related harms. <u><strong>The US has long been one of the world's "main harm reduction resistors</u></strong>." There are grounds for optimism. <u><strong>The US</u></strong>, Trace noted, <u><strong>spends by far the most money on drug issues and has immense <mark>diplomatic clout, international networks and expertise at its disposal.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>So <mark>a change of tack would have a correspondingly big worldwide impact</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>The trouble is</u></strong>, the US drug war machine has the turning circle of an oil tanker. <u><strong>Trace is "pessimistic about </u></strong>the speak of <u><strong>cultural change within US government institutions</u></strong>." In particular, the DEA, he said, is "a massive, expensive agency -- a redundant agency -- that really needs to get smaller." "Bless 'em," he said of DEA officials. "If you talk to them, they have no idea of the drug policy debates going on." Slowly, though, change is happening. <u><strong><mark>Recent noises from the US</mark> </u></strong>Office of National Drug Control Policy<u><strong> [ONDCP<mark>] pay lip-service</u></strong></mark>, at least, <u><strong><mark>to a progressive approach</u></strong></mark> ("I keep looking for the word 'mistake' in these speeches..." said Trace). But we mustn't forget, Trace urged, America's "Number One issue: the hundreds of thousands of people who are going to sleep in a prison tonight" for nonviolent drug offenses. The US has begun telling the world that incarceration isn't the best way to deal with drug problems -- while continuing to incarcerate more people for drug-related reasons than anyone else. <u><strong><mark>In the wake of Washington</mark> and Colorado, US diplomats</u></strong><mark>,</mark> usually so assertive, Trace said, have been reluctant to draw attention to an awkward new reality: "<u><strong>The US role in these discussions now is </u></strong>keeping its head down -- not natural territory!" Instead, <u><strong><mark>they've been engaging</u></strong></mark> in some <u><strong><mark>quiet "intellectual gymnastics</mark>" to explain why their country still isn't</u></strong>, in fact, <u><strong>breaking the international treaties that maintain drug prohibition</u></strong>: <u><strong>arguing that the US federal government isn't in breach</u></strong>, or that get-out clauses provide for exceptions based on constitutional necessities.</p>

Godfrey 14 – Editor-in-chief of Substance.com [Will Godfrey, “Will the US Start to Use Its Power Over World Drug Laws for Good?,” Huffington Post, Posted: Updated: 09/15/2014 5:59 am EDT, pg. http://tinyurl.com/ks4xktl

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Godfrey 14 – Editor-in-chief of Substance.com [Will Godfrey, “Will the US Start to Use Its Power Over World Drug Laws for Good?,” Huffington Post, Posted: Updated: 09/15/2014 5:59 am EDT, pg. http://tinyurl.com/ks4xktl fulltext: Mike Trace -- whose lengthy CV includes current chairman of the International Drug Policy Consortium [IDPC], former deputy UK drug czar and a spell at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna -- is well equipped to tackle such questions. After attending the UN in New York yesterday for an event concerning UNGASS 2016, he was invited by P2PH to give a speech about America's changing international role. There's a sense of America's need to "do penance," he began, for leading the world down the path of prohibition. "They got us into this mess -- what are they going to do to get us out of it?" Experience and science, he continued, show that "the vast majority of drug use is not harmful," and that "most people who use drugs are not a threat to anyone, certainly not to society." Rather, he said, the settings and legal consequences of drug use -- as dictated by policy -- cause the majority of drug-related harms. The US has long been one of the world's "main harm reduction resistors." There are grounds for optimism. The US, Trace noted, spends by far the most money on drug issues and has immense diplomatic clout, international networks and expertise at its disposal. So a change of tack would have a correspondingly big worldwide impact. The trouble is, the US drug war machine has the turning circle of an oil tanker. Trace is "pessimistic about the speak of cultural change within US government institutions." In particular, the DEA, he said, is "a massive, expensive agency -- a redundant agency -- that really needs to get smaller." "Bless 'em," he said of DEA officials. "If you talk to them, they have no idea of the drug policy debates going on." Slowly, though, change is happening. Recent noises from the US Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP] pay lip-service, at least, to a progressive approach ("I keep looking for the word 'mistake' in these speeches..." said Trace). But we mustn't forget, Trace urged, America's "Number One issue: the hundreds of thousands of people who are going to sleep in a prison tonight" for nonviolent drug offenses. The US has begun telling the world that incarceration isn't the best way to deal with drug problems -- while continuing to incarcerate more people for drug-related reasons than anyone else. In the wake of Washington and Colorado, US diplomats, usually so assertive, Trace said, have been reluctant to draw attention to an awkward new reality: "The US role in these discussions now is keeping its head down -- not natural territory!" Instead, they've been engaging in some quiet "intellectual gymnastics" to explain why their country still isn't, in fact, breaking the international treaties that maintain drug prohibition: arguing that the US federal government isn't in breach, or that get-out clauses provide for exceptions based on constitutional necessities. [/INST] <h4>US diplomats are undermining reforms. Only federal legalization will force them to put their diplomatic clout behind reforming UN drug treaties </h4><p><strong>Godfrey 14</strong> – Editor-in-chief of Substance.com [Will Godfrey, “Will the US Start to Use Its Power Over World Drug Laws for Good?,” <u>Huffington Post</u><strong>, Posted: Updated: 09/15/2014 5:59 am EDT, pg. http://tinyurl.com/ks4xktl </p><p><u>Mike Trace -- whose</u></strong> lengthy <u><strong>CV includes current chair</u></strong>man <u><strong>of the </u></strong>International Drug Policy Consortium<u><strong> [IDPC], former deputy UK drug czar and a spell at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime</u></strong> in Vienna -- <u><strong>is well equipped to tackle</u></strong> such<u><strong> questions</u></strong>. After attending the UN in New York yesterday for an event concerning UNGASS 2016, he was invited by P2PH to give a speech about America's changing international role. <u><strong><mark>There's a sense of America's need to "do penance</mark>,"</u></strong> he began, <u><strong><mark>for leading the world down the path of prohibition</u></strong></mark>. "<u><strong>They got us into this mess</u></strong> -- <u><strong>what are they going to do to get us out of it?"</u></strong> Experience and science, he continued, show that "the vast majority of drug use is not harmful," and that "most people who use drugs are not a threat to anyone, certainly not to society." Rather, he said, the settings and legal consequences of drug use -- as dictated by policy -- cause the majority of drug-related harms. <u><strong>The US has long been one of the world's "main harm reduction resistors</u></strong>." There are grounds for optimism. <u><strong>The US</u></strong>, Trace noted, <u><strong>spends by far the most money on drug issues and has immense <mark>diplomatic clout, international networks and expertise at its disposal.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>So <mark>a change of tack would have a correspondingly big worldwide impact</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>The trouble is</u></strong>, the US drug war machine has the turning circle of an oil tanker. <u><strong>Trace is "pessimistic about </u></strong>the speak of <u><strong>cultural change within US government institutions</u></strong>." In particular, the DEA, he said, is "a massive, expensive agency -- a redundant agency -- that really needs to get smaller." "Bless 'em," he said of DEA officials. "If you talk to them, they have no idea of the drug policy debates going on." Slowly, though, change is happening. <u><strong><mark>Recent noises from the US</mark> </u></strong>Office of National Drug Control Policy<u><strong> [ONDCP<mark>] pay lip-service</u></strong></mark>, at least, <u><strong><mark>to a progressive approach</u></strong></mark> ("I keep looking for the word 'mistake' in these speeches..." said Trace). But we mustn't forget, Trace urged, America's "Number One issue: the hundreds of thousands of people who are going to sleep in a prison tonight" for nonviolent drug offenses. The US has begun telling the world that incarceration isn't the best way to deal with drug problems -- while continuing to incarcerate more people for drug-related reasons than anyone else. <u><strong><mark>In the wake of Washington</mark> and Colorado, US diplomats</u></strong><mark>,</mark> usually so assertive, Trace said, have been reluctant to draw attention to an awkward new reality: "<u><strong>The US role in these discussions now is </u></strong>keeping its head down -- not natural territory!" Instead, <u><strong><mark>they've been engaging</u></strong></mark> in some <u><strong><mark>quiet "intellectual gymnastics</mark>" to explain why their country still isn't</u></strong>, in fact, <u><strong>breaking the international treaties that maintain drug prohibition</u></strong>: <u><strong>arguing that the US federal government isn't in breach</u></strong>, or that get-out clauses provide for exceptions based on constitutional necessities.</p> </s>

Every demand is necessarily exclusionary and that is why we choose none --- the only effect the ballot can ever have is to signal a participation in or refusal of the university

Why No Demands? First, because anything we might win now would be too insignificant. Countless times past student struggles have worked months and years – striking and occupying buildings and mobilizing thousands upon thousands of people – only to win back half of what they had already lost, a half that was again taken away one or two years later If we set our horizons higher we must realize that nothing short of full-scale insurrection could ever achieve this. And if we were strong enough to bring the existing order tumbling down around us, why would we stop short and settle The process of negotiation – the settlement of demands – is a dangerous one for a movement. It often signals its death We understand that, if we were to become powerful enough, and if we remained steadfast in our refusal of all negotiation or settlement, someone, some group, would step in and begin negotiating for us Once we become a threat, then the bargaining will begin Become a threat first you’ll never become a threat by determining to fight over the crumbs A demand defines those who utter it; it sets the limits of the struggle, determining who is and who is not in solidarity with a given fight. And such demands are, invariably, bound to exclude some party or group This is why we make no demands. Because we want to be in solidarity with all who are oppressed and exploited. We will not say who they are in advance. They will define themselves by rising up and standing with us

Why No Demands? because anything we win would be too insignificant past student struggles have worked years striking and occupying only to win half of what they lost a half that was taken away later we must realize that nothing short of full-scale insurrection could ever achieve this why would we stop short and settle The process of negotiation the settlement of demands is dangerous It signals its death you’ll never become a threat by determining to fight over the crumbs demand defines those who utter it it sets the limits of the struggle determining who is and who is not in solidarity demands are bound to exclude some party or group we make no demands

Why No Demands? First, because anything we might win now would be too insignificant. Countless times past student struggles have worked months and years – striking and occupying buildings and mobilizing thousands upon thousands of people – only to win back half of what they had already lost, a half that was again taken away one or two years later. But in any case, we are as yet far too small to win anything on a scale remotely close to the mildest of demands – a reduction or freeze of student fees, an end to the layoffs and furloughs. Even these demands would mean only a return to the status quo of last year or the year before – inadequate by any but the most cowardly measure. If we set our horizons higher – free education, a maximum salary differential of, for instance, 3 or 5, a university managed by faculty and students and workers – then we must realize, immediately, that nothing short of full-scale insurrection could ever achieve this. And if we were strong enough to bring the existing order tumbling down around us, why would we stop short and settle for the foregoing list? The process of negotiation – the settlement of demands – is a dangerous one for a movement. It often signals its death. We have no illusions about this. We understand that, if we were to become powerful enough, and if we remained steadfast in our refusal of all negotiation or settlement, someone, some group, would step in and begin negotiating for us. There is no avoiding that. Once we become a threat, then the bargaining will begin. If the first or second set of demands seems a worthy terminus, then we have a piece of advice. Become a threat first. You just might win something. But you’ll never become a threat by determining to fight over the crumbs. The whole theory of demands as it currently exists seems to rest upon a fundamental misconception. The demand is never really addressed to the existing powers. They can’t hear us – everyone knows that. And, in any case, they’ve never responded to petitions or requests, only force. The real addressee of the demand is on our side, not theirs. A demand defines those who utter it; it sets the limits of the struggle, determining who is and who is not in solidarity with a given fight. And such demands are, invariably, bound to exclude some party or group. We recognize, of course, that they can be useful in this respect – useful as a means to constitute and unify body in struggle, but this body can only be partial, fragmentary, divided from further support. Some groups attempt to get around this problem by making their demands an eclectic laundry-list, but such solutions always end in absurdity. This is why we make no demands. Because we want to be in solidarity with all who are oppressed and exploited. We will not say who they are in advance. They will define themselves by rising up and standing with us.

<h4>Every demand is necessarily exclusionary and that is why we choose none --- the <u>only effect</u> the ballot can ever have is to signal a <u>participation in</u> or <u>refusal of</u> the university</h4><p><strong>ACP 09</strong> Anti-Capital Projects “Anti-Capital Projects: Questions & Answers” Anti-Capital Projects. 11-19-2009. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/anti-capital-projects/</p><p><u><strong><mark>Why No Demands?</mark> First, <mark>because anything we</mark> might <mark>win</mark> now <mark>would be too insignificant</mark>. Countless times <mark>past student struggles have</mark> <mark>worked</mark> months and <mark>years</mark> – <mark>striking and occupying</mark> buildings and mobilizing thousands upon thousands of people – <mark>only to win</mark> back <mark>half of what</mark> <mark>they</mark> had already <mark>lost</mark>, <mark>a half that was</mark> again <mark>taken away</mark> one or two years <mark>later</u></strong></mark>. But in any case, we are as yet far too small to win anything on a scale remotely close to the mildest of demands – a reduction or freeze of student fees, an end to the layoffs and furloughs. Even these demands would mean only a return to the status quo of last year or the year before – inadequate by any but the most cowardly measure. <u><strong>If we set our horizons higher</u></strong> – free education, a maximum salary differential of, for instance, 3 or 5, a university managed by faculty and students and workers – then <u><strong><mark>we must realize</u></strong></mark>, immediately, <u><strong><mark>that nothing short of full-scale insurrection</mark> <mark>could ever achieve this</mark>. And if we were strong enough to bring the existing order tumbling down around us, <mark>why would we stop short and settle</u></strong></mark> for the foregoing list? <u><strong><mark>The process of negotiation</mark> – <mark>the settlement of demands</mark> – <mark>is</mark> a <mark>dangerous</mark> one for a movement. <mark>It</mark> often <mark>signals its death</u></strong></mark>. We have no illusions about this. <u><strong>We understand that, if we were to become powerful enough, and if we remained steadfast in our refusal of all negotiation or settlement, someone, some group, would step in and begin negotiating for us</u></strong>. There is no avoiding that. <u><strong>Once we become a threat, then the bargaining will begin</u></strong>. If the first or second set of demands seems a worthy terminus, then we have a piece of advice. <u><strong>Become a threat first</u></strong>. You just might win something. But <u><strong><mark>you’ll never become a threat by determining to fight over the crumbs</u></strong></mark>. The whole theory of demands as it currently exists seems to rest upon a fundamental misconception. The demand is never really addressed to the existing powers. They can’t hear us – everyone knows that. And, in any case, they’ve never responded to petitions or requests, only force. The real addressee of the demand is on our side, not theirs. <u><strong>A <mark>demand defines those who utter it</mark>; <mark>it sets the limits of the struggle</mark>, <mark>determining who is and who is not in solidarity</mark> with a given fight. And such <mark>demands are</mark>, invariably, <mark>bound to exclude some party or group</u></strong></mark>. We recognize, of course, that they can be useful in this respect – useful as a means to constitute and unify body in struggle, but this body can only be partial, fragmentary, divided from further support. Some groups attempt to get around this problem by making their demands an eclectic laundry-list, but such solutions always end in absurdity. <u><strong>This is why <mark>we make no demands</mark>. Because we want to be in solidarity with all who are oppressed and exploited. We will not say who they are in advance. They will define themselves by rising up and standing with us</u></strong>. </p>

ACP 09 Anti-Capital Projects “Anti-Capital Projects: Questions & Answers” Anti-Capital Projects. 11-19-2009. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/anti-capital-projects/

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: ACP 09 Anti-Capital Projects “Anti-Capital Projects: Questions & Answers” Anti-Capital Projects. 11-19-2009. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/anti-capital-projects/ fulltext: Why No Demands? First, because anything we might win now would be too insignificant. Countless times past student struggles have worked months and years – striking and occupying buildings and mobilizing thousands upon thousands of people – only to win back half of what they had already lost, a half that was again taken away one or two years later. But in any case, we are as yet far too small to win anything on a scale remotely close to the mildest of demands – a reduction or freeze of student fees, an end to the layoffs and furloughs. Even these demands would mean only a return to the status quo of last year or the year before – inadequate by any but the most cowardly measure. If we set our horizons higher – free education, a maximum salary differential of, for instance, 3 or 5, a university managed by faculty and students and workers – then we must realize, immediately, that nothing short of full-scale insurrection could ever achieve this. And if we were strong enough to bring the existing order tumbling down around us, why would we stop short and settle for the foregoing list? The process of negotiation – the settlement of demands – is a dangerous one for a movement. It often signals its death. We have no illusions about this. We understand that, if we were to become powerful enough, and if we remained steadfast in our refusal of all negotiation or settlement, someone, some group, would step in and begin negotiating for us. There is no avoiding that. Once we become a threat, then the bargaining will begin. If the first or second set of demands seems a worthy terminus, then we have a piece of advice. Become a threat first. You just might win something. But you’ll never become a threat by determining to fight over the crumbs. The whole theory of demands as it currently exists seems to rest upon a fundamental misconception. The demand is never really addressed to the existing powers. They can’t hear us – everyone knows that. And, in any case, they’ve never responded to petitions or requests, only force. The real addressee of the demand is on our side, not theirs. A demand defines those who utter it; it sets the limits of the struggle, determining who is and who is not in solidarity with a given fight. And such demands are, invariably, bound to exclude some party or group. We recognize, of course, that they can be useful in this respect – useful as a means to constitute and unify body in struggle, but this body can only be partial, fragmentary, divided from further support. Some groups attempt to get around this problem by making their demands an eclectic laundry-list, but such solutions always end in absurdity. This is why we make no demands. Because we want to be in solidarity with all who are oppressed and exploited. We will not say who they are in advance. They will define themselves by rising up and standing with us. [/INST] <h4>Every demand is necessarily exclusionary and that is why we choose none --- the <u>only effect</u> the ballot can ever have is to signal a <u>participation in</u> or <u>refusal of</u> the university</h4><p><strong>ACP 09</strong> Anti-Capital Projects “Anti-Capital Projects: Questions & Answers” Anti-Capital Projects. 11-19-2009. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/anti-capital-projects/</p><p><u><strong><mark>Why No Demands?</mark> First, <mark>because anything we</mark> might <mark>win</mark> now <mark>would be too insignificant</mark>. Countless times <mark>past student struggles have</mark> <mark>worked</mark> months and <mark>years</mark> – <mark>striking and occupying</mark> buildings and mobilizing thousands upon thousands of people – <mark>only to win</mark> back <mark>half of what</mark> <mark>they</mark> had already <mark>lost</mark>, <mark>a half that was</mark> again <mark>taken away</mark> one or two years <mark>later</u></strong></mark>. But in any case, we are as yet far too small to win anything on a scale remotely close to the mildest of demands – a reduction or freeze of student fees, an end to the layoffs and furloughs. Even these demands would mean only a return to the status quo of last year or the year before – inadequate by any but the most cowardly measure. <u><strong>If we set our horizons higher</u></strong> – free education, a maximum salary differential of, for instance, 3 or 5, a university managed by faculty and students and workers – then <u><strong><mark>we must realize</u></strong></mark>, immediately, <u><strong><mark>that nothing short of full-scale insurrection</mark> <mark>could ever achieve this</mark>. And if we were strong enough to bring the existing order tumbling down around us, <mark>why would we stop short and settle</u></strong></mark> for the foregoing list? <u><strong><mark>The process of negotiation</mark> – <mark>the settlement of demands</mark> – <mark>is</mark> a <mark>dangerous</mark> one for a movement. <mark>It</mark> often <mark>signals its death</u></strong></mark>. We have no illusions about this. <u><strong>We understand that, if we were to become powerful enough, and if we remained steadfast in our refusal of all negotiation or settlement, someone, some group, would step in and begin negotiating for us</u></strong>. There is no avoiding that. <u><strong>Once we become a threat, then the bargaining will begin</u></strong>. If the first or second set of demands seems a worthy terminus, then we have a piece of advice. <u><strong>Become a threat first</u></strong>. You just might win something. But <u><strong><mark>you’ll never become a threat by determining to fight over the crumbs</u></strong></mark>. The whole theory of demands as it currently exists seems to rest upon a fundamental misconception. The demand is never really addressed to the existing powers. They can’t hear us – everyone knows that. And, in any case, they’ve never responded to petitions or requests, only force. The real addressee of the demand is on our side, not theirs. <u><strong>A <mark>demand defines those who utter it</mark>; <mark>it sets the limits of the struggle</mark>, <mark>determining who is and who is not in solidarity</mark> with a given fight. And such <mark>demands are</mark>, invariably, <mark>bound to exclude some party or group</u></strong></mark>. We recognize, of course, that they can be useful in this respect – useful as a means to constitute and unify body in struggle, but this body can only be partial, fragmentary, divided from further support. Some groups attempt to get around this problem by making their demands an eclectic laundry-list, but such solutions always end in absurdity. <u><strong>This is why <mark>we make no demands</mark>. Because we want to be in solidarity with all who are oppressed and exploited. We will not say who they are in advance. They will define themselves by rising up and standing with us</u></strong>. </p> </s>

PAS allows for a breakdown of class divisions -- their rejection is a link that solidifies the difference between the rich and the poor

NOTE** -Patrician means the wealthy, elite ruling class Societies have minor sins illegal These are often called "victimless crimes victimless crimes apply only to society's poor and uninformed the rich and informed indulge in these behaviors without any penalty these two groups in society the plebeians and patricians abortion was illegal Pregnant patricians could take a vacation in the Caribbean and return home with a suntan and no longer pregnant Meanwhile the plebeians desperately sought out their abortionists locally and risked being butchered in septic conditions by unqualified practitioners consider prostitution the high class callgirl clientele is restricted to the rich and wealthy These women did not walk the streets or solicit clients They accepted referrals The plebeians who wanted the services of a prostitute were forced to risk soliciting sex who had a sexually transmitted disease running the risk of being arrested The laws that criminalize immoral behaviors serve in part to preserve these privileges for the patricians in the society and prohibit them from the plebeians They are ways the oppressors in society control the oppressed patricians can easily die from assisted suicide They are rich informed and, have "contacts." Meanwhile, the plebeians have to beg to find sufficient quantities of a painless medication with which to commit suicide A fair and just society should not have two sets of rules one for the patricians and one for the plebeians Rather than imposing the same prohibitions a more rational solution is to open the same options for both groups If the practice is illegal, it goes underground, and the abuses continue unnoticed and ignored in cities where prostitution is legal, prostitutes have a low incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, are rarely raped or murdered and do not forfeit their money to pimps The same absence of restrictions should apply to suicide Suicide is not illegal, even in America There is no reason to give only the patricians permission to have assistance in committing suicide.

victimless crimes apply only to society's poor and uninformed the rich and informed indulge without any penalty. abortion was illegal Pregnant patricians could vacation and return home no longer pregnant Meanwhile plebeians sought out abortionists locally and risked being butchered in septic conditions by unqualified practitioners consider prostitution the high-class callgirl clientele is restricted to the rich These women did not walk the streets The plebeians were forced to risk soliciting sex who had a s t d laws that criminalize immoral behaviors preserve privileges for patricians and prohibit them from the plebeians They are ways the oppressors in society control the oppressed patricians can easily die from assisted suicide They are rich informed, and, have "contacts." the plebeians have to beg to find sufficient quantities of a painless medication with which to commit suicide A fair and just society should not have two sets of rules one for patricians and one plebeians Rather than imposing prohibition a more rational solution is to open the same options for both groups. If the practice is illegal, it goes underground, and abuses continue unnoticed The absence of restrictions should apply to suicide There is no reason to give only the patricians permission to have assistance

David is Professor of Psychology @ The Richard Stockton College, Crisis 2002; Volume 23 (4): 178–179, “A Marxist Perspective on Assisted Suicide”, AB NOTE** -Patrician means the wealthy, elite ruling class Societies have often made vices, minor sins, and immoral behaviors illegal, thus making them crimes. These behaviors are often called "victimless crimes" because it is arguable whether they meet the criteria for crimes with clear, identifiable victims, such as murder, assaults, robberies, burglary, and theft. It is important to note that such victimless crimes apply only to society's poor and uninformed; the rich and informed indulge in these behaviors without any penalty. Following Rome, let me call these two groups in society the plebeians and patricians, respectively. For example, prior to 1973, abortion was illegal in some states of the United States. Pregnant patricians, however, could take a vacation in the Caribbean and have a D&C while staying there, returning home with a suntan and no longer pregnant. Or, if they preferred, they could combine their D&C with a skiing vacation in Scandinavia. Meanwhile, the plebeians desperately sought out their abortionists locally and risked being butchered in septic conditions by unqualified practitioners. Or consider prostitution. Harold Greenwald (1970), a psychoanalyst, in his book entitled The Elegant Prostitute described the world of the high-class callgirl whose clientele is restricted to the rich and wealthy (and informed). These women did not walk the streets or solicit clients. They accepted referrals only from patrician clients whom they had previously served. The plebeians, on the other hand, who wanted the services of a prostitute were forced to risk soliciting sex from a possibly addicted prostitute on the street who probably had a sexually transmitted disease such as AIDS, running the risk of being arrested (since police found it more convenient to arrest clients rather than the prostitutes) and, in some cities, of even having their cars confiscated. The laws that criminalize immoral behaviors serve in part to preserve these privileges for the patricians in the society and prohibit them from the plebeians. They are a one of the ways the oppressors in society control the oppressed. In 1939, after fleeing Austria and arriving in England, Sigmund Freud was dying from cancer of the neck and jaw. He was in severe pain and the lesions were most unpleasant. He had arranged that his personal doctor, Dr. Max Schur, would inject him with a lethal dose of morphine, which Schur did on September 21 and September 22, 1939, according to Peter Gay (1988). Sigmund Freud died from an assisted suicide. As in so many ways, Freud—the only genius the field of psychology has yet witnessed was ahead of his time. The patricians can easily die from assisted suicide. They are rich, they are informed, and, most importantly, they have "contacts." Meanwhile, the plebeians have to beg and find devious ways to find sufficient quantities of a painless medication with which to commit suicide, as witnessed by the stories of Betty Rollin (1985) seeking such medications for her mother or Jo Roman (1980) for herself. A fair and just society should not have two sets of rules, one for the patricians and one for the plebeians. Rather than imposing the same prohibitions on both groups, a more rational solution is to open the same options for both groups. The Economist, for example, has consistently argued for the legalization of victimless crimes, such as drug use and prostitution. In decriminalizing options such as assisted suicide, some argue that the practice may be abused. As Thomas Szasz (1973) has pointed out time and again, there is in fact little that cannot be abused. One can drive a car so as to wreck it and harm others, yet we do not ban cars. Closer to home, electroconvulsive therapy was occasionally misused, applied at times in a barbaric and punitive manner rather than a therapeutic fashion; yet, this does not rule out the possibility that it may occasionally indeed have a beneficial effect on a patient. Unethical and incompetent psychotherapists harm their clients, but we do not prohibit psychotherapy altogether. The clear advantage of decriminalizing assisted suicide (and other victimless behaviors) is that we can monitor the practice and, if we detect abuses and misuses, we can institute measures to prevent such abuses and misuses in the future. If the practice is illegal, it goes underground, and the abuses continue unnoticed and ignored. The Economist has noted that in cities where prostitution is legal, prostitutes have a low incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, are rarely raped (or murdered), are hardly ever drug-addicted, and do not forfeit their hardearned money to pimps. "Survivors" argue that the suicide of a loved-one leaves them with great suffering. Surely, any mode of death of a loved-one causes the survivors to suffer. But so do some parents cause their children great suffering, and some spouses cause their partner great suffering. We do not prevent people from having children because they will harm them or prevent people from marrying because they will harm each other. The same absence of restrictions should apply to suicide. Suicide is not illegal, even in America. There is no reason to give only the patricians permission to have assistance in committing suicide.

<h4><strong>PAS allows for a breakdown of class divisions -- their rejection is a link that solidifies the difference between the rich and the poor</h4><p>Lester 02</p><p></strong>David is Professor of Psychology @ The Richard Stockton College, Crisis 2002; Volume 23 (4): 178–179, “A Marxist Perspective on Assisted Suicide”, AB </p><p><u><strong>NOTE** -Patrician means the wealthy, elite ruling class </p><p>Societies have</u></strong> often made vices, <u><strong>minor sins</u></strong>, and immoral behaviors <u><strong>illegal</u></strong>, thus making them crimes. <u><strong>These</u></strong> behaviors <u><strong>are often called "victimless crimes</u></strong>" because it is arguable whether they meet the criteria for crimes with clear, identifiable victims, such as murder, assaults, robberies, burglary, and theft. It is important to note that such <u><strong><mark>victimless crimes apply only to society's poor and uninformed</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>the rich and informed indulge</mark> in these behaviors <mark>without any penalty</u></strong>. </mark>Following Rome, let me call <u><strong>these two groups in society the plebeians and patricians</u></strong>, respectively. For example, prior to 1973, <u><strong><mark>abortion was illegal</mark> </u></strong>in some states of the United States. <u><strong><mark>Pregnant patricians</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>could</mark> take a <mark>vacation</mark> in the Caribbean</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> have a D&C while staying there, <u><strong><mark>return</u></strong></mark>ing <u><strong><mark>home</mark> with a suntan and <mark>no longer pregnant</u></strong></mark>. Or, if they preferred, they could combine their D&C with a skiing vacation in Scandinavia. <u><strong><mark>Meanwhile</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>the <mark>plebeians</mark> desperately <mark>sought</mark> <mark>out</mark> their <mark>abortionists locally and risked being butchered in septic conditions by unqualified practitioners</u></strong></mark>. Or <u><strong><mark>consider prostitution</u></strong></mark>. Harold Greenwald (1970), a psychoanalyst, in his book entitled The Elegant Prostitute described the world of <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>high</u></strong>-<u><strong>class</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>callgirl</u></strong></mark> whose <u><strong><mark>clientele is restricted to</mark> <mark>the rich </mark>and wealthy</u></strong> (and informed). <u><strong><mark>These women did not walk the streets</mark> or solicit clients</u></strong>. <u><strong>They accepted referrals</u></strong> only from patrician clients whom they had previously served. <u><strong><mark>The plebeians</u></strong></mark>, on the other hand,<u><strong> who wanted the services of a prostitute <mark>were forced to risk soliciting sex</u></strong></mark> from a possibly addicted prostitute on the street <u><strong><mark>who</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>had a</mark> <mark>s</mark>exually <mark>t</mark>ransmitted <mark>d</mark>isease</u></strong> such as AIDS, <u><strong>running the risk of being arrested</u></strong> (since police found it more convenient to arrest clients rather than the prostitutes) and, in some cities, of even having their cars confiscated. <u><strong>The <mark>laws that criminalize immoral behaviors</mark> serve in part to <mark>preserve</mark> these <mark>privileges for</mark> the <mark>patricians</mark> in the society <mark>and prohibit them from the plebeians</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They are</u></strong></mark> a one of the <u><strong><mark>ways the oppressors in society control the oppressed</u></strong></mark>. In 1939, after fleeing Austria and arriving in England, Sigmund Freud was dying from cancer of the neck and jaw. He was in severe pain and the lesions were most unpleasant. He had arranged that his personal doctor, Dr. Max Schur, would inject him with a lethal dose of morphine, which Schur did on September 21 and September 22, 1939, according to Peter Gay (1988). Sigmund Freud died from an assisted suicide. As in so many ways, Freud—the only genius the field of psychology has yet witnessed was ahead of his time. The <u><strong><mark>patricians can easily die from assisted suicide</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They are rich</u></strong></mark>, they are <u><strong><mark>informed</u></strong>, <u><strong>and,</u></strong></mark> most importantly, they <u><strong><mark>have "contacts."</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Meanwhile, <mark>the plebeians have to beg</u></strong></mark> and find devious ways <u><strong><mark>to find sufficient quantities of a painless</u></strong> <u><strong>medication with which to commit suicide</u></strong></mark>, as witnessed by the stories of Betty Rollin (1985) seeking such medications for her mother or Jo Roman (1980) for herself. <u><strong><mark>A fair and just society should not have two sets of rules</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>one for </mark>the <mark>patricians and one</mark> for the <mark>plebeians</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Rather than imposing</mark> the same <mark>prohibition</mark>s</u></strong> on both groups, <u><strong><mark>a more rational solution is to open the same options for both groups</u></strong>.</mark> The Economist, for example, has consistently argued for the legalization of victimless crimes, such as drug use and prostitution. In decriminalizing options such as assisted suicide, some argue that the practice may be abused. As Thomas Szasz (1973) has pointed out time and again, there is in fact little that cannot be abused. One can drive a car so as to wreck it and harm others, yet we do not ban cars. Closer to home, electroconvulsive therapy was occasionally misused, applied at times in a barbaric and punitive manner rather than a therapeutic fashion; yet, this does not rule out the possibility that it may occasionally indeed have a beneficial effect on a patient. Unethical and incompetent psychotherapists harm their clients, but we do not prohibit psychotherapy altogether. The clear advantage of decriminalizing assisted suicide (and other victimless behaviors) is that we can monitor the practice and, if we detect abuses and misuses, we can institute measures to prevent such abuses and misuses in the future. <u><strong><mark>If the practice is illegal, it goes underground, and</mark> the <mark>abuses continue unnoticed</mark> and ignored</u></strong>. The Economist has noted that <u><strong>in cities where prostitution is legal, prostitutes have a low incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, are rarely raped</u></strong> (<u><strong>or murdered</u></strong>), are hardly ever drug-addicted, <u><strong>and do not forfeit their</u></strong> hardearned <u><strong>money to pimps</u></strong>. "Survivors" argue that the suicide of a loved-one leaves them with great suffering. Surely, any mode of death of a loved-one causes the survivors to suffer. But so do some parents cause their children great suffering, and some spouses cause their partner great suffering. We do not prevent people from having children because they will harm them or prevent people from marrying because they will harm each other. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> same <mark>absence of restrictions should apply to suicide</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Suicide is not illegal, even in America</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>There is no reason to give only the patricians permission to have assistance</mark> in committing suicide. </p></u></strong>

Lester 02

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Lester 02 fulltext: David is Professor of Psychology @ The Richard Stockton College, Crisis 2002; Volume 23 (4): 178–179, “A Marxist Perspective on Assisted Suicide”, AB NOTE** -Patrician means the wealthy, elite ruling class Societies have often made vices, minor sins, and immoral behaviors illegal, thus making them crimes. These behaviors are often called "victimless crimes" because it is arguable whether they meet the criteria for crimes with clear, identifiable victims, such as murder, assaults, robberies, burglary, and theft. It is important to note that such victimless crimes apply only to society's poor and uninformed; the rich and informed indulge in these behaviors without any penalty. Following Rome, let me call these two groups in society the plebeians and patricians, respectively. For example, prior to 1973, abortion was illegal in some states of the United States. Pregnant patricians, however, could take a vacation in the Caribbean and have a D&C while staying there, returning home with a suntan and no longer pregnant. Or, if they preferred, they could combine their D&C with a skiing vacation in Scandinavia. Meanwhile, the plebeians desperately sought out their abortionists locally and risked being butchered in septic conditions by unqualified practitioners. Or consider prostitution. Harold Greenwald (1970), a psychoanalyst, in his book entitled The Elegant Prostitute described the world of the high-class callgirl whose clientele is restricted to the rich and wealthy (and informed). These women did not walk the streets or solicit clients. They accepted referrals only from patrician clients whom they had previously served. The plebeians, on the other hand, who wanted the services of a prostitute were forced to risk soliciting sex from a possibly addicted prostitute on the street who probably had a sexually transmitted disease such as AIDS, running the risk of being arrested (since police found it more convenient to arrest clients rather than the prostitutes) and, in some cities, of even having their cars confiscated. The laws that criminalize immoral behaviors serve in part to preserve these privileges for the patricians in the society and prohibit them from the plebeians. They are a one of the ways the oppressors in society control the oppressed. In 1939, after fleeing Austria and arriving in England, Sigmund Freud was dying from cancer of the neck and jaw. He was in severe pain and the lesions were most unpleasant. He had arranged that his personal doctor, Dr. Max Schur, would inject him with a lethal dose of morphine, which Schur did on September 21 and September 22, 1939, according to Peter Gay (1988). Sigmund Freud died from an assisted suicide. As in so many ways, Freud—the only genius the field of psychology has yet witnessed was ahead of his time. The patricians can easily die from assisted suicide. They are rich, they are informed, and, most importantly, they have "contacts." Meanwhile, the plebeians have to beg and find devious ways to find sufficient quantities of a painless medication with which to commit suicide, as witnessed by the stories of Betty Rollin (1985) seeking such medications for her mother or Jo Roman (1980) for herself. A fair and just society should not have two sets of rules, one for the patricians and one for the plebeians. Rather than imposing the same prohibitions on both groups, a more rational solution is to open the same options for both groups. The Economist, for example, has consistently argued for the legalization of victimless crimes, such as drug use and prostitution. In decriminalizing options such as assisted suicide, some argue that the practice may be abused. As Thomas Szasz (1973) has pointed out time and again, there is in fact little that cannot be abused. One can drive a car so as to wreck it and harm others, yet we do not ban cars. Closer to home, electroconvulsive therapy was occasionally misused, applied at times in a barbaric and punitive manner rather than a therapeutic fashion; yet, this does not rule out the possibility that it may occasionally indeed have a beneficial effect on a patient. Unethical and incompetent psychotherapists harm their clients, but we do not prohibit psychotherapy altogether. The clear advantage of decriminalizing assisted suicide (and other victimless behaviors) is that we can monitor the practice and, if we detect abuses and misuses, we can institute measures to prevent such abuses and misuses in the future. If the practice is illegal, it goes underground, and the abuses continue unnoticed and ignored. The Economist has noted that in cities where prostitution is legal, prostitutes have a low incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, are rarely raped (or murdered), are hardly ever drug-addicted, and do not forfeit their hardearned money to pimps. "Survivors" argue that the suicide of a loved-one leaves them with great suffering. Surely, any mode of death of a loved-one causes the survivors to suffer. But so do some parents cause their children great suffering, and some spouses cause their partner great suffering. We do not prevent people from having children because they will harm them or prevent people from marrying because they will harm each other. The same absence of restrictions should apply to suicide. Suicide is not illegal, even in America. There is no reason to give only the patricians permission to have assistance in committing suicide. [/INST] <h4><strong>PAS allows for a breakdown of class divisions -- their rejection is a link that solidifies the difference between the rich and the poor</h4><p>Lester 02</p><p></strong>David is Professor of Psychology @ The Richard Stockton College, Crisis 2002; Volume 23 (4): 178–179, “A Marxist Perspective on Assisted Suicide”, AB </p><p><u><strong>NOTE** -Patrician means the wealthy, elite ruling class </p><p>Societies have</u></strong> often made vices, <u><strong>minor sins</u></strong>, and immoral behaviors <u><strong>illegal</u></strong>, thus making them crimes. <u><strong>These</u></strong> behaviors <u><strong>are often called "victimless crimes</u></strong>" because it is arguable whether they meet the criteria for crimes with clear, identifiable victims, such as murder, assaults, robberies, burglary, and theft. It is important to note that such <u><strong><mark>victimless crimes apply only to society's poor and uninformed</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>the rich and informed indulge</mark> in these behaviors <mark>without any penalty</u></strong>. </mark>Following Rome, let me call <u><strong>these two groups in society the plebeians and patricians</u></strong>, respectively. For example, prior to 1973, <u><strong><mark>abortion was illegal</mark> </u></strong>in some states of the United States. <u><strong><mark>Pregnant patricians</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>could</mark> take a <mark>vacation</mark> in the Caribbean</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> have a D&C while staying there, <u><strong><mark>return</u></strong></mark>ing <u><strong><mark>home</mark> with a suntan and <mark>no longer pregnant</u></strong></mark>. Or, if they preferred, they could combine their D&C with a skiing vacation in Scandinavia. <u><strong><mark>Meanwhile</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>the <mark>plebeians</mark> desperately <mark>sought</mark> <mark>out</mark> their <mark>abortionists locally and risked being butchered in septic conditions by unqualified practitioners</u></strong></mark>. Or <u><strong><mark>consider prostitution</u></strong></mark>. Harold Greenwald (1970), a psychoanalyst, in his book entitled The Elegant Prostitute described the world of <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>high</u></strong>-<u><strong>class</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>callgirl</u></strong></mark> whose <u><strong><mark>clientele is restricted to</mark> <mark>the rich </mark>and wealthy</u></strong> (and informed). <u><strong><mark>These women did not walk the streets</mark> or solicit clients</u></strong>. <u><strong>They accepted referrals</u></strong> only from patrician clients whom they had previously served. <u><strong><mark>The plebeians</u></strong></mark>, on the other hand,<u><strong> who wanted the services of a prostitute <mark>were forced to risk soliciting sex</u></strong></mark> from a possibly addicted prostitute on the street <u><strong><mark>who</u></strong></mark> probably <u><strong><mark>had a</mark> <mark>s</mark>exually <mark>t</mark>ransmitted <mark>d</mark>isease</u></strong> such as AIDS, <u><strong>running the risk of being arrested</u></strong> (since police found it more convenient to arrest clients rather than the prostitutes) and, in some cities, of even having their cars confiscated. <u><strong>The <mark>laws that criminalize immoral behaviors</mark> serve in part to <mark>preserve</mark> these <mark>privileges for</mark> the <mark>patricians</mark> in the society <mark>and prohibit them from the plebeians</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They are</u></strong></mark> a one of the <u><strong><mark>ways the oppressors in society control the oppressed</u></strong></mark>. In 1939, after fleeing Austria and arriving in England, Sigmund Freud was dying from cancer of the neck and jaw. He was in severe pain and the lesions were most unpleasant. He had arranged that his personal doctor, Dr. Max Schur, would inject him with a lethal dose of morphine, which Schur did on September 21 and September 22, 1939, according to Peter Gay (1988). Sigmund Freud died from an assisted suicide. As in so many ways, Freud—the only genius the field of psychology has yet witnessed was ahead of his time. The <u><strong><mark>patricians can easily die from assisted suicide</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They are rich</u></strong></mark>, they are <u><strong><mark>informed</u></strong>, <u><strong>and,</u></strong></mark> most importantly, they <u><strong><mark>have "contacts."</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Meanwhile, <mark>the plebeians have to beg</u></strong></mark> and find devious ways <u><strong><mark>to find sufficient quantities of a painless</u></strong> <u><strong>medication with which to commit suicide</u></strong></mark>, as witnessed by the stories of Betty Rollin (1985) seeking such medications for her mother or Jo Roman (1980) for herself. <u><strong><mark>A fair and just society should not have two sets of rules</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>one for </mark>the <mark>patricians and one</mark> for the <mark>plebeians</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Rather than imposing</mark> the same <mark>prohibition</mark>s</u></strong> on both groups, <u><strong><mark>a more rational solution is to open the same options for both groups</u></strong>.</mark> The Economist, for example, has consistently argued for the legalization of victimless crimes, such as drug use and prostitution. In decriminalizing options such as assisted suicide, some argue that the practice may be abused. As Thomas Szasz (1973) has pointed out time and again, there is in fact little that cannot be abused. One can drive a car so as to wreck it and harm others, yet we do not ban cars. Closer to home, electroconvulsive therapy was occasionally misused, applied at times in a barbaric and punitive manner rather than a therapeutic fashion; yet, this does not rule out the possibility that it may occasionally indeed have a beneficial effect on a patient. Unethical and incompetent psychotherapists harm their clients, but we do not prohibit psychotherapy altogether. The clear advantage of decriminalizing assisted suicide (and other victimless behaviors) is that we can monitor the practice and, if we detect abuses and misuses, we can institute measures to prevent such abuses and misuses in the future. <u><strong><mark>If the practice is illegal, it goes underground, and</mark> the <mark>abuses continue unnoticed</mark> and ignored</u></strong>. The Economist has noted that <u><strong>in cities where prostitution is legal, prostitutes have a low incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, are rarely raped</u></strong> (<u><strong>or murdered</u></strong>), are hardly ever drug-addicted, <u><strong>and do not forfeit their</u></strong> hardearned <u><strong>money to pimps</u></strong>. "Survivors" argue that the suicide of a loved-one leaves them with great suffering. Surely, any mode of death of a loved-one causes the survivors to suffer. But so do some parents cause their children great suffering, and some spouses cause their partner great suffering. We do not prevent people from having children because they will harm them or prevent people from marrying because they will harm each other. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> same <mark>absence of restrictions should apply to suicide</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Suicide is not illegal, even in America</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>There is no reason to give only the patricians permission to have assistance</mark> in committing suicide. </p></u></strong> </s>

Whether or not climate change is factually catastrophic is irrelevant - the framing of the issue outweighs its scientific validity and directly influences the effectiveness of challenges to climate change

Should climate change be considered an emergency? How soon and how drastically must carbon emissions be reduced? This way of thinking seems to be concerned with scientific matters, but actually it builds in social assumptions. assumptions need to be brought out into the open and discussed. The emergency frame implicitly prioritises climate change above other issues. this may encourage competition between activists rather than cooperation. Rather than prioritise climate change as more urgent, it may be more effective for climate change activists to work with other social justice campaigners to find ways to help each other - Emergency framing can be used to sideline dissent within the climate change movement itself. For example, those who advocate highly ambitious targets for CO2 reduction may seek the high ground, presenting their position as the only option for humanity and stigmatising others as selling out. Internal democracy, divergent approaches and openness to new viewpoints can be dismissed as unaffordable luxuries when the future is at stake.

climate change emergency thinking seems to be concerned with scientific matters, but builds in social assumptions. assumptions need to be brought out into the open and discussed The emergency frame prioritises climate change above other issues this may encourage competition between activists rather than cooperation Emergency framing sideline dissent within the climate change movement those who advocate ambitious targets for CO2 reduction seek the high ground, as the only option for humanity stigmatising others as selling out divergent approaches and new viewpoints can be dismissed as unaffordable luxuries when the future is at stake

Should climate change be considered an emergency? Our aim here is to present some cautionary comments. Most discussion has approached the issue in terms of whether climate change really is an emergency. For example, does the evidence show that warming is proceeding faster than previously thought? Is there a tipping point beyond which climate change is irreversible? How soon and how drastically must carbon emissions be reduced? This way of thinking seems to be concerned with scientific matters, but actually it builds in social assumptions. Many of those who talk of a climate crisis or emergency assume that evidence about climate processes means that addressing climate change is the most urgent social issue, that the solution is policy change at the top, and that thinking of the issue as an emergency is an effective way of bringing about change. It is not the use of the word "emergency" that is necessarily significant here but rather the assumptions that so commonly go along with the word. We think these assumptions need to be brought out into the open and discussed. Let us be clear. We believe climate change is a vitally important issue. We believe action should be taken, the sooner and the more effective the better, to prevent the adverse consequences of global warming. Calling climate change an emergency might be a good approach - but on the other hand it might not be, indeed it might be counterproductive. We think both the advantages and disadvantages of emergency framing should be discussed. The emergency frame implicitly prioritises climate change above other issues. On the other hand, some critics, like Lomborg (2006), argue that other issues should have higher priority. We think it can be a mistake to prioritise one issue over others, because this may encourage competition between activists rather than cooperation. There are plenty of issues of vital importance in which millions of lives are at stake, among them nuclear war, global poverty, HIV, inequality - and smoking, which could kill one billion people this century (Proctor 2001). It is natural to expect campaigners on other vitally important issues - such as torture, sexual slavery and genocide - to remain committed to their concerns. Rather than prioritise climate change as more urgent, it may be more effective for climate change activists to work with other social justice campaigners to find ways to help each other - indeed, some are doing this already. Emergency framing can be used to sideline dissent within the climate change movement itself. For example, those who advocate highly ambitious targets for CO2 reduction may seek the high ground, presenting their position as the only option for humanity and stigmatising others as selling out. Internal democracy, divergent approaches and openness to new viewpoints can be dismissed as unaffordable luxuries when the future is at stake. Our view, instead, is that because climate change is such an important issue, maintaining democracy, diversity and dialogue within the movement is even more vital.

<h4>Whether or not climate change is factually catastrophic is irrelevant - the framing of the issue outweighs its scientific validity and directly influences the effectiveness of challenges to climate change</h4><p><strong>Martin and Hodder 2009</strong> (Brian Martin is a Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong Australia. Patrick Hodder is a Tutor and PhD candidate at the Bega Education Centre of the University of Wollongong. "Climate crisis? The politics of emergency framing"; Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 36, pp. 53-60)</p><p><u>Should <mark>climate change</mark> be considered an <mark>emergency</mark>?</u> Our aim here is to present some cautionary comments. Most discussion has approached the issue in terms of whether climate change really is an emergency. For example, does the evidence show that warming is proceeding faster than previously thought? Is there a tipping point beyond which climate change is irreversible? <u>How soon and how drastically must carbon emissions be reduced? This way of <mark>thinking</u></mark> <u><mark>seems</u> <u>to be concerned with scientific matters, but</mark> actually it <mark>builds in social assumptions.</u></mark> Many of those who talk of a climate crisis or emergency assume that evidence about climate processes means that addressing climate change is the most urgent social issue, that the solution is policy change at the top, and that thinking of the issue as an emergency is an effective way of bringing about change. It is not the use of the word "emergency" that is necessarily significant here but rather the assumptions that so commonly go along with the word. We think these <u><strong><mark>assumptions need to be brought out into the open and discussed</mark>. </u></strong>Let us be clear. We believe climate change is a vitally important issue. We believe action should be taken, the sooner and the more effective the better, to prevent the adverse consequences of global warming. Calling climate change an emergency might be a good approach - but on the other hand it might not be, indeed it might be counterproductive. We think both the advantages and disadvantages of emergency framing should be discussed.<u><strong> </strong><mark>The emergency frame</mark> implicitly <mark>prioritises climate change above other issues</mark>.</u> On the other hand, some critics, like Lomborg (2006), argue that other issues should have higher priority. We think it can be a mistake to prioritise one issue over others, because <u><mark>this may encourage competition between activists rather than cooperation</mark>. </u>There are plenty of issues of vital importance in which millions of lives are at stake, among them nuclear war, global poverty, HIV, inequality - and smoking, which could kill one billion people this century (Proctor 2001). It is natural to expect campaigners on other vitally important issues - such as torture, sexual slavery and genocide - to remain committed to their concerns. <u>Rather than prioritise climate change as more urgent, it may be more effective for climate change activists to work with other social justice campaigners to find ways to help each other -</u> indeed, some are doing this already.<u><strong> </strong><mark>Emergency framing</mark> can be used to <mark>sideline dissent within the climate change movement</mark> itself. For example, <mark>those who advocate </mark>highly <mark>ambitious targets for CO2 reduction </mark>may <mark>seek the high ground,</mark> presenting their position <mark>as the only</mark> <mark>option for humanity </mark>and <mark>stigmatising others as selling out</mark>.</u> <u>Internal democracy, <mark>divergent approaches and</mark> openness to <mark>new viewpoints can be dismissed as unaffordable luxuries when the future is at stake</mark>.</u> Our view, instead, is that because climate change is such an important issue, maintaining democracy, diversity and dialogue within the movement is even more vital.</p>

Martin and Hodder 2009 (Brian Martin is a Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong Australia. Patrick Hodder is a Tutor and PhD candidate at the Bega Education Centre of the University of Wollongong. "Climate crisis? The politics of emergency framing"; Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 36, pp. 53-60)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Martin and Hodder 2009 (Brian Martin is a Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong Australia. Patrick Hodder is a Tutor and PhD candidate at the Bega Education Centre of the University of Wollongong. "Climate crisis? The politics of emergency framing"; Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 36, pp. 53-60) fulltext: Should climate change be considered an emergency? Our aim here is to present some cautionary comments. Most discussion has approached the issue in terms of whether climate change really is an emergency. For example, does the evidence show that warming is proceeding faster than previously thought? Is there a tipping point beyond which climate change is irreversible? How soon and how drastically must carbon emissions be reduced? This way of thinking seems to be concerned with scientific matters, but actually it builds in social assumptions. Many of those who talk of a climate crisis or emergency assume that evidence about climate processes means that addressing climate change is the most urgent social issue, that the solution is policy change at the top, and that thinking of the issue as an emergency is an effective way of bringing about change. It is not the use of the word "emergency" that is necessarily significant here but rather the assumptions that so commonly go along with the word. We think these assumptions need to be brought out into the open and discussed. Let us be clear. We believe climate change is a vitally important issue. We believe action should be taken, the sooner and the more effective the better, to prevent the adverse consequences of global warming. Calling climate change an emergency might be a good approach - but on the other hand it might not be, indeed it might be counterproductive. We think both the advantages and disadvantages of emergency framing should be discussed. The emergency frame implicitly prioritises climate change above other issues. On the other hand, some critics, like Lomborg (2006), argue that other issues should have higher priority. We think it can be a mistake to prioritise one issue over others, because this may encourage competition between activists rather than cooperation. There are plenty of issues of vital importance in which millions of lives are at stake, among them nuclear war, global poverty, HIV, inequality - and smoking, which could kill one billion people this century (Proctor 2001). It is natural to expect campaigners on other vitally important issues - such as torture, sexual slavery and genocide - to remain committed to their concerns. Rather than prioritise climate change as more urgent, it may be more effective for climate change activists to work with other social justice campaigners to find ways to help each other - indeed, some are doing this already. Emergency framing can be used to sideline dissent within the climate change movement itself. For example, those who advocate highly ambitious targets for CO2 reduction may seek the high ground, presenting their position as the only option for humanity and stigmatising others as selling out. Internal democracy, divergent approaches and openness to new viewpoints can be dismissed as unaffordable luxuries when the future is at stake. Our view, instead, is that because climate change is such an important issue, maintaining democracy, diversity and dialogue within the movement is even more vital. [/INST] <h4>Whether or not climate change is factually catastrophic is irrelevant - the framing of the issue outweighs its scientific validity and directly influences the effectiveness of challenges to climate change</h4><p><strong>Martin and Hodder 2009</strong> (Brian Martin is a Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong Australia. Patrick Hodder is a Tutor and PhD candidate at the Bega Education Centre of the University of Wollongong. "Climate crisis? The politics of emergency framing"; Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 36, pp. 53-60)</p><p><u>Should <mark>climate change</mark> be considered an <mark>emergency</mark>?</u> Our aim here is to present some cautionary comments. Most discussion has approached the issue in terms of whether climate change really is an emergency. For example, does the evidence show that warming is proceeding faster than previously thought? Is there a tipping point beyond which climate change is irreversible? <u>How soon and how drastically must carbon emissions be reduced? This way of <mark>thinking</u></mark> <u><mark>seems</u> <u>to be concerned with scientific matters, but</mark> actually it <mark>builds in social assumptions.</u></mark> Many of those who talk of a climate crisis or emergency assume that evidence about climate processes means that addressing climate change is the most urgent social issue, that the solution is policy change at the top, and that thinking of the issue as an emergency is an effective way of bringing about change. It is not the use of the word "emergency" that is necessarily significant here but rather the assumptions that so commonly go along with the word. We think these <u><strong><mark>assumptions need to be brought out into the open and discussed</mark>. </u></strong>Let us be clear. We believe climate change is a vitally important issue. We believe action should be taken, the sooner and the more effective the better, to prevent the adverse consequences of global warming. Calling climate change an emergency might be a good approach - but on the other hand it might not be, indeed it might be counterproductive. We think both the advantages and disadvantages of emergency framing should be discussed.<u><strong> </strong><mark>The emergency frame</mark> implicitly <mark>prioritises climate change above other issues</mark>.</u> On the other hand, some critics, like Lomborg (2006), argue that other issues should have higher priority. We think it can be a mistake to prioritise one issue over others, because <u><mark>this may encourage competition between activists rather than cooperation</mark>. </u>There are plenty of issues of vital importance in which millions of lives are at stake, among them nuclear war, global poverty, HIV, inequality - and smoking, which could kill one billion people this century (Proctor 2001). It is natural to expect campaigners on other vitally important issues - such as torture, sexual slavery and genocide - to remain committed to their concerns. <u>Rather than prioritise climate change as more urgent, it may be more effective for climate change activists to work with other social justice campaigners to find ways to help each other -</u> indeed, some are doing this already.<u><strong> </strong><mark>Emergency framing</mark> can be used to <mark>sideline dissent within the climate change movement</mark> itself. For example, <mark>those who advocate </mark>highly <mark>ambitious targets for CO2 reduction </mark>may <mark>seek the high ground,</mark> presenting their position <mark>as the only</mark> <mark>option for humanity </mark>and <mark>stigmatising others as selling out</mark>.</u> <u>Internal democracy, <mark>divergent approaches and</mark> openness to <mark>new viewpoints can be dismissed as unaffordable luxuries when the future is at stake</mark>.</u> Our view, instead, is that because climate change is such an important issue, maintaining democracy, diversity and dialogue within the movement is even more vital.</p> </s>

The advantage is Environmental Policy

<h4>The advantage is Environmental Policy</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>The advantage is Environmental Policy</h4> </s>

OR

<h4>OR </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>OR </h4> </s>

The aff’s approach to marijuana legalization is a redefinition of the law from the administrative regime of criminalization to a tolerant liberal market of justice which can only mystify the inner workings of disciplinary power. This is a hedonistic approach to politcs that attempts to combine the freedom of drug use with the restraint of the market that upholds narratives of neutrality sorrounding the law and university. This is the foundation for violence, otherness becomes tolerated insofar as it takes on the form of a proper subject which creates the conditions for extermination based on notions of bare life.

The university discourse is enunciated from the position of "neutral" Knowledge in the case of pedagogical knowledge, the "raw, uncultivated child"), turning it into the subject The "truth" of the university discourse, hidden beneath the bar, of course, is power it disavows its performative dimension, presenting what effectively amounts to a political decision based on power as a simple insight into the factual state of things. the produced subject is not simply the subjectivity which arises as the result of the disciplinary application of knowledge-power, but its remainder, that which eludes the grasp of knowledge-power. "Production" does not stand simply for the result of the discursive operation, but rather for its "indivisible remainder," for the excess which resists being included in the discursive network, i.e. for what the discourse itself produces as the foreign body in its very heart. medical discourse functions in our everyday lives: at the surface level, we are dealing with pure objective knowledge which desubjectivizes the subject-patient, reducing [them] to an object of research, of diagnosis and treatment; however, beneath it, one can easily discern a worried hystericized subject, obsessed with anxiety, addressing the doctor as his [or her] Master and asking for reassurance from him [or her]. At a more common level, suffice it to recall the market expert who advocates strong budgetary measures as a necessity imposed by his neutral expertise devoid of any ideological biases: what he conceals is the series of power-relations the "neutral" functioning of the market mechanism. In the University discourse, is not the upper level that of biopolitics Of the expert knowledge dealing with its object which is a - not subjects, but individuals reduced to bare life the expert rule of "biopolitics" is grounded in and conditioned by the crisis of investiture; this crisis generated the "post-metaphysical" survivalist [position] of the Last Men, which ends up in an anemic spectacle of life dragging on as its own shadow. It is within this horizon that one should appreciate today's growing rejection of death penalty: what one should be able to discern is the hidden "biopolitics" which sustains this rejection. Those who assert the "sacredness of life," defending it against the threat of transcendent powers which parasitize on it, end up in a world in which, on behalf of its very official goal — long pleasurable life — all effective pleasures are prohibited or strictly controlled (smoking, drugs, food…) "demystifying" presentation of war as a meaningless slaughter which nothing can really justify - as such, it provides the best possible justification for "no-casualties-on-our-side" military doctrine. On today's market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol the contemporary redefinition of politics as the art of expert administration as politics without politics, up to today's tolerant liberal multiculturalism as an experience of Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized Other who dances fascinating dances and has an ecologically sound holistic approach to reality, while features like wife beating remain out of sight…)? Virtual Reality simply generalizes this procedure of offering a product deprived of its substance: it provides reality itself deprived of its substance Today's hedonism combines pleasure with constraint — it is no longer the old notion of the "right measure" between pleasure and constraint, but a kind of pseudo-Hegelian immediate coincidence of the opposites: action and reaction should coincide, the very thing which causes damage should already be the medicine hegemony of this stance the fact that true unconstrained consumption (in all its main forms: drugs, free sex, smoking…) is emerging as the main danger? The fight against these dangers is one of the main investments of today's "biopolitics." Solutions are here desperately sought which would reproduce the paradox of the chocolate laxative. The ultimate goal would be here, along the lines of decaf coffee, to invent "opium without opium": no wonder marijuana is so popular among liberals who want to legalize it — it already IS a kind of "opium without opium." The structure of a product containing the agent of its own containment, can be discerned throughout today's ideological landscape. the Other is OK insofar as its presence is not intrusive, insofar as the Other is not really Other… A similar structure is clearly present in how we relate to capitalist profiteering: it is OK IF it is counteracted with charitable activities — first you amass billions, then you return (part of) them to the needy… And the same goes for war, for the emergent logic of humanitarian or pacifist militarism: war is OK insofar as it really serves to bring about peace, democracy, or to create conditions for distributing humanitarian help. for democracy: it is OK if it is "rethought" to include torture and a permanent emergency state, if it is cleansed of its populist "excesses," and if the people are "mature" enough to live by it… However, what we were describing what cannot but appear as two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to bare life, to homo sacer as the dispensable object of the expert caretaking knowledge; and that of the respect for the vulnerable Other brought to extreme, of the attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences itself as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential "harassments." Is there a stronger contrast than the one between the respect for the Other's vulnerability and the reduction of the Other to "mere life" regulated by the administrative knowledge? these two rely on the same root, to designate as the contemporary case of the Hegelian "infinite judgement" which asserts the identity of opposites ultimate goal of our lives is life itself. death is, quite logically, the ultimate traumatic point of biopolitics, the politics of the administration of life. the notion of the morally/legally responsible subject is an ideological fiction whose function is to cover up the network of power relations, individuals are not responsible for the crimes they commit, so they should not be punished? Is, however, the obverse of this thesis not that those who control the circumstances control the people? No wonder the two strongest industrial complexes are today the military and the medical, that of destroying and that of prolonging life. the dimension of an unconditional injunction that is inherent to knowledge itself. Recall the informations about health we are bombarded with all the time: "Smoking is dangerous! To much fat may cause a heart attack! Regular exercise leads to a longer life!" etc.etc. — it is impossible not to hear beneath it the unconditional injunction "You should enjoy a long and healthy life!"… What this means is that the discourse of the University is thoroughly mystifying, concealing its true foundation, obfuscating the unfreedom on which it relies.

university discourse is neutral" Knowledge turning it into the subject "Production" included in the discursive network reducing [them] to an object of research, and treatment neutral expertise devoid of any ideological biases conceals the series of power-relations University discourse, is that of biopolitics this crisis generated the "post-metaphysical" survivalist [position] ends up spectacle of life dragging on as its own shadow. biopolitics" sustains this rejection. Those who assert the "sacredness of life," defending it against the threat of transcendent powers end up in a world in which pleasures are prohibited smoking, drugs demystifying" presentation of war as a meaningless slaughter provides the best possible justification for military doctrine. Today's hedonism combines pleasure with constraint The fight against these dangers is one of the main investments of today's "biopolitics." Solutions reproduce the paradox of the chocolate laxative no wonder marijuana is so popular among liberals who want to legalize it — it already IS a kind of "opium without opium." a product containing the agent of its own containment Other is OK insofar as its presence is not intrusive present in to capitalist profiteering: it is OK IF it is counteracted with charitable activities — the same goes for war war is OK insofar as it really serves to bring about peace, democracy it is "rethought" to include a permanent emergency state, if it is cleansed of "excess these rely on the same root, ultimate goal of our lives is life itself the notion of the legally responsible subject is an ideological fiction whose function is to cover up the network of power relations, No wonder the two strongest industrial complexes are today the military and the medical, that of destroying and that of prolonging life the discourse of the University mystifying true foundation, obfuscating the unfreedom on which it relies.

The university discourse is enunciated from the position of "neutral" Knowledge; it addresses the remainder of the real (say, in the case of pedagogical knowledge, the "raw, uncultivated child"), turning it into the subject ($). The "truth" of the university discourse, hidden beneath the bar, of course, is power, i.e. the Master-Signifier: the constitutive lie of the university discourse is that it disavows its performative dimension, presenting what effectively amounts to a political decision based on power as a simple insight into the factual state of things. What one should avoid here is the Foucauldian misreading: the produced subject is not simply the subjectivity which arises as the result of the disciplinary application of knowledge-power, but its remainder, that which eludes the grasp of knowledge-power. "Production" (the fourth term in the matrix of discourses) does not stand simply for the result of the discursive operation, but rather for its "indivisible remainder," for the excess which resists being included in the discursive network, i.e. for what the discourse itself produces as the foreign body in its very heart. Perhaps the exemplary case of the Master's position which underlies the university discourse is the way in which medical discourse functions in our everyday lives: at the surface level, we are dealing with pure objective knowledge which desubjectivizes the subject-patient, reducing [them] to an object of research, of diagnosis and treatment; however, beneath it, one can easily discern a worried hystericized subject, obsessed with anxiety, addressing the doctor as his [or her] Master and asking for reassurance from him [or her]. At a more common level, suffice it to recall the market expert who advocates strong budgetary measures (cutting welfare expenses, etc.) as a necessity imposed by his neutral expertise devoid of any ideological biases: what he conceals is the series of power-relations (from the active role of state apparatuses to ideological beliefs) which sustain the "neutral" functioning of the market mechanism. In the University discourse, is not the upper level ($ — a) that of biopolitics (in the sense deployed from Foucault to Agamben)? Of the expert knowledge dealing with its object which is a - not subjects, but individuals reduced to bare life? And does the lower not designate what Eric Santner called the "crisis of investiture," i.e., the impossibility of the subject to relate to S1, to identify with a Master-Signifier, to assume the imposed symbolic mandate?[1] The key point is here that the expert rule of "biopolitics" is grounded in and conditioned by the crisis of investiture; this crisis generated the "post-metaphysical" survivalist [position] of the Last Men, which ends up in an anemic spectacle of life dragging on as its own shadow. It is within this horizon that one should appreciate today's growing rejection of death penalty: what one should be able to discern is the hidden "biopolitics" which sustains this rejection. Those who assert the "sacredness of life," defending it against the threat of transcendent powers which parasitize on it, end up in a world in which, on behalf of its very official goal — long pleasurable life — all effective pleasures are prohibited or strictly controlled (smoking, drugs, food…). Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan is the latest example of this survivalist attitude towards dying, with its "demystifying" presentation of war as a meaningless slaughter which nothing can really justify - as such, it provides the best possible justification for the Colin Powell's "no-casualties-on-our-side" military doctrine. On today's market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol... And the list goes on: what about virtual sex as sex without sex, the Colin Powell doctrine of warfare with no casualties (on our side, of course) as warfare without warfare, the contemporary redefinition of politics as the art of expert administration as politics without politics, up to today's tolerant liberal multiculturalism as an experience of Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized Other who dances fascinating dances and has an ecologically sound holistic approach to reality, while features like wife beating remain out of sight…)? Virtual Reality simply generalizes this procedure of offering a product deprived of its substance: it provides reality itself deprived of its substance, of the resisting hard kernel of the Real - in the same way decaffeinated coffee smells and tastes like the real coffee without being the real one, Virtual Reality is experienced as reality without being one. Is this not the attitude of the hedonistic Last Man? Everything is permitted, you can enjoy everything, BUT deprived of its substance which makes it dangerous. (This is also Last Man's revolution — "revolution without revolution.") Is this not one of the two versions of Lacan's anti-Dostoyevski motto "If God doesn't exist, everything is prohibited"? (1) God is dead, we live in a permissive universe, you should strive for pleasures and happiness — but, in order to have a life full of happiness and pleasures, you should avoid dangerous excesses, so everything is prohibited if it is not deprived of its substance; (2) If God is dead, superego enjoins you to enjoy, but every determinate enjoyment is already a betrayal of the unconditional one, so it should be prohibited. The nutritive version of this is to enjoy directly the Thing Itself: why bother with coffee? Inject caffeine directly into your blood! Why bother with sensual perceptions and excitations by external reality? Take drugs which directly affect your brain! - And if there is God, then everything is permitted — to those who claim to act directly on behalf of God, as the instruments of His will; clearly, a direct link to God justifies our violation of any "merely human" constraints and considerations (as in Stalinism, where the reference to the big Other of historical Necessity justifies absolute ruthlessness). Today's hedonism combines pleasure with constraint — it is no longer the old notion of the "right measure" between pleasure and constraint, but a kind of pseudo-Hegelian immediate coincidence of the opposites: action and reaction should coincide, the very thing which causes damage should already be the medicine. The ultimate example of it is arguably a chocolate laxative, available in the US, with the paradoxical injunction "Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate!", i.e., of the very thing which causes constipation. Do we not find here a weird version of Wagner's famous "Only the spear which caused the wound can heal it" from Parsifal? And is not a negative proof of the hegemony of this stance the fact that true unconstrained consumption (in all its main forms: drugs, free sex, smoking…) is emerging as the main danger? The fight against these dangers is one of the main investments of today's "biopolitics." Solutions are here desperately sought which would reproduce the paradox of the chocolate laxative. The main contender is "safe sex" — a term which makes one appreciative of the truth of the old saying "Is having sex with a condom not like taking a shower with a raincoat on?". The ultimate goal would be here, along the lines of decaf coffee, to invent "opium without opium": no wonder marijuana is so popular among liberals who want to legalize it — it already IS a kind of "opium without opium." The structure of the "chocolate laxative," of a product containing the agent of its own containment, can be discerned throughout today's ideological landscape. There are two topics which determine today's liberal tolerant attitude towards Others: the respect of Otherness, openness towards it, AND the obsessive fear of harassment — in short, the Other is OK insofar as its presence is not intrusive, insofar as the Other is not really Other… A similar structure is clearly present in how we relate to capitalist profiteering: it is OK IF it is counteracted with charitable activities — first you amass billions, then you return (part of) them to the needy… And the same goes for war, for the emergent logic of humanitarian or pacifist militarism: war is OK insofar as it really serves to bring about peace, democracy, or to create conditions for distributing humanitarian help. And does the same not hold more and more even for democracy: it is OK if it is "rethought" to include torture and a permanent emergency state, if it is cleansed of its populist "excesses," and if the people are "mature" enough to live by it… However, what we were describing what cannot but appear as two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to bare life, to homo sacer as the dispensable object of the expert caretaking knowledge; and that of the respect for the vulnerable Other brought to extreme, of the attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences itself as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential "harassments." Is there a stronger contrast than the one between the respect for the Other's vulnerability and the reduction of the Other to "mere life" regulated by the administrative knowledge? But what if these two stances nonetheless rely on the same root, what if they are the two aspects of one and the same underlying attitude, what if they coincide in what one is tempted to designate as the contemporary case of the Hegelian "infinite judgement" which asserts the identity of opposites? What the two poles share is precisely the underlying refusal of any higher Causes, the notion that the ultimate goal of our lives is life itself. Nowhere is the complicity of these two levels clearer as in the case of the opposition to death penalty — no wonder, since (violently putting another human being to) death is, quite logically, the ultimate traumatic point of biopolitics, the politics of the administration of life. To put it in Foucauldian terms, is the abolition of death penalty not part of a certain "biopolitics" which considers crime as the result of social, psychological, ideological, etc., circumstances: the notion of the morally/legally responsible subject is an ideological fiction whose function is to cover up the network of power relations, individuals are not responsible for the crimes they commit, so they should not be punished? Is, however, the obverse of this thesis not that those who control the circumstances control the people? No wonder the two strongest industrial complexes are today the military and the medical, that of destroying and that of prolonging life. Superego is thus not directly S2; it is rather the S1 of the S2 itself, the dimension of an unconditional injunction that is inherent to knowledge itself. Recall the informations about health we are bombarded with all the time: "Smoking is dangerous! To much fat may cause a heart attack! Regular exercise leads to a longer life!" etc.etc. — it is impossible not to hear beneath it the unconditional injunction "You should enjoy a long and healthy life!"… What this means is that the discourse of the University is thoroughly mystifying, concealing its true foundation, obfuscating the unfreedom on which it relies.

<h4>The aff’s approach to marijuana legalization is a redefinition of the law from the administrative regime of criminalization to a tolerant liberal market of justice which can only mystify the inner workings of disciplinary power. This is a hedonistic approach to politcs that attempts to combine the freedom of drug use with the restraint of the market that upholds narratives of neutrality sorrounding the law and university. This is the foundation for violence, otherness becomes tolerated insofar as it takes on the form of a proper subject which creates the conditions for extermination based on notions of bare life. </h4><p><strong>Zizek ’03 </strong>(Slavoj, he has like a degree or something, “HOMO SACER AS THE OBJECT OF THE DISCOURSE OF THE UNIVERSITY<u><strong><mark>”, [SG]) **Modified from previously assumed genders and abilities** </p><p></mark>The <mark>university discourse is </mark>enunciated from the position of "<mark>neutral" Knowledge</u></strong></mark>; it addresses the remainder of the real (say, <u><strong>in the case of pedagogical knowledge, the "raw, uncultivated child"), <mark>turning it into the subject</u></strong></mark> ($). <u><strong>The "truth" of the university discourse, hidden beneath the bar, of course, is power</u></strong>, i.e. the Master-Signifier: the constitutive lie of the university discourse is that <u><strong>it disavows its performative dimension, presenting what effectively amounts to a political decision based on power as a simple insight into the factual state of things.</u></strong> What one should avoid here is the Foucauldian misreading: <u><strong>the produced subject is not simply the subjectivity which arises as the result of the disciplinary application of knowledge-power, but its remainder, that which eludes the grasp of knowledge-power. <mark>"Production"</u></strong></mark> (the fourth term in the matrix of discourses) <u><strong>does not stand simply for the result of the discursive operation, but rather for its "indivisible remainder," for the excess which resists being <mark>included in the discursive network</mark>, i.e. for what the discourse itself produces as the foreign body in its very heart.</u></strong> Perhaps the exemplary case of the Master's position which underlies the university discourse is the way in which <u><strong>medical discourse functions in our everyday lives: at the surface level, we are dealing with pure objective knowledge which desubjectivizes the subject-patient, <mark>reducing [them] to an object of research, </mark>of diagnosis <mark>and treatment</mark>; however, beneath it, one can easily discern a worried hystericized subject, obsessed with anxiety, addressing the doctor as his [or her] Master and asking for reassurance from him [or her]. At a more common level, suffice it to recall the market expert who advocates strong budgetary measures</u></strong> (cutting welfare expenses, etc.) <u><strong>as a necessity imposed by his <mark>neutral expertise devoid of any ideological biases</mark>: what he <mark>conceals</mark> is <mark>the series of power-relations</u></strong></mark> (from the active role of state apparatuses to ideological beliefs) which sustain <u><strong>the "neutral" functioning of the market mechanism. In the <mark>University discourse,</mark> <mark>is</mark> not the upper level </u></strong>($ — a) <u><strong><mark>that of biopolitics</u></strong></mark> (in the sense deployed from Foucault to Agamben)? <u><strong>Of the expert knowledge dealing with its object which is a - not subjects, but individuals reduced to bare life</u></strong>? And does the lower not designate what Eric Santner called the "crisis of investiture," i.e., the impossibility of the subject to relate to S1, to identify with a Master-Signifier, to assume the imposed symbolic mandate?[1] The key point is here that <u><strong>the expert rule of "biopolitics" is grounded in and conditioned by the crisis of investiture; <mark>this crisis generated the "post-metaphysical" survivalist [position]</mark> of the Last Men, which <mark>ends up</mark> in an anemic <mark>spectacle of</mark> <mark>life dragging on as its own shadow.</mark> It is within this horizon that one should appreciate today's growing rejection of death penalty: what one should be able to discern is the hidden "<mark>biopolitics"</mark> which <mark>sustains this rejection.</mark> <mark>Those who assert the "sacredness of life," defending it against the threat of transcendent powers</mark> which parasitize on it, <mark>end up in a world in which</mark>, on behalf of its very official goal — long pleasurable life — all effective <mark>pleasures are prohibited</mark> or strictly controlled (<mark>smoking, drugs</mark>, food…)</u></strong>. Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan is the latest example of this survivalist attitude towards dying, with its <u><strong>"<mark>demystifying" presentation of war as a meaningless slaughter</mark> which nothing can really justify - as such, it <mark>provides the best possible justification for</u></strong></mark> the Colin Powell's <u><strong>"no-casualties-on-our-side" <mark>military doctrine. </mark>On today's market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol</u></strong>... And the list goes on: what about virtual sex as sex without sex, the Colin Powell doctrine of warfare with no casualties (on our side, of course) as warfare without warfare, <u><strong>the contemporary redefinition of politics as the art of expert administration as politics without politics, up to today's tolerant liberal multiculturalism as an experience of Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized Other who dances fascinating dances and has an ecologically sound holistic approach to reality, while features like wife beating remain out of sight…)? Virtual Reality simply generalizes this procedure of offering a product deprived of its substance: it provides reality itself deprived of its substance</u></strong>, of the resisting hard kernel of the Real - in the same way decaffeinated coffee smells and tastes like the real coffee without being the real one, Virtual Reality is experienced as reality without being one. Is this not the attitude of the hedonistic Last Man? Everything is permitted, you can enjoy everything, BUT deprived of its substance which makes it dangerous. (This is also Last Man's revolution — "revolution without revolution.") Is this not one of the two versions of Lacan's anti-Dostoyevski motto "If God doesn't exist, everything is prohibited"? (1) God is dead, we live in a permissive universe, you should strive for pleasures and happiness — but, in order to have a life full of happiness and pleasures, you should avoid dangerous excesses, so everything is prohibited if it is not deprived of its substance; (2) If God is dead, superego enjoins you to enjoy, but every determinate enjoyment is already a betrayal of the unconditional one, so it should be prohibited. The nutritive version of this is to enjoy directly the Thing Itself: why bother with coffee? Inject caffeine directly into your blood! Why bother with sensual perceptions and excitations by external reality? Take drugs which directly affect your brain! - And if there is God, then everything is permitted — to those who claim to act directly on behalf of God, as the instruments of His will; clearly, a direct link to God justifies our violation of any "merely human" constraints and considerations (as in Stalinism, where the reference to the big Other of historical Necessity justifies absolute ruthlessness). <u><strong><mark>Today's hedonism combines pleasure with constraint</mark> — it is no longer the old notion of the "right measure" between pleasure and constraint, but a kind of pseudo-Hegelian immediate coincidence of the opposites: action and reaction should coincide, the very thing which causes damage should already be the medicine</u></strong>. The ultimate example of it is arguably a chocolate laxative, available in the US, with the paradoxical injunction "Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate!", i.e., of the very thing which causes constipation. Do we not find here a weird version of Wagner's famous "Only the spear which caused the wound can heal it" from Parsifal? And is not a negative proof of the <u><strong>hegemony of this stance the fact that true unconstrained consumption (in all its main forms: drugs, free sex, smoking…) is emerging as the main danger? <mark>The fight against these dangers is one of the main investments of today's "biopolitics."</mark> <mark>Solutions</mark> are here desperately sought which would <mark>reproduce the paradox of the chocolate laxative</mark>.</u></strong> The main contender is "safe sex" — a term which makes one appreciative of the truth of the old saying "Is having sex with a condom not like taking a shower with a raincoat on?". <u><strong>The ultimate goal would be here, along the lines of decaf coffee, to invent "opium without opium": <mark>no wonder marijuana is so popular among liberals who want to legalize it — it already IS a kind of "opium without opium."</mark> The structure</u></strong> of the "chocolate laxative," <u><strong>of <mark>a product containing the agent of its own containment</mark>, can be discerned throughout today's ideological landscape.</u></strong> There are two topics which determine today's liberal tolerant attitude towards Others: the respect of Otherness, openness towards it, AND the obsessive fear of harassment — in short, <u><strong>the <mark>Other is OK insofar as its presence is not intrusive</mark>, insofar as the Other is not really Other… A similar structure is clearly <mark>present in</mark> how we relate <mark>to capitalist profiteering: it is OK IF it is counteracted with charitable activities —</mark> first you amass billions, then you return (part of) them to the needy… And <mark>the same goes for war</mark>, for the emergent logic of humanitarian or pacifist militarism: <mark>war is OK insofar as it really serves to bring about peace, democracy</mark>, or to create conditions for distributing humanitarian help.</u></strong> And does the same not hold more and more even <u><strong>for democracy: it is OK if <mark>it is "rethought" to include </mark>torture and <mark>a permanent emergency state, if it is cleansed of</mark> its populist <mark>"excess</mark>es," and if the people are "mature" enough to live by it… However, what we were describing what cannot but appear as two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to bare life, to homo sacer as the dispensable object of the expert caretaking knowledge; and that of the respect for the vulnerable Other brought to extreme, of the attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences itself as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential "harassments." Is there a stronger contrast than the one between the respect for the Other's vulnerability and the reduction of the Other to "mere life" regulated by the administrative knowledge?</u></strong> But what if <u><strong><mark>these</mark> two</u></strong> stances nonetheless <u><strong><mark>rely on the same root,</u></strong></mark> what if they are the two aspects of one and the same underlying attitude, what if they coincide in what one is tempted <u><strong>to designate as the contemporary case of the Hegelian "infinite judgement" which asserts the identity of opposites</u></strong>? What the two poles share is precisely the underlying refusal of any higher Causes, the notion that the <u><strong><mark>ultimate goal of our lives is life itself</mark>.</u></strong> Nowhere is the complicity of these two levels clearer as in the case of the opposition to death penalty — no wonder, since (violently putting another human being to) <u><strong>death is, quite logically, the ultimate traumatic point of biopolitics, the politics of the administration of life.</u></strong> To put it in Foucauldian terms, is the abolition of death penalty not part of a certain "biopolitics" which considers crime as the result of social, psychological, ideological, etc., circumstances: <u><strong><mark>the notion of the</mark> morally/<mark>legally responsible subject is an ideological fiction whose function is to cover up the network of power relations, </mark>individuals are not responsible for the crimes they commit, so they should not be punished? Is, however, the obverse of this thesis not that those who control the circumstances control the people? <mark>No wonder the two strongest industrial complexes are today the military and the medical, that of destroying and that of prolonging life</mark>.</u></strong> Superego is thus not directly S2; it is rather the S1 of the S2 itself, <u><strong>the dimension of an unconditional injunction that is inherent to knowledge itself. Recall the informations about health we are bombarded with all the time: "Smoking is dangerous! To much fat may cause a heart attack! Regular exercise leads to a longer life!" etc.etc. — it is impossible not to hear beneath it the unconditional injunction "You should enjoy a long and healthy life!"… What this means is that <mark>the discourse of the University</mark> is thoroughly <mark>mystifying</mark>, concealing its <mark>true foundation, obfuscating the unfreedom on which it relies.</p></u></strong></mark>

Zizek ’03 (Slavoj, he has like a degree or something, “HOMO SACER AS THE OBJECT OF THE DISCOURSE OF THE UNIVERSITY”, [SG]) **Modified from previously assumed genders and abilities**

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Zizek ’03 (Slavoj, he has like a degree or something, “HOMO SACER AS THE OBJECT OF THE DISCOURSE OF THE UNIVERSITY”, [SG]) **Modified from previously assumed genders and abilities** fulltext: The university discourse is enunciated from the position of "neutral" Knowledge; it addresses the remainder of the real (say, in the case of pedagogical knowledge, the "raw, uncultivated child"), turning it into the subject ($). The "truth" of the university discourse, hidden beneath the bar, of course, is power, i.e. the Master-Signifier: the constitutive lie of the university discourse is that it disavows its performative dimension, presenting what effectively amounts to a political decision based on power as a simple insight into the factual state of things. What one should avoid here is the Foucauldian misreading: the produced subject is not simply the subjectivity which arises as the result of the disciplinary application of knowledge-power, but its remainder, that which eludes the grasp of knowledge-power. "Production" (the fourth term in the matrix of discourses) does not stand simply for the result of the discursive operation, but rather for its "indivisible remainder," for the excess which resists being included in the discursive network, i.e. for what the discourse itself produces as the foreign body in its very heart. Perhaps the exemplary case of the Master's position which underlies the university discourse is the way in which medical discourse functions in our everyday lives: at the surface level, we are dealing with pure objective knowledge which desubjectivizes the subject-patient, reducing [them] to an object of research, of diagnosis and treatment; however, beneath it, one can easily discern a worried hystericized subject, obsessed with anxiety, addressing the doctor as his [or her] Master and asking for reassurance from him [or her]. At a more common level, suffice it to recall the market expert who advocates strong budgetary measures (cutting welfare expenses, etc.) as a necessity imposed by his neutral expertise devoid of any ideological biases: what he conceals is the series of power-relations (from the active role of state apparatuses to ideological beliefs) which sustain the "neutral" functioning of the market mechanism. In the University discourse, is not the upper level ($ — a) that of biopolitics (in the sense deployed from Foucault to Agamben)? Of the expert knowledge dealing with its object which is a - not subjects, but individuals reduced to bare life? And does the lower not designate what Eric Santner called the "crisis of investiture," i.e., the impossibility of the subject to relate to S1, to identify with a Master-Signifier, to assume the imposed symbolic mandate?[1] The key point is here that the expert rule of "biopolitics" is grounded in and conditioned by the crisis of investiture; this crisis generated the "post-metaphysical" survivalist [position] of the Last Men, which ends up in an anemic spectacle of life dragging on as its own shadow. It is within this horizon that one should appreciate today's growing rejection of death penalty: what one should be able to discern is the hidden "biopolitics" which sustains this rejection. Those who assert the "sacredness of life," defending it against the threat of transcendent powers which parasitize on it, end up in a world in which, on behalf of its very official goal — long pleasurable life — all effective pleasures are prohibited or strictly controlled (smoking, drugs, food…). Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan is the latest example of this survivalist attitude towards dying, with its "demystifying" presentation of war as a meaningless slaughter which nothing can really justify - as such, it provides the best possible justification for the Colin Powell's "no-casualties-on-our-side" military doctrine. On today's market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol... And the list goes on: what about virtual sex as sex without sex, the Colin Powell doctrine of warfare with no casualties (on our side, of course) as warfare without warfare, the contemporary redefinition of politics as the art of expert administration as politics without politics, up to today's tolerant liberal multiculturalism as an experience of Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized Other who dances fascinating dances and has an ecologically sound holistic approach to reality, while features like wife beating remain out of sight…)? Virtual Reality simply generalizes this procedure of offering a product deprived of its substance: it provides reality itself deprived of its substance, of the resisting hard kernel of the Real - in the same way decaffeinated coffee smells and tastes like the real coffee without being the real one, Virtual Reality is experienced as reality without being one. Is this not the attitude of the hedonistic Last Man? Everything is permitted, you can enjoy everything, BUT deprived of its substance which makes it dangerous. (This is also Last Man's revolution — "revolution without revolution.") Is this not one of the two versions of Lacan's anti-Dostoyevski motto "If God doesn't exist, everything is prohibited"? (1) God is dead, we live in a permissive universe, you should strive for pleasures and happiness — but, in order to have a life full of happiness and pleasures, you should avoid dangerous excesses, so everything is prohibited if it is not deprived of its substance; (2) If God is dead, superego enjoins you to enjoy, but every determinate enjoyment is already a betrayal of the unconditional one, so it should be prohibited. The nutritive version of this is to enjoy directly the Thing Itself: why bother with coffee? Inject caffeine directly into your blood! Why bother with sensual perceptions and excitations by external reality? Take drugs which directly affect your brain! - And if there is God, then everything is permitted — to those who claim to act directly on behalf of God, as the instruments of His will; clearly, a direct link to God justifies our violation of any "merely human" constraints and considerations (as in Stalinism, where the reference to the big Other of historical Necessity justifies absolute ruthlessness). Today's hedonism combines pleasure with constraint — it is no longer the old notion of the "right measure" between pleasure and constraint, but a kind of pseudo-Hegelian immediate coincidence of the opposites: action and reaction should coincide, the very thing which causes damage should already be the medicine. The ultimate example of it is arguably a chocolate laxative, available in the US, with the paradoxical injunction "Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate!", i.e., of the very thing which causes constipation. Do we not find here a weird version of Wagner's famous "Only the spear which caused the wound can heal it" from Parsifal? And is not a negative proof of the hegemony of this stance the fact that true unconstrained consumption (in all its main forms: drugs, free sex, smoking…) is emerging as the main danger? The fight against these dangers is one of the main investments of today's "biopolitics." Solutions are here desperately sought which would reproduce the paradox of the chocolate laxative. The main contender is "safe sex" — a term which makes one appreciative of the truth of the old saying "Is having sex with a condom not like taking a shower with a raincoat on?". The ultimate goal would be here, along the lines of decaf coffee, to invent "opium without opium": no wonder marijuana is so popular among liberals who want to legalize it — it already IS a kind of "opium without opium." The structure of the "chocolate laxative," of a product containing the agent of its own containment, can be discerned throughout today's ideological landscape. There are two topics which determine today's liberal tolerant attitude towards Others: the respect of Otherness, openness towards it, AND the obsessive fear of harassment — in short, the Other is OK insofar as its presence is not intrusive, insofar as the Other is not really Other… A similar structure is clearly present in how we relate to capitalist profiteering: it is OK IF it is counteracted with charitable activities — first you amass billions, then you return (part of) them to the needy… And the same goes for war, for the emergent logic of humanitarian or pacifist militarism: war is OK insofar as it really serves to bring about peace, democracy, or to create conditions for distributing humanitarian help. And does the same not hold more and more even for democracy: it is OK if it is "rethought" to include torture and a permanent emergency state, if it is cleansed of its populist "excesses," and if the people are "mature" enough to live by it… However, what we were describing what cannot but appear as two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to bare life, to homo sacer as the dispensable object of the expert caretaking knowledge; and that of the respect for the vulnerable Other brought to extreme, of the attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences itself as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential "harassments." Is there a stronger contrast than the one between the respect for the Other's vulnerability and the reduction of the Other to "mere life" regulated by the administrative knowledge? But what if these two stances nonetheless rely on the same root, what if they are the two aspects of one and the same underlying attitude, what if they coincide in what one is tempted to designate as the contemporary case of the Hegelian "infinite judgement" which asserts the identity of opposites? What the two poles share is precisely the underlying refusal of any higher Causes, the notion that the ultimate goal of our lives is life itself. Nowhere is the complicity of these two levels clearer as in the case of the opposition to death penalty — no wonder, since (violently putting another human being to) death is, quite logically, the ultimate traumatic point of biopolitics, the politics of the administration of life. To put it in Foucauldian terms, is the abolition of death penalty not part of a certain "biopolitics" which considers crime as the result of social, psychological, ideological, etc., circumstances: the notion of the morally/legally responsible subject is an ideological fiction whose function is to cover up the network of power relations, individuals are not responsible for the crimes they commit, so they should not be punished? Is, however, the obverse of this thesis not that those who control the circumstances control the people? No wonder the two strongest industrial complexes are today the military and the medical, that of destroying and that of prolonging life. Superego is thus not directly S2; it is rather the S1 of the S2 itself, the dimension of an unconditional injunction that is inherent to knowledge itself. Recall the informations about health we are bombarded with all the time: "Smoking is dangerous! To much fat may cause a heart attack! Regular exercise leads to a longer life!" etc.etc. — it is impossible not to hear beneath it the unconditional injunction "You should enjoy a long and healthy life!"… What this means is that the discourse of the University is thoroughly mystifying, concealing its true foundation, obfuscating the unfreedom on which it relies. [/INST] <h4>The aff’s approach to marijuana legalization is a redefinition of the law from the administrative regime of criminalization to a tolerant liberal market of justice which can only mystify the inner workings of disciplinary power. This is a hedonistic approach to politcs that attempts to combine the freedom of drug use with the restraint of the market that upholds narratives of neutrality sorrounding the law and university. This is the foundation for violence, otherness becomes tolerated insofar as it takes on the form of a proper subject which creates the conditions for extermination based on notions of bare life. </h4><p><strong>Zizek ’03 </strong>(Slavoj, he has like a degree or something, “HOMO SACER AS THE OBJECT OF THE DISCOURSE OF THE UNIVERSITY<u><strong><mark>”, [SG]) **Modified from previously assumed genders and abilities** </p><p></mark>The <mark>university discourse is </mark>enunciated from the position of "<mark>neutral" Knowledge</u></strong></mark>; it addresses the remainder of the real (say, <u><strong>in the case of pedagogical knowledge, the "raw, uncultivated child"), <mark>turning it into the subject</u></strong></mark> ($). <u><strong>The "truth" of the university discourse, hidden beneath the bar, of course, is power</u></strong>, i.e. the Master-Signifier: the constitutive lie of the university discourse is that <u><strong>it disavows its performative dimension, presenting what effectively amounts to a political decision based on power as a simple insight into the factual state of things.</u></strong> What one should avoid here is the Foucauldian misreading: <u><strong>the produced subject is not simply the subjectivity which arises as the result of the disciplinary application of knowledge-power, but its remainder, that which eludes the grasp of knowledge-power. <mark>"Production"</u></strong></mark> (the fourth term in the matrix of discourses) <u><strong>does not stand simply for the result of the discursive operation, but rather for its "indivisible remainder," for the excess which resists being <mark>included in the discursive network</mark>, i.e. for what the discourse itself produces as the foreign body in its very heart.</u></strong> Perhaps the exemplary case of the Master's position which underlies the university discourse is the way in which <u><strong>medical discourse functions in our everyday lives: at the surface level, we are dealing with pure objective knowledge which desubjectivizes the subject-patient, <mark>reducing [them] to an object of research, </mark>of diagnosis <mark>and treatment</mark>; however, beneath it, one can easily discern a worried hystericized subject, obsessed with anxiety, addressing the doctor as his [or her] Master and asking for reassurance from him [or her]. At a more common level, suffice it to recall the market expert who advocates strong budgetary measures</u></strong> (cutting welfare expenses, etc.) <u><strong>as a necessity imposed by his <mark>neutral expertise devoid of any ideological biases</mark>: what he <mark>conceals</mark> is <mark>the series of power-relations</u></strong></mark> (from the active role of state apparatuses to ideological beliefs) which sustain <u><strong>the "neutral" functioning of the market mechanism. In the <mark>University discourse,</mark> <mark>is</mark> not the upper level </u></strong>($ — a) <u><strong><mark>that of biopolitics</u></strong></mark> (in the sense deployed from Foucault to Agamben)? <u><strong>Of the expert knowledge dealing with its object which is a - not subjects, but individuals reduced to bare life</u></strong>? And does the lower not designate what Eric Santner called the "crisis of investiture," i.e., the impossibility of the subject to relate to S1, to identify with a Master-Signifier, to assume the imposed symbolic mandate?[1] The key point is here that <u><strong>the expert rule of "biopolitics" is grounded in and conditioned by the crisis of investiture; <mark>this crisis generated the "post-metaphysical" survivalist [position]</mark> of the Last Men, which <mark>ends up</mark> in an anemic <mark>spectacle of</mark> <mark>life dragging on as its own shadow.</mark> It is within this horizon that one should appreciate today's growing rejection of death penalty: what one should be able to discern is the hidden "<mark>biopolitics"</mark> which <mark>sustains this rejection.</mark> <mark>Those who assert the "sacredness of life," defending it against the threat of transcendent powers</mark> which parasitize on it, <mark>end up in a world in which</mark>, on behalf of its very official goal — long pleasurable life — all effective <mark>pleasures are prohibited</mark> or strictly controlled (<mark>smoking, drugs</mark>, food…)</u></strong>. Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan is the latest example of this survivalist attitude towards dying, with its <u><strong>"<mark>demystifying" presentation of war as a meaningless slaughter</mark> which nothing can really justify - as such, it <mark>provides the best possible justification for</u></strong></mark> the Colin Powell's <u><strong>"no-casualties-on-our-side" <mark>military doctrine. </mark>On today's market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol</u></strong>... And the list goes on: what about virtual sex as sex without sex, the Colin Powell doctrine of warfare with no casualties (on our side, of course) as warfare without warfare, <u><strong>the contemporary redefinition of politics as the art of expert administration as politics without politics, up to today's tolerant liberal multiculturalism as an experience of Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized Other who dances fascinating dances and has an ecologically sound holistic approach to reality, while features like wife beating remain out of sight…)? Virtual Reality simply generalizes this procedure of offering a product deprived of its substance: it provides reality itself deprived of its substance</u></strong>, of the resisting hard kernel of the Real - in the same way decaffeinated coffee smells and tastes like the real coffee without being the real one, Virtual Reality is experienced as reality without being one. Is this not the attitude of the hedonistic Last Man? Everything is permitted, you can enjoy everything, BUT deprived of its substance which makes it dangerous. (This is also Last Man's revolution — "revolution without revolution.") Is this not one of the two versions of Lacan's anti-Dostoyevski motto "If God doesn't exist, everything is prohibited"? (1) God is dead, we live in a permissive universe, you should strive for pleasures and happiness — but, in order to have a life full of happiness and pleasures, you should avoid dangerous excesses, so everything is prohibited if it is not deprived of its substance; (2) If God is dead, superego enjoins you to enjoy, but every determinate enjoyment is already a betrayal of the unconditional one, so it should be prohibited. The nutritive version of this is to enjoy directly the Thing Itself: why bother with coffee? Inject caffeine directly into your blood! Why bother with sensual perceptions and excitations by external reality? Take drugs which directly affect your brain! - And if there is God, then everything is permitted — to those who claim to act directly on behalf of God, as the instruments of His will; clearly, a direct link to God justifies our violation of any "merely human" constraints and considerations (as in Stalinism, where the reference to the big Other of historical Necessity justifies absolute ruthlessness). <u><strong><mark>Today's hedonism combines pleasure with constraint</mark> — it is no longer the old notion of the "right measure" between pleasure and constraint, but a kind of pseudo-Hegelian immediate coincidence of the opposites: action and reaction should coincide, the very thing which causes damage should already be the medicine</u></strong>. The ultimate example of it is arguably a chocolate laxative, available in the US, with the paradoxical injunction "Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate!", i.e., of the very thing which causes constipation. Do we not find here a weird version of Wagner's famous "Only the spear which caused the wound can heal it" from Parsifal? And is not a negative proof of the <u><strong>hegemony of this stance the fact that true unconstrained consumption (in all its main forms: drugs, free sex, smoking…) is emerging as the main danger? <mark>The fight against these dangers is one of the main investments of today's "biopolitics."</mark> <mark>Solutions</mark> are here desperately sought which would <mark>reproduce the paradox of the chocolate laxative</mark>.</u></strong> The main contender is "safe sex" — a term which makes one appreciative of the truth of the old saying "Is having sex with a condom not like taking a shower with a raincoat on?". <u><strong>The ultimate goal would be here, along the lines of decaf coffee, to invent "opium without opium": <mark>no wonder marijuana is so popular among liberals who want to legalize it — it already IS a kind of "opium without opium."</mark> The structure</u></strong> of the "chocolate laxative," <u><strong>of <mark>a product containing the agent of its own containment</mark>, can be discerned throughout today's ideological landscape.</u></strong> There are two topics which determine today's liberal tolerant attitude towards Others: the respect of Otherness, openness towards it, AND the obsessive fear of harassment — in short, <u><strong>the <mark>Other is OK insofar as its presence is not intrusive</mark>, insofar as the Other is not really Other… A similar structure is clearly <mark>present in</mark> how we relate <mark>to capitalist profiteering: it is OK IF it is counteracted with charitable activities —</mark> first you amass billions, then you return (part of) them to the needy… And <mark>the same goes for war</mark>, for the emergent logic of humanitarian or pacifist militarism: <mark>war is OK insofar as it really serves to bring about peace, democracy</mark>, or to create conditions for distributing humanitarian help.</u></strong> And does the same not hold more and more even <u><strong>for democracy: it is OK if <mark>it is "rethought" to include </mark>torture and <mark>a permanent emergency state, if it is cleansed of</mark> its populist <mark>"excess</mark>es," and if the people are "mature" enough to live by it… However, what we were describing what cannot but appear as two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to bare life, to homo sacer as the dispensable object of the expert caretaking knowledge; and that of the respect for the vulnerable Other brought to extreme, of the attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences itself as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential "harassments." Is there a stronger contrast than the one between the respect for the Other's vulnerability and the reduction of the Other to "mere life" regulated by the administrative knowledge?</u></strong> But what if <u><strong><mark>these</mark> two</u></strong> stances nonetheless <u><strong><mark>rely on the same root,</u></strong></mark> what if they are the two aspects of one and the same underlying attitude, what if they coincide in what one is tempted <u><strong>to designate as the contemporary case of the Hegelian "infinite judgement" which asserts the identity of opposites</u></strong>? What the two poles share is precisely the underlying refusal of any higher Causes, the notion that the <u><strong><mark>ultimate goal of our lives is life itself</mark>.</u></strong> Nowhere is the complicity of these two levels clearer as in the case of the opposition to death penalty — no wonder, since (violently putting another human being to) <u><strong>death is, quite logically, the ultimate traumatic point of biopolitics, the politics of the administration of life.</u></strong> To put it in Foucauldian terms, is the abolition of death penalty not part of a certain "biopolitics" which considers crime as the result of social, psychological, ideological, etc., circumstances: <u><strong><mark>the notion of the</mark> morally/<mark>legally responsible subject is an ideological fiction whose function is to cover up the network of power relations, </mark>individuals are not responsible for the crimes they commit, so they should not be punished? Is, however, the obverse of this thesis not that those who control the circumstances control the people? <mark>No wonder the two strongest industrial complexes are today the military and the medical, that of destroying and that of prolonging life</mark>.</u></strong> Superego is thus not directly S2; it is rather the S1 of the S2 itself, <u><strong>the dimension of an unconditional injunction that is inherent to knowledge itself. Recall the informations about health we are bombarded with all the time: "Smoking is dangerous! To much fat may cause a heart attack! Regular exercise leads to a longer life!" etc.etc. — it is impossible not to hear beneath it the unconditional injunction "You should enjoy a long and healthy life!"… What this means is that <mark>the discourse of the University</mark> is thoroughly <mark>mystifying</mark>, concealing its <mark>true foundation, obfuscating the unfreedom on which it relies.</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

US marijuana prohibition is the key issue---reversing US policy is critical to reform success in 2016

Will 2016 be the year when reality finally sinks in within the international community that drug prohibition has failed and that it is time to look for more sustainable alternatives? There are good reasons to believe so.¶ In the US, the number of medical marijuana states is likely to reach 20 in 2013 The battle has even been brought to the US Congress, Ultimately, the fate of the 2016 special session lies most likely in Washington DC. The US has been the initiator, main architect and chief sponsor of the prohibitionist approach for over a century and has imposed prohibitionist policies to the rest of the world with Colorado and Washington now squarely confronting them, the “tough on drugs” stance is increasingly untenable Unless it reverses its attitude and draws the lessons from a century of failed prohibitionist rule, the US will be increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place and prohibition will become more and more indefensible. drug policy reform will be achieved by cracking the US prohibitionist backbone the pieces of the global drug policy reform puzzle appeared to be falling into place one by one and the US resolve seems to be faltering. Obama appears hesitant after the decisive victories for marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington While the 2016 special session could easily be derailed, if drug policy reformists within the US, use the next three years to keep resolutely pushing for reform, we may see the emergence of a global coalition and a new global consensus on drug policy.

Will 2016 be the year when reality finally sinks in that drug prohibition has failed There are good reasons to believe so the fate of the 2016 session lies in Washington The US has been the chief sponsor of the prohibitionist approach with Colorado and Washington now confronting them, the “tough on drugs” stance is increasingly untenable. Unless it reverses its attitude the US will be increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place reform will be achieved by cracking the US prohibitionist backbone While the 2016 special session could easily be derailed, if drug reformists within the US keep resolutely pushing for reform, we may see the emergence of a global coalition and new consensus on drug policy

So, what does the prospect of a UN summit on drug policy means for the drug policy reform movement, and what can be expected from it? There have been after all quite a few similar events since the Adoption of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Will 2016 be the year when reality finally sinks in within the international community that drug prohibition has failed and that it is time to look for more sustainable alternatives? There are good reasons to believe so.¶ The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances set lofty goals of complete eradication of drug use, toned down to a 50% reduction within 10 years in 1988, a goal reiterated in 1998, but abandoned altogether in 2008 amidst growing restlessness within the UN community. Furthermore, the “soft on drugs” label is rapidly losing its stickiness as the political risk of drug reformist positions is plummeting rapidly. Drug policy reform may even start turning into political asset in some circumscriptions, as was the case in Washington this November, when most of the Democrat political establishment lined up behind the legalization initiative.¶ As the consensus behind the War on Drugs starts crumbling, and as countries start breaking ranks and reject the dominant approach to drug policy altogether, the international community will see reduced opportunities for reprisals and sanctions. Uruguay’s intention to legalize marijuana under state control has been met with rather muted UN opposition so far. Sanctions against Uruguay will be hard to justify if similar sanctions are not imposed on Washington and Colorado, a prospect not even remotely likely, and may just galvanize regional rancor. Other Latin American countries might emulate the Uruguayan model, with neighboring Argentina a real potential candidate.¶ In the US, the number of medical marijuana states is likely to reach 20 in 2013 as proposals are set to be presented to several state legislatures, including New Hampshire, Illinois and New York. Rhode Island, Maine, Vermont, and Massachusetts, as well as Oregon and Montana may also try to adopt full marijuana legalization through their legislatures, while a legalization initiative is already on the drawing board in California. The battle has even been brought to the US Congress, with a bipartisan bill that would enable the states to make their own marijuana laws. The bill is probably still symbolic at this stage, and stands very little chances, but it may be a harbinger of things to come.¶ Embroiled in a deep economic and financial crisis, Europe is staying relatively on the sidelines on drug policy issues, even though (or maybe because), European drug policies are generally leaning on the liberal side and drug abuse is substantially lower there than in the US.¶ Ultimately, the fate of the 2016 special session lies most likely in Washington DC. The US has been the initiator, main architect and chief sponsor of the prohibitionist approach for over a century, and has over the years imposed her prohibitionist policies to the rest of the world. All current international treaties on illicit drugs having been produced and backed by successive US administrations over the past 50 years, a complete U-turn seems unlikely. But with 18 states and the district of Colombia in oblique violation of the international treaties and Colorado and Washington now squarely confronting them, the “tough on drugs” stance is increasingly untenable. Unless it reverses its attitude and draws the lessons from a century of failed prohibitionist rule, the US will be increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place and her prohibitionist-in-chief posture will become more and more indefensible.¶ I have argued for quite some time that drug policy reform will be achieved by cracking the US prohibitionist backbone through the combined internal pressure from the states and external pressure from the US allies, principally, in Latin America. In a truly historic year for drug policy reform, the pieces of the global drug policy reform puzzle appeared to be falling into place one by one in 2012, and the US resolve seems to be faltering. The Obama administration appears hesitant after the decisive victories for marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington. By intensifying the crackdown on medical marijuana over the past few years, Obama brought the War on Drugs to the Caucasian community, which may have further galvanized support for legalization. Whether hidden agenda or law of unintended consequences, it clearly narrowed the administration’s margins of maneuver and crackdowns on the newly legalized marijuana states may backfire even more, further stiffening support for legalization. ¶ While the 2016 special session could easily be derailed, if drug policy reformists, especially in Latin American and within the US, use the next three years to keep resolutely pushing for reform, we may see the emergence of a global coalition and a new global consensus on drug policy. This is an opportunity that reform activists cannot afford to waste.

<h4>US marijuana prohibition is the key issue---reversing US policy is critical to reform success in 2016</h4><p>Jeffrey <strong>Dhywood 12,</strong> author of World War D. The Case against prohibitionism, roadmap to controlled re-legalization, also a European-born investigative writer, lecturer and public speaker, “What to expect from the 2016 special UN session on global drug policy?,” December 2, : http://www.world-war-d.com/2012/12/02/un-special-session-on-global-drug-policy-2016/#sthash.6pIQKa8F.dpuf</p><p>So, what does the prospect of a UN summit on drug policy means for the drug policy reform movement, and what can be expected from it? There have been after all quite a few similar events since the Adoption of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. <u><mark>Will 2016 be the year when reality finally sinks in</mark> within the international community <mark>that drug prohibition has failed</mark> and that it is time to look for more sustainable alternatives? <mark>There are good reasons to believe so</mark>.¶</u> The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances set lofty goals of complete eradication of drug use, toned down to a 50% reduction within 10 years in 1988, a goal reiterated in 1998, but abandoned altogether in 2008 amidst growing restlessness within the UN community. Furthermore, the “soft on drugs” label is rapidly losing its stickiness as the political risk of drug reformist positions is plummeting rapidly. Drug policy reform may even start turning into political asset in some circumscriptions, as was the case in Washington this November, when most of the Democrat political establishment lined up behind the legalization initiative.¶ As the consensus behind the War on Drugs starts crumbling, and as countries start breaking ranks and reject the dominant approach to drug policy altogether, the international community will see reduced opportunities for reprisals and sanctions. Uruguay’s intention to legalize marijuana under state control has been met with rather muted UN opposition so far. Sanctions against Uruguay will be hard to justify if similar sanctions are not imposed on Washington and Colorado, a prospect not even remotely likely, and may just galvanize regional rancor. Other Latin American countries might emulate the Uruguayan model, with neighboring Argentina a real potential candidate.¶ <u>In the US, the number of medical marijuana states is likely to reach 20 in 2013</u> as proposals are set to be presented to several state legislatures, including New Hampshire, Illinois and New York. Rhode Island, Maine, Vermont, and Massachusetts, as well as Oregon and Montana may also try to adopt full marijuana legalization through their legislatures, while a legalization initiative is already on the drawing board in California. <u>The battle has even been brought to the US Congress,</u> with a bipartisan bill that would enable the states to make their own marijuana laws. The bill is probably still symbolic at this stage, and stands very little chances, but it may be a harbinger of things to come.¶ Embroiled in a deep economic and financial crisis, Europe is staying relatively on the sidelines on drug policy issues, even though (or maybe because), European drug policies are generally leaning on the liberal side and drug abuse is substantially lower there than in the US.¶ <u>Ultimately, <mark>the <strong>fate of the 2016</mark> special <mark>session lies</mark> most likely <mark>in Washington</mark> DC</strong>. <mark>The US has been the</mark> initiator, main architect and <mark>chief sponsor of the prohibitionist approach</mark> for over a century</u>, <u>and has</u> over the years <u>imposed</u> her <u>prohibitionist policies to the rest of the world</u>. All current international treaties on illicit drugs having been produced and backed by successive US administrations over the past 50 years, a complete U-turn seems unlikely. But <u><mark>with</u></mark> 18 states and the district of Colombia in oblique violation of the international treaties and <u><mark>Colorado and Washington now</mark> squarely <mark>confronting them, the “tough on drugs” stance is increasingly untenable</u>. <u><strong>Unless it reverses its attitude</strong></mark> and draws the lessons from a century of failed prohibitionist rule, <mark>the US will be increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place</mark> and</u> her <u>prohibition</u>ist-in-chief posture <u>will become more and more indefensible.</u>¶ I have argued for quite some time that <u>drug policy <mark>reform will be achieved <strong>by cracking the US prohibitionist backbone</mark> </u></strong>through the combined internal pressure from the states and external pressure from the US allies, principally, in Latin America. In a truly historic year for drug policy reform, <u>the pieces of the global drug policy reform puzzle appeared to be falling into place one by one</u> in 2012, <u>and the US resolve seems to be faltering.</u> The <u>Obama</u> administration <u>appears hesitant after the decisive victories for marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington</u>. By intensifying the crackdown on medical marijuana over the past few years, Obama brought the War on Drugs to the Caucasian community, which may have further galvanized support for legalization. Whether hidden agenda or law of unintended consequences, it clearly narrowed the administration’s margins of maneuver and crackdowns on the newly legalized marijuana states may backfire even more, further stiffening support for legalization. ¶ <u><mark>While the 2016 special session <strong>could easily be derailed</strong>, if drug</mark> policy <mark>reformists</u></mark>, especially in Latin American and <u><mark>within the US</mark>, use the next three years to <mark>keep resolutely pushing for reform, <strong>we may see the emergence of a global coalition and</mark> a <mark>new</mark> global <mark>consensus on drug policy</strong></mark>.</u> This is an opportunity that reform activists cannot afford to waste.</p>

Jeffrey Dhywood 12, author of World War D. The Case against prohibitionism, roadmap to controlled re-legalization, also a European-born investigative writer, lecturer and public speaker, “What to expect from the 2016 special UN session on global drug policy?,” December 2, : http://www.world-war-d.com/2012/12/02/un-special-session-on-global-drug-policy-2016/#sthash.6pIQKa8F.dpuf

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Jeffrey Dhywood 12, author of World War D. The Case against prohibitionism, roadmap to controlled re-legalization, also a European-born investigative writer, lecturer and public speaker, “What to expect from the 2016 special UN session on global drug policy?,” December 2, : http://www.world-war-d.com/2012/12/02/un-special-session-on-global-drug-policy-2016/#sthash.6pIQKa8F.dpuf fulltext: So, what does the prospect of a UN summit on drug policy means for the drug policy reform movement, and what can be expected from it? There have been after all quite a few similar events since the Adoption of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Will 2016 be the year when reality finally sinks in within the international community that drug prohibition has failed and that it is time to look for more sustainable alternatives? There are good reasons to believe so.¶ The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances set lofty goals of complete eradication of drug use, toned down to a 50% reduction within 10 years in 1988, a goal reiterated in 1998, but abandoned altogether in 2008 amidst growing restlessness within the UN community. Furthermore, the “soft on drugs” label is rapidly losing its stickiness as the political risk of drug reformist positions is plummeting rapidly. Drug policy reform may even start turning into political asset in some circumscriptions, as was the case in Washington this November, when most of the Democrat political establishment lined up behind the legalization initiative.¶ As the consensus behind the War on Drugs starts crumbling, and as countries start breaking ranks and reject the dominant approach to drug policy altogether, the international community will see reduced opportunities for reprisals and sanctions. Uruguay’s intention to legalize marijuana under state control has been met with rather muted UN opposition so far. Sanctions against Uruguay will be hard to justify if similar sanctions are not imposed on Washington and Colorado, a prospect not even remotely likely, and may just galvanize regional rancor. Other Latin American countries might emulate the Uruguayan model, with neighboring Argentina a real potential candidate.¶ In the US, the number of medical marijuana states is likely to reach 20 in 2013 as proposals are set to be presented to several state legislatures, including New Hampshire, Illinois and New York. Rhode Island, Maine, Vermont, and Massachusetts, as well as Oregon and Montana may also try to adopt full marijuana legalization through their legislatures, while a legalization initiative is already on the drawing board in California. The battle has even been brought to the US Congress, with a bipartisan bill that would enable the states to make their own marijuana laws. The bill is probably still symbolic at this stage, and stands very little chances, but it may be a harbinger of things to come.¶ Embroiled in a deep economic and financial crisis, Europe is staying relatively on the sidelines on drug policy issues, even though (or maybe because), European drug policies are generally leaning on the liberal side and drug abuse is substantially lower there than in the US.¶ Ultimately, the fate of the 2016 special session lies most likely in Washington DC. The US has been the initiator, main architect and chief sponsor of the prohibitionist approach for over a century, and has over the years imposed her prohibitionist policies to the rest of the world. All current international treaties on illicit drugs having been produced and backed by successive US administrations over the past 50 years, a complete U-turn seems unlikely. But with 18 states and the district of Colombia in oblique violation of the international treaties and Colorado and Washington now squarely confronting them, the “tough on drugs” stance is increasingly untenable. Unless it reverses its attitude and draws the lessons from a century of failed prohibitionist rule, the US will be increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place and her prohibitionist-in-chief posture will become more and more indefensible.¶ I have argued for quite some time that drug policy reform will be achieved by cracking the US prohibitionist backbone through the combined internal pressure from the states and external pressure from the US allies, principally, in Latin America. In a truly historic year for drug policy reform, the pieces of the global drug policy reform puzzle appeared to be falling into place one by one in 2012, and the US resolve seems to be faltering. The Obama administration appears hesitant after the decisive victories for marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington. By intensifying the crackdown on medical marijuana over the past few years, Obama brought the War on Drugs to the Caucasian community, which may have further galvanized support for legalization. Whether hidden agenda or law of unintended consequences, it clearly narrowed the administration’s margins of maneuver and crackdowns on the newly legalized marijuana states may backfire even more, further stiffening support for legalization. ¶ While the 2016 special session could easily be derailed, if drug policy reformists, especially in Latin American and within the US, use the next three years to keep resolutely pushing for reform, we may see the emergence of a global coalition and a new global consensus on drug policy. This is an opportunity that reform activists cannot afford to waste. [/INST] <h4>US marijuana prohibition is the key issue---reversing US policy is critical to reform success in 2016</h4><p>Jeffrey <strong>Dhywood 12,</strong> author of World War D. The Case against prohibitionism, roadmap to controlled re-legalization, also a European-born investigative writer, lecturer and public speaker, “What to expect from the 2016 special UN session on global drug policy?,” December 2, : http://www.world-war-d.com/2012/12/02/un-special-session-on-global-drug-policy-2016/#sthash.6pIQKa8F.dpuf</p><p>So, what does the prospect of a UN summit on drug policy means for the drug policy reform movement, and what can be expected from it? There have been after all quite a few similar events since the Adoption of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. <u><mark>Will 2016 be the year when reality finally sinks in</mark> within the international community <mark>that drug prohibition has failed</mark> and that it is time to look for more sustainable alternatives? <mark>There are good reasons to believe so</mark>.¶</u> The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances set lofty goals of complete eradication of drug use, toned down to a 50% reduction within 10 years in 1988, a goal reiterated in 1998, but abandoned altogether in 2008 amidst growing restlessness within the UN community. Furthermore, the “soft on drugs” label is rapidly losing its stickiness as the political risk of drug reformist positions is plummeting rapidly. Drug policy reform may even start turning into political asset in some circumscriptions, as was the case in Washington this November, when most of the Democrat political establishment lined up behind the legalization initiative.¶ As the consensus behind the War on Drugs starts crumbling, and as countries start breaking ranks and reject the dominant approach to drug policy altogether, the international community will see reduced opportunities for reprisals and sanctions. Uruguay’s intention to legalize marijuana under state control has been met with rather muted UN opposition so far. Sanctions against Uruguay will be hard to justify if similar sanctions are not imposed on Washington and Colorado, a prospect not even remotely likely, and may just galvanize regional rancor. Other Latin American countries might emulate the Uruguayan model, with neighboring Argentina a real potential candidate.¶ <u>In the US, the number of medical marijuana states is likely to reach 20 in 2013</u> as proposals are set to be presented to several state legislatures, including New Hampshire, Illinois and New York. Rhode Island, Maine, Vermont, and Massachusetts, as well as Oregon and Montana may also try to adopt full marijuana legalization through their legislatures, while a legalization initiative is already on the drawing board in California. <u>The battle has even been brought to the US Congress,</u> with a bipartisan bill that would enable the states to make their own marijuana laws. The bill is probably still symbolic at this stage, and stands very little chances, but it may be a harbinger of things to come.¶ Embroiled in a deep economic and financial crisis, Europe is staying relatively on the sidelines on drug policy issues, even though (or maybe because), European drug policies are generally leaning on the liberal side and drug abuse is substantially lower there than in the US.¶ <u>Ultimately, <mark>the <strong>fate of the 2016</mark> special <mark>session lies</mark> most likely <mark>in Washington</mark> DC</strong>. <mark>The US has been the</mark> initiator, main architect and <mark>chief sponsor of the prohibitionist approach</mark> for over a century</u>, <u>and has</u> over the years <u>imposed</u> her <u>prohibitionist policies to the rest of the world</u>. All current international treaties on illicit drugs having been produced and backed by successive US administrations over the past 50 years, a complete U-turn seems unlikely. But <u><mark>with</u></mark> 18 states and the district of Colombia in oblique violation of the international treaties and <u><mark>Colorado and Washington now</mark> squarely <mark>confronting them, the “tough on drugs” stance is increasingly untenable</u>. <u><strong>Unless it reverses its attitude</strong></mark> and draws the lessons from a century of failed prohibitionist rule, <mark>the US will be increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place</mark> and</u> her <u>prohibition</u>ist-in-chief posture <u>will become more and more indefensible.</u>¶ I have argued for quite some time that <u>drug policy <mark>reform will be achieved <strong>by cracking the US prohibitionist backbone</mark> </u></strong>through the combined internal pressure from the states and external pressure from the US allies, principally, in Latin America. In a truly historic year for drug policy reform, <u>the pieces of the global drug policy reform puzzle appeared to be falling into place one by one</u> in 2012, <u>and the US resolve seems to be faltering.</u> The <u>Obama</u> administration <u>appears hesitant after the decisive victories for marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington</u>. By intensifying the crackdown on medical marijuana over the past few years, Obama brought the War on Drugs to the Caucasian community, which may have further galvanized support for legalization. Whether hidden agenda or law of unintended consequences, it clearly narrowed the administration’s margins of maneuver and crackdowns on the newly legalized marijuana states may backfire even more, further stiffening support for legalization. ¶ <u><mark>While the 2016 special session <strong>could easily be derailed</strong>, if drug</mark> policy <mark>reformists</u></mark>, especially in Latin American and <u><mark>within the US</mark>, use the next three years to <mark>keep resolutely pushing for reform, <strong>we may see the emergence of a global coalition and</mark> a <mark>new</mark> global <mark>consensus on drug policy</strong></mark>.</u> This is an opportunity that reform activists cannot afford to waste.</p> </s>

US drug reform is key -- the plan is a signal toward a health based approach to drugs

the Global Commission on Drug Policy urged the world to recognize that the war on drugs has failed and to consider policies that would reduce violence sitting presidents and premiers, mainly from Latin America, have called for a review of the entire drug control system and for drug-control reform to figure prominently in the international agenda. the UN will debate the drug control regime in 2016 Botticelli needs to speak louder, engaging the American apparatus in big debates. On many fronts, those debates are proceeding without U.S. leadership. Without engagement from Washington, the debate risks lurching and stalling. This is where Botticelli’s agency has so far fallen short. Momentum for these changes will continue and the U.S. government could be a critical force in making them take hold. If action follows the new vernacular, then it represents the beginning of something very important. We just need the government to take major steps toward realizing health-based approaches to drugs, and to assert its support for humane policies on the international stage.

the UN will debate the drug control regime in 2016 Botticelli needs to speak louder, engaging the American apparatus in big debates. On many fronts, those debates are proceeding without U.S. leadership. Without engagement from Washington, the debate risks lurching and stalling. Momentum for these changes will continue and the U.S. government could be a critical force in making them take hold. action represents the beginning of something very important. We need steps toward health-based approaches to drugs

More than three years ago, the Global Commission on Drug Policy urged the world to recognize that the war on drugs has failed and to consider policies that would reduce violence, decrease mass incarceration, and promote health. Since then, sitting presidents and premiers, mainly from Latin America, have called for a review of the entire drug control system and for drug-control reform to figure prominently in the international agenda. For example, the UN will debate the drug control regime in 2016, and the Organization of American States (OAS) will make drug policy a central theme of its meeting in mid-September. The OAS meeting could be a particularly important moment for the United States to meaningfully engage in the debate. It would come as the White House welcomes a new drug czar, Michael Botticelli, who may bring fresh thinking to the role. Botticelli has a background in public health, which is critical for the job. In addition, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, which Botticelli is heading, now says it can support health-based approaches to drugs, moving away from the “war on drugs” terminology. The office has also spoken out in favor of common-sense interventions, like the distribution of the overdose-reversing drug naloxone. But Botticelli needs to speak louder, engaging the American apparatus in big debates. On many fronts, those debates are proceeding without U.S. leadership. In early September, the Global Commission on Drug Policy—composed of leaders in the fields of politics, business, and the arts—put forward a new set of recommendations on drug policy. They urge governments to: Put health first and provide adequate resources for health services; Ensure access to essential medicines and pain control; End the senseless criminalization and incarceration of minor, non-violent drug offenders and target strategies to help dependent people access treatment; Consider regulation of drug markets to undermine the staggering profits reaped by criminal gangs; Adapt enforcement strategies to target the most violent and disruptive criminal groups rather than punish low-level players; Refuse to shy away from the transformative potential of responsible regulation. Many of these recommendations are already in force in other parts of the world or are slowly taking shape in local jurisdictions here. They are far from radical. Latin American leaders pushing the issue are clearly hoping for some cooperation from the United States. Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos, for example, has consistently affirmed that the search for alternatives should include discussions about legalization—but that all decisions should reflect international consensus. Without engagement from Washington, the debate risks lurching and stalling. This is where Botticelli’s agency has so far fallen short. Despite its support for health-based interventions, the office seems more ambivalent about sweeping reforms such as the sensible regulation of drugs like cannabis or even support for the words “harm reduction” in international documents. Momentum for these changes will continue at OAS and beyond, and the U.S. government could be a critical force in making them take hold. If action follows the new vernacular, then it represents the beginning of something very important. We just need the government to take major steps toward realizing health-based approaches to drugs, and to assert its support for humane policies on the international stage. That could make Botticelli’s appointment herald a new era for people who use drugs, and for their communities.

<h4>US drug reform is key -- the plan is a signal toward a health based approach to drugs </h4><p>Kasia <strong>Sempruch</strong> <strong>14</strong> director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Program, "The Debate on Drugs Is Moving Forward. Will the U.S. Get Left Behind?" Global Drug Policy Program, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/will-united-states-lead-or-follow-international-drug-reform, 9/19</p><p>More than three years ago, <u><strong>the Global Commission on Drug Policy urged the world to recognize that the war on drugs has failed and to consider policies that would reduce violence</u></strong>, decrease mass incarceration, and promote health. Since then, <u><strong>sitting presidents and premiers, mainly from Latin America, have called for a review of the entire drug control system and for drug-control reform to figure prominently in the international agenda.</u></strong> For example, <u><strong><mark>the UN will debate the drug control regime in 2016</u></strong></mark>, and the Organization of American States (OAS) will make drug policy a central theme of its meeting in mid-September. The OAS meeting could be a particularly important moment for the United States to meaningfully engage in the debate. It would come as the White House welcomes a new drug czar, Michael Botticelli, who may bring fresh thinking to the role. Botticelli has a background in public health, which is critical for the job. In addition, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, which Botticelli is heading, now says it can support health-based approaches to drugs, moving away from the “war on drugs” terminology. The office has also spoken out in favor of common-sense interventions, like the distribution of the overdose-reversing drug naloxone. But <u><strong><mark>Botticelli needs to speak louder, engaging the American apparatus in big debates.</u></strong> <u><strong>On many fronts, those debates are proceeding without U.S. leadership.</mark> </u></strong>In early September, the Global Commission on Drug Policy—composed of leaders in the fields of politics, business, and the arts—put forward a new set of recommendations on drug policy. They urge governments to: Put health first and provide adequate resources for health services; Ensure access to essential medicines and pain control; End the senseless criminalization and incarceration of minor, non-violent drug offenders and target strategies to help dependent people access treatment; Consider regulation of drug markets to undermine the staggering profits reaped by criminal gangs; Adapt enforcement strategies to target the most violent and disruptive criminal groups rather than punish low-level players; Refuse to shy away from the transformative potential of responsible regulation. Many of these recommendations are already in force in other parts of the world or are slowly taking shape in local jurisdictions here. They are far from radical. Latin American leaders pushing the issue are clearly hoping for some cooperation from the United States. Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos, for example, has consistently affirmed that the search for alternatives should include discussions about legalization—but that all decisions should reflect international consensus. <u><strong><mark>Without engagement from Washington, the debate risks lurching and stalling.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>This is where Botticelli’s agency has so far fallen short.</u></strong> Despite its support for health-based interventions, the office seems more ambivalent about sweeping reforms such as the sensible regulation of drugs like cannabis or even support for the words “harm reduction” in international documents. <u><strong><mark>Momentum for these changes will continue</u></strong></mark> at OAS and beyond, <u><strong><mark>and the U.S. government could be a critical force in making them take hold.</mark> If <mark>action</mark> follows the new vernacular, then it <mark>represents the beginning of something very important.</mark> <mark>We</mark> just <mark>need</mark> the government to take major <mark>steps toward</mark> realizing <mark>health-based approaches to drugs</mark>, and to assert its support for humane policies on the international stage.</u></strong> That could make Botticelli’s appointment herald a new era for people who use drugs, and for their communities.</p>

Kasia Sempruch 14 director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Program, "The Debate on Drugs Is Moving Forward. Will the U.S. Get Left Behind?" Global Drug Policy Program, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/will-united-states-lead-or-follow-international-drug-reform, 9/19

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Kasia Sempruch 14 director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Program, "The Debate on Drugs Is Moving Forward. Will the U.S. Get Left Behind?" Global Drug Policy Program, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/will-united-states-lead-or-follow-international-drug-reform, 9/19 fulltext: More than three years ago, the Global Commission on Drug Policy urged the world to recognize that the war on drugs has failed and to consider policies that would reduce violence, decrease mass incarceration, and promote health. Since then, sitting presidents and premiers, mainly from Latin America, have called for a review of the entire drug control system and for drug-control reform to figure prominently in the international agenda. For example, the UN will debate the drug control regime in 2016, and the Organization of American States (OAS) will make drug policy a central theme of its meeting in mid-September. The OAS meeting could be a particularly important moment for the United States to meaningfully engage in the debate. It would come as the White House welcomes a new drug czar, Michael Botticelli, who may bring fresh thinking to the role. Botticelli has a background in public health, which is critical for the job. In addition, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, which Botticelli is heading, now says it can support health-based approaches to drugs, moving away from the “war on drugs” terminology. The office has also spoken out in favor of common-sense interventions, like the distribution of the overdose-reversing drug naloxone. But Botticelli needs to speak louder, engaging the American apparatus in big debates. On many fronts, those debates are proceeding without U.S. leadership. In early September, the Global Commission on Drug Policy—composed of leaders in the fields of politics, business, and the arts—put forward a new set of recommendations on drug policy. They urge governments to: Put health first and provide adequate resources for health services; Ensure access to essential medicines and pain control; End the senseless criminalization and incarceration of minor, non-violent drug offenders and target strategies to help dependent people access treatment; Consider regulation of drug markets to undermine the staggering profits reaped by criminal gangs; Adapt enforcement strategies to target the most violent and disruptive criminal groups rather than punish low-level players; Refuse to shy away from the transformative potential of responsible regulation. Many of these recommendations are already in force in other parts of the world or are slowly taking shape in local jurisdictions here. They are far from radical. Latin American leaders pushing the issue are clearly hoping for some cooperation from the United States. Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos, for example, has consistently affirmed that the search for alternatives should include discussions about legalization—but that all decisions should reflect international consensus. Without engagement from Washington, the debate risks lurching and stalling. This is where Botticelli’s agency has so far fallen short. Despite its support for health-based interventions, the office seems more ambivalent about sweeping reforms such as the sensible regulation of drugs like cannabis or even support for the words “harm reduction” in international documents. Momentum for these changes will continue at OAS and beyond, and the U.S. government could be a critical force in making them take hold. If action follows the new vernacular, then it represents the beginning of something very important. We just need the government to take major steps toward realizing health-based approaches to drugs, and to assert its support for humane policies on the international stage. That could make Botticelli’s appointment herald a new era for people who use drugs, and for their communities. [/INST] <h4>US drug reform is key -- the plan is a signal toward a health based approach to drugs </h4><p>Kasia <strong>Sempruch</strong> <strong>14</strong> director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Program, "The Debate on Drugs Is Moving Forward. Will the U.S. Get Left Behind?" Global Drug Policy Program, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/will-united-states-lead-or-follow-international-drug-reform, 9/19</p><p>More than three years ago, <u><strong>the Global Commission on Drug Policy urged the world to recognize that the war on drugs has failed and to consider policies that would reduce violence</u></strong>, decrease mass incarceration, and promote health. Since then, <u><strong>sitting presidents and premiers, mainly from Latin America, have called for a review of the entire drug control system and for drug-control reform to figure prominently in the international agenda.</u></strong> For example, <u><strong><mark>the UN will debate the drug control regime in 2016</u></strong></mark>, and the Organization of American States (OAS) will make drug policy a central theme of its meeting in mid-September. The OAS meeting could be a particularly important moment for the United States to meaningfully engage in the debate. It would come as the White House welcomes a new drug czar, Michael Botticelli, who may bring fresh thinking to the role. Botticelli has a background in public health, which is critical for the job. In addition, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, which Botticelli is heading, now says it can support health-based approaches to drugs, moving away from the “war on drugs” terminology. The office has also spoken out in favor of common-sense interventions, like the distribution of the overdose-reversing drug naloxone. But <u><strong><mark>Botticelli needs to speak louder, engaging the American apparatus in big debates.</u></strong> <u><strong>On many fronts, those debates are proceeding without U.S. leadership.</mark> </u></strong>In early September, the Global Commission on Drug Policy—composed of leaders in the fields of politics, business, and the arts—put forward a new set of recommendations on drug policy. They urge governments to: Put health first and provide adequate resources for health services; Ensure access to essential medicines and pain control; End the senseless criminalization and incarceration of minor, non-violent drug offenders and target strategies to help dependent people access treatment; Consider regulation of drug markets to undermine the staggering profits reaped by criminal gangs; Adapt enforcement strategies to target the most violent and disruptive criminal groups rather than punish low-level players; Refuse to shy away from the transformative potential of responsible regulation. Many of these recommendations are already in force in other parts of the world or are slowly taking shape in local jurisdictions here. They are far from radical. Latin American leaders pushing the issue are clearly hoping for some cooperation from the United States. Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos, for example, has consistently affirmed that the search for alternatives should include discussions about legalization—but that all decisions should reflect international consensus. <u><strong><mark>Without engagement from Washington, the debate risks lurching and stalling.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>This is where Botticelli’s agency has so far fallen short.</u></strong> Despite its support for health-based interventions, the office seems more ambivalent about sweeping reforms such as the sensible regulation of drugs like cannabis or even support for the words “harm reduction” in international documents. <u><strong><mark>Momentum for these changes will continue</u></strong></mark> at OAS and beyond, <u><strong><mark>and the U.S. government could be a critical force in making them take hold.</mark> If <mark>action</mark> follows the new vernacular, then it <mark>represents the beginning of something very important.</mark> <mark>We</mark> just <mark>need</mark> the government to take major <mark>steps toward</mark> realizing <mark>health-based approaches to drugs</mark>, and to assert its support for humane policies on the international stage.</u></strong> That could make Botticelli’s appointment herald a new era for people who use drugs, and for their communities.</p> </s>

We must refuse the university as an act of pure negation—only this way can we prevent the reappropriation of our act and means perm can never solve.

Instead of facilitating expression of creative instincts, society created an array of imaginary needs and desires By making individuals feel part of an illusory integration the potentially great variety of modes of social expression were funneled into a one-dimensional system in which the capacity to think and act freely in manners other than those sanctioned by the system eventually disappeared. By monopolizing the means of consumption as well alternative or oppositional forms of expression, advanced societies blocked development of an eroticized society All expression of rebellion, including literature and the arts, would be turned into chips in the game of competition The efforts to recapture the Great Refusal in the language of literature suffer the fate of being absorbed by what they refute Marcuse's answer: a Great Refusal beyond what the scandalous but ineffectual vanguards had achieved, a break he called a "rupture withdrawal from the system of organized social conduct the "establishment a society that had won the basic struggle for survival and eliminated excessive domination and repression should open itself to the development of a new being, an orphic-narcissist who would reject utilitarian goals or social standing in favor of love, pleasure, play, and contemplation. This rupture must not fall into the trap of oppositional collaboration; rather it must counter the system's capacity for appropriating everything in its path with "the politically impotent form of the 'absolute negation What we refuse is not without value or importance. Precisely because of that, the refusal is necessary. There is a reason which we no longer accept, there is an appearance of wisdom which horrifies us, there is a plea for agreement and conciliation which we will no longer heed. A break has occurred. We have been reduced to that frankness which no longer tolerates complicity

By making individuals feel part of an illusory integration the variety of modes of social expression were funneled into a one-dimensional system in which the capacity to think and act freely in manners other than those sanctioned by the system disappeared All expression of rebellion, would be turned into chips in the game of competition withdrawal from the system of organized social conduct the "establishment a society that had won the basic struggle for survival and eliminated excessive domination and repression should open itself to the development of a new being who would reject social standing in favor of love, pleasure, play, and contemplation What we refuse is not without value or importance. Precisely because of that, the refusal is necessary. There is a reason which we no longer accept, A break has occurred. We have been reduced to that frankness which no longer tolerates complicity

In One-Dimensional Man, a less optimistic Marcuse analyzed the manipulation by advanced industrial societies of communication media and concepts of modernity to stifle cultural revolution, voiding any possibility of the erotic liberation of the masses. Instead of facilitating expression of creative instincts, society created an array of imaginary needs and desires, the acquisition of which—through participation in the rites of consumption—constituted a sinister, complex, and highly developed form of sublimating human sexual energy. By making individuals feel part of an illusory integration of national life, the potentially great variety of modes of social expression were funneled into a one-dimensional system in which the capacity to think and act freely in manners other than those sanctioned by the system eventually disappeared. By monopolizing the means of consumption as well alternative or oppositional forms of expression, advanced societies blocked development of an eroticized society. Marcuse warned that control mechanisms even provided outlets for eroticism that channeled its energy into merely distracting and addictive consumption. All expression of rebellion, including literature and the arts, would be turned into chips in the game of competition and economic gain. The efforts to recapture the Great Refusal in the language of literature suffer the fate of being absorbed by what they refute. As modern classics, the avant-garde and the beatniks share the function of entertaining without endangering the good conscience of the men of good will. This absorption is justified by technical progress; the refusal is refuted by the alleviation of misery in the advanced industrial society. The liquidation of high culture is a by-product of the conquest of nature, and of the progressing conquest of scarcity. (Marcuse 1991, 70) Marcuse's answer: a Great Refusal beyond what the scandalous but ineffectual vanguards had achieved, a break he called a "rupture"—especially and significantly in the chapter "The New Sensibility" in An Essay on Liberation (1969a, 33–34, 36). This rupture signaled the withdrawal from the system of organized social conduct, or in 1960s parlance, the "establishment." Borrowing elements of his analysis from Eros and Civilization, Marcuse postulated that a society that had won the basic struggle for survival and eliminated excessive domination and repression should open itself to the development of a new being, an orphic-narcissist who would reject utilitarian goals or social standing in favor of love, pleasure, play, and contemplation. This eroticized being would be a product of an essentially new human reality, able to achieve the ultimate "break, the turn of quantity into quality" (1991, 231) and establish "the realm of the irrational [that] becomes the home of the really rational—of the ideas which may 'promote the art of life'" (247). This rupture must not fall into the trap of oppositional collaboration; rather it must counter the system's capacity for appropriating everything in its path with "the politically impotent form of the 'absolute negation'" (Marcuse 1991, 255). To support his claim while simultaneously offering an example of such an act of refusal in the guise of surrendering to appropriation, Marcuse cites Maurice Blanchot, a writer whose work would also become key reading for counterculture intellectuals in their passage to postmodernity, particularly for García Ponce. [End Page 7] What we refuse is not without value or importance. Precisely because of that, the refusal is necessary. There is a reason which we no longer accept, there is an appearance of wisdom which horrifies us, there is a plea for agreement and conciliation which we will no longer heed. A break has occurred. We have been reduced to that frankness which no longer tolerates complicity. (Blanchot, quoted in Marcuse 1991, 256)

<h4>We must refuse the university as an act of pure negation—only this way can we prevent the reappropriation of our act and means perm can never solve.</h4><p>Juan Bruce-<strong>Novoa 05</strong>, Lecturer in Mexican and Latino Literature and Culture the University of California-Irvine. “Eroticism, Counterculture, and Juan García Ponce.” CR: The New Centennial Review. 5.3. pp. 1-33</p><p>In One-Dimensional Man, a less optimistic Marcuse analyzed the manipulation by advanced industrial societies of communication media and concepts of modernity to stifle cultural revolution, voiding any possibility of the erotic liberation of the masses. <u><strong>Instead of facilitating expression of creative instincts, society created an array of imaginary needs and desires</u></strong>, the acquisition of which—through participation in the rites of consumption—constituted a sinister, complex, and highly developed form of sublimating human sexual energy. <u><strong><mark>By making individuals feel part of an illusory integration</u></strong></mark> of national life, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> potentially great <mark>variety of modes of social expression were funneled into a one-dimensional system in which the capacity to think and act freely in manners other than those sanctioned by the system </mark>eventually <mark>disappeared</mark>. By monopolizing the means of consumption as well alternative or oppositional forms of expression, advanced societies blocked development of an eroticized society</u></strong>. Marcuse warned that control mechanisms even provided outlets for eroticism that channeled its energy into merely distracting and addictive consumption.<u><strong> <mark>All expression of rebellion,</mark> including literature and the arts, <mark>would be turned into chips in the game of competition</u></strong></mark> and economic gain. <u><strong>The efforts to recapture the Great Refusal in the language of literature suffer the fate of being absorbed by what they refute</u></strong>. As modern classics, the avant-garde and the beatniks share the function of entertaining without endangering the good conscience of the men of good will. This absorption is justified by technical progress; the refusal is refuted by the alleviation of misery in the advanced industrial society. The liquidation of high culture is a by-product of the conquest of nature, and of the progressing conquest of scarcity. (Marcuse 1991, 70) <u><strong>Marcuse's answer: a Great Refusal beyond what the scandalous but ineffectual vanguards had achieved, a break he called a "rupture</u></strong>"—especially and significantly in the chapter "The New Sensibility" in An Essay on Liberation (1969a, 33–34, 36). This rupture signaled the <u><strong><mark>withdrawal from the system of organized social conduct</u></strong></mark>, or in 1960s parlance, <u><strong><mark>the "establishment</u></strong></mark>." Borrowing elements of his analysis from Eros and Civilization, Marcuse postulated that <u><strong><mark>a society that had won the basic struggle for survival and eliminated excessive domination and repression should open itself to the development of a new being</mark>, an orphic-narcissist <mark>who would reject</mark> utilitarian goals or <mark>social standing in favor of love, pleasure, play, and contemplation</mark>.</u></strong> This eroticized being would be a product of an essentially new human reality, able to achieve the ultimate "break, the turn of quantity into quality" (1991, 231) and establish "the realm of the irrational [that] becomes the home of the really rational—of the ideas which may 'promote the art of life'" (247). <u><strong>This rupture must not fall into the trap of oppositional collaboration; rather it must counter the system's capacity for appropriating everything in its path with "the politically impotent form of the 'absolute negation</u></strong>'" (Marcuse 1991, 255). To support his claim while simultaneously offering an example of such an act of refusal in the guise of surrendering to appropriation, Marcuse cites Maurice Blanchot, a writer whose work would also become key reading for counterculture intellectuals in their passage to postmodernity, particularly for García Ponce. [End Page 7] <u><strong><mark>What we refuse is not without value or importance. Precisely because of that, the refusal is necessary. There is a reason which we no longer accept, </mark>there is an appearance of wisdom which horrifies us, there is a plea for agreement and conciliation which we will no longer heed. <mark>A break has occurred. We have been reduced to that frankness which no longer tolerates complicity</u></strong></mark>. (Blanchot, quoted in Marcuse 1991, 256)</p>

Juan Bruce-Novoa 05, Lecturer in Mexican and Latino Literature and Culture the University of California-Irvine. “Eroticism, Counterculture, and Juan García Ponce.” CR: The New Centennial Review. 5.3. pp. 1-33

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Juan Bruce-Novoa 05, Lecturer in Mexican and Latino Literature and Culture the University of California-Irvine. “Eroticism, Counterculture, and Juan García Ponce.” CR: The New Centennial Review. 5.3. pp. 1-33 fulltext: In One-Dimensional Man, a less optimistic Marcuse analyzed the manipulation by advanced industrial societies of communication media and concepts of modernity to stifle cultural revolution, voiding any possibility of the erotic liberation of the masses. Instead of facilitating expression of creative instincts, society created an array of imaginary needs and desires, the acquisition of which—through participation in the rites of consumption—constituted a sinister, complex, and highly developed form of sublimating human sexual energy. By making individuals feel part of an illusory integration of national life, the potentially great variety of modes of social expression were funneled into a one-dimensional system in which the capacity to think and act freely in manners other than those sanctioned by the system eventually disappeared. By monopolizing the means of consumption as well alternative or oppositional forms of expression, advanced societies blocked development of an eroticized society. Marcuse warned that control mechanisms even provided outlets for eroticism that channeled its energy into merely distracting and addictive consumption. All expression of rebellion, including literature and the arts, would be turned into chips in the game of competition and economic gain. The efforts to recapture the Great Refusal in the language of literature suffer the fate of being absorbed by what they refute. As modern classics, the avant-garde and the beatniks share the function of entertaining without endangering the good conscience of the men of good will. This absorption is justified by technical progress; the refusal is refuted by the alleviation of misery in the advanced industrial society. The liquidation of high culture is a by-product of the conquest of nature, and of the progressing conquest of scarcity. (Marcuse 1991, 70) Marcuse's answer: a Great Refusal beyond what the scandalous but ineffectual vanguards had achieved, a break he called a "rupture"—especially and significantly in the chapter "The New Sensibility" in An Essay on Liberation (1969a, 33–34, 36). This rupture signaled the withdrawal from the system of organized social conduct, or in 1960s parlance, the "establishment." Borrowing elements of his analysis from Eros and Civilization, Marcuse postulated that a society that had won the basic struggle for survival and eliminated excessive domination and repression should open itself to the development of a new being, an orphic-narcissist who would reject utilitarian goals or social standing in favor of love, pleasure, play, and contemplation. This eroticized being would be a product of an essentially new human reality, able to achieve the ultimate "break, the turn of quantity into quality" (1991, 231) and establish "the realm of the irrational [that] becomes the home of the really rational—of the ideas which may 'promote the art of life'" (247). This rupture must not fall into the trap of oppositional collaboration; rather it must counter the system's capacity for appropriating everything in its path with "the politically impotent form of the 'absolute negation'" (Marcuse 1991, 255). To support his claim while simultaneously offering an example of such an act of refusal in the guise of surrendering to appropriation, Marcuse cites Maurice Blanchot, a writer whose work would also become key reading for counterculture intellectuals in their passage to postmodernity, particularly for García Ponce. [End Page 7] What we refuse is not without value or importance. Precisely because of that, the refusal is necessary. There is a reason which we no longer accept, there is an appearance of wisdom which horrifies us, there is a plea for agreement and conciliation which we will no longer heed. A break has occurred. We have been reduced to that frankness which no longer tolerates complicity. (Blanchot, quoted in Marcuse 1991, 256) [/INST] <h4>We must refuse the university as an act of pure negation—only this way can we prevent the reappropriation of our act and means perm can never solve.</h4><p>Juan Bruce-<strong>Novoa 05</strong>, Lecturer in Mexican and Latino Literature and Culture the University of California-Irvine. “Eroticism, Counterculture, and Juan García Ponce.” CR: The New Centennial Review. 5.3. pp. 1-33</p><p>In One-Dimensional Man, a less optimistic Marcuse analyzed the manipulation by advanced industrial societies of communication media and concepts of modernity to stifle cultural revolution, voiding any possibility of the erotic liberation of the masses. <u><strong>Instead of facilitating expression of creative instincts, society created an array of imaginary needs and desires</u></strong>, the acquisition of which—through participation in the rites of consumption—constituted a sinister, complex, and highly developed form of sublimating human sexual energy. <u><strong><mark>By making individuals feel part of an illusory integration</u></strong></mark> of national life, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> potentially great <mark>variety of modes of social expression were funneled into a one-dimensional system in which the capacity to think and act freely in manners other than those sanctioned by the system </mark>eventually <mark>disappeared</mark>. By monopolizing the means of consumption as well alternative or oppositional forms of expression, advanced societies blocked development of an eroticized society</u></strong>. Marcuse warned that control mechanisms even provided outlets for eroticism that channeled its energy into merely distracting and addictive consumption.<u><strong> <mark>All expression of rebellion,</mark> including literature and the arts, <mark>would be turned into chips in the game of competition</u></strong></mark> and economic gain. <u><strong>The efforts to recapture the Great Refusal in the language of literature suffer the fate of being absorbed by what they refute</u></strong>. As modern classics, the avant-garde and the beatniks share the function of entertaining without endangering the good conscience of the men of good will. This absorption is justified by technical progress; the refusal is refuted by the alleviation of misery in the advanced industrial society. The liquidation of high culture is a by-product of the conquest of nature, and of the progressing conquest of scarcity. (Marcuse 1991, 70) <u><strong>Marcuse's answer: a Great Refusal beyond what the scandalous but ineffectual vanguards had achieved, a break he called a "rupture</u></strong>"—especially and significantly in the chapter "The New Sensibility" in An Essay on Liberation (1969a, 33–34, 36). This rupture signaled the <u><strong><mark>withdrawal from the system of organized social conduct</u></strong></mark>, or in 1960s parlance, <u><strong><mark>the "establishment</u></strong></mark>." Borrowing elements of his analysis from Eros and Civilization, Marcuse postulated that <u><strong><mark>a society that had won the basic struggle for survival and eliminated excessive domination and repression should open itself to the development of a new being</mark>, an orphic-narcissist <mark>who would reject</mark> utilitarian goals or <mark>social standing in favor of love, pleasure, play, and contemplation</mark>.</u></strong> This eroticized being would be a product of an essentially new human reality, able to achieve the ultimate "break, the turn of quantity into quality" (1991, 231) and establish "the realm of the irrational [that] becomes the home of the really rational—of the ideas which may 'promote the art of life'" (247). <u><strong>This rupture must not fall into the trap of oppositional collaboration; rather it must counter the system's capacity for appropriating everything in its path with "the politically impotent form of the 'absolute negation</u></strong>'" (Marcuse 1991, 255). To support his claim while simultaneously offering an example of such an act of refusal in the guise of surrendering to appropriation, Marcuse cites Maurice Blanchot, a writer whose work would also become key reading for counterculture intellectuals in their passage to postmodernity, particularly for García Ponce. [End Page 7] <u><strong><mark>What we refuse is not without value or importance. Precisely because of that, the refusal is necessary. There is a reason which we no longer accept, </mark>there is an appearance of wisdom which horrifies us, there is a plea for agreement and conciliation which we will no longer heed. <mark>A break has occurred. We have been reduced to that frankness which no longer tolerates complicity</u></strong></mark>. (Blanchot, quoted in Marcuse 1991, 256)</p> </s>

Apocalyptic environment discourse creates a politics of danger that make totalitarian control necessary in the name of ecological protection.

environmental security is its mobilization potential the obvious reason for putting environmental issues into the security agenda is the possible magni tude of the threats posed, and the need to mobilize urgent and unprece dented responses to them. The security label is a useful way both of sig nalling danger and setting priority, and for this reason alone it is likely to per sist in the environmental debates A first argument against the environment as a security issue, mentioned, for exam ple, by Buzan, is that environmental threats are generally unintentional This does not make the threats any less serious, although it does take them out of the realm of will. the field of secu rity is constituted around relationships between wills: It has been, conventionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in defense of its sovereignty the concept of "security" tends to imply that defense from the problem is to be provided by the state: The most serious consequence of thinking of global change and other environmental problems as threats to security is that the sorts of centralized governmental responses by powerful and autonomous state organizations that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems. when responding to environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to glob al environmental problems It might ven lead to militarization of environmental problems The tendency toward "us vs. them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left," which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis of environmental collectivism the logic of ecology, with its religious potentials and references to totalitarian projects, where also the science of ecology has focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in the name of the environment.

environmental security41 label is a useful way both of sig nalling danger and setting priority in debates environmental threats are unintentional : The consequence of thinking of environmental problems as threats to security is that the sorts of governmental responses by state organizations the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to glob al environmental problems. It might even lead to militarization of environmental problems The tendency toward "us vs. them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left, totalitarian projects, where also the science of ecology has focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in the name of the environment.

Central to the arguments for the conceptual innovation of environmental or ecological security41 is its mobilization potential. As Buzan points out, the concept of national security "has an enormous power as an instrument of social and political mobilization" and, therefore, "the obvious reason for putting environmental issues into the security agenda is the possible magni tude of the threats posed, and the need to mobilize urgent and unprece dented responses to them. The security label is a useful way both of sig nalling danger and setting priority, and for this reason alone it is likely to per sist in the environmental debates."42 Several analysts have, however, warned against securitization of the environmental issue for some of these very rea sons, and some of the arguments I present here fit into the principled issue of securitization/desecuritization as discussed earlier in this chapter. A first argument against the environment as a security issue, mentioned, for exam ple, by Buzan, is that environmental threats are generally unintentional.43 This, by itself, does not make the threats any less serious, although it does take them out of the realm of will. As I pointed out earlier, the field of secu rity is constituted around relationships between wills: It has been, conventionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in defense of its sovereignty. The contest of concern, in other words, is among strategic actors imbued with intentionality, and this has been the logic around which the whole issue of security has been framed. In light of my earlier discussion, in which I stressed that "security" is not a reflection of our everyday sense of the word but, rather, a specific field with traditions, the jump to environ­mental security becomes much larger than might appear at first to be the case. I do not present this as an argument against the concept but, rather, as a way of illuminating or even explaining the debate over it. Second in his critique of the notion of environmental security, Richard Moss points out that the concept of "security" tends to imply that defense from the problem is to be provided by the state: The most serious consequence of thinking of global change and other environmental problems as threats to security is that the sorts of centralized governmental responses by powerful and autonomous state organizations that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems. When one is reacting to the threat of organized external violence, military and intelligence institutions are empowered to take the measures required to repel the threat. By this same logic, when responding to environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical. Unfortunately, in most cases this sort of response is not the most efficient or effective way of addressing environ mental problems, particularly those that have a global character.44 Moss goes on to warn that "the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to glob al environmental problems."45 It might, he points out, even lead to militarization of environmental problems .46 A third warning, not unrelated to the previous two, is the tendency for the concept of security to produce thinking in terms of us-them, which could then be captured by the logic of nationalism. Dan Deudney writes that "the 'nation' is not an empty vessel or blank slate waiting to be filled or scripted, but is instead profoundly linked to war and 'us vs. them' thinking ( . . . ) Of course, taking the war and 'us vs. them' thinking out of national ism is a noble goal. But this may be like taking sex out of 'rock and roll,' a project whose feasibility declines when one remembers that 'rock and roll' was originally coined as a euphemism for sex."47 The tendency toward "us vs. them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems." Finally, there is the more political warning that the concept of security is basically defensive in nature, a status quo concept defending that which is, even though it does not necessarily deserve to be protected. In a paradoxical way, this politically conservative bias has also led to warnings by some that the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left," which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis of environmental collectivism." Certainly, there is some risk that the logic of ecology, with its religious potentials and references to holistic categories, survival and the linked significance of everything, might easily lend itself to totalitarian projects, where also the science of ecology has focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in the name of the environment.

<h4>Apocalyptic environment discourse creates a politics of danger that make totalitarian control necessary in the name of ecological protection.</h4><p><strong>Waever 1995</strong> (Ole, Senior Researcher at the Center for Peace & Conflict Research, On Security, p. 63-64)</p><p><u><mark> </p><p></u></mark>Central to the arguments for the conceptual innovation of <u><mark>environmental</u></mark> or ecological <u><mark>security</u>41</mark> <u>is its mobilization potential</u>. As Buzan points out, the concept of national security "has an enormous power as an instrument of social and political mobilization" and, therefore, "<u>the obvious reason for putting environmental issues into the security agenda is the possible magni tude of the threats posed, and the need to mobilize urgent and unprece dented responses to them. The security <mark>label is a useful way both of sig nalling danger and setting priority</mark>, and for this reason alone it is likely to per sist <mark>in</mark> the environmental <mark>debates</u></mark>."42 Several analysts have, however, warned against securitization of the environmental issue for some of these very rea sons, and some of the arguments I present here fit into the principled issue of securitization/desecuritization as discussed earlier in this chapter. <u>A first argument against the environment as a security issue, mentioned, for exam ple, by Buzan, is that <mark>environmental threats are </mark>generally <mark>unintentional</u></mark>.43 <u>This</u>, by itself, <u>does not make the threats any less serious, although it does take them out of the realm of will.</u> As I pointed out earlier, <u>the field of secu rity is constituted around relationships between wills: It has been, conventionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in defense of its sovereignty</u>. The contest of concern, in other words, is among strategic actors imbued with intentionality, and this has been the logic around which the whole issue of security has been framed. In light of my earlier discussion, in which I stressed that "security" is not a reflection of our everyday sense of the word but, rather, a specific field with traditions, the jump to environ­mental security becomes much larger than might appear at first to be the case. I do not present this as an argument against the concept but, rather, as a way of illuminating or even explaining the debate over it. Second in his critique of the notion of environmental security, Richard Moss points out that <u>the concept of "security" tends to imply that defense from the problem is to be provided by the state<mark>: The</mark> most serious <mark>consequence of thinking of</mark> global change and other <mark>environmental</mark> <mark>problems as threats to security is that the sorts of</mark> centralized <mark>governmental responses by</mark> powerful and autonomous <mark>state organizations</mark> that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems.</u> When one is reacting to the threat of organized external violence, military and intelligence institutions are empowered to take the measures required to repel the threat. By this same logic, <u>when responding to environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical</u>. Unfortunately, in most cases this sort of response is not the most efficient or effective way of addressing environ mental problems, particularly those that have a global character.44 Moss goes on to warn that "<u><mark>the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to glob al environmental problems</u>.</mark>"45 <u><mark>It</mark> <mark>might</u></mark>, he points out, <mark>e<u>ven lead to militarization of environmental problems</u></mark> .46 A third warning, not unrelated to the previous two, is the tendency for the concept of security to produce thinking in terms of us-them, which could then be captured by the logic of nationalism. Dan Deudney writes that "the 'nation' is not an empty vessel or blank slate waiting to be filled or scripted, but is instead profoundly linked to war and 'us vs. them' thinking ( . . . ) Of course, taking the war and 'us vs. them' thinking out of national ism is a noble goal. But this may be like taking sex out of 'rock and roll,' a project whose feasibility declines when one remembers that 'rock and roll' was originally coined as a euphemism for sex."47 <u><mark>The tendency toward "us vs. them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems</u></mark>." Finally, there is the more political warning that the concept of security is basically defensive in nature, a status quo concept defending that which is, even though it does not necessarily deserve to be protected. In a paradoxical way, this politically conservative bias has also led to warnings by some that <u><mark>the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left,</mark>" which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis of environmental collectivism</u>." Certainly, there is some risk that <u>the logic of ecology, with its religious potentials and references to</u> holistic categories, survival and the linked significance of everything, might easily lend itself to <u><mark>totalitarian projects, where also the science of ecology has focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in the name of the environment.</p></u></mark>

Waever 1995 (Ole, Senior Researcher at the Center for Peace & Conflict Research, On Security, p. 63-64)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Waever 1995 (Ole, Senior Researcher at the Center for Peace & Conflict Research, On Security, p. 63-64) fulltext: Central to the arguments for the conceptual innovation of environmental or ecological security41 is its mobilization potential. As Buzan points out, the concept of national security "has an enormous power as an instrument of social and political mobilization" and, therefore, "the obvious reason for putting environmental issues into the security agenda is the possible magni tude of the threats posed, and the need to mobilize urgent and unprece dented responses to them. The security label is a useful way both of sig nalling danger and setting priority, and for this reason alone it is likely to per sist in the environmental debates."42 Several analysts have, however, warned against securitization of the environmental issue for some of these very rea sons, and some of the arguments I present here fit into the principled issue of securitization/desecuritization as discussed earlier in this chapter. A first argument against the environment as a security issue, mentioned, for exam ple, by Buzan, is that environmental threats are generally unintentional.43 This, by itself, does not make the threats any less serious, although it does take them out of the realm of will. As I pointed out earlier, the field of secu rity is constituted around relationships between wills: It has been, conventionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in defense of its sovereignty. The contest of concern, in other words, is among strategic actors imbued with intentionality, and this has been the logic around which the whole issue of security has been framed. In light of my earlier discussion, in which I stressed that "security" is not a reflection of our everyday sense of the word but, rather, a specific field with traditions, the jump to environ­mental security becomes much larger than might appear at first to be the case. I do not present this as an argument against the concept but, rather, as a way of illuminating or even explaining the debate over it. Second in his critique of the notion of environmental security, Richard Moss points out that the concept of "security" tends to imply that defense from the problem is to be provided by the state: The most serious consequence of thinking of global change and other environmental problems as threats to security is that the sorts of centralized governmental responses by powerful and autonomous state organizations that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems. When one is reacting to the threat of organized external violence, military and intelligence institutions are empowered to take the measures required to repel the threat. By this same logic, when responding to environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical. Unfortunately, in most cases this sort of response is not the most efficient or effective way of addressing environ mental problems, particularly those that have a global character.44 Moss goes on to warn that "the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to glob al environmental problems."45 It might, he points out, even lead to militarization of environmental problems .46 A third warning, not unrelated to the previous two, is the tendency for the concept of security to produce thinking in terms of us-them, which could then be captured by the logic of nationalism. Dan Deudney writes that "the 'nation' is not an empty vessel or blank slate waiting to be filled or scripted, but is instead profoundly linked to war and 'us vs. them' thinking ( . . . ) Of course, taking the war and 'us vs. them' thinking out of national ism is a noble goal. But this may be like taking sex out of 'rock and roll,' a project whose feasibility declines when one remembers that 'rock and roll' was originally coined as a euphemism for sex."47 The tendency toward "us vs. them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems." Finally, there is the more political warning that the concept of security is basically defensive in nature, a status quo concept defending that which is, even though it does not necessarily deserve to be protected. In a paradoxical way, this politically conservative bias has also led to warnings by some that the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left," which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis of environmental collectivism." Certainly, there is some risk that the logic of ecology, with its religious potentials and references to holistic categories, survival and the linked significance of everything, might easily lend itself to totalitarian projects, where also the science of ecology has focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in the name of the environment. [/INST] <h4>Apocalyptic environment discourse creates a politics of danger that make totalitarian control necessary in the name of ecological protection.</h4><p><strong>Waever 1995</strong> (Ole, Senior Researcher at the Center for Peace & Conflict Research, On Security, p. 63-64)</p><p><u><mark> </p><p></u></mark>Central to the arguments for the conceptual innovation of <u><mark>environmental</u></mark> or ecological <u><mark>security</u>41</mark> <u>is its mobilization potential</u>. As Buzan points out, the concept of national security "has an enormous power as an instrument of social and political mobilization" and, therefore, "<u>the obvious reason for putting environmental issues into the security agenda is the possible magni tude of the threats posed, and the need to mobilize urgent and unprece dented responses to them. The security <mark>label is a useful way both of sig nalling danger and setting priority</mark>, and for this reason alone it is likely to per sist <mark>in</mark> the environmental <mark>debates</u></mark>."42 Several analysts have, however, warned against securitization of the environmental issue for some of these very rea sons, and some of the arguments I present here fit into the principled issue of securitization/desecuritization as discussed earlier in this chapter. <u>A first argument against the environment as a security issue, mentioned, for exam ple, by Buzan, is that <mark>environmental threats are </mark>generally <mark>unintentional</u></mark>.43 <u>This</u>, by itself, <u>does not make the threats any less serious, although it does take them out of the realm of will.</u> As I pointed out earlier, <u>the field of secu rity is constituted around relationships between wills: It has been, conventionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in defense of its sovereignty</u>. The contest of concern, in other words, is among strategic actors imbued with intentionality, and this has been the logic around which the whole issue of security has been framed. In light of my earlier discussion, in which I stressed that "security" is not a reflection of our everyday sense of the word but, rather, a specific field with traditions, the jump to environ­mental security becomes much larger than might appear at first to be the case. I do not present this as an argument against the concept but, rather, as a way of illuminating or even explaining the debate over it. Second in his critique of the notion of environmental security, Richard Moss points out that <u>the concept of "security" tends to imply that defense from the problem is to be provided by the state<mark>: The</mark> most serious <mark>consequence of thinking of</mark> global change and other <mark>environmental</mark> <mark>problems as threats to security is that the sorts of</mark> centralized <mark>governmental responses by</mark> powerful and autonomous <mark>state organizations</mark> that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems.</u> When one is reacting to the threat of organized external violence, military and intelligence institutions are empowered to take the measures required to repel the threat. By this same logic, <u>when responding to environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical</u>. Unfortunately, in most cases this sort of response is not the most efficient or effective way of addressing environ mental problems, particularly those that have a global character.44 Moss goes on to warn that "<u><mark>the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to glob al environmental problems</u>.</mark>"45 <u><mark>It</mark> <mark>might</u></mark>, he points out, <mark>e<u>ven lead to militarization of environmental problems</u></mark> .46 A third warning, not unrelated to the previous two, is the tendency for the concept of security to produce thinking in terms of us-them, which could then be captured by the logic of nationalism. Dan Deudney writes that "the 'nation' is not an empty vessel or blank slate waiting to be filled or scripted, but is instead profoundly linked to war and 'us vs. them' thinking ( . . . ) Of course, taking the war and 'us vs. them' thinking out of national ism is a noble goal. But this may be like taking sex out of 'rock and roll,' a project whose feasibility declines when one remembers that 'rock and roll' was originally coined as a euphemism for sex."47 <u><mark>The tendency toward "us vs. them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems</u></mark>." Finally, there is the more political warning that the concept of security is basically defensive in nature, a status quo concept defending that which is, even though it does not necessarily deserve to be protected. In a paradoxical way, this politically conservative bias has also led to warnings by some that <u><mark>the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left,</mark>" which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis of environmental collectivism</u>." Certainly, there is some risk that <u>the logic of ecology, with its religious potentials and references to</u> holistic categories, survival and the linked significance of everything, might easily lend itself to <u><mark>totalitarian projects, where also the science of ecology has focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in the name of the environment.</p></u></mark> </s>

Turns their offense—limits are vital to creativity and innovation

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” nothing could be further from the truth creativity is about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you are the one defining the problem you are required to establish limits to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part.

creativity is about problem-solving a problem is , a limit What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you are required to establish limits to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something useful That’s the hard part

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.

<h4><strong>Turns their offense—limits are vital to creativity and innovation</h4><p>Intrator 10</p><p></strong>David Intrator (President of The Creative Organization) October 21, 2010 “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box </p><p><u><strong>One of the most pernicious myths about creativity</u></strong>, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, <u><strong>is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.”</u></strong> As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, <u><strong>nothing could be further from the truth</u></strong>. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, <u><strong><mark>creativity is</u></strong></mark> not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s <u><strong><mark>about problem-solving</mark>, and by definition <mark>a problem is </mark>a constraint<mark>, a limit</mark>, a box.</u></strong> One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. <u><strong><mark>What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that</mark> you</u></strong>, as the creator, <u><strong>are the one defining the problem</u></strong>. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, <u><strong><mark>you are required to establish limits</u></strong></mark>, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But <u><strong><mark>to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something</mark> real, something <mark>useful</mark>, something that actually works. <mark>That’s the hard part</mark>.</u></strong> It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.</p>

Intrator 10 David Intrator (President of The Creative Organization) October 21, 2010 “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Intrator 10 David Intrator (President of The Creative Organization) October 21, 2010 “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box fulltext: One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box. [/INST] <h4><strong>Turns their offense—limits are vital to creativity and innovation</h4><p>Intrator 10</p><p></strong>David Intrator (President of The Creative Organization) October 21, 2010 “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box </p><p><u><strong>One of the most pernicious myths about creativity</u></strong>, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, <u><strong>is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.”</u></strong> As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, <u><strong>nothing could be further from the truth</u></strong>. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, <u><strong><mark>creativity is</u></strong></mark> not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s <u><strong><mark>about problem-solving</mark>, and by definition <mark>a problem is </mark>a constraint<mark>, a limit</mark>, a box.</u></strong> One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. <u><strong><mark>What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that</mark> you</u></strong>, as the creator, <u><strong>are the one defining the problem</u></strong>. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, <u><strong><mark>you are required to establish limits</u></strong></mark>, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But <u><strong><mark>to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something</mark> real, something <mark>useful</mark>, something that actually works. <mark>That’s the hard part</mark>.</u></strong> It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.</p> </s>

Scenario 1 is Biodiversity

<h4>Scenario 1 is Biodiversity </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Scenario 1 is Biodiversity </h4> </s>

B.) their harms are constructed for the purpose of alarmism which makes them symbolic terrorists.

<h4>B.) their harms are constructed for the purpose of alarmism which makes them symbolic terrorists.</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>B.) their harms are constructed for the purpose of alarmism which makes them symbolic terrorists.</h4> </s>

This marketplace for trauma creates the very conditions for imperial control that they criticize

Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law ed. Sarat & Kearns, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Pg. 49-54/ ravaged bodies saturate the global marketplace in which the U S seeks to compete signifying a race that will be won by the nations whose conditions are most optimal the media of the political public sphere regularly register new scandals “at home” and “abroad,” which has to be a good thing, because it produces feeling and with it something at least akin to consciousness that can lead to action Yet even as the image of the traumatized proliferates even as evidence of exploitation is found under every rock or commodity, it competes with a normative/utopian image of the U.S. citizens who remains unmarked, framed, and protected by the private trajectory of his life project which is the American Dream exploitation only appears as a scandalous nugget in the sieve of memory when it can be condensed into an exotic thing of momentary fascination, a squalor of the bottom too horrible to be read in its own actual banality. The exposed traumas do not induce more than mourning on the part of the state and the public culture to whose feeling based opinions the state is said to respond Mourning is what happens when a grounding object is lost, is dead, no longer living (to you). Mourning is an experience of irreducible boundedness: I am here, I am living, he is dead It is a beautiful experience of emancipation: mourning supplies the subject the definitional perfection of a being no longer in flux. It takes place over a distance: even if the object who induces the feeling of loss and helplessness is neither dead nor at any great distance mounting can also be an act of aggression, of social deathmaking: it can perform the evacuation of significance from actually-existing subjects. Even when liberals do it are ghosted for a good cause The sorrow songs of scandal that sing of the exploitation that is always "elsewhere" (even a few blocks away) are in this sense aggressively songs of mourning. Play them backward, and the military march of capitalist triumphalism The Trans-Nationale) can be heard. Its Lyric, currently creamed by every organ of record in the U S is about necessity. It exhorts citizens to understand that the "bottom line" of national life is neither utopia nor freedom but survival, which can only be achieved by a citizenry that eats its anger, and uses its most creative energy to cultivate intimate spheres while scrapping a Life together flexibly in response to the market world’s caprice the pressure of feeling the shock of being uncomfortably political produces a cry for a double therapy—to the victim and the viewer. But before "we" appear too complacently different from the privileged citizens who desire to caption the mute image of exotic suffering with an aversively fascinated mooning we must note that this feeling culture crosses over into other domains, the domains of what we call identity politics, where the wronged take up voice and agency to produce transformative testimony, which depends on an analogous conviction about the self-evidence and therefore the objectivity of painful feeling. I mean to challenge belief in the positive workings of national sentimentality, a rhetoric of promise that a nation can be built across fields of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy. Sentimental politics promotes and maintains the hegemony of the national identity form, no mean feat in the face of continued widespread intercultural antagonism and economic cleavage. Sentimentality has long been the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced, in the dominant public sphere, as the true core of national collectivity. It operates when the pain of intimate others burns into the conscience of classically privileged national subjects, such that they feel the pain of denied citizenship as their pain Theoretically Identification with pain, a universal true feeling, then leads to structural social change Yet, since these very sources of protection have buttressed traditional matrices of cultural hierarchy and since their historic job has been to protect universal subject from feeling and corporeal specificity as a political vulnerability, the imagined capacity of these institutions to assimilate to the affective tactics of subaltern counterpolitics suggests some weaknesses, or misrecognitions, in these tactics the sharp specificity of the traumatic model of pain mischaracterizes what a person is as what a person becomes in the experience of social negation this model also falsely premises a sharp picture of structural violence's source and scope, in tum promoting a dubious optimism that law and other visible sources of inequality can provide the best remedies for their own taxonomizing harms counterhegemonic deployments of pain as the measure of structural injustice actually sustain the utopian image of a homogeneous national metaculture, which can look like a healed or healthy body in contrast to the scarred and exhausted ones. the tactical use of trauma to describe the effects of social inequality so overidentifies the eradication of pain with the achievement of justice that it enables various confusions the equation of pleasure with freedom or the sense that changes in feeling, even on a mass scale, amount to substantial social change Sentimental politics makes these confusions credible and these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the centrality of inter-personal identification and empathy to the vitality and viability of collective life This gives citizens something to do in response to overwhelming structural violence. Meanwhile, by equating mass society with that thing called "national culture," these important transpersonal linkages and intimacies are too frequently serve as proleptic shields, as ethically uncontestable legitimating devices for sustaining the hegemonic field.

ravaged bodies saturate the global marketplace signifying a race that will be won by the nations whose conditions are most optimal the media regularly register new scandals “at home” and “abroad,” which has to be a good thing, because it produces feeling and consciousness Yet even as the image of the traumatized proliferates it competes with a normative/utopian image of the U.S. citizens who remains unmarked and protected by the American Dream exploitation only appears as a scandalous nugget in the sieve of memory Mourning is what happens when a grounding object is lost no longer living (to you). It is a beautiful experience of emancipation It takes place over a distance: even if the object who induces the feeling of loss is neither dead nor at any great distance mounting can be an act of aggression, social deathmaking: it can perform the evacuation of significance The sorrow songs of scandal that sing of the exploitation that is always "elsewhere" are aggressively songs of mourning. Play them backward, and the military march of capitalist triumphalism can be heard. It exhorts citizens to understand that the "bottom line" is survival, which can only be achieved by a citizenry that uses its most creative energy to cultivate intimate spheres while scrapping a Life together flexibly in response to the market world’s caprice the pressure of feeling the shock of being uncomfortably political produces a cry for a double therapy— victim and viewer. e must note that this feeling culture crosses into other domains of identity politics, where the wronged take up voice and agency to produce transformative testimony, which depends on self-evidence and the objectivity of painful feeling. I mean to challenge belief in the positive workings of national sentimentality Sentimental politics promotes and maintains the hegemony of the national identity form Sentimentality has long been the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced as the true core of national collectivity. It operates when the pain of intimate others burns into the conscience of privileged subjects, such that they feel the pain of denied citizenship as their pain. Theoretically Identification with pain leads to change Yet, since these very sources of protection have buttressed traditional matrices of cultural hierarchy, and since their historic job has been to protect universal subject from feeling corporeal specificity as a political vulnerability, the imagined capacity of these institutions to assimilate to the affective tactics of subaltern counterpolitics suggests weaknesses in these tactics the sharp specificity of the traumatic model of pain mischaracterizes what a person is as what a person becomes in the experience of social negation this model falsely premises a sharp picture of structural violence's source and scope counterhegemonic deployments of pain actually sustain the utopian image of a homogeneous national metaculture, which can look like a healed body the tactical use of trauma to describe social inequality so overidentifies the eradication of pain with the achievement of justice that it enables confusions equation of pleasure with freedom or the sense that changes in feeling amount to substantial change. Sentimental politics makes these confusions credible and these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the centrality of inter-personal identification and empathy to the vitality of collective life. This gives citizens something to do in response to overwhelming structural violence. Meanwhile these linkages too frequently serve as ethically uncontestable legitimating devices for sustaining the hegemonic field

/Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and Politics” in Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law ed. Sarat & Kearns, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Pg. 49-54/ Ravaged wages and ravaged bodies saturate the global marketplace in which the United States seeks desperately to compete “competitively,” as the euphemism goes, signifying a race that will be won by the nations whose labor conditions are most optimal for profit? In the United States the media of the political public sphere regularly register new scandals of the proliferating sweatshop networks “at home” and “abroad,” which has to be a good thing, because it produces feeling and with it something at least akin to consciousness that can lead to action.3 Yet even as the image of the traumatized worker proliferates, even as evidence of exploitation is found under every rock or commodity, it competes with a normative/utopian image of the U.S. citizens who remains unmarked, framed, and protected by the private trajectory of his life project which is sanctified at the juncture where the unconscious meets history: the American Dream.4 in that story one’s identity is not borne of suffering, mental, physical, or economic. If the U.S. Worker’s lucky enough to live at an economic moment that sustains the Dream he gets to appear at his least national when he is working and at his most national at leisure, with his family or in semipublic worlds of other men producing surplus manliness (e.g., via sports). In the American dreamscape his identity is private property, a zone in which structural obstacles and cultural differences fade into an ether of prolonged, deferred, and individuating enjoyment that he has earned and that the nation has helped him to earn. Meanwhile, exploitation only appears as a scandalous nugget in the sieve of memory when it can be condensed into an exotic thing of momentary fascination, a squalor of the bottom too horrible to be read in its own actual banality. The exposed traumas of workers in ongoing extreme conditions do not generally induce more than mourning on the part of the state and the public culture to whose feeling based opinions the state is said to respond. Mourning is what happens when a grounding object is lost, is dead, no longer living (to you). Mourning is an experience of irreducible boundedness: I am here, I am living, he is dead, I am mourning. It is a beautiful, not sublime, experience of emancipation: mourning supplies the subject the definitional perfection of a being no longer in flux. It takes place over a distance: even if the object who induces the feeling of loss and helplessness is neither dead nor at any great distance from where you are? In other words, mounting can also be an act of aggression, of social deathmaking: it can perform the evacuation of significance from actually-existing subjects. Even when liberals do it, one might say, are ghosted for a good cause.6 The sorrow songs of scandal that sing of the exploitation that is always "elsewhere" (even a few blocks away) are in this sense aggressively songs of mourning. Play them backward, and the military march of capitalist triumphalism (The Trans-Nationale) can be heard. Its Lyric, currently creamed by every organ of record in the United States, is about necessity. It exhorts citizens to understand that the "bottom line" of national life is neither utopia nor freedom but survival, which can only be achieved by a citizenry that eats its anger, makes no unreasonable claims on resources or controls over value, and uses its most creative energy to cultivate intimate spheres while scrapping a Life together flexibly in response to the market world’s caprice8. In this particular moment of expanding class unconsciousness that looks like consciousness emerges a peculiar, though not unprecedented, here: the exploited child. If a worker can be infantilized, pictured as young, as small, as feminine or feminized, as starving, as bleeding and diseased, and as a (virtual) sieve, the righteous indignation around procuring his survival resounds everywhere. The child must not be sacrificed to states or to profiteering. His wounded image speaks a truth that subordinates narrative: he has not “freely” chosen his exploitation; the optimism and play that are putatively the right of childhood have been stolen from him. Yet only "voluntary" steps are ever taken to try to control this visible sign of what is ordinary and systemic amid the chaos of capitalism, in order in make its localized nightmares seem uninevitable. Privatize the atrocity, delete the visible sign, make it seem foreign. Return the child to the family, replace the children with admits who can look dignified while being paid virtually the same revoking wage. The problem that organizes so much feeling then regains livable proportions, and the uncomfortable pressure of feeling dissipates, like so much gas. Meanwhile, the pressure of feeling the shock of being uncomfortably political produces a cry for a double therapy—to the victim and the viewer. But before "we" appear too complacently different from the privileged citizens who desire to caption the mute image of exotic suffering with an aversively fascinated mooning (a desire for the image to be dead, a ghost), we must note that this feeling culture crosses over into other domains, the domains of what we call identity politics, where the wronged take up voice and agency to produce transformative testimony, which depends on an analogous conviction about the self-evidence and therefore the objectivity of painful feeling. The central concern of this essay is to address the place of painful feeling in the making of political worlds. In particular, I mean to challenge a powerful popular belief in the positive workings of something I call national sentimentality, a rhetoric of promise that a nation can be built across fields of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy. Sentimental politics generally promotes and maintains the hegemony of the national identity form, no mean feat in the face of continued widespread intercultural antagonism and economic cleavage. But national sentimentality is more than a current of feeling that circulates in a political field: the phrase describes a longstanding contest between two models of US. citizenship. In one, the classic made}, each citizen’s value is secured by an equation between abstractness and emancipation: a cell of national identity provides juridically protected personhood for citizens regardless of anything specific about them. In the second model, which was initially organized around labor, feminist, and antiracist struggles of the nineteenth-century United States, another version of the nation is imagined as the index of collective life. This nation is peopled by suffering citizens and noncitizens whose structural exclusion from the utopian-American dreamscape exposes the state's claim of legitimacy and virtue to an acid wash of truth telling that makes hegemonic disavowal virtually impossible, at certain moments of political intensity. Sentimentality has long been the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced, in the dominant public sphere, as the true core of national collectivity. It operates when the pain of intimate others burns into the conscience of classically privileged national subjects, such that they feel the pain of flawed or denied citizenship as their pain. Theoretically, to eradicate the pain those with power will do whatever is necessary to return the nation once more to its legitimately utopian order. Identification with pain, a universal true feeling, then leads to structural social change. In return, subalterns scarred by the pain of failed democracy will reauthorize universalist notions of citizenship in the national utopia, which involves in a redemptive notion of law as the guardian of public good. The object of the nation and the law in this light is to eradicate systemic social pain, the absence of which becomes the definition of freedom. Yet, since these very sources of protection—the state, the law, patriotic ideology—have traditionally buttressed traditional matrices of cultural hierarchy, and since their historic job has been to protect universal subject I citizens from feeling their culture} and corporeal specificity as a political vulnerability, the imagined capacity of these institutions to assimilate to the affective tactics of subaltern counterpolitics suggests some weaknesses, or misrecognitions, in these tactics. For one thing, it may be that the sharp specificity of the traumatic model of pain implicitly mischaracterizes what a person is as what a person becomes in the experience of social negation; this model also falsely premises a sharp picture of structural violence's source and scope, in tum promoting a dubious optimism that law and other visible sources of inequality, for example, can provide the best remedies for their own taxonomizing harms. It is also possible that counterhegemonic deployments of pain as the measure of structural injustice actually sustain the utopian image of a homogeneous national metaculture, which can look like a healed or healthy body in contrast to the scarred and exhausted ones. Finally, it might be that the tactical use of trauma to describe the effects of social inequality so overidentifies the eradication of pain with the achievement of justice that it enables various confusions: for instance, the equation of pleasure with freedom or the sense that changes in feeling, even on a mass scale, amount to substantial social change. Sentimental politics makes these confusions credible and these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the centrality of inter-personal identification and empathy to the vitality and viability of collective life. This gives citizens something to do in response to overwhelming structural violence. Meanwhile, by equating mass society with that thing called "national culture," these important transpersonal linkages and intimacies are too frequently serve as proleptic shields, as ethically uncontestable legitimating devices for sustaining the hegemonic field.9

<h4><strong>This marketplace for trauma creates the very conditions for imperial control that they criticize </h4><p>Berlant 1999</p><p></strong>/Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and Politics” in <u><strong>Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law ed. Sarat & Kearns, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Pg. 49-54/</p><p></u></strong>Ravaged wages and <u><strong><mark>ravaged bodies saturate the global marketplace</mark> in which the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>seeks </u></strong>desperately <u><strong>to compete</u></strong> “competitively,” as the euphemism goes, <u><strong><mark>signifying a race that will be won by the nations whose</u></strong></mark> labor <u><strong><mark>conditions are most optimal</u></strong></mark> for profit? In the United States <u><strong><mark>the media</mark> of the political public sphere <mark>regularly register new scandals</u></strong></mark> of the proliferating sweatshop networks <u><strong><mark>“at home” and “abroad,” which has to be a good thing, because it produces feeling and</mark> with it something at least akin to <mark>consciousness</mark> that can lead to action</u></strong>.3 <u><strong><mark>Yet even as the image of the traumatized</u></strong></mark> worker <u><strong><mark>proliferates</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>even as evidence of exploitation is found under every rock or commodity, <mark>it competes with a normative/utopian image of the U.S. citizens who remains unmarked</mark>, framed, <mark>and protected by</mark> the private trajectory of his life project</u></strong> <u><strong>which is</u></strong> sanctified at the juncture where the unconscious meets history: <u><strong><mark>the American Dream</u></strong></mark>.4 in that story one’s identity is not borne of suffering, mental, physical, or economic. If the U.S. Worker’s lucky enough to live at an economic moment that sustains the Dream he gets to appear at his least national when he is working and at his most national at leisure, with his family or in semipublic worlds of other men producing surplus manliness (e.g., via sports). In the American dreamscape his identity is private property, a zone in which structural obstacles and cultural differences fade into an ether of prolonged, deferred, and individuating enjoyment that he has earned and that the nation has helped him to earn. Meanwhile, <u><strong><mark>exploitation only appears as a scandalous nugget in the sieve of memory</mark> when it can be condensed into an exotic thing of momentary fascination, a squalor of the bottom too horrible to be read in its own actual banality.</u></strong> <u><strong>The exposed traumas</u></strong> of workers in ongoing extreme conditions <u><strong>do not</u></strong> generally <u><strong>induce more than mourning on the part of the state and the public culture to whose feeling based opinions the state is said to respond</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Mourning is what happens when a grounding object is lost</mark>, is dead, <mark>no longer living (to you).</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Mourning is an experience of irreducible boundedness: I am here, I am living, he is dead</u></strong>, I am mourning. <u><strong><mark>It is a beautiful</u></strong></mark>, not sublime, <u><strong><mark>experience of emancipation</mark>: mourning supplies the subject the definitional perfection of a being no longer in flux. <mark>It takes place over a distance: even if the object who induces the feeling of loss</mark> and helplessness <mark>is neither dead nor at any great distance</u></strong></mark> from where you are? In other words, <u><strong><mark>mounting can</mark> also <mark>be an act of aggression,</mark> of <mark>social deathmaking: it can perform the evacuation of significance</mark> from actually-existing subjects. Even when liberals do it</u></strong>, one might say, <u><strong>are ghosted for a good cause</u></strong>.6<u><strong> <mark>The sorrow songs of scandal that sing of the exploitation that is always "elsewhere"</mark> (even a few blocks away) <mark>are</mark> in this sense <mark>aggressively songs of mourning. Play them backward, and the military march of capitalist triumphalism</u></strong></mark> (<u><strong>The Trans-Nationale) <mark>can be heard.</mark> Its Lyric, currently creamed by every organ of record in the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, <u><strong>is about necessity. <mark>It exhorts citizens to understand that the "bottom line"</mark> of national life <mark>is</mark> neither utopia nor freedom but <mark>survival,</u></strong> <u><strong>which can only be achieved by a citizenry that</mark> eats its anger,</u></strong> makes no unreasonable claims on resources or controls over value, <u><strong>and <mark>uses its most creative energy to cultivate intimate spheres while scrapping a Life together flexibly in response to the market world’s caprice</u></strong></mark>8. In this particular moment of expanding class unconsciousness that looks like consciousness emerges a peculiar, though not unprecedented, here: the exploited child. If a worker can be infantilized, pictured as young, as small, as feminine or feminized, as starving, as bleeding and diseased, and as a (virtual) sieve, the righteous indignation around procuring his survival resounds everywhere. The child must not be sacrificed to states or to profiteering. His wounded image speaks a truth that subordinates narrative: he has not “freely” chosen his exploitation; the optimism and play that are putatively the right of childhood have been stolen from him. Yet only "voluntary" steps are ever taken to try to control this visible sign of what is ordinary and systemic amid the chaos of capitalism, in order in make its localized nightmares seem uninevitable. Privatize the atrocity, delete the visible sign, make it seem foreign. Return the child to the family, replace the children with admits who can look dignified while being paid virtually the same revoking wage. The problem that organizes so much feeling then regains livable proportions, and the uncomfortable pressure of feeling dissipates, like so much gas. Meanwhile, <u><strong><mark>the pressure of feeling the shock of being uncomfortably political produces a cry for a double therapy—</mark>to the <mark>victim and</mark> the <mark>viewer.</mark> But before "we" appear too complacently different from the privileged citizens who desire to caption the mute image of exotic suffering with an aversively fascinated mooning</u></strong> (a desire for the image to be dead, a ghost), <u><strong>w<mark>e must note that this feeling culture crosses</mark> over <mark>into other domains</mark>, the domains <mark>of</mark> what we call <mark>identity politics, where the wronged take up voice and agency to produce transformative testimony, which depends on</mark> an analogous conviction about the <mark>self-evidence and</mark> therefore <mark>the objectivity of painful feeling.</u></strong></mark> The central concern of this essay is to address the place of painful feeling in the making of political worlds. In particular, <u><strong><mark>I mean to challenge</u></strong></mark> a powerful popular <u><strong><mark>belief in the positive workings of</mark> </u></strong>something I call <u><strong><mark>national sentimentality</mark>, a rhetoric of promise that a nation can be built across fields of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy. <mark>Sentimental politics</u></strong></mark> generally <u><strong><mark>promotes and maintains the hegemony of the national identity form</mark>, no mean feat in the face of continued widespread intercultural antagonism and economic cleavage.</u></strong> But national sentimentality is more than a current of feeling that circulates in a political field: the phrase describes a longstanding contest between two models of US. citizenship. In one, the classic made}, each citizen’s value is secured by an equation between abstractness and emancipation: a cell of national identity provides juridically protected personhood for citizens regardless of anything specific about them. In the second model, which was initially organized around labor, feminist, and antiracist struggles of the nineteenth-century United States, another version of the nation is imagined as the index of collective life. This nation is peopled by suffering citizens and noncitizens whose structural exclusion from the utopian-American dreamscape exposes the state's claim of legitimacy and virtue to an acid wash of truth telling that makes hegemonic disavowal virtually impossible, at certain moments of political intensity. <u><strong><mark>Sentimentality has long been the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced</mark>, in the dominant public sphere, <mark>as the true core of national collectivity.</u></strong> <u><strong>It operates when the pain of intimate others burns into the conscience of</mark> classically <mark>privileged</mark> national <mark>subjects, such that they feel the pain of</u></strong></mark> flawed or <u><strong><mark>denied citizenship as their pain</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Theoretically</u></strong></mark>, to eradicate the pain those with power will do whatever is necessary to return the nation once more to its legitimately utopian order. <u><strong><mark>Identification with pain</mark>, a universal true feeling, then <mark>leads to</mark> structural social <mark>change</u></strong></mark>. In return, subalterns scarred by the pain of failed democracy will reauthorize universalist notions of citizenship in the national utopia, which involves in a redemptive notion of law as the guardian of public good. The object of the nation and the law in this light is to eradicate systemic social pain, the absence of which becomes the definition of freedom. <u><strong><mark>Yet, since these very sources of protection</u></strong></mark>—the state, the law, patriotic ideology—<u><strong><mark>have</u></strong></mark> traditionally <u><strong><mark>buttressed traditional matrices of cultural hierarchy</u></strong>, <u><strong>and since their historic job has been to protect universal subject</u></strong></mark> I citizens <u><strong><mark>from feeling</u></strong></mark> their culture} <u><strong>and <mark>corporeal specificity as a political vulnerability, the imagined capacity of these institutions to assimilate to the affective tactics of subaltern counterpolitics suggests</mark> some <mark>weaknesses</mark>, or misrecognitions, <mark>in these tactics</u></strong></mark>. For one thing, it may be that <u><strong><mark>the sharp specificity of the traumatic model of pain</u></strong></mark> implicitly <u><strong><mark>mischaracterizes what a person is as what a person becomes in the experience of social negation</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>this model</mark> also <mark>falsely premises a sharp picture of structural violence's source and scope</mark>, in tum promoting a dubious optimism that law and other visible sources of inequality</u></strong>, for example, <u><strong>can provide the best remedies for their own taxonomizing harms</u></strong>. It is also possible that <u><strong><mark>counterhegemonic deployments of pain</mark> as the measure of structural injustice <mark>actually sustain the utopian image of a homogeneous national metaculture, which can look like a healed</mark> or healthy <mark>body</mark> in contrast to the scarred and exhausted ones.</u></strong> Finally, it might be that <u><strong><mark>the tactical use of trauma to describe</mark> the effects of <mark>social inequality so overidentifies the eradication of pain with the achievement of justice that it enables</mark> various <mark>confusions</u></strong></mark>: for instance, <u><strong>the <mark>equation of pleasure with freedom or the sense that changes in feeling</mark>, even on a mass scale, <mark>amount to substantial</mark> social <mark>change</u></strong>. <u><strong>Sentimental politics makes these confusions credible and these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the centrality of inter-personal identification and empathy to the vitality</mark> and viability <mark>of collective life</u></strong>. <u><strong>This gives citizens something to do in response to overwhelming structural violence. Meanwhile</mark>, by equating mass society with that thing called "national culture," <mark>these</mark> important transpersonal <mark>linkages</mark> and intimacies are <mark>too frequently serve</mark> as proleptic shields, <mark>as ethically uncontestable legitimating devices for sustaining the hegemonic field</mark>.</u></strong>9</p>

Berlant 1999

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Berlant 1999 fulltext: /Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and Politics” in Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law ed. Sarat & Kearns, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Pg. 49-54/ Ravaged wages and ravaged bodies saturate the global marketplace in which the United States seeks desperately to compete “competitively,” as the euphemism goes, signifying a race that will be won by the nations whose labor conditions are most optimal for profit? In the United States the media of the political public sphere regularly register new scandals of the proliferating sweatshop networks “at home” and “abroad,” which has to be a good thing, because it produces feeling and with it something at least akin to consciousness that can lead to action.3 Yet even as the image of the traumatized worker proliferates, even as evidence of exploitation is found under every rock or commodity, it competes with a normative/utopian image of the U.S. citizens who remains unmarked, framed, and protected by the private trajectory of his life project which is sanctified at the juncture where the unconscious meets history: the American Dream.4 in that story one’s identity is not borne of suffering, mental, physical, or economic. If the U.S. Worker’s lucky enough to live at an economic moment that sustains the Dream he gets to appear at his least national when he is working and at his most national at leisure, with his family or in semipublic worlds of other men producing surplus manliness (e.g., via sports). In the American dreamscape his identity is private property, a zone in which structural obstacles and cultural differences fade into an ether of prolonged, deferred, and individuating enjoyment that he has earned and that the nation has helped him to earn. Meanwhile, exploitation only appears as a scandalous nugget in the sieve of memory when it can be condensed into an exotic thing of momentary fascination, a squalor of the bottom too horrible to be read in its own actual banality. The exposed traumas of workers in ongoing extreme conditions do not generally induce more than mourning on the part of the state and the public culture to whose feeling based opinions the state is said to respond. Mourning is what happens when a grounding object is lost, is dead, no longer living (to you). Mourning is an experience of irreducible boundedness: I am here, I am living, he is dead, I am mourning. It is a beautiful, not sublime, experience of emancipation: mourning supplies the subject the definitional perfection of a being no longer in flux. It takes place over a distance: even if the object who induces the feeling of loss and helplessness is neither dead nor at any great distance from where you are? In other words, mounting can also be an act of aggression, of social deathmaking: it can perform the evacuation of significance from actually-existing subjects. Even when liberals do it, one might say, are ghosted for a good cause.6 The sorrow songs of scandal that sing of the exploitation that is always "elsewhere" (even a few blocks away) are in this sense aggressively songs of mourning. Play them backward, and the military march of capitalist triumphalism (The Trans-Nationale) can be heard. Its Lyric, currently creamed by every organ of record in the United States, is about necessity. It exhorts citizens to understand that the "bottom line" of national life is neither utopia nor freedom but survival, which can only be achieved by a citizenry that eats its anger, makes no unreasonable claims on resources or controls over value, and uses its most creative energy to cultivate intimate spheres while scrapping a Life together flexibly in response to the market world’s caprice8. In this particular moment of expanding class unconsciousness that looks like consciousness emerges a peculiar, though not unprecedented, here: the exploited child. If a worker can be infantilized, pictured as young, as small, as feminine or feminized, as starving, as bleeding and diseased, and as a (virtual) sieve, the righteous indignation around procuring his survival resounds everywhere. The child must not be sacrificed to states or to profiteering. His wounded image speaks a truth that subordinates narrative: he has not “freely” chosen his exploitation; the optimism and play that are putatively the right of childhood have been stolen from him. Yet only "voluntary" steps are ever taken to try to control this visible sign of what is ordinary and systemic amid the chaos of capitalism, in order in make its localized nightmares seem uninevitable. Privatize the atrocity, delete the visible sign, make it seem foreign. Return the child to the family, replace the children with admits who can look dignified while being paid virtually the same revoking wage. The problem that organizes so much feeling then regains livable proportions, and the uncomfortable pressure of feeling dissipates, like so much gas. Meanwhile, the pressure of feeling the shock of being uncomfortably political produces a cry for a double therapy—to the victim and the viewer. But before "we" appear too complacently different from the privileged citizens who desire to caption the mute image of exotic suffering with an aversively fascinated mooning (a desire for the image to be dead, a ghost), we must note that this feeling culture crosses over into other domains, the domains of what we call identity politics, where the wronged take up voice and agency to produce transformative testimony, which depends on an analogous conviction about the self-evidence and therefore the objectivity of painful feeling. The central concern of this essay is to address the place of painful feeling in the making of political worlds. In particular, I mean to challenge a powerful popular belief in the positive workings of something I call national sentimentality, a rhetoric of promise that a nation can be built across fields of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy. Sentimental politics generally promotes and maintains the hegemony of the national identity form, no mean feat in the face of continued widespread intercultural antagonism and economic cleavage. But national sentimentality is more than a current of feeling that circulates in a political field: the phrase describes a longstanding contest between two models of US. citizenship. In one, the classic made}, each citizen’s value is secured by an equation between abstractness and emancipation: a cell of national identity provides juridically protected personhood for citizens regardless of anything specific about them. In the second model, which was initially organized around labor, feminist, and antiracist struggles of the nineteenth-century United States, another version of the nation is imagined as the index of collective life. This nation is peopled by suffering citizens and noncitizens whose structural exclusion from the utopian-American dreamscape exposes the state's claim of legitimacy and virtue to an acid wash of truth telling that makes hegemonic disavowal virtually impossible, at certain moments of political intensity. Sentimentality has long been the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced, in the dominant public sphere, as the true core of national collectivity. It operates when the pain of intimate others burns into the conscience of classically privileged national subjects, such that they feel the pain of flawed or denied citizenship as their pain. Theoretically, to eradicate the pain those with power will do whatever is necessary to return the nation once more to its legitimately utopian order. Identification with pain, a universal true feeling, then leads to structural social change. In return, subalterns scarred by the pain of failed democracy will reauthorize universalist notions of citizenship in the national utopia, which involves in a redemptive notion of law as the guardian of public good. The object of the nation and the law in this light is to eradicate systemic social pain, the absence of which becomes the definition of freedom. Yet, since these very sources of protection—the state, the law, patriotic ideology—have traditionally buttressed traditional matrices of cultural hierarchy, and since their historic job has been to protect universal subject I citizens from feeling their culture} and corporeal specificity as a political vulnerability, the imagined capacity of these institutions to assimilate to the affective tactics of subaltern counterpolitics suggests some weaknesses, or misrecognitions, in these tactics. For one thing, it may be that the sharp specificity of the traumatic model of pain implicitly mischaracterizes what a person is as what a person becomes in the experience of social negation; this model also falsely premises a sharp picture of structural violence's source and scope, in tum promoting a dubious optimism that law and other visible sources of inequality, for example, can provide the best remedies for their own taxonomizing harms. It is also possible that counterhegemonic deployments of pain as the measure of structural injustice actually sustain the utopian image of a homogeneous national metaculture, which can look like a healed or healthy body in contrast to the scarred and exhausted ones. Finally, it might be that the tactical use of trauma to describe the effects of social inequality so overidentifies the eradication of pain with the achievement of justice that it enables various confusions: for instance, the equation of pleasure with freedom or the sense that changes in feeling, even on a mass scale, amount to substantial social change. Sentimental politics makes these confusions credible and these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the centrality of inter-personal identification and empathy to the vitality and viability of collective life. This gives citizens something to do in response to overwhelming structural violence. Meanwhile, by equating mass society with that thing called "national culture," these important transpersonal linkages and intimacies are too frequently serve as proleptic shields, as ethically uncontestable legitimating devices for sustaining the hegemonic field.9 [/INST] <h4><strong>This marketplace for trauma creates the very conditions for imperial control that they criticize </h4><p>Berlant 1999</p><p></strong>/Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and Politics” in <u><strong>Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law ed. Sarat & Kearns, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Pg. 49-54/</p><p></u></strong>Ravaged wages and <u><strong><mark>ravaged bodies saturate the global marketplace</mark> in which the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>seeks </u></strong>desperately <u><strong>to compete</u></strong> “competitively,” as the euphemism goes, <u><strong><mark>signifying a race that will be won by the nations whose</u></strong></mark> labor <u><strong><mark>conditions are most optimal</u></strong></mark> for profit? In the United States <u><strong><mark>the media</mark> of the political public sphere <mark>regularly register new scandals</u></strong></mark> of the proliferating sweatshop networks <u><strong><mark>“at home” and “abroad,” which has to be a good thing, because it produces feeling and</mark> with it something at least akin to <mark>consciousness</mark> that can lead to action</u></strong>.3 <u><strong><mark>Yet even as the image of the traumatized</u></strong></mark> worker <u><strong><mark>proliferates</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>even as evidence of exploitation is found under every rock or commodity, <mark>it competes with a normative/utopian image of the U.S. citizens who remains unmarked</mark>, framed, <mark>and protected by</mark> the private trajectory of his life project</u></strong> <u><strong>which is</u></strong> sanctified at the juncture where the unconscious meets history: <u><strong><mark>the American Dream</u></strong></mark>.4 in that story one’s identity is not borne of suffering, mental, physical, or economic. If the U.S. Worker’s lucky enough to live at an economic moment that sustains the Dream he gets to appear at his least national when he is working and at his most national at leisure, with his family or in semipublic worlds of other men producing surplus manliness (e.g., via sports). In the American dreamscape his identity is private property, a zone in which structural obstacles and cultural differences fade into an ether of prolonged, deferred, and individuating enjoyment that he has earned and that the nation has helped him to earn. Meanwhile, <u><strong><mark>exploitation only appears as a scandalous nugget in the sieve of memory</mark> when it can be condensed into an exotic thing of momentary fascination, a squalor of the bottom too horrible to be read in its own actual banality.</u></strong> <u><strong>The exposed traumas</u></strong> of workers in ongoing extreme conditions <u><strong>do not</u></strong> generally <u><strong>induce more than mourning on the part of the state and the public culture to whose feeling based opinions the state is said to respond</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Mourning is what happens when a grounding object is lost</mark>, is dead, <mark>no longer living (to you).</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Mourning is an experience of irreducible boundedness: I am here, I am living, he is dead</u></strong>, I am mourning. <u><strong><mark>It is a beautiful</u></strong></mark>, not sublime, <u><strong><mark>experience of emancipation</mark>: mourning supplies the subject the definitional perfection of a being no longer in flux. <mark>It takes place over a distance: even if the object who induces the feeling of loss</mark> and helplessness <mark>is neither dead nor at any great distance</u></strong></mark> from where you are? In other words, <u><strong><mark>mounting can</mark> also <mark>be an act of aggression,</mark> of <mark>social deathmaking: it can perform the evacuation of significance</mark> from actually-existing subjects. Even when liberals do it</u></strong>, one might say, <u><strong>are ghosted for a good cause</u></strong>.6<u><strong> <mark>The sorrow songs of scandal that sing of the exploitation that is always "elsewhere"</mark> (even a few blocks away) <mark>are</mark> in this sense <mark>aggressively songs of mourning. Play them backward, and the military march of capitalist triumphalism</u></strong></mark> (<u><strong>The Trans-Nationale) <mark>can be heard.</mark> Its Lyric, currently creamed by every organ of record in the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, <u><strong>is about necessity. <mark>It exhorts citizens to understand that the "bottom line"</mark> of national life <mark>is</mark> neither utopia nor freedom but <mark>survival,</u></strong> <u><strong>which can only be achieved by a citizenry that</mark> eats its anger,</u></strong> makes no unreasonable claims on resources or controls over value, <u><strong>and <mark>uses its most creative energy to cultivate intimate spheres while scrapping a Life together flexibly in response to the market world’s caprice</u></strong></mark>8. In this particular moment of expanding class unconsciousness that looks like consciousness emerges a peculiar, though not unprecedented, here: the exploited child. If a worker can be infantilized, pictured as young, as small, as feminine or feminized, as starving, as bleeding and diseased, and as a (virtual) sieve, the righteous indignation around procuring his survival resounds everywhere. The child must not be sacrificed to states or to profiteering. His wounded image speaks a truth that subordinates narrative: he has not “freely” chosen his exploitation; the optimism and play that are putatively the right of childhood have been stolen from him. Yet only "voluntary" steps are ever taken to try to control this visible sign of what is ordinary and systemic amid the chaos of capitalism, in order in make its localized nightmares seem uninevitable. Privatize the atrocity, delete the visible sign, make it seem foreign. Return the child to the family, replace the children with admits who can look dignified while being paid virtually the same revoking wage. The problem that organizes so much feeling then regains livable proportions, and the uncomfortable pressure of feeling dissipates, like so much gas. Meanwhile, <u><strong><mark>the pressure of feeling the shock of being uncomfortably political produces a cry for a double therapy—</mark>to the <mark>victim and</mark> the <mark>viewer.</mark> But before "we" appear too complacently different from the privileged citizens who desire to caption the mute image of exotic suffering with an aversively fascinated mooning</u></strong> (a desire for the image to be dead, a ghost), <u><strong>w<mark>e must note that this feeling culture crosses</mark> over <mark>into other domains</mark>, the domains <mark>of</mark> what we call <mark>identity politics, where the wronged take up voice and agency to produce transformative testimony, which depends on</mark> an analogous conviction about the <mark>self-evidence and</mark> therefore <mark>the objectivity of painful feeling.</u></strong></mark> The central concern of this essay is to address the place of painful feeling in the making of political worlds. In particular, <u><strong><mark>I mean to challenge</u></strong></mark> a powerful popular <u><strong><mark>belief in the positive workings of</mark> </u></strong>something I call <u><strong><mark>national sentimentality</mark>, a rhetoric of promise that a nation can be built across fields of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy. <mark>Sentimental politics</u></strong></mark> generally <u><strong><mark>promotes and maintains the hegemony of the national identity form</mark>, no mean feat in the face of continued widespread intercultural antagonism and economic cleavage.</u></strong> But national sentimentality is more than a current of feeling that circulates in a political field: the phrase describes a longstanding contest between two models of US. citizenship. In one, the classic made}, each citizen’s value is secured by an equation between abstractness and emancipation: a cell of national identity provides juridically protected personhood for citizens regardless of anything specific about them. In the second model, which was initially organized around labor, feminist, and antiracist struggles of the nineteenth-century United States, another version of the nation is imagined as the index of collective life. This nation is peopled by suffering citizens and noncitizens whose structural exclusion from the utopian-American dreamscape exposes the state's claim of legitimacy and virtue to an acid wash of truth telling that makes hegemonic disavowal virtually impossible, at certain moments of political intensity. <u><strong><mark>Sentimentality has long been the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced</mark>, in the dominant public sphere, <mark>as the true core of national collectivity.</u></strong> <u><strong>It operates when the pain of intimate others burns into the conscience of</mark> classically <mark>privileged</mark> national <mark>subjects, such that they feel the pain of</u></strong></mark> flawed or <u><strong><mark>denied citizenship as their pain</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Theoretically</u></strong></mark>, to eradicate the pain those with power will do whatever is necessary to return the nation once more to its legitimately utopian order. <u><strong><mark>Identification with pain</mark>, a universal true feeling, then <mark>leads to</mark> structural social <mark>change</u></strong></mark>. In return, subalterns scarred by the pain of failed democracy will reauthorize universalist notions of citizenship in the national utopia, which involves in a redemptive notion of law as the guardian of public good. The object of the nation and the law in this light is to eradicate systemic social pain, the absence of which becomes the definition of freedom. <u><strong><mark>Yet, since these very sources of protection</u></strong></mark>—the state, the law, patriotic ideology—<u><strong><mark>have</u></strong></mark> traditionally <u><strong><mark>buttressed traditional matrices of cultural hierarchy</u></strong>, <u><strong>and since their historic job has been to protect universal subject</u></strong></mark> I citizens <u><strong><mark>from feeling</u></strong></mark> their culture} <u><strong>and <mark>corporeal specificity as a political vulnerability, the imagined capacity of these institutions to assimilate to the affective tactics of subaltern counterpolitics suggests</mark> some <mark>weaknesses</mark>, or misrecognitions, <mark>in these tactics</u></strong></mark>. For one thing, it may be that <u><strong><mark>the sharp specificity of the traumatic model of pain</u></strong></mark> implicitly <u><strong><mark>mischaracterizes what a person is as what a person becomes in the experience of social negation</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>this model</mark> also <mark>falsely premises a sharp picture of structural violence's source and scope</mark>, in tum promoting a dubious optimism that law and other visible sources of inequality</u></strong>, for example, <u><strong>can provide the best remedies for their own taxonomizing harms</u></strong>. It is also possible that <u><strong><mark>counterhegemonic deployments of pain</mark> as the measure of structural injustice <mark>actually sustain the utopian image of a homogeneous national metaculture, which can look like a healed</mark> or healthy <mark>body</mark> in contrast to the scarred and exhausted ones.</u></strong> Finally, it might be that <u><strong><mark>the tactical use of trauma to describe</mark> the effects of <mark>social inequality so overidentifies the eradication of pain with the achievement of justice that it enables</mark> various <mark>confusions</u></strong></mark>: for instance, <u><strong>the <mark>equation of pleasure with freedom or the sense that changes in feeling</mark>, even on a mass scale, <mark>amount to substantial</mark> social <mark>change</u></strong>. <u><strong>Sentimental politics makes these confusions credible and these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the centrality of inter-personal identification and empathy to the vitality</mark> and viability <mark>of collective life</u></strong>. <u><strong>This gives citizens something to do in response to overwhelming structural violence. Meanwhile</mark>, by equating mass society with that thing called "national culture," <mark>these</mark> important transpersonal <mark>linkages</mark> and intimacies are <mark>too frequently serve</mark> as proleptic shields, <mark>as ethically uncontestable legitimating devices for sustaining the hegemonic field</mark>.</u></strong>9</p> </s>

The 2016 conference success is key to African and Afghan stability

the political context is more complicated today than it was around the 2012 Summit of the Americas. There is widespread consensus that the 'war on drugs' has failed drugs are a health problem and that use and possession should be decriminalized further. Political leadership towards reform is also more hesitant than it was in 2012. Santos of Colombia has taken a back seat in the international debate to some extent Guatemala remains very proactive However, it is a small country that needs partners and has been more reluctant than its neighbours to engage in a review of its domestic policy In the United States, the referendums in Colorado and Washington, and the OAS report, have put pressure on the Obama administration to discuss domestic and international drug policy reforms more openly. Some notable progress has been made Holder confirmed that the Department of Justice would not seek to challenge the marijuana regulation laws in Colorado and Washington. However, concerns remain on the international stage as to how open the United States will be in discussing and promoting reform given the country's historical reluctance to challenge international drugs conventions. Russia is pushing for harsher counter-narcotics policies in the country Russia's uncompromising prohibitionist stance continues to be popular in numerous countries in Asia and Africa that advocate zero-tolerance. European governments have largely stayed away from the recent international debates. Other regions of the world face increased levels of political uncertainty and insecurity related to drug production and trafficking. West Africa struggles to tackle the multiple challenges linked to the growing trade through the region, including corruption, organized crime, financing of extremist organizations, an increase in addiction and an increased burden on law-enforcement agencies and other already struggling public institutions. In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of ISAF from the country and the transition to an Afghan-led security apparatus shows little promise of mitigating opium production and related corruption. current difficulties and the overall complexity of the problem should not be used as an excuse for policy inaction and inertia. The current situation — characterized by persistent levels of violence, insecurity and corruption, changing trade routes causing instability in new regions, the emergence of new drugs and the negative impact of drug policies — is no longer sustainable. Drug control policies around the world have often proved at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive, unless they strayed away from the strict letter of the UN conventions. However, a tipping point has been reached Current policies are no longer sustainable and therefore momentum is growing towards more responsible and comprehensive responses to the global problem of illicit drugs. The UNGASS in 2016 provides an opportunity for governments to review and reform their policies at the national and regional levels. regional and international discussions will crucial to tackle these truly transnational challenges and opt for more adequate responses that focus on reducing the harms caused by drug consumption, trafficking and production, and drug policies themselves.

There is widespread consensus the 'war on drugs' has failed, and possession should be decriminalized leadership towards reform is hesitant referendums put pressure on Obama to discuss international drug policy concerns remain as to how the United States will reform given historical reluctance to challenge international drugs conventions. West Africa struggles to tackle crime extremist organizations and struggling institutions In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of ISAF and Afghan security shows little promise of mitigating production complexity should not be used as an excuse for inaction The current situation characterized by violence insecurity corruption instability is no longer sustainable Drug control policies proved counter-productive, unless they strayed away from UN conventions a tipping point has been reached momentum is growing towards responsible responses to global drugs. UNGAS 2016 provides an opportunity for governments to reform policies

I the last three years, the drug policy debate has evolved more than in the previous three decades. However, there remain a number of obstacles to making recent developments sustainable ahead of UNGASS 2016. Although Latin American leaders mental in pushing the debate forward, the political context is more complicated today than it was around the 2012 Summit of the Americas. There is widespread consensus in the region that the 'war on drugs' has failed, that drugs are primarily a health problem, and that use and possession should be decriminalized further. However, disagreements remain on how to control supply (in particular on the effectiveness of regulation models), what law enforcement should look like in a regulated market, and what public health strategies mean in practice, especially in countries that have had difficulty in controlling parts of their territory and collecting taxes. Political leadership towards reform is also more hesitant than it was in 2012. In Mexico, President Enriqe Pena Nieto has been willing to discuss alternative policies. He has said he would aim to prioritize social and economic issues, and readjust security policy towards reducing violence while ending widespread US access to Mexican intelligence. However, the Mexican government is undertaking other ambitious reforms, including in the energy and education sectors and in economic and fiscal policy. The country's diplomatic efforts with the United States have also prioritized immigration and gun laws drug policy reform. President Santos of Colombia over has taken a back seat in the international debate to some extent, focusing instead on the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), and on the forth-coming presidential elections. Guatemala, under the leadership of President Molina and Foreign Minister Fernando Carrera, remains very proactive and continues to punch above its weight in the drug debate. However, it is a small country that needs partners and has been more reluctant than its neighbours to engage in a review of its domestic policy. Two elements further complicate the political context in Latin America. The revelation by Edward Snowden of widespread US intelligence activities that included targeting the emails of former president Felipe Calderön and the text messages of Pena Nieto when he "'as running for president may have an impact on Mexico's collaboration with the United States. Although such intelligence practices were arguably always presumed within the country s political elite, their public revelation means that government leaders need to address the issue." In addition, the populations of Latin American countries are still predominantly against more progressive drugs policies. In Uruguay, 63 per cent of the population were opposed to the marijuana bill in July 2013." Around the same time in Mexico, only 32 per cent of the population supported marijuana legalization." The support has been even lower in Colombia and Peru — respectively 13 per cent and 11 per cent in 2010." In the United States, the referendums in Colorado and Washington, and the OAS report, have put pressure on the Obama administration to discuss domestic and international drug policy reforms more openly. Some notable progress has been made domestically. US Attorney General Eric Holder has announced that the federal government would order prosecutors to sidestep federal mandatory minimum sentencing in certain low-level cases as a way to reduce the prison population. He also confirmed that the Department of Justice would not seek to challenge the marijuana regulation laws in Colorado and Washington. However, concerns remain on the international stage as to how open the United States will be in discussing and promoting reform given the country's historical reluctance to challenge international drugs conventions. Russia, meanwhile has expressed concerns over flows of drugs from Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2014. It is pushing for harsher counter-narcotics policies in the country, as the latest UN report indicates a record annual increase of opium production." Russia has also supported a series of counter-narcotics programmes focused on law enforcement and interdiction training in Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan, and in Central American countries. Russia's uncompromising prohibitionist stance continues to be popular in numerous countries in Asia and Africa that advocate zero-tolerance. Europe certainly has lessons to offer regarding drug policy but European governments have largely stayed away from the recent international debates. In countries such as Portugal, where progressive policies have been implemented, budgetary pressures and the rise of conservative views are endangering progress domestically." In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister David Cameron rejected the parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee's proposal for a Royal Commission to comprehensively reassess current policies. Home Secretary Theresa May has been reluctant to discuss reform, even disregarding recommendations from the Advisory' Council on the Misuse of Drugs and putting in place a ban on khat. An internal review into drug policy concluded that decreases in use in the country demonstrate that policies are working. This argument, however, ignores the international nature of the challenge and the larger responsibility of West European governments in tackling a truly global and complex problem that fuels high levels of organized and violence. In addition, the United Kingdom faces an increase in the use of other drugs, including new psycho-active substances and over-the-counter or prescription medicine. Other regions of the world face increased levels of political uncertainty and insecurity related to drug production and trafficking. West Africa struggles to tackle the multiple challenges linked to the growing trade through the region, including corruption, organized crime, financing of extremist organizations, an increase in addiction and an increased burden on law-enforcement agencies and other already struggling public institutions. In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of ISAF from the country and the transition to an Afghan-led security apparatus shows little promise of mitigating opium production and related corruption. This international political context makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to substantially reform the UN conventions. However, current difficulties and the overall complexity of the problem should not be used as an excuse for policy inaction and inertia. The current situation — characterized by persistent levels of violence, insecurity and corruption, changing trade routes causing instability in new regions, the emergence of new drugs and the negative impact of drug policies — is no longer sustainable. In 2012, President Santos of Colombia said: 'Sometimes we all feel that we have been pedalling on a stationary bicycle. We look to our right and our left and we still see the same landscape. Little progress has been made in the drug policy field since President Richard Nixon first called drug abuse 'America's public enemy number one in the United States" and policies have caused much damage. Drug control policies around the world have often proved at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive, unless they strayed away from the strict letter of the UN conventions. However, a tipping point has been reached. Current policies are no longer sustainable and therefore momentum is growing towards more responsible and comprehensive responses to the global problem of illicit drugs. The UNGASS in 2016 provides an opportunity for governments to review and reform their policies at the national and regional levels. A number of national governments, including Colombia's, have embarked on much-needed review processes of their domestic drug policies, but regional and international discussions will crucial to tackle these truly transnational challenges and opt for more adequate responses that focus on reducing the harms caused by drug consumption, trafficking and production, and drug policies themselves.

<h4>The 2016 conference success is key to African and Afghan stability</h4><p>Benoit <strong>Gomis 14</strong> is a Visiting Scholar at the University Of British Columbia and the Canadian Network for Research in Terrorism, Security and Society, PhD LSE and UChicago, “Illicit Drugs and International Security: Towards UNGASS 2016,” International Security, February, #SPS</p><p>I the last three years, the drug policy debate has evolved more than in the previous three decades. However, there remain a number of obstacles to making recent developments sustainable ahead of UNGASS 2016. Although Latin American leaders mental in pushing the debate forward, <u>the political context is more complicated today than it was around the 2012 Summit of the Americas.</u> <u><mark>There is <strong>widespread consensus</u></strong></mark> in the region <u>that <strong><mark>the 'war on drugs' has failed</u></strong>,</mark> that <u>drugs are </u>primarily <u>a health problem</u>, <u><mark>and </mark>that use and <strong><mark>possession should be decriminalized</strong></mark> further.</u> However, disagreements remain on how to control supply (in particular on the effectiveness of regulation models), what law enforcement should look like in a regulated market, and what public health strategies mean in practice, especially in countries that have had difficulty in controlling parts of their territory and collecting taxes. <u>Political <strong><mark>leadership towards reform is</strong></mark> also more <strong><mark>hesitant</strong></mark> than it was in 2012.</u> In Mexico, President Enriqe Pena Nieto has been willing to discuss alternative policies. He has said he would aim to prioritize social and economic issues, and readjust security policy towards reducing violence while ending widespread US access to Mexican intelligence. However, the Mexican government is undertaking other ambitious reforms, including in the energy and education sectors and in economic and fiscal policy. The country's diplomatic efforts with the United States have also prioritized immigration and gun laws drug policy reform. President <u>Santos of Colombia</u> over <u>has taken a back seat in the international debate to some extent</u>, focusing instead on the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), and on the forth-coming presidential elections. <u>Guatemala</u>, under the leadership of President Molina and Foreign Minister Fernando Carrera, <u>remains very proactive</u> and continues to punch above its weight in the drug debate. <u>However, it is a small country that needs partners and has been more reluctant than its neighbours to engage in a review of its domestic policy</u>. Two elements further complicate the political context in Latin America. The revelation by Edward Snowden of widespread US intelligence activities that included targeting the emails of former president Felipe Calderön and the text messages of Pena Nieto when he "'as running for president may have an impact on Mexico's collaboration with the United States. Although such intelligence practices were arguably always presumed within the country s political elite, their public revelation means that government leaders need to address the issue." In addition, the populations of Latin American countries are still predominantly against more progressive drugs policies. In Uruguay, 63 per cent of the population were opposed to the marijuana bill in July 2013." Around the same time in Mexico, only 32 per cent of the population supported marijuana legalization." The support has been even lower in Colombia and Peru — respectively 13 per cent and 11 per cent in 2010." <u>In the United States, the <mark>referendums </mark>in Colorado and Washington, and the OAS report, have <mark>put pressure on </mark>the <mark>Obama </mark>administration <mark>to discuss</mark> domestic and <mark>international drug policy </mark>reforms more openly.</u> <u>Some notable progress has been made</u> domestically. US Attorney General Eric <u>Holder</u> has announced that the federal government would order prosecutors to sidestep federal mandatory minimum sentencing in certain low-level cases as a way to reduce the prison population. He also <u>confirmed that the Department of Justice would not seek to challenge the marijuana regulation laws in Colorado and Washington.</u> <u>However, <mark>concerns remain </mark>on the international stage <mark>as to how</mark> open <mark>the United States will</mark> be in discussing and promoting <mark>reform given</mark> the country's <mark>historical reluctance to challenge international drugs conventions.</u></mark> <u>Russia</u>, meanwhile has expressed concerns over flows of drugs from Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2014. It <u>is pushing for harsher counter-narcotics policies in the country</u>, as the latest UN report indicates a record annual increase of opium production." Russia has also supported a series of counter-narcotics programmes focused on law enforcement and interdiction training in Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan, and in Central American countries. <u>Russia's uncompromising prohibitionist stance continues to be popular in numerous countries in Asia and Africa that advocate zero-tolerance.</u> Europe certainly has lessons to offer regarding drug policy but <u>European governments have largely stayed away from the recent international debates.</u> In countries such as Portugal, where progressive policies have been implemented, budgetary pressures and the rise of conservative views are endangering progress domestically." In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister David Cameron rejected the parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee's proposal for a Royal Commission to comprehensively reassess current policies. Home Secretary Theresa May has been reluctant to discuss reform, even disregarding recommendations from the Advisory' Council on the Misuse of Drugs and putting in place a ban on khat. An internal review into drug policy concluded that decreases in use in the country demonstrate that policies are working. This argument, however, ignores the international nature of the challenge and the larger responsibility of West European governments in tackling a truly global and complex problem that fuels high levels of organized and violence. In addition, the United Kingdom faces an increase in the use of other drugs, including new psycho-active substances and over-the-counter or prescription medicine. <u>Other regions of the world face increased levels of political uncertainty and insecurity related to drug production and trafficking.</u> <u><mark>West Africa struggles to tackle</mark> the multiple challenges linked to the growing trade through the region, including corruption, organized <mark>crime</mark>, financing of <mark>extremist organizations</mark>, an increase in addiction <mark>and</mark> an increased burden on law-enforcement agencies and other already <mark>struggling</mark> public <mark>institutions</mark>.</u> <u><mark>In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of ISAF </mark>from the country <mark>and </mark>the transition to an <mark>Afghan</mark>-led <mark>security </mark>apparatus <mark>shows little promise of mitigating</mark> opium <mark>production </mark>and related corruption.</u> This international political context makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to substantially reform the UN conventions. However, <u>current difficulties and the overall <mark>complexity</mark> of the problem <strong><mark>should not be used as an excuse for</mark> policy <mark>inaction</strong></mark> and inertia.</u> <u><mark>The current situation</mark> — <mark>characterized by</mark> persistent levels of <mark>violence</mark>, <mark>insecurity</mark> and <mark>corruption</mark>, changing trade routes causing <mark>instability </mark>in new regions, the emergence of new drugs and the negative impact of drug policies — <strong><mark>is no longer sustainable</strong></mark>.</u> In 2012, President Santos of Colombia said: 'Sometimes we all feel that we have been pedalling on a stationary bicycle. We look to our right and our left and we still see the same landscape. Little progress has been made in the drug policy field since President Richard Nixon first called drug abuse 'America's public enemy number one in the United States" and policies have caused much damage. <u><mark>Drug control policies </mark>around the world have often <mark>proved </mark>at best ineffective and at worst <mark>counter-productive, unless they strayed away from</mark> the strict letter of the <mark>UN conventions</mark>.</u> <u>However, <strong><mark>a tipping point has been reached</u></strong></mark>. <u>Current policies are no longer sustainable and therefore <mark>momentum is growing towards</u></mark> <u>more</u> <u><mark>responsible </mark>and comprehensive <mark>responses to</mark> the <mark>global</mark> problem of illicit <mark>drugs. </mark>The <mark>UNGAS</mark>S<mark> </mark>in <mark>2016 provides an opportunity for governments to</mark> review and <mark>reform</mark> their <mark>policies </mark>at the national and regional levels.</u> A number of national governments, including Colombia's, have embarked on much-needed review processes of their domestic drug policies, but <u>regional and international discussions will crucial to tackle these truly transnational challenges and opt for more adequate responses that focus on reducing the harms caused by drug consumption, trafficking and production, and drug policies themselves.</u> </p>

Benoit Gomis 14 is a Visiting Scholar at the University Of British Columbia and the Canadian Network for Research in Terrorism, Security and Society, PhD LSE and UChicago, “Illicit Drugs and International Security: Towards UNGASS 2016,” International Security, February, #SPS

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Benoit Gomis 14 is a Visiting Scholar at the University Of British Columbia and the Canadian Network for Research in Terrorism, Security and Society, PhD LSE and UChicago, “Illicit Drugs and International Security: Towards UNGASS 2016,” International Security, February, #SPS fulltext: I the last three years, the drug policy debate has evolved more than in the previous three decades. However, there remain a number of obstacles to making recent developments sustainable ahead of UNGASS 2016. Although Latin American leaders mental in pushing the debate forward, the political context is more complicated today than it was around the 2012 Summit of the Americas. There is widespread consensus in the region that the 'war on drugs' has failed, that drugs are primarily a health problem, and that use and possession should be decriminalized further. However, disagreements remain on how to control supply (in particular on the effectiveness of regulation models), what law enforcement should look like in a regulated market, and what public health strategies mean in practice, especially in countries that have had difficulty in controlling parts of their territory and collecting taxes. Political leadership towards reform is also more hesitant than it was in 2012. In Mexico, President Enriqe Pena Nieto has been willing to discuss alternative policies. He has said he would aim to prioritize social and economic issues, and readjust security policy towards reducing violence while ending widespread US access to Mexican intelligence. However, the Mexican government is undertaking other ambitious reforms, including in the energy and education sectors and in economic and fiscal policy. The country's diplomatic efforts with the United States have also prioritized immigration and gun laws drug policy reform. President Santos of Colombia over has taken a back seat in the international debate to some extent, focusing instead on the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), and on the forth-coming presidential elections. Guatemala, under the leadership of President Molina and Foreign Minister Fernando Carrera, remains very proactive and continues to punch above its weight in the drug debate. However, it is a small country that needs partners and has been more reluctant than its neighbours to engage in a review of its domestic policy. Two elements further complicate the political context in Latin America. The revelation by Edward Snowden of widespread US intelligence activities that included targeting the emails of former president Felipe Calderön and the text messages of Pena Nieto when he "'as running for president may have an impact on Mexico's collaboration with the United States. Although such intelligence practices were arguably always presumed within the country s political elite, their public revelation means that government leaders need to address the issue." In addition, the populations of Latin American countries are still predominantly against more progressive drugs policies. In Uruguay, 63 per cent of the population were opposed to the marijuana bill in July 2013." Around the same time in Mexico, only 32 per cent of the population supported marijuana legalization." The support has been even lower in Colombia and Peru — respectively 13 per cent and 11 per cent in 2010." In the United States, the referendums in Colorado and Washington, and the OAS report, have put pressure on the Obama administration to discuss domestic and international drug policy reforms more openly. Some notable progress has been made domestically. US Attorney General Eric Holder has announced that the federal government would order prosecutors to sidestep federal mandatory minimum sentencing in certain low-level cases as a way to reduce the prison population. He also confirmed that the Department of Justice would not seek to challenge the marijuana regulation laws in Colorado and Washington. However, concerns remain on the international stage as to how open the United States will be in discussing and promoting reform given the country's historical reluctance to challenge international drugs conventions. Russia, meanwhile has expressed concerns over flows of drugs from Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2014. It is pushing for harsher counter-narcotics policies in the country, as the latest UN report indicates a record annual increase of opium production." Russia has also supported a series of counter-narcotics programmes focused on law enforcement and interdiction training in Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan, and in Central American countries. Russia's uncompromising prohibitionist stance continues to be popular in numerous countries in Asia and Africa that advocate zero-tolerance. Europe certainly has lessons to offer regarding drug policy but European governments have largely stayed away from the recent international debates. In countries such as Portugal, where progressive policies have been implemented, budgetary pressures and the rise of conservative views are endangering progress domestically." In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister David Cameron rejected the parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee's proposal for a Royal Commission to comprehensively reassess current policies. Home Secretary Theresa May has been reluctant to discuss reform, even disregarding recommendations from the Advisory' Council on the Misuse of Drugs and putting in place a ban on khat. An internal review into drug policy concluded that decreases in use in the country demonstrate that policies are working. This argument, however, ignores the international nature of the challenge and the larger responsibility of West European governments in tackling a truly global and complex problem that fuels high levels of organized and violence. In addition, the United Kingdom faces an increase in the use of other drugs, including new psycho-active substances and over-the-counter or prescription medicine. Other regions of the world face increased levels of political uncertainty and insecurity related to drug production and trafficking. West Africa struggles to tackle the multiple challenges linked to the growing trade through the region, including corruption, organized crime, financing of extremist organizations, an increase in addiction and an increased burden on law-enforcement agencies and other already struggling public institutions. In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of ISAF from the country and the transition to an Afghan-led security apparatus shows little promise of mitigating opium production and related corruption. This international political context makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to substantially reform the UN conventions. However, current difficulties and the overall complexity of the problem should not be used as an excuse for policy inaction and inertia. The current situation — characterized by persistent levels of violence, insecurity and corruption, changing trade routes causing instability in new regions, the emergence of new drugs and the negative impact of drug policies — is no longer sustainable. In 2012, President Santos of Colombia said: 'Sometimes we all feel that we have been pedalling on a stationary bicycle. We look to our right and our left and we still see the same landscape. Little progress has been made in the drug policy field since President Richard Nixon first called drug abuse 'America's public enemy number one in the United States" and policies have caused much damage. Drug control policies around the world have often proved at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive, unless they strayed away from the strict letter of the UN conventions. However, a tipping point has been reached. Current policies are no longer sustainable and therefore momentum is growing towards more responsible and comprehensive responses to the global problem of illicit drugs. The UNGASS in 2016 provides an opportunity for governments to review and reform their policies at the national and regional levels. A number of national governments, including Colombia's, have embarked on much-needed review processes of their domestic drug policies, but regional and international discussions will crucial to tackle these truly transnational challenges and opt for more adequate responses that focus on reducing the harms caused by drug consumption, trafficking and production, and drug policies themselves. [/INST] <h4>The 2016 conference success is key to African and Afghan stability</h4><p>Benoit <strong>Gomis 14</strong> is a Visiting Scholar at the University Of British Columbia and the Canadian Network for Research in Terrorism, Security and Society, PhD LSE and UChicago, “Illicit Drugs and International Security: Towards UNGASS 2016,” International Security, February, #SPS</p><p>I the last three years, the drug policy debate has evolved more than in the previous three decades. However, there remain a number of obstacles to making recent developments sustainable ahead of UNGASS 2016. Although Latin American leaders mental in pushing the debate forward, <u>the political context is more complicated today than it was around the 2012 Summit of the Americas.</u> <u><mark>There is <strong>widespread consensus</u></strong></mark> in the region <u>that <strong><mark>the 'war on drugs' has failed</u></strong>,</mark> that <u>drugs are </u>primarily <u>a health problem</u>, <u><mark>and </mark>that use and <strong><mark>possession should be decriminalized</strong></mark> further.</u> However, disagreements remain on how to control supply (in particular on the effectiveness of regulation models), what law enforcement should look like in a regulated market, and what public health strategies mean in practice, especially in countries that have had difficulty in controlling parts of their territory and collecting taxes. <u>Political <strong><mark>leadership towards reform is</strong></mark> also more <strong><mark>hesitant</strong></mark> than it was in 2012.</u> In Mexico, President Enriqe Pena Nieto has been willing to discuss alternative policies. He has said he would aim to prioritize social and economic issues, and readjust security policy towards reducing violence while ending widespread US access to Mexican intelligence. However, the Mexican government is undertaking other ambitious reforms, including in the energy and education sectors and in economic and fiscal policy. The country's diplomatic efforts with the United States have also prioritized immigration and gun laws drug policy reform. President <u>Santos of Colombia</u> over <u>has taken a back seat in the international debate to some extent</u>, focusing instead on the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), and on the forth-coming presidential elections. <u>Guatemala</u>, under the leadership of President Molina and Foreign Minister Fernando Carrera, <u>remains very proactive</u> and continues to punch above its weight in the drug debate. <u>However, it is a small country that needs partners and has been more reluctant than its neighbours to engage in a review of its domestic policy</u>. Two elements further complicate the political context in Latin America. The revelation by Edward Snowden of widespread US intelligence activities that included targeting the emails of former president Felipe Calderön and the text messages of Pena Nieto when he "'as running for president may have an impact on Mexico's collaboration with the United States. Although such intelligence practices were arguably always presumed within the country s political elite, their public revelation means that government leaders need to address the issue." In addition, the populations of Latin American countries are still predominantly against more progressive drugs policies. In Uruguay, 63 per cent of the population were opposed to the marijuana bill in July 2013." Around the same time in Mexico, only 32 per cent of the population supported marijuana legalization." The support has been even lower in Colombia and Peru — respectively 13 per cent and 11 per cent in 2010." <u>In the United States, the <mark>referendums </mark>in Colorado and Washington, and the OAS report, have <mark>put pressure on </mark>the <mark>Obama </mark>administration <mark>to discuss</mark> domestic and <mark>international drug policy </mark>reforms more openly.</u> <u>Some notable progress has been made</u> domestically. US Attorney General Eric <u>Holder</u> has announced that the federal government would order prosecutors to sidestep federal mandatory minimum sentencing in certain low-level cases as a way to reduce the prison population. He also <u>confirmed that the Department of Justice would not seek to challenge the marijuana regulation laws in Colorado and Washington.</u> <u>However, <mark>concerns remain </mark>on the international stage <mark>as to how</mark> open <mark>the United States will</mark> be in discussing and promoting <mark>reform given</mark> the country's <mark>historical reluctance to challenge international drugs conventions.</u></mark> <u>Russia</u>, meanwhile has expressed concerns over flows of drugs from Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2014. It <u>is pushing for harsher counter-narcotics policies in the country</u>, as the latest UN report indicates a record annual increase of opium production." Russia has also supported a series of counter-narcotics programmes focused on law enforcement and interdiction training in Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan, and in Central American countries. <u>Russia's uncompromising prohibitionist stance continues to be popular in numerous countries in Asia and Africa that advocate zero-tolerance.</u> Europe certainly has lessons to offer regarding drug policy but <u>European governments have largely stayed away from the recent international debates.</u> In countries such as Portugal, where progressive policies have been implemented, budgetary pressures and the rise of conservative views are endangering progress domestically." In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister David Cameron rejected the parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee's proposal for a Royal Commission to comprehensively reassess current policies. Home Secretary Theresa May has been reluctant to discuss reform, even disregarding recommendations from the Advisory' Council on the Misuse of Drugs and putting in place a ban on khat. An internal review into drug policy concluded that decreases in use in the country demonstrate that policies are working. This argument, however, ignores the international nature of the challenge and the larger responsibility of West European governments in tackling a truly global and complex problem that fuels high levels of organized and violence. In addition, the United Kingdom faces an increase in the use of other drugs, including new psycho-active substances and over-the-counter or prescription medicine. <u>Other regions of the world face increased levels of political uncertainty and insecurity related to drug production and trafficking.</u> <u><mark>West Africa struggles to tackle</mark> the multiple challenges linked to the growing trade through the region, including corruption, organized <mark>crime</mark>, financing of <mark>extremist organizations</mark>, an increase in addiction <mark>and</mark> an increased burden on law-enforcement agencies and other already <mark>struggling</mark> public <mark>institutions</mark>.</u> <u><mark>In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of ISAF </mark>from the country <mark>and </mark>the transition to an <mark>Afghan</mark>-led <mark>security </mark>apparatus <mark>shows little promise of mitigating</mark> opium <mark>production </mark>and related corruption.</u> This international political context makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to substantially reform the UN conventions. However, <u>current difficulties and the overall <mark>complexity</mark> of the problem <strong><mark>should not be used as an excuse for</mark> policy <mark>inaction</strong></mark> and inertia.</u> <u><mark>The current situation</mark> — <mark>characterized by</mark> persistent levels of <mark>violence</mark>, <mark>insecurity</mark> and <mark>corruption</mark>, changing trade routes causing <mark>instability </mark>in new regions, the emergence of new drugs and the negative impact of drug policies — <strong><mark>is no longer sustainable</strong></mark>.</u> In 2012, President Santos of Colombia said: 'Sometimes we all feel that we have been pedalling on a stationary bicycle. We look to our right and our left and we still see the same landscape. Little progress has been made in the drug policy field since President Richard Nixon first called drug abuse 'America's public enemy number one in the United States" and policies have caused much damage. <u><mark>Drug control policies </mark>around the world have often <mark>proved </mark>at best ineffective and at worst <mark>counter-productive, unless they strayed away from</mark> the strict letter of the <mark>UN conventions</mark>.</u> <u>However, <strong><mark>a tipping point has been reached</u></strong></mark>. <u>Current policies are no longer sustainable and therefore <mark>momentum is growing towards</u></mark> <u>more</u> <u><mark>responsible </mark>and comprehensive <mark>responses to</mark> the <mark>global</mark> problem of illicit <mark>drugs. </mark>The <mark>UNGAS</mark>S<mark> </mark>in <mark>2016 provides an opportunity for governments to</mark> review and <mark>reform</mark> their <mark>policies </mark>at the national and regional levels.</u> A number of national governments, including Colombia's, have embarked on much-needed review processes of their domestic drug policies, but <u>regional and international discussions will crucial to tackle these truly transnational challenges and opt for more adequate responses that focus on reducing the harms caused by drug consumption, trafficking and production, and drug policies themselves.</u> </p> </s>

US marijuana prohibition is the key issue---reversing US policy is critical to reform success in 2016

Will 2016 be the year when reality finally sinks in within the international community that drug prohibition has failed and that it is time to look for more sustainable alternatives? There are good reasons to believe so.¶ In the US, the number of medical marijuana states is likely to reach 20 in 2013 The battle has even been brought to the US Congress, Ultimately, the fate of the 2016 special session lies most likely in Washington DC. The US has been the initiator, main architect and chief sponsor of the prohibitionist approach for over a century and has imposed prohibitionist policies to the rest of the world with Colorado and Washington now squarely confronting them, the “tough on drugs” stance is increasingly untenable Unless it reverses its attitude and draws the lessons from a century of failed prohibitionist rule, the US will be increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place and prohibition will become more and more indefensible. drug policy reform will be achieved by cracking the US prohibitionist backbone the pieces of the global drug policy reform puzzle appeared to be falling into place one by one and the US resolve seems to be faltering. Obama appears hesitant after the decisive victories for marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington While the 2016 special session could easily be derailed, if drug policy reformists within the US, use the next three years to keep resolutely pushing for reform, we may see the emergence of a global coalition and a new global consensus on drug policy.

Will 2016 be the year when reality finally sinks in that drug prohibition has failed There are good reasons to believe so the fate of the 2016 session lies in Washington The US has been the chief sponsor of the prohibitionist approach with Colorado and Washington now confronting them, the “tough on drugs” stance is increasingly untenable. Unless it reverses its attitude the US will be increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place reform will be achieved by cracking the US prohibitionist backbone While the 2016 special session could easily be derailed, if drug reformists within the US keep resolutely pushing for reform, we may see the emergence of a global coalition and new consensus on drug policy

So, what does the prospect of a UN summit on drug policy means for the drug policy reform movement, and what can be expected from it? There have been after all quite a few similar events since the Adoption of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Will 2016 be the year when reality finally sinks in within the international community that drug prohibition has failed and that it is time to look for more sustainable alternatives? There are good reasons to believe so.¶ The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances set lofty goals of complete eradication of drug use, toned down to a 50% reduction within 10 years in 1988, a goal reiterated in 1998, but abandoned altogether in 2008 amidst growing restlessness within the UN community. Furthermore, the “soft on drugs” label is rapidly losing its stickiness as the political risk of drug reformist positions is plummeting rapidly. Drug policy reform may even start turning into political asset in some circumscriptions, as was the case in Washington this November, when most of the Democrat political establishment lined up behind the legalization initiative.¶ As the consensus behind the War on Drugs starts crumbling, and as countries start breaking ranks and reject the dominant approach to drug policy altogether, the international community will see reduced opportunities for reprisals and sanctions. Uruguay’s intention to legalize marijuana under state control has been met with rather muted UN opposition so far. Sanctions against Uruguay will be hard to justify if similar sanctions are not imposed on Washington and Colorado, a prospect not even remotely likely, and may just galvanize regional rancor. Other Latin American countries might emulate the Uruguayan model, with neighboring Argentina a real potential candidate.¶ In the US, the number of medical marijuana states is likely to reach 20 in 2013 as proposals are set to be presented to several state legislatures, including New Hampshire, Illinois and New York. Rhode Island, Maine, Vermont, and Massachusetts, as well as Oregon and Montana may also try to adopt full marijuana legalization through their legislatures, while a legalization initiative is already on the drawing board in California. The battle has even been brought to the US Congress, with a bipartisan bill that would enable the states to make their own marijuana laws. The bill is probably still symbolic at this stage, and stands very little chances, but it may be a harbinger of things to come.¶ Embroiled in a deep economic and financial crisis, Europe is staying relatively on the sidelines on drug policy issues, even though (or maybe because), European drug policies are generally leaning on the liberal side and drug abuse is substantially lower there than in the US.¶ Ultimately, the fate of the 2016 special session lies most likely in Washington DC. The US has been the initiator, main architect and chief sponsor of the prohibitionist approach for over a century, and has over the years imposed her prohibitionist policies to the rest of the world. All current international treaties on illicit drugs having been produced and backed by successive US administrations over the past 50 years, a complete U-turn seems unlikely. But with 18 states and the district of Colombia in oblique violation of the international treaties and Colorado and Washington now squarely confronting them, the “tough on drugs” stance is increasingly untenable. Unless it reverses its attitude and draws the lessons from a century of failed prohibitionist rule, the US will be increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place and her prohibitionist-in-chief posture will become more and more indefensible.¶ I have argued for quite some time that drug policy reform will be achieved by cracking the US prohibitionist backbone through the combined internal pressure from the states and external pressure from the US allies, principally, in Latin America. In a truly historic year for drug policy reform, the pieces of the global drug policy reform puzzle appeared to be falling into place one by one in 2012, and the US resolve seems to be faltering. The Obama administration appears hesitant after the decisive victories for marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington. By intensifying the crackdown on medical marijuana over the past few years, Obama brought the War on Drugs to the Caucasian community, which may have further galvanized support for legalization. Whether hidden agenda or law of unintended consequences, it clearly narrowed the administration’s margins of maneuver and crackdowns on the newly legalized marijuana states may backfire even more, further stiffening support for legalization. ¶ While the 2016 special session could easily be derailed, if drug policy reformists, especially in Latin American and within the US, use the next three years to keep resolutely pushing for reform, we may see the emergence of a global coalition and a new global consensus on drug policy. This is an opportunity that reform activists cannot afford to waste.

<h4>US marijuana prohibition is the key issue---reversing US policy is critical to reform success in 2016</h4><p>Jeffrey <strong>Dhywood 12,</strong> author of World War D. The Case against prohibitionism, roadmap to controlled re-legalization, also a European-born investigative writer, lecturer and public speaker, “What to expect from the 2016 special UN session on global drug policy?,” December 2, : http://www.world-war-d.com/2012/12/02/un-special-session-on-global-drug-policy-2016/#sthash.6pIQKa8F.dpuf</p><p>So, what does the prospect of a UN summit on drug policy means for the drug policy reform movement, and what can be expected from it? There have been after all quite a few similar events since the Adoption of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. <u><strong><mark>Will 2016 be the year when reality finally sinks in</mark> within the international community <mark>that drug prohibition has failed</mark> and that it is time to look for more sustainable alternatives? <mark>There are good reasons to believe so</mark>.¶</u></strong> The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances set lofty goals of complete eradication of drug use, toned down to a 50% reduction within 10 years in 1988, a goal reiterated in 1998, but abandoned altogether in 2008 amidst growing restlessness within the UN community. Furthermore, the “soft on drugs” label is rapidly losing its stickiness as the political risk of drug reformist positions is plummeting rapidly. Drug policy reform may even start turning into political asset in some circumscriptions, as was the case in Washington this November, when most of the Democrat political establishment lined up behind the legalization initiative.¶ As the consensus behind the War on Drugs starts crumbling, and as countries start breaking ranks and reject the dominant approach to drug policy altogether, the international community will see reduced opportunities for reprisals and sanctions. Uruguay’s intention to legalize marijuana under state control has been met with rather muted UN opposition so far. Sanctions against Uruguay will be hard to justify if similar sanctions are not imposed on Washington and Colorado, a prospect not even remotely likely, and may just galvanize regional rancor. Other Latin American countries might emulate the Uruguayan model, with neighboring Argentina a real potential candidate.¶ <u><strong>In the US, the number of medical marijuana states is likely to reach 20 in 2013</u></strong> as proposals are set to be presented to several state legislatures, including New Hampshire, Illinois and New York. Rhode Island, Maine, Vermont, and Massachusetts, as well as Oregon and Montana may also try to adopt full marijuana legalization through their legislatures, while a legalization initiative is already on the drawing board in California. <u><strong>The battle has even been brought to the US Congress,</u></strong> with a bipartisan bill that would enable the states to make their own marijuana laws. The bill is probably still symbolic at this stage, and stands very little chances, but it may be a harbinger of things to come.¶ Embroiled in a deep economic and financial crisis, Europe is staying relatively on the sidelines on drug policy issues, even though (or maybe because), European drug policies are generally leaning on the liberal side and drug abuse is substantially lower there than in the US.¶ <u><strong>Ultimately, <mark>the fate of the 2016</mark> special <mark>session lies</mark> most likely <mark>in Washington</mark> DC. <mark>The US has been the</mark> initiator, main architect and <mark>chief sponsor of the prohibitionist approach</mark> for over a century</u></strong>, <u><strong>and has</u></strong> over the years <u><strong>imposed</u></strong> her <u><strong>prohibitionist policies to the rest of the world</u></strong>. All current international treaties on illicit drugs having been produced and backed by successive US administrations over the past 50 years, a complete U-turn seems unlikely. But <u><strong><mark>with</u></strong></mark> 18 states and the district of Colombia in oblique violation of the international treaties and <u><strong><mark>Colorado and Washington now</mark> squarely <mark>confronting them, the “tough on drugs” stance is increasingly untenable</u></strong>. <u><strong>Unless it reverses its attitude</mark> and draws the lessons from a century of failed prohibitionist rule, <mark>the US will be increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place</mark> and</u></strong> her <u><strong>prohibition</u></strong>ist-in-chief posture <u><strong>will become more and more indefensible.</u></strong>¶ I have argued for quite some time that <u><strong>drug policy <mark>reform will be achieved by cracking the US prohibitionist backbone</mark> </u></strong>through the combined internal pressure from the states and external pressure from the US allies, principally, in Latin America. In a truly historic year for drug policy reform, <u><strong>the pieces of the global drug policy reform puzzle appeared to be falling into place one by one</u></strong> in 2012, <u><strong>and the US resolve seems to be faltering.</u></strong> The <u><strong>Obama</u></strong> administration <u><strong>appears hesitant after the decisive victories for marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington</u></strong>. By intensifying the crackdown on medical marijuana over the past few years, Obama brought the War on Drugs to the Caucasian community, which may have further galvanized support for legalization. Whether hidden agenda or law of unintended consequences, it clearly narrowed the administration’s margins of maneuver and crackdowns on the newly legalized marijuana states may backfire even more, further stiffening support for legalization. ¶ <u><strong><mark>While the 2016 special session could easily be derailed, if drug</mark> policy <mark>reformists</u></strong></mark>, especially in Latin American and <u><strong><mark>within the US</mark>, use the next three years to <mark>keep resolutely pushing for reform, we may see the emergence of a global coalition and</mark> a <mark>new</mark> global <mark>consensus on drug policy</mark>.</u></strong> This is an opportunity that reform activists cannot afford to waste.</p>

Jeffrey Dhywood 12, author of World War D. The Case against prohibitionism, roadmap to controlled re-legalization, also a European-born investigative writer, lecturer and public speaker, “What to expect from the 2016 special UN session on global drug policy?,” December 2, : http://www.world-war-d.com/2012/12/02/un-special-session-on-global-drug-policy-2016/#sthash.6pIQKa8F.dpuf

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Jeffrey Dhywood 12, author of World War D. The Case against prohibitionism, roadmap to controlled re-legalization, also a European-born investigative writer, lecturer and public speaker, “What to expect from the 2016 special UN session on global drug policy?,” December 2, : http://www.world-war-d.com/2012/12/02/un-special-session-on-global-drug-policy-2016/#sthash.6pIQKa8F.dpuf fulltext: So, what does the prospect of a UN summit on drug policy means for the drug policy reform movement, and what can be expected from it? There have been after all quite a few similar events since the Adoption of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Will 2016 be the year when reality finally sinks in within the international community that drug prohibition has failed and that it is time to look for more sustainable alternatives? There are good reasons to believe so.¶ The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances set lofty goals of complete eradication of drug use, toned down to a 50% reduction within 10 years in 1988, a goal reiterated in 1998, but abandoned altogether in 2008 amidst growing restlessness within the UN community. Furthermore, the “soft on drugs” label is rapidly losing its stickiness as the political risk of drug reformist positions is plummeting rapidly. Drug policy reform may even start turning into political asset in some circumscriptions, as was the case in Washington this November, when most of the Democrat political establishment lined up behind the legalization initiative.¶ As the consensus behind the War on Drugs starts crumbling, and as countries start breaking ranks and reject the dominant approach to drug policy altogether, the international community will see reduced opportunities for reprisals and sanctions. Uruguay’s intention to legalize marijuana under state control has been met with rather muted UN opposition so far. Sanctions against Uruguay will be hard to justify if similar sanctions are not imposed on Washington and Colorado, a prospect not even remotely likely, and may just galvanize regional rancor. Other Latin American countries might emulate the Uruguayan model, with neighboring Argentina a real potential candidate.¶ In the US, the number of medical marijuana states is likely to reach 20 in 2013 as proposals are set to be presented to several state legislatures, including New Hampshire, Illinois and New York. Rhode Island, Maine, Vermont, and Massachusetts, as well as Oregon and Montana may also try to adopt full marijuana legalization through their legislatures, while a legalization initiative is already on the drawing board in California. The battle has even been brought to the US Congress, with a bipartisan bill that would enable the states to make their own marijuana laws. The bill is probably still symbolic at this stage, and stands very little chances, but it may be a harbinger of things to come.¶ Embroiled in a deep economic and financial crisis, Europe is staying relatively on the sidelines on drug policy issues, even though (or maybe because), European drug policies are generally leaning on the liberal side and drug abuse is substantially lower there than in the US.¶ Ultimately, the fate of the 2016 special session lies most likely in Washington DC. The US has been the initiator, main architect and chief sponsor of the prohibitionist approach for over a century, and has over the years imposed her prohibitionist policies to the rest of the world. All current international treaties on illicit drugs having been produced and backed by successive US administrations over the past 50 years, a complete U-turn seems unlikely. But with 18 states and the district of Colombia in oblique violation of the international treaties and Colorado and Washington now squarely confronting them, the “tough on drugs” stance is increasingly untenable. Unless it reverses its attitude and draws the lessons from a century of failed prohibitionist rule, the US will be increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place and her prohibitionist-in-chief posture will become more and more indefensible.¶ I have argued for quite some time that drug policy reform will be achieved by cracking the US prohibitionist backbone through the combined internal pressure from the states and external pressure from the US allies, principally, in Latin America. In a truly historic year for drug policy reform, the pieces of the global drug policy reform puzzle appeared to be falling into place one by one in 2012, and the US resolve seems to be faltering. The Obama administration appears hesitant after the decisive victories for marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington. By intensifying the crackdown on medical marijuana over the past few years, Obama brought the War on Drugs to the Caucasian community, which may have further galvanized support for legalization. Whether hidden agenda or law of unintended consequences, it clearly narrowed the administration’s margins of maneuver and crackdowns on the newly legalized marijuana states may backfire even more, further stiffening support for legalization. ¶ While the 2016 special session could easily be derailed, if drug policy reformists, especially in Latin American and within the US, use the next three years to keep resolutely pushing for reform, we may see the emergence of a global coalition and a new global consensus on drug policy. This is an opportunity that reform activists cannot afford to waste. [/INST] <h4>US marijuana prohibition is the key issue---reversing US policy is critical to reform success in 2016</h4><p>Jeffrey <strong>Dhywood 12,</strong> author of World War D. The Case against prohibitionism, roadmap to controlled re-legalization, also a European-born investigative writer, lecturer and public speaker, “What to expect from the 2016 special UN session on global drug policy?,” December 2, : http://www.world-war-d.com/2012/12/02/un-special-session-on-global-drug-policy-2016/#sthash.6pIQKa8F.dpuf</p><p>So, what does the prospect of a UN summit on drug policy means for the drug policy reform movement, and what can be expected from it? There have been after all quite a few similar events since the Adoption of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. <u><strong><mark>Will 2016 be the year when reality finally sinks in</mark> within the international community <mark>that drug prohibition has failed</mark> and that it is time to look for more sustainable alternatives? <mark>There are good reasons to believe so</mark>.¶</u></strong> The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances set lofty goals of complete eradication of drug use, toned down to a 50% reduction within 10 years in 1988, a goal reiterated in 1998, but abandoned altogether in 2008 amidst growing restlessness within the UN community. Furthermore, the “soft on drugs” label is rapidly losing its stickiness as the political risk of drug reformist positions is plummeting rapidly. Drug policy reform may even start turning into political asset in some circumscriptions, as was the case in Washington this November, when most of the Democrat political establishment lined up behind the legalization initiative.¶ As the consensus behind the War on Drugs starts crumbling, and as countries start breaking ranks and reject the dominant approach to drug policy altogether, the international community will see reduced opportunities for reprisals and sanctions. Uruguay’s intention to legalize marijuana under state control has been met with rather muted UN opposition so far. Sanctions against Uruguay will be hard to justify if similar sanctions are not imposed on Washington and Colorado, a prospect not even remotely likely, and may just galvanize regional rancor. Other Latin American countries might emulate the Uruguayan model, with neighboring Argentina a real potential candidate.¶ <u><strong>In the US, the number of medical marijuana states is likely to reach 20 in 2013</u></strong> as proposals are set to be presented to several state legislatures, including New Hampshire, Illinois and New York. Rhode Island, Maine, Vermont, and Massachusetts, as well as Oregon and Montana may also try to adopt full marijuana legalization through their legislatures, while a legalization initiative is already on the drawing board in California. <u><strong>The battle has even been brought to the US Congress,</u></strong> with a bipartisan bill that would enable the states to make their own marijuana laws. The bill is probably still symbolic at this stage, and stands very little chances, but it may be a harbinger of things to come.¶ Embroiled in a deep economic and financial crisis, Europe is staying relatively on the sidelines on drug policy issues, even though (or maybe because), European drug policies are generally leaning on the liberal side and drug abuse is substantially lower there than in the US.¶ <u><strong>Ultimately, <mark>the fate of the 2016</mark> special <mark>session lies</mark> most likely <mark>in Washington</mark> DC. <mark>The US has been the</mark> initiator, main architect and <mark>chief sponsor of the prohibitionist approach</mark> for over a century</u></strong>, <u><strong>and has</u></strong> over the years <u><strong>imposed</u></strong> her <u><strong>prohibitionist policies to the rest of the world</u></strong>. All current international treaties on illicit drugs having been produced and backed by successive US administrations over the past 50 years, a complete U-turn seems unlikely. But <u><strong><mark>with</u></strong></mark> 18 states and the district of Colombia in oblique violation of the international treaties and <u><strong><mark>Colorado and Washington now</mark> squarely <mark>confronting them, the “tough on drugs” stance is increasingly untenable</u></strong>. <u><strong>Unless it reverses its attitude</mark> and draws the lessons from a century of failed prohibitionist rule, <mark>the US will be increasingly stuck between a rock and a hard place</mark> and</u></strong> her <u><strong>prohibition</u></strong>ist-in-chief posture <u><strong>will become more and more indefensible.</u></strong>¶ I have argued for quite some time that <u><strong>drug policy <mark>reform will be achieved by cracking the US prohibitionist backbone</mark> </u></strong>through the combined internal pressure from the states and external pressure from the US allies, principally, in Latin America. In a truly historic year for drug policy reform, <u><strong>the pieces of the global drug policy reform puzzle appeared to be falling into place one by one</u></strong> in 2012, <u><strong>and the US resolve seems to be faltering.</u></strong> The <u><strong>Obama</u></strong> administration <u><strong>appears hesitant after the decisive victories for marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington</u></strong>. By intensifying the crackdown on medical marijuana over the past few years, Obama brought the War on Drugs to the Caucasian community, which may have further galvanized support for legalization. Whether hidden agenda or law of unintended consequences, it clearly narrowed the administration’s margins of maneuver and crackdowns on the newly legalized marijuana states may backfire even more, further stiffening support for legalization. ¶ <u><strong><mark>While the 2016 special session could easily be derailed, if drug</mark> policy <mark>reformists</u></strong></mark>, especially in Latin American and <u><strong><mark>within the US</mark>, use the next three years to <mark>keep resolutely pushing for reform, we may see the emergence of a global coalition and</mark> a <mark>new</mark> global <mark>consensus on drug policy</mark>.</u></strong> This is an opportunity that reform activists cannot afford to waste.</p> </s>

3) It’s arbitrary and undermines research

a clear definition of terms is a precondition Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk exacerbating misperceptions Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research

a clear definition of terms is a precondition Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an ad hoc fashion risk misperceptions Scholars undercut valuable research

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

<h4><strong>3) It’s arbitrary and undermines research</h4><p>Resnick 1</p><p></strong>Evan Resnick 1, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2</p><p>In matters of national security, establishing <u><strong><mark>a clear definition of terms is a precondition</u></strong></mark> for effective policymaking. <u><strong><mark>Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an</mark> erratic, <mark>ad hoc fashion risk</u></strong></mark> alienating their constituencies. They also risk <u><strong>exacerbating <mark>misperceptions</u></strong></mark> and hostility among those the policies target. <u><strong><mark>Scholars</mark> who commit the same error <mark>undercut</mark> their ability to conduct <mark>valuable</mark> empirical <mark>research</u></strong></mark>. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.</p>

Resnick 1 Evan Resnick 1, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Resnick 1 Evan Resnick 1, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 fulltext: In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy. [/INST] <h4><strong>3) It’s arbitrary and undermines research</h4><p>Resnick 1</p><p></strong>Evan Resnick 1, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2</p><p>In matters of national security, establishing <u><strong><mark>a clear definition of terms is a precondition</u></strong></mark> for effective policymaking. <u><strong><mark>Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an</mark> erratic, <mark>ad hoc fashion risk</u></strong></mark> alienating their constituencies. They also risk <u><strong>exacerbating <mark>misperceptions</u></strong></mark> and hostility among those the policies target. <u><strong><mark>Scholars</mark> who commit the same error <mark>undercut</mark> their ability to conduct <mark>valuable</mark> empirical <mark>research</u></strong></mark>. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.</p> </s>

The war in Afghanistan is an extension of the narrative of the Western savior—the discursive construction of Afghanistan as a state in desperate need of US help makes war inevitable and results in bankrupt policy

the media have become central to the constitution of social identity In pop culture it appears that war has become ‘in style’ celebrating images that glorify war while the aftereffects are invisible the media has the exceptional ability to generate myth through military jargon, the severing of causal connections, banishment of bodies, and the cool demeanor of third-person-reporter-speak We are faced with “pseudo concrete images” Žizek’s “plague of fantasies” which blur our view Because of the irrepresentability of the ‘real’ there is just surplus-obedience; we obey rather than confront.” 56 The historical production of myths of Afghanistan have relied on representations that are largely simplistic, ahistorical, and politically motivated. Afghanistan is a “fuzzy dream” for the West: embodied in de-contextualized photos numbers and graphs claiming statistical quantification, and disjointed metaphors The vigor with which particular discourses have materialized are representative of their link to the War on Terror’ and the relationship between policies and militarized discourses which legitimate the West’s military engagement Afghanistan serves as an example of the very real power of discourse and myth-making which affect the form that international engagement takes; this in turn reproduces those myths in a cycle of destructive imperial engagement. In trying to understand Afghanistan it is vital that we are aware of the dominant narratives that are being produced, who is producing them and for what purpose, and what is at stake in failing to interrogate them. Any policy that does not take the role of deliberately constructed narratives and the mediums throough which they are disseminated into account will not only continue to replicate them but any “peacebuilding” and “development” efforts built on these terms can never result in long-term success. The emancipatory possibilities of such a critical project lie in uncovering militarization embedded within these myths, and the recognition of the detrimental effect of the West’s ‘myths’ and configuring the reconceptualisation of policy alternatives through its contestation. By looking critically at the language of foreign engagement the foundation of historical narratives or ‘myths’ that perpetuate a certain image of Afghanistan, and which results in attitudes that imbue foreign policy, begin to be revealed. The ‘heroism’ narrative can be called the ‘saviour syndrome’, “foreign aid”, “humanitarian intervention”, etc. This narrative constructs foreign engagement in a region as spectacle and as prized commodities to be admired and ‘sold’ to the public; it constructs the West as ‘saviours’ and the ‘Other’, in this case Afghanistan, as the victim in need of saving, accomplished through images and tales of passion that pathologize the other and valorize the West as reconstruction and ‘peace-building’ efforts are saturated with the necessary and benevolent role the West must play in instilling ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and ‘democracy’ in the war-torn and poverty stricken region humanitarian NGO’s simulate “heroism, sentiment, and compassion”; medical catastrophes and civil conflicts have become prized commodities for globalizing neoliberal policies of Western states to sell to ‘myth readers’: “They give Western states the opportunity to put their humanistic policies into practice There are several repercusions of this myth First, this has resulted in real humanitarian and moral issues being overlooked; Second, images are being purged of their content Myth has thus becom the very real enemy of true humanitarianism; we’ve become so inundates with superhero mythologization of real world events that the embedded paternalism and unrealistic goals go unnoticed this narrative reinforces a victimology of the ‘Other’ and capitalises on it, while simultaneously hiding the paternalistic and neo-colonialist ideologies in humanitarian garb. passion and spectacle are valued in the commodification of images over content and history Words such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘justice’, and ‘women’s rights’ have become permanent variables in the mantra that has been used as part of the un-stated, assumptions that intervention will improve the lives of Afghanistan people over ‘there’ and increase security for us over ‘here’ we are continually told that Afghan women have been “liberated” from an oppressive regime by the West. This is bolstered by the assumption that the Afghan people support the US-backed government There is a dominant assumption that the West can “win” the “war on terror” and that military measures in the Middle East are necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks. embedded in these images is the assumption that reconstruction can coesist alongside military efforts to fight off insurgents and “pacify” the opposition reports on the increasing numbers of casualties of the war does not appear incongruous with claims of ‘peace-making’ and ‘development’ - therefore we must protect it the puppet government and fight the insurgents. 6

war s aftereffects are invisible the media has the ability to generate myth through military jargon, “pseudo images blur our view Because of the irrepresentability of the ‘real’ we obey rather than confront myths of Afghanistan reli on representations that are ahistorical, and politically motivated Afghanistan serves as an example of the power of discourse which reproduces destructive imperial engagement. Any policy that does not take the role of deliberately constructed narratives into account will not only replicate them but “development” efforts built on these terms can never result in success. The possibilities of such a critical project lie in uncovering militarization and configuring the reconceptualisation of policy alternatives through its contestation By looking critically at the language of engagement ‘myths begin to be revealed The ‘heroism’ narrative constructs the West as ‘saviours’ and the ‘Other’, Afghanistan, as the victim in need of saving, accomplished through tales of passion that pathologize the other catastrophes have become prized commodities for neoliberal policies this myth resulted in real humanitarian issues being overlooked images are purged of their content. Myth has thus becom the enemy of humanitarianism we’ve become so inundates with superhero mythologization that paternalism go unnoticed , this reinforces victimology while hiding the paternalistic ideologies in humanitarian garb There is a assumption that the West can “win” the “war on terror” increasing casualties does not appear incongruous with peace-making’

The medium for the dissemination of myth is not, however, limited to TV or radio news broadcasts, particularly in the technologically infused new media culture where movies, cartoons, comics, music vidoes, and the internet have saturated pop culture so thoroughly that it has become easier than ever to propagate myth to viewers/listeners around the globe. In contemporary culture, the media have become central to the constitution of social identity. It is not just that media messages have become important forms of influence on individuals. We also identify and construct ourselves as social beings through the mediation of images. This is not simply a case of people being dominated by images, but of people seeking and obtaining pleasure through the experience of the consumption of these images. An understanding of contemporary culture involves a focus both on the phenomenology of watching and the cultural form of images. 52 Consider, for example, the increase in films infused with US militarized patriotism or the recent obsession with Internet blogs and now videos posted on UTube from soldiers stationed in Afghanistan. Hunt explores the political racist/sexist currency of a cartoon circulating on the internet post9/11 of five Taliban leaders looking horrified after reading a document that states, “To the Taliban: Give us Osama bin Laden or we’ll send your women to college”. 53 I similarly encountered an image via email of beloved cultural cartoon icon Homer Simpson in front of an American flag holding a shotgun with Osama bin Laden in the target site. In pop culture it appears that war has become back ‘in style’ celebrating images that glorify heroic soldiers and valorize war while the aftereffects are often invisible. Consider an article in Rolling Stone magazine which lists the results of a poll of some of the most popular songs soldiers listen to in order to get ‘pumped up’ for a mission. Hard rock, heavy metal, and rap such as 2Pac’s “Hit ‘Em Up” and Drowning Pool’s “Bodies” apparently helps soldiers “get ready to kill” and “haul balls down the road”. 54 The problem is that the media and pop culture has the exceptional ability to generate myth through, for example, ambiguous wording, military jargon, the severing of causal connections, banishment of bodies, and the cool demeanor of third-person-reporter-speak 55 : We are faced with “pseudo concrete images” explains Eisenstein, “Žizek’s “plague of fantasies” which blur our viewings. Because of the irrepresentability of the ‘real’ there is just surplus-obedience; we obey rather than confront.” 56 Afghanistan The historical production of particular myths of Afghanistan have relied on representations of the country in the West that are largely simplistic, ahistorical, and politically motivated. Afghanistan is a sort of “fuzzy dream” for most in the West: embodied in a series of fabricated images of war and poverty, de-contextualized photos without names or places, numbers and graphs claiming statistical quantification, and disjointed yet often repeated phrases and metaphors. A particular mythic representation of Afghanistan is being (and has been) proliferated in the international community, through media, history books, foreign policy documents, political commentators, academia, and virtually any other body of communication. The vigor with which particular discourses have materialized since 9/11 are representative of their link to the Wests militarized ‘War on Terror’ and more generally of the embedded relationship between political policies and militarized discourses which legitimate the West’s military engagement and development policies. That is, Afghanistan serves as an unfortunate example of the very real power of discourse and myth-making which affect the form that international engagement takes; this in turn reproduces those myths in a cycle of destructive imperial engagement. In trying to understand the current political situation in Afghanistan, and in attempting to formulate international policy in the region, it is vital that we are aware of the dominant narratives or ‘myths’ that are being produced, who it is that is producing them and for what purpose, and what is at stake in failing to interrogate them. Any policy that does not take the role of deliberately constructed narratives and the mediums throough which they are disseminated into account will not only continue to replicate them, perhaps unknowingly, but any “securitizing”, “peacebuilding” and “development” efforts built on these terms can never result in long-term success. The emancipatory possibilities of such a critical project of discourse deconstruction lie in: 1) understanding the raced/classed/gendered power hierarchies that are their foundation; 2) uncovering the nationalized militarization and the hypermasculinized and hyperfeminized normativities that are are embedded within these myths, and; 3) the recognition of the detrimental effect of the West’s ‘myths’ and configuring the reconceptualisation of policy alternatives through its contestation. By looking critically at what has become the common language of foreign engagement in Afghanistan, the foundation of historical narratives or ‘myths’ that perpetuate a certain image of Afghanistan, and which in turn results in very particular attitudes that imbue foreign policy, begin to be revealed. I will utilize two broad (and inextricably linked) categorizations which most accurately encapsulate the dominant strains of discourse to help clarify how this relationship is constructed and by thus identifying them as such attempt to de-bunk the myths they create. These ‘myths’ which have become normalized and banal in foreign policy, media, and some academic discourse I define as the ‘heroism’ discourse/myth and the ‘militarization’ discourse/myth. Superman and G.I. Joe “When we read the history books given to children in the United States, it all starts with heroic adventure – there is no bloodshed – and Columbus Day is a celebration.” 57 The ‘heroism’ narrative can be called by several names: the ‘saviour syndrome’, “mediatically generated” or “hybrid techno-medical” humanitarianism 58 , “foreign aid”, “humanitarian intervention”, etc. This narrative constructs foreign engagement in a region as spectacle and as prized commodities to be admired and ‘sold’ to the public; it constructs the West as ‘saviours’ and the ‘Other’, in this case Afghanistan, as the victim in need of saving, accomplished through images and tales of passion and fervour that often pathologize the other and valorize the Western interveener. When the US, with the support of the UN, bombed Afghanistan in 2001in response to the events of September 11 th , the mission was entitled “Operation Enduring Freedom”. Today, as reconstruction and ‘peace-building’ efforts are underway in Afghanistan in tandem with military operations, political conversations and media productions are saturated with calls to “win the hearts and minds” of the people of Afghanistan and of the necessary and benevolent role the West must play in instilling ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and ‘democracy’ in the war-torn and poverty stricken region. Debrix, offers an analysis of what he calls “the global humanitarian spectacle” to demonstrate how medical and humanitarian NGO’s simulate “heroism, sentiment, and compassion”; medical catastrophes and civil conflicts, he explains, have indeed become prized commodities for globalizing neoliberal policies of Western states and international organizations to sell to ‘myth readers’: “They give Western states and the UN the opportunity to put their liberal humanistic policies into practice, while, for Western media, humanitarianism simply sells”. 59 There are several repercusions of this myth, explains Debrix. First, this has resulted in real humanitarian and moral issues being overlooked; Second, images are being purged of their content. Myth has thus becoming the very real enemy of true humanitarianism; that is, we’ve become so inundates with superhero mythologization of real world events that the embedded paternalism and unrealistic goals go unnoticed. 60 Additionally, this narrative reinforces a victimology of the ‘Other’ and in fact capitalises on it, while simultaneously hiding the paternalistic and neo-colonialist ideologies in humanitarian garb. The role of the media and consciously generated and disseminated images is particularly pronounced here, as passion and spectacle are valued in the commodification of images over content and history. Jean Baudrillard states “There is no possible distinction, at the level of images and information, between the spectacular and the symbolic, no possible distinction between the ‘crime’ and the crackdown”. 61 The militarization narrative, in contrast to the ‘objective benevolence’ of the heroism myth, utilizes constructed and one-dimensional conceptions of militaries, security, and defense. This narrative relies on the myth that militarization is always a useful tool in securitization. For example: Following the NATO air strikes in October of this year that killed at least 50 civilians and an augmentation of Taliban suicide attacks, Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai called on the need for more military operations, an international air force, and an increase in Afghan soldiers and police as mechanisms necessary to “tackle the root causes of terrorism”. 62 Words such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘justice’, and ‘women’s rights’ have become permanent variables in the mantra that has been used liberally and repeatedly as part of the common and often un-stated, assumptions that intervention by NATO, American, Canadian, and British forces will improve the lives of Afghanistan people over ‘there’ and increase security for us over ‘here’. Thus, as the military continues to occupy the region, we in the West are continually told that Afghan women and men have now been “liberated” from an oppressive regime by the West. This is bolstered by the assumption that the Afghan people support the US-backed government and want the military there for security (That is, that they are better off now than before). There is a dominant assumption that the West can “win” the “war on terror” and that military measures in the Middle East are necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks. If prospects look dim in the region, this narrative implies the appropriate response is to increase combat troops and artillery. Finally, embedded in these images is the assumption that reconstruction, delivery of humanitarian aid and development can coesist alongside military efforts to fight off insurgents/terrorists and “pacify” the opposition. Thus, reports on the increasing numbers of casualties of the war does not appear incongruous with claims of ‘peace-making’ and ‘development’ - therefore we must protect it the puppet government and fight the insurgents. 6

<h4>The war in Afghanistan is an extension of the narrative of the Western savior—the discursive construction of Afghanistan as a state in desperate need of US help makes war inevitable and results in bankrupt policy </h4><p><strong>Crowe 7</strong>—Researcher, York Centre for International and Security Studies. PhD candidate in pol sci, York U (Lori, The “Fuzzy Dream”: Discourse, Historical myths, and Militarized (in)Security - Interrogating dangerous myths of Afghanistan and the ‘West’, http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Crowe-loricrowe.pdf)</p><p>The medium for the dissemination of myth is not, however, limited to TV or radio news broadcasts, particularly in the technologically infused new media culture where movies, cartoons, comics, music vidoes, and the internet have saturated pop culture so thoroughly that it has become easier than ever to propagate myth to viewers/listeners around the globe. In contemporary culture, <u><strong>the media have become central to the constitution of social identity</u></strong>. It is not just that media messages have become important forms of influence on individuals. We also identify and construct ourselves as social beings through the mediation of images. This is not simply a case of people being dominated by images, but of people seeking and obtaining pleasure through the experience of the consumption of these images. An understanding of contemporary culture involves a focus both on the phenomenology of watching and the cultural form of images. 52 Consider, for example, the increase in films infused with US militarized patriotism or the recent obsession with Internet blogs and now videos posted on UTube from soldiers stationed in Afghanistan. Hunt explores the political racist/sexist currency of a cartoon circulating on the internet post9/11 of five Taliban leaders looking horrified after reading a document that states, “To the Taliban: Give us Osama bin Laden or we’ll send your women to college”. 53 I similarly encountered an image via email of beloved cultural cartoon icon Homer Simpson in front of an American flag holding a shotgun with Osama bin Laden in the target site. <u><strong>In pop culture it appears that <mark>war</mark> ha<mark>s </mark>become</u></strong> back <u><strong>‘in style’</u></strong> <u><strong>celebrating images that glorify</u></strong> heroic soldiers and valorize <u><strong>war while the <mark>aftereffects are</mark> </u></strong>often<u><strong> <mark>invisible</u></strong></mark>. Consider an article in Rolling Stone magazine which lists the results of a poll of some of the most popular songs soldiers listen to in order to get ‘pumped up’ for a mission. Hard rock, heavy metal, and rap such as 2Pac’s “Hit ‘Em Up” and Drowning Pool’s “Bodies” apparently helps soldiers “get ready to kill” and “haul balls down the road”. 54 The problem is that <u><strong><mark>the media</u></strong></mark> and pop culture <u><strong><mark>has the</mark> exceptional <mark>ability to generate myth</u></strong> <u><strong>through</u></strong></mark>, for example, ambiguous wording, <u><strong><mark>military jargon,</mark> the severing of causal connections, banishment of bodies, and the cool demeanor of third-person-reporter-speak </u></strong>55 : <u><strong>We are faced with <mark>“pseudo</mark> concrete <mark>images</mark>”</u></strong> explains Eisenstein, “<u><strong>Žizek’s “plague of fantasies” which <mark>blur our view</u></strong></mark>ings. <u><strong><mark>Because of the irrepresentability of the ‘real’ </mark>there is just surplus-obedience; <mark>we obey rather than confront</mark>.” 56 </p><p></u></strong>Afghanistan <u><strong>The historical production of</u></strong> particular <u><strong><mark>myths of Afghanistan </mark>have <mark>reli</mark>ed <mark>on representations</u></strong></mark> of the country in the West <u><strong><mark>that are</mark> largely simplistic, <mark>ahistorical, and politically motivated</mark>. Afghanistan is a</u></strong> sort of <u><strong>“fuzzy dream” for</u></strong> most in <u><strong>the West: embodied in</u></strong> a series of fabricated images of war and poverty, <u><strong>de-contextualized photos</u></strong> without names or places, <u><strong>numbers and graphs claiming statistical quantification, and disjointed</u></strong> yet often repeated phrases and <u><strong>metaphors</u></strong>. A particular mythic representation of Afghanistan is being (and has been) proliferated in the international community, through media, history books, foreign policy documents, political commentators, academia, and virtually any other body of communication. <u><strong>The vigor with which particular discourses have materialized</u></strong> since 9/11 <u><strong>are representative of their link to the</u></strong> Wests militarized ‘<u><strong>War on Terror’</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> more generally of <u><strong>the</u></strong> embedded <u><strong>relationship between</u></strong> political <u><strong>policies and militarized discourses which legitimate the West’s military engagement</u></strong> and development policies. That is, <u><strong><mark>Afghanistan serves as an</mark> </u></strong>unfortunate <u><strong><mark>example of the</mark> very real <mark>power of discourse</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and myth-making <mark>which </mark>affect the form that international engagement takes; this in turn <mark>reproduces</mark> those myths in a cycle of <mark>destructive imperial engagement.</mark> </p><p>In trying to understand </u></strong>the current political situation in <u><strong>Afghanistan</u></strong>, and in attempting to formulate international policy in the region, <u><strong>it is vital that we are aware of the dominant narratives</u></strong> or ‘myths’ <u><strong>that are being produced, who</u></strong> it is that <u><strong>is producing them and for what purpose, and what is at stake in failing to interrogate them. <mark>Any policy that does not take the role of deliberately constructed narratives </mark>and the mediums throough which they are disseminated <mark>into account will not only</mark> continue to <mark>replicate them</u></strong></mark>, perhaps unknowingly, <u><strong><mark>but </mark>any</u></strong> “securitizing”, <u><strong>“peacebuilding” and <mark>“development” efforts built on these terms can never result in </mark>long-term <mark>success.</u></strong> <u><strong>The </mark>emancipatory <mark>possibilities</u></strong> <u><strong>of such a critical project</u></strong></mark> of discourse deconstruction <u><strong><mark>lie in</u></strong></mark>: 1) understanding the raced/classed/gendered power hierarchies that are their foundation; 2) <u><strong><mark>uncovering</u></strong></mark> the nationalized <u><strong><mark>militarization</u></strong></mark> and the hypermasculinized and hyperfeminized normativities that are are <u><strong>embedded within these myths, and</u></strong>; 3) <u><strong>the recognition of the detrimental effect of the West’s ‘myths’ <mark>and configuring</mark> <mark>the reconceptualisation of policy alternatives through its contestation</mark>.</p><p><mark>By looking critically at</mark> </u></strong>what has become<u><strong> <mark>the</u></strong></mark> common <u><strong><mark>language of</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>foreign <mark>engagement</u></strong></mark> in Afghanistan, <u><strong>the foundation of historical narratives or <mark>‘myths</mark>’ that perpetuate a certain image of Afghanistan, and which </u></strong>in turn<u><strong> results in </u></strong>very particular<u><strong> attitudes that imbue foreign policy, <mark>begin to be revealed</mark>.</u></strong> I will utilize two broad (and inextricably linked) categorizations which most accurately encapsulate the dominant strains of discourse to help clarify how this relationship is constructed and by thus identifying them as such attempt to de-bunk the myths they create. These ‘myths’ which have become normalized and banal in foreign policy, media, and some academic discourse I define as the ‘heroism’ discourse/myth and the ‘militarization’ discourse/myth. </p><p>Superman and G.I. Joe “When we read the history books given to children in the United States, it all starts with heroic adventure – there is no bloodshed – and Columbus Day is a celebration.” 57 <u><strong><mark>The ‘heroism’ narrative </mark>can be called</u></strong> by several names: <u><strong>the ‘saviour syndrome’,</u></strong> “mediatically generated” or “hybrid techno-medical” humanitarianism 58 , <u><strong>“foreign aid”, “humanitarian intervention”, etc.</u></strong> <u><strong>This narrative constructs foreign engagement in a region as spectacle and as prized commodities to be admired and ‘sold’ to the public;</u></strong> <u><strong>it <mark>constructs the West as ‘saviours’ and the ‘Other’,</mark> in this case <mark>Afghanistan, as the victim in need of saving, accomplished through</mark> images and <mark>tales of passion</mark> </u></strong>and fervour<u><strong> <mark>that</mark> </u></strong>often<u><strong> <mark>pathologize the other</mark> and valorize the West</u></strong>ern interveener. When the US, with the support of the UN, bombed Afghanistan in 2001in response to the events of September 11 th , the mission was entitled “Operation Enduring Freedom”. Today, <u><strong>as reconstruction and ‘peace-building’ efforts are </u></strong>underway in Afghanistan in tandem with military operations, political conversations and media productions are <u><strong>saturated with</u></strong> calls to “win the hearts and minds” of the people of Afghanistan and of <u><strong>the necessary and benevolent role the West must play in instilling ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and ‘democracy’ in the war-torn and poverty stricken region</u></strong>. Debrix, offers an analysis of what he calls “the global humanitarian spectacle” to demonstrate how medical and <u><strong>humanitarian NGO’s simulate “heroism, sentiment, and compassion”; medical <mark>catastrophes</mark> and civil conflicts</u></strong>, he explains, <u><strong><mark>have</u></strong></mark> indeed <u><strong><mark>become prized commodities for </mark>globalizing <mark>neoliberal policies </mark>of Western states </u></strong>and international organizations<u><strong> to sell to ‘myth readers’:</u></strong> <u><strong>“They give Western states </u></strong>and the UN<u><strong> the opportunity to put their </u></strong>liberal<u><strong> humanistic policies into practice</u></strong>, while, for Western media, humanitarianism simply sells”. 59 </p><p><u><strong>There are several repercusions of <mark>this myth</u></strong></mark>, explains Debrix. <u><strong>First,</u></strong> <u><strong>this has <mark>resulted in real humanitarian</mark> and moral <mark>issues being overlooked</mark>; Second, <mark>images are </mark>being <mark>purged of their content</u></strong>. <u><strong>Myth has thus becom</u></strong></mark>ing<u><strong> <mark>the</mark> very real <mark>enemy of </mark>true <mark>humanitarianism</mark>;</u></strong> that is, <u><strong><mark>we’ve become so inundates with superhero</mark> <mark>mythologization</mark> of real world events <mark>that</mark> the embedded <mark>paternalism</mark> and unrealistic goals <mark>go unnoticed</u></strong></mark>. 60 Additionally<mark>, <u><strong>this </mark>narrative <mark>reinforces</mark> a <mark>victimology</mark> of the ‘Other’ and</u></strong> in fact <u><strong>capitalises on it, <mark>while </mark>simultaneously <mark>hiding the paternalistic</mark> and neo-colonialist <mark>ideologies in humanitarian garb</mark>.</u></strong> The role of the media and consciously generated and disseminated images is particularly pronounced here, as <u><strong>passion and spectacle are valued in the commodification of images over content and history</u></strong>. Jean Baudrillard states “There is no possible distinction, at the level of images and information, between the spectacular and the symbolic, no possible distinction between the ‘crime’ and the crackdown”. 61 </p><p>The militarization narrative, in contrast to the ‘objective benevolence’ of the heroism myth, utilizes constructed and one-dimensional conceptions of militaries, security, and defense. This narrative relies on the myth that militarization is always a useful tool in securitization. For example: Following the NATO air strikes in October of this year that killed at least 50 civilians and an augmentation of Taliban suicide attacks, Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai called on the need for more military operations, an international air force, and an increase in Afghan soldiers and police as mechanisms necessary to “tackle the root causes of terrorism”. 62 <u><strong>Words such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘justice’, and ‘women’s rights’ have become permanent variables in the mantra that has been used </u></strong>liberally and repeatedly<u><strong> as part of the </u></strong>common and often<u><strong> un-stated, assumptions that intervention </u></strong>by NATO, American, Canadian, and British forces<u><strong> will improve the lives of Afghanistan people over ‘there’ and increase security for us over ‘here’</u></strong>. Thus, as the military continues to occupy the region, <u><strong>we</u></strong> in the West <u><strong>are continually told that Afghan women</u></strong> and men <u><strong>have </u></strong>now<u><strong> been</u></strong> <u><strong>“liberated” from an oppressive regime by the West. This is bolstered by the assumption that the Afghan people support the US-backed government</u></strong> and want the military there for security (That is, that they are better off now than before). <u><strong><mark>There is a</mark> dominant <mark>assumption that the West can “win” the “war on terror”</mark> and that military measures in the Middle East are necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks.</u></strong> If prospects look dim in the region, this narrative implies the appropriate response is to increase combat troops and artillery. Finally, <u><strong>embedded in these images is the assumption that reconstruction</u></strong>, delivery of humanitarian aid and development <u><strong>can coesist alongside military efforts to fight off insurgents</u></strong>/terrorists <u><strong>and “pacify” the opposition</u></strong>. Thus, <u><strong>reports on the <mark>increasing </mark>numbers of <mark>casualties</mark> of the war <mark>does not appear incongruous with </mark>claims of ‘<mark>peace-making’</mark> and ‘development’ - therefore we must protect it the puppet government and fight the insurgents. 6 </p></u></strong>

Crowe 7—Researcher, York Centre for International and Security Studies. PhD candidate in pol sci, York U (Lori, The “Fuzzy Dream”: Discourse, Historical myths, and Militarized (in)Security - Interrogating dangerous myths of Afghanistan and the ‘West’, http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Crowe-loricrowe.pdf)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Crowe 7—Researcher, York Centre for International and Security Studies. PhD candidate in pol sci, York U (Lori, The “Fuzzy Dream”: Discourse, Historical myths, and Militarized (in)Security - Interrogating dangerous myths of Afghanistan and the ‘West’, http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Crowe-loricrowe.pdf) fulltext: The medium for the dissemination of myth is not, however, limited to TV or radio news broadcasts, particularly in the technologically infused new media culture where movies, cartoons, comics, music vidoes, and the internet have saturated pop culture so thoroughly that it has become easier than ever to propagate myth to viewers/listeners around the globe. In contemporary culture, the media have become central to the constitution of social identity. It is not just that media messages have become important forms of influence on individuals. We also identify and construct ourselves as social beings through the mediation of images. This is not simply a case of people being dominated by images, but of people seeking and obtaining pleasure through the experience of the consumption of these images. An understanding of contemporary culture involves a focus both on the phenomenology of watching and the cultural form of images. 52 Consider, for example, the increase in films infused with US militarized patriotism or the recent obsession with Internet blogs and now videos posted on UTube from soldiers stationed in Afghanistan. Hunt explores the political racist/sexist currency of a cartoon circulating on the internet post9/11 of five Taliban leaders looking horrified after reading a document that states, “To the Taliban: Give us Osama bin Laden or we’ll send your women to college”. 53 I similarly encountered an image via email of beloved cultural cartoon icon Homer Simpson in front of an American flag holding a shotgun with Osama bin Laden in the target site. In pop culture it appears that war has become back ‘in style’ celebrating images that glorify heroic soldiers and valorize war while the aftereffects are often invisible. Consider an article in Rolling Stone magazine which lists the results of a poll of some of the most popular songs soldiers listen to in order to get ‘pumped up’ for a mission. Hard rock, heavy metal, and rap such as 2Pac’s “Hit ‘Em Up” and Drowning Pool’s “Bodies” apparently helps soldiers “get ready to kill” and “haul balls down the road”. 54 The problem is that the media and pop culture has the exceptional ability to generate myth through, for example, ambiguous wording, military jargon, the severing of causal connections, banishment of bodies, and the cool demeanor of third-person-reporter-speak 55 : We are faced with “pseudo concrete images” explains Eisenstein, “Žizek’s “plague of fantasies” which blur our viewings. Because of the irrepresentability of the ‘real’ there is just surplus-obedience; we obey rather than confront.” 56 Afghanistan The historical production of particular myths of Afghanistan have relied on representations of the country in the West that are largely simplistic, ahistorical, and politically motivated. Afghanistan is a sort of “fuzzy dream” for most in the West: embodied in a series of fabricated images of war and poverty, de-contextualized photos without names or places, numbers and graphs claiming statistical quantification, and disjointed yet often repeated phrases and metaphors. A particular mythic representation of Afghanistan is being (and has been) proliferated in the international community, through media, history books, foreign policy documents, political commentators, academia, and virtually any other body of communication. The vigor with which particular discourses have materialized since 9/11 are representative of their link to the Wests militarized ‘War on Terror’ and more generally of the embedded relationship between political policies and militarized discourses which legitimate the West’s military engagement and development policies. That is, Afghanistan serves as an unfortunate example of the very real power of discourse and myth-making which affect the form that international engagement takes; this in turn reproduces those myths in a cycle of destructive imperial engagement. In trying to understand the current political situation in Afghanistan, and in attempting to formulate international policy in the region, it is vital that we are aware of the dominant narratives or ‘myths’ that are being produced, who it is that is producing them and for what purpose, and what is at stake in failing to interrogate them. Any policy that does not take the role of deliberately constructed narratives and the mediums throough which they are disseminated into account will not only continue to replicate them, perhaps unknowingly, but any “securitizing”, “peacebuilding” and “development” efforts built on these terms can never result in long-term success. The emancipatory possibilities of such a critical project of discourse deconstruction lie in: 1) understanding the raced/classed/gendered power hierarchies that are their foundation; 2) uncovering the nationalized militarization and the hypermasculinized and hyperfeminized normativities that are are embedded within these myths, and; 3) the recognition of the detrimental effect of the West’s ‘myths’ and configuring the reconceptualisation of policy alternatives through its contestation. By looking critically at what has become the common language of foreign engagement in Afghanistan, the foundation of historical narratives or ‘myths’ that perpetuate a certain image of Afghanistan, and which in turn results in very particular attitudes that imbue foreign policy, begin to be revealed. I will utilize two broad (and inextricably linked) categorizations which most accurately encapsulate the dominant strains of discourse to help clarify how this relationship is constructed and by thus identifying them as such attempt to de-bunk the myths they create. These ‘myths’ which have become normalized and banal in foreign policy, media, and some academic discourse I define as the ‘heroism’ discourse/myth and the ‘militarization’ discourse/myth. Superman and G.I. Joe “When we read the history books given to children in the United States, it all starts with heroic adventure – there is no bloodshed – and Columbus Day is a celebration.” 57 The ‘heroism’ narrative can be called by several names: the ‘saviour syndrome’, “mediatically generated” or “hybrid techno-medical” humanitarianism 58 , “foreign aid”, “humanitarian intervention”, etc. This narrative constructs foreign engagement in a region as spectacle and as prized commodities to be admired and ‘sold’ to the public; it constructs the West as ‘saviours’ and the ‘Other’, in this case Afghanistan, as the victim in need of saving, accomplished through images and tales of passion and fervour that often pathologize the other and valorize the Western interveener. When the US, with the support of the UN, bombed Afghanistan in 2001in response to the events of September 11 th , the mission was entitled “Operation Enduring Freedom”. Today, as reconstruction and ‘peace-building’ efforts are underway in Afghanistan in tandem with military operations, political conversations and media productions are saturated with calls to “win the hearts and minds” of the people of Afghanistan and of the necessary and benevolent role the West must play in instilling ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and ‘democracy’ in the war-torn and poverty stricken region. Debrix, offers an analysis of what he calls “the global humanitarian spectacle” to demonstrate how medical and humanitarian NGO’s simulate “heroism, sentiment, and compassion”; medical catastrophes and civil conflicts, he explains, have indeed become prized commodities for globalizing neoliberal policies of Western states and international organizations to sell to ‘myth readers’: “They give Western states and the UN the opportunity to put their liberal humanistic policies into practice, while, for Western media, humanitarianism simply sells”. 59 There are several repercusions of this myth, explains Debrix. First, this has resulted in real humanitarian and moral issues being overlooked; Second, images are being purged of their content. Myth has thus becoming the very real enemy of true humanitarianism; that is, we’ve become so inundates with superhero mythologization of real world events that the embedded paternalism and unrealistic goals go unnoticed. 60 Additionally, this narrative reinforces a victimology of the ‘Other’ and in fact capitalises on it, while simultaneously hiding the paternalistic and neo-colonialist ideologies in humanitarian garb. The role of the media and consciously generated and disseminated images is particularly pronounced here, as passion and spectacle are valued in the commodification of images over content and history. Jean Baudrillard states “There is no possible distinction, at the level of images and information, between the spectacular and the symbolic, no possible distinction between the ‘crime’ and the crackdown”. 61 The militarization narrative, in contrast to the ‘objective benevolence’ of the heroism myth, utilizes constructed and one-dimensional conceptions of militaries, security, and defense. This narrative relies on the myth that militarization is always a useful tool in securitization. For example: Following the NATO air strikes in October of this year that killed at least 50 civilians and an augmentation of Taliban suicide attacks, Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai called on the need for more military operations, an international air force, and an increase in Afghan soldiers and police as mechanisms necessary to “tackle the root causes of terrorism”. 62 Words such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘justice’, and ‘women’s rights’ have become permanent variables in the mantra that has been used liberally and repeatedly as part of the common and often un-stated, assumptions that intervention by NATO, American, Canadian, and British forces will improve the lives of Afghanistan people over ‘there’ and increase security for us over ‘here’. Thus, as the military continues to occupy the region, we in the West are continually told that Afghan women and men have now been “liberated” from an oppressive regime by the West. This is bolstered by the assumption that the Afghan people support the US-backed government and want the military there for security (That is, that they are better off now than before). There is a dominant assumption that the West can “win” the “war on terror” and that military measures in the Middle East are necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks. If prospects look dim in the region, this narrative implies the appropriate response is to increase combat troops and artillery. Finally, embedded in these images is the assumption that reconstruction, delivery of humanitarian aid and development can coesist alongside military efforts to fight off insurgents/terrorists and “pacify” the opposition. Thus, reports on the increasing numbers of casualties of the war does not appear incongruous with claims of ‘peace-making’ and ‘development’ - therefore we must protect it the puppet government and fight the insurgents. 6 [/INST] <h4>The war in Afghanistan is an extension of the narrative of the Western savior—the discursive construction of Afghanistan as a state in desperate need of US help makes war inevitable and results in bankrupt policy </h4><p><strong>Crowe 7</strong>—Researcher, York Centre for International and Security Studies. PhD candidate in pol sci, York U (Lori, The “Fuzzy Dream”: Discourse, Historical myths, and Militarized (in)Security - Interrogating dangerous myths of Afghanistan and the ‘West’, http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Crowe-loricrowe.pdf)</p><p>The medium for the dissemination of myth is not, however, limited to TV or radio news broadcasts, particularly in the technologically infused new media culture where movies, cartoons, comics, music vidoes, and the internet have saturated pop culture so thoroughly that it has become easier than ever to propagate myth to viewers/listeners around the globe. In contemporary culture, <u><strong>the media have become central to the constitution of social identity</u></strong>. It is not just that media messages have become important forms of influence on individuals. We also identify and construct ourselves as social beings through the mediation of images. This is not simply a case of people being dominated by images, but of people seeking and obtaining pleasure through the experience of the consumption of these images. An understanding of contemporary culture involves a focus both on the phenomenology of watching and the cultural form of images. 52 Consider, for example, the increase in films infused with US militarized patriotism or the recent obsession with Internet blogs and now videos posted on UTube from soldiers stationed in Afghanistan. Hunt explores the political racist/sexist currency of a cartoon circulating on the internet post9/11 of five Taliban leaders looking horrified after reading a document that states, “To the Taliban: Give us Osama bin Laden or we’ll send your women to college”. 53 I similarly encountered an image via email of beloved cultural cartoon icon Homer Simpson in front of an American flag holding a shotgun with Osama bin Laden in the target site. <u><strong>In pop culture it appears that <mark>war</mark> ha<mark>s </mark>become</u></strong> back <u><strong>‘in style’</u></strong> <u><strong>celebrating images that glorify</u></strong> heroic soldiers and valorize <u><strong>war while the <mark>aftereffects are</mark> </u></strong>often<u><strong> <mark>invisible</u></strong></mark>. Consider an article in Rolling Stone magazine which lists the results of a poll of some of the most popular songs soldiers listen to in order to get ‘pumped up’ for a mission. Hard rock, heavy metal, and rap such as 2Pac’s “Hit ‘Em Up” and Drowning Pool’s “Bodies” apparently helps soldiers “get ready to kill” and “haul balls down the road”. 54 The problem is that <u><strong><mark>the media</u></strong></mark> and pop culture <u><strong><mark>has the</mark> exceptional <mark>ability to generate myth</u></strong> <u><strong>through</u></strong></mark>, for example, ambiguous wording, <u><strong><mark>military jargon,</mark> the severing of causal connections, banishment of bodies, and the cool demeanor of third-person-reporter-speak </u></strong>55 : <u><strong>We are faced with <mark>“pseudo</mark> concrete <mark>images</mark>”</u></strong> explains Eisenstein, “<u><strong>Žizek’s “plague of fantasies” which <mark>blur our view</u></strong></mark>ings. <u><strong><mark>Because of the irrepresentability of the ‘real’ </mark>there is just surplus-obedience; <mark>we obey rather than confront</mark>.” 56 </p><p></u></strong>Afghanistan <u><strong>The historical production of</u></strong> particular <u><strong><mark>myths of Afghanistan </mark>have <mark>reli</mark>ed <mark>on representations</u></strong></mark> of the country in the West <u><strong><mark>that are</mark> largely simplistic, <mark>ahistorical, and politically motivated</mark>. Afghanistan is a</u></strong> sort of <u><strong>“fuzzy dream” for</u></strong> most in <u><strong>the West: embodied in</u></strong> a series of fabricated images of war and poverty, <u><strong>de-contextualized photos</u></strong> without names or places, <u><strong>numbers and graphs claiming statistical quantification, and disjointed</u></strong> yet often repeated phrases and <u><strong>metaphors</u></strong>. A particular mythic representation of Afghanistan is being (and has been) proliferated in the international community, through media, history books, foreign policy documents, political commentators, academia, and virtually any other body of communication. <u><strong>The vigor with which particular discourses have materialized</u></strong> since 9/11 <u><strong>are representative of their link to the</u></strong> Wests militarized ‘<u><strong>War on Terror’</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> more generally of <u><strong>the</u></strong> embedded <u><strong>relationship between</u></strong> political <u><strong>policies and militarized discourses which legitimate the West’s military engagement</u></strong> and development policies. That is, <u><strong><mark>Afghanistan serves as an</mark> </u></strong>unfortunate <u><strong><mark>example of the</mark> very real <mark>power of discourse</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and myth-making <mark>which </mark>affect the form that international engagement takes; this in turn <mark>reproduces</mark> those myths in a cycle of <mark>destructive imperial engagement.</mark> </p><p>In trying to understand </u></strong>the current political situation in <u><strong>Afghanistan</u></strong>, and in attempting to formulate international policy in the region, <u><strong>it is vital that we are aware of the dominant narratives</u></strong> or ‘myths’ <u><strong>that are being produced, who</u></strong> it is that <u><strong>is producing them and for what purpose, and what is at stake in failing to interrogate them. <mark>Any policy that does not take the role of deliberately constructed narratives </mark>and the mediums throough which they are disseminated <mark>into account will not only</mark> continue to <mark>replicate them</u></strong></mark>, perhaps unknowingly, <u><strong><mark>but </mark>any</u></strong> “securitizing”, <u><strong>“peacebuilding” and <mark>“development” efforts built on these terms can never result in </mark>long-term <mark>success.</u></strong> <u><strong>The </mark>emancipatory <mark>possibilities</u></strong> <u><strong>of such a critical project</u></strong></mark> of discourse deconstruction <u><strong><mark>lie in</u></strong></mark>: 1) understanding the raced/classed/gendered power hierarchies that are their foundation; 2) <u><strong><mark>uncovering</u></strong></mark> the nationalized <u><strong><mark>militarization</u></strong></mark> and the hypermasculinized and hyperfeminized normativities that are are <u><strong>embedded within these myths, and</u></strong>; 3) <u><strong>the recognition of the detrimental effect of the West’s ‘myths’ <mark>and configuring</mark> <mark>the reconceptualisation of policy alternatives through its contestation</mark>.</p><p><mark>By looking critically at</mark> </u></strong>what has become<u><strong> <mark>the</u></strong></mark> common <u><strong><mark>language of</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>foreign <mark>engagement</u></strong></mark> in Afghanistan, <u><strong>the foundation of historical narratives or <mark>‘myths</mark>’ that perpetuate a certain image of Afghanistan, and which </u></strong>in turn<u><strong> results in </u></strong>very particular<u><strong> attitudes that imbue foreign policy, <mark>begin to be revealed</mark>.</u></strong> I will utilize two broad (and inextricably linked) categorizations which most accurately encapsulate the dominant strains of discourse to help clarify how this relationship is constructed and by thus identifying them as such attempt to de-bunk the myths they create. These ‘myths’ which have become normalized and banal in foreign policy, media, and some academic discourse I define as the ‘heroism’ discourse/myth and the ‘militarization’ discourse/myth. </p><p>Superman and G.I. Joe “When we read the history books given to children in the United States, it all starts with heroic adventure – there is no bloodshed – and Columbus Day is a celebration.” 57 <u><strong><mark>The ‘heroism’ narrative </mark>can be called</u></strong> by several names: <u><strong>the ‘saviour syndrome’,</u></strong> “mediatically generated” or “hybrid techno-medical” humanitarianism 58 , <u><strong>“foreign aid”, “humanitarian intervention”, etc.</u></strong> <u><strong>This narrative constructs foreign engagement in a region as spectacle and as prized commodities to be admired and ‘sold’ to the public;</u></strong> <u><strong>it <mark>constructs the West as ‘saviours’ and the ‘Other’,</mark> in this case <mark>Afghanistan, as the victim in need of saving, accomplished through</mark> images and <mark>tales of passion</mark> </u></strong>and fervour<u><strong> <mark>that</mark> </u></strong>often<u><strong> <mark>pathologize the other</mark> and valorize the West</u></strong>ern interveener. When the US, with the support of the UN, bombed Afghanistan in 2001in response to the events of September 11 th , the mission was entitled “Operation Enduring Freedom”. Today, <u><strong>as reconstruction and ‘peace-building’ efforts are </u></strong>underway in Afghanistan in tandem with military operations, political conversations and media productions are <u><strong>saturated with</u></strong> calls to “win the hearts and minds” of the people of Afghanistan and of <u><strong>the necessary and benevolent role the West must play in instilling ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and ‘democracy’ in the war-torn and poverty stricken region</u></strong>. Debrix, offers an analysis of what he calls “the global humanitarian spectacle” to demonstrate how medical and <u><strong>humanitarian NGO’s simulate “heroism, sentiment, and compassion”; medical <mark>catastrophes</mark> and civil conflicts</u></strong>, he explains, <u><strong><mark>have</u></strong></mark> indeed <u><strong><mark>become prized commodities for </mark>globalizing <mark>neoliberal policies </mark>of Western states </u></strong>and international organizations<u><strong> to sell to ‘myth readers’:</u></strong> <u><strong>“They give Western states </u></strong>and the UN<u><strong> the opportunity to put their </u></strong>liberal<u><strong> humanistic policies into practice</u></strong>, while, for Western media, humanitarianism simply sells”. 59 </p><p><u><strong>There are several repercusions of <mark>this myth</u></strong></mark>, explains Debrix. <u><strong>First,</u></strong> <u><strong>this has <mark>resulted in real humanitarian</mark> and moral <mark>issues being overlooked</mark>; Second, <mark>images are </mark>being <mark>purged of their content</u></strong>. <u><strong>Myth has thus becom</u></strong></mark>ing<u><strong> <mark>the</mark> very real <mark>enemy of </mark>true <mark>humanitarianism</mark>;</u></strong> that is, <u><strong><mark>we’ve become so inundates with superhero</mark> <mark>mythologization</mark> of real world events <mark>that</mark> the embedded <mark>paternalism</mark> and unrealistic goals <mark>go unnoticed</u></strong></mark>. 60 Additionally<mark>, <u><strong>this </mark>narrative <mark>reinforces</mark> a <mark>victimology</mark> of the ‘Other’ and</u></strong> in fact <u><strong>capitalises on it, <mark>while </mark>simultaneously <mark>hiding the paternalistic</mark> and neo-colonialist <mark>ideologies in humanitarian garb</mark>.</u></strong> The role of the media and consciously generated and disseminated images is particularly pronounced here, as <u><strong>passion and spectacle are valued in the commodification of images over content and history</u></strong>. Jean Baudrillard states “There is no possible distinction, at the level of images and information, between the spectacular and the symbolic, no possible distinction between the ‘crime’ and the crackdown”. 61 </p><p>The militarization narrative, in contrast to the ‘objective benevolence’ of the heroism myth, utilizes constructed and one-dimensional conceptions of militaries, security, and defense. This narrative relies on the myth that militarization is always a useful tool in securitization. For example: Following the NATO air strikes in October of this year that killed at least 50 civilians and an augmentation of Taliban suicide attacks, Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai called on the need for more military operations, an international air force, and an increase in Afghan soldiers and police as mechanisms necessary to “tackle the root causes of terrorism”. 62 <u><strong>Words such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘justice’, and ‘women’s rights’ have become permanent variables in the mantra that has been used </u></strong>liberally and repeatedly<u><strong> as part of the </u></strong>common and often<u><strong> un-stated, assumptions that intervention </u></strong>by NATO, American, Canadian, and British forces<u><strong> will improve the lives of Afghanistan people over ‘there’ and increase security for us over ‘here’</u></strong>. Thus, as the military continues to occupy the region, <u><strong>we</u></strong> in the West <u><strong>are continually told that Afghan women</u></strong> and men <u><strong>have </u></strong>now<u><strong> been</u></strong> <u><strong>“liberated” from an oppressive regime by the West. This is bolstered by the assumption that the Afghan people support the US-backed government</u></strong> and want the military there for security (That is, that they are better off now than before). <u><strong><mark>There is a</mark> dominant <mark>assumption that the West can “win” the “war on terror”</mark> and that military measures in the Middle East are necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks.</u></strong> If prospects look dim in the region, this narrative implies the appropriate response is to increase combat troops and artillery. Finally, <u><strong>embedded in these images is the assumption that reconstruction</u></strong>, delivery of humanitarian aid and development <u><strong>can coesist alongside military efforts to fight off insurgents</u></strong>/terrorists <u><strong>and “pacify” the opposition</u></strong>. Thus, <u><strong>reports on the <mark>increasing </mark>numbers of <mark>casualties</mark> of the war <mark>does not appear incongruous with </mark>claims of ‘<mark>peace-making’</mark> and ‘development’ - therefore we must protect it the puppet government and fight the insurgents. 6 </p></u></strong> </s>

Prohibition results in cartel grow ops that destroys biodiversity -- legalization solves

illegal marijuana plantations endanger forests by operating under the radar and unregulated in our most pristine natural areas They contaminate water supplies result in deforestation, and threaten indigenous species But I had no idea how widespread the destruction really was the Sierras campaign uncovered 69 marijuana plantations run by Mexican drug cartels Mexican drug trafficking organizations have been operating on public lands to cultivate marijuana with serious consequences for the environment In creating and abandoning vast marijuana plantations the cartels are leaving heaps of trash slaughtered animals pesticides and dangerous spilled fuels each plantation results in an environmental disaster there are still believed to be many plantations still in operation cartels aren't slowing down They've realized that it's cheaper and easier to fund the plantations from below the border and grow the marijuana closer to prime US markets eliminating the need to smuggle the drugs across the border US forests are suffering pesticides are the worst byproduct of the operations: Growers used pesticides and fertilizers stronger than residential to cultivate crop the chemical pesticides kill insects and organisms fertilizer runoff contaminates local waterways and aids in the growth of algae and weeds vegetation impedes water flows that are critical to frogs, toads and salamanders in the rivers the surest way to prevent such destruction in the forests is to legalize the growing of marijuana removing the incentives to operate recklessly and clandestinely and allowing for regulation of pesticide and fertilizer use

marijuana plantations endanger forests by operating unregulated--in pristine areas They contaminate water supplies, result in deforestation, and threaten indigenous species. trafficking organizations operat on public lands with serious consequences leaving heaps of trash, slaughtered animals pesticides, and dangerous spilled fuels each results in an environmental disaster cartels aren't slowing down. They've realized that it's cheaper and easier to fund the plantations and grow closer to US markets--eliminating the need to smuggle forests are suffering fertilizer runoff contaminates waterways and aids in the growth of algae and weeds vegetation impedes water flows that are critical to the rivers the surest way to prevent destruction in the forests is to legalize marijuana and allowing for regulation of pesticide and fertilizer use.

When I argued a few months back that legalizing marijuana would be good for the environment, my main point was that illegal marijuana plantations endanger forests by operating under the radar--and unregulated--in some of our most pristine natural areas. They contaminate water supplies, result in deforestation, and threaten indigenous species. But I had no idea how widespread the destruction really was--just recently, the "Save our Sierras" campaign uncovered 69 marijuana plantations run by Mexican drug cartels and seized over a billion dollars worth of plants in California national forests. According to a report in Greenwire, "Mexican drug trafficking organizations have been operating on public lands to cultivate marijuana, with serious consequences for the environment and public safety," said Gil Kerlikowske, chief of the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy. In creating, and eventually abandoning, vast marijuana plantations the cartels are leaving heaps of trash, slaughtered animals, copious amounts of pesticides, and dangerous spilled fuels in their wake. Essentially, each plantation results in an environmental disaster. But the campaign to stop them is vigorous, and is already seeing encouraging results: The massive operation that began in February has already seized about 318,000 marijuana plants worth an estimated $1.1 billion, officials announced last week. In addition to 82 arrests, the multi-jurisdictional federal, state and local operation netted 42 pounds of processed marijuana, more than $40,000 in cash, 25 weapons and three vehicles. But there are still believed to be many plantations still in operation, and the cartels aren't slowing down. They've realized that it's cheaper and easier to fund the plantations from below the border and grow the marijuana closer to prime US markets--eliminating the need to smuggle the drugs across the border. Instead, US forests are suffering. The pesticides are perhaps the worst byproduct of the operations: Growers in Fresno County used a cocktail of pesticides and fertilizers many times stronger than what is used on residential lawns to cultivate their crop . . . While the chemical pesticides kill insects and other organisms directly, fertilizer runoff contaminates local waterways and aids in the growth of algae and weeds. The vegetation in turn impedes water flows that are critical to frogs, toads and salamanders in the Kings and San Joaquin rivers. As a response to the issue, California is hiring more forest service law enforcement, and expanding their efforts. But it seems to me that the surest way to prevent such destruction in the forests is to legalize the growing of marijuana, and thus removing the incentives to operate recklessly and clandestinely--and allowing for regulation of pesticide and fertilizer use. For now, however, I wish the Save our Sierras program continued luck in their good work.

<h4>Prohibition results in cartel grow ops that destroys biodiversity -- legalization solves </h4><p><strong>Merchant 09</strong> (Brian is a freelance writer and editor that covers politics with a focus on climate and energy issues, http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/drug-cartels-turning-us-forests-into-marijuana-plantations-toxic-messes.html, “Drug Cartels Turning US Forests into Marijuana Plantations, Toxic Messes”, AB) </p><p>When I argued a few months back that legalizing marijuana would be good for the environment, my main point was that <u><strong>illegal <mark>marijuana plantations endanger forests by operating </mark>under the radar</u></strong>--<u><strong>and <mark>unregulated</u></strong>--<u><strong>in</u></strong> </mark>some of <u><strong>our most <mark>pristine </mark>natural <mark>areas</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They contaminate water supplies</u></strong>, <u><strong>result in deforestation, and threaten indigenous</u></strong> <u><strong>species</u></strong>. <u><strong></mark>But I had no idea how widespread the destruction really was</u></strong>--just recently, <u><strong>the</u></strong> "Save our <u><strong>Sierras</u></strong>" <u><strong>campaign</u></strong> <u><strong>uncovered 69 marijuana plantations</u></strong> <u><strong>run by Mexican drug cartels</u></strong> and seized over a billion dollars worth of plants in California national forests. According to a report in Greenwire, "<u><strong>Mexican drug <mark>trafficking organizations </mark>have been <mark>operat</mark>ing <mark>on public lands</mark> to cultivate marijuana</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>with serious consequences </mark>for the environment</u></strong> and public safety," said Gil Kerlikowske, chief of the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy. <u><strong>In creating</u></strong>, <u><strong>and</u></strong> eventually <u><strong>abandoning</u></strong>, <u><strong>vast marijuana plantations the cartels are <mark>leaving</u></strong> <u><strong>heaps of trash</u></strong>, <u><strong>slaughtered animals</u></strong></mark>, copious amounts of <u><strong><mark>pesticides</u></strong>, <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>dangerous spilled fuels</u></strong> </mark>in their wake. Essentially, <u><strong><mark>each </mark>plantation <mark>results in an environmental disaster</u></strong></mark>. But the campaign to stop them is vigorous, and is already seeing encouraging results: The massive operation that began in February has already seized about 318,000 marijuana plants worth an estimated $1.1 billion, officials announced last week. In addition to 82 arrests, the multi-jurisdictional federal, state and local operation netted 42 pounds of processed marijuana, more than $40,000 in cash, 25 weapons and three vehicles. But <u><strong>there are still believed to be many plantations still in operation</u></strong>, and the <u><strong><mark>cartels aren't slowing down</u></strong>. <u><strong>They've realized that it's cheaper and easier to fund the plantations</mark> from below the border <mark>and grow</mark> the marijuana <mark>closer to </mark>prime <mark>US markets</u></strong>--<u><strong>eliminating the need to smuggle </mark>the drugs across the border</u></strong>. Instead, <u><strong>US <mark>forests are suffering</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong>pesticides</u></strong> <u><strong>are</u></strong> perhaps <u><strong>the worst byproduct of the operations: Growers</u></strong> in Fresno County <u><strong>used</u></strong> a cocktail of <u><strong>pesticides and fertilizers</u></strong> many times <u><strong>stronger</u></strong> <u><strong>than</u></strong> what is used on <u><strong>residential</u></strong> lawns <u><strong>to cultivate</u></strong> their <u><strong>crop</u></strong> . . . While <u><strong>the chemical pesticides kill insects and</u></strong> other <u><strong>organisms</u></strong> directly, <u><strong><mark>fertilizer runoff contaminates </mark>local <mark>waterways</u></strong> <u><strong>and aids in the growth of algae and</u></strong> <u><strong>weeds</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>vegetation</u></strong> </mark>in turn <u><strong><mark>impedes</u></strong> <u><strong>water flows</u></strong> <u><strong>that are critical to</mark> frogs, toads and salamanders in <mark>the</u></strong> </mark>Kings and San Joaquin <u><strong><mark>rivers</u></strong></mark>. As a response to the issue, California is hiring more forest service law enforcement, and expanding their efforts. But it seems to me that <u><strong><mark>the surest way to prevent </mark>such <mark>destruction in the forests is to legalize </mark>the growing of <mark>marijuana</u></strong></mark>, and thus <u><strong>removing the incentives to operate recklessly and clandestinely</u></strong>--<u><strong><mark>and allowing for regulation of pesticide and fertilizer use</u></strong>.</mark> For now, however, I wish the Save our Sierras program continued luck in their good work.</p>

Merchant 09 (Brian is a freelance writer and editor that covers politics with a focus on climate and energy issues, http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/drug-cartels-turning-us-forests-into-marijuana-plantations-toxic-messes.html, “Drug Cartels Turning US Forests into Marijuana Plantations, Toxic Messes”, AB)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Merchant 09 (Brian is a freelance writer and editor that covers politics with a focus on climate and energy issues, http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/drug-cartels-turning-us-forests-into-marijuana-plantations-toxic-messes.html, “Drug Cartels Turning US Forests into Marijuana Plantations, Toxic Messes”, AB) fulltext: When I argued a few months back that legalizing marijuana would be good for the environment, my main point was that illegal marijuana plantations endanger forests by operating under the radar--and unregulated--in some of our most pristine natural areas. They contaminate water supplies, result in deforestation, and threaten indigenous species. But I had no idea how widespread the destruction really was--just recently, the "Save our Sierras" campaign uncovered 69 marijuana plantations run by Mexican drug cartels and seized over a billion dollars worth of plants in California national forests. According to a report in Greenwire, "Mexican drug trafficking organizations have been operating on public lands to cultivate marijuana, with serious consequences for the environment and public safety," said Gil Kerlikowske, chief of the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy. In creating, and eventually abandoning, vast marijuana plantations the cartels are leaving heaps of trash, slaughtered animals, copious amounts of pesticides, and dangerous spilled fuels in their wake. Essentially, each plantation results in an environmental disaster. But the campaign to stop them is vigorous, and is already seeing encouraging results: The massive operation that began in February has already seized about 318,000 marijuana plants worth an estimated $1.1 billion, officials announced last week. In addition to 82 arrests, the multi-jurisdictional federal, state and local operation netted 42 pounds of processed marijuana, more than $40,000 in cash, 25 weapons and three vehicles. But there are still believed to be many plantations still in operation, and the cartels aren't slowing down. They've realized that it's cheaper and easier to fund the plantations from below the border and grow the marijuana closer to prime US markets--eliminating the need to smuggle the drugs across the border. Instead, US forests are suffering. The pesticides are perhaps the worst byproduct of the operations: Growers in Fresno County used a cocktail of pesticides and fertilizers many times stronger than what is used on residential lawns to cultivate their crop . . . While the chemical pesticides kill insects and other organisms directly, fertilizer runoff contaminates local waterways and aids in the growth of algae and weeds. The vegetation in turn impedes water flows that are critical to frogs, toads and salamanders in the Kings and San Joaquin rivers. As a response to the issue, California is hiring more forest service law enforcement, and expanding their efforts. But it seems to me that the surest way to prevent such destruction in the forests is to legalize the growing of marijuana, and thus removing the incentives to operate recklessly and clandestinely--and allowing for regulation of pesticide and fertilizer use. For now, however, I wish the Save our Sierras program continued luck in their good work. [/INST] <h4>Prohibition results in cartel grow ops that destroys biodiversity -- legalization solves </h4><p><strong>Merchant 09</strong> (Brian is a freelance writer and editor that covers politics with a focus on climate and energy issues, http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/drug-cartels-turning-us-forests-into-marijuana-plantations-toxic-messes.html, “Drug Cartels Turning US Forests into Marijuana Plantations, Toxic Messes”, AB) </p><p>When I argued a few months back that legalizing marijuana would be good for the environment, my main point was that <u><strong>illegal <mark>marijuana plantations endanger forests by operating </mark>under the radar</u></strong>--<u><strong>and <mark>unregulated</u></strong>--<u><strong>in</u></strong> </mark>some of <u><strong>our most <mark>pristine </mark>natural <mark>areas</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They contaminate water supplies</u></strong>, <u><strong>result in deforestation, and threaten indigenous</u></strong> <u><strong>species</u></strong>. <u><strong></mark>But I had no idea how widespread the destruction really was</u></strong>--just recently, <u><strong>the</u></strong> "Save our <u><strong>Sierras</u></strong>" <u><strong>campaign</u></strong> <u><strong>uncovered 69 marijuana plantations</u></strong> <u><strong>run by Mexican drug cartels</u></strong> and seized over a billion dollars worth of plants in California national forests. According to a report in Greenwire, "<u><strong>Mexican drug <mark>trafficking organizations </mark>have been <mark>operat</mark>ing <mark>on public lands</mark> to cultivate marijuana</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>with serious consequences </mark>for the environment</u></strong> and public safety," said Gil Kerlikowske, chief of the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy. <u><strong>In creating</u></strong>, <u><strong>and</u></strong> eventually <u><strong>abandoning</u></strong>, <u><strong>vast marijuana plantations the cartels are <mark>leaving</u></strong> <u><strong>heaps of trash</u></strong>, <u><strong>slaughtered animals</u></strong></mark>, copious amounts of <u><strong><mark>pesticides</u></strong>, <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>dangerous spilled fuels</u></strong> </mark>in their wake. Essentially, <u><strong><mark>each </mark>plantation <mark>results in an environmental disaster</u></strong></mark>. But the campaign to stop them is vigorous, and is already seeing encouraging results: The massive operation that began in February has already seized about 318,000 marijuana plants worth an estimated $1.1 billion, officials announced last week. In addition to 82 arrests, the multi-jurisdictional federal, state and local operation netted 42 pounds of processed marijuana, more than $40,000 in cash, 25 weapons and three vehicles. But <u><strong>there are still believed to be many plantations still in operation</u></strong>, and the <u><strong><mark>cartels aren't slowing down</u></strong>. <u><strong>They've realized that it's cheaper and easier to fund the plantations</mark> from below the border <mark>and grow</mark> the marijuana <mark>closer to </mark>prime <mark>US markets</u></strong>--<u><strong>eliminating the need to smuggle </mark>the drugs across the border</u></strong>. Instead, <u><strong>US <mark>forests are suffering</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong>pesticides</u></strong> <u><strong>are</u></strong> perhaps <u><strong>the worst byproduct of the operations: Growers</u></strong> in Fresno County <u><strong>used</u></strong> a cocktail of <u><strong>pesticides and fertilizers</u></strong> many times <u><strong>stronger</u></strong> <u><strong>than</u></strong> what is used on <u><strong>residential</u></strong> lawns <u><strong>to cultivate</u></strong> their <u><strong>crop</u></strong> . . . While <u><strong>the chemical pesticides kill insects and</u></strong> other <u><strong>organisms</u></strong> directly, <u><strong><mark>fertilizer runoff contaminates </mark>local <mark>waterways</u></strong> <u><strong>and aids in the growth of algae and</u></strong> <u><strong>weeds</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>vegetation</u></strong> </mark>in turn <u><strong><mark>impedes</u></strong> <u><strong>water flows</u></strong> <u><strong>that are critical to</mark> frogs, toads and salamanders in <mark>the</u></strong> </mark>Kings and San Joaquin <u><strong><mark>rivers</u></strong></mark>. As a response to the issue, California is hiring more forest service law enforcement, and expanding their efforts. But it seems to me that <u><strong><mark>the surest way to prevent </mark>such <mark>destruction in the forests is to legalize </mark>the growing of <mark>marijuana</u></strong></mark>, and thus <u><strong>removing the incentives to operate recklessly and clandestinely</u></strong>--<u><strong><mark>and allowing for regulation of pesticide and fertilizer use</u></strong>.</mark> For now, however, I wish the Save our Sierras program continued luck in their good work.</p> </s>

Turns case in context of the black body

SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21/

/Saidiya V, Associate Professor of English @ UC BERKLEY,“SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21/

<h4><strong>Turns case in context of the black body</h4><p>Hartman 97</p><p></strong>/Saidiya V, Associate Professor of English @ UC BERKLEY,“<u>SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21/</p></u>

Hartman 97

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Hartman 97 fulltext: /Saidiya V, Associate Professor of English @ UC BERKLEY,“SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21/ [/INST] <h4><strong>Turns case in context of the black body</h4><p>Hartman 97</p><p></strong>/Saidiya V, Associate Professor of English @ UC BERKLEY,“<u>SCENCES OF SUBJECTION: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America”; pp. 20-21/</p></u> </s>

The 1AC’s linear logic ignores complexity and paves over interactions between dozens of predictions

human systems do not work in a linear fashion clear causal relations cannot be traced because of multiple influences. The distinction is far from trivial Linearity assume problems can be broken down each piece analysed separately all the separate answers recombined to the whole equivalent to the sum of the parts Nonlinear relationships have to be examined all at once, as a coherent entity. , dynamics are highly context specific Therefore assumptions and theories not entirely appropriate to a local situation is unlikely to lead hoped-for changes. It is important from the outset to understand interaction among variables, rather than assuming that one causes another , linear logic suggests if A is done, B will result, leading to C and Impact D. The distinction between linearity and nonlinearity re-frame the debate If the goals of learning are about mindsets the degree to which a balance can be struck without exploring these assumptions is open to question. Complexity suggest , in certain systems future events cannot be forecasted in other s future s can be foreseen is important to identify unpredictability and not treat uncertainty as embarrassing Rather than rejecting planning outright, there is a need to accept inherent levels of uncertainty Byrne gives the example of a city as a complex system ( the cities are complex problems a range of variables are interacting simultaneously in interconnected ways.

human systems do not work in a linear fashion because of multiple influences Linearity assume problems can be broken down each piece analysed separately recombined to the whole equivalent to the sum of the parts Nonlinear relationships have to be examined as a coherent entity. dynamics are context-specific assumptions not appropriate to a local situation is unlikely to lead to hoped-for changes understand interaction among variables, rather than assuming one causes another linear logic suggests if A is done B will result, leading to C and Impact D The distinction between linearity and nonlinearity re-frame the debate Rather than rejecting planning there is a need to accept inherent levels of uncertainty

Concept 4: Nonlinearity5 ‘... the darkest corner of science [is] the realm of non-linear problems’ (Strogatz, 2003). Outline of the concept Traditional scientific approaches are based on the idea that linear relationships can be identified through data gathering and analysis, and can be used as the basis of ‘laws’ of behaviour (Byrne, 1998). Such approaches in the physical sciences have informed the development of social, economic and political science, using broad theories of behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest (Homer-Dixon, 1995). However, complexity science suggests that human systems do not work in a simple linear fashion. Feedback processes between interconnected elements and dimensions lead to relationships that see change that is dynamic, nonlinear and unpredictable (Stacey, 1996). Nonlinearity is a direct result of the mutual interdependence between dimensions found in complex systems. In such systems, clear causal relations cannot be traced because of multiple influences. The distinction between linear and nonlinearity is far from trivial. If dynamic nonlinear feedbacks in response to rising greenhouse gases are included in the model used in the Stern Review of Climate Change (cited in Concept 2), for example, the total average cost of climate change rises from 5% to at least 20% of global per capita consumption (HM Treasury, 2006).6 Detailed explanation Vast numbers of naturally occurring systems exhibit nonlinearity. As one thinker has dryly suggested (Stanislaw Ulam, in the 1950s), calling a situation nonlinear is like going to the zoo and talking about all the interesting non-elephant animals you can see there (Campbell et al., 1985): there are as many nonlinear situations as there are non-elephant animals. Linearity describes the proportionality assumed in idealised situations where responses are proportional to forces and causes are proportional to effects (Strogatz, 2003). Linear problems can be broken down into pieces, with each piece analysed separately; finally, all the separate answers can be recombined to give the right answer to the original problem. In a linear system, the whole is exactly equivalent to the sum of the parts. However, linearity is often an approximation of a more complicated reality – most systems only behave linearly if they are close to equilibrium and are not pushed too hard. When a system starts to behave in a nonlinear fashion, ‘all bets are off’ (Strogatz, 2003). This is not to suggest that nonlinearity is necessarily a dangerous or unwanted aspect of systems. The biology of life itself is dependent on nonlinearity, as are the laws of ecology. Combination therapy for HIV/AIDS using a cocktail of three drugs works precisely because the immune response and viral dynamics are nonlinear – the three drugs taken in combination are much more effective than the sum of the three taken separately. The nonlinearity concept means that linear assumptions of how social phenomena play out should be questioned. It is important to note that such thinking has only relatively recently been incorporated into the ‘hard’ science paradigms and, moreover, is still only starting to shape thinking in the social, economic and political realms. Nonlinearity poses challenges to analysis precisely because such relationships cannot be taken apart – they have to be examined all at once, as a coherent entity. However, the need to develop such ways of thinking cannot be overstated – as one thinker puts it: ‘... every major unresolved problem in science – from consciousness to cancer to the collective craziness of the economy, is nonlinear’ (Capra, 1996). 5 It is important to distinguish nonlinearity as used here, which relates to relationships and proportionality, and nonlinearity in terms of sequences of events – one thing following another. 6 Note that the previously cited increase from 5 to 14.4% was due to natural, known feedbacks and does not include non-linear feedbacks 25 Although nonlinearity is a mathematical formulation, it is useful to take the suggestion that what is required is a ‘qualitative understanding of [the] quantitative’ when attempting to investigate them systematically (Byrne, 1998). Such a qualitative understanding has been furthered by the work of Robert Jervis (1997) on the role of complexity in international relations. Starting with the notion that understanding of social systems has tacitly incorporated linear approaches from Newtonian sciences, Jervis goes on to highlight three common assumptions that need to be challenged in order to take better account of nonlinearity. These assumptions provide a solid basis for investigating nonlinearity. First, it is very common to test ideas and propositions by making comparisons between two situations which are identical except for one variable – referred to as the independent variable. This kind of analysis is usually prefaced with the statement ‘holding all other things constant’. However, in a system of interconnected and interrelated parts, with feedback loops, adaptive agents and emergent properties, this is almost impossible, as everything else cannot be held constant and there is no independent variable. Jervis argues that, in such systems, it is impossible to look at ‘just one thing’, or to make only one change, hence to look at a situation involving just one change is unrealistic. Secondly, it is often assumed that changes in system output are proportional to changes in input. For example, if it has been assumed that a little foreign aid slightly increases economic growth, then more aid should produce more growth. However, as recent work by ODI and others argues, absorption capacity needs to be taken account – more aid does not necessarily equate to better aid. In complex systems, then, the output is not proportional to the input. Feedback loops and adaptive behaviours and emergent dynamics within the system may mean that the relationship between input and output is a nonlinear one: ‘Sometimes even a small amount of the variable can do a great deal of work and then the law of diminishing returns sets in [a negative feedback process] … in other cases very little impact is felt until a critical mass is assembled’ (Jervis, 1997). The third and final commonly made assumption of linearity is that the system output that follows from the sum of two different inputs is equal to the sum of the outputs arising from the individual inputs. In other words, the assumption is that if Action A leads to Consequence X and Action B has Consequence Y then Action A plus Action B will have Consequences X plus Y. This frequently does not hold, because the consequences of Action A may depend on the presence or absence of many other factors which may well be affected by B or B’s Consequence (Y). In addition, the sequence in which actions are undertaken may affect the outcome. Example: The growth dynamics model as an alternative to linear regression models Studies of economic growth face methodological problems, the foremost of which is dealing with real world complexity. The standard way of understanding growth assumes, implicitly, that the same model of growth is true for all countries, and that linear relationships of growth are true for all countries. However, linear relationships might not apply in many cases. An example would be a country where moderate trade protection would increase economic growth but closing off the economy completely to international trade would spell economic disaster. Linear growth models imply that the effect of increasing the value of the independent variable would be the same for all countries, regardless of the initial value of that variable or other variables. Therefore, an increase of the tariff rate from 0% to 10% is presumed to generate the same change in the growth rate as a change from 90% to 100%. Furthermore, the change from 0% to 10% is assumed to have the same effect in a poor country as in a rich country, in a primary resource exporter as in a manufacturing exporter, and in a country with well developed institutions as in a country with underdeveloped institutions. Despite some efforts to address these issues by relaxing the linear framework and introducing mechanisms to capture nonlinearities and interactions among some variables, this is still a poor way of addressing real world nonlinearity. Econometric research has identified that linear models cannot generally be expected to 26 provide a good approximation of an unknown nonlinear function, and in some cases can lead to serious misestimates (Rodríguez, 2007). Research at Harvard University has focused on the problem of designing a growth strategy in a context of ‘radical uncertainty’ about any generalised growth models. They call their method ‘growth diagnostics’, in part because it is very similar to the approach taken by medical specialists in identifying the causes of ailments. In such a context, assuming that every country has the same problem is unlikely to be very helpful. The principal idea is to look for clues in the country’s concrete environment about the specific binding constraints on growth. The growth diagnostics exercise asks a set of basic questions that can sequentially rule out possible explanations of the problem. The answers are inherently country-specific and time-specific. The essential method is to identify the key problem to be addressed as the signals that the economy would provide if a particular constraint were the cause of that problem. Implication: Challenge linearity in underlying assumptions Within complex systems, the degree of nonlinearity and relationships between various factors, and the lack of proportionality between inputs and outputs, means that the dynamics of change are highly context-specific. Therefore, if there are assumptions, aggregations and theories about the relations among different aspects of a specific situation, and these are not entirely appropriate when applied to the dynamics of a new local situation, then this perspective is unlikely to lead to a deep understanding of what should be done, and is furthermore unlikely to lead to the hoped-for changes. Nonlinearity implies that, as well as understanding the limitations of a particular model or perspective, it is important to build and improve new models that can provide the sort of information required for the particular task at hand. ‘No kind of explanatory representation can suit all kinds of phenomena ... any one diagnosis of [a] problem and its solution is necessarily partial’ (Holland, 2000). From this perspective, it is important to tailor to the particular situation one’s perspective on the dynamics of some phenomena. In a complex system, one must examine the complex web of interrelationships and interdependencies among its parts or elements (Flynn Research, 2003). It is important from the outset to understand the association and interaction among variables, rather than assuming that one causes another to change, and to look at how variables interact and feed back into each other over time (Haynes, 2003). Homer-Dixon, cited above, suggests that political scientists use methods that are modelled on the physical sciences, developing broad theories of political behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest. These ideas resonate strongly with a recent assessment undertaken for Sida on the use of the log frame (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005), highlighting some of the advantages and disadvantages in a way which is particularly pertinent for this paper. In the international aid world, much of programme planning and development is undertaken using a set of methods and tools called the logical framework. For most of the study respondents, the advantage of logical frameworks was that they force people to think carefully through what they are planning to do, and to consider in a systematic fashion how proposed activities might contribute to the desired goal through delivering outputs and outcomes. As a result, many see the log frame as a useful way of encouraging clear thinking. However, these positive aspects were offset by the almost universal complaint that the log frame rests on a very linear logic, which suggests that if Activity A is done, Output B will result, leading to Outcome C and Impact D. This linear idea of cause and effect is profoundly ill-at-ease with the implications of complexity science and, indeed, the experiences of many development practitioners. The authors of the study sum up the problems of the log frame in a way that is key to our discussion of complexity: ‘Unfortunately (for the logical framework approach at least) we are not working with such a selfcontained system and there are so many factors involved which lie beyond the scope of the 27 planned initiative that will change the way things work. Although the LFA makes some attempt to capture these through the consideration of the risks and assumptions, these are limited by the imagination and experience of those involved. As a result the LFA tends to be one-dimensional and fails to reflect the messy realities facing development actors’ (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005). Nonlinearity also has clear implications for the increased interest in randomised control trials (RCTs). While the implications of nonlinearity for techniques and tools such as the log frame and RCTs are increasingly well understood by many actors within the aid system, the answer to the deeper question as to whether incorporation of nonlinearity will be feasible, given the pressure on donors to justify aid budgets while having to deal with a reducing headcount, is less clear. The distinction between linearity and nonlinearity can be seen in as providing a theoretical underpinning of the frequently cited tension between upward accountability and learning. It also provides a means to re-frame the debate. If the two goals of accountability and learning are also about different mindsets, the degree to which an appropriate balance can be struck – without exploring these mindsets and the assumptions on which they are based – is open to question. Concept 5: Sensitivity to initial conditions Outline of the concept The behaviours of complex systems are sensitive to their initial conditions. Simply, this means that two complex systems that are initially very close together in terms of their various elements and dimensions can end up in distinctly different places. This comes from nonlinearity of relationships – where changes are not proportional, small changes in any one of the elements can result in large changes regarding the phenomenon of interest. Detailed explanation Imagine a small ball dropped onto the edge of a razor blade, as shown in the first image in Figure 4 below. The ball can strike the blade in such a way that it can go off to the left (centre image) or to the right (right-hand image). The condition that will determine whether the ball goes to the left or right is minute. If the ball were initially held centred over the blade (as in the first image), a prediction of which direction the ball would bounce would be impossible to make with certainty. A very slight change in the initial conditions of the ball can result in falling to the right or left of the blade. Figure 4: Sensitivity to initial conditions – ball striking razor blade Source: http://www.schuelers.com/ChaosPsyche/part_1_14.htm. The concept of phase space (Concept 6) allows a more precise understanding of initial conditions. Phase space allows for the analysis of the evolution of systems by considering the evolution process as a sequence of states in time (Rosen, 1991). A state is the position of the system in its phase space at a given time. At any time, the system’s state can be seen as the initial conditions for whatever processes follow. The sensitive dependence on initial conditions, in phase space terms, means that the position of a system in its phase space at a particular moment will have an influence on its future evolution. The interactions that are taking place at any moment in time have evolved from a previous moment in time, that is, all interactions are contingent on an historical process. Put simply, history matters in complex systems. 28 The infamous butterfly effect was a metaphor developed to illustrate this idea in the context of the weather. Edward Lorenz (1972), a meteorologist, used the metaphor of a flapping wing of a butterfly to explain how a minute difference in the initial condition of a weather system leads to a chain of events producing large-scale differences in weather patterns, such as the occurrence of a tornado where there was none before. As more recent thinkers have put it, in relation to complex systems in general, an initial uncertainty in measurement of the state of a system: ‘… however small, inevitably grow[s] so large that long-range prediction becomes impossible … even the most gentle, unaccounted-for perturbation can produce, in short order, abject failure of prediction’ (Peak and Frame, 1998). A large proportion of complex systems are prone to exhibiting the butterfly effect, so much so that some have defined complex behaviour as occurring where the butterfly effect is present (ibid). As no two situations will be exactly alike, the phenomenon will inevitably occur in many settings. As with nonlinearity, many have not used formal models to demonstrate the butterfly effect, but instead have tried to develop a qualitative understanding of the likely quantitative nature of real life situations. Sensitivity to initial conditions also means that ‘the generalisation of good practice [between contexts] begins to look fragile’ (Haynes, 2003) because initial conditions are never exactly the same, and because the complexity and nonlinearity of behaviour make it extremely difficult to separate the contributions to overall behaviour that individual factors have. Any notion of ‘good practice’ requires a detailed local knowledge to understand why the practice in question was good. This concept highlights the importance of understanding what can be forecast in complex systems to what level of certainty, as well as what is comparable across complex systems. It reinforces the point that both of these areas are necessarily restricted by the perspective of the observer. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions suggests that no single perspective can capture all there is to know about a system, that it may be wise to look in detail at how appropriate our solution to a problem is, and that it may be better to work with inevitable uncertainty rather than plan based on flimsy or hopeful predictions. This may mean, to take the example of predictability, that the success of a nation may be best explained not by its population’s virtues, its natural resources and its government’s skills, but rather simply by the position it took in the past, with small historical advantages leading to much bigger advantages later. Another example is how socioeconomic policy can result in a separation of neighbourhoods, driving a large gap between the rich and the poor so that, in short order, a gulf in wealth can result between two families who once had similar wealth (Byrne and Rogers, 1996). This is closely related to the notion of ‘path dependence’, which is the idea that many alternatives are possible at some stages of a system’s development, but once one of these alternatives gains the upper hand, it becomes ‘locked in’ and it is not possible to go to any of the previous available alternatives. For example, ‘… many cities developed where and how they did not because of the “natural advantages” we are so quick to detect after the fact, but because their establishment set off self-reinforcing expectations and behaviours’ (Cronon, cited in Jervis, 1997). In economic development, the term ‘path dependence’ is used to describe how standards which are first-to-market can become entrenched ’lock ins’ - such as the QWERTY layout in typewriters still used in computer keyboards (David, 2000). In certain situations, positive feedbacks leading from a small change can lead to such irreversible path dependence (Urry, 2003). Urry gives the example of irreversibility across an entire industry or sector, whereby through sensitive dependence on initial conditions, feedback can set in motion institutional patterns that are hard or impossible to reverse. He cites the example of the domination of steel and petroleum-based fuel models, developed in the late 29 19th century, which have come to dominate over other fuel alternatives, especially steam and electric, which were at the time preferable. The concept of path dependence has received some criticism from exponents of complexity science, because it has imported into economics the view that minor initial perturbations are important while grafting this onto an underlying theory that still assumes that there are a finite number of stable and alternative end-states, one of which will arise based on the particular initial conditions. As will be explained in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos, this is not always the case in complex systems (Margolis and Liebowitz, 1998).  Example: Sensitive dependence on initial conditions and economic growth Economists have generally identified sensitive dependence on initial conditions as one of the important features of the growth process – that is, what eventually happens to an economy depends greatly on the point of departure. There is mounting evidence that large qualitative differences in outcomes can arise from small (and perhaps accidental) differences in initial conditions or events (Hurwicz, 1995). In other words, the scope for and the direction and magnitude of change that a society can undertake depend critically on its prevailing objective conditions and the constellation of sociopolitical and institutional factors that have shaped these conditions. For specific economies, the initial conditions affecting economic growth include levels of per capita income; the development of human capital; the natural resource base; the levels and structure of production; the degree of the economy’s openness and its form of integration into the world system; the development of physical infrastructure; and institutional variables such as governance, land tenure and property rights. One might add here the nature of colonial rule and the institutional arrangements it bequeathed the former colonies, the decolonisation process, and the economic interests and policies of the erstwhile colonial masters. Wrongly specifying these initial conditions can undermine policy initiatives. Government polices are not simply a matter of choice made without historical or socioeconomic preconditions. Further, a sensitive appreciation of the differences and similarities in the initial conditions is important if one is to avoid some of the invidious comparisons one runs into today and the naive voluntarism that policymakers exhibit when they declare that their particular country is about to become the ‘new tiger’ of Africa. Such comparisons and self-description actually make the process of learning from others more costly because they start the planning process off on a wrong foot (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). Implication: Rethink the scope of learning and the purpose of planning in an uncertain world Sensitivity to initial conditions suggests that there are inevitably degrees of non-comparability across, and unpredictability within, complex systems. Some have argued that this implies that: ‘… the map to the future cannot be drawn in advance. We cannot know enough to set forth a meaningful vision or plan productively’ (Tetenbaum, 1998). The general implications for development theory and practice have been highlighted by a previous ODI working paper on participatory approaches, which suggests that this implies the notion of development as planned change is paradoxical. To quote directly, ‘… perfect planning would imply perfect knowledge of the future, which in turn would imply a totally deterministic universe in which planning would not make a difference’ (Geyer, cited in Sellamna, 1999). Sellamna goes on: ‘For this reason, development planning should abandon prescriptive, goal-oriented decision making and prediction about future states and focus instead on understanding the dynamics of 30 change and promoting a collective learning framework through which concerned stakeholders can constantly, through dialogue, express their respective interests and reach consensus.’ With regards to learning, this poses profound issues for the transferability of ‘best practice’, a concept that has taken on increasing meaning within the development sector since the rise of knowledge management and organisational learning strategies (Ramalingam, 2005). While it is possible that, for example, an understanding of the interplay of factors driving urban change in the Philippines may be relevant for analysis of urban change in Guatemala, this is not necessarily the case. The sensitivity to initial conditions gives us a strong reason to suppose that, even if we have a generally useful perspective on urban environments, this may entirely fail to capture the key features of the next situation we look at. This means that the search for ‘best practices’ may need to be replaced by the search for ‘good principles’. Some have suggested that the most appropriate way to bring the principles of effective approaches from one context to another is for ‘… development workers to become facilitators … enabling representatives of other communities … to see first hand what in the successful project they would wish to replicate’ (Breslin, 2004). Moving onto planning, to say that prediction of any kind is impossible may be overstating the case. Complexity does suggest that, in certain kinds of systems, future events cannot be forecasted to a useful level of probability and that, from certain perspectives, it is not possible to offer any firm prediction of the way the future will pan out on certain timescales. However, in other systems, future events can be foreseen in a helpful manner. For example, Geyer (2006) suggests that, with political dynamics, it is fairly safe to predict the short-term dynamics of basic power resources and political structures and that, therefore, there is decent scope for forecasting voting and decision outcomes of policy. On the other hand, examining party and institutional dynamics becomes more difficult, and grasping the potential shifts in contested political and social debates is even harder, while the longterm development of political dynamics is effectively characterised by disorder, as far as our ability to predict is concerned. It is important to clarify that certain levels of uncertainty are unavoidable when looking into the future. Complexity science suggests that it is important to identify and analyse these levels of unpredictability as part of the nature of the systems with which we work, and not treat uncertainty as in some way ‘unscientific’ or embarrassing. Rather than rejecting planning outright, there is a need to rethink the purpose and principles of planning. This has two key strands. First, it is necessary to incorporate an acceptance of the inherent levels of uncertainty into planning. The requirement for a certain level of detail in understanding future events should be balanced with the understanding that both simple and intricate processes carry uncertainty of prediction. While improving one’s models of change and analyses of facets of a situation may be worthwhile, it is just as important and often more practical to work with a realistic understanding of this uncertainty and build a level of flexibility and adaptability into projects, allowing for greater resilience. It has been argued that development projects have ‘fallen under the enchantment of [delivering] clear, specific, measurable outcomes’ (Westley et al., 2006). In many cases, this could be unrealistic, ineffective or even counterproductive; it is uncertain whether valuable social outcomes could be planned in terms of a specific series of outputs, and it is unclear why it is more productive to be able to hold agencies strictly accountable to promises at the expense of their promises delivering real results. This resonates with critiques of the log frame approach cited earlier, which argue that the adoption of the log frame as a central tool in effect and impact evaluations assumes higher powers of foresight than in fact is the case (Gasper, 2000). What is needed is higher levels of flexibility in the funding of international aid work, involving less stringent ‘targets’ and requirements from donors. The role of M&E would be shifted to value learning from unexpected outcomes. This is at the heart of the participatory approach to M&E developed by IDRC called outcome mapping. 31 Second, the way organisations look into the future should be adjusted by taking a more systematic and realistic view of what the future can hold: ‘A single vision to serve as an intended organisational future … is a thoroughly bad idea … not that the long term is dismissed as an effective irrelevance, [instead we need a] refocusing: rather than establish a future target and work back to what we do now to achieve it, the sequence is reversed. We should concentrate on the significant issues which need to be handled in the short term, and ensure that the debate about their long-term consequences is lively and engaged’ (Rosenhead, 2001). What is needed is a ‘pragmatic balance between present concerns and future potentialities’ (ibid); this means that ongoing systematic thinking about the future is an important task for any organisation working in development or humanitarian aid. Foresight is ‘the ability to create and maintain viable forward views and to use these in organisationally useful ways’ (Slaughter, 2003), and futures techniques, such as driver analysis or scenario planning, are suitable for this task. Scenario planning constructs a number of possible futures, in order to produce decisions and policies that are robust under a variety of feasible circumstances. This encourages a move away from looking for ‘optimal’ policies or strategies: ‘any strategy can only be optimum under certain conditions’ and ‘when those conditions change, the strategy may no longer be optimal’ (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003), so it may be preferable to produce strategies that are robust and insensitive to future variability rather than optimal for one possible future scenario. Path dependence and ’lock ins’ are also important to consider in the context of the practices of international aid agencies. The widespread use of the logical framework approach, despite the often serious critiques, is a clear example of path dependence at play. In fact, it could be argued that linearity has a ’lock in’ when it comes to the thought processes and approaches of international agencies. How ‘lock ins’ may be addressed in specific agency contexts is touched upon in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos  Concept 6: Phase space and attractors Outline of the concept The dimensions of any system can be mapped using a concept called phase space, also described as the ‘space of the possible’ (Cohen and Stewart, 1995).7 For any system, the ‘space of the possible’ is developed by identifying all the dimensions that are relevant to understanding the system, then determining the possible values that these dimensions can take (Romenska, 2006). This ‘space of the possible’ is then represented in either graphical or tabular form. In natural sciences, the prevalence of time-series data means that the phase space can be represented as a graphical map of all of the relevant dimensions and their values. In social scientific thinking, tables of data can be used to apply the same principles. The phase space of a system is literally the set of all the possible states – or phases – that the system can occupy. Phase space is particularly useful as a way to describe complex systems because it does not seek to establish known relationships between selected variables, but instead attempts to shed light on the overall shape of the system by looking at the patterns apparent when looking across all of the key dimensions. This resonates with a key point raised in Concept 1 – more may be learned about complex systems by trying to understand the important patterns of interaction and association across different elements and dimensions of such systems (Haynes, 2003). Phase space can be used to enable this kind of learning. By creating such a map of a system, it is possible to characterise how that system changes over time and the constraints that exist to change in the system (Musters et al., 1998). 7 Phase space is often used interchangeably with the phrase ‘state space’. 32 Detailed explanation The dimensions of a complex system mutually influence each other, leading to an intricate intertwining (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003) of these relationships and system behaviours to degrees of nonlinearity and unpredictability. Because of the challenges involved in analysing such systems, scientists studying complex systems have made use of a mathematical tool called phase space, which allows data relating to the dimensions of a system to be mapped rather than solved (Capra, 1996). Put simply, phase space is a visual way of representing information about the dimensions of a system. Rather than a graph, which attempts to show the relationships between specific chosen dimensions, phase space maps the possible values of each dimension of the system (akin to drawing the axes of a graph). This is the space within which a complex system displays its behaviour. Byrne gives the example of a city as a complex system (Byrne, 2006). He describes how the cities are complex problems in that they present situations where a range of variables are interacting simultaneously and in interconnected ways. He cites the specific example of Leicester, a city in the UK that grew from a small market town of 2,000 people in the 11th century to a city of 280,000 in 2001. Using the Census data from 2001, he shows that Leicester could be seen as a complex urban system made up of the following variables:

<h4><strong>The 1AC’s linear logic ignores complexity and paves over interactions between dozens of predictions </h4><p><mark>Ramalingam</mark> </strong>et al<strong> 20<mark>08</mark> </strong>(Ben, Senior Research Associate at the Overseas Development Institute, and Harry jones at ODI, "Exploring the science of complexity" http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/833.pdf)</p><p>Concept 4: Nonlinearity5 ‘... the darkest corner of science [is] the realm of non-linear problems’ (Strogatz, 2003). Outline of the concept Traditional scientific approaches are based on the idea that linear relationships can be identified through data gathering and analysis, and can be used as the basis of ‘laws’ of behaviour (Byrne, 1998). Such approaches in the physical sciences have informed the development of social, economic and political science, using broad theories of behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest (Homer-Dixon, 1995). However, complexity science suggests that <u><mark>human systems</mark> <mark>do not work in a</u></mark> simple <u><mark>linear fashion</u></mark>. Feedback processes between interconnected elements and dimensions lead to relationships that see change that is dynamic, nonlinear and unpredictable (Stacey, 1996). Nonlinearity is a direct result of the mutual interdependence between dimensions found in complex systems. In such systems, <u>clear causal relations cannot be traced <mark>because of multiple</mark> <mark>influences</mark>.</u> <u>The distinction</u> between linear and nonlinearity <u>is far from trivial</u>. If dynamic nonlinear feedbacks in response to rising greenhouse gases are included in the model used in the Stern Review of Climate Change (cited in Concept 2), for example, the total average cost of climate change rises from 5% to at least 20% of global per capita consumption (HM Treasury, 2006).6 Detailed explanation Vast numbers of naturally occurring systems exhibit nonlinearity. As one thinker has dryly suggested (Stanislaw Ulam, in the 1950s), calling a situation nonlinear is like going to the zoo and talking about all the interesting non-elephant animals you can see there (Campbell et al., 1985): there are as many nonlinear situations as there are non-elephant animals. <u><mark>Linearity</u></mark> describes the proportionality <u><mark>assume</u></mark>d in idealised situations where responses are proportional to forces and causes are proportional to effects (Strogatz, 2003). Linear <u><mark>problems</u> <u>can</u> <u>be</u> <u>broken</u> <u>down</u></mark> into pieces, with <u><mark>each</u> <u>piece</u> <u>analysed</u> <u>separately</u></mark>; finally, <u>all</u> <u>the separate answers</u> can be <u><mark>recombined to</u></mark> give the right answer to the original problem. In a linear system, <u><mark>the whole</u></mark> is exactly <u><mark>equivalent to the sum of the parts</u></mark>. However, linearity is often an approximation of a more complicated reality – most systems only behave linearly if they are close to equilibrium and are not pushed too hard. When a system starts to behave in a nonlinear fashion, ‘all bets are off’ (Strogatz, 2003). This is not to suggest that nonlinearity is necessarily a dangerous or unwanted aspect of systems. The biology of life itself is dependent on nonlinearity, as are the laws of ecology. Combination therapy for HIV/AIDS using a cocktail of three drugs works precisely because the immune response and viral dynamics are nonlinear – the three drugs taken in combination are much more effective than the sum of the three taken separately. The nonlinearity concept means that linear assumptions of how social phenomena play out should be questioned. It is important to note that such thinking has only relatively recently been incorporated into the ‘hard’ science paradigms and, moreover, is still only starting to shape thinking in the social, economic and political realms. <u><mark>Nonlinear</u></mark>ity poses challenges to analysis precisely because such <u><mark>relationships</u></mark> cannot be taken apart – they <u><mark>have to be examined</mark> all at once, <mark>as a coherent entity.</u></mark> However, the need to develop such ways of thinking cannot be overstated – as one thinker puts it: ‘... every major unresolved problem in science – from consciousness to cancer to the collective craziness of the economy, is nonlinear’ (Capra, 1996). 5 It is important to distinguish nonlinearity as used here, which relates to relationships and proportionality, and nonlinearity in terms of sequences of events – one thing following another. 6 Note that the previously cited increase from 5 to 14.4% was due to natural, known feedbacks and does not include non-linear feedbacks 25 Although nonlinearity is a mathematical formulation, it is useful to take the suggestion that what is required is a ‘qualitative understanding of [the] quantitative’ when attempting to investigate them systematically (Byrne, 1998). Such a qualitative understanding has been furthered by the work of Robert Jervis (1997) on the role of complexity in international relations. Starting with the notion that understanding of social systems has tacitly incorporated linear approaches from Newtonian sciences, Jervis goes on to highlight three common assumptions that need to be challenged in order to take better account of nonlinearity. These assumptions provide a solid basis for investigating nonlinearity. First, it is very common to test ideas and propositions by making comparisons between two situations which are identical except for one variable – referred to as the independent variable. This kind of analysis is usually prefaced with the statement ‘holding all other things constant’. However, in a system of interconnected and interrelated parts, with feedback loops, adaptive agents and emergent properties, this is almost impossible, as everything else cannot be held constant and there is no independent variable. Jervis argues that, in such systems, it is impossible to look at ‘just one thing’, or to make only one change, hence to look at a situation involving just one change is unrealistic. Secondly, it is often assumed that changes in system output are proportional to changes in input. For example, if it has been assumed that a little foreign aid slightly increases economic growth, then more aid should produce more growth. However, as recent work by ODI and others argues, absorption capacity needs to be taken account – more aid does not necessarily equate to better aid. In complex systems, then, the output is not proportional to the input. Feedback loops and adaptive behaviours and emergent dynamics within the system may mean that the relationship between input and output is a nonlinear one: ‘Sometimes even a small amount of the variable can do a great deal of work and then the law of diminishing returns sets in [a negative feedback process] … in other cases very little impact is felt until a critical mass is assembled’ (Jervis, 1997). The third and final commonly made assumption of linearity is that the system output that follows from the sum of two different inputs is equal to the sum of the outputs arising from the individual inputs. In other words, the assumption is that if Action A leads to Consequence X and Action B has Consequence Y then Action A plus Action B will have Consequences X plus Y. This frequently does not hold, because the consequences of Action A may depend on the presence or absence of many other factors which may well be affected by B or B’s Consequence (Y). In addition, the sequence in which actions are undertaken may affect the outcome. Example: The growth dynamics model as an alternative to linear regression models Studies of economic growth face methodological problems, the foremost of which is dealing with real world complexity. The standard way of understanding growth assumes, implicitly, that the same model of growth is true for all countries, and that linear relationships of growth are true for all countries. However, linear relationships might not apply in many cases. An example would be a country where moderate trade protection would increase economic growth but closing off the economy completely to international trade would spell economic disaster. Linear growth models imply that the effect of increasing the value of the independent variable would be the same for all countries, regardless of the initial value of that variable or other variables. Therefore, an increase of the tariff rate from 0% to 10% is presumed to generate the same change in the growth rate as a change from 90% to 100%. Furthermore, the change from 0% to 10% is assumed to have the same effect in a poor country as in a rich country, in a primary resource exporter as in a manufacturing exporter, and in a country with well developed institutions as in a country with underdeveloped institutions. Despite some efforts to address these issues by relaxing the linear framework and introducing mechanisms to capture nonlinearities and interactions among some variables, this is still a poor way of addressing real world nonlinearity. Econometric research has identified that linear models cannot generally be expected to 26 provide a good approximation of an unknown nonlinear function, and in some cases can lead to serious misestimates (Rodríguez, 2007). Research at Harvard University has focused on the problem of designing a growth strategy in a context of ‘radical uncertainty’ about any generalised growth models. They call their method ‘growth diagnostics’, in part because it is very similar to the approach taken by medical specialists in identifying the causes of ailments. In such a context, assuming that every country has the same problem is unlikely to be very helpful. The principal idea is to look for clues in the country’s concrete environment about the specific binding constraints on growth. The growth diagnostics exercise asks a set of basic questions that can sequentially rule out possible explanations of the problem. The answers are inherently country-specific and time-specific. The essential method is to identify the key problem to be addressed as the signals that the economy would provide if a particular constraint were the cause of that problem. Implication: Challenge linearity in underlying assumptions Within complex systems<u>,</u> the degree of nonlinearity and relationships between various factors, and the lack of proportionality between inputs and outputs, means that the <u><mark>dynamics</u></mark> of change <u><mark>are</mark> highly</u> <u><mark>context</u>-<u>specific</u></mark>. <u>Therefore</u>, if there are <u><mark>assumptions</u></mark>, aggregations <u>and theories</u> about the relations among different aspects of a specific situation, and these are <u><mark>not </mark>entirely <mark>appropriate</u></mark> when applied <u><mark>to</u></mark> the dynamics of <u><mark>a</u></mark> new <u><mark>local</u> <u>situation</u></mark>, then this perspective <u><mark>is unlikely to lead</u> to</mark> a deep understanding<u> </u>of what should be done, and is furthermore unlikely to lead to the <u><mark>hoped-for changes</mark>.</u> Nonlinearity implies that, as well as understanding the limitations of a particular model or perspective, it is important to build and improve new models that can provide the sort of information required for the particular task at hand. ‘No kind of explanatory representation can suit all kinds of phenomena ... any one diagnosis of [a] problem and its solution is necessarily partial’ (Holland, 2000). From this perspective, it is important to tailor to the particular situation one’s perspective on the dynamics of some phenomena. In a complex system, one must examine the complex web of interrelationships and interdependencies among its parts or elements (Flynn Research, 2003). <u>It is important from the outset to <mark>understand</mark> </u>the association and <u><mark>interaction among variables, rather</u> <u>than</u> <u>assuming </mark>that <mark>one causes another</mark> </u>to change, and to look at how variables interact and feed back into each other over time (Haynes, 2003). Homer-Dixon<u>,</u> cited above, suggests that political scientists use methods that are modelled on the physical sciences, developing broad theories of political behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest. These ideas resonate strongly with a recent assessment undertaken for Sida on the use of the log frame (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005), highlighting some of the advantages and disadvantages in a way which is particularly pertinent for this paper. In the international aid world, much of programme planning and development is undertaken using a set of methods and tools called the logical framework. For most of the study respondents, the advantage of logical frameworks was that they force people to think carefully through what they are planning to do, and to consider in a systematic fashion how proposed activities might contribute to the desired goal through delivering outputs and outcomes. As a result, many see the log frame as a useful way of encouraging clear thinking. However, these positive aspects were offset by the almost universal complaint that the log frame rests on a very <u><strong><mark>linear logic</u></strong></mark>, which <u><strong><mark>suggests</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>if</u></strong></mark> Activity <u><strong><mark>A is done</strong></mark>,</u> Output <u><strong><mark>B will result, leading to</u></strong></mark> Outcome <u><strong><mark>C and Impact D</strong></mark>.</u> This linear idea of cause and effect is profoundly ill-at-ease with the implications of complexity science and, indeed, the experiences of many development practitioners. The authors of the study sum up the problems of the log frame in a way that is key to our discussion of complexity: ‘Unfortunately (for the logical framework approach at least) we are not working with such a selfcontained system and there are so many factors involved which lie beyond the scope of the 27 planned initiative that will change the way things work. Although the LFA makes some attempt to capture these through the consideration of the risks and assumptions, these are limited by the imagination and experience of those involved. As a result the LFA tends to be one-dimensional and fails to reflect the messy realities facing development actors’ (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005). Nonlinearity also has clear implications for the increased interest in randomised control trials (RCTs). While the implications of nonlinearity for techniques and tools such as the log frame and RCTs are increasingly well understood by many actors within the aid system, the answer to the deeper question as to whether incorporation of nonlinearity will be feasible, given the pressure on donors to justify aid budgets while having to deal with a reducing headcount, is less clear. <u><mark>The distinction between linearity and nonlinearity</u></mark> can be seen in as providing a theoretical underpinning of the frequently cited tension between upward accountability and learning. It also provides a means to <u><mark>re-frame the debate</u></mark>. <u>If</u> <u>the</u> two <u>goals</u> <u>of</u> accountability and <u>learning</u> <u>are</u> also <u>about</u> different <u>mindsets</u>, <u>the degree to which</u> <u>a</u>n appropriate <u>balance can be struck</u> – <u>without exploring these</u> mindsets and the <u>assumptions</u> on which they are based – <u>is</u> <u>open to question.</u> Concept 5: Sensitivity to initial conditions Outline of the concept The behaviours of complex systems are sensitive to their initial conditions. Simply, this means that two complex systems that are initially very close together in terms of their various elements and dimensions can end up in distinctly different places. This comes from nonlinearity of relationships – where changes are not proportional, small changes in any one of the elements can result in large changes regarding the phenomenon of interest. Detailed explanation Imagine a small ball dropped onto the edge of a razor blade, as shown in the first image in Figure 4 below. The ball can strike the blade in such a way that it can go off to the left (centre image) or to the right (right-hand image). The condition that will determine whether the ball goes to the left or right is minute. If the ball were initially held centred over the blade (as in the first image), a prediction of which direction the ball would bounce would be impossible to make with certainty. A very slight change in the initial conditions of the ball can result in falling to the right or left of the blade. Figure 4: Sensitivity to initial conditions – ball striking razor blade Source: http://www.schuelers.com/ChaosPsyche/part_1_14.htm. The concept of phase space (Concept 6) allows a more precise understanding of initial conditions. Phase space allows for the analysis of the evolution of systems by considering the evolution process as a sequence of states in time (Rosen, 1991). A state is the position of the system in its phase space at a given time. At any time, the system’s state can be seen as the initial conditions for whatever processes follow. The sensitive dependence on initial conditions, in phase space terms, means that the position of a system in its phase space at a particular moment will have an influence on its future evolution. The interactions that are taking place at any moment in time have evolved from a previous moment in time, that is, all interactions are contingent on an historical process. Put simply, history matters in complex systems. 28 The infamous butterfly effect was a metaphor developed to illustrate this idea in the context of the weather. Edward Lorenz (1972), a meteorologist, used the metaphor of a flapping wing of a butterfly to explain how a minute difference in the initial condition of a weather system leads to a chain of events producing large-scale differences in weather patterns, such as the occurrence of a tornado where there was none before. As more recent thinkers have put it, in relation to complex systems in general, an initial uncertainty in measurement of the state of a system: ‘… however small, inevitably grow[s] so large that long-range prediction becomes impossible … even the most gentle, unaccounted-for perturbation can produce, in short order, abject failure of prediction’ (Peak and Frame, 1998). A large proportion of complex systems are prone to exhibiting the butterfly effect, so much so that some have defined complex behaviour as occurring where the butterfly effect is present (ibid). As no two situations will be exactly alike, the phenomenon will inevitably occur in many settings. As with nonlinearity, many have not used formal models to demonstrate the butterfly effect, but instead have tried to develop a qualitative understanding of the likely quantitative nature of real life situations. Sensitivity to initial conditions also means that ‘the generalisation of good practice [between contexts] begins to look fragile’ (Haynes, 2003) because initial conditions are never exactly the same, and because the complexity and nonlinearity of behaviour make it extremely difficult to separate the contributions to overall behaviour that individual factors have. Any notion of ‘good practice’ requires a detailed local knowledge to understand why the practice in question was good. This concept highlights the importance of understanding what can be forecast in complex systems to what level of certainty, as well as what is comparable across complex systems. It reinforces the point that both of these areas are necessarily restricted by the perspective of the observer. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions suggests that no single perspective can capture all there is to know about a system, that it may be wise to look in detail at how appropriate our solution to a problem is, and that it may be better to work with inevitable uncertainty rather than plan based on flimsy or hopeful predictions. This may mean, to take the example of predictability, that the success of a nation may be best explained not by its population’s virtues, its natural resources and its government’s skills, but rather simply by the position it took in the past, with small historical advantages leading to much bigger advantages later. Another example is how socioeconomic policy can result in a separation of neighbourhoods, driving a large gap between the rich and the poor so that, in short order, a gulf in wealth can result between two families who once had similar wealth (Byrne and Rogers, 1996). This is closely related to the notion of ‘path dependence’, which is the idea that many alternatives are possible at some stages of a system’s development, but once one of these alternatives gains the upper hand, it becomes ‘locked in’ and it is not possible to go to any of the previous available alternatives. For example, ‘… many cities developed where and how they did not because of the “natural advantages” we are so quick to detect after the fact, but because their establishment set off self-reinforcing expectations and behaviours’ (Cronon, cited in Jervis, 1997). In economic development, the term ‘path dependence’ is used to describe how standards which are first-to-market can become entrenched ’lock ins’ - such as the QWERTY layout in typewriters still used in computer keyboards (David, 2000). In certain situations, positive feedbacks leading from a small change can lead to such irreversible path dependence (Urry, 2003). Urry gives the example of irreversibility across an entire industry or sector, whereby through sensitive dependence on initial conditions, feedback can set in motion institutional patterns that are hard or impossible to reverse. He cites the example of the domination of steel and petroleum-based fuel models, developed in the late 29 19th century, which have come to dominate over other fuel alternatives, especially steam and electric, which were at the time preferable. The concept of path dependence has received some criticism from exponents of complexity science, because it has imported into economics the view that minor initial perturbations are important while grafting this onto an underlying theory that still assumes that there are a finite number of stable and alternative end-states, one of which will arise based on the particular initial conditions. As will be explained in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos, this is not always the case in complex systems (Margolis and Liebowitz, 1998).  Example: Sensitive dependence on initial conditions and economic growth Economists have generally identified sensitive dependence on initial conditions as one of the important features of the growth process – that is, what eventually happens to an economy depends greatly on the point of departure. There is mounting evidence that large qualitative differences in outcomes can arise from small (and perhaps accidental) differences in initial conditions or events (Hurwicz, 1995). In other words, the scope for and the direction and magnitude of change that a society can undertake depend critically on its prevailing objective conditions and the constellation of sociopolitical and institutional factors that have shaped these conditions. For specific economies, the initial conditions affecting economic growth include levels of per capita income; the development of human capital; the natural resource base; the levels and structure of production; the degree of the economy’s openness and its form of integration into the world system; the development of physical infrastructure; and institutional variables such as governance, land tenure and property rights. One might add here the nature of colonial rule and the institutional arrangements it bequeathed the former colonies, the decolonisation process, and the economic interests and policies of the erstwhile colonial masters. Wrongly specifying these initial conditions can undermine policy initiatives. Government polices are not simply a matter of choice made without historical or socioeconomic preconditions. Further, a sensitive appreciation of the differences and similarities in the initial conditions is important if one is to avoid some of the invidious comparisons one runs into today and the naive voluntarism that policymakers exhibit when they declare that their particular country is about to become the ‘new tiger’ of Africa. Such comparisons and self-description actually make the process of learning from others more costly because they start the planning process off on a wrong foot (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). Implication: Rethink the scope of learning and the purpose of planning in an uncertain world Sensitivity to initial conditions suggests that there are inevitably degrees of non-comparability across, and unpredictability within, complex systems. Some have argued that this implies that: ‘… the map to the future cannot be drawn in advance. We cannot know enough to set forth a meaningful vision or plan productively’ (Tetenbaum, 1998). The general implications for development theory and practice have been highlighted by a previous ODI working paper on participatory approaches, which suggests that this implies the notion of development as planned change is paradoxical. To quote directly, ‘… perfect planning would imply perfect knowledge of the future, which in turn would imply a totally deterministic universe in which planning would not make a difference’ (Geyer, cited in Sellamna, 1999). Sellamna goes on: ‘For this reason, development planning should abandon prescriptive, goal-oriented decision making and prediction about future states and focus instead on understanding the dynamics of 30 change and promoting a collective learning framework through which concerned stakeholders can constantly, through dialogue, express their respective interests and reach consensus.’ With regards to learning, this poses profound issues for the transferability of ‘best practice’, a concept that has taken on increasing meaning within the development sector since the rise of knowledge management and organisational learning strategies (Ramalingam, 2005). While it is possible that, for example, an understanding of the interplay of factors driving urban change in the Philippines may be relevant for analysis of urban change in Guatemala, this is not necessarily the case. The sensitivity to initial conditions gives us a strong reason to suppose that, even if we have a generally useful perspective on urban environments, this may entirely fail to capture the key features of the next situation we look at. This means that the search for ‘best practices’ may need to be replaced by the search for ‘good principles’. Some have suggested that the most appropriate way to bring the principles of effective approaches from one context to another is for ‘… development workers to become facilitators … enabling representatives of other communities … to see first hand what in the successful project they would wish to replicate’ (Breslin, 2004). Moving onto planning, to say that prediction of any kind is impossible may be overstating the case. <u>Complexity</u> does <u>suggest </u>that<u>,</u> <u>in certain</u> kinds of <u>systems</u>, <u>future events cannot be forecasted </u>to a useful level of probability and that, from certain perspectives, it is not possible to offer any firm prediction of the way the future will pan out on certain timescales. However, <u>in other </u>system<u>s</u>, <u>future </u>event<u>s can be foreseen </u>in a helpful manner. For example, Geyer (2006) suggests that, with political dynamics, it is fairly safe to predict the short-term dynamics of basic power resources and political structures and that, therefore, there is decent scope for forecasting voting and decision outcomes of policy. On the other hand, examining party and institutional dynamics becomes more difficult, and grasping the potential shifts in contested political and social debates is even harder, while the longterm development of political dynamics is effectively characterised by disorder, as far as our ability to predict is concerned. It is important to clarify that certain levels of uncertainty are unavoidable when looking into the future. Complexity science suggests that it <u>is important to identify</u> and analyse these levels of <u>unpredictability</u> as part of the nature of the systems with which we work, <u>and not treat uncertainty as</u> in some way ‘unscientific’ or <u>embarrassing</u>. <u><mark>Rather than rejecting planning</mark> outright,</u> <u><mark>there is a need to</u></mark> rethink the purpose and principles of planning. This has two key strands. First, it is necessary to incorporate an <u><mark>accept</u></mark>ance of the <u><mark>inherent</u> <u>levels of uncertainty</u></mark> into planning. The requirement for a certain level of detail in understanding future events should be balanced with the understanding that both simple and intricate processes carry uncertainty of prediction. While improving one’s models of change and analyses of facets of a situation may be worthwhile, it is just as important and often more practical to work with a realistic understanding of this uncertainty and build a level of flexibility and adaptability into projects, allowing for greater resilience. It has been argued that development projects have ‘fallen under the enchantment of [delivering] clear, specific, measurable outcomes’ (Westley et al., 2006). In many cases, this could be unrealistic, ineffective or even counterproductive; it is uncertain whether valuable social outcomes could be planned in terms of a specific series of outputs, and it is unclear why it is more productive to be able to hold agencies strictly accountable to promises at the expense of their promises delivering real results. This resonates with critiques of the log frame approach cited earlier, which argue that the adoption of the log frame as a central tool in effect and impact evaluations assumes higher powers of foresight than in fact is the case (Gasper, 2000). What is needed is higher levels of flexibility in the funding of international aid work, involving less stringent ‘targets’ and requirements from donors. The role of M&E would be shifted to value learning from unexpected outcomes. This is at the heart of the participatory approach to M&E developed by IDRC called outcome mapping. 31 Second, the way organisations look into the future should be adjusted by taking a more systematic and realistic view of what the future can hold: ‘A single vision to serve as an intended organisational future … is a thoroughly bad idea … not that the long term is dismissed as an effective irrelevance, [instead we need a] refocusing: rather than establish a future target and work back to what we do now to achieve it, the sequence is reversed. We should concentrate on the significant issues which need to be handled in the short term, and ensure that the debate about their long-term consequences is lively and engaged’ (Rosenhead, 2001). What is needed is a ‘pragmatic balance between present concerns and future potentialities’ (ibid); this means that ongoing systematic thinking about the future is an important task for any organisation working in development or humanitarian aid. Foresight is ‘the ability to create and maintain viable forward views and to use these in organisationally useful ways’ (Slaughter, 2003), and futures techniques, such as driver analysis or scenario planning, are suitable for this task. Scenario planning constructs a number of possible futures, in order to produce decisions and policies that are robust under a variety of feasible circumstances. This encourages a move away from looking for ‘optimal’ policies or strategies: ‘any strategy can only be optimum under certain conditions’ and ‘when those conditions change, the strategy may no longer be optimal’ (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003), so it may be preferable to produce strategies that are robust and insensitive to future variability rather than optimal for one possible future scenario. Path dependence and ’lock ins’ are also important to consider in the context of the practices of international aid agencies. The widespread use of the logical framework approach, despite the often serious critiques, is a clear example of path dependence at play. In fact, it could be argued that linearity has a ’lock in’ when it comes to the thought processes and approaches of international agencies. How ‘lock ins’ may be addressed in specific agency contexts is touched upon in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos  Concept 6: Phase space and attractors Outline of the concept The dimensions of any system can be mapped using a concept called phase space, also described as the ‘space of the possible’ (Cohen and Stewart, 1995).7 For any system, the ‘space of the possible’ is developed by identifying all the dimensions that are relevant to understanding the system, then determining the possible values that these dimensions can take (Romenska, 2006). This ‘space of the possible’ is then represented in either graphical or tabular form. In natural sciences, the prevalence of time-series data means that the phase space can be represented as a graphical map of all of the relevant dimensions and their values. In social scientific thinking, tables of data can be used to apply the same principles. The phase space of a system is literally the set of all the possible states – or phases – that the system can occupy. Phase space is particularly useful as a way to describe complex systems because it does not seek to establish known relationships between selected variables, but instead attempts to shed light on the overall shape of the system by looking at the patterns apparent when looking across all of the key dimensions. This resonates with a key point raised in Concept 1 – more may be learned about complex systems by trying to understand the important patterns of interaction and association across different elements and dimensions of such systems (Haynes, 2003). Phase space can be used to enable this kind of learning. By creating such a map of a system, it is possible to characterise how that system changes over time and the constraints that exist to change in the system (Musters et al., 1998). 7 Phase space is often used interchangeably with the phrase ‘state space’. 32 Detailed explanation The dimensions of a complex system mutually influence each other, leading to an intricate intertwining (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003) of these relationships and system behaviours to degrees of nonlinearity and unpredictability. Because of the challenges involved in analysing such systems, scientists studying complex systems have made use of a mathematical tool called phase space, which allows data relating to the dimensions of a system to be mapped rather than solved (Capra, 1996). Put simply, phase space is a visual way of representing information about the dimensions of a system. Rather than a graph, which attempts to show the relationships between specific chosen dimensions, phase space maps the possible values of each dimension of the system (akin to drawing the axes of a graph). This is the space within which a complex system displays its behaviour. <u>Byrne gives the example of a city as a complex system (</u>Byrne, 2006). He describes how <u>the cities are complex problems </u>in that they present situations where <u>a range of variables are interacting simultaneously </u>and <u>in interconnected ways.</u> He cites the specific example of Leicester, a city in the UK that grew from a small market town of 2,000 people in the 11th century to a city of 280,000 in 2001. Using the Census data from 2001, he shows that Leicester could be seen as a complex urban system made up of the following variables:</p>

Ramalingam et al 2008 (Ben, Senior Research Associate at the Overseas Development Institute, and Harry jones at ODI, "Exploring the science of complexity" http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/833.pdf)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ramalingam et al 2008 (Ben, Senior Research Associate at the Overseas Development Institute, and Harry jones at ODI, "Exploring the science of complexity" http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/833.pdf) fulltext: Concept 4: Nonlinearity5 ‘... the darkest corner of science [is] the realm of non-linear problems’ (Strogatz, 2003). Outline of the concept Traditional scientific approaches are based on the idea that linear relationships can be identified through data gathering and analysis, and can be used as the basis of ‘laws’ of behaviour (Byrne, 1998). Such approaches in the physical sciences have informed the development of social, economic and political science, using broad theories of behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest (Homer-Dixon, 1995). However, complexity science suggests that human systems do not work in a simple linear fashion. Feedback processes between interconnected elements and dimensions lead to relationships that see change that is dynamic, nonlinear and unpredictable (Stacey, 1996). Nonlinearity is a direct result of the mutual interdependence between dimensions found in complex systems. In such systems, clear causal relations cannot be traced because of multiple influences. The distinction between linear and nonlinearity is far from trivial. If dynamic nonlinear feedbacks in response to rising greenhouse gases are included in the model used in the Stern Review of Climate Change (cited in Concept 2), for example, the total average cost of climate change rises from 5% to at least 20% of global per capita consumption (HM Treasury, 2006).6 Detailed explanation Vast numbers of naturally occurring systems exhibit nonlinearity. As one thinker has dryly suggested (Stanislaw Ulam, in the 1950s), calling a situation nonlinear is like going to the zoo and talking about all the interesting non-elephant animals you can see there (Campbell et al., 1985): there are as many nonlinear situations as there are non-elephant animals. Linearity describes the proportionality assumed in idealised situations where responses are proportional to forces and causes are proportional to effects (Strogatz, 2003). Linear problems can be broken down into pieces, with each piece analysed separately; finally, all the separate answers can be recombined to give the right answer to the original problem. In a linear system, the whole is exactly equivalent to the sum of the parts. However, linearity is often an approximation of a more complicated reality – most systems only behave linearly if they are close to equilibrium and are not pushed too hard. When a system starts to behave in a nonlinear fashion, ‘all bets are off’ (Strogatz, 2003). This is not to suggest that nonlinearity is necessarily a dangerous or unwanted aspect of systems. The biology of life itself is dependent on nonlinearity, as are the laws of ecology. Combination therapy for HIV/AIDS using a cocktail of three drugs works precisely because the immune response and viral dynamics are nonlinear – the three drugs taken in combination are much more effective than the sum of the three taken separately. The nonlinearity concept means that linear assumptions of how social phenomena play out should be questioned. It is important to note that such thinking has only relatively recently been incorporated into the ‘hard’ science paradigms and, moreover, is still only starting to shape thinking in the social, economic and political realms. Nonlinearity poses challenges to analysis precisely because such relationships cannot be taken apart – they have to be examined all at once, as a coherent entity. However, the need to develop such ways of thinking cannot be overstated – as one thinker puts it: ‘... every major unresolved problem in science – from consciousness to cancer to the collective craziness of the economy, is nonlinear’ (Capra, 1996). 5 It is important to distinguish nonlinearity as used here, which relates to relationships and proportionality, and nonlinearity in terms of sequences of events – one thing following another. 6 Note that the previously cited increase from 5 to 14.4% was due to natural, known feedbacks and does not include non-linear feedbacks 25 Although nonlinearity is a mathematical formulation, it is useful to take the suggestion that what is required is a ‘qualitative understanding of [the] quantitative’ when attempting to investigate them systematically (Byrne, 1998). Such a qualitative understanding has been furthered by the work of Robert Jervis (1997) on the role of complexity in international relations. Starting with the notion that understanding of social systems has tacitly incorporated linear approaches from Newtonian sciences, Jervis goes on to highlight three common assumptions that need to be challenged in order to take better account of nonlinearity. These assumptions provide a solid basis for investigating nonlinearity. First, it is very common to test ideas and propositions by making comparisons between two situations which are identical except for one variable – referred to as the independent variable. This kind of analysis is usually prefaced with the statement ‘holding all other things constant’. However, in a system of interconnected and interrelated parts, with feedback loops, adaptive agents and emergent properties, this is almost impossible, as everything else cannot be held constant and there is no independent variable. Jervis argues that, in such systems, it is impossible to look at ‘just one thing’, or to make only one change, hence to look at a situation involving just one change is unrealistic. Secondly, it is often assumed that changes in system output are proportional to changes in input. For example, if it has been assumed that a little foreign aid slightly increases economic growth, then more aid should produce more growth. However, as recent work by ODI and others argues, absorption capacity needs to be taken account – more aid does not necessarily equate to better aid. In complex systems, then, the output is not proportional to the input. Feedback loops and adaptive behaviours and emergent dynamics within the system may mean that the relationship between input and output is a nonlinear one: ‘Sometimes even a small amount of the variable can do a great deal of work and then the law of diminishing returns sets in [a negative feedback process] … in other cases very little impact is felt until a critical mass is assembled’ (Jervis, 1997). The third and final commonly made assumption of linearity is that the system output that follows from the sum of two different inputs is equal to the sum of the outputs arising from the individual inputs. In other words, the assumption is that if Action A leads to Consequence X and Action B has Consequence Y then Action A plus Action B will have Consequences X plus Y. This frequently does not hold, because the consequences of Action A may depend on the presence or absence of many other factors which may well be affected by B or B’s Consequence (Y). In addition, the sequence in which actions are undertaken may affect the outcome. Example: The growth dynamics model as an alternative to linear regression models Studies of economic growth face methodological problems, the foremost of which is dealing with real world complexity. The standard way of understanding growth assumes, implicitly, that the same model of growth is true for all countries, and that linear relationships of growth are true for all countries. However, linear relationships might not apply in many cases. An example would be a country where moderate trade protection would increase economic growth but closing off the economy completely to international trade would spell economic disaster. Linear growth models imply that the effect of increasing the value of the independent variable would be the same for all countries, regardless of the initial value of that variable or other variables. Therefore, an increase of the tariff rate from 0% to 10% is presumed to generate the same change in the growth rate as a change from 90% to 100%. Furthermore, the change from 0% to 10% is assumed to have the same effect in a poor country as in a rich country, in a primary resource exporter as in a manufacturing exporter, and in a country with well developed institutions as in a country with underdeveloped institutions. Despite some efforts to address these issues by relaxing the linear framework and introducing mechanisms to capture nonlinearities and interactions among some variables, this is still a poor way of addressing real world nonlinearity. Econometric research has identified that linear models cannot generally be expected to 26 provide a good approximation of an unknown nonlinear function, and in some cases can lead to serious misestimates (Rodríguez, 2007). Research at Harvard University has focused on the problem of designing a growth strategy in a context of ‘radical uncertainty’ about any generalised growth models. They call their method ‘growth diagnostics’, in part because it is very similar to the approach taken by medical specialists in identifying the causes of ailments. In such a context, assuming that every country has the same problem is unlikely to be very helpful. The principal idea is to look for clues in the country’s concrete environment about the specific binding constraints on growth. The growth diagnostics exercise asks a set of basic questions that can sequentially rule out possible explanations of the problem. The answers are inherently country-specific and time-specific. The essential method is to identify the key problem to be addressed as the signals that the economy would provide if a particular constraint were the cause of that problem. Implication: Challenge linearity in underlying assumptions Within complex systems, the degree of nonlinearity and relationships between various factors, and the lack of proportionality between inputs and outputs, means that the dynamics of change are highly context-specific. Therefore, if there are assumptions, aggregations and theories about the relations among different aspects of a specific situation, and these are not entirely appropriate when applied to the dynamics of a new local situation, then this perspective is unlikely to lead to a deep understanding of what should be done, and is furthermore unlikely to lead to the hoped-for changes. Nonlinearity implies that, as well as understanding the limitations of a particular model or perspective, it is important to build and improve new models that can provide the sort of information required for the particular task at hand. ‘No kind of explanatory representation can suit all kinds of phenomena ... any one diagnosis of [a] problem and its solution is necessarily partial’ (Holland, 2000). From this perspective, it is important to tailor to the particular situation one’s perspective on the dynamics of some phenomena. In a complex system, one must examine the complex web of interrelationships and interdependencies among its parts or elements (Flynn Research, 2003). It is important from the outset to understand the association and interaction among variables, rather than assuming that one causes another to change, and to look at how variables interact and feed back into each other over time (Haynes, 2003). Homer-Dixon, cited above, suggests that political scientists use methods that are modelled on the physical sciences, developing broad theories of political behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest. These ideas resonate strongly with a recent assessment undertaken for Sida on the use of the log frame (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005), highlighting some of the advantages and disadvantages in a way which is particularly pertinent for this paper. In the international aid world, much of programme planning and development is undertaken using a set of methods and tools called the logical framework. For most of the study respondents, the advantage of logical frameworks was that they force people to think carefully through what they are planning to do, and to consider in a systematic fashion how proposed activities might contribute to the desired goal through delivering outputs and outcomes. As a result, many see the log frame as a useful way of encouraging clear thinking. However, these positive aspects were offset by the almost universal complaint that the log frame rests on a very linear logic, which suggests that if Activity A is done, Output B will result, leading to Outcome C and Impact D. This linear idea of cause and effect is profoundly ill-at-ease with the implications of complexity science and, indeed, the experiences of many development practitioners. The authors of the study sum up the problems of the log frame in a way that is key to our discussion of complexity: ‘Unfortunately (for the logical framework approach at least) we are not working with such a selfcontained system and there are so many factors involved which lie beyond the scope of the 27 planned initiative that will change the way things work. Although the LFA makes some attempt to capture these through the consideration of the risks and assumptions, these are limited by the imagination and experience of those involved. As a result the LFA tends to be one-dimensional and fails to reflect the messy realities facing development actors’ (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005). Nonlinearity also has clear implications for the increased interest in randomised control trials (RCTs). While the implications of nonlinearity for techniques and tools such as the log frame and RCTs are increasingly well understood by many actors within the aid system, the answer to the deeper question as to whether incorporation of nonlinearity will be feasible, given the pressure on donors to justify aid budgets while having to deal with a reducing headcount, is less clear. The distinction between linearity and nonlinearity can be seen in as providing a theoretical underpinning of the frequently cited tension between upward accountability and learning. It also provides a means to re-frame the debate. If the two goals of accountability and learning are also about different mindsets, the degree to which an appropriate balance can be struck – without exploring these mindsets and the assumptions on which they are based – is open to question. Concept 5: Sensitivity to initial conditions Outline of the concept The behaviours of complex systems are sensitive to their initial conditions. Simply, this means that two complex systems that are initially very close together in terms of their various elements and dimensions can end up in distinctly different places. This comes from nonlinearity of relationships – where changes are not proportional, small changes in any one of the elements can result in large changes regarding the phenomenon of interest. Detailed explanation Imagine a small ball dropped onto the edge of a razor blade, as shown in the first image in Figure 4 below. The ball can strike the blade in such a way that it can go off to the left (centre image) or to the right (right-hand image). The condition that will determine whether the ball goes to the left or right is minute. If the ball were initially held centred over the blade (as in the first image), a prediction of which direction the ball would bounce would be impossible to make with certainty. A very slight change in the initial conditions of the ball can result in falling to the right or left of the blade. Figure 4: Sensitivity to initial conditions – ball striking razor blade Source: http://www.schuelers.com/ChaosPsyche/part_1_14.htm. The concept of phase space (Concept 6) allows a more precise understanding of initial conditions. Phase space allows for the analysis of the evolution of systems by considering the evolution process as a sequence of states in time (Rosen, 1991). A state is the position of the system in its phase space at a given time. At any time, the system’s state can be seen as the initial conditions for whatever processes follow. The sensitive dependence on initial conditions, in phase space terms, means that the position of a system in its phase space at a particular moment will have an influence on its future evolution. The interactions that are taking place at any moment in time have evolved from a previous moment in time, that is, all interactions are contingent on an historical process. Put simply, history matters in complex systems. 28 The infamous butterfly effect was a metaphor developed to illustrate this idea in the context of the weather. Edward Lorenz (1972), a meteorologist, used the metaphor of a flapping wing of a butterfly to explain how a minute difference in the initial condition of a weather system leads to a chain of events producing large-scale differences in weather patterns, such as the occurrence of a tornado where there was none before. As more recent thinkers have put it, in relation to complex systems in general, an initial uncertainty in measurement of the state of a system: ‘… however small, inevitably grow[s] so large that long-range prediction becomes impossible … even the most gentle, unaccounted-for perturbation can produce, in short order, abject failure of prediction’ (Peak and Frame, 1998). A large proportion of complex systems are prone to exhibiting the butterfly effect, so much so that some have defined complex behaviour as occurring where the butterfly effect is present (ibid). As no two situations will be exactly alike, the phenomenon will inevitably occur in many settings. As with nonlinearity, many have not used formal models to demonstrate the butterfly effect, but instead have tried to develop a qualitative understanding of the likely quantitative nature of real life situations. Sensitivity to initial conditions also means that ‘the generalisation of good practice [between contexts] begins to look fragile’ (Haynes, 2003) because initial conditions are never exactly the same, and because the complexity and nonlinearity of behaviour make it extremely difficult to separate the contributions to overall behaviour that individual factors have. Any notion of ‘good practice’ requires a detailed local knowledge to understand why the practice in question was good. This concept highlights the importance of understanding what can be forecast in complex systems to what level of certainty, as well as what is comparable across complex systems. It reinforces the point that both of these areas are necessarily restricted by the perspective of the observer. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions suggests that no single perspective can capture all there is to know about a system, that it may be wise to look in detail at how appropriate our solution to a problem is, and that it may be better to work with inevitable uncertainty rather than plan based on flimsy or hopeful predictions. This may mean, to take the example of predictability, that the success of a nation may be best explained not by its population’s virtues, its natural resources and its government’s skills, but rather simply by the position it took in the past, with small historical advantages leading to much bigger advantages later. Another example is how socioeconomic policy can result in a separation of neighbourhoods, driving a large gap between the rich and the poor so that, in short order, a gulf in wealth can result between two families who once had similar wealth (Byrne and Rogers, 1996). This is closely related to the notion of ‘path dependence’, which is the idea that many alternatives are possible at some stages of a system’s development, but once one of these alternatives gains the upper hand, it becomes ‘locked in’ and it is not possible to go to any of the previous available alternatives. For example, ‘… many cities developed where and how they did not because of the “natural advantages” we are so quick to detect after the fact, but because their establishment set off self-reinforcing expectations and behaviours’ (Cronon, cited in Jervis, 1997). In economic development, the term ‘path dependence’ is used to describe how standards which are first-to-market can become entrenched ’lock ins’ - such as the QWERTY layout in typewriters still used in computer keyboards (David, 2000). In certain situations, positive feedbacks leading from a small change can lead to such irreversible path dependence (Urry, 2003). Urry gives the example of irreversibility across an entire industry or sector, whereby through sensitive dependence on initial conditions, feedback can set in motion institutional patterns that are hard or impossible to reverse. He cites the example of the domination of steel and petroleum-based fuel models, developed in the late 29 19th century, which have come to dominate over other fuel alternatives, especially steam and electric, which were at the time preferable. The concept of path dependence has received some criticism from exponents of complexity science, because it has imported into economics the view that minor initial perturbations are important while grafting this onto an underlying theory that still assumes that there are a finite number of stable and alternative end-states, one of which will arise based on the particular initial conditions. As will be explained in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos, this is not always the case in complex systems (Margolis and Liebowitz, 1998).  Example: Sensitive dependence on initial conditions and economic growth Economists have generally identified sensitive dependence on initial conditions as one of the important features of the growth process – that is, what eventually happens to an economy depends greatly on the point of departure. There is mounting evidence that large qualitative differences in outcomes can arise from small (and perhaps accidental) differences in initial conditions or events (Hurwicz, 1995). In other words, the scope for and the direction and magnitude of change that a society can undertake depend critically on its prevailing objective conditions and the constellation of sociopolitical and institutional factors that have shaped these conditions. For specific economies, the initial conditions affecting economic growth include levels of per capita income; the development of human capital; the natural resource base; the levels and structure of production; the degree of the economy’s openness and its form of integration into the world system; the development of physical infrastructure; and institutional variables such as governance, land tenure and property rights. One might add here the nature of colonial rule and the institutional arrangements it bequeathed the former colonies, the decolonisation process, and the economic interests and policies of the erstwhile colonial masters. Wrongly specifying these initial conditions can undermine policy initiatives. Government polices are not simply a matter of choice made without historical or socioeconomic preconditions. Further, a sensitive appreciation of the differences and similarities in the initial conditions is important if one is to avoid some of the invidious comparisons one runs into today and the naive voluntarism that policymakers exhibit when they declare that their particular country is about to become the ‘new tiger’ of Africa. Such comparisons and self-description actually make the process of learning from others more costly because they start the planning process off on a wrong foot (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). Implication: Rethink the scope of learning and the purpose of planning in an uncertain world Sensitivity to initial conditions suggests that there are inevitably degrees of non-comparability across, and unpredictability within, complex systems. Some have argued that this implies that: ‘… the map to the future cannot be drawn in advance. We cannot know enough to set forth a meaningful vision or plan productively’ (Tetenbaum, 1998). The general implications for development theory and practice have been highlighted by a previous ODI working paper on participatory approaches, which suggests that this implies the notion of development as planned change is paradoxical. To quote directly, ‘… perfect planning would imply perfect knowledge of the future, which in turn would imply a totally deterministic universe in which planning would not make a difference’ (Geyer, cited in Sellamna, 1999). Sellamna goes on: ‘For this reason, development planning should abandon prescriptive, goal-oriented decision making and prediction about future states and focus instead on understanding the dynamics of 30 change and promoting a collective learning framework through which concerned stakeholders can constantly, through dialogue, express their respective interests and reach consensus.’ With regards to learning, this poses profound issues for the transferability of ‘best practice’, a concept that has taken on increasing meaning within the development sector since the rise of knowledge management and organisational learning strategies (Ramalingam, 2005). While it is possible that, for example, an understanding of the interplay of factors driving urban change in the Philippines may be relevant for analysis of urban change in Guatemala, this is not necessarily the case. The sensitivity to initial conditions gives us a strong reason to suppose that, even if we have a generally useful perspective on urban environments, this may entirely fail to capture the key features of the next situation we look at. This means that the search for ‘best practices’ may need to be replaced by the search for ‘good principles’. Some have suggested that the most appropriate way to bring the principles of effective approaches from one context to another is for ‘… development workers to become facilitators … enabling representatives of other communities … to see first hand what in the successful project they would wish to replicate’ (Breslin, 2004). Moving onto planning, to say that prediction of any kind is impossible may be overstating the case. Complexity does suggest that, in certain kinds of systems, future events cannot be forecasted to a useful level of probability and that, from certain perspectives, it is not possible to offer any firm prediction of the way the future will pan out on certain timescales. However, in other systems, future events can be foreseen in a helpful manner. For example, Geyer (2006) suggests that, with political dynamics, it is fairly safe to predict the short-term dynamics of basic power resources and political structures and that, therefore, there is decent scope for forecasting voting and decision outcomes of policy. On the other hand, examining party and institutional dynamics becomes more difficult, and grasping the potential shifts in contested political and social debates is even harder, while the longterm development of political dynamics is effectively characterised by disorder, as far as our ability to predict is concerned. It is important to clarify that certain levels of uncertainty are unavoidable when looking into the future. Complexity science suggests that it is important to identify and analyse these levels of unpredictability as part of the nature of the systems with which we work, and not treat uncertainty as in some way ‘unscientific’ or embarrassing. Rather than rejecting planning outright, there is a need to rethink the purpose and principles of planning. This has two key strands. First, it is necessary to incorporate an acceptance of the inherent levels of uncertainty into planning. The requirement for a certain level of detail in understanding future events should be balanced with the understanding that both simple and intricate processes carry uncertainty of prediction. While improving one’s models of change and analyses of facets of a situation may be worthwhile, it is just as important and often more practical to work with a realistic understanding of this uncertainty and build a level of flexibility and adaptability into projects, allowing for greater resilience. It has been argued that development projects have ‘fallen under the enchantment of [delivering] clear, specific, measurable outcomes’ (Westley et al., 2006). In many cases, this could be unrealistic, ineffective or even counterproductive; it is uncertain whether valuable social outcomes could be planned in terms of a specific series of outputs, and it is unclear why it is more productive to be able to hold agencies strictly accountable to promises at the expense of their promises delivering real results. This resonates with critiques of the log frame approach cited earlier, which argue that the adoption of the log frame as a central tool in effect and impact evaluations assumes higher powers of foresight than in fact is the case (Gasper, 2000). What is needed is higher levels of flexibility in the funding of international aid work, involving less stringent ‘targets’ and requirements from donors. The role of M&E would be shifted to value learning from unexpected outcomes. This is at the heart of the participatory approach to M&E developed by IDRC called outcome mapping. 31 Second, the way organisations look into the future should be adjusted by taking a more systematic and realistic view of what the future can hold: ‘A single vision to serve as an intended organisational future … is a thoroughly bad idea … not that the long term is dismissed as an effective irrelevance, [instead we need a] refocusing: rather than establish a future target and work back to what we do now to achieve it, the sequence is reversed. We should concentrate on the significant issues which need to be handled in the short term, and ensure that the debate about their long-term consequences is lively and engaged’ (Rosenhead, 2001). What is needed is a ‘pragmatic balance between present concerns and future potentialities’ (ibid); this means that ongoing systematic thinking about the future is an important task for any organisation working in development or humanitarian aid. Foresight is ‘the ability to create and maintain viable forward views and to use these in organisationally useful ways’ (Slaughter, 2003), and futures techniques, such as driver analysis or scenario planning, are suitable for this task. Scenario planning constructs a number of possible futures, in order to produce decisions and policies that are robust under a variety of feasible circumstances. This encourages a move away from looking for ‘optimal’ policies or strategies: ‘any strategy can only be optimum under certain conditions’ and ‘when those conditions change, the strategy may no longer be optimal’ (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003), so it may be preferable to produce strategies that are robust and insensitive to future variability rather than optimal for one possible future scenario. Path dependence and ’lock ins’ are also important to consider in the context of the practices of international aid agencies. The widespread use of the logical framework approach, despite the often serious critiques, is a clear example of path dependence at play. In fact, it could be argued that linearity has a ’lock in’ when it comes to the thought processes and approaches of international agencies. How ‘lock ins’ may be addressed in specific agency contexts is touched upon in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos  Concept 6: Phase space and attractors Outline of the concept The dimensions of any system can be mapped using a concept called phase space, also described as the ‘space of the possible’ (Cohen and Stewart, 1995).7 For any system, the ‘space of the possible’ is developed by identifying all the dimensions that are relevant to understanding the system, then determining the possible values that these dimensions can take (Romenska, 2006). This ‘space of the possible’ is then represented in either graphical or tabular form. In natural sciences, the prevalence of time-series data means that the phase space can be represented as a graphical map of all of the relevant dimensions and their values. In social scientific thinking, tables of data can be used to apply the same principles. The phase space of a system is literally the set of all the possible states – or phases – that the system can occupy. Phase space is particularly useful as a way to describe complex systems because it does not seek to establish known relationships between selected variables, but instead attempts to shed light on the overall shape of the system by looking at the patterns apparent when looking across all of the key dimensions. This resonates with a key point raised in Concept 1 – more may be learned about complex systems by trying to understand the important patterns of interaction and association across different elements and dimensions of such systems (Haynes, 2003). Phase space can be used to enable this kind of learning. By creating such a map of a system, it is possible to characterise how that system changes over time and the constraints that exist to change in the system (Musters et al., 1998). 7 Phase space is often used interchangeably with the phrase ‘state space’. 32 Detailed explanation The dimensions of a complex system mutually influence each other, leading to an intricate intertwining (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003) of these relationships and system behaviours to degrees of nonlinearity and unpredictability. Because of the challenges involved in analysing such systems, scientists studying complex systems have made use of a mathematical tool called phase space, which allows data relating to the dimensions of a system to be mapped rather than solved (Capra, 1996). Put simply, phase space is a visual way of representing information about the dimensions of a system. Rather than a graph, which attempts to show the relationships between specific chosen dimensions, phase space maps the possible values of each dimension of the system (akin to drawing the axes of a graph). This is the space within which a complex system displays its behaviour. Byrne gives the example of a city as a complex system (Byrne, 2006). He describes how the cities are complex problems in that they present situations where a range of variables are interacting simultaneously and in interconnected ways. He cites the specific example of Leicester, a city in the UK that grew from a small market town of 2,000 people in the 11th century to a city of 280,000 in 2001. Using the Census data from 2001, he shows that Leicester could be seen as a complex urban system made up of the following variables: [/INST] <h4><strong>The 1AC’s linear logic ignores complexity and paves over interactions between dozens of predictions </h4><p><mark>Ramalingam</mark> </strong>et al<strong> 20<mark>08</mark> </strong>(Ben, Senior Research Associate at the Overseas Development Institute, and Harry jones at ODI, "Exploring the science of complexity" http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/833.pdf)</p><p>Concept 4: Nonlinearity5 ‘... the darkest corner of science [is] the realm of non-linear problems’ (Strogatz, 2003). Outline of the concept Traditional scientific approaches are based on the idea that linear relationships can be identified through data gathering and analysis, and can be used as the basis of ‘laws’ of behaviour (Byrne, 1998). Such approaches in the physical sciences have informed the development of social, economic and political science, using broad theories of behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest (Homer-Dixon, 1995). However, complexity science suggests that <u><mark>human systems</mark> <mark>do not work in a</u></mark> simple <u><mark>linear fashion</u></mark>. Feedback processes between interconnected elements and dimensions lead to relationships that see change that is dynamic, nonlinear and unpredictable (Stacey, 1996). Nonlinearity is a direct result of the mutual interdependence between dimensions found in complex systems. In such systems, <u>clear causal relations cannot be traced <mark>because of multiple</mark> <mark>influences</mark>.</u> <u>The distinction</u> between linear and nonlinearity <u>is far from trivial</u>. If dynamic nonlinear feedbacks in response to rising greenhouse gases are included in the model used in the Stern Review of Climate Change (cited in Concept 2), for example, the total average cost of climate change rises from 5% to at least 20% of global per capita consumption (HM Treasury, 2006).6 Detailed explanation Vast numbers of naturally occurring systems exhibit nonlinearity. As one thinker has dryly suggested (Stanislaw Ulam, in the 1950s), calling a situation nonlinear is like going to the zoo and talking about all the interesting non-elephant animals you can see there (Campbell et al., 1985): there are as many nonlinear situations as there are non-elephant animals. <u><mark>Linearity</u></mark> describes the proportionality <u><mark>assume</u></mark>d in idealised situations where responses are proportional to forces and causes are proportional to effects (Strogatz, 2003). Linear <u><mark>problems</u> <u>can</u> <u>be</u> <u>broken</u> <u>down</u></mark> into pieces, with <u><mark>each</u> <u>piece</u> <u>analysed</u> <u>separately</u></mark>; finally, <u>all</u> <u>the separate answers</u> can be <u><mark>recombined to</u></mark> give the right answer to the original problem. In a linear system, <u><mark>the whole</u></mark> is exactly <u><mark>equivalent to the sum of the parts</u></mark>. However, linearity is often an approximation of a more complicated reality – most systems only behave linearly if they are close to equilibrium and are not pushed too hard. When a system starts to behave in a nonlinear fashion, ‘all bets are off’ (Strogatz, 2003). This is not to suggest that nonlinearity is necessarily a dangerous or unwanted aspect of systems. The biology of life itself is dependent on nonlinearity, as are the laws of ecology. Combination therapy for HIV/AIDS using a cocktail of three drugs works precisely because the immune response and viral dynamics are nonlinear – the three drugs taken in combination are much more effective than the sum of the three taken separately. The nonlinearity concept means that linear assumptions of how social phenomena play out should be questioned. It is important to note that such thinking has only relatively recently been incorporated into the ‘hard’ science paradigms and, moreover, is still only starting to shape thinking in the social, economic and political realms. <u><mark>Nonlinear</u></mark>ity poses challenges to analysis precisely because such <u><mark>relationships</u></mark> cannot be taken apart – they <u><mark>have to be examined</mark> all at once, <mark>as a coherent entity.</u></mark> However, the need to develop such ways of thinking cannot be overstated – as one thinker puts it: ‘... every major unresolved problem in science – from consciousness to cancer to the collective craziness of the economy, is nonlinear’ (Capra, 1996). 5 It is important to distinguish nonlinearity as used here, which relates to relationships and proportionality, and nonlinearity in terms of sequences of events – one thing following another. 6 Note that the previously cited increase from 5 to 14.4% was due to natural, known feedbacks and does not include non-linear feedbacks 25 Although nonlinearity is a mathematical formulation, it is useful to take the suggestion that what is required is a ‘qualitative understanding of [the] quantitative’ when attempting to investigate them systematically (Byrne, 1998). Such a qualitative understanding has been furthered by the work of Robert Jervis (1997) on the role of complexity in international relations. Starting with the notion that understanding of social systems has tacitly incorporated linear approaches from Newtonian sciences, Jervis goes on to highlight three common assumptions that need to be challenged in order to take better account of nonlinearity. These assumptions provide a solid basis for investigating nonlinearity. First, it is very common to test ideas and propositions by making comparisons between two situations which are identical except for one variable – referred to as the independent variable. This kind of analysis is usually prefaced with the statement ‘holding all other things constant’. However, in a system of interconnected and interrelated parts, with feedback loops, adaptive agents and emergent properties, this is almost impossible, as everything else cannot be held constant and there is no independent variable. Jervis argues that, in such systems, it is impossible to look at ‘just one thing’, or to make only one change, hence to look at a situation involving just one change is unrealistic. Secondly, it is often assumed that changes in system output are proportional to changes in input. For example, if it has been assumed that a little foreign aid slightly increases economic growth, then more aid should produce more growth. However, as recent work by ODI and others argues, absorption capacity needs to be taken account – more aid does not necessarily equate to better aid. In complex systems, then, the output is not proportional to the input. Feedback loops and adaptive behaviours and emergent dynamics within the system may mean that the relationship between input and output is a nonlinear one: ‘Sometimes even a small amount of the variable can do a great deal of work and then the law of diminishing returns sets in [a negative feedback process] … in other cases very little impact is felt until a critical mass is assembled’ (Jervis, 1997). The third and final commonly made assumption of linearity is that the system output that follows from the sum of two different inputs is equal to the sum of the outputs arising from the individual inputs. In other words, the assumption is that if Action A leads to Consequence X and Action B has Consequence Y then Action A plus Action B will have Consequences X plus Y. This frequently does not hold, because the consequences of Action A may depend on the presence or absence of many other factors which may well be affected by B or B’s Consequence (Y). In addition, the sequence in which actions are undertaken may affect the outcome. Example: The growth dynamics model as an alternative to linear regression models Studies of economic growth face methodological problems, the foremost of which is dealing with real world complexity. The standard way of understanding growth assumes, implicitly, that the same model of growth is true for all countries, and that linear relationships of growth are true for all countries. However, linear relationships might not apply in many cases. An example would be a country where moderate trade protection would increase economic growth but closing off the economy completely to international trade would spell economic disaster. Linear growth models imply that the effect of increasing the value of the independent variable would be the same for all countries, regardless of the initial value of that variable or other variables. Therefore, an increase of the tariff rate from 0% to 10% is presumed to generate the same change in the growth rate as a change from 90% to 100%. Furthermore, the change from 0% to 10% is assumed to have the same effect in a poor country as in a rich country, in a primary resource exporter as in a manufacturing exporter, and in a country with well developed institutions as in a country with underdeveloped institutions. Despite some efforts to address these issues by relaxing the linear framework and introducing mechanisms to capture nonlinearities and interactions among some variables, this is still a poor way of addressing real world nonlinearity. Econometric research has identified that linear models cannot generally be expected to 26 provide a good approximation of an unknown nonlinear function, and in some cases can lead to serious misestimates (Rodríguez, 2007). Research at Harvard University has focused on the problem of designing a growth strategy in a context of ‘radical uncertainty’ about any generalised growth models. They call their method ‘growth diagnostics’, in part because it is very similar to the approach taken by medical specialists in identifying the causes of ailments. In such a context, assuming that every country has the same problem is unlikely to be very helpful. The principal idea is to look for clues in the country’s concrete environment about the specific binding constraints on growth. The growth diagnostics exercise asks a set of basic questions that can sequentially rule out possible explanations of the problem. The answers are inherently country-specific and time-specific. The essential method is to identify the key problem to be addressed as the signals that the economy would provide if a particular constraint were the cause of that problem. Implication: Challenge linearity in underlying assumptions Within complex systems<u>,</u> the degree of nonlinearity and relationships between various factors, and the lack of proportionality between inputs and outputs, means that the <u><mark>dynamics</u></mark> of change <u><mark>are</mark> highly</u> <u><mark>context</u>-<u>specific</u></mark>. <u>Therefore</u>, if there are <u><mark>assumptions</u></mark>, aggregations <u>and theories</u> about the relations among different aspects of a specific situation, and these are <u><mark>not </mark>entirely <mark>appropriate</u></mark> when applied <u><mark>to</u></mark> the dynamics of <u><mark>a</u></mark> new <u><mark>local</u> <u>situation</u></mark>, then this perspective <u><mark>is unlikely to lead</u> to</mark> a deep understanding<u> </u>of what should be done, and is furthermore unlikely to lead to the <u><mark>hoped-for changes</mark>.</u> Nonlinearity implies that, as well as understanding the limitations of a particular model or perspective, it is important to build and improve new models that can provide the sort of information required for the particular task at hand. ‘No kind of explanatory representation can suit all kinds of phenomena ... any one diagnosis of [a] problem and its solution is necessarily partial’ (Holland, 2000). From this perspective, it is important to tailor to the particular situation one’s perspective on the dynamics of some phenomena. In a complex system, one must examine the complex web of interrelationships and interdependencies among its parts or elements (Flynn Research, 2003). <u>It is important from the outset to <mark>understand</mark> </u>the association and <u><mark>interaction among variables, rather</u> <u>than</u> <u>assuming </mark>that <mark>one causes another</mark> </u>to change, and to look at how variables interact and feed back into each other over time (Haynes, 2003). Homer-Dixon<u>,</u> cited above, suggests that political scientists use methods that are modelled on the physical sciences, developing broad theories of political behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest. These ideas resonate strongly with a recent assessment undertaken for Sida on the use of the log frame (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005), highlighting some of the advantages and disadvantages in a way which is particularly pertinent for this paper. In the international aid world, much of programme planning and development is undertaken using a set of methods and tools called the logical framework. For most of the study respondents, the advantage of logical frameworks was that they force people to think carefully through what they are planning to do, and to consider in a systematic fashion how proposed activities might contribute to the desired goal through delivering outputs and outcomes. As a result, many see the log frame as a useful way of encouraging clear thinking. However, these positive aspects were offset by the almost universal complaint that the log frame rests on a very <u><strong><mark>linear logic</u></strong></mark>, which <u><strong><mark>suggests</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>if</u></strong></mark> Activity <u><strong><mark>A is done</strong></mark>,</u> Output <u><strong><mark>B will result, leading to</u></strong></mark> Outcome <u><strong><mark>C and Impact D</strong></mark>.</u> This linear idea of cause and effect is profoundly ill-at-ease with the implications of complexity science and, indeed, the experiences of many development practitioners. The authors of the study sum up the problems of the log frame in a way that is key to our discussion of complexity: ‘Unfortunately (for the logical framework approach at least) we are not working with such a selfcontained system and there are so many factors involved which lie beyond the scope of the 27 planned initiative that will change the way things work. Although the LFA makes some attempt to capture these through the consideration of the risks and assumptions, these are limited by the imagination and experience of those involved. As a result the LFA tends to be one-dimensional and fails to reflect the messy realities facing development actors’ (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005). Nonlinearity also has clear implications for the increased interest in randomised control trials (RCTs). While the implications of nonlinearity for techniques and tools such as the log frame and RCTs are increasingly well understood by many actors within the aid system, the answer to the deeper question as to whether incorporation of nonlinearity will be feasible, given the pressure on donors to justify aid budgets while having to deal with a reducing headcount, is less clear. <u><mark>The distinction between linearity and nonlinearity</u></mark> can be seen in as providing a theoretical underpinning of the frequently cited tension between upward accountability and learning. It also provides a means to <u><mark>re-frame the debate</u></mark>. <u>If</u> <u>the</u> two <u>goals</u> <u>of</u> accountability and <u>learning</u> <u>are</u> also <u>about</u> different <u>mindsets</u>, <u>the degree to which</u> <u>a</u>n appropriate <u>balance can be struck</u> – <u>without exploring these</u> mindsets and the <u>assumptions</u> on which they are based – <u>is</u> <u>open to question.</u> Concept 5: Sensitivity to initial conditions Outline of the concept The behaviours of complex systems are sensitive to their initial conditions. Simply, this means that two complex systems that are initially very close together in terms of their various elements and dimensions can end up in distinctly different places. This comes from nonlinearity of relationships – where changes are not proportional, small changes in any one of the elements can result in large changes regarding the phenomenon of interest. Detailed explanation Imagine a small ball dropped onto the edge of a razor blade, as shown in the first image in Figure 4 below. The ball can strike the blade in such a way that it can go off to the left (centre image) or to the right (right-hand image). The condition that will determine whether the ball goes to the left or right is minute. If the ball were initially held centred over the blade (as in the first image), a prediction of which direction the ball would bounce would be impossible to make with certainty. A very slight change in the initial conditions of the ball can result in falling to the right or left of the blade. Figure 4: Sensitivity to initial conditions – ball striking razor blade Source: http://www.schuelers.com/ChaosPsyche/part_1_14.htm. The concept of phase space (Concept 6) allows a more precise understanding of initial conditions. Phase space allows for the analysis of the evolution of systems by considering the evolution process as a sequence of states in time (Rosen, 1991). A state is the position of the system in its phase space at a given time. At any time, the system’s state can be seen as the initial conditions for whatever processes follow. The sensitive dependence on initial conditions, in phase space terms, means that the position of a system in its phase space at a particular moment will have an influence on its future evolution. The interactions that are taking place at any moment in time have evolved from a previous moment in time, that is, all interactions are contingent on an historical process. Put simply, history matters in complex systems. 28 The infamous butterfly effect was a metaphor developed to illustrate this idea in the context of the weather. Edward Lorenz (1972), a meteorologist, used the metaphor of a flapping wing of a butterfly to explain how a minute difference in the initial condition of a weather system leads to a chain of events producing large-scale differences in weather patterns, such as the occurrence of a tornado where there was none before. As more recent thinkers have put it, in relation to complex systems in general, an initial uncertainty in measurement of the state of a system: ‘… however small, inevitably grow[s] so large that long-range prediction becomes impossible … even the most gentle, unaccounted-for perturbation can produce, in short order, abject failure of prediction’ (Peak and Frame, 1998). A large proportion of complex systems are prone to exhibiting the butterfly effect, so much so that some have defined complex behaviour as occurring where the butterfly effect is present (ibid). As no two situations will be exactly alike, the phenomenon will inevitably occur in many settings. As with nonlinearity, many have not used formal models to demonstrate the butterfly effect, but instead have tried to develop a qualitative understanding of the likely quantitative nature of real life situations. Sensitivity to initial conditions also means that ‘the generalisation of good practice [between contexts] begins to look fragile’ (Haynes, 2003) because initial conditions are never exactly the same, and because the complexity and nonlinearity of behaviour make it extremely difficult to separate the contributions to overall behaviour that individual factors have. Any notion of ‘good practice’ requires a detailed local knowledge to understand why the practice in question was good. This concept highlights the importance of understanding what can be forecast in complex systems to what level of certainty, as well as what is comparable across complex systems. It reinforces the point that both of these areas are necessarily restricted by the perspective of the observer. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions suggests that no single perspective can capture all there is to know about a system, that it may be wise to look in detail at how appropriate our solution to a problem is, and that it may be better to work with inevitable uncertainty rather than plan based on flimsy or hopeful predictions. This may mean, to take the example of predictability, that the success of a nation may be best explained not by its population’s virtues, its natural resources and its government’s skills, but rather simply by the position it took in the past, with small historical advantages leading to much bigger advantages later. Another example is how socioeconomic policy can result in a separation of neighbourhoods, driving a large gap between the rich and the poor so that, in short order, a gulf in wealth can result between two families who once had similar wealth (Byrne and Rogers, 1996). This is closely related to the notion of ‘path dependence’, which is the idea that many alternatives are possible at some stages of a system’s development, but once one of these alternatives gains the upper hand, it becomes ‘locked in’ and it is not possible to go to any of the previous available alternatives. For example, ‘… many cities developed where and how they did not because of the “natural advantages” we are so quick to detect after the fact, but because their establishment set off self-reinforcing expectations and behaviours’ (Cronon, cited in Jervis, 1997). In economic development, the term ‘path dependence’ is used to describe how standards which are first-to-market can become entrenched ’lock ins’ - such as the QWERTY layout in typewriters still used in computer keyboards (David, 2000). In certain situations, positive feedbacks leading from a small change can lead to such irreversible path dependence (Urry, 2003). Urry gives the example of irreversibility across an entire industry or sector, whereby through sensitive dependence on initial conditions, feedback can set in motion institutional patterns that are hard or impossible to reverse. He cites the example of the domination of steel and petroleum-based fuel models, developed in the late 29 19th century, which have come to dominate over other fuel alternatives, especially steam and electric, which were at the time preferable. The concept of path dependence has received some criticism from exponents of complexity science, because it has imported into economics the view that minor initial perturbations are important while grafting this onto an underlying theory that still assumes that there are a finite number of stable and alternative end-states, one of which will arise based on the particular initial conditions. As will be explained in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos, this is not always the case in complex systems (Margolis and Liebowitz, 1998).  Example: Sensitive dependence on initial conditions and economic growth Economists have generally identified sensitive dependence on initial conditions as one of the important features of the growth process – that is, what eventually happens to an economy depends greatly on the point of departure. There is mounting evidence that large qualitative differences in outcomes can arise from small (and perhaps accidental) differences in initial conditions or events (Hurwicz, 1995). In other words, the scope for and the direction and magnitude of change that a society can undertake depend critically on its prevailing objective conditions and the constellation of sociopolitical and institutional factors that have shaped these conditions. For specific economies, the initial conditions affecting economic growth include levels of per capita income; the development of human capital; the natural resource base; the levels and structure of production; the degree of the economy’s openness and its form of integration into the world system; the development of physical infrastructure; and institutional variables such as governance, land tenure and property rights. One might add here the nature of colonial rule and the institutional arrangements it bequeathed the former colonies, the decolonisation process, and the economic interests and policies of the erstwhile colonial masters. Wrongly specifying these initial conditions can undermine policy initiatives. Government polices are not simply a matter of choice made without historical or socioeconomic preconditions. Further, a sensitive appreciation of the differences and similarities in the initial conditions is important if one is to avoid some of the invidious comparisons one runs into today and the naive voluntarism that policymakers exhibit when they declare that their particular country is about to become the ‘new tiger’ of Africa. Such comparisons and self-description actually make the process of learning from others more costly because they start the planning process off on a wrong foot (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). Implication: Rethink the scope of learning and the purpose of planning in an uncertain world Sensitivity to initial conditions suggests that there are inevitably degrees of non-comparability across, and unpredictability within, complex systems. Some have argued that this implies that: ‘… the map to the future cannot be drawn in advance. We cannot know enough to set forth a meaningful vision or plan productively’ (Tetenbaum, 1998). The general implications for development theory and practice have been highlighted by a previous ODI working paper on participatory approaches, which suggests that this implies the notion of development as planned change is paradoxical. To quote directly, ‘… perfect planning would imply perfect knowledge of the future, which in turn would imply a totally deterministic universe in which planning would not make a difference’ (Geyer, cited in Sellamna, 1999). Sellamna goes on: ‘For this reason, development planning should abandon prescriptive, goal-oriented decision making and prediction about future states and focus instead on understanding the dynamics of 30 change and promoting a collective learning framework through which concerned stakeholders can constantly, through dialogue, express their respective interests and reach consensus.’ With regards to learning, this poses profound issues for the transferability of ‘best practice’, a concept that has taken on increasing meaning within the development sector since the rise of knowledge management and organisational learning strategies (Ramalingam, 2005). While it is possible that, for example, an understanding of the interplay of factors driving urban change in the Philippines may be relevant for analysis of urban change in Guatemala, this is not necessarily the case. The sensitivity to initial conditions gives us a strong reason to suppose that, even if we have a generally useful perspective on urban environments, this may entirely fail to capture the key features of the next situation we look at. This means that the search for ‘best practices’ may need to be replaced by the search for ‘good principles’. Some have suggested that the most appropriate way to bring the principles of effective approaches from one context to another is for ‘… development workers to become facilitators … enabling representatives of other communities … to see first hand what in the successful project they would wish to replicate’ (Breslin, 2004). Moving onto planning, to say that prediction of any kind is impossible may be overstating the case. <u>Complexity</u> does <u>suggest </u>that<u>,</u> <u>in certain</u> kinds of <u>systems</u>, <u>future events cannot be forecasted </u>to a useful level of probability and that, from certain perspectives, it is not possible to offer any firm prediction of the way the future will pan out on certain timescales. However, <u>in other </u>system<u>s</u>, <u>future </u>event<u>s can be foreseen </u>in a helpful manner. For example, Geyer (2006) suggests that, with political dynamics, it is fairly safe to predict the short-term dynamics of basic power resources and political structures and that, therefore, there is decent scope for forecasting voting and decision outcomes of policy. On the other hand, examining party and institutional dynamics becomes more difficult, and grasping the potential shifts in contested political and social debates is even harder, while the longterm development of political dynamics is effectively characterised by disorder, as far as our ability to predict is concerned. It is important to clarify that certain levels of uncertainty are unavoidable when looking into the future. Complexity science suggests that it <u>is important to identify</u> and analyse these levels of <u>unpredictability</u> as part of the nature of the systems with which we work, <u>and not treat uncertainty as</u> in some way ‘unscientific’ or <u>embarrassing</u>. <u><mark>Rather than rejecting planning</mark> outright,</u> <u><mark>there is a need to</u></mark> rethink the purpose and principles of planning. This has two key strands. First, it is necessary to incorporate an <u><mark>accept</u></mark>ance of the <u><mark>inherent</u> <u>levels of uncertainty</u></mark> into planning. The requirement for a certain level of detail in understanding future events should be balanced with the understanding that both simple and intricate processes carry uncertainty of prediction. While improving one’s models of change and analyses of facets of a situation may be worthwhile, it is just as important and often more practical to work with a realistic understanding of this uncertainty and build a level of flexibility and adaptability into projects, allowing for greater resilience. It has been argued that development projects have ‘fallen under the enchantment of [delivering] clear, specific, measurable outcomes’ (Westley et al., 2006). In many cases, this could be unrealistic, ineffective or even counterproductive; it is uncertain whether valuable social outcomes could be planned in terms of a specific series of outputs, and it is unclear why it is more productive to be able to hold agencies strictly accountable to promises at the expense of their promises delivering real results. This resonates with critiques of the log frame approach cited earlier, which argue that the adoption of the log frame as a central tool in effect and impact evaluations assumes higher powers of foresight than in fact is the case (Gasper, 2000). What is needed is higher levels of flexibility in the funding of international aid work, involving less stringent ‘targets’ and requirements from donors. The role of M&E would be shifted to value learning from unexpected outcomes. This is at the heart of the participatory approach to M&E developed by IDRC called outcome mapping. 31 Second, the way organisations look into the future should be adjusted by taking a more systematic and realistic view of what the future can hold: ‘A single vision to serve as an intended organisational future … is a thoroughly bad idea … not that the long term is dismissed as an effective irrelevance, [instead we need a] refocusing: rather than establish a future target and work back to what we do now to achieve it, the sequence is reversed. We should concentrate on the significant issues which need to be handled in the short term, and ensure that the debate about their long-term consequences is lively and engaged’ (Rosenhead, 2001). What is needed is a ‘pragmatic balance between present concerns and future potentialities’ (ibid); this means that ongoing systematic thinking about the future is an important task for any organisation working in development or humanitarian aid. Foresight is ‘the ability to create and maintain viable forward views and to use these in organisationally useful ways’ (Slaughter, 2003), and futures techniques, such as driver analysis or scenario planning, are suitable for this task. Scenario planning constructs a number of possible futures, in order to produce decisions and policies that are robust under a variety of feasible circumstances. This encourages a move away from looking for ‘optimal’ policies or strategies: ‘any strategy can only be optimum under certain conditions’ and ‘when those conditions change, the strategy may no longer be optimal’ (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003), so it may be preferable to produce strategies that are robust and insensitive to future variability rather than optimal for one possible future scenario. Path dependence and ’lock ins’ are also important to consider in the context of the practices of international aid agencies. The widespread use of the logical framework approach, despite the often serious critiques, is a clear example of path dependence at play. In fact, it could be argued that linearity has a ’lock in’ when it comes to the thought processes and approaches of international agencies. How ‘lock ins’ may be addressed in specific agency contexts is touched upon in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos  Concept 6: Phase space and attractors Outline of the concept The dimensions of any system can be mapped using a concept called phase space, also described as the ‘space of the possible’ (Cohen and Stewart, 1995).7 For any system, the ‘space of the possible’ is developed by identifying all the dimensions that are relevant to understanding the system, then determining the possible values that these dimensions can take (Romenska, 2006). This ‘space of the possible’ is then represented in either graphical or tabular form. In natural sciences, the prevalence of time-series data means that the phase space can be represented as a graphical map of all of the relevant dimensions and their values. In social scientific thinking, tables of data can be used to apply the same principles. The phase space of a system is literally the set of all the possible states – or phases – that the system can occupy. Phase space is particularly useful as a way to describe complex systems because it does not seek to establish known relationships between selected variables, but instead attempts to shed light on the overall shape of the system by looking at the patterns apparent when looking across all of the key dimensions. This resonates with a key point raised in Concept 1 – more may be learned about complex systems by trying to understand the important patterns of interaction and association across different elements and dimensions of such systems (Haynes, 2003). Phase space can be used to enable this kind of learning. By creating such a map of a system, it is possible to characterise how that system changes over time and the constraints that exist to change in the system (Musters et al., 1998). 7 Phase space is often used interchangeably with the phrase ‘state space’. 32 Detailed explanation The dimensions of a complex system mutually influence each other, leading to an intricate intertwining (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003) of these relationships and system behaviours to degrees of nonlinearity and unpredictability. Because of the challenges involved in analysing such systems, scientists studying complex systems have made use of a mathematical tool called phase space, which allows data relating to the dimensions of a system to be mapped rather than solved (Capra, 1996). Put simply, phase space is a visual way of representing information about the dimensions of a system. Rather than a graph, which attempts to show the relationships between specific chosen dimensions, phase space maps the possible values of each dimension of the system (akin to drawing the axes of a graph). This is the space within which a complex system displays its behaviour. <u>Byrne gives the example of a city as a complex system (</u>Byrne, 2006). He describes how <u>the cities are complex problems </u>in that they present situations where <u>a range of variables are interacting simultaneously </u>and <u>in interconnected ways.</u> He cites the specific example of Leicester, a city in the UK that grew from a small market town of 2,000 people in the 11th century to a city of 280,000 in 2001. Using the Census data from 2001, he shows that Leicester could be seen as a complex urban system made up of the following variables:</p> </s>

African instability causes great power war

Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes can give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers The conflicts in Africa have regional and global dimensions

Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have global aspects. All conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes can give rise to global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers conflicts in Africa have regional and global dimensions

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers. Located in and around the Horn of Africa are the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a nagging border dispute with Ethiopia which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme. Although a UN mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so the conflict festers. Eritrea also fights a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia, Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts Union which took control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November 2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US, Ethiopia invaded Somalia last December to restore the recognized Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed. Although the Ethiopian army successfully ousted the ICU from power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the ICU has waged a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year. The senior ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed. Eritrean President-for-life Isaias Afwerki declared his country's support for the insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation." Although touted in the West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in connection with his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in Ethiopia. The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians. Ethiopia, for its part has fought a brutal counter-insurgency to restore its control over the region. Human rights organizations have accused Ethiopia of massive human rights abuses of civilians in Ogaden. Then there is Sudan. As Eric Reeves wrote in the Boston Globe on Saturday, "The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years, and is now poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region's African populations." The Islamist government of Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir is refusing to accept non-African states as members of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur that is due to replace the undermanned and demoralized African Union peacekeeping force whose mandate ends on December 31. Without its UN component of non-African states, the UN Security Council mandated force will be unable to operate effectively. Khartoum's veto led Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping to warn last month that the entire peacekeeping mission may have to be aborted. And the Darfur region is not the only one at risk. Due to Khartoum's refusal to carry out the terms of its 2005 peace treaty with the Southern Sudanese that ended Khartoum's 20-year war and genocide against the region's Christian and animist population, the unsteady peace may be undone. Given Khartoum's apparent sprint to victory over the international community regarding Darfur, there is little reason to doubt that once victory is secured, it will renew its attacks in the south. The conflicts in the Horn of Africa have regional and global dimensions. Regionally, Egypt has played a central role in sponsoring and fomenting conflicts. Egypt's meddling advances its interest of preventing the African nations from mounting a unified challenge to Egypt's colonial legacy of extraordinary rights to the waters of the Nile River which flows through all countries of the region.

<h4>African instability causes great power war</h4><p>Caroline <strong>Glick 7</strong>, senior Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, 12/12, Condi’s African holiday,http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/home.aspx?sid=56&categoryid=56&subcategoryid=90&newsid=11568 </p><p>The Horn of<u> <mark>Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars</u></mark>, which rage continuously, <u><mark>can <strong>easily escalate into big wars</strong>. Local conflicts have</mark> regional and <mark>global aspects. All</u></mark> of the <u><mark>conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes</u></mark> from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, <u><mark>can</u></mark> potentially <u><mark>give rise to</mark> regional, and indeed <mark>global conflagrations between competing regional actors and <strong>global powers</u></strong></mark>. Located in and around the Horn of Africa are the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a nagging border dispute with Ethiopia which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme. Although a UN mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so the conflict festers. Eritrea also fights a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia, Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts Union which took control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November 2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US, Ethiopia invaded Somalia last December to restore the recognized Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed. Although the Ethiopian army successfully ousted the ICU from power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the ICU has waged a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year. The senior ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed. Eritrean President-for-life Isaias Afwerki declared his country's support for the insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation." Although touted in the West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in connection with his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in Ethiopia. The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians. Ethiopia, for its part has fought a brutal counter-insurgency to restore its control over the region. Human rights organizations have accused Ethiopia of massive human rights abuses of civilians in Ogaden. Then there is Sudan. As Eric Reeves wrote in the Boston Globe on Saturday, "The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years, and is now poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region's African populations." The Islamist government of Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir is refusing to accept non-African states as members of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur that is due to replace the undermanned and demoralized African Union peacekeeping force whose mandate ends on December 31. Without its UN component of non-African states, the UN Security Council mandated force will be unable to operate effectively. Khartoum's veto led Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping to warn last month that the entire peacekeeping mission may have to be aborted. And the Darfur region is not the only one at risk. Due to Khartoum's refusal to carry out the terms of its 2005 peace treaty with the Southern Sudanese that ended Khartoum's 20-year war and genocide against the region's Christian and animist population, the unsteady peace may be undone. Given Khartoum's apparent sprint to victory over the international community regarding Darfur, there is little reason to doubt that once victory is secured, it will renew its attacks in the south. <u>The <mark>conflicts in</mark> </u>the Horn of<u> <mark>Africa have regional and global dimensions</u></mark>. Regionally, Egypt has played a central role in sponsoring and fomenting conflicts. Egypt's meddling advances its interest of preventing the African nations from mounting a unified challenge to Egypt's colonial legacy of extraordinary rights to the waters of the Nile River which flows through all countries of the region.</p>

Caroline Glick 7, senior Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, 12/12, Condi’s African holiday,http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/home.aspx?sid=56&categoryid=56&subcategoryid=90&newsid=11568

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Caroline Glick 7, senior Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, 12/12, Condi’s African holiday,http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/home.aspx?sid=56&categoryid=56&subcategoryid=90&newsid=11568 fulltext: The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers. Located in and around the Horn of Africa are the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a nagging border dispute with Ethiopia which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme. Although a UN mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so the conflict festers. Eritrea also fights a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia, Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts Union which took control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November 2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US, Ethiopia invaded Somalia last December to restore the recognized Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed. Although the Ethiopian army successfully ousted the ICU from power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the ICU has waged a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year. The senior ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed. Eritrean President-for-life Isaias Afwerki declared his country's support for the insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation." Although touted in the West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in connection with his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in Ethiopia. The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians. Ethiopia, for its part has fought a brutal counter-insurgency to restore its control over the region. Human rights organizations have accused Ethiopia of massive human rights abuses of civilians in Ogaden. Then there is Sudan. As Eric Reeves wrote in the Boston Globe on Saturday, "The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years, and is now poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region's African populations." The Islamist government of Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir is refusing to accept non-African states as members of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur that is due to replace the undermanned and demoralized African Union peacekeeping force whose mandate ends on December 31. Without its UN component of non-African states, the UN Security Council mandated force will be unable to operate effectively. Khartoum's veto led Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping to warn last month that the entire peacekeeping mission may have to be aborted. And the Darfur region is not the only one at risk. Due to Khartoum's refusal to carry out the terms of its 2005 peace treaty with the Southern Sudanese that ended Khartoum's 20-year war and genocide against the region's Christian and animist population, the unsteady peace may be undone. Given Khartoum's apparent sprint to victory over the international community regarding Darfur, there is little reason to doubt that once victory is secured, it will renew its attacks in the south. The conflicts in the Horn of Africa have regional and global dimensions. Regionally, Egypt has played a central role in sponsoring and fomenting conflicts. Egypt's meddling advances its interest of preventing the African nations from mounting a unified challenge to Egypt's colonial legacy of extraordinary rights to the waters of the Nile River which flows through all countries of the region. [/INST] <h4>African instability causes great power war</h4><p>Caroline <strong>Glick 7</strong>, senior Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, 12/12, Condi’s African holiday,http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/home.aspx?sid=56&categoryid=56&subcategoryid=90&newsid=11568 </p><p>The Horn of<u> <mark>Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars</u></mark>, which rage continuously, <u><mark>can <strong>easily escalate into big wars</strong>. Local conflicts have</mark> regional and <mark>global aspects. All</u></mark> of the <u><mark>conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes</u></mark> from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, <u><mark>can</u></mark> potentially <u><mark>give rise to</mark> regional, and indeed <mark>global conflagrations between competing regional actors and <strong>global powers</u></strong></mark>. Located in and around the Horn of Africa are the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a nagging border dispute with Ethiopia which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme. Although a UN mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so the conflict festers. Eritrea also fights a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia, Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts Union which took control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November 2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US, Ethiopia invaded Somalia last December to restore the recognized Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed. Although the Ethiopian army successfully ousted the ICU from power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the ICU has waged a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year. The senior ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed. Eritrean President-for-life Isaias Afwerki declared his country's support for the insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation." Although touted in the West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in connection with his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in Ethiopia. The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians. Ethiopia, for its part has fought a brutal counter-insurgency to restore its control over the region. Human rights organizations have accused Ethiopia of massive human rights abuses of civilians in Ogaden. Then there is Sudan. As Eric Reeves wrote in the Boston Globe on Saturday, "The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years, and is now poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region's African populations." The Islamist government of Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir is refusing to accept non-African states as members of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur that is due to replace the undermanned and demoralized African Union peacekeeping force whose mandate ends on December 31. Without its UN component of non-African states, the UN Security Council mandated force will be unable to operate effectively. Khartoum's veto led Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping to warn last month that the entire peacekeeping mission may have to be aborted. And the Darfur region is not the only one at risk. Due to Khartoum's refusal to carry out the terms of its 2005 peace treaty with the Southern Sudanese that ended Khartoum's 20-year war and genocide against the region's Christian and animist population, the unsteady peace may be undone. Given Khartoum's apparent sprint to victory over the international community regarding Darfur, there is little reason to doubt that once victory is secured, it will renew its attacks in the south. <u>The <mark>conflicts in</mark> </u>the Horn of<u> <mark>Africa have regional and global dimensions</u></mark>. Regionally, Egypt has played a central role in sponsoring and fomenting conflicts. Egypt's meddling advances its interest of preventing the African nations from mounting a unified challenge to Egypt's colonial legacy of extraordinary rights to the waters of the Nile River which flows through all countries of the region.</p> </s>

Marijuana is a general rallying call for Dems and the SQ solves your aff – plan removes that incentive

The Republican Party is increasingly dependent on the elderly, white population for votes and the good news for them is that elderly people are more inclined to vote in off-year elections than anyone else. These ads are designed specifically to make sure they are even more motivated than usual to get themselves to the polls and confused enough to believe that the long-term enemies of Social Security and Medicare (the Republicans) have inexplicably changed sides and are now their protectors One of the other ways both parties have of getting a higher turnout in off year elections is to get initiatives on the ballot designed to get their bases to the polls even when nobody running for the office is sufficiently sexy or frightening to rouse them from jaded ennui that characterizes the American voter in most elections Studies have shown that a controversial ballot initiative can boost turnout by as much as 4 percent in off year elections Today it’s the Democrats who are taking advantage of the ballot initiative process to push for a loosening of marijuana laws in states across the country and having some big successes In fact, there’s good evidence that while the youth vote overall stayed nearly exactly the same percentage of the electorate in 2012 as 2008 in the states where marijuana legalization was on the ballot, the 18-29 year old vote went way up In 2008 young people made up just 14 percent of the vote in Colorado but this year it was 20 percent in Washington State the youth vote went from just 10 percent of the electorate last election to 22 percent this time. Polling last spring showed a very big advantage for Democrats if marijuana is on the ballot this fall George Washington University Battleground poll , reveals that nearly four in 10 respondents say they would be “much more likely” to vote if marijuana legalization issues were on the ballot An additional 30% say such ballot initiatives would make them “somewhat” more likely to vote The numbers are encouraging to Democratic pollster Lake, who conducted the survey with GOP pollster Ed Goeas, because Democrats historically have a tougher time than Republicans in turning out voters in non-presidential election years. The GWU survey underscored the enthusiasm gap going into 2014 elections 64% of Republicans say they are extremely likely to vote this year compared with 57% of Democrats who are a pillar of the Democratic base, 36% said they are extremely likely to vote. Democrats all over the country are pushing these initiatives whether for full legalization or medical use.

One of the ways both parties have of getting a higher turnout is initiatives on the ballot designed to get their bases to the polls a controversial ballot initiative can boost turnout by as much as 4 percent in off year elections Democrats are taking advantage of the ballot initiative process to push for a loosening of marijuana laws across the country in the states where marijuana legalization was on the ballot, the 18-29 year old vote went way up The numbers are encouraging to Democratic Democrats all over the country are pushing these initiatives for full legalization

But that’s beside the point. The Republican Party is increasingly dependent on the elderly, white population for votes and the good news for them is that elderly people are more inclined to vote in off-year elections than anyone else. These ads are designed specifically to make sure they are even more motivated than usual to get themselves to the polls — and confused enough to believe that the long-term enemies of Social Security and Medicare (the Republicans) have inexplicably changed sides and are now their protectors. One of the other ways both parties have of getting a higher turnout in off year elections is to get initiatives on the ballot designed to get their bases to the polls even when nobody running for the office is sufficiently sexy or frightening to rouse them from jaded ennui that characterizes the American voter in most elections. Studies have shown that a controversial ballot initiative can boost turnout by as much as 4 percent in off year elections. For years the Republicans used “gay marriage” as the boogeyman (SIC) to rouse their social conservative voters but that seems to have backfired on them in recent years as marriage equality is now being routinely acknowledged by legislatures and the courts. Today it’s the Democrats who are taking advantage of the ballot initiative process to push for a loosening of marijuana laws in states across the country and having some big successes. In fact, there’s good evidence that while the youth vote overall stayed nearly exactly the same percentage of the electorate in 2012 as 2008, in the states where marijuana legalization was on the ballot, the 18-29 year old vote went way up: In 2008 young people made up just 14 percent of the vote in Colorado but this year it was 20 percent. Even more incredibly, in Washington State the youth vote went from just 10 percent of the electorate last election to 22 percent this time. In Oregon there was also a 5 percent point increase. Polling last spring showed a very big advantage for Democrats if marijuana is on the ballot this fall: George Washington University Battleground poll, a national survey of likely voters, reveals that nearly four in 10 respondents say they would be “much more likely” to vote if marijuana legalization issues were on the ballot. An additional 30% say such ballot initiatives would make them “somewhat” more likely to vote. The numbers are encouraging to Democratic pollster Celinda Lake, who conducted the survey with GOP pollster Ed Goeas, because Democrats historically have a tougher time than Republicans in turning out voters in non-presidential election years. The GWU survey underscored the enthusiasm gap going into 2014 elections: 64% of Republicans say they are extremely likely to vote this year, compared with 57% of Democrats. Among young voters, who are a pillar of the Democratic base, 36% said they are extremely likely to vote. Democrats all over the country are pushing these initiatives, whether for full legalization or medical use. This isn’t a wholly opportunistic campaign. There are real benefits to medical marijuana and since America has been running an experiment with the participation of tens of millions of people over the course of many decades now, it’s clear there is little downside to the drug itself. Whatever problems it’s caused have been the result of prohibition and prison. Pushing for legalization makes sense on both substantive and political grounds.

<h4>Marijuana is a general rallying call for Dems and the SQ solves your aff – plan removes that incentive</h4><p><strong>Parton, 14</strong> Heather Digby, contributing writer for Salon and winner of the 2014 Hillman Prize for Opinion and Analysis Journalism, “The left’s secret midterm weapon: How marijuana ballot initiatives can change turnout,” http://www.salon.com/2014/08/26/the_lefts_secret_midterm_weapon_how_marijuana_ballot_initiatives_can_change_turnout/, ALB</p><p>But that’s beside the point. <u><strong>The Republican Party is increasingly dependent on the elderly, white population for votes and the good news for them is that elderly people are more inclined to vote in off-year elections than anyone else.</u></strong> <u><strong>These ads are designed</u></strong> <u><strong>specifically to make sure they are even more motivated than usual to get themselves to the polls</u></strong> — <u><strong>and confused enough to believe that the long-term enemies of Social Security and Medicare (the Republicans) have inexplicably changed sides and are now their protectors</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>One of the</mark> other <mark>ways both parties have of getting a higher turnout</mark> in off year elections <mark>is</mark> to get <mark>initiatives on the ballot designed to get their bases to the polls</mark> even when nobody running for the office is sufficiently sexy or frightening to rouse them from jaded ennui that characterizes the American voter in most elections</u></strong>. <u><strong>Studies have shown that <mark>a controversial ballot initiative can boost turnout by as much as 4 percent in off year elections</u></strong></mark>. For years the Republicans used “gay marriage” as the boogeyman (SIC) to rouse their social conservative voters but that seems to have backfired on them in recent years as marriage equality is now being routinely acknowledged by legislatures and the courts. <u><strong>Today it’s the <mark>Democrats</mark> who <mark>are taking advantage of the ballot initiative process to push for a loosening of marijuana laws</mark> in states <mark>across the country</mark> and having some big successes</u></strong>. <u><strong>In fact, there’s good evidence that while the youth vote overall stayed nearly exactly the same percentage of the electorate in 2012 as 2008</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>in the states where marijuana legalization was on the ballot, the 18-29 year old vote went way up</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong>In 2008 young people made up just 14 percent of the vote in Colorado but this year it was 20 percent</u></strong>. Even more incredibly, <u><strong>in Washington State the youth vote went from just 10 percent of the electorate last election to 22 percent this time.</u></strong> In Oregon there was also a 5 percent point increase. <u><strong>Polling last spring showed a very big advantage for Democrats if marijuana is on the ballot this fall</u></strong>: <u><strong>George Washington University Battleground poll</u></strong>, a national survey of likely voters<u><strong>, reveals that nearly four in 10 respondents say they would be “much more likely” to vote if marijuana legalization issues were on the ballot</u></strong>. <u><strong>An additional 30% say such ballot initiatives would make them “somewhat” more likely to vote</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The numbers are encouraging to Democratic</mark> pollster</u></strong> Celinda <u><strong>Lake, who conducted the survey with GOP pollster Ed Goeas, because Democrats historically have a tougher time than Republicans in turning out voters in non-presidential election years. The GWU survey underscored the enthusiasm gap going into 2014 elections</u></strong>: <u><strong>64% of Republicans say they are extremely likely to vote this year</u></strong>, <u><strong>compared with 57% of Democrats</u></strong>. Among young voters, <u><strong>who are a pillar of the Democratic base, 36% said they are extremely likely to vote.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Democrats all over the country are pushing these initiatives</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>whether <mark>for full legalization</mark> or medical use.</u> This isn’t a wholly opportunistic campaign. There are real benefits to medical marijuana and since America has been running an experiment with the participation of tens of millions of people over the course of many decades now, it’s clear there is little downside to the drug itself. Whatever problems it’s caused have been the result of prohibition and prison. Pushing for legalization makes sense on both substantive and political grounds.</p></strong>

Parton, 14 Heather Digby, contributing writer for Salon and winner of the 2014 Hillman Prize for Opinion and Analysis Journalism, “The left’s secret midterm weapon: How marijuana ballot initiatives can change turnout,” http://www.salon.com/2014/08/26/the_lefts_secret_midterm_weapon_how_marijuana_ballot_initiatives_can_change_turnout/, ALB

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Parton, 14 Heather Digby, contributing writer for Salon and winner of the 2014 Hillman Prize for Opinion and Analysis Journalism, “The left’s secret midterm weapon: How marijuana ballot initiatives can change turnout,” http://www.salon.com/2014/08/26/the_lefts_secret_midterm_weapon_how_marijuana_ballot_initiatives_can_change_turnout/, ALB fulltext: But that’s beside the point. The Republican Party is increasingly dependent on the elderly, white population for votes and the good news for them is that elderly people are more inclined to vote in off-year elections than anyone else. These ads are designed specifically to make sure they are even more motivated than usual to get themselves to the polls — and confused enough to believe that the long-term enemies of Social Security and Medicare (the Republicans) have inexplicably changed sides and are now their protectors. One of the other ways both parties have of getting a higher turnout in off year elections is to get initiatives on the ballot designed to get their bases to the polls even when nobody running for the office is sufficiently sexy or frightening to rouse them from jaded ennui that characterizes the American voter in most elections. Studies have shown that a controversial ballot initiative can boost turnout by as much as 4 percent in off year elections. For years the Republicans used “gay marriage” as the boogeyman (SIC) to rouse their social conservative voters but that seems to have backfired on them in recent years as marriage equality is now being routinely acknowledged by legislatures and the courts. Today it’s the Democrats who are taking advantage of the ballot initiative process to push for a loosening of marijuana laws in states across the country and having some big successes. In fact, there’s good evidence that while the youth vote overall stayed nearly exactly the same percentage of the electorate in 2012 as 2008, in the states where marijuana legalization was on the ballot, the 18-29 year old vote went way up: In 2008 young people made up just 14 percent of the vote in Colorado but this year it was 20 percent. Even more incredibly, in Washington State the youth vote went from just 10 percent of the electorate last election to 22 percent this time. In Oregon there was also a 5 percent point increase. Polling last spring showed a very big advantage for Democrats if marijuana is on the ballot this fall: George Washington University Battleground poll, a national survey of likely voters, reveals that nearly four in 10 respondents say they would be “much more likely” to vote if marijuana legalization issues were on the ballot. An additional 30% say such ballot initiatives would make them “somewhat” more likely to vote. The numbers are encouraging to Democratic pollster Celinda Lake, who conducted the survey with GOP pollster Ed Goeas, because Democrats historically have a tougher time than Republicans in turning out voters in non-presidential election years. The GWU survey underscored the enthusiasm gap going into 2014 elections: 64% of Republicans say they are extremely likely to vote this year, compared with 57% of Democrats. Among young voters, who are a pillar of the Democratic base, 36% said they are extremely likely to vote. Democrats all over the country are pushing these initiatives, whether for full legalization or medical use. This isn’t a wholly opportunistic campaign. There are real benefits to medical marijuana and since America has been running an experiment with the participation of tens of millions of people over the course of many decades now, it’s clear there is little downside to the drug itself. Whatever problems it’s caused have been the result of prohibition and prison. Pushing for legalization makes sense on both substantive and political grounds. [/INST] <h4>Marijuana is a general rallying call for Dems and the SQ solves your aff – plan removes that incentive</h4><p><strong>Parton, 14</strong> Heather Digby, contributing writer for Salon and winner of the 2014 Hillman Prize for Opinion and Analysis Journalism, “The left’s secret midterm weapon: How marijuana ballot initiatives can change turnout,” http://www.salon.com/2014/08/26/the_lefts_secret_midterm_weapon_how_marijuana_ballot_initiatives_can_change_turnout/, ALB</p><p>But that’s beside the point. <u><strong>The Republican Party is increasingly dependent on the elderly, white population for votes and the good news for them is that elderly people are more inclined to vote in off-year elections than anyone else.</u></strong> <u><strong>These ads are designed</u></strong> <u><strong>specifically to make sure they are even more motivated than usual to get themselves to the polls</u></strong> — <u><strong>and confused enough to believe that the long-term enemies of Social Security and Medicare (the Republicans) have inexplicably changed sides and are now their protectors</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>One of the</mark> other <mark>ways both parties have of getting a higher turnout</mark> in off year elections <mark>is</mark> to get <mark>initiatives on the ballot designed to get their bases to the polls</mark> even when nobody running for the office is sufficiently sexy or frightening to rouse them from jaded ennui that characterizes the American voter in most elections</u></strong>. <u><strong>Studies have shown that <mark>a controversial ballot initiative can boost turnout by as much as 4 percent in off year elections</u></strong></mark>. For years the Republicans used “gay marriage” as the boogeyman (SIC) to rouse their social conservative voters but that seems to have backfired on them in recent years as marriage equality is now being routinely acknowledged by legislatures and the courts. <u><strong>Today it’s the <mark>Democrats</mark> who <mark>are taking advantage of the ballot initiative process to push for a loosening of marijuana laws</mark> in states <mark>across the country</mark> and having some big successes</u></strong>. <u><strong>In fact, there’s good evidence that while the youth vote overall stayed nearly exactly the same percentage of the electorate in 2012 as 2008</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>in the states where marijuana legalization was on the ballot, the 18-29 year old vote went way up</u></strong></mark>: <u><strong>In 2008 young people made up just 14 percent of the vote in Colorado but this year it was 20 percent</u></strong>. Even more incredibly, <u><strong>in Washington State the youth vote went from just 10 percent of the electorate last election to 22 percent this time.</u></strong> In Oregon there was also a 5 percent point increase. <u><strong>Polling last spring showed a very big advantage for Democrats if marijuana is on the ballot this fall</u></strong>: <u><strong>George Washington University Battleground poll</u></strong>, a national survey of likely voters<u><strong>, reveals that nearly four in 10 respondents say they would be “much more likely” to vote if marijuana legalization issues were on the ballot</u></strong>. <u><strong>An additional 30% say such ballot initiatives would make them “somewhat” more likely to vote</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The numbers are encouraging to Democratic</mark> pollster</u></strong> Celinda <u><strong>Lake, who conducted the survey with GOP pollster Ed Goeas, because Democrats historically have a tougher time than Republicans in turning out voters in non-presidential election years. The GWU survey underscored the enthusiasm gap going into 2014 elections</u></strong>: <u><strong>64% of Republicans say they are extremely likely to vote this year</u></strong>, <u><strong>compared with 57% of Democrats</u></strong>. Among young voters, <u><strong>who are a pillar of the Democratic base, 36% said they are extremely likely to vote.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Democrats all over the country are pushing these initiatives</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>whether <mark>for full legalization</mark> or medical use.</u> This isn’t a wholly opportunistic campaign. There are real benefits to medical marijuana and since America has been running an experiment with the participation of tens of millions of people over the course of many decades now, it’s clear there is little downside to the drug itself. Whatever problems it’s caused have been the result of prohibition and prison. Pushing for legalization makes sense on both substantive and political grounds.</p></strong> </s>

US leadership will change the course of international drug politics

Obama has aligned itself rhetorically with those who would manage illicit drug use as a public health rather than a criminal law problem, but funds, programs and statements in key international forums have not materialized to concretize that stance A new direction for US policy on illicit drugs cannot come too soon The need for new thinking on US drug policy is urgent in light of the enormous global influence that US action and leadership will have The administration faces a global policy environment where receptivity to progressive drug policy directions may be greater than it supposes. Obama should not fail to appreciate the room that he has internationally and domestically for boldness in this challenging policy arena The administration’s leadership is urgently needed There must be an official rethinking of prohibitionist strategies It is promising that the new director of ONDCP is concerned that “drug war” rhetoric makes people feel as though their government is at war with them, but the administration should act boldly president should take on the task of helping US and global audiences to appreciate the benefits of pragmatic approaches The administration should recognize in an explicit and public way the structural factors that lead impoverished rural people with few alternatives to grow coca or poppies. On the U N stage, backing away from prohibitionism as the central tenet of drug control would place the US in a progressive leadership position that could dramatically change the course of international policy The administration should work side by side with countries that have expressed the need for humane and effective policies At little or no political cost Obama could help inaugurate a new era of affordable, humane and respectful treatment for drug dependence, accompanied by international standards of practice and effective mechanisms for monitoring and redress all of which have been blocked by approaching drug addiction as a crime

US drug policy is urgent in light of the enormous global influence The administration faces a global policy environment where receptivity to progressive drug policy directions may be greater than it supposes There must be an official rethinking of prohibitionist strategies the administration should act boldly The administration should recognize in an explicit and public way the structural factors that lead impoverished rural people with few alternatives to grow coca or poppies backing away from prohibitionism would place the US in a progressive leadership position that could dramatically change the course of international policy inaugurate a new era of treatment for drug dependence, accompanied by international standards of practice and effective mechanisms for redress

In April 2009, the influential health journal The Lancet ran an article under the headline “The USA shifts away from the ‘war on drugs’,”128 an example of many hopeful expressions from the public health world that a new era of progressive US leadership on drug control was dawning. In light of the evidence presented here, that headline seems premature. The Obama White House has aligned itself rhetorically, to some degree, with those who would manage illicit drug use as a public health rather than a criminal law problem, but funds, programs and statements in key international forums have not materialized to concretize that stance. It is, certainly, early in the administration, and, as is often repeated by the president and his staff, extraordinary economic and political problems have confronted the new White House since its first hours. It may be that the Obama administration has explicitly sought to delay tackling divisive social issues to keep the focus on what are perceived to be more central concerns, perhaps mindful of the Clinton White House’s experience on gays in the military in its early days. Nonetheless, lives continue to be lost to ill‐conceived and inhumane policies related to illicit drugs. A new direction for US policy on illicit drugs cannot come too soon. The need for new thinking on US drug policy is all the more urgent in light of the enormous global influence that US action and leadership have had and will continue to have in this area. The administration faces a global policy environment where receptivity to progressive drug policy directions may be greater than it supposes. The 26 countries that defied business as usual in the March 2009 session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs by insisting that harm reduction was an essential part of services for drug users represented frustration with military and criminal law solutions. In February 2009, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, convened by former presidents of Mexico, Colombia and Brazil, explicitly called for a turn away from “war on drugs” policies in the region in favor of more humane and effective health‐centered strategies.129 In addition, in its “outcome framework” for 2009‐2011, UNAIDS has committed itself, somewhat more forthrightly than in the past, to removal of “punitive laws” that impede effective responses to HIV and to “ensuring that legal and policy frameworks serve HIV prevention efforts” among drug users.130 President Obama, whose instinct for caution often shows itself to be well developed, should not fail to appreciate the room that he has internationally and, increasingly, domestically for boldness in this challenging policy arena. An administration that loses no opportunity to differentiate itself from its predecessor in its commitment to evidence‐based policies must make that commitment real in this policy area that has been lethally compromised by ideology and fear‐mongering. The administration’s leadership is urgently needed in the following ways: END PROHIBITIONISM AS POLICY DIRECTION There must be an official rethinking of prohibitionist strategies and their dire consequences for people who use illicit drugs and their societies more broadly. It is promising that the new director of ONDCP is concerned that “drug war” rhetoric makes people feel as though their government is at war with them, but the administration should speak and act boldly on the breadth and depth of the harms of prohibitionism as it leads a movement toward peace in the drug war. A president who unquestionably knows how to use his privileged public platform should take on the task of helping US and global audiences to appreciate the benefits of other sound and pragmatic approaches to illicit drugs. The administration should become the ally of those who have carefully documented the political, social, human rights and human life costs of the war on drugs and should ensure that persons most harmed by past policies play a meaningful role in shaping a new policy direction. The administration should recognize in an explicit and public way the structural factors that prevent people living with drug dependence from receiving humane and affordable medical care as well as those that lead impoverished rural people with few alternatives to grow coca or opium poppies. On the United Nations stage, backing away from prohibitionism as the central tenet of drug control would place the US in a progressive leadership position that could dramatically change the course of international policy and the lives of millions of people who use illicit drugs. The administration’s delegation to the next CND should work side by side with countries that have already expressed the need for humane and effective policies and national and multilateral budgets that are not dominated by supply reduction measures. At little or no political cost to itself, the Obama White House could help inaugurate a new era of affordable, humane and respectful treatment for drug dependence, accompanied by international standards of practice and effective mechanisms for monitoring and redress – all of which have been blocked by approaching drug addiction as a crime or a character flaw. Broader leadership on harm reduction – a phrase that seems to bring out the worst irrationality in drug policy debates – will be more challenging, but the administration would find itself in the company of many other countries if it set out to reduce that irrationality. Pg. 12-13

<h4>US leadership will change the course of international drug politics </h4><p><strong>Ceste et al. 10</strong> – Deputy director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Programme [Joanne Ceste, Richard Parker (Professor of Sociomedical Sciences @ Columbia University) & Nancy Worthington (PhD Candidate at Mailman School of Public Health of Columbia University), “Rethinking the War on Drugs: The Impact of US Drug Control Policy on Global Public Health,” Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, Law and Policy Project Working Paper, (March 2010)</p><p>In April 2009, the influential health journal The Lancet ran an article under the headline “The USA shifts away from the ‘war on drugs’,”128 an example of many hopeful expressions from the public health world that a new era of progressive US leadership on drug control was dawning. In light of the evidence presented here, that headline seems premature. The <u><strong>Obama</u></strong> White House <u><strong>has aligned itself rhetorically</u></strong>, to some degree, <u><strong>with those who would manage illicit drug use as a public health rather than a criminal law problem, but funds, programs and statements in key international forums have not materialized to concretize that stance</u></strong>. It is, certainly, early in the administration, and, as is often repeated by the president and his staff, extraordinary economic and political problems have confronted the new White House since its first hours. It may be that the Obama administration has explicitly sought to delay tackling divisive social issues to keep the focus on what are perceived to be more central concerns, perhaps mindful of the Clinton White House’s experience on gays in the military in its early days. Nonetheless, lives continue to be lost to ill‐conceived and inhumane policies related to illicit drugs. <u><strong>A new direction for US policy on illicit drugs cannot come too soon</u></strong>. <u><strong>The need for new thinking on <mark>US drug policy is</u></strong></mark> all the more <u><strong><mark>urgent in light of the enormous global influence</mark> that US action and leadership </u></strong>have had and<u><strong> will </u></strong>continue to<u><strong> have </u></strong>in this area. <u><strong><mark>The administration faces a global policy environment</mark> <mark>where receptivity to progressive drug policy directions may be greater than it supposes</mark>.</u></strong> The 26 countries that defied business as usual in the March 2009 session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs by insisting that harm reduction was an essential part of services for drug users represented frustration with military and criminal law solutions. In February 2009, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, convened by former presidents of Mexico, Colombia and Brazil, explicitly called for a turn away from “war on drugs” policies in the region in favor of more humane and effective health‐centered strategies.129 In addition, in its “outcome framework” for 2009‐2011, UNAIDS has committed itself, somewhat more forthrightly than in the past, to removal of “punitive laws” that impede effective responses to HIV and to “ensuring that legal and policy frameworks serve HIV prevention efforts” among drug users.130 President <u><strong>Obama</u></strong>, whose instinct for caution often shows itself to be well developed, <u><strong>should not fail to appreciate the room that he has internationally and</u></strong>, increasingly, <u><strong>domestically for boldness in this challenging policy arena</u></strong>. An administration that loses no opportunity to differentiate itself from its predecessor in its commitment to evidence‐based policies must make that commitment real in this policy area that has been lethally compromised by ideology and fear‐mongering. <u><strong>The administration’s leadership is urgently needed</u></strong> in the following ways: END PROHIBITIONISM AS POLICY DIRECTION <u><strong><mark>There must be an official rethinking of prohibitionist strategies</u></strong></mark> and their dire consequences for people who use illicit drugs and their societies more broadly. <u><strong>It is promising that the new director of ONDCP is concerned that “drug war” rhetoric makes people feel as though their government is at war with them, but</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>the administration should</u></strong></mark> speak and <u><strong><mark>act boldly</u></strong></mark> on the breadth and depth of the harms of prohibitionism as it leads a movement toward peace in the drug war. A <u><strong>president</u></strong> who unquestionably knows how to use his privileged public platform <u><strong>should take on the task of helping</u></strong> <u><strong>US and</u></strong> <u><strong>global audiences to appreciate the benefits of </u></strong>other sound and <u><strong>pragmatic approaches</u></strong> to illicit drugs. The administration should become the ally of those who have carefully documented the political, social, human rights and human life costs of the war on drugs and should ensure that persons most harmed by past policies play a meaningful role in shaping a new policy direction. <u><strong><mark>The administration should recognize in an explicit and public way the structural factors</u></strong></mark> that prevent people living with drug dependence from receiving humane and affordable medical care as well as those <u><strong><mark>that lead impoverished rural people with few alternatives</u></strong> <u><strong>to grow coca or</u></strong></mark> opium <u><strong><mark>poppies</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>On the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>N</u></strong>ations <u><strong>stage, <mark>backing away from prohibitionism</mark> as the central tenet of drug control <mark>would place the US in a progressive leadership position that could dramatically change the course of international policy</mark> </u></strong>and the lives of millions of people who use illicit drugs. <u><strong>The administration</u></strong>’s delegation to the next CND <u><strong>should work side by side with countries that have</u></strong> already <u><strong>expressed the need for humane and effective policies</u></strong> and national and multilateral budgets that are not dominated by supply reduction measures. <u><strong>At little or no political cost </u></strong>to itself, the <u><strong>Obama</u></strong> White House <u><strong>could help <mark>inaugurate a new era of</mark> affordable, humane and respectful <mark>treatment for drug dependence, accompanied by international standards</mark> <mark>of practice and effective mechanisms for </mark>monitoring and <mark>redress</u></strong></mark> – <u><strong>all of which have been blocked by approaching drug addiction as a crime</u></strong> or a character flaw. Broader leadership on harm reduction – a phrase that seems to bring out the worst irrationality in drug policy debates – will be more challenging, but the administration would find itself in the company of many other countries if it set out to reduce that irrationality. Pg. 12-13</p>

Ceste et al. 10 – Deputy director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Programme [Joanne Ceste, Richard Parker (Professor of Sociomedical Sciences @ Columbia University) & Nancy Worthington (PhD Candidate at Mailman School of Public Health of Columbia University), “Rethinking the War on Drugs: The Impact of US Drug Control Policy on Global Public Health,” Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, Law and Policy Project Working Paper, (March 2010)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ceste et al. 10 – Deputy director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Programme [Joanne Ceste, Richard Parker (Professor of Sociomedical Sciences @ Columbia University) & Nancy Worthington (PhD Candidate at Mailman School of Public Health of Columbia University), “Rethinking the War on Drugs: The Impact of US Drug Control Policy on Global Public Health,” Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, Law and Policy Project Working Paper, (March 2010) fulltext: In April 2009, the influential health journal The Lancet ran an article under the headline “The USA shifts away from the ‘war on drugs’,”128 an example of many hopeful expressions from the public health world that a new era of progressive US leadership on drug control was dawning. In light of the evidence presented here, that headline seems premature. The Obama White House has aligned itself rhetorically, to some degree, with those who would manage illicit drug use as a public health rather than a criminal law problem, but funds, programs and statements in key international forums have not materialized to concretize that stance. It is, certainly, early in the administration, and, as is often repeated by the president and his staff, extraordinary economic and political problems have confronted the new White House since its first hours. It may be that the Obama administration has explicitly sought to delay tackling divisive social issues to keep the focus on what are perceived to be more central concerns, perhaps mindful of the Clinton White House’s experience on gays in the military in its early days. Nonetheless, lives continue to be lost to ill‐conceived and inhumane policies related to illicit drugs. A new direction for US policy on illicit drugs cannot come too soon. The need for new thinking on US drug policy is all the more urgent in light of the enormous global influence that US action and leadership have had and will continue to have in this area. The administration faces a global policy environment where receptivity to progressive drug policy directions may be greater than it supposes. The 26 countries that defied business as usual in the March 2009 session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs by insisting that harm reduction was an essential part of services for drug users represented frustration with military and criminal law solutions. In February 2009, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, convened by former presidents of Mexico, Colombia and Brazil, explicitly called for a turn away from “war on drugs” policies in the region in favor of more humane and effective health‐centered strategies.129 In addition, in its “outcome framework” for 2009‐2011, UNAIDS has committed itself, somewhat more forthrightly than in the past, to removal of “punitive laws” that impede effective responses to HIV and to “ensuring that legal and policy frameworks serve HIV prevention efforts” among drug users.130 President Obama, whose instinct for caution often shows itself to be well developed, should not fail to appreciate the room that he has internationally and, increasingly, domestically for boldness in this challenging policy arena. An administration that loses no opportunity to differentiate itself from its predecessor in its commitment to evidence‐based policies must make that commitment real in this policy area that has been lethally compromised by ideology and fear‐mongering. The administration’s leadership is urgently needed in the following ways: END PROHIBITIONISM AS POLICY DIRECTION There must be an official rethinking of prohibitionist strategies and their dire consequences for people who use illicit drugs and their societies more broadly. It is promising that the new director of ONDCP is concerned that “drug war” rhetoric makes people feel as though their government is at war with them, but the administration should speak and act boldly on the breadth and depth of the harms of prohibitionism as it leads a movement toward peace in the drug war. A president who unquestionably knows how to use his privileged public platform should take on the task of helping US and global audiences to appreciate the benefits of other sound and pragmatic approaches to illicit drugs. The administration should become the ally of those who have carefully documented the political, social, human rights and human life costs of the war on drugs and should ensure that persons most harmed by past policies play a meaningful role in shaping a new policy direction. The administration should recognize in an explicit and public way the structural factors that prevent people living with drug dependence from receiving humane and affordable medical care as well as those that lead impoverished rural people with few alternatives to grow coca or opium poppies. On the United Nations stage, backing away from prohibitionism as the central tenet of drug control would place the US in a progressive leadership position that could dramatically change the course of international policy and the lives of millions of people who use illicit drugs. The administration’s delegation to the next CND should work side by side with countries that have already expressed the need for humane and effective policies and national and multilateral budgets that are not dominated by supply reduction measures. At little or no political cost to itself, the Obama White House could help inaugurate a new era of affordable, humane and respectful treatment for drug dependence, accompanied by international standards of practice and effective mechanisms for monitoring and redress – all of which have been blocked by approaching drug addiction as a crime or a character flaw. Broader leadership on harm reduction – a phrase that seems to bring out the worst irrationality in drug policy debates – will be more challenging, but the administration would find itself in the company of many other countries if it set out to reduce that irrationality. Pg. 12-13 [/INST] <h4>US leadership will change the course of international drug politics </h4><p><strong>Ceste et al. 10</strong> – Deputy director of the Open Society Global Drug Policy Programme [Joanne Ceste, Richard Parker (Professor of Sociomedical Sciences @ Columbia University) & Nancy Worthington (PhD Candidate at Mailman School of Public Health of Columbia University), “Rethinking the War on Drugs: The Impact of US Drug Control Policy on Global Public Health,” Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, Law and Policy Project Working Paper, (March 2010)</p><p>In April 2009, the influential health journal The Lancet ran an article under the headline “The USA shifts away from the ‘war on drugs’,”128 an example of many hopeful expressions from the public health world that a new era of progressive US leadership on drug control was dawning. In light of the evidence presented here, that headline seems premature. The <u><strong>Obama</u></strong> White House <u><strong>has aligned itself rhetorically</u></strong>, to some degree, <u><strong>with those who would manage illicit drug use as a public health rather than a criminal law problem, but funds, programs and statements in key international forums have not materialized to concretize that stance</u></strong>. It is, certainly, early in the administration, and, as is often repeated by the president and his staff, extraordinary economic and political problems have confronted the new White House since its first hours. It may be that the Obama administration has explicitly sought to delay tackling divisive social issues to keep the focus on what are perceived to be more central concerns, perhaps mindful of the Clinton White House’s experience on gays in the military in its early days. Nonetheless, lives continue to be lost to ill‐conceived and inhumane policies related to illicit drugs. <u><strong>A new direction for US policy on illicit drugs cannot come too soon</u></strong>. <u><strong>The need for new thinking on <mark>US drug policy is</u></strong></mark> all the more <u><strong><mark>urgent in light of the enormous global influence</mark> that US action and leadership </u></strong>have had and<u><strong> will </u></strong>continue to<u><strong> have </u></strong>in this area. <u><strong><mark>The administration faces a global policy environment</mark> <mark>where receptivity to progressive drug policy directions may be greater than it supposes</mark>.</u></strong> The 26 countries that defied business as usual in the March 2009 session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs by insisting that harm reduction was an essential part of services for drug users represented frustration with military and criminal law solutions. In February 2009, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, convened by former presidents of Mexico, Colombia and Brazil, explicitly called for a turn away from “war on drugs” policies in the region in favor of more humane and effective health‐centered strategies.129 In addition, in its “outcome framework” for 2009‐2011, UNAIDS has committed itself, somewhat more forthrightly than in the past, to removal of “punitive laws” that impede effective responses to HIV and to “ensuring that legal and policy frameworks serve HIV prevention efforts” among drug users.130 President <u><strong>Obama</u></strong>, whose instinct for caution often shows itself to be well developed, <u><strong>should not fail to appreciate the room that he has internationally and</u></strong>, increasingly, <u><strong>domestically for boldness in this challenging policy arena</u></strong>. An administration that loses no opportunity to differentiate itself from its predecessor in its commitment to evidence‐based policies must make that commitment real in this policy area that has been lethally compromised by ideology and fear‐mongering. <u><strong>The administration’s leadership is urgently needed</u></strong> in the following ways: END PROHIBITIONISM AS POLICY DIRECTION <u><strong><mark>There must be an official rethinking of prohibitionist strategies</u></strong></mark> and their dire consequences for people who use illicit drugs and their societies more broadly. <u><strong>It is promising that the new director of ONDCP is concerned that “drug war” rhetoric makes people feel as though their government is at war with them, but</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>the administration should</u></strong></mark> speak and <u><strong><mark>act boldly</u></strong></mark> on the breadth and depth of the harms of prohibitionism as it leads a movement toward peace in the drug war. A <u><strong>president</u></strong> who unquestionably knows how to use his privileged public platform <u><strong>should take on the task of helping</u></strong> <u><strong>US and</u></strong> <u><strong>global audiences to appreciate the benefits of </u></strong>other sound and <u><strong>pragmatic approaches</u></strong> to illicit drugs. The administration should become the ally of those who have carefully documented the political, social, human rights and human life costs of the war on drugs and should ensure that persons most harmed by past policies play a meaningful role in shaping a new policy direction. <u><strong><mark>The administration should recognize in an explicit and public way the structural factors</u></strong></mark> that prevent people living with drug dependence from receiving humane and affordable medical care as well as those <u><strong><mark>that lead impoverished rural people with few alternatives</u></strong> <u><strong>to grow coca or</u></strong></mark> opium <u><strong><mark>poppies</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>On the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>N</u></strong>ations <u><strong>stage, <mark>backing away from prohibitionism</mark> as the central tenet of drug control <mark>would place the US in a progressive leadership position that could dramatically change the course of international policy</mark> </u></strong>and the lives of millions of people who use illicit drugs. <u><strong>The administration</u></strong>’s delegation to the next CND <u><strong>should work side by side with countries that have</u></strong> already <u><strong>expressed the need for humane and effective policies</u></strong> and national and multilateral budgets that are not dominated by supply reduction measures. <u><strong>At little or no political cost </u></strong>to itself, the <u><strong>Obama</u></strong> White House <u><strong>could help <mark>inaugurate a new era of</mark> affordable, humane and respectful <mark>treatment for drug dependence, accompanied by international standards</mark> <mark>of practice and effective mechanisms for </mark>monitoring and <mark>redress</u></strong></mark> – <u><strong>all of which have been blocked by approaching drug addiction as a crime</u></strong> or a character flaw. Broader leadership on harm reduction – a phrase that seems to bring out the worst irrationality in drug policy debates – will be more challenging, but the administration would find itself in the company of many other countries if it set out to reduce that irrationality. Pg. 12-13</p> </s>

Border region is a critical hotspot - no adaptation

the U.S.-Mexico border region encompasses diverse ecosystems Freshwater, marine, and wetland ecosystems deserts, rangelands, and several forest types constitute invaluable natural features the Sonoran Desert has the greatest diversity of vegetation of any desert in the world These ranges contribute to the biodiversity of the border territory Big waterways traverse the international border and support millions of people All rely on it for irrigation the Rio Grande sustains a diversity of critical ecosystems and is crucial for wildlife The Gulf of Mexico supports productive fisheries The coastal habitats at the mouth of the Rio Grande are particularly important as breeding grounds and maturation areas for commercial fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico The reserve is home to eight threatened and endangered species

the U.S.-Mexico encompasses diverse ecosystems several constitute invaluable natural features the Sonoran Desert has the greatest diversity of vegetation of any desert the Rio Grande sustains a diversity of critical ecosystems coastal habitats are important breeding grounds and maturation areas for fisheries The reserve is home to endangered species

Due to its vastness the U.S.-Mexico border region encompasses an important wealth of natural resources and diverse ecosystems. Freshwater, marine, and wetland ecosystems, deserts, rangelands, and several forest types constitute sensitive and invaluable natural features. For example, the Chihuahuan Desert supports 350 of the 1 500 known species of cacti in the world. Many of these species are found only in single valleys. In the western region, the Sonoran Desert has the greatest diversity of vegetation of any desert in the world. A prominent feature of the Chihuahuan and Sonoran deserts is the occurrence of mountain ranges separated by extended valleys. These ranges provide habitats not present in the valleys and host species that contribute to the biodiversity of the border territory. Urban settlements, along with agriculture and cattle ranches, generally occupy the valleys. Big waterways, like the Rio Grande or the Colorado River, traverse the international border and support millions of people in large cities and rural towns. The Rio Grande or Río Bravo, as it is known in Mexico, flows through five Mexican states and three U.S. states, and a dozen Native American nations. All rely on it for irrigation. From the headwaters in the Rocky Mountains, through the semi-arid Colorado Plateau and the arid Chihuahuan Desert, to its final subtropical ending in the Gulf of Mexico, the Rio Grande sustains a diversity of critical ecosystems and is crucial for wildlife, including animals as diverse as beavers, bears, kangaroo rats, and migratory birds. The Colorado River also sustains a very biodiverse region encompassing six U.S. states and two Mexican states. The ecosystems along the Colorado are facing unprecedented pressure from economic activities. The ecosystem’s water needs are rarely considered as agricultural production, industry, and a rapidly growing urban population use all but a trickle of the river’s water. The Gulf of Mexico supports productive fisheries, which are largely dependent on the estuaries, lagoons, wetlands and freshwater inflows from the Rio Grande. The coastal habitats at the mouth of the Rio Grande are particularly important as breeding grounds and maturation areas for commercial fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico. In the Pacific coastal area, a saltwater lagoon and slough mark the seaward end of the Tijuana River within the Tijuana River National Estuarine Research Reserve (TRNERR). Established in 1982 to restore and preserve the integrity of the estuary as a functioning ecosystem supporting a diversity of fish and wildlife resources, this protected area encompasses 2 500 acres of beach, dune, mudflat, saltmarsh, riparian, coastal sage, and upland habitats. The reserve is home to eight threatened and endangered species, including the light-footed clapper rail and the California least tern among others.

<h4>Border region is a critical hotspot - no adaptation </h4><p><strong>BGC 9</strong> (Border Governors Conference, “Strategic Guidelines for the Competitive and Sustainable Development of the U.S.-Mexico Transborder Region,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/strategic-guidelines-for-the-competitive-and-sustainable-development-the-us-mexico)</p><p>Due to its vastness <u><strong><mark>the U.S.-Mexico </mark>border region <mark>encompasses</u></strong> </mark>an important wealth of natural resources and <u><strong><mark>diverse ecosystems</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Freshwater, marine, and wetland ecosystems</u></strong>, <u><strong>deserts, rangelands, and <mark>several </mark>forest types <mark>constitute</u></strong> </mark>sensitive and <u><strong><mark>invaluable natural features</u></strong></mark>. For example, the Chihuahuan Desert supports 350 of the 1 500 known species of cacti in the world. Many of these species are found only in single valleys. In the western region, <u><strong><mark>the Sonoran Desert has the greatest diversity of vegetation of any desert </mark>in the</u></strong> <u><strong>world</u></strong>. A prominent feature of the Chihuahuan and Sonoran deserts is the occurrence of mountain ranges separated by extended valleys. <u><strong>These ranges</u></strong> provide habitats not present in the valleys and host species that <u><strong>contribute to the biodiversity of the border territory</u></strong>. Urban settlements, along with agriculture and cattle ranches, generally occupy the valleys. <u><strong>Big waterways</u></strong>, like the Rio Grande or the Colorado River, <u><strong>traverse the international</u></strong> <u><strong>border and </strong>support millions of people</u> in large cities and rural towns. The Rio Grande or Río Bravo, as it is known in Mexico, flows through five Mexican states and three U.S. states, and a dozen Native American nations. <u><strong>All rely on it for irrigation</u></strong>. From the headwaters in the Rocky Mountains, through the semi-arid Colorado Plateau and the arid Chihuahuan Desert, to its final subtropical ending in the Gulf of Mexico, <u><strong><mark>the Rio Grande sustains a</u></strong> <u><strong>diversity of critical ecosystems </mark>and is crucial for wildlife</u></strong>, including animals as diverse as beavers, bears, kangaroo rats, and migratory birds. The Colorado River also sustains a very biodiverse region encompassing six U.S. states and two Mexican states. The ecosystems along the Colorado are facing unprecedented pressure from economic activities. The ecosystem’s water needs are rarely considered as agricultural production, industry, and a rapidly growing urban population use all but a trickle of the river’s water. <u><strong>The Gulf of Mexico supports productive fisheries</u></strong>, which are largely dependent on the estuaries, lagoons, wetlands and freshwater inflows from the Rio Grande. <u><strong>The <mark>coastal</u></strong> <u><strong>habitats </mark>at the mouth of the Rio Grande <mark>are </mark>particularly <mark>important </mark>as <mark>breeding grounds and maturation areas for </mark>commercial <mark>fisheries </mark>in the Gulf of Mexico</u></strong>. In the Pacific coastal area, a saltwater lagoon and slough mark the seaward end of the Tijuana River within the Tijuana River National Estuarine Research Reserve (TRNERR). Established in 1982 to restore and preserve the integrity of the estuary as a functioning ecosystem supporting a diversity of fish and wildlife resources, this protected area encompasses 2 500 acres of beach, dune, mudflat, saltmarsh, riparian, coastal sage, and upland habitats. <u><strong><mark>The reserve</u></strong> <u><strong>is home to </mark>eight threatened and <mark>endangered species</u></strong></mark>, including the light-footed clapper rail and the California least tern among others.</p>

BGC 9 (Border Governors Conference, “Strategic Guidelines for the Competitive and Sustainable Development of the U.S.-Mexico Transborder Region,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/strategic-guidelines-for-the-competitive-and-sustainable-development-the-us-mexico)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: BGC 9 (Border Governors Conference, “Strategic Guidelines for the Competitive and Sustainable Development of the U.S.-Mexico Transborder Region,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/strategic-guidelines-for-the-competitive-and-sustainable-development-the-us-mexico) fulltext: Due to its vastness the U.S.-Mexico border region encompasses an important wealth of natural resources and diverse ecosystems. Freshwater, marine, and wetland ecosystems, deserts, rangelands, and several forest types constitute sensitive and invaluable natural features. For example, the Chihuahuan Desert supports 350 of the 1 500 known species of cacti in the world. Many of these species are found only in single valleys. In the western region, the Sonoran Desert has the greatest diversity of vegetation of any desert in the world. A prominent feature of the Chihuahuan and Sonoran deserts is the occurrence of mountain ranges separated by extended valleys. These ranges provide habitats not present in the valleys and host species that contribute to the biodiversity of the border territory. Urban settlements, along with agriculture and cattle ranches, generally occupy the valleys. Big waterways, like the Rio Grande or the Colorado River, traverse the international border and support millions of people in large cities and rural towns. The Rio Grande or Río Bravo, as it is known in Mexico, flows through five Mexican states and three U.S. states, and a dozen Native American nations. All rely on it for irrigation. From the headwaters in the Rocky Mountains, through the semi-arid Colorado Plateau and the arid Chihuahuan Desert, to its final subtropical ending in the Gulf of Mexico, the Rio Grande sustains a diversity of critical ecosystems and is crucial for wildlife, including animals as diverse as beavers, bears, kangaroo rats, and migratory birds. The Colorado River also sustains a very biodiverse region encompassing six U.S. states and two Mexican states. The ecosystems along the Colorado are facing unprecedented pressure from economic activities. The ecosystem’s water needs are rarely considered as agricultural production, industry, and a rapidly growing urban population use all but a trickle of the river’s water. The Gulf of Mexico supports productive fisheries, which are largely dependent on the estuaries, lagoons, wetlands and freshwater inflows from the Rio Grande. The coastal habitats at the mouth of the Rio Grande are particularly important as breeding grounds and maturation areas for commercial fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico. In the Pacific coastal area, a saltwater lagoon and slough mark the seaward end of the Tijuana River within the Tijuana River National Estuarine Research Reserve (TRNERR). Established in 1982 to restore and preserve the integrity of the estuary as a functioning ecosystem supporting a diversity of fish and wildlife resources, this protected area encompasses 2 500 acres of beach, dune, mudflat, saltmarsh, riparian, coastal sage, and upland habitats. The reserve is home to eight threatened and endangered species, including the light-footed clapper rail and the California least tern among others. [/INST] <h4>Border region is a critical hotspot - no adaptation </h4><p><strong>BGC 9</strong> (Border Governors Conference, “Strategic Guidelines for the Competitive and Sustainable Development of the U.S.-Mexico Transborder Region,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/strategic-guidelines-for-the-competitive-and-sustainable-development-the-us-mexico)</p><p>Due to its vastness <u><strong><mark>the U.S.-Mexico </mark>border region <mark>encompasses</u></strong> </mark>an important wealth of natural resources and <u><strong><mark>diverse ecosystems</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Freshwater, marine, and wetland ecosystems</u></strong>, <u><strong>deserts, rangelands, and <mark>several </mark>forest types <mark>constitute</u></strong> </mark>sensitive and <u><strong><mark>invaluable natural features</u></strong></mark>. For example, the Chihuahuan Desert supports 350 of the 1 500 known species of cacti in the world. Many of these species are found only in single valleys. In the western region, <u><strong><mark>the Sonoran Desert has the greatest diversity of vegetation of any desert </mark>in the</u></strong> <u><strong>world</u></strong>. A prominent feature of the Chihuahuan and Sonoran deserts is the occurrence of mountain ranges separated by extended valleys. <u><strong>These ranges</u></strong> provide habitats not present in the valleys and host species that <u><strong>contribute to the biodiversity of the border territory</u></strong>. Urban settlements, along with agriculture and cattle ranches, generally occupy the valleys. <u><strong>Big waterways</u></strong>, like the Rio Grande or the Colorado River, <u><strong>traverse the international</u></strong> <u><strong>border and </strong>support millions of people</u> in large cities and rural towns. The Rio Grande or Río Bravo, as it is known in Mexico, flows through five Mexican states and three U.S. states, and a dozen Native American nations. <u><strong>All rely on it for irrigation</u></strong>. From the headwaters in the Rocky Mountains, through the semi-arid Colorado Plateau and the arid Chihuahuan Desert, to its final subtropical ending in the Gulf of Mexico, <u><strong><mark>the Rio Grande sustains a</u></strong> <u><strong>diversity of critical ecosystems </mark>and is crucial for wildlife</u></strong>, including animals as diverse as beavers, bears, kangaroo rats, and migratory birds. The Colorado River also sustains a very biodiverse region encompassing six U.S. states and two Mexican states. The ecosystems along the Colorado are facing unprecedented pressure from economic activities. The ecosystem’s water needs are rarely considered as agricultural production, industry, and a rapidly growing urban population use all but a trickle of the river’s water. <u><strong>The Gulf of Mexico supports productive fisheries</u></strong>, which are largely dependent on the estuaries, lagoons, wetlands and freshwater inflows from the Rio Grande. <u><strong>The <mark>coastal</u></strong> <u><strong>habitats </mark>at the mouth of the Rio Grande <mark>are </mark>particularly <mark>important </mark>as <mark>breeding grounds and maturation areas for </mark>commercial <mark>fisheries </mark>in the Gulf of Mexico</u></strong>. In the Pacific coastal area, a saltwater lagoon and slough mark the seaward end of the Tijuana River within the Tijuana River National Estuarine Research Reserve (TRNERR). Established in 1982 to restore and preserve the integrity of the estuary as a functioning ecosystem supporting a diversity of fish and wildlife resources, this protected area encompasses 2 500 acres of beach, dune, mudflat, saltmarsh, riparian, coastal sage, and upland habitats. <u><strong><mark>The reserve</u></strong> <u><strong>is home to </mark>eight threatened and <mark>endangered species</u></strong></mark>, including the light-footed clapper rail and the California least tern among others.</p> </s>