elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1650460

201905

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

IMC

Icing; Rain; Turbulence

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Learjet 60

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Generator Drive

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 2800; Flight Crew Type 667

Troubleshooting

1650460

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

We were IMC on initial descent in the high 20s or low 30s; between ZZZ and ZZZ1; going through some rain/ice and light; borderline moderate turbulence. The Master Caution flashed so I checked the annunciator panel and saw that both generator lights were on. I called my First Officer's attention to it and told him it looks like we have a dual generator failure and called for the generator fail checklist. I also called Center and [advised them] and requested assistance with weather as we focused on the aircraft. We completed the checklist; which included reducing the electrical load. I only had cabin fans and lights to turn off. With the icing conditions I did not want to risk turning off any anti-ice. The checklist had us press the generator reset buttons; and when we did; both generators came back on line. I confirmed with seeing 28 VDC on the EIS. Shortly after; we got an amber Stab Heat annunciator; showing there was a disagreement and may not be working. We did the Stab Heat light checklist. At some point around then; I don't remember exact timing; we got a white L ENG COMPUTER light and an aural alarm of some sort. We did not know what the alarm was and could not find a way to mute it. We completed the checklist for the engine computer light.In the meantime we were descended further by ATC and ended up in the clear with layers above and below. I turned off the anti-ice after a couple of minutes and addressed my passengers. We still could not determine what the alarm was. Prior to entering the layers below us; I turned the anti-ice back on; and the Stab Heat light did not come on; indicating it was working. With all systems appearing to be working as they should be; I advised ATC that I was expecting a normal landing and [advising them] was more precautionary at this point. We landed without incident and the alarm finally stopped when I turned off the main batteries after engine shutdown. We have since determined the alarm was the SelCal going off; however; I don't know what set it off.

Learjet 60 Captain reported dual generator failure; left engine computer master caution; and intermittent stab heat fail in descent through clouds and icing.

1365619

201606

0601-1200

SLC.Airport

UT

6000.0

TRACON S56

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

STAR LEETZ FIVE

Class E S56

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1365619

ATC Issue All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Procedure

We departed 16L and tower was fairly busy. However; we had to ask for a frequency change since it was not given at about the normal time on the LEETZ departure. This is not inherently a big deal. We continued on the departure and were given a; 'delete the speed' clearance. Shortly after; another clearance; climb and maintain FL230 came as well. At about ZEETA intersection; we were given the clearance 'cleared direct UPJAR' intersection. We agreed that this would be in conflict with our drift down since we were only about 6000 feet above the terrain and we would have to take responsibility for terrain clearance. So; we requested to stay on route since that is the safest and most conservative. We were approved to stay on course. We were then handed over to another controller. This controller; the second departure controller on the LEETZ departure issued the clearance 'Direct EKR (MEEKR).' There was an exchange back and forth between us and the controller in which we attempted to communicate we wanted to stay on the route for drift down alternate planning. We were not far from the original course. But; the end result of the conversation was what seemed to be a very strong-willed controller not taking into consideration what we were trying to convey in our radio communications. This being that our route is most conservatively flown in this aircraft using the drift down procedures dispatched with us. The controllers should be educated on exactly why drift down is important to our operations. Also; this communication should include the importance of not clearing us to fixes directly; taking us off our route. It is equally important for controllers to listen to the pilots and planes they are monitoring. Our reasoning may be in conflict with their need to expedite traffic out of their sectors; but safety is always in mind.

Air carrier Captain reported being given direct routings in mountainous terrain and repeatedly having to explain to ATC controllers that he wanted to remain on his filed route due to drift down considerations.

1179328

201406

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

35000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Hydraulic Main System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 13600; Flight Crew Type 4000

Troubleshooting; Workload; Situational Awareness

1179328

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

At cruise RT SYS QTY EICAS. Ran checklist which called to turn OFF electric and engine pumps. Contacted Dispatch and Maintenance. Continued to our filed destination which shutdown for weather and diverted to an enroute airport. Turned on both pumps before landing. Rest of flight uneventful.

A B757 EICAS alerted RT SYS QTY so the QRH was completed and the flight continued with both RT system pumps OFF. After the destination airport close; the flight diverted and turned the pumps on prior to landing.

1664768

201907

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1200.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

RV-8

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing; Final Approach; Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class G ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Landing; Initial Approach; Final Approach

None

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 18000

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1664768

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was leading a flight of 2 into ZZZ.Our flight was following a flight of 3 Aircraft on a left downwind for Runway 34 at ZZZ. Since the [flight of 3] were extending the downwind for individual spacing I elected to fly the overhead pattern for my flight to prevent spacing problems and expedite landing.On downwind; 90 to initial (Base turn at pattern altitude) and initial I announced our intention to fly an overhead pattern for full stop landings.On short initial (just prior to pitching out for the inside downwind Aircraft Y called on the 45 to the outside downwind. On inside downwind just as I was rolling into a left base turn to final my wingman alerted me to the Aircraft Y coming up abeam me on the outside downwind. I noted that Aircraft Y was at a higher speed and was starting a left base from the outside downwind.Due to the position and closure of the Aircraft Y I made a call to alert the pilot that there were 2 aircraft ahead of him in the base turn. The Aircraft Y pilot response was 'I am really pissed off; you two cut me off'. As we continued our turn to final my wingman recommended Aircraft Y's pilot to check the FARs. His response was 'I don't give a S**T about the FARs'. Aircraft Y's pilot also accused us of being unprofessional and creating a hazard.On short final I announced that my flight would be going around (this would let the Aircraft Y land unimpeded); Aircraft Y announced that he was already going around so both my wingman and I landed to prevent an unsafe situation from developing due to 3 aircraft going around in close proximity.After landing Aircraft Y flew a touch and go then landed to taxi by and record our N numbers.The 3 pilots that landed before us witnessed the event and have volunteered to submit statements as needed.There appear to be several educational points associated with this event.1. Situational awareness and aeronautical decision making: When Aircraft Y was alerted to our presence he could have easily made an extension of his downwind for spacing as there was no traffic behind him. This would have eliminated any spacing issues.2. Professionalism: Although my wingman and I were accused of being unprofessional Aircraft Y's pilots conduct was noted by witnesses as a case of 'Road Rage' in the air and potential anger management issues.3. Overhead Traffic Pattern: While military pilots are trained in flying overhead traffic patterns many general aviation pilots are unfamiliar even though it is covered in the Airman's Information Manual. When executed correctly the overhead pattern is more efficient and safer for landing numerous aircraft as opposed to stringing out the downwind pattern for spacing.Formation flying groups are operating all across the country so overhead patterns would appear to be a good topic for FAA Safety Seminars.Both my wingman and I are members of 2 formation flying groups that perform in air shows and special events. When we train new flight leads the group's emphasis is placed on being courteous and considerate of other pilots in the traffic pattern. Some of the techniques taught to new flight leads include:1. Adjusting the outside downwind to avoid conflicts.2. Delaying the overhead break when an airplane is past midfield on the outside downwind.3. Taking the flight straight through initial and back to the outside downwind when there are numerous other aircraft trying to land.4. Breaking the formation out of the traffic pattern to avoid a conflict.

Lead RV8 Pilot in a flight of two; while accomplishing an overhead pattern; reported an airborne conflict with another light aircraft entering the rectangular traffic pattern at a non-towered airport.

1008331

201205

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

35000.0

CLR

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Electrical Wiring & Connectors

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 1900

1008331

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Total 11900; Flight Crew Type 1570

1008343.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

Our maintenance history indicated the airplane had four recent write-ups; including a diversion and 'info only' comment relating to an odor in the cockpit. The most recent maintenance action taken was a replacement of the weather radar unit. A subsequent flight was flown and an 'info only' comment was made that 'no fumes' were noticed on their flight. En-route airports had good weather and we felt comfortable that the maintenance action corrected the problem. [About an hour into flight]; we noticed an acrid odor. Knowing the airplane history with the weather radar (which we had on); we confirmed with Dispatch that there was no convective weather near our position and was told none. We turned the weather radar off and the odor dissipated. Five to six minutes later; the odor re-appeared and because of the way the sun was shining in the cockpit; I happen to see what appeared as a very thin layer of haze. We began discussing a diversion and referenced the QRH when I noticed visible smoke coming from the First Officer's instrument switching panel area. I announced 'we have visible smoke'; we then donned our Oxygen mask and established communications. The First Officer was the pilot flying; we declared an emergency and initiated our diversion to the airport. I contacted Dispatch through ACARS and verbally discussed our intentions to divert to the airport. I briefed the flight attendants (using the emergency brief acronym). I followed the Smoke; Fire or Fumes QRH while the First Officer flew the airplane and was coordinating our arrival with Approach. Upon reaching the step to turn the pack selectors OFF; the smoke and odor had completely dissipated. Because we were on a high left downwind position at this time and setting up for the final approach; we abandoned the checklist and set up for the landing. We landed approximately 8;000 LBS. overweight. It was an uneventful landing. ARFF was standing by and reported nothing unusually from their vantage point. We taxied to our gate and deplaned the passengers. I felt we received good support from Dispatch; ATC; ARFF and most certainly the crew.

We incurred an immediate action emergency resulting from smoke in the cockpit which required a declaration of an emergency and an immediate descent and landing into the airport. The events that lead to this situation began when we began to notice an acrid smell in the cockpit. A previous write up associated this issue with the weather radar; therefore we secured the radar at this time. The odor cleared and we assessed the situation was resolved. The Captain informed Dispatch of the issue. Maintenance was informed and weather along our route was assessed. In the course of time in which the communication and coordination was accomplished (approximately 5 minutes) we began to notice what appeared to be pieces of wire insulation proceeding from the Captain's eyeball vent followed shortly by the return of the odor; followed by visible smoke proceeding from above the First Officer's instrument selector panel. We initiated the Smoke; Fire or Fumes immediate action procedures. Once communications were established the Captain confirmed that I; the First Officer; had the airplane and ATC and he would conduct the Smoke; Fire or Fumes checklist. He also instructed me to declare an emergency and arrange for an immediate divert and landing into the airport with emergency equipment standing by. The Center gave initial instructions for direct VOR direct the airport with a clearance to descend to 16;000 FT followed by a descent to 14;000 FT and direct another VOR followed by a clearance direct to the airport. During the descent the Captain conducted the checklist and at various intervals inquired of our progress to the airport. He also kept me informed of his status in the checklist. At a certain point the Captain asked me to confirm with him that the smoke and odor had indeed cleared in which I answered in the affirmative. We removed the masks and began coordinating our arrival into the airport. The airport was experiencing relatively strong winds with gusts from the south. Due to the heavy weight and wind correction Vref speed exceeded flaps 30 approach speed so flaps 25 was briefed and selected for landing. Runway 16L was assigned which also was the most appropriate runway for our situation. A normal stabilized approach and landing was made with maximum use of reverse thrust. The brakes were not required nor applied until just prior to 80 KTS. Center handled the emergency very well. Giving us clear and concise directives made navigating and loading the box for arrival more simple in a high workload environment. Clearing us quickly to lower altitudes placed us in a better position to deal with the smoke if it became a greater concern than locating and fighting its source. It seemed to be a very short time from the point the emergency was declared and we arrived at the gate. In retrospect I am critical though; of not obtaining the landing performance data required when diverting and/or landing overweight. This was not intentional; it occurred as a result of operating in a high workload environment and where time is a factor. Adding a note stating 'landing performance data must be evaluated' to any procedure requiring to land at the nearest suitable airport should be considered. Finally; include in the dispatchers' procedures when these types of emergencies occur to offer assistance in obtaining landing performance data. This would be a great back up to the crew as they are dealing with an emergency in the fog of war.

B757 flight crew experiences smoke in the cockpit one hour into flight and diverts to the nearest suitable airport. QRH procedures eliminate the smoke prior to landing.

1112994

201309

0601-1200

NCT.TRACON

CA

10000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Descent

STAR PXN 3

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 169

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1112994

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1113668.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

On approach to OAK; we asked for the RNAV Z 29. ATC said they would check on the request. They told us then to descend on the PXN 3 Arrival. They then asked if we were doing the BUSHY transition. BUSHY is on the PXN 3 Arrival prior to SUNOL so we said yes (no mention of any clearance on the RNAV Z 29). We then switched controllers and they again asked us if we were on the BUSHY transition. We said yes. They cleared us for the visual and we responded; 'Are we cleared for the visual RNAV Z 29?' and then they said 'Cleared RNAV Z 29.' At this point; we were past BUSHY and almost to SUNOL and they said; 'Oh; I thought you were on the BUSHY transition' and we said; 'We were never really cleared the RNAV Z.' They said 'no problem' and they gave us a short vector for traffic and cleared us for the visual. ATC needed to clarify the Approach instead of assuming. And; we needed to also clarify and ask when there are misunderstandings.

BUSHY is not a transition and should never have been referred to as such. It is an initial approach fix. The term transition refers to a point on a STAR from which an approach can start and it is published on the STAR. All LAX STARs and approaches are a good points of reference. When clearing an aircraft for an approach say; 'Proceed direct BUSHY. At BUSHY cleared the RNAV Z 29.' Revise the PANOCHE Three Arrival to indicate BUSHY as a transition point! Never issue partial or vague clearances. Never ask an aircraft to fly a transition that is not published on the STAR! Instead; say 'Proceed direct BUSHY. At BUSHY cleared the RNAV Z 29.'

A B737 crew on the OAK PNX 3 Arrival was cleared via the RNAV Z 29 but did not begin the approach at BUSHY because they did not believe that the BUSHY IAF should be termed a transition from the arrival.

1198858

201408

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

33000.0

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

1198858

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

At FL330; we felt and heard an audible thump. We were at cruise power and no change had been made to the thrust setting. Immediately following the thump; the ITT on the Number 1 Engine momentarily spiked. Neither of us noticed the actual temperature value; but it was a red indication over the max line. I slowly began pulling the thrust lever back that is when the engine vibration indicator went full scale high. About the same time we noticed an acrid smell; albeit not overwhelming. We then accomplished the memory items for severe engine damage to secure the engine. The First Officer then continued the QRH. We quickly decided on ZZZ for our diversion airport for its proximity; visible weather; and operations available. This was not on our release; so after we notified ATC of our intensions; we then ACARSed Dispatch of our situation. Although I cannot recall the exact sequence of events; we:-Spoke with the Flight Attendant almost immediately following the thump; verifying with her there was no smoke or damage inside the cabin. She also noticed the acrid smell. Which did dissipate quickly after the engine was secured and bleed and pack were deselected.-Notified the passengers of the failed engine and explained that we would be diverting to ZZZ. The Flight Attendant told us that they responded well to the PA.-Spoke with our Flight Attendant multiple times during our descent to update her on our progress/time; and verify the condition of the cabin and passengers.-To the best of my recollection and understanding; the necessary QRH items were completed prior to approach and landing.-Two separate logbook entries were made one for the engine issue; and one for the overweight landing. We landed on the longest runway. We were somewhere around 1;000 LBS overweight on the landing. I deployed engine reverser number 2; but did not use reverse thrust (spool the engine). The touchdown was smooth; with minimal descent rate (as noted in the logbook for the overweight landing). After turning off the runway; the emergency response team inspected the aircraft and verified that nothing was on fire. 'No excessive heat' was the report to the Tower from them. We then continued to taxi to the gate. Notes:-No fire indication was received at any time.-Oil quantity remained at 8 quarts for Engine 1.-Difficult to recall; but I believe N2 continued to spin at a low value. I cannot recall N1 at all.

EMB-145 Captain experiences a sudden engine failure at FL330. The engine is shut down and the flight diverts to a suitable airport.

1727519

202002

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

IMC

Thunderstorm; Turbulence

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1727519

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

While receiving vectors to land; ATC alerted us of a severe storm cell in our path. Our radar was not adequately depicting any weather in front of us. As such; we asked ATC to provide an initial heading to keep us away from the worst of the weather. As we were starting the initial turn; we were struck by lightning; causing the number one engine to go out. Due to the circumstances of the failure and seeing a high ITT (Interstage Turbine Temperature) spike during the failure; we elected not to restart the engine since we were unsure of the state of the engine if we tried to restart it. We were quickly brought in to land single engine. Fire trucks verified there was no visible damage to the engine; and we proceeded to the gate. Identification: EICAS master caution for engine one out. Cause: inadequate time to react to severe weather in the vicinity before the lightning strike occurred. Response: we ran the appropriate QRH checklist for an engine out; and decided not to attempt an engine restart given the nature of the failure and the proximity to the airport. Suggestions: rely less on ATC when there is a time critical decision to make concerning weather. While snap decisions should not be made; sometimes a definitive decision is still needed.

EMB-145 Captain reported a safe landing followed the loss of #1 engine due to a lightning strike.

1802482

202104

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Coalescer Bag

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Check Pilot; Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1802482

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Upon arriving at the gate in ZZZZ; the APU was started; bleed on with packs operating. The flight crew conducted a walkaround. As we climbed up the jet bridge; we were greeted by the flight attendants and the Station Manager advising us that the aircraft had a terrible odor; similar to smelly socks; burning crayons; and musty. A logbook writeup was made and the local maintenance started working on the writeup. After several hours they came up with the source being the number 1 air conditioning pack. The next day we departed with Pack 1 on MEL. Sometimes you come across an aircraft that exhibits the distinct low odor of being 'old'. We must determine if this odor is embedded in the interior? Or is it slowly seeping through the vent system? I am aware our airline is at the forefront of addressing these odor issues and I understand they are in the preliminary stage of replacing the APU on the A320 fleet. [Captain recommends Company] should consider a safety campaign educating fight crews on the cause and types of odor events associated with air conditioning packs and APU. I know several publications have addressed this issue in the past; but it keeps happening.

A319 Captain reported a fume event during pre-flight resulting in flight cancellation for maintenance action.

1022228

201207

1801-2400

SFO.Airport

CA

11000.0

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Class E NCT

Facility NCT.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Other / Unknown; Workload

1022228

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

New SOP in effect requires right downwind traffic to San Francisco be vectored between two points depicted on video map only a few miles wide. This requirement never existed before. Vector off arrival route to remain between these points must be timed very precise and can be affected by wind; aircraft performance; workload etc; etc. I was sequence delay vectoring aircraft to SFO; picking up VFR aircraft; issuing approach clearances and coordinating a HAF GPS approach. My vector to the right downwind left the aircraft slightly south of the southern point now required in the SOP. Delete this unrealistic requirement in the SOP. There are too many variable factors and too busy a sector to keep aircraft between these points all the time. Concentrating on this vector to comply with the SOP will deter from other more important sector duties.

NCT Controller voiced concern regarding newly established vectoring points on the downwind to SFO; claiming the precise vectoring required is unrealistic given other position responsibilities.

1061413

201301

0601-1200

CPR.Airport

WY

0.0

Air Carrier

B757-200

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Y

Cockpit Lighting

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Technician

Confusion; Training / Qualification

1061413

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

MEL; Human Factors

Human Factors

Pilot inbound write up for Left Engine Hydraulic on and Center Electric 1 Hydraulic lights on overhead panel extinguished in flight. Myself and the Local Technician applied MEL 33-11-01 to both of the above inbound write-ups considering the write-ups for both [were] for the background lighting for both of the switches per the B757 AMM [Aircraft Maintenance Manual] and wiring manual; but the above MEL mentions that in the remarks that the individual switches cannot be MEL'd. It must be noted that this light is controlled by the rheostat after it is pushed in and is only an info light for the crew. The MEL was updated and not given the proper consideration when updated for what is the function of each light.

A Maintenance Technician applied a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) reference to the pilot log write-ups for panel lighting but was confused by the restriction against using the MEL reference for individual switch lights.

1110981

201308

0001-0600

PDX.Airport

OR

1000.0

Tower PDX

Air Carrier

Q400

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class C PDX

Communication Systems

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1110981

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Ambiguous

I have noticed a significant and consistent increase of frequency interference (loud static) over 123.77 (PDX Tower) that is hard to talk over via the interphone. These events are occurring on final and departure; at various altitudes (including below 1;000 FT AFE) in various tail numbers. While it doesn't seem to affect comm transmissions or reception; it can significantly interfere with crew communication. Duration has lasted approximately 15 seconds or more on some occasions. It seems like interference issues which were encountered some time back; have resurfaced. It doesn't appear to be called out by other traffic or caused by someone's stuck mic. It also could be limited to our type of aircraft since the Q400 radios continue to be sub-par.

Q400 Captain experiences frequency interference (loud static) over 123.77 (PDX Tower) that is hard to talk over via the interphone.

1166827

201404

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Daylight

No Aircraft

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1166827

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

As I was returning to the control room after my lunch break; I was asked by a Technician about what caused Sector X to power down. He indicated that it might have been caused by the Controller working the sector. The Technician told me that the power button to the VSCS had been turned off and he wasn't sure why the Controller had done it. So I asked the Controller why he turned the power off; and he replied; 'Because I was bored. I thought if I just pushed it once; it would reset and not shut off completely.' The result of his actions caused the sector's frequencies and land lines to be inoperable for 24 minutes while the system had to be reset by the Tech Ops. The Controller did not notify management right away and simply moved to another sector; compromising the safety of the operation. Once the CIC became aware of the situation; he notified the technicians; but did not notify myself or the OM.More training on the equipment to prevent occurrences so controllers have better knowledge of how to operate and handle the VSCS; particularly the consequences of what will happen if they are not handled with care.

Front Line Manager reports a Controller while bored turns off the VSCS; causing the frequencies and land lines to be inoperable.

1012526

201205

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Powerplant Fuel Valve

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure

1012526

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During the taxi out the First Officer informed me that the detent on the start/stop knob might not have been functioning 100%. I thought about the night before (as we had brought in the same airplane) and when I shut down the Number 1 engine. The detent was functioning (albeit maybe slightly loose); but it seemed to be functioning correctly and preventing the knob from traveling on its own. I thought this was what the First Officer was alluding to and decided to continue with the taxi out. After thinking about it further enroute and in the interest of safety I decided to inform Dispatch that the start/stop detents might not be functioning 100% and perhaps it would be wise to have them looked at by Maintenance. When we arrived at the gate I confirmed that the detents were in fact not functioning 100% and warranted a write up. It should be noted the situation may have been aggravated further on the ground when I attempted move the selectors to stop without first pulling them up to confirm they were not functioning properly. I believe this made the difference between them being slightly loose; and being inoperative. Although the knobs were functioning correctly at departure; it might have been prudent to try and force them to stop without lifting them before we left to confirm that a little bit of looseness in the travel would not cause a problem. Perhaps put more of an emphasis on safety than on-time performance. A comment from the Mechanic that showed up to our airplane 'THANKS FOR GROUNDING THE AIRPLANE' does not help in the argument of whats more important.

EMB170 Captain is informed by the First Officer during taxi out that the detent for the engine start/stop knob may not be functioning correctly. Upon arrival a quick test indicates that the knob should be written up. The Mechanic who shows up chastises the Captain for grounding the aircraft.

1850348

202110

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Vectors

Class A ZZZ

Hydraulic Main System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1850348

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

While climbing out of approximately 20;000 feet we received an ECAM G RSVR low level alert and noticed that the fluid quantity was zero. I transferred control to the First Officer and completed the ECAM actions. After referencing the QRH; there were many items now unavailable for use on landing. Among these were gravity gear extension and no nose steering upon landing. I contacted dispatch and maintenance to let them know our situation; and they advised us that ZZZ and tech ops would be ready for us upon landing. I reiterated to dispatch that we would need a tow in from the runway upon landing and was assured they would be ready. We briefly thought about diverting; but with a full load we were overweight. We elected to continue to ZZZ.We discussed at length on the flight southbound what we needed to do upon arrival. I chose not to inform inflight or the customers of the failure until closer to ZZZ. I called the #1 up to the cockpit about an hour out and explained to her we had a code yellow. I went into detail the nature of the problem and how it might affect our landing. I explained that I didn't think there would be anything abnormal on landing other than the fire trucks and being towed to the gate. Everyone was professional and did their jobs as trained. I made a PA to the customers about 40 minutes out and explained the failure in layman's terms and what they could expect on landing.Out of an abundance of caution with a hydraulic failure; I instructed the First Officer to request priority handling with ZZZ approach. After all pertinent information was exchanged we requested a 20 mile final to be sure we could get all checklist items completed before landing. On downwind we slowed and lowered the gear successfully by the gravity extension. We then configured the aircraft for landing. ATC asked if we were ready for the approach and we flew a 15 mile final to runway 10L. We reiterated to the tower that we would not be able to clear the runway upon landing. We touched down about 1500 feet down the runway and braked to a stop abeam Taxiway XX. I made a quick PA when the aircraft stopped to ask everyone to stay seated. We completed the after landing checklist; started the APU and shut down the engines. The tug then entered the runway; hooked up to us and towed us to Gate XX. The required logbook entries were made and I discussed our failure with CFR and tech ops. Tech ops said there was a major leak on top of engine number one in a hydraulic line.

A320 Captain reported diverting after the loss of the green hydraulic system and made a precautionary landing.

1307587

201510

1201-1800

ERI.Airport

PA

5000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Tower ERI

Personal

Cardinal 177/177RG

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ERI

AC Generator/Alternator

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 448; Flight Crew Type 363

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Confusion

1307587

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

While on an IFR flight to ERI in VMC; I experienced a partial alternator failure. The ammeter indicated that the battery was discharging. I attempted to reset the alternator by cycling the master switch; but this was unsuccessful. I shut down the autopilot and COM2 to shed some of the load on the battery. I notified Erie Approach of the problem and told them that; if I lost COM; I would proceed inbound VFR and asked them; if that happened; to tell the Erie Tower that I would be looking for the light signals to land. It seemed better to notify them of my intentions and have a clear; shared plan instead of relying on our mutual understanding (and memory) of the IFR lost COM procedures. Erie was reporting OVC034; but the visibility was excellent and I could see that the sky was clear just north of the airport. Maintaining VFR was not in doubt. The situation seemed to worry the controllers more than it worried me. They asked how many people on board (one) and how much remaining fuel (32 gallons). I was cruising at 5;000 ft. MSL. ATC asked for my flight conditions; which were VMC/SKC. They told me to descend at pilot's discretions to 3;000; which I did. They then asked me if I wanted to cancel if I lost COM or cancel now. Since it was VMC; I cancelled now. I was told to enter right downwind for runway 24. I thought that this was a mistake; but expected Erie Tower to correct it. Erie Approach handed me off to Erie Tower. Tower cleared me to land on runway 24.When I was 14 miles out; Erie tower delayed an arriving airliner because of an inbound Cessna with an alternator failure (me). He wanted to get the Cessna on the ground. This seemed like an overreaction to me. Tower asked me to 'keep my speed up;' and I agreed to. Shortly thereafter; another airliner arrived. He informed them that they were #3 following a Cessna with a failed alternator and another airliner. I felt bad that he was delaying two airliners for my relatively minor technical problem. This caused me more stress and distraction than the alternator failure did. I thought about offering to wait for the airliners to land; but did not. In my experience; ATC has reasons for what they do and they don't always appreciate uninformed offers to help. I figured that he wanted me out of the way.I had departed ZZZ from runway 7. When I arrived ERI; I was assuming that I would land in the same general direction; on runway 6; even though the METAR said runway 24 in use and I had been told to enter right downwind for runway 24. I was also distracted by the delayed airliners and the alternator failure and I was eager to be out of his way; so I was proceeding straight in (runway 6). When I was several miles out; the tower asked me if I could make a short approach. I made an uneventful short approach and landed; quickly exiting the runway at taxiway A3. After the flight; I called my flight instructor to debrief about my handling of the problem and especially about how distracting it was to have even a small technical issue.Lessons:1. I still think that telling ATC about my situations and my plans was a good idea.2. Fuel on board? I should have answered in hours not gallons. '32 gallons remaining' sounds more ominous than 'four hours of fuel remaining.'3. I should occasionally review lost COM procedures.4. I should have stopped and thought when they told me right downwind instead of thinking that they were mistaken.5. Don't assume that you will be landing in the same direction that you took off from 100 nm away.6. I need to better familiarize myself with the electrical system in the plane. Which half of the master switch cycles the alternator? The circuit breakers are not clearly labeled. This was distracting and caused me to inadvertently shut down my transponder for a short while; maybe more than once.7. I was glad that this problem did not happen at night in IMC.

A general aviation pilot reported a malfunctioning alternator while inflight. He requested assistance from ATC and received a traffic priority in order to expedite his arrival at the destination airport where an uneventful landing was accomplished.

1103276

201307

ZFW.ARTCC

TX

24000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZFW

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

STAR CQY7

Class A ZFW

Center ZFW

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Class A ZFW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1103276

Aircraft Y

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1103785.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Weather; Staffing; Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Staffing

We were established in holding pattern over CAPTI Intersection at our assigned altitude of FL240. We received TCAS TA which was followed by TCAS RA from traffic descending. We followed TCAS RA commands and descended to 23;500. We notified Center; and when clear we climbed back to FL240. The traffic was a CRJ. Center cleared them to climb and/or maintain FL260. Possible ATC or pilot error; DFW was not taking any aircraft due to weather over the field. It was a very busy time for ATC and air crews. Many aircraft were holding; and making decisions to divert to alternate airports. We ended up diverting to for fuel.

ZFW Center informed us to expect holding 'As Published' at WEIRS Intersection on the CQY7 STAR arrival due to thunderstorms over DFW. We slowed to approximately 200 KIAS. Later ZFW Center instructed us to proceed to WEIRS Intersection. Approaching WEIRS Intersection; ZFW Center then re-cleared us direct CAPTI Intersection and to 'hold as published' at FL240; 10 mile legs; and gave us an EFC. Once confirming the correct holding definition information was set in FMS2 (pilot flying); I began to enter the same in FMS1 with conventional VOR navigation underlying the GPS information. At approximately 3-4 NM from CAPTI Intersection; a red TCAS 'Resolution Advisory' displayed on my MFD screen. The aural TCAS commanded to 'Climb; Climb' and I visually acquired a B737 or A320 at the 10 o'clock position on a converging course. The aircraft appeared to be at the same or slightly lower altitude of FL240. I reacted by pulling the control yoke aft and pushing both thrust levers full forward to the stops. We climbed to FL251 and ZFW Center cleared us to descend to FL220. I informed ZFW Center of the RA and gave control back to my First Officer and turned the autopilot back on. The First Officer never visually acquired the intruder aircraft as he was seated on the opposite side. There was another aircraft holding at CAPTI Intersection at a higher altitude during this event. Several factors coincided to cause this event: Multiple aircraft holding at the same STAR arrival intersection; a last moment ATC clearance to hold at another intersection; an ATC Controller change with several aircraft holding at the same fix which increases the risk.Holding at the WEIRS Intersection would have been less flight crew workload as it was on our original STAR clearance. There was sufficient time to input the holding definition into the FMS navigation units and verify the information by both pilots.

In the midst of a chaotic ZFW ATC scene an A321 and an E-135 were both cleared to enter the hold at CAPTI Intersection at FL240. Rapidly sequential TA and RA commands to both aircraft prevented a disastrous culmination. Five reports from pilots and controllers involved provided a close up look at both sides of the events. Excerpts from the final ATC report are must reading to obtain the flavor of the event.

1248727

201503

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Clear; Calm

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Golden Eagle 421

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Direct; Visual Approach

Y

Scheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Installation; Testing; Repair

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

Cessna

X

Failed

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Personal

Technician

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1248727

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Personal

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Lead Technician 3; Maintenance Technician 40

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1248849.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Y

Person Maintenance

Other On Landing

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure

Human Factors

A Cessna 421C having undergone a complete and thorough Annual with overhauled/rebuilt engines; props; landing gear actuators and several other items was taken on a test flight for any issues resulting from the extensive disassembly and reassembly of parts and panels.The following are the facts:My Director of Maintenance (DOM) for the newly purchased Part 135 Air Charter and I had done most of the work on the aircraft during long days and nights trying to get it ready for an FAA inspection to be put back in service in March. As the owner of the air charter I called our Principal Operations Inspector (POI) at the local FSDO and let him/her know we were not going to meet the deadline in March and that we were going to wait until late April for the inspection; but nonetheless my DOM pushed to complete the remaining repairs by staying very late at night and into the wee morning hours; sometimes exceeding 16-hours of continuous work.My Director of Maintenance called on the Chief Pilot and the former Director of Operations to act as pilot and copilot on a short test run from North ZZZ1 to ZZZ2; and we both rode as passengers to observe aircraft gauges and look for general performance issues.At ZZZ2 we inspected the aircraft and noticed some minor hydraulic leaks from reservoir; engine oil leak from left engine; and some other minor issues that were not serious enough to be a problem for a return flight for further service. We filled all fuel tanks to the top to check for leaks.During run-up; brakes felt like they were not releasing well and a low hydraulic pressure light illuminated. Consensus among the three seasoned aviators was to free up the brakes by fiddling with the parking brake and hydraulic valve and fly back with the landing gear down the whole way in case the low hydraulic warning was in fact an indication of hydraulic issues; which may prevent the landing gears from dropping down for landing.My aviation repair experience is short and limited but I had the opportunity to read the chapter on human factors and the chain of events that generally lead to an incident/accident; and the importance of recognizing that and breaking that chain of events to prevent a catastrophe. However; hearing the three veterans of aviation conferring and deciding to continue to fly the aircraft; against my better judgment; I chose to remain silent and opted to be more vigilant of the aircraft gauges and look out the windows for signs of the hydraulic and engine oil leak from becoming too severe (as if that would be a lot of help at 9;000 feet).Even though the following incident didn't result from any of the issues noted above; the fact that the Pilot in Command (PIC) and the Second in Command (SIC) felt no need to be extra vigilant during the pre flight and/or to question the quality of workmanship during the Annual Inspection and ensuing repairs; in my opinion; was the 'missed opportunity' to break the chain of events that led to the incident below.Upon landing at the home ZZZ1 airfield; the front gear actuator broke just past the jam-nut; which had not been safety wired; as was the left gear. Both these actuators had been sent out to be rebuilt and reinstalled due to leaks; but not safety wired. The recently overhauled engines and props and additionally the nose of the aircraft were severely damaged; when the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft slid down the runway for over 1;200 feet. Fortunately there were no injuries to anyone onboard.

Reporter stated that he is a private pilot and that he and two other students who were in an aircraft technician school; were working under the direction of an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) who also had an Inspection Authority (IA) rating and was thought to be the Director of Maintenance for the recently purchased Part 135 Air Charter Cessna 421c aircraft they were working on. He did not install the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) actuator; but one of the other student's did. A bolt for the actuator rod end became difficult to install and started to strip; so the AMT told them to leave it loose and he would get to it later. But apparently he forgot and did not notice the actuator jam nut was not safety tied. The aircraft had flown at 140 knots with the gear down and the thinking was the vibration in flight caused the unsafety tied jam nut to back off causing the rod end to break on landing.

Aircraft was in for Annual where it was discovered Nose Gear Retract Actuator and Left Gear Retract Actuator Leaking. Actuators were removed and sent out for overhaul. Overhauled Actuators were installed and rigged. Aircraft was connected to a hydraulic power unit while the aircraft was on jacks and the Landing Gear was cycled four times verifying landing gear lights operation and verifying no hydraulic leaks; and rigging and doors were correct per Cessna Maintenance Manual (CMM).Main Brake pads were changed at the same time as the actuators installation; four high speed taxi runs down the runway were accomplished to brake in the new pads per Cessna Maintenance Manuel. The next Day; in March 2015; the aircraft was flown to ZZZ2; no event landing all system operating normal. Return flight ZZZ2 to ZZZ1; no event until landing where Nose Gear collapsed upon landing. Nose Gear Retract Actuator broke at rod end.

A student mechanic and an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) report about a Nose Landing Gear (NLG) on a Cessna 421C aircraft that had collapsed on landing damaging both overhauled engines; props; and nose section. Nose Gear Retract Actuator had broken at the actuator rod end where a jam nut was found not safety tied. The aircraft had slid down the runway 1200 feet.

1696213

201910

0601-1200

EWR.Airport

NJ

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower EWR

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1696213

ATC Issue All Types

Y

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

While waiting to take off from Runway 04L in EWR; the Captain and I noticed that we were directly behind a 757. We both talked about having had wake turbulence upsets (from which we'd recovered; but were still unexpected and potentially dangerous) behind 757s in the past after receiving takeoff clearances with minimum separation; and agreed that we would ask for some extra time if ATC tried to have us takeoff too soon after the 757. I started a timer when the 757 started its roll (before lining up on Runway 4L as directed); and sure enough; 56 seconds later; we were cleared for takeoff. We asked for extra time for wake turbulence separation; so Tower cancelled our takeoff clearance. We called back after two minutes after the departure of the 757; and; after an aircraft crossed the runway downfield; Tower then granted our clearance. After takeoff; Tower suggested that we ask for extra time sooner; as he would have to fill out paperwork for the rejected clearance.The major threat is unusual attitudes resulting from being in the wake of a near-heavy aircraft. Because we waited to take off; we did not experience this Unusual Attitude Scenario today. From a safety perspective; I think we made the best choice for the situation. From a procedures perspective; we could have asked Tower for extra spacing when we were first told to line up on the runway; instead of after getting the takeoff clearance. We suspected Tower might clear us more quickly than we'd like; but we did not know for sure; and we didn't know this would cause them any hassle.If wake turbulence separation seems insufficient; in the future; I could ask for extra spacing earlier; before getting the takeoff clearance - while receiving the line up and wait clearance seems ideal. However; based on my prior experience of an upset behind a 757; I think we made the right call; and it might behoove the company or even the FAA to increase spacing minimums between near-heavies and trailing RJs.

EMB-145 First Officer reported that requesting additional wait time prior to departure behind a B757 resulted in a canceled takeoff clearance.

1433307

201703

1201-1800

IWA.Airport

AZ

4000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON P50

Personal

PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 30C

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class E P50

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Cruise

Class E P50

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 3900; Flight Crew Type 35

1433307

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 100; Vertical 0

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

I was on a checkride with Mr. X and had just received my transponder squawk for a practice approach for the ILS 30C into IWA. PHX approach control called out traffic as 11 o'clock and 4 miles; then 11 o'clock and 2 miles. Both times we replied with looking for the traffic. Then we received a call to turn 270; maintain 4000 until established on the ILS. As I turned to the assigned heading; I noticed an aircraft in my left peripheral vision and called the traffic to Mr. X. He saw the traffic; but at that point; there was no action taken as the aircraft passed as close as 100 feet; from left to right and then was out of our view. We called Tower and informed them of the near-miss.

PA44 pilot reported a NMAC while on approach to IWA.

1226754

201412

1201-1800

ATL.Airport

GA

400.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B ATL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1226754

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1226757.0

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

Just after rotation; departing behind a DC-9 the aircraft was hit by wake. Moderate aileron forces were needed but the most concerning issue was a momentary stick shaker. The aircraft was and remained on speed V2 plus 15 knots as bugged; 166 knots. The numbers are certain as they were later checked. We were about 400 FT AGL at start of wake turbulence. There was a slight quartering tail wind. The report is mostly to catalog the event to hopefully avoid other wake events. Duration of event was very short.Cause may have been tail wind and separation being close; along with being right in the center of the wake due to being in trail. Better separation obviously helps avoid these problems.

The rotation speed and pitch attitude were standard. There was a slight tailwind (340 at 6 knots). The captain; who was flying; added the correct aileron and pitch to hold our altitude and gain airspeed while we climbed out.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence in trail of a DC-9 departing ATL that resulted in a momentary stick shaker.

1581200

201809

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

2000.0

IMC

TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Other RNAV (GPS)

Class C ZZZ

Autopilot

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Type 2098.5

Human-Machine Interface

1581200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

We were arriving ZZZ with weather reported at 700 overcast and 4 miles visibility. The ILS was out of service; so we briefed and flew the RNAV Approach. This aircraft has no speed intervention. I was flying the approach with the autopilot connected; Lnav and Vnav active; flaps 5 and controlling speed with the throttles. We configured with gear down; flaps 15; then flaps 25. The autopilot disengaged; and would not reengage; so we requested vectors straight ahead and received clearance to maintain 2000 feet. We completed the missed approach; and received a climb and vectors for another approach. We set up and briefed the RNAV Y for this second attempt; then received vectors for approach. Again while configuring; the autopilot disengaged and we executed a missed approach. The weather was less than 1000/3; so there was no approach we could fly without the autopilot. Due to this and our fuel state I elected to divert to ZZZ1. Being in the high traffic approach environment I made this decision without contacting dispatch. Our dispatcher saw the two missed approaches and acars destination change. He contacted us by acars to let us know he was working with the ZZZ1 station and we let him know a short reason for the divert. We landed with 4200 pounds of fuel and the station did an excellent job with the short notice divert.

B737 Captain reported an autopilot failure into IMC airport led to a diversion.

1331024

201509

1801-2400

ZKC.ARTCC

KS

36000.0

IMC

Night

Center ZKC

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZKC

Weather Radar

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1331024

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

1330932.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft; Weather

Weather

At approximately 100 nm NE of ICT we were deviating due to thunderstorms in the area along the same track ATC was using with other traffic. The Captain called the flight attendants and told them to be seated. After a few minutes we started seeing St Elmo's Fire on the forward windscreen. Shortly after that we had a lightning strike or static discharge on the nose of the aircraft. After that the radar stopped working. Cycled the radar on-off but still was inoperative. We notified ATC that we had lost our radar and asked if our current track would keep us clear of any additional weather. ATC advised a 20 degree turn right would keep us clear of weather (wx). A minute later we experienced severe turbulence and our altitude increased approx 600 feet. We immediately turned left and notified ATC of the altitude deviation. Within a minute our conditions improved to light chop. We notified Dispatch of the radar inoperative and lightning strike and routing that would keep us clear of wx. Dispatch indicated it was able to help us with routing that kept us clear of wx.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

An A319 flight crew reported they encountered severe turbulence that resulted in slight flight attendant injuries after the weather radar failed due to a lightning strike.

1744335

202005

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Unscheduled Maintenance

Repair

Circuit Breaker / Fuse / Thermocouple

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 91; Flight Crew Total 5685; Flight Crew Type 3653

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

1744335

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface

1744340.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I briefed the crew like I always do; but emphasized to both pilots and FAs the fact that we are making a lot of mistakes. I encouraged everyone to stick to SOP and work together as a crew.We pre-flighted the aircraft and I made a point to be diligent. That said; you get interrupted and this was the case with my normal inspection of the circuit breaker panel. I normally do this as so as I go into the flight deck. In this case; the FO was not in their seat fully; so I accomplished some initial items; then stepped back. When I returned; I failed to inspect the C/B panels. If I had; I'd have noticed the collared C/Bs for every probe heater.I went through my overhead flow although I checked the probe heat; I didn't notice that the lights never went out. I think this is possibly due to the fact that every probe heater was ions; so the whole light panel for these probes was lit; as opposed to noticing if only one light failed to extinguish. My error.We continue with our procedures and briefly noticed before taxi that the panel anti-ice light was lit. The FO jiggles the button and it extinguished. We figured it was just the panel acting up; which it often does. This is a human factors issue. We have become so de-sensitized to the panel not working that when we get an indication like this; we think nothing of jiggling the switch and continuing if the lights go out. I have the panel stick many times and often when we check it; it take numerous presses from both pilots to get the system to test. This is normalization of deviation; both from and SOP standpoint; but also from a design and system failure standpoint. We all know this system is poor.When the anti-ice light went out; we continued to takeoff; checking the panel once again; and got no lights. We took the runway and at about 30 knots; the Master Caution light lit up and I took the aircraft and rejected the takeoff. We ran the checklist and cleared the runway to troubleshoot. We had gotten the Master Caution with no associated panel light illuminated. This is not right. We jiggled both panel lights and the anti-ice light in front of the FO came on steady. It should have been on; the entire time. I called Maintenance Control and after talking with the; I taxied back to the gate for maintenance.They discovered that when the aircraft was pulled from storage; that all the C/Bs for the probe heaters were still collared.Takeaways for me:- Late night departure.- Lack of recent experience; proficiency.- Interrupted SOPs during preflight.- Myopia to the illuminated probe heat lights because they were all on. This is not common and doesn't stick out. This may seem strange; but we both looked at the overhead panel numerous times; and even though all the probe heat lights were on; it didn't stick out. If only one had been on; it would have been salient.- The panel system doesn't work right. We all know this and have learned to accept it. That said; I think we all believe this system needs fixing. It sticks and doesn't test very often.

Scheduled push of XA:55 local. 3rd flying leg in the previous 33 days. Due to various reasons both the Captain and I completely missed the CB check during our preflight flow. During the recall test for the after start flow; the MC light and Anti-ice annunciation on the panel illuminated. We checked the overhead panel; and the window heat looked normal (no overheat; all green). We then checked the probe heat panel and all of the amber lights were on; however our brains incorrectly registered it as 'normal' since there wasn't a broken up pattern (expecting to see one or two lights not in the same state as the others). We then retested the recall check it did not illuminate the MC light or any panel annunciations; even during the recall checks of all subsequent flows. During the takeoff roll; before the engines even achieved T/O N1; the MC light illuminated but no panel annunciations illuminated. The Captain executed a low speed RTO and stopped on a taxi way to troubleshoot. We checked and cleared the recall test multiple times because the only light that kept illuminating was the MC. Only after several recall tests did the anti-ice annunciation on the panel illuminate again. After discussing the situation with Maintenance Control we ended up returning to the gate. Operations started asking us questions and troubleshooting the anti-ice systems. After a couple minutes; the Captain realized that we had completely forgotten to check the CBs and we started looking for any popped CBs. We then saw all the pitot heat CBs pulled and secured with big red collars and flags even though the maintenance release we had was valid. Operations re-secured the CBs and we were on our way.

Air carrier flight crew reported rejecting a takeoff in response to multiple warning lights. The aircraft had been in storage and anti-ice circuit breakers had been collared and not removed by Maintenance prior to flight.

1458076

201706

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

IFR

Descent

None

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1458076

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Human Factors; Weather; Procedure; Company Policy

Weather

With the tropical system bands arriving in all sectors the weather complexity increased dramatically within all sectors of the specialty. Our personnel count was down to only [a few] Certified Professional Controllers (CPC) at the start of the shift for our night count. I overheard one of the supervisors tell the relieving supervisor that we took two sick hits but the weather wasn't going to be a factor because it's going to shut down our airspace. This proved completely false. With our staffing levels low they decided to combine all low sectors into a mid-shift style configuration. Now you're working 4 sectors with 4 different frequencies with 6 different sites to try and manage. At no normal time do we ever combine all the sectors into this configuration unless we are preparing for the mid [shift.] This was my first session to work it today but I watched another previous controller struggle for almost two hours on position in the same manner. At no time could you provide a good safe service to the flying public. It was utter chaos with the supervisor sitting at the desk for [several] hours letting the specialty go down the tubes. Have an engaged supervisor in the area at all times; especially with weather. To provide some relief in surrounding approaches for departures; routing; etc. Just sitting there doing nothing for hours is unacceptable. Utilize Overtime (OT) with a low count is unacceptable in the conditions we were experiencing.

Center Controller reported a staffing problem and weather related issues that made the sectors overloaded with traffic.

1488262

201710

1201-1800

PYM.Airport

MA

60.0

6.0

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

CLR

TRACON K90

FBO

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Cruise

Other maneuvering

Class E K90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 3800; Flight Crew Type 900

Situational Awareness

1488262

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was providing flight instruction to a student pilot and reviewing the maneuvers for the required Airmen Certification Standards. The flight was conducted in VFR conditions 6 miles east of the Plymouth Airport (KPYM) and 2-4 miles northwest of the Plymouth Nuclear Power plant over Plymouth Bay and Duxbury Bay. We flew from the airport to a practice area over the water between 3;000 and 4;000 ft. The flight began with simulated IFR training and unusual attitudes. Stalls; slow flight; steep turns; emergency descents and turns around a point were maneuvers conducted after the simulated IFR training.Upon completion of the training flight; I was advised by my FBO the FAA; Cape TRACON (K90); wanted to speak with me. I contacted the person via phone and was asked if I had been operating over the power plant. The person stated the facility's primary radar was out of service and Boston TRACON (A90) tracked my aircraft on radar. A90 subsequently contacted K90 in an effort to determine the aircraft's identity. A US Coast Guard aircraft apparently flew near my aircraft and photographed my call sign relaying it to the FAA.The FAA official I spoke with indicated to me that the FAA wanted me to be aware I was operating over a nuclear power plant. I was operating northwest of the power plant over Plymouth Bay and Duxbury Bay. There was no indication that action would be taken by the FAA in the form of a Pilot Deviation.Since instructing at this FBO for the last 9 years in this area; this is the first inquiry made to me regarding flights in that area. Bordering this practice area is V141; 2.5 miles east of the power plant and FREDO; a holding fix; 2 miles south of the power plant. Also; the area lies near the boundary of K90's and A90's airspace and is approximately 10 miles from the Boston Class B airspace.The wording of FDC 3/1655 'SPECIAL NOTICE' states in part;' PILOTS CONDUCTING FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE ADVISED TO AVOID THE AIRSPACE ABOVE OR IN PROXIMITY TO ALL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS. PILOTS SHOULD NOT CIRCLE OR LOITER IN THE VICINITY OF SUCH FACILITIES.' 'Proximity and vicinity' are ambiguous at best. In an effort to resolve any misunderstanding of the applicable NOTAM I recommend the FAA clearly review and redefine restrictions near a nuclear power plant. A pro-active stance in defining 'proximity' and 'vicinity' would remove any subjectivity of their definition. However; the simplest solution would be the creation of Prohibited Airspace around all nuclear power plants and publishing them on all navigation charts.It is unclear at the time of this report if the TSA has been notified and if it would be involved in an investigation.

GA flight instructor reported that K90 TRACON was concerned about his flight lesson near a nuclear power plant.

1089493

201305

0601-1200

DEN.Airport

CO

0.0

Dawn

Ground DEN

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

1089493

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Chart Or Publication

Taxi out from DEN ramp; instructed behind traffic taxi SA; A; A hold point. The Company ramp procedures were briefed to include the requirement to hold at the A hold point and contact Ground. We taxied as instructed but missed the hold point for A. Apparently it is very close the SA and was missed coming out of the turn from SA onto A. We contacted Ground without issue and continued with a normal flight. Having briefed the procedure we were looking for the hold point to be further up A. We were following traffic that did not stop at the hold point and were looking for the hold point to be further up A. The Ramp Pages do a good job of describing the procedure but do not show a very good depiction of its actual location.

The Reporter stated that the crew briefed the HOLD POSITION from a Company airport chart and were anticipating its location immediately upon entering Taxiway A. It was not there and the hold position was not obvious to them at any time. Another point of distraction was the four smaller aircraft taxiing ahead of them did not stop at any point leading them to believe they were not required to even though documentation said otherwise.A good friend of his was going to DEN the next day so the Reporter asked him to locate the HOLD POSITION line. He did not see it either.

A Captain briefed the taxi procedure from the DEN Freight Ramp to the runways including the A hold point; but did not see the hold point on the taxiway and suggested a better chart depiction.

1006542

201204

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

10000.0

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Oceanic

Class E ZZZ

Elevator Trim System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1006542

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

1006543.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

[I] departed as pilot flying. At 10;000 FT as I started to accelerate to climb speed; I noticed the aircraft was not trimming in the nose down direction and wanted to pitch up. I told the Captain I thought we might have a trim problem; and passed control of the aircraft to him to try. He found the same results; returned control of the aircraft to me; and got out the QRH. I took ATC on the radio; while the Captain ran the QRH checklist and contacted Maintenance Control. In the course of evaluating the malfunction with maintenance; and after discussing the Circuit Breaker reset policy; we elected that as a flight control system malfunction; it was within the Captain's authority and would be prudent to attempt one reset of a popped Circuit Breaker. The popped Circuit Breaker was reset and immediately popped again when nose down trim was selected. At this point; we completed the QRH; and began a diversion. An uneventful; heavyweight; flaps 15 (per QRH) landing was accomplished. Stabilizer Trim system failed sometime after the trim was set for takeoff. (Note: aircraft was trimmed nose down to set takeoff trim during normal checklist operations and functioned correctly at that time).

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information]

A B737-800 Stabilizer Trim failed after takeoff without a failure annunciation when the circuit break popped; was reset and popped again; so the flight diverted to a nearby airport.

1199632

201408

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Dusk

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Workload; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1199632

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight; In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors; Weather; Procedure

Company Policy

I was scheduled to operate 3 flights with a total scheduled block of 8:00. After being delayed and over blocking the first leg of my day; I was scheduled to be within 6 minutes under the 9:00 max block time allowed under FAR 117 PRIOR to beginning a last leg turn. Moments before our departure; in order to prevent a possible illegality and flight cancellation; and rather than using an alternative crew to operate the flight; Crew Scheduling (CS) and Dispatch unilaterally reran our return flight plan for the out and back that 'reduced' our scheduled block time from 2:07 to 1:55. This is a reduction of approximately 10% in our scheduled block time and required a cost index of 100 for the flight. In order to achieve this reduction; and create an apparent legal scheduling situation; the return flight plan involved climb speeds of 319 knots; cruise of .80 Mach; and descent speed of 340 knots. This plan was for flight through an area of known and reported moderate chop; along with several areas of convective activity. These speeds were well outside the operating limitations for turbulent airspeeds for the aircraft as well as safe operating speeds for our flight attendants to be providing service to the passengers. It also was beyond any reasonable or comfortable operating speed for our passengers. We were told to 'fly fast'. The entire purpose of creating this flight plan was to make us 'legal' to depart rather than use a different crew to conduct the operation in a safe manner. I queried Crew Scheduling prior to departing on the first leg and was told by an obviously irritated and annoyed Crew Scheduler that their actions were perfectly legal and reasonable. After departure the return leg; we encountered occasional moderate chop along with some light turbulence along the route of flight. The same conditions were previously encountered outbound on the previous leg and were known to Dispatch. The conditions returning required the seat belt sign to be on for approximately half of the flight time.Our return block time was 2:00 and included a significant short cut from our arrival; and a high speed descent to the final approach fix. With these extraordinary efforts; my block time for the day was 8:54; just short of the MAXIMUM legal flight time allowed with a duty day of 11:35.The creation of an extraordinarily fast flight time was done solely in an effort to make it 'legal' for us to depart the last station in the hopes of not having a crew time out. There was no consideration given to the safe operation of the flight or the human factors of a crew operating to the maximum flight time.There was no legitimate operational need to create a flight plan to operate the aircraft at excessive speeds for the conditions; risk the safe movement of flight attendants and passengers in the aircraft; or increase the operational stresses on the flight crew other than for the convenience of the Company. Crew Scheduling and Dispatch never consulted with the flight crew prior to taking any of their actions and were defensive and irritated when the issue was raised. There is no focus; or concern about the safe operation of our flights; unnecessary stress is being placed on our crews; and retribution and punitive actions (disciplinary hearings and 'refuse to fly' notations) are being taken against those who do not immediately comply with the orders being issued even when the Company is notified of safety concerns by the flight crew. There is a terrible environment; no common agreement on actions; complete lack of communication; and an unwillingness to even remotely consider the impact of Crew Scheduling and Dispatch decisions on the flight crews. Safety is not only NOT our 'first priority'; it is simply not even being considered. The only thing that appears to matter is pushing the flight crews to the maximum and reducing costs.This Company has to begin to care about safety. Better planning. This Company should not be pushing their crews to the maximums and then bending operational parameters in order to make them 'legal.' Legal is not the same as safe!

An A319 pilot reported his company increased the out and back flight speed to Mach .80; disregarding turbulence; to reduce his day's flight time below nine hours on a day originally scheduled less than eight hours.

1110323

201308

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

25000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 2700

1110323

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 7900; Flight Crew Type 2108

1111299.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Avionics smoke ECAM Came on as we climbed toward FL250. We handled the ECAM and determined that there were no other indications of smoke; fire or instrument degradation. ECAM directed LAND ASAP. We declared an emergency with Center and requested a return to our departure airport (approximately 30 miles away). We notified company Dispatch through ACARS and then landed safely. We were inspected by CFR who determined that there were no other indications of fire or smoke. They then escorted us to the gate.

No additional information was provided in the secondary narrative.

Following receipt of an Avionics smoke ECAM warning an A320 flight crew performed the associated checklist procedures; declared an emergency and returned to their departure airport.

1476553

201708

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Center ZZZ

Air Taxi

Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Electrical Wiring & Connectors

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting

1476553

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft

Cruise flight 70 NM from [destination]; a passenger alerted us that he saw smoke coming from the left circuit breaker panel. I looked down and confirmed that there was in fact smoke coming from the panel. Performed memory items and referenced QRH. [Advised] ATC. The isolation of the electrical systems stopped the smoke. We diverted to ZZZ (~40 NM) as it was closer than [destination] and would have emergency response crew. Landed at ZZZ and performed emergency ground evacuation per the QRH. Fire crews inspected the plane and were not able to find source of smoke but did detect a strong smell of a previous electrical fire. I suspect the source of the smoke was from the heater and or heater fan which was turned on 15 minutes prior; or it was possible it was the lightning strike detector. No circuit breakers or switch breakers were tripped. Aircraft was fresh out of phase; perhaps Functional Check Flights after phase could prevent this experience for passengers. These passengers were on the previous flight which had an air return for a rough running engine.

Cessna 402 Captain reported that a passenger noticed smoke coming from a circuit breaker panel. After confirming that an electrical problem did exist; the Captain elected to divert a suitable nearby airport.

1112724

201309

0001-0600

ORD.Airport

IL

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ground ORD

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1112724

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

After departing our gate; we were instructed to taxi to Runway 32L at T10 via A; A7; T; T10; exactly as we had briefed the expected taxi. Passing A11; Ground instructed us to give way to a MD80 at Taxiway A9. As the jet was crossing in front of us Ground then instructed us to either: Go behind the jet on Taxiway A9 [or] follow the jet on Taxiway A9. So we turned left onto Taxiway A9. At the time; my impression was that Ground wanted us to follow the jet and then join T10 and hold short of Runway 32L. So I followed the jet on A9; then Taxiway Bravo. T10 was RIGHT there and I heard follow the jet. As we were making the right turn off Taxiway Bravo onto T10 the Ground Controller told us to 'just go ahead and turn right on T10 monitor Tower.' At this point I began to re-evaluate what the Controller had actually meant. After takeoff; the First Officer and I discussed and he said he thought they wanted us to make the left on Taxiway A9; then left on T; then T10. Based on the situation; I now believe that's what should have occurred. I'm unfamiliar with ORD; as I don't go there often. On this particular afternoon; the Ground Controller was giving many instructions with little availability/time for read-backs. Very quick change in taxi instructions with little time to digest exactly what was said. ORD mentality of 'don't stop' running through my mind. Now uncertain; but the use of the word Follow or Behind led me to think I was to follow the jet. First Officer's attention was divided on the before takeoff flow.I turned onto Taxiway Bravo; and I now believe I shouldn't have. Apparent confusion in the use of the word Follow or Behind in the clearance received. Insufficient monitor/crosscheck between myself and the First Officer. I was on a taxiway I shouldn't have been on.It's truly another lesson in CRM dynamics. Knowing how busy ORD can be; I know that my taxi speed today was appropriate; meaning the best way to give yourself more time to react is to taxi slowly. I employ this technique most always; but especially at big airports; and MOST especially ORD. As I was making the left turn onto Taxiway A9 behind the jet; I verbalized that I was 'making a U-turn' onto Taxiway B behind the jet. If the First Officer had heard/interpreted the taxi clearance correctly; I would hope that he would have corrected me at that time. That said his attention was divided on the before takeoff flow. That's my fault; as I had him start it while we were on the 'straight-away' before all the turning in our original taxi clearance. In the future; I think I will brief; or at least have the First Officer stop whatever they're doing in the event of a modified taxi instruction; I didn't stop him today and that proved consequential. In retrospect; that was the proper thing to do and the only way the First Officer would have realistically have been able to notice and correct the error; as he was obviously not really listening/comprehending what I had said.

An EMB-145 crew realized after the fact that having followed jet traffic to ORD Runway 32L may not have been what ORD Ground had intended.

1607965

201901

1201-1800

UNV.Airport

PA

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower UNV

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class D UNV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 4600; Flight Crew Type 220

Situational Awareness

1607965

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

While on a visual approach into UNV Runway 24; we received a EGWPS warning instructing the flight crew to take evasive action. The EGWPS warning sounded and instructed us to 'pull up'. The conditions were VFR and we had clear visual contact with the terrain. I started a stabilized descent after I passed the last ridge line to join the final approach course. We appeared to be past the ridge and had over 1;000 ft clearance with the terrain. I immediately performed the EGWPS escape maneuver and the aural alert ceased. We proceeded with the visual approach and landed with no issue. I have flown into UNV numerous times in the [other similarly sized aircraft] and have never had this issue. ATC vectored us in a little tighter than normal and I guess the ridge is a little higher in that vicinity which triggered the alert. In the future I will request a wider vector and delay my descent from the MVA until the aircraft is completely clear of the ridge and established on the final approach course. I also should've been monitoring the 'Terrain' page on my MFD. I typically do this; but realized I wasn't; after the fact; during this event.

EMB-145 First Officer reported taking evasive action in response to an EGPWS terrain warning on a visual approach into UNV airport.

1438755

201704

1801-2400

ZLC.ARTCC

UT

32000.0

Night

Center ZLC

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZLC

Center ZLC

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZLC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Type 4185

1438755

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Type 710

1439140.0

ATC Issue All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

While at FL320 in completely smooth air we encountered a jolt of moderate turbulence lasting approximately 2 seconds. This was followed by another jolt of turbulence lasting 2-3 seconds that was moderate to more than moderate; but not fitting of the definition of severe in intensity (FOM); and about 3-5 seconds after the first encounter. In our vicinity an airplane had just passed in front and above us and was abeam our aircraft when the turbulence was encountered. I immediately suspected a wake encounter. This occurred about 100 miles south-southeast of BIL. We asked ATC what kind of aircraft it was and he said his designation was a Heavy Airbus A300. A flight attendant in the rear of the aircraft reported bumping her head. No other injuries to passengers and crew.

At FL320; prior to top of descent; we flew underneath a heavy Airbus 300; with no warning from ATC and the airplane dropped and rolled aggressively. We immediately put the fasten seatbelt sign on and checked in with the flight attendants. One flight attendant said she hit her head on the bathroom door.

A319 flight crew reported an 'aggressive' roll resulted after encountering wake turbulence at FL320 from a crossing A300. A Flight Attendant hit her head during the encounter.

1683374

201909

0.0

Rain

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Ramp

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

1683374

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

Ramp Lead did not properly identify item 14 as dangerous goods; instead he loaded the item in pit 2 which didn't have the required 15 bags. He called after pushing the aircraft to advise he could not final; at which point I advised him item 14 which was XXXXXX. Biologicals was dangerous goods and the flight would need to gate return. The flight returned and the Ramp Lead then held off item 14. He called to advise that cargo did not properly identify the item as dangerous goods on the [load plan] which I then advised him was not correct and cargo did in fact staged it correctly and used the appropriate code. The Ramp Lead then stated he had never seen dangerous goods stage this way and why is there no pilot paperwork to which I responded this is the normal correct way to stage biologicals and that there are dangerous goods that are exempt from pilot paperwork. His response was he has never heard of dangerous goods being exempt again I informed him all of this information is in the Dangerous Goods recurrent training modules but he claims for the ramp they are there to which I informed him he was wrong.

Airline ramp personnel reported communication breakdown between ramp personnel and Ramp Lead regarding incorrectly loading and misidentifying Dangerous Goods in cargo pits.

1069732

201302

ZZZ.Tower

US

Tower ZZZ

Beech 1900

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Final Approach

None

Class D ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1069732

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

A Cessna 172 and another 172 were in the traffic pattern. [An airliner] was inbound from the West for a visual approach showing 290 KTS of ground speed. MD was working Local 1 and instructed [the airliner] to make a straight in for Runway XXL and report an 8 mile final. The first 172 was on a 5 mile final for Runway XXL when the second 172 was downwind passing the numbers of Runway XXL. Instead of turning the second 172 into the 5 mile hole; the Controller extended his downwind. I thought the intent was to have the second 172 follow the airliner since he was turning base leg 8 NM North of the airport;. Instead the Controller turned the second 172 to follow the first 172. I told the Controller that wouldn't work since the airliner was still going well over 200 knots. I told the Controller to change the second 172 to Runway XXR and the Controller ended up having to send the first 172 around to have enough room to let the airliner land. The Controller didn't want me to get him/her out because it was too busy; honestly it was self-inflicted volume and complexity. I ended up opening Local 2 and getting Local 1 relieved as he/she was clearly in over his/her head. I don't agree with a check ride for certification consisting of being able to work one session of moderate traffic without an 'A1.' This breeds controllers that can squeak by under idea conditions but can't handle the traffic if any little thing doesn't go their way. Not understanding sequencing; speed control; traffic flow; etc and counting on doing everything rote and having it work out makes for some scary situations and very poor customer service. I asked him/her later what went wrong and she said that the airliner turned a 6 mile final instead of an 8 mile final. I explained that when the trailing aircraft is going nearly 5 miles per minute and the leading aircraft is going less than 2 miles per minute; 2 miles doesn't make any difference at all. I suggested that if traffic existed to take the airliner over the top of the airport and enter them on the downwind in addition to moving pattern traffic to the other runway.

Tower CIC described a go-around event when the Local Controller failed to noted the overtake speed of a much faster aircraft resulting in a go around clearance even after recommendations were provided by the reporter.

1132095

201311

1201-1800

BFI.Airport

WA

VMC

Daylight

TRACON S46; Tower BFI

Fractional

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class D BFI

Tower BFI

Helicopter

1.0

VFR

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D BFI

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1132095

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1132097.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

I was the pilot flying sitting in the left seat. The flight was uneventful until we arrived in the terminal area at our arrival airport. The weather was clear. A beautiful Saturday mid afternoon; which meant a fair amount of VFR traffic in the traffic pattern there at BFI. With the airport in sight; we were cleared for the visual approach to Runway 31L. After checking in with the Tower and being cleared to land; we were given traffic advisories about some VFR helicopter traffic in the pattern. Tower advised that they were close and that the helicopter traffic had us in sight. We had the map on the MFD scrolled in so that we could see the traffic in our area. At approximately 700 AGL the TCAS began with a 'TA'. Almost immediately we received an 'RA'. At a quick glance; I recall seeing the conflicting traffic below us by 400 FT and we were descending. By now the TCAS is in full tenor singing 'CLIMB! CLIMB NOW'!!! So...we climb. I called out 'GO-AROUND' and both my Co-Captain and I executed the missed approach. All along the Tower Controller was so busy with his duties and the traffic that he sounded like an auctioneer. My Co-Captain had to jump in and announce that we had gone missed. After what seemed like a bit of a pause; my partner asked the Tower for missed approach instructions. The Tower Controller responds with...'Fly the published missed.' And he said it as if he was annoyed. Annoyed with what? The fact we didn't trust his traffic advisories or the fact that we had the nerve to ask for missed approach instructions. Either way; I didn't think visual approaches came with a published missed approach procedure. Nonetheless; since we did in fact have the ILS procedure up and available; we started to maneuver in the proper direction. As we made our initial turn to the left toward the LOFAL intersection; heading approx 280 and climbing through approx 2;000 FT MSL; the Tower Controller is yelling at us... 'XXX descend; descend now! Traffic at your 10 o'clock!' Startled; as I pulled the power back and pushed the nose over; I look to my left and see a B-737 climbing. He's above us; but not by much. Also our horizontal separation isn't by much either. At the beginning of this fiasco; I had to climb to avoid an in-flight collision. Now; just a mere 30 seconds later; I have to descend to accomplish the same. The Tower Controller told us to descend and maintain 1;500 FT. So; we descend. After what seemed like awhile listening to the Tower Controller going back to his auctioneer style of controlling the traffic we left behind; my partner again jumps in and asked if we should go to departure? 'YES! YES PLEASE!' was the response. So... we contact Departure Control. Checking in with Departure was uneventful. No hype or hysteria here. The Controller acknowledged our heading and altitude. Moments later he gave us a clearance to climb to 4;000 FT and vector for another visual approach into BFI. We briefly mentioned to the Departure Controller the nature of our missed approach out of BFI. We told him that our concern was another repeat of the same scenario; and the primary concern was the aggressive helicopters that fly a very tight pattern and close proximity to other arriving traffic. He mentioned that he would pass this along to the Tower at BFI. The rest of the flight was routine except my contempt for the Tower Controller and his misfit helicopter pilots. All the more vigilant; we flew another visual approach to 31L. Checking in with what seemed like a different Tower Controller; we were cleared to land. And so... we landed. Please review the missed approach procedure for the ILS 31L into BFI. Please note the left hand turn that is required to head toward LOFAL intersection. That heading takes you right across the departure path of SEA. Also; advise the BFI Tower that a sensitive TCAS; along with an errant/aggressive helicopter flying technique isn't a good combination.

The runways at BFI are very closely spaced. Until that day I was unaware of what seems to be pretty intensive helicopter training at BFI; in very small aircraft that are not easy to pick out in the ground clutter. Perhaps more separation should be provided by the controllers during sequencing because even if visual contact is made; a TCAS RA must be complied with.

A fractional crew executed a go-around while approaching Runway 31L at BFI after a TCAS RA from a small helicopter landing on Runway 31R. Aircraft comes in conflict with a B737 departing nearby SEA while on the Tower issued missed approach procedure.

989331

201201

0001-0600

CLT.TRACON

NC

11000.0

Night

TRACON CLT

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb; Initial Climb

SID JACAL 6

Class B CLT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

989331

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 1700

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

989333.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure

We were initially cleared for take off by Tower Control to depart Runway 23 from CLT and fly the JACAL 6 RNAV departure procedure. Shortly after checking in with Departure Control the Controller gave us a 300 heading direct and cleared us direct to a fix. The Captain and I were confused by the pronunciation of the fix; we thought to be VLADY. I asked the Controller to clarify and confirm direct to VLADY; which she did. Shortly there after the Controller stated that we were showing north of the fix and cleared us direct to JACAL. Upon further investigation we determined the Controller wanted us direct to GLADI a fix on the departure procedure and not VLADY a fix a little further down on our flight plan. Short cuts are great; but flying RNAV SID's as depicted allow pilots to fly what they brief. The Controller was working another frequency at the time and was issuing an IFR clearance to an aircraft. The division of attention my have lead to the Controller not fully hear my verbalization of VLADY. Also having two fixes close to each other with similar names can lead to confusion and is not a good idea.

This was a simple case of misinterpreted instructions with two points that sounded very much alike; and which were both on our route of flight. The First Officer and I both thought we were getting an early morning shortcut and the Controller noticed our deviation quickly and issued an updated clearance. Repeat points by spelling them out phonetically whenever in doubt.

An ERJ170 on the CLT JACAL 6 RNAV departure was cleared to GLADI intersection but misunderstood and proceeded to VLADI intersection which was a more distant point on their flight plan. This was a similar sounding fix confusion.

1307994

201511

1801-2400

HXD.Airport

SC

IMC

Tower HXD

Fractional

Embraer Legacy 450/500

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

GPS

Initial Approach

Class E SAV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1307994

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

During our departure brief we discussed at length the 2 NOTAMs at HXD that would prevent us from landing at night on RWY 3 (favored runway by the current wind). We ran an iPreflight book to determine effect of landing with a tailwind and the possible consequences if it should be raining at arrival time adding the 15% LPA. As a crew we agreed it to be safe to depart and to land with the tailwind on RWY 21. At around 75 miles the Pilot Monitoring (PM) obtained the ASOS for HXD; GPS RWY 3 was in use. I asked the PM to call HXD tower to see if they were indeed landing on RWY 3 since it was after sunset and those approaches were NOTAM'd NA. When queried; HXD tower said 'oh yeah; I'll switch that around by the time you get here'. In planning our approach we decided on the GPS 21 vs. LOC DME 21 as it was a simpler approach with our equipment not requiring a stepdown fix and the GPS would count down the distance to the runway for our Visual Descent Point calculations. Boufort approach asked us what type approach we would like; we asked for the GPS 21; we were then cleared direct to DORVE and cleared for the GPS 21. Upon switching to tower OVER the FAF; tower asked us 'can you shoot the GPS 21 at night?' We looked at each other; agreed that the NOTAMS we reviewed were for RWY 3 and said 'Yes' to the tower who then cleared us to land. I asked the PM if he was comfortable continuing the approach with a question like that from tower and he said yes so we continued the approach and landing without event.Upon landing we continued to discuss the events and how they unfolded and reviewed the NOTAMs yet again; this time we realized we overlooked the NOTAM for GPS 21 'PROCEDURE NA AT NIGHT'. In looking back we did everything right. We reviewed the NOTAMs; discussed the impact of a night landing with a tailwind; discussed wet runways; calculated performance using iPreflight; thoroughly briefed the approach and questioned ATC why they were flying approaches to the wrong runway 3 at night. So where did it go wrong? The error started when we BOTH overlooked the NOTAM for GPS 21 which was in a different format than the other 2 NOTAMs; the second link was losing faith in HXD tower who said 'oh yeah; I'll switch that around by the time you get here' making it seem that he was even unaware of the night NOTAM restrictions to RWY 3; the 3rd link was Boufort APPROACH clearing us for the GPS 21; the 4th link (and the critical one that should have broken the chain) was HXD tower asking us if we can shoot the GPS 21 at night. I think we would have given his question a little more credit if he wasn't surprised when we asked him why they were shooting approaches to RWY 3. We both felt confident in our pre-departure planning so we did not stop to investigate his query to us. In looking back we really should have stopped the approach and re-evaluated the situation prior to continuing.

EMB505 Captain reported a night landing at HXD using the GPS 21 approach that was not authorized for night use.

1188011

201407

0601-1200

EWR.Airport

NJ

1500.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON N90; Tower EWR

Air Carrier

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 4

Initial Approach

Class B EWR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1188011

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Conducting approach to Runway 4R. Directed to maintain 2;500 feet and intercept the final approach course. Also; told to maintain 200 KIAS until FAF (DOOIN @ 1;700 feet). We were never cleared for the approach or cleared for the visual. I configured the aircraft with gear down; flaps-1 and speed brakes extended and autopilot off in anticipation of having to 'dive'. The First Officer; pilot monitoring; tried several times to call Approach but was blocked at each attempt. Just outside of FAF; contact was finally made with Approach who told us to contact Tower and indicated that we had been cleared for the approach when we were directed to intercept final. They did not!!! (There was [another airline] jumpseater who witnessed the approach and subsequent missed who can verify what occurred). We contacted Tower who immediately asked if we could get down. We responded no and [we] initiated a go-around at about 1;500 feet AGL. This started the next issue. I leveled the aircraft at 1;000 feet; called for gear up; and asked for 170 KIAS. At the same time Tower told us to go to Departure and gave us a frequency switch; which was incorrect. At that point the First Officer and Jumpseater (who was very helpful as he was EWR based and immediately recognized that the frequency was incorrect) were engaged in sorting out the correct frequency. After some confusion; and a call on Guard; we sorted things out and returned for a landing. This approach episode and subsequent missed approach issue were caused entirely by ATC. The Approach Controller 'thought' he cleared us for the approach and then we were prevented from clarifying the situation because of a congested frequency. The Tower giving us the wrong frequency for the go-around basically put us in a lost comm situation in the middle of a congested flight corridor.

While on approach to EWR; the TRACON failed to clear an air carrier for a Runway 4 approach. When EWR Tower was called late; the flight was too high for a stabilized approach and so executed a go-around.

1565948

201808

0601-1200

DEN.Airport

CO

0.0

VMC

Tower DEN

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Landing

Tower DEN

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270; Flight Crew Type 10779

Situational Awareness

1565948

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Type 7995

1565793.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Weather; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

Approach was stable and uneventful through below 500 ft AGL. At that point; I let the aircraft dip below glideslope to capture three red PAPI. As the aircraft passed through 100 feet AGL; I noticed four red PAPI and began to adjust pitch and power. As the threshold neared; the aircraft began to be affected by the previous arrival's wake; and required control inputs as aircraft crossed the threshold to maintain path and centerline. These inputs were more significant than any inputs on the approach and began rather suddenly.My last look as we crossed the threshold had airspeed on target. I began to increase the back pressure for the flare; but the aircraft did not respond as I expected; never arrested descent; and contacted the runway before planned; resulting in a hard bounce.With the power still up; the resulting bounce was high; and I immediately called for a go around. Go around was accomplished and subsequent landing was uneventful. Thankfully; we later heard from Maintenance the aircraft inspection showed all ok.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737NG flight crew reported a hard landing and subsequent go-around occurred following a wake turbulence encounter just before touchdown.

1060406

201301

1801-2400

ZME.ARTCC

TN

24000.0

IMC

Icing

Center ZME

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Class A ZME

Autoflight System

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1060406

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1060407.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

Ambiguous

We were flight planned for the LTOWN arrival but ATC rerouted us to ARG for the FNCHR arrival. Approaching ARG from the east; we received radar vectors for spacing which took us to the north and west of ARG at FL240 and 320 KIAS. At a point about 15 NM to the northwest of STANI; we received the following clearance from ATC: 'Cleared direct to STANI; 'descend via' the FNCHR 1 arrival. After we executed the new route in the FMC we noted the 290 KIAS restriction which was appropriate at STANI had not been programmed. This was because we did not cross ARG (the point prior on the arrival where the restriction was charted). Thinking we had to be at 290 KIAS; the pilot flying speed intervened while pilot not flying made the adjustment in the FMS. Pilot not flying set 4;000 FT in the altitude window (final restriction at JAYWA) so as to descend via the FNCHR arrival. The airplane began an immediate descent to make the 'at or below 230' restriction at STANI. This is where I believe an error was made. At the time we left FL 240; we were within 10 miles to the NW of STANI but not actually on the FNCHR arrival. While not on the arrival; we should have asked for an altitude change so as to meet the 'at or below' restriction at STANI.The ATC clearance was incomplete. We should have been given more guidance with regard to altitude. Either a clearance to descend to FL230 or a crossing restriction at STANI would have been appropriate. Being fast and close to STANI did not allow the crew enough time to discuss the issue and there was confusion as to whether we should have crossed STANI at FL240 and then started the descent or initiated a descent so as to meet the restriction at STANI.

We were in VNAV PATH and I entered 4;000 FT into the altitude window and then a speed intervention of 290 KIAS to comply with the 290 KIAS at Walnut Ridge; which we were inside of; and to also be in compliance with our next restriction of Below FL230 at 290 KIAS at STANI. We crossed STANI below FL230 and at 290; meeting that restriction. The problem we believe that we made is that we weren't on a published portion of the approach; so therefore we departed an assigned altitude of FL240 to meet the STANI restriction. We should have clarified our clearance with ATC; whether to cross STANI at FL230; or FL240 and what airspeed we wanted. I initially thought he wanted us to go direct to STANI and descend via the FINCHR; meeting the first restriction at STANI; but then we started to doubt that was the clearance and thought perhaps he wanted us to proceed to STANI; cross it at FL240 and then descend VIA. A simple clarification would have solved this issue. During all this; the Controller was very busy with other traffic as many airplanes were getting vectored; speed assignments and rerouted with new STARS.

A B757-200 flight crew cleared to fly a radar vector to intercept the FNCHR RNAV STAR inside of ARG questioned whether they should have begun a descent to cross their first waypoint at the charted altitude since they were technically not established on the STAR.

1182921

201406

0001-0600

ZBW.ARTCC

NH

25000.0

Center ZBW

Corporate

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZBW

Facility ZBW.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.5

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1182921

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

ZNY-34 flashed me a data block on Aircraft X that showed no aircraft type; or any flight plan information; just a target descending to FL250. I was busy with multiple sectors; and numerous aircraft. I did not have a D-side to handle any coordination for me. I assumed ZNY had an UTM [Unsuccessful Transmission Message] on this aircraft; as it is uncommon to have an aircraft flash without flight plan information; without any UTM; etc. I called the Controller at ZNY-34 and advised I had no flight plan information on the data block Aircraft X; and asked if he had a UTM or any fails. He said no. I questioned this; as I was surprised and he said; 'No; so do you want to write it?' I said standby; as the aircraft was still several minutes from my sector. I went back to a few other aircraft; then I got back on the line with ZNY-34 and said; 'Go ahead; I'll write it;' and he said; 'You know what; I don't like your attitude I'm gonna spin him.' At this point the ZNY Controller entered my airspace with Aircraft X without coordination; turned him around in a 360 turn; then entered my airspace again after descending the aircraft to FL200; violating my airspace a second time. He refused to answer any landlines; and my Supervisor tried calling his area several times and their Supervisor would not answer the phone. The Controller at ZNY-34's unwillingness to communicate; and provide manual coordination led to the aircraft getting delayed; and him violating my airspace twice.I recommend ZNY controllers be responsible for ensuring flight plan information passes to ZBW in a timely manner.

ZBW controller describes scenario where he doesn't have complete track data or a flight plan on an aircraft. He requests information from the Controller working the aircraft who refuses to pass the information to him and violates the airspace twice with the aircraft.

1746254

202006

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Confusion

1746254

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

Departing ZZZ and assigned the ZZZZZX departure. The departure was thoroughly briefed before flight. All waypoints checked. We went as far as setting up the engine out procedure in the secondary flight plan. After takeoff the PF began the departure. The aircraft was cleaned up; accelerated; and hand-flown. A busy time immediately after departure. Within one minute after departure and after completing the after takeoff checklist I looked at my primary display and noticed our flight path was roughly one mile west and one mile south of the left-hand initial curve of the ZZZZZ Departure. It was visual conditions and I believe the PF got distracted by maintaining visual with the terrain outside during the initial steep climbout and not focusing closely enough on the departure course line. I did not catch the deviation initially with the workload and all happening within a couple minutes. There was never any issue with terrain or traffic. ATC stated after this initial departure climb that we were off our course; and I acknowledged this. Both myself the PNF; and the PF have flown very little in the last 3 months. I believe for the PF that this was his first leg in a few months. For myself; I've had 3 legs in the last 3.5 months. There is something to be said for a small lack of proficiency that this created; and not catching the error with a faster scan or recognition. Another factor was the PF wanting to get the feel of the plane again and to wanting to hand-fly a busy DP in mountainous terrain.

Pilot reported a track heading deviation and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.

1608459

201901

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Type 2509

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1608459

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors

There were two issues with during the pushback. Upon requesting push clearance gate [ramp control] told us to push for spot X but disconnect abeam the gate. As we were pushing I noticed we were turning well wide of the spot X line and it appeared we were headed for the spot Y line. The Captain began communicating with the tug driver to inform him of his error. As the Captain began to communicate with the tug driver gate [ramp control] called me to tell me we were on the wrong line. I told them we were aware and trying to relay the message to the tug driver who didn't seem to understand what we were telling him. [Ramp control] told us it was okay and that we could disconnect where we were; which was now on the spot Y line. The Captain told the tug driver ramp wants us to disconnect here now. The next communication we received from the tug driver was to 'set brakes'. We noticed we were still rolling forward so the Captain said we can't because he is still towing us forward. The only reply was another 'set brakes'. We explained we still cannot set them he's towing us. Through several more exchanges we realized we're no longer connected to the tug. The Captain then applied the brakes causing an abrupt stop. During that time I was looking at the tug and it was moving backwards (away from aircraft) at the same speed we were rolling forward which visually appeared as if we were being towed. There was a complete lack of standard communication from the tug driver causing confusion. Once we had brakes set and were officially disconnected the flight attendants called to ask what happened and that they almost fell over during the briefing.

B737NG First Officer reported several deviations from SOP during pushback that posed safety risks.

1304002

201510

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

None

Ground ZZZ

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Taxi

Facility ZZZ.TWR

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1304002

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

It was after sunset when Aircraft X landed and was rolling out. My Ground Controller was busy with multiple tasks; including a clearance he was about to start reading. I gave the taxiway a quick scan and decided I was going to exit Aircraft X in front of his ramp and have him taxi into parking while monitoring ground (instead of stopping; calling and waiting). I loudly said to Ground Control 'Aircraft X to parking with me'. The ground controller working at the time is one of the best we have and I assumed he would say something if there was a problem. I told Aircraft X to 'turn right at [taxiway]; cross 31R and taxi to parking via A; monitor ground point niner on your way in'. Aircraft X crossed 31R partially then did not continue on to the A Taxiway. I heard Aircraft X say out of Ground Control's speaker 'hey; Ground; did you know about this Cessna?' I looked up to see a taxing Cessna pass in front of Aircraft X; left to right. My Ground Controller was obviously upset. Aircraft X taxied to parking without further incident.At [tower] we have a cultural practice of holding on to aircraft to parking; if it is close to the runway exit point. (taxiing aircraft to parking on tower frequency) It is generally accepted and most controllers here do it; under the premise that it provides better service. A few are against it and now I see why. It was dark when this occurred; which further increased the chances of the taxiing Cessna being missed with a quick scan of the taxiway.I have now joined the ranks of the few controllers who won't taxi them in on ground. I plan to bring this up at the next local safety council meeting and advise against the practice to my coworkers.

Local Controller issued taxi instructions to an aircraft instead of switching the aircraft to Ground Control frequency to receive the taxi instructions. Reporter states this is a common practice at this facility in certain circumstances. Ground Control had traffic taxiing in confliction with the aircraft Local Control issued taxi instructions to. The pilot noticed the traffic and stopped on the taxiway and asked the Tower if they knew about the conflicting traffic.

1123503

201310

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B757-200

Part 121

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

Y

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Stall Warning System

Boeing

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Other

1123503

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals; MEL

MEL

Maintenance in ZZZZ found the Cannon plug broken on the First Officer's Stick Shaker. We applied MEL 27-32-02 which has you pull and collar the Circuit Breaker for the affected system isolating the Stick Shaker motor. The Cannon plug was secured and capped per the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) Chapter-20; since it could not be re-connected to the broken receptacle on the motor. Initially; an Engineering Authorization was pursued until we realized that we could deactivate the system by pulling and collaring the Circuit Breaker per the MEL and that would isolate the broken connector. At that point; with Engineering Management's concurrence; we did not pursue an Engineering Authorization. The system was deactivated by pulling and collaring the Circuit Breaker for the Stick Shaker per the MEL. The Cannon plug on the motor was broken; it was not removed for isolation of the motor; and it could not be connected to the receptacle on the motor. I felt that the intent of the MEL was met and that we were not further isolating the system with the broken Cannon plug being disconnected as the maintenance alert states. [Recommend] clarifying the intent of maintenance alert XX-000. What is the exact communication from the FAA on this? When an item of equipment is inoperative (Stick Shaker motor Cannon plug Circuit Breaker) and maintenance is deferred under the guidance of the MEL (pull and collar Circuit Breaker); the airplane must be operated under all applicable conditions and limitations contained in the MEL: (pull and collar Circuit Breaker). Until further notice; if an additional isolation procedure is deemed to be necessary at any time during the deferral period of an MEL item; contact Maintenance Control and submit an Engineering Request. Engineering may issue an Engineering Authorization on a case by case basis to permit these procedures if appropriate. If Engineering does not issue an Engineering Authorization; or the conditions of the MEL cannot be met; the item must be repaired prior to further flight. Additional isolation needs to be defined. This was a broken Cannon plug on the Stick Shaker motor. Is this an additional isolation; or an inoperative system addressed by the MEL? Aircraft Maintenance Manager.

An Aircraft Maintenance Manager reports about the need for clarification of a company Maintenance Alert that describes the importance of requesting an Engineering Authorization (E/A) when an additional isolation procedure is applied during a deferral process. Cannon plug for the first officer's Stick Shaker motor was broken and was capped-off; but was not part of the MEL procedure for deferral of the Stick Shaker System on a B757-200.

1120274

201310

1801-2400

ATL.Airport

GA

600.0

VMC

Night

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ATL

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

MD-88

2.0

Part 121

Initial Climb

Class B ATL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1120274

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1120290.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Procedure

At rotation; we encountered wake turbulence from the preceding MD-88. The aircraft rolled hard to the left and triggered a momentary stick-shaker. The First Officer lowered the pitch and countered the roll immediately. We encountered the wake turbulence again at 600 FT consisting of a hard roll again to the left. The First Officer countered the roll to maintain wings level. At 1;500 FT; we hit the wake turbulence again. I advised ATC and they gave us a heading of 070 to rejoin the departure. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. In the future; if ATC issues a takeoff clearance; so soon after the preceding aircraft takes off; I should be vigilant of possible wake turbulence. I should notify ATC sooner especially during RNAV departures.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-200 flight crew reported wake turbulence encounter departing ATL in trail of an MD-88.

1773891

202011

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 104.82; Flight Crew Total 7679.57; Flight Crew Type 4580.55

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1773891

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

I unknowingly rode in a van with; and flew with a Flight Attendant who had exhibited COVID symptoms the day prior to our flight. On [date 1]; the Flight Attendant reported from ZZZ that she had been vomiting and had a temperature above 100. She reportedly called in sick at that time; but still flew the next day with us ZZZ-ZZZ1. That day she also rode with us in the van; a 15 minute ride from the hotel. Only once airborne; from ZZZ-ZZZ1; was I made aware of the Flight Attendant's situation; and reported it immediately. I must not have all the information; because it appears that she called in sick on [date 1] with COVID symptoms; but was allowed to fly the [to] ZZZ1; then was on sick list again when she got to ZZZ1. Because I was in close proximity to the Flight Attendant with COVID symptoms for more than 15 minutes; I called in sick for the remainder of my trip.

Air carrier Captain reported concerns with being in close contact with a Flight Attendant that had called in sick the day before for COVID-19 like symptoms.

1573731

201808

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Haze / Smoke; 7

Daylight

7500

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Skywagon 185

2.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 4500

Situational Awareness

1573731

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors

Following a normal approach to landing at a back country airstrip; and during the rollout phase it appears as though the brakes were being applied by the right seat passenger. The wheel landing (which I have done literally 1;000's of times) seemed normal until the point at which the tail should have started to settle. The tail did not settle as expected and at this point the aircraft began a very gradual left turn and with the tail rising. The prop struck the ground. There were no injuries. The aircraft had only two front seat occupants; was full of fuel and any application of brakes at that time is not something that one should do. Having had lots of experience in this aircraft I am quite comfortable that A) Somebody had their feet on the brake(s) & B) I am relatively sure it was not me.

C185 pilot reported a prop strike occurred on landing roll when the passenger presumably applied the brakes at an inopportune moment.

1597917

201811

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

WI

22.0

10000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Personal

SR22

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 4000

1597917

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft

Climbing from 7;000 feet to 15;000 feet; noticed rising engine temperatures approaching 10;000 feet; initiated course reversal and descent. Tried to diagnose engine issue; but was unable to do so before completely losing power.

SR22 pilot reported an engine failure was preceded by rising engine temperatures.

1313038

201511

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Ground Spoiler

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 83

Troubleshooting

1313038

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 182

1313041.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

While landing; the ground spoilers deployed and then began to stow during the rollout. I wasn't exactly sure when it occurred during the landing. The Pilot Monitoring noticed it and returned the speedbrake handle to the deployed position. I thought it was something I had inadvertently done and didn't realize exactly how the sequence occurred. I figured since I didn't have a full picture on what just happened or why; we should fly the plane to the next destination; and if it happened again; we'd watch it more closely so we could describe it. We flew the plane to our next destination. In retrospect; that was a poor decision; and I believe I should have called a Maintenance Technician and given him all the information I could and have him take a look at it.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

Flight crew experienced an apparent ground spoiler problem on landing roll out and decide to watch the spoilers closer on landing next leg.

1353073

201604

1201-1800

OXC.Airport

CT

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

5000

Ground OXC

FBO

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Taxi

Wingtip

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 386; Flight Crew Type 298

Workload; Confusion; Situational Awareness

1353073

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

I departed my home base late afternoon and flew to OXC; arriving at approximately about a half hour later. I was flying solo (the sole occupant of the plane). Upon arriving at OXC; I requested taxi to the east side of field as I was meeting somebody there. The tower gave me taxi instructions and I proceeded. As I went to make a 180 degree turn to park the plane into the tie down; I misjudged my clearance on the left hand side; causing the plastic wing tip to strike a chain-link fence at an angle of about 10 degrees. Immediately upon realizing what happened; I shut down the aircraft; and a line crew member in the area helped me push the plane off the fence and to a more suitable location. Inspection of the damage revealed broken strobe and nav lights; some paint damage; and a small dent on the front left corner of the plastic wing tip. I immediately called our Operations Officer and we decided to have the plane towed to the maintenance shop to get a disposition on the plane. When the plane was towed; the FBO staff were all in consensus that the damage was very minor and cosmetic; and that as long as we unscrewed the bracket for one of the lights and taped over the dangling wiring harness from the lights; the plane could be flown back. With help from the FBO; the bracket was unscrewed; the area taped over; and the aircraft was flown back to its home base without incident; arriving back still during daylight hours.It is noteworthy that multiple people noted to me that I was far from the first person to strike a fence in that area. I was shown other places where planes struck; and have been told that some planes have even practically taken the fence out. While I accept fault for misjudging my clearance on my left side; it appears as though this spot for some reason poses a problem for pilots. Perhaps further action should be taken in the future to make the parking in this area more pilot-friendly.

A single engine pilot taxiing and turning to a tie down spot reported striking the wingtip on a chain link fence at OXC. The plastic wingtip; nav light; and strobe were damaged. Maintenance secured the damaged area which allowed the pilot to return to his home base.

1321481

201512

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Flap/Slat Control System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 179; Flight Crew Type 8607

Situational Awareness

1321481

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

After takeoff; the FO who was flying; seemed to be having trouble stabilizing the aircraft in roll. He kept working with the aileron and rudder trim. We elected to stop climbing upon reaching 15000 feet in order to analyze the problem. If the rudder and aileron trim were set back to '0' you had to hold the control wheel right wing down at 5 units according to the control wheel scale. If you let go; the aircraft rolled left at about 10 degrees per second. I elected to go into the cabin and see what I could see and the only thing I saw was the right spoiler slightly lifted as I expected. I did not look to see if all the trailing edges were even as the flap indicator showed full up and even pointers. After considerable difficulty of getting and maintaining communication with commercial radio were established. After discussing the problem with maintenance control; we elected to [advise ATC] and return to ZZZ as the best course of action. I told the flight attendants I had expected a normal landing and no evacuation. I informed the passengers we were returning to ZZZ and that they would see fire trucks and that was normal in the interest of extra precaution. After we began extending flaps for landing; the roll tendency diminished until reaching flaps 30. At which the FO said it seemed as though the aircraft wanted to roll to the right a little. We landed overweight with a smooth touchdown. After we got to the gate; a mechanic came to the flight deck and said that they had found the problem; the right inboard trailing edge flap had a broken actuator and was extended. All flight deck indicators indicated normal and proper indications at all times.Since the flap pointers were perfectly even; displaying full up; flap asymmetry just did not occur to us. There were no indications of any problem except the pronounced uncommanded roll. I told the FO that I wanted to go back and look at the wing. He opposed going into the cabin citing security concerns. He suggested having a flight attendant look. Personally; I felt like I would not get good information from a flight attendant in this situation. I called the FAs and they reported everything seemed normal to them. When I asked for someone to go look at the wing; they only handed the phone from one to another. So I told the FO I was going to go back and look and he concurred. Since the flap indicator was showing even needles and full up; I believe I had a preconceived expectation that the flaps were not the problem so I did not check them. I only looked at the spoilers mainly and they looked as expected. All it did was to further place in my mind that it was not a flap; slat or spoiler problem. I was hoping maintenance control would have another idea; however it seemed maintenance control was more interested in trying to get us to just use a combination of aileron and rudder trim to get the aircraft on down the road. After listening to him for a while and complying with his request; it became clear to me that his viewpoint was that this was a minor issue. I felt like the dispatcher did grasp the situation. We [advised ATC] and returned to ZZZ which were not far from. The FO was the PF and he did an excellent job throughout the flight and in all aspects of CRM.

B737 Captain reported being unable to stabilize the aircraft on its roll axis. Setting the aileron and rudder trim to zero; the pilot flying had to hold the control wheel right wing down five units; according to the control wheel scale; to stabilize the aircraft. After landing Maintenance informed the crew of the right inboard flap actuator being broken.

1170600

201405

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

24000.0

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Military

Widebody; Low Wing; 4 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Center ZZZ

Military

Large Transport; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.3

Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1170600

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

While working Sector XX/XY combined. Traffic volume was low; I had plenty of time to listen and hear what was happening around the room and to pre-plan my next few steps based on URET information. I knew there was an AR200 flight of two coming to my sector and was preparing for any odd military requests based on this. I heard an adjacent Controller (Sector XZ) take a request from the Aircraft X; to initiate a flight break up. Aircraft X forwarded the requested break up to the adjacent Controller. The adjacent Controller took the information and then proceeded to switch the aircraft to my frequency after acceptance of the handoff. I then queried the other Controller at Sector XZ; 'Do you have anything you need to tell me about Aircraft X?' The adjacent Controller said; 'I'm a little busy; I have three things going on.' Which is possible but still no excuse to not forward coordination information to me. The flight asks for a break up. Aircraft X and Aircraft Y request a split and I proceed to tag up Aircraft Y. I radar identify Aircraft Y and clear the aircraft on course to its requested route; a radial off of ZZZ ([a] VOR). I had traffic for Aircraft Y so I could only initially offer a vector away from the Aircraft X to allow Aircraft Y to climb from FL240 back to the Aircraft Y's orbit of FL350. During the middle of this I also had to vector out Aircraft X away from a ZZZ1 arrival [Aircraft Z] in order to get the [ZZZ1 arrival] down to meet its crossing restriction of FL270. This is a situation that should never arise. The unwritten rule in the area is AR200 shall not have arrivals stacked on top of the refueling track simply because there is little room to get the aircraft down. Back to Aircraft Y; as I continue to re-evaluate the Aircraft Y's flight I realize I cannot clear the aircraft higher than FL300 due to crossing FL310 traffic and I cannot clear Aircraft Y back to the orbit because there is a limited data block descending through my airspace without a handoff or point out. I asked the adjacent Controller (Sector XZ) what is this limited and he failed to acknowledge my question. I then proceeded to hand off Aircraft Y to Sector XZ on a heading to avoid the intruder limited. The adjacent Controller at Sector XZ was frustrated that Aircraft Y was left on a heading and without control turns the aircraft 90 degrees to the left and climbs the aircraft to FL350 in my airspace on course towards the requested ZZZ radial to resume the orbit. I then asked the Sector XZ Controller; what is going on with the Aircraft Y; he says; 'I'm not working him. [Another area] must have turned the airplane'. In all; the adjacent Controller fed me a no win situation of a ZZZ1 arrival on top of a flight breakup and violated my airspace twice.I know that [this reporting tool] is not a snitch program. I also understand as a reporting tool cadre that the intent of the program is to learn from situations. However I fear that the freedom from punishment or training has made many controllers lackadaisical in their duties and responsibilities. I do not understand how one individual can routinely violate the regulations without some form of correction. I explained the situation to my Supervisor and was told there isn't much she can do simply because she must build a case against the individual. I know the QA/QC order defines what kind of corrections can be taken and steps for this to occur. My real question is; 'What am I supposed to do as a controller?' I am witnessing negligence and am put into situations that I cannot; by law; look the other way on. I know people turn aircraft in each others airspace. I know not all appreq's are completed. I also know I don't want to be a snitch or complainer. I know this isn't the correct avenue to handle this problem. But what recourse do I have? The 7110 says that If I see an unsafe situation that I must do my best to correct it. 7110.65; 2-1-16; 'Do notassume that because someone else has responsibility for the aircraft that the unsafe situation has been observed and the safety alert issued; inform the appropriate controller.' Hence this report. I am more than happy to entertain any questions you may have. Please feel free to contact me.

Controller reports of complacent Controller at the next sector who isn't pointing out aircraft or following facility SOP; which leads reporter to become frustrated about the other controllers work ethics.

1268911

201505

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

6800.0

VMC

20

14000

CTAF ZZZ

FBO

Sail Plane

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Class G ZZZ

Cockpit Canopy Window

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 2788; Flight Crew Type 4.7

1268911

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

After a break for lunch from morning towing we returned to the airport and listened to the weather on AWOS. I commented that the time on AWOS was 3 minutes fast. Winds were SW at 8 knots. The others prepped aircraft for launch and towing. We towed the plane from the tie down area on the ramp to about the 1500 ft mark on the west side of the runway; crossing the grass between the runway and taxiway. We parked the glider outside of the line of the runway lights. I sat in the forward cockpit; fastened my seat harness; checked the controls; and made sure the spoilers were locked by pushing forward on the spoiler control while the tow-out gear was removed. Before the instructor entered the cockpit; he checked to make sure my harness was fastened. After the instructor was seated; he indicated that since this was my first winch launch; the flight would be to familiarize me with a winch launch; that he would do the flying; and that I was welcome to follow along on the controls. He also covered the sensations that I would feel during the launch. I adjusted my headrest to insure that my head would not tilt back. I checked with the instructor and turned on the master. We set the altimeters to field elevation and listened to the radio to follow local traffic while waiting for the tow line. We also talked about trim position and confirmed the position of the trim. I spent some time trying to get the S80 to turn on; although I was not successful. I do not specifically remember what else we discussed nor what else was done while waiting.After the tow line was attached the instructor made a radio call that we were taking the runway. We were pulled onto the runway. I operated the release and commented on how much farther I had to pull compared to the nose release. At this point we closed the canopies. I checked to make sure that the canopy pin was protruding from the front of the latch and again pushed forward on the spoilers to make sure that the spoilers were locked. I called out that my canopy was closed and locked and that spoilers were closed and locked. The instructor also called out canopy closed and locked and spoilers closed and locked and I saw the control stick move around its full range of travel. Upon the instructor's signals; the strop was attached to the tow line; we checked for traffic; and leveled the wings. I placed my right hand lightly on the stick; my feet lightly on the rudder pedals; and my left hand on my left leg. The instructor called on the radio 'slack; slack; slack'; and called out 'rope alive'. When the glider moved forward slightly; the instructor called on the radio 'go; go; go' and the glider accelerated forward. Somewhere during the process of getting ready on the runway; the instructor made a two-minute radio call and a launch radio call; but I do not remember where they were in the sequence.I remember a tremendous acceleration and the airspeed coming alive. We rotated and began a rapid climb. Airspeed and pitch were steady throughout the tow. Suddenly there was a rapid change in cockpit pressure. I saw the spoiler handle move aft; and there was a lot of dust moving around the cockpit. I looked out the left to confirm the spoiler was extended and it was. At this point I heard the instructor yell 'take the airplane' and I took control and yelled 'I have the airplane'. He apparently did not hear me and he again yelled 'take the airplane' as I was lowering the nose and closing the spoilers. So I yelled as loud as I could 'I have the plane'. I looked out the right side to make sure that the spoilers had closed and this is when I noticed that the rear canopy was slightly open. I got a glimpse of the rear canopy frame extending slightly past the glider cockpit frame. I do not remember the noise and I also do not remember the release from the tow line. I stabilized the glider; noticed the altimeter about 6800'and gingerly tried the controls. Everything was working fine and the glider was behaving normally. I could not see any damage. The instructor told me that the canopy had opened and was broken but intact. He also indicated that I should land the glider. I slowly accelerated to 70 MPH and retrimmed the glider. I made a shallow left turn and entered a high left downwind. I continued a normal approach; went through the landing checklist; landed on runway and stopped next to a taxiway. As we exited the glider; I noticed that the rear canopy was cracked with a circular piece missing on the right side. The eyebolt that holds the limit cord was also broken. The instructor had a cut on his right wrist and he indicated that his shoulder was sore. We pushed the glider back to the ramp.

A glider crew experienced a rear canopy malfunction resulting in a partially open rear canopy. Front-seat pilot landed the glider.

1645167

201905

0.0

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1645167

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Other eyewitness

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

This is a general report regarding some techniques I've seen from First Officers (mostly new hires). They are being taught that since we have higher target speeds it's ok to intentionally fly below the glideslope and inside of 200 ft it's ok to dive for the runway as 'we won't hit anything now'. This is leading to harder landings; either too slow or too fast target speeds and is normalizing deviance. Additionally going into LAX they are being taught to purposely land off centerline since it is a 'bumpy' runway. The training department should address these techniques.

B737 Captain reported concern regarding some training techniques that are presented to the new hire pilots.

1206216

201409

1201-1800

CNO.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

Clear; 10

Daylight

12000

Tower CNO

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 98; Flight Crew Type 17

Training / Qualification

1206216

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

I was practicing pattern work when I made my 3rd out of 3 approaches. The first approach was a touch n go; the second was a practice go around; and the 3rd was a normal approach. As I recall the wind was from 230 @ 10 knots. My set up for approach was good with no issues descending at approximately 300 feet per minute; then reducing down to 50 feet per minute; on final approach; with an approach speed of 80-85 mph indicated. I added my 3rd and final notch of flaps approximately 500 yds from the end of runway 26L; which I was cleared for the option for by ATC. Upon touchdown at around 65 mph; a strong wind gust from the left pushed my plane hard toward the right hand side of the runway. The plane also lifted back up a few feet as I was in the process of pulling my flaps back up. I attempted to steer back toward the left but the plane; by this time on the ground; continued to pull toward the right side. The plane then veered left at approximately a 60 degree angle; I did not attempt to correct the pull as I did not wish to tip the plane; and there was soft grass and short brush just off of runway 26L which appeared to be a safe location to come to a stop in. The plane rolled into the tall grass/brush. I completed a check list shut down of the engine; contacted the tower that I would need assistance pushing the plane off of the grass and back to the runway. I exited the plane and waited for airport personnel. The airport personnel assisted in turning my plane back toward runway 26L until my wheels were clear of the tall grass and brush. I started the engine back up; contacted the tower; then taxied back to my tie down spot. There was no damage to the aircraft noted. I learned from the this incident that I need to have improved command of my aircraft in terms of set up for a crosswind landing; to pull the flaps up to normal setting more quickly rather than leaving them in the full down position as I did in this case. I believe that this was the main reason for my failure to maintain control of my landing roll; or for why the aircraft ballooned once on the runway. My approach and landing speeds could have also been less; along with a more efficient crab angle into the cross wind that was occurring. I intend to seek out a CFI for further training with my aircraft; specifically for crosswind landings and procedures.I learned a great lesson from this incident; and will think of it often as I continue with my aviation pursuits.

PA-28-180 pilot reported loss of control during landing in gusty wind conditions that resulted in excursion from the runway surface into grass and brush. No damage noted.

1741756

202003

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

3.0

Part 121

Passenger

Company

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

1741756

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors

Company Policy

I contacted Scheduling once I landed in ZZZZ. I wanted to return on the outbound flight that was completely empty. Scheduling informed me that I needed to [be] with crew and stay in ZZZZ. I expressed my concerns of staying with the crew. Then getting on 2 other aircraft and staying in 2 Hotels. Scheduling wanted to know the reason for my concern. I begin to explain that I received called before I left for my trip; that I have come in contact with a crew member that tested positive [for] COVID-19. Scheduling immediately turned me over to the Duty Manager on duty that evening back in ZZZ. I tried to explain the situation; and who was the person telling me the details of my interaction. And the scheduler that told me that I had to either do the trip or remove myself from the trip.I explained to Manager the person that called me to inform me of my contact with the crew member with COVID-19. And also explained what the Scheduler wanted me to do. Then I tried to explain the concern of the Captain of why I was on the trip in the first place. Manager explained he wanted me to continue on the trip. To stay at the hotel and continuing on with the crew on the rest of the trip. Manager informed me that someone from the COVID team would be calling me at the hotel within [X] hours. None of which ever happened.At this point of arriving in ZZZZ. The only thing I wanted to do is come home. I would like to know the reason why I could not do that. So would my crew and so would the flight deck. Please give me a reason why I had to stay in two hotels and try to self quarantine myself. After working the full flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZZ. Then staying at the hotel in ZZZZ. Then deadheading from ZZZZ to ZZZ2. Staying in a hotel in ZZZ2. And then continue on another flight from ZZZ2 to ZZZ1. No I'm not a doctor but listening to the experts; the scientist and the doctors. The best thing would have to turn me around and send me home. So please tell me why that was not done. And what was the purpose of keeping me there.

Flight Attendant reported being asked to continue flying after being notified of being in contact with a crew member who had tested positive for COVID-19.

1772363

202011

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Installation; Testing; Inspection

Pitot-Static System

X

Malfunctioning

Company

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Workload

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1772363

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Other Post Flight

General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Staffing; Aircraft; Manuals

Human Factors

Aircraft X had a BTB for a Captain pitot static amber EICAS warning. We quickly determined it was a probe. We have an FAK with a R/H probe in inventory. We needed an LH probe. We were able to get one from company; we installed the probe; Ops checked probe; accomplished the paperwork. Had multiple conversations with Tech and [Maintenance Control]. Deferred the aerodynamic sealant with a 767 desk. No mention in B767 MM 34-11-01 OF RII . ETOPS was noted for ice/rain (mm 30-31). When I awoke this AM; I had a friend look up in GMM ATA 34 FOR RII and then notified [Maintenance Control] of a possible situation my next step was my report. There was 1 mechanic at ZZZ that was ETOPS qualified; me who accomplished task; [and] we had another who was RII but not ETOPS.

Technician reported not having correct qualifications to perform and sign off the log book for a Captain's Pitot Probe replacement.

1200236

201408

0601-1200

OXR.Airport

CA

2000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

TRACON NTD

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

VOR / VORTAC CMA

Initial Approach

Class D OXR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 784; Flight Crew Type 651

Situational Awareness

1200236

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

I passed the final approach fix (FAF) well below specified minimum altitude while flying the OXR VOR 25 approach.I had not flown this approach for a long time; and chose to do so as part of maintaining general IFR proficiency. I failed to achieve a stabilized approach while on the approach segment leading to the CMA VOR; which is the FAF. At one point I realized I was higher than intended; and started a too aggressive correction toward 2;000 FT; which is the FAF crossing minimum. By the time I realized I had failed to halt my descent at 2;000; the VOR was in the zone when neither the TO nor the FROM flag was showing. Thus I thought I might already be passed the FAF. I was not sure I had passed the FAF. I was not sure I had passed the FAF below minimums until informed by ATC a few moments later.

C172 pilot reported descending below the FAF crossing altitude during a practice VOR Runway 25 approach to OXR in day VMC. ATC detected the error.

1684449

201909

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Dawn

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 193; Flight Crew Total 20175; Flight Crew Type 7711

1684449

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

The event was a low speed rejected takeoff. Around 80-90 kts we received a door forward cargo ECAM. As per my brief on rejected takeoff; I assumed aircraft control and rejected the takeoff. I believe the maximum speed attained was around 90 kts. The auto brakes engaged and pulled the aircraft to the right. I immediately disengaged the auto brakes and corrected back to runway center-line using both the rudder pedals and the tiller. I immediately released all brake applications because we were slowing down nicely and the next high speed taxiway was still down the runway a bit. I asked the FO (First Officer) to make a call to the Tower telling them we were aborting the takeoff and required no assistance. I applied brakes as we pulled off the runway on Taxiway XX and then on to Taxiway XY.I then looked at the brake temperatures which were around 400 and climbing slowly. I then made an announcement to the passengers explaining what had just happened and that there was nothing to worry about and that we would have to coordinate with Maintenance and allow the brakes to cool off. I then called [Maintenance Control] and explained the situation. We came to an agreement that it was best to go to a gate and get Maintenance [to] look at the door and get brake fans to cool the brakes. I then asked the FO to call Operations and coordinate for a gate; Maintenance; and arrange for brake fans. We proceeded to the gate; blocked in; and released the parking brake after we confirmed that all wheels were chalked. They took a little bit to get the fans in place. The temperatures reached around 675 on the left and around 770 on the right. Once the brake fans were in place; the temperatures came down quickly. Sometime during all of this when we were parked at the gate; the fuse plugs on the right side tires melted. After the brakes cooled off; we changed the 2 right side tires. We called Dispatch and coordinated for a new release and more gas.

A319 Captain reported rejecting takeoff due to receiving a door forward cargo alert through ECAM.

1646690

201905

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

19000.0

IMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Citation Excel (C560XL)

2.0

IFR

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Engine Air Pneumatic Ducting

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Distraction

1646690

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

While climbing through approximately FL190-FL200; the right engine fire light illuminated. I called for the INFLIGHT ENGINE FIRE QRC (Quick Reference Checklist) and my First Officer performed that while I took the radios. The light extinguished within three seconds of bringing the thrust lever to idle. We notified ATC; leveled off at FL220 then immediately started a descent and a diversion into ZZZ. I'm not sure if I missed him reading it or if he missed reading that line; but we did not catch that we should have then conducted the ENGINE INOP APPROACH and ENGINE INOP LANDING QRC's. Knowing that we still needed to run more checklists; but with several things running through my head at that point we forgot that we should have remained in the QRC; we conducted the ENGINE FIRE and the SINGLE-ENGINE Approach and Landing Abnormal/Emergency Cessna Checklists. After landing we stopped on the runway to allow the ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting) trucks to evaluate. They said no fire; so we taxied to the FBO and shutdown normally. Maintenance was at the aircraft shortly thereafter and removed the engine cowling's for inspection. They had an opportunity to inspect the aircraft before we left the FBO property and they stated that there was evidence the light was probably the result of a bleed leak from a bad coupling. I reviewed the single engine procedures and the emergency checklists after securing the aircraft. I will continue to study these on a more frequent basis to ensure I am extremely familiar with the QRC. In addition; with any future emergencies; I will be sure to slow down my non-flying pilot if they are 'breezing' through the QRC and make them read it in a very slow and deliberate manner. I think I let the threat of fire (despite the light being extinguished) push me towards the approach and landing instead of ensuring we were precisely following correct procedures. I do understand that there is a balance between perceived urgency of the situation and being too 'wrapped up' in correct procedures. My last suggestion is to make a change to the QRC that would help to highlight or draw the eye to any lines that direct us to another QRC. Perhaps a larger font; different font; bold font or another color font.

CE-560XLS flight crew encountered Engine Fire Warning in flight.

1236537

201501

1801-2400

ABQ.Airport

NM

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed WIng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144; Flight Crew Type 8618

1236537

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

Airport

The overnight remote aircraft parking location for ABQ between Taxiway 'A' and the airport terminal gates presents a hazard to aircraft parking at gates [at the south side of the terminal]. To terminate an aircraft at gate [those gates] when aircraft are 'remoted'; taxiing aircraft do not have a lead-in line to follow as the extended safety zone for [these gates] to taxi way 'A' is partially blocked by the remoted aircraft. This requires aircraft to taxi between unlit aircraft with no taxi lines to follow to ensure aircraft clearance.At the western end of the remote parking spots there is a taxi line that goes around the remote parking spots and the terminal for the first two of the eight remote parking spots. This line provides taxi guidance between the first two remote parking spots and the gates but then goes into a terminal gate. Taxi lines should be painted that give aircraft a safe taxi route from taxiway Alpha to the terminal gates with aircraft parked at the remote parking spots to the south of the terminal.

An air carrier Captain expressed concern that the remote parking area between the gates on the south side of the terminal and Taxiway A at ABQ is hazard for taxiing aircraft inbound to those gates. This is of particular concern because there is no taxi lead in line on the ramp to insure an aircraft is centered in the remaining gap. The Captain also notes that aircraft at both the terminal and the remote area are unlit; further compromising safe passage.

1565249

201808

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

34000.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

Powerplant Fuel Indication

X

Malfunctioning

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 1735.90; Flight Crew Type 1735.90

1565249

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

Just prior to Level off at FL 340 both blue engine fuel valve closed lights indication lights illuminated bright blue; ENGINE 1 & 2 High Pressure Shut Off Valve CB's popped. Engine all normal indication; used ARINC conferenced With Dispatch; Technical Support Maintenance Control; [and] Chief Pilot. Notified ATC [and] landed in ZZZ.

B737 Captain reported multiple engine fuel and bleed air anomaly indications just prior to leveling off at cruise altitude.

1662146

201907

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Military

Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Class D ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Distraction; Workload

1662146

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Airspace Structure

Aircraft X on a vector for a RNAV 33 approach on the outside vector for the crosswind to downwind entered the obstruction ring for 2500 at 2000 ft. I was also dealing with a heavy aircraft and trying to fix the flight plan and steering clear of an active MOA while also vectoring additional aircraft for their approaches. I should have turned Aircraft X sooner and then commenced with dealing with other facilities on the landlines.

TRACON Controller reported aircraft was vectored into a higher MVA.

1038702

201209

1201-1800

RDG.Airport

PA

170.0

3.0

4000.0

Mixed

Turbulence; 10

Daylight

3000

TRACON RDG

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Cruise

Direct

Class E RDG

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 3900; Flight Crew Type 350

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1038702

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

We requested the RNAV 26 approach. We were cleared direct HEDED; a waypoint with which we were not familiar. Flight conditions were a broken cloud deck at our altitude with moderate chop; good VFR conditions below. [The aircraft was] equipped with an Avidyne Entegra flight deck and two Garmin GTN 650 touch screen navigators. We displayed the RNAV 26 approach on the MFD and it did not display HEDED nor was HEDED on the paper en route charts. We manually entered HEDED as the active waypoint. The MFD showed that we had just passed HEDED and we requested further instructions. However; the Controller advised that we were still approximately 10 miles to the north of HEDED and we advised that the MFD was clearly showing that we had passed HEDED. We advised the Controller and circled around in a right turn to intercept HEDED and the Controller inquired as to our intentions. We explained the discrepancy between the Controller's report of our position and the MFD clear depiction of HEDED almost at our then present position. The huge discrepancy caused us to be confused and in order to avoid a possibly dangerous situation we cancelled the RNAV 26 approach and requested a visual approach to LNS which was completed without problems. Once safely on the ground; we realized that HEDED had been entered as a user waypoint at our present position at the time of entry and that when the MFD displayed the approach chart; it had started up in a zoom configuration so that HEDED was off screen and not visible. The only depiction we had regarding the location of HEDED showed HEDED 10 miles to the north northeast of its actual position. We're not sure how HEDED was entered as a user waypoint (perhaps; in the turbulence; and the difficulty in using a touch screen that we accidentally created a user waypoint). However; the displayed misinformation confused two experienced instrument pilots. We feel that the data entry error coupled with the MFD approach chart depiction starting in a zoomed view rather than a standard view (so that the correct information which would have been at the extreme edge of the display was never presented) created a dangerous situation. The GPS navigator should never have accepted a user waypoint with the same spelling as a published designated waypoint. There were no [traffic] conflicts involved.

After discovering a large discrepancy between the GPS and the Controller's location of a fix; the pilots of an experimental aircraft cancelled the RNAV approach and flew a visual approach. Pilots later determined that they had accidentally entered the fix as a user waypoint at their current location.

1854281

202111

0001-0600

SFO.Airport

CA

VMC

Night

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Other Instrument Approach

Class B SFO

Ground SFO

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

None

Other Tow

None

Aircraft X; Facility SFO.TOWER

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Radar 22

1854281

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Air Traffic Control

Other Towing

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Human Factors; Airport

Procedure

Runway 1R was closed because last week's storm knocked out all of the 80+ lights and signs associated with the Runway exits; which still has about [many] days to go for repairs. There is also a long term closure of Taxiway Zulu at Taxiway Charlie that creates a need for all inbound and outbound maintenance repositioning aircraft; as well as traffic to Runway 1L or 1R; to cross mid filed. So this was a night time; VMC; calm wind night coordination for crossing midfield between Local and Ground.The arrival was on about a five mile final when coordination took place to cross Runways 28L and 28R with this towing aircraft at Kilo. There was also a coordination to complete the crossing of Runway 28L at Delta with another aircraft under tow that was inconsequential to the event. The coordination was crossing on Grounds frequency after an aircraft landed Runway 28L. I told the arrival to turn left at Echo; traffic crossing downfield twice. They acknowledged and I advised Ground I had their acknowledgement and they issued the crossings. I believe they gave the Kilo crossing first; and then the Delta. In between; as soon as I had the exiting confirmed at Echo; I cleared an aircraft for takeoff Runway 1L; the arrival had just rolled through and was approaching Echo. This should have worked all day. As the aircraft under tow started moving at Kilo; they were looking good in my scan with their breakaway movement; then tragedy struck. I guess they were loaded with gas; because it did not work. Their extremely slow movement up to and over the hump (apex of the runway we normally see when an aircraft arrival has shut down one of their engines between the runways) and it takes just a little more for them to clear the middle high spot of the runway on crossing. It was decided at the beginning of the approach lights; it was not going to work.I sent the arrival aircraft around; with runway heading and three thousand; which they read back clearly and performed. I performed the coordination with NorCal Approach and then shipped them off to Departure. I would think that the tug driver would say out of caution that they were full of gas and heavier than usual before accepting the crossing; as this was very unusual for a regular crossing fleet with the Taxiway Zulu construction requiring midfield crossings.

SFO Local Controller reported a situation where a towing air carrier aircraft did not tow fast enough across the runway causing an arrival aircraft to go around.

1437990

201606

0601-1200

SSI.Airport

GA

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CTAF SSI

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Takeoff / Launch

FBO

DA42 Twin Star

1.0

Part 91

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 4500

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1437990

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 2000; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Human Factors

The [student pilot] was beginning a soft-field takeoff on runway 4 at SSI when she observed the Diamond Twin-star in the flare for landing runway 22 at the 1000 foot marker. I took the controls and was able to slow the airplane and exit the runway to avoid a collision. I followed the Twin-star to the ramp to talk with the pilot about what had just occurred. He was a [local pilot] and admitted he had been on the wrong CTAF frequency.

C172 instructor pilot reported taking control on the takeoff roll and exiting the runway to avoid a collision with landing traffic coming from the opposite direction at the non-towered SSI airport.

1637623

201904

PSP.Airport

CA

VMC

Night

TRACON PSP; Tower PSP

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 31L

Final Approach

Other VOR OR GPS-B

Class C PSP

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 128; Flight Crew Total 9335; Flight Crew Type 9335

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction

1637623

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

During night VMC conditions; we were assigned to fly the VOR GPS B approach to 31L at PSP. This approach; we were told; was the only authorized approach into PSP due to a radar outage. We requested the RNAV Y (RNP) and were told 'unable' by ATC. This VOR approach that was flown had many threats embedded in it. This being the first time having flown this approach; I was unaware of its complexities. First; the approach makes you remain over 700 feet high on the 3 to 1 glide path at the final approach fix. We recognized this and configured early. The approach is also offset which places the aircraft in a trajectory toward rapidly rising terrain and a necessary descent rate of 1;900-1;500 FPM just to 'capture' the VASI. The outcome of the approach was successful without any GPWS alerts and we achieved stabilized approach criteria just in time to meet our 500 feet gate. It was a 'scramble' to achieve and certainly had many distractions such as trying to capture the glide path from above; rapid descent toward terrain and realigning with the runway. It seems to me that no CAT C or D aircraft should attempt this approach as you begin at the final approach fix way behind the stabilized approach criteria gate; I.E.; not in landing configuration and on glide path. Again; it leaves you 700 feet too high.On the ground; we queried ATC why we could not have flown either the RNAV visual or RNAV RNP and he stated it is the Local Control Tower policy to only allow VOR GPS B approaches to be flown during radar outages. There are no other restrictions on flying the RNAV's except 'local policy.'In the future; I would strongly urge [Company] to restrict our aircraft from flying the VOR GPS B as having seen it first hand; it is an approach with too many threats and a set up for failure (being forced to remain 700 feet high at final approach fix). I would not feel comfortable accepting this approach again.

B737 First Officer reported the VOR OR GPS-B approach to PSP increases the flight crew's workload and has the potential of creating an unstable approach for this category aircraft.

1869381

202201

0001-0600

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Parked

ILS/VOR

X

Failed

Air Carrier

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1869381

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

I'm writing to address a concern that there is an issue with the B737 MAX. Since it has returned to service; after the global grounding; I have flown it at least 13 times. I previously addressed this concern with an aviation group; but my dialogue with them came to no resolution; and it appeared there wasn't much concern.The matter I want to clarify is performing the ILS test on the First Officer side. Outside of one time on Date 1; it has never functioned correctly (12 failures). It fails each time you perform the test. It functions properly on the Captain side; but not on the First Officer side. I inform the Captain of the failure and explain the Guidance Maintenance Control will probably take; which is to pull X circuit breaker; then run the test again. Many Captains are reluctant to make an entry into the Maintenance logbook. I attempt to explain that unless we write up the discrepancy; it will continue to be ignored. After nearly a year and no guidance from Flight Operations; I'm guessing it will continue to be ignored. I am not sure how to escalate the issue rather than filing a report and hoping the aviation group will explore the matter in greater detail. Please reach out to me if you have addition questions.

B737 MAX pilot reported the ILS test on the First Officer side fails repeatedly. Reporter stated the problem exists and no one has been able to answer him as to why it fails.

1732916

202003

0601-1200

ABE.Tower

PA

800.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ABE

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1732916

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Departing ABE as per tower instructions and Company SOPs; a TCAS RA was triggered at approximately 800 ft. AGL during initial climb out. Flaps had not yet been retracted (20 degrees) and autopilot had not yet been selected on. The TCAS RA was followed; as well as a late vectoring from ABE Tower. The TCAS RA's required descent triggered a 'Don't Sink' aural from the aircraft GPWS.TCAS TA was triggered at approximately 500 ft. AGL as well as pilot monitoring identifying the aircraft in sight. Tower simultaneously vectored [us] to heading 280; and general aviation aircraft to turn away. TCAS RA was triggered during the turn and the TCAS RA was followed until the situation was resolved. ABE Control Tower cleared [us] for departure; runway heading; up to 3;000 ft. (I believe). At the same time; ABE Approach vectored a general aviation light aircraft directly into [our] initial climb out path. Tower and Approach failed to communicate to one another the instructions given and caused two aircraft to be vectored onto a collision course.An immediate turn to heading 280 was initiated; however; during the turn the TCAS RA was triggered indicating the need for a 3;000 ft./min descent. The resolution was resolved before a full 3;000 ft./min descent was achieved. A GPWS 'Don't Sink' aural was triggered during the TCAS RA's required action. This event occurred at 800 ft. AGL. No limitations were broken during the TCAS RA maneuver. The previously instructed heading; climb; and initial climb SOP procedures were followed after the resolution.Due to lack of internal ATC communication between approach and tower; [we were] accidentally cleared for departure into another aircraft. The TCAS RA which occurred during the initial climb-out at 800 ft. suggested that [we] descend at 3;000 ft./min. Luckily the RA was resolved before 3;000 ft./min was achieved; and autopilot had not yet been activated (increasing reaction time from pilot flying). The rate of descent the TCAS required triggered a 'Don't Sink' call from the GPWS; leading me to believe that the resolution of one situation could have caused the creation of another.

CRJ-900 First Officer reported that a TCAS RA commanded a descent shortly after departure that caused a GPWS 'Don't sink' alert.

1069723

201302

1801-2400

ZZZ.Tower

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

DA40 Diamond Star

VFR

Other VFR Traffic Pattern

None

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Aerobatic

Taxi

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1069723

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Handoff / Assist

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

1069740.0

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors

I was working Local Control 2 which controls Runway XXL and Ground Control coordinated via the land line behind short final cross Runway XXL at intersection Delta and it was approved. I was watching Diamond Star on short final at the same time [another aircraft] crossed the hold bars Diamond Star advised that he was going around. The go around was conducted before the aircraft reached the landing threshold.

I was working the Assistant Local Position monitoring LC1. Ground Control had coordinated a runway crossing at Taxiway Delta with Local 2 and Local 1. I had just received an IFR release from TRACON and was off monitor for a few seconds and then returned to listening to Local 1. Local 2 shouted out something about going around traffic was crossing. When I looked at the situation Diamond Star was starting a Climbing GO Around on Runway XXL and [another aircraft] was stopped about half way between the runway edge and the Hold Short lines. Recommendation; I do not believe we need to make any changes in procedure. The inexperienced Ground Controller should have said what he originally intended too.

Tower Controller described a go around event when coordination between a Local Controller and Ground Controller was confused and Ground Controller cleared an aircraft to cross a runway with traffic on short final.

1845810

202110

1201-1800

ESN.Airport

MD

2.0

450.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ESN

Military

Helicopter

2.0

VFR

Training

Final Approach

Class D ESN

UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Class D ESN

Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Aircraft / UAS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Military

First Officer; Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Rotorcraft

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 860

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Training / Qualification

1845810

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Vertical 50

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Ambiguous

While executing the ILS 04 into ESN on Date at approximately XA:30; our crew witnessed a small drone pass over the helicopter (50 ft. above helicopter). Our helicopter was within 2 miles from the field at approximately 450 ft. when the drone passed 50 ft. over the helicopter. The drone was approximately 2-3 ft. wide and white/silver. It appeared to have 2 rotors; but may been a fixed-wing type. The drone was reported to ESN tower who notified all aircraft on the ILS 04 and operating at the airfield. The drone was not seen again.

Helicopter flight crew had a near miss with a UAS while on an ILS approach and notified ATC.

1339222

201603

0601-1200

CLT.Airport

NC

VMC

Daylight

TRACON CLT

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B CLT

TRACON CLT

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B CLT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1339222

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1339104.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

On a vector for approach to Runway 23; both Runway 23 and B757 traffic 3nm ahead in sight; CLT Approach Control cleared us for the Visual Approach Runway 23. Upon intercepting the final approach course; we encountered wake turbulence from the preceding B757; which contributed to us going through the final approach course. As we turned back to re-intercept the final approach course; re-encountered wake turbulence which then contributed to us going through the final approach course again. CLT Approach Control intervened and vectored us off the approach to re-enter to an uneventful approach and landing on Runway 23. I suspect the event occurred because we were within the range of the B757 wake. I suggest further separation from traffic ahead.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A321 flight crew reported two track deviations from cleared course when wake turbulence from a preceding B757 was encountered during approach to CLT.

1315215

201512

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

7000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 218; Flight Crew Total 4297; Flight Crew Type 4297

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1315215

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1315252.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

While in the descent/arrival phase of flight; we were cleared direct to a fix and to descend and maintain 7000 ft. At this time Center also handed us off to the next Center. In compliance with the clearance; we proceeded direct to the fix and descended to 7000 ft. The hand-off to the next Center was successful and the Captain was able to establish communication. However; as we were approaching the fix; with no further clearance; the Captain attempted to query the new Center 2-3 times for further instructions. With no response; as we passed the fix at 7000 ft.; I initiated a right procedure turn (northwest) and initiated a descent to 2500 ft. As we completed the procedure turn; the Captain was able to re-establish communication. The Center Controller expressed concern about the fact that we had proceeded past the fix and descended below 7000 ft without further clearance. However; he did not ask for follow-up communication via landline. The Center Controller cleared us to continue the RNAV (GPS) approach. We landed without incident and cancelled our flight plan once we were on the ground.Once we determined we were not in contact with Center; we had no way of knowing when or if we would be able to re-establish communication with them and we had a limited amount of fuel left. Additionally; TCAS displayed no other aircraft operating in the area. Based on these circumstances; the Captain and I decided to fly the published RNAV (GPS) approach procedure and proceed to the airport.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

An Air Carrier flight crew lost communication with ATC in the final phase of flight and during approach. Communication was regained prior to landing.

1155561

201403

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Galley Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 215; Flight Crew Total 18625; Flight Crew Type 9638

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Crew

1155561

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure

Procedure

This report concerns the omission of a potentially significant maintenance log item from the pilot's flight planning maintenance review papers. Because I was the author of the original write-up about a week before; I was aware of its existence. Seeing that we were assigned the same aircraft for this day's flight I informed the Captain the aircraft had had two items that prevented us from flying it the week prior. One item was the failure of the right system hydraulic pressure low light to come on when it should (when system not pressurized). The more significant item; in my opinion; was finding the galley Circuit Breaker (CB) on the cockpit overhead panel popped. When we pulled the flight papers at the airport; this last item (the popped CB) was missing from the log history. Although the log history reflected other items going back [well prior to my first write-up] this item was missing. Some history from the earlier fight. As I boarded the aircraft the flight attendants notified me that the entire aft galley lacked power. Entering the cockpit; I noticed the galley CB on the overhead panel popped. I notified Maintenance; and made a write-up. Maintenance attempted a reset of the CB; and it immediately popped. Hours later; the only way the CB would stay in was if the mechanics removed all power from the aft galley (via pulling CB's in the galley and in the EE compartment). They could not otherwise isolate the source of the electrical problem. More extensive investigation was required. That; coupled with the inability to get the hydraulic pressure light to come on; meant the airplane was grounded. We were assigned another aircraft to fly.After completing that flight I went to the office and pulled up the aircraft history on our dated computer system. Under our standard maintenance review code I found my original write-up; with the corrective action noted (maintenance replaced ELCU per [Maintenance Manual] Ops Checked Normal.) I further noticed another galley write up from several days earlier. The mid galley oven was written up as 'Oven running with door open and produced a lot of heat.' The repair stated 'Replaced oven.' I do recall seeing that in the log history when we operated the flight. But there was a further maintenance history item dated the same day that I am fairly certain did not show up in the pilot's papers: 'Wall bordering mid galley oven is charred.' This is a write-up I hope I would remember. Again; I am fairly certain it wasn't in the history provided the pilots. I am left to surmise that when the mid-galley oven was replaced; the charred wall was discovered. This item seems to be of a piece with the galley oven write up; and I believe should have shown up in the pilots' version of the log history. With the [implementation of the] electronic logbook; pilots must now rely on the log history printout supplied with the flight papers to ascertain [their aircraft's] maintenance history. There is another way to check the history; however; and that is through our [dated computers] in flight offices. Most pilots no longer use these as the software is being phased out; and is virtually useless anymore. But; it still has maintenance functions; a blessing really; if you want to avail yourself of them. The ONLY way I could verify this missing write-up was to conduct a search on this Jurassic system. I certainly hope the company does not remove this tool from the pilots' domain.I called Maintenance Control about the omission. The Controller looked up the history and found the CB write-up. When I told him it was missing from the pilot's [flight planning] version of the log history; he could not explain it (but confirmed it should be there.) I have heard anecdotes from other pilots complaining that known maintenance items were sometimes missing in the flight plan log history. This is the first time I could verify it myself. I have lost some measure of faith in the integrity of the data supplied the pilots. How can a log history show pilots every stuck; now fixed; window shade and every stuck; now fixed; reading lamp; but drop an electrical defect that could result in a fire? How can a significant item escape pilot review simply because a mechanic found it and repaired it? Does the pilot care by whom it was found? Or; does the pilot want to know the entire; recent; history of the airplane; so trends can be spotted; and potential trouble spots noted? Information is power. Pilots share unusual cabin histories with their co-workers. When something odd happens in-flight; knowing what went on before can often inform the crew's response. If the flight attendant in the galley notices a burning smell; rather than dismiss it as an overheated food wrapping or crumbs left behind; perhaps knowing there was a serious issue with the galley/oven previously would lead the crew to remove all power to that oven.As an aside; there is an 'unable to operate' section of the log history. I did not realize until now that unable to operate remarks would only be entered for pilot refusals based on maintenance status. If the pilot makes a log entry and maintenance removes the airplane from service; to correct that non-deferrable defect; no unable to operate entry is made. If the airplane truly is unable to operate; I think it should be noted in the flight papers; regardless of who made that determination.

A comprehensive report from a B757 First Officer describing incomplete maintenance data provided to the flight crew regarding a potentially hazardous condition with which the reporter had first hand knowledge from a week previous flight on the same aircraft.

992639

201202

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

13000.0

Icing

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Golden Eagle 421

Part 91

IFR

Descent

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Other / Unknown

992639

Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Weather

While at the Sector; I was receiving numerous icing reports. Aircraft X departed northbound; requesting 18;000 FT. Eighteen thousand feet was not usable due to low altimeters; so I asked the pilot if he wanted 16;000 FT or 20;000 FT. He chose 16;000 FT. The aircraft turned around in the adjacent airspace due to severe icing and was handed back to me at 13;000 FT; my control. I descended him to 11;300 FT; my lowest MIA; but he could not maintain altitude due to icing. I asked him if he had the terrain in site; and he said no. He was IMC. I informed my supervisor that I had an emergency situation. I kept the pilot updated on the MIA and when he would be able to get lower. At one point he was 1;500 FT below my MIA. I advised him that we have a 2;000 FT buffer in mountainous terrain so he could be as close as 500 FT to an obstacle. I issued a heading for him to fly to get to lower terrain sooner. I then asked my supervisor to pull up a terrain chart so I could estimate his proximity to the closest obstacle. I informed him that he was south of the highest obstacle that we depicted on the chart and kept assigning the lowest altitudes possible. He was able to get his departure airport in sight about six miles out. He chose to do a visual approach.

An Enroute Controller reported that an IFR aircraft was below MIA and unable to hold altitude in an emergency situation due to icing.

989705

201201

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Ramp ZZZ

Fractional

Challenger CL604

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Parked

Aircraft Logbook(s)

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Fatigue; Workload; Situational Awareness

989705

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Other Person

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

Near the end of a five leg; sixteen hour duty day that ended at shortly before dawn; I MEL'ed four cabin items. Three of the items were passenger convenience items covered by MEL 25-60-3. Item number three of four was covered by MEL 25-20-1-2. Leg three was supposed to be our last. Prior to leg two I was notified that operations was unable to contact the FBO at our final destination where we were to arrive around midnight with passengers. Prior to leg three we still did not know if the FBO at our destination was going to be open. We contacted Operations while in flight on our way to that destination and was told that the FBO would be closed and would we be willing to reposition the airplane to help in the recovery of an international flight later that morning. It would put us right at sixteen hours duty time. I conferred with the rest of the crew and we decided to position the plane. Because the FBO was closed we did not have enough fuel to make a flight non-stop to the reposition destination so operations had us stop for fuel. I felt somewhat tired on the last leg into our final destination but a cup of coffee helped maintain my alertness at a satisfactory level. After landing my mind and body started relaxing and I filled out the flight log and was made aware of some items in the cabin that were broken/inoperative so I wrote them up and contacted Maintenance with the MEL book on the dash of the airplane. Maintenance gave me the information needed to fill out the sheet at the front of the MEL book and I did not have my MEL copy opened to the offending MEL as I had another MEL to fill in after it. My plan was to review the MEL book when I finished filling in the MEL sheet and I did look at 25-60-3; but failed to look at 25-20-1-2. I am not sure why I missed this very important step; but I did. It may have been the unwinding effect of finishing up a sixteen hour day. It might have been the time of day. It might have been the pressure to close out our duty day before our normal one hour duty on the ground. It probably was a bit of the three. I believe I have a reputation for striving to be as compliant with the SOP's; FAR's; and Operation Spec's as any pilot at this carrier and the one time I missed looking at one single MEL it was the one that I needed to really look at as it was a (M) maintenance required item. I would not have allowed the aircraft to remain in a 'B' status had I done what I always had done previously. I flew home the next day. To avoid a recurrence of this event I will never again accept any duty over fourteen hours and when I find myself getting tired I will greatly slow my 'Professional Pace' to accommodate any possible reduced alertness. I have always looked at each MEL that is open on an aircraft that I accept and each that I write up so I will redouble my efforts to continue to do so.

A CL604 Captain failed to note a MEL item that he entered in the maintenance log at the end of a sixteen hour day required maintenance attention before the next flight.

1205654

201409

1801-2400

OAK.Airport

CA

IMC

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 30

Initial Approach

Tablet

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface

1205654

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Airport; Company Policy; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

Ambiguous

[We had] planned RNAV30 approach into Oakland because notams said long term outage of ILS30. Upon reaching NORCAL approach control; they told us to expect ILS30 which we accepted and began setting up approach in ILS radio head and FMS according to our iPad jepp data. In our printout of FPR and weather/notams was included an ILS30 approach plate dated 26 September. This was not effective for two more days so we both questioned why it was even included in our paper work; and had no indication that it would be a valid approach so we did not reference it. ILS was identified via morse code. Approach controller tried to clear us direct to MYFUT and intercept the localizer. On our approach plates; this point was not present so we queried approach and he gave us vectors at that time to intercept localizer course. At least two other flights questioned this same clearance from the controller. At this point we were too high to commence the approach so we did a go around to re-enter the pattern. We got vectors to final for ILS30 approach and landed. Because of the confusion of the event; several phone calls transpired between my Captain and the duty officer to get a note placed for future crews traveling to Oakland so they wouldn't be involved in a similar confusing situation. Multiple airlines are having this issue even as I type this the next day. Apparently; the communication on this approach change has not made it down to the end user.

An A300-600 was cleared for an ILS 30L approach at OAK for which their company provided approach plate was not yet valid and for which their nav data base had no data. Cooperative assistance from ATC ultimately provided the tools to fly the approach.

1851813

202110

1801-2400

9V9.Airport

SD

0.0

Center ZZZ

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

1.0

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Other unknown

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine

Other / Unknown; Troubleshooting

1851813

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

Ambiguous

The airport rotating beacon was lighted up but not rotating; there is no NOTAM for the airport to this effect. Approximately five days earlier on a flight to 9V9 [Chamberlain Municipal Airport] the airport beacon was not working at all. I notified ATC Center via comm radio and the Controller explained that their Supervisor would call the airport Manager about issuing a NOTAM. There is still no NOTAM or operational rotating beacon for the field.

Pilot reported the airport rotating beacon is out of service at 9V9 airport and there is no NOTAM.

1862510

202112

1201-1800

FXE.Airport

FL

8.0

2000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON MIA

Small Aircraft

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Cruise

Vectors

Class C FXE

TRACON MIA

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Class C FXE

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Contracted Service

Check Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1862510

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 200; Vertical 300

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure

I was conducting a Part 135 IFR flight check for a PIC (Pilot In command). We flew a hand flown ILS to minimums at FXE and advised the Tower that we wanted to go missed and fly one more ILS Runway 9(coupled this time). This was all done in VMC conditions with VFR traffic advisories from ATC. Our missed approach instructions from the Tower were to 'make a left turn northwest; climb and maintain 2;000 ft'. Shortly after the missed we were handed off to Miami Approach. On check in with Miami; we stated that we were climbing to 2;000 ft. and on a 290 heading which we continued maintaining VFR. The Controller instructed us to 'turn left to a 270 heading'; a few moments later the controller asked us if we were going to 'turn left to 270' the PIC replied ' yes we turned left to a 270; that is what we are doing' The Controller once more asked us if we were 'going to turn left' the PIC asked 'left to what heading; we are flying 270 as instructed' the Controller replied 'I wanted you to make a left 360 to a 270 heading'. The PIC replied 'that wasn't what you gave us but were turning left'. As we started the turn; I saw what was a very close by smaller jet descending to get out of our way. This must have been the traffic in conflict. Being on a 290 heading and the controller stating 'turn left to 270' we both were under the impression that the Controller wanted us to tighten up our downwind for the ILS. After 3 attempts to turn us 360 degrees to the left; the controller never said the words 'make a 360' or 'make a left orbit' or anything that would indicate to us that he wanted us to turn further than 20 degrees to the left. I do not believe that standard phraseology was used by the Approach Controller and this could have avoided a near collision. If I was under the hood taking a flight check; I would have reacted the same way as the PIC taking this flight check as he was doing exactly as the Controller instructed him to do. I'm not sure why; if he didn't see us doing what he thought he was instructing us to do he did not move the other conflicting traffic clear of us? I am a firm believer of standard phraseology use for communication with ATC and this is precisely the reason why.

Check Airman reported miscommunication with MIA TRACON issuing clearances as incomplete; unclear; and non standard which resulted in an NMAC.

1282168

201507

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 119

1282168

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Staffing

Company Policy

I was very surprised to find that all three flight attendants (FA) assigned to work the Boeing 737-700 from were conducting their first flight. The three new flight attendants were incredibly personable and did their best to operate the trip as they were trained; but as all of us can attest when we are new to a position; there is a big difference between learning something in training and putting it to practice in the real world. I do not know what the training footprint or scheduling rules are for FAs; but I was incredibly surprised to learn this was even legal. Yes; the FAs are trained for safety events; but would three brand new FAs be able to manage the cabin well? I would greatly appreciate more insight into the FA training footprint; what their level of OE is before being signed off; and would love to see a no all-low-time crew restriction. Even having just one experienced flight attendant; even one with just 100 hours or so; would have been extremely helpful for providing much better service and ensuring the highest level of safety. Additionally; I would suggest that if those procedures are not going to be changed; then at a minimum an all-new-FA crew should be assigned to a longer flight; not one with barely a 1hr flying time.

B737 Captain reports that all three flight attendants assigned to work his flight were on their first flight out of training. FAR 121.434 (operating experience; operating cycles; and consolidation of knowledge and skills) only lists a 'consolidation of knowledge and skills' requirement; after completion of initial operating experience; for PIC and SIC; none for Flight Attendants.

1607445

201812

1201-1800

SFO.Airport

CA

1400.0

VMC

Cloudy

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 28L

Final Approach

Class B SFO

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Final Approach

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 201.08; Flight Crew Type 2538.43

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1607445

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Weather

Weather

SFO ATIS reported cig 1800 BKN; Few 1200. Cleared for the ILS 28L; on 10 mile final with bridge and airport in sight. Given the ATC instruction to maintain 220 or better to the 7 mile final; we were at 240. Pairing traffic to 28R visually acquired by both pilots and communicated this to ATC who then told us to maintain visual separation. Both pilots recognized excessive closure rate to E170 and Pilot Flying started to pair airspeed towards 220 by disengaging Autothrottle and using manual thrust (idle). Around this point (@9miles) ATC instructed 'slow to 180 knots to San Mateo Bridge'. Approaching San Mateo Bridge; we entered IMC (BKN layer) with E175 @ 500 above; offset to 28R FAC (Final Approach Course); and slightly in trail. Pilot Monitoring advised ATC that we were IMC and lost sight of pairing traffic. ATC responded with 'maintain visual separation'; to which Pilot Monitoring advised we were unable due to IMC. ATC instructed 'Go Around; maintain RUNWAY HEADING' (emphasis mine). By this point; we were VMC with field in sight again (@1400ft) but E175 was in the layer above. Pilot Flying disengaged autopilot and began a methodical go-around conscientious of the presence of the E175 above and slightly in trail and that winds at altitude were @220/25kts. With this in mind; Pilot Flying instructed a slight offset upwind of RH to Pilot Monitoring to enter into HDG window and @275 was entered with Pilot Flying executing a reduced rate climb back into the IMC. ATC nearly simultaneously instructed a left turn towards a downwind and remainder of FM GA/MAPP was executed.

B737 flight crew reported entering IMC conditions and losing visual separation with landing aircraft on parallel runway while on an ILS approach. Go-around and missed approach conducted.

1570501

201808

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Escape Slide

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Door Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Deplaning

1570501

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

We had a normal boarding procedure; I was Flight Attendant (FA) 3 at door 2 left. In flight we had periods of bumps; the last 20 minutes we experienced moderate to severe turbulence; Flight Attendant X and I experienced it. FA X sat herself down on the aisle while I grabbed on to the seats. FA Y made the announcement; 'flight attendants take your jump seats.' We both then proceeded to our jump seat. FA X arrived first and literally slid over to door 2 left; I took the 2 right jump seat. We strapped in and sat there until landing. As I stated earlier our original jump seats were switched due to the quick seating; and since FA X arrived at the jump seat first; she took 2 left.Upon landing; FA Y made his announcement; 'flight attendants disarm doors for arrival; cross check and stand by for all call.' We both got out of the jump seat and went to disarm the doors for the respective jump seat position; not talking; only concerned with disarming; I proceeded to disarm door 2 right.I looked over to cross check FA X and I noticed the red light in the window for slide armed and also the fact that the 'RME' was still lined up with the A and D for 'ARMED'. FA X then stated that she had lifted the door handle. FA X had some deliberation over whether or not she should attempt to push the door handle down; at that point the door was not open yet. I said nothing; and I cannot say if the door was open at all; only that I noticed the red armed light and armed lever flush to the door. The door opened and the slide inflated. I took FA X's shoulder and told her to stay clear of the door.We then heard the All Call and I answered the phone; FA Y stated his doors were disarmed crosschecked. I answered;'2 left slide deployed; 2 right disarmed and cross checked'. FA Y asked if the door had been opened and the slide deployed. I repeated that yes; 2 left in fact had been open and the slide was deployed. FA X and I both then looked out the door to check if anyone had been hurt; fortunately no one was near the aircraft. We waited by our doors until the passengers had all deplaned; the passengers did not know of the slide deployment to our knowledge as we were both quiet at this point. FA X stated that she was extremely tired after waking up for our early morning call outs for the last 3 days. She also wondered if she had too much going on in her head which may have impeded her from making the correct decision to disarm the door.FA X stood in front of her door and looked at me then the door and said something to the effect that she could not believe she had opened the door; didn't know if she should have held on to the handle and tried to close the door again and stated again that she could not believe what just transpired. FA Y came back and we attached the black and yellow strap to the door frame as a security measure. Then the pilots came back and took over from there on the analysis of the door. We deplaned and went to our hotel.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported an inadvertent deployment of an evacuation slide.

1287017

201508

1201-1800

A80.TRACON

GA

8000.0

Mixed

10

4000

TRACON A80

B737-700

2.0

IFR

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 09R

Descent

Class B A80

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Type 125

Situational Awareness

1287017

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Environment - Non Weather Related

On approach to 9R in Atlanta we flew through a large roll change due to wake turbulence from an aircraft ahead; aircraft went into Control Wheel Steering and disengaged LNAV mode. Loss of LNAV mode was not noticed until late turn onto 9R Localizer. Deviation corrected by Crew and ATC gave us a new heading to intercept the 9R Localizer. Remainder of the approach and landing was normal.

B737-700 First Officer reported a track deviation following a wake turbulence encounter on approach to ATL.

1774233

202011

P50.TRACON

AZ

12500.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON P50

Personal

Small Aircraft

Part 91

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Class E P50

Captain; Flight Engineer / Second Officer; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Other ATP

Air Traffic Control Military 20; Air Traffic Control Non Radar 20; Air Traffic Control Radar 50; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 500

Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1774233

ATC Issue All Types

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Staffing; Airspace Structure

Staffing

Please listen to the Phoenix [P50] TRACON sectors during peak periods. The Controller could not work all of the traffic. The COVID-19 cutback by ATC is dangerous during peak use hours. The controllers are magnificent but need help/more controllers. One Controller is working an area twice to 3 times the reasonable area. Please let them get back to work like it was before the COVID slowdown.I have been actively flying for XX+ years. Please don't blow this off. The environment is dangerous.

Pilot reported the P50 TRACON controllers appear to be working unreasonably large areas and expressed concern over COVID-19 related cutbacks in ATC staffing.

1565070

201807

1201-1800

A80.TRACON

GA

37000.0

IMC

Turbulence

Daylight

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1565070

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Weather

We had flown to MSY from ZZZ earlier and knew of various unstable build ups earlier and had conducted a quick turn back to ZZZ from MSY. As a crew we were cautious and on guard for possible turbulence. The FA's were aware of the possibility of light turbulence and according to previous aircraft and ATC there had been nothing worse than occasional light chop so the seatbelt sign was turned off and there were no returns in the immediate area on the aircraft radar. Approximately 40 NM from LGC VOR we started to get continuous light chop and the seat belt sign was turned on. When we were approximately 25 to 30 NM from LGC to the South we encountered Moderate turbulence and the PF (Captain/Me) guarded the controls and then Severe turbulence was encountered with the Autopilot becoming disengaged and the aircraft banked hard left and started to descend at approximately 700-800 FPM and speed decreased. I applied Climb thrust and was able to regain control of the aircraft smoothly but the turbulence persisted for 45 seconds to 1 minute at Moderate. After aircraft was under control I directed the FO to check on the FA's and Passengers. The report was that things flew around the cabin and I transferred control of the aircraft; made an announcement to the passengers and received more information from the rear FA that she had hit her head and I checked to make sure she didn't need immediate medical attention or anyone else. The aircraft was handling normally and all systems were checked. It was discussed and as a crew to include dispatch we decided to continue to ZZZ with no severe injuries and no indication of aircraft damage.I did not use AIRINC but utilized ACARS. In hindsight I would have utilized AIRINC to ensure Dispatch; Maintenance and the crew were on the same page. I do not believe without being risk adverse that we as a crew could have done anything different or taken a different route.

Aircraft encountered moderate and severe turbulence at FL370. Pilot regained control and stabilized aircraft. One injury reported by Flight Attendant.

1741072

202004

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

High

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding

1741072

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

During boarding; I noticed a passenger step on to the plane with a mask around his neck. I said hello and he said hello back. When he turned right to head down the aisle; he stopped almost as soon as he stepped on to the carpet. I stepped forward from the galley to see why he had stopped. I saw him turn his head completely to the left so that his face was now facing mine; with approximately 18' between us. He sneezed directly in my face; making no attempt to cover his mouth; pull up his mask or turn towards the row 1 window. I immediately stepped back; grabbed a C-fold and blotted my face. I politely asked him to cover his mouth and/or wear his mask if he needs to sneeze or cough. He said okay and proceeded to a seat. I don't believe his behavior was intentional; but I was still exposed to any germs he has. I was wearing a mask; but no eye glasses or goggles to cover my eyes. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic; this is an even greater safety concern than it normally would have been.Not sure what else could have been done; as passengers should always cover their mouths when they sneeze. Perhaps Operations could add some basic hygiene tips to their boarding announcements; like washing hands; covering their mouths; etc.

Flight attendant reported passenger sneezed directly into Flight Attendant's face without attempting to cover the sneeze. Flight Attendant suggested passengers should be given hygiene tips during pre-boarding announcements.

1020098

201206

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Thunderstorm

Daylight

Air Carrier

Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Y

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Work Cards

Cabin Lighting

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1020098

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure; MEL; Logbook Entry; Aircraft

Human Factors

I was dispatched from my home base of ZZZ to report to ZZZ1 for an aircraft which had smoke in the cabin and flight deck during final approach. I connected through ZZZ3 and did not arrive at the aircraft in question until late that evening. The Flight crew had been put on rest and I was unable to question them about the events that occurred. I met with the on-demand Maintenance Mechanic who was able to talk to the [flight] crew and reviewed what inspection he had completed and what information he had gathered prior to my arrival. He [had] worked the issue while I was en route and was unable to duplicate any such event as was written-up by the flight crew. Due to the serious nature of smoke in an aircraft he and I continued to investigate every source of possible ignition or failure that may cause smoke. I was informed via Maintenance Control that Bombardier requested each pack be run isolated; using APU [bleed] and each engine bleed for a period of 30-minutes on both full 'Hot' and full 'Cold' settings. This lengthy procedure proved to show no hint of smoke developing. Both engines showed no signs of ingestion or leaking of fluid that would cause a poor air quality in the aircraft. I inspected every area of aircraft where electrical connections could possibly create a hazardous situation and found only one suspect area. Upon inspection of the left-hand ceiling lights at Rows One and Two; I discovered lighting fixture had evidence of overheating at the ends of the fixtures. Per MEL 33-21-01A; Category 'C'; I placed the lights on deferral. Per the MEL there is no Maintenance Action required. Due to the manner in which the connecting ends; not the bulb; showed evidence of overheating and the fact that a fire in an aircraft could result in the loss of all souls onboard; I disconnected the [electrical] connectors from either end of the fixture and bagged them to eliminate potential contamination or ignition of the light fixture and connectors. The Lighting Ballast is usually the culprit for these kinds of discrepancies and although I could not detect signs of failure; upon request of Maintenance Control; I also disconnected the ballast on either end and bagged the connectors as well.As a Mechanic; I strive to act in a manner that protects all aircraft I work on and most importantly all those who travel on them. My experience and skill-sets should involve more than just proper workmanship; they should be exemplary; and include all documentation of work performed to protect myself and those who rely on me. I felt I was acting in accordance with the MEL by eliminating the entire system out of an equation where variables could be life threatening. No Maintenance Action was required per the [MEL] book; but per common sense no Maintenance Action was unacceptable. For all future maintenance I shall document any; over and above procedures completed; that are not explicitly called out by the MEL. Log can write-up read backs; and faxed proof reads can go only so far as to getting documentation correct. The responsibility lies in the hands of I; the Mechanic; and I will always remember so. As a Contracted Aircraft Maintainer for Air Carrier X; I am expected to placate all requests made by Air Carrier X's Maintenance Control; but as a Mechanic; it is my duty to question my actions and adhere to procedures set out by the FAA; the Aircraft Manufacturer; and my creed taken as an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT).

A Contract Line Mechanic reports that a Regional Jet aircraft had reported smoke in the cabin and flight deck on approach. During troubleshooting of the smoke; he noticed evidence of overheating at the left-hand ceiling ballast fixture and disconnected the electrical connectors at both ends of the fixture; but had failed to include the information when deferring the light assembly.

1330272

201602

0001-0600

ZAU.ARTCC

IL

36000.0

Night

Center ZAU

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZAU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1330272

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Procedure

Approx 2 hours into our flight (time and position were not noted); we were advised by ATC that an experimental balloon was in free fall near our position. We were also advised that the vehicle was unlit and had no transponder and no way to fix its position. ATC later reported that they had a primary target at our nine thirty position and eight miles and estimated the altitude at 45;000; but could not confirm that it was the plummeting balloon. Although we were looking for any trace of the balloon; we did not see; nor would we likely see it; due to the fact that it was unlit and it was a dark nightWe continued to our destination without further incident.Why the balloon failed is unknown. However; the fact that it did not have emergency lights and emergency transponder (or other way to absolutely fix it's position) when operating above commercial air routes is inexcusable. It would seem a simple thing to have an emergency aneroid switch that would activate when below a certain altitude; say 80;000 ft; thus giving position/altitude data; as well lighting for visual conformation (see and avoid) during hours of darkness.

ATC notified an air carrier at FL360 about an experimental balloon in a free fall descent through an estimated FL450; unlit and without a transponder during night conditions.

1091372

201305

0601-1200

NCT.TRACON

CA

5000.0

VMC

TRACON NCT

Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Descent

Class C SJC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1091372

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1091373.0

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

After being cleared for the visual approach; ATC called out traffic and advised leveling at 5;000 FT until traffic passed. I was able to make visual contact with the traffic below. The traffic continued to climb. At that time I turned the aircraft to the left to create more space and began to level the aircraft prior to reaching 5;000 FT. At that time I watched the traffic pass below us and started a shallow descent for the airport. We received the traffic alert followed by a RA that lasted approximately 5 seconds. I complied with the RA. I should have been more aggressive with my spacing for the other traffic.

After we were cleared for a visual approach to Runway 30L; we were advised that there was traffic that seemed to be climbing toward us. Norcal suggested that we level off at 5;000 FT which we did. The light single engine plane continued to climb toward us. The non-flying pilot climbed slightly to about 5;100 FT and we got a 'Monitor Vertical Speed' followed shortly thereafter by a very brief 'Climb'. A very slight climb was initiated and then we were 'Clear of conflict'. The approach was continued uneventfully to a normal landing.It would be nice if VFR traffic would not be allowed to climb into busy airspace without having to talk to any Approach Control facility.

Air Carrier flight crew reports a TCAS RA arriving SJC from the south at 5;000 FT. Climbing slightly and turning to avoid VFR traffic.

1782538

202101

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

37000.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144; Flight Crew Total 5058.90; Flight Crew Type 1767.15

Distraction; Confusion

1782538

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

During a restroom break in cruise at FL370; the Captain stepped out of the flight deck and the FA came in. I had my headset on and was communicating with Center about the rides ahead. When I was done with ATC; I moved one of my headset ear cups off of my ear and I said hello to the FA and mentioned to her that we would have turbulence ahead. She said hello and then said 'I see you don't have your mask on; could you please put it on?' Well; I was in a bit of shock by the request as that has yet to be asked of me. I then was queried from ATC about our current ride and answered them and then put my mask on for her comfort.But then I became uncomfortable.I have been in a rapid decompression at altitude before and it all started to come back to me about TUC [The Times of Useful Consciousness] and I became concerned about what would happen if I had that happen again in this situation. The Captain came back though in short order and the FA left but I worry that in my appeal to go along with making her comfortable with putting on my mask I would not have been able to perform my required duties if something bad were to happen.Imagine for a moment being in an aircraft at [fight level] 370; having a rapid decompression and putting your oxygen mask on. At that altitude a person has a TUC of approximately 19 seconds. 19 seconds seems like a long time even with the startle factor of what is happening and trying to figure out why. However; most of us in the aircraft type wear full headsets and I would take my headset off before putting the O2 mask on if a rapid decompression where to happen. 19 seconds of TUC minus the startle factor minus the headset and putting on the O2 mask and time is getting pretty tight not to mention if someone has glasses on. Now throw the surgical mask into the equation and I believe we are now out of time.I wonder how much of this has been explored? Do we indeed have time to take off all of this stuff with a TUC of 18-20 seconds and still live to save the day? It's one thing to have the mask on when the door is open or even below 25;000 feet but I believe we are setting ourselves up if we experience a rapid decompression with our headsets; surgical masks and glasses on.It's also fair to say this became a major distraction as the captain and I were discussing how best to deal with this situation in the future. Not so much as missed radio calls or unsafe handling of the aircraft but just a general distraction weighing on our minds and how this can be handled in the future.

Air carrier First Officer reported concerns with having to wear a face mask in the cockpit especially in a rapid decompression situation.

1740396

202004

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

1740396

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Company Policy

I was the X Flight Attendant on flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. With only 2 passengers the operations Agent came down to ask if we were ready to board. I said no we don't need to board 30 minutes early with only 2 people. Agent was pressured by management to still board at the normal time of 30 minutes prior to departure time. Again I explained that we do not need to board this early. I even told the Agent that I had not confirmed that the safety checks were done yet and started walking to the back of the aircraft. Agent asked 'How long is that going to take?' To which I replied 'I don't know maybe 10 minutes.' Even though I had not indeed confirmed the safety checks had been performed; I honestly was trying to hold Agent up from boarding with this as a stall tactic. As I walked towards the back Agent yelled out 'Are you guys ready?' to the flight attendants in the back to bypass me. I can only assume Agent was actually feeling pressured to board this early when anybody clearly knows that boarding 2 people will take at most 5 minutes. I believe with the current pandemic going on we could better limit ourselves to exposure by relaxing our boarding times. It is in our best interest to board people as late as possible right now. As the X Flight Attendant I am required to stand in the front of the aircraft for boarding and this forces me to be in close proximity to somebody that sits in the front. And upon boarding; the one passenger did take the first available seat to him which was row X. Had this person been disabled and required the first row seats I am required to let that individual sit there and expose me to them as well as expose them to me. Even more so than I was with the gentleman on my flight. The longer people are on these planes the more chance there is for them to contaminate the planes or us and vice versa.There needs to be less on time performance pressure from the company. We should be allowed to choose a boarding position that we feel is safe and appropriate.

Flight Attendant reported concerns with being pressured to board early with only a few passengers. Flight Attendant stated it would be best to avoid boarding unnecessarily early to minimize the time of possibly being exposed to COVID-19.

1636206

201904

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Electrical Power

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180

Confusion; Troubleshooting

1636206

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Completed brief with ground crew for coordination; checked hand microphone Captain side during preflight with ground crew; due to INOP APU and push to talk switch on Captain yoke. Completed all checklist; cleared to start number 1; FO (First Officer) began to start number 2 in error; ground crew and myself recognized error and immediately aborted start of number 2. Completed checklist again and correctly started number 1. Generator on number 1 was unable to carry electric load for required configuration and would be unsafe to power up engine at gate; so start was aborted and ground; operations; and maintenance were advised. Parking checklist completed aircraft grounded by maintenance with write-up of number one generator and passengers were deplaned and put on another aircraft along with crew.

B737 Captain reported the generator was unable to carry aircraft electrical load.

1496782

201711

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

7000.0

IMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Taxi

PA-31 Navajo/Chieftan/Mojave/T1040

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

Powerplant Lubrication System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

1496782

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

While enroute; we were level at 7000 feet. I noticed that we seemed to be losing power slightly on the left engine. I scanned the instruments and noted an oil pressure of 30 psi and an oil temperature of 250 degrees red line on the left engine. I observed the oil pressure decrease to 20 psi over the next 30 seconds or so. At that time I elected to shut down the left engine. We notified ATC of our engine shutdown. We continued to ZZZ and landed there safely. We had maintenance meet our aircraft upon exiting the active runway so that we could be tugged to the ramp. Oil was observed from the cowl flap and streaming aft.

PA-31 Captain reported shutting down the left engine in cruise at 7;000 feet due to low oil pressure and high oil temperature.

1759515

202008

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding; Safety Related Duties

Distraction

1759515

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

Observed a guest prior to departure and one enroute with vented masks. Guests where offered masks from onboard stock. X weeks post policy change how can we still be policing the policy change? Safety for the crew should be looked after.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger boarding was wearing a vented face mask which is not in compliance with policy.

1875303

202202

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

FBO

SR20

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Landing

None

Class D ZZZ

Reciprocating Engine Assembly

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 137; Flight Crew Total 890; Flight Crew Type 344

Confusion; Troubleshooting

1875303

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

During student pilot training flight engine throttle was brought to idle for engine out training procedures. Engine indication showed an unusually high RPM for the idle position. Instructor took control of aircraft to troubled shoot and run checklists. Instructor contacted ZZZ Approach to [Inform] an issue may be occurring and requested monitoring during return to ZZZ. ATC asked if [requesting priority handling]. At the time Instructor said to standby to take time to trouble shoot and evaluate. Instructor still provided ATC with all needed information. When Instructor unable to clear the abnormal reading and aircraft RPM did not appear to slow [requested priority]. On final approach to land shut down engine as the RPM would still not go to idle. Engine was then secured and aircraft safely landed on runway. No injury or aircraft damage occurred. Aircraft grounded and moved to maintenance for engine inspection. Instructor requested re-training event with Safety Officer and Chief Pilot to evaluate situation and makes sure Instructor is safe and knowledge before return to flight line.

Flight Instructor reported no engine response to throttle movement and returned to land immediately at departure airport.

1485225

201709

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Haze / Smoke; 6

Daylight

CLR

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 150

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 84; Flight Crew Type 19

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1485225

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Human Factors

I went on a short training flight solo and got lost. I could not find my way back to my home airport. I went west to our practice area for some slow flight and turns around a point and some S turns. I drifted south much more than I believed and when I turned east to go back to my home airport; I realized I was lost. I spent an hour or so trying to find a landmark I recognized to no avail. After approximately 2 hours in the air I was concerned about my fuel supply. I had only about 15 gallons on board when I left. I was increasingly concerned about running out of fuel and crashing. I had previously believed I would find my way back home and made a bad decision to pass up a couple of small airports where I could have landed and refueled. By the time I saw ZZZ Airport I was convinced I was in an emergency situation and had to land and refuel.Unfortunately; I had not brought my sectional chart with me that day and could not use it to help me find some recognizable landmarks. I also had nothing with me to give me the radio frequencies of any airports or towers. I felt I could not contact the Tower at ZZZ so as I was fearful of fuel starvation; I decided it was better to land and not crash. I carefully observed no traffic in the vicinity of ZZZ and no planes moving on the ground even.I decided I must land. Unfortunately; I did not think of trying to get the Tower's attention and get a green light permission to land. I was not even sure that towers gave permission to land by lights in these modern times. I know now that they still do that. I called the tower by phone that I borrowed and apologized and gave them my name; tail number and phone number. I got the tower frequencies from the FBO and established radio contact with the Tower and Ground Control. I got permission to taxi and clearance to takeoff and went on my way to my home base.I learned many valuable lessons that day.First; I learned to always take everything I might need; even on a short flight near my own airport. Charts; navigation aids on my phone which I had left in my car; full gas tanks; letting someone know where I was going and how soon I should be back; which I did not do that day. I know now that even if I lose my radios; I know to Squawk 7600 and wait for a light signal from the Tower before I attempt to land.I made many questionable or downright bad decisions that day due to poor decision making and not ever having been lost before. But; I do learn from my mistakes and this situation if it ever happens that I am lost or low on fuel will never find me so ill prepared.I did two hours of ground instruction with my CFI friend today on what to do if [I get] lost and how to prevent getting lost in the first place; and how to contact someone by radio or phone to help me in such situations. I deeply regret my entering Class Delta airspace as I have never had any problems and do realize that I might have put others; in the air or on the ground; in jeopardy. Thankfully no one was hurt and no property was damaged.I now know that I must be prepared every time I go up in the air for any unforeseen circumstance. I believe I will be a much safer pilot and more skillful pilot because of this event.

GA pilot reported becoming disoriented and unable to locate the departure airport; concerned about fuel exhaustion; landed unannounced at a nearby Class D airport.

1167725

201404

1801-2400

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Dusk

Air Carrier

A320

3.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown

1167725

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Company Policy

While taxing out for departure; a maintenance issue caused us to return to the gate. Contract Maintenance was called and the problem was cleared. During our second attempt to taxi out we experienced the same maintenance issue and returned to the gate. This time; Contract Maintenance deferred the problem and we proceeded to taxi out for departure a third time. During our third attempt to takeoff we received an additional failure during initial power application; and the Captain promptly rejected the aircraft well below 20 knots and we taxied to the gate without issue. During these three maintenance occurrences an approximate elapsed time of 3 hours and 45 minutes had elapsed. While Contract Maintenance proceeded to address the brake system failure; the Captain and Gate Agent deplaned the passengers. After the aircraft was fixed and ready for departure for the fourth attempt; I reviewed my elapsed flight duty period and availability period. Since being on standby reserve; my accumulated duty time was approximately 13 hours and 45 minutes. I determined with the help of my Captain that the required flight time to return would have caused me to have an accumulated time of approximately 16 hours and 45 minutes. More than likely this time would have increased due to re-boarding and an air start. I promptly contacted Crew Scheduling to discuss this issue and was immediately confronted with a defensive attitude and an unwillingness to discuss what could potentially be a violation of CFR 117.21. I was placed on hold for a short time and when the Scheduler returned he stated that the three of them working that night were in agreement that I could complete 18 hours of total duty. 16 hours 2 of which could be from an extension period. I asked the Scheduler how he knew this and he was unable to give me a valid reference. I tried explaining to him the information detailed in the company guide but he quickly explained that it was wrong. I asked to speak to a Supervisor and was transferred; and this individual told me to call back in a few minutes and proceeded to hang up. I called the assistant Chief Pilot and discussed the issue with him; stating I would violate CFR 117.21 if I flew the flight after having been delayed all afternoon. He discussed the issue of fatigue after having a potential duty day of 17 hours upon arrival. He informed me he wanted to research the maximum duty times and the possibility of extension and would call me back shortly. After speaking to him I called scheduling to see if they had time to research my specific situation. Scheduling informed me that I was legal to fly and could be extended into an 18 hour duty day. I tried to reason with him and read to him the guide to flight duty periods published by the company; but he proceeded to hang up on me a second time. I quickly called the Chief Pilot back and he informed me that he had discussed my issue with another individual and they concluded that I was no longer legal to accept the flight and would land beyond my duty period maximum limits (16 hours). He stated he would call scheduling and explain this to them; and within five minutes of ending that call my Captain received word from the Gate Agent that Dispatch had cancelled the flight due to maintenance. Keep in mind that all maintenance had been completed and the maintenance issue was cleared. The real reason for the cancellation should have been due to my maximum duty day; but that was never stated as the reason for cancellation. I'm filing this ASAP report due to the blatant disregard for adherence to the newly implemented Part 117 flight duty time regulations. The crew schedulers had an inadequate understanding of these rules and were unwilling to take the time to discuss them with me at the time they mattered most. My concern is the company; specifically the crew schedulers; have no regard for my responsibility under CFR Part 117. I am also concerned they lack the proper training associated with CFR Part 121.135(b) (26).

Maintenance issues and delays caused this First Officer to exceed the duty and availability limitations imposed by elements of FAR 117 that were contested by Crew Scheduling and the Chief Pilot's office.