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crs_R44355

crs_R44355_0

The Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Plan (Central States) is a multiemployer defined benefit (DB) pension plan and is projected to become insolvent by 2026 and then will be unable to pay benefits. On September 26, 2015, Central States submitted an application to the U.S. Department of the Treasury to reduce benefits to two-thirds of the plan participants. Central States is one of the largest multiemployer DB pension plans and is the largest (by number of participants) among plans that may be eligible to reduce benefits as a result of the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act (MPRA), enacted as Division O in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ). MPRA allows certain multiemployer plans that are expected to become insolvent to apply to Treasury for authorization to reduce benefits to participants in the plan, if the benefit reductions can restore the plan to solvency. When a multiemployer DB pension plan becomes insolvent, PBGC provides financial assistance to the plan to pay participants' benefits. When a multiemployer plan receives financial assistance from PBGC, the plan must reduce participants' benefits to a maximum per participant benefit. However, if Central States (or another large multiemployer plan) were to become insolvent, PBGC would likely be unable to provide sufficient financial assistance to pay participants' maximum insured benefit. PBGC's multiemployer program does not receive any federal funding. Participants in multiemployer plans that receive financial assistance from PBGC would not receive 100% of their promised benefits. In the event of PBGC's insolvency, financial assistance from Treasury is not assured. As shown in Table 1 , Central States paid $2.8 billion in benefits in 2014. If PBGC were required to provide financial assistance to the Central States plan, it is likely that PBGC would quickly become insolvent. It also requires that an individual's benefit be reduced to no less than 110% of the PBGC maximum guarantee. The Central States application for benefit reductions lists three tiers of benefits. Central States submitted its proposal to reduce participants' benefits on September 25, 2015. Treasury is currently evaluating Central States' application. Under MPRA, Treasury must approve or deny the application within 225 days of receipt, which is May 7, 2016. In general, the Secretary of the Treasury must approve the application for benefit suspensions if Central States' financial condition (such as the plan being in critical and declining status) and proposed benefit suspensions meet the criteria specified in MPRA (such as the benefit suspensions being equitably distributed and no benefit suspensions for participants aged 80 and older). Is a Vote of Participants Required to Approve Benefit Reductions? Under MPRA, if Treasury determines that a plan is systematically important then Treasury may permit (1) the benefit suspensions to occur regardless of the participant vote or (2) the implementation of a modified plan of benefit suspensions to take effect, provided the modified plan would enable the pension plan to avoid insolvency. Treasury would most likely determine that Central States is a systematically important plan. In the 114 th Congress, a number of bills have been introduced that would affect potentially insolvent multiemployer DB pension plans. H.R. 2844 / S. 1631 . Representative Marcy Kaptur and Senator Bernie Sanders introduced companion legislation, the Keep Our Pension Promises Act, on June 19, 2015, that would, among other provisions, repeal the benefit suspensions enacted in MPRA. H.R. 4029 / S. 2147 . Representative David Joyce on November 17, 2015, and Senator Rob Portman on October 7, 2015, introduced companion legislation, the Pension Accountability Act, that would (1) change the participant vote to approve a plan to reduce benefits from a majority of plan participants to a majority of participants who vote and (2) eliminate the ability of systematically important plans to implement benefit suspensions regardless of the outcome of the participant vote.

Under the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act (MPRA), enacted as Division O in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) on December 16, 2014, certain multiemployer defined benefit (DB) pension plans that are projected to become insolvent and therefore have insufficient funds from which to pay benefits may apply to the U.S. Department of the Treasury to reduce participants' benefits. The benefit reductions can apply to both retirees who are currently receiving benefits from a plan and current workers who have earned the right to future benefits. On September 25, 2015, the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Plan (Central States) applied to the Treasury to reduce benefits to plan participants in order to avoid becoming insolvent. At the end of 2014, Central States had almost 400,000 participants, of whom about 200,000 received $2.8 billion in benefits that year. The plan reported $18.7 billion in assets that was sufficient to pay 53% of promised benefits. In its application to reduce benefits, Central States projects that it will become insolvent in 2026. If Central States does not reduce participants' benefits and the plan becomes insolvent, then the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) would provide financial assistance to the plan. PBGC is an independent U.S. government agency that insures participants' benefits in private-sector DB pension plans. Multiemployer plans that receive financial assistance from PBGC are required to reduce participants' benefits to a maximum of $12,870 per year in 2016. However, the insolvency of Central States would likely result in the insolvency of PBGC, as PBGC would likely have insufficient resources from which to provide financial assistance to Central States to pay 100% of its guaranteed benefits. Treasury is not obligated to provide financial assistance if PBGC were to become insolvent. Under MPRA, participants' benefits in the Central States plan could be reduced to 110% of the PBGC maximum guarantee level. However, participants aged 80 and older, receiving a disability pension, or who are receiving a benefit that is already less than the PBGC maximum benefit would not receive any reduction in benefits. Central States' application for benefit reductions indicates that about two-thirds of participants would receive reductions in benefits. About 185,000 (almost 40%) participants would receive at least 30% or higher reductions in their benefits. Treasury is currently reviewing Central States' application and must approve or deny the application by May 7, 2016. If Central States' financial condition and proposed benefit suspensions meet the criteria specified in MPRA, then Treasury must approve the application for benefit reductions. The plan has proposed to begin implementing the benefit reductions beginning in July 2016. If Treasury approves a plan's application to reduce benefits, it must also obtain the approval of the plan's participants via a vote of plan participants. However, MPRA requires Treasury to designate certain plans as systematically important if a plan is projected to require $1 billion or more in financial assistance from PBGC. Plans that are labelled systematically important may implement benefit suspensions regardless of the outcome of the participant vote. Central States is likely a systematically important plan. Legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress that would affect potentially insolvent multiemployer DB pension plans. H.R. 2844 and S. 1631, the Keep Our Pension Promises Act, would, among other provisions, repeal the benefit reductions enacted in MPRA. H.R. 4029 and S. 2147, the Pension Accountability Act, would change the criteria of the participant vote and would eliminate the ability of systematically important plans to implement benefit suspensions regardless of the participant vote.

crs_R42631

crs_R42631_0

Introduction Federal law enforcement officers, as defined in statute, and a few related occupations—such as federal firefighters an d air traffic controllers—are eligible for enhanced retirement benefits. Incorporating additional occupations may address problems of attrition and perceived inequity across law enforcement-related positions. Federal Law Enforcement Officers and Related Personnel Currently, the definition of a federal law enforcement officer (LEO) for retirement purposes is limited to an employee who performs certain duties defined in statute under either the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), which covers federal employees hired before 1984, or the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS), which covers federal employees hired in 1984 or later. LEOs and employees who have enhanced retirement benefits also contribute more to their own benefits than regular civilian federal employees and are subject to a mandatory retirement age. The center column lists the public law that provides enhanced retirement benefits for each group. Legislative Rationale for Enhanced Retirement Benefits The duties of law enforcement personnel place unique physical and psychological demands on individuals employed in those positions. Law enforcement personnel are subject to a mandatory retirement age to maintain this goal, which leads to an expectation of limited federal service for these employees. Consequently, Congress has established enhanced retirement benefits for individuals in these occupations. Under both CSRS and FERS, law enforcement personnel are required by law to retire at the age of 57 or as soon as 20 years of service have been completed after the age of 57. To ensure that law enforcement personnel are eligible for retirement benefits at the mandatory retirement age, certain agencies have also been allowed to implement a maximum age of entry. Law enforcement personnel contribute 7.5% of pay, as do their agencies. Under P.L. By comparison, law enforcement personnel first hired before 2013 contribute 1.3% of pay, while their agencies currently contribute 30.1% of pay. Under P.L. 112-96 , law enforcement personnel first hired in 2013 contribute 3.6% of pay to FERS. 113-67 increased the FERS contribution rate for law enforcement personnel first hired in 2014 or later to 4.4% of pay. Agencies employing law enforcement personnel hired in 2013 or later (including individuals hired in 2014 or later) currently contribute 28.4% of pay. For their first 20 years of service, CSRS law enforcement personnel accrue benefits at the rate of 2.5% per year and 2% for each year after the 20 th year of service. Law enforcement personnel accrue FERS benefits at the rate of 1.7% per year for the first 20 years of service and 1% per year for each year thereafter. Formula for Law Enforcement Personnel Under FERS Similarly under FERS, the annuity for law enforcement personnel would be FE RS Annual Pension = [ Years of Service ( not exceeding 20 years) × High-Three Salary × 0.017] + [Years of S ervice ( exceeding 20) × High-Three Salary ×0 .0 1] For example, law enforcement personnel retiring with 25 years of service would receive a pension equal to FERS A nnual Pension = [20 × High-Three Salary × 0 .0 17] + [ 5 × High-Three Salary ×0 .0 1] Federal Law Enforcement Personnel with Both CSRS and FERS Coverage Individuals who chose to transfer from coverage under CSRS to FERS with five or more years of creditable civilian service as of the effective date of the transfer, excluding service covered by both CSRS and Social Security deductions, will have a CSRS component to their annuity. Extending Enhanced Benefits to Other Occupational Groups Many employees in law enforcement occupations are not recognized as LEOs by their agency and OPM, and consequently they are not eligible to receive enhanced retirement benefits. Several employee groups and unions representing individuals in these occupations have sought enhanced benefits through additional legislation.

Federal employees who perform specific duties, as defined in statute, are classified as law enforcement officers (LEOs) for the purpose of federal retirement benefits. LEOs and a few legislatively designated groups, including federal firefighters and air traffic controllers, are eligible for enhanced retirement benefits under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), for individuals hired before 1984, or the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS), for individuals hired in 1984 or later. The availability of enhanced retirement benefits for LEOs and similar groups is linked to an expectation of limited federal service. This limited service is due, in turn, to the rigorous physical demands of law enforcement duties and the mandatory retirement age to which these individuals are subject. LEO enhanced retirement benefits are designed to provide adequate retirement income for federal employees with careers that end at an earlier age with fewer years of service than regular civilian federal employees. In general, law enforcement personnel are subject to mandatory retirement at age 57, or as soon as 20 years of service have been completed after age 57. The maximum age of entry, which is intended to ensure full retirement benefits upon reaching mandatory retirement age, is typically age 37. Under both CSRS and FERS, law enforcement personnel are eligible for their enhanced benefits at the age of 50 provided they have completed the minimum requirement of 20 years of service. Under FERS, law enforcement personnel with 25 years of service are eligible for retirement regardless of age. Law enforcement personnel in CSRS and their employing agencies each contribute 7.5% of payroll. CSRS law enforcement personnel accrue benefits at the rate of 2.5% per year for their first 20 years of service and 2% for each year after the 20th year of service. Law enforcement personnel in FERS accrue benefits at the rate of 1.7% per year for the first 20 years of service and 1% per year for each year thereafter. FERS contribution rates vary by date of hire. Law enforcement personnel in FERS first hired before 2013 contribute 1.3% of pay (plus Social Security contributions), and their agencies contribute 30.1% of pay. Under P.L. 112-96, FERS law enforcement personnel first hired in 2013 contribute 3.6% of pay (plus Social Security contributions), and their agencies contribute 28.4% of pay. Finally, under P.L. 113-67, FERS law enforcement personnel first hired in 2014 or later contribute 4.9% of pay (plus Social Security contributions), but their agencies still contribute 28.4% of pay. FERS accrual rates remain unchanged for law enforcement personnel first hired in 2013 or later (including individuals first hired in 2014 or later). Many employees in law enforcement occupations are not recognized as LEOs by their agencies and OPM for the purposes of federal retirement coverage and, consequently, are not eligible to receive enhanced retirement benefits. Several employee groups and unions representing individuals in these occupations have sought enhanced retirement benefits through additional legislation. Recent Congresses have responded by introducing legislation that would provide enhanced retirement benefits to additional personnel. Though granting more groups such benefits may alleviate problems of attrition and perceived inequity across law enforcement occupations, it would also increase personnel costs for employing agencies as well as overall federal expenditures on civilian federal retirement benefits.

crs_RL34519

crs_RL34519_0

On February 24, 2010, in a split vote, the SEC adopted an alternative uptick rule in which a security-specific circuit breaker would be triggered if a stock's price declines by 10% or more from the previous trading day's closing price, resulting in a temporary restriction on short selling in the stock. Short Selling Short selling involves selling a stock that the seller has borrowed. In popular lore, short selling is often depicted as questionable and a form of stock market manipulation. Short selling can, however, also confer a number of economic benefits on markets, including providing them with the following: Greater Market Liquidity. In an analysis of results from the pilot, the SEC's Office of Economic Analysis found that short trade restrictions had a limited effect on a stock price and that there appeared to be no association between manipulative short selling activities like "bear raids," and the presence of the tick test. American Stock Exchange (AMEX) officials expressed related concerns. In particular, a NECSI study criticized the SEC for dismissing as statistically insignificant its finding that stocks that were not subject to the uptick rule observed 2% lower returns than the stocks that were subject to the rule. In the context of the claims that rescinding the uptick rule added to market volatility, another possible view is that the lifting of the short sale restrictions may have had a marginal impact on volatility but that larger and more significant forces were already at work before the restriction was rescinded. However ... throughout 2008 there was not a majority [of the five SEC commissioners] interested in reconsidering the 2007 decision to repeal the uptick rule...." Key Developments Between September 2008 and April 2009 On September 18, 2008, as the financial crisis deepened, the SEC announced that it was immediately implementing a temporary emergency ban on short selling in the securities of what would eventually amount to nearly 1,000 financial firms. 110-343 ) on October 3, 2008. For example, Steve Forbes, editor and CEO of Forbes magazine, charged that the rule's removal was responsible for an explosion in market volatility. It will limit the ability of a small number of professional investors to trigger fast dramatic price drops that create panic among investors…" On March 24, 2009, the three largest U.S. stock exchanges (BATS Trading, the New York Stock Exchange, and Nasdaq) joined with the smaller National Stock Exchange to send a joint letter to the SEC urging it to consider adopting (1) a modified uptick rule, which would only would only allow short selling at a price above the highest prevailing national bid (offer to buy) by posting a quote for a short sale order above the national bid; and (2) a circuit breaker rule, which would trigger the modified uptick rule only after the price of a stock has experienced a precipitous decline by perhaps 10%. In addition, in March 2009, both House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank and Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee Chairman Dodd reportedly indicated that they hoped that the SEC would reinstate the uptick rule. In the event that such a circuit breaker is triggered, short selling in that stock will only be permitted if its price is above the current national best bid. Once triggered, the circuit breaker would remain in effect for the remainder of that day through the following trading day. There is little empirical evidence that short sales contributed to the market crisis. These include H.R. 302 (Ackerman, introduced January 8, 2009 ), which would require the SEC to reinstate the uptick rule on short sales of securities; and S. 605 (Kaufman, introduced March 16, 2009), which would require the SEC to prohibit short sales of the securities of any financial institution, unless that trade is effected at a price (in minimum lots, as specified by the agency) that is at least $0.05 higher than the immediately preceding transaction.

Historically, in much of the popular lore surrounding short selling (borrowing stock with the objective of making a profit if its price falls), the activity has been unfavorably described as a destructive force for both stock markets and the firms whose shares are sold short. In the 1930s, due to concerns that a concerted kind of manipulative short selling known as a bear raid had contributed to the stock market collapse, federal securities regulations were adopted that restricted short selling. Known as the uptick rule, the restriction essentially forbade short sales on stocks unless a stock's previous price movement had been upward. By contrast, modern economics orthodoxy generally views short selling to be a beneficial economic force. Among the benefits ascribed to shorting are its ability to (1) counter an unwarranted, speculative upward price pressure in stocks, and even help uncover and expose fraudulent issuer activities; (2) enable an entity to hedge the risk of a stock position owned, thus protecting against price declines; and (3) provide liquidity in response to buyer demand. This perspective received added credibility after a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) based pilot program found no significant adverse economic outcomes when a sample of stocks were not subject to the uptick rule. In June 2007, the agency voted to rescind the uptick rule. In the aftermath of the repeal, there was concern over the role that the repeal may have had in exacerbating stock market volatility. Months into 2008, in the midst of a deepening financial crisis, officials at a number of large financial firms claimed that short sellers were responsible for their falling stock prices. Responding to what he called the need for a temporary timeout in the midst of abnormally functioning financial markets, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox banned short selling of stocks in nearly 1,000 financial firms between September 19, 2008, and October 3, 2008, a decision he later indicated regretting. In early 2009, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank and Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd reportedly expressed hope that the SEC would reinstate the uptick rule. Among those in the private sector also supporting reinstatement were the entrepreneurs Charles Schwab and Steve Forbes. In addition, several major stock exchanges (including BATS Trading, the New York Stock Exchange, and Nasdaq) jointly wrote to the SEC, urging it to consider adopting a modified uptick rule. Still, a number of studies, including an internal SEC study, raised doubts about charges that the uptick rule's repeal had a deleterious market impact. On April 8, 2009, the SEC issued several uptick rule-related reform proposals. Later, on February 24, 2010, the SEC adopted an alternative uptick rule in which a security-specific circuit breaker is triggered if a stock's price declines by 10% or more from the previous trading day's closing price. Short selling in the stock would then only be allowed if its price remains above the current national best bid for the remainder of that day through the next trading day. The SEC indicated that the reform would help market stability and help restore investor confidence in uncertain markets. Critics, including two Republican SEC commissioners and some securities industry and hedge fund trade groups, have questioned whether the SEC provided sufficient evidence that short selling has been harmful. They also indicated that recent SEC reforms curtailing naked shorting have reduced manipulative short selling and predicted that restricting short selling would have harmful market consequences. The investor confidence rationale used in part to justify the rulemaking was also greeted with skepticism. H.R. 302 (Ackerman) and S. 605 (Kaufman) would both require the SEC to reinstate the uptick rule. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

crs_R45075

crs_R45075_0

Introduction This is a brief discussion of the law associated with the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of federal controlled substance (drug) laws and drug-related federal firearms and recidivist statutes. The governme nt may elect not to prosecute the underlying offenses. The federal courts may also bypass some of them for the benefit of certain low-level, nonviolent, offenders with virtually spotless criminal records under the so-called "safety valve" provision. Finally, in cases where the mandatory minimums would usually apply, the President may pardon the offenders or commute their sentences before the minimum term of imprisonment has been served. Mandatory Minimums for Drug Crimes Table 1 below describes the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for various drug and drug-related offenses. Import/Export Offenses Sections 960 and 963 of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, and by cross- reference Section 70506 of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), largely track the penalties found in the Section 841(b) of the Controlled Substances Act, including the mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment. Drug-Related Mandatory Minimums Firearm Possession in Furtherance (18 U.S.C. The mandatory minimums must be imposed in addition to any sentence imposed for the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking and vary depending upon the circumstances, i.e ., (1) imprisonment for not less than five years, unless one of the higher mandatory minimums below applies; (2) imprisonment for not less than seven years if a firearm is brandished; (3) imprisonment for not less than 10 years if a firearm is discharged; (4) imprisonment for not less than 10 years if a firearm is a short-barreled rifle or shotgun or is a semi-automatic weapon; (5) imprisonment for not less than 15 years if the offense involves the armor piercing ammunition; (6) imprisonment for not less than 25 years if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of Section 924(c); (7) imprisonment for not less than 30 years if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer; and (8) imprisonment for life if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of Section 924(c) and if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer. Such considerations are irrelevant ... under the Act." By the same token, there is no need to prove that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of the controlled substance involved in his predicate serious drug offense if the serious drug offense satisfied the 10-year requirement and, in the case of state law predicate, involved the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The criminal history point qualification refers to the defendant's criminal record. One involves instances in which the offense resulted in death or serious bodily injury. Substantial Assistance Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. Constitutional Considerations Defendants sentenced to mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment have challenged their sentences on a number of constitutional grounds beginning with Congress's legislative authority and ranging from cruel and unusual punishment through ex post facto and double jeopardy to equal protection and due process. Thus far, constitutional challenges have largely been to no avail.

As a general rule, federal judges must impose a minimum term of imprisonment upon defendants convicted of various controlled substance (drug) offenses and drug-related offenses. The severity of those sentences depends primarily upon the nature and amount of the drugs involved, the defendant's prior criminal record, any resulting injuries or death, and in the case of the related firearms offenses, the manner in which the firearm was used. The drug offenses reside principally in the Controlled Substances Act or the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act. The drug-related firearms offenses involve the possession and use of firearms in connection with serious drug offenses and instances in which prior drug convictions trigger mandatory sentences for unlawful firearms possession. The minimum sentences range from imprisonment for a year to imprisonment for life. Although the sentences are usually referred to as mandatory minimum sentences, a defendant may avoid them under several circumstances. Prosecutors may elect not to prosecute. The President may choose to pardon the defendant or commute his sentence. The defendant may qualify for sentencing for providing authorities with substantial assistance or under the so-called "safety valve" provision available to low-level, nonviolent, first-time offenders. Over time, defendants, sentenced to mandatory terms of imprisonment for drug- related offenses, have challenged Congress's legislative authority to authorize them and the government's constitutional authority to enforcement. The challenges have met with scant success. Generally, courts have concluded that the provisions fall within congressional authority under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, Treaty, and Territorial Clauses of the Constitution. By and large, courts have also found no impediment to mandatory minimum sentences under the Due Process, Equal Protection, or Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses, or the separation-of- powers doctrine. Proposals to amend drug-related mandatory minimum sentence provisions surfaced during the 114th Congress. In the 115th Congress, Senator Grassley introduced the successor to those proposals for himself and a bi-partisan list of co-sponsors as S. 1917, the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2017. Many of the same issues are addressed in H.R. 4261 introduced by Representative Scott of Virginia. This is an overview of the law from which those proposals spring. This report is an abridged version of a longer report, CRS Report R45074, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing of Federal Drug Offenses, without the citations to authority and origin of quotations found in the parent report.

crs_RL34426

crs_RL34426_0

Targeted case management (TCM) refers to case management that is restricted to specific beneficiary groups. The Medicaid statute covering case management has been amended a number of times, most recently by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171 ). Section 6052 of DRA added new language that further defined case management services (including TCM) and directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to develop rules for states to follow in claiming reimbursement for case management expenditures under Medicaid. To this end, CMS issued an interim final rule governing the use and claiming of Medicaid case management services. It became effective March 3, 2008. In comparison, overall Medicaid expenditures also increased rapidly over the same period, rising from approximately $147 billion in FY1999 to $276 billion in FY2005, an approximate 87% increase. The TCM interim final rule was published on December 4, 2007. Case Management Interim Final Rule The case management interim final rule elaborates on changes to the TCM definition authorized and initiated in DRA by providing specific guidance on how states may claim federal financial participation (FFP) for TCM expenditures. CMS estimated that the case management regulation will reduce federal Medicaid expenditures by approximately $1.28 billion between FY2008 and FY2012. 5613 ), was introduced in March that would impose a moratorium until April 1, 2009, on implementation of the TCM and other Medicaid regulations. In the Senate, a similar measure to H.R. 5613 , the Economic Recovery in Health Care Act of 2008 ( S. 2819 ), was introduced in April. 5613 , S. 2819 , would impose a moratorium until April 1, 2009, on implementation of the case management, TCM and five other Medicaid regulations until April 1, 2009. On May 22, 2008, the Senate passed the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 ( H.R. 2642 ). 2642 covering Medicaid regulations included requirements, similar to H.R. 2642 was amended by the House and passed on June 19, 2008. The House amendments included moratoria on implementation of six Medicaid regulations, including case management and TCM, until April 1, 2009. On June 26, 2008, the Senate passed H.R. 2642 without changes to the latest House measure, including the moratoria on implementation of six Medicaid regulations (until April 1, 2009). H.R. The President signed P.L. 110-252 into law on June 30, 2008. Earlier, on June 4 and 5, 2008, the Senate and House, respectively, adopted the final version of the budget resolution ( H.Rept. 110-659 accompanying S.Con.Res. 70 ). Among other provisions, the conference agreement establishes a number of deficit-neutral reserve funds and a sense of the Senate provision that would delay Medicaid administrative regulations, including Medicaid case management and TCM.

Case management services assist Medicaid beneficiaries in obtaining needed medical and related services. Targeted Case Management (TCM) refers to case management for specific Medicaid beneficiary groups or for individuals who reside in state-designated geographic areas. Over the past seven years of available data (1999-2005), total expenditures on Medicaid TCM increased from $1.4 billion to $2.9 billion, an increase of 107%. In comparison, over the same period, total Medicaid spending increased by 87%, from $147.4 billion to $275.6 billion. TCM has been an active concern for both the executive and legislative branches. For instance, the Bush Administration proposed legislative changes to reduce Medicaid TCM expenditures in recent annual budget submissions. In the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171), Congress added new statutory language to clarify the definition of case management and directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations to guide states' claims for federal Medicaid matching funds for TCM. As a result of DRA requirements, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued an interim final rule on December 4, 2007 for case management, which took effect March 3, 2008. In the interim final rule, CMS estimated that the new case management rules would reduce federal Medicaid expenditures by approximately $1.3 billion between FY2008 and FY2012. In April, the Economic Recovery in Health Care Act of 2008 (S. 2819), was introduced in the Senate, which would impose a moratorium on implementation of the TCM regulation until April 1, 2009. On May 22, 2008, the Senate passed the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 (H.R. 2642). H.R. 2642 included a moratorium until April 1, 2009, on implementation of the TCM and other Medicaid regulations. H.R. 2642 was amended by the House and passed on June 19, 2008. The House amendments to H.R. 2642 included moratoria on implementation of six Medicaid regulations, including case management and TCM, until April 1, 2009. On June 26, 2008, the Senate passed H.R. 2642 without changes to the House legislation, so that implementation of six Medicaid regulations, including case management and TCM, would be delayed until April 1, 2009. The President signed P.L. 110-252 into law on June 30, 2008. Earlier, on June 4 and 5, 2008, the Senate and House, respectively, adopted the final version of the budget resolution (H.Rept. 110-659 accompanying S.Con.Res. 70). The conference agreement established budget-neutral reserve funds that could be used to impose moratoria on Medicaid rules and administrative actions and also includes a sense of the Senate provision on delaying Medicaid administrative regulations including case management and TCM. This report describes Medicaid case management services, presents major provisions of the proposed Medicaid case management regulation, and provides various perspectives on the TCM interim final rule. This report will be updated to reflect legislative and regulatory activity.

crs_R40594

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Introduction On February 11, 2013, NASA launched Landsat 8, a remote sensing satellite jointly operated by the U.S. Geological Survey and NASA. Landsat 8 is the latest in a series of Earth-observing satellites that began on July 23, 1972, with the launch of Landsat 1. Landsat has been used in a wide variety of applications, including land use planning, agriculture, forestry, natural resources management, public safety, homeland security, climate research, and natural disaster management, among others. More generally, should Congress support the development of another moderate resolution land-imaging satellite, and what are the alternatives? Landsat After Landsat 8 Most proponents agree that Landsat 8's 30-meter resolution—its ability to capture images with its Operational Land Imager (OLI) instrument at the scale of about a baseball diamond—renders it a valuable tool for characterizing human-scale processes such as urban growth, agricultural irrigation, and deforestation. They also note that the consistent and continuous collection of imagery from the succession of Landsat satellites since 1972 makes it possible to document land changes because images are comparable. The Appendix provides further details about the efforts to privatize Landsat in the 1980s and early 1990s. NASA and USGS: The Sustainable Land Imaging Architecture Study Team The Administration is examining a future land imaging program that may depart from the current Landsat "model"—namely a dedicated satellite pair each with a moderate-resolution multispectral scanner and a thermal imager. NASA and USGS are crafting a post Landsat-8 strategy via the Sustainable Land Imaging Architecture Study Team (AST), which appears to be following the broad guidelines laid out in the National Plan, discussed above. At the meeting, the NASA Earth Science Division director noted that the Administration wants NASA to explore all options to achieve this goal, including options like a hosted payload and international partnerships, as opposed to a stand-alone payload and launch vehicle and an entirely U.S.-based project. Discussion: Differing Views over the Future of Landsat Senate Senate appropriators have been critical of the Administration's current approach to continuing a Landsat-type moderate-resolution Earth observing system. In the report, the committee emphasized its concerns over a potential data gap should Landsat 7 fail before a successor satellite was launched: such a failure would mean that instead of 8 days for continuous terrestrial coverage with two satellites, it would take 16 days with just Landsat 8. Although a congressional debate over the next phase of the Landsat legacy is in its early stages, the discussion above notes potentially divergent opinions among the Administration and Congress. Some members of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies have recently questioned if the multiagency Landsat program aligns within the fundamental mission of NASA, since NASA acquires and launches Landsat, but a different agency, USGS, assumes operational responsibility, and manages and distributes Landsat data. A common theme likely to be expressed by both the House and Senate majorities and minorities will be the need to keep costs under control and at least below the amount appropriated for Landsat 8. In addition to a unified admonition to keep the cost of a Landsat successor low, Congress may also exert pressure on the Administration to move forward on the next land imaging mission and reduce the chances of a data gap if Landsat 7 or 8 fails before the next satellite is placed in orbit. However, what a data gap actually means may be in question depending on the results of the AST study, and the resulting implementation strategy. Although the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 reversed the privatization track for Landsat and returned the satellite system to the federal government, the act also authorized the Secretary of Commerce to license operators of private remote sensing space systems.

On February 11, 2013, NASA launched Landsat 8, a remote sensing satellite jointly operated by the U.S. Geological Survey and NASA. Landsat 8 is the latest in a series of Earth-observing satellites that began on July 23, 1972, with the launch of Landsat 1. Landsat has been used in a wide variety of applications, including land use planning, agriculture, forestry, natural resources management, public safety, homeland security, climate research, and natural disaster management, among others. A question for Congress is, should there be a Landsat 9? More generally, should Congress support the development of another moderate resolution land-imaging satellite, and what are the alternatives? Landsat 8's 30-meter resolution—its ability to capture images at the scale of about a baseball diamond—renders it a valuable tool for characterizing human-scale processes such as urban growth, agricultural irrigation, and deforestation. Landsat supporters also would contend that the consistent and continuous collection of imagery from the succession of Landsat satellites since 1972 makes it possible to document land changes, because images are comparable over that 42-year time period. In congressional deliberations about the future of Landsat, it is likely that the topics of privatization and commercialization will be revisited as one alternative to the current arrangement. Landsat's 30-meter resolution, the continuous and comparable 42-year record of data, and the current policy of making all Landsat data available for no cost would factor into a discussion about commercialization. Efforts to commercialize Landsat in the 1980s and early 1990s culminated with passage of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, which reversed the privatization track for Landsat and restored management of the satellite system back to the federal government. Although a congressional debate over the next phase of the Landsat legacy is in its early stages, there are potentially divergent opinions among the Administration and Congress. The Administration is examining a future land imaging program that may depart from what might be considered the current Landsat "model"—namely, a dedicated satellite pair, each with the same or similar instruments as those aboard Landsats 7 and 8, the two currently orbiting satellites. For example, the Administration is directing NASA to explore options like a hosted payload and international partnerships, as opposed to a stand-alone payload and launch vehicle and an entirely U.S. project. The Administration, through NASA and the U.S. Geological Survey, is crafting a post-Landsat 8 strategy via the Sustainable Land Imaging Architecture Study Team, which broadly follows guidelines laid out in the White House National Plan for Civil Earth Observations. Senate appropriators have been critical of the Administration's current approach to continuing a Landsat-type moderate-resolution Earth-observing system, namely one that may depart from the current Landsat model. In addition, the committee has emphasized its concerns over a potential data gap should Landsat 7 fail before a successor satellite was launched, leaving just one satellite—Landsat 8—operational. Some members of the House Appropriations Committee have recently questioned if the multiagency Landsat program aligns within the fundamental mission of NASA. A common theme likely to be expressed by both the House and Senate will be the need to keep costs under control and at least below the amount appropriated for Landsat 8. In addition, Congress will also likely exert pressure on the Administration to move forward on the next land imaging mission and reduce the chances of a data gap if Landsat 7 or 8 fails before the next satellite is placed in orbit. What a data gap actually means, however, may be in question, depending on the results of the Sustainable Land Imaging Architecture Study Team study and the resulting implementation strategy for the next land remote sensing satellite.

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Medicare fee-for-service (FFS)—Medicare Parts A or B—provides coverage in a beneficiary's home for certain services and treatments of an illness or injury. Beneficiaries who meet the home health eligibility requirements are entitled to a 60-day episode of home health coverage and then to an unlimited number of 60-day episodes, so long as they continue to meet the eligibility requirements. Medicare Home Health Eligibility To be eligible for Medicare-covered home health services, a beneficiary must meet three requirements: he/she must be homebound, he/she must need part-time or intermittent skilled nursing care and/or skilled rehabilitation , or, after establishing prior eligibility, a continuing need for occupational therapy, and he/she must be under the care of a physician and need reasonable and necessary home health services that have been certified by a physician and established in a 60-day plan of care. Medicare Home Health Services and Beneficiaries Medicare beneficiaries who meet the home health eligibility criteria are entitled to a 60-day episode of home visits by skilled health care professionals. Roughly 9.5% (or 3.4 million) of Medicare FFS beneficiaries used home health services in 2011. Most Medicare-certified HHAs (85%) are freestanding—not a part of a larger institution (such as a hospital or nursing home). Since the implementation of the home health prospective payment system (HH PPS) in 2000, the number of HHAs has grown steadily with a large majority of the increase in freestanding for-profit HHAs. Between 2000 and 2011, the number of Medicare-certified HHAs increased by 62%, from 7,528 to 12,199. Under the HH PPS, Medicare provides a payment to HHAs for covered home health services on a 60-day per episode basis. This method is in contrast to the prior Medicare payment method that reimbursed HHAs for each home health visit performed on the basis of "reasonable costs." Medicare Home Health Financial Trends Total Medicare FFS home health payments increased from $8.5 billion in 2001 to roughly $18.4 billion in 2011—an average annual rate of growth of 8.0%. Home Health Margins Under the HH PPS, freestanding HHAs have had consistently high Medicare margins—the percentage difference in Medicare home health payments relative to the HHA's costs in providing home health services to beneficiaries (a positive margin is a profit, a negative margin a loss). Over the same time period, Part A home health expenditures increased at an average annual rate of 5% while Part B home health expenditures have increased at an average annual rate of 10.5%. Standardized home health payments are Medicare payments for home health services that have removed geographic wage adjustments that are included in the PPS. Additionally, as required by ACA, CMS recently issued a plan to implement a value-based purchasing (VBP) program for HHAs in addition to the existing Medicare VBP programs currently being implemented for acute-care hospitals and physicians. Further, additional issues for congressional consideration stems from a proposed settlement agreement, which requires CMS to revise its existing Medicare benefit guidelines as a result of a recent class-action lawsuit between HHS and the Center for Medicare Advocacy, and the temporary moratoria on new HHAs in targeted geographic areas. Cost-Sharing for Home Health Services Currently, the home health benefit does not require beneficiary cost-sharing for home health services. Additionally, the aggregate Medicare margin for freestanding HHAs has remained consistently high: 13.6% in 2003 and 14.8% in 2011. Beginning on or after October 1, 1999 (but implemented on October 1, 2000), BBA 97 required a home health prospective payment system (HH PPS) to supplant the interim payment system and reimburse home health agencies (HHAs) based upon a beneficiary's expected care needs and geographic location, among other factors.

The Medicare home health benefit provides coverage for home visits by skilled health care professionals. Medicare Parts A and B provide coverage for home health services. To be eligible for the home health benefit, a beneficiary must meet three different criteria. The beneficiary must (1) be homebound, (2) require intermittent skilled nursing care and/or skilled rehabilitation services, and (3) be under the care of a physician who has established that the home health visits are medically necessary in a 60-day plan of care. A beneficiary who meets these requirements is entitled to a 60-day episode of Medicare coverage for home health visits, and is then entitled to an unlimited number of subsequent 60-day episodes so long as he or she continues to meet the eligibility requirements. There is no cost-sharing requirement for home health services. Roughly 9.5% of Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries (or 3.4 million individuals) used home health services in 2011. Home health services are provided through home health agencies (HHAs), most of which (85%) are freestanding—HHAs not affiliated with an institution such as a hospital or a nursing facility. The number of HHAs participating in Medicare grew by 62% between 2000 and 2011 (from 7,528 to 12,199), with a vast majority of the increase in for-profit freestanding HHAs. Similar to most Medicare payment methods, Medicare Part A or Part B reimburses HHAs using a prospective payment system (PPS). A PPS reimburses providers with payments that are predetermined by a formula that adjusts payments for beneficiaries' expected care needs and location, among other factors. The home health PPS (HH PPS) was implemented for services beginning on or after October 1, 2000. Generally, the HH PPS provides a single payment for a 60-day episode to HHAs for the estimated costs of home health services. The 60-day episode payment is in contrast to the prior home health payment system that reimbursed HHAs retrospectively on a per visit basis. While total Medicare FFS expenditures have grown at an average annual rate of roughly 5.6% between 2001 and 2011, Medicare FFS expenditures on home health services have increased at an average annual rate of 8.0% over the same time period. In 2011, Medicare FFS expenditures on covered home health services totaled $18.4 billion. In addition to the high growth rate in Medicare home health payments, the home health benefit has drawn attention due to the consistently high Medicare margins (percentage of Medicare revenue that exceeds costs of services) of participating HHAs. Between 2003 and 2011, aggregate Medicare margins for freestanding HHAs have remained consistently high—from 13.6% in 2003 to 14.8% in 2011. As deficit reduction pressures increase, the 113th Congress may debate whether to include beneficiary cost-sharing for home health services (a proposal recommended by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission and various other groups). Congress may also consider proposals to implement a value-based purchasing program for HHAs that would adjust Medicare payments based upon certain HHA quality measures. Similar proposals are currently being implemented in other Medicare payment systems. Congress may also choose to monitor the implementation of the settlement agreement of a recent class-action lawsuit between the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Center for Medicare Advocacy regarding the so-called "improvement standard" as well as the moratoria on new HHAs in targeted geographic areas.

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CBO's Budget and Economic Outlook Description Each year, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) releases a projection of budgetary and economic outcomes titled The Budget and Economic Outlook . The budget is required to include (1) estimates of spending, revenues, borrowing, and debt; (2) detailed estimates of the financial operations of federal agencies and programs; (3) the President's budgetary, policy, and legislative recommendations; and (4) information supporting the President's recommendations. The budget resolution reflects an agreement between the House and Senate on a budgetary framework for the upcoming fiscal year, designed to establish parameters within which Congress will consider subsequent budgetary legislation. The budget resolution does not become law: therefore, no money is spent or collected as a result of its adoption. Instead, it is meant to assist Congress in considering an overall budget plan. FY2018 Actions This section will be updated to reflect actions on budget reconciliation as they occur. Appropriations in some form must be enacted by the beginning of a new fiscal year (October 1) or a government shutdown may occur. Such programs, also referred to as direct spending programs or entitlement programs, generally continue annually without any congressional action required. The content and consideration of revenue measures is shaped primarily by House and Senate rules and the budget resolution. Each year Congress passes legislation that affects revenue in varying degrees. Debt Limit Legislation Description The Constitution allows Congress to restrict the amount of federal debt that may be incurred as part of its power of the purse. The implementation of extraordinary measures does not typically require legislative action. Such budgetary restrictions can take many forms. Congress has typically incorporated some type of internal budget enforcement in each recent Congress. The House Budget Committee held a number of hearings and released a series of "working papers focused on the committee's effort to overhaul the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and reform the congressional budget process."

The Constitution grants Congress the power of the purse, but does not dictate how Congress must fulfill this constitutional duty. Congress has, therefore, developed certain types of budgetary legislation, along with rules and practices that govern its content and consideration. This set of budgetary legislation, rules, and practices is often referred to as the congressional budget process. There is no prescribed congressional budget process that must be strictly followed each year, and Congress does not always consider budgetary measures in a linear or predictable pattern. Such dissimilarity can be the result of countless factors, such as a lack of consensus, competing budgetary priorities, the economy, natural disasters, military engagements, and other circumstances creating complications, obstacles, and interruptions within the policymaking process. Since the budget process will vary significantly each year, it is better understood not as a definite set of actions that must occur annually, but instead as an array of opportunities for affecting the federal budget. This report seeks to assist in (1) anticipating what budget-related actions might occur within the upcoming year, and (2) staying abreast of budget actions that occur this year. It provides a general description of the recurrent types of budgetary actions, and reflects recent events that have unfolded in each category during 2017. In addition, it includes information on certain events that may affect Congress's work on the budget, such as the President's budget request and the Congressional Budget Office's budget and economic outlook. The most-recent budget actions will be noted at the beginning of the report.

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Introduction The 21 st Century Cures Act ( P.L. The Increasing Choice, Access, and Quality in Health Care for Americans Act (Division C of P.L. Division C comprises Title XV through Title XVIII. The first three titles in Division C include provisions primarily relating to Medicare. Title XVII focuses on provisions relating to other aspects of Medicare, such as Medicare Part C (Medicare Advantage, or MA, the private plan option for beneficiaries that covers all Parts A and B services, except hospice); Medicare Part D (Prescription Drug Plan, or PDP, which covers outpatient prescription drug benefits); MA quality ratings; enrollment data; the Welcome to Medicare package; the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP); and payments to Medicare, Medicaid, or Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) providers and suppliers. The fourth title in Division C includes a single provision relating to the small-group health insurance market. Title XV—Provisions Relating to Medicare Part A Section 15001. Provisions Sections 15009 and 15010 create or reinstate two sets of temporary clinical criteria for an LTCH to receive payment under the LTCH PPS rather than the site neutral payment. Provision Section 16001 makes modifications for certain new PBD HOPDs to be paid under the OPPS in 2017 and beyond. Beginning in 2015, physicians who do not successfully demonstrate meaningful use are subject to a penalty in the form of a payment adjustment that reduces their Part B reimbursement for covered services. Provision Section 16004 extends the moratorium on enforcement of the requirement of direct supervision of outpatient therapeutic services furnished in CAHs and small rural hospitals through the end of CY2016. Provision Section 16005 delays the date when the HHS Secretary can begin using information from competitive bidding to adjust the fee schedule rates for accessories used with Group 3 complex rehabilitative power wheelchairs by six months (to July 1, 2017). Provision Section 16007 requires the HHS Secretary to extend the transition to the adjusted fee schedule amounts by six months so that (1) for items and services furnished January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, 50% of the payment is based on the new adjusted fee schedule methodology and 50% is based on the unadjusted fee schedule amount and (2) for items and services furnished starting January 1, 2017, the Medicare payment is based entirely on the adjusted fee schedule amount. Provision Section 16008 requires the HHS Secretary to solicit and take into account stakeholder input when adjusting fee schedule rates outside of competitive bidding areas for items and services furnished on or after January 1, 2019. Title XVII—Other Medicare Provisions Section 17001. Provision Section 17001 expresses the intent of Congress, consistent with the IMPACT Act, to continue to study and request input on the effects of socioeconomic status and dual-eligible populations on the MA five-star rating system before reforming the system with the input of stakeholders. 114-255 until the end of plan year 2018, the HHS Secretary may not terminate an MA organization's contract solely because the MA plan has failed to achieve a minimum quality rating under the five-star rating system. States that determine a temporary moratorium on new provider enrollment would reduce beneficiaries' access to care are required to notify the HHS Secretary in writing. Provision Under Section 17004, beginning October 1, 2017, the HHS Secretary is authorized to prohibit payment for services or items furnished by Medicare, Medicaid, or CHIP providers and suppliers who are subject to temporary new provider or supplier enrollment moratoria. Starting in 2019, this provision creates a continuous open enrollment and disenrollment period during the first three months of each year, during which an MA enrollee may switch to a different MA plan or disenroll from MA to return to Parts A and B (with or without a PDP). Exception from Group Health Plan Requirements for Qualified Small Employer Health Reimbursement Arrangements Health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs) are employer-established arrangements that pay or reimburse employees for substantiated medical care expenses up to a maximum dollar amount. 114-113 ) CAH: Critical Access Hospital CBO: Congressional Budget Office CEHRT: Certified Electronic Health Records Technology CHIP: Children's Health Insurance Program CMS: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services DRG: Diagnosis Related Group DME: Durable Medical Equipment DMEPOS: Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies EHR : Electronic Health Record ERISA: Employee Retirement Income Security Act ESRD: End-Stage Renal Disease FFS: Fee-For-Service FY: Fiscal Year HCPCS: Healthcare Common Procedure Code System HHS: Department of Health and Human Services HI: Hospital Insurance HITECH: Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act HOPD: Hospital Outpatient Department HRA: Health Reimbursement Arrangement HRRP: Hospital Readmission Reduction Program ICD: International Classification of Diseases IMPACT: Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014 ( P.L.

This report summarizes the Increasing Choice, Access, and Quality in Health Care for Americans Act, enacted December 13, 2016, as Division C of the 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255). Division C comprises Title XV through Title XVII, which include provisions primarily relating to Medicare and Title XVIII, which includes a provision relating to the small-group health insurance market. Title XV Medicare Part A provisions: extend the Rural Community Hospital demonstration five years; require the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to account for socioeconomic factors in administering the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program; reduce a specific inpatient hospital payment update for FY2018; require the HHS Secretary to create a crosswalk between codes used for reimbursing procedures performed in inpatient and outpatient settings; and make adjustments to long-term care hospital (LTCH) reimbursement including creating or reinstating temporary clinical criteria for payment under the LTCH prospective payment system (PPS) rather than site neutral payment; modifying the average length of stay formula that determines whether a hospital qualifies as an LTCH; reinstating an exemption from a temporary moratorium on additional LTCH beds; delaying implementation of a rule that lowers reimbursement for certain LTCHs that rely disproportionately on referrals from a single acute-care hospital; and creating a new, non-LTCH hospital category in statute for a specific type of long-stay hospital. Title XVI Medicare Part B provisions: make modifications for PPS-exempt cancer hospital and certain new provider-based hospital outpatient departments to be paid under the outpatient PPS; exclude certain ambulatory surgical center-based eligible professionals from the electronic health records meaningful use payment adjustment; allow physical therapists who furnish outpatient physical therapy in certain areas to use locum tenens arrangements for payment purposes; extend the delay in enforcement of direct physician supervision requirements for outpatient therapeutic services in critical access hospitals and small rural hospitals; and make changes to durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) payment including delaying when competitive bidding information can be used to adjust fee schedule rates for Group 3 complex rehabilitative power wheelchairs accessories; extending the transition to the adjusted fee schedule for DMEPOS; and requiring the HHS Secretary to consider stakeholder input when adjusting fee schedule rates outside of competitive bidding areas. Title XVII's other Medicare provisions: express Congress's intent to continue to study the effects of socioeconomic status and dual-eligible populations on the Medicare Advantage (MA) five-star rating system before reforming the system with stakeholder input; instruct that the HHS Secretary may not terminate MA or Prescription Drug Plan (PDP) contracts solely because of failure to achieve a minimum quality rating; create a three-month period at the beginning of the year during which an MA enrollee may switch to a different MA plan or return to Medicare Parts A and B (with or without a PDP); allow beneficiaries with end-stage renal disease (ESRD) to enroll in MA beginning January 1, 2021; modify the requirements for assigning beneficiaries to Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) accountable care organizations; require the HHS Secretary to submit Medicare enrollment data to Congress annually; require the HHS Secretary to update the new beneficiary Welcome to Medicare package; and authorize the HHS Secretary to prohibit payment for services or items furnished by Medicare, Medicaid, or State Children's Health Insurance Program providers and suppliers who are subject to temporary new provider or supplier enrollment moratoria. Title XVIII: creates qualified small employer health reimbursement arrangements, which are arrangements offered by eligible employers that pay or reimburse employees for substantiated medical expenses. Under certain conditions, employers may make contributions up to a specified limit and employees do not owe income tax on the payments and reimbursements.

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There, the United States is relying heavily, apparently for the first time in an unstable environment, on private firms to supply a wide variety of security services. This report first summarizes available information on the private contractors providing security services under U.S. government contracts in Iraq. 109-364 ). Other companies provide security for convoys or officials traveling throughout Iraq. Members of Congress have also raised questions about the State Department's oversight of its protective service contractors' activities in Iraq. Legal Status and Authorities Contractors to the coalition forces in Iraq operate under three levels of legal authority: (1) the international order of the laws and usages of war and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council; (2) U.S. law; and (3) Iraqi law, including orders of the CPA that have not been superceded. Under the authority of international law, contractors and other civilians working with the military are civilian non-combatants whose conduct may be attributable to the United States or may implicate the duty to promote the welfare and security of the Iraqi people. Iraqi courts do not currently have jurisdiction to prosecute them for conduct related to their contractual responsibilities without the permission of the Sending State. A mercenary is any person who: (a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; (b) Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; (c) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; (d) Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; (e) Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and (f) Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. However, some contractor personnel who commit crimes might not fall within the statutory definitions described below, and thus might fall outside the jurisdiction of U.S. criminal law, even though the United States is responsible for their conduct as a matter of state responsibility under international law and despite that such conduct might interfere with the ability of the Multi-National Forces in Iraq to carry out its U.N. mandate. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) Persons who are "employed by or accompanying the armed forces" overseas may be prosecuted under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000 for any offense that would be punishable by imprisonment for more than one year if committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ, as amended by § 552 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 ( P.L. The trial of civilian contractors by courts-martial will likely be subject to challenge on constitutional grounds. Military Considerations Proponents of the use of private security contractors argue that they are as responsible as serving military personnel because many are former soldiers or individuals equally dedicated to the national mission. Section 824 would bar the Department of Defense from allowing contractors to perform inherently governmental functions in a combat area. S. 674 (Obama)—Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007 S. 674 would require the Secretaries of Defense, State, and the Interior; the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the Director of National Intelligence to provide information to the Congress within 90 days of enactment on U.S. government contractors and subcontractors working in Afghanistan and Iraq, with particularly detailed requirements for information on private security contractors. (This last provision is also included in H.R.

The United States is relying heavily on private firms to supply a wide variety of services in Iraq, including security. From publicly available information, this is apparently the first time that the United States has depended so extensively on contractors to provide security in a hostile environment, although it has previously contracted for more limited security services in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and elsewhere. In Iraq, private firms known as Private Security Contractors (PSCs) serve to protect individuals, transport convoys, forward operating bases, buildings, and other economic infrastructure, and are training Iraqi police and military personnel. By providing security for reconstruction and stabilization efforts, many analysts and policymakers say, private contractors contribute an essential service to U.S. and international efforts to bring peace to Iraq. Nonetheless, the use of armed contractors raises several concerns, including transparency and accountability. The lack of public information on the terms of the contracts, including their costs and the standards governing hiring and performance, make evaluating their efficiency difficult. The apparent lack of a practical means to hold contractors accountable under U.S. law for abuses and other transgressions, and the possibility that they could be prosecuted by foreign courts, is also a source of concern. Contractors working with the Department of State or the U.S. military (or with any of the coalition forces) in Iraq are non-combatants who have no combat immunity under international law if they engage in hostilities, and whose conduct may be attributable to the United States. Section 552 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364) makes military contractors supporting the Armed Forces in Iraq subject to court-martial, but due to constitutional concerns, it seems more likely that contractors who commit crimes in Iraq would be prosecuted under criminal statutes that apply extraterritorially or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or by means of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). Generally, Iraqi courts do not have jurisdiction to prosecute contractors without the permission of the relevant member country of the Multi-National Forces in Iraq. Some contractors, including those with the State Department, may remain outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, civil or military, for improper conduct in Iraq. This report summarizes what is currently known publicly about companies that provide personnel for security missions in Iraq and some sources of controversy surrounding them. A treatment of legal status and authorities follows, including an overview of relevant international law as well as Iraqi law, which currently consists primarily of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) orders that remain in effect until superceded. The various possible means for prosecuting contractors under U.S. law in civilian or military courts are detailed, followed by a discussion of possible issues for Congress, including whether protective services are inherently governmental functions. The report also summarizes pertinent legislative proposals. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Recent court decisions have highlighted the ongoing controversy over the scope of the Affordable Care Act's (ACA's) contraceptive coverage requirement and, more generally, whether religious freedom rights extend to commercial entities as well as nonprofits and individuals. Congress has enacted a number of exemptions to accommodate religious objections to legislative requirements, but those exemptions generally have been limited to individuals and nonprofit organizations. Several federal courts and some state decisions that have considered the issue have reached different conclusions, and the U.S. Supreme Court, by granting certiorari in Conestoga and Hobby Lobby Store , appears poised to provide guidance on this issue in the future. This report examines the constitutional and statutory protections related to free exercise of religion, including current Supreme Court interpretations, as well as judicial and legislative avoidance of defining the parameters of religious belief. It also discusses significant examples of existing religious exemptions in current law, including employment nondiscrimination, health care, and public accommodations law. Finally, it analyzes recent federal judicial decisions that have considered the religious freedom rights of commercial entities whose owners have religious objections to the contraceptive coverage requirement. The contraceptive coverage requirement requires that group health plans and health insurance issuers provide coverage for certain preventive health services, including a range of contraceptives, without imposing cost-sharing requirements. However, some employers have objected to the requirement for contraceptive coverage, arguing that doing so would mean facilitating access to services that directly conflict with their religious beliefs regarding human reproduction. Certain public accommodations have objected to the lack of exemption for entities with religious objections to same-sex relationships. These objections have arisen mainly in the context of same-sex marriage and civil union ceremonies. Among the questions posed by the contraceptive cases are whether secular corporations may pursue legal challenges related to religious freedom under either the First Amendment or RFRA; whether the corporations' for-profit status should be considered in eligibility for legal protection; whether the religious rights of the owners of closely held corporations "pass-through" to the corporation itself; and whether those owners may pursue distinct legal challenges separate from the corporation. In the context of the contraceptive coverage mandate, corporations have asserted their rights as persons protected by RFRA and Free Exercise jurisprudence generally, and they have asserted their rights as passed to them by their owners. Relying upon the plain text of the Dictionary Act, the courts found that the companies could be eligible for protection under RFRA. Applying RFRA to Religious Objections to the Contraceptive Coverage Requirement Of the five circuit courts that have considered contraceptive coverage cases, the Third and Sixth Circuits rejected the ability of the parties—either as corporations or their owners in their individual capacity—to challenge free exercise rights, and therefore did not address the likelihood on the parties' success on the merits. Those courts considered the three elements of RFRA claims: whether the mandate imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise of the claimants; whether the government demonstrated a compelling interest in such a burden; and whether the government used the least restrictive means.

The Supreme Court's grant of review in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and Hobby Lobby Stores v. Sebelius, along with recent federal court decisions, has highlighted the ongoing controversy over the scope of the Affordable Care Act's (ACA's) contraceptive coverage requirement, which requires an employer to provide certain contraceptive coverage to its employees under its group health plan. Some employers have objected to the requirement, citing objections to the facilitation of the use of contraceptives in conflict with the religious tenets by which their businesses operate. An analogous issue has arisen in state courts in the context of same-sex weddings. Several private businesses that qualify as public accommodations have objected to state requirements that they provide services without discriminating based on sexual orientation despite the owners' religious objections to same-sex marriage. These issues have raised a novel legal question for the courts: What rights do secular businesses that operate for profit have to pursue legal claims to protect their religious exercise? Although a number of statutory exemptions exist to protect individuals and organizations' religious beliefs and objections (e.g., employment discrimination under Title VII, disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, etc.), courts have applied those exemptions only to individuals and nonprofit, religious organizations. A number of legal challenges to the contraceptive coverage requirement have examined a range of questions related to the rights of these businesses. As a threshold question, courts have had to analyze whether the business itself is eligible for protection under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and Free Exercise jurisprudence. The businesses have asserted that they qualify as "persons" under RFRA and, in the alternative, that they are entitled to pursue their claims on behalf of their owners under what is known as the "pass-through" theory of corporate rights. Courts have also considered whether the business owners may pursue independent legal claims asserting their objections, or if their individual rights are forfeited at the time of the company's incorporation. If a court determines that the business or its owners are eligible for free exercise protection, it may then consider the merits of the case, including whether the mandate constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise; whether the government has a compelling interest to do so; and whether the government used the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. Five federal circuit courts have considered these questions in the context of the contraceptive coverage requirement, and have reached different conclusions on the range of questions raised. This report examines the constitutional and statutory protections related to free exercise of religion, including current Supreme Court interpretations, as well as judicial and legislative avoidance of defining the parameters of religious belief. It also discusses significant examples of existing religious exemptions in current law, including employment nondiscrimination, health care, and public accommodations law. Finally, it analyzes recent federal judicial decisions that have considered the religious freedom rights of commercial entities whose owners have religious objections to the contraceptive coverage requirement.

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Introduction This report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2016. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the third title of the homeland security appropriations bill—the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in recent years as "Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery." The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2016 request for Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, and the appropriations proposed by Congress in response, and those enacted thus far. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the third title, the report includes information on provisions throughout the proposed bill and report that directly affect these functions. 112-25 ). Data used in this report for FY2015 amounts are derived from the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery As noted above, the Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery title (Title III) of the DHS appropriations bill is the second-largest title in the bill in terms of net discretionary budget authority: NPPD, OHA, and FEMA are funded in this title. The Administration requested $6,222 million in FY2016 net discretionary budget authority for components included in this title, as part of a total budget for these components of $19,020 million for FY2016. The appropriations request was $267 million (4.5%) more than was provided for FY2015. The Administration also requested an additional $6,713 billion not reflected in the above totals for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the Budget Control Act (BCA, P.L. Senate-reported S. 1619 would have provided the components included in this title $6,291 million in net discretionary budget authority—$69 million (1.1%) more than requested, and $336 million (5.6%) more than was provided in FY2015—while House-reported H.R. 3128 would have provided $6,122 million—$100 million (1.6%) less than requested, and $167 million (2.8%) more than was provided in FY2015. Both Senate- and House-reported bills included the requested disaster relief funding. On December 18, 2015, the President signed into law P.L. 114-113 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Division F of which was the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016. The act included $6,353 million for these components in FY2016, $398 million (6.8%) more than was provided for FY2015, and $131 million (2.1%) more than was requested. It also included the requested disaster relief funding. However, unlike the Senate-reported bill and the Administration's budget proposal, the House bill did not provide for SAFER waiver authority in FY2016.

This report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2016. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the third title of the homeland security appropriations bill—the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in the appropriations act in recent years as "Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery." The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2016 request for Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, and the appropriations proposed by Congress in response, and those enacted thus far. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the third title, the report includes information on provisions throughout the proposed bill and report that directly affect these functions. Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery is the second largest of the four titles that carry the bulk of the funding in the bill. The Administration requested $6,222 million for these components in FY2016, $267 million more than was provided for FY2015. These three components made up 15.0% of the Administration's $41.4 billion request for the department in net discretionary budget authority, and the proposed additional funding was 15.5% of the total net increase requested. Most of the proposed net discretionary increase was for NPPD ($157 million, or 10.5% more than last year) and its work in cybersecurity and communications. The Administration also requested an additional $6.7 billion not reflected above for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the Budget Control Act (BCA, P.L. 112-25). Senate-reported S. 1619 would have provided the components included in this title $6,291 million in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $69 million (1.1%) more than requested, and $336 million (5.6%) more than was provided in FY2015. The Senate-reported bill also included the requested disaster relief funding. House-reported H.R. 3128 would have provided the components included in this title $6,122 million in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $100 million (1.6%) less than requested, and $167 million (2.8%) more than was provided in FY2015. Like the Senate-reported bill, the House-reported bill also included the requested disaster relief funding. On December 18, 2015, the President signed into law P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Division F of which was the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016. The act included $6,353 million for these components in FY2016, $398 million (6.8%) more that was provided for FY2015, and $131 million (2.1%) more than was requested. Additional information on the broader subject of FY2016 funding for the department can be found in CRS Report R44053, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2016, as well as links to analytical overviews and details regarding appropriations for other components. This report will be updated if supplemental appropriations are provided for any of these components throughout the FY2016 appropriations process.

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The national debate about how police use force and police-community relations might generate interest among policymakers about what role Congress could play in facilitating efforts to build trust between the police and the people they serve, as well as police accountability for any excessive use of force. The report starts with an overview of data on public opinion of the police. Public Perception of the Police Gallup, whose polling tracks confidence in a variety of institutions, found that the public's level of confidence in police is back to its historical norm after a decrease in 2014 and 2015 (see Figure 1 ). Whites were more likely to say that they have a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the police than Hispanics and blacks. Federalism and State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Under the authority of the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Congress may choose to impose conditions on federal grant awards to state and local governments as a way to influence state and local policy. Even though there are limits on how much influence Congress and the federal government can have on state and local law enforcement policy, the federal government does currently have some tools that might be used to promote better police-community relations and accountability. These include (1) federal efforts to collect and disseminate data on the use of force by law enforcement officers; (2) statutes that allow the federal government to investigate instances of police misconduct; and (3) the influence DOJ has on state and local law enforcement policies through its role as a public interest law enforcer, policy leader, convener, and funder of law enforcement agencies. What Role Might the Department of Justice Play in Improving Police-Community Relations? These options include (1) placing conditions on federal funding to encourage state and local governments to adopt policy changes; (2) expanding efforts to collect data on the use of force by law enforcement officers; (3) promoting the use of body-worn cameras; (4) taking steps to facilitate more investigations and prosecutions of deaths that result from excessive force; (5) promoting community policing activities through COPS grants; and (6) using the influence of congressional authority to affect the direction of national criminal justice policy. One option Congress could consider is amending 18 U.S.C. This could be done by amending Section 242 to employ a "reckless disregard" standard. Congress has already established a grant program to promote community policing: the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program. During the mid- to late 1990s, the COPS Office awarded billions of dollars in grants for law enforcement agencies to hire officers to engage in community policing.

Several high-profile incidents where the police have apparently used excessive force against citizens have generated interest in what role Congress could play in facilitating efforts to build trust between the police and the people they serve. This report provides a brief overview of the federal government's role in police-community relations. Public confidence in the police declined in 2014 and 2015 after several high-profile incidents in which men of color were killed during confrontations with the police. Confidence in the police has rebounded in recent years and is now back to the historical average. However, certain groups, such as Hispanics, blacks, people under the age of 35, and individuals with liberal political leanings say they have less confidence in the police than whites, people over the age of 35, and people with conservative political leanings. If Congress concludes that low public opinion of the police is at least partially attributable to police policies and practices, it may decide to address state and local law enforcement policies and practices it believes erode public trust in the police. Federalism limits the amount of influence Congress can have over state and local law enforcement policy. Regardless, the federal government might choose to address issues related to promoting better police-community relations and accountability through (1) federal efforts to collect and disseminate data on the use of force by police, (2) statutes that allow the federal government to investigate instances of alleged police misconduct, and (3) the influence the Department of Justice (DOJ) has on state and local policing through its role as a public interest law enforcer, policy leader, convener, and funder of state and local law enforcement agencies. There are several options policymakers might consider should they choose to play a role in facilitating better police-community relations, including the following: placing conditions on federal funding to encourage law enforcement agencies to adopt policies that promote better community relations; expanding efforts to collect comprehensive data on the use of force by law enforcement officers; providing grants to law enforcement agencies so they could purchase body-worn cameras for their officers; taking steps to facilitate investigations and prosecutions of excessive force by amending 18 U.S.C. Section 242 to reduce the mens rea standard in federal prosecutions, or place conditions on federal funds to promote the use of special prosecutors at the state level; funding Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) hiring grants so law enforcement agencies could hire more officers to engage in community policing activities; and using the influence of congressional authority to affect the direction of national criminal justice policy.

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Introduction To provide funding for discretionary spending programs of the government, Congress generally uses an annual appropriations process. Under congressional rules, when making decisions about the funding of individual items or programs, however, Congress may be constrained by the terms of previously enacted legislation. The way in which the House and Senate interpret and apply this concept under their respective rules and precedents creates a distinction between appropriations for purposes authorized by law and those for purposes not authorized by law, often termed unauthorized appropriations. This report provides a brief explanation of this distinction, and its significance for understanding how appropriations and other legislation work in conjunction to determine how agencies may spend appropriated funds. Background The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the "power of the purse" by prohibiting expenditures "but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." As a result, legislation to provide for government expenditures must adhere to the same requirements and conditions imposed on the law-making process as any other measure. The Constitution does not, however, prescribe specific practices or procedures. Instead, the manner in which the House and Senate have chosen to exercise this authority is a construct of congressional rules and practices, which have evolved pursuant to the constitutional authority of each chamber to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings." One effect of these rules has been the formalization of funding decisions as a two-step process, in which separate legislation to establish or continue federal agencies, programs, policies, projects, or activities, is presumed to be enacted first, and is subsequently followed by legislation that provides funding. Under the rules of the House and Senate, this distinction is largely based on technical issues related to the precedents of the respective chamber; the existence of legislation defining the legal authority for particular federal agencies, programs, policies, projects, or activities; and the relationship of such authority to the applicable appropriation. In most cases, an appropriation is said to be authorized when it follows explicit language defining the legal authority for a federal agency, program, policy, project, or activity that will be applicable in the same fiscal year for which the appropriation is to be enacted. In contrast, an appropriation is said to be unauthorized when no such authority has been enacted or, if previously enacted, has terminated or expired. Legal Issues Related to Authorizations and Appropriations Appropriations in the Absence of Authorizations There is no constitutional or general statutory requirement that an appropriation must be preceded by a specific act that authorized the appropriation. "The existence of a statute (organic legislation) imposing substantive functions upon an agency that require funding for their performance is itself sufficient legal authorization for the necessary appropriations, regardless of whether the statute addresses the question of subsequent appropriations." An authorizing statute that establishes a federal agency often creates statutory duties and obligations for that federal agency (including the responsibility to conduct certain acts, such as enforcement of particular laws that the agency is charged with administering). If an authorization of appropriations expires, or if Congress fails to appropriate sufficient funds without explicitly denying their use for a particular purpose, those statutory obligations still exist even though the agency may lack sufficient funds to satisfy them.

To provide funding for discretionary spending programs of the government, Congress generally uses an annual appropriations process. Under congressional rules, when making decisions about the funding of individual items or programs, however, Congress may be constrained by the terms of previously enacted legislation. The way in which the House and Senate interpret and apply this concept under their respective rules and precedents creates a distinction between authorized and unauthorized appropriations. This report provides a brief explanation of this distinction, and its significance for understanding how appropriations and other legislation work in conjunction to determine how agencies may spend appropriated funds. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the "power of the purse" by prohibiting expenditures "but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." As a result, legislation to provide for government expenditures must adhere to the same requirements and conditions imposed on the law-making process as any other measure. The Constitution does not, however, prescribe specific practices or procedures. Instead, the manner in which the House and Senate have chosen to exercise this authority is a construct of congressional rules and practices, which have evolved pursuant to the constitutional authority of each chamber to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings." One effect of these rules has been the formalization of funding decisions as a two-step process, in which separate legislation to establish or continue federal agencies, programs, policies, projects, or activities, is presumed to be enacted first, and is subsequently followed by legislation that provides funding. Another effect of these rules has been a distinction between those appropriations for purposes authorized by law and those for purposes not authorized by law. Under the rules of the House and Senate, this distinction is largely based on technical issues related to the precedents of the respective chamber; the existence of legislation defining the legal authority for particular federal agencies, programs, policies, projects, or activities; and the relationship of such authority to the applicable appropriation. In most cases, an appropriation is said to be authorized when it follows explicit language defining the legal authority for a federal agency, program, policy, project, or activity that will be applicable in the same fiscal year for which the appropriation is to be enacted. In contrast, an appropriation is said to be unauthorized when no such authority has been enacted or, if previously enacted, has terminated or expired. There is no constitutional or general statutory requirement that an appropriation must be preceded by a specific act that authorized the appropriation. According to the Government Accountability Office, "The existence of a statute (organic legislation) imposing substantive functions upon an agency that require funding for their performance is itself sufficient legal authorization for the necessary appropriations." An authorizing statute that establishes a federal agency often creates statutory duties and obligations for that federal agency (including the responsibility to conduct certain activities such as enforcement of the particular law that the agency is charged with administering). If an authorization of appropriations expires, or if Congress fails to appropriate sufficient funds without explicitly denying their use for a particular purpose, those statutory obligations still exist even though the agency may lack sufficient funds to satisfy them.

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Introduction On July 16, 2015, the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) of the Department of the Interior proposed a Stream Protection Rule. It would revise regulations that implement Title V of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), the law that governs the permitting of coal mining operations. Portions of the existing rules were promulgated more than 30 years ago. OSM asserts that updated rules, which have been under development for more than five years, are needed to reflect current science, technology, and modern mining practices. To stakeholders, the proposed rule raised a number of issues, including whether new federal rules are needed and, in particular, whether OSM's proposed approach will improve and strengthen implementation of the law. At the same time, some environmental advocacy groups that have generally supported OSM's efforts to strengthen regulation of coal mining operations now contended that the proposed rule was not strong enough. Thus, a related issue is whether an alternative regulatory approach with greater benefits but also increased costs would better achieve SMCRA's purposes. This report is intended to assist consideration of issues raised by the Stream Protection Rule. The report briefly describes SMCRA and the context for the 2015 proposed rule. It discusses major elements of the 2015 proposal and OSM's estimates of its impacts (costs and benefits). Finally, it highlights key elements of the final rule, which was released by OSM on December 19, 2016. In order to protect streams from sedimentation and channel disturbance, the 1983 buffer zone rules provided that no land within 100 feet of a perennial or intermittent stream shall be disturbed by surface mining activities, including the dumping of mining waste, unless the regulatory authority grants a variance that specifically authorizes surface mining activities closer to or through such a stream. As indicated since 2009, the proposal—now called the Stream Protection Rule—would apply to coal mining activities nationwide, not just Appalachia. However, it included elements from several of the other alternatives considered by OSM that would be more stringent than existing rules, such as new requirements for baseline data collection to determine the impacts of proposed mining operations, more specificity on reclamation plans, and more specificity on measures to protect fish and wildlife from adverse impacts of mining. Impacts of the Proposed Rule The Draft RIA report presented OSM's estimates of costs and benefits of the proposed rule, and it also described uncertainties associated with the analyses. Costs54 OSM estimated that the coal industry will incur annual compliance costs of $52 million under the proposed rule, above baseline costs that would be incurred in the absence of the rule. The $52 million total consists of $45 million annually for surface coal mining operations and $7 million annually for underground mining operations. Nearly 46% of the expected compliance costs reflect new regulatory requirements on coal mining operations in the Appalachia region. Of the increased costs for operations in Appalachia, OSM estimated that 72% are for costs to surface mining operations there—or, 33% of the total cost of the rule. Qualitatively, the agency projected that the proposed rule would have several types of benefits. States also say that OSM has underestimated administrative costs to regulators that could result from the rule. Some states and mining industry groups have focused particular criticism on OSM for, in their view, failing to adequately consult with affected states during development of the proposed rule. Legislation was introduced in the 114 th Congress to halt or re-direct OSM's activities concerning the Stream Protection Rule. 1644 ), was passed by the House January 12, 2016. Opposition to the final revised rule by coal industry groups and some Members of Congress was immediate after its release, and legislation to overturn the rule was soon introduced, including H.J.Res. 11 and H.J.Res. If the final rule were overturned by legislative or presidential action in the 115 th Congress or by a court, existing rules (i.e., the 1983 stream buffer zone rule) would remain in place, unless or until new rules or guidance were issued.

On July 16, 2015, the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) of the Department of the Interior proposed a Stream Protection Rule that would revise regulations implementing Title V of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). Revised rules are intended to avoid or minimize adverse impacts of coal mining on surface water, groundwater, fish, wildlife, and other natural resources by limiting the mining of coal in or through streams, placement of waste in streams and limiting the generation of mining waste. Some of the existing regulations that would be replaced by the proposed rule were promulgated more than 30 years ago. OSM asserts that updated rules, which have been under development since 2009, are needed to reflect current science, technology, and modern mining practices. The proposal retained the core of existing rules in many respects, including the stream buffer zone rule. It requires that land within 100 feet of a perennial or intermittent stream shall not be disturbed by surface mining activities, including the dumping of mining waste, unless the regulatory authority grants a variance that specifically authorizes surface mining activities closer to or through such a stream. The 2015 proposed rule, called the Stream Protection Rule, also included new requirements for baseline data collection to determine the impacts of proposed mining operations, more specificity on reclamation plans, and more specificity on measures to protect fish and wildlife. OSM estimated that the coal industry would incur annual compliance costs of $52 million under the proposal. These costs would be above baseline costs that would be incurred in the absence of the rule. Costs of the proposed rule were expected to consist of $45 million annually for surface coal mining operations and $7 million annually for underground mining operations. Nearly 46% of the expected compliance costs reflect new regulatory requirements on coal mining operations in Appalachian states. Of the increased costs in those states, OSM estimated that 72% are for costs to surface mining operations there—or, 33% of the total cost of the rule. Other regions also are expected to experience operational costs, but impacts are anticipated to vary across mine type (e.g., surface or underground) and region. Because of data limitations, OSM could not quantify benefits of the proposal, but qualitatively, the agency said that the rule is expected to reduce the adverse impacts of coal mining on water resources and aquatic habitat. To stakeholders, OSM's Stream Protection Rule raised a number of questions, including whether new regulations are needed; if so, whether benefits of the proposed rule justify the projected compliance and associated costs; and whether an alternative regulatory approach with greater benefits but also increased costs would better achieve SMCRA's purposes. Concern that OSM's efforts to develop a new rule would be costly and burdensome to the coal industry has led to strong congressional interest for some time. Oversight hearings have been held, and legislation was introduced in the 114th Congress to halt or re-direct OSM's initiatives, including H.R. 1644 (passed by the House January 12, 2016), S. 1458, and a provision of H.R. 2822. Mining industry groups were very critical of the costs of the proposal, while environmental groups that have generally supported strengthening SMCRA regulations contended that the rule should be stronger to provide more protection to streams. A number of states say that the rule would undermine state authority and that OSM failed to consult adequately with states during development of the rule. OSM issued the final revised Stream Protection Rule on December 19, 2016. Opposition by coal industry groups and some Members of Congress was immediate, and legislation to overturn the rule was introduced, including H.J.Res. 11 and H.J.Res. 16 in the 115th Congress. If the final rule were overturned by legislative or presidential action, the existing rules (i.e., the 1983 stream buffer zone rule) would remain in place, unless or until new rules or guidance were issued. This report briefly describes SMCRA and the context for the 2015 proposed rule. It discusses major elements of the proposal and OSM's estimates of its costs and benefits. It describes congressional activity concerning the proposed rule and highlights key elements of the final rule, which was released on December 19, 2016.

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Introduction The Bush Administration described the strategy of "tailored deterrence" to define the role that nuclear weapons might play in U.S. national security policy. Yet, there has been little discussion of this concept, either in Congress or in the public at large, that would allow this concept to serve as a mechanism to help determine the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force. This absence of discussion has also made it difficult to identify the ways in which tailored deterrence differs, if at all, from the Cold War concept of strategic deterrence and how it might alter the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. It then identifies a number of issues that Congress might address when it reviews these differences, including the question of whether detailed and tailored attack plans are more likely to enhance deterrence or more likely to lead to the early use of nuclear weapons, and the question of whether tailored deterrence provides any guidance about the future size and structure of U.S. nuclear forces. From the end of World War II, and, particularly, from the first explosion of a Soviet nuclear weapon in 1949, until the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States relied on nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression and forestall the outbreak of a global war between the United States and the Soviet Union. This widespread consensus about the nature of the threat to the United States and its allies, and the need for nuclear weapons to deter and respond to this threat, began to dissolve during the 1990s, after the demise of the Soviet Union. Although the Obama Administration has not yet completed its nuclear posture review or enunciated a role for nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, reports indicate it will continue to focus on the emerging threats from nuclear proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, and the possible use of a nuclear weapon by non-state actors. Specifically, and of interest for this report, the Defense Department identified the need to shift "from 'one size fits all' deterrence to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer competitors." But, even during the Cold War, the United States tailored its nuclear targeting doctrine, its nuclear weapons employment policy, and its nuclear force structure to enhance or maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent posture. Questions about the credibility of the U.S. deterrent posture persisted throughout the Cold War, with the United States adjusting its doctrine, targeting strategy, and force structure periodically in an effort to bolster its credibility and enhance deterrence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Department of Defense conducted several studies to review U.S. nuclear targeting strategy and weapons employment policy. Nuclear weapons threaten destruction of an adversary's most highly valued targets.... The new nations challenging the United States may not possess nuclear weapons at all, and certainly will not possess the capability to destroy the United States as a functioning society. Nevertheless, these differing perspectives on both the substance and the rationale for U.S. nuclear weapons, in general, and tailored deterrence, in particular, give rise to several specific issues, addressed in the remainder of this report, that might be part of a congressional, or even national, debate on the future role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy. The 111 th Congress may also address questions about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy when it reviews the results of the Obama Administration's nuclear posture review, which is due to be completed early in 2010. How Much Has Nuclear Strategy Changed? There is no question that the Bush Administration changed the rhetoric about U.S. deterrent strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in that strategy substantially when it released the nuclear posture review in late 2001. Further, just as U.S. war plans evolved during the Cold War to accommodate changes in weapons capabilities and threat assessments, the Bush Administration's supporters argued that tailored deterrence would allow for similar, ongoing modifications to U.S. war plans.

The Bush Administration outlined a strategy of "tailored deterrence" to define the role that nuclear weapons play in U.S. national security policy. There has been little discussion of this concept, either in Congress or in the public at large. This leaves unanswered questions about how this strategy differs from U.S. nuclear strategy during the Cold War and how it might advise decisions about the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Throughout the Cold War, the United States relied on nuclear weapons to deter an attack by the Soviet Union and its allies and to forestall the outbreak of a global war between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the broad Cold War-era agreement about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy began to dissolve during the 1990s, after the demise of the Soviet Union. Further, in response to emerging threats to U.S. national security, the Bush Administration argued that the United States must alter its deterrence strategy "from 'one size fits all' deterrence to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer competitors." During the Cold War, the United States often modified, or tailored, its nuclear targeting doctrine, its nuclear weapons employment policy, and its nuclear force structure to enhance or maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent posture. In some ways, the Bush Administration's concept of tailored deterrence follows the same pattern, using assessments of an adversary's society and values to identify a range of targets that might be threatened, and adjusting U.S. war plans and force structure to enhance the credibility of U.S. threats to destroy these targets. However, tailored deterrence differs from Cold War deterrence in that it explicitly notes that U.S. nuclear weapons could be used in attacks against a number of nations that might have developed and deployed chemical and biological weapons, even if they did not possess nuclear weapons. Hence, the new policy seems more of a change in "who" we will deter than it is a change in "how" we will deter. Congress may review the concept of tailored deterrence, either as a part of its oversight of nuclear weapons policies and programs, or as a part of a broader debate about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy. Issues that might come up in such a review are questions about how much U.S. nuclear strategy and weapons employment policy have changed in recent years; questions about whether the new capabilities and war plans will enhance the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats, or, conversely, make the use of nuclear weapons more likely; questions about whether the United States must develop new weapons capabilities to meet the demands of tailored deterrence, or whether it must retain a force structure with thousands of deployed warheads if it no longer uses "the Russian threat" as the metric for sizing the U.S. force; and questions about whether the new concepts and war plans expand or restrict the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. The Obama Administration is also likely to review and revise this concept as it conducts its nuclear posture review. It may revise the rationale for why the United States retains nuclear weapons, in accordance with the President's pledge to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. It may also address questions about U.S. declaratory policy, and the role that other policy options may play in efforts to deter or defend against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This report will not be updated again; it will be replaced by a new report on U.S. nuclear doctrine after the Obama Administration completes, and reports on, its nuclear posture review.

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Conference Report with full text of the act ( H.R. State and Local Incentives This section covers websites that list and describe state and local incentives available to support energy efficiency and renewable energy. Also, the homepage includes a map-link to a list of federal incentives. Incentives by Technology Type The following are links to resources by type of renewable energy. 111-5) General CRS Report RL33831, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Legislation in the 110 th Congress CRS Report RL33578, Energy Tax Policy: History and Current Issues CRS Report RL34162, Renewable Energy: Background and Issues for the 110 th Congress Vehicles and Fuels CRS Report RL32979, Alcohol Fuels Tax Incentives CRS Report R40168, Alternative Fuels and Advanced Technology Vehicles: Issues in Congress CRS Report R40110, Biofuels Incentives: A Summary of Federal Programs CRS Report RS22558, Tax Credits for Hybrid Vehicles CRS Report RS22351, Tax Incentives for Alternative Fuel and Advanced Technology Vehicles Wave, Tidal, In-Stream CRS Report RL33883, Issues Affecting Tidal, Wave, and In-Stream Generation Projects Wind Power CRS Report RL34546, Wind Power in the United States: Technology, Economic, and Policy Issues Popular Incentives Tables Grants Information Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) http://www.cfda.gov/ The CFDA is the primary source of federal grants program information, although actual funding depends upon annual congressional budget appropriations. The CFDA is available on the Internet.

The following list of authoritative resources is designed to assist in responding to a broad range of constituent questions and concerns about renewable energy and energy efficiency tax incentives. Links are provided for the following: the full text of public laws establishing and extending federal renewable energy and energy efficiency incentives; federal, state, and local incentives resources; incentive resources grouped by technology type (solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass); CRS reports on this topic; and federal grants information resources. The last section of this report includes tables displaying popular incentives, the corresponding U.S. Code citations, and current expiration dates of those incentives. This list reflects information that is currently available. It will be updated regularly as other relevant material becomes available.

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The following is a profile of the 113 th Congress (2013-2014). Party Breakdown In the 113 th Congress, the current party alignments as of November 24, 2014, are House of Representatives: 234 Republicans, 207 Democrats (including the 5 Delegates and the Resident Commissioner), and no vacant seats. Senate: 53 Democrats; 2 Independents, who caucus with the Democrats; and 45 Republicans. Congressional Service The average length of service of Members of the House at the beginning of the 113 th Congress was 9.1 years (4.6 terms) and for Senators 10.2 years (1.7 terms). Statistics gathered by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, which studies the religious affiliation of Members, and CQ Roll Call at the beginning of the 113 th Congress showed the following: 56% of the Members (247 in the House, 52 in the Senate) are Protestant, with Baptist as the most represented denomination; 31% of the Members (136 in the House, 27 in the Senate) are Catholic; 6.2% of the Members (22 in the House, 11 in the Senate) are Jewish; 2.8% of the Members (8 in the House, 7 in the Senate) are Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints); 3 Members (2 in the House, 1 in the Senate) are Buddhist, 2 House Members are Muslim, and 1 House Member is Hindu; and Other religious affiliations represented include Greek Orthodox, Quaker, Unitarian Universalist, and Christian Science. Eighty-three women, including 3 Delegates, serve in the House and 20 in the Senate. Forty-three serve in the House, including 2 Delegates, and 2 serve in the Senate. This number includes one Member of the House who is of African American and Asian ancestry and is counted in both ethnic categories in this report. Hispanic/Latino American Members There are 37 Hispanic or Latino Members in the 113 th Congress, 6.9% of the total membership. American Indian Members There are two American Indian (Native American) Members of the 113 th Congress, both of whom are Republican Members of the House.

This report presents a profile of the membership of the 113th Congress (2013-2014). Statistical information is included on selected characteristics of Members, including data on party affiliation, average age, occupation, education, length of congressional service, religious affiliation, gender, ethnicity, foreign births, and military service. As of November 24, 2014, in the House of Representatives, there are 234 Republicans, 207 Democrats (including 5 Delegates and the Resident Commissioner), and no vacant seats. The Senate has 45 Republicans, 53 Democrats, and 2 Independents, who caucus with the Democrats. The average age of Members of the House at the beginning of the 113th Congress was 57.0 years; of Senators, 62.0 years. The overwhelming majority of Members of Congress have a college education. The dominant professions of Members are public service/politics, business, and law. Most Members identify as Christians, and Protestants collectively constitute the majority religious affiliation. Roman Catholics account for the largest single religious denomination, and numerous other affiliations are represented. The average length of service for Representatives at the beginning of the 113th Congress was 9.1 years (4.6 terms); for Senators, 10.2 years (1.7 terms). One hundred three women (a record number) serve in the 113th Congress: 83 in the House, including 3 Delegates, and 20 in the Senate. There are 43 African American Members of the House and 2 in the Senate. This House number includes 2 Delegates. There are 37 Hispanic or Latino Members (a record number) serving: 33 in the House, including 1 Delegate and the Resident Commissioner, and 4 in the Senate. Thirteen Members (10 Representatives, 2 Delegates, and 1 Senator) are Asian American or Pacific Islanders. Two American Indians (Native Americans) serve in the House. The portions of this report covering political party affiliation, gender, ethnicity, and vacant seats will be updated as events warrant. The remainder of the report will not be updated.

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The offense consists of three elements: (1) a continuing obligation to report to the authorities in any jurisdiction in which the individual resides, works, or attends school; (2) the knowing failure to comply with registration requirements; and (3) a jurisdictional element, i.e ., (a) an obligation to register as a consequence of a prior qualifying federal conviction or (b)(i) travel in interstate or foreign commerce, (ii) travel into or out of Indian country, or (iii) residence in Indian country. In Nichols v. United States , the Supreme Court recently concluded that SORNA's requirements in place at the time did not apply when offenders relocated abroad. Anticipating the problem, Congress passed the International Megan's Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and Other Sexual Crimes Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex Offenders [Act], which among other things, amends SORNA to compel offenders to supplement their registration statements with information relating to their plans to travel abroad. Qualifying Convictions Only those who have been convicted of a qualifying sex offense need register. §2242 (sexual abuse) 18 U.S.C. The Supreme Court resolved a split among the lower federal courts when it declared in Reynolds v. United States that SORNA's "registration requirements do not apply to pre-Act offenders until the Attorney General specifies that they do apply." An individual need only have a knowing failure to register and a prior conviction for a qualifying sex offense under federal law or the law of the District of Columbia, the Code of Military Justice, tribal law, or the law of a United States territory or possession. Bail Federal bail laws permit the prosecution to request a pre-trial detention hearing prior to the pre-trial release of anyone charged with a violation of Section 2250. Imprisonment Upon conviction, the individual may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years and/or fined not more than $250,000. Section 2250 also sets an additional penalty of not more than 30 years, but not less than 5 years, in prison for the commission of a federal crime of violence when the offender has also violated Section 2250. A SORNA tier II sex offender is: [A] sex offender other than a tier III sex offender whose offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year and- (A) is comparable to or more severe than the following offenses, when committed against a minor, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense against a minor: (i) sex trafficking (as described in section 1591 of title 18 ); (ii) coercion and enticement (as described in section 2422(b) of title 18 ); (iii) transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity (as described in section 2423(a)) of title 18; (iv) abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of title 18 ); (B) involves- (i) use of a minor in a sexual performance; (ii) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution; or (iii) production or distribution of child pornography; or (C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier I sex offender. The Sentencing Guidelines recommend a 5-year term of supervised release. One argues that SORNA or Section 2250 operates in a manner which the Constitution specifically forbids, for example in its clauses on Ex Post Facto laws, Due Process, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment. Legislative Authority The most frequent constitutional challenge to SORNA and Section 2250 is that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to enact them. Nevertheless, a subsequent circuit court opinion concluded that Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause extends to a defendant convicted of a Commerce Clause-based federal offense who was never unconditionally released from federal supervision.

Section 2250 of Title 18 of the United States Code outlaws an individual's failure to comply with federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requirements. SORNA demands that an individual—previously convicted of a qualifying federal, state, or foreign sex offense—register with state, territorial, or tribal authorities. Individuals must register in every jurisdiction in which they reside, work, or attend school. They must also update the information whenever they move, or change their employment or educational status. Section 2250 applies only under one of several jurisdictional circumstances: the individual was previously convicted of a qualifying federal sex offense; the individual travels in interstate or foreign commerce; or the individual enters, leaves, or resides in Indian country. The Supreme Court in Nichols v. United States held that SORNA, as originally written, had limited application to sex offenders in the United States who relocated abroad. The International Megan's Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and Other Sexual Crimes Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex Offenders [Act], P.L. 114-119 (H.R. 515), however, anticipated and addressed the limit identified in Nichols. Individuals charged with a violation of Section 2250 may be subject to preventive detention or to a series of pre-trial release conditions. If convicted, they face imprisonment for not more than 10 years and/or a fine of not more than $250,000 as well as the prospect of a post-imprisonment term of supervised release of not less than 5 years. An offender guilty of a Section 2250 offense, who also commits a federal crime of violence, is subject to an additional penalty of imprisonment for up to 30 years and not less than 5 years for the violent crime. The Attorney General has exercised his statutory authority to make SORNA applicable to qualifying convictions occurring prior to its enactment. The Supreme Court rejected the suggestion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that Congress lacks the constitutional authority to make Section 2250 applicable, on the basis of a prior federal offense and intrastate noncompliance, to individuals who had served their sentence and been released from federal supervision prior to SORNA's enactment, United States v. Kebodeaux, 134 S. Ct. 2496 (2013). The Fifth Circuit's Kebodeaux opinion aside, the lower federal appellate courts have almost uniformly rejected challenges to Section 2250's constitutional validity. Those challenges have included arguments under the Constitution's Ex Post Facto, Due Process, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Spending Clauses. This report is available in an abridged version, CRS Report R42691, SORNA: An Abridged Legal Analysis of 18 U.S.C. §2250 (Failure to Register as a Sex Offender), without the footnotes or the attribution or citations to authority found here.

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Apprenticeship is a workforce development strategy that trains an individual in a specific occupation using a structured combination of on-the-job training and related instruction. How are State Apprenticeship Agencies recognized? SAAs must go through a recognition process with the U.S. Department of Labor. There are likely other workforce programs that combine on-the-job training and related instruction but do not meet Registered Apprenticeship requirements or otherwise have not registered with a certifying agency. What federal funding directly supports apprenticeship? In recent years, however, dedicated federal funds have been made available to support the development and expansion of apprenticeship programs: In December 2014, DOL solicited applications for competitive American Apprenticeship Grants. There are several federal programs in which supporting apprenticeship is an allowable use of funds.

Apprenticeship is a job training strategy that combines on-the-job training with related instruction, typically provided in a classroom setting. This report answers frequently asked questions about apprenticeship and the federal activities that support this training approach. This Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) report focuses on the Registered Apprenticeship system, through which the U.S. Department of Labor (or a recognized state apprenticeship agency) certifies a program as meeting federal requirements related to duration, intensity, and benefit to the apprentice. Historically, the federal role in apprenticeship has primarily involved regulation and oversight. In recent years, federal funds have been made available to support the development and expansion of apprenticeship programs. There are also several established federal funding streams in which apprenticeship is an allowable, but not required, use of funds.

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R ecent reports regarding an uptick in the number of alien minors apprehended at the U.S. border without a parent or legal guardian have prompted renewed questions regarding so-called unaccompanied alien children (UACs). Many of these questions were previously raised in FY2013-FY2014, when a significant number of UACs were apprehended along the southern U.S. border. Although the number of UAC apprehensions dropped in FY2015, the beginning of FY2016 has seen an increase in the number of UACs apprehended along the southern border in comparison to the same time period in the prior year. Some of these questions pertain to the numbers of children involved, their reasons for coming to the United States, and current and potential responses of the federal government and other entities to their arrival. Other questions concern the interpretation and interplay of various federal statutes and regulations, administrative and judicial decisions, and settlement agreements pertaining to alien minors. This report addresses the latter questions, providing general and relatively brief answers to 15 frequently asked questions regarding UACs. In particular, this report begins with questions and answers that give basic definitions and background information pertaining to UACs, including how federal law defines unaccompanied alien child and the difference between being a UAC and having Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status. It concludes with questions and answers regarding UACs' rights, privileges, and benefits while in the United States, including whether UACs have a right to counsel at the government's expense in removal proceedings and whether UACs are eligible for inclusion in the Obama Administration's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative. Other CRS reports address the pre-FY2015 surge in the number of UACs encountered at the U.S. border with Mexico, as well as how UACs who are apprehended by immigration officials are processed and treated. These include CRS Report R43599, Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43628, Unaccompanied Alien Children: Potential Factors Contributing to Recent Immigration , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43734, Unaccompanied Alien Children: Demographics in Brief , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Insight IN10107, Unaccompanied Alien Children: A Processing Flow Chart , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R43664, Asylum Policies for Unaccompanied Children Compared with Expedited Removal Policies for Unauthorized Adults: In Brief , by [author name scrubbed]. Yet other CRS reports discuss the circumstances in foreign countries that some see as contributing to UACs' unauthorized migration to the United States. These include CRS Report R43702, Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43616, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R42580, Guatemala: Political, Security, and Socio-Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL34027, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed]. and " Can UACs obtain asylum due to gang violence in their home countries? ." Why aren't UACs encountered at ports of entry turned away as inadmissible? Custody, Control, and Enforcement Which federal agencies have primary responsibility for maintaining custody of alien children without immigration status? The Flores settlement agreement establishes a "general policy" favoring the release of children from detention.

The beginning of FY2016 has seen an uptick in the number of alien minors apprehended at the U.S. border without a parent or legal guardian in comparison to the same time period in the prior year. This increase has prompted renewed questions regarding so-called unaccompanied alien children (UACs), many of which were previously raised in FY2013-FY2014, when a significant number of UACs were apprehended along the southern U.S. border. Some of these questions pertain to the numbers of children involved, their reasons for coming to the United States, and current and potential responses of the federal government and other entities to their arrival. Other questions concern the interpretation and interplay of various federal statutes and regulations, administrative and judicial decisions, and settlement agreements pertaining to alien minors. This report addresses the latter questions, providing general and relatively brief answers to 15 frequently asked questions regarding UACs. In particular, some of the questions and answers in this report provide basic definitions and background information relevant to discussions of UACs, such as the legal definition of unaccompanied alien child; the difference between being a UAC and having Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status; the terms and enforcement of the Flores settlement agreement; and why UACs encountered at a port of entry—as some recent arrivals have been—are not turned away on the grounds that they are inadmissible. Other questions and answers explore which federal agencies have primary responsibility for maintaining custody of alien children without immigration status; removal proceedings against such children; the release of alien minors from federal custody; the "best interest of the child" standard; and whether UACs could obtain asylum due to gang violence in their home countries. Yet other questions and answers address whether UACs have a right to counsel at the government's expense; their ability under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to have consular officials of their home country notified of their detention; and whether UACs are eligible for inclusion in the Obama Administration's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative. Other CRS reports address the pre-FY2015 surge in the number of UACs encountered at the U.S. border with Mexico, as well as how UACs who are apprehended by immigration officials are processed and treated. These include CRS Report R43599, Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43628, Unaccompanied Alien Children: Potential Factors Contributing to Recent Immigration, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43734, Unaccompanied Alien Children: Demographics in Brief, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Insight IN10107, Unaccompanied Alien Children: A Processing Flow Chart, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R43664, Asylum Policies for Unaccompanied Children Compared with Expedited Removal Policies for Unauthorized Adults: In Brief, by [author name scrubbed]. Yet other CRS reports discuss the circumstances in foreign countries that some see as contributing to UACs' unauthorized migration to the United States. These include CRS Report R43702, Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43616, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R42580, Guatemala: Political, Security, and Socio-Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL34027, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

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This vast pipeline network is integral to U.S. energy supply and has links to power plants, refineries, airports, and other critical infrastructure. In particular, cyber infiltration of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems could allow "hackers" to disrupt pipeline service and cause spills, explosions, or fires—all from remote locations via the Internet or other communication pathways. In March 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported ongoing cyber intrusions among U.S. natural gas pipeline operators. These cybersecurity events coupled with serious consequences from recent pipeline accidents have heightened congressional concern about cybersecurity measures in the U.S. pipelines sector. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is authorized by federal statute to promulgate pipeline physical security and cybersecurity regulations, if necessary, but the agency has not found a need to issue such regulations to date. An April 2011 White House proposal and the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 ( S. 2105 ) both would mandate the promulgation of cybersecurity regulations for pipelines, among other privately-owned critical infrastructures sectors. A revised version of S. 2105 , S. 3414 , would permit the issuance of regulations but would focus on voluntary cybersecurity measures. U.S. TSA officials assert that security regulations could be counterproductive because they could establish a general standard below the level of security already in place at many pipeline companies based on their company-specific security assessments. Conclusions While the pipelines sector has many cybersecurity issues in common with other critical infrastructure sectors, it is somewhat distinct in several ways: Pipelines in the United States have been the target of several confirmed terrorist plots and attempted physical attacks since September 11, 2001. Changes to pipeline computer networks over the past 20 years, more sophisticated hackers, and the emergence of specialized malicious software have made pipeline SCADA operations increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks. There recently has been a coordinated series of cyber intrusions specifically targeting U.S. pipeline computer systems. TSA already has statutory authority to issue cybersecurity regulations for pipelines if the agency chooses to do so, but may not have the resources to develop, implement, and enforce such regulations if they are mandated. TSA maintains that voluntary cybersecurity standards have been effective in protecting U.S. pipelines from cyber attacks. Based on the agency's corporate security reviews, TSA believes cybersecurity among major U.S. pipeline systems is good. However, without formal cybersecurity plans and reporting requirements, it is difficult for Congress to know for certain. Whether this self-interest is sufficient to generate the level of cybersecurity appropriate for a critical infrastructure sector, and whether imposing formal regulations would be counterproductive, is open to debate. If Congress concludes that current voluntary measures are insufficient to ensure pipeline cybersecurity, it may decide to provide specific direction to TSA to develop regulations and provide additional resources to support them, as such an effort may be beyond the TSA Pipeline Security Division's existing capabilities.

The vast U.S. network of natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines is integral to U.S. energy supply and has vital links to other critical infrastructure. While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, this network is vulnerable to cyber attacks. In particular, cyber infiltration of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems could allow successful "hackers" to disrupt pipeline service and cause spills, explosions, or fires—all from remote locations. In March 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported ongoing cyber intrusions among U.S. natural gas pipeline operators. These intrusions have heightened congressional concern about cybersecurity in the U.S. pipelines sector. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is authorized by federal statute to promulgate pipeline physical security and cybersecurity regulations, if necessary, but the agency has not issued such regulations. TSA officials assert that security regulations could be counterproductive because they could establish a general standard below the level of security already in place for many pipelines. An April 2011 White House proposal and the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 (S. 2105) both would mandate cybersecurity regulations for privately owned critical infrastructures sectors like pipelines. A revised version of S. 2105, S. 3414, would permit the issuance of regulations but would focus on voluntary cybersecurity measures. While the pipelines sector has many cybersecurity issues in common with other critical infrastructure sectors, it is somewhat distinct in several ways: Pipelines in the United States have been the target of several confirmed terrorist plots and attempted physical attacks since September 11, 2001. Changes to pipeline computer networks over the past 20 years, more sophisticated hackers, and the emergence of specialized malicious software have made pipeline SCADA operations increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks. There recently has been a coordinated series of cyber intrusions specifically targeting U.S. pipeline computer systems. TSA already has statutory authority to issue cybersecurity regulations for pipelines if the agency chooses to do so, but it may not have the resources to develop, implement, and enforce such regulations if they are mandated. TSA maintains that voluntary standards have been effective in protecting U.S. pipelines from cyber attacks. Based on the agency's corporate security reviews, TSA believes cybersecurity among major U.S. pipeline systems is effective. However, without formal cybersecurity plans and reporting requirements, it is difficult for Congress to know for certain. Whether the self-interest of pipeline operators is sufficient to generate the level of cybersecurity appropriate for a critical infrastructure sector is open to debate. If Congress concludes that current voluntary measures are insufficient to ensure pipeline cybersecurity, it may decide to provide specific direction to the TSA to develop regulations and provide additional resources to support them, as such an effort may be beyond the TSA Pipeline Security Division's existing capabilities.

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To help inform these policy debates, this report analyzes data from 1989 to 2013 of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) on the trend in the level and concentration of wealth across families. U.S. Family Wealth Data and Limitations Data regarding family wealth are very limited. In the SCF, wealth is measured by net worth (i.e., total value of assets minus total value of liabilities). Put another way, it is the value at which one-half of families in the distribution have less wealth and one-half have more wealth. In the case of wealth distribution, the median is a more reliable indicator of the wealth of the "typical" family than the mean because of the way in which a mean is calculated. The mean ranged from almost four to more than six times the median during the 1989-2013 period. As explained above, such a relationship indicates considerable concentration of wealth among families in the upper half of the wealth distribution. Mean family net worth typically increased to a greater extent than median family net worth from 1992 through 2007, which suggests that the wealth distribution became more concentrated at the upper end of the distribution over time. Since 2007, reflecting the negative impact of the deep 2007-2009 recession and the subsequent slow recovery on income and asset prices, both measures decreased (see Table 1 ). That median net worth declined and mean net worth was unchanged between 2010 and 2013 was the result of a continuing general decline in asset prices, notably housing prices. Family net worth appears to have become more concentrated in recent decades. The drop in median net worth (23%) was greater than the drop in mean net worth (19%), which suggests that the balance sheets of families in the lower half of the wealth distribution were proportionately more adversely affected by the 2007-2009 recession than those further up the distribution. The ratio of the mean to median is an indicator of the degree of concentration in a distribution because, as previously mentioned, the mean can be greatly affected by a few high-value observations.

U.S. family wealth has been an underlying consideration in congressional deliberations on various issues, including education, taxation, social welfare, and recovery from the 2007-2009 recession. This report analyzes the change over time in the level and concentration of family wealth as measured by net worth (i.e., assets minus liabilities) to help inform those policy deliberations. According to the Federal Reserve's latest Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), in 2013, mean family net worth was $534,600 and median family net worth was $81,200. The median is the value at which one-half of wealth-owners have lower values and one-half have higher values of wealth. The median is a more reliable indicator of the wealth of the "typical" family than is the mean, which, because of the way in which the mean is calculated, can be greatly affected by a relatively small number of families with high values of net worth. Mean family net worth is more than six times median family net worth, which suggests a concentration of wealth among families at the upper end of the wealth distribution. The change over time in the relationship between the mean and median indicates how the distribution of wealth across families has changed. Both mean and median net worth increased from 1989 to 2007, with the mean typically increasing to a greater extent than the median. This suggests that in recent decades wealth became more concentrated among families at the upper end of the distribution. Both measures fell between 2007 (the outset of the 2007-2009 recession) and 2010 (the first full year of recovery). The relatively greater decline in the median than in the mean between 2007 and 2010 suggests that the recession and slow recovery had a proportionately greater effect on families in the bottom half of the wealth distribution than those further up the distribution. According to a September 2014 article in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, which presents data from the 2013 SCF, "The improvements in economic activity along with changes in house and corporate equity prices combined to effectively stabilize average and median family net worth between 2010 and 2013 after both measures fell dramatically between 2007 and 2010."

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Agriculture is a source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which many scientists agree are contributing to observed climate change. Agriculture is also a "sink" for sequestering carbon, which partly offsets these emissions. Second, the report describes the types of land management and farm conservation practices that can reduce GHG emissions and/or sequester carbon in agricultural soils, highlighting those practices that are currently promoted under existing voluntary federal agricultural programs. Source of National Estimates Estimates of GHG emissions and sinks for the U.S. agriculture sector presented in this report are the official U.S. estimates of national GHG emissions and carbon uptake, as published annually by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in its Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks . This aggregation is intended to illustrate agriculture's contribution to national GHG emissions and to contrast emissions against estimates of sequestered carbon. Agricultural sources of CH 4 emissions mostly occur as part of the natural digestive process of animals and manure management in U.S. livestock operations. These estimates do not include emissions associated with on-farm energy use and forestry activities. Higher feed effectiveness is associated with lower emissions. Land Use and Forestry Emissions Land use and forestry activities account for less than 1% of total estimated GHG emissions in the United States ( Table 1 ). Improved Soil Management Options to reduce nitrous oxide emissions associated with crop production include improved soil management, more efficient fertilization, and implementing soil erosion controls and conservation practices. Agricultural Carbon Sinks Carbon Loss and Uptake Agriculture can sequester carbon, which may offset GHG emissions by capturing and storing carbon in agricultural soils. Other Land Use and Forestry Sequestration These estimates do not include estimates for the forestry sector, or sequestration activities on forested lands or open areas that may be affiliated with the agriculture sector. Congressional Action Energy and Climate Legislative Proposals Congress is currently considering a range of energy and climate policy options. In general, the current climate proposals would not require GHG emission reductions in the agriculture and forestry sectors. However, if enacted, provisions in these bills could potentially raise farm input costs for fossil fuels, fertilizers, energy, and other production inputs. These higher costs could potentially be offset by possible farm revenue increases should farmers participate in carbon offset and renewable energy provisions that are part of this legislation. For example, within cap-and-trade proposals being debated in Congress are provisions that could provide tradeable allowances to certain agricultural industries, and provisions that could establish a carbon offset program for domestic farm- and land-based carbon storage activities. In addition, the renewable energy provisions contained in these bills could potentially expand the market for farm-based biofuels, biomass residues, and dedicated energy crops. These and related bills and issues are currently being debated in Congress. ); Effectiveness , the success of the mitigation practice will depend on the type of practice, how well implemented and managed by the farmer or landowner, and the length of time the practice is undertaken; Additionality/Double Counting , given that some of the activities generating offsets would have occurred anyway under a pre-existing program or practice, and thus may not go beyond business as usual (BAU); and/or given that some reductions may be counted by another program (e.g., attributable to other environmental goals under various farm conservation programs) or toward more than one GHG reduction target; and Leakage , given that reductions in one place could result in additional emissions elsewhere.

The agriculture sector is a source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which many scientists agree are contributing to observed climate change. Agriculture is also a "sink" for sequestering carbon, which might offset GHG emissions by capturing and storing carbon in agricultural soils. The two key types of GHG emissions associated with agricultural activities are methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). Agricultural sources of CH4 emissions mostly occur as part of the natural digestive process of animals and manure management at livestock operations; sources of N2O emissions are associated with soil management and fertilizer use on croplands. This report describes these emissions on a carbon-equivalent basis to illustrate agriculture's contribution to total national GHG emissions and to contrast emissions against estimates of sequestered carbon. Emissions from agricultural activities account for 6%-8% of all GHG emissions in the United States. Carbon captured and stored in U.S. agricultural soils partially offsets these emissions, sequestering about one-tenth of the emissions generated by the agriculture sector, but less than 1% of all U.S. emissions annually. Emissions and sinks discussed in this report are those associated with agricultural production only. Emissions associated with on-farm energy use or with food processing or distribution, and carbon uptake on forested lands or open areas that might be affiliated with the farming sector, are outside the scope of this report. Most land management and farm conservation practices can help reduce GHG emissions and/or sequester carbon, including land retirement, conservation tillage, soil management, and manure and animal feed management, among other practices. Many of these practices are encouraged under most existing voluntary federal and state agricultural programs that provide cost-sharing and technical assistance to farmers, predominantly for other production or environmental purposes. However, uncertainties are associated with implementing these types of practices depending on site-specific conditions, the type of practice, how well it is implemented, the length of time a practice is undertaken, and available funding, among other factors. Despite these considerations, the potential to reduce emissions and sequester carbon on agricultural lands is reportedly much greater than current rates. Congress is currently considering a range of energy and climate policy options. In general, the current climate proposals would not require GHG emission reductions in the agriculture and forestry sectors. However, if enacted, provisions in these bills could potentially raise farm input costs for fossil fuels, fertilizers, energy, and other production inputs. These higher costs could potentially be offset by possible farm revenue increases should farmers participate in carbon offset and renewable energy provisions that are part of this legislation. For example, within cap-and-trade proposals being debated in Congress are provisions that could provide tradeable allowances to certain agricultural industries, and provisions that could establish a carbon offset program for domestic farm- and land-based carbon storage activities. In addition, the renewable energy provisions contained in these bills could potentially expand the market for farm-based biofuels, biomass residues, and dedicated energy crops. These and related bills and issues are currently being debated in Congress.

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This report provides a "big picture" overview of the U.S. aid program and congressional action. It describes what various aid agencies report they are doing in Afghanistan. It does not address the effectiveness of their programs. For greater detail on security assistance provided by the Department of Defense, see CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. The main purpose of the program is to stabilize and strengthen the Afghan economic, social, political, and security environment so as to blunt popular support for extremist forces in the region. The bulk of U.S. assistance is in security-related activities. Since 2001, nearly two-thirds (63%) of total U.S. assistance has gone to the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the account supporting the training and equipping of Afghan security forces, and related military and security aid accounts. For discussion, see CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed]. The foreign operations request included $2.8 billion in ESF. 2055 , P.L. 112-74 ) was signed into law. It also divided NADR funds, providing $41.8 million in regular funds and $23 million in OCO. Division A of the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2012 provided Department of Defense OCO appropriations to Afghanistan, including $11.2 billion for the ASFF, $400 million for the CERP, and $400 million for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund. The Administration has also allocated about $258 million for the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations. FY2013 Appropriations In February 2012, the Administration issued its FY2013 budget request, seeking a total of $2.5 billion in ESF, INCLE, NADR, and IMET, compared with the $2.3 billion allocated for these accounts in the previous year. The Defense appropriations request total includes $5.7 billion for the ASFF, only slight more than half than the previous year's appropriation, $400 million for CERP, $400 million for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund, and $179 million for the Task Force for Business Stability Operations.

The U.S. program of assistance to Afghanistan is intended to stabilize and strengthen the Afghan economic, social, political, and security environment so as to blunt popular support for extremist forces in the region. Since 2001, nearly $83 billion has been appropriated toward this effort. Since FY2002, nearly two-thirds of U.S. assistance—roughly 62%—has gone to the training and equipping of Afghan forces. The remainder has gone to development and humanitarian-related activities from infrastructure to private sector support, governance and democratization efforts, and counter-narcotics programs. Key U.S. agencies providing aid are the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, and the Department of State. On December 23, 2011, the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2012 (H.R. 2055, P.L. 112-74) was signed into law. The State, Foreign Operations appropriations did not specify account levels for Afghanistan, but from available amounts, the Administration allocated $1.8 billion in Economic Support Fund (ESF), $324 million in International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and $64.8 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, and Demining (NADR) funds. The Defense appropriations provided $11.2 billion for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), $400 million for the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), and $400 million for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund. The Administration has allocated about $258 million for the Task Force for Business Stability Operations. In February 2012, the Administration issued its FY2013 budget request, seeking a total of $2.5 billion in total ESF, INCLE, NADR, and IMET, compared with the $2.3 billion allocated in the previous year. It also requested $5.7 billion for the ASFF, $400 million for CERP, $400 million for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund, and $179 million for the Task Force for Business Stability Operations. This report provides a "big picture" overview of the U.S. aid program and congressional action. It describes what various aid agencies report they are doing in Afghanistan. It does not address the effectiveness of their programs. It will be updated as events warrant. For discussion of the Afghan political, security, and economic situation, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]. For greater detail on security assistance provided by the Department of Defense, see CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].

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Introduction This report provides an overview of FY2017 appropriations actions for accounts traditionally funded in the appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS). In addition, the bill provides annual appropriations for more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration (SSA). The LHHS bill provides appropriations for the following federal departments and agencies: the Department of Labor; most agencies at the Department of Health and Human Services, except for the Food and Drug Administration (funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill), the Indian Health Service (funded through the Interior-Environment appropriations bill), and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (also funded through the Interior-Environment appropriations bill); the Department of Education; and more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration, the Corporation for National and Community Service, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Institute of Museum and Library Services, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Railroad Retirement Board. FY2017 Omnibus Appropriations On May 5, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ). FY2017 discretionary LHHS appropriations totaled $173.3 billion, including amounts provided by the omnibus and certain full-year appropriations provided by the second FY2017 continuing resolution. This total is roughly $3.1 billion (+1.8%) more than FY2016 levels and $900 million (+0.5%) more than the Obama Administration's FY2017 request. The omnibus also provided $760.6 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined FY2017 LHHS total of $934.0 billion. Until the enactment of the FY2017 omnibus, temporary LHHS appropriations were provided by three continuing resolutions (CRs): P.L. 115-30 , P.L. 114-254 , and P.L. With limited exceptions, the FY2017 CRs generally funded discretionary LHHS programs at the same rate and under the same conditions as in FY2016, minus an across-the-board reduction. Under the second and third FY2017 CRs, discretionary LHHS programs were reduced by less than one-fifth of one percent (-0.1901%) from FY2016 levels. Congressional Action on a Stand-Alone LHHS Bill FY2017 LHHS Action in the House The House Appropriations Committee's version of the FY2017 LHHS appropriations bill was ordered reported by the full committee on July 14, 2016, by a vote of 31-19, and reported to the House on July 22, 2016. As reported by the full committee, this bill would have provided $170.2 billion in discretionary LHHS funds, the same amount as FY2016. This amount would have been 1.3% less than the FY2017 President's request. In addition, the House committee bill would have provided an estimated $760.6 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $930.9 billion for LHHS as a whole. FY2017 LHHS Action in the Senate The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2017 LHHS appropriations bill on June 9, 2016 ( S. 3040 ) by a vote of 29-1. As reported by the full committee, this bill would have provided $171.6 billion in discretionary LHHS funds. This would have been 0.8% more than FY2016, and 0.5% less than the FY2017 President's request. In addition, the bill would have provided an estimated $760.6 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $932.2 billion for LHHS as a whole. FY2017 President's Budget Request On February 9, 2016, the Obama Administration released the FY2017 President's budget. The President requested $172.5 billion in discretionary funding for accounts funded by the LHHS bill, which would have been an increase of 1.3% from FY2016 levels. In addition, the President requested roughly $760.6 billion in annually appropriated mandatory funding, for a total of roughly $933.1 billion for the LHHS bill as a whole. This law appropriated $170.2 billion in discretionary funding for LHHS, which was $6.0 billion (+3.7%) more than FY2015 enacted levels and $4.5 billion (-2.6%) less than the FY2016 President's request. DOL and the Related Agencies accounted for a roughly even split of the remaining 15.6% of discretionary LHHS funds. For Environmental Health at CDC, the FY2017 omnibus provided $164 million in discretionary appropriations, which is about $1.6 million (-0.9%) less than FY2016. 114-223 ). This is $2.0 billion (+6.2%) more than FY2016 and $3.0 billion (+10.0%) more than the Obama Administration's FY2017 discretionary request. This was $44 million (+1.0%) more than FY2016 and $440 million (-9.1%) less than the FY2017 Obama Administration request. This was $1 million (+0.1%) more than FY2016. The President requested that the FY2016 level of funding be continued in FY2017. Typically, each of the remaining related agencies receives less than $1 billion from the annual LHHS appropriations bill. 5926 ).

This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress and the President to provide FY2017 appropriations for accounts funded by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. This bill provides funding for all accounts funded through the annual appropriations process at the Departments of Labor (DOL) and Education (ED). It provides annual appropriations for most agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with certain exceptions (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration is funded via the Agriculture bill). The LHHS bill also provides funds for more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration (SSA). Readers should be aware that the FY2017 appropriations cycle occurred during a presidential transition from the Administration of Barack H. Obama to the Administration of Donald J. Trump. This transition occurred in late January 2017, well after President Obama submitted his FY2017 budget request but before the FY2017 annual appropriations process concluded with President Trump signing into law an omnibus appropriations act. FY2017 Omnibus: On May 5, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), which provided LHHS appropriations in Division H. FY2017 LHHS discretionary appropriations totaled $173.3 billion (including amounts provided by the omnibus and certain full-year appropriations provided by the second FY2017 continuing resolution). This amount is 1.8% more than FY2016 levels and 0.5% more than the FY2017 budget request from the Obama Administration. The omnibus also provided $760.6 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined FY2017 LHHS total of $934.0 billion. The distribution of discretionary funding is as follows: DOL: $12.1 billion, 0.7% less than FY2016. HHS: $78.1 billion, 3.6% more than FY2016. ED: $68.2 billion, 0.3% more than FY2016. Related Agencies: $14.9 billion, 1.8% more than FY2016. FY2017 Continuing Resolutions: The FY2017 omnibus followed three continuing resolutions (CRs), which had provided temporary LHHS funding earlier in the fiscal year (P.L. 115-30, P.L. 114-254, and P.L. 114-223). With limited exceptions, the second and third FY2017 CRs generally funded discretionary LHHS programs at FY2016 levels, minus a reduction of 0.1901%. The first FY2017 CR temporarily funded discretionary LHHS programs at FY2016 levels, minus a reduction of 0.496%. FY2017 House LHHS Action: The House Appropriations Committee's version of the FY2017 LHHS appropriations bill was ordered reported by the full committee on July 14, 2016, by a vote of 31-19, and reported to the House on July 22, 2016 (H.R. 5926). This bill would have provided $170.2 billion in discretionary LHHS funds, the same amount as FY2016. This amount would have been 1.3% less than the FY2017 President's request. In addition, the House committee bill would have provided an estimated $760.6 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $930.9 billion for LHHS as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding would have been as follows: DOL: $11.8 billion, 2.8% less than FY2016. HHS: $77.2 billion, 2.3% more than FY2016. ED: $67.0 billion, 1.6% less than FY2016. Related Agencies: $14.2 billion, 2.5% less than FY2016. FY2017 Senate LHHS Action: The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2017 LHHS appropriations bill on June 9, 2016 (S. 3040) by a vote of 29-1. This bill would have provided $171.6 billion in discretionary LHHS funds. This would have been 0.8% more than FY2016, and 0.5% less than the FY2017 President's request. In addition, the Senate committee bill would have provided an estimated $760.6 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $932.2 billion for LHHS as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding would have been as follows: DOL: $12.0 billion, 1.1% less than FY2016. HHS: $76.8 billion, 1.9% more than FY2016. ED: $67.8 billion, 0.3% less than FY2016. Related Agencies: $14.9 billion, 1.8% more than FY2016. FY2017 President's Budget Request: On February 9, 2016, the Obama Administration released the FY2017 President's budget. The President requested $172.5 billion in discretionary funding for accounts funded by the LHHS bill, which would have been an increase of 1.3% from FY2016 levels. In addition, the President requested $760.6 billion in annually appropriated mandatory funding, for a total of $933.1 billion for the LHHS bill as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding would have been as follows: DOL: $12.8 billion, 5.2% more than FY2016. HHS: $74.7 billion, 0.9% less than FY2016. ED: $69.4 billion, 2.0% more than FY2016. Related Agencies: $15.6 billion, 6.4% more than FY2016.

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Interests in South and North Korea U.S. interests in the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.—South Korea) involve security, economic, and political concerns. However, other North Korean policies and actions have affected U.S. interests including proliferation of missiles and other weapons of mass destruction to Middle Eastern countries, support for terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia, counterfeiting of U.S. currency and U.S. products, human rights abuses, and policies that have forced thousands of North Koreans to flee to China as refugees. South Korea is the seventh-largest U.S. trading partner. In 2007, the United States and South Korea signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Since August 2003, negotiations over North Korea's nuclear weapons programs have involved six governments: the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. Three developments since August 2008 appear to have influenced the situation leading to North Korea's announcement: the failure to complete implementation of the Bush Administration-North Korean agreement, including completing the Yongbyon disablement, because of a dispute over whether inspectors could take samples of nuclear materials at Yongbyon; the stroke suffered by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in August 2008; and the issuance by North Korea after January 1, 2009, of a tough set of negotiating positions, including an assertion that the United States must extend diplomatic relations prior to any final denuclearization agreement rather than in such an agreement, that a denuclearization deal must include the construction of light water nuclear reactors in North Korea, and that U.S. reciprocity for North Korean denuclearization must be an end of the "U.S. nuclear threat," meaning major reductions of and restrictions on U.S. military forces in South Korea and around the Korean peninsula. North Korea had rejected South Korean food and fertilizer aid in 2008, and it expelled the U.S. food aid program in March 2009. Reports of the Bosworth mission and a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement of January 11, 2010, indicated that North Korea seeks to draw the United States into negotiation of a bilateral peace treaty, move the nuclear issue into a bilateral peace treaty negotiation (thus scuttling the six party talks), negotiate with the United States over elimination of the "U.S. nuclear threat" (which North Korea says must be eliminated as part of "denuclearization of the Korean peninsula") and demand an early elimination of U.N. and U.S. sanctions against North Korea. The Obama Administration has emphasized these sanctions in its discussions with several countries. North Korea is estimated to have more than 600 Scud short-range missiles with a range of up to 300 miles. List of State Sponsors of Terrorism The removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism ended the absolute requirement under U.S. law ( P.L. The Japanese government asserts that it has knowledge that North Korea has kidnapped at least 17 Japanese citizens. Numerous reports indicate that North Korea's activities include providing training and weapons to Hezbollah and cooperation with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the development of both missiles and nuclear weapons. Food Aid Since 1995, the international community has donated over 12 million metric tons of food aid to North Korea to help alleviate chronic, massive food shortages that began in the early 1990s. It has not raised the issue in the six party talks. It calls for human rights to be a principal element in U.S. policy toward North Korea, including negotiations with North Korea and other Northeast Asian states. Key principles of this conciliation policy were the extension of South Korean economic and humanitarian aid to North Korea; the promotion of North-South economic relations; separating economic initiatives from political and military issues; no expectation of strict North Korean reciprocity for South Korean conciliation measures; avoidance of South Korean government public criticisms of North Korea over military and human rights issues; and settlement of security issues with North Korea (including the nuclear issue) through dialogue only without pressure and coercion. The Obama Administration also has called for a further relaxation of South Korean restrictions on imports of U.S. beef. Opposition in the U.S. Congress to the FTA appears to be strong. Many of its provisions are modeled after the draft U.S.-R.O.K. military commands into two commands; (3) possible further reductions of U.S. forces in South Korea, particularly U.S. ground forces; (4) a South Korean military contribution to Afghanistan; and (5) South Korea's share of the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in South Korea (i.e., host nation support). Separate U.S. and R.O.K. President Roh Moo-hyun sent 3,600 R.O.K.

The United States has had a military alliance with South Korea (R.O.K.) and important interests in the Korean peninsula since the Korean War of 1950-1953. Many U.S. interests relate to communist North Korea. Since the early 1990s, the issue of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons has been the dominant U.S. policy concern. Experts in and out of the U.S. government believe that North Korea has produced plutonium for at least six atomic bombs. North Korea tested nuclear devices in October 2006 and May 2009. In 2007, a six party negotiation (among the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia) produced agreements that resulted in a disablement of North Korea's main nuclear reactor and U.S. removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. In April 2009, North Korea rejected six party talks. The Obama Administration began bilateral talks with North Korea in December 2009 aimed at returning North Korea to the six party talks; North Korea demanded first a lifting of U.N. sanctions and negotiation of a U.S.-North Korean peace treaty. Other North Korean policies affect U.S. interests. North Korean exports of counterfeit U.S. currency and U.S. products produce upwards of $1 billion annually for the North Korean regime. North Korea earns considerable income from sales of missiles and missile and nuclear technology cooperation with Iran and Syria. It has developed short-range and intermediate-range missiles, but it has so far failed to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile. It is estimated to have sizeable stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. Pyongyang's main goal of its nuclear program appears to be the development of nuclear warheads that can be mounted on its missiles. North Korean involvement in international terrorism has included the kidnapping of Japanese citizens, reportedly arms and training to the Hezbollah and Tamil Tigers terrorist groups, and cooperation with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in development of missiles and nuclear weapons. U.S. human rights groups are involved in responding to the outflow of tens of thousands of North Korean refugees into China, due to severe food shortages inside North Korea and the repressive policies of the North Korean regime. U.S. and international food aid to North Korea has been provided since 1995, but North Korea rejected South Korean food aid in 2008 and expelled U.S. food aid workers in March 2009. North Korea faces severe food shortages in 2010. South Korea followed a conciliation policy toward North Korea under the administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun; but President Lee Myung-bak, elected in December 2007, linked South Korean aid to North Korea, including food aid, to the nuclear and other policy issues. North Korea responded by cutting off most contacts with the Lee government until August 2009. North Korea then made overtures to South Korea, probably because of its worsening food situation. The United States signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with South Korea (the seventh-largest U.S. trading partner) in 2007. There is substantial opposition to the FTA in Congress. The Obama Administration has called for renegotiation on the automobile provisions and additional South Korean measures to open the R.O.K. market to imports of U.S. beef. The U.S.-R.O.K. military alliance appears to function well. It is dealing with several issues of change: relocations of 28,500 U.S. forces within South Korea; construction of new bases; the creation of separate U.S. and South Korean military commands in 2012; possible future withdrawals of U.S. ground forces to U.S. conflict areas; an R.O.K. military contribution to Afghanistan; and South Korean financial support for U.S. forces.

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Congress plays a major role in formulating and implementing U.S. trade policy through its legislative and oversight responsibilities. The United States concluded the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) among the United States and 11 other countries and negotiated the U.S.-European Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). The 12 TPP countries signed the agreement in February 2016, but it required ratification by each country before it could enter into force. In the United States, this requires implementing legislation by Congress. Upon taking office, President Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP and halted further negotiations on the T-TIP, but may reengage in the TPP under different terms. The remaining 11 partners to the TPP concluded, without U.S. participation, a revised TPP, now identified as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The Trump Administration is also attempting to revise the two largest existing U.S. FTAs, through the ongoing renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and modification talks regarding the U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) FTA. For Members of Congress and others, international trade and trade agreements offer the prospect of improving national economic welfare, while also raising questions about the potential cost to the economy. Congress plays an important role in shaping and considering legislation to implement U.S. trade agreements. This report focuses on a number of major issues concerning the role of trade and trade agreements in the economy and issues that are particular to FTAs, including the role of trade in the economy and the macroeconomic forces that drive the trade deficit; the impact of trade on employment and the adjustment costs experienced by firms and workers; estimates of the number of jobs in the economy that are supported by trade and economic models used to estimate the impact of FTAs on employment; the impact of FTAs on foreign investment and employment; and the relationship between trade and the distribution of income. economy." Most economists argue, however, that estimates of employment gains or losses represent a partial accounting of the total economic effects of FTAs and, therefore, are not representative of the overall impact of FTAs on the economy. The various models and approaches have strengths and weaknesses, although not always in equal proportions, and they vary in the degree to which they reflect economic reality and are highly sensitive to the assumptions that are used. International Trade and Income Inequality Some opponents of trade agreements contend that international trade, trade agreements, and globalization more broadly have been important factors contributing to the growing inequality in wealth and income within countries. Despite intense focus in the academic literature, there is no clear consensus on the direct impact of trade and trade agreements on income inequality. OECD Analyses of Trade Liberalization and Income Inequality Growing income inequality is not unique to the United States, or even to developed countries, but is found in both developed and developing countries. Such efforts could provide (1) greater insights into the dynamic adjustments that would occur as the result of a given trade agreement; (2) improved estimates of the number of jobs currently related to international trade; (3) improved assessments of the impact of trade agreements on particular sectors in the economy; and (4) a more informed assessment of the potential long-run impact of a trade agreement on the economy as a whole and on particular sectors within the economy. Economists recognize, however, that the adjustment costs associated with trade agreements and other types of market transformations can be highly concentrated on some workers, firms, and communities.

During the Obama Administration, the United States negotiated two comprehensive and high-standard mega-regional free trade agreements: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) among the United States and 11 other countries, and the U.S.-European Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). The 12 TPP countries signed the agreement in February 2016, but the agreement required ratification by each country before it could enter into force. In the United States this requires implementing legislation by Congress. Upon taking office, President Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP and halted further negotiations on the T-TIP, but may reengage in the TPP under different terms. The remaining 11 partners to the TPP concluded, without U.S. participation, a revised TPP, now identified as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The Trump Administration is also attempting to revise the two largest existing U.S. FTAs, through the ongoing renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and modification talks regarding the U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) FTA. For Members of Congress and others, international trade and trade agreements offer the prospect of improving national economic welfare, while also raising questions about the potential cost to the economy. Congress plays an important role in shaping and considering legislation to implement U.S. trade agreements. Discussions of trade and trade agreements often focus on a number of issues, including the role that trade plays in the U.S. economy, the impact of trade agreements on employment gains and losses, and the size of the U.S. trade deficit. This report focuses on some of the major issues associated with trade and trade agreements and the impact of trade on the U.S. economy. The key findings include the following: From the perspective of the U.S. economy as a whole, trade is one among a number of forces that drive changes in employment, wages, the distribution of income, and ultimately the standard of living. Most economists argue that broad macroeconomic forces, including technological advances, are generally considered to be more important than trade. Economists generally conclude that trade provides net overall positive benefits to economies. Changes in trading patterns associated with changes in trading partners and composition or with new trade agreements, however, may entail certain adjustment costs, including changes in employment, which can be highly concentrated with some workers, firms, and communities affected disproportionately. In discussions of trade agreements, both proponents and opponents use the results of a variety of trade models and underlying assumptions to estimate the impact on the U.S. economy. Such models have various strengths and weaknesses, although not always in equal proportion. Most economists argue that such estimates represent a partial accounting of the total economic effects and, therefore, are not representative of the overall impact of trade agreements on the U.S. economy. Some argue that trade, trade agreements, and globalization more broadly contributed to growing wealth and income equality within countries. Growing income inequality domestically is not unique to the United States, or even to developed countries, but is found in both developed and developing countries. Despite intense focus in the academic literature, there is no consensus on the direct impact that trade or trade agreements have on income inequality. Congress faces a number of challenging policy issues relative to trade and the impact of trade agreements on the U.S. economy. These challenges include assessing the quality of data on trade and what, if any, additional resources should be devoted to collecting trade data and analyzing the role of trade in the economy. Congress also has legislative and oversight responsibility over various government programs that assist workers and firms adjust to increased competition from trade.

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Recent Developments This report provides an overview of farm safety net proposals for the next farm bill, as advocated by the Administration, Members of Congress, and various interest groups. The Senate Agriculture Committee approved its version of the 2012 omnibus farm bill on April 26, 2012 (Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2012), and officially filed the measure, S. 3240 , on May 24, 2012. Introduction In advance of the expiration of the 2008 farm bill ( P.L. 110-246 ), numerous proposals have been offered to revise the "farm safety net" for producers of crops covered by farm commodity support programs. Farm safety net proposals surfaced mostly during fall 2011, when budget deliberations by the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction generated concerns that a new farm bill might be "written" or severely constrained from a budgetary perspective by budget negotiators, rather than by the House and Senate Agriculture Committees. The leadership's proposal was not publically released, and ultimately the joint committee failed to reach a bipartisan consensus on deficit reduction. As a result, development of the farm bill is now following a more traditional legislative process, beginning with committee deliberations. Current Farm Safety Net Programs2 The federal government supports farm income and helps farmers manage risks associated with variability in crop yields and prices through a collection of programs. The broader farming community often refers to the "farm safety net" as: 1. farm commodity price and income support programs under Title I of the 2008 farm bill, 2. federal crop insurance (permanently authorized) under the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980, and 3. disaster assistance programs under Title XII of the 2008 farm bill, which expired on September 30, 2011. These include 1. how price (or revenue) protection is established, 2. the geographic level at which program benefits are triggered, and 3. whether or not a proposal addresses "shallow losses" (i.e., losses not covered by federally subsidized crop insurance because of the policy deductible). "Recoupling" Another choice when designing a farm program is whether to tie the benefits to current plantings or to historical plantings. Most proposals either reduce or eliminate direct and counter-cyclical payments to generate savings and provide funding to change the farm safety net so it addresses concerns pertaining to farm revenue risk for producers. Also, most either leave the marketing loan program unchanged or retain it with modest modifications. Several proposals would reduce or eliminate direct payments and other commodity payments, and create a new crop revenue program by borrowing concepts from current programs such as ACRE or SURE. In addition, the program uses harvest prices from the crop insurance program (which are based on current futures market prices for harvest-time contracts) for calculating actual and guarantee levels of revenue. The primary program is limited to current program crops. Program description: Replace current farm commodity programs and all crop insurance subsidies with a free crop insurance policy that covers yield losses of more than 30%. According to the organization, the proposed changes to the safety net would save $2.5 billion per year. The report outlines policy changes in six specific areas: commodity programs, conservation, research and development, beginning farmer programs, crop insurance, and nutrition. The draft contained multiple titles, including a proposal for the farm safety net.

In advance of the expiration of the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246), numerous proposals have been offered to revise the "farm safety net" for producers of crops covered by farm commodity support programs. Farm safety net proposals by Members of Congress, the Administration, and a number of farm and interest groups surfaced mostly during fall 2011, when budget deliberations by the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction generated concerns that a new farm bill might be "written" or severely constrained from a budgetary perspective by budget negotiators, rather than by the House and Senate Agriculture Committees. Ultimately, the joint committee failed to reach a bipartisan consensus on deficit reduction. Nevertheless, the joint committee process generated substantial movement toward reshaping the policy framework underlying the farm safety net and other major farm bill issue areas, such as conservation and nutrition. Since early 2012, legislation for the next farm bill has followed a more traditional process, starting with committee hearings prior to expiration of the 2008 farm bill (generally September 2012, but for commodity program crops, prior to the 2013 harvest). Many proposals with policy changes and proposed cuts have been directed at commodity programs and crop insurance, because these programs account for the bulk of agricultural funding (excluding conservation and nutrition programs, which are also considered part of the agricultural budget). Commodity programs, crop insurance, and the recently expired farm disaster programs comprise the so-called "farm safety net"—the federal government's suite of programs designed to support farm income and help farmers manage risks associated with variability in crop yields and prices. To generate budget savings and provide funding for proposed changes to the farm safety net, many of the proposals either reduce or eliminate direct and counter-cyclical payments. Most proposals either leave the marketing loan program unchanged or retain it with modest modifications. Several proposals would make changes in crop insurance, including cuts in producer subsidies. Three major issues are embedded in nearly all farm safety net proposals: (1) how price (or revenue) protection is established (i.e., within-year versus averaging across multiple years or fixed in statute); (2) at what geographic level—the farm level or a more aggregated regional level—program benefits are triggered; and (3) whether the proposal addresses "shallow losses," those not covered by federally subsidized crop insurance but paid by the producer via the policy deductible. Additional issues include whether program benefits should be based on current plantings ("re-coupled") rather than tied to historical plantings (as done since 1996 under direct payments), and to what extent a revised farm safety net program is applicable to crops outside of the traditional farm program mix. The Senate Agriculture Committee approved its version of the 2012 omnibus farm bill on April 26, 2012 (Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2012), and officially filed the measure, S. 3240, on May 24, 2012. It overhauls the farm safety net by eliminating direct and counter-cyclical payments and establishing a new shallow loss revenue program. For the revenue guarantee, farmers are offered a choice of basing the guarantee on either historical farm or county yields. A separate insurance program is made available for cotton, and other changes are made to the crop insurance program that are designed to provide additional options to all crop producers, not just traditional farm program crops.

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Swine flu refers to strains of influenza ("flu") that occur naturally and may cause outbreaks of respiratory illness among wild and domestic pigs. What Is 2009 Influenza A(H1N1)? This new virus was first detected in people in the United States in April 2009. Mexico, Canada, and other countries around the world have reported human cases of illness from the new flu strain. The CDC, the WHO, and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) confirm that there is no evidence that 2009 H1N1 virus is transmitted by food. These organizations have repeatedly emphasized that humans cannot get 2009 H1N1 flu, or any other type of flu, from eating pork or pork products. Four intergovernmental organizations—WHO, OIE, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)—issued a joint statement that "pork products handled in accordance with hygienic practices are not a source of infection." Given the safety of eating pork and pork products, along with the fact that the disease is primarily transmitted from human to human, several U.S. and international organizations argued that the disease should not be called "swine flu." Tyson Foods Inc. also reported a drop in domestic pork sales. How Did U.S. Trading Partners React to Reports of the Outbreak? Following the initial reports of the outbreak, USMEF and other media reports confirmed that several countries, among them mainland China and Russia, had instituted official full or partial trade restrictions on U.S. pork products. In June 2009, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) reported that 16 U.S. trading partners had officially notified the United States of trade restrictions on swine and pork products: Russia, China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Malaysia, South Korea, St. Lucia, Thailand, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. USDA later reported that as many as 27 countries had imposed trade restrictions on U.S. pork products. Of all the countries that imposed restrictions on U.S. swine and pork products, the two largest in terms of their overall importance to U.S. pork export markets—China and Russia—account for an estimated with 15% of the value of annual U.S. pork trade ( Table 1 ). Russia and China lifted their restrictions after several months, following negotiations with the United States. Administration officials and many in Congress are strongly urging all U.S. trading partners to base any food safety measures on scientific evidence and to act in accordance with their international obligations under the WTO, OIE guidelines, and WTO member obligations under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement. Accordingly, it is argued, there currently is no justification for imposing trade measures against the import of pork and pork products based on 2009 H1N1. As some countries continue to pursue trade restrictions on North American pork products, some affected exporting countries are considering formal trade actions within the WTO. Many regarded the trade bans and restrictions as politically motivated or intended to protect pork producers in their own countries. Agricultural Markets Affected by the Outbreak? Pork producers in the United States began to see a downturn in U.S. pork markets in late 2007. The ongoing economic crisis in the U.S. hog sector, coupled with potentially negative effects of the H1N1 virus, remains a concern to the sector.

In March 2009, a number of cases of an influenza-like illness and severe respiratory infections in humans were reported in parts of Mexico. These cases were later confirmed to be a strain of influenza A(H1N1), commonly referred to as "swine flu" and later called 2009 H1N1. By the end of April 2009, confirmed human cases of 2009 H1N1 infection were reported throughout Mexico, in parts of the United States, and in several countries worldwide. Reports of the outbreak—coupled with the use of the initial moniker "swine flu"—initially caused a downturn in domestic and international pork markets. Domestic pork demand and prices dropped sharply because of consumer fears that eating pork might result in infection. Several pork-importing countries also began to institute trade bans and restrictions on live pig and pork imports from certain countries, including the United States. This initial reaction further rippled throughout pork and other agricultural markets, such as feed grain and other livestock markets, as market analysts attempted to speculate about the short- and long-term consequences of a decline in pork demand and prices. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) confirm that there is no evidence that the 2009 H1N1 virus is transmitted by food and that humans cannot get the illness from eating properly handled pork or pork products. Four global organizations—WHO, OIE, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)—also issued a joint statement that "pork products handled in accordance with hygienic practices are not a source of infection." Despite these assurances from U.S. and global food and health organizations, several U.S. trading partners began to implement or were considering implementing full or partial trade restrictions on U.S. swine and pork products. Administration officials and many in Congress are strongly urging U.S. trading partners to base any food safety measures on scientific evidence and to act in accordance with their international obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), OIE guidelines, and WTO member obligations under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement. OIE, among other international organizations, has stated that there currently is no justification for imposing trade measures against the importation of pork and pork products. As some countries are continuing to pursue trade restrictions on North American pork products, some affected exporting countries are considering formal trade actions in the WTO. In June 2009, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) reported that 16 U.S. trading partners had officially notified the United States of trade restrictions on swine and pork products; USDA reported that as many as 27 countries had imposed such trade restrictions. Of these countries, the two largest in terms of their overall importance to U.S. pork markets, China and Russia, account for an estimated with 15% of the value of annual U.S. pork exports. Both China and Russia lifted their restrictions several months later, following negotiations with the United States. U.S. pork producers hope that efforts to avoid further negative effects on U.S. pork and other agricultural markets are successful. The National Pork Producers Council (NPPC) has asked USDA to provide financial assistance for U.S. pork producers to address the general economic downturn in U.S. hog markets, including assistance to address issues regarding the H1N1 virus.

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Agencies are required to dispose of real property that they no longer need, but many continue to hold onto unneeded building space. It then examines key provisions of four real property reform bills introduced in the 113 th Congress: the Federal Real Property Asset Management Reform Act of 2013 ( S. 1398 ); the Excess Federal Building and Property Disposal Act of 2013 ( H.R. 328 ); and two versions of the Civilian Property Realignment Act of 2013 ( H.R. 695 , S. 1715 ), which take similar, but not identical approaches to reforming the real property disposal process. Statutory Disposal Requirements The steps in the real property disposal process are set by statute. It would expand the role of the FRPC in collecting and analyzing real property data. Section 629(9)(B) of the bill would also require each agency to provide an annual assessment of its real property inventory to the FRPC and the GSA Administrator, including an assessment of each property that must include the age and condition of the property; size of the property in square footage and acreage; geographical location of the property, including its address; extent to which the property is being utilized; actual annual operating costs associated with the property; total cost of capital expenditures associated with the property; sustainability metrics associated with the property; number of federal employees and functions housed at the property; extent to which the mission of the federal agency is dependent on the property; and the estimated amount of capital expenditures needed to maintain and operate the property over the next five years. The report would also include a description of the progress the FRPC has made in fulfilling its requirements under S. 1398 and the progress agencies have made toward achieving their real property goals. Expedited Disposal Program The bill would establish a real property disposal program under which the GSA Administrator and the OMB Director, based on recommendations from landholding agencies, would identify the 15 federal properties that are excess or surplus and have the highest fair market value and the greatest potential to sell. Those properties would then bypass statutory transfer and conveyance requirements and be offered for sale immediately through public auction. The expedited disposal program under H.R. Duties of the General Services Administration and Executive Agencies H.R. In addition, H.R. Congress would be required to vote on a joint resolution of approval by the end of that period. If no joint resolution of approval is passed within the 45-day time limit, or if the resolution is passed and the President vetoes it, then agencies would not be required to implement the recommendations. This would appear to permit agencies to bypass steps in the existing disposal process. 695 and S. 1715 propose establishing a new Civilian Property Realignment Commission that would be responsible for the final list of recommendations to be considered by Congress. S. 1398 would not create a new body to oversee the disposal process, but would instead utilize the existing Federal Real Property Council to develop asset management plans for each agency—plans that would include recommendations for disposal of underutilized properties. In addition, S. 1398 would require GSA to establish a descriptive database that must be available at no cost to the public, and require the database to include certain data that may be of use to Congress. 328 would require GSA to establish and maintain a database of all federal real properties (other than those excluded for reasons of national security) that would be accessible to the public at no cost. There are underutilized and vacant properties, perhaps thousands of them, which agencies cannot dispose of because they lack the funding to make needed repairs.

Real property disposal is the process by which federal agencies identify and then transfer, donate, or sell real property they no longer need. Disposition is an important asset management function because the costs of maintaining unneeded properties can be substantial, consuming financial resources that might be applied to long-standing real property needs, such as repairing existing facilities, or other pressing policy issues, such as reducing the national debt. Despite the expense, federal agencies hold thousands of unneeded and underutilized properties. Agencies have argued that they are unable to dispose of these properties for several reasons. First, there are statutorily prescribed steps in the disposal process that can take months to complete. Second, agencies are often required to complete major repairs or environmental remediation before properties are ready for disposal—steps for which agencies lack funding. Third, key stakeholders in the disposal process—including local governments, non-profit organizations, and businesses—are often at odds over how to dispose of properties. In addition, Congress may be limited in its capacity to conduct oversight of the disposal process because it currently lacks access to reliable, comprehensive real property data. Four bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress that propose significant changes to the existing real property disposal system. The Federal Real Property Asset Management Reform Act of 2013 (S. 1398), would establish an expedited disposal program under which 200 properties would be exempt from time-consuming, statutory disposal requirements. In addition, S. 1398 would expand the role of an interagency workgroup, the Federal Real Property Council, to set disposal goals for agencies and monitor their progress in meeting those goals. The bill would also increase oversight of agency disposal activities by requiring the Administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) to establish a real property database available to the public at no cost. The Excess Federal Building and Property Disposal Act of 2013 (H.R. 328) would establish an expedited disposal program under which the 15 unneeded federal properties with the highest fair market value would bypass statutory disposal requirements and be offered for sale immediately. H.R. 328 would also require the GSA Administrator to establish a real property database available to the public at no cost and provide a report to Congress on the progress each landholding agency has made in reducing its unneeded property. Two similar, but not identical, versions of the Civilian Property Realignment Act (H.R. 695, S. 1715) have been introduced. Both bills would have the same overarching structure. They would centralize the disposal process by establishing a Civilian Property Realignment Commission, which would work with agencies to develop a list of disposal recommendations to the President. If the President approved the recommendations, then they would be sent to Congress. If Congress passed a joint resolution of approval, then agencies would be required to implement the recommendations; if a joint resolution of approval was not passed, then the realignment process would end for the fiscal year.

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Introduction German Chancellor Angela Merkel took office in November 2005 and was elected to a second term in September 2009. Since reaching a low point in the lead-up to the Iraq war in 2003, diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany have improved substantially and the bilateral relationship remains strong. German unification in 1990 and the end of the Cold War represented monumental shifts in the geopolitical realities that had defined German foreign policy. Germany was once again Europe's largest country, and the Soviet threat, which had served to unite West Germany with its pro-western neighbors and the United States, was no longer. Since the end of the Cold War, German leaders have been increasingly challenged to reconcile their commitment to continuity in foreign policy with a desire to pursue the more proactive global role many argue is necessary both to maintain Germany's credibility as an ally within a network of redefined multilateral institutions, and to address the foreign and security policy challenges of the post-Cold War, and post-September 11, 2001, era. As Germany's role within the European Union evolves, its foreign policy is marked by a desire to balance its support for a stronger, more capable Europe, with a traditional allegiance to NATO as the foundation for European security. Germany continues to prioritize relations with Russia. A second factor concerns Germany's ability to undertake the security and defense policy reforms many, particularly in the United States, believe are necessary for Germany to meet its commitments to an evolving alliance that is expected to increasingly engage in "out-of-area" missions. U.S. Administration officials and many Members of Congress have welcomed the Merkel government's commitment to a foreign and security policy anchored in NATO and the transatlantic relationship, and have expressed confidence in Merkel's ability to improve U.S.-German and U.S.-European cooperation on the world stage. These include Germany's commitment to international institutions, international law, and the multilateral framework; its deep-rooted aversion to the exercise of military force; and a potentially widening gap between the foreign policy ambitions of some in Germany's political class and the German public. President Obama's popularity in Germany suggests that many Germans view the new U.S. Administration's foreign policy as a welcome change from the perceived unilateralism of the unpopular George W. Bush Administration. However, some observers caution that public expectations of the new President have been unreasonably high and note that policy differences between the two countries remain, particularly in areas where public opposition is high. For example, in the face of the global economic slowdown, German leaders on both sides of the political spectrum resisted calls from the Obama Administration to stimulate economic growth through larger domestic spending measures. In the foreign policy domain, while German officials have welcomed the Obama Administration's strategic review of Afghanistan/Pakistan policy, they have essentially ruled out sending more than 500 additional combat troops or relaxing constraints on those troops currently serving in Afghanistan.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel began her first term in office in November 2005 and was elected to a second term in September 2009. Most observers agree that under her leadership, relations between the United States and Germany have improved markedly since reaching a low point in the lead-up to the Iraq war in 2003. U.S. officials and many Members of Congress view Germany as a key U.S. ally, have welcomed German leadership in Europe, and voiced expectations for increased U.S.-German cooperation on the international stage. German unification in 1990 and the end of the Cold War represented monumental shifts in the geopolitical realities that had defined German foreign policy. Germany was once again Europe's largest country, and the Soviet threat, which had served to unite West Germany with its pro-western neighbors and the United States, was no longer. Since the early 1990s, German leaders have been challenged to exercise a foreign policy grounded in a long-standing commitment to multilateralism and an aversion to military force while simultaneously seeking to assume the more proactive global role many argue is necessary to confront emerging security threats. Until 1994, Germany was constitutionally barred from deploying its armed forces abroad. Today, approximately 7,000 German troops are deployed in peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction missions worldwide. However, as Germany's foreign and security policy continues to evolve, some experts perceive a widening gap between the global ambitions of Germany's political class, and a consistently skeptical German public. Since the end of the Cold War, Germany's relations with the United States have been shaped by several key factors. These include Germany's growing support for a stronger, more capable European Union, and its continued allegiance to NATO as the primary guarantor of European security; Germany's ability and willingness to undertake the defense reforms many argue are necessary for it to meet its commitments within NATO and a burgeoning European Security and Defense Policy; and German popular opinion, especially the influence on German leaders of strong public opposition to U.S. foreign policies during the George W. Bush Administration. President Obama's popularity in Germany suggests that many Germans expected the Obama Administration to distance itself from the perceived unilateralism of the Bush Administration. However, some observers caution that public expectations of President Obama may have been unreasonably high and note that policy differences between the two countries remain. For example, in the face of the global economic slowdown, German leaders on both sides of the political spectrum resisted calls from the Obama Administration to stimulate economic growth through larger domestic spending measures and have urged the Administration to pursue more stringent reforms of the U.S. and international financial sector. In the foreign policy domain, while German officials have welcomed the Obama Administration's strategic review of Afghanistan/Pakistan policy, they have been reluctant to significantly increase the number of combat troops serving in Afghanistan.

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Most Recent Developments President Obama's FY2015 budget request for Energy and Water Development was released in March 2014. The adjusted request totaled $34.26 billion, compared with a total of $34.13 billion appropriated for FY2014. Final FY2015 Energy and Water Development funding was included in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( H.R. 83 ). Energy and Water funding totaled $34.78 billion, $519 million above the request and $653 million above FY2014, including rescissions. The consolidated appropriations measure passed the House December 11, 2014, and the Senate December 13, 2014, and was signed by the President on December 16, 2014 ( P.L. The House Appropriations Committee approved the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill for FY2015 on June 20, 2014 ( H.R. 4923 , H.Rept. 113-486 ), with a total spending level of $34.20 billion. The House passed the bill on July 10, 2014, by a vote of 253-170. The Senate Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on Energy and Water Development approved its version of the FY2015 bill on June 17, 2014, with a total of $34.21 billion (including budget scorekeeping adjustments). Overview The Energy and Water Development bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). The largest requested subprogram increase would support a joint effort with the Departments of the Navy and Agriculture for commercial-scale biorefineries that produce military-specification fuels. Not including the rescission, the total spending level is higher than the request and the FY2014 amount. (See the " Nuclear Waste Disposal " section for more details.) ITER is a multi-national effort to design and build an experimental fusion reactor, which is currently under construction in France. In approving its version of the FY2015 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, the House did not amend the Weapons Activities section as reported by the House Appropriations Committee. According to that document, "the Administration intends to invest $80 billion in the next decade to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex." 113-235 enacted the proposed funding levels. NRC's proposed FY2015 budget included no funds for licensing DOE's previously planned Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository.

The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), for the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), and the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and several other independent agencies. President Obama's FY2015 budget request for Energy and Water Development was released in March 2014. Including adjustments, the request totaled $34.26 billion, compared with a total of $34.13 billion appropriated for FY2014. The House approved the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill for FY2015 by a vote of 253-170 on July 10, 2014 (H.R. 4923, H.Rept. 113-486), with a funding total of $34.20 billion. The House adopted several amendments that did not change the total funding level from the bill as reported by the Appropriations Committee. The Senate Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on Energy and Water Development approved its version of the bill on June 17, 2014, with a total of $34.21 billion, but the full committee did not take it up. Final FY2015 Energy and Water Development funding was included in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 83). Energy and Water funding totaled $34.78 billion, $519 million above the request and $653 million above FY2014, including rescissions. The consolidated appropriations measure passed the House December 11, 2014, and the Senate December 13, 2014, and was signed by the President on December 16, 2014 (P.L. 113-235). Major issues in the debate over the Energy and Water Development bill included: the distribution of appropriations for Corps (Title I) and Reclamation (Title II) projects that have historically received congressional appropriations above Administration requests; alternatives to the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, which the Administration has abandoned (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal); proposed FY2015 spending levels for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) programs (Title III) that were more than 20% higher in the Administration's request than the amount appropriated for FY2014; DOE funding for a joint effort with the Departments of the Navy and Agriculture for commercial-scale biorefineries that produce military-specification fuels; cost, schedule, and management concerns for the international ITER project, which seeks to design and build an experimental fusion reactor (Title III, Science); long-standing controversy over facilities for processing uranium and plutonium components for nuclear weapons (Title III, Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship); and the Administration's proposal, rejected in the enacted version, to suspend construction of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which is intended to convert surplus nuclear weapons plutonium into civilian nuclear reactor fuel.

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Introduction Scientific research indicates that in recent years, the frequency and geographic distribution of harmful algal blooms (HABs) have been increasing nationally and globally. HABs can be detrimental to human health, animals, aquatic ecosystems, and local economies. In 2014, a major HAB in Lake Erie caused the city of Toledo, Ohio, to issue a "do not drink" order for tap water that left more than 500,000 people without drinking water for two days and had an estimated impact of $65 million in lost benefits. Algal communities are naturally occurring components of healthy aquatic ecosystems, such as lakes, rivers, and estuaries. However, under certain environmental conditions, such as increased temperatures and nutrient concentrations (e.g., nitrogen and phosphorus), colonies of algae can grow excessively, or "bloom," and produce toxins that pose a threat to human and aquatic ecosystem health and potentially cause economic damage. HAB Types and Impacts While many types of algae can cause HABs in bodies of freshwater, cyanobacteria (sometimes referred to as blue-green algae) typically cause the most frequent and severe blooms. Some species of cyanobacteria produce toxins, called cyanotoxins, which can cause hepatic (liver-related), neurologic, respiratory, dermatologic, and other symptoms. In addition to the effects of algal toxins on human and animal health, HABs can also contribute to deteriorating water quality and ecosystem health. In addition, as the algae die and decompose, they consume oxygen, leaving waterways in a hypoxic (or low oxygen) state, sometimes forming "dead zones"—areas where life cannot survive due to lack of oxygen. Low oxygen areas can suffocate and kill fish and bottom-dwelling organisms such as crabs and clams. Nutrient enrichment is widely recognized as one of the key causes of HAB formation. Nutrients, such as nitrogen and phosphorus, are essential to plant growth and natural parts of aquatic ecosystems. HABs, including cyanobacterial HABs, have been recorded in the waters of all 50 states, with some HABs crossing state lines. In 1998, Congress passed the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act (HABHRCA), which established an Interagency Task Force on Harmful Algal Blooms and Hypoxia. It required the task force to prepare reports assessing HABs and hypoxia with a focus on coastal waters and authorized funding for HAB and hypoxia-related research, education, and monitoring activities. In addition to HAB-specific legislation, the Clean Water Act (CWA) authorizes EPA to address water quality concerns associated with HABs. The act establishes a system, under Section 303, for states to adopt ambient water quality standards consisting of the designated use or uses of a water body (e.g., recreational, public water supply, or aquatic life) and the water quality criteria that are necessary to protect the use or uses. Regulatory Efforts and Guidelines EPA and states have also taken steps to address HABs and nutrient loads that contribute to their proliferation through regulatory efforts and guidelines. Environmental groups generally supported EPA's criteria for use in both swimming advisories and development of water quality standards. Some states have also added waters affected by algal blooms and algal toxins to their impaired water lists (i.e., Section 303(d) lists) for algal blooms and algal toxins. According to EPA, 45 states identified nutrient-related pollution as a priority to be addressed by TMDLs and/or alternative restoration plans in setting long-term priorities for their CWA Section 303(d) programs. EPA has also emphasized the need to focus on reducing nutrients from all sources—both point and nonpoint sources. Under the CWA, EPA has authority to regulate discharges from point sources. However, the CWA does not authorize EPA to regulate nonpoint sources. Federal Financial Assistance Recognizing that a critical role for EPA in addressing nutrient pollution is supporting watershed-based efforts at the state and local level, in its 2016 memorandum, the agency stated that the Office of Water would continue to provide financial assistance to states through CWA Section 106 and Section 319 grant programs and the Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) Program, as well as Section 604(b) planning grants, Wetland Program Development grants, and grants targeted toward specific geographic locations, such as the Chesapeake Bay, Great Lakes, and other water bodies. The President's FY2019 budget request for EPA proposes that funding for these programs, with the exception of the CWSRF, be eliminated or significantly reduced (see Table 8 ). Legislation in the 115th Congress Congressional interest in HABs has largely focused on funding further research and coordinating the efforts of federal agencies and their partners to study and address HABs. Controlling nonpoint sources of excess nutrients that contribute to HAB formation is challenging.

Scientific research indicates that in recent years, the frequency and geographic distribution of harmful algal blooms (HABs) have been increasing nationally and globally. Because the impacts of HABs can be severe and widespread—often with interstate implications—these issues have been a perennial interest for Congress. While algal communities are natural components of healthy aquatic ecosystems, under certain conditions (e.g., increased temperatures and nutrient concentrations), algae may grow excessively, or "bloom," and produce toxins that can harm human health, animals, aquatic ecosystems, and the economy. In 2014, a cyanobacterial HAB in Lake Erie affected the drinking water for more than 500,000 people in Toledo, Ohio. In 2016, a massive HAB in Florida's Lake Okeechobee negatively impacted tourism and aquatic life. HABs have been recorded in every state and have become a concern nationwide. Many types of algae can cause HABs in freshwater systems. The most frequent and severe blooms involve the proliferation of cyanobacteria. Some cyanobacteria species can produce toxins—cyanotoxins—that can cause mild to severe health effects in humans and kill aquatic life and other animals. HABs can also contribute to deteriorating water quality and ecosystem health. As masses of cyanobacteria or other algae die and decompose, they consume oxygen, sometimes forming "dead zones" where life cannot survive. These areas can kill fish and organisms, such as crabs and clams, and have detrimental economic effects. Scientists widely consider nutrient enrichment to be a key cause of HAB formation. While nutrients are essential to plants and natural parts of aquatic ecosystems, excessive amounts can overstimulate algal growth. Sources include point sources (e.g., municipal wastewater discharges) and nonpoint sources (e.g., fertilizer runoff from agricultural and urban areas). Congress, federal agencies, and states have taken steps to address HABs and nutrients that contribute to their occurrence. The Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act of 1998 (HABHRCA), as amended, established an interagency task force, required the task force to prepare reports and plans addressing marine and freshwater HABs, and authorized funding for research, education, monitoring activities, etc. In December 2016, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used its authority under the Clean Water Act (CWA) to propose water quality criteria for two algal toxins in waters used for recreational purposes. States use such criteria when developing water quality standards—measures that describe the desired condition or level of protection of a water body and what is needed for protection. Further, EPA has emphasized the need to reduce nutrient pollution from all sources to reduce public health and environmental impacts associated with HABs. The CWA does not authorize EPA to regulate all sources. It authorizes EPA to regulate point (direct) sources of nutrients but does not authorize EPA to regulate nonpoint (diffuse) sources of nutrient pollution. Some states have developed guidelines for algal toxins, primarily for use in guiding swimming advisories. Also, states have listed waters as impaired, or not meeting water quality standards, for algal blooms or algal toxins. Some of these states have begun to develop Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs)—essentially pollution budgets—to address them. Most states have identified nutrient-related pollution as a priority to be addressed by their TMDLs and/or alternative restoration plans. States rely heavily on financial assistance from EPA in implementing these plans and, more broadly, in addressing nonpoint source pollution that leads to degraded water quality and HAB formation. Congress has long provided financial assistance through EPA for regional, state, and local programs through CWA Sections 106 and 319 planning grants, geographic programs (such as the Chesapeake Bay and Great Lakes), and other sources. The President's FY2019 budget request for most of these programs is either eliminated or significantly reduced. Congress continues to show interest in addressing HABs. This interest has largely focused on funding research to close research gaps identified by scientists and decisionmakers and to coordinate the efforts of federal agencies and their partners to study and address HABs.

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Background The United States Army and Marine Corps have been at war—first in Afghanistan and, then Iraq—since November 2001. In a similar manner, the Marine Corps has deployed its forces and equipment in what has been described as "the harsh operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan" where the heat, sand, and dust as well as operational rates "well in excess of peacetime rates" have taken a heavy toll on the service's equipment, which, in some cases, was more than 20 years old when the conflicts first began. Equipping Reserve and National Guard units also presents challenges to the services. The Army and Marine Corps are also undertaking efforts to re-equip their pre-positioned stocks which were drawn upon to provide equipment for use in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army and Marines have a number of equipment-related challenges to rectify which may require significant funding and management efforts. In terms of equipping forces, there are a number of options available. Both the Army and Marines are involved in efforts to improve the current Interceptor body armor systems used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army has reportedly pledged to spend $21 billion over the next four years to re-equip the National Guard, but some are concerned that this equipment will instead be deployed to Iraq to support the "Surge" instead of being used to re-equip depleted National Guard units at home as they prepare to support domestic missions and train for overseas deployments. Given these concerns, Congress might decide to examine DOD's and the Army's plans to re-equip National Guard units. How Many MRAPs Does DOD Intend to Procure? Allegations that the successor of the Army's M-16/M-4 carbine, the Heckler & Koch's XM-8 assault rifle, was cancelled due to bureaucratic conflicts among Army and DOD acquisition officials might be an issue for congressional examination.

The United States Army and Marine Corps have been at war—first in Afghanistan and then Iraq—since November 2001. The Army's and Marine Corps' equipment has been employed in what has been described as "the harsh operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan" where the heat, sand, and dust as well as operational rates "well in excess of peacetime rates" have taken a heavy toll on the Army's and Marines' equipment. Re-equipping Reserve and National Guard units that, in many cases, were under-equipped to start with and then required to leave their equipment in theater also presents challenges to the Services. The Army and Marine Corps are also undertaking efforts to re-equip their pre-positioned stocks which were drawn upon to provide equipment for use in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are also concerns that the Army and Marines have not always aggressively pursued the best force protection equipment available and the Army has been questioned on its efforts to improve the standard soldier assault rifle. Congress, in its appropriation, authorization, and oversight roles may be faced with some of the following issues: What are the Department of Defense's (DOD's) and the Service's plans to re-equip reserve forces so that they are sufficiently resourced for domestic missions and to properly train for deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan? What is the current state of pre-positioned stocks that have been drawn down again to support the Iraq "surge"? What type of equipment is being used to restock pre-positioned stocks and is this equipment fully operational or in a lesser state of readiness? How Many MRAPs does DOD intend to procure? Have bureaucratic difficulties attributed to the Army and DOD had an adverse impact on efforts to find a suitable replacement for the Army's M-16/M-4 series of assault rifles? This report will be updated on a periodic basis.

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Introduction Both congressional and executive branch policy makers assert that science and technology play significant roles in improving homeland security. Congress established the Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that DHS has access to science and technology advice and research and development (R&D) capabilities. However, successful R&D activities may not result in a deployable product for many years. Additionally, the directorate supports the development of operational requirements and oversees the operational testing and evaluation of homeland security systems throughout the department. Mission The Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. The groups are: Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) , which contains six technical divisions that manage R&D in different topical areas and the Special Projects Office that oversees the directorate's classified R&D; Support to the Homeland Security Enterprise and First Responders Group , which is responsible for technology interoperability and compatibility, transfers technologies to first responders, and oversees the National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (formerly the Environmental Measurements Laboratory); Acquisition Support and Operational Analysis Division , which oversees the requirements generation process, interfaces with some DHS federally funded research and development centers, and provides test and evaluation policy oversight, including management of the test and evaluation activities of the Transportation Security Laboratory; and Research and Development Partnerships Division , which serves as the primary external interface for the S&T Directorate, coordinates work with the DHS University Centers of Excellence, oversees several DHS laboratories, and manages the relationship between the S&T Directorate and the Department of Energy national laboratories. Selected Issues The Homeland Security Act provided direction and broadly defined functions for the S&T Directorate. This section highlights a selection of issues: priority-setting mechanisms for the directorate's R&D programs; the scope of the directorate's R&D activities; efforts to consolidate R&D activity within the S&T Directorate; and the directorate's role in the DHS acquisition process. Coordination of R&D Activities in Other DHS Components As mentioned above, although the S&T Directorate is the primary R&D entity within DHS, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 allows other DHS components to perform R&D activities so long as they are coordinated through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology.

Policy makers generally believe that science and technology can and will play significant roles in improving homeland security. When Congress established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), it included the Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) to ensure that the new department had access to science and technology advice and research and development (R&D) capabilities. The S&T Directorate is the primary organization for R&D in DHS. It conducts R&D in several DHS laboratories and funds R&D conducted by other government agencies, the Department of Energy national laboratories, academia, and the private sector. Additionally, the directorate supports the development of operational requirements and oversees the operational testing and evaluation of homeland security systems for DHS. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provided direction and broadly defined functions for the Under Secretary for Science and Technology and the S&T Directorate. Within this broad statutory framework, congressional and executive branch policy makers face many challenges, including balancing funding for R&D activities, which may not result in a deployable product for many years, with other near-term homeland security needs. Despite several restructurings and close congressional oversight, the S&T Directorate continues to face difficulties in meeting congressional expectations. The 113th Congress may consider several policy issues related to the performance of the S&T Directorate. These include priority-setting mechanisms for the directorate's R&D programs, such as strategic planning and targeting high-priority investments; the scope of the directorate's R&D activities, such as balancing incremental efforts with efforts that offer high risk, but high reward; whether R&D efficiency and effectiveness could be enhanced through further consolidations of R&D activities into the S&T Directorate or through dispersing these activities to other entities; and the directorate's role in the DHS acquisition process, both in identifying operational requirements and assessing operational effectiveness.

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Historically, private health insurers have provided less coverage of mental illnesses compared to other medical conditions. For example, health plans have imposed lower annual or lifetime dollar limits on mental health coverage, limited treatment of mental health illnesses by covering fewer hospital days and outpatient office visits, and increased cost sharing for mental health care services. However, the MHPA is limited in scope and does not compel health plans to offer full-parity mental health coverage. It requires group health plans that choose to provide mental health benefits to adopt the same annual and lifetime dollar limits on their coverage of mental and physical illnesses. Plans may still impose more restrictive treatment limitations or cost sharing requirements on their mental health coverage. In the 109 th Congress, the MHPA was introduced in the House ( H.R. The report reviewed the extensive scientific literature on mental health and concluded that mental illnesses were largely biologically based disorders like many other medical conditions. It also found that the efficacy of mental health treatments is well documented, and that effective treatments exist for most mental disorders. Employer and health insurance associations oppose parity legislation because of concerns that it will drive up costs. Twenty-eight states have passed laws mandating full-parity mental health coverage. The report then reviews state mental health parity legislation and compares the Senate and House versions of the latest full-parity legislation ( S. 558 and H.R. Although stigma has played and continues to play an important role in the mental health care debate, differences in insurance coverage of mental illnesses and other medical conditions are also the result of important economic factors. While health insurance, in general, creates incentives for overuse by insulating patients from the total costs of care, research shows that the demand response to reduced cost sharing in mental health care is approximately twice as large as that observed in general medical care. The result has been for insurers to impose higher cost sharing for mental health care. Insurers have also restricted their mental health coverage to protect themselves from adverse selection. Adverse selection refers to the tendency for health plans with generous coverage provisions to attract sick (i.e., high-cost) enrollees. Supporters of parity maintain that studies show that implementing parity through managed mental health care will not lead to a significant increase in costs to the insurers. Health plans frequently subcontract, or carve out, to managed behavioral health care organizations (MBHOs) the management of the mental health (and substance abuse) component of their benefits package. P.L. On June 17, 2008, Sec. 110-245 , H.R. Mental Health Parity Legislation 110th Congress On February 12, 2007, Senators Domenici and Kennedy introduced the Mental Health Parity Act of 2007 ( S. 558 ) to amend and expand the MHPA by requiring employer-sponsored group health plans to impose the same treatment limitations and financial requirements on their mental health coverage as they do on their medical and surgical coverage. 1424 . Issues for Congress Persistent Mental Health Benefit Limitations National employer survey data indicate that despite the passage of state parity laws and changes in the delivery of mental health services, mental health coverage is still not offered at a level comparable to coverage for other medical conditions. But many are concerned that parity in nominal benefits for mental health care, by itself, is not sufficient to guarantee equal access to high-quality care and equal levels of financial protection for people with mental disorders.

In the 110th Congress, the Senate and House have passed different versions of expanded mental health parity legislation (S. 558 and H.R. 1424). These bills have always been strongly supported by advocates for the mentally ill and have had broad, bipartisan support in Congress. Although employers and health insurance groups opposed the legislation in the past because of concern that it would drive up costs, the provisions in S. 558 now have their support. Expanded parity legislation was introduced in the 107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses, but each time it failed to pass. Private health insurers often provide less coverage for mental illnesses than for other medical conditions. Historically, health plans have imposed lower annual or lifetime dollar limits on mental health coverage, limited treatment of mental health illnesses by covering fewer hospital days and outpatient office visits, and increased cost sharing for mental health care by raising deductibles and copayments. The lack of parity (i.e., equivalence) in part reflects insurers' concerns that mental disorders are difficult to diagnose, and that mental health care is expensive and often ineffective. However, the 1999 Surgeon General's report on mental health concluded that mental illnesses are largely biologically based disorders, like many other medical conditions. It found that effective treatments exist for most mental disorders. Differences in insurance coverage of mental illnesses and other medical conditions are also the result of economic factors. Studies indicate that demand response of mental health patients to reduced cost sharing is approximately twice as large as that observed in general medical care. Partly as a consequence, insurers impose higher cost sharing for mental health. Insurers have also restricted mental health coverage to protect themselves against adverse selection (i.e., the tendency for plans with generous mental health coverage to attract patients with mental illnesses that are costly to treat). Health plans frequently subcontract management of the mental health component of their benefits to specialized managed behavioral health care organizations (MBHOs). Recent studies have shown that there is no significant increase in mental health costs to the insurer when parity is implemented in the context of managed care. Despite this finding, introduction of managed behavioral health care, and passage of state parity laws, mental health coverage continues to be subject to more limitations and higher cost sharing than coverage of other illnesses. Some analysts argue that parity alone is not sufficient to guarantee equal access to quality care and equal financial protection for people with mental disorders. Twenty-eight states have laws that mandate full-parity mental health coverage, though these laws do not apply to self-insured group plans. In 1996, Congress enacted the Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA), which is more limited in scope and does not compel insurers to provide full-parity coverage. For group plans that choose to offer mental health benefits, the MHPA requires parity only for annual and lifetime dollar limits on coverage. Group plans may still impose more restrictive treatment limitations and cost sharing requirements on their mental health coverage. On June 17, 2008, the President signed into law (P.L. 110-245) the extension of MHPA through 2008.

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Introduction This report responds to frequently asked questions about the Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program. Authorized by the Small Business Act, the SBA Disaster Loan Program has been a source of economic assistance to businesses, nonprofit organizations, homeowners, and renters as they repair or replace property damaged or destroyed in a federally declared disaster. The SBA Disaster Loan Program is also designed to help small agricultural cooperatives recover from economic injury resulting from a disaster. SBA disaster loans include (1) Home and Personal Property Disaster Loans, (2) Business Physical Disaster Loans, and (3) Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL). As demonstrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2 , most direct disaster loans (approximately 83%) are awarded to individuals and households rather than small businesses. The program generally offers low-interest disaster loans at a fixed rate that have loan maturities of up to 30 years. SBA Disaster Loan Program: General Information and Questions How Is the Program Put into Effect? What Are SBA Loan Processing Times for Disaster Loans? How Much Does Congress Annually Appropriate to the SBA Disaster Loan Program? Business Disaster Loans What Type of Loans are Available to Businesses? What Are the Interest Rates and Terms for EIDLs?

This report responds to frequently asked questions about the Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program. The SBA Disaster Loan Program provides direct loans to help businesses, nonprofit organizations, homeowners, and renters repair or replace property damaged or destroyed in a federally declared disaster. The program is also designed to help small agricultural cooperatives recover from economic injury resulting from a disaster. SBA disaster loans include (1) Home and Personal Property Disaster Loans, (2) Business Physical Disaster Loans, and (3) Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL). Most direct disaster loans (approximately 80%) are awarded to individuals and households rather than small businesses. The program generally offers low-interest disaster loans at a fixed rate with loan maturities of up to 30 years. Key issues of interest to Congress include: how the program is put into effect, how much Congress appropriates to the program, what types of loans are available to businesses and homeowners, the use of SBA disaster loans in conjunction with insurance, loan interest rates and terms for SBA disaster loans, eligible activities, loan processing times, and collateral requirements. For additional information on Small Business Administration Disaster Loan Program, see CRS Report R41309, The SBA Disaster Loan Program: Overview and Possible Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].

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Introduction On October 12, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13813, entitled "Promoting Healthcare Choice and Competition Across the United States." E.O. The order addresses three unrelated, private-sector health coverage options: association health plans (AHPs); short-term, limited-duration insurance (STLDI); and health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs). This report answers frequently asked questions (FAQs) about E.O. 13813 and subsequent rulemaking and provides background information about AHPs, STLDI, and HRAs. 13813 directs specified agencies to "consider proposing regulations or revising guidance, consistent with the law" to expand access to AHPs, increase availability of STLDI, and expand the availability and permitted use of HRAs. Because federal statute does not define association health plan (or association coverage ), AHP is colloquially used to represent a wide spectrum of arrangements that provide health coverage through different types of organizations, including but not limited to trade associations, professional societies, and chambers of commerce. Instead, relevant federal agencies have indicated that a given AHP should be regulated according to the characteristics of the organization offering the AHP coverage and plan enrollees. Overall, the vast majority of AHPs provide either individual or small-group coverage, as determined by federal regulatory agencies (see the following discussion about regulatory activities at the Department of Labor [DOL] and the Department of Health and Human Services [HHS]). Also, association coverage that is not provided in connection with a group health plan is not group coverage for PHSA purposes; such coverage would be subject to individual insurance requirements. On January 5, 2018, DOL issued a proposed regulation concerning AHPs. Collectively, the changes proposed in the rule would allow AHPs currently regulated as small-group or individual coverage at the federal level to be regulated as large-group coverage instead, as long as the group meets the size definition of a large group. The reduced regulatory burden could affect the regulation of current AHPs and encourage the formation of new AHPs. AHP proponents argue that the proposal will not only lead to an expansion of coverage options but also lower premiums for those options. 13813. STLDI is a type of health insurance that is generally designed to fill gaps in having health insurance coverage, particularly for individuals transitioning from one type of coverage to another. In layman's terms, this means that an STLDI policy can last a maximum of three months, including any extensions a consumer may request. See " What Is Short-Term, Limited-Duration Insurance? " ": health insurance coverage provided "pursuant to a contract with an issuer that (1) has an expiration date specified in the contract (taking into account any extensions that may be elected by the policyholder with or without the issuer's consent) that is less than 3 months after the original effective date of the contract" (emphasis added) and (2) includes information in its contract and application materials about the coverage not being considered minimum essential coverage for purposes of the individual mandate penalty (see Table 2 ). What Changes to STLDI Have Been Proposed in Response to E.O. Opponents of the currently proposed changes have emphasized the potential negative impacts on the risk pool for the individual market for comprehensive coverage (including individual exchanges), in terms of shifts in enrollment away from this market, premium increases for those who remain in this market, and increases in federal outlays for premium tax credits. Health Reimbursement Arrangements (HRAs) What Are Health Reimbursement Arrangements? HRAs are employer-established arrangements that pay or reimburse employees for substantiated medical care expenses up to a maximum dollar amount. HRAs are funded solely by employers; employees cannot contribute to HRAs directly or through salary-reduction agreements. Payments and reimbursements from an HRA for an employee's (and the employee's spouse and dependents) substantiated medical care expenses are excluded from the employee's income and employment taxes. In general, employers may offer to employees only HRAs that are integrated with another group health plan (that is not an HRA). However, HRAs are not explicitly authorized by legislation and are not named in the IRC. As of the date of this report, the Secretaries of the Treasury, Labor, and HHS have not proposed changes to HRAs.

On October 12, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13813, entitled "Promoting Healthcare Choice and Competition Across the United States." E.O. 13813 directs specified agencies to consider regulatory or sub-regulatory approaches to expand access to three unrelated, private-sector health coverage options: association health plans (AHPs); short-term, limited-duration insurance (STLDI); and health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs). This report answers frequently asked questions (FAQs) about E.O. 13813 and subsequent rulemaking and provides background information about AHPs, STLDI, and HRAs. Association health plan is an umbrella term that represents a spectrum of arrangements that provide health coverage to a collective body of employers or individuals (e.g., self-employed persons). AHP coverage may be provided through different types of organizations, including but not limited to trade associations, professional societies, and chambers of commerce. Given the absence of a federal definition for either association health plan or association coverage, applicable federal agencies have indicated that a given AHP should be regulated according to the characteristics of the organization offering the AHP coverage and plan enrollees. Generally, association coverage is addressed through sub-regulatory guidance. The vast majority of AHPs provide either individual or small-group coverage, as determined by federal regulatory agencies. On January 5, 2018, the Department of Labor issued a proposed regulation that would amend the federal definition of employer. The proposed amendment potentially could allow certain AHPs that currently are regulated as individual or small-group coverage to be regulated as large-group coverage instead, and it could encourage the formation of new AHPs. Such a change would reduce the overall scope of federal requirements applicable to those AHPs. AHP proponents argue that the proposed changes would expand coverage options and reduce premiums for certain consumers. AHP opponents argue that those changes would raise premiums for consumers with greater health care needs, particularly in the individual market. Short-term, limited-duration insurance is a type of health insurance that generally is designed to fill gaps in health insurance coverage, particularly for individuals transitioning from one type of coverage to another. STLDI is defined in regulations as health insurance coverage with a maximum duration of three months (including any extensions a consumer may request) that is marketed and issued with disclaimer language about the coverage not being considered minimum essential coverage for purposes of avoiding the individual mandate penalty. Beyond this definition, STLDI is not subject to federal requirements applicable to health coverage. On February 21, 2018, the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Labor, and the Treasury jointly issued proposed regulations that would increase the maximum duration of STLDI from 3 months to 12 months, make policy extensions easier, and modify the required disclaimer language. Proponents of expanding access to STLDI argue that these changes would provide more insurance options for consumers; opponents of the proposed changes have emphasized the potential negative impacts on the risk pool for the individual market for comprehensive coverage. Health reimbursement arrangements are employer-established arrangements that pay or reimburse employees for substantiated medical care expenses up to a maximum dollar amount. HRAs are funded solely by employers; employees cannot contribute to HRAs. Payments and reimbursements from an HRA for an employee's substantiated medical care expenses (and those of the employee's spouse and dependents) are excluded from the employee's income and employment taxes. In general, employers may offer to employees only HRAs that are integrated with another group health plan (that is not an HRA). Although HRAs are governed under the federal tax code, they are not explicitly authorized by legislation. Generally, HRAs are addressed through sub-regulatory guidance. As of the publication date of this report, the agencies identified in E.O. 13813 (Treasury, Labor, and HHS) have not published guidance or proposed regulation on HRAs in response to the order.

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Introduction The 108th Congress did not complete action on legislation to reauthorize the block grant ofTemporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The latest short-term extension funds the program through March31, 2005. The House of Representatives did pass a bill in February 2003 ( H.R. The differences in the two bills highlight some of the contentious issues in the reauthorizationdebate. Summary of the Similarities and Differences between the Two Bills The bills had many similarities, with both extending basic funding at current levels throughFY2008 and incorporating President Bush's proposal to provide categorical "marriage promotion"grants. They both also raised TANF work participation standards, though the two bills differed interms of how much more work would be required and what activities count toward the participationstandards. The major difference in the funding provision between the two bills was that the Senate FinanceCommittee bill would have completely revamped the TANF contingency (recession) funds, whilethe House-passed bill would have made relatively minor revisions to the fund. Both the House-passed and Senate Finance Committee bills would have continued supplemental grants for the same 17 states at theFY2003 funding level through FY2007 (unlike other grants, which expire in FY2008). Contingency Funds. TANF includes acontingency fund, which is designed to provide extra matching grants to states that meet criteria ofeconomic need (based on unemployment rates and food stamp caseloads) and have stateexpenditures in excess of their FY1994 level. The Senate Finance Committee bill wouldhave retained the current law 30% transfer limit. They both raised workparticipation rates that states must meet from the current law's standard of 50% to 70%, raised therequired hours of working to receive full credit and provided partial credit for participating familiesthat do not meet the full credit standard, and revised the list of activities. However, the bills differedin how they did these three things. States are subject to an additional participation rate standard for two-parent families, currently 90%. The participation rate standards may be reduced for caseload reduction (not attributable to policychanges) that have occurred since before enactment of welfare reform (FY1995). Both the House-passed and Senate Finance Committee bills raised the work participation standard for all families to 70% by FY2008 and eliminated the separate standard for two-parentfamilies. Except for a limited period of time (see below), theHouse bill would have required that families participate for at least 24 hours per week in work,community service, or work experience programs to be counted toward the state's standard. The Senate Finance Committee bill also allowed states to have up to 10% of their caseload enrolled in a special program of two- or four-year undergraduate education or vocational educationaltraining. Detailed Comparison of TANF Provisions of the House and Senate Finance Committee Bill Table 1 provides a detailed comparison of the TANF programs of theHouse-passed and SenateFinance Committee reported versions of H.R. 4 .

The 108th Congress did not complete action on legislation to reauthorize the block grant ofTemporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), instead adopting short-term extensions. Thelatest extension funds the program through March 31, 2005. Though welfare reauthorization failedto receive final action, a bill ( H.R. 4 ) did pass the House and a substitute measure wasreported from the Senate Finance Committee. The differences in the two bills highlight some of thecontentious issues in the reauthorization debate. The House-passed and Senate Finance Committee bills were very similar in terms of how they would continue funding under the TANF program. Both bills would have extended basic TANFfunding at current levels ($16.6 billion for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories)through FY2008 and extended supplemental grants provided to 17 states through FY2007. Both billsalso would have provided new, categorical grants for marriage promotion activities. The majordifference in the funding provisions of the two bills was how they provided extra contingency(recession-related) funding to the states. The House bill essentially extended the current law fundthat provides matching grants to states that experience high and increased unemployment rates andfood stamp caseloads. The Senate Finance Committee bill eliminated the requirements that statesexpend additional money to access contingency funds, and instead based extra funding on the costof increased caseloads for states that meet revised unemployment or food stamp caseload criteria. The two bills would have substantially revised TANF work participation standards that states must meet or be subject to a financial penalty. Under current law, 50% of TANF families with anadult or minor household head must participate, though the 50% rate is reduced by caseloadreductions that have occurred since welfare reform. Both versions of H.R. 4 wouldhave raised this standard to 70%, though under both bills the standard could have been reducedthrough credits (though the credits differ between the two bills). They also both eliminated aseparate 90% participation rate requirement for two-parent families. Both bills would have raisedthe minimum hours required of family members to be considered full participants, though the Houseraised them more than did the Senate Finance Committee bill. The bills also differed in the activitiescountable toward the participation standards: the House narrowed the list of activities countable,requiring recipients to spend at least 24 hours in work, community service, or work experienceprograms except for a short (usually three month) period when states may define what counts asactivities themselves. The Senate Finance Committee bill kept all activities on the current law list,and also allowed states to count activities on an expanded list for three months (six months in somecircumstances). Both bills included non-TANF provisions relating to child support enforcement, responsible "fatherhood" programs, and transitional medical assistance (not addressed herein). This report willnot be updated.

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Background The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) is a small, intra-theater airlifter being procured by the Army and Air Force. A rift over FCA between the Army and Air Force began to surface in 2005. Industry teams competed four aircraft for the JCA contract: L-3 Communications, Alenia Aeronautica, and Boeing offered the C-27J. By April 2007, updates to this JROC approval reflected a joint requirement for up to 75 aircraft.

Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) is a joint acquisition program between the Army and Air Force intended to procure a commercial off-the-shelf aircraft capable of meeting Army and Air Force requirements for intra-theater airlift. The C-27J Spartan, built by L-3 Communications, was awarded the JCA contract in 2007. This is an update of a report by [author name scrubbed] and will be updated as conditions warrant.

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Introduction Sharp increases in U.S. oil exports in recent years has led to perceptions that these exports are not in the national interest, and have drawn Congressional attention. Oil exports from the United States, which averaged 1.4 million barrels daily (mbd) in 2007, and have increased to a daily average of 1.9 mbd during the period of January-September 2008. This represents roughly 10% of total daily consumption of oil products in the United States. A significant volume of these exports are of heavier oil products that U.S. markets cannot absorb. Exports of these products averaged, respectively, 40,000 b/d and 362,000 b/d annually during the first nine months of 2008. There would be no advantage to keeping these products in the United States as it would be costly or impractical to further refine them into products that could be used in the automotive or residential heating sectors. However, because oil is a commodity in a global market, a prohibition on U.S. exports would not lower crude oil prices. Exports of crude oil from Alaska ended in 2000. The only crude exported from the United States is an insignificant amount which does not originate from Alaska; it averaged 25,000 barrels per day (b/d) during the period of January-September 2008. Congress Lifts ANS Export Ban The West Coast oil glut elicited persistent expressions of concern from oil producers who argued that the ban on the export of Alaskan oil production was distorting the market and causing a decline in the price of West Coast production. Bills introduced in the 104 th Congress to repeal the ban ( H.R. Residual fuel oil averaged less than 22%. During this period, approximately 35% of total U.S. oil exports went to Canada and Mexico in cross-border trades. Restricting U.S. oil exports would not lead to lower prices for products such as gasoline and diesel fuel. Additionally, prohibiting U.S. oil exports would compel customers for those exports to seek the supply no longer provided by the U.S. elsewhere. This would have no bearing on world demand for crude oil.

Concern about exports of United States crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel and home heating oil periodically draws Congressional attention to the level of these exports, recently observed to increase from 1.4 million barrels daily in 2007, to nearly 1.9 mbd during January-September 2008. Some policymakers have suggested that prohibiting oil exports would lower prices. Legislation introduced in the 110th Congress (H.R. 6515, S. 2598) included provisions prohibiting some or all oil exports, or would have reimposed the ban on Alaskan oil exports; but no bills received major attention. Virtually all U.S. oil exports are of refined products, and no crude is exported from the West Coast. A trickle of crude oil, in a range of 25,000 barrels per day during the first nine months of 2008, is sent to Canada from the upper Midwest. However, as Canada is the largest supplier of crude oil to the United States, providing nearly 1.9 mbd in 2008 (also through September), the U.S. crude sent to Canada is of limited significance. The United States does export some gasoline to Canada and Mexico, and middle distillates to Latin America, but some of this product would not meet U.S. environmental standards. An additional roughly 40% of U.S. oil exports are of "heavier" products, such as residual fuel oil and petroleum coke, for which there is insufficient market in the United States. Because the market for oil is global, a prohibition on U.S. oil exports would have negligible effect on price. Such a restriction would only cause a rebalancing in the movement of petroleum because countries that had purchased U.S. oil products would need to find them from other suppliers. Restrictions on exports might, in fact, create inefficiencies in the movement of world oil supplies that could foster less optimal distribution of oil and possibly lead to higher prices in some markets.

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The State Department website shows that currently 105 countries (including the United States) plus the Holy See participate in the initiative (see the Appendix ). For example, participating states are encouraged to: formally commit to and publicly endorse, if possible, the Statement of Principles; review and provide information on current national legal authorities and indicate willingness to strengthen authorities as appropriate; identify specific national assets that might contribute to PSI efforts; provide points of contact for interdiction requests; be willing to actively participate in PSI interdiction training exercises and actual operations as they arise; and be willing to consider signing relevant agreements or to otherwise establish a concrete basis for cooperation with PSI efforts. Organization PSI has no international secretariat and no distinct program funding. An informal coordinating structure has developed through an Operational Experts Group (OEG), which discusses proliferation concerns and plans future exercises. Several approaches under the PSI framework may help improve interdiction efforts. While some Bush Administration officials have cited this as an example of a successful PSI interdiction, others have argued it was part of a separate operation, and thus should not be used as evidence of PSI's success. Legal Authorities U.S. officials have been careful to emphasize that PSI actions, including ship boarding and seizures, would be carried out in accordance with national legal authorities and international law and frameworks. The letter said that the Convention supports the efforts of the Proliferation Security Initiative. In President Bush's submission note to the Senate, he summarizes the importance of this protocol to PSI activities: "The 2005 SUA Protocol also provides for a ship-boarding regime based on flag state consent that will provide an international legal basis for interdiction at sea of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials." Specifically, the bill dictated that, (11) PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE- Funds appropriated by this Act under the heading `Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs' shall be made available for programs to increase international participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and endorsement of the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles: Provided, That not later than 45 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations detailing steps to be taken to implement the requirements of this paragraph. PSI Participants (as of August 9, 2018)

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was formed to increase international cooperation in interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials. The Initiative was announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003. PSI does not create a new legal framework but aims to use existing national authorities and international law to achieve its goals. Initially, 11 nations signed on to the "Statement of Interdiction Principles" that guides PSI cooperation. As of June 2018, 105 countries (plus the Holy See) have committed formally to the PSI principles, although the extent of participation may vary by country. PSI has no secretariat, but an Operational Experts Group (OEG), made up of 21 PSI participants, coordinates activities. Although WMD interdiction efforts took place with international cooperation before PSI was formed, supporters argue that PSI training exercises and boarding agreements give a structure and expectation of cooperation that has improved interdiction efforts. Many observers believe that PSI's "strengthened political commitment of like-minded states" to cooperate on interdiction is a successful approach to counter-proliferation policy. The effort faced early criticism that said it would be difficult to measure the initiative's effectiveness, guarantee even participation, or sustain the effort over time in the absence of a formal multilateral framework. However, successive administrations have supported the PSI and worked to expand membership. Its goals have been a part of U.S. national security strategy. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review says, "The United States will continue to work with allies and partners to disrupt proliferation networks and interdict transfers of nuclear materials and related technology." This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Ballast water has been identified as a major pathway for introduction of ANS. Federal authority to address ballast water concerns in the United States is contained in the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990 (NANPCA), as amended by the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), and is administered by the U.S. Coast Guard. Today there is wide agreement on the need for stronger measures to control ballast water discharges, but there are differing views on how best to do that. Several states (notably Michigan, California, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington) have passed or are considering their own ballast water laws, raising concern that separate state programs could create a patchwork of inconsistent regulatory requirements. This concern was part of the rationale for Title V of H.R. 2830 , the Coast Guard Reauthorization Act of 2007, passed by the House on April 24, 2008. It would have amended NANPCA to establish a strengthened national ballast water management program administered by the Coast Guard. However, it was opposed by other advocacy groups, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and several of the states that have moved forward with their own ballast water programs. Evaluating these differing views is complicated by an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposal to control ballast water and other discharges incidental to the normal operation of vessels through the mechanism of a Clean Water Act (CWA) permit. EPA finalized this permit in December 2008. At issue was whether the standard-setting, permit, and enforcement authorities of the CWA are better tools for managing ballast water discharges than the approach in H.R. That legislation contained statutory performance standards that were to be implemented by the Coast Guard which would preempt state regulatory programs that are inconsistent or in conflict with the federal law. 2830 , as passed by the House, was supported by the maritime industry and a number of environmental advocacy groups (such as the National Wildlife Federation, see footnote 4 ) who argued, in essence, that a nationally uniform program providing certainty to the regulated community, requiring standards more stringent than existing Coast Guard or international rules, and specifying compliance deadlines is the best approach. 2830 contended that the proposed changes were relatively minor and did not overcome serious deficiencies in the bill, namely that the legislation largely would preempt state efforts, could override CWA authorities, and would have provided a slower and less effective approach to controlling ballast water discharges than that of the CWA. Critics of H.R.

Today there is wide agreement on the need for stronger measures to control ballast water discharges from vessels which are a major pathway for introduction of invasive species into U.S. waters, but there are differing views on how best to do that. Current federal authority to manage ballast water, in the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990, as amended (NANPCA), has been criticized as inadequate. Several states (notably Michigan, California, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington) have passed or are considering their own ballast water laws, creating concern that separate state programs could create a patchwork of inconsistent regulatory requirements. This concern was part of the rationale for Title V of H.R. 2830, the Coast Guard Reauthorization Act of 2007, passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on April 24, 2008. It would have established a strengthened national ballast water management program administered by the Coast Guard. This legislative approach was supported by many in the maritime industry and by a number of environmental advocacy groups, such as the National Wildlife Foundation. They argued, in essence, that a nationally uniform program providing certainty to the regulated community, requiring standards more stringent than existing Coast Guard or international rules, and specifying compliance deadlines is the best legislative approach. However, H.R. 2830 was opposed by other advocacy groups, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and several of the states that have moved forward with their own ballast water programs. They contended that the legislation would largely have preempted state efforts and provide a slower and less effective approach to controlling ballast water discharges than that of the Clean Water Act. Evaluating these differing views was complicated by an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposal to control ballast water and other discharges incidental to the normal operation of vessels through the mechanism of a Clean Water Act permit. EPA finalized this permit in December 2008. At issue was whether the standard-setting, permit, and enforcement authorities of the Clean Water Act (CWA) are better tools for managing ballast water discharges than the approach that was proposed in H.R. 2830. That legislation contained statutory performance standards to be implemented by the Coast Guard which would preempt state regulatory programs that are inconsistent or in conflict with federal law. These issues and the views of proponents and opponents, which could again receive attention in the 111th Congress, are reviewed in this report.

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Many Members now use email, official websites, YouTube channels, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Flickr, Google+, Medium, and other networking platforms to share information with and collect information from their followers. Many of these technologies were either nonexistent or not widely available several years ago. In addition to Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, Members of Congress have adopted various other social media services. Social media have arguably enhanced the ability of Members of Congress to fulfill their representational duties by providing greater opportunities for communications between Members and constituents, supporting the fundamental democratic role of sharing information about public policy and government operations. This report examines Member adoption of social media broadly. Therefore, this report focuses not only on adoption of these platforms, but also on the adoption of other social media platforms—Instagram, Flickr, Google+, Snapchat, Medium, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Periscope, and Tumblr—to evaluate which platforms are being adopted, how adoption has changed over time, and what the use of multiple social media platforms might mean for Member communication (see Appendix for a brief description of the most popular social media platforms adopted by Members of Congress). The following examination of social media adoption by Members of Congress is divided into two parts: 1. the adoption of established platforms—Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—over time; and 2. the adoption of newer platforms in the 114 th and 115 th Congresses. These considerations include managing multiple platforms, the type of content and posting location, the allocation of office resources to social media communications, and archiving social media content. Therefore, it is inherently a snapshot in time of a dynamic process. As with any new technology, the number of Members signed up for any particular social media platform and the patterns of adoption may change in short periods of time. Thus, the conclusions drawn from these data cannot necessarily be generalized. Finally, these results cannot be used to predict future behavior. This section discusses Member adoption of both types of social media and the number of platforms that Representatives and Senators have adopted in the 114 th Congress and the 115 th Congress. Figure 1 shows the percentage of Representatives and Senators who have adopted Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube in the 114 th Congress (2015-2016) and the 115 th Congress (2017-2018). For Twitter, between 95% and 100% of Representatives and 93% and 100% of Senators have accounts. YouTube has the biggest variation over this time period, with adoption between 87% and 93% for Representatives and between 86% and 94% for Senators. The adoption of established platforms by Members of Congress appears to generally follow the popular use of these services among the general public. Figure 2 shows the percentage of Representatives and Senators who have created accounts on the six most-adopted social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Among all Members of Congress, Instagram, Flickr, and Google+ are the most popular of the new social media platforms. In light of the adoption of multiple social media platforms, several potential implications exist for the continued use of social media as a communications tool. Google+ Founded in 2011, Google+ is Google's social network.

Communication between Members of Congress and their constituents has changed with the development of online social networking services. Many Members now use email, official websites, blogs, YouTube channels, Twitter, Facebook, and other social media platforms to communicate—technologies that were nonexistent or not widely available just a few decades ago. Social networking services have arguably enhanced the ability of Members of Congress to fulfill their representational duties by providing them with greater opportunities to share information and potentially to gauge constituent preferences in a real-time manner. In addition, electronic communication has reduced the marginal cost of communications. Unlike with postal letters, social media can allow Members to reach large numbers of constituents for a fixed cost. This report examines Member adoption of social media broadly. Because congressional adoption of long-standing social media platforms Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube is nearly ubiquitous, this report focuses on the adoption of other, newer social media platforms. These include Instagram, Flickr, and Google+, which have each been adopted by at least 2.5% of Representatives and Senators. Additionally, Members of Congress have adopted Snapchat, Medium, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Periscope, and Tumblr at lower levels. This report evaluates the adoption rates of various social media platforms and what the adoption of multiple platforms might mean for an office's social media strategy. Data on congressional adoption of social media were collected by an academic institution in collaboration with the Congressional Research Service during the 2016-2017 academic year. This report provides a snapshot of a dynamic process. As with any new technology, the number of Members using any single social media platform, and the patterns of use, may change rapidly in short periods of time. As a result, the conclusions drawn from these data cannot necessarily be generalized or used to predict future behavior. The data show that, on average, Members of Congress adopt six social media platforms for official communications. Between 87% and 100% of Representatives and 94% and 100% of Senators have adopted the established platforms—Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—during the 114th Congress (2015-2016) and the 115th Congress (2017-2018). These adoption rates generally match the popularity of these services among the general public. Instagram, Flickr, and Google+ are the most popular of the newer social media platforms. Among Senators, Instagram has been the most adopted platform, with between 36% (2015) and 71% (2018) of Senators having adopted it. For Flickr, between 34% (2017 and 2018) and 45% (2016) of Senators have adopted the service, and for Google+ between 5% (2018) and 19% (2016). For Representatives, Instagram was also the most adopted of the newer platforms, with between 23% (2015) and 52% (2017) of Representatives adopting the service. For Flickr, between 23% (2018) and 43% (2015) of Representatives have accounts, and for Google+ between 2.3% (2018) and 5.2% (2015) have adopted the platform. Additionally, this report discusses the possible implications of the adoption of social media, including managing multiple platforms, the type of content and posting location, the allocation of office resources to social media communications, and archiving social media content.

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A second criticism is that the agency relies for most of its CAA benefit assessments on the effects of reducing a single category of pollutants, particulate matter (PM). A third issue critics raise is whether the methodology used to place monetary value on the avoidance of premature death—a technique referred to as calculating the "value of a statistical life"—inflates the estimated benefits of regulation. This report examines these issues in the context of Clean Air Act (CAA) regulations. Among the 34 sections are several major regulatory authorities, including the authority to set emission standards for new stationary sources (power plants, refineries, etc.) These sections of the act direct the EPA Administrator to consider the "remaining useful life of the existing source" to which an emission standard will apply, under Section 111(d); provide for the use of "generally available control technologies" to control area sources of hazardous air pollutants, under Section 112(d)(5); promulgate "reasonable regulations and appropriate guidance to provide, to the greatest extent practicable, for the prevention and detection of accidental releases" of extremely hazardous substances and take into consideration "the concerns of small business," under Section 112(r)(7); consider "the availability and feasibility of pollution control measures" in classifying nonattainment areas under Section 172; consider "such other factors as he [the Administrator] deems pertinent" and take into consideration "the restraints of an adequate leadtime for design and production" in setting vapor recovery standards for gasoline under Section 202(a)(5) impose emissions standards or emissions control technology requirements that "reflect the best retrofit technology and maintenance practices reasonably achievable" for retrofit of urban buses under Section 219(d); decide whether a requirement is "practicable, taking into account technological achievability, safety, and other relevant factors" in establishing an accelerated schedule for phasing out production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances under Section 606; and consider "the purpose or intended use of the product, the technological availability of substitutes ..., safety, health, and other relevant factors" in regulating nonessential products that release class I ozone depleting substances under Section 610 (except for two specific categories of products that are listed in the statute). These statutory authorities tend to fall into one of four categories: (1) provisions in which Congress itself set the standards; (2) provisions where Congress directed the agency to set health-based standards, without mentioning cost; (3) provisions in which Congress gave the agency broad authority to promulgate regulations to achieve an objective that Congress determined was necessary (generally protecting public health directly or indirectly, or protecting the environment), but the specifics of which Congress could not anticipate; or (4) a provision requiring EPA to promulgate federal requirements in cases where states have failed to develop or implement adequate regulations to meet a federal mandate. EPA's Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis Although the statute prohibits the consideration of cost in setting some standards, EPA is subject to executive orders that require the estimation of costs and benefits any time an agency develops "economically significant" regulations. Issues Raised by EPA's CAA Cost-Benefit Analyses A number of issues have been raised regarding EPA's cost-benefit analyses for Clean Air Act rules. Cumulative Impacts of Clean Air Act Regulations A frequent criticism of EPA's Clean Air Act regulations is that the agency underestimates the cost and other negative impacts of rules by considering them individually, and thus potentially ignoring cumulative impacts. The benefits of those regulations outweighed the costs by more than an order of magnitude, according to the agency. OIRA Reports on the Cost and Benefit of Regulations The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the President's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is the office that conducts interagency reviews of proposed and final regulations under E.O. Research has tied PM to tens of thousands of premature deaths, and EPA often finds that reductions in PM emissions justify regulation, even where the target of the regulations is a different pollutant. c. Quantification and Monetization Most rules also have benefits that cannot be quantified or monetized in light of existing information. Concluding Observations Although many parts of the Clean Air Act require the EPA Administrator to promulgate regulations without mentioning consideration of cost, EPA is bound by the statute in some cases and by executive orders in the case of each economically significant rule to provide estimates of the costs and benefits during the rulemaking process. The agency has indicated that benefits exceed costs, usually by a wide margin, for the vast majority of its CAA rules: as noted earlier, according to EPA, the estimated cumulative benefits of CAA regulations during the period 1990-2020 will exceed the estimated costs by more than 30 to 1. On January 30, 2017, he signed Executive Order 13771, "Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs." 13783, "Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth," signed March 28, 2017, addressed specific Clean Air Act regulations. The second of the two orders, E.O. directs EPA to review these rules "for consistency with the policy set forth in section 1 of this order," and, if appropriate, to "suspend, revise, or rescind" them.

The Clean Air Act (CAA) gives the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) broad authority to set ambient air quality standards to protect public health and welfare. It authorizes emission standards for both mobile and stationary air pollution sources, including cars, trucks, factories, power plants, fuels, consumer products, and dozens of other source categories. Since 1970, EPA has used this authority to require emission controls for these sources. Emissions of the most widespread ("criteria") pollutants have been reduced by 72% during that period. As directed by Congress and by executive orders, EPA has estimated the costs and benefits of major CAA (and other) regulations for the last four decades. Its most comprehensive recent studies and studies by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have concluded that the benefits of clean air regulations outweigh the costs by substantial margins. EPA's cost-benefit analyses of individual regulations, required by Executive Order 12866, show similar results: a review of the 55 economically significant CAA regulations promulgated from 2001 to 2016 found only two in which estimated costs exceeded benefits. Nevertheless, many in Congress have expressed concern that Clean Air Act and other environmental regulations harm the nation's economy. One issue raised by critics is whether EPA underestimates the cost and other negative impacts of CAA rules—in part, by considering them individually, and not considering cumulative impacts. Another criticism is that the agency relies for most of its benefit assessments on the effects of reducing a single category of pollutants, particulate matter (PM). Research has tied PM to tens of thousands of premature deaths, and EPA often finds that reductions in PM emissions justify regulation, even where PM reductions are a "co-benefit" of reducing another targeted pollutant. A third issue critics raise is whether the methodology used to place monetary value on the avoidance of premature death—a technique referred to as calculating the "value of a statistical life"—inflates the estimated benefits of regulation. This report examines these issues in the context of Clean Air Act regulation. It reviews EPA and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) studies of the cost and benefit of CAA regulations, and addresses the issues raised by agency critics. The report finds that The Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to set standards in multiple sections of the act: about half of the act's major regulatory authorities mention costs or economic considerations explicitly, and several others imply that costs may be considered; but other authorizing sections, including some key sections, make no mention of cost considerations. Where the statutory authorities do not mention cost consideration, they tend to fall into one of four categories: provisions in which Congress itself set the standards; provisions where Congress directed the agency to set health-based standards, without mentioning cost; broad authority to promulgate regulations to achieve an objective that Congress determined was necessary, but the specifics of which it could not anticipate; or authority to promulgate federal requirements in cases where states have failed to develop or implement adequate regulations on their own to meet a federal mandate. In all cases, even where the statute would prohibit consideration of cost in setting standards, EPA is bound by executive orders to provide estimates of costs and benefits if the rule would be economically significant. According to EPA, the estimated benefits of CAA regulation will exceed the estimated costs by more than 30 to 1 in the period 1990-2020. CAA regulations prevent 230,000 premature deaths annually, according to the agency. The estimated benefits of CAA regulations rely heavily on the effects of reducing particulate emissions, and on the value placed on the avoidance of premature death as a result of such controls. Many rules have benefits or costs that cannot be quantified or monetized in light of existing information. President Trump has issued two executive orders that address the cost of EPA regulations: Executive Order (E.O.) 13771, signed January 30, 2017, and E.O. 13783, signed March 28, 2017. The former directs OMB to set regulatory "budgets" for executive branch departments and agencies and, in general, to rescind two regulations for every new one issued. The latter requires EPA to review—and, if appropriate, suspend, revise, or rescind—several CAA regulations affecting energy production, with an eye to avoiding regulatory burdens. At present, the effect of the two orders on future CAA regulations is unclear. The report discusses some of the possible implications.

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However, the ability to implement recycling programs may be constrained by federal and/or state law. Specifically, many of the medications covered by recycling programs are considered controlled substances and thus are subject to the requirements of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Furthermore, most, if not all, of the drugs in question also require a prescription in order to be dispensed, and therefore are regulated by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA) —thus adding another layer of federal statutory regulations. Additionally, programs to recycle medications may also encounter logistical problems relating to billing under the Health Insurance Accountability and Portability Act (HIPAA). Controlled Substances Act One potential impediment to drug recycling programs is the CSA. Enforced by the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the CSA establishes civil as well as criminal sanctions for its violation. Current State Practice In recent years, several states have attempted to combat waste associated with discarding unused medications by creating drug recycling programs. This section provides examples of current practices regarding such recycling programs.

In recent years, the rising costs of prescription drugs have motivated various policymakers to implement cost-saving measures. In some cases, states have pursued programs to collect and redistribute unused medications that would otherwise be discarded. However, the ability to implement these so-called drug recycling programs may be constrained by federal or state law or both. For example, medications classified as controlled substances are regulated by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Furthermore, drugs that require prescriptions, as many controlled substances do, are regulated by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA). Additionally, programs may encounter logistical problems related to billing under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which is not designed to accommodate drug recycling. Despite these hurdles, states have begun to implement drug recycling programs. Although the details of the laws vary among states, most contain strict rules to ensure the safety of the medications. This report provides an overview of the federal laws that may affect state drug recycling programs, as well as examples of these state programs.

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In March 2014, a regional director of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) ruled that scholarship football players at Northwestern University are employees for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and ordered an election to determine support for the College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), a newly created labor organization. This report provides an overview of the NLRA, and reviews the decision by the NLRB's regional director. The report also examines the concerns raised by Northwestern and CAPA. The report ends with a brief discussion of other developments that could affect unionization efforts by athletes at private colleges and universities. NLRB and Northwestern University In late January 2014, a group of students who play football for Northwestern University filed a representation petition with the NLRB. The students are seeking to be represented by CAPA, which contends that college football and basketball players, particularly those who compete in Division I of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), are essentially employees given the amount of time they commit to athletics, the revenue they generate for their schools, and their receipt of compensation in the form of scholarships. Pursuant to a federal district court decision issued on August 8, 2014, the NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and Division I basketball schools can use revenue from the use of player's names, images, or likenesses to provide financial aid up to the cost of attendance. Among other changes, five conferences—consisting of 65 private and public colleges and universities—will be allowed to adopt new rules affecting student athletes.

In late January 2014, a group of students who play football for Northwestern University filed a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The students are seeking to be represented by the College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), a newly created labor organization. CAPA contends that college football and basketball players, particularly those who compete in Division I of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), are essentially employees given the amount of time they commit to athletics, the revenue they generate for their schools, and their receipt of compensation in the form of scholarships. If the Northwestern players are found to be employees for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), they will be permitted to engage in collective bargaining over the terms and conditions of their employment. This report provides an overview of the NLRA, and reviews the March 2014 decision by the NLRB's regional director, which concluded that the Northwestern players are employees under the act. The report examines the concerns raised by both the university and CAPA. The report also discusses other developments that could affect unionization efforts by athletes at private colleges and universities. In August 2014, the NCAA Division I Board of Directors gave new authority to five conferences—consisting of 65 public and private colleges and universities—to provide greater financial support to student-athletes. Also, an August 2014 U.S. District Court decision will allow NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and basketball schools to use revenue from the use of players' names, images, or likenesses to provide greater financial support to athletes.

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Background The Department of Defense (DOD) has a long history of relying on contractors to support troops during wartime and expeditionary operations. As the number of contractors in the area of operations has increased, the operational force—the service men and women in the field—increasingly rely on, interact with, and are responsible for managing contractors. This finding confirms what many analysts have argued: that deployed military personnel are not sufficiently trained or prepared to manage contractors in an area of operations. DOD Efforts to Train the Operational Force to Work Effectively With Contractors During Expeditionary Operations According to Title X of the United States Code, military services are generally responsible for training military forces. In addition, the Army is working with the joint community to include contract support into other operations. Options for Congress Take No Action The National Defense Authorization Act of FY2008 ( H.R. 4986 / P.L. 110-181 ) required DOD, and especially the Army, to train military personnel who are outside the acquisition workforce but are expected to have acquisition responsibility , and to incorporate contractors and contract operations into mission exercises. As outlined above, DOD has initiated a number of steps to comply with P.L. 110-181 , including developing doctrine, developing a concept of operations, planning and introducing educational courses into the curricula of non-acquisition military personnel, and incorporating contractor support scenarios into mission-ready and other exercises. Require Military Departments to Report on Acquisition Education Courses Available for Operational Personnel Such a requirement would be similar to section 527 of the FY2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for performing a wide range of expeditionary missions, including domestic emergency operations and military operations outside of the continental United States. DOD increasingly relies on contractors during expeditionary operations to perform a wide range of services. For example, more contractors are working for DOD in Iraq and Afghanistan than are U.S. military personnel. As a result, military personnel in the field are increasingly interacting with and responsible for managing contractors. Yet many observers argue that the military is not sufficiently prepared to manage contractors during expeditionary missions. The National Defense Authorization Act of FY2008 (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181) required DOD, and especially the Army, to train military personnel who are outside the acquisition workforce but are expected to have acquisition responsibility , and to incorporate contractors and contract operations into mission exercises. DOD, including the Army, are taking a number of steps to comply with Congressional legislation to better prepare the operational force—including servicemen and women conducting military operations on the battlefield—to work with contractors. These steps include developing doctrine for integrating contract support into expeditionary operations, introducing courses on contract support into the curriculum for non-acquisition personnel, and incorporating contract operations into mission readiness exercises. This report examines these steps being taken by DOD and options for Congress to monitor DOD's efforts to comply with P.L. 110-181. Options include requiring military departments to report on acquisition education courses available for operational personnel. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Balancing Storage and In-Stream Flow Tradeoffs Recent drought in the Southeast has intensified a tri-state water conflict involving Alabama, Florida, and Georgia over water allocation and management in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) river basin (see Figure 1 ). Management of the current drought may shape long-term ACF management, set precedents for future federal drought responses, and affect the role of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in water resources management. A central issue for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) is how to manage its reservoirs to meet municipal and industrial (M&I) water needs equitably in the upper and lower basin, while complying with federal law (e.g., ESA) and minimizing harm to river and bay ecosystems. Predictions for a continued drought have Georgia's upper basin municipal and industrial users concerned about depletion of their principal (and, in some cases, their only) water supply—Lake Lanier—which is slow to refill because of the limited drainage area feeding into it. Lower basin interests (including those in southwest Georgia) are concerned about current and future river flows to meet their municipal, electricity, and ecosystem needs. The fifth section briefly discusses legislation in the 110 th Congress related to the ACF and water supply and management issues in the Southeast. Lake Lanier's drawdown escalated the conflict among the three states. Without a water allocation agreement or decision to guide distribution of available supply among the states, lower basin stakeholders began questioning the sufficiency of Georgia's municipal, industrial, and agricultural long-term and emergency water conservation and demand management efforts. Upper basin stakeholders questioned the justification for the minimum flow requirements in the Apalachicola River and cited the Corps' operating procedures, which had been adopted in 2006 to protect threatened and endangered species, as significantly increasing the risk of depleting ACF reservoirs by allowing their drawdown and insufficient opportunity for refill. Tri-State Water Conflict In the 1970s and 1980s, Georgia officials became increasingly concerned with water supply for the Atlanta metro area's growing needs. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the Corps adopted the Interim Operations Plan (IOP) for Woodruff Dam in October 2006. Others argue that system storage should be used to support species during dry conditions because the ACF ecosystems and species have been compromised by the cumulative long-term impacts of federal reservoir management and the basin's municipal, industrial, and agricultural water use. Exceptional Drought Operations (November 2007-June 2008): Lower Minimum Flows and More Reservoir Refill On November 15, 2007, the Corps began operating under an Exceptional Drought Operations (EDO) modification to the IOP. The effects of the lower flows on electricity generation also were raised as a concern and are discussed in detail in Appendix C ; as discussed there, the EDO does not appear to have caused significant immediate harm to electricity generation or grid reliability. Proposed Modified Interim Operations Plan (June 2008 until Water Control Plan Is Revised) On April 15, 2008, the Corps submitted to FWS a proposal to modify its IOP, thus eliminating the temporary EDO by incorporating elements of the EDO and other changes into a modified IOP (MIOP). Water Control Plan Revision During the 2007-2008 winter, the Corps began revising its water control manual for the ACF reservoirs. Apalachicola River Ecosystem Restoration—H.R. H.R. H.R. 5587 On March 11, 2008, H.R. The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the issues raised by the ACF litigation at this time.

Drought in the Southeast has brought congressional attention to an ongoing interstate conflict among Alabama, Florida, and Georgia over water allocation in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) river system. Drawdown of Lake Lanier, the uppermost federal reservoir in the ACF basin, in fall 2007 to support minimum flows in the lower basin's Apalachicola River escalated the conflict. The Atlanta metropolitan area's municipal and industrial water users are concerned about drawdown of their principal (in some cases, their only) water supply. They question the justification for the minimum flow requirements. Lower basin stakeholders are concerned about sustaining river flows to meet their municipal, electricity, and ecosystem needs and are questioning the sufficiency of Georgia's municipal, industrial, and agricultural water conservation efforts. The issue for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) is how to manage federal reservoirs to equitably meet upper and lower basin multipurpose water needs, especially during drought. The challenge is complying with federal law (e.g., the Endangered Species Act (ESA)); minimizing harm to the river and Apalachicola Bay species, ecosystems, and oyster industry; and providing flows for hydropower and thermoelectric cooling, while also providing municipal and industrial water supply security. The Corps' challenge has increased as basin water demands have increased (e.g., water supply to support the growing Atlanta metro area, agriculture's increased reliance on irrigation, and ecosystem and species needs), creating conflicts between water in storage and flows for in-stream purposes. Is the ACF a harbinger of conflicts between ESA implementation and other water uses across the nation? Is the ACF a testing ground for both federal river management and resource allocation during drought in multi-state basins with riparian water laws? Legislation in the 110th Congress related to the ACF and southeast water supply issues includes H.R. 135, H.R. 2650, H.R. 3847, H.R. 5587, and S. 2165. ACF drought management may set a precedent for drought responses on other rivers regulated by federal dams. In November 2007, the Corps began managing the ACF under an Exceptional Drought Operations (EDO) amendment to its previous operations plan (which consisted of a 2006 Interim Operations Plan (IOP) amending a draft 1989 comprehensive plan). The EDO lowered the minimum flow required in the Apalachicola River and allowed for greater reservoir refill before resuming normal operations, thus improving upper basin water supply security. Four species protected by the ESA depend on Apalachicola River flows. The EDO's immediate and long-term species impacts continue as subjects of study and debate. The EDO has not caused significant immediate harm to electricity generation or grid reliability. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) approved the EDO through June 1, 2008. On April 15, the Corps submitted to FWS a modification to the IOP; the Corps proposes that the modification be implemented starting June 1 until a new long-term ACF comprehensive plan is adopted. The Corps began revising its comprehensive plan during the 2007-2008 winter. With the failure of recent efforts by the Administration to broker a tri-state water allocation agreement by March 2008, the revision has gained additional significance for the future of ACF river management.

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Introduction On June 18, 2008, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-246 ) contains the most recent version of the commodity price and income support programs. Five crops (corn, cotton, wheat, rice, and soybeans) account for about 90% of these payments. Farm Commodity Program Provisions The farm commodity price and income support provisions in the 2008 farm bill include three primary types of payments: Direct payments unrelated to production or prices; Counter-cyclical payments which are triggered when (a) prices are below statutorily-determined target prices, or (b) revenue for a commodity falls below a historical guaranteed level, and Marketing assistance loans that offer interim financing and, if prices fall below loan prices set in statute, additional income support, sometimes paid as loan deficiency payments (LDP) . The 2008 farm bill generally continues the farm commodity price and income support framework of the 2002 farm bill, with modifications. It continues the direct payment, counter-cyclical payment, and marketing loan programs for the 2008-2012 crop years, but adjusts target prices and loan rates for some commodities. The law also creates a pilot revenue-based counter-cyclical program ("ACRE") beginning with the 2009 crop year. It revises payment limitations by tightening some limits and relaxing others. The new law also has a pilot program for planting flexibility, new restrictions on base acres developed for residential use, and elimination of benefits to farms with fewer than 10 acres of program crops. For the 2008 crop year, the programs are essentially unchanged from the 2002 farm bill. The Administration wants to use prices from 2006 and 2007 when implementing ACRE for the 2009 crop year. One sets the maximum amount of farm program payments that a person can receive per year. Limits are tightened by (a) reducing the AGI limit, (b) eliminating the "three-entity rule," which allowed individuals to double their payments by having multiple ownership interests, and (c) requiring "direct attribution" of payments to a living person instead of to a corporation, general partnership, etc. Limits are relaxed by eliminating any limit on marketing loans. The new payment limit rules do not take effect until the 2009 crop year. In terms of the 2008 farm bill, data are not yet available that are specific to the farm bill limits of $500,000 non-farm AGI and $750,000 farm AGI. 6849 , to suspend enforcement of the 10-acre requirement for the 2008 crop year. H.R. The bill now awaits the President's signature. Congress refers to aggregation in the report language for the 10-acre provision.

Farm commodity price and income support provisions in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246, the 2008 farm bill) include three primary types of payments: Direct payments unrelated to production or prices; Counter-cyclical payments for a commodity that are triggered when (a) prices are below statutorily-determined target prices, or(b) revenue falls below a historical guaranteed level; and Marketing assistance loans that offer interim financing and, if prices fall below loan prices set in statute, additional income support. The farm commodity programs are the most visible part of the farm bill. In recent years, five crops (corn, wheat, cotton, rice, and soybeans) account for over 90% of government commodity payments to farmers. The 2008 farm bill generally continues the farm commodity price and income support framework of the 2002 farm bill, with modifications. It continues the direct payment, counter-cyclical payment, and marketing loan programs for the 2008-2012 crop years, but adjusts target prices and loan rates for some commodities. The law also creates a pilot revenue-based counter-cyclical program ("ACRE") beginning with the 2009 crop year. The new law also has a pilot program for planting flexibility, new restrictions on base acres developed for residential use, and elimination of benefits to farms with fewer than 10 acres of program crops. For the 2008 crop year, the programs are essentially unchanged from the 2002 farm bill. Payment limits both determine eligibility and set a maximum amount of commodity payments per person. The 2008 farm bill revises payment limitations for the commodity programs by tightening some limits and relaxing others. Limits are tightened by (1) reducing the adjusted gross income (AGI) limit to $500,000 of non-farm AGI and $750,000 of farm AGI, (2) eliminating the "three-entity rule," which allowed individuals to double their payments by having multiple ownership interests (doubling by having a spouse continues), and (3) requiring "direct attribution" of payments to a living person. Limits are relaxed by eliminating any limit on the marketing loan program. The new rules do not take effect until the 2009 crop year. Implementation has been problematic in two ways. First, the Administration did not allow farmers to combine land before enforcing the 10-acre restriction, an allowance Congress mentioned only in report language. Consequently, Congress passed H.R. 6849 to suspend enforcement of the 10-acre provision for one year and offset the cost with reductions in computer technology outlays and changes to the new permanent disaster program. The bill awaits the President's signature. The second implementation issue is that USDA is considering using prices from crop years 2006 and 2007 for setting the 2009 ACRE revenue guarantee, rather than the immediate past two years of 2007 and 2008, as Congress intended. The regulations, however, have not yet been released.

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Overview Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) task forces have been designated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to provide specialized assistance after buildings or other structures collapse. The task forces work to stabilize damaged structures, locate and extricate victims, identify risks of additional collapses, and meet other needs at disaster sites. Although the USAR task forces are local government entities, they may be considered part of the federal emergency response network as they receive funding, training, and accreditation from the federal government. The recognition given to the task forces' successful rescue efforts in Haiti, and extensive media coverage of their deployment to Japan, may presage calls for greater reliance on the USAR concept for international crises. Locations Twenty-eight task forces have been established throughout the United States, as shown in the following map.

Since the early 1990s, Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Task Forces have been certified, trained, and funded by the federal government. Twenty-eight task forces are located in 19 states. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials may call out the task force (or forces) in closest proximity to the disaster to help locate and extricate victims from collapsed buildings and structures. The task forces represent a partnership involving federal, local government, and private sector experts. Most recently, USAR teams received extensive media coverage for their missions to Haiti after the earthquakes of early 2010, and Japan after the earthquake and tsunami in the spring of 2011. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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In 2007, DHS issued interim final regulations establishing risk-based performance standards known as the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). As of February 2015, DHS had inspected and approved 1,526 site security plans, covering approximately 43% of the regulated facilities. Statute and Regulation In 2006, Congress authorized the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue interim final regulations establishing risk-based performance standards for chemical facility security and requiring facilities to develop vulnerability assessments and to develop and implement site security plans. The Secretary must review and approve the required vulnerability assessment, site security plan, and its implementation at each facility. The DHS then monitors facility compliance with these site security plans. When the facility receives a final tier assignment, it must develop and submit a Site Security Plan (SSP) to DHS. The following sections analyze DHS data to identify underlying challenges for the following steps: the process of DHS assigning a facility to a risk tier; the rate at which DHS authorizes site security plans; the rate at which DHS inspects and approves authorized site security plans; and the occurrence of compliance inspections. Chemical Facility Tier Assignment In the CFATS process, all facilities possessing chemicals of interest above a certain threshold amount must report to DHS through the Top-Screen process. Some of these new submissions may be from high-risk facilities. This may reflect the dynamic nature of the pool of CFATS-regulated facilities with facilities joining, leaving, and being retiered within the CFATS program, or it may suggest that DHS is not resolving the gap between total facilities and facilities with a final tier. Site Security Plan Authorization Regulated facilities must submit site security plans (SSPs) that meet the risk-based performance standards applicable to their final risk tier. Assuming that the total number of regulated facilities remains unchanged over time, DHS would need to authorize an average of 76 site security plans monthly to authorize a number of SSPs equal to the number of facilities within 1 year, an average of 38 monthly to authorize all within 2 years, an average of 15 monthly to authorize all within 5 years, and an average of 8 monthly to authorize all within 10 years. The DHS has generally increased its average authorization rate over time; between August 2014 and February 2015, DHS authorized an average of 135 SSPs per month. Between January 2015 and February 2015, DHS authorized 120 SSPs. Authorization Inspections and SSP Approvals Following authorization of a site security plan, DHS inspects the facility to determine its adherence to its submitted SSP. Comparison of the current rate of approval against that necessary to approve all SSPs indicates that it will likely take more than a year for DHS to finish inspecting and approving the existing SSPs. As a point of reference, DHS approved an average of 85 site security plans monthly between February 2014 and February 2015. The DHS has generally increased this rate over time; between August 2014 and February 2015, DHS approved an average of 93 SSPs per month. Compliance Inspections Following approval of a facility site security plan, DHS inspects the facility for compliance. The CFATS program has historically not met DHS-established deadlines for securing high-risk chemical facilities.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implements the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, which regulate security at high-risk facilities possessing more than certain amounts of one or more chemicals of interest. Facilities possessing more than the specified amount must register with DHS through this program (a process known as the Top-Screen) and perform security-related activities. The DHS identifies a subset of high-risk chemical facilities from among those that register. These high-risk chemical facilities must submit a security vulnerability assessment, which DHS uses to confirm their high-risk designation, and a site security plan, which DHS then reviews and authorizes. The DHS also inspects and approves high-risk chemical facilities for adherence to their submitted site security plans. It also later inspects for compliance with these plans following DHS approval. The DHS regulates approximately 3,600 facilities under this program and is in the process of implementing the regulatory requirements for security vulnerability assessment, site security planning, and inspection. The DHS has had challenges meeting its own projections and congressional expectations regarding program performance, raising questions about its ability to achieve steady-state regulatory implementation. As of April 2014, DHS had made final risk assignments to 3,316 of the approximately 4,200 facilities then regulated. The DHS reported in December 2014 that it now regulates approximately 3,600 facilities, approximately 2,700 of which have final risk assignments. The DHS authorizes a site security plan when the submitted plan satisfies CFATS requirements. Following a successful authorization inspection, DHS approves the site security plan. As of February 2014, DHS had authorized 2,646 site security plans; conducted 1,969 authorization inspections; and approved 1,526 site security plans. Between February 2014 and February 2015, DHS authorized an average of 132 and approved an average of 85 site security plans per month. The DHS has generally increased its average authorization and approval rate over time; between August 2014 and February 2015, DHS authorized an average of 135 and approved an average of 93 site security plans per month. Between January 2015 and February 2015, DHS authorized 120 and approved 80 site security plans. This report analyzes data from a variety of DHS presentations, testimony, and other sources to present a historical overview of program performance to date. It identifies an ongoing gap between the number of facilities that have received final risk tier assignments and the total number of regulated facilities. This makes it appear likely that DHS will not have inspected or approved site security plans for some portion of the regulated facility universe for at least several years. In addition, the current rates of authorization of site security plans, authorization inspection, and approval of site security plans make it appear likely that DHS will not have completed implementation for the initial facilities before the date when it will potentially need to begin reinspecting already approved facilities. With the onset of compliance inspections, congressional policymakers may have further questions about the ability of the CFATS program to meet congressional expectations regarding timeliness.

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The House passed the bill( H.R. 106-60 )by the President September 29, 1999. Status of Energy and Water Appropriations,FY2000 Overview The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil projects of the Army Corpsof Engineers, the Department of the Interior'sBureau of Reclamation, most of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, includingthe Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) andthe Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). As with other FY2000 appropriations bills, the Energy and Water Subcommittees had difficulty meeting the spending allocations assigned them under Section 302(b) of the Budget Act. 2605 )recommended raising the Corps appropriation to $4.19 billion. The Houseand Senate Conference settled on $4.14 billion for the Corps of Engineers and $769.3 million for the Bureau ofReclamation. DOE programs funded by the Senate bill would have risen about 4% to $17.1 billion, about what the Administration requested. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Title I: Corps of Engineers (in millions ofdollars) Key Policy Issues -- Corps of Engineers Funding for Corps of Engineers civil programs is often a contentious issue between the Administration and the Congress, with final appropriations bills typicallyfunding more projects than requested. Policy issues related to wetlands regulatory programs were addressed in the final bill. As approved by the House on July 27, the bill included two such provisions. The Administration proposed and thefinal bill included no new funding for thecontroversial Animas-La Plata water supply project in Colorado, and instead proposed allocating $3 million (witha recommendation of $2 million) from previousappropriations for preconstruction activities. P.L. In passing S. 1186 on June 16, the Senate voted to reject most of the requested increase, recommending $353.9 million for DOE's renewable energyprograms. The primary element of DOE's national security R&D request is the stockpilestewardship program, aimed at developing the science and technology to maintain the nation's nuclear weaponsstockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. Nonproliferation and National Security Programs. Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal. Bipartisan groups in both the House and Senate found this feature of the budget request controversial. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees sharply criticized NRC last year for allegedly failing to overhaul its regulatory system in line withimprovements in nuclear industry safety. Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal. Civilian Nuclear Spent Fuel Temporary Storage Options.

The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil projects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior'sBureau of Reclamation (BuRec), most of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies. The Administration requested $22 billion forthese programs for FY2000. The House and Senate approved $21.3 billion. Low allocations under Section 302 (b) of the Budget Act created difficulties for Appropriations Committees in both Houses. The Senate Committee responded bycutting water projects for the Corps and BuRec, and keeping DOE funding about at the requested level. The HouseAppropriations Committee increased moneyfor the Corps and cut about $1.5 billion from DOE, much of it in the weapons program. The Senate passed the bill( S. 1186 ) June 16, 1999. TheHouse passed its version of the bill ( H.R. 2605 ) July 27, 1999. The House-Senate Conference Committeereported out its agreement on September24, 1999, with some of the Senate cuts to the Corps, and some of the House cuts to DOE, restored. The bill wassigned by the President on September 29, 1999( P.L. 106-60 ). Other key issues involving Energy and Water Development appropriations programs included: Policy issues related to wetlands regulatory programs involving the Corps; the Bureau of Reclamation's controversial Animas-La Plata project in Colorado, a large irrigation and tribal projects with likely controversialenvironmental impacts, for which the Administration requested no new appropriations in FY2000; a pending decision by DOE on the electrometallurgical treatment of nuclear spent fuel for storage and disposal, a process that opponentscontend raises nuclear nonproliferation concerns; proposed funding increases for DOE's accelerated computer simulation efforts to simulate nuclear weapons explosions and other importantaspects of the nuclear weapons stockpile; increased funding for DOE's Nuclear Cities Initiative in Russia, to find alternative work for unemployed Russian nuclear weaponsdesigners; NRC's plans to overhaul its regulatory system for nuclear power plant safety, as urged by the House and Senate AppropriationsCommittees; The ongoing controversy over interim civilian nuclear waste storage; and DOE's "privatization" program for nuclear waste cleanup. Key Policy Staff Division abbreviation: RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry.

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Introduction Since 2007, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has amended certain national standards for traffic signs. Some agencies also confused the new nighttime visibility maintenance standard, which originally included deadlines by which agencies had to comply with the new standard, with the new sign-lettering standard, which did not have compliance deadlines. There Are Two New Traffic Sign Standards In 2007, FHWA updated the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices standard governing the maintenance of the nighttime visibility (retroreflectivity) of traffic signs (§2A.08). Retroreflectivity refers to the reflection of light back from an object. The 2007 amendment set a minimum level of retroreflectivity for signs and required state agencies to adopt a method to ensure that signs met that minimum. This standard did not have a deadline for compliance. Some press reports have given the impression that the federal government is requiring communities to immediately begin replacing all street signs just to comply with the new lettering style standard, but this is incorrect. However, there was no measurable standard for what constituted "adequate retroreflectivity." In 1985, the Center for Auto Safety petitioned FHWA to add a minimum nighttime visibility standard to the MUTCD. In 1992, Congress directed DOT to develop a minimum standard, with this provision in the FY1993 Department of Transportation (DOT) appropriations bill: SEC. The Secretary of Transportation shall revise the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices to include— (a) a standard for a minimum level of retroreflectivity that must be maintained for pavement markings and signs, which shall apply to all roads open to public travel ... Purpose The reflective properties of sign materials decrease over time, due to exposure to sunlight and other factors. As an earlier version of the MUTCD put it, if a sign is necessary in the daytime, it has equal or greater value to motorists at night. But ensuring that traffic signs are easily visible at night benefits not only older drivers, but all drivers. To provide flexibility to agencies, the standard listed several methods that can satisfy this requirement, including visual nighttime inspection from a moving vehicle by a trained sign inspector; measurement of sign retroreflectivity using a retroreflectometer; replacement of signs based on their expected life above the minimum standard for retroreflectivity; replacement of all signs in an area, or of a given type, at specified intervals, based on the expected life above the minimum standard for retroreflectivity of the shortest-life material used on the signs in that area or of that type; replacement based on the performance of sample signs that are monitored for loss of retroreflectivity; or other methods that are developed based on engineering studies. FHWA's final retroreflectivity standard tried to satisfy both the congressional directive to set a minimum retroreflectivity standard, by including a table of minimum numerical standards in the MUTCD, and the preferences of the state and local transportation agencies, by saying that not every sign needed to meet the minimum standard so long as agencies had a management process in place to maintain the nighttime visibility of their signs. One was concern on the part of agencies about the cost of compliance. The other was that several press reports conflated the requirement for replacing signs that were no longer clearly visible at night with the entirely unrelated new standard requiring mixed-case lettering on street signs, which was added in the 2009 update of the MUTCD. Most MUTCD standards, such as the lettering standard, do not have compliance deadlines. DOT has observed that the MUTCD already required agencies to maintain the nighttime visibility of traffic signs. DOT said it changed the deadlines to reduce the costs and impacts of the compliance deadlines on state and local highway agencies.

Traffic signs provide information to help motorists travel safely. If a sign is useful during daytime, it has equal or greater value to motorists at night, when less of the road environment can be seen. Federal regulations have long required that traffic signs be visible at night, either through the use of retroreflective materials (materials that reflect light, such as from headlights, back in the direction from which it came) or through permanent lighting illuminating the sign. These regulations are part of the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), a compilation of federal regulations governing traffic control devices. Due to the costs and practical limitations on supplying electricity for lighting, agencies typically rely on retroreflective materials to make most traffic signs visible at night. Retroreflective materials lose their reflective properties over time due to weathering and other factors. This reduces the visibility of the signs at night. To promote safety, the MUTCD also requires agencies to monitor their traffic control devices and make sure they comply with the federal requirements. Thus, agencies have been required to make sure that their traffic signs are visible at night, and to replace those which are no longer visible. However, for many years there was no objective standard establishing what level of retroreflectivity was needed for a traffic sign to be visible at night. In 1992, Congress directed the federal Department of Transportation (DOT) to develop a standard for the minimum level of retroreflectivity that traffic signs (and pavement markings) must maintain. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) within DOT had already been doing research on the reflective properties of sign materials. Between 1993 and 2004 FHWA did further research and consulted with state and local transportation agencies regarding the implementation of the congressional directive. Between 2004 and 2007, FHWA completed a rulemaking to add a minimum standard for the retroreflectivity of traffic signs to the MUTCD. The new standard had three elements: it set a minimum measurable value for the retroreflectivity of traffic signs to ensure their visibility at night; it required state and local agencies to adopt a method by which to maintain the nighttime visibility of their traffic signs by 2012; and it required agencies to ensure that their signs were in compliance with the standard by 2018. In 2009, the street sign lettering standard in the MUTCD was revised. This standard did not have a compliance deadline. In 2010, several press reports conflated the new nighttime visibility standard with the new street sign lettering standard. These articles made it appear that the federal government was requiring communities to replace traffic signs just to change their lettering style. Communities also complained about the cost of the new nighttime visibility maintenance standard (though the requirement that they replace traffic signs that were no longer visible at night was not new). Thus the nighttime visibility maintenance standard came to the attention of Congress. In 2012, FHWA amended the compliance dates for the retroreflectivity standard (and several other MUTCD standards) to alleviate possible financial burdens the deadlines might have created for state and local highway agencies.

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An increasingly important retirement saving vehicle is the individual retirement account (IRA). Currently, nearly everyone is eligible to contribute to at least one type of IRA. IRA savings is encouraged by two mechanisms—a carrot and a stick approach. First, tax provisions allow individuals to defer taxes on IRA contributions and investment earnings or to accumulate investment earnings tax free, effectively raising the rate of return on IRA contributions. Second, nonqualified withdrawals before the age of 59½ are subject to a 10% penalty tax in addition to regular taxes. The Obama Administration appears to be taking a different tack by proposing additional incentives to saving in existing retirement saving accounts that have proven effective in evaluations. Taxable distributions from traditional IRAs are taxed as ordinary income. Roth (Back-loaded) IRAs Contributions to Roth IRAs are not tax deductible, but qualified distributions from Roth IRAs are tax free. Tax Consequences of IRAs The main tax advantages of a traditional IRA are the deductibility of contributions for some individuals and the tax deferment of investment returns on IRA assets. Savings Effects Higher savings rates can lead to faster wealth and capital accumulation, which can boost future national income. These objectives include reducing the federal budget deficit and federal debt, increasing national savings, and increasing retirement savings. The deductible traditional IRA is more likely to result in more private savings than the Roth IRA, from the perspective of either conventional economic theory or the "psychological" theories advanced by some. While the IRA tax incentives may not have appreciably increased national savings, they have probably increased retirement savings by individuals. Recent Proposals In 2005, the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform proposed consolidating the traditional and Roth IRAs. This plan would create Save for Retirement Accounts (SRAs) to replace traditional and Roth IRAs. These proposals would predominantly benefit higher-income individuals and families who are the ones likely to save. The Administration has proposed incentives to save in traditional and Roth IRAs rather than creating new savings accounts. Many of the provisions in EGTRRA would have expired in 2010, but the Pension Protection Act of 2006 made those expansions permanent.

Current law provides many incentives to promote saving. The goal of these provisions is to increase saving for special purposes such as education or retirement, and to increase national saving. Increased national saving can lead to faster wealth and capital accumulation, which can boost future national income. An increasingly important retirement saving vehicle is the individual retirement account (IRA). IRA savings is encouraged by two mechanisms—a carrot approach and a stick approach. First, tax provisions allow individuals to defer taxes on IRA contributions and investment earnings or to accumulate investment earnings tax free. Second, withdrawals before the age of 59½ are generally subject to a 10% penalty tax in addition to regular taxes. There are two types of IRAs: the traditional IRA and the Roth IRA. The traditional IRA allows for the tax-deferred accumulation of investment earnings, and some individuals are eligible to make tax-deductible contributions to their traditional IRAs while other individuals are not. Some or all distributions from traditional IRAs are taxed at retirement. In contrast, contributions to Roth IRAs are not tax deductible, but distributions from Roth IRAs are not taxed on withdrawal in retirement. Expanded contribution limits were adopted in 2001, but were scheduled to expire after 2010; the Pension Protection Act of 2006 made those increases permanent. In November 2005, President Bush's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform proposed changes to IRAs. The panel's plan would have created Save for Retirement Accounts (SRAs) to replace traditional and Roth IRAs. Additionally, President Bush proposed consolidating IRAs into a Roth-style retirement savings account. The Obama Administration appears to be taking a different tack by proposing additional incentives to increase saving by low- and moderate-income workers in existing retirement saving accounts that have proven effective in evaluations. Neither conventional economic theory nor the empirical evidence on savings effects tends to support the argument that increased IRA contributions are primarily new savings—often increased retirement saving comes at the expense of reduced nonretirement saving. Roth-style accounts are less likely to induce new private savings than are traditional ones. Furthermore, these proposals would predominantly benefit higher-income individuals and families, who are the ones most likely to save without the added incentive. Proposals that increase retirement saving among low- and moderate-income workers could be effective in increasing new saving because these workers typically have little or no nonretirement saving to reduce.

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Description of the Conversion The Tridents as converted can carry up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles (or other non-strategic land attack missiles ) and 66 Navy SEAL special operations forces (SOF) personnel. Program Cost As shown in Table 1 , the Navy estimates the total cost for refueling and converting four Tridents (including both research and development as well as procurement costs) at about $4.0 billion, or about $1 billion per boat. Program Schedule All four Trident conversions have been completed, and Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the program was declared on November 1, 2007.

The FY2006 budget completed the funding required in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account for the Navy's program to refuel and convert four Trident ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) into cruise-missile-carrying and special operations forces (SOF) support submarines (SSGNs). Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the program was declared on November 1, 2007. The total estimated cost of the program is about $4.0 billion. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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This reportdiscusses high-threat biological agents, focusing on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC) definition for Category A pathogens (bacteria and viruses), their treatment and detection,current policies, and possible future approaches to reducing their threat. What Are High-Threat Biological Agents? Depending on what aspects of a pathogen are considered priorities, differentbiological agents are likely to be identified as high threat. (5) The CDC views CategoryA pathogens as easily disseminated ortransmitted from person to person; resulting in high mortality rates; having the potential for majorpublic health impact; potentially causing public panic and social disruption; and requiring specialaction for public health preparedness. Some anthrax strains may be less sensitive toantibiotics and therefore difficult to treat. The different forms of exposure to tularemiabacteria lead to different symptoms. Detection of Biological Agents The detection of pathogens, especially in the case of a covert release, is a complicated process. (36) It has been suggested that the first sign of acovert pathogen release by terrorist groups may be a sudden increase in the number of hospitalpatients exhibiting symptoms. Biological Agents as Weapons of Mass Destruction Versus as Weapons of Terror The likelihood of terrorist use of biological agents as a weapon of mass destruction is an areaof great debate. The technical feasability of terrorist groupsdisseminating biological agents is also open to question. They claim that release of small amounts of biological agent might cause alevel of panic disproportionate to the actual amount released, and point to the anxieties raised afterthe mailings of the anthrax letters of 2001 as emblematic of the type of response that can begenerated by small-scale use of biological weapons. The anthrax mailings of 2001 highlighted the vulnerability of the United States to biological attack, and reignited public interest in bioterrorism and domestic preparedness. (47) Research and Development Defense against bioterrorism has spurred research and development activities. Detecting and identifying pathogens is an area of continued research. Such countermeasures include, but are not limited to,new detectors, treatments, medical prophylaxis, and physical protection from biological agents. Early treatment of theinhalation form of these diseases is essential to recovery, and a system that signaled pathogen releasebefore the appearance of symptoms in victims would be likely to increase the ability of victims toreceive medication and survive. Others have asserted that the current model will be effective in limiting casualties from a pathogen release. They claim that increases in the public health infrastructure have reduced thelikelihood that hospitals and care-providers would be overwhelmed by a bioterror event. Policymakers may ultimately determine the adequacy of current firstresponder equipment and its availability, the amount of funds that first responders should receive topurchase protective equipment, whether proper guidance has been given by the federal governmentto state and local authorities regarding this equipment, and what steps may be required, throughoversight or legislation, to properly equip first responders.

The anthrax mailings in 2001, which culminated in 5 deaths, 22 infections, and contamination of both postal and congressional buildings, intensified concerns about terrorist use of biologicalagents. This event increased Congressional interest in actions to limit the vulnerability of the UnitedStates to such attacks. High-threat biological agents, defined by the Centers for Disease Control andPrevention as Category A pathogens, are considered relatively easy to disseminate, have highmortality, and have the potential for major public health impacts. High-threat biological agents cause different symptoms in their victims, depending on the pathogen. Since the nature of these agents differs, no single treatment can be given in the case ofa biological attack. As a result, treatment of the victims of a biological attack, especially one whichis covert, may be difficult. The identification process for many pathogens may be complicated bytheir incubation period, and the lack of distinct symptoms early in the disease's progress. Thedifficulties in treating the various high-threat agents may place strain on the resources of the medicalsystem, especially in the case of mass casualties. Protection from biological agents is an area of active research and development. The range of protection and detection equipment available to first responders has led to questions regardingequipment standardization and state and local preparedness. Development and distribution ofvaccines continues to be a contentious issue. Attempts to detect biological releases using sensortechnologies, or through analyzing public health data, continue to be implemented, but thesetechnologies are in relatively early stages of development. It is unclear whether terrorist groups are capable of effectively using biological agents as weapons of mass destruction, but the relatively small amounts of pathogen that may be needed toexecute a significant attack is a source of concern. Some suggest that terrorist interest in biologicalagents is increasing. However, others assert that technical difficulties would make mass casualtyattacks unlikely. Current policies seek to reduce the proliferation of biological weapons by relying on both domestic and international controls, to increase the number of countermeasures available againstsuch pathogens through research and development activities, to improve the nation's ability to detectpathogen releases, and to increase the ability of hospitals and care providers to treat mass casualties. Policymakers may be called upon to further address potential biological terrorism vulnerabilities, including overseeing the use of atmospheric monitoring equipment for pathogendetection; the direction of continued research and development into biological agent detectors;review of further research into protective equipment, prophylaxis and treatment against high-threatpathogens; and assessment of first responder emergency preparedness. This report will be updatedas events warrant.

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FISA Provisions which are Part of Intelligence Reform or Reorganization Proposals While not all of the intelligence reform or reorganization proposals introduced in the 108thCongress addressed FISA, a number had FISA provisions, including: P.L. 108-458 ( S. 2845 ) . Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,enacted into law December 17, 2004. The President signed the measure into law on December 17, 2004, P.L. 108-458 , entitled theIntelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. § 402 et seq. Section 1071(e) of P.L. Section 6001 of P.L. 108-458 amended Sec. 224 of the USA PATRIOT Act, P.L.107-56 ,including the exception provided in subsection (b) of Sec. § 1801(b)(1)(C)]; (3) the number oftimes that the Attorney General has authorized that information obtained under this act may be usedin a criminal proceeding or any information derived therefrom may be used in a criminal proceeding;(4) a summary of significant legal interpretations of this act involving matters before the ForeignIntelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, includinginterpretations presented in applications or pleadings filed with the Foreign Intelligence SurveillanceCourt or the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review by the Department of Justice; and (5) copies ofall decisions (not including orders) or opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orForeign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that include significant construction orinterpretation of the provisions of this act." H.R. 10 . 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act. For further action, see discussion of P.L.108-458 ( S. 2845 ). 2001 as introduced with a new Sec. H.R. 4104 . H.R. 5040 . 9/11 Commission Report Implementation Act of 2004. 5150 . S. 6 . S. 190 . S. 1520 . 9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act. Section 8(a)(1) of the bill would have directedthe Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of the FBI, to "provide detailed training toappropriate personnel of the FBI, and to appropriate personnel of other elements of the intelligencecommunity, on the availability and utilization of the authorities provided by [FISA] to addressterrorist threats to the United States." S. 2811 . S. 2840 . Senator Pat Roberts' Draft Bill , dated August 23, 2004. 9-11 National Security Protection Act. Other FISA-Related Bills in the 108th Congress The FISA-related measures in the 108th Congress which did not involve intelligence reformor reorganization appear to have been more varied in their focus and approach. These included thefollowing bills: H.R. 1157 . H.R. 2242 . H.R. 2429 . In addition, it would have established certain public reporting requirements withrespect to electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen registers, and business records productionunder FISA. H.R. 2800 . Note that H.R. H.R. 3179 . § 1801(b)(1) to include in the definition of an "agent of a foreign power" anyperson other than a U.S. person who "engages in international terrorism or activities in preparationtherefor." H.R. 3352 . H.R. 3552 . 2 addedadditional reporting requirements: the Attorney General would have been required to report annuallyin April to the House Judiciary Committee, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,Senate Judiciary Committee and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on (1) the aggregatenumber of non-U.S. persons targeted for FISA orders during the previous year, broken down byelectronic surveillance, physical searches, pen registers, or access to records under 50 U.S.C. H.R. 4591 . In the context of electronic surveillance orphysical searches under FISA, Sec. H.Amdt. 652 to H.R. S. 123 . Related bill, S. 113 . S. 410 . S. 436 . S. 578 . Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 108-312. S. 1158 . S. 1507 . S. 1552 . S. 1709 . S. 2528 . S.Amdt. 536 to S. 113 .

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. , (FISA) as passed in1978, provided a statutory framework for the use of electronic surveillance in the context of foreignintelligence gathering. In so doing, Congress sought to strike a delicate balance between nationalsecurity interests and personal privacy rights. Subsequent legislation expanded federal laws dealingwith foreign intelligence gathering to address physical searches, pen registers and trap and tracedevices, and access to certain business records. The Uniting and Strengthening America byProviding Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Actof 2001, P.L. 107-56 , made significant changes to some of these provisions. Further amendmentsto FISA were included in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, P.L. 107-108 , andthe Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296 . In addressing international terrorism orespionage, the same factual situation may be the focus of both criminal investigations and foreignintelligence collection efforts. The changes in FISA under these public laws facilitate informationsharing between law enforcement and intelligence elements. In The 9/11 Commission Report, FinalReport of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (W. W. Norton2004) ( Final Report ), the 9/11 Commission noted that the removal of the pre-9/11 "wall" betweenintelligence and law enforcement "has opened up new opportunities for cooperative action withinthe FBI." In the 108th Congress, a number of intelligence reform bills were introduced, including somewhich pre-dated the release of the Final Report of the 9/11 Commission, while others emerged afterits release. On December 17, 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458 ( S. 2845 ), was signed into law. It included several provisions related toFISA. In addition to P.L. 108-458 , a variety of other bills were introduced with FISA-relatedprovisions. The FISA provisions of some of these measures were part of larger intelligence reform proposals. Still others were more narrowly focused measures that would also have impacted FISAinvestigations in the post-9/11 environment. This report briefly discusses the FISA-related aspectsof these proposals. For purposes of this report, the bills addressed are divided generally into twocategories: intelligence reform or reorganization proposals that have FISA provisions, including P.L.108-458 ( S. 2845 ), H.R. 10 , H.R. 4104 , H.R. 5040 , H.R. 5150 , S. 6 , S. 190 , S. 1520 , S. 2811 , S. 2840 , and Senator Pat Roberts' draft bill; and otherFISA-related bills, including H.R. 1157 , H.R. 2242 , H.R. 2429 , H.R. 2800 , H.R. 3179 , H.R. 3352 , H.R. 3552 , H.R. 4591 , H.Amdt. 652 to H.R. 4574 , S. 113 , S. 123 , S. 410 , S. 436 , S. 578 , S. 1158 , S. 1507 , S. 1552 , S. 1709 , S. 2528 , and S.Amdt. 536 to S. 113 . For a more detaileddiscussion of FISA, see CRS Report RL30465 , The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: AnOverview of the Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions , while a discussion of theamendment in P.L. 108-458 to the FISA definition of "agent of a foreign power may be found in CRS Report RS22011 , Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: "Lone Wolf"Amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act .

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Brief Overview of Essential Features Debt Ceiling Increase and Disapproval Process The Budget Control Act is the result of negotiations between the President and Congress held in response to the federal government having nearly reached its borrowing capacity. The BCA authorized debt limit increases up to at least $2.1 trillion dollars (and up to $2.4 trillion under certain conditions) in three installments. Ultimately, therefore, the support of two-thirds of each chamber might be necessary to prevent a debt limit increase. The BCA therefore also established caps on the amount of money that could be spent through the annual appropriations process for the next 10 years, which the Congressional Budget Office estimates will reduce federal spending by $917 billion. Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction Another part of the BCA agreement to increase the debt ceiling was the creation of a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, instructed to develop legislation to reduce the federal deficit by at least another $1.5 trillion over the 10-year period ending in FY2021. The legislation resulting from the joint committee recommendations can be considered under special procedures that prevent amendment and limit debate in both chambers. These procedures could have a significant impact in the Senate because they allow a simple majority to approve a bill without indefinite delay. Under regular Senate procedures, the support of 60 Senators is often necessary to advance the consideration of legislation. The only procedural consequence of not voting as specified in the BCA is that, if Congress does not approve a constitutional amendment, one of two avenues for increasing the debt ceiling by $1.5 trillion, instead of $1.2 trillion, will not be available. The BCA does not affect procedures for bringing a measure up before the Senate, however. Federal Student Aid Programs The BCA also makes changes to the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program and the Federal Pell Grant program, two of the largest federal student aid programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. 89-329). The BCA amends the HEA by eliminating the availability of Subsidized Stafford Loans to graduate and professional students for periods of instruction beginning on or after July 1, 2012. CBO estimates these changes in the DL program would reduce direct spending by $9.6 billion over the FY2012-FY2016 period and $21.6 billion over the FY2012-FY2021 period. Approximately $17 billion of the $21.6 billion in estimated savings from the changes in the DL program would be directed to the Pell Grant program for future general use. The expedited procedures represent a significant divergence from regular Senate procedures, under which it can generally become necessary to obtain agreement among at least three-fifths of the Senate (normally 60 Senators) in order to bring debate to a close and the chamber to a vote on a matter. The House and Senate can then each initially consider its own bill. Budget Goal Enforcement: Spending Reduction Trigger Section 302 of the Budget Control Act of 2011 establishes an automatic process to reduce spending, beginning in 2013, unless a joint committee bill reducing the deficit by at least $1.2 trillion over the period covering FY2012-FY2021 is enacted by January 15, 2012. The process presumably is intended to encourage agreement on such deficit reduction, either by enacting the joint committee proposal by the deadline at the end of 2011, or possibly by enacting other legislation (through existing congressional procedures) by the beginning of 2013, when the automatic process would begin to make reductions. These additional appropriations would reduce the amount of discretionary appropriations required in FY2012 and FY2013. In the Senate, to get to a direct passage vote on a constitutional amendment, it might be necessary to secure support from 60 Senators to begin consideration of such a proposal.

The Budget Control Act (BCA) is the result of negotiations between the President and Congress held in response to the federal government having nearly reached its borrowing capacity. The BCA authorized increases in the debt limit of at least $2.1 trillion dollars (and up to $2.4 trillion under certain conditions), subject to a disapproval process that would likely require securing the support of two-thirds of each chamber to prevent a debt limit increase. It established caps on the amount of money that could be spent through the annual appropriations process for the next 10 years, which the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates will reduce federal spending by $917 billion. The BCA also created a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction that is instructed to develop a bill to reduce the federal deficit by at least another $1.5 trillion over the 10 year period ending in FY2021. The legislation resulting from the joint committee recommendations can be considered under special procedures that prevent amendment and limit debate in both chambers. These procedures could have a significant impact in the Senate because they allow the bill to advance with simple majority support; under regular Senate procedures it can be necessary to obtain agreement among at least three-fifths of the Senate (normally 60 Senators) to advance consideration of legislation. If a joint committee proposal cutting the deficit by at least $1.2 trillion is not enacted by January 15, 2012, then the BCA established an automatic spending reduction process that includes sequestration (the cancellation of budgetary resources). The process presumably is intended to encourage agreement on deficit reduction, either by enacting the joint committee legislation by early 2012, or possibly by enacting other legislation (presumably through existing congressional procedures) by the beginning of 2013, when the automatic process would make reductions. If the enacted bill cuts the deficit by more than $1.2 trillion, an additional increase in the debt limit becomes available in the amount of the excess, up to $0.3 trillion. The Budget Control Act has two additional elements. First, it directs that the House and Senate must each vote on a proposal to amend the Constitution to require that the budget of the federal government be balanced. The BCA does not alter the procedures for taking up such a measure in the Senate, and therefore the Senate might not be able to vote on passage of a constitutional amendment unless the support of 60 Senators can be secured to begin consideration. The only procedural consequence of not voting specified in the BCA is that, if Congress does not approve a constitutional amendment, the second of two conditions under which the act would permit an additional increase of $0.3 trillion in the debt ceiling, will not be available. Second, the BCA also makes changes to the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program and the Federal Pell Grant program, two federal student aid programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. 89-329). Effective July 1, 2012, the BCA eliminates the availability of Subsidized Stafford Loans to graduate and professional students and eliminates all but one type of repayment incentives on future DL program loans. CBO estimates these changes would reduce direct spending by $21.6 billion over the FY2012-FY2021 period. Approximately $17 billion of the $21.6 billion in estimated savings from the changes in the DL program would be directed to the Pell Grant program for future general use in FY2012 and FY2013.

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Introduction Administrative agencies have long been criticized by some for taking too long to issue and implement regulations. Some delay is necessary for reasoned decisionmaking. Habitual delays can undermine public trust in agency process. Congress has a number of tools that it can use to combat agency delay. To encourage agencies to act in a timely fashion, Congress may set nonbinding time frames or statutory deadlines for particular agency actions, or impose penalties on agencies should they fail to meet those deadlines. Even if Congress does not impose any specific timing requirements for a required agency action, the agency still must act within a "reasonable time" under the APA. In the absence of specific deadlines, most courts employ a multifactor balancing test to determine whether the agency's delay is "unreasonable"; this test examines, among other things, the length of the delay, the importance of the regulation at issue, and the interests harmed by the delay. If the APA's default rule of reasonableness is not enough, Congress may choose to impose more stringent timing requirements on the agency, such as a nonbinding time frame or an explicit statutory deadline. Because congressionally established time frames are one of the factors that courts consider in determining whether to compel an agency to act, courts are generally more likely to compel agency action when a suggested time frame is violated than if no time frame was imposed by Congress. Deadlines are frequently used with respect to environmental regulations and other public health matters. However, an individual can only sue to compel discrete actions that the agency is required to take. However, some courts will dispense with this balancing test when the agency has violated a statutory deadline. Distilling its prior case law, the court enumerated six considerations that form the "contours of a standard" to assess the reasonableness of agency delay: (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a "rule of reason"; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is "unreasonably delayed." Agency Delays in Violation of a Statutory Deadline When Congress imposes an express statutory deadline on the agency and the agency misses that deadline, courts are more receptive to claims to compel the agency to act. . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld," and, quite simply, "'shall' means shall." Congressional Tools to Address Agency Delay Ex Post As discussed above, Congress possesses a variety of means to reduce the likelihood of agency delay and influence the lawsuits under section 706(1) to compel agency action. If troubled by a particular agency's delay, Congress can use its oversight powers to put pressure on the agency to act. Individual Members may send letters to agencies expressing concern about delays that affect their constituents. Perhaps the most potent weapon at Congress's disposal is the power of the purse, which Congress can use either as a carrot or a stick to motivate the agency to act. Alternatively, Congress may threaten to eliminate funding for an agency if it does not take action more quickly.

Agencies are sometimes criticized for taking too long to promulgate regulations and issue decisions. Some amount of time, of course, is necessary for reasoned decisionmaking. However, unjustified delays have significant costs for regulated entities and the public at large. At the extreme, agency delays can undermine public trust in agencies and frustrate the implementation of the regulatory regime created by Congress. Congress has a number of means at its disposal to reduce the likelihood of agency delays in rulemaking. Even if Congress does not impose any specific timing requirements for an agency to act, the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA's) default rule requires that the agency act "within a reasonable time." If Congress wishes to impose more stringent requirements, it can enact nonbinding time frames or hard statutory deadlines for particular agency rulemakings. Finally, if timing is of primary importance, Congress may impose statutory penalties on the agency should it fail to meet deadlines. The particular statutory tools that Congress uses to encourage timely agency action will greatly influence the scope of subsequent judicial review. The APA grants persons affected by agency delay the right to sue to compel certain discrete agency actions. Lawsuits are available only with respect to required agency actions; if Congress has committed the decision to regulate to an agency's discretion, courts will dismiss a suit to compel the agency to act on that matter. For agency actions that are required, courts will compel the agency to engage in rulemaking only if the delay is unreasonable or the action is unlawfully withheld. If Congress has not imposed a time frame or deadline, courts are usually deferential to the agencies and hesitant to compel agency action. Most courts employ a multifactor balancing test in this situation, looking to the length of the delay, the interests harmed by the delay, the agency's other priorities, and any bad faith by the agency. If Congress imposes a nonbinding time frame (i.e., a suggested sense of how long an action should take), that will be considered as an additional factor in the balancing analysis. If Congress imposes a statutory deadline, however, some courts will routinely order the agency to act if it misses the deadline, without the need to balance the various factors. Other courts still use the balancing test, but consider the missed deadline as a factor weighing against the agency. If Congress has imposed a statutory penalty for missing a deadline, lawsuits to compel agency action are usually unnecessary because the penalty spurs the agency to act. Although lawsuits by affected individuals are the primary means to remedy agency delay, Congress may also use its oversight powers to address agency delay after it arises. Members may write letters to agencies on behalf of their constituents. Congressional committees may hold hearings and ask agency directors to account for the delay. Finally, Congress may use its power of the purse as a carrot or a stick to compel agency action, either by granting agencies additional resources to remedy the delay, or by threatening an agency's funding should it not take timely action.

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Overview of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) was passed in 2005. The act generally shields federally licensed manufacturers, dealers, and sellers of firearms or ammunition, as well as trade associations, from any civil action "resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse" of a firearms or ammunition. The act lists six exceptions where civil suits may be maintained but otherwise requires that lawsuits, pending at the time of enactment, brought by shooting victims and municipalities "be immediately dismissed by the court in which the action was brought or is currently pending." Conclusion Many civil lawsuits against federal firearms licensees have been dismissed since the enactment of the PLCAA.

The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA, P.L. 109-92) was passed in 2005. The PLCAA generally shields licensed manufacturers, dealers, and sellers of firearms or ammunition, as well as trade associations, from any civil action "resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse" of a firearm or ammunition, but lists six exceptions where civil suits may be maintained. This act was introduced in response to litigation brought by municipalities and victims of shooting incidents against federally licensed firearms manufacturers and dealers, some of whom were located outside the state where the injuries occurred. Consequently, most lawsuits brought after the enactment of this law have been dismissed notwithstanding the exceptions that would permit a civil suit to proceed against a federal firearms licensee. This report provides an overview of the PLCAA and its exceptions, and discusses recent judicial developments.

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How many Representatives should the House comprise? Moreover, no matter how one specified the ideal population of a congressional district or the number of Representatives in the House, a state's ideal apportionment would, as a practical matter, always be either a fraction, or a whole number and a fraction—say, 14.489326. Thus, another question was whether that state would be apportioned 14 or 15 representatives? The questions of how populous a congressional district should be and how many Representatives should constitute the House have received little attention since the number of Representatives was last increased from 386 to 435 after the 1910 Census. The problem of fractional entitlement to Representatives, however, continued to be troublesome. The issue of fairness could not be perfectly resolved: inevitable fractional entitlements and the requirement that each state have at least one representative lead to inevitable disparities among the states' average congressional district populations. In light of the lengthy debate on apportionment, this report has four major purposes: 1. summarize the constitutional and statutory requirements governing apportionment; 2. explain how the current apportionment formula works in theory and in practice; 3. summarize challenges to it on grounds of inequity; and 4. explain the reasoning underlying the choice of the equal proportions method over its chief alternative, the method of major fractions. There can be no fewer than one Representative per state, and no more than one for every 30,000 persons. Once received by Congress, the Clerk of the House of Representatives is charged with the duty of sending to the governor of each state a "certificate of the number of Representatives to which such state is entitled" within 15 days of receiving notice from the President. First, the U.S. apportionment population is divided by the total number of seats in the House (e.g., 309,183,463 divided by 435, in 2010) to identify the "ideal" sized congressional district (708,377 in 2010). In most cases this will result in a whole number and a fractional remainder, as noted earlier. There are two fundamental problems with using simple rounding for apportionment, given a House of fixed size. First, it is possible that some state populations might be so small that they would be "entitled" to less than half a seat. Thus, this intuitive way to apportion fails because, by definition, it does not take into account the constitutional requirement that every state have at least one seat in the House and the statutory requirement that the House size be fixed at 435. Then each state's apportionment population is divided by the "ideal" district size to determine its number of seats. Next, the seventh seat's allocation is determined. The fact that higher rounding points are necessary for states to obtain additional seats has led to charges that the equal proportions formula favors small states at the expense of large states. This method, called the Webster method in Fair Representation , is also referred to as the major fractions method (major fractions uses the concept of the adjustable divisor as does equal proportions, but rounds at the arithmetic mean [.5] rather than the geometric mean.) For the purpose of this analysis, we will concentrate on the differences between the equal proportions and major fractions methods because the Hamilton-Vinton method is subject to several mathematical anomalies. Apportioning the House can be viewed as a system with four main variables: (1) the size of the House, (2) the population of the states, (3) the number of states, and (4) the method of apportionment. 2010 Priority List for Apportioning Seats to the House of Representatives

On December 21, 2010, the number of seats allocated to each state for the House of Representatives was announced. This allocation likely will determine representation to the House for the next five Congresses. The Constitution requires that states be represented in the House of Representatives in accord with their population. It also requires that each state have at least one Representative, and that there be no more than one Representative for every 30,000 persons. For the 2010 apportionment, this could have meant a House of Representatives as small as 50 or as large as 10,306 Representatives. Apportioning seats in the House of Representatives among the states in proportion to state population as required by the Constitution appears on the surface to be a simple task. In fact, however, the Constitution presented Congress with issues that provoked extended and recurring debate. How many Representatives should the House comprise? How populous should congressional districts be? What is to be done with the practically inevitable fractional entitlement to a House seat that results when the calculations of proportionality are made? How is fairness of apportionment to be best preserved? Apportioning the House can be viewed as a system with four main variables: (1) the size of the House, (2) the population of the states, (3) the number of states, and (4) the method of apportionment. Over the years since the ratification of the Constitution, the number of Representatives has varied, but in 1941 Congress resolved the issue by fixing the size of the House at 435 members. How to apportion those 435 seats, however, continued to be an issue because of disagreement over how to handle fractional entitlements to a House seat in a way that both met constitutional and statutory requirements and minimized inequity. The intuitive method of apportionment is to divide the United States population by 435 to obtain an average number of persons represented by a member of the House. This is sometimes called the ideal size congressional district. Then a state's population is divided by the ideal size to determine the number of Representatives to be allocated to that state. The quotient will be a whole number plus a remainder—say 14.489326. What is Congress to do with the 0.489326 fractional entitlement? Does the state get 14 or 15 seats in the House? Does one discard the fractional entitlement? Does one round up at the arithmetic mean of the two whole numbers? At the geometric mean? At the harmonic mean? Congress has used, or at least considered, several methods over the years. Every method Congress has used or considered has its advantages and disadvantages, and none has been exempt from criticism. Under current law, however, seats are apportioned using the equal proportions method, which is not without its critics. Some charge that the equal proportions method is biased toward small states. They urge Congress to adopt either the major fractions or the Hamilton-Vinton method as more equitable alternatives. A strong mathematical case can be made for either equal proportions or major fractions. Deciding between them is a policy matter based on whether minimizing the differences in district sizes in absolute terms (through major fractions) or proportional terms (through equal proportions) is most preferred by Congress.

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Unlike the other two components of CCS, transportation and geologic storage, the first component of CCS—CO 2 capture—is almost entirely technology-dependent. For CCS to succeed at reducing CO 2 emissions from a significant fraction of large sources in the United States, CO 2 capture technology would need to deployed widely. Widespread commercial deployment would likely depend on the cost of capturing CO 2 . Chapter 1: Executive Summary Background Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is widely seen as a critical technology for limiting atmospheric emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 )—the principal "greenhouse gas" linked to global climate change—from power plants and other large industrial sources. While all three approaches are capable of high CO 2 capture efficiencies (typically about 90%), the major drawbacks of current processes are their high cost and the large energy requirement for operation (which significantly reduces the net plant capacity and contributes to the high cost of capture). Another drawback in terms of their availability for greenhouse gas mitigation is that at present, there are still no applications of CO 2 capture on a coal-fired or gas-fired power plant at full scale (i.e., a scale of several hundred megawatts of plant capacity). Current Research and Development (R&D) Activities To address the current lack of demonstrated capabilities for full-scale CO 2 capture at power plants, a number of large-scale demonstration projects at both coal combustion and gasification-based power plants are planned or underway in the United States and elsewhere. In general, the focus of most current R&D activities is on cost reduction rather than additional gains in the efficiency of CO 2 capture (which can result in cost increases rather than decreases). To address the first question, this report reviews a variety of "technology roadmaps" developed by governmental and private-sector organizations in the United States and elsewhere. All of these roadmaps anticipate that CO 2 capture will be available for commercial deployment at power plants by 2020. A number of roadmaps also project that novel, lower-cost technologies like solid sorbent systems for post-combustion capture will be commercial in the 2020 time frame. Such projections acknowledge, however, that this will require aggressive and sustained efforts to advance promising concepts to commercial reality. In the context of this report, the key insight governing prospects for improved carbon capture technology is that achieving significant cost reductions will require not only a vigorous and sustained level of R&D, but also a substantial level of commercial deployment. Each chapter addresses one of the three main avenues for CO 2 capture—post-combustion, pre-combustion, and oxy-combustion systems. EPRI-supported projects include development and testing of advanced carbon capture technologies. Also discussed in this report are the substantial R&D activities underway in the United States and elsewhere to develop and commercialize improved solvents that can lower the cost of current post-combustion capture processes, as well as research on a variety of potential "breakthrough technologies" such as novel solvents, sorbents, membranes, and oxyfuel systems that hold promise for lower-cost capture systems. Whether for new power plants or existing ones, the key questions are, when will advanced CO 2 capture systems be available for commercial rollout, and how much cheaper will they be compared to current technology? At present such a market does not yet exist. While various types of incentive programs can accelerate the development and deployment of CO 2 capture technology, actions that significantly limit emissions of CO 2 to the atmosphere ultimately are needed to realize substantial and sustained reductions in the future cost of CO 2 capture.

Carbon capture and sequestration (or carbon capture and storage, CCS) is widely seen as a critical strategy for limiting atmospheric emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2)—the principal "greenhouse gas" linked to global climate change—from power plants and other large industrial sources. This report focuses on the first component of a CCS system, the CO2 capture process. Unlike the other two components of CCS, transportation and geologic storage, the CO2 capture component of CCS is heavily technology-dependent. For CCS to succeed at reducing CO2 emissions from a significant fraction of large sources in the United States, CO2 capture technologies would need to be deployed widely. Widespread commercial deployment would likely depend, in part, on the cost of the technology deployed to capture CO2. This report assesses prospects for improved, lower-cost technologies for each of the three current approaches to CO2 capture: post-combustion capture; pre-combustion capture; and oxy-combustion capture. While all three approaches are capable of high CO2 capture efficiencies (typically about 90%), the major drawbacks of current processes are their high cost and the large energy requirements for operation. Another drawback in terms of their availability for greenhouse gas mitigation is that at present, there are still no full-scale applications of CO2 capture on a coal-fired or gas-fired power plant (i.e., a scale of several hundred megawatts of plant capacity). To address the current lack of demonstrated capabilities for full-scale CO2 capture at power plants, a number of large-scale demonstration projects at both coal combustion and gasification-based power plants are planned or underway in the United States and elsewhere. Substantial research and development (R&D) activities are also underway in the United States and elsewhere to develop and commercialize lower-cost capture systems with smaller energy penalties. Current R&D activities include development and testing of new or improved solvents that can lower the cost of current post-combustion and pre-combustion capture, as well as research on a variety of potential "breakthrough technologies" such as novel solvents, sorbents, membranes, and oxyfuel systems that hold promise for even lower-cost capture systems. In general, the focus of most current R&D activities is on cost reduction rather than additional gains in the efficiency of CO2 capture (which can result in cost increases rather than decreases). Key questions regarding the outcomes from these R&D efforts are when advanced CO2 capture systems would be available for commercial rollout, and how much cheaper they would be compared to current technology. "Technology roadmaps" developed by governmental and private-sector organizations in the United States and elsewhere anticipate that CO2 capture will be available for commercial deployment at power plants by 2020. A number of roadmaps also project that some novel, lower-cost technologies would be commercial in the 2020 time frame. Such projections acknowledge, however, that this would require aggressive and sustained efforts to advance promising concepts to commercial reality. Achieving significant cost reductions would likely require not only a vigorous and sustained level of R&D, but also a significant market for CO2 capture technologies to generate a substantial level of commercial deployment. At present such a market does not exist. While various types of incentive programs can accelerate the development and deployment of CO2 capture technology, actions that significantly limit emissions of CO2 to the atmosphere ultimately would be needed to realize substantial and sustained reductions in the future cost of CO2 capture.

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Some policymakers have concluded that the energy challenges facing the United States are so critical that a concentrated investment in energy research and development (R&D) should be undertaken. The Manhattan project, which produced the atomic bomb, and the Apollo program, which landed American men on the moon, have been cited as examples of the success such R&D investments can yield. Investment in federal energy technology R&D programs of the 1970s, in response to two energy crises, have generally been viewed as less successful than the earlier two efforts. This report compares and contrasts the goals of, and the investments in, the three initiatives, which may provide useful insights for Congress as it assesses and debates the nation's energy policy. Comparative Analysis of the Manhattan Project, the Apollo Program, and Federal Energy Technology R&D A general understanding of driving forces of and funding histories for the Manhattan project and Apollo program, and a comparison of these two initiatives to Department of Energy (DOE) energy technology R&D programs, may provide useful insights for Congress as it assesses and determines the nation's energy R&D policy. Four criteria that might be used to compare these programs are funding, perception of threat, goal clarity, and technology customer. From an overall economy standpoint, the percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) spent on DOE energy technology R&D in the peak funding year was one-fourth that spent on either the Manhattan project or the Apollo program. In terms of federal outlays, energy technology R&D funding would need to increase from 0.5% to 1% (Manhattan project) or 2.2 % (Apollo program) of federal outlays. For the Manhattan project, the response to the threat of enemy development of a nuclear bomb was the goal to construct a bomb; for the Apollo program, the threat of Soviet space dominance was translated into a specific goal of landing on the moon. For energy, however, the response to the problems of insecure oil sources and high prices has resulted in multiple, sometimes conflicting goals. Both the Manhattan project and the Apollo program goals pointed to technologies primarily for governmental use with little concern about their environmental impact; for energy, in contrast, the hoped for outcome depends on commercial viability and mitigation of the environmental impacts of the energy technologies developed. Although the Manhattan project and the Apollo program may provide some useful analogies for funding, these differences may limit their utility regarding energy policy. Rather, energy technology R&D has been driven by at least three not always commensurate goals—resource and technological diversity, commercial viability, and environmental protection—which were not goals of the historical programs.

Some policymakers have concluded that the energy challenges facing the United States are so critical that a concentrated investment in energy research and development (R&D) should be undertaken. The Manhattan project, which produced the atomic bomb, and the Apollo program, which landed American men on the moon, have been cited as examples of the success such R&D investments can yield. Investment in federal energy technology R&D programs of the 1970s, in response to two energy crises, have generally been viewed as less successful than the earlier two efforts. This report compares and contrasts the three initiatives. In 2008 dollars, the cumulative cost of the Manhattan project over 5 fiscal years was approximately $22 billion; of the Apollo program over 14 fiscal years, approximately $98 billion; of post-oil shock energy R&D efforts over 35 fiscal years, $118 billion. A measure of the nation's commitments to the programs is their relative shares of the federal outlays during the years of peak funding: for the Manhattan program, the peak year funding was 1% of federal outlays; for the Apollo program, 2.2%; and for energy technology R&D programs, 0.5%. Another measure of the commitment is their relative shares of the nation's gross domestic product (GDP) during the peak years of funding: for the Manhattan project and the Apollo program, the peak year funding reached 0.4% of GDP, and for the energy technology R&D programs, 0.1%. Besides funding, several criteria might be used to compare these three initiatives including perception of the program or threat, goal clarity, and the customer of the technology being developed. By these criteria, while the Manhattan project and the Apollo program may provide some useful analogies for thinking about an energy technology R&D initiative, there are fundamental differences between the forces that drove these historical R&D success stories and the forces driving energy technology R&D today. Critical differences include (1) the ability to transform the program or threat into a concrete goal, and (2) the use to which the technology would be put. On the issue of goal setting, for the Manhattan project, the response to the threat of enemy development of a nuclear bomb was the goal to construct a bomb; for the Apollo program, the threat of Soviet space dominance was translated into a specific goal of landing on the moon. For energy, the response to the problems of insecure oil sources and high prices has resulted in multiple, sometimes conflicting, goals. Regarding use, both the Manhattan project and the Apollo program goals pointed to technologies primarily for governmental use with little concern about their environmental impact; for energy, in contrast, the hoped-for outcome depends on commercial viability and mitigation of environmental impacts from energy use. Although the Manhattan project and the Apollo program may provide some useful analogies for funding, these differences may limit their utility regarding energy policy. Rather, energy technology R&D has been driven by at least three not always commensurate goals—resource and technological diversity, commercial viability, and environmental protection—which were not goals of the historical programs.

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The backlog of SAKs has raised concerns over justice for assault victims and that additional victimizations could have been prevented had the evidence from any given kit been tested and the perpetrator apprehended in a timely manner. Upon completion of forensic medical exams, kits are transferred to law enforcement, who log the kits into evidence. Procedure and protocol regarding when and where kits are sent, however, vary across jurisdictions. Some law enforcement agencies automatically send the kits to forensic laboratories for testing while others wait for varying amounts of time, in some cases depending on when/if a police officer or prosecutor requests forensic analysis. It may be used to establish elements of a crime including the time at which an alleged attack occurred. Evidence may also be stored in DNA databases for use in other cases. When people refer to a "rape kit backlog," they are referring either to untested kits that reside with law enforcement having never been submitted to a laboratory for testing, or to untested kits that have been submitted to crime labs but are delayed for testing for longer than 30 days. Some research organizations state that the problem more typically resides with those kits that were submitted to a crime laboratory but remain untested; however, the definition of backlog appears to vary across jurisdictions. While the status and location of the kits vary, the binding element of the backlogged kits is that they have never been tested. Rape kits remain untested for several reasons including limited resources of laboratories and law enforcement as well as police discretion. Due to Police Discretion Police may opt not to pursue a forensic investigation due to a variety of reasons including perception of victim cooperation or consideration that the results of the kit would not be pertinent to the overall investigation. Federal Support to Reduce Rape Kit Backlogs In recent years, the federal government has addressed the SAK backlog by providing financial support, conducting or funding research to address the backlog, and testing a limited number of SAKs from local law enforcement agencies that had not been submitted previously. 113-4 ) which, among other things, included new provisions to address the SAK backlog in states. In addition, VAWA 2013 incorporated the Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence Reporting Act of 2013. Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence Reporting Act of 2013 Congress amended the authorizing legislation for the Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program by passing the Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence Reporting Act of 2013 (the SAFER Act of 2013, Title X of P.L. The SAFER Act added two new purposes for which Debbie Smith grants can be used: (1) to conduct an audit of the samples of sexual assault evidence in the possession of a state or unit of local government that are awaiting testing, and (2) to ensure that the collection and processing of DNA evidence by law enforcement is carried out in a timely manner and in accordance with the protocols and practices the FBI is required to develop under the act. Going Forward Congress may wish to assess the SAK backlog and debate if the federal response should be changed as the issue evolves and agencies, including NIJ, capture the breadth of the problem. For example, Congress may design preventative measures in attempting to prevent future backlogs. This may be done through grants to states and local entities by funding preventative measures and/or conditioning grants on the requirement that states and local governments establish a set time in which SAKs must be tested. Congress may also wish to request research on the impact of the backlog reduction and determine how efforts to address the issue have affected crime victims.

Sexual assault kits (SAKs, also referred to as "rape kits") are used by medical professionals to collect evidence during a forensic medical exam of a sexual assault victim in order to establish elements of a crime. Generally, upon completion of the medical exam the kit is transferred to an authorized law enforcement agency that logs the kit into evidence. Procedure and protocol regarding when and where kits are sent, however, vary across jurisdictions. Some law enforcement agencies automatically send the kits to forensic laboratories for testing while others wait for varying amounts of time; in some cases depending on when/if a police officer or prosecutor requests forensic analysis of the kits. Evidence from these kits may help identify, convict, or exonerate an offender. Evidence may also be stored in DNA databases for use in other cases. When people refer to a "rape kit backlog," they are referring to untested kits that either reside with law enforcement having never been submitted to a laboratory for testing, or referring to untested kits that have been submitted to crime labs but are delayed for testing for longer than 30 days. Some research organizations state that the problem more typically resides with those kits that were submitted to a crime laboratory but remain untested; however, the definition of backlog appears to vary across jurisdictions. While the status and location of the kits vary, the binding element of the backlogged kits is that they have never been tested. The backlog of SAKs has raised concerns over justice for assault victims and that evidence in untested kits could be used to prevent suspects from victimizing others. SAKs may remain untested for reasons such as limited resources of laboratories and law enforcement and police discretion. Police may opt not to pursue a forensic investigation for a variety of reasons including perception of victim cooperation or a decision that the results of the kit would not be pertinent to the overall investigation. In recent years, the federal government has addressed the SAK backlog by providing financial support, conducting or funding research to address the backlog, and testing a limited number of SAKs from local law enforcement agencies that had not been submitted previously. Congress has passed legislation that addresses aspects of the SAK backlog. In February 2013, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA 2013; P.L. 113-4) which, among other things, included new provisions to address the backlog in the states. VAWA 2013 incorporated the Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence Reporting Act of 2013 (SAFER Act). The SAFER Act added two new purposes for which authorizing legislation for the Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program funds can be used: (1) to conduct an audit of the samples of sexual assault evidence in the possession of a state or unit of local government that are awaiting testing and (2) to ensure that the collection and processing of DNA evidence by law enforcement is carried out in a timely manner and in accordance with the protocols and practices the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is required to develop under the act. Congress may wish to assess the SAK backlog and debate if the federal response should be changed as the issue evolves and agencies, including the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), capture the breadth of the problem. For example, Congress may design preventative measures in attempting to prevent future backlogs. This may be done through grants to states and local entities by funding preventative measures and/or conditioning grants on the requirement that states and local governments establish a set time in which SAKs must be tested. Congress may also wish to request research on the impact of the backlog reduction and determine how efforts to address the issue have affected crime victims.

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Discretionary Funds for FY2011 The 112 th Congress is currently discussing how to fund the federal government's discretionary programs for the remainder of FY2011, which began on October 1, 2010. The current CR provides funding until April 15, 2011. If further funding were not provided, much of the federal government would be shut down. 1473 , a compromise reached just before the expiration on April 8 of the sixth CR ( P.L. The last part of this report summarizes long-term trends in federal spending and presents projections of FY2011 and FY2012 federal spending in terms of outlays. 112-8 ; H.R. 1473 , the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, is expected to be considered this week. Comparisons of Spending Levels Much of the discussion has focused on comparing proposed funding levels with the FY2010 enacted level, the President's FY2011 budget request, and H.R. 1 , the funding level approved by the House on February 19, 2011, which was intended to return spending levels for most agencies other than the Defense Department and other security-related agencies to FY2008 levels. All other agencies are non-security. There has been little debate about the Administration's proposed funding levels for the Afghan and Iraq wars, which is treated separately. 1 , as passed by the House on February 19, 2011, but which failed in the Senate on March 9, 2011, proposed a total of $1.026 trillion, below the FY2010 enacted level and substantially below the President's FY2011 budget request. 1473 , being considered this week, proposes a level of $1.050 trillion, an overall total below the FY2010 enacted level but above the level proposed in H.R. 1473 is $66.5 billion below FY2010 enacted levels including a decrease of $42.0 billion for non-security agencies and a $1.3 billion increase for security agencies. Compared to the FY2011 request, H.R. H.R. 1473 funding is $28.8 billion or 2% higher than H.R. While the funds within the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee's jurisdiction would receive funding below the President's FY2011 request in all of the proposals, both H.R. 1473 and about $7 billion in the case of H.R. 1473 would be $2 billion below FY2010 enacted levels. H.R. 1473 includes $17.5 billion in reductions in mandatory programs. A new CBO estimate suggests that these reductions in mandatory programs would have relatively little effect on outlays.

The 112th Congress is considering H.R. 1473, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, which would fund the federal government's discretionary programs for the remainder of FY2011, which began on October 1, 2010. H.R. 1473 represents a last-minute compromise reached on April 8, the eve of the expiration of the sixth short-term continuing resolution (CR) enacted to date. The current CR (H.R. 1373/P.L. 112-8) provides funding until April 15, 2011. If further funding is not provided, much of the federal government would be shut down. The difficulty in reaching agreement on funding levels for the current fiscal year reflects a larger debate about how to restrain federal spending in the face of large deficits this year and in years to come. Much of the debate has focused on how various proposed funding levels compare to the FY2010 enacted level and President Obama's FY2011 budget request. H.R. 1473 proposes a total federal spending level of $1.21 trillion, or $66.5 billion below the FY2010 enacted level and $78.5 billion below the President's request. All of the proposed funding levels include $159 billion in emergency spending for the Afghan and Iraq wars as proposed by the President. While funding levels for the Defense Department and other security-related agencies (defined here as Defense, Military Construction/Veterans' Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security) have been reduced below the President's request in H.R. 1473, those levels are slightly above FY2010 enacted levels. Most of the debate about reducing spending has focused on discretionary spending for all other non-security areas ranging from Agriculture and Commerce to Transportation and Housing. For all non-security agencies, H.R. 1473 proposes a funding level of $421.7 billion—$42.0 billion or 4% below the FY2010 enacted level and $56.1 billion or 7% below the President's request. H.R. 1473 proposes a funding level of $23.8 billion or 2% above H.R. 1, which was passed by the House on February 19, 2011, and intended to return non-security spending to FY2008 levels. These comparisons are not precise because the $42 billion decrease relative to FY2010 enacted includes $17 billion in decreases to mandatory programs. A new CBO estimate suggests that H.R. 1473 reduces cumulative outlays by about $20 billion to $25 billion, largely because many of the changes to mandatory programs would have little effect on outlays. This report will be updated as necessary.

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Background on the Programs The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is responsible for inspecting most meat, poultry, and processed egg products for safety, wholesomeness, and proper labeling. Federal inspectors or their state counterparts are present at all times in virtually all slaughter plants and for at least part of each day in establishments that further process meat and poultry products. Several significant changes in meat and poultry inspection programs were included in the 2008 farm bill ( P.L. 110-246 ), signed into law in June 2008. These include permitting certain state-inspected meat and poultry products to enter interstate commerce, just like USDA-inspected products; bringing catfish under mandatory USDA inspection; requiring an inspected establishment to notify USDA if it believes that an adulterated or misbranded product has entered commerce; and requiring establishments to prepare and maintain written recall plans. For FY2010, FSIS received an annual appropriation of approximately $1 billion. Although significant declines in the incidence of certain pathogens have occurred since establishment of FoodNet, these all occurred before 2004. Nonetheless, large recent recalls of meat and poultry products, often due to microbiological contamination, have brought closer attention to USDA's and industry's record in detecting harmful pathogens and preventing them from reaching consumers and making them sick. Development of HACCP In the early 1990s, following years of debate over how to respond to mounting evidence that invisible, microbiological contamination on meat and poultry posed greater public health risks than visible defects (the focus of traditional inspection methods), FSIS began to add testing for pathogenic bacteria on various species and products to its inspection system. In 1995, under existing statutes, FSIS published a proposed rule to systematize these changes in a mandatory program called the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) system. FDA, which oversees pepper and other spices, has been coordinating with FSIS regarding the recall. Risk-Based Inspection System Congress in 2007 ordered a halt to FSIS's work on what the agency was calling a more robust "risk-based inspection system" (RBIS), aimed at enabling the agency to rebalance existing inspection resources. More specifically, the initiative was to enable FSIS to shift some processing inspection resources from lower-risk products and plants to relatively higher-risk products (for example, ground poultry), and to plants with relatively poor safety records. This prohibition is continued under the FY2010 appropriations measure ( P.L. In Congress Provisions of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 ( H.R. Mandatory recall provisions have been incorporated into food safety legislation ( H.R. 1018 would have prohibited the establishment of a mandatory ID system. (FSIS has been authorized since 1919 to charge user fees for holiday and overtime inspections, and does so). More specifically, Section 743 of the final measure states that funds cannot be used to implement the rule unless the Secretary of Agriculture formally notifies Congress that China will not receive any preferential consideration of any application to export poultry or poultry products to the United States; the Secretary will conduct audits of inspection systems and on-site reviews of slaughter and processing facilities, laboratories, and other control operations before any Chinese facilities are certified to ship products to the United States, and subsequently such audits and reviews will be conducted at least annually (or more frequently if the Secretary determines it necessary); there will be a "significantly increased level" of reinspections at U.S. ports of entry; and a "formal and expeditious" information sharing program will be established with other countries importing Chinese processed poultry products that have conducted audits and plant inspections. Mechanically separated meat may not be used for human food.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) must inspect most meat, poultry, and processed egg products for safety, wholesomeness, and labeling. Federal inspectors or their state counterparts are present at all times in virtually all slaughter plants and for at least part of each day in establishments that further process meat and poultry products. Debate has ensued for decades over whether this system, first designed in the early 1900s, has kept pace with changes in the food production and marketing industries. Several significant changes in meat and poultry inspection programs were included in the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246), signed into law in June 2008. These include permitting certain state-inspected meat and poultry products to enter interstate commerce, just like USDA-inspected products; bringing catfish under mandatory USDA inspection; requiring an inspected establishment to notify USDA if it believes that an adulterated or misbranded product has entered commerce; and requiring establishments to prepare and maintain written recall plans. USDA's implementation of these provisions is an oversight item for the 111th Congress. Other recent inspection issues could receive continued attention in the 111th Congress, which currently appears to be focused on broader legislation to reform food safety programs—notably those of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which oversees all foods other than meat and poultry. Issues relevant to FSIS programs include the following. Is enough being done to address longstanding concerns about naturally occurring microbiological contamination? In 1996, FSIS added a sweeping new system known as Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)—essentially plant-specific contamination prevention plans—on top of the traditional "sight-, smell-, and touch-based" inspection system. However, recalls due to pathogen problems continue to occur, and the significant rates of decline in the incidence of some major foodborne pathogens have not been sustained in recent years, according to government data. Past proposals to delineate pathogen performance standards and/or safe tolerance levels could again be offered. Should USDA have authority to mandate recalls of meat and poultry products, as advocates have requested? FSIS now relies on the establishments to recall adulterated products but asserts that this approach, along with other enforcement tools, is sufficient to protect consumers. Those wanting mandatory recall authority also contend that an improved ability to trace animals, meat, and poultry products should be built into the system to make recalls more effective. Does FSIS have adequate funding and resources, and/or should industry pay more for inspection? FSIS inspection is mainly funded through USDA's annual appropriation, with some user fees authorized to cover plant overtime and holiday inspection costs. Congress has denied successive Administrations' proposals for additional user fees. Congress also has used annual appropriations measures to direct FSIS's administration of its programs. Examples include prohibiting implementation of a rule that would allow imports of some Chinese poultry products; prohibiting the use of funds to inspect horses to be used for food for humans; and slowing the agency's implementation of a controversial "risk based inspection system" (RBIS, now being retooled as the "Public Health Based Inspection System") aimed at shifting some existing FSIS resources from processing plants and products that pose relatively lower safety risks to others posing relatively higher risks.

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2499 , introduced by Representative Pedro Pierluisi, would have established procedures to determine Puerto Rico's political status. It would have authorized a two-stage plebiscite in Puerto Rico to reconsider the status issue. H.R. 2499 was similar to H.R. 900 as introduced in the 110 th Congress. A possible outcome of this process is Puerto Rican statehood. 2499 , then Puerto Rico would, most likely, be entitled to five Representatives in the House of Representatives as well as two United States Senators. Puerto Rican Statehood Apportionment Options If Puerto Rico were admitted to statehood between censuses, Congress would have at least three options for handling the five Representatives the new state would be entitled to under the current apportionment formula using the 2010 apportionment figures: (1) subtract seats from states that would have lost them if Puerto Rico had been admitted before the previous census; (2) temporarily increase the size of the House until the next census; or (3) permanently increase the size of the House. Similarly, New York and Ohio will each lose two seats relative to their current allocation, regardless of the status of Puerto Rico. Increasing the Size of the House and the Tradition of a 435-Seat House The strong 20 th century tradition that the total number of Representatives in the House of Representatives should total 435 Members might prevent an increase in the House size should Puerto Rico be admitted to statehood.

For years, the people of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have been involved in discussions relating to changing the political status of Puerto Rico from a commonwealth of the United States to either the 51st state or an independent nation, or maintaining the status quo as a commonwealth. In the 111th Congress, H.R. 2499, introduced by Representative Pedro Pierluisi, would have established procedures to determine Puerto Rico's political status. It would have authorized a two-stage plebiscite in Puerto Rico to reconsider the status issue. H.R. 2499 was similar to H.R. 900 as introduced in the 110th Congress. A possible outcome of this process is Puerto Rican statehood. Proposals to change Puerto Rico's governmental relationship with the United States from a commonwealth to some other model raise many political, social, and economic issues. This report focuses exclusively on what impact adding a new state that is more populous than 22 of the existing 50 states would have on representation in the House of Representatives. Statehood for Puerto Rico would likely cause Congress to explore whether the current limit of 435 seats in the House of Representatives should be changed. If Puerto Rico had been a state when the 2010 census was taken, it would have been entitled to five Representatives based on its 2010 census population of 3.7 million residents. If the House were faced with the addition of five new Representatives, it could accommodate them either by expanding the size of the House or adhering to the current 435-seat statutory limit, which would reduce the number of Representatives in other states.

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CRP General Background The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is the federal government's largest land retirement program for private land. The program is administered by USDA's Farm Services Agency (FSA), with technical assistance from USDA's Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and funding from USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). This was the first general sign-up since 2006. Over half the acreage enrolled was set to expire on September 30, 2010. A new general sign-up (number 41) was announced for March 14, 2011, through April 15, 2011. Approximately 84% of CRP acreage (26.2 million of 31.2 million acres) is currently enrolled through general sign-ups. For general sign-up number 39, nearly 4.8 million acres were offered by farmers for sign-up, of which 4 million were finally enrolled. For the previous general sign-up (number 33), which ran from March 27 to April 28, 2006, USDA selected 1 million acres of the 1.4 million acres offered. The 2008 continuous sign-up (number 36) added 282,000 acres, the continuous sign-up for FY2009 (number 37) added 277,556 acres as of July 2009, and the FY2010 sign-up (number 38) has enrolled 607,000 acres as of March 2011. These sign-ups bring the total acreage under continuous sign-up contracts to over 5 million acres as of March 2011, 16% of the total 31.2 million CRP acres. Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) CREP is a joint federal-state continuous sign-up program. The 2008 farm bill expanded land eligibility for the FWP from land that was cropped during at least 3 of the immediately preceding 10 crop years, as well as contiguous buffer acreage to protect the wetlands, to include: land on which constructed wetland is to be developed that will receive flow from a row-crop agriculture drainage system and is designed to provide nitrogen removal in addition to other wetland functions; land devoted to commercial pond-raised aquaculture in any year during calendar years 2002-2007; intermittently flooded land, provided the land had a cropping history in three years between 1990 and 2002 and was subject to natural overflow of prairie wetland; and buffer acreage that enhances wildlife benefits. 110-246 ) reauthorized the CRP with a maximum acreage cap of 32 million acres, down from a cap of 39.2 million acres established in the 2002 farm bill ( P.L. The 2008 farm bill also modified the criteria for evaluating CRP contract applications. FSA published the draft supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) in February 2010. The final SEIS was available for public comment for a 30-day period beginning June 18, 2010, and ending July 19, 2010. A second rule was published September 28, 2010, implementing other CRP provisions of the farm bill. A final rule has not been published, but is expected in mid-2011. Following a review of the comments by FSA, a record of decision (ROD) for the CRP SEIS will be issued. On May 14, 2010, an interim rule was published in the Federal Register to implement the Transition Incentives Program. The rule essentially amends the CRP contract regulations to provide that retired or retiring farm owners and operators have permission to amend their contract if it is due to expire within one year to facilitate the transition of the land enrolled in the expiring CRP contract to a beginning or socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher. Expiring CRP Contracts and Reenrollment and Extension Policy Approximately 28 million acres under CRP contract expired between 2007 and 2010. Contracts covering 5.9 million acres were set to expire in FY2008, and 3.9 million more acres were set to expire at the end of FY2009. An additional 4.4 million acres also expired September 30, 2010. For contracts expiring September 30, 2010, about 75% of the 4.4 million acres has been reenrolled or had contracts extended. FSA estimates approximately $1.85 billion in projected outlays for CRP payments under all programs in FY2011. This is about the same as for FY2010. This projected total includes funding for rental payments, cost-share payments, and incentive payments. Rental Rates for CRP Acreage The average rental rate for all CRP land was slightly over $55 per acre as of March 2011.

The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), enacted in the 1985 farm bill, provides payments to farmers to take highly erodible or environmentally sensitive cropland out of production for 10 years or more. It is the federal government's largest private land retirement program. The program is administered by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), with technical assistance provided by USDA's Natural Resources Conservation Service. The CRP also has several subprograms, the best-known of which is the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP). The 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246) reauthorized CRP through FY2012, but reduced the maximum acreage level to 32 million acres, down from the previous cap of 39.2 million acres. Criteria for haying and grazing on CRP land were amended, and incentives were authorized to assist socially disadvantaged and beginning farmers in leasing or purchasing land under a CRP contract. A draft supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) on the 2008 farm bill changes to CRP was completed in February 2010. On May 14, 2010, an interim rule was published in the Federal Register to implement the Transition Incentives Program. On September 27, 2010, another interim rule was published implementing other provisions of the 2008 farm bill. The final SEIS was available for public comment for a 30-day period beginning June 18, 2010. A final rule is expected by mid-year 2011. Following a review of the comments by FSA, a record of decision (ROD) for the CRP SEIS will be issued. The national enrollment as of March 2011 stood at 31.2 million acres. Approximately 4 million acres of farmland was added through a general sign-up (number 39) in summer 2010, nearly 57% of which was acreage under contracts set to expire September 30, 2010. This was the first general sign-up since 2006. Approximately 84% of total CRP acreage is currently enrolled under general sign-ups. A new general sign-up (number 41) began March 14, 2011, and ended April 15, 2011. There was also a continuous enrollment sign-up during late spring and summer 2009 (number 37) that added 488,000 acres to CRP totals. Continuous sign-up 38 began in October 2009 and will continue to October 2011. That sign-up has added 607,454 acres as of March 2011. Continuous sign-up 40 for FY2011 added 30,690 acres in March 2011 and now totals 120,295 acres. Total continuous sign-up acreage is over 5 million acres as of March 2011. For FY2011, total CRP rental outlays are estimated at $1.85 billion, approximately the same as for FY2010. This projected total includes funding for rental payments, cost-share payments, and incentive payments. The average per-acre rental payment for general sign-ups is currently $45.87, and the average rental rate for CREP is nearly $129.93 per acre. The average rental payment for all CRP programs is $55.09 per acre. Between 2007 and 2010, 27.8 million acres under CRP contracts expired. Contracts for approximately 24 million (86%) of these acres have been renewed or extended. On September 30, 2009, contracts on approximately 3.9 million acres were set to expire. USDA announced a sign-up for contract extensions that ran from May 18 to June 30, 2009. Of the expiring 3.9 million acres, however, only about 1.5 million were offered extension contracts. About 55% of the eligible expiring acreage was in four states: Colorado, Kansas, Montana, and Texas. As of December 2009, participants holding contracts on 1.1 million acres originally set to expire September 30, 2009, had accepted extension offers (73%). Contracts on an additional 4.4 million acres expired September 30, 2010. Approximately 75% of that expiring acreage has been reenrolled or had its contracts extended. On September 2011, 4.4 million acres will expire.

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Background The purpose of this report is to provide data on the size and composition of USPS's workforce between FY1995 and FY2014. Reforms to the size and composition of the workforce have been an integral part of USPS's strategy to reduce costs and regain financial solvency, particularly after the onset of substantial revenue losses in FY2007. USPS Workforce Size and Composition Workforce Size Between FY1995 and FY2014, the size of USPS's workforce decreased 29.4%, from 874,972 employees to 617,877 employees ( Table 2 ). Employment Trends: Career and Non-Career Employees USPS categorizes its workforce into two types of employees: career and non-career. Career employees serve in permanent positions on a full-time or part-time basis and typically receive full federal benefits. Non-career employees, in contrast, serve in time-limited or otherwise temporary positions on a full-time or part-time basis. Of these categories, 10 had fewer employees in FY2014 than in FY1995. USPS stated the increase in the number of headquarters employees is primarily attributable to the agency's efforts to centralize certain local, district, and area functions at the headquarters level. Since FY2011, USPS has established three new non-career employee categories: Postal Support Employees (PSEs), City Carrier Assistants (CCAs), and Mail Handler Assistants (MHAs). Efforts to Reduce the Size and Cost of the Workforce Between FY2007 and FY2014 In recent years, the USPS has experienced significant financial challenges. As USPS's finances have deteriorated, its ability to absorb operating losses has diminished. One strategy has been to reduce the size and cost of the USPS workforce, as personnel costs comprise the majority of USPS's expenses. Attrition and Separation Incentives USPS has reduced its workforce size through voluntary attrition and separation incentives to retire or resign. Between FY2010 and FY2014, 55,473 employees accepted a separation incentive ( Table 3 ). On January 9, 2015, however, USPS implemented a reduction in force for 249 postmasters who did not accept a separation incentive offered in FY2014. Increased Use of Non-Career Employees USPS has also increased its use of non-career employees in an effort to contain costs. The number of non-career employees increased by 28.1% between FY2007 and FY2014, from 101,167 to 129,577. Employees in these three positions can often perform the full range of duties undertaken by their career counterparts, but at lower wages. USPS's use of certain non-career employees is governed by postal labor union contracts, which limit the number of non-career employees that can comprise the total USPS workforce. The 2011-2016 contract, however, raised the limit to 15% of the total number of career carriers in a district.

This report provides data from the past 20 years on the size and composition of the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS's) workforce. Reforms to the size and composition of the workforce have been an integral part of USPS's strategy to reduce costs and regain financial solvency, particularly between FY2007 and FY2014. Since 2007, USPS has experienced significant revenue losses that have affected its ability to manage its expenses. Personnel costs are one of the primary drivers of USPS's operating expenses. As such, USPS has employed strategies to reform the size and composition of its workforce in an effort to cut personnel costs, primarily through attrition and separation incentives and increased use of lower-cost employees. These strategies reduced personnel expenses between FY2013 and FY2014. The sustainability of these reduced expenses and their overall impact on USPS's ability to regain financial solvency, however, is unclear. The size of the USPS workforce has declined in the past 20 years. The number of employees has dropped by 257,095 (29.4%) in the past 20 years, from 874,972 in FY1995 to 617,877 in FY2014. USPS, however, had 163 more employees at the end of FY2014 than it did at the end of FY2013. Declines in workforce size between FY2010 and FY2014 were driven, in part, by USPS's efforts to reduce its workforce size through attrition and separation incentives. Between FY2010 and FY2014, 55,473 career employees accepted a separation incentive to retire or resign early. On January 9, 2015, USPS instituted a reduction in force for 249 postmasters who did not accept a separation incentive offered in 2014. The composition of USPS's workforce has also changed over the past two decades. USPS categorizes its workforce into two types of employees: career and non-career. Career employees serve in permanent positions on a full-time or part-time basis and typically receive full federal benefits. Non-career employees serve in time-limited or otherwise temporary positions and can often perform the full range of duties of career counterparts at lower wage rates, which might lower personnel costs. USPS has increased the number of non-career employees in an effort to reduce personnel costs, particularly since FY2011. Between FY2011 and FY2014, the number of non-career employees increased by 46.1%, from 88,699 to 129,577 employees. The influx in non-career employees since FY2011 is primarily attributable to the establishment of three new non-career positions: postal support employees, city carrier assistants, and mail handler assistants. Labor union contracts governing these positions, which went into effect in 2011 and 2013, effectively raised the total number of non-career employees that can comprise the USPS workforce. Career employees, however, continued to comprise the majority of the total workforce in FY2014 (79%). This report will be updated as events warrant.

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U.S. Foreign, Security, and Trade Policy in a New Era [author name scrubbed], Specialist in International Relations ([phone number scrubbed]) [author name scrubbed], Specialist in National Defense ([phone number scrubbed]) In 2003, the 108th Congress is expected to face early challenges in foreign, defense and trade policy. Congress may beasked to provide funding for a range of foreign assistance programs that would facilitate U.S.long-range objectives in Iraq. If the AgreedFramework with North Korea fails, North Korea may resume missile testing. HIV/AIDS. The 108th Congress may be faced with the issue of which should have a higher priority - proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or terrorism (leaving aside other issues that couldtrigger sanctions, such as democracy or human rights) - and shape U.S. law to address that exigency. Stability in the Balkans. Russia and U.S.-Russia Relations. The 108th Congress also faces a set of interrelated trade issues: permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) and WTO accession for Russia, application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Russia,the potential for increased U.S.-Russian energy cooperation, and tension over U.S. poultry exportsto Russia and Russian steel exports to the United States. Latin America Overview. Congressional oversight of these issues in the 108th will likely focus on the effects on U.S.interests and the appropriate U.S. policy response. Attention is expected to focus on thecontinuing confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction(WMD) programs - and the possibility of a major conflict centering on that issue (see sectionentitled "Possible War with Iraq"), and Middle East aspects of the war on terrorism, including thesituation in Afghanistan. International Terrorism and Security Assistance. HIV/AIDS. The challenges for the United States in the region are first, todiminish the threat of terrorism (as manifest by the bombing in Bali and the Taliban who have fledto Pakistan) second, to reduce the threat of war in hot spots (such as across the Taiwan Straits,between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India, or on the Korean peninsula), third, to contain the spreadof weapons of mass destruction; fourth, to promote stable economic growth and beneficial traderelations (such as China's adherence to World Trade Organization commitments and free-tradeagreements), and, fifth, to continue pressure on countries to improve their human rights and laborrecords and to adopt more democratic institutions. Southeast Asia. A number of other defense policy issues will also be on the agenda . Concurrent Receipt of Military Retired Pay and Veterans' Administration (VA) Disability Benefits. (See also the section belowentitled "Department of Defense Role in Homeland Security"). Defense Management and Business Operations Reform Acquisition Process Reform. In considering whether to approve FTAs submitted by the Administration,Congress will evaluate how these agreements affect the often divergent interests of exporters,import-competing industries, consumers, and workers, as well as the progress of two broader tradenegotiations that are scheduled to be concluded by 2005 - the Free Trade Area of the Americas(FTAA) and the Doha Development Agenda. The 108th Congress will also take up a number of other trade issues. Agreements with Chile and Central Americaare seen putting pressure on South American countries, particularly Brazil, to negotiate on the FreeTrade Area of the Americas. Congressional Role in Trade Agreements.

The 108th Congress will be faced early on with a number of pressing foreign affairs, defense, and trade issues. This report provides background information on the issues most likely to be takenup in the first session, analyzes the congressional role in shaping U.S. policy on these key issues, andlists CRS products that provide more detailed discussion and analysis. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon dramatically altered the U.S. political environment, pushing issues of war and homeland security to the top of the policy agenda. Of particular concern to 108th Congress as it begins its first session will be the progress of theongoing war on terrorism, a possible war with Iraq, the unfolding crisis with North Korea, anddealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles. Each of thesetopics receives particular attention in this report. This report also describes foreign policy tools that the 108th Congress will consider in dealing with a wide range of challenges affecting U.S. interests around the globe. It discusses major foreigneconomic and security assistance programs which Congress may consider funding, including theMillennium Challenge Account, global HIV/AIDS programs, humanitarian aid to Afghanistan,counter-terrorism activities in Southeast Asia and Africa, and possible reconstruction andhumanitarian assistance in Iraq. It examines how U.S. relations with NATO and policies towardcountries such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, China, Russia, and Pakistan may affect U.S.counter-terrorism and non-proliferation efforts. Other issues covered include potential global flashpoints - such as the Israel-Palestinian conflict, China-Taiwan relations, and the Balkans - and U.S.concerns in Latin America, such as drug trafficking. A number of defense issues are likely to receive considerable attention in the 108th Congress, including managing defense related costs within budgetary constraints, guiding Department ofDefense (DOD) "transformation" initiatives, setting priorities on major weapons systems, andassessing whether the military is the proper size to meet the demands of current or anticipatedmissions. Other defense issues covered include whether to allow "concurrent receipt" of militaryretired pay and Veterans' Administration disability benefits, the appropriate role of DOD inhomeland security, and oversight of reforms in defense management and business operations. Congressional consideration of U.S. bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with Chile and Singapore, and other trade issues are discussed in this report as well. The 108th Congress will likelymonitor U.S. negotiations on FTAs with Morocco, Central America, the South Africa CustomsUnion, Australia, and countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Its agendamay include WTO compliance issues, the re-authorization of the Export Administration Act, the FreeTrade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), and the Doha Development Agenda. This report willnot be updated.

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Introduction and Issues for Congress Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress consider Spain to be an important U.S. ally and one of the closest U.S. partners in Europe. Political developments in Spain, cooperation between the United States and Spain on security issues and counterterrorism, and U.S.-Spain economic ties are possible topics of continuing interest during the 115 th Congress. Domestic Overview Political Dynamics The government of Spain is led by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of the center-left Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE). Sánchez became prime minister in June 2018 after launching a parliamentary vote of no confidence that defeated the previous government led by Mariano Rajoy of the center-right Popular Party (PP). Prime Minister Sánchez leads a minority government which holds less than one-quarter of the seats in the Congress of Deputies. His government relies on support from left-wing party Podemos and regional nationalist parties from Catalonia and the Basque region to maintain viability and secure the votes needed for passing legislation. The Economy The global financial crisis and recession of 2008-2009 hit Spain especially hard. The crisis has had a lasting impact on the Spanish economy, and the country's economic challenges have been a central issue over the past decade. Unemployment has increased dramatically since 2008, peaking at 26% in 2013 and remaining at about 15%. Since 2015, the economy has experienced a period of relatively strong recovery, with average annual growth of 3.2% over the period 2015-2017, and 2.7% growth expected for 2018. With a population of approximately 7.45 million, Catalonia has about 15% of Spain's population. The Spanish central government (with the support of main opposition parties) subsequently received permission from the Spanish Senate to trigger Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, dissolving the regional government and assembly of Catalonia on October 28, and taking direct control of the regional police force. The head of Catalonia's regional government, Carles Puigdemont, and four other former regional ministers subsequently fled to Brussels in an attempt to appeal to EU leaders and avoid arrest on charges of rebellion and misuse of public funds, offenses that could carry a sentence of up to 30 years in prison. On November 8, 2017, Spain's constitutional court annulled the Catalan parliament's independence declaration. In recent years, Spanish police have conducted raids to dismantle jihadist recruiting networks active in Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish enclaves located on the north coast of Africa, as well as in Madrid. In 2015, the Spanish Parliament adopted legislation backed by the PP and PSOE to strengthen counterterrorism laws and police powers in response to the foreign fighter threat. Relations with the United States The United States and Spain have close links in many areas, including extensive cultural ties. Spain has been a member of NATO since 1982. Defense Relations Spain plays a significant role in U.S. defense strategy with regard to Europe and Africa. In 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO announced that four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships (Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system) would be based at Rota as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for missile defense in Europe. Following the 2012 terrorist attack against the U.S. diplomatic facility in Benghazi, Libya, the United States deployed 500 U.S. Marines to Morón in 2013 to serve as a rapid reaction force protecting U.S. interests and personnel in North Africa. Deployments include more than 600 soldiers to the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, 473 to the international coalition ( Inherent Resolve ) countering the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and 336 (including a mechanized infantry company) with the multinational battlegroup stationed in Latvia as part of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence mission. Economic Ties The U.S.-Spain economic relationship is large and mutually beneficial. Spain's FDI in the United States has increased every year since 2002, and the value of Spanish assets invested in the United States has increased nearly five-fold over the past decade. Approximately 1,100 U.S. firms operate subsidiaries and branches in Spain (including, for example, Apple, General Electric, General Motors, Ford, and AT&T). In 2016, U.S. affiliates employed more than 181,500 people in Spain and Spanish affiliates accounted for more than 83,000 jobs in the United States.

The United States and Spain have extensive cultural ties and a mutually beneficial economic relationship, and the two countries cooperate closely on numerous diplomatic and security issues. Spain has been a member of NATO since 1982 and a member of the European Union (EU) since 1986. Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, developments in Spain and its relations with the United States are of continuing interest to the U.S. Congress. Domestic Political and Economic Issues The government of Spain is led by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of the center-left Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE). Sánchez became prime minister at the head of a minority government in June 2018, after a parliamentary vote of no confidence against Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy of the center-right Popular Party (PP). Rajoy, who had led the government since 2011, was damaged by a corruption scandal involving senior PP figures. Holding less than a quarter of the seats in parliament, the Sánchez government relies on support from the left-wing party Podemos and several regional parties. Economic conditions, austerity policies, and corruption scandals have fueled public backlash against Spain's political establishment in recent years. This dynamic fractured Spain's two-party system, dominated for more than 30 years by the PP and the PSOE, with the emergence of two new parties, Ciudadanos and Podemos. Over the past several years, Spain's economy has experienced a relatively strong recovery, with growth averaging more than 3% annually, a decreasing government budget deficit, and stabilized financial conditions. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 plunged Spain into a prolonged recession and has had a lasting impact on the country. Unemployment has decreased to 15% after peaking at 26% in 2013. Catalonia Crisis A crisis over Catalan independence efforts has been the predominant issue in Spain since late 2017. Spain's central government invoked Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution to dissolve the regional assembly and executive and take direct control of the region after the Catalan parliament held an illegal vote for independence in October 2017. The issue remains deadlocked after separatist parties retained a majority of seats in the regional parliament following a new regional election in December 2017. Spain has charged 13 separatist leaders with rebellion and misuse of public funds, offenses that could carry a lengthy prison sentence. Catalonia accounts for about 15% of Spain's population and one-fifth of its economy. Counterterrorism The United States and Spain cooperate closely on counterterrorism issues. Spanish authorities have dismantled numerous recruiting networks over the past several years, many of them based in Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish enclaves on the north coast of Africa. In 2015, the Spanish Parliament adopted new legislation to strengthen counterterrorism laws and police powers in response to the foreign fighter threat. U.S.-Spain Defense Relations Spain plays an important role in U.S. defense strategy for Europe and Africa. Four U.S. destroyers equipped with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system are based at Rota naval base, and Morón air base is the headquarters for a rapid reaction force of U.S. Marines that protects U.S. interests and personnel in North Africa. Spanish armed forces participate in numerous international peacekeeping and security operations, including the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, the international coalition countering the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence mission in Latvia, EU and NATO maritime security missions, and EU operations in the Sahel region. Spain's defense spending was cut during the economic crisis but has been increasing since 2015. With the acquisition of new Eurofighter combat aircraft nearly complete, additional spending is focused largely on planned naval acquisitions. U.S.-Spain Economic Relations Investment flows between the United States and Spain totaled more than $105 billion in 2016, and Spanish foreign direct investment in the United States has increased every year since 2002. Annual U.S.-Spain trade in goods and services totals nearly $40 billion. Approximately 1,100 U.S. firms operate subsidiaries and branches in Spain. Affiliates of Spanish companies account for approximately 83,000 jobs in the United States.

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Introduction For more than a decade, violent crime perpetrated by warring criminal organizations has threatened citizen security and governance in parts of Mexico. Organized crime-related violence has resulted in more than 109,000 killings since December 2006 and contributed to 30,000 disappearances. Although daunting challenges remain, U.S.-Mexican cooperation to improve security and the rule of law has increased significantly as a result of the Mérida Initiative, a bilateral partnership developed by the George W. Bush Administration and the government of Felipe Calderón. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto took office in December 2012, vowing to reduce violence in Mexico and adjust U.S.-Mexican security efforts to focus on violence prevention. The 115 th Congress provided $139 million for the Mérida Initiative in the FY2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. Congress is now considering President Trump's FY2018 budget request, which would cut funding for the Mérida Initiative by $54 million, or 38.8%, compared to the FY2017 estimated funding level (see Table 1 ). Organized crime-related homicides in Mexico rose slightly in 2015 and significantly in 2016. Federal forces operating in the state of Guerrero did not intervene to prevent the September 2014 enforced disappearances and killings of 43 students. Security and Justice Sector Reform The Peña Nieto government dedicated significant attention and funding (more than $1.2 billion) to support implementation of judicial reforms enacted in 2008, but experts are concerned about whether the government will sustain that support to ensure the system's success. As part of the Mérida Initiative's emphasis on shared responsibility, the Mexican government pledged to tackle crime and corruption and the U.S. government pledged to address domestic drug demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly have met twice with their Mexican counterparts and emphasized the importance of partnering with Mexico "to disrupt and destroy the criminal organizations which threaten our citizens, our communities, and our country." From FY2008 to FY2017, Congress appropriated nearly $2.8 billion for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative (see Table 1 for Mérida appropriations, U.S . Assistance to Mexico Table A-1 for overall assistance to Mexico, and Figure 4 for funding by account). 115-31 ), signed into law on May 5, 2017, provides $139 million for the Mérida Initiative, some $10 million above the Obama Administration's request. Given its previous support for the Mérida program and security cooperation with Mexico, Congress is likely to set its own level of funding for Mérida at a time when Mexico continues to struggle to address violence, corruption, and human abuses and is working closely with the United States on migration enforcement and antidrug efforts. As of March 2017, deliveries stood at more than $1.6 billion. Progress has been made in combating human trafficking, with more data being gathered and cooperation to resolve cross-border cases increasing. In 2015, Mexico's Human Rights Commission estimated that the country's prisons were at 25% over capacity. In the meantime, the State Department has pointed to some indications of success: cooperation among law enforcement and intelligence officials that has led to the capture and extradition of top criminal leaders, including Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán; Mexico's transition to an accusatorial justice system with oral trials in June 2016; the improvements in infrastructure and policies that helped more than 55 Mexican correctional facilities (including all federal prisons) achieve international accreditation; and Mexico's apprehension of more than 150,000 Central American migrants in FY2015 and FY2016, as well as migrants from Africa and Asia. In recent years, however, domestic and international human rights groups have vigorously criticized the government's handling of recent high-profile cases of alleged human rights abuses, including those committed by security forces. Seven journalists have been killed thus far in 2017, including award-winning crime reporter Javier Valdez. The FY2018 budget request would cut all of those programs substantially.

Ten years after the Mexican government launched an aggressive, military-led campaign against drug trafficking and organized crime, violent crime continues to threaten citizen security and governance in parts of Mexico, including in cities along the U.S. southwest border. Organized crime-related violence in Mexico declined from 2011 to 2014 but rose in 2015 and again in 2016. Analysts estimate that the violence may have claimed more than 109,000 lives since December 2006. High-profile cases—particularly the enforced disappearance and murder of 43 students in Guerrero in September 2014—have drawn attention to the problem of human rights abuses involving security forces. Numerous cases of corruption by former governors, some of whom have fled the country, have increased concerns about impunity. Supporting Mexico's criminal justice sector reform efforts is widely regarded as crucial for combating criminality and improving citizen security in the country. U.S. support for those efforts has increased significantly as a result of the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a bilateral partnership launched in 2007 for which Congress has appropriated almost $2.8 billion since FY2008. U.S. assistance to Mexico focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups, (2) institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) creating a 21st-century border, and (4) building strong and resilient communities. Newer areas of focus have involved bolstering security along Mexico's southern border and addressing the production and trafficking of heroin and fentanyl. As of March 2017, more than $1.6 billion of Mérida assistance had been delivered to Mexico. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto has continued U.S.-Mexican security cooperation but struggled to contain rising crime. U.S. intelligence has helped Mexico arrest top crime leaders, including Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, in February 2014. Guzmán's July 2015 prison escape was a major setback, but he was recaptured in 2016 and extradited to the United States in early 2017. The Peña Nieto government met a 2008 constitutional mandate to transition to an accusatorial justice system by June 2016 but has made minimal progress in preventing torture, enforced disappearances, and other serious human rights abuses. A spate of killings of journalists thus far in 2017 and media reports that the government has spied on journalists and human rights defenders have prompted serious domestic and international concern. On May 18, 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly met for the second time with their Mexican counterparts and pledged to continue security cooperation with new "strategies to attack the business model" of criminal organizations. President Trump's FY2018 budget request includes $85 million for the Mérida Initiative (a 38.8% decline from the FY2017 estimated appropriation). It is as yet unclear what types of programs would be most affected by potential funding reductions. Congress provided $139 million in FY2017 for the Mérida Initiative in the FY2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-31), some $10 million above the budget request; it is now considering the FY2018 budget request. The Senate passed a resolution (S.Res. 83) calling for U.S. support for Mexico's efforts to combat illicit fentanyl production and trafficking. Similar legislation has been introduced in the House (H.Res. 268). Bipartisan resolutions that are similar, but not identical, have been introduced in both chambers reiterating the importance of bilateral cooperation (H.Res. 336 and S.Res. 102). Other legislation that has been introduced relates to combating firearms trafficking to Mexico (H.R. 1692). This report will be updated.

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Introduction The Obama Administration built its foreign assistance programming around the priorities and practices it identified in the 2010 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) on Global Development. It identified broad-based economic growth and democratic governance as overarching U.S. development priorities and focused on three key initiatives as a means to support those priorities: the Global Health Initiative (GHI), the Global Climate Change Initiative, and the Global Food Security Initiative (Feed the Future). While built on the foundation of existing programs, each initiative was intended to bring new focus, improve coordination, and boost funding to the aid sectors it supports. The Obama Administration followed a particularly active era in U.S. support for global development. The portion of U.S. bilateral development assistance obligated for global health, agricultural development, and environment programs—more than one-third of total economic aid from FY2012 to FY2015—has increased under the Obama Administration, continuing a trend begun under the Bush Administration ( Figure 1 ). Investment in Innovation and Research. The U.S. Results - Oriented . Global Partnership . The Administration launched the GHI in May 2009, calling on Congress to provide $63 billion over five years to "improve health outcomes through strengthened health systems, increased and integrated investments in maternal and child health, family planning, nutrition and infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases, and through a particular focus on improving the health of women, newborns and children." The GHI strategy and results framework faded away over the course of the Administration, but progress in global health outcomes that began during the Bush Administration was largely sustained, and in some areas accelerated during the Obama Administration. Some assert that implementation of the initiative was poorly managed, while others contend that U.S. global health programs were strong and effective before President Obama took office, and that the scaled back emphasis on GHI as a unique approach reflects a recognition that little change was needed. Feed the Future emphasizes accelerating inclusive growth (affecting a broad range of participants, including small-scale farmers and women) in the agriculture sector of partner countries and improving nutritional status, particularly of women and girls. 1567 , the Global Food Security Act of 2016, which was enacted by Congress and signed into law as P.L. 114-195 in July 2016. The law established a specific statutory foundation for global food security assistance, required the President to develop a whole-of-government strategy to promote global food security, and authorized funding to support the strategy (just over $1 billion per year) for FY2017 and FY2018. Funding The Administration, working with Congress, easily met its Aquila pledge. There is little doubt that Feed the Future and the legislative support provided by the GFSA have given food security and agricultural development a more prominent role in the U.S. development policy and budget. USAID reports that climate change was incorporated into 62% of USAID country and regional strategies between 2011 and 2015, and beginning in 2015 USAID began to assess and address climate risks and consider climate change mitigation opportunities in all new country strategies. Critics, however, assert that by choosing to make U.S. global policy on climate change almost exclusively through executive action, without seeking the approval and involvement of Congress, the Obama Administration has made any progress in this area vulnerable to dismantlement in a new Administration. Conclusion The Obama Administration's global development initiatives sustained Bush Administration efforts on global health and climate change, and brought new attention to food security and agricultural development. Nevertheless, sustained congressional interest in global health and food security, and the coordinated global efforts around climate change, may keep these issues prominent in global development policy discussions beyond the end of the Obama Administration.

Over the past few Administrations, Congress has maintained strong interest in and support for the broad global development areas of global health, food security, and climate-related aid and investment. The Obama Administration built its foreign assistance programming around the priorities and practices it identified in the 2010 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) on Global Development, which identified broad-based economic growth and democratic governance as overarching U.S. development priorities. In particular, the Obama Administration focused on three key initiatives: the Global Health Initiative (GHI), the Global Climate Change Initiative, and the Global Food Security Initiative (Feed the Future). While built on the foundation of existing programs, each initiative was intended to bring new focus, improve coordination, and boost funding to the aid sectors it supported. The initiatives shared several principles, including an emphasis on building host country capacity, investing in innovation and research, using whole-of-government strategies, being results oriented, leveraging global partnerships, and applying a cross-sectoral approach. The Global Health Initiative was launched to improve health outcomes through strengthened health systems and increased and integrated investments in maternal and child health, family planning, nutrition, and infectious diseases. GHI as a distinct platform faded away over the course of the Administration, but progress in global health outcomes that began during the George W. Bush Administration have been largely sustained during the Obama Administration, and the role of multilateral programs was elevated. Some assert that implementation of the initiative was inadequate, but others contend that U.S. global health programs were strong and effective before President Obama took office, and the scaled back emphasis on GHI reflects recognition that little change was needed. Feed the Future aimed to accelerate inclusive growth in the agriculture sector of partner countries and improve nutritional status, particularly of women and girls. Feed the Future is the only original Obama foreign aid initiative specifically authorized in law (the Global Food Security Act of 2016, P.L. 114-195). The law established a specific statutory foundation for global food security assistance, required the President to develop a whole-of-government strategy to promote global food security (released in October 2016), and authorized funding to support the strategy (just over $1 billion per year) for FY2017 and FY2018. The initiative and the legislative support provided by the GFSA have given food security and agricultural development a more prominent role in the U.S. development policy and budget. The Global Climate Change Initiative ramped up U.S. climate-related aid to developing countries, with a focus on promoting clean energy, sustainable landscapes, and climate change resilience and adaptation. While Congress has not always supported GCCI programs and funding, the United States has met its international pledges, and the initiative has reportedly had an impact on U.S. development practice, with USAID now assessing and addressing climate risks and climate change mitigation opportunities in all new country strategies. However, by promoting its climate agenda primarily through executive action, without seeking the approval of Congress, the Obama Administration has made any progress in this area vulnerable to dismantlement. Reported results have been mixed, but the Obama Administration's global development initiatives sustained efforts from the Bush Administration on global health and climate change and brought new attention to food security and agricultural development. While budget pressures have tamped down growth in the foreign aid budget, the portion of U.S. bilateral development assistance obligated for global health, agricultural development, and environment programs—more than one-third of total economic aid from FY2012 to FY2015—increased under the Obama Administration, continuing a trend that began under the Bush Administration. The incoming Administration and the 115th Congress may examine these initiatives as they consider future U.S. global development policy. Interest in these issues, if not these specific initiatives, can be expected to continue beyond the end of the Obama Administration.

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. . that are sufficient to provide to such individuals a level of service (1) which is comparable to the level of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without disabilities using such system; or (2) in the case of response time, which is comparable, to the extent practicable, to the level of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without disabilities using such system. Under these regulations, "each public entity operating a fixed route system" (excluding commuter bus, commuter rail, and intercity rail systems) must provide "comparable" paratransit service for individuals with disabilities. Minimum Service Requirements The statutory language provides little guidance regarding the required scope of paratransit service. The ADA therefore required the Department of Transportation to develop minimum service criteria to "determine the level of services" sufficient to be "comparable" with services offered to individuals without disabilities. "Origin to Destination" The regulations require that all paratransit service be "origin-to-destination" service. Response Times Multiple regulations govern entities' obligations regarding the time it takes to respond to an individual's request for paratransit service. Specifically, this "capacity constraints" regulation prohibits limiting paratransit service in any of the following ways: "(1) [r]estrictions on the number of trips an individual will be provided; (2) [w]aiting lists for access to the service; or (3) [a]ny operational pattern or practice that significantly limits the availability of service to ADA paratransit eligible persons."

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., is a broad non-discrimination statute that includes a prohibition of discrimination in public transportation. To prevent such discrimination, the ADA imposes several affirmative obligations on transportation providers, including a requirement that providers offer separate "paratransit" service, or accessible origin-to-destination service, for eligible individuals with disabilities. Under the statute, the level of such service must be "comparable" to the level of service offered on fixed route systems to individuals without disabilities. Department of Transportation regulations implement this "comparable" standard with specific requirements regarding the scope and manner of paratransit service. Regarding the time taken by providers to respond to individuals' requests for paratransit service, recent case law suggests that providers' legal obligation under the ADA and accompanying regulations is to avoid discriminatory "patterns or practices" of service. For more information on the ADA, see CRS Report 98-921, The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA): Statutory Language and Recent Issues, by [author name scrubbed].

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Congressional Context The Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) and its affiliated health centers (called Planned Parenthood Affiliated Health Centers or PPAHCs) have been topics of debate within the 114 th and 115 th Congresses. These discussions have raised questions about the services that PPAHCs provide and the availability of alternative facilities to provide similar services to disadvantaged populations. 1628 , the American Health Care Act of 2017 (AHCA), includes a one-year funding prohibition. H.R. Access to health care varies by location, as health systems and options vary considerably across states and localities. In some areas, one facility may be as accessible as another and may provide (or may be able to begin to provide) the same set of services. In other areas, this may not occur because, for example, only one provider exists, either in general or for a particular service type. Moreover, facilities located in the same geographic area may not be equally accessible for patients, as one facility may be located near public transportation routes while another may not. PPAHCs provide a narrow range of services to a more targeted population (i.e., family planning and related services to individuals of reproductive age), whereas FQHCs provide primary care, dental, and behavioral health services to individuals of all ages. For one health facility to begin to provide services to patients that had previously been seen at a different facility, one could argue that the receiving facility should provide similar services, serve a similar population, and be located in a similar geographic area. This report is organized around these three dimensions and presents national-level data for both PPAHCs and FQHCs. In addition, these facilities are more coordinated with each other than are FQHCs. However, their service focus differs: PPAHCs focus on family planning services, and FQHCs focus on general primary care. There are many more FQHCs than there are PPAHCs; thus FQHCs provide far more services in a given year than do PPAHCs. However, despite the fact that there are nearly 15 times the number of FQHCs than there are PPAHCs, FQHCs in total provide fewer contraceptive services than do PPAHCs. Specifically, PPAHCs provided 2.9 million contraceptive services in 2014-2015 while FQHCs provided 1.3 million of these services in calendar year 2015. In addition, each individual FQHC provides far fewer contraceptive services than does the typical PPAHC. PPAHCs also serve a diverse population. FQHCs serve the population throughout their lifespan; for example, approximately one-third of patients are children. Locations of PPAHCs and FQHCs PPFA affiliates are independent organizations and may choose the location of their facilities. PPFA reports that the majority of PPAHCs are located in health professional shortage areas (HPSAs), medically underserved areas (MUAs), or rural areas (see text box). Specifically, they are required to be located in MUAs or serve a medically underserved population, which are automatically designated as HPSAs (see text box). However, there is some overlap in the location of PPAHCs and FQHCs. Table 6 presents data on the number of counties that have either a PPAHC or an FQHC, or both facility types. These maps present only a portion of the health services available in any particular area; as such, they are not sufficient to infer meaningful information about the local health care system. This report may be updated if changes occur. Acronyms Used in this Report

Recent debates about federal funding for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) and its affiliated health centers (PPAHCs) have raised questions about the services that PPAHCs provide and the availability of alternative facilities to provide similar services to disadvantaged populations. This report provides background information and data that may be useful for policymakers evaluating these recent debates. Although a number of other facility types could potentially provide similar services as PPAHCs, this report focuses on federally qualified health centers (FQHCs)—a term used interchangeably with health centers or community health centers—because these facilities have been the focus of recent policy discussions, including the American Health Care Act of 2017 (H.R. 1628, AHCA) in the 115th Congress. This report provides information on three central dimensions of health care. For one health facility to begin to provide services to patients that had previously been seen at a different facility, one could argue that the receiving facility should provide similar services, serve a similar population, and be located in a similar geographic area. This report provides national-level data on these three dimensions. Some selected findings include the following: Services: Both PPAHCs and FQHCs provide family planning services; however, PPAHCs focus on providing family planning and related services, whereas FQHCs focus on providing more comprehensive primary care, dental, and behavioral health services. There are more than 15 times the number of FQHCs than there are PPAHCs; thus FQHCs provide far more services in a given year than do PPAHCs. However, despite providing more services overall, FQHCs in total provide less than half the number of contraceptive services than do PPAHCs. Specifically, in its 2014-2015 report (which covered federal FY2014), PPFA reported that its PPAHCs provided 2.9 million contraceptive services while FQHCs reported providing 1.4 million of these services in calendar year 2015. In addition, each individual FQHC provides far fewer contraceptive services than does the typical PPAHC. Populations: Both PPAHCs and FQHCs serve a diverse, but disadvantaged population. PPAHCs focus their services on individuals of reproductive age, whereas FQHCs provide services to individuals throughout their lifetime. FQHCs served 24.2 million people in 2015, as compared to 2.5 million served by PPAHCs. Approximately one-third (31%) of FQHC patients were children in 2015 and 8% were age 65 years and over. Locations: PPFA affiliates choose the location of their facilities. PPFA reports that the majority of PPAHCs are located in health professional shortage areas (HPSAs), medically underserved areas (MUAs), or rural areas. In contrast, FQHCs are required to be located in MUAs or to serve a medically underserved population; these areas are also automatically designated as HPSAs. There is some overlap in the location of PPAHCs and FQHCs, as 352 counties have both a PPAHC and an FQHC. Facility locations may be particularly important to evaluations of access because the availability of health services varies considerably across states and localities. In some areas, one facility may be as accessible as another and may provide (or may be able to begin to provide) the same set of services. In other areas, this may not occur because, for example, only one provider exists, either in general or for a particular service type. Moreover, facilities located in the same geographic area may not be equally accessible for patients, as one facility may be located near public transportation routes while another may not. Although this report presents maps of the locations of PPAHCs and FQHCs, these maps are not sufficient to infer meaningful information about the availability of health services in specific localities.

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Introduction The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank, EXIM Bank, or the Bank) operates under a renewable charter, the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173), as amended. The 112 th Congress considered several pieces of legislation related to Ex-Im Bank's authority, and ultimately passed a bill to extend the Ex-Im Bank's authority through FY2014 ( H.R. 2072 ). Background Overview of the Ex-Im Bank The Ex-Im Bank is the official export credit agency (ECA) of the United States. 2072 ) raises the authority incrementally to $140 billion in FY2014. As members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), these countries are party to the OECD Arrangement on Official Supported Export Credits (the "OECD Arrangement"), which is intended to ensure that exporting takes place on a level playing field (see text box, "International Disciplines on Export Credit Activity"). This trend is also emerging in other sectors, such as in green energy projects. What follows are some data that may provide an indication of the levels of international export credit activity. Policy options include maintaining the Ex-Im Bank as an independent agency, reorganizing or privatizing the functions of the Bank, or terminating the Bank. Policy options related to reauthorization time length include maintaining status quo, extending the Ex-Im Bank's authority for a few years at a time; extending the Bank's authority for a longer period of time; or providing the Bank with a "permanent" reauthorization. Revise the Ex-Im Bank's Policies Congress could revise the Bank's policies related to the requirements and limitations on the Ex-Im Bank's credit and insurance activities. Congress also may seek to balance its interest in targeting Ex-Im Bank support for specific types of exports against the Bank's desire for flexibility in fulfilling its general mandate to support U.S. exports. These challenges give rise to additional potential options for Congress. As passed, H.R. The bill includes other provisions, including to: increase the Bank's lending authority to $120 billion in FY2012, $130 billion in FY2013, and $140 billion in FY2014—with the increase in lending authority for FY2013 and FY2014 contingent on the Bank maintaining a "default rate" of less than 2% and on submitting various reports; require the Bank to monitor and report to Congress on the "default rate" of its financing, and, in the event that the rate exceeds 2%, to submit a report to Congress on a plan to reduce it to less than 2%; require the Bank to provide a notice and comment period for Bank transactions exceeding $100 million; require the Secretary of the Treasury to initiate and pursue negotiations with other major exporting countries, including members of the OECD and non-OECD members, to substantially reduce—with the ultimate goal of eliminating—subsidized export financing and other forms of export subsidies; to negotiate with all countries to eliminate all aircraft export credit financing by state-sponsored entities covered by the OECD Aircraft Sector Understanding; and to provide annual reports to Congress on the progress of such negotiations; require the Bank to develop and make publicly available methodological guidelines to be used by the Bank in conducting economic impact analyses of its transactions; require the Bank to review its national content policy, taking into consideration factors such as whether the policy captures both the direct and indirect costs of U.S. production of goods and services, the competitiveness of Ex-Im Bank's national content policy relative to foreign ECAs, the impact on the U.S. manufacturing and services workforce, any recommendations of the Ex-Im Bank Advisory Committee, and the impact of the policy on incentives to create or maintain operations in the United States and to increase the level of U.S. jobs; direct the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to analyze the Ex-Im Bank's methodology for calculating how many U.S. jobs are created or maintained through Ex-Im Bank support; prohibit Ex-Im Bank from supporting transactions with persons unless they self-certify that they are not engaged in sanctionable activities with respect to Iran, related to the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996; the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010; and part 560 of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations (commonly referred to as the "Iran Transactions Regulations"); require certification in the event that a person has engaged in sanctionable activity with respect to Iran, such that Ex-Im Bank financing would be prohibited unless the President has waived the imposition of sanctions on the person (such as for national interests reasons), pursuant to the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 ( P.L. Prior to final consideration of H.R.

The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank, EXIM Bank, or the Bank), a self-sustaining agency, is the official U.S. export credit agency (ECA). It operates under a renewable charter, the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173), as amended. Potential issues for Congress in examining the Ex-Im Bank's authority include the following: The economic rationale for the Bank, including the role of the federal government in export promotion and finance; Specific Bank policies, such as those relating to content, shipping, economic and environmental impact analysis, and tied aid, including how these policies balance U.S. export and other policy interests; Statutory requirements directing the Ex-Im Bank to support certain types of exports, such as exports of small businesses and "green" technology, including the tension that such requirements can create between desiring to support specific economic sectors and allowing the Ex-Im Bank flexibility to fulfill its mission to support U.S. exports and jobs; and International developments that may affect the Bank's work, such as the growing role of emerging economies' ECAs and the sufficiency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits to "level the playing field" for U.S. exporters. Potential options for Congress include, but are not limited to, the following areas: Structure of the Bank. Congress could maintain the Ex-Im Bank as an independent agency, reorganize or privatize the functions of the Bank, or terminate the Bank. Length of reauthorization. Congress could extend the Bank's authority for a few years at a time (as in previous reauthorizations), for a longer period of time, or permanently reauthorize the Bank. Bank's policies. Congress could maintain the status quo, or revise the Bank's policies, such as those related to the requirements and limitations on the Ex-Im Bank's credit and insurance activities. International ECA context. Congress could seek to enhance international regulation of official export credit activity through the OECD or other mechanisms, or enhance the Ex-Im Bank's understanding of international export credit activity and trends. Most recently, Congress passed H.R. 2072 to extend the Bank's authority through FY2014; previously, the Bank's authority was extended to May 31, 2012. H.R. 2072 also raises the Bank's lending authority incrementally from the previous $100 billion limit to $140 billion in FY2014, contingent on certain other requirements. In addition, H.R. 2072, among other things, includes provisions related to the Bank's domestic content policy and requirements to conduct international negotiations to reduce and eliminate official export credit activity. Prior to final action, the 112th Congress considered several other bills related to the Ex-Im Bank's authority.

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Introduction One of the chief objectives of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) is to promote financial stability within the United States, without the need for emergency governmental assistance to troubled firms like that provided by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in 2008. Additionally, a pillar of this heightened regulatory regime is that each covered financial institution must submit "credible" plans to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) detailing how the firm could be quickly resolved in an orderly fashion under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or other applicable insolvency regime "in the event of a material financial distress or failure." These resolution plans are commonly referred to as "living wills." Over 130 institutions have filed at least one resolution plan with regulators. Each of the 11 largest financial firms in the United States, which each hold more than $250 billion in nonbank assets, has filed at least two resolution plans. As is discussed in greater detail below, all 11 of these companies' plans, in spite of the fact that some of them span tens of thousands of pages, have fallen short of the minimum requirements of DFA Section 165(d) in the view of the FRB and FDIC. These 11 firms' next living wills are due July 2015. If any of these plans is determined to be insufficient, then the FRB and FDIC have expressed their intent "to use their [enforcement] authority under section 165(d)," which eventually could include the power to require an institution "to divest certain assets or operations ... to facilitate an orderly resolution.... " This report reviews the legal structure of the DFA's living will requirements, pursuant to both DFA Section 165(d) and the regulations and guidance issued jointly by the FRB and FDIC; explains the August 2014 joint announcement of the FRB and FDIC regarding the inadequacies of the 2013 living wills filed by the 11 largest, most complex financial institutions in the country; analyzes the steps that the FRB and FDIC have suggested that these companies could take to rectify the common shortcomings in resolution plans filed thus far; and discusses the enforcement tools the FRB and FDIC may utilize against firms that fail to submit "credible" resolution plans. In fact, there are bills in the 113 th Congress that would change how financial institutions are regulated to promote the financial stability of the United States. For example, H.R. 46 and S. 20 , the Financial Takeover Repeal Act of 2013, would repeal the DFA in its entirety, including the provisions designed to promote financial stability in Titles I and II. H.R. A similar bill, S. 1861 , the Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act, would make changes to the Bankruptcy Code to facilitate the resolution of financial institutions, while also explicitly repealing DFA Title II. H.R. 1450 / S. 685 , the Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Exist Act, would require the Secretary of the Treasury to identify all financial institutions it considers to be "too big to fail," and within one year of such designation, "break up [these] entities ... so that their failure would no longer cause a catastrophic effect on the United States or global economy without taxpayer bailout." And as a final example, H.R. 613 , the Systemic Risk Mitigation Act, would among other things, require every bank holding company with $50 billion or more in consolidated assets to hold long-term, subordinated debt of the value of at least 15% of its total consolidated assets. As is discussed more fully below, increasing long-term, unsecured debt arguably could help promote the long-term viability of the firm and, if the firm actually fails, help absorb some of its losses. §1818 against a covered financial institution that fails to comply with the living wills regime.

One of the chief objectives of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) is to promote financial stability within the United States, without the need for emergency governmental assistance to troubled firms. To achieve this goal, the DFA establishes a heightened regulatory regime for certain, generally large "covered financial institutions." A pillar of this heightened regulatory regime is that each covered financial institution must submit "credible" plans to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) detailing how the firm could be quickly resolved in an orderly fashion under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or other applicable insolvency regime "in the event of a material financial distress or failure." These resolution plans are commonly referred to as "living wills." Over 130 institutions have filed at least one resolution plan with regulators. Each of the 11 largest financial firms in the United States, which each hold more than $250 billion in nonbank assets, has filed at least two resolution plans. However, all 11 of these companies' plans, in spite of the fact that some of them span tens of thousands of pages, have fallen short of the minimum requirements of the DFA's living wills regime in the discretionary view of the FRB and FDIC. The 11 firms' next living wills are due July 2015. If any of these plans is determined to be insufficient, then the FRB and FDIC have expressed their intent "to use their [enforcement] authority under [DFA] section 165(d)," which eventually could include the power to require an institution "to divest certain assets or operations ... to facilitate an orderly resolution.... " This report reviews the legal structure of the DFA's living will requirements, pursuant to both DFA Section 165(d) and the regulations and guidance issued jointly by the FRB and FDIC, and explains the August 2014 joint announcement of the FRB and FDIC regarding the inadequacies of the 2013 living wills filed by the 11 largest, most complex financial institutions in the country. This report also examines some of the steps that these institutions might voluntarily take, which, in the view of the FRB and FDIC, would improve their resolvability, including strategic divestiture; legal reorganization; amendment of default trigger provisions of qualified financial contracts; and increasing their long-term, unsecured debt as a proportion of their assets. In addition to voluntary measures, there are bills in the 113th Congress that would change how financial institutions are regulated to promote the financial stability of the United States. For example, H.R. 46 and S. 20, the Financial Takeover Repeal Act of 2013, would repeal the DFA in its entirety, including the provisions designed to promote financial stability. H.R. 5421, the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014, and a similar bill, S. 1861, the Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act, would make changes to the Bankruptcy Code to facilitate the resolution of financial institutions. H.R. 1450/S. 685, the Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Exist Act, would require the Secretary of the Treasury to identify all financial institutions it considers to be "too big to fail," and to "break up [these] entities ... so that their failure would no longer cause a catastrophic effect on the United States or global economy without taxpayer bailout." And H.R. 613, the Systemic Risk Mitigation Act, would, among other things, require every bank holding company with $50 billion or more in consolidated assets to hold long-term, subordinated debt of the value of at least 15% of its total consolidated assets. Proponents argue that this could help promote the long-term viability of the firm and, if the firm actually fails, help absorb some of its losses.

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Shortly after the ruling in Olmstead , on February 1, 2001, President Bush announced the "New Freedom Initiative," an effort through multiple federal agencies, in cooperation with the states, to ensure full participation in society of persons with disabilities. Part of the New Freedom Initiative was an executive order implementing the Olmstead decision to ensure that all people with disabilities, not just those with mental illnesses, benefit from community-based treatment. The federal government makes funds available to finance subsidized rental housing for persons with disabilities primarily through the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Over the years, a number of other HUD programs have been used to fund housing units dedicated to persons with disabilities, and many of those units are still in service. Federal block grant programs—the Community Development Block Grant and HOME Investment Partnerships program—have also been a source of funds used by states and local communities to develop and rehabilitate housing for persons with disabilities. In addition, prior to creation of the Section 811 program, the Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly program set aside units for persons with disabilities. The Definition in Other HUD Programs The definition of the term "person with disabilities" in the Section 811 program differs somewhat from the definition for both the tenant- and project-based Section 8 programs (referred to here by the blanket term "Section 8") and the Public Housing program, which are defined together in the same statute and regulation, and properties developed under the Section 202 loan program, which is found in regulation. Section 811 Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities Program The Section 811 Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities program is administered by HUD and funds permanent supportive housing for very low-income persons with disabilities (those with family income at or below 50% of area median income). To the extent that Congress may still appropriate new capital grants for Section 811, P.L. Project Rental Assistance (PRA) Program As part of P.L. 111-374 , enacted at the end of the 111 th Congress, the Section 811 program was changed to allow rental assistance funds to be used to assist multifamily housing units developed using other, non-Section 811 sources of funding such as LIHTCs, HOME, or other public or private sources. The Frank Melville Supportive Housing Investment Act ( P.L. Other HUD Housing Designated for Persons with Disabilities While the Section 811 program is dedicated solely to persons with disabilities, HUD also funds housing for persons with disabilities through programs that serve all tenant populations, but that also give project owners the ability to designate buildings to special populations, including elderly persons and persons with disabilities. In addition to housing historically provided through the Section 202 program (described in the "Evolution of Section 811" section of this report), property owners that participate in the project-based Section 8 rental assistance program and Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) that administer the Public Housing program may choose to designate buildings specifically for elderly residents and residents with disabilities together (sometimes referred to as "mixed population" developments) or for residents with disabilities alone. Since then, persons with disabilities have lived in public housing facilities designated for elderly residents (defined as households where one or more person is age 62 or older). 111-374 was funding for Section 811 rental assistance only (i.e., not provided in conjunction with Section 811 capital grants), called the Project Rental Assistance (PRA) program. Using Section 811 Capital Grants with Low-Income Housing Tax Credits Financing affordable housing, including housing for persons with disabilities, may require multiple streams of funding in order to support the design, construction, and ongoing operating costs of a project.

The ability of persons with disabilities to live independently in affordable, accessible housing became a prominent issue starting in 1999 as the result of a Supreme Court decision, Olmstead v. L.C. The court held that institutionalization of persons with mental disabilities in lieu of community-based care may constitute discrimination. Shortly after the Olmstead decision, on February 1, 2001, President George W. Bush announced the New Freedom Initiative, an effort through multiple federal agencies to ensure full participation in society of persons with disabilities. Part of the New Freedom Initiative was Executive Order 13217, which implemented the Olmstead decision by ensuring (among other things) that all people with disabilities, not just those with mental illness, benefit from community-based treatment. In order to ensure that persons with disabilities may live in community settings rather than in institutions, affordable and accessible housing is necessary. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) operates a number of programs that provide housing for persons with disabilities in various ways. The Section 811 Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities program is authorized to provide capital grants and project rental assistance to nonprofit developers of housing targeted specifically to persons with disabilities. Prior to creation of Section 811, persons with disabilities lived together with elderly residents (defined by HUD as households with one or more adults age 62 or older) in developments funded through the Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly program. The project-based Section 8 and Public Housing programs give project owners the option of dedicating facilities to elderly residents, residents with disabilities, or both populations together. Over the years, both the Section 811 and the tenant-based Section 8 programs have set aside housing vouchers for persons with disabilities. And two HUD block grant programs—HOME and the Community Development Block Grant—may be used by states and communities to construct or rehabilitate housing for persons with disabilities. In addition to these HUD programs, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), administered by the Internal Revenue Service, may be used by states to target housing to special needs populations, including persons with disabilities. The LIHTC may be used in conjunction with HUD grants, including capital grants through the Section 811 program. Congress has not appropriated capital funds for new Section 811 units since FY2011. In FY2012 through FY2014, Congress made Section 811 rental assistance funds available to be used in conjunction with capital funding from other sources (such as LIHTCs and HOME funds) rather than Section 811 capital grants, which were not appropriated. This use of rental assistance was authorized as part of the Frank Melville Supportive Housing Investment Act (P.L. 111-374), and is referred to by HUD as the Project Rental Assistance (PRA) Program. P.L. 111-374 instituted other changes to the Section 811 program: authorizing that the source of funding for Section 811 tenant-based rental assistance be converted to the Section 8 program; decreasing the concentration of housing units for persons with disabilities by limiting the units in multifamily housing dedicated to persons with disabilities to 25% of the total; and delegating the processing of mixed finance developments to state housing finance agencies.

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These include the bordering or close-by countries of Russia, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Turkey, and the South Caucasus states (see below, Appendix ), and others such as the United States, Germany, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Ukraine. Security Problems and Progress The problems of authoritarian regimes, crime, corruption, terrorism, and ethnic and civil tensions jeopardize the security and independence of all the new states of Central Asia, though to varying degrees. Turkmenistan faces clan and provincial tensions and widespread poverty that could contribute to instability. Stability in Tajikistan remains fragile. Economic cooperation among the Central Asian states began to develop by the mid-1990s, leading to several initiatives, but results have been scant. Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan. In testimony on December 15, 2009, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Krol listed five objectives of U.S. policy in Central Asia: to maximize the cooperation of the regional states with coalition counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan; to increase the development and diversification of the region's energy resources and supply routes; to promote the eventual emergence of good governance and respect for human rights; to foster competitive market economies; and to prevent state failure in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, including by enhancing food security assistance. Conditions on Assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Supplemental appropriations for FY2002 ( H.R. Issues for Congress Most in Congress have supported U.S. assistance to bolster independence and reforms in Central Asia and other NIS. Those who object to a more forward U.S. policy toward Central Asia argue that the United States has historically had few interests in this region, and that if peace is established in Afghanistan, the region again will be less important to U.S. interests. They advocate limited U.S. involvement undertaken along with Turkey and other friends and coalition partners to ensure general U.S. goals of preventing strife, fostering democratization and regional cooperation, and improving human rights and the quality of life. These analysts also assert that the United States has a major interest in preventing outside terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring nuclear weapons-related materials and technology from the region. The Silk Road language calls for enhanced policy and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport (including energy pipelines) and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasian and Central Asian states. In January 2010, Richard Morningstar, the State Department's Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, stressed that the three main goals of the Administration's Eurasian energy strategy are to encourage the development of oil and gas resources in the Caspian region; to support energy security in Europe by advocating the development of multiple sources of energy supplies and multiple routes to market; and to assist the Caspian countries in expanding their export routes. Energy and other resources were also stressed in the case of Kazakhstan, as well as its huge territory and lengthy borders. According to some critics, the former Bush Administration's protests over human rights abuses at Andijon contributed to the loss of U.S. military access to K2 and other security ties with Uzbekistan. This concern is most evident in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is interested in asserting its own regional power. The establishment of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, has directly challenged Iran's security and interests in the region by surrounding Iran with U.S. friends and allies, although Iran also has gained from the U.S.-led defeat of the Taliban and coalition operations in Iraq.

The Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) face common security challenges from crime, corruption, terrorism, and faltering commitments to economic and democratic reforms. However, cooperation among them remains halting, so security in the region is likely in the near term to vary by country. Kyrgyzstan's and Tajikistan's futures are most clouded by ethnic and territorial tensions, and corruption in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan could spoil benefits from the development of their ample energy resources. Authoritarianism and poverty in Uzbekistan could contribute to a succession crisis. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan's beleaguered civil society might eventually help the relatively small nation safeguard its independence. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan might become regional powers able to champion policy solutions to common Central Asian problems and to resist undue influence from more powerful outside powers, because of their large territories and populations and energy and other resources. Internal political developments in several bordering or close-by states may have a large impact on Central Asian security. These developments include a more authoritarian and globalist Russia, an economically growing China, instability in Iran and the South Caucasus region, and re-surging drug production and Islamic extremism in Afghanistan. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the former Bush Administration established bases and other military access in the region to support U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan. The Obama Administration has highlighted U.S. interests in such continued access as well as the long-term security and stability of the region. U.S. interests in Central Asia include combating terrorism, drug production, and trafficking; assisting the development of oil and other resources; and fostering democratization, human rights, free markets, and trade. The United States also seeks to thwart dangers posed to its security by the illicit transfer of strategic missile, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technologies, materials, and expertise to terrorist states or groups, and to address threats posed to regional independence by Iran. Some critics counter that the United States has historically had few interests in this region, and advocate only limited U.S. contacts undertaken with Turkey and other friends and allies to ensure U.S. goals. They also urge these friends and allies to enhance their energy security by taking the lead in the development of diverse export routes for Central Asia's energy resources. Most in Congress have supported U.S. assistance to bolster independence and reforms in Central Asia. The 106th Congress authorized a "Silk Road" initiative for greater policy attention and aid for democratization, market reforms, humanitarian needs, conflict resolution, transport infrastructure (including energy pipelines), and border controls. The 108th and subsequent Congresses have imposed conditions on foreign assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, based on their human rights records. Congress has continued to debate the balance between U.S. security interests in the region and interests in democratization and the protection of human rights.

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Background In January 2003, President Bush announced the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a government-wide initiative to combat global HIV/AIDS. Later that year, Congress enacted the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act), P.L. 108-25 , which authorized $15 billion to be spent from FY2004 to FY2008 on bilateral and multilateral HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria programs. The Act included language that instructed how the funds should be spent, listed several goals and targets, and required the President to establish the Coordinator of the United States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally (known as the Global AIDS Coordinator) at the Department of State. The Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) distributes the majority of the funds it receives from Congress for global HIV/AIDS programs to U.S. federal agencies and departments and multilateral groups like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund). In 2008, Congress enacted the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Lantos-Hyde Act), P.L. 110-293 , which amended the Leadership Act to authorize the appropriation of $48 billion for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria efforts from FY2009 to FY2013. Key amendments in the Act established the Coordinator of the United States Government Activities to Combat Malaria Globally (known as the Malaria Coordinator) at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Certain provisions within the Leadership Act, as amended, and the Lantos-Hyde Act are set to expire at the end of FY2013. 3177 ) entitled the PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act. The bills extend authorities related to key priority areas: authorizing appropriations for the Global Fund, expanding reporting requirements, and allocating a portion of global HIV/AIDS funds for orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) and for HIV/AIDS treatment and care. Table A-1 in Appendix A offers a side-by-side comparison of the Leadership Act in its original form and the Lantos-Hyde Act, which amends the Leadership Act and other legislation. A third column explains which sections are set to expire and summarizes language in S. 1545 and H.R. 3177 that amend the Leadership Act, as amended. The Leadership Act, as amended, Lantos-Hyde Act, and legislation that these Acts amend include language to facilitate oversight of U.S. global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs, as well as to ensure key congressional priorities are met. It does not appear some of the contentious issues that dominated debate when crafting the Leadership and Lantos-Hyde Acts (such as family planning) will be revisited at this time. S. 1545 , the PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act and its House companion ( H.R. The following sections describe which authorities in the Leadership Act, as amended, and the Lantos-Hyde Act are set to expire and which are enduring. Congress amended these reporting requirements through the Lantos-Hyde Act and added some additional ones. The Leadership Act authorized $15 billion for the U.S. fight against HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria from FY2004 through FY2008; and the Lantos-Hyde Act amended the Leadership Act to authorize $48 billion from FY2009 through FY2013 for the acceleration of U.S. efforts to combat the three diseases. In addition to expiring authorities cited above, language in the Leadership Act, as amended and Lantos-Hyde Act (and the legislation that they amended) set program targets for TB programs, prioritized U.S. efforts to fight TB and malaria worldwide, and established a coordinator of all U.S. global malaria programs. Appendix A. Legislative Tables The Leadership Act, as amended, Lantos-Hyde Act, and Foreign Assistance Act as amended, include several reporting requirements. Appendix B.

Fighting HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria globally is a priority for Congress. The 108th and 110th Congresses enacted two pieces of legislation that have shaped U.S. responses to these diseases: P.L. 108-25, the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act), and P.L. 110-293, the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Lantos-Hyde Act). The Leadership Act authorized $15 billion to be spent from FY2004 through FY2008 on fighting HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. The Lantos-Hyde Act amended the Leadership Act to authorize $48 billion for fighting the three diseases from FY2009 through FY2013. The Leadership Act (and the legislation that it amends) is the primary vehicle through which U.S. global assistance for fighting these diseases is authorized. The Lantos-Hyde Act mostly amends the Leadership Act, though it amends some other acts, such as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and includes some stand-alone authorities. The Leadership Act and the Lantos-Hyde Act (primarily through amendments to the Leadership Act) created frameworks for how the funds should be spent, established program goals and targets, and established coordinating offices for managing government-wide responses. The Leadership Act required the President to establish the Coordinator of the United States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally (known as the Global AIDS Coordinator) at the Department of State. Congress appropriates the bulk of global HIV/AIDS funds to the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, which leads the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The Global AIDS Coordinator distributes the majority of these funds to U.S. federal agencies and departments and multilateral groups like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The Lantos-Hyde Act amended the Leadership Act to establish the Coordinator of the United States Government Activities to Combat Malaria Globally (known as the Malaria Coordinator) at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to oversee implementation of related efforts by USAID and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Some authorities within these Acts are enduring, such as those that created the Global AIDS and Malaria Coordinator positions (Leadership Act, as amended) and permitted U.S. participation in advance market commitments for vaccine development (Lantos-Hyde Act). Other authorities, however, are set to expire, such as language authorizing funding for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs. This report explains which authorities within the Leadership and Lantos-Hyde Acts are set to expire and which are permanent. Table A-1 in the Appendix A offers a side-by-side comparison of the Leadership Act in its original form and the Lantos-Hyde Act, which amends the Leadership Act and other legislation. A third column explains which sections are set to expire and summarizes language in S. 1545 and H.R. 3177 that amend the Leadership Act, as amended. The Leadership Act, as amended and Lantos-Hyde Act include comprehensive reporting requirements. Table A-2 in the Appendix A lists the reporting requirements and describes the extent to which the Administration has complied with the requirements. Rather than revisit some of the contentious issues that dominated debate when crafting the Lantos-Hyde Act, House and Senate Members introduced legislation (H.R. 3177 and S. 1545) that is narrowly aimed at key priorities: enhancing oversight of U.S. global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs; authorizing appropriations for the Global Fund through FY2018; and allocating a portion of HIV/AIDS funds for orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) and for HIV/AIDS treatment and care. Table B-1 in Appendix B summarizes key amendments in the bills, entitled the PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act.

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Akey concept embodied in the accountability provisions of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. 107-110 ) is that of adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward proficiency on state assessments. In order to maintain eligibility for grants under ESEA Title I, Part A—Grants to Local Educational Agencies (LEAs) for the Education of Disadvantaged Pupils, the largest federal K-12 education program—states must establish and implement standards of AYP that are applicable to all public schools and LEAs in the state, as well as the state overall. Schools or LEAs that fail to meet AYP standards for two or more consecutive years face a variety of consequences and, ultimately, corrective actions. The authorization for ESEA programs expired at the end of FY2008, and the 111 th Congress is expected to consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA. This report will be updated regularly to reflect major legislative developments and available information. Substantial interest has been expressed in the use of growth models to meet the AYP requirements of the NCLB. Such AYP models are not consistent with certain statutory provisions of the NCLB, as they were originally interpreted by the U.S. Department of Education (ED). The AYP Models Explicitly Authorized by the NCLB The primary model of AYP under the NCLB currently is a group status model. A school where aggregate achievement is below the level required under the group status model described above would still be deemed to have made AYP, through the "safe harbor" provision, if, among relevant pupil groups who did not meet the primary AYP standard, the percentage of pupils who are not at the proficient or higher level in the school declines by at least 10% (not 10 percentage points) , and those pupil groups make progress on at least one other academic indicator included in the state's AYP standards. The models proposed by the states must meet at least the following criteria (in addition to a variety of criteria applicable to all state AYP policies—that is, measure achievement separately in reading/language arts and mathematics): they must incorporate an ultimate goal of all pupils reaching a proficient or higher level of achievement by the end of the 2013-2014 school year; achievement gaps among pupil groups must decline in order for schools or LEAs to meet AYP standards; annual achievement goals for pupils must not be set on the basis of pupil background or school characteristics; annual achievement goals must be based on performance standards, not past or "typical" performance growth rates; the assessment system must produce comparable results from grade-to-grade and year-to-year; and the progress of individual students must be tracked within a state data system. Are Growth Models of AYP More Fair and Accurate than Status or Improvement Models? At the same time, growth models of AYP have the significant disadvantage of implicitly setting lower thresholds or expectations for some pupil groups and/or schools. Although any growth model deemed consistent with NCLB would likely need to incorporate that act's ultimate goal of all pupils at a proficient or higher level of achievement by 2013-2014 (see below), the majority of such models used currently or in the past do not include such goals, and tend to allow disadvantaged schools and pupils to remain at relatively low levels of achievement for considerable periods of time. Growth models of AYP may be quite complicated, and may address the accountability purposes of NCLB less directly and clearly than status or (to a lesser extent) improvement models.

A key concept embodied in the accountability provisions of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. 107-110), is that of adequate yearly progress (AYP). In order to be eligible for grants under ESEA Title I, Part A—Education for Disadvantaged Pupils—states must implement AYP policies applicable to all public schools and local educational agencies (LEAs), based primarily on the scores of pupils on state assessments. Schools or LEAs that fail to meet AYP standards for two or more consecutive years face a variety of consequences. The primary model of AYP under the NCLB is a group status model. Such models set threshold levels of performance, expressed as a percentage of pupils scoring at a proficient or higher level on state assessments of reading and mathematics, that must be met by all pupils as a group, as well as pupils in designated demographic subgroups, in order for a public school or LEA to make AYP. Current law also includes a secondary model of AYP, a "safe harbor" provision, under which a school or LEA may make AYP if, among pupil groups who did not meet the primary AYP standard, the percentage of pupils who are not at the proficient or higher level declines by at least 10%. Substantial interest has been expressed in the use of individual/cohort growth models to meet the AYP requirements of the NCLB. Such AYP models are not consistent with certain statutory provisions of the NCLB, as those were originally interpreted by the U.S. Department of Education (ED). However, under a pilot program, ED has approved applications from 15 states for waivers to use growth models to make AYP determinations, and regulations adopted in late 2008 allow an unlimited number of states to apply for this option. Many proponents of growth models of AYP see them as being more fair and accurate than the models generally employed to meet NCLB requirements, primarily because they recognize the fact that different schools and pupils have different starting points in their achievement levels, and recognize progress being made at all levels. Growth models of AYP have the disadvantage of implicitly setting lower initial thresholds or expectations for some pupils. Although any growth model consistent with the NCLB would need to incorporate the act's ultimate goal of all pupils at a proficient or higher level of achievement by 2013-2014, such models used currently in state (non-NCLB) accountability plans do not include such goals and might allow disadvantaged schools and pupils to remain at relatively low levels of achievement for significant periods of time. Growth models of AYP may be quite complicated and may address the accountability purposes of the NCLB less directly and clearly than the currently statutory AYP models. The authorization for ESEA programs expired at the end of FY2008, and the 111th Congress is expected to consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA. This report will be updated regularly to reflect major legislative developments and available information.

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Among these are electric power generation and distribution, drinking water, communications and information systems, oil and gas production and distribution, transportation systems, and banking and finance. DHS's 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan defined resilience as "the ability to resist, absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt to adversity or a change in conditions." Reducing the potential risks associated with the loss of critical infrastructure resulting from a terrorist, natural hazard, or technological disaster (hereinafter referred to collectively as all-hazard events) is a key element in the nation's homeland security strategy and a topic of continued interest in Congress. In January 2006, the Critical Infrastructure Task Force of the Homeland Security Council published a report that concluded: Given the diverse spectrum of potential threats [to the nation's critical infrastructure], coupled with the reality that resources are limited, policies and strategies focusing on achieving resilience would be more robust than current guidance, which focuses primarily on protection. The Task Force also argued that owners and operators of critical infrastructure could make a better business case for investing in resilience, measured in terms of the amount of time and effort needed to restore operations, than trying to justify investments to increase protection or reduce vulnerabilities, which, according to the Task Force, are more difficult to quantify. Resilience, on the other hand, according to Jackson, offers a way to reduce the consequences should an attack prevail and offers to broaden the range of ways to reduce risks. In a September 2009 report, the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) found the "current policy framework fundamentally sound but could be improved to better reflect principles of resilience.…" The report also recommended that DHS: expand programs to allow funding for programmatic and grant funding of resilience efforts; encourage each sector to set resiliency goals; and assist in building resilience in the next generation of infrastructure. DHS Response G.W. Bush Administration Early high level government policy documents rarely mentioned resilience. Neither the first National Homeland Security Strategy (2002) nor Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (2003) mention resilience at all. However, the NIPP still considered resiliency to be part of a protective strategy. Two of the four objectives under that goal were (1) protect critical infrastructure (prevent high consequence events by securing critical assets, systems, networks, or function from attacks or disruptions), and (2) make critical infrastructure resilient (enhance the ability of critical infrastructure systems, networks, and functions to withstand and rapidly recover from damage and disruption and adapt to changing conditions). One can also argue that the department programs to help owner/operators of critical infrastructure identify threats, assess the vulnerability of their assets and operations to those threats, and assess the possible consequences from those threats, are necessary before one can identify and implement protective or resilient options for reducing those risks. These latter components contribute to the development of a Resiliency Index, similar to the protective Measure Indexes. Recovery refers to the ability to return to normal operations as quickly and efficiently as possible. FEMA Grants The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers a number of grant programs. These grants can support public expenditures for overtime personnel costs associated with protecting critical infrastructure assets. The risk assessment and security plan are to consider, among other items, efforts to provide redundant or back-up assets that would enable the transportation system to continue to operate in the event of an attack or incident. Such a requirement would relate to resilience. Eligible recipients include private sector facility owners/operators along with state and local governments and public entities. Program Summary DHS can be thought of as having always contributed to community resilience in its efforts to improve the ability of communities to respond and recover from incidents through grants and various assistance programs. This has been furthered by more recent emphasis given to mitigation of risks before as well as after an incident. More recently, those efforts have taken into consideration more specifically resilience-oriented risk reduction options. However, the National Infrastructure Advisory Council cautioned that it is not clear that market incentives are sufficient to drive such investments. Congress may choose to continue its oversight of the progress being made in the area of metrics.

In 2006, the Critical Infrastructure Task Force of the Homeland Security Advisory Council initiated a public policy debate arguing that the government's critical infrastructure policies were focused too much on protecting assets from terrorist attacks and not focused enough on improving the resilience of assets against a variety of threats. According to the Task Force, such a defensive posture was "brittle." Not all possible targets could be protected and adversaries could find ways to defeat defenses, still leaving the nation having to deal with the consequences. The Task Force advocated that greater encouragement for resilience would broaden the range of risk reduction options and should be the overarching policy framework for reducing risks associated with all threats to critical infrastructure. Others in the homeland security community agreed. Critical infrastructure are those assets the loss of which would result in great harm to the nation's security, economy, health and safety, and morale. They include assets necessary to generate and distribute such basic goods and services such as electricity, drinking water, telecommunications, banking and finance, etc. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to resist, absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt to a change in environment or conditions. The Task Force argued that government policies encouraged employing greater defenses such as surveillance equipment, guards, etc., around these assets but did less to encourage efforts that would allow assets to continue operating at some level, or quickly return to full operation, if attacked. Such efforts might include increasing redundancies (such as having multiple backup power generation capability) or designing more robust systems for the future (such as using more hardened concrete for stronger fixed facilities). In 2008, as part of its oversight function, the House Committee on Homeland Security held a series of hearings addressing resilience. At those hearings, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) argued that government policies and actions did encourage resilience as well as protection. Even so, subsequent policy documents made greater reference to resilience. At first those references were relatively superficial, but later they became more substantive. Policy has evolved to the point that resilience and protection of critical infrastructure assets are recognized as distinct options to be equally considered when seeking to reduce the risks associated with potential attacks on critical infrastructures. As policy has evolved, programs have also evolved somewhat, to support efforts at improving critical infrastructure resiliency. The Office of Infrastructure Protection within the DHS conducts risk assessments at the asset and regional level that now include a resilience index along with a protection index. The program allows asset owners/operators to compare their level of resilience to other similar assets and allows them to analyze how certain improvements might contribute to better resilience. Also, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate supports some resilience-oriented research and development projects. In addition to projects developing better technologies to aid in response and recovery, the Directorate also supports projects that are developing technologies for structures to withstand blasts or large physical displacements or systems which can self-heal after being damaged. The Federal Emergency Management Agency within DHS provides grants, primarily to state and local governments or public authorities, that largely support resilience by improving the ability to respond to and recover from incidents. Mitigation grants, which allow communities to reduce the potential consequences of an incident before it happens, offer limited support for improving the resilience of critical infrastructures. There is relatively little direct government support or incentives for private sector owners/operators to implement resilience-oriented (or protective-oriented) measures. It is not clear if market incentives are sufficient to drive such investments. Congress may choose to consider the adequacy of private investments in resilience, whether the private market provides sufficient incentives, and options for government action if markets do not.

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T his report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2016. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the second title of the homeland security appropriations bill—Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS). Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in recent years as "Security, Enforcement, and Investigations." The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2016 request for Security, Enforcement, and Investigations, the appropriations proposed by Congress in response, and those enacted thus far. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the second title, the report includes information on provisions throughout the proposed bill and report that directly affect these functions. Data used in this report for FY2015 amounts are derived from the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. Information on the House-reported recommended funding levels is from H.R. The Administration requested $32,481 million in FY2016 net discretionary budget authority for components included in this title, as part of a total budget for these components of $39,431 million for FY2016. The appropriations request was $807 million (2.5%) more than was provided for FY2015. Senate-reported S. 1619 would have provided the components included in this title $32,484 million in net discretionary budget authority, $3 million (0.01%) more than requested, and $810 million (2.6%) more than was provided in FY2015. 3128 would have provided the components included in this title $32,182 million in net discretionary budget authority, $299 million (0.9%) less than requested, and $508 million (1.6%) more than was provided in FY2015. On December 18, 2015, the President signed into law P.L. 114-113 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Division F of which was the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016. The act included $33,062 million for these components in FY2016, $1,388 million (4.4%) more that was provided for FY2015, and $581 million (1.8%) more than was requested. Table 1 lists the enacted funding level for the individual components funded under Security, Enforcement, and Investigations for FY2015, as well as the amounts requested for these accounts for FY2016 by the Administration, proposed by the Senate and House appropriations committees, and provided by the enacted annual appropriation for FY2016. The TSA budget is one of the most complex components of the DHS Appropriations bill.

This report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2016. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the second title of the homeland security appropriations bill—Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS). Collectively, Congress has labeled these components in recent years as "Security, Enforcement, and Investigations." The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2016 request for Security, Enforcement, and Investigations, the appropriations proposed by the House and Senate appropriations committees in response, and those enacted thus far. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the second title, the report includes information on provisions throughout the bills and report that directly affect these functions. Security, Enforcement, and Investigations is the largest of the four titles that carry the bulk of the funding in the bill. The Administration requested $32,481 million for these components in FY2016, $807 million more than was provided for FY2015. The amount requested for these components is 78.5% of the Administration's $41.4 billion request for DHS in net discretionary budget authority. The proposed increase in discretionary funding for the components is 46.7% of the total net increase requested for the department. The largest budget increase proposed in the request for these five agencies was $806 million (7.4%) for CBP, while the largest budget decrease proposed was $227 million (2.8%) for the USCG. Senate-reported S. 1619 would have provided the components included in this title $32,484 million in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $3 million (0.01%) more than requested, and $810 million (2.6%) more than was provided in FY2015. House-reported H.R. 3128 would have provided the components included in this title $32,182 million in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $299 million (0.9%) less than requested, and $508 million (1.6%) more than was provided in FY2015. On December 18, 2015, the President signed into law P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Division F of which was the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016. The act included $33,062 million for these components in FY2016, $1,388 million (4.4%) more that was provided for FY2015, and $581 million (1.8%) more than was requested. Additional information on the broader subject of FY2016 funding for the department can be found in CRS Report R44053, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2016, as well as links to analytical overviews and details regarding appropriations for other components. This report will be updated if supplemental appropriations are provided for any of these components through the FY2016 appropriations process.

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1. What Is the Reserve Component? The term "Reserve Component" (RC) refers collectively to the seven individual reserve components of the Armed Forces: the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The purpose of these seven reserve components, as codified in law, is to "provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components." How Many People Are in the Reserve Component? 4. What Are the Different Categories of Full-time Support for the Reserve Components? They were organized under Congress's constitutional authority "to raise and support Armies" and "to provide and maintain a Navy." How Has the Role of the Reserve Components Changed in Recent Years? During the Cold War era, the reserve components were a manpower pool that was rarely tapped. From 1945 to 1989, reservists were involuntarily activated for federal service four times, an average of less than once per decade. The nation has relied more heavily on the reserve components since the end of the Cold War. 7. 8. 9. The authority to activate reservists under this provision rests with the Service Secretary, but it may only be invoked for a "preplanned mission in support of a combatant command" where the costs of the activations and a description of the mission are included in the service's budget materials. This provision is codified at 10 U.S.C. and " 12. What Type of Legal Protections Do Reservists Have When They Are Serving on Active Duty? This is the provision of law used to provide federal pay and benefits to the Guardsmen called up to provide security at many of the nation's airports in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to assist with the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, and to support the southwest border security mission in 2006-2008, 2010-2016, and 2018-present. 13. Congress has made many changes in Reserve Component pay and benefits since the September 11 th attacks.

The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers over the Armed Forces, including the power to "to raise and support Armies," "to provide and maintain a Navy," "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" and "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.... " In the exercise of this constitutional authority, Congress has historically shown great interest in various issues that bear on the vitality of the reserve components, such as funding, equipment, and personnel policy. This report is designed to provide an overview of key reserve component personnel issues. The term "Reserve Component" refers collectively to the seven individual reserve components of the Armed Forces: the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The purpose of these seven reserve components, as codified in law at 10 U.S.C. §10102, is to "provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components." During the Cold War era, the reserve components were a manpower pool that was rarely tapped. From 1945 to 1989, reservists were involuntarily activated by the federal government four times, an average of less than once per decade. Since the end of the Cold War, the nation has relied more heavily on the reserve components. Reservists have been involuntarily activated for contingency operations by the federal government six times since 1990, an average of about once every five years, including large-scale mobilizations for the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991) and in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks (2001-present). Additionally, starting in FY2014, the Services began involuntarily activating reservists under a new authority for pre-planned missions in support of Combatant Commanders. This report provides insight to reserve component personnel issues through a series of questions and answers that address How reserve component personnel are organized (questions 2 and 4); How many people are in each of the different categories of the reserve component (question 3); How reserve component personnel have been and may be used (questions 1, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 11); How reserve component personnel are compensated (questions 8 and 10); The types of legal protections that exist for reserve component personnel (question 12); and Recent changes in reserve component pay and benefits made by Congress (question 13).

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It is a means-tested entitlement program that financed the delivery of primary and acute medical services, as well as long-term services and supports, to an estimated 56.7 million people in FY2012, at a total cost of $431 billion with the federal government paying $249 billion (about 58%) of that total. 109-171 ) added benchmark benefit packages (now called Alternative Benefit Plans or ABPs) as a state option. This report begins with a summary of major Medicaid eligibility pathways. As of January 1, 2014, federal law allows states to expand Medicaid eligibility for citizens with income up to 133% of the federal poverty level who do not fit into these traditional categories. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. Traditional Medicaid Benefits Under federal law, states must cover certain benefits, while other services may be offered at state option. Examples of benefits that are mandatory for most Medicaid groups (i.e., categorically needy populations excluding the ACA Medicaid expansion subgroup) include inpatient hospital services, physician services, laboratory and x-ray services, early and periodic screening, diagnostic and treatment services (EPSDT) for individuals under 21, nursing facility services for individuals aged 21 and over, and home health care for those entitled to nursing facility care. Examples of optional benefits for such Medicaid groups include prescribed drugs, physician-directed clinic services, services of other licensed practitioners (e.g., chiropractors, podiatrists, psychologists), nursing facility services for individuals under age 21, physical therapy, and prosthetic devices. Medicaid Alternative Benefit Plans (ABPs) As an alternative to providing all the mandatory and selected optional benefits under traditional Medicaid, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA; P.L. In such cases, states must describe the differences between traditional Medicaid and ABPs to these beneficiaries in order to facilitate an informed choice. These essential health benefits (EHBs) are (1) ambulatory patient services, (2) emergency services, (3) hospitalization, (4) maternity and newborn care, (5) mental health and substance use disorder services (including behavioral health treatment), (6) prescribed drugs, (7) rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, (8) lab services, (9) preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management, and (10) pediatric services, including oral and vision care. The requirements applicable to the current ABPs are different from the requirements that applied to former benchmark plans.

The Medicaid program, which served an estimated 56.7 million people in FY2012, finances the delivery of a wide variety of preventive, primary, and acute care services as well as long-term services and supports for certain low-income populations. Benefits are available to beneficiaries through two avenues: traditional coverage and alternative benefit plans (ABPs, formerly known as benchmark plans, first established in P.L. 109-171, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005). The traditional Medicaid program covers a wide variety of mandatory services (e.g., inpatient hospital services, lab/x-ray services, physician care, nursing facility care for persons aged 21 and over), and other services at state option (e.g., prescribed drugs, physician-directed clinic services, physical therapy, prosthetic devices) to the majority of Medicaid beneficiaries across the United States. Within broad federal guidelines, states define the amount, duration, and scope of these benefits. Thus, even mandatory services are not identical from state to state. With the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended), benefit requirements have expanded under ABPs. At a minimum, these plans must cover essential health benefits (i.e., ambulatory patient services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance use disorder services [including behavioral health treatment], prescribed drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, lab services, preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management, and pediatric services, including oral and vision care). In addition, at state option, a new group of citizens with income up to 133% of the federal poverty level is eligible for Medicaid as of January 1, 2014. These individuals are required to receive ABPs rather than traditional Medicaid benefits (with some exceptions for subgroups with special medical needs). This report outlines the major rules that govern and define both traditional Medicaid and ABPs. It also compares the similarities and differences between these two benefit package designs.

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Introduction The federal government currently provides support for career and technical education through the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act of 1998 (Perkins III; P.L. 105-332 ). The act authorized funding for vocational and technical education through FY2003, although the Congress continued to provide funding under the act through FY2006. The 109 th Congress has passed and the President has signed the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Improvement Act of 2006 (Perkins IV; P.L. 109-270 ), which reauthorizes and amends the Perkins Act. The President signed the bill on August 12, 2006, P.L. Changes to state and local plans and uses of funds are then considered. The act refers to career and technical education (CTE) rather than vocational and technical education. Title II of the act authorizes the tech-prep program. Highlights of these changes include the following: specifies separate core indicators of performance for the secondary and postsecondary levels; links established between secondary core indicators of performance and ESEA; requires eligible recipients to accept state-adjusted levels of performance or negotiate their own adjusted levels of performance with the eligible agency for each of the core indicators of performance at the secondary and postsecondary levels; requires annual data reported on eligible agencies' and recipients' progress in meeting their core indicators of performance to be disaggregated as required for data reporting under ESEA; requires eligible agencies and recipients to meet at least 90% of an adjusted level of performance for each core indicator of performance, or be required to write an improvement plan; allows the Secretary to withhold only state leadership and administrative funds from eligible agencies that fail to make progress or show improvement, but no longer allows funds withheld to be redistributed to other eligible agencies; and permits eligible agencies to withhold funds from an eligible recipient, but requires the funds be used by the eligible agency to provide services to students who would otherwise have received services from the eligible recipient. During congressional consideration of Perkins IV, there was debate about whether tech-prep should be retained as a separate program or integrated into the basic state grants program.

The federal government currently provides support for career and technical education through the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act of 1998 (Perkins III; P.L. 105-332). The act authorized funding for vocational and technical education through FY2003, although the Congress continued to provide funding under the act through FY2006. The 109th Congress has reauthorized the Perkins Act. On August 12, 2006, the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Improvement Act of 2006 was signed into law (Perkins IV; P.L. 109-270). While many aspects of the Perkins Act remain intact, Perkins IV made several key changes to the act: refers to career and technical education rather than vocational and technical education; retains the basic state grant formula for allocating funds to states if appropriations are level funded or decreasing, but implements a modified formula if appropriations increase; establishes separate core indicators of performance for the secondary and postsecondary levels; modifies the required contents of state and local plans, including adding linkages between the Perkins Act and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as modified by the No Child Left Behind Act; requires eligible agencies and eligible recipients to meet at least 90% of their adjusted levels of performance on each of their core indicators of performance or be required to develop and implement an improvement plan; allows the Secretary of Education to withhold only state leadership and administrative funds from eligible agencies that fail to make progress or show improvement, but no longer allows funds withheld to be redistributed to other eligible agencies; permits eligible agencies to withhold funds from eligible recipients failing to make progress or show improvement; modifies the required and allowable uses of state leadership funds; modifies the required and allowable uses of local funds; and maintains the tech-prep program as a separate program, but permits eligible agencies to consolidate their funding under the basic state grants program and the tech-prep program. This report will not be updated.

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107-279 ). ESRA established IES as an independent research institute housed within the Department of Education (ED) headed by a Director, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve a term of six years. ESRA also established a technical panel composed primarily of researchers, the National Board of Educational Sciences (NBES), to advise the Director on the policies of the institute and approve research priorities and procedures for technical and scientific peer review. Along with ESRA, P.L. 107-279 enacted two additional acts—the Educational Technical Assistance Act (ETAA, Title II of P.L. 107-279 ) and the National Assessment of Educational Progress Authorization Act (NAEPAA, Title III of P.L. 107-279 ). ETAA authorizes the Secretary of Education to make grants to local entities for the purpose of supporting varied technical assistance activities and to states for statewide, longitudinal data systems. NAEPAA authorizes the Commissioner of Education Statistics to carry out a national assessment, state assessments, and a long-term trend assessment in reading and mathematics in grades 4, 8, and 12. Authorities under ESRA, ETAA, and NAEPAA expired in FY2008; however, funding for these programs and activities has continued through annual appropriations legislation. In the 113 th Congress, the House of Representatives passed the Strengthening Education through Research Act ( H.R. 4366 ) by a voice vote on May 8, 2014. In the 114 th Congress, the Senate adopted a largely similar bill by the same name ( S. 227 ) by unanimous consent on December 17, 2015. Education Sciences Reform Act Title I of P.L. Under the provisions of ESRA, as amended, IES is composed of four research centers: the National Center for Education Research (NCER), the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), the National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance (NCEE), and the National Center for Special Education Research (NCSER). National Center for Education Research Part B of ESRA authorizes NCER "to sponsor sustained research that will lead to the accumulation of knowledge and understanding of education." National Center for Education Statistics ESRA Part C authorizes NCES "to collect and analyze education information and statistics in a manner that meets the highest methodological standards." Both bills would have provided for reauthorization of ESRA, ETAA, and NAEPAA and would have amended several provisions related to IES independence, research standards, technical assistance, evaluation, privacy protection, student assessment oversight, and IES accountability.

The Education Sciences Reform Act (ESRA, Title I of P.L. 107-279) established the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) as an independent research arm of the Department of Education (ED). The IES Director, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, serves a six-year term and is advised by a technical panel composed primarily of educational researchers, the National Board of Educational Sciences (NBES). The IES consists of four research centers, the National Center for Education Research (NCER), the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), the National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance (NCEE), and the National Center for Special Education Research (NCSER). NCER sponsors research leading to the accumulation of knowledge and understanding of education. NCES's mission is to collect and analyze education information and statistics in a manner that meets the highest methodological standards. NCEE supports evaluation, technical assistance, development, and dissemination activities. NCSER sponsors research to expand knowledge and understanding of the needs of infants, toddlers, and children with disabilities. Along with ESRA, P.L. 107-279 enacted two additional acts—the Educational Technical Assistance Act (ETAA, Title II of P.L. 107-279) and the National Assessment of Educational Progress Authorization Act (NAEPAA, Title III of P.L. 107-279). ETAA authorizes the Secretary of Education to make grants to local entities for the purpose of supporting varied technical assistance activities and to states for statewide, longitudinal data systems. NAEPAA authorizes the Commissioner of Education Statistics to carry out a national assessment, state assessments, and a long-term trend assessment in reading and mathematics. Authorities under ESRA, ETAA, and NAEPAA expired in FY2008; however, funding for these programs and activities has continued through annual appropriations legislation. In the 113th Congress, the House of Representatives passed the Strengthening Education through Research Act (H.R. 4366) by a voice vote on May 8, 2014. In the 114th Congress, the Senate adopted a largely similar bill by the same name (S. 227) by unanimous consent on December 17, 2015. Both bills would have provided for reauthorization of ESRA, ETAA, and NAEPAA and would have amended several provisions related to IES independence, research standards, technical assistance, evaluation, privacy protection, student assessment oversight, and IES accountability.

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Also of critical importance is the Army's ability to fund both the Future Combat System (FCS) program and its modularity program concurrently. Are some Brigade Combat Teams vulnerable to enemy armor? Accordingly, the Army hopes that modularization will result in: At least a 30% increase in the combat power of the Active Component of the force; An increase in the rotational pool of ready units by at least 50%; Army operating forces that require less augmentation when deployed—reducing the requirement for ad hoc organizations; Creation of a deployable joint-capable headquarters and improvement of joint interoperability across all Army units; Force design upon which the future network centric developments [Future Combat System] can be readily applied; Reduced stress on the force through a more predictable deployment cycle: One year deployed and two years at home station for the Active Component; One year deployed and four years at home station for the Reserve Force; One year deployed and five years at home station for the National Guard Force; and Reduced mobilization times for the Reserve Component as a whole. These shortages will likely be even more pronounced in the Army National Guard that could start their modular conversions with less and much older equipment than most active Army units. Rebalancing and Stabilizing the Force and Cyclical Readiness Other Critical Army Initiatives The Army has three other concurrent initiatives underway which have been described as "critical enablers" in the Army's brigade-centric reconfiguration: rebalancing and stabilizing the force and cyclic unit readiness. These initiatives involve substantial policy, organizational, and personnel changes and some observers contend that these initiatives may be more be difficult to achieve than the creation of modular BCTs and support brigades as they require significant cultural changes for the entire Army. The objective is to keep soldiers in units longer in order to reduce historically high turnover rates of soldiers and their leaders and to foster unit cohesion and operational effectiveness. In addition, this initiative is intended to provide stability to Army families, and could ultimately save the Army money as it could result in fewer moves for soldiers and their families. Congress might decide to examine this issue of Infantry and Stryker BCT firepower vulnerabilities with the Army in greater detail.

In what the Army describes as the "most significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years," it is redesigning its current active duty division force to a 48 brigade combat team (BCT) force. The Army National Guard and Army Reserves will also redesign their forces in a similar fashion. The planned addition of active duty brigades and the conversion of Army National Guard brigades could provide a larger force pool of deployable combat units to ease the burden on units presently deployed, and possibly to shorten the length of time that units are deployed on operations. The Army has three other concurrent initiatives underway that it considers inextricably linked to its brigade-centric redesign: rebalancing to create new "high demand" units; stabilizing the force to foster unit cohesion and enhance predictability for soldiers and their families; and cyclical readiness to better manage resources and to ensure a ready force for operations. These initiatives involve substantial cultural, policy, organizational, and personnel changes. Some experts believe that modular redesign, selective rebalancing, stabilizing, and cyclical readiness are prudent actions that should provide the Army with additional deployable units and also eventually bring stability to soldiers and their families. As long as no additional significant long term troop commitments arise, many feel that these initiatives could help ease the stress on both the active and reserve forces. As the Army continues its modular conversion, it may have to contend with budget, personnel, and equipment shortages which could impede plans to build this new force as intended. Some also question if the Army can afford both its Future Combat System (FCS) program and its modularity program. The 110th Congress might decide to examine these and other concerns in greater detail. This report will be updated.

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Complaints often focus on the fact that some spam contains, or has links to, pornography; that much of it is fraudulent; and the volume of spam is steadily increasing. The DMA, for example, considers spam to be only fraudulent UCE. The final law, the CAN-SPAM Act (see below), took the former approach, defining and allowing marketers to send such e-mail as long as they abide by the terms of the law, such as ensuring that the e-mail does not have fraudulent header information or deceptive subject headings, and includes an opt-out opportunity and other features that proponents argue will allow recipients to take control of their in-boxes. Proponents of the law argue that consumers will benefit because they should see a reduction in fraudulent e-mails. Opponents of the law counter that it legitimizes sending commercial e-mail, and to the extent that consumers do not want to receive such e-mails, the amount of unwanted e-mail actually may increase. Signed into law by President Bush on December 16, 2003 ( P.L. 108-187 ), it went into effect on January 1, 2004. Commercial e-mail may be sent to recipients as long as the message conforms with the following requirements: —transmission information in the header is not false or misleading; —subject headings are not deceptive; —a functioning return e-mail address or comparable mechanism is included to enable recipients to indicate they do not wish to receive future commercial e-mail messages from that sender at the e-mail address where the message was received; —the e-mail is not sent to a recipient by the sender, or anyone acting on behalf of the sender, more than 10 days after the recipient has opted-out, unless the recipient later gives affirmative consent to receive the e-mail (i.e., opts back in); and —the e-mail must be clearly and conspicuously identified as an advertisement or solicitation (although the legislation does not state how or where that identification must be made). The law required only that the FTC develop a plan and timetable for establishing such a registry and to inform Congress of any concerns it has with regard to establishing it. The concept is similar to the National Do Not Call registry where consumers can indicate they do not want to receive telemarketing calls. CAN-SPAM Act Provision The CAN-SPAM Act did not require the FTC to create a Do Not Email registry. FTC Implementation The FTC issued its report to Congress on June 15, 2004. If not, the Commission would then reconsider whether or not a Do Not Email registry is needed. The CAN-SPAM Act preempts state spam laws, but not other state laws that are not specific to electronic mail, such as trespass, contract, or tort law, or other state laws to the extent they relate to fraud or computer crime.

Spam, also called unsolicited commercial email (UCE) or "junk email," aggravates many computer users. Not only can spam be a nuisance, but its cost may be passed on to consumers through higher charges from Internet service providers who must upgrade their systems to handle the traffic. Also, some spam involves fraud, or includes adult-oriented material that offends recipients or that parents want to protect their children from seeing. Proponents of UCE insist it is a legitimate marketing technique that is protected by the First Amendment, and that some consumers want to receive such solicitations. On December 16, 2003, President Bush signed into law the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM) Act, P.L. 108-187. It went into effect on January 1, 2004. The CAN-SPAM Act does not ban UCE. Rather, it allows marketers to send commercial email as long as it conforms with the law, such as including a legitimate opportunity for consumers to "opt-out" of receiving future commercial emails from that sender. It preempts state laws that specifically address spam, but not state laws that are not specific to email, such as trespass, contract, or tort law, or other state laws to the extent they relate to fraud or computer crime. It does not require a centralized "Do Not Email" registry to be created by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), similar to the National Do Not Call registry for telemarketing. The law requires only that the FTC develop a plan and timetable for establishing such a registry, and to inform Congress of any concerns it has with regard to establishing it. The FTC submitted a report to Congress on June 15, 2004, concluding that a Do Not Email registry could actually increase spam. Proponents of CAN-SPAM have argued that consumers are most irritated by fraudulent email, and that the law should reduce the volume of such email because of the civil and criminal penalties included therein. Opponents counter that consumers object to unsolicited commercial email, and since the law legitimizes commercial email (as long as it conforms with the law's provisions), consumers actually may receive more, not fewer, UCE messages. Thus, whether or not "spam" is reduced depends in part on whether it is defined as only fraudulent commercial email, or all unsolicited commercial email. Many observers caution that consumers should not expect any law to solve the spam problem—that consumer education and technological advancements also are needed.

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Introduction One of the most controversial issues in U.S. foreign assistance concerns restrictions on U.S. funding for abortion and family planning activities abroad. For many, the debate focuses on three key questions: Do countries or organizations that receive U.S. assistance perform abortions or engage in coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization activities with U.S. funds? These debates have continued since the Supreme Court's 1973 landmark ruling in Roe v. Wade , which holds that the Constitution protects a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy. Debate over international abortion restrictions has also reached the executive branch. In 1984, President Reagan issued what has become known as the "Mexico City policy," which required foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) receiving U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) family planning assistance to certify that they would not perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning, even if such activities were undertaken with non-U.S. funds. Most recently, it was rescinded by President Barack Obama in January 2009 and reinstated and expanded by President Donald Trump on January 23, 2017. This report examines key legislative and executive branch policies that restrict or place requirements on U.S. funding of abortion or voluntary family planning activities abroad. Setting the Context: Legislative Vehicles Many of the restrictions attached to U.S. funding of abortion and requirements relating to voluntary family planning programs abroad are included in foreign aid authorizations, appropriations, or both, and affect different types of foreign assistance. Helms Amendment (1973) The Helms amendment prohibits the use of U.S. foreign assistance funds to perform abortions or to motivate or coerce individuals to practice abortions. Biden Amendment (1981) In 1981, Congress passed an amendment to the FAA specifying that the United States may not provide foreign assistance for biomedical research related to abortion or involuntary sterilization. Since the Siljander amendment was first introduced, Congress has modified the amendment to state that no funds may be used to "lobby for or against abortion" (emphasis added). It states that "funds shall be made available" only to voluntary family planning projects that meet the following requirements: (1) service providers or referral agents in the project shall not implement or be subject to quotas, or other numerical targets, of total number of births, number of family planning acceptors, or acceptors of a particular method of family planning (this provision shall not be construed to include the use of quantitative estimates or indicators for budgeting and planning purposes); (2) the project shall not include payment of incentives, bribes, gratuities, or financial reward to: (A) an individual in exchange for becoming a family planning acceptor; or (B) program personnel for achieving a numerical target or quota of total number of births, number of family planning acceptors, or acceptors of a particular method of family planning; (3) the project shall not deny any right or benefit, including the right of access to participate in any program of general welfare or the right of access to health care, as a consequence of any individual's decision not to accept family planning services; (4) the project shall provide family planning acceptors comprehensible information on the health benefits and risks of the method chosen, including those conditions that might render the use of the method inadvisable and those adverse side effects known to be consequent to the use of the method; and (5) the project shall ensure that experimental contraceptive drugs and devices and medical procedures are provided only in the context of a scientific study in which participants are advised of potential risks and benefits; and, not less than 60 days after the date on which the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development determines that there has been a violation of the requirements contained in paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (5) of this proviso, or a pattern or practice of violations of the requirements contained in paragraph (4) of this proviso, the Administrator shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations a report containing a description of such violation and the corrective action taken by the Agency. Since the Tiahrt amendment was enacted, USAID reports there have been violations in Peru, Guatemala, and the Philippines. The Mexico City policy as described above was maintained by President George H. W. Bush and rescinded by President Clinton in 1993. The expanded policy, which the Trump Administration named "Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance" (PLGHA), was approved by the Secretary of State in May 2017.

This report details legislation and policies that restrict or place requirements on U.S. funding of abortion or family planning activities abroad. The level and extent of federal funding for these activities is an ongoing and controversial issue in U.S. foreign assistance and has continued to be a point of contention during the 115th Congress. These issues have been debated for over four decades in the context of a broader domestic abortion controversy that began with the Supreme Court's 1973 ruling in Roe v. Wade, which holds that the Constitution protects a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. Since Roe, Congress has enacted foreign assistance legislation placing restrictions or requirements on the federal funding of abortions and on family planning activities abroad. Many of these provisions, often referred to by the name of the lawmakers that introduced them, have been included in foreign aid authorizations, appropriations, or both, and affect different types of foreign assistance. Examples include the "Helms amendment," which prohibits the use of U.S. funds to perform abortions or to coerce individuals to practice abortions; the "Biden amendment," which states that U.S. funds may not be used for biomedical research related to abortion or involuntary sterilization; the "Siljander amendment," which prohibits U.S. funds from being used to lobby for or against abortion; the "Kemp-Kasten amendment," which prohibits funding for any organization or program that, as determined by the President, supports or participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization (the Trump Administration has withheld funding from UNFPA under this law); and the "Tiahrt amendment," which places requirements on voluntary family planning projects receiving assistance from USAID. The executive branch has also engaged in the debate over international abortion and family planning. In 1984, President Ronald Reagan issued what has become known as the "Mexico City policy," which required foreign nongovernmental organizations receiving USAID family planning assistance to certify that they would not perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning, even if such activities were conducted with non-U.S. funds. The policy was rescinded by President Bill Clinton and reinstituted and expanded by President George W. Bush to include State Department activities. In January 2009, President Barack Obama rescinded the policy. It was reinstated and expanded by President Trump in January 2017, and renamed "Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance" (PLGHA). This report focuses primarily on legislative restrictions and executive branch policies related to international abortion and family planning. For information on domestic abortion laws and U.S. global health assistance, including international family planning, see CRS Report RL33467, Abortion: Judicial History and Legislative Response, by Jon O. Shimabukuro, and CRS In Focus IF10131, U.S. Global Health Assistance: FY2017-FY2019 Request, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther. This report is updated as events warrant.

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Introduction Border and Transportation Security (BTS) is a pivotal function in protecting the Americanpeople from terrorists and their instruments of destruction. The threereports in this series attempt to provide an understanding of the complex problems faced in seekingenhanced border and transportation security, suggest a framework to better understand existingprograms and policies, and explore some possible new directions and policy options. Thisreport addresses the myriad programs and policies that make up the nation's current approach toattaining higher levels of BTS. Congressional Concerns Congressional concern with terrorism and border security was manifested early, followinga series of terrorist attacks beginning in the 1990s. The congressional response began with inquiries related tothe nature of the terrorist threat, and was followed by specific, targeted measures to protect the nationfollowing the events of 9/11. There are indications that congressional interest continues in broader,more comprehensive approaches including recent efforts to respond to the report of the 9/11Commission contained in the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 ( P.L. The following actions are set in a framework that suggests types of possiblepolicy actions: Pushing the border outwards to intercept unwanted people or goods before theyreach the United States; Hardening the border through the use of technology and the presence of moreagents at the border; Making the border more accessible for legitimate trade andtravel; Strengthening the border through more effective use of intelligence;and Multiplying effectiveness through the engagement of other actors in theenforcement effort (including engaging Canada, Mexico, state and local law enforcement resources,and the private sector). Computer Aided Passenger Pre-Screening System. (48) Traditional foreignintelligence as well as criminal intelligence contribute to enhancing border security. Conclusion Balancing security with trade and travel may require a "layered approach" to attain bothgoals. (55) The current programs and policies were either put into place asa result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks or predated the attacks. Those programs and policies that wereput into place as a result of the attacks were done so with a sense of urgency -- to prevent anotherattack . Programs and policies already in existence prior to the attacks, however, were created witha different focus and not necessarily with the goal of keeping terrorists out of the country. As noted earlier, this report is one of a series of three CRS reports that address the issue ofBTS. The first report in the series, CRS Report RL32839 , Border and Transportation Security: TheComplexity of the Challenge , analyzes the reasons why BTS is so difficult to attain. This report isthe second in the series. The final report is CRS Report RL32841 , Border and TransportationSecurity: Possible New Directions and Policy Options . (58) It is a form ofpre-inspections for low-risk, frequent travelers.

Border and Transportation Security (BTS) is a pivotal function in protecting the Americanpeople from terrorists and their instruments of destruction. This report addresses selected programsand policies now in place that seek to attain higher levels of BTS. It is the second in a three-partseries of CRS reports that make use of analytical frameworks to better understand complexphenomena and cast them in terms that facilitate consideration of alternative policies and practices. (The first report in the series, CRS Report RL32839 , Border and Transportation Security: TheComplexity of the Challenge , analyzes the reasons why BTS is so difficult to attain. This report isthe second in the series. The final report is CRS Report RL32841 , Border and TransportationSecurity: Possible New Directions and Policy Options .) Congressional concern with terrorism and border security was manifested as early as 1993,with the first World Trade Center attack and subsequent terrorist attacks against U.S. targets abroad. The congressional response to these events began with attempts to understand the nature of theterrorist threat through the creation of several commissions. The response to the 9/11 attacks wasfollowed by specific, targeted measures to protect the nation such as the creation of theTransportation Security Administration and the passage of laws that were aimed at strengtheningsecurity at the border, including immigration policies with respect to the admission of foreignnationals; and strengthening security in the maritime domain. Congressional interest continues inmore comprehensive approaches including recent efforts to respond to the report of the 9/11Commission. There are several broad strategies that could be pursued to enhance border security. Currentprograms and policies can be grouped under the following generic categories, which include pushingthe border outwards to intercept unwanted people or goods before they reach the United States (asin the passenger pre-screening program); hardening the border through the use of technology (asshown by biometric identifiers); making the border more accessible for legitimate trade and travel(as in "trusted traveler" programs); strengthening the border inspection process through moreeffective use of intelligence (with the integration of terrorist watch lists); and multiplying theeffectiveness of interdiction programs through the engagement of other actors in the enforcementeffort (as displayed by bi-national accords with Canada and Mexico). It is also possible to use thestrategies as a checklist for what new efforts might be explored. Many current programs and policies to enhance border and transportation security were putinto place as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks with a sense of urgency -- to prevent another attack . Programs and policies in existence prior to the attacks, however, were often created with a differentfocus and not necessarily with the terrorist threat in mind. The challenge for Congress is to reviewthese programs and policies comprehensively to help them form a more coherent and effectiveoverall strategy. This report will be updated periodically as events warrant.

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U.S. concerns about gangs are due in part to the role gangs have played in the violence, extortion, and forced recruitment that has fueled internal displacement, as well as the record-level emigration of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) and families to the United States. Members of Congress have also taken an interest in the impact on the gang problem of U.S. deportations of individuals with criminal records to Central America, as well as the evolving relationship between Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and the gangs. This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. Transnational Gangs in Central America The major gangs operating in Central America with ties to the United States are the "18 th Street" gang (also known as M-18), and its main rival, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). The northern triangle countries have among the highest homicide rates in the world (see Figure 3 ). Some also maintain that recent reductions in homicides in El Salvador may be due more to a nonaggression pact among the gangs than to the "extraordinary measures" adopted by the government in March 2016. Gangs also engage in sex trafficking involving women and children, particularly in Honduras and in Guatemala City. El Salvador's attorney general is investigating several officials who were involved in facilitating the truce for allegedly providing as much as $25 million to gang leaders and their affiliates. The failed truce in El Salvador and the escalating gang-related violence that has fueled illegal emigration from that country and parts of Honduras since 2014 has refocused attention on gangs in Central America. As Congress has appropriated significant funding for anti-gang efforts, it has also conducted oversight of the efficacy of U.S. programs that affect Central American gangs. Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress appropriated roughly $38 million in global International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Since FY2013, approximately $10 million in Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) funding has been assigned to continue specific anti-gang initiatives. Evolution of U.S. International Anti-gang Efforts U.S. agencies have been engaged on both the law-enforcement and the preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs for more than a decade. Throughout 2005 and 2006, an interagency committee worked to develop a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, which was announced at a July 2007 U.S.-Central America Integration System summit on security issues. The strategy stated that the U.S. government would pursue coordinated anti-gang activities in five broad areas: diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. The U.S. government has expanded its citizen-security and law-enforcement programs in Central America beyond anti-gang efforts and antidrug programs through CARSI, a regional security initiative for which Congress appropriated roughly $1.5 billion from FY2008 to FY2016. The Honduran government has provided $3 million from its security tax to support USAID's violence-prevention programming. The TCIUs focus on transnational investigations and border crimes, some of which have a nexus with gangs. U.S. Treasury Department On October 11, 2012, the Treasury Department designated the MS-13 as a significant TCO whose assets will be targeted for economic sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581. How effective are regional anti-gang efforts?

The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its main rival, the "18th Street" gang, continue to undermine citizen security and subvert government authority in parts of Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in El Salvador, Honduras, and urban areas in Guatemala, contributing to some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of gang-related crime and violence on governance, citizen security, and investment in Central America. Congress has examined the role that gang-related violence has played in fueling mixed migration flows, which have included asylum seekers, by families and unaccompanied alien children (UAC) to the United States. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated funding for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Central American governments have struggled to address the gang problem. From 2012 to 2014, the government of El Salvador facilitated a historic—and risky—truce involving the country's largest gangs. The truce contributed to a temporary reduction in homicides but strengthened the gangs. Since taking office in June 2014, President Salvador Sanchez Cerén has adopted repression-oriented anti-gang policies similar those implemented in the mid-2000s, including relying on the military to support anti-gang efforts. El Salvador's attorney general is investigating allegations of extrajudicial killings committed by police engaged in anti-gang efforts. Successive Honduran governments have generally relied on suppression-oriented policies toward the gangs as well, with some funding provided in recent years to support community-level prevention programs. The Guatemalan government has generally relied on periodic law-enforcement operations to round up suspected gang members. U.S. agencies have engaged with Central American governments on gang issues for more than a decade. In July 2007, an interagency committee announced the U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, which emphasized diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. Between FY2008 and FY2013, Congress appropriated roughly $38 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds through a special line item for anti-gang efforts in Central America. Since FY2013, approximately $10 million in Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) funding has been assigned to continue those anti-gang initiatives. Significant additional support has been provided through CARSI for violence-prevention efforts in communities affected by gang violence, as well as for vetted police units working on transnational gang cases with U.S. law enforcement. Recently, U.S. and Salvadoran officials have also targeted the financing of MS-13, which the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated as a Transnational Criminal Organization subject to U.S. sanctions in October 2012, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581. This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America. Congressional oversight may focus on the efficacy of anti-gang efforts in Central America; the interaction between U.S. domestic and international anti-gang policies, and the potential impact of U.S. sanctions on law-enforcement efforts. See also CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, and CRS Report R43702, Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations.

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Eradication of Crops A long-standing U.S. policy regarding international drug control is to reduce cultivation and production of illicit narcotics through eradication. The United States supports programs to eradicate coca, opium, and marijuana in a number of countries. Proponents of strong drug interdiction policies have long been concerned that the nation's focus on anti-terror objectives will detract from resources and political will needed to combat foreign illicit drug production and trafficking. To this end, the U.S. government has provided technical assistance for anti-drug programs in other countries. Current law on International Drug Control Certification Procedures ( P.L. In the report the President must designate each country that has "failed demonstrably" to meet its counternarcotics obligations. Policy Approaches Overview The primary goal of U.S. international narcotics control policy is to stem the flow of foreign drugs into the United States. Opponents of a sanctions policy linking aid and trade to U.S. international narcotics objectives argue that sanctions may have an undesirable effect on the political and economic stability of target countries, making them all the more dependent on the drug trade for income; that sanctions have little impact because many countries are not dependent on U.S. aid; that sanctions historically have little effect unless they are multilaterally imposed; and that sanctions are arbitrary in nature, hurt national pride in the foreign country, and are seen in many countries as an ugly manifestation of "Yankee imperialism." Plan Colombia/Andean Counterdrug Initiative On July 13, 2000, U.S. legislation was signed into law ( P.L. 106-246 ). Included was $1.3 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations for equipment, supplies, and other counter narcotics aid primarily for the Colombian military. It required the President to withhold assistance from the countries most remiss in meeting their international drug-fighting obligations, but permitted the President to determine what countries to put in the "worst offending" category and (under specified conditions) to provide U.S. foreign assistance to a designated country. This does not mean that international drug policy has been neglected by the Administration, or given a lower priority than by preceding administrations. Possible Issues Relating to Policy and Strategy Implementation Possible issues of concern to Congress relating to international drug control policy and strategy implementation include the following: (1) Can Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative as currently envisioned have a meaningful impact on reducing drug shipments to the United States and in reducing the current level of violence and instability in Colombia? For example, should the U.S. continue to press for aerial crop eradication in Afghanistan against the wishes of the local Afghan leadership, even if this means alienating and losing their support for counterterror goals and objectives?

Efforts to significantly reduce the flow of illicit drugs from abroad into the United States have so far not succeeded. Moreover, over the past decade, worldwide production of illicit drugs has risen dramatically: opium and marijuana production has roughly doubled and coca production tripled. The effectiveness of international narcotics control programs in reducing consumption is a matter of ongoing concern. Despite apparent national political resolve to deal with the drug problem, inherent contradictions regularly appear between U.S. anti-drug policy and other national policy goals and concerns. Pursuit of drug control policies can sometimes affect foreign policy interests and bring political instability and economic dislocation to countries where narcotics production has become entrenched economically and socially. Drug supply interdiction programs and U.S. systems to facilitate the international movement of goods, people, and wealth are often at odds. U.S. international narcotics policy requires cooperative efforts by many nations that may have domestic and foreign policy goals that compete with the requirements of drug control. One contentious issue has been the congressionally-mandated certification process, an instrument designed to induce specified drug-exporting countries to prioritize or pay more attention to the fight against narcotics businesses. Current law requires the President, with certain exceptions, to designate and withhold assistance from countries that have failed demonstrably to meet their counternarcotics obligations. P.L. 106-246, commonly referred to as "Plan Colombia," a $1.3 billion military assistance-focused initiative to provide emergency supplemental narcotics assistance to Colombia, was signed into law July 13, 2000. Recently, U.S. policy toward Colombia has focused increasingly on containing the terrorist threat to that country's security posed by groups engaged in drug trafficking. The high national priority given to terrorism has resulted in enhanced focus on links between drug and terror groups. A challenge facing policymakers is not to divert counter-drug resources for anti-terror ends in areas of potentially low payoff. An issue likely to receive continued attention in the 109th Congress is that of skyrocketing opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and whether to press for aerial crop eradication against the wishes of the local Afghan leadership. This report replaces IB10150, International Narcotics Policy: Overview and Analysis, by [author name scrubbed]. It will be updated periodically.

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The Constitution, House rules and practices, and certain statutes define which proceedings are to be recorded, while the House itself controls how and to what extent the Journal 's contents are presented. In current practice, the House automatically agrees to approval unless a Member calls for a vote. Unlike the Congressional Record , it is not a transcript of debate. Rather, it is a listing of legislative actions. At the start of the next legislative day, the Speaker announces his or her approval of the previous day's Journal (the daily Journal ). House Rule XX provides specific requirements for the recording of votes and quorum calls. House Practice , and the three published collections of House precedents, identify the main purpose of the Journal is "to ensure that the proceedings of the House be a matter of public record." Use as Official Record The Journal is the official record of House proceedings. If the question is decided in the affirmative by voice or record vote, the Clerk reads the previous day's Journal , omitting the names of Members responding to votes or the texts of messages unless a Member demands a full reading. Procedures That Occur If a Journal Vote Fails Journal approval votes rarely fail. Reasons to Demand a Vote on or Vote Against Approval of the Journal According to the U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Votes database, the House held 472 Journal -approval record votes from 1991 to 2016 (102 nd -114 th Congresses, Table 1 ). None of these votes failed. To Amend the Journal When a Member demands a vote to agree to the Speaker's approval of the Journal , it may be seen as an attempt to amend the Journal 's contents. Thus, a Member may initiate a Journal -approval vote in order to ascertain the presence of a quorum. To Assemble Members Prior to a Major Vote or Announcement The act of assessing a quorum is related to another use of Journal -approval votes: to assemble Members prior to a major vote or leadership announcement. For instance, in 1999, a majority-party Member initiated an immediate record vote on the Journal . Under this still-common procedure, the Speaker responds with either an immediate record vote to confirm the presence of a quorum or instead postpones the question until later in the legislative day, at which point the question is considered de novo (as if new), and a record vote may or may not be requested following a voice vote.

The Journal of the House of Representatives is the official record of the chamber's legislative actions. The Journal's contents include the titles of introduced legislation, the results of votes, presidential veto messages, and any other matters the House deems to be official proceedings. Unlike the Congressional Record, it is not a transcript of debate. Rather, the Journal is a listing of House actions without the debate accompanying those actions. The Constitution mandates that each House keep a journal of its proceedings (Art. 1, §5). The Constitution, House rules and practices, and, to a lesser extent, statutes direct which proceedings must be recorded. The Journal is public, enabling citizens to follow House actions, excepting those that require secrecy, such as matters of national security. Under House rules, the Speaker announces his or her approval of the Journal at the start of each legislative day. In current practice, approval is automatic unless a Member demands a vote. If that occurs, the Speaker then holds or postpones a voice or record vote to agree to the approval of the Journal. Members may call for a vote, or vote against the Journal's approval, in order to pursue changes to the Journal or for strategic reasons unrelated to the Journal's contents. For instance, Members may use votes to ascertain the presence of Members, delay proceedings, protest an action, assemble Members prior to a vote or announcement, or establish independence from leadership. If the vote to approve the Journal fails, the Journal may be subject to amendment. In the period examined (1990-2016), no record vote on approval of the Journal has failed. However, in 1990, a voice vote failed, allowing a Member to offer an amendment, which was approved. This report considers the origin and purpose of the Journal as well as the procedures related to its approval. It discusses why a Member might call for a vote and why a Member might vote against the Journal's approval. The report also examines record approval votes from 1991 to 2016 (102nd-114th Congresses), addressing trends in the frequency of these votes, the percentage of votes initiated by majority party Members, and the procedures used to call for or postpone record votes.

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Data and Methodology The existence of the e-mail "Dear Colleague" system and the web-based e -"Dear Colleague" system means that data on House "Dear Colleague" letters are available beginning in 2003. The first dataset, which contains the total number of "Dear Colleague" letters between January 2003 and December 2010, allowed examination of the volume of "Dear Colleague" letters sent. "Dear Colleague" Volume Overall, the number of "Dear Colleague" letters sent electronically between 2003 and 2010 increased each year. "Dear Colleague" Letters' Characteristics and Purpose "Dear Colleague" letters are often used to encourage others to co-sponsor, support, or oppose a bill or resolution. In light of the analysis of the volume, use, characteristics, and purpose of "Dear Colleague" letters, several possible administrative and operational questions could be raised to aid the House in future discussions of the e -"Dear Colleague" system. Can the current system handle the indefinite archiving of "Dear Colleague" letters? In 2003, 5,161 "Dear Colleague" letters were sent, while in 2010, 14,531 letters were sent in the House. This report analyzed the number of "Dear Colleague" letters sent and showed that overall more letters were sent during the first session of a Congress than the second session. Additionally, the average number of "Dear Colleague" letters sent in the second session declined between September and December, which coincides with a decline in overall legislative activity at the end of a Congress. During the 111 th Congress, data from the web-based e -"Dear Colleague" system showed that Members sent the most letters (94%), and that the most popular topics were health care (8.8%), foreign affairs (7.9%), education (6.0%), family issues (5.8%), the economy (5.6%), and the environment (5.4%). The data demonstrated that the most frequent use of "Dear Colleague" letters in the 111 th Congress was to elicit legislative co-sponsors (53%). Finally, when examining "Dear Colleague" letters that were linked to a specific piece of legislation, the data showed that public laws with a linked "Dear Colleague" letter had a greater number of average co-sponsors (74) than public laws without an associated "Dear Colleague" letter (16). The same can also be said for House resolutions, where resolutions associated with a "Dear Colleague" letter had an average of 50 co-sponsors and resolutions not associated with a "Dear Colleague" letter had average of 24.

The practice of writing "Dear Colleague" letters—official written correspondence from one Member, committee, or office to other Members, committees, or offices—dates back to at least the 1800s. Yet until recently, it was almost impossible to track the volume or purpose of "Dear Colleague" letters because a centralized, searchable system did not exist. The creation of the web-based e-"Dear Colleague" system has made it possible to systematically examine "Dear Colleague" letters, thereby offering a clearer understanding of what are largely, but not exclusively, intra-chamber communications. In analyzing data on the volume of "Dear Colleague" letters sent between January 2003 and December 2010, several discernable trends can be observed. Overall, the total number of "Dear Colleague" letters sent continued to increase, from 5,161 "Dear Colleague" letters sent in 2003 to 14,531 letters sent in 2010. Additionally, the data show that overall more letters were sent during the first session of a Congress than the second session, and that the average number of "Dear Colleague" letters sent in the second session declined between September and December. This fall-off coincides with a decline in overall legislative activity at the end of a Congress. During the 111th Congress, data from the web-based e-"Dear Colleague" system showed that Members sent the most letters (94%), and that the most popular topics were health care (8.8%) and foreign affairs (7.9%), followed by education (6.0%), family issues (5.8%), economy (5.6%), and environment (5.4%). The data demonstrated that the most frequent use of "Dear Colleague" letters in the 111th Congress was to elicit bill and resolution co-sponsors (53%). Finally, when examining "Dear Colleague" letters that were linked to a specific piece of legislation, the data showed that public laws with a linked "Dear Colleague" letter had a greater number of average co-sponsors (74) than public laws without an associated "Dear Colleague" letter (16). The same can also be said for House resolutions, where resolutions associated with a "Dear Colleague" letter had an average of 50 co-sponsors and resolutions not associated with a "Dear Colleague" letter had an average of 24. In light of the analysis of the volume, use, characteristics, and purpose of "Dear Colleague" letters, several possible administrative and operations questions are raised to aid the House in future discussions of the e-"Dear Colleague" system. These include questions on handling the growth in volume of "Dear Colleague" letters sent per year, and the potential to create additional mechanisms within the e-"Dear Colleague" system to aid subscribers in managing the "Dear Colleague" letters they receive. For a brief explanation on how to send "Dear Colleague" letters, see CRS Report RL34636, "Dear Colleague" Letters: Current Practices, by [author name scrubbed].

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Political and Economic Environment in the Region U.S. policy toward the Latin American and Caribbean region is conducted in the context of significant economic and political changes in the hemisphere as well as the region's increasing independence from the United States. Latin American and Caribbean countries have diversified their economic and diplomatic ties with countries outside the region. Obama Administration's Priorities for the Region The Obama Administration set forth a broad framework for U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean centered on four pillars or priorities: promoting economic and social opportunity; ensuring citizen security; strengthening effective institutions of democratic governance; and securing a clean energy future. Continuity and Change in U.S. Policy During the Obama Administration's first six years, there was significant continuity in U.S. policy toward Latin America, with the Administration pursuing some of the same basic policy approaches as the Bush Administration. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration also made several changes, including an overall emphasis on partnership and shared responsibility. In 2015, Congress enacted P.L. Congress and Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean Overview of Action in the 114th Congress Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. The most significant legislative action on Latin America and the Caribbean in the first session of the 114 th Congress was the enactment of the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure ( P.L. The law included numerous provisions on foreign aid to the region, including $750 million for ramped up funding for Central America to address economic, security, and governance challenges. 114-92 ), enacted in November 2015, also has provisions regarding increased support for Central America as well as prohibitions against funding for the closure of the U.S. Earlier in the year, Congress approved an extension of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) through 2017 in the Trade Preferences Extension Act ( P.L. 114-27 ), enacted in June, which benefits some 15 countries in the region. In other action, the House passed H.Res. In the second session in 2016, Congress took action on several measures related to the region. 114-194 ). Also in September, Congress enacted a legislative vehicle ( P.L. 114-223 , Division B) that provided FY2016 supplemental funding to control the spread of the Zika virus in the Americas. 114-323 , the FY2017 Department of State Authorities Act, in Title VI established a Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. drug control policy in the Western Hemisphere, including an evaluation of counternarcotics assistance programs. The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. 114-328 ( S. 2943 ), signed into law by the President on December 23, has several provisions on the region, including those extending a unified counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign in Colombia for two years (Section 1013); continuing a prohibition on use of funds for realigning forces at or the closure of the U.S. Naval Station and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Section 1035); requiring the Secretaries of Defense and State to submit a joint report on military units that have been assigned to do policing or other law enforcement duties in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and detailing U.S. government assistance for those units (Section 1069); and restricting FY2017 funding for Cuba's participation in certain joint or multilateral exercises or related security conference between the U.S. and Cuban governments (Section 1286). 114-254 ) in December funding most foreign aid programs at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of almost 0.2%, through April 28, 2017. The 115 th Congress will face completing action on FY2017 foreign aid appropriations. Oversight attention in the 114 th Congress focused on such issues as U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean; the Administration's policy shift on Cuba, including issues related to U.S. national security, human rights, U.S. trade, U.S. property claims, security concerns surrounding the resumption of regular air service with Cuba, and U.S. agricultural trade with Cuba; the Administration's aid request for Central America and the migration crisis in that subregion; Venezuela's economic and political crisis; an overview of the situation in Haiti; the activities of Iran in Latin America; energy issues; the status of Colombia's peace talks; threats to press freedom in the Americas; Chinese and Russian engagement in the region; the human rights situation in both Cuba and Venezuela; the Zika epidemic in the hemisphere; U.S. engagement with the Caribbean; and the democratic setback in Nicaragua. Congress did not complete action on these bills, but in December 2016, it enacted a FY2017 continuing resolution ( P.L. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 . Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the FY2016 NDAA, P.L. In July 2016, the 114 th Congress enacted legislation ( P.L. In September 2016, the House approved H.Res. Policy toward the region under the incoming Trump Administration at this juncture is uncertain. Appendix. Hearings in the 114th Congress

U.S. Interests and Policy Geographic proximity has ensured strong linkages between the United States and the Latin American and Caribbean region, based on diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and security concerns. U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration focused on four priorities: promoting economic and social opportunity; ensuring citizen security; strengthening effective democratic institutions; and securing a clean energy future. There was substantial continuity in U.S. policy toward the region during the first six years of the Obama Administration, which pursued some of the same basic policy approaches as the Bush Administration. However, the Obama Administration made several significant policy changes, including an emphasis on partnership and shared responsibility. Moreover, President Obama unveiled a new policy approach of engagement with Cuba in 2014. U.S. policy toward the region is conducted in the context of an increasingly independent Latin America, which has diversified its economic and diplomatic ties with countries outside the region. Over the past few years, several Latin American regional organizations have been established that do not include the United States. Nevertheless, the United States remains very much engaged in Latin America bilaterally and multilaterally. Congressional Action and Oversight Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. In the first session of the 114th Congress in 2015, the most significant legislative action was enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). The law had numerous provisions on foreign aid to the region, including $750 million for ramped-up funding to address Central America's economic, security, and governance challenges. The FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 114-92) also had provisions regarding increased support for Central America and prohibitions against funding for the closure of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Also in 2015, Congress approved an extension of the Generalized System of Preferences through 2017 in the Trade Preferences Extension Act (P.L. 114-27) benefitting some 15 countries in the region. Late in 2015, the House passed H.Res. 536, expressing support for freedom of the press in the region. In the second session, Congress enacted legislation in July 2016 extending targeted sanctions for human rights abuses in Venezuela through 2019 (P.L. 114-194), while in September 2016 the House approved H.Res. 851 on the situation in Venezuela. Also in September, Congress enacted a legislative vehicle (P.L. 114-223) that provided FY2016 supplemental funding to control the spread of the Zika virus in the Americas. As the 114th Congress neared its end in December 2016, Congress completed action on several measures with provisions related to the region. P.L. 114-291 requires the Secretary of State to submit a multiyear strategy for U.S. engagement with the Caribbean. P.L. 114-323, the Department of State Authorities Act, FY2017, established a commission to review U.S. drug control policy in the hemisphere, including an evaluation of counternarcotics assistance programs. P.L. 114-328, the FY2017 NDAA, extends a unified counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign in Colombia for two years; requires a report on U.S. military units that have been assigned to do policing or other law enforcement duties in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras; continues prohibitions on funding for the closure of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and restricts funding for Cuba's participation in certain joint or multilateral exercises or related security conferences. Congress did not complete action on FY2017 foreign aid appropriations, but it enacted a continuing resolution, P.L. 114-254, in December that funded most foreign aid programs at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of almost 0.2%, through April 28, 2017. The 115th Congress will face completing action on FY2017 foreign aid appropriations. This report, which will not be updated, provides an overview of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean during the 114th Congress in 2015 and 2016. It begins with an overview of the political and economic environment affecting U.S. relations and then examines the Obama Administration's policy toward the region. The report then examines congressional interests in the region and legislative action, looking at selected regional and country issues. An Appendix provides links to hearings on the region in the 114th Congress.

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A bank's asset or lending portfolio may grow proportionately with its capital reserves, and guidelines for this proportion have been established by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). In a further response to the financial crisis, the Basel III reform package revises the definition of regulatory capital and increases the amount that banks must hold. Basel III also would require banks to hold a greater percentage of their assets in cash or in assets that can easily be converted to cash. Basel III requires banks to satisfy all of these enhanced requirements by 2019. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203 ) also addressed capital reserve requirements for banks. The Collins Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act amends the definition of capital, establishes minimum capital and leverage requirements, and establishes an implementation timeline that is faster than what was agreed to in the Basel III Accord. In addition, Dodd-Frank removes the requirement that credit ratings be referenced when evaluating the creditworthiness of financial securities. Regulators are required to find other appropriate standards by which to determine the financial risks of bank portfolio holdings while enforcing the mandatory capital requirements. This statutory requirement can potentially complicate implementation of Basel II.5 and Basel III in the United States. This report discusses how the Basel Capital Accord framework has been modified to improve the methodology used to capture credit risk, and analyzes selected implementation issues in the United States. The next section explains how the BCBS incorporates credit ratings into the regulatory framework whereas the Dodd-Frank Act eliminates any references to credit ratings in federal financial regulation, and how this may complicate the adoption of Basel II.5 and Basel III. The report also summarizes the enhanced capital and liquidity requirements associated with Basel III and compares them to related provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act. In contrast to the four risk categories established under Basel I, the December NPR proposed the assignment of a specific range of risk weights to various types of asset holdings (or exposures) based upon the following seven categories of issuers (of financial securities): sovereign entities (i.e., a central government or an agency, department, ministry, or a central bank of a central government); certain multilateral development banks (the December NPR provides a listing) and supranational entities (i.e., the Bank for International Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund); government-sponsored entities (i.e., the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, the Farm Credit System, the Federal Home Loan Bank System); depository institutions, foreign banks, and credit unions; public-sector entities (i.e., state, local authority or other government subdivision below the level of a sovereign entity); corporate entities (i.e., an entity that does not fall under the previously listed entities or meet the definition of a securitization) and a financial institution that satisfies the definition provided in the December NPR; and any financial securities that satisfy the definition of a securitization provided in the December NPR. The quantitative requirements and phase-in schedules for Basel III were approved by the 27-member jurisdictions and 44 central banks and supervisory authorities on September 12, 2010. Table 1 summarizes the Basel III minimum capital requirements and phase-in arrangements. Bank lending decisions and strategies may also ensue at a slower pace as a result of the challenges associated with the simultaneous implementation of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act.

The Basel III Capital Accord, which was produced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the Bank for International Settlements, is the latest in a series of evolving agreements among central banks and bank supervisory authorities from around the world to establish minimum capital requirements for financial institutions. Capital serves as a cushion against sudden financial shocks (such as an unusually high occurrence of loan defaults), which can otherwise lead to insolvency. The Basel III regulatory reform package revises the definition of regulatory capital and increases the amount that must be held by banking organizations. Basel III also recommends holding more assets that can easily be converted to cash to shield against temporary decreases in liquidity. The quantitative requirements and phase-in schedules for Basel III were approved by the 27-member jurisdictions and 44 central banks and supervisory authorities on September 12, 2010, and endorsed by the G20 leaders on November 12, 2010. Basel III requires banks to satisfy all of these enhanced requirements by 2019. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) also addressed capital reserve requirements for banks. The Collins Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act amends the definition of capital; establishes minimum capital and leverage requirements for banking subsidiaries, bank holding companies, and systemically important non-bank financial companies; and establishes an implementation timeline that is shorter than the timeline agreed to in the Basel III Accord. In addition, Dodd-Frank removes the requirement that credit ratings be referenced when evaluating the creditworthiness of financial securities. In other words, bank regulators (e.g., the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) are required to find other appropriate standards by which to determine the financial risks of bank portfolio holdings while enforcing the mandatory capital requirements. Regulators face challenges in their attempt to establish credit rating alternatives, which may delay the implementation of Basel III in the United States. Bank lending decisions and strategies, therefore, may also be delayed in anticipation of higher capital reserve requirements stemming from implementation of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act. Bankers may prefer knowing how much more capital they would need to hold before greatly expanding their lending portfolios with longer-term assets. This report discusses how the Basel Capital Accord framework has been modified as well as subsequent implementation issues in the United States. The report explains how the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision incorporates credit ratings into the regulatory framework whereas the Dodd-Frank Act eliminates references to credit ratings in federal financial regulation, and how this may complicate the adoption of subsequent phases of the Basel framework, namely Basel II.5 and Basel III. The regulators issued a proposed rule in December 2011 for implementing Basel II.5, which may help to inform the future contours of Basel III implementation in the United States. The report also summarizes the enhanced capital and liquidity requirements associated with Basel III, related provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act, and some remaining implementation concerns.

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Recent Heightened Interest President Barack H. Obama issued Executive Order 13526 on "Classified National Security Information" on December 29, 2009. 13526, multiple incidents have further heightened congressional, media, and public interest in the issue of classified information policy: 1. 2. This report addresses classified information policy, including its history, costs, and the agencies assigned a role in it. The report focuses on Executive Order 13526, which establishes the current policy, and identifies possible classified information policy oversight issues for Congress. Overview: Classified Information Policy Definition Many authorities and policies limit access to information held by the federal government. This report focuses on one of these policies—classified information policy, which also is called security classification policy and classified national security information policy . Federal law has defined classified information as information or material designated and clearly marked or clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or Executive order (or a regulation or order issued pursuant to a statute or Executive order), as requiring a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security (50 U.S.C. 426(1)). Executive Orders Since 1940, Presidents regularly have issued executive orders to set classified information policies ( Table 1 ). Typically, these directives have defined who in the federal government may classify information, what levels of classification and classification markings (e.g., "top secret") may be used, who may access classified information, and how and when classified information is to be declassified. 12937), or established new agencies to implement aspects of classified information policy (E.O. Most recently, Congress enacted P.L. 111-258 , the Reducing Over-Classification Act, which President Obama signed into law on October 9, 2010. The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), an agency within the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), annually releases a report on agencies' estimated classified information policy costs. The ISOO reports that total government classified information policy costs were $8.8 billion in FY2009. 12958) regarding (i) Establishment of a National Declassification Center to bring appropriate agency officials together to perform collaborative declassification review under the administration of the Archivist of the United States; (ii) Effective measures to address the problem of over classification, including the possible restoration of the presumption against classification, which would preclude classification of information where there is significant doubt about the need for such classification, and the implementation of increased accountability for classification decisions; (iii) Changes needed to facilitate greater sharing of classified information among appropriate parties; (iv) Appropriate prohibition of reclassification of material that has been declassified and released to the public under proper authority; (v) Appropriate classification, safeguarding, accessibility, and declassification of information in the electronic environment, as recommended by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and others; and (vi) Any other measures appropriate to provide for greater openness and transparency in the Government's security classification and declassification program while also affording necessary protection to the Government's legitimate interests. 13526 E.O 13526 revoked E.O. 13526) requiring agencies to make significant revisions to their security classification policies and practices. The terms damage and national security are inherently broad concepts. 3. 4. 13526, the President ordered the National Declassification Center to clear the more than 400 million pages of classified records more than 25 years old by December 31, 2013. Congress may consider examining whether agencies have faced any challenges in implementing the new law and the executive order consonantly. The Reducing Over-Classification Act aims to increase information-sharing among agencies.

Recently, there have been multiple high-profile incidents involving the release of classified government information. Perhaps most prominent was Wikileaks.org's unauthorized publication of more than 600,000 classified Department of Defense documents. Such incidents have further heightened congressional, media, and public interest in classified information policy. President Barack H. Obama issued Executive Order 13526 on "Classified National Security Information" on December 29, 2009, and Congress enacted P.L. 111-258, the Reducing Over-Classification Act, which President Obama signed into law on October 9, 2010. This report provides information on classified information policy, which also is called security classification policy and national security classification information policy. It discusses the history, costs, and agencies assigned roles in classified information policy. The report focuses on Executive Order 13526, which establishes much of the current policy, and the report identifies possible oversight issues for Congress. In broad terms, classified information policy aims to decrease the probability of persons or foreign nations accessing government-held information without authorization and using it to harm the national security of the United States. To this end, many authorities and policies limit access to information held by the federal government. Federal law defines "classified information" as "information or material designated and clearly marked or clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or Executive order (or a regulation or order issued pursuant to a statute or Executive order), as requiring a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security (50 U.S.C. 426(1))." According to the Information Security Oversight Office, government security classification costs were $8.8 billion in FY2009, although this figure excludes intelligence agencies' expenditures. Congress has enacted statutes to set aspects of classified information policy. More regularly, Presidents have issued executive orders to establish classified information policies and procedures. Typically, these directives have defined (1) who in the federal government may classify information; (2) what levels of classification and classification markings (e.g., "top secret") may be used; (3) who may access classified information; and (4) how and when classified information is to be declassified. E.O. 13526 revised the previous policies on these matters and established a National Declassification Center. This center, located at the National Archives and Records Administration, is tasked with eliminating a more than 400 million-page backlog of classified records that are 25 years old and older. Congress may opt to examine the implementation of E.O. 13526, including issues such as its mandate for agencies to review their security classification guides for fealty to current policy. Additionally, the practice of permitting the executive branch to set much of classified information policy may be subject to examination. Similarly, the enactment of the Reducing Over-Classification Act came less than a year after the issuance of E.O. 13526. Congress may choose to examine to what degree classifying agencies have implemented the new law and the executive order consonantly. This report will be updated to reflect significant developments.