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crs_R43864

crs_R43864_0

China is the world's leading producer and consumer of many minerals and metals that are in high demand in the United States and China and upon which the United States is highly import dependent. China's current, 12 th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) and successive five-year plans anticipate rapid urbanization, a rising middle class, and increased product manufacturing of high-value, high-quality goods and increased consumption. With China's potential economic growth and heavy U.S. reliance on imported raw materials, will adequate supplies of critical and strategic raw materials and metals be available to the U.S. economy from reliable suppliers? Is there a possibility of material shortfalls? If China uses more of its raw materials and metals for its own downstream manufacturing sector instead of exporting them, as well as competing for raw materials and metals from outside China, then there may be a cause for concern. Materials such as the platinum group metals (PGMs), niobium, tantalum, manganese, and cobalt are heavily imported by the United States and China. The mining industry in China consists of many small and fragmented companies. China's national government seeks to consolidate its mining industry, eliminating obsolete and inefficient capacity, and has announced specific consolidation goals for certain sectors. Over the past several years there has been some concern in Congress that China was trying to "lock up" long-term supplies of raw materials, particularly iron ore. Long-term contracts have been established for some imports, but for others, Chinese companies have made equity investments or entered joint ventures in order to secure needed resources. China is a relative newcomer to the global mining stage, but in recent years, under its "go global" policy, China has become much more aggressive in pursuing raw materials from all over the world. The United States has diversified its sources for some of its material requirements since 1993, but still imports significant quantities and became more dependent on China as either a primary or major provider of raw materials and several metals by 2014 (See Table 5 ). Aside from a small amount of recycling, the United States is 100% import reliant on 19 minerals that provide critical support for the U.S. economy and national security (see Appendix C ). China's dominance in the supply and demand of global raw materials could be addressed through consistent development of alternate sources of supply, use of alternative materials (substitutes) when possible, efficiency gains, aggressive R&D in development of new technologies, and comprehensive minerals information to support this effort. There may not be an immediate crisis, but China is likely entering an era of fewer raw material exports over the long run, which seems to call for some type of long-term planning by the private sector and government entities that want to meet U.S. national security, economic, and energy policy interests and challenges. H.R. 761 passed by a vote of 246-178 on September 18, 2013. The bill defines critical and strategic minerals and would seek to streamline the federal permitting process for domestic mineral exploration and development. S. 1600 , Critical Minerals Policy Act of 2013 Introduced by Senator Lisa Murkowski on October 29, 2013; referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. The bill would establish analytical and forecasting capability on mineral/metal market dynamics as part of U.S. mineral policy. The Secretary of the Interior would direct a comprehensive resource assessment of critical mineral potential in the United States, assessing the most critical minerals first and including details on the critical mineral potential on federal lands.

China is the world's leading producer and consumer of many minerals and metals that are in high demand in the United States and on which the United States is highly import dependent. In the near future, China anticipates rapid urbanization, a rising middle class, and increased product manufacturing of high-value, high-quality goods and increased consumption. As China pursues this development path, will adequate supplies of critical and strategic raw materials and metals be available to the U.S. economy from reliable suppliers? Is there a possibility of material shortfalls? If China uses more of its raw materials and metals for its own downstream manufacturing sector instead of exporting them, as well as competing for raw materials and metals from outside China, then there may be a cause for concern. Materials such as the platinum group metals (PGMs), niobium, tantalum, manganese, and cobalt are heavily imported by the United States and China. Over the past several years there has been some concern in Congress that China was trying to "lock up" long-term supplies of raw materials, particularly iron ore. Long-term contracts have been established for some imports, but for others, Chinese companies have made equity investments or entered joint ventures in order to secure needed resources. China is a relative newcomer to the global mining stage, but in recent years, under its "go global" policy, China has become much more aggressive in pursuing raw materials from all over the world. The mining industry in China consists of many small and fragmented companies. China's government seeks to consolidate its mining industry, eliminating obsolete and inefficient capacity, and has announced specific consolidation goals for certain sectors. Aside from a small amount of recycling, the United States is 100% import reliant on 19 minerals that provide critical support for the U.S. economy and national security. The United States has diversified sources for some of its material requirements over the past several years, but still imports significant quantities and has become more dependent on China as either a primary or major provider of raw materials and several metals since 1993. China's dominance in the supply and demand of global raw materials could be addressed, if needed, through consistent development of alternate sources of supply, alternative materials (substitutes) when possible, efficiency gains, aggressive R&D, and comprehensive minerals information to support this effort. There may not be an immediate crisis, but China is likely entering an era of fewer raw material exports over the long run, which requires some type of long-term planning by the private sector and government entities that want to meet U.S. national security, economic, and energy policy interests and challenges. Congress is likely to keep an eye on free trade issues, such as export restrictions on rare earth oxides and other raw materials, which were brought before the World Trade Organization by the United States, Europe, and Japan and won against China. Legislation aimed at domestic mineral production was considered in the 113th Congress. H.R. 761, introduced by Representative Mark E. Amodei, passed the House by 246-178 on September 18, 2013. The bill would have defined critical and strategic minerals and sought to streamline the federal permitting process for domestic mineral exploration and development. There were hearings held on S. 1600, the Critical Minerals Policy Act of 2013, introduced by Senator Lisa Murkowski. The bill would have defined what critical minerals are, established analytical and forecasting capability on mineral/metal market dynamics as part of U.S. mineral policy, and required that the Secretary of the Interior direct a comprehensive resource assessment of critical mineral potential in the United States, including the critical mineral potential on federal lands.

crs_RL30520

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Background The United States, from its beginning in 1790 to the present, has been free of a national debt for only two years, 1834 and 1835. The national debt reached a high of 108.6% of GDP in 1946. The large budget deficits of the 1980s and 1990s reversed this trend and pushed the percentage to another high of 49.5% in 1993. The federal budget surpluses from FY1998 to FY2001 were used to retire a portion of the publicly held national debt. In common with other major countries, the United States has rarely financed the surge in wartime expenditures exclusively by raising taxes. Interestingly, mainstream macroeconomics views the burden of a national debt, not in terms of the debt per se, but in terms of government budget deficits that are the cause of the debt and its growth. In a fully employed economy, in addition to raising prices, the increase in demand will lead to a rise in interest rates. This is primarily business spending for capital goods such as plant, equipment, and structures and spending by households for homes, automobiles, appliances and the like. Thus, the budget deficit "crowds out" private capital and the burden of the growing national debt represented by the bonds issued to finance the war, is the decrease in the private capital stock of the country. Since the private capital stock inherited by future generations will be smaller, it implies that the level of output enjoyed by them will be lower. Rather than borrowing the wherewithal it could simply print money (currency) and pay its bills. The majority of that spending, however, is likely to be on current consumption. This encourages (or "crowds in") interest-sensitive spending. Retiring debt that is foreign owned relieves the United States from having to pay interest to foreigners. Conclusion The current consensus view among economists is that the source of the burden associated with a national debt is the government budget deficit that gives rise to the debt. And, it is a burden that is largely shifted forwarded to future generations. Selective Views on the Burden of a National Debt Although economists have long recognized that a national debt imposes an inescapable burden on a nation, they have argued about who bears this burden. In particular, whether the burden is borne by the generation that incurred the debt or whether it is shifted forward to a future generation or, in the language of the time, whether it is a "burden or mortgage on our children." The "We Owe It To Ourselves" View As a result of the concern over whether the enjoyment of full employment by the current generation would shift a burden to the future, it became an accepted view during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, that an internally held national debt would impose a burden only on the generation present when it was contracted and would impose no burden on future generations because we "owe the debt to ourselves." It is not borne by the generation who contracted the debt.

The United States has been free of a national debt for only two years, 1834 and 1835. In its first year, 1790, the country faced a debt of $75 million. From FY1998 to FY2001, the federal government ran budget surpluses. Since then, the budget has returned to deficit, and the debt had risen to $7.5 trillion by 2009. It rose to a high of 108.6% of gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of World War II; declined to a post-World War II low of 23.8% of GDP in 1974; and, then, rose to another high of 49.5% of GDP in 1993. The national debt results from borrowing to finance budget deficits. Historically, the major cause of debt accumulation has been war. The United States has financed the extraordinary expenditures associated with war by borrowing rather than by raising taxes or printing money. This pattern was broken by the large budget deficits of the 1980s, the first half of the 1990s, and the period subsequent to 2001, which caused the national debt to rise substantially as a fraction of GDP. Although economists have long recognized that a national debt imposes an inescapable burden on a nation, they have debated whether the burden is borne by the generation who contracts the debt or is shifted forward to future generations. There has also been some controversy over the nature of the burden. The current consensus among economists is that the burden of the national debt is largely shifted forward to future generations. However, the burden imposed by the national debt does not arise from debt per se, but from budget deficits that gives rise to a national debt. If an economy is fully employed and the government increases its expenditures, for example, the resultant increase in aggregate demand will cause interest rates to rise and this will reduce or "crowd out" interest-sensitive spending by the private sector. This type of spending is likely to be for capital purposes (e.g., business spending for plant and equipment and household spending for housing and durable goods including automobiles). As a result, the private capital stock inherited by future generations is likely to be smaller and their real income or output will likely be lower. It is the reduction in future output that constitutes the burden of the national debt and it is a burden borne largely by future generations. It is a burden that cannot be decreased by borrowing abroad even though foreign borrowing could leave unchanged the size of the private capital stock. Crucial to the consensus view (and other views) is the assumption that the economy is fully employed. And the burden discussed must be regarded as a gross burden in the sense that certain intangible gains must be set against it such as freedom from tyranny and domination by a foreign power that might have occurred had the United States lost such a contest as World War II. This report will be updated periodically.

crs_RL32770

crs_RL32770_0

Background The Andean-U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations began in May 2004, when theUnited States, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador participated in the first round of talks, with Boliviaparticipating as an observer. After thirteen rounds of talks, however, negotiators failed to reach anagreement. Peru decided to continue negotiating alone with the United States and concluded abilateral agreement in December 2005. Colombia later continued negotiationswith the United States and this agreement was concluded on February 27, 2006. The report alsodiscusses U.S.-Andean trade relations and the major trade issues in the negotiations. A press release thataccompanied the notification said that the Administration planned negotiations to begin the secondquarter of 2004, initially with Colombia and Peru, and that the United States would work withEcuador and Bolivia "with a view to including them in the agreement as well." It said that an FTA would help U.S. interests "...by reducing and eliminating barriersto trade and investment between the Andean countries and the United States. It said that an FTA "...willalso enhance our efforts to strengthen democracy and support for fundamental values in the region." U.S.-Andean Trade The United States extends special duty treatment to imports from Bolivia, Colombia,Ecuador, and Peru under a regional trade preference program. This program accounted for over halfof all U.S. imports from the four countries in 2005. The program began under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA; title II of P.L. ATPA authorized the President to grant duty-free treatment to certainproducts from the four Andean countries that met domestic content and other requirements. After ATPA had lapsed for months, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act(ATPDEA; title XXXI of P.L. In 2005, the United States imported $20.1 billion, or 1% of total U.S. imports, from the fourcountries. Peru and Ecuador split nearly all of the other half of imports and exports, and Boliviaaccounted for a very small share. The leading U.S. import from the region in 2005 (35% of imports) was petroleum oil,principally crude oil from Ecuador and Colombia. Leading U.S. exports to the region were petroleumproducts, mining equipment, broadcasting equipment, and data processing machines. Nevertheless, an important goal for the United States in the FTA talks was the elimination of apractice called the "price-band mechanism." (27) Some specific products were especially important to the trading partners. These disputes were discussed at the negotiations. The main outstanding issues are related to agriculture. (41) A senior US trade official recently said that the U.S. trade agreements with Colombia andPeru are likely to be treated as separate agreements by the Congress, thereby narrowing thepossibility of a stand-alone Andean-U.S. FTA. Given the TPA notificationprocedures, the free trade agreements with Colombia and Peru could be voted on by the Congresssometime this summer. 109-53 ) had been viewed as an indicator that anyU.S.-Andean FTA might also face considerable opposition. How the Bush Administration's decisionto negotiate and submit separate FTAs with Peru and Colombia may affect this calculation remainsuncertain.

In November 2003, the Administration notified Congress that it intended to beginnegotiations on a free-trade agreement (FTA) with four Andean countries - Colombia, Peru,Ecuador, and Bolivia. The notification said that an FTA would reduce and eliminate foreign barriersto trade and investment and would support democracy and fight drug activity in the Andean region. The Andean governments wanted to ensure access to the U.S. market, especially since their currenttrade preferences will terminate at the end of 2006. In the United States, the business communityindicated strong support for the trade agreement, with labor opposing it as the case for many FTAs,and the agriculture community was split. The Andean-U.S. FTA negotiations began in May 2004, when the United States, Colombia,Peru, and Ecuador participated in the first round of talks. Bolivia participated as an observer. Afterthirteen rounds of talks, however, negotiators failed to reach an agreement. After the last set of talks,Peru decided to continue negotiating, without Colombia or Ecuador, and concluded a bilateralagreement with the United States in December 2005. Colombia later continued negotiations withthe United States and this agreement was successfully concluded on February 27, 2006. Negotiationswith Ecuador are stalemated. A senior US trade official recently stated that the Peru and ColombianFTAs are likely to be submitted to Congress as separate agreements, thereby constraining thepossibility of an Andean-U.S. FTA. The United States currently extends duty-free treatment to imports from the four Andeancountries under a regional preference program. The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)authorized the President to grant duty-free treatment to certain products, and the Andean TradePromotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) reauthorized the ATPA program and addedproducts that had been previously excluded. Over half of all U.S. imports in 2005 from the Andeancountries entered under these preferences. In 2005, the United States imported $20.1 billion from the four Andean countries andexported $9.9 billion. Colombia accounted for about half of U.S. trade with the region. Peru andEcuador almost evenly split the other half, and Bolivia represented a very small share. The leadingU.S. import from the region in 2005 was crude petroleum oil, which accounted for 35% of imports. Leading U.S. exports to the region were petroleum products, mining equipment, and broadcastingequipment. There were several important issues in the FTA negotiations. The trade negotiators statedthat the main obstacles to concluding an overall agreement were in agriculture and intellectualproperty rights. Another major concern was the issue of labor standards. Under the notificationprocedures founded in the Trade Promotion Authority Act, the trade agreements with Peru andColombia could be voted on by the Congress sometime this summer. The narrow passage ofCAFTA-DR had been viewed as an indicator that any U.S.-Andean FTA might also faceconsiderable opposition. How the Bush Administration's decision to negotiate and submit separateFTAs with Peru and Colombia might affect this calculation remains uncertain. This report will notbe updated.

crs_R40962

crs_R40962_0

Individual office spending may be as varied as the districts Members represent. While Representatives have a high degree of flexibility to operate their offices in a way that supports their congressional duties and responsibilities, they must operate within a number of restrictions and regulations. This report provides a history of the MRA and overview of recent developments. Subsequent legislation in 1996 further defined the MRA and made it subject to regulations and adjustments adopted by the Committee on House Administration. Subsequent MRA Legislation Appropriations Acts: Administrative Provisions Related to Unexpended Balances and Deficit Reduction Since the MRA's establishment, appropriations acts funding the legislative branch have contained—or continued, in the case of a continuing resolution—a provision requiring unused amounts remaining in the MRA be used for deficit reduction or to reduce the federal debt. This legislation has generally fallen into three major categories: Attempts to change the MRA procedure or regulate, prohibit, authorize, disclose, or encourage the use of funds for a particular purpose. Stand-alone legislation that would govern the use of unexpended balances, including language to require these funds to go toward deficit reduction. Bills or resolutions that would limit or change the g rowth of overall MRA or adjustment among Members. The individual MRAs for the 441 Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner are authorized for periods that correspond closely to the sessions of Congress—from January 3 of each year through January 2 of the following year. A similar discussion of the use of prior spending patterns in the determination of MRA appropriations levels was included in numerous other House reports, particularly in the first few years of the MRA. The MRA funding level peaked at $660.0 million in FY2010. At the May 17, 2016, full committee markup, an amendment offered by Representative Farr to increase this level by $8.3 million, to $562.6 million (+1.5%), was agreed to. The FY2017 level was continued for FY2018. The FY2019 level of $573.6 million represents an increase of $10.998 million (+2.0%). The office expenses and mail allowances components vary from Member to Member. 112th Congress: Resolution Reducing Individual Authorizations In the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), the House agreed to H.Res. 22 , which reduced the amount authorized for salaries and expenses of Member, committee, and leadership offices in 2011 and 2012. This resolution, agreed to on January 6, 2011, stated that the MRA allowances for these years may not exceed 95% of the amount established for 2010. The FY2016 MRA appropriations level remained unchanged from FY2014 and FY2015, although Members' individual allowances for legislative year 2016 were increased by 1.0%. According to the Statement of Disbursements , each Member's authorization for 2017 was increased "by approximately 3.9% of the average MRA." 3162 ), in addition to addressing funding for the Capitol Police and the House Sergeant at Arms, indicated that the Appropriations "Committee has provided resources necessary to support the Committee on House Administration's plan to increase Member's Representational Allowance (MRA) by $25,000 per account this year for the purpose of providing Member security when away from the Capitol complex." The House approved the MRA authorization increases when it agreed to H.Res. These may include personnel compensation; personnel benefits; travel; rent, communications, and utilities; printing and reproduction; other services; supplies and materials; transportation of things; and equipment. Beginning with disbursements covering January-March 2016, this website provides SOD information in a sortable CSV (comma-separated values) format.

Members of the House of Representatives have one consolidated allowance, the Members' Representational Allowance (MRA), with which to operate their offices. The MRA was first authorized in 1996 and was made subject to regulations and adjustments of the Committee on House Administration. Representatives have a high degree of flexibility to use the MRA to operate their offices in a way that supports their congressional duties and responsibilities, and individual office spending may be as varied as the districts Members represent. The appropriation for the MRA decreased from a high in FY2010 of $660.0 million to $554.7 million in FY2014, FY2015, and FY2016. For FY2017, the MRA level was increased by $8.3 million, to $562.6 million (+1.5%). This level was continued for FY2018. The FY2019 level of $573.6 million represents an increase of $10.998 million (+2.0%). The reduction in the overall MRA appropriation from its FY2010 peak has corresponded with a reduction to the individual MRA authorization for each Member, which is available for expenses incurred from January 3 of each year through January 2 of the following year. In the 112th Congress, the House agreed to H.Res. 22, which reduced the amount authorized for salaries and expenses of Member, committee, and leadership offices in 2011 and 2012. This resolution, agreed to on January 6, 2011, stated that the MRA allowances for these years may not exceed 95% of the amount established for 2010. Individual MRAs were further reduced 6.4% in 2012 and 8.2% in 2013, before increasing 1.0% in 2014 and remaining flat in 2015. The 2016 allowances increased by 1.0%. The individual 2017 allowances initially increased by 3.9% from 2016, and then by another $25,000 when the House agreed to H.Res. 411. In 2018, individual allowances were increased by $25,000. Information on individual office spending is published in the quarterly Statements of Disbursements of the House (SOD), which has been made available online since 2009. Beginning with disbursements covering January-March 2016, this website provides SOD information in a sortable CSV (comma-separated values) format. In addition to recurring administrative provisions in the annual appropriations acts requiring unused amounts remaining in the MRA be used for deficit reduction or to reduce the federal debt, numerous bills and resolutions addressing the MRA have been introduced. This legislation has generally fallen into three major categories: (1) attempts to change the MRA procedure or regulate, authorize, or encourage the use of funds for a particular purpose; (2) stand-alone legislation that would govern the use of unexpended balances, including language to require these funds to go toward deficit reduction; and (3) bills that would limit or change the growth of overall MRA or adjustment among Members. This report provides a history and overview of the MRA and examines spending patterns in recent years. The data exclude nonvoting Members, including Delegates and the Resident Commissioner, as well as Members who were not in Congress for the entirety of the session. Information is provided on total spending and spending for various categories, including personnel compensation; travel; rent, utilities, and communications; printing and reproduction; other services; supplies and materials; equipment; and franked mail. The data collected demonstrate that, despite variations when considering all Members, many Members allocate their spending in a similar manner, and spending allocation patterns have remained relatively consistent over time.

crs_R45149

crs_R45149_0

Introduction In 1976, President Ford signed into law the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), which requires the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to identify and regulate chemicals in U.S. commerce that present an "unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment" or an imminent hazard. Since 1976, Congress has added five other titles to TSCA to address specific chemical concerns. None of the additional titles made amendments to the core chemical evaluation and regulatory program under Title I and therefore are not discussed in this report. On June 22, 2016, President Obama signed into law the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21 st Century Act ( P.L. 114-182 ), which amended TSCA. 114-182 expanded EPA authority to collect fees from chemical manufacturers and processors to partially defray the costs of conducting risk evaluations. The following sections of the report summarize the major authorities of TSCA and cover the following topics: 1. the overall scope and applicability of authorities under TSCA; 2. the information gathering authorities; 3. the confidentiality and disclosure of information submitted to EPA under the act; 4. the framework for prioritizing chemicals for evaluation, evaluating risks, and regulating those chemicals that present unreasonable or imminent risks; 5. the applicability of the act to chemical imports; 6. the requirements for chemical export notification; 7. the process in filing citizen petitions and bringing citizen suits; 8. the enforcement of the act; 9. the federal and state roles under the act; and 10. the resources to administer the act. Even if EPA were to determine unreasonable risk, TSCA provides that authorities under other federal law supersede TSCA authorities to address unreasonable risks. Information that EPA obtains from chemical manufacturers and processors may contain material that, if disclosed, would harm commercial interests, so TSCA provides protection from disclosure of submitted information if the submitter can justify that the information meets certain criteria. For small manufacturers and processors, EPA may promulgate recordkeeping and reporting requirements only for chemicals for which the agency has already required the development of new information or has previously regulated under the act. The types of information required in a PMN or SNUN are relevant to assessing risk (e.g., chemical identity, uses, volumes produced, byproducts, health and environmental effects, exposure, and disposal methods). Development of New Information Regarding Chemicals Section 4(a) authorizes EPA to request chemical manufacturers or processors to develop new information necessary to evaluate the risks of a chemical if available information on the chemical is insufficient for the agency to evaluate risks associated with the chemical and the agency suspects unreasonable risks associated with the chemical that may warrant regulation. For specific chemical identities determined to warrant confidential treatment, P.L. TSCA establishes a framework for EPA to prioritize which chemicals to evaluate for risks and directs EPA to take expedited actions for specific chemicals: polychlorinated biphenyls; certain persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic chemical substances; imminently hazardous chemicals; chemicals that present significant risks; and new chemical substances and significant new uses of chemical substances. Risk Evaluation Process The original enactment of TSCA in 1976 directed EPA to regulate the lifecycle of chemicals that present unreasonable risks but did not specify how the agency would evaluate risks of chemicals. 114-182 amended TSCA Section 6 to require EPA to promulgate a rule that establishes the manner in which the agency is to conduct risk evaluations for purposes of determining whether a chemical presents unreasonable risks. Under Section 6, as amended by P.L. EPA may extend the 180-day deadline by an additional 90 days for good cause. Regulation of New Chemical Substances and Significant New Uses If EPA finds that a new chemical substance subject to a PMN or a significant new use of a chemical substance subject to a SNUN presents an unreasonable risk, Section 5(f) directs the agency to either propose a rule to apply one or more of the specified regulatory options to the extent necessary to protect against such risk or issue an order to prohibit or limit manufacture, processing, or distribution. Federal and State Relationship To avoid potential conflict between federal requirements under TSCA and state requirements or restrictions on chemicals, TSCA provides circumstances in which a federal requirement for a specific chemical under the act would preempt state requirements that apply to the same chemical unless exempted or waived. Congress set forth provisions for chemical-specific preemption of state requirements in TSCA as originally enacted and refined those preemption provisions in P.L. Exceptions to preemption may apply, or EPA may grant waivers by rule. Section 18 allows the EPA Administrator to exempt from preemption a state requirement under certain circumstances. Although the authorization of appropriations to carry out TSCA expired after FY1983, Congress has continued to fund the statute's activities through annual discretionary appropriations.

In 1976, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA; P.L. 94-469) was enacted to direct the U.S Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to obtain information relevant to evaluating the lifecycle (i.e., manufacture, importation, processing, distribution, use, and disposal) of industrial and commercial chemicals for "unreasonable risks" and, if warranted, to regulate such chemicals. Concerns that EPA lacked sufficient authority to take such actions, among other concerns, led to the enactment of the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (P.L. 114-182), which amended TSCA, in 2016. Still, Congress requires that implementation of the amended TSCA balance two objectives—the protection of public health and the environment from unreasonable risks and the regulation of chemicals in a manner that does not "impede unduly or create unnecessary economic barriers to technological innovation." TSCA as amended requires EPA to gather existing information (e.g., production volumes, health and safety studies) regarding potential chemical risks from chemical manufacturers, processors, and distributors. Manufacturers of new chemicals must notify EPA prior to the chemical being commercialized. Similar notification requirements apply to chemicals proposed for uses determined by EPA to be significant new uses. If EPA has inadequate information on a chemical to determine whether it presents unreasonable risks, TSCA authorizes the agency to require the development of new information necessary for the evaluation of risks. For information submitted under TSCA, the act establishes a framework to protect from disclosure information that warrants confidential treatment and to ensure that certain types of information are disclosed. To identify which chemicals may warrant regulation, TSCA requires EPA to systematically prioritize chemicals for risk evaluation and to regulate those chemicals that present unreasonable risks to ensure they no longer do so. If EPA finds that a chemical presents unreasonable risk, TSCA requires the agency to undertake rulemaking to regulate the chemical. EPA must take regulatory action on specific chemicals that exhibit characteristics known to present greater risks in an expedited manner. For instance, EPA may promulgate requirements to address risks presented by certain persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic chemicals without conducting a risk evaluation. Additionally, TSCA authorizes EPA to commence a civil action against imminently hazardous chemicals and expedite review of chemicals that present significant risk of serious or widespread harm. For new chemicals and chemicals proposed for a significant new use determined to warrant evaluation by EPA, the agency must make a determination regarding unreasonable risk within 90 days of the required notification unless extended for good cause. Under TSCA, requirements that apply to chemical manufacture apply in the same way to chemical importation. TSCA establishes procedures for handling imports of chemicals that do not comply with requirements under the act. Chemicals marked for export only are subject to recordkeeping and reporting requirements unless EPA has previously taken regulatory action to require the development of new information or establish a requirement to protect against unreasonable risk. TSCA includes provisions to allow citizens to challenge EPA implementation of the act. Additionally, TSCA includes provisions for enforcement, including inspection and administrative subpoena authority, establishment of civil and criminal penalties for violations, and citizen suits to allow any person to enforce the act. TSCA provides a federal role for the evaluation and restriction of chemicals, but, unlike most other federal environmental statutes, does not provide for delegation to, or implementation by, states. However, states may evaluate and regulate chemicals under their own authorities. TSCA provides limited explicit preemption of state requirements, although long-standing state requirements are generally preserved. If a state requirement does not meet one of the exceptions from preemption, waivers from preemption may be available under certain circumstances. Although authorization of appropriations to carry out TSCA expired in 1983, Congress has continued to fund TSCA activities through annual discretionary appropriations. TSCA authorizes EPA to collect fees from chemical manufacturers and processors to partially defray costs that the agency may incur from evaluating information submissions, conducting risk evaluations and developing regulations. The original 1976 act, which was amended by P.L. 114-182, is referred to as Title I. Since 1976, Congress has added five other titles to TSCA to address specific chemical concerns. The five additional titles of TSCA are not discussed in this report.

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Introduction On August 2, 2005, the President signed the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for FY2006 ( P.L. 109-54 , H.R. 109-54 provided $7.73 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), subject to an across-the-board rescission of 0.476%. Even after both rescissions, the FY2006 appropriation for EPA is an increase above the Administration's request of $7.52 billion, but a decrease below the FY2005 appropriation of $8.03 billion. There were varying degrees of interest in specific programs and activities funded within EPA's appropriation. Among the prominent issues in the debate over the Interior bill were the adequacy of funding for wastewater infrastructure, cleanup of hazardous waste sites under the Superfund program, cleanup of commercial and industrial sites referred to as brownfields, EPA's homeland security activities, and "congressional project priorities" or earmarks. In addition to funding, another issue receiving significant attention was EPA's use and consideration of intentional human dosing studies for determining potential human health risks from exposure to pesticides. At the end of the first session, the 109 th Congress passed the conference agreement on the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY2006 ( H.R. It included a government-wide rescission that reduced FY2006 funding for EPA and all other federal agencies by 1%, except for the Department of Veterans Affairs and excluded spending designated as an "emergency" requirement. 109-148 also reallocated $8 million in emergency funds to EPA for responding to leaking underground tanks in Gulf Coast states affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This recommendation was part of a proposal to reallocate $17.1 billion among numerous federal agencies, which was provided in two supplemental appropriations acts ( P.L. 109-148 did not include a $166 million rescission for EPA's clean water State Revolving Fund (SRF). This fund provides federal assistance to states for issuing loans to communities for constructing and upgrading wastewater infrastructure to meet federal requirements, discussed later in this report. Among individual programs and activities, P.L. Title II of P.L. The Administration had requested a reallocation of $15 million for this purpose in October 2005. Prior to the two rescissions, P.L. In recent years, Congress has appropriated significantly more funding than the Administration has requested for the clean water SRF. 109-54 provided the following amounts for these grants: $50 million for wastewater infrastructure projects along the U.S./Mexico border, the same as the House, Senate, and Administration had proposed, and close to the FY2005 appropriation; $35 million for the construction of wastewater and drinking water facilities in Alaska Native Villages, compared to $15 million proposed by the House and the Administration, and $40 million proposed by the Senate, all of which were less than the FY2005 appropriation of nearly $45 million; and no funding for drinking water infrastructure improvements to the Metropolitano community water system in San Juan, Puerto Rico, as the Senate had proposed, whereas the House and the Administration had proposed to maintain funding at the same level as the FY2005 appropriation of $4 million. Prior to the two above rescissions, P.L. 109-54 provided $900 million for the clean water SRF, a $170 million increase above the $730 million request but nearly a $200 million decrease below the FY2005 appropriation of $1.09 billion. EPA's funding was moved from the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development (VA-HUD), and Independent Agencies to that of the Interior subcommittees beginning with the FY2006 appropriation.

Early in the first session, the 109th Congress eliminated the Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development (VA-HUD), and Independent Agencies appropriations subcommittee and moved funding jurisdiction for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the Interior subcommittee. As enacted in August 2005, Title II of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-54, H.R. 2361) provided $7.73 billion for EPA, subject to an across-the-board rescission of 0.476%. The appropriation included an additional $80 million in unobligated funds "rescinded" from past appropriations. Overall, P.L. 109-54 provided more funding for EPA than the Administration's FY2006 request of $7.52 billion, but less than the FY2005 appropriation of $8.03 billion. Among individual programs, funding decreased for some activities and increased for others, compared with the FY2006 request and the FY2005 appropriation. At the end of the first session, the 109th Congress enacted a government-wide rescission in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-148, H.R. 2863). This rescission reduced FY2006 funding for EPA and all other federal agencies by 1%, except for the Department of Veterans Affairs and excluding "emergency" spending. P.L. 109-148 also reallocated $8 million in emergency funds to EPA for responding to leaking underground tanks in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina. The Administration had recommended $15 million for this purpose in October 2005, as part of a $17.1 billion reallocation of emergency funds. The law did not include the $166 million rescission for EPA's clean water State Revolving Fund (SRF) that the Administration also had proposed in October, as part of a $2.3 billion rescission affecting numerous federal agencies. In the debate over the Interior bill, considerable attention focused on the adequacy of federal assistance to states to support the clean water and drinking water SRFs. States use these funds to issue loans to communities for constructing and upgrading wastewater and drinking water infrastructure to meet federal requirements. Prior to the two rescissions noted above, P.L. 109-54 provided $900 million for the clean water SRF, an increase above the Administration's request of $730 million, but a decrease below the FY2005 appropriation of $1.09 billion. P.L. 109-54 also provided $850 million for the drinking water SRF, which was the same as the Administration had requested and similar to the FY2005 appropriation, prior to the two above rescissions. Other prominent issues in the debate over FY2006 appropriations for EPA included the adequacy of funding for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites under the Superfund program, the cleanup of commercial and industrial sites referred to as brownfields, EPA's homeland security activities, "congressional project priorities" or earmarks, and EPA's use and consideration of intentional human dosing studies for determining potential human health risks from exposure to pesticides. There also were varying levels of interest in numerous other activities funded within EPA's accounts. This report reflects final congressional action on FY2006 appropriations for EPA and will not be updated.

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The United States exceeds the People's Republic of China (PRC) in global trade, and far surpasses China in GDP and foreign direct investment. It continues to be the dominant external political and military actor in the Middle East and political and economic influence in Latin America. It maintains robust, formal alliances in Europe and Asia, and far outweighs China in military spending and capabilities. Foreign policy observers have raised several issues related to the U.S. use of soft power tools: Some experts argue that the United States has neglected public diplomacy, particularly in helping to shape foreign perceptions of American policy. By some indicators, China's rising soft power may have experienced some recent setbacks, while the U.S. image has shown signs of a possible renewal. The United States possesses latent reserves of soft power. Each country deploys its power, however, in different ways. These include the following: large international tasks are most effectively tackled with large international coalitions for financial, physical, as well as political support; future wars involving the United States may well be asymmetrical and involve soft power—a combination of military operations (against conventional as well as insurgent forces), reconstruction, governance, and winning the hearts and minds of people; threats to U.S. security have become "democratized"—whether a single person, a group, or an international network, all can potentially damage American people or assets; budget constraints are real both in terms of opportunity costs and for financing foreign operations; countries are placing more emphasis on national sovereignty—not just guarding against outside incursions but, for some nations, rigidly controlling humanitarian interventions or opposing foreign assistance to local non-governmental organizations for political reasons; as democratic institutions and societies become more entrenched (particularly in developing nations), public opinion, nationalism, and attitudes become large moving forces for governments (even autocratic governments use nationalism to bolster public support); international relations requires dealing not only with governments but with the perceptions and attitudes of people under those governments; globalization and technology have shrunk geographical distances among countries and created more economic interdependence; communications networks have so linked people of the world that everything seems to have a public face; that face often can be distorted according to the interests of those in the network; and the rise in prices of commodities (particularly petroleum) and the U.S. trade deficit are redistributing wealth away from the United States and other industrialized nations toward commodity exporting nations (many are either politically unstable or located in unstable regions) and toward China. The countries in which Chinese soft power competes most directly with that of the United States fall into three categories: the arc of instability stretching from North Africa through the Middle East and into South Asia, other countries in play (Southeast Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central Asia), and new (and re-emerging) centers of power, the so-called BRICs (Brazil, India, as well as Russia and China, for U.S. soft power). PART TWO: COMPARISONS OF U.S. AND PRC INSTRUMENTS OF HARD AND SOFT POWER Diplomacy and Foreign Assistance The following section examines three aspects of non-economic soft power—public diplomacy, state diplomacy, and foreign assistance. The 110 th Congress has held hearings and proposed measures that support U.S. public diplomacy, diplomatic efforts, and foreign aid. (March 8, 2007 and June 25, 2008) The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 ( P.L. The Public Diplomacy Resource Centers Act of 2007 ( H.R. Debt forgiveness is also a major form of PRC foreign aid. China's concessions include Block No. China's sovereign wealth fund potentially could provide Beijing with another instrument to project its soft power around the world. This void has been filled in part by China's growing soft power. U.S. According to one U.S. analyst, these grants are indicative of China's increased military diplomacy activities in developing countries worldwide since the early 2000s. The People's Republic of China (PRC) uses a combination of political and economic means to protect this trade and foster bilateral ties. While the United States remains the dominant external political and military actor in the Middle East, the decline in public support for U.S. policies in many Arab states and Chinese efforts to establish broad commercial linkages across the region have strengthened China's position relative to the United States in some non-official channels.

This report compares the People's Republic of China's (PRC) and U.S. projections of global influence, with an emphasis on non-coercive means or "soft power," and suggests ways to think about U.S. foreign policy options in light of China's emergence. Part One discusses U.S. foreign policy interests, China's rising influence, and its implications for the United States. Part Two compares the global public images of the two countries and describes PRC and U.S. uses of soft power tools, such as public diplomacy, state diplomacy, and foreign assistance. It also examines other forms of soft power such as military diplomacy, global trade and investment, and sovereign wealth funds. In Part Three, the report analyzes PRC and U.S. diplomatic and economic activities in five developing regions—Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. China and the United States use tools of soft power in different ways and with varying effects. Since the mid-1990s, the PRC has adopted an increasingly active and pragmatic diplomatic approach around the world that emphasizes complementary economic interests. China's influence and image have been bolstered through its increasingly open and sophisticated diplomatic corps as well as through prominent PRC-funded infrastructure, public works, and economic investment projects in many developing countries. Meanwhile, some surveys have indicated marked declines in the U.S. international public image since 2002. Some foreign observers have criticized U.S. state diplomacy as being neglectful of smaller countries or of countries and regional issues that are not related to the global war on terrorism. According to some experts, U.S. diplomatic and foreign aid efforts have been hampered by organizational restructuring, inadequate staffing levels, and foreign policies that remain unpopular abroad. Despite China's growing influence, the United States retains significant strengths, including latent reserves of soft power, much of which lie beyond the scope of government. Furthermore, by some indicators, China's soft power has experienced some recent setbacks, while the U.S. image abroad has shown signs of a possible renewal. The United States exceeds the People's Republic of China (PRC) in global trade, although the PRC is catching up, and far surpasses China in GDP and foreign direct investment. It continues to be the dominant external political and military actor in the Middle East and political and economic influence in Latin America. The United States maintains formal alliances in Europe and Asia, and far outweighs the PRC in military spending and capabilities. The 110th Congress has held hearings and proposed measures that support U.S. public diplomacy, diplomatic efforts, and foreign aid. Relevant legislation includes the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) and the Public Diplomacy Resource Centers Act of 2007 (H.R. 2553). This report will not be updated.

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Introduction The U.S. government's national security system includes the organizations, structures, and processes that govern decision-making, budgeting, planning and execution, and congressional oversight of executive branch national security activities. In theory, these documents and review exercises are all "nested" with each other, such that guidance issued at higher levels of the executive branch, for example by the President, informs guidance issued at lower levels, for example by the Secretary of Defense, whose guidance, in turn, informs that issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). In recent years, other agencies have adopted analogues to the Department of Defense's (DOD) QDR process: the Department of Homeland Security's Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), the Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), and the intelligence community's Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review (QICR). The Obama Administration, at the start of its first term, declared the concepts of "national security" and "homeland security" to be "indistinguishable," and it institutionalized that concept organizationally by merging the previously separate National and Homeland Security Councils. This report provides an overview of mandates, statutory and otherwise, for key national security strategic reviews and reports; assesses recent execution; and raises issues that Congress may wish to consider as it conducts future oversight activities. Why Strategy? By laying out a detailed strategic vision, it can help inform public audiences both at home and abroad about U.S. government intent. At the level of an individual agency, in turn, strategy can help locate that agency's efforts in the context of the national security efforts of the government as a whole; confirm agency priorities; clarify internal roles and missions; and provide a foundation for external communications including with Congress. Strategic Reviews and Reports with Statutory Requirements Congress has enacted, and sometimes amended, an array of requirements for the executive branch to conduct strategic reviews and/or to publish strategy documents. Executive branch compliance with these mandates, in form and substance, has varied a great deal over time. Evaluating the effectiveness of congressional oversight of executive branch strategy-making may depend in part on how one defines "effective strategy-making." There is no separate statutory mandate for an NDS. As long as the basic premises of the defense strategy still hold, which is by no means a given, a two-year gap between adjudication of defense strategy, and assessment of the appropriateness of the assignment of roles and missions for executing that strategy, might in principle allow sufficient time to gauge the effectiveness of the division of labor. National Defense Panel (NDP) Many practitioners and observers have suggested the value of a competition of ideas, to spur the rigor and creativity of any strategic review process. Issues for Congress Over time, there has been no shortage of debate and commentary about the role of "strategy" in the national security system, which also includes decision-making, budgeting, planning and execution, and congressional oversight. In the defense arena of national security, Congress requires the submission of a national security strategy (NSS) at least once per year, of a national defense strategy (NDS) as part of the quadrennial defense review (QDR) report every four years, and of a national military strategy (NMS) or update every two years. In practice, review and reporting timelines have been less coherent. Strategy and Resourcing Both in practice and in theory, the relationship between strategy-making and resourcing can be fraught. What mechanisms might help ensure that conclusions of strategic reviews and the content of strategic guidance directly shape specific policy and resourcing decisions?

Strategy—together with decision-making, planning and execution, budgeting, and congressional oversight—is a critical component of U.S. government thinking and practice in the arena of national security. In theory, effective national security strategy-making can sharpen priorities and refine approaches; provide a single shared vision for all concerned agencies; clarify the roles and responsibilities of all concerned agencies so that they may more effectively plan and resource; offer a coherent baseline for congressional oversight; and communicate U.S. government intent to key audiences at home and abroad. While there is no single shared view of the boundaries of the concept of "national security," many would include homeland security, and an array of economic, energy and/or environmental concerns, as well as traditional military affairs. In practice, the U.S. government—at the levels of both the White House and individual agencies—conducts a wide array of strategic reviews, and issues many forms of strategic guidance. The pinnacle of the national security strategic architecture is the national security strategy, issued by the President. That effort is supported by an array of subordinate quadrennial reviews—the Quadrennial Defense Review by the Department of Defense, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review by the Department of State, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review issued by the Department of Homeland Security, and the Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review issued by the Office of the Director for National Intelligence—as well as a number of subordinate strategies including national defense strategy, national military strategy, national homeland security strategy, and national intelligence strategy. Yet in practice, the strategic architecture is more complex and less coherent than this synopsis might suggest, because these core strategic efforts are joined by a number of one-off strategic reviews and documents, and because timelines, content, and relationships among the various documents have all varied a great deal over time. Congress has provided statutory mandates for many but not all U.S. government strategy-making activities. In principle, congressional oversight of Administration strategic efforts can help hold the executive branch accountable for both the content and the rigor of its thinking. To the extent that strategy actually shapes policy-making and resourcing, such strategy oversight can be a powerful tool for shaping real-world outcomes. In practice, executive branch compliance with statutory mandates—in terms of both form and content—has been mixed at best in recent history. This report offers a brief overview of the role of strategy in conducting the business of national security; and it reviews the major statutory and non-statutory mandates for national security activities, addressing both requirements and execution to date. It analyzes key issues that may be of interest to Congress in exercising oversight of executive branch strategy-making, including the frequency of strategy updates; the synchronization of timelines and content among different strategies; the prioritization of objectives; the assignment of roles and responsibilities among relevant agencies; the links between strategy and resourcing; and the value of a competition of ideas.

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Granting Russia permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status requires a change in law because Russia is prohibited from receiving PNTR under Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974. Title IV includes the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment free emigration requirements. After 19 years of negotiations, Russia joined the WTO on August 22, 2012. 6156 , which does just that, among other things. The legislation also included provisions—the Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012—that impose sanctions on individuals linked to the incarceration and death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. H.R. 6156 also authorized PNTR status for Moldova. President Obama signed the legislation into law on December 14, 2012. "Normal trade relations" (NTR), or "most-favored-nation" (MFN), trade status is used to denote nondiscriminatory treatment of a trading partner compared to that of other countries. It authorized the President to grant PNTR by proclamation. On November 16, 2012, the House passed (365-43), and on December 6, 2012, the Senate passed (92-4) H.R. To fulfill that commitment, the United States would have to extend PNTR to Russia. It also contained other provisions that required: the USTR report annually to the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee on Russia's implementation of its WTO commitments, including sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards and IPR protection and on acceding to the WTO plurilateral agreements on government procurement and information technology; the USTR report to the two committees within 180 days and annually thereafter on USTR actions to enforce Russia's compliance with its WTO commitments; the USTR and the Secretary of State report annually on measures that they have taken and results they have achieved to promote the rule of law in Russia and to support U.S. trade and investment by strengthening investor protections in Russia; the Secretary of Commerce to take specific measures against bribery and corruption in Russia, including establishing a hotline and website for U.S. investors to report instances of bribery and corruption; a description of Russian government policies, practices, and laws that adversely affect U.S. digital trade be included in the USTR's annual trade barriers report (required under Section 181 of the Trade Act of 1974); and the negotiation of a bilateral agreement with Russia on equivalency of SPS measures.

U.S.-Russian trade is governed by Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, which sets conditions on Russia's normal trade relations (NTR), or nondiscriminatory, status, including the "freedom-of-emigration" requirements of the Jackson-Vanik amendment (Section 402). Changing Russia's trade status to unconditional NTR or "permanent normal trade relations status (PNTR)" requires legislation to lift the restrictions of Title IV as they apply to Russia and authorize the President to grant Russia PNTR by proclamation. On November 16, 2012, the House passed (365-43), and on December 6, 2012, the Senate passed (92-4) H.R. 6156, which does just that, among other things. The legislation also included provisions—the Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012—that impose sanctions on individuals linked to the incarceration and death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. H.R. 6156 also authorized PNTR status for Moldova. President Obama signed the legislation into law on December 14, 2012. PNTR for Russia became an issue for the 112th Congress because, on August 22, 2012, Russia joined the WTO after having completed a 19-year accession process. The WTO requires each member to accord newly acceding members "immediate and unconditional" most-favored-nation (MFN) status, or PNTR. In order to comply with WTO rules, the United States had to extend PNTR to Russia.

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Introduction The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent attacks on European countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain have prompted both sides of the Atlantic to reinvigorate their respective efforts to ensure homeland security and combat terrorism. However, U.S. and European approaches to these issues differ. While the United States has embarked on a wholesale reorganization of its domestic security and border protection institutions, European countries have largely preferred to work within their existing institutional architectures to combat terrorism and respond to other security challenges and disasters, both natural and man-made. This report examines homeland security and counterterrorist measures in six selected European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. None of these European countries currently has a single ministry or department equivalent to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In most of these countries, responsibility for different aspects of homeland security and counterterrorism is scattered across several ministries, and inter-governmental cooperation plays a key role in addressing threats and challenges to domestic security. Others contend that European governments have sought to integrate counterterrorism and preparedness programs into existing emergency management efforts, thereby providing greater flexibility to respond to a wide range of security challenges with often limited personnel and financial resources. Spending priorities in the different countries vary, but most have devoted increased funds over the last several years to intelligence and law enforcement efforts against terrorism. Funding for measures to strengthen transport security, improve emergency preparedness and response, counter chem-bio incidents, and protect critical national infrastructure are more difficult to determine and compare among the countries, given that responsibility for these various issues is often spread among the budgets of different government ministries. Some U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress are taking an increasing interest in how European countries are organizing and managing homeland security issues and emergency preparedness and response, in light of both recent terrorist activity and Hurricane Katrina, which devastated the U.S. Gulf Coast in August 2005. In seeking to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad, many U.S. officials recognize that the actions or inaction of the European allies can affect U.S. domestic security, especially given the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, which allows nationals of many European states to travel to the United States without a visa or other checks on their identities. Some experts suggest that greater U.S.-European cooperation in the field of homeland security is necessary in order to better guarantee security on both sides of the Atlantic.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent attacks on European countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain have prompted both sides of the Atlantic to reinvigorate their respective efforts to ensure homeland security and combat terrorism. However, U.S. and European approaches to these issues differ. While the United States has embarked on a wholesale reorganization of its domestic security and border protection institutions, European countries have largely preferred to work within their existing institutional architectures to combat terrorism and respond to other security challenges and disasters, both natural and man-made. This report examines homeland security and counterterrorist measures in six selected European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. None of these European countries currently has a single ministry or department equivalent to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In most of these countries, responsibility for different aspects of homeland security and counterterrorism is scattered across several ministries or different levels of government. Different countries maintain different priorities in spending for homeland security, but most have devoted increased funds over the last several years to intelligence and law enforcement efforts against terrorism. Funding for measures to strengthen transport security, improve emergency preparedness and response, counter chem-bio incidents, and protect critical national infrastructure are more difficult to determine and compare among the countries, given that responsibility for these various issues is often spread among the budgets of different government ministries. Some critics suggest that the Europeans have been slow to bolster domestic protection efforts beyond the law enforcement angle. Others contend that European governments have sought to integrate counterterrorism and preparedness programs into existing emergency management efforts, thereby providing greater flexibility to respond to a wide range of security challenges with often limited personnel and financial resources. Some U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress are taking an increasing interest in how European countries are managing homeland security issues and emergency preparedness and response, in light of both recent terrorist activity and Hurricane Katrina, which devastated the U.S. Gulf Coast in August 2005. In seeking to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad, many U.S. officials recognize that the actions or inaction of the European allies can affect U.S. domestic security, especially given the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, which allows nationals of many European states to travel to the United States without a visa or other checks on their identities. Some experts suggest that greater U.S.-European cooperation in the field of homeland security is necessary in order to better guarantee security on both sides of the Atlantic. This report will not be updated. For more information, also see CRS Report RL31612, European Counterterrorist Efforts: Political Will and Diverse Responses in the First Year After September 11, by [author name scrubbed] (pdf).

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This Report briefly summarizes (1) the primary United States antitrust statutes, and (2) some of the activities which are generally considered to be violations of those laws. There is also some reference to the prohibition against unfair competition and the "unfairness" jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Further, the laws whose descriptions follow do not constitute all of the statutes which may be applicable to, or implicated in antitrust issues, but rather, are those which are most often utilized.

This Report briefly summarizes (1) the primary United States antitrust statutes, and (2) some of the activities which are generally considered to be violations of those laws. There is also some reference to the prohibition against unfair competition and the "unfairness" jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The laws discussed do not constitute all of the statutes which may be applicable to, or implicated in antitrust issues, but rather, are those which are most often utilized.

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Introduction The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) created a permanent risk adjustment program that aims to reduce some of the incentives insurers may have to avoid enrolling individuals who are at risk of high health care costs in the private health insurance market—specifically in the individual (nongroup) and small-group markets. Section 1343 of the ACA established the risk adjustment program, which is designed to assess charges to health plans that have relatively healthier enrollees compared with other health plans in a given state. The program uses collected charges from plans with comparatively healthy enrollees to make payments to plans in the same state that have relatively sicker enrollees. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) administers the risk adjustment program as a budget-neutral program, so that payments made are equal to the charges collected in each state. CMS assesses payments and charges on an annual basis, beginning in the 2014 benefit year. Prior to the ACA, most state laws (and federal law under limited circumstances) allowed insurers to minimize their exposure to high-risk individuals by charging higher or lower premiums to potential enrollees based on factors such as age, gender, and health status. However, under current federal law, insurers in the individual and small-group markets are unable to set premiums based on gender or health status and are limited in how much they may vary premiums by age. Without being permitted to account for the risk from individuals who expect or plan for high use of health services on the basis of the aforementioned criteria, insurers still may attempt to avoid such individuals by using benefit designs, networks, formularies, and/or marketing techniques that are not likely to appeal to them (though insurers are limited by other ACA requirements, such as being required to offer coverage for the Essential Health Benefits). This report provides responses to frequently asked questions related to the risk adjustment program. The first several questions pertain to background on insurance markets, why risk mitigation matters, and the role of risk adjustment in risk mitigation. The following questions relate to the mechanics of the risk program, including how enrollee risk scores are calculated and how risk adjustment payments and charges are determined. Responses to the concluding questions provide information on the experience of the risk adjustment program thus far and future changes to the program. The concept underlying insurance is risk (i.e., the likelihood and magnitude of experiencing a financial loss). In addition to the risks and uncertainty described above, one phenomenon that exists in health insurance markets is that individuals who expect or plan for high use of health services are more likely to seek out coverage and enroll in plans with more benefits than individuals who do not expect to use many or any of the health services. The ACA established three risk mitigation programs to mitigate the financial risk that insurers face and to stabilize the price of health insurance in the individual and small-group markets: (1) the transitional reinsurance program, (2) the temporary risk corridors program, and (3) the permanent risk adjustment program. Step 2: Determine Enrollee Risk Scores CMS uses the data to measure an insurer's risk for each plan. for more information). What Factors Are Used to Determine an Enrollee's Risk Score? A plan's risk adjustment payment or charge is determined by calculating the predicted costs considering the health status of the plan's actual enrollees relative to the statewide average and subtracting expected premium revenue based on allowable rating factors (i.e., individual or family enrollment, geographic rating area, tobacco use, and age) relative to the statewide average. The insurer would be able to collect 25% more Plan A premiums than Plan B premiums, given the differences in age rating.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) created a permanent risk adjustment program that aims to reduce incentives that insurers may have to avoid enrolling individuals at risk of high health care costs in the private health insurance market. Section 1343 of the ACA established the program, which is designed to assess charges to health plans that have relatively healthier enrollees compared with other health plans in a given state. The program uses collected charges to make payments to other plans in the same state that have relatively sicker enrollees. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) administers the risk adjustment program as a budget-neutral program, so that payments made are equal to the charges assessed in each state. CMS assesses payments and charges on an annual basis, beginning in the 2014 benefit year. The concept of risk (i.e., the likelihood and magnitude of experiencing financial loss) is at the root of any insurance arrangement. One of the ways that insurers are exposed to risk is that individuals have more information about their own health status than an insurer does. Individuals who expect or plan for high use of health services (e.g., older or sicker individuals) are more likely to seek out coverage and enroll in plans with more benefits than individuals who do not expect to use many or any health services (e.g., younger or healthier individuals). Prior to the ACA, most state laws (and federal law under limited circumstances) allowed insurers to minimize their exposure to this risk by charging higher or lower premiums to potential enrollees based on factors such as age, gender, and health status. However, under current federal law, insurers in the individual and small-group markets are unable to set premiums based on gender or health status and are limited in how much they may vary premiums by age. Without being permitted to account for the risk from individuals who expect or plan for high use of health services using the aforementioned criteria, insurers still may attempt to avoid such individuals enrolling by using networks, formularies, and other techniques that are not likely to appeal to them, though insurers are limited by other ACA requirements (e.g., they are required to offer certain benefits). The ACA established the permanent risk adjustment program to try to eliminate incentives insurers may have to avoid enrolling high-risk individuals. This program, along with the transitional reinsurance program and the temporary risk corridors programs, is intended to encourage insurers to participate in the marketplace by moderating the risk and uncertainty that may reduce their likelihood to participate. Under the risk adjustment program, insurers place enrollee and claims data for a benefit year on a computer server that they own but that runs CMS software. CMS's software calculates a risk score for an enrollee using that enrollee's demographic and diagnosis information and obtains summary data for each plan. CMS uses the risk scores for a plan's enrollees to calculate the difference between the plan's predicted costs for its enrollees relative to the predicted state average cost, given the health status of the plan's enrollees and the estimated premium revenue that the plan would be able to collect based on allowable rating factors, relative to the estimated state average. This difference is then multiplied by the state average premium and results in either a risk adjustment payment or charge for a given plan. This report provides responses to some frequently asked questions (FAQs) about the ACA risk adjustment program. The report begins with background on the health insurance market, discusses why risk mitigation matters, and introduces the role of risk adjustment in risk mitigation. The next section describes the mechanics of the program, including how enrollee risk scores are determined and how they are used to calculate payments and charges. The report concludes with questions regarding the program's experience thus far and future changes to the program.

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T ermination for convenience refers to the exercise of the government's right to bring to an end the performance of all or part of the work provided for under a contract prior to the expiration of the contract "when it is in the Government's interest" to do so. Federal agencies typically incorporate clauses in their procurement contracts which grant them the right to terminate for convenience. However, the right to terminate procurement and other contracts for convenience has also been "read into" contracts which do not expressly provide for it on the grounds that the government has an inherent right to terminate for convenience, or on other related grounds. Some contracts were reportedly terminated, or considered for termination, for convenience in FY2013 as a result of sequestration. However, they would not necessarily do so. What Is the Basis for the Government's Right to Terminate for Convenience? When Can the Government Terminate a Contract for Convenience? The standard Termination for Convenience clauses prescribed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) all provide that a termination for convenience is based on the "Government's interest," as opposed to the contractor's actual or anticipated failure to perform. For example, federal courts and agency boards of contract appeals have recognized the government's interest in terminating a contract when the government no longer needs the supplies or services covered by the contract; the contractor refuses to accept a modification of the contract; questions have arisen regarding the propriety of the award, or about continued performance of the contract; the contractor ceases to be eligible for the contract awarded; the business relationship between the agency and the contractor has deteriorated; the agency has decided to restructure its contractual arrangements or perform work in-house; the agency seeks to avoid a conflict with the Comptroller General, or a dispute with Congress; or the work contemplated by the contract is proving impossible or too costly. Terminations in almost any other circumstances could also be found to be in the government's interest. How Does a Termination for Default Differ from a Termination for Convenience? In other words, if the government exercises its right to terminate for default, and is later found to have exercised this right improperly, the default termination will be treated as a constructive termination for convenience, as previously discussed (see " What Is a Constructive Termination? How Does Cancellation Differ from Termination for Convenience? The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), however, distinguishes between termination and cancellation. Partial terminations for convenience, in particular, can resemble "de-scoping" pursuant to any Changes clause incorporated in the contract. Part 31 specifically contemplates the following costs as potentially allowable (i.e., included in settlements under the government contract to which it is allocable) when a contract is wholly or partially terminated: common items : the costs of items "reasonably usable on the contractor's other work" if these items could not be retained at cost without the contractor sustaining a loss; costs continuing after termination : costs which cannot be discontinued immediately after the termination "[d]espite all reasonable efforts by the contractor"; initial costs : nonrecurring labor, material, and related overhead costs incurred in the early part of production as a result of factors such as training, lack of familiarity with the product, or excess spoilage due to inexperienced labor; and preparatory costs incurred in preparing to perform the terminated work, such as initial plant rearrangement and alterations and production planning; loss of useful value of special tooling, machinery, and equipment, provided that the items are not "reasonably capable of use" in the contractor's other work, and the government's interest is protected; rental under unexpired leases , minus the residual value of such leases, provided that the amount of rent claimed does not exceed the reasonable use value of the property, and the contractor makes "all reasonable efforts" to terminate or otherwise reduce the cost of the lease; alterations of leased property : alterations and reasonable restorations required by the lease, when the alterations were necessary for performing the contract; settlement expenses : accounting, legal, clerical, and similar costs reasonably necessary for preparing settlement claims and for termination and settlement of subcontracts; reasonable costs for the storage, transportation, protection, and disposition of property acquired or produced for the contract; and indirect costs related to salary and wages incurred as settlement expenses in relation to the foregoing; and subcontractor claims , including the allocable portion of the claims common to the contract and the contractor's other work, as well as an "appropriate share" of the contractor's indirect expenses, provided that the amount allocated is "reasonably proportionate" to the relative benefits received and is otherwise consistent with Part 31 of the FAR. In certain cases, though, courts and boards of contract appeals have found breach when the government exercises its right to terminate for convenience. Congress has also specifically appropriated or designated additional funds to cover potential termination liability.

"Termination for convenience" refers to the exercise of the government's right to bring to an end the performance of all or part of the work provided for under a contract prior to the expiration of the contract "when it is in the Government's interest" to do so. Federal agencies typically incorporate clauses in their procurement contracts granting them the right to terminate for convenience. However, the right to terminate procurement and other contracts for convenience has also been "read into" contracts which do not expressly provide for it on the grounds that the government has an inherent right to terminate for convenience, or on other related grounds. Where termination for convenience is concerned, the "Government's interest" is broadly construed. Federal courts and agency boards of contract appeals have recognized the government's interest in terminating a contract when (1) the government no longer needs the supplies or services covered by the contract; (2) the contractor refuses to accept a modification of the contract; (3) questions have arisen regarding the propriety of the award or continued performance of the contract; (4) the contractor ceases to be eligible for the contract awarded; (5) the business relationship between the agency and the contractor has deteriorated; or (6) the agency has decided to restructure its contractual arrangements or perform work in-house. Terminations in other circumstances could also be found to be in the "Government's interest." In contrast, terminations based on the contractor's actual or anticipated failure to perform substantially as required in the contract are known as "terminations for default." Such terminations are distinct from terminations for convenience in both their contractual basis and the amount of any recovery by the contractor in the event of termination. However, an improper termination for default will typically be treated as a constructive termination for convenience. Terminations for convenience are similarly distinguishable from "de-scoping" pursuant to any Changes clause incorporated in the contract. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) also distinguishes between termination for convenience and cancellation of multiyear contracts. As a rule, the government cannot be held liable for breach when it exercises its right to terminate contracts for convenience because it has the contractual and/or inherent right to do so. This means that contractors generally cannot recover anticipatory profits or consequential damages when the government terminates a contract for convenience. The contractor is, however, entitled to a termination settlement, which, in part, represents the government's consideration for its right to terminate. The composition of any termination settlement can vary depending upon which of the "standard" Termination for Convenience clauses is incorporated into the contract, among other factors. Such settlements typically include any costs incurred in anticipation of performing the terminated work and profit thereon. Some settlements are "no cost"; others are sizable. In certain cases, however, exercise of the right to terminate for convenience could result in breach of contract (e.g., the agency entered the contract with the intent to terminate). Congress is perennially interested in termination for convenience because it is part of the overall framework of federal procurement. However, congressional interest has been particularly high in recent Congresses due to sequestration and other efforts to constrain federal spending. Some contracts were reportedly terminated, or considered for termination, for convenience in FY2013 as a result of sequestration. There has also been interest in ways to reduce the amount of funds that must be obligated or otherwise "reserved" to cover potential termination liability.

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1512) Section 1512 applies to the obstruction of federal proceedings—judicial, congressional, or executive. Retaliating Against Federal Witnesses (18 U.S.C. Criminal Contempt of Court The final and oldest of the general obstruction provisions is contempt. Obstruction of Justice by Violence or Threat Several other federal statutes outlaw use of threats or violence to obstruct federal government activities. Obstruction of Justice by Destruction of Evidence Other than subsection 1512(c), there are three federal statutes which expressly outlaw the destruction of evidence in order to obstruct justice: 18 U.S.C. Obstruction of Justice by Deception In addition to the obstruction of justice provisions of 18 U.S.C. §3C1.1) Regardless of the offense for which an individual is convicted, his sentence may be enhanced as a consequence of any obstruction of justice for which he is responsible, if committed during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing for the offense of his conviction. The enhancement may result in an increase in his term of imprisonment by as much as four years.

Obstruction of justice is the frustration of governmental purposes by violence, corruption, destruction of evidence, or deceit. It is a federal crime. In fact, it is several crimes. Obstruction prosecutions regularly involve charges under several statutory provisions. Federal obstruction of justice laws are legion; too many for even passing reference to all of them in a single report. The general obstruction of justice provisions are six: 18 U.S.C. 1512 (tampering with federal witnesses), 1513 (retaliating against federal witnesses), 1503 (obstruction of pending federal court proceedings), 1505 (obstruction of pending congressional or federal administrative proceedings), 371 (conspiracy), and contempt. In addition to these, there are a host of other statutes that penalize obstruction by violence, corruption, destruction of evidence, or deceit. Moreover, regardless of the offense for which an individual is convicted, his sentence may be enhanced as a consequence of any obstruction of justice for which he is responsible, if committed during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing for the offense of his conviction. The enhancement may result in an increase in his term of imprisonment by as much as four years. This is an abridged version of CRS Report RL34303, Obstruction of Justice: An Overview of Some of the Federal Statutes That Prohibit Interference with Judicial, Executive, or Legislative Activities, without the footnotes, quotations, or citations to authority found in the longer report.

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Introduction On June 23, 2014, the Supreme Court decided a much-anticipated case in the area of federal securities law. Class certification is important in the securities area, and lawsuits are often brought to challenge the class of plaintiffs attempting to be certified. In addition, the amount of money involved in a class action securities lawsuit may be significant. Proponents and opponents of securities class actions have actively argued their points. Proponents believe that certification requirements must be kept to a minimum because investors should be able easily to pursue companies that have committed fraud. They also argue that the only people who benefit from securities class actions are the attorneys who receive large legal fees. The Halliburton cases illustrate the importance of class certification. The history of the cases leading to the second Supreme Court Halliburton decision is lengthy, spanning more than a decade. Thus far, the courts have dealt only with the issue of class certification; they have not yet had the opportunity to address the merits of the plaintiffs' arguments. There have been three rounds of decisions in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas and two rounds in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court. The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas has issued a third decision on class certification after the Supreme Court's remand. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) sets out requirements that class actions must meet. In the area of securities fraud class action certification, Basic v. Levinson discussed the predominance requirement. The fraud-on-the-market theory is based on the belief that, in an efficient, well-developed securities market, all material information about a company is available to the public and this information is reflected in the stock price. In an unpublished opinion, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas declined to certify the class to bring the lawsuit on the basis that the plaintiffs had not proved reliance (one of the necessary elements for proving a Section 10(b) claim, as mentioned above) on material misstatements made by Halliburton. The Supreme Court concluded by stating that the Court of Appeals erred when it required the Erica P. John Fund to prove loss causation at the certification stage. The Court refused to address any other questions which Halliburton might have, such as the presumption of reliance under the fraud-on-the-market theory or how and when the presumption might be rebutted. Fifth Circuit Decision—II Halliburton appealed to the Fifth Circuit, and in April 2013 the Fifth Circuit in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. affirmed the district court's decision to certify the class. The Court decided, with respect to the first question stated at the beginning of this report, not to overrule the presumption of reliance provided by the fraud-on-the-market theory but that, with respect to the second question, defendants in a class action may attempt to rebut the presumption of reliance at the class certification stage by introducing evidence that the alleged misrepresentations did not distort the market price of its stock. However, based on its analysis of the Supreme Court's Halliburton II decision, which, according to the district court, clarified that securities fraud defendants may rebut the Basic presumption at the class certification stage, the district court found that the burdens of production and persuasion to show lack of price impact were on Halliburton, the defendants. Halliburton II was clearly not the end of the Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton saga. The federal district court decision has fleshed out some of the particulars of the Supreme Court's Halliburton II decision. It approved the use of event studies by both parties to attempt to determine whether alleged misstatements cause a drop in share price. However, this case is not the end of the class certif. tion challenges, as the fifth Circuit has granted Halliburton leave to appeal. If the class is finally certified, the courts may then face the merits of the case.

On June 23, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a much-anticipated case in the area of federal securities law: Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. The history of the case spans more than a decade, through three rounds in federal district court and two rounds in the court of appeals and the Supreme Court. All of the cases so far have dealt with the issue of class certification for securities fraud plaintiffs. The merits of the case have not yet been considered. Class certification is important in the area of securities law because the merits of the case cannot be considered until after the class of plaintiffs has been certified. A class of many plaintiffs suing a company for fraud that has allegedly resulted in investment losses may be a formidable plaintiff, and a significant amount of money may be involved. So much money may be involved in these lawsuits that proponents and opponents have been very vocal. Proponents of such suits believe that certification requirements should be kept to a minimum to protect investors and the marketplace. Opponents of minimum certification requirements have argued that class action suits are often frivolous and are brought to pressure companies to settle rather than incur large litigation costs. They also argue that plaintiffs' attorneys, who may receive large legal fees, are the only ones who benefit from class actions. The Halliburton cases illustrate the importance of class certification. There have been two rounds of decisions in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court. The Erica P. John Fund accused Halliburton of violating federal securities fraud statutes by making material misstatements with respect to its liabilities, revenues, and cost savings. In the first round of cases, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas declined to certify the class on the basis that the plaintiffs had not proved reliance on material misstatements made by Halliburton. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to certify the class on the basis that the class had not shown loss causation at the class certification stage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the proving of loss causation at the class certification stage is not required. The Court refused to address any other questions which Halliburton might have, such as the presumption of reliance under the "fraud-on-the-market theory" (a theory recognized in the Supreme Court case Basic v. Levinson—that, in an efficient, well-developed securities market, all material information is available to the public and this information is reflected in the stock price, resulting in presumptive reliance by plaintiffs on the material misstatements). In the second round, the district court certified the class, believing that the class certification requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been met. The Fifth Circuit affirmed certification and concluded that Halliburton could not introduce evidence that its alleged misrepresentations had no impact on the stock price. The Supreme Court held that price impact evidence could be introduced at the class certification stage to rebut the presumption that the shareholders had relied on the alleged misstatements. However, the Court refused to overrule Basic v. Levinson's presumption of reliance provided by the fraud-on-the-market theory. Halliburton II was clearly not the end of the Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton saga. A third round in federal district court fleshed out some of the particulars of the Supreme Court's Halliburton II decision. It approved the use of event studies by both parties to attempt to determine whether alleged misstatements caused a drop in share price. However, even this case is not the end of the class certification challenges because the Fifth Circuit has granted Halliburton leave to appeal. If the class is finally certified, the courts may then face the merits of the case.

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Background The Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), P.L. 112-144 , continues the five-year reauthorization cycle of the prescription drug and medical device user fee programs that allow the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to collect fees and use the revenue to support the review of brand-name drug, biological product, and device marketing applications. In addition to titles that would reauthorize the drug and device user fee programs, FDASIA includes additional titles that create new user fee authority for generic drugs and biosimilar biological products; permanently authorize programs to encourage or require studies of drugs for pediatric use; and amend the law regarding medical device regulation, drug regulation, and several areas, such as advisory committee conflict of interest, that cut across FDA product areas. Title V permanently authorizes the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act and the Pediatric Research Equity Act. Titles VII through X address the regulation of drugs, including the supply chain, antimicrobial development, expedited drug approval, and shortages. The remainder of this report presents a general overview of FDASIA by title and section, providing a narrative overview of each title, as well as a brief description of each section in the statute. Appendix A lists the time-specific requirements of federal entities dictated by FDASIA. 112-144 law. Title I—Fees Relating to Drugs FDASIA reauthorizes the prescription drug user program for another five years, from FY2013 through FY2017. 107-109 ) and the Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA, P.L. Subtitle B—Medical Gas Product Regulation Subtitle B addresses the regulation of medical gases, such as oxygen. Requires the Secretary, within one year of enactment, to establish a strategy and implementation plan, consistent with user fee program performance goals, for advancing regulatory science for medical products, and to identify in such plan a vision and priorities related to medical product decision-making, and ways to address regulatory and scientific gaps, among other stated requirements; and requires the Secretary to include a report on progress on those goals as part of the FY2014 and FY2016 performance reports required for the prescription drug, medical device, generic drug, and biosimilar biological product user fee programs (§1124).

The Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), P.L. 112-144, amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) to expand the authority of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in performing its human drug, biological product, and medical device responsibilities. Frequently referred to as the user fee reauthorization act, FDASIA does include four titles relating to user fees. Titles I and II reauthorize the prescription drug and medical device user fee programs (PDUFA and MDUFA). Titles III and IV authorize new user fee programs for generic drugs (GDUFA) and biosimilar biological products (BSUFA). Title V of FDASIA reauthorizes and amends provisions of the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA) and the Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA); it also includes other pediatric research sections. Title VI addresses the regulation of medical devices across such diverse topics as clarifying the definition of a custom device; extending for another five years the ability of the manufacturer of a humanitarian use device (one with a limited number of potential users) to make a profit on sales for pediatric use and the expansion of that ability to sales for nonpediatric use; and authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to enter into arrangements with nations regarding harmonization of device regulation. Titles VII through X address the regulation of human drugs, highlighting the areas of supply chain security, anti-infective product development incentives, expedited development and review of drugs, and drug shortages. Title XI contains a miscellany of provisions including, for example, medical gas product regulation, advisory committee conflicts of interest, and required reports and guidance from the Secretary. For each title of FDASIA, this report provides a brief policy background narrative and an overview of provisions in P.L. 112-144. An appendix lists the time-specific requirements of federal entities in FDASIA.

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The administrative responsibilities associated with these rules vary by chamber. House Earmark Disclosure Rule House Rule XXI, clause 9, generally requires that certain types of measures be accompanied by a list of congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits that are included in the measure or its report, or a statement that the proposition contains no earmarks. Legislation Subject to the Rule House earmark disclosure rules apply to any congressional earmark included in either the text of the bill or the committee report accompanying the bill, as well as the conference report and joint explanatory statement. The disclosure requirements apply to items in authorizing legislation, appropriations legislation, and tax measures. Furthermore, they apply not only to measures reported by committees but also to unreported measures, "manager's amendments," Senate bills, and conference reports. The committee of jurisdiction is responsible for identifying earmarks in both the legislative text and any accompanying reports.

Earmark disclosure rules in both the House and Senate establish certain administrative responsibilities that vary by chamber. Under House rules, a Member requesting that an earmark be included in legislation is responsible for providing specific written information, such as the purpose and recipient of the earmark, to the committee of jurisdiction. Further, House committees are responsible for compiling, presenting, and maintaining such requests in accord with House rules. In the House, disclosure rules apply to any congressional earmark, limited tax benefit, or limited tariff benefit included in either the text of a bill or any report accompanying the measure, including a conference report and joint explanatory statement. The disclosure requirements apply to earmarks in appropriations legislation, authorizing legislation, and tax measures. Furthermore, they apply not only to measures reported by committees but also to measures not reported by committees, "manager's amendments," and conference reports. This report will be updated as needed.

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Introduction This report provides background information and potential issues for Congress regarding the growing strategic competition between China and India—the world's two most populous nations—in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This economic dependence on energy and trade transiting the Indian Ocean has become a strategic vulnerability for these states at a time when the United States is becoming less dependent on imported energy. Goals and Objectives Under several past administrations, U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific has included the following goals and objectives: Shape the strategic dynamics in the IOR as needed to prevent Asia from being dominated by a single hegemon or coalition of powers that could threaten the United States; Support U.S. friends and allies in the region and develop strategic and defense relationships with regional partners to strengthen the U.S strategic standing in the region; Promote a rules-based order and norms that support regional stability; Protect U.S. access to energy supplies; Help maintain freedom of navigation on the high seas and through the strategic choke points of the Indo-Pacific to facilitate the flow of U.S. and global trade and energy resources and the transit of U.S. naval forces; Prevent the region from being used by terrorists as bases of operations; Prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction from the region to state and non-state actors; Prevent large scale conflicts, such as between India and Pakistan, to preserve regional stability and trade; Keep the United States engaged in the dominant economic and strategic architectures of the region to promote U.S. economic interests; Continue to work with like-minded partners to support open societies and promote shared values including the rule of law, human rights, democracy and religious freedom; Conduct counterpiracy operations; and Work with China, India and regional states to address the threat of climate change in bilateral, multilateral, and global contexts. It identifies "a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order" in the Indo-Pacific. An understanding of strategic dynamics between India and China may help inform congressional decisionmakers as they make military procurement decisions related to the Administration's policies and U.S. interests. The Quad raises the role of values, as well as interests, in regional security groups. China-India strategic rivalry in the IOR is shaped by a number factors, including the following: China's further development of its strategic partnership with Indian rival Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key project in China's BRI; China's strategic, trade, investment and diplomatic advances in Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), Nepal, and Sri Lanka; China's expanding naval and military presence in the IOR including the new military base at Djibouti (and potentially another in Pakistan) as well as increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean; India's decision not to join China's BRI over sovereignty concerns related to CPEC projects in Kashmir; Border disputes including China's claim to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and China and India's border standoff at Doklam in Bhutan; China's opposition to India joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group and to it becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council; India's hosting the Dalai Lama and nearly 100,000 exiled Tibetans; India's Act East Policy including developing relations with Vietnam; China's role in blocking the designation of certain anti-India terrorists at the United Nations; India's trade deficit with China; and the two nations' starkly different political systems (India is the world's largest democracy and China is presenting its authoritarian system as a model for the world). There are other conceptual frameworks, such as the security dilemma, which could also be applied. Land Border Tensions While maritime security dynamics between China and India are evolving rapidly, the two nations continue their long-standing dispute over the contested Himalayan land border. China and India fought a month-long border war in late 1962. China may have been motivated to signal displeasure over developing ties between India and the United States. Much of China's energy must be imported by sea. China's dependence on imported energy, much of which must transit the Indiana Ocean and the Strait of Malacca, is a key strategic vulnerability for China and is a key driver for China's increasing engagement with the IOR. Some media reports view the AAGC as a counter to China's Belt and Road Initiative and "an attempt to create a free and open Indo-Pacific region by rediscovering ancient sea-routes and creating new sea corridors that will link the African continent with India and countries in South-Asia and South-East Asia." (See below.) Sri Lanka Sri Lanka's strategically important location near sea lanes that link the energy-rich Persian Gulf with the economies of Asia apparently have led to China's growing interest in the nation. China has increased both security and economic assistance to Sri Lanka. India, along with the United States, has been an active voice for reconciliation. Dhaka's foreign policy seeks to develop ties with China while continuing positive relations with New Delhi, the United States, and the West. Such humanitarian concerns are largely absent in China's relations with Burma which are more focused on securing its trade and energy infrastructure investments.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), a key geostrategic space linking the energy-rich nations of the Middle East with economically vibrant Asia, is the site of intensifying rivalry between China and India. This rivalry has significant strategic implications for the United States. Successive U.S. administrations have enunciated the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific region to U.S. security and economic strategy. The Trump Administration's National Security Strategy of December 2017 states that "A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region." A discussion of strategic dynamics related to the rivalry between China and India, with a focus on U.S. interests in the region, and China's developing strategic presence and infrastructure projects in places such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma (Myanmar), and Djibouti, can inform congressional decision-makers as they help shape the United States' regional strategy and military capabilities. Potential issues for Congress include determining resource levels for the Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Army to meet the United States' national security interests in the region and providing oversight of the Administration's efforts to develop a regional strategy, provide foreign assistance, and maintain and develop the United States' strategic and diplomatic relationships with regional friends and allies to further American interests. Competition between China and India is driven to a large extent by their economic rise and the rapid associated growth in, and dependence on, seaborne trade and imported energy, much of which transits the Indian Ocean. There seems to be a new strategic focus on the maritime and littoral regions that are adjacent to the sea lanes that link the energy rich Persian Gulf with the energy dependent economies of Asia. Any disruption of this supply would likely be detrimental to the United States' and the world's economy. China's dependence on seaborne trade and imported energy, and the strategic vulnerability that this represents, has been labeled China's "Malacca dilemma" after the Strait of Malacca, the key strategic choke point through which a large proportion of China's trade and energy flows. Much of the activity associated with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can be viewed as an attempt by China to minimize its strategic vulnerabilities by diversifying its trade and energy routes while also enhancing its political influence through expanded trade and infrastructure investments. China's BRI in South and Central Asia and the IOR, when set in context with China's assertive behavior in the East China Sea and the South China Sea and border tensions with India, is contributing to a growing rivalry between India and China. This rivalry, which previously had been largely limited to the Himalayan region where the two nations fought a border war in 1962, is now increasingly maritime-focused. Some in India feel encircled by China's strategic moves in the region while China feels threatened by its limited ability to secure its sea lanes. Understanding and effectively managing this evolving security dynamic may be crucial to preserving regional stability and U.S. national interests. Some IOR states appear to be hedging against China's rising power by building their defense capabilities and partnerships, while others utilize more accommodative strategies with China or employ a mix of both. Some also see an opportunity to balance India's influence in the region. Hedging strategies by Asian states include increasing intra-Asian strategic ties, as well as seeking to enhance ties with the United States. This may present an opportunity for enhanced security collaboration particularly with like-minded democracies such as the United States, India, Australia and Japan. While forces of nationalism and rivalry may increase tensions, shared trade interests and interdependencies between China and India, as well as forces of regional economic integration in Asia more broadly, have the potential to dampen their rivalry. The United States' presence as a balancing power can also contribute to regional stability.

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Manufacturers from South Korea and China are also expanding production capacity and entering the U.S. market. Federal interest in the U.S. wind turbine manufacturing industry is based on (1) increasing the role of clean energy technology in energy production; (2) encouraging advanced manufacturing and the creation of skilled manufacturing jobs; and (3) enhancing the diversity of U.S. energy sources. For the next two decades fuel prices were low and U.S. incentives spotty. This allowed wind turbine manufacturers to establish themselves in countries such as Denmark, Spain, and Germany, where many wind turbine manufacturers are now based. These firms are headquartered in Europe, the United States, India, and China. Wind Turbine Components, Raw Materials, Global Supply Chain, and U.S. Manufacturing Capacity Wind Turbine Components A wind turbine is a collection of operating systems that convert energy from wind to produce electricity. In simple terms, as shown in Figure 1 , the major components in a wind turbine consist of: a rotor comprising four principal components—the blade, the blade extender, the hub, and the pitch drive system; a nacelle, the external shell or structure resting atop the tower containing and housing the controller, gearbox, generator, large bearings, connecting shafts, and electronic components that allow the turbine to monitor changes in wind speed and direction; a tower, normally made of rolled steel tube sections that are bolted together to provide the support system for the blades and nacelle; and, other components, including transformers, circuit breakers, fiber optic cables, and ground-mounted electrical equipment. U.S. Wind Turbine Manufacturing Facilities At the end of 2011, the American Wind Energy Association reported that more than 470 wind turbine manufacturing facilities were located in the United States, up substantially from the 30-40 wind-related manufacturing facilities nationwide in 2004. Greater demand for wind turbines, cost savings related to transportation, and concern about the risks associated with currency fluctuations are among the reasons wind turbine and component manufacturers have opened new production facilities in the United States since 2005. U.S. Wind Turbine Manufacturing Employment In 2011, the wind turbine manufacturing sector supported an estimated 30,000 manufacturing jobs nationwide. But although more of these large components are being produced domestically, imports remain significant. In an August 2012 report, analysts at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory calculated that the share of parts manufactured domestically nearly doubled from around 35% in 2005-2006 to 67% in 2011. U.S. Exports Future growth of the U.S. wind turbine industry also depends on foreign markets. More recently, however, many countries—especially in Europe—have begun to reduce subsidies for renewables, including wind. However, faced with a difficult fiscal and economic situation, some European countries have reduced their wind power feed-in tariffs and are taking a more critical look at their renewable energy policies. In the United States, various federal policies also have been instrumental in the development of a domestically based wind power sector, including the production tax credit (PTC)/Investment Tax Credit (ITC), which will expire at the end of 2013; an advanced energy manufacturing tax credit (MTC), which reached its funding cap in 2010 (no additional funds were allocated to continue with the MTC); the Section 1603 Treasury Cash Grant Program, which required that wind projects begin construction by December 31, 2011, and be placed in service by December 31, 2012; and the Section 1705 Loan Guarantee Program for commercial projects, which includes manufacturing facilities that employ "new or significantly improved" technologies. The wind industry asserts that a national renewable electricity standard is needed to create long-term stability and to attract investment in new turbine production facilities. Production Tax Credit (PTC)/Investment Tax Credit (ITC) The PTC, the main federal policy tool in the deployment of U.S. wind power, was first adopted during the Administration of President George H. W. Bush as part of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ( P.L.

Increasing U.S. energy supply diversity has been the goal of many Presidents and Congresses. This commitment has been prompted by concerns about national security, the environment, and the U.S. balance of payments. Investments in new energy sources also have been seen as a way to expand domestic manufacturing. For all of these reasons, the federal government has a variety of policies to promote wind power. Expanding the use of wind energy requires installation of wind turbines. These are complex machines composed of some 8,000 components, created from basic industrial materials such as steel, aluminum, concrete, and fiberglass. Major components in a wind turbine include the rotor blades, a nacelle and controls (the heart and brain of a wind turbine), a tower, and other parts such as large bearings, transformers, gearboxes, and generators. Turbine manufacturing involves an extensive supply chain. Until recently, Europe has been the hub for turbine production, supported by national renewable energy deployment policies in countries such as Denmark, Germany, and Spain. However, support for renewable energy including wind power has begun to wane across Europe as governments there reduce or remove some subsidies. Competitive wind turbine manufacturing sectors are also located in India and Japan and are emerging in China and South Korea. U.S. and foreign manufacturers have expanded their capacity in the United States to assemble and produce wind turbines and components. About 470 U.S. manufacturing facilities produced wind turbines and components in 2011, up from as few as 30 in 2004. An estimated 30,000 U.S. workers were employed in the manufacturing of wind turbines in 2011. Because turbine blades, towers, and certain other components are large and difficult to transport, manufacturing clusters have developed in certain states, notably Colorado, Iowa, and Texas, which offer proximity to the best locations for wind energy production. The U.S. wind turbine manufacturing industry also depends on imports, with the majority coming from European countries, where the technical ability to produce large wind turbines was developed. Although turbine manufacturers' supply chains are global, recent investments are estimated to have raised the share of parts manufactured in the United States to 67% in 2011, up from 35% in 2005-2006. The outlook for wind turbine manufacturing in the United States is more uncertain now than in recent years. For the past two decades, a variety of federal laws and state policies have encouraged both wind energy production and the use of U.S.-made equipment to generate that energy. A continuing challenge for the industry is uncertainty about one main federal policy tool in the deployment of wind power, the production tax credit (PTC), which Congress has extended eight times and let lapse on four occasions. Most recently, the PTC expired at the end of 2012, but a few days later, Congress extended it through year-end 2013. At least a dozen wind turbine manufacturers announced layoffs or hiring freezes at U.S. facilities in 2012, citing concern about the PTC's future as one reason. Other factors affecting the health of the U.S. wind industry are intense price competition from natural gas, an oversupply in wind turbines, and softening demand for renewable electricity.

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In 2013, the United States exported about $14 billion in yarns and fabrics worldwide. More than half of this output was shipped to Western Hemisphere nations that are members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). These FTAs provide that certain exports from member countries may enter the U.S. market duty-free only if they are made from textiles produced in the region. This has encouraged manufacturers in Mexico and Central America to use U.S.-made yarns and fabrics in apparel, home furnishings, and other products. Exports to the NAFTA and CAFTA-DR countries contributed to a U.S. trade surplus of $2.4 billion in yarns and fabrics in 2013. Aligned against them are retailers and apparel companies that want to be able to import apparel from producers wherever they are located, regardless of whether U.S. textiles are used; they urge full inclusion of textiles and apparel in any TPP agreement and favor preferential access for apparel cut and sewn from fabric made in countries not included in the TPP, such as China. The U.S. Textile Industry and Its Markets With nearly $57 billion in industry shipments in 2013, textile manufacturing, which produces yarns and fabrics from raw materials such as cotton and various man-made fibers, is a supplier industry to three industrial sectors. At the end of 2013, the domestic textile industry employed about 230,700 workers, accounting for fewer than 2% of the nearly 12 million domestic factory jobs (see Appendix A ). Vietnam, a fast-growing source of apparel for the U.S. market, furnished 10% of imports, and Mexico accounted for 5%, but the other TPP participants shipped only small quantities of apparel to the United States. Almost all U.S. apparel imports from Central America, the Caribbean, Mexico, and Canada are made with textiles produced in the United States. If apparel produced in Asian TPP countries gains duty-free access to the U.S. market, it could displace apparel manufactured with U.S. fabric in the Western Hemisphere, adversely affecting U.S. textile exports. Also, should Vietnam develop a larger textile industry, U.S. textile exports could be hurt if the TPP were to allow Western Hemisphere apparel producers to use textiles made in any TPP member country and still enjoy duty-free access to the U.S. market. Among the Asian and Pacific countries in the TPP, Vietnam is the only one with significant textile and apparel trade with the United States. The United States' main textile-related export to Vietnam is raw cotton: U.S. exports supply about 60% of the cotton used in Vietnamese textile mills. Cut and S ew : Only the cutting and sewing of the finished article must occur in FTA member countries, providing maximum flexibility for sourcing. U.S. negotiators have proposed that the TPP agreement incorporate a unified yarn-forward ROO, with perhaps some exemptions for inputs considered to be in short supply, or "not commercially available," in the region to assure that duty-free preferences only benefit countries that are part of the agreement. This would permit use of yarns and fabrics from China and other countries in garments qualifying for duty-free access to all TPP countries. For textile manufacturers, the inclusion of a significant apparel producer such as Vietnam in a free trade agreement holds the potential to dramatically shift global trading patterns. U.S. textile manufacturing interests have urged U.S. negotiators to insist on a "yarn forward" rule in the TPP. Domestic manufacturers of household and technical textiles seem less likely to be immediately affected by any TPP agreement. U.S. manufacturers appear to be internationally competitive in these sectors, and Vietnam's low labor costs will provide little comparative advantage in areas where production is highly automated.

Textiles are a contentious and unresolved issue in the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations to establish a free-trade zone across the Pacific. Because the negotiating parties include Vietnam, a major apparel producer that now mainly sources yarns and fabrics from China and other Asian nations, the agreement has the potential to shift global trading patterns for textiles and demand for U.S. textile exports. Canada and Mexico, both significant regional textile markets for the United States, and Japan, a major manufacturer of high-end textiles and industrial fabrics, are also participants in the negotiations. U.S. textile manufacturers produce yarn, thread, and fabric for apparel, home furnishings, and various industrial applications. In 2013, the U.S. textile industry generated nearly $57 billion in shipments and directly employed about 230,700 Americans, accounting for approximately 2% of all U.S. factory jobs. More than one-third of U.S. textile production is exported, with the bulk of the exports going to Western Hemisphere nations that are members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). These free trade agreements provide that certain exports from member countries may enter the U.S. market duty-free only if they are made from textiles produced in the region. This has encouraged manufacturers in Mexico and Central America to use U.S.-made yarns and fabrics in apparel, home furnishings, and other products. Exports to the NAFTA and CAFTA-DR countries contributed to a U.S. trade surplus of $2.4 billion in yarns and fabrics in 2013. The TPP has the potential to affect U.S. textile exporters in at least two ways. First, it could enable Asian apparel producers, principally Vietnam, to export clothing to the United States duty-free. This would eliminate much of the advantage now enjoyed by Western Hemisphere apparel producers in the U.S. market and, because Vietnamese manufacturers make little use of U.S.-made textiles, could reduce demand for U.S. textile exports. Second, if the TPP were to allow Western Hemisphere apparel manufacturers to use yarn and fabric made anywhere in the TPP region and still enjoy preferential access to the U.S. market, an enlarged Vietnamese textile industry could, at some future time, compete with U.S. exporters in Mexico and Central America. Textile industry trade groups have urged the United States to insist on a strict "yarn forward" rule that allows a garment to enter the United States duty-free only if yarn production, fabric production, and cutting and sewing of the finished garment all occur within the TPP region. U.S. negotiators have also proposed that certain textile inputs "not commercially available" in TPP-member countries could be sourced from outside the region, including China. On the other side, retailers and apparel companies with extensive global supply chains want maximum flexibility for sourcing and are less concerned about whether textiles manufactured in the United States are used; they urge textiles and apparel to be treated like other products in any TPP agreement, and they want any apparel cut and sewn within the TPP area, regardless of where the fabric originates, to be eligible for duty-free entry. Members of Congress have voiced their support for both sides. The TPP seems likely to have less impact on those segments of the U.S. textile industry that do not supply apparel manufacturing. U.S. manufacturers of household and technical textiles appear to be internationally competitive, and it is not evident that lower-wage countries would have comparative advantage in these highly capital-intensive sectors.

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The first statue in the collection, depicting Nathanael Greene, was provided by Rhode Island in 1870. Aesthetic and structural concerns necessitated the relocation of some statues throughout the Capitol. It examines the creation, design, placement, and replacement of statues in the National Statuary Hall Collection. The report then discusses recent legislative proposals to increase the size of the National Statuary Hall Collection. Finally, the report discusses potential issues for congressional consideration. And the President is hereby authorized to invite each and all the States to provide and furnish statues, in marble or bronze, not exceeding two in number for each state, of deceased persons who have been citizens thereof, and illustrious for their historic renown or from distinguished civic or military services, such as each state shall determine to be worthy of this national commemoration; and when so furnished the same shall be placed in the old hall of the House of Representatives, in the capitol of the United States, which is hereby set apart, or so much thereof as may be necessary, as a national statuary hall, for the purposes herein indicated. 1289 , the Share America's Diverse History in the Capitol Act) to expand the National Statuary Hall Collection from two statues per state to three. Currently, collection statues are located in the Rotunda, the Crypt, the House wing of the Capitol in National Statuary Hall, the Hall of Columns, and adjacent to the House chamber, the Senate wing of the Capitol, and the CVC. One group of legislative proposals involves adding additional statues for each state; another would expand the collection by allowing the District of Columbia and the U.S. territories to provide statues to the collection. When the CVC opened, the Architect, under the direction of the Joint Committee on the Library, reduced the number of collection statues on display in National Statuary Hall as well as in the House and Senate wings of the Capitol by moving them to Emancipation Hall and other locations within the CVC. National Statuary Hall Collection Statues Since 2005, when New Mexico provided its second statue—Po'Pay—the National Statuary Hall Collection has contained 100 statues.

The National Statuary Hall Collection, located in the United States Capitol, comprises 100 statues provided by individual states to honor persons notable for their historic renown or for distinguished services. The collection was authorized in 1864, at the same time that Congress redesignated the hall where the House of Representatives formerly met as National Statuary Hall. The first statue, depicting Nathanael Greene, was provided in 1870 by Rhode Island. The collection has consisted of 100 statues—two statues per state—since 2005, when New Mexico sent a statue of Po'pay. At various times, aesthetic and structural concerns necessitated the relocation of some statues throughout the Capitol. Today, some of the 100 individual statues in the National Statuary Hall Collection are located in the House and Senate wings of the Capitol, the Rotunda, the Crypt, and the Capitol Visitor Center. Legislation to increase the size of the National Statuary Hall Collection was introduced in several Congresses. These measures would permit states to furnish more than two statues or allow the District of Columbia and the U.S. territories to provide statues to the collection. None of these proposals were enacted. Should Congress choose to expand the number of statues in the National Statuary Hall Collection, the Joint Committee on the Library and the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) may need to address statue location to address aesthetic, structural, and safety concerns in National Statuary Hall, the Capitol Visitor Center, and other areas of the Capitol. This report provides historical information on the National Statuary Hall Collection and National Statuary Hall. It examines the creation, design, placement, and replacement of statues in the National Statuary Hall Collection. The report then discusses recent legislative proposals to increase the size of the National Statuary Hall Collection. Finally, the report discusses potential issues for congressional consideration.

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Introduction Foreign ballistic and cruise missiles pose a potential threat to the national security interestsof the United States. Several other countries have missiles withinrange of U.S. overseas facilities and interests. While not posing a direct threat to the United States, theproliferation of shorter range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles has resulted in heightened regionaltensions in the Middle East, between India and Pakistan, and between China and Taiwan. A Declining Ballistic Missile Threat? (5) Given these decreases, the threat is characterized by some asfollows: There is a widespread capability to launch short-rangemissiles; There is a slowly growing, but limited, capability to launch medium-rangemissiles; A decreasing number of long-range missiles from Cold War levels that willcontinue to drop significantly over the next fifteen years; A possibility that one or two new nations could acquire a limited capability tolaunch long-range missiles over the next two decades; Likelihood of a nation attacking the United States or Europe with a ballisticmissile is exceptionally low. The most worrisome trend is the growing number of countries with both long-rangemissile and WMD programs. SouthAfrica reportedly dismantled the nuclear weapons and missiles that it had developed. The MTCR was designed to slow the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles,rockets, and unmanned air vehicles (UAV) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Russia Russia's ICBM force - although greatly diminished in size over the years - continues to posea significant threat to U.S. national security. Newer versions of these missiles that are being deployed feature improved range and accuracy andis believed to be exploring how these and other ballistic missiles can be used for anti-access andsea-denial purposes. (58) It is also believed that this LACM can carry both nuclear andconventional payloads. North Korea has allegedly exported ballisticmissiles and associated technologies to a number of countries and some analysts suggest that thesetransfers have advanced the recipient's missile programs by many years. Current Assessments. (83) Missile Proliferation. A Resumption of Ballistic Missile Test Flights? At least nine countries will be involved in producing theseweapons. (126) As already discussed,China is developing the HN series of land attack cruise missiles as well as a number of otheranti-ship, and air, ground, submarine and ship-launched cruise missiles. Implications Based on reported program progress, it is reasonable to conclude that the development andacquisition of ballistic and cruise missiles continues to remain a central security goal for a numberof countries of concern to the United States. While shorter-range ballistic missiles are of concern,particularly in terms of their use on the battlefield, a number of combat proven and developmentalballistic missile defense systems -- such as the U.S. Patriot and the Israeli Arrow -- provide a meansto counter these systems. China, a country that has had long-range ballistic missiles and nuclearwarheads for a number of decades, appears to be modernizing and upgrading its capability, notnecessarily to directly rival or surpass the United States but, as some suggest, as a means to obtaineven greater strategic "freedom of action." Some analysts contend thatpast Administrations relied too heavily on nonproliferation activities (which are considerably lessexpensive and controversial than many counterproliferation programs) and blame this imbalance forthe current state of missile proliferation. U.S. The primary means by which this goal isto be achieved is through counterproliferation and nonproliferation activities.

This report provides a current summary of ballistic and cruise missile activity in selectedcountries and discusses implications for U.S. national security policy. The Defense ThreatReduction Agency's Weapons of Mass Destruction Terms of Reference Handbook defines a ballisticmissile as "a missile that is guided during powered flight and unguided during free flight when thetrajectory that it follows is subject only to the external influences of gravity and atmospheric drag"and a cruise missile as "a long-range, low-flying guided missile that can be launched from air, sea,and land." Ballistic and cruise missile development and proliferation continue to pose a threat toU.S. national security interests both at home and abroad. Approximately 35 countries currentlypossess operational ballistic missiles of various ranges and approximately 25 countries haveoperational cruise missiles with a range greater than 150 km (90 miles). Some analysts considercruise missile proliferation to be of more concern than that of ballistic missile proliferation, primarilydue to their low threshold of use, availability, affordability, and accuracy. This report will beupdated annually. With the fall of Iraq and the voluntary termination of Libya's ballistic missile program, manyview North Korean and Iranian missile and WMD programs as the primary "rogue nation"long-range ballistic missile threat to U.S. national security. Russia and China continue to be the onlytwo countries that could conceivably attack the United States with intercontinental ballistic missilesarmed with nuclear weapons, but improved relationships with both countries have done a great dealto diminish this threat over past decades. India's and Pakistan's ongoing missile developmentprograms are viewed by many as highly aggressive and even provocative, but are generally viewedin a regional context as opposed to a direct threat to the United States. The renewal of dialoguebetween these two countries in an attempt to settle their disputes by diplomatic means may also helpin slowing proliferation as well as preventing their potential use in this region. The implications of ballistic and cruise missile proliferation to the United States hasnecessitated both nonproliferation and counterproliferation approaches in trying to stem thedevelopment, deployment, and export of missiles. Past Administrations have been characterized asnonproliferation-oriented by some analysts while the current Bush Administration is viewed by someas having abandoned traditional nonproliferation for a more action-oriented approach towardsmissile proliferation. Other experts have suggested that the United States must somehow find theright balance between missile nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies if meaningful,long-term progress is to be made. While some believe that missile proliferation can be "rolled back"by some combination of these approaches, others note that both ballistic and cruise missiles havebecome such an integral part of many countries' national security frameworks, that it is highlyunlikely that countries will abandon their programs in deference to U.S. pressure.

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Accordingly, reducing CO 2 emissions from coal plants is a focus of many proposals for cutting greenhouse gas emissions. Another option is to replace coal power with increased use of natural gas generation. This report provides an overview of the issues involved in displacing coal-fired generation with electricity from existing natural gas plants. This is a complex subject and the report does not seek to provide definitive answers. The report aims to highlight the key issues that Congress may consider in deciding whether to rely on, and encourage, displacement of coal-fired electricity with power from existing natural gas plants. For example, while existing natural gas plants may have enough excess capacity today to displace a material amount of coal generation, this could change in the future as load grows. Coal displacement by existing gas-fired generators is a similar type of problem. Policy Considerations As discussed in this report, the potential for displacing coal consumption in the power sector by making greater use of existing NGCC power plants depends on numerous factors. These include: The amount of excess NGCC generating capacity available; The current operating patterns of coal and NGCC plants, and the amount of flexibility power system operators have for changing those patterns; Whether or not the transmission grid can deliver power from existing NGCC plants to loads currently served by coal plants; and Whether there is sufficient natural gas supply, and pipeline and gas storage capacity, to deliver large amounts of additional fuel to gas-fired power plants; and consideration of the environmental impacts of increasing gas production. All of these factors have a time dimension. Therefore a full analysis of the potential for gas displacement of coal must take into account future conditions, not just a snapshot of the current situation. As a step toward addressing these questions, Congress may consider chartering a rigorous study of the potential for displacing coal with power from existing gas-fired power plants. Such a study would require sophisticated computer modeling to simulate the operation of the power system, to determine whether there is sufficient excess gas fired capacity and the supporting transmission and other infrastructure to displace a significant volume of coal over the near term. Such a study could help Congress judge whether there is sufficient potential to further explore a policy of replacing coal generation with increased output from existing gas-fired plants.

Reducing carbon dioxide emissions from coal plants is a focus of many proposals for cutting greenhouse gas emissions. One option is to replace some coal power with natural gas generation, a relatively low carbon source of electricity, by increasing the power output from currently underutilized natural gas plants. This report provides an overview of the issues involved in displacing coal-fired generation with electricity from existing natural gas plants. This is a complex subject and the report does not seek to provide definitive answers. The report aims to highlight the key issues that Congress may want to consider in deciding whether to rely on, and encourage, displacement of coal-fired electricity with power from existing natural gas plants. The report finds that the potential for displacing coal by making greater use of existing gas-fired power plants depends on numerous factors. These include: The amount of excess natural gas-fired generating capacity available. The current operating patterns of coal and gas plants, and the amount of flexibility power system operators have for changing those patterns. Whether or not the transmission grid can deliver power from existing gas power plants to loads currently served by coal plants. Whether there is sufficient natural gas supply, and pipeline and gas storage capacity, to deliver large amounts of additional fuel to gas-fired power plants. There is also the question of the cost of a coal displacement by gas policy, and the impacts of such a policy on the economy, regions, and states. All of these factors have a time dimension. For example, while existing natural gas power plants may have sufficient excess capacity today to displace a material amount of coal generation, this could change in the future as load grows. Therefore a full analysis of the potential for gas displacement of coal must take into account future conditions, not just a snapshot of the current situation. As a step toward addressing these questions, Congress may consider chartering a rigorous study of the potential for displacing coal with power from existing gas-fired power plants. Such a study would require sophisticated computer modeling to simulate the operation of the power system to determine whether there is sufficient excess gas fired capacity, and the supporting transmission and other infrastructure, to displace a material volume of coal over the near term. Such a study could help Congress judge whether there is sufficient potential to further explore a policy of replacing coal generation with increased output from existing gas-fired plants.

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While frequently discussed, no commonly accepted definition of the term big data exists. Public-level big data represent records that are collected, maintained, and analyzed through publicly funded sources, specifically by federal agencies (e.g., farm program participant records, Soil Survey, and weather data). Private big data represent records generated at the production level and originate with the farmer or rancher (e.g., yield, soil analysis, irrigation levels, livestock movement, and grazing rates). Both also present challenges, such as privacy and security, for producers and policymakers. Rather, the term big data is often used to describe a modern trend in which the combination of technology and advanced analytics creates a new way of processing information that is more useful and timely. In other words, big data is just as much about new methods for processing data as about the data themselves. Big data is viewed as dynamic and when analyzed can provide a useful tool in a decisionmaking process. Big data may significantly affect many aspects of the agricultural industry, although the full extent and nature of its eventual impacts remain uncertain. Many observers predict that the growth of big data will bring positive benefits through enhanced production, resource efficiency, and improved adaptation to climate change. While lauded for its potentially revolutionary applications, big data is not without issues. It is still unclear how big data will progress within agriculture due to challenges associated with both technical and policy issues. From a policy perspective, issues related to big data involve nearly every stage of its existence, including its collection (how it is captured), management (how it is stored and managed), and use (how it is analyzed and used). Both private and public big data play a key role in the use of technology and analytics that drive a producer's evidence-based decisions. While discussed separately in this report, they are typically combined to create a more complete picture of an operation and therefore better decisionmaking tools. Private Big Data Similar to public big data, private big data refers to the combination of technology and analytics used to process data. Most see big data in agriculture at the end use point, where farmers use precision tools to potentially create positive results like increased yields, reduced inputs, or greater sustainability. While this is certainly the more intriguing part of the discussion, it is but one aspect and does not necessarily represent a complete picture. As Congress follows the issue a number of questions may arise, including a principal one—what is the federal role?

Recent media and industry reports have employed the term big data as a key to the future of increased food production and sustainable agriculture. A recent hearing on the private elements of big data in agriculture suggests that Congress too is interested in potential opportunities and challenges big data may hold. While there appears to be great interest, the subject of big data is complex and often misunderstood, especially within the context of agriculture. There is no commonly accepted definition of the term big data. It is often used to describe a modern trend in which the combination of technology and advanced analytics creates a new way of processing information that is more useful and timely. In other words, big data is just as much about new methods for processing data as about the data themselves. It is dynamic, and when analyzed can provide a useful tool in a decisionmaking process. Most see big data in agriculture at the end use point, where farmers use precision tools to potentially create positive results like increased yields, reduced inputs, or greater sustainability. While this is certainly the more intriguing part of the discussion, it is but one aspect and does not necessarily represent a complete picture. Both private and public big data play a key role in the use of technology and analytics that drive a producer's evidence-based decisions. Public-level big data represent records collected, maintained, and analyzed through publicly funded sources, specifically by federal agencies (e.g., farm program participant records and weather data). Private big data represent records generated at the production level and originate with the farmer or rancher (e.g., yield, soil analysis, irrigation levels, livestock movement, and grazing rates). While discussed separately in this report, public and private big data are typically combined to create a more complete picture of an agricultural operation and therefore better decisionmaking tools. Big data may significantly affect many aspects of the agricultural industry, although the full extent and nature of its eventual impacts remain uncertain. Many observers predict that the growth of big data will bring positive benefits through enhanced production, resource efficiency, and improved adaptation to climate change. While lauded for its potentially revolutionary applications, big data is not without issues. From a policy perspective, issues related to big data involve nearly every stage of its existence, including its collection (how it is captured), management (how it is stored and managed), and use (how it is analyzed and used). It is still unclear how big data will progress within agriculture due to technical and policy challenges, such as privacy and security, for producers and policymakers. As Congress follows the issue a number of questions may arise, including a principal one—what is the federal role?

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T he FY2016 budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. 11 ) established the congressional budget for the federal government for FY2016 and set forth budgetary levels for FY2017-FY2025. It also included reconciliation instructions for House and Senate committees to submit changes in laws to reduce the federal deficit to their respective budget committees. Specifically, S.Con.Res. 11 instructed three committees of the House and two committees of the Senate to submit changes in laws within each committee's jurisdiction to reduce the deficit by not less than $1 billion for the period FY2016-FY2025. Additionally, S.Con.Res. 11 provided that these committees shall "note the policies discussed in title VI [of S.Con.Res. 11 ] that repeal the Affordable Care Act and the health care related provisions of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010" and "determine the most effective methods" by which these provisions "shall be repealed in their entirety." On October 23, 2015, the House passed the Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015 ( H.R. 3762 ). The bill would repeal several provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended), and it could restrict federal funding for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) and its affiliates and clinics for a period of one year. The bill also would appropriate an additional $235 million for each of FY2016 and FY2017 to the Community Health Center Fund. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimate that H.R. 3762 would reduce federal deficits by $78.1 billion over the 2016-2025 period. In lieu of action on a Senate reconciliation bill, on December 1, 2015, the Senate majority leader made a motion to proceed to the consideration of H.R. 3762 . The motion was non-debatable and was approved by voice vote. The majority leader then offered an amendment encompassing the recommendations of the instructed Senate committees as a substitute for the House language ( S.Amdt. 2874 ). Over the course of December 1, 2, and 3, the Senate debated this substitute and considered a number of amendments. On December 3, Senator Enzi, chairman of the Budget Committee, offered an amendment for himself and the majority leader as a substitute for S.Amdt. 2874 ( S.Amdt. 2916 ). On a point of order, a section of S.Amdt. 2874 concerning repeal of certain premium-stabilization programs was stricken, but the remainder of the amendment was subsequently adopted by the Senate by voice vote. The Senate then voted to pass the bill, 52-47. Similar to H.R. 3762 , the Senate amendment to H.R. 3762 would repeal several provisions of the ACA, could restrict federal funding for PPFA and its affiliated clinics for a period of one year, and would appropriate an additional $235 million for each of FY2016 and FY2017 to the Community Health Center Fund. However, the Senate bill includes many more ACA amendments or repeal provisions, as well as other non-ACA provisions. CBO and JCT estimate that the Senate bill would reduce federal deficits by $317.5 billion over the 2016-2025 period. Pursuant to the provisions of H.Res. 579 , on January 6, 2016, Representative Tom Price, chairman of the House Budget Committee, was recognized to make a motion that the House concur in the Senate amendment to H.R. 3762 . After an hour of debate, the House agreed to the motion, clearing the measure for presentment to the President. The measure was subsequently vetoed by President Obama on January 8 and returned to the House. This report includes a table listing all provisions in H.R. 3762 and the Senate amendment to H.R. 3762 that would amend or repeal ACA provisions. It also provides a brief explanation of the provisions included in the Senate Amendment to H.R. 3762 . For information about H.R. 3762 , see CRS Report R44238, Potential Policy Implications of the House Reconciliation Bill (H.R. 3762) , coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

The FY2016 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 11) established the congressional budget for the government for FY2016 and set forth budgetary levels for FY2017-FY2025. It also included reconciliation instructions for House and Senate committees to submit changes in laws to reduce the federal deficit to their respective budget committees. Specifically, S.Con.Res. 11 instructed three committees of the House and two committees of the Senate to submit changes in laws within each committee's jurisdiction to reduce the deficit by not less than $1 billion for the period FY2016-FY2025. Additionally, S.Con.Res. 11 provided that these committees shall "note the policies discussed in title VI [of S.Con.Res. 11] that repeal the Affordable Care Act and the health care related provisions of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010" and "determine the most effective methods" by which these provisions "shall be repealed in their entirety." On October 23, 2015, the House passed the Restoring Americans' Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015 (H.R. 3762). The bill would repeal several provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended), and it could restrict federal funding for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) and its affiliates and clinics for a period of one year. The bill also would appropriate an additional $235 million for each of FY2016 and FY2017 to the Community Health Center Fund. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimate that H.R. 3762 would reduce federal deficits by $78.1 billion over the 2016-2025 period. In lieu of action on a Senate reconciliation bill, on December 1, 2015, the Senate majority leader made a motion to proceed to the consideration of H.R. 3762. The motion was non-debatable and was approved by voice vote. The majority leader then offered an amendment encompassing the recommendations of the instructed Senate committees as a substitute for the House language (S.Amdt. 2874). Over the course of December 1, 2, and 3, the Senate debated this substitute and considered a number of amendments. On December 3, Senator Enzi, chairman of the Budget Committee, offered an amendment for himself and the majority leader as a substitute for S.Amdt. 2874 (S.Amdt. 2916). On a point of order, a section of S.Amdt. 2874 concerning repeal of certain premium-stabilization programs was stricken, but the remainder of the amendment was subsequently adopted by the Senate by voice vote. The Senate then voted to pass the bill, 52-47. Similar to H.R. 3762, the Senate amendment to H.R. 3762 would repeal several provisions of the ACA, could restrict federal funding for PPFA and its affiliated clinics for a period of one year, and would appropriate an additional $235 million for each of FY2016 and FY2017 to the Community Health Center Fund. Unlike the House bill, the Senate bill includes many more ACA amendments or repeal provisions, as well as other non-ACA provisions. CBO and JCT estimate that the Senate bill would reduce federal deficits by $317.5 billion over the 2016-2025 period. Pursuant to the provisions of H.Res. 579, on January 6, 2016, Representative Tom Price, chairman of the House Budget Committee, was recognized to make a motion that the House concur in the Senate amendment to H.R. 3762. After an hour of debate, the House agreed to the motion, 240-181, clearing the measure for presentment to the President. The measure was subsequently vetoed by President Obama on January 8 and returned to the House. This report includes a table listing all provisions in H.R. 3762 and the Senate amendment to H.R. 3762 that would amend or repeal ACA provisions. It also provides a brief explanation of the provisions included in the Senate Amendment to H.R. 3762. For information about H.R. 3762, see CRS Report R44238, Potential Policy Implications of the House Reconciliation Bill (H.R. 3762), coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

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Administrators would be responsible for the development of early warning systems of financial distress, such as a composite index of leading indicators. Finally, macroprudential policy administrators would also be able to provide advice to other regulatory agencies on matters related to financial stability. This report begins by briefly summarizing how recent innovations in finance, while increasing the capacity to borrow and lend, also resulted in a large volume of banking transactions occurring outside of traditional banking institutions. Monitoring these institutions for safety and soundness, which is referred to as microprudential oversight, does not directly address the challenges posed by systemic risk. Hence, the benefits and limitations of macroprudential policy will be discussed. The intermediation transaction carries a variety of risks. 4173 , the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 (Representative Barney Frank), proposes to establish a Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC), which would consist of the heads of the federal financial regulatory agencies, to provide macroprudential oversight of the U.S. financial system. H.R.

Recent innovations in finance, while increasing the capacity to borrow and lend, resulted in a large volume of banking transactions occurring outside of traditional banking institutions. Also, even though existing regulators supervise individual banks for safety and soundness, there are risks that do not reside with those institutions but may still adversely affect the banking system as a whole. Macroprudential policy refers to a variety of tasks designed to defend the broad financial system against threats to its stability. Responsibilities include monitoring the system for systemic risk vulnerabilities; developing early warning systems of financial distress; conducting stress-testing exercises; and advising other regulatory agencies on matters related to financial stability. H.R. 4173, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 (Representative Barney Frank), establishes a Financial Services Oversight Council with macroprudential regulatory responsibilities. On March 22, 2010, the Senate Banking Committee ordered reported the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 (Senator Christopher Dodd), which also would establish a Financial Services Oversight Council with similar responsibilities. This report provides background and discusses the potential benefits and limitations of macroprudential policy efforts. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Introduction Congress maintains a strong interest in the health of U.S. manufacturing due to its central role in the economy and national defense. One of the President's key proposals to help U.S. manufacturers is the establishment of a National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI). NNMI Proposal and Legislative Action In February 2012, in his FY2013 budget, President Obama proposed the establishment of the NNMI, requesting $1 billion in mandatory funding to support the establishment of up to 15 institutes. No legislation to enact the President's proposal was introduced in the 112 th Congress. In 2013, the President renewed his call for an NNMI in his FY2014 budget request, again seeking $1 billion in mandatory funding. In August 2013, bills titled the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act were introduced in the House ( H.R. 2996 ) and the Senate ( S. 1468 ) to establish a Network for Manufacturing Innovation. 2996 passed the House in September 2014. S. 1468 was reported by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in August 2014. No further legislative action was taken. The President's FY2015 budget proposal once again sought authority and funding to establish the NNMI. The OGSI included $2.4 billion in discretionary funding to establish up to 45 NNMI institutes. In December 2014, nearly three years after President Obama first proposed the establishment of the NNMI, Congress passed the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act of 2014 (RAMI Act), as Title VII of Division B of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ). The RAMI Act directs the Secretary of Commerce to establish a Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NMI) program within the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Institutes for Manufacturing Innovation (IMIs) Pre-RAMI Act IMIs Prior to passage of the RAMI Act, the Obama Administration relied on regular appropriations and the existing statutory authorities of the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE) to establish seven NNMI-like institutes. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ) provided NIST with $25.0 million for FY2016 for the NNMI, to include funding for establishment of IMIs and up to $5.0 million for coordination activities. A second source of NNMI funding provided for by the RAMI Act is authority given to the Department of Energy to transfer to NIST up to $250 million for the period FY2015-FY2024. In this regard, the act specifies which institutes are eligible to be a part of the network and designates the National Program Office as "a convener of the Network." However, the act does not further specify the purpose, federal role, or activities of the network of IMIs. Structure The act directs the Secretary of Commerce to establish a Network for Manufacturing Innovation program at NIST. Authorization of Appropriations The RAMI Act authorizes NIST to use $5 million per year for FY2015-FY2024 from funds appropriated to its Industrial Technology Services account to carry out the Network for Manufacturing Innovation program. The act specifies the following functions of the National Program Office: to oversee planning, management, and coordination of the program; to enter into memoranda of understanding with federal departments and agencies whose missions contribute to or are affected by advanced manufacturing, to carry out the authorized purposes of the program; to develop a strategic plan to guide the program no later than one year from the date of enactment of the act, and to update the strategic plan at least once every three years thereafter; to establish such procedures, processes, and criteria necessary and appropriate to maximize cooperation and coordination of the activities of the program with programs and activities of other federal departments and agencies whose missions contribute to or are affected by advanced manufacturing. Additional Program-Related Authorities Other provisions of the RAMI Act authorize the Secretary of Commerce to appoint such personnel and enter into such contracts, financial assistance agreements, and other agreements as the Secretary considers necessary or appropriate to carry out the program, including support for R&D activities involving an IMI; the Secretary of Commerce to transfer to other federal agencies such sums as the Secretary considers necessary or appropriate to carry out the program—however, such funds may not be used to reimburse or otherwise pay for the costs of financial assistance incurred or commitments of financial assistance made prior to the date of enactment of the RAMI Act; agencies to accept funds transferred to them by the Secretary of Commerce, in accordance with the provisions of the RAMI Act, to award and administer, under the same conditions and constraints applicable to the Secretary, all aspects of financial assistance awards under the RAMI Act; and the Secretary of Commerce to use, with the consent of a covered entity and with or without reimbursement, land, services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of such covered entity.

Congress maintains a strong interest in the health of U.S. manufacturing due to its central role in the U.S. economy and national defense. In 2012, in his FY2013 budget, President Obama proposed the creation of a National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI) to help accelerate innovation by investing in industrially relevant manufacturing technologies with broad applications, and to support manufacturing technology commercialization by bridging the gap between the laboratory and the market. The proposal included a request for $1 billion in mandatory funding for the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the establishment of up to 15 NNMI Institutes for Manufacturing Innovation (IMIs). No legislation to enact the President's proposal was introduced in the 112th Congress. In 2013, the President renewed his call for an NNMI in his FY2014 budget request, again seeking $1 billion in mandatory funding. In August 2013, bills entitled the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act were introduced in the House (H.R. 2996) and the Senate (S. 1468) to establish a Network for Manufacturing Innovation. H.R. 2996 passed the House in September 2014. S. 1468 was reported by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in August 2014. No further legislative action was taken. In 2014, the President's FY2015 budget again sought authority and funding to establish the NNMI, including $2.4 billion in discretionary funding to establish up to 45 IMIs. In December 2014, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act of 2014 (RAMI Act), as Title VII of Division B of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235). The RAMI Act directs the Secretary of Commerce to establish a Network for Manufacturing Innovation program at NIST. The RAMI Act includes provisions authorizing NIST, the Department of Energy (DOE), and other agencies to support the establishment of IMIs and establishing and providing for the operation of a Network for Manufacturing Innovation. NIST is authorized to use up to $5.0 million per year of appropriated funds for FY2015-FY2024 to carry out its responsibilities under the act. The Department of Energy is authorized, but not required, to transfer to NIST up to $250.0 million of appropriated funds over the same FY2015-FY2024 period. The Secretary of Commerce is also authorized to accept funds, services, equipment, personnel, and facilities to carry out the program. The act also establishes a National Office of the Network for Manufacturing Innovation Program at NIST to oversee and carry out the program. Prior to enactment of the RAMI Act, President Obama used existing authorities and regular appropriations of the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOE to establish several NNMI-like institutes. Under the RAMI Act, these and other institutes may be designated as part of the Network for Manufacturing Innovation. As of the date of this report, 14 IMIs have been established, eight by DOD, five by DOE, and one by the Department of Commerce. Enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) provided a new impetus for congressional oversight as appropriations were made explicitly for the first time for the NNMI. P.L. 114-113 provides NIST with $25 million for the purpose of establishing IMIs and coordinating their activities. Among the issues of interest are the selection of focus areas for the new centers and the integration of these centers with existing ones. Another area of possible congressional attention is to the network of IMIs. While the RAMI Act specifies which new and existing institutes are eligible to be a part of the network and designates the National Program Office as "a convener of the Network," it does not further specify the purpose, federal role, and activities of the network. The Trump Administration has not yet indicated its disposition toward the NNMI program.

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Most Recent Developments President Obama's FY2014 budget request for Energy and Water Development was released in April 2013. The request totaled $34.4 billion. The bill, H.R. 2609 , passed the House with amendments on July 10. The Senate Energy and Water Development Subcommittee reported out a bill June 25, totaling $34.4 billion, and the full Appropriations Committee approved the bill, S. 1245 , on June 27. On October 16, 2013, Congress passed the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, H.R. 2775 , P.L. 113-46 , extending funding for all federal programs, including Energy and Water Development, through January 15, 2014, at the FY2013 post-sequestration spending level. On December 26 the President signed H.J.Res. 59 ( P.L. 113-67 ), which contained the Bipartisan Budget Act establishing less stringent spending caps for FY2014 and FY2015 than the BCA, thus easing the way for an appropriations agreement. On January 17, 2014, the President signed H.R. 3547 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-76 ), containing appropriations for all 12 FY2014 appropriations bills, including Energy and Water Development programs (Division D). Overview The Energy and Water Development bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). The Budget Control Act and Energy and Water Development Appropriations for FY2013 and FY2014 FY2013 discretionary appropriations were considered in the context of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25 ), which established discretionary spending limits for FY2012-FY2021. Because deficit reduction legislation was not enacted by that date, an automatic spending reduction process established by the BCA was triggered; this process consists of a combination of sequestration and lower discretionary spending caps, initially scheduled to begin on January 2, 2013. Tables 4 through 1 6 provide budget details for Title I (Corps of Engineers), Title II (Department of the Interior), Title III (Department of Energy), and Title IV (independent agencies) for FY2012-FY2013, and proposed funding for FY2014. In its markup, the House Appropriations Committee recommended $4.876 billion for the Corps, or about $50 million more than the amount requested by the Administration for FY2014. The FY2013 continuing resolution, P.L. H.R. The Senate Appropriations Committee had approved the Administration's proposed funding level for Used Fuel without mentioning Yucca Mountain. Other Programs Weapons Activities includes several smaller programs in addition to DSW, Campaigns, Nuclear Programs, and Site Stewardship.

The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), for the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Department of Energy (DOE), and several independent agencies. FY2013 Energy and Water Development appropriations were considered in the context of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25), which established discretionary spending limits for FY2012-FY2021. On March 26, 2013, the President signed H.R. 933, the FY2013 Defense and Military Construction/VA, Full Year Continuing Resolution (P.L. 113-6). The act funded Energy and Water Development accounts at the FY2012 enacted level for the rest of FY2013, with some exceptions. However, under BCA, an automatic spending reduction process, consisting of a combination of sequestration and lower discretionary spending caps, went into effect March 1, 2013. For FY2014, as in previous years, the level of overall spending was a major issue. President Obama's FY2014 budget request for Energy and Water Development was released in April 2013. The request totaled $34.4 billion. On June 26 the House Appropriations Committee reported a bill, H.R. 2609, with a total of $30.4 billion; the bill passed the House, with amendments, on July 10. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out a bill, S. 1245, on June 27, with a total of $34.4 billion. On October 16, 2013, Congress passed the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, H.R. 2775, P.L. 113-46, extending funding for all federal programs, including Energy and Water Development, through January 15, 2014, at the FY2013 post-sequestration spending level. On December 26 the President signed H.J.Res. 59 (P.L. 113-67), which contained the Bipartisan Budget Act establishing less stringent spending caps for FY2014 and FY2015 than the BCA and easing the way for an appropriations agreement. On January 17, 2014, the President signed H.R. 3547, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), containing appropriations for all 12 FY2014 appropriations bills, including Energy and Water Development programs (Division D). In addition to funding levels, issues specific to Energy and Water Development programs included the distribution of appropriations for Corps (Title I) and Reclamation (Title II) projects that have historically received congressional appropriations above Administration requests; alternatives to the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, which the Administration has abandoned (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal); proposed FY2014 spending levels for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) programs (Title III) that were more than 50% higher in the Administration's request than the amount appropriated for FY2012; and, funding for the nuclear weapons program and other defense activities, which make up half of the total Department of Energy budget.

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Introduction The Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) is the statutory method for determining the annual updates to the Medicare physician fee schedule (MPFS). In the first few years of the SGR system, the actual expenditures did not exceed the targets and the updates to the physician fee schedule were close to the Medicare economic index (MEI, a price index of inputs required to produce physician services). With the exception of 2002, when a 4.8% decrease was applied, Congress has enacted a series of laws to override the reductions. If expenditures over a period are less than the cumulative spending target for the period, the update is increased. However, if spending exceeds the cumulative spending target over a certain period, the update for a future year is reduced, with the goal to bring spending back in line with the target. However, beginning in 2002, the actual expenditures exceeded allowed targets and the discrepancy has grown with each year. Issues for Congress: Concerns About SGR There is a growing consensus among observers that the SGR system is fundamentally flawed and is creating instability in the Medicare program for providers and beneficiaries. Potential Impact on Beneficiary Access to Services There has been an increased concern that continued declines in physician payment rates, especially among primary care specialties, may potentially jeopardize access to services. On February 5, 2013, CBO released a report stating that its estimate of the cost of overriding the SGR with a 10-year freeze in payments had fallen by more than $100 billion over 10 years compared to its July 2012 estimate of $273.3 billion (see above). In December 2013, CBO issued another score indicating that a 10-year freeze in MPFS payment levels would add $116.5 billion over 10 years. Each of the three committees of jurisdiction passed bills in 2013 that would repeal the SGR system (see Table 2 ). First, each of the bills would provide an initial period of payment stability: the Energy and Commerce bill would increase MPFS payments by 0.5% each year from 2014 to 2018, the Senate Finance Committee bill would freeze the payments (0% increase) for 10 years from 2014 to 2023, and the Ways and Means bill would increase payments by 0.5% in 2015 and 2016. Second, they each establish the development of new payment systems while maintaining fee-for-service payment in a manner similar to the existing system. Third, they each create incentives for physicians to transition to the new payment systems over time, generally by establishing different rates of increase over time for the new payment systems compared to fee-for-service. On December 26, 2013, the President signed into law H.J.Res. Section 1101 of the Pathway for SGR Reform Act provided for a 0.5% increase in MPFS payments for three months, from January 1, 2014, through March 31, 2014. On April 1, 2014, the Protecting Access to Medicare Act (PAMA, P.L. 113-93 ) was signed into law. The PAMA provided a 12-month override of the SGR-directed payment reduction and keeps Medicare physician fee schedule payments at the current level through March 31, 2015.

The Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) is the statutory method for determining the annual updates to the Medicare physician fee schedule (MPFS). Under the SGR formula, if expenditures over a period are less than the cumulative spending target for the period, the annual update is increased. However, if spending exceeds the cumulative spending target over a certain period, future updates are reduced to bring spending back in line with the target. In the first few years of the SGR system, the actual expenditures did not exceed the targets and the updates to the physician fee schedule were close to the Medicare economic index (MEI, a price index of inputs required to produce physician services). Beginning in 2002, the actual expenditure exceeded allowed targets, and the discrepancy has grown with each year. However, with the exception of 2002, when a 4.8% decrease was applied, Congress has enacted a series of laws to override the reductions. Most observers agree that the SGR system is fundamentally flawed and is creating instability in the Medicare program for providers and beneficiaries: (1) the SGR system treats all services and physicians equally in the calculation of the annual payment update, which is applied uniformly with no distinction across specialties; (2) continued declines in physician payment rates, especially among primary care specialties, may potentially jeopardize access to services; and (3) legislative overrides have provided only temporary reprieve from projected reductions in payments under the SGR calculation, requiring even steeper future reductions in payment rates. On February 5, 2013, CBO stated that its estimate of the cost of a 10-year freeze in payments had fallen to $138 billion over 10 years, more than $100 billion less than its August 2012 estimate, primarily due to lower spending for physician services. In December 2013, CBO issued another score indicating that a 10-year freeze would cost $116.5 billion over 10 years. Each of the three committees of jurisdiction passed bills in 2013 that would repeal the SGR system. The bills would provide an initial period of payment stability: the Energy and Commerce bill would increase MPFS payments by 0.5% each year from 2014 to 2018, the Senate Finance Committee bill would freeze the payments (0% increase) for 10 years from 2014 to 2023, and the Ways and Means bill would increase payments by 0.5% in 2015 and 2016. Second, they each establish the development of new payment systems while maintaining fee-for-service payment in a manner similar to the existing system. Third, they each create incentives for physicians to transition to the new payment systems over time, generally by establishing different rates of increase over time for the new payment systems compared to fee-for-service. However, none of the bills was passed by both houses of Congress. H.J.Res. 59 (signed into law on December 26, 2013) included the Pathway for SGR Reform Act, which provided for a 0.5% increase in MPFS payments for three months, from January 1, 2014, through March 31, 2014. The Protecting Access to Medicare Act (PAMA, P.L. 113-93) was signed into law on April 1, 2014, and provided a 12-month override of the SGR-directed payment reduction, keeping Medicare fee schedule payments at the current level through March 31, 2015.

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History and Background The United States Congress is served by a group of young adults known as pages. Pages have been employed since the early Congresses, and some Members of Congress have served as pages. At various times, congressional actions related to employing pages have addressed the lack of supervised housing as well as pages' ages, tenure, selection, education, and management. Most reports of misbehavior were later found to be unsubstantiated. As a consequence of the allegations, however, both the House and Senate for the first time provided supervised housing for their pages; established separate page schools and took over the education of the pages, which had been provided under contract by the District of Columbia school system; and developed more educational and recreational opportunities for their pages. In August 2011, Speaker John Boehner and Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi announced the termination of the House page program effective August 31. Senate Pages There are 30 Senate page positions, 16 for the majority party and 14 for the minority party. The Senate Page School is located in the lower level of Webster Hall. Participants in the House page program typically served for one academic semester during the school year, or during a summer session.

For more than 180 years, messengers known as pages have served the United States Congress. Pages must be high school juniors and at least 16 years of age. Several incumbent and former Members of Congress as well as other prominent Americans have served as congressional pages. Senator Daniel Webster appointed the first Senate page in 1829. The first House pages began their service in 1842. Women were first appointed as pages in 1971. In August 2011, House leaders announced the termination of that chamber's page program. Senate pages are appointed and sponsored by Senators for one academic semester of the school year, or for a summer session. The right to appoint pages rotates among Senators pursuant to criteria set by the Senate's leadership. Academic standing is one of the most important criteria used in the final selection of pages. Selection criteria for House pages was similar when the page program operated in that chamber. Prospective Senate pages are advised to contact their Senators to request consideration for a page appointment.

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Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 Background In an effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate billions of dollars in improper payments made by federal agencies each fiscal year, Congress passed the Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA; P.L. 107-300 ; 116 Stat. 2350) in 2002. IPIA established an initial framework for identifying, measuring, preventing, and reporting on improper payments at each agency. Separately, Congress also passed legislation, the Recovery Audit Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-107 ; Section 831; 115 Stat. 1186), which required agencies that awarded more than $500 million annually in contracts to implement plans to recover overpayments to contractors. In response, Congress passed new legislation, the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA; P.L. 111-204 ; 124 Stat. 2224), which amended and consolidated the requirements of both IPIA and the Recovery Audit Act. As discussed below, IPERA retained the core provisions of the IPIA while requiring improvements in agency improper payment estimation methodologies and improper payment reduction plans. It also significantly expanded the scope and reporting requirements of recovery audit programs. Improper Payments IPERA defines an improper payment as a payment that should not have been made or that was made in an incorrect amount, including both overpayments and underpayments. First, the legislation requires agency heads to provide a report on improper payment recovery actions, which is to include a statistically valid estimate of improper payments made by each program or activity, along with the following: a discussion of the methods used to recover overpayments; the amounts recovered, outstanding, and determined not to be collectable; a written justification explaining any uncollected amounts; an aging schedule of outstanding amounts; a summary of the disposition of recovered amounts; a discussion of conditions giving rise to improper payments and how these are being resolved; and if an agency determined that a recovery audit was not cost-effective, then a justification as to why. Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Audit Improvement Act of 2012 In an attempt to expand the scope of data used to verify that payments are being made to eligible recipients and for the correct amount, Congress passed the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Audit Improvement Act of 2012 (IPERIA; P.L. 112-248 ). High-Priority Programs A-123 establishes criteria for high-priority programs. Agencies are required to establish annual payment recapture targets for their programs, which OMB must approve. In some cases, error rates for those programs have actually increased over time. Other programs have reduced their error rates, but not substantially. Incomplete Scope The full scope of improper payments has not been determined because agencies have not yet developed estimates for all of their risk-susceptible programs or are not consistently reporting improper payment rates and amounts. Some agencies have not yet implemented recovery audit programs as required. Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act The Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 (FRDAA, S. 2133 ) passed the Senate on April 12, 2016. Companion legislation ( H.R. Agencies are required to include in their annual financial reports a discussion of their progress in implementing fraud risk guidance and controls, identifying risks and vulnerabilities to fraud, and establishing strategies and procedures to combat fraud. The FRDAA also requires OMB to establish a working group to develop strategies to improve the sharing of (1) best practices for detecting, preventing and responding to fraud; and (2) data analytics techniques. The working group is to submit a plan to Congress for establishing an interagency library of data analytics and data sets, which could be used by federal agencies and IGs to facilitate the detection, prevention, and recovery of fraud, including improper payments.

As Congress searches for ways to generate savings, reduce the deficit, and fund federal programs, it has held hearings and passed legislation to prevent and recover improper payments. Improper payments—which exceeded $137 billion in FY2015—are payments made in an incorrect amount, payments that should not have been made at all, or payments made to an ineligible recipient or for an ineligible purpose. The total amount of improper payments may be even higher than reported because several agencies have yet to determine improper payment amounts for all of their programs. In 2002, Congress passed the Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA; P.L. 107-300; 116 Stat. 2350), which established an initial framework for identifying, measuring, preventing, and reporting on improper payments at each agency. That same year, Congress also passed legislation, the Recovery Audit Act (P.L. 107-107; Section 831; 115 Stat. 1186), which required agencies that awarded more than $500 million annually in contracts to establish programs to recover overpayments to contractors. Congress passed new legislation, the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA, P.L. 111-204; 124 Stat. 2224), which replaced and consolidated the requirements of both IPIA and the Recovery Audit Act. IPERA retained the core provisions of the IPIA while requiring improvements in agency improper payment estimation methodologies and improper payment reduction plans. It also significantly expanded the scope and reporting requirements of recovery audit programs. The Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012 (IPERIA; P.L. 112-248; 126 Stat. 2390) requires agencies to improve the quality of oversight for high-dollar and high-risk programs, and mandates that agencies share data regarding recipient eligibility and payment amounts. In addition, IPERIA requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to examine the rates and amounts of improper payments that agencies have recovered and establish targets for increasing those amounts. Implementation of improper payments legislation has been uneven across the government. While error rates have decreased for some programs, they have increased for others—including some high-priority programs with billions in annual outlays. Some agencies have not established error rates for all of their risk-susceptible programs, or have not consistently reported required improper payments reduction goals. Data sharing among agencies—a key tool for preventing improper payments—has been limited, and some agencies have not implemented and reported on their recovery audit programs, despite being required by law to do so. The Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 (H.R. 4180/S. 2133) would require the OMB to establish financial and administrative controls related to fraud and improper payments. Agencies would be required to include in their annual financial reports a discussion of their progress in implementing fraud risk guidance. OMB would also be required to establish a working group to improve the sharing of (1) best practices for mitigating fraud, and (2) effective data analytics techniques. The working group would also submit a plan to Congress for establishing an interagency library of data analytics and data sets, which would be used by federal agencies and IGs to facilitate the detection, prevention, and recovery of fraud, including improper payments.

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These programs are primarily used by first responders, including firefighters, emergency medical personnel, emergency managers, and law enforcement officers. Issues As Congress begins its appropriation process, Members may opt to consider issues associated with the Administration's proposed budget request for state and local homeland security assistance programs. Proposed Elimination of Programs For FY2011, the Administration proposed a total appropriation of $4.0 billion for state and local homeland security programs, which is $164 million less than Congress appropriated in FY2010. This proposed reduction in the total appropriation is a combination of reducing funding to some programs, such as the Assistance to Firefighters Program, and eliminating selected programs. The Administration's budget request does not provide information on why it has proposed to reduce AFG funding.

The President's budget request proposed total appropriations of $4.0 billion in FY2011 for homeland security assistance to states and localities, which is $164 million less than Congress appropriated in FY2010. These assistance programs are used by state and local governments, primarily first responder entities, to meet homeland security needs and enhance capabilities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from both man-made and natural disasters. The Administration's budget request not only proposes to reduce total appropriations for these programs, but also to eliminate some programs, such as the Metropolitan Medical Response System, the Emergency Operations Centers Program, and the Interoperable Communications Program. This report briefly discusses issues of debate associated with the budget request. This report will be updated as congressional appropriations actions warrant.

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The appropriate size and role of the government is one of the most fundamental and enduring debates in American politics. Government activity affects the economy in four ways: The government produces goods and services, including roads and national defense. Less than half of federal spending is devoted to the production of goods and services. The government collects taxes, and that alters economic behavior. It is useful to remember that federal spending is overwhelmingly devoted to a handful of activities. Defense spending, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid accounted for nearly two-thirds of all federal outlays in 2009. Thus, any proposal to reduce the government's size would be unlikely to make much of a dent in overall spending unless it reduced one or more of these programs. The merits of government transfers cannot typically be evaluated on the basis of economic efficiency alone, because they often pursue social goals. What should be realized is that even if offsetting collections and receipts are not included in the budget as revenues because they represent choices made in the marketplace (i.e., they are not compulsory like taxes), removing them from revenues also causes the activities that they finance to be removed from the outlay side of the budget. When state and local government spending is included, the decline in the size of the government since 1983 is smaller because of the corresponding increase in the size of state and local government. Economic conditions can temporarily alter the size of government . Spending and tax revenue are not the only ways to think about the size of the government. And yet to ignore it in discussions of the size of government could be misleading. When markets function perfectly, which is defined as a market with many buyers and sellers, no barriers to entry, perfect information, and the costs and benefits of the transaction are completely borne by the buyer and seller, an economically efficient outcome will occur and government intervention can only reduce efficiency. To understand when government intervention in the economy can increase economic efficiency, it is necessary to define a market failure. For example, could an acceptable level of national defense be attained at lower cost? During peacetime, these questions cannot be definitively answered. For that reason, they may be overconsumed and can be depleted or even exhausted over time in the absence of government intervention. Economists can, however, evaluate how to achieve a social goal in the least economically costly way. But unlike a firm, most government goods and services, like defense, are not bought and sold in the private market, and so there is no way to value them. This makes it difficult to measure the effect of government production on the economy empirically, even if there are good empirical reasons for believing it to have an effect. As a result of government intervention, saving (and economic growth) would fall, but economic efficiency would increase. To the extent that "loopholes" in the tax code do divert resources from the pursuit of efficient market activity, this too lowers economic growth, although it is difficult to estimate the size of this effect, and whether there is a one-time reduction in growth when the loophole is introduced or an ongoing reduction in growth. Government intervention increases economic efficiency when it rectifies market failures and reduces efficiency when it distorts perfectly competitive markets. Political choices may lead to second-best outcomes, however, and some therefore argue that accepting market failures can be preferable to government intervention in some cases. Not all government spending is created equally. It is not so much the size of government as what government does with its spending, transfer, tax, and regulatory policies that affects economic efficiency and growth. The financial crisis of 2008 led to a sharp but temporary increase in government outlays as a share of GDP.

The size and role of the government is one of the most fundamental and enduring debates in American politics. Economics can be used to analyze the relative merits of government intervention in the economy in specific areas, but it cannot answer the question of whether there is "too much" or "too little" government activity overall. That is not to say that one cannot find many examples of government programs that economists would consider to be a highly inefficient, if not counterproductive, way to achieve policy goals. Reducing inefficient government spending would benefit the economy; however, reducing efficient government spending would harm it, and reducing the size of government could involve either one. Government intervention can increase economic efficiency when market failures or externalities exist. Political choices may lead to second-best economic outcomes, however, and some argue that, for that reason, market failures can be preferable to government intervention. In the absence of market failures and externalities, there is little economic justification for government intervention, which lowers efficiency and probably economic growth. But government intervention is often based on the desire to achieve social goals, such as income redistribution. Economics cannot quantitatively value social goals, although it can often offer suggestions for how to achieve those goals in the least costly way. The government intervenes in the economy in four ways. First, it produces goods and services, such as infrastructure, education, and national defense. Measuring the effects of these goods and services is difficult because they are not bought and sold in markets. Second, it transfers income, both vertically across income levels and horizontally among groups with similar incomes and different characteristics. Third, it taxes to pay for its outlays, which can lower economic efficiency by distorting behavior. Not all taxes are equally distortionary, however, so there are ways of reducing the costs of taxation without changing the size of government. Furthermore, deficit spending does not allow the government to escape the burden of taxation since deficits impose their own burden. Finally, government regulation alters economic activity. The economic effects of regulation are the most difficult to measure, in terms of both costs and benefits, yet they cannot be neglected because they can be interchangeable with taxes or government spending. There are many different ways to measure the size of the government, making its economic effects difficult to evaluate. Budgeting conventions are partly responsible: tax expenditures, offsetting receipts and collections, and government corporations are all excluded from the budget. But some governmental functions, like regulation, simply cannot be quantified robustly. Discussions about the overall size of government mask significant changes in the composition of government spending over time. Spending has shifted from the federal to the state and local level. Federal production of goods and services has fallen, while federal transfers have grown significantly. In 2009, nearly two-thirds of federal spending is devoted to Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and national defense. Thus, there is limited scope to alter the size of government without fundamentally altering these programs. The share of federal spending devoted to the elderly has burgeoned over time, and this trend is forecast to continue. The size of government has increased significantly since the financial crisis of 2008 as a result of the government's unplanned intervention in financial markets and subsequent stimulus legislation. Much of the increase in government spending is temporary and could be reversed when financial conditions return to normal, although many question how easy it will be for the government to extricate itself from new commitments it has made.

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The democracy promotion ideal continues to be under close scrutiny, particularly with recent unsettled election events in Kenya and Pakistan, and with a landslide victory in Taiwan for the opposition party that supports closer ties with Mainland China. The issue among Members of Congress, presidential hopefuls, and in the wider foreign policy community may not be whether democracy promotion is worthwhile, but rather when, where, and how to apply it effectively. This report will be updated as warranted. More broadly, the current Bush Administration has viewed democracy promotion as an instrument for promoting peace and combatting terrorism. The Bush Administration continued to stress democracy promotion as a key element in its foreign policy when Secretary of State Rice announced her transformational diplomacy plan in January 2006. In a recent survey, Americans weighed in on U.S. democracy promotion efforts. The lack of a clear definition of democracy and a comprehensive understanding of its basic elements may have created multiple problems for U.S. policy making, according to some. Arguably, the lack of clear definition has hampered the formulation of democracy promotion policy and effective prioritizing of democracy promotion activities over the years. Also the lack of definition can complicate coordination of democracy programs and the assessment of U.S. government activities and funding. Further, without a consensus on the definition of democracy, what criteria will determine when a country has attained an acceptable level of democratic reform and no longer needs American assistance? The benefits and costs of democracy promotion may vary, depending on the circumstances in which the programs are carried out. U.S. Government Activities to Promote Democracy For years, the U.S. government has supported numerous bilateral and multilateral activities that promote democracy around the world. Both the executive and congressional branches of government are involved. Therefore, the total estimated funding request for democracy promotion activities in FY2008 was over $1.5 billion out of a total foreign affairs budget request of $36.2 billion. The House of Representatives also created the House Democracy Assistance Commission (HDAC) to help other governments' legislative branches evolve. From the 101 st Congress through the first session of the 110 th Congress, numerous pieces of legislation were introduced and passed to authorize and appropriate funds for democracy promotion in specific countries and regions, and to press governments of non-democratic countries to begin a process of democratization. The ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007 ( H.R. 982 ), introduced on February 12, 2007, by Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) and others, contains provisions to promote democracy in foreign countries, calls for specific State Department actions and reports with regard to non-democracies, aims to strengthen the "Community of Democracies," and authorizes funding for democracy assistance for FY2008 and FY2009. It is difficult to document and quantify the value added of U.S. and other assistance programs.

The Bush Administration has viewed democracy promotion as key element in its foreign policy agenda and an instrument for combatting terrorism. Given unsettled events related to elections in Pakistan and Kenya, and a recent landslide election in Taiwan for a party advocating closer ties with Mainland China, democracy promotion objectives will continue to be of interest in the American presidential campaigns and in the second session of the 110th Congress. Arguably, the lack of a clear definition of democracy and a comprehensive understanding of its basic elements may have hampered the formulation of democracy promotion policy and effective prioritizing of democracy promotion activities over the years. Also, the lack of definition may have complicated coordination of democracy programs and the assessment of U.S. government activities and funding. Further, without a consensus on democracy definition and goals, what criteria will determine when, if ever, a country has attained an acceptable level of democratic reform and no longer needs American assistance? Both the U.S. executive and legislative branches of government support democracy promotion in other countries. The Bush Administration has implemented both bilateral and multilateral programs to promote democracy, such as the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), and requested about $1.5 billion for democracy promotion out of a total foreign affairs budget request of $36.2 billion in FY2008. Also, the Administration identified "governing justly and democratically" as a key objective of its foreign aid policies. Congress appropriates funds, authorizes programs, and is responsible for oversight. In 2007, Congress considered, among other democracy promotion bills, the ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007 (H.R. 982). It contains provisions to promote democracy overseas, calls for specific State Department actions and reports, aims to strengthen the "Community of Democracies," and authorizes funding for democracy assistance for FY2008 and FY2009. Congress is currently carrying out its own program through the House Democracy Assistance Commission (HDAC), which was established in 2005. The Commission provides expert advice to fledgling legislatures. To date, 12 countries have received assistance from the Commission. The issue among Members of Congress, presidential hopefuls, and in the wider policy community is not whether democracy promotion is worthwhile in general, but rather when, where, and how it is to be applied to get the desired results and the most for the taxpayer's dollar. In addition, coordination of democracy promotion activities is lacking among developed countries and within the U.S. government. The 110th Congress may scrutinize U.S. democracy promotion in Iraq and elsewhere. Whether or not "victory in Iraq" includes establishing an independent democratic Iraqi government will be important in evaluating the human and financial costs and benefits of U.S. involvement in Iraq and could affect other U.S. democracy promotion agendas. This report will be updated as warranted.

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A session begins when a chamber convenes , or assembles, and ends when it adjourns . A calendar day on which a chamber convenes and then adjourns or recesses until a later calendar day may be called a "calendar day of session" or, more informally, simply a "day of session" for that chamber. A legislative day ends only when the chamber adjourns, and a new legislative day begins whenever the chamber reconvenes after an adjournment. By recessing overnight rather than adjourning, a chamber may continue a single legislative day into a second calendar day. Conversely, instead of taking a short recess within a calendar day, a chamber may adjourn briefly and reconvene later on the same day. If, however, the President were to call an extraordinary session after the sine die adjournment of one regular annual session and before the convening of the next, the presidentially called session would be a separate session of Congress, additional to the regular annual sessions that convene pursuant to the Constitution, and would receive a separate number within the regular sequence. As with sine die adjournments of a session, each chamber normally provides permission for the other to adjourn for three days or more by means of a concurrent resolution, adopted by both. A "recess of the session" (for more than three days, pursuant to a concurrent resolution) does not terminate an annual session, but only puts it in a state of suspension, just as a recess of the daily session does not terminate the legislative day, but only puts it into a state of suspension. Pro Forma Sessions In the primary sense of the term, a pro forma session is considered to include any daily session which is held chiefly to prevent the occurrence of a "recess of the session" (that is, an adjournment for more than three days within an annual session) or forestalls a sine die adjournment. Nevertheless, no adjournment for three days or more within the session occurs, and no adjournment resolution is required. During a recess of (the annual session of) the Senate, nominations retain their pendency, except that, if the recess is longer than 30 days, they are returned to the President unless the Senate otherwise orders. In recent times, when Congress has met in lame duck session, the post-election portion of the annual session has most often been separated from the pre-election portion by a recess of the session. "Recess" and "Session" are clearly used here in a sense pertinent to the annual session, not the daily; the President could hardly avoid asking the Senate to confirm his nominations just by making appointments during a recess in the course of a daily session, or even during an overnight or weekend recess within the same legislative day. On the other hand, it has long been the general practice that for purposes of this clause, a "recess" can be either an intersession recess or an intrasession recess; that is, either a period of sine die adjournment or a recess of the session, as described earlier in the sections on " Adjournment Sine Die " and "Recess of the Session ." In practice, however, Presidents until very recently appear to have made recess appointments during intrasession recesses of the Senate only when the recess would be at least 10 days long. Based on the Court's rationale in Noel Canning , the Senate may effectively utilize pro forma sessions to prevent the President from making recess appointments. In this way, pro forma sessions tend to make days of continuous session elapse as fast as calendar days. If a period measured in calendar days begins on the same day for both chambers, it will necessarily also end on the same day for both. In the second session of the 110 th Congress, for example, if an action period of 60 days of session began on the day the annual session convened, it would have started in both chambers on January 3, 2008, but the 60 th day of session would have occurred in the House on April 21, and in the Senate not until May 16. To forestall this situation, many statutes that count action periods in this way stipulate that the expedited procedure is available during the "first period of [the stipulated number of] days of continuous session of Congress beginning after" the designated initiating event, and also provide that "continuity of session of Congress is broken … by an adjournment sine die" (or, sometimes, only by a final adjournment sine die of the Congress).

The House and Senate use the terms session, adjournment, and recess in both informal and more formal ways, but the concepts apply in parallel ways to both the daily and the annual activities of Congress. A session begins when the chamber convenes and ends when it adjourns. A recess, by contrast, does not terminate a session, but only suspends it temporarily. In context of the daily activities of Congress, any calendar day on which a chamber is in session may be called a (calendar) "day of session." A legislative day, by contrast, continues until the chamber adjourns. A session that continues into a second calendar day without adjourning still constitutes only one legislative day, but if a chamber adjourns, then reconvenes later on the same day, the single day of session includes two legislative days. Conversely, if a chamber recesses and then reconvenes on the same day, the same day of session and the same legislative day both continue. Finally, when a chamber recesses overnight, instead of adjourning, although a new calendar day of session begins when it reconvenes, the same legislative day continues. A regular annual session of Congress begins when the two chambers convene in January, pursuant to the Constitution (or to law). An annual session ends with an adjournment sine die. Until the next annual session convenes, Congress is then in a period of sine die adjournment (or "intersession recess"). If the President were to call an additional, "extraordinary" session, it would be procedurally similar to a regular annual session. The Constitution provides that neither chamber may adjourn for three days or more without the consent of the other. The two houses consent to each other's sine die adjournment by adopting a concurrent resolution, called an "adjournment resolution." They use a similar vehicle to allow each other to suspend their daily sessions for three days or more without terminating their annual session. Such a suspension is called a "recess of the session," an intrasession recess, or, more formally, an "adjournment for more than three days" within a session. To avoid the need for a concurrent resolution, a chamber may hold pro forma sessions on such a schedule that no break of three days or more occurs. Legislation retains its status, and may continue to receive action, until the last session of a Congress adjourns sine die. Nowadays, measures are "pocket vetoed" only when unsigned by the President after a final adjournment sine die. Nominations, by contrast, will be returned to the President if they remain pending whenever the Senate adjourns sine die or recesses its session for more than 30 days, unless the body otherwise orders. "Lame duck sessions" are periods when Congress is in session after election day, but before the newly elected Congress takes office. Nowadays, they are not separate annual sessions, but portions of the last regular annual session of a Congress, usually separated from the pre-election portion by a recess of the session or by a period of pro forma sessions. Recent Presidents have made recess appointments during intersession recesses (periods of sine die adjournment), even very short ones, but have usually done so during intrasession recesses only of 10 days or more. Pro forma sessions have sometimes been used to preclude recess appointments by preventing a recess of the session. In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the President may make recess appointments during recesses of 10 or more days, but the Senate may utilize pro forma sessions to effectively prevent such appointment opportunities. Certain statutes provide that Congress may disapprove, or must approve, specified actions of the executive branch by using expedited ("fast track") procedures during specified periods. These periods may be defined in calendar days, days of session, legislative days, or "days of continuous session." Days of continuous session include all calendar days except those on which either chamber is in a "recess of the session."

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This report highlights those personnel-related issues that seem likely to generate high levels of congressional and constituent interest, and tracks their status in the House and Senate versions of the FY2013 NDAA. Those issues that were considered previously are designated with a " * " in the relevant section titles of this report. *Military Pay Raise Background: Increasing concern with the overall cost of military personnel, combined with ongoing military operations in Afghanistan, have continued to focus interest on the military pay raise. 654, which served as the basis for the 1993 policy banning open homosexuality in the military, known as Don't Ask, Don't Tell or DADT. Arguably, this is to protect the free speech and religious rights of service members in the wake of the repeal of DADT. Section 544 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 112-81 ), Congress included a number of provisions to address the issues involving sexual assault in the military. Reference(s): Previously discussed in CRS Report R41874, FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R40711, FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL34590, FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. CHCBP does not provide dental benefits.

Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. Recent military operations in Iraq and ongoing operations in Afghanistan, along with the operational role of the Reserve Components, further heighten interest in a wide range of military personnel policies and issues. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has selected a number of the military personnel issues considered in deliberations on the House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013. This report provides a brief synopsis of sections that pertain to personnel policy. These include end strengths, pay raises, health care, sexual assault, issues related to the repeal of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, as well as less prominent issues that nonetheless generate significant public interest. This report focuses exclusively on the annual defense authorization process. It does not include language concerning appropriations, veterans' affairs, tax implications of policy choices, or any discussion of separately introduced legislation. Some issues were addressed in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act and discussed in CRS Report R41874, FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. Those issues that were considered previously are designated with a "*" in the relevant section titles of this report.

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In order to receive federal highway funding, several environmental requirements mustbe met. The Clean Air Act requires states with poor air quality to demonstrate that plans to expandhighway capacity would conform with their plans to control emissions, referred to as "transportationconformity." The most recent multi-year funding authorizationfor these activities was provided in the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21, P.L.105-178 ), which expired on September 30, 2003. This law authorized a total of $218 billion forfederal highway and transit programs from FY1998 through FY2003. It set aside approximately $9billion of this amount for air quality projects, authorized tax benefits for cleaner-burningalcohol-based fuels, and permitted states to exempt certain low-emission vehicles from HighOccupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane requirements. TEA-21 also made funding available for mitigatingwater pollution from highway runoff, and authorized funding for environmental research and thedevelopment of advanced vehicle technologies. The most controversial issues for the reauthorization of federal highway and transit programs have been the amount of funding to provide for surface transportation infrastructure needs and howto allocate this funding among the states. There also has been significant interest in the adequacy of funding for air quality projects under the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ). This report provides background information on activities intended to help mitigate pollution resulting from highway construction and travel, and analyzes key issues for Congress. This reportis a resource document for the reauthorization debate and will not be updated. The limitation on available funding has made it more challenging to balancehighway capacity needs with protecting the environment and other competing priorities. (5) Howto meet public needs for greater highway capacitywhile controlling emissions is a major issue for states with areas that are in nonattainment with theNAAQS and areas that must maintain them, as the availability of federal highway funding in theseareas is dependent on the state demonstrating that its transportation plan conforms to the emissionsbudget for motor vehicles in its air quality plan. In order to reduce conflicts between highway capacity needs and air quality requirements, Congress has authorized the use of federal highway funds for various projects that would reducevehicular emissions. Federal transit funding has also been made available to local transit agenciesfor the purchase of clean fuel buses. Even though there is no dedicated source of funding for the purchase of clean fuel buses, they do receive preferential treatment under federal matching funds requirements to help local areas attainor maintain federal air quality standards. Use of High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) Lanes Many states have constructed HOV lanes as a means to reduce traffic congestion. In response to these needs, Congress has provided authority for states to use federalhighway funds for environmental restoration or mitigation projects to address waterpollution from existing highways. Some of the relevant issues for the reauthorization of the Surface Transportation Program are (1)whether to increase the limitation on the portion of the total project cost that can bespent on environmental restoration and pollution abatement activities, in order toaccommodate cases in which mitigation costs may exceed the current 20% cap; (2)whether to establish a comprehensive reporting mechanism for tracking the amountof STP funds expended by states on these activities, so as to gain a betterunderstanding of the extent to which transportation facilities have impacted waterquality and necessitated mitigation; and (3) whether to permit STP funds to be usedto address water pollution from highway runoff, even if no highway improvementsare underway at the time.

Balancing public needs for surface transportation infrastructure with protecting the environment has been a long-standing issue among states and local communities. These two objectives can oftenconflict due to the rise in pollution that typically results when new highways or roadways areconstructed, or a highway is expanded, to provide greater traffic capacity. Expanding highwaycapacity can be especially challenging for states, if the resulting rise in pollution would be greatenough to make compliance with federal air quality standards more difficult. In order to receivefederal highway funds, the Clean Air Act requires states with air quality problems to demonstratethat their transportation plans conform to their plans to control emissions, referred to as"transportation conformity." To help reduce potential conflicts between highway capacity needs and environmental requirements, Congress has authorized the use of federal highway funds to alleviate some of thepollution resulting from highway construction and travel. The most recent multi-year fundingauthorization for these activities was provided in the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century(TEA-21, P.L. 105-178 ), which expired at the end of FY2003. How to meet state needs for highwayinfrastructure, while ensuring compliance with environmental requirements, is among the key issuesfor reauthorization. TEA-21 authorized a total of $218 billion for federal highway and transit programs from FY1998 to FY2003. It set aside $9 billion for air quality projects, including $8 billion for theCongestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ) to offset some of theemissions from highway travel, as a means to assist states in complying with federal air qualitystandards. The other $1 billion was authorized for the purchase of clean fuel transit buses. TEA-21also expanded funding eligibility to allow states to use federal highway funds for mitigating waterpollution from highway runoff. The law also authorized funding for environmental research and thedevelopment of advanced vehicle technologies, and it included several other provisions related toenvironmental protection. The use of federal highway funds to address environmental needs has focused mostly on air quality projects, due primarily to requirements for states to demonstrate conformity as a conditionfor receiving federal highway funds. Most of this funding has been provided under the CMAQprogram. While the program's effectiveness has been questioned, there is broad support forincreasing its funding in response to an upcoming rise in air quality needs among the states. Otherair quality issues involve the use of transit funding for the purchase of clean fuel buses, offering taxbenefits for cleaner-burning alcohol-based fuels, and exempting certain low-emission vehicles fromHigh Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane requirements. The extent to which water pollution mitigationprojects and environmental research and development activities should be eligible for federalhighway funds are issues as well. This report provides background information and analysis of key issues to serve as a resource document for the reauthorization debate. It will not be updated.

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Congress in 1989 directed the Secretary of the Treasury to ask the U.S. Executive Director of the World Bank to develop a pilot debt-for-nature program and other ways of reducing debt owed by foreign countries while generating funds for the environment. In 1998, the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA; P.L. In the 115 th Congress, S. 1023 would authorize appropriations for the TFCA of $20.0 million annually from FY2018 to FY2021. In a three-party swap, a conservation group purchases a hard currency debt owed to commercial banks on the secondary market or in some cases a public (official) debt owed to a creditor government at a discounted rate compared to the face value of the debt, and then renegotiates the debt obligation with the debtor country. In these cases, the fund is administered by the conservation organization, representatives from local environmental groups, and the debtor government. Bilateral Debt-for-Nature Initiatives The model for bilateral debt-for-nature agreements conducted by the United States was first defined in 1990 by the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI; Title 15, Section 1512 of the Food, Agriculture Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, "1990 farm bill," P.L. 105-214 ; 22 U.S.C. Funds can be used to support environmental, natural resource, health protection, and child development programs within the debtor country. Debt swaps, buybacks, and restructuring are three mechanisms authorized to conduct debt-for-nature transactions under the EAI. In a debt-restructuring agreement, the original debt agreement is cancelled (e.g., a percentage of the face value of the debt could be reduced) and a new debt agreement is created with a provision for an annual amount of money (in local currency) to be deposited into an environmental fund. 2431), which was established to generate funds to conserve tropical forests by reducing external debt in countries with such forests. TFCA is an extension of the Enterprise for the Americas Act, in that it allows debt swaps, debt restructuring, and debt buybacks to generate conservation funds. To date, 14 countries have participated in this program, establishing 20 agreements (several countries have two agreements) that will reduce a total of at least $90.0 million from the face value of their debts to the United States and generate $339.4 million in local currency for tropical forest conservation projects (see Table 4 ). Conservation funds (in local currency) from these transactions are deposited in a tropical forest fund for each country. Interest earned from this principal balance and the principal itself is usually given in the form of grants to fund tropical forest conservation projects. Eligible conservation projects include (1) the establishment, maintenance, and restoration of parks, protected reserves, and natural areas, and the plant and animal life within them; (2) training programs to increase the capacity of personnel to manage parks; (3) development and support for communities residing near or within tropical forests; (4) development of sustainable ecosystem and land management systems; and (5) research to identify the medicinal uses of tropical forest plants and their products. This law also authorizes the use of the principal of restructured loans for debt-for-nature transactions. §262p-6) aims to reduce debt in developing countries. Decline of Debt-for-Nature Transactions The number of debt-for-nature transactions has declined in recent years, perhaps due to accounting changes that require greater appropriations to fund debt-for-nature transactions with official (public) debt and a higher price of commercial debt on the secondary market (see Figure 3 ). TFCA has not received appropriations since FY2014. Future Directions Bilateral debt-for-nature initiatives implemented by the U.S. government were supported through appropriations under programs such as the EAI and TFCA. Others have supported expanding TFCA to include coral reefs. Reauthorization of Appropriations under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act ( P.L.

In the late 1980s, extensive foreign debt and degraded natural resources in developing nations led to the creation of debt-for-nature initiatives that reduced debt obligations, allowed for debt repayments in local currency as opposed to hard currency, and generated funds for the environment. These initiatives, called debt-for-nature swaps typically involved restructuring, reducing, or buying a portion of a developing country's outstanding debt, with a percentage of proceeds (in local currency) being used to support conservation programs within the debtor country. Most early transactions involved debt owed to commercial banks and were administered by nongovernmental conservation organizations and referred to as three-party transactions. Other debt-for-nature initiatives involved official (public) debt and were administered by creditor governments directly with debtor governments (termed bilateral transactions). In the early 1990s, the United States initiated a program called the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), which involved debt-for-nature transactions. The United States restructured, and in one case sold, debt equivalent to a face value of over $1 billion owed by Latin American countries; these transactions were authorized by Congress as part of the EAI, which broadened the scope of debt transactions to include a number of social goals. Nearly $177 million in local currency for environmental, natural resource, health protection, and child development projects within debtor countries was generated from these transactions. The model for debt-for-nature transactions, outlined in the EAI, was used in the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA; P.L. 105-214; 22 U.S.C. 2431) to include countries around the world with tropical forests. Under this program, debt can be restructured in eligible countries and funds generated from the transactions are used to support programs to conserve tropical forests within the debtor country. TFCA authorizes the use of debt swaps, debt restructuring, and debt buybacks to generate conservation funds. Under these agreements, the existing debt agreement is canceled and a new one is created; a Tropical Forest Agreement is created and interest payments for the principal of the loan are deposited in local currency equivalents in a Tropical Forest Fund; and the money in the fund is given in the form of grants to local conservation groups or the debtor government to conduct conservation activities for tropical forests. Eligible conservation projects include (1) the establishment, maintenance, and restoration of parks, protected reserves, and natural areas, and the plant and animal life within them; (2) training programs to increase the capacity of personnel to manage parks; (3) development and support for communities residing near or within tropical forests; (4) development of sustainable ecosystem and land management systems; and (5) research to identify the medicinal uses of tropical forest plants and their products. Since 1998, $233.4 million has been used under TFCA to restructure loan agreements in 14 countries (20 transactions), and over $339.4 million will be generated for tropical forest conservation at the conclusion of these agreements. TFCA was authorized to receive appropriations through FY2007, but no funds have been appropriated for the program since FY2014. TFCA is being considered for reauthorization in the 115th Congress in S. 1023. This bill would expand the purpose of TFCA to include coral reefs and authorize $20 million in appropriations annually from FY2018 to FY2021, among other things. Debt-for-nature transactions generally are viewed as a success by conservation organizations and debtor governments because of the funds generated for conservation efforts. Debt-for-nature transactions under TFCA have stopped in recent years. Some observers suggest that this is due to lack of appropriations to support TFCA and competing debt-relief programs, such as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

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Introduction The same group of air pollutant emissions from outer continental shelf (OCS) operations are subject to different regulatory programs, depending on the location of the operation. The Department of the Interior (DOI) has jurisdiction over OCS sources in federal waters in the western Gulf of Mexico and most of the central Gulf. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ), transferred air emission authority in the OCS off Alaska's north coast from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to DOI. EPA has jurisdiction over sources in all other federal waters. Therefore, two identical operations, located in separate jurisdictions, could face considerably different requirements and procedural time frames. For much of the past 30 years, these differences received little attention, primarily because most of the federal oil and gas resources in EPA's jurisdiction have been subject to moratoria. In 2008, moratoria provisions expired, allowing many of the areas in EPA's jurisdiction to potentially open for oil and gas leasing activity. Pursuant to this section, EPA established two regulatory regimes: one for OCS sources located within 25 miles of a state's seaward boundary ("inner OCS sources"); another for OCS sources located beyond 25 miles of a state's water boundary and extending to the boundary of the EEZ ("outer OCS sources"). Part 55) OCS sources are potentially subject to the CAA's Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program. For any stationary source, the threshold is 250 tons per year (tpy) of a regulated pollutant. These emissions are subject to a different threshold. Inner OCS sources would be subject to the same standards as onshore sources. The DOI regulations contain an exemption formula, based on projected emissions and distance from shore. Note the primary threshold for EPA's substantive requirements (e.g., PSD program) is 250 tpy, and states may have even lower thresholds that would apply to inner OCS sources. Required Emission Controls If air emissions from a non-exempt OCS source would significantly affect the air quality of an onshore area (based on the modeling described above), further requirements apply. This definition applies to sources in both EPA and DOI jurisdictions. The primary difference between the EPA and DOI programs is rooted in the different statutory authorities: the 1990 CAA and the 1978 OCSLA. The primary objectives of these statutes are different—air quality versus offshore energy development. The two regulatory programs reflect these underlying differences. For example, DOI's two-step significance determination is a potentially much less stringent threshold than EPA's 250 tpy threshold for its PSD program. Another substantial difference is the time frame allotted to the agencies for reviewing a potential source's permit (EPA) or activity-specific plan (DOI). In addition, the EPA permit process allows greater opportunity for input from the public. In particular, EPA's EAB offers parties a powerful tool to compel agency review. Some stakeholders would likely argue that the additional opportunities for public involvement in EPA's permit process help create a balance between resource development and environmental concerns. Others would likely contend these steps present unnecessary burdens and timing uncertainty in the process. If more OCS areas in EPA's jurisdiction are open for oil and gas leasing, policymakers interest in these differences will likely increase.

Air emissions from outer continental shelf (OCS) operations are subject to different regulatory programs, depending on the location of the operation. The Department of the Interior (DOI) has jurisdiction over OCS sources in federal waters in the western Gulf of Mexico and most of the central Gulf. In addition, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74), transferred air emission authority in the OCS off Alaska's north coast from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to DOI. EPA has jurisdiction over sources in all other federal waters. The primary difference between the EPA and DOI programs is rooted in the different statutory authorities: the 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) and the 1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). The primary objectives of these statutes are different—air quality versus offshore energy development. The two regulatory programs reflect these underlying differences. For much of the past 30 years, these differences received little attention, primarily because most of the federal oil and gas resources in EPA's jurisdiction have been subject to moratoria. In 2008, moratoria provisions expired, potentially opening many of the areas in EPA's jurisdiction to oil and gas leasing activity. If more OCS areas in EPA's jurisdiction are open for oil and gas leasing, policymakers' interest in these differences will likely increase. For OCS sources in EPA's jurisdiction, requirements depend on whether the source is located within 25 miles of a state's seaward boundary ("inner OCS sources") or beyond ("outer OCS sources"). Inner OCS sources are subject to the same requirements as comparable onshore emission sources, which vary by state and depend on the area's air quality status; outer sources are subject to various CAA provisions, including the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program. In contrast, OCS sources in DOI's jurisdiction are subject to air emission requirements only if emissions would "significantly affect" onshore air quality. A key difference between the EPA and DOI programs is the federal emission threshold that would subject a source to substantive requirements. For sources in EPA's jurisdiction, this is the PSD threshold of 250 tons per year (tpy) of regulated emissions. Sources that exceed this level would likely be subject to Best Achievable Control Technology (BACT) and other provisions. States' analogous thresholds that apply to inner OCS sources may be more stringent. By comparison, a DOI OCS source applies an exemption formula, based on distance from shore (e.g., a source 30 miles from shore would have an emission threshold of 990 tpy). If a source remains subject after this step, it must conduct air modeling to assess whether its emissions would have a significant effect on onshore air quality. In effect, this two-step process constitutes a much less stringent threshold than EPA's 250 tpy threshold. Another substantial difference is the time frame allotted to the agencies for reviewing a potential source's permit (EPA) or activity-specific plan (DOI). In addition, the EPA permit process allows greater opportunity for input from the public. In particular, EPA's Environmental Appeals Board offers parties a powerful tool to compel agency review. Therefore, two identical operations, located in separate jurisdictions, could face considerably different requirements and procedural time frames. Some stakeholders would likely argue that the additional opportunities for public involvement in EPA's permit process help create a balance between resource development and environmental concerns. Others would likely contend these steps present unnecessary burdens and timing uncertainty in the process.

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Many discussions of wildfire protection focus on the federal agencies that manage lands and receive funds to prepare for and control wildfires. This report provides historical background on wildfires, and describes concerns about the wildland-urban interface and about forest and rangeland health. In the FY2001 Interior appropriations act ( P.L. 106-291 ), Congress enacted the additional funding, and other requirements for the agencies. During the severe 2002 fire season, the Bush Administration developed a proposal, called the Healthy Forests Initiative, to expedite fuel reduction projects in priority areas. In particular, small trees and dense undergrowth can create fuel ladders that sometimes cause surface fires to spread upward into the forest canopy. is often very slow. Previous proposed legislation (e.g., H.R. Timber harvests remove heavy fuels that contribute to fire intensity, and can break fuel ladders, but the remaining limbs and tree tops ("slash") substantially increase fuel loads on the ground and get in the way of controlling future fires, at least in the short term, until the slash is removed or disposed of through burning. Mechanical treatments are often effective at eliminating fuel ladders, but as with timber cutting, do not reduce the fine fuels on the sites without additional treatment (e.g., without prescribed burning). A wide array of factors determine whether a wildfire will blow up into a conflagration. Whether a wildfire becomes a conflagration can also be influenced by land management practices and policies. Historic grazing and logging practices (by encouraging growth of many small trees), and especially fire suppression over the past century, appear to have contributed to unprecedented fuel loads in some ecosystems. Fuel treatments can reduce fuel loads, and thus probably reduce the likelihood and severity of catastrophic wildfires, at least in some ecosystems; however, some policies and decisions may restrict fuel treatment—for example, air quality protection that limits prescribed burning or wilderness designation that prevents fuel reduction with motorized or mechanical equipment. Animals, as well as plants, can benefit from fire. Roles and Responsibilities Landowner Responsibilities Individuals who choose to build or live in homes and other structures in the wildland-urban interface face some risk of loss from wildfires. However, landowners can take steps, individually and collectively, to reduce the threat to their structures. State and local governments could further assist home protection from wildfires by supporting programs to inform residents, especially those in the urban-wildland interface, of ways that they can protect their homes. The value of wildfires as case studies for building predictive models is constrained, because the a priori situation (e.g., fuel loads and distribution) and burning conditions (e.g., wind and moisture levels, patterns, and variations) are often unknown. Thus, research on fire protection and control is challenging, and predictive tools for fire protection and control are often based substantially on expert opinion and anecdotes, rather than on documented research evidence. One might anticipate more careful federal prescribed burning after the May 2000 escaped prescribed fire burned 239 homes in Los Alamos, NM; more cautious prescribed burning is likely to have higher unit costs than the GAO figure. However, it should also be recognized that, regardless of the extent of fuel reduction and other fire protection efforts, as long as there is biomass for burning, especially under severe weather conditions (drought and high wind), catastrophic wildfires will occasionally occur, with the attendant damages to resources, destruction of nearby homes, other economic and social impacts, and potential loss of life.

Congress continues to face questions about forestry practices, funding levels, and the federal role in wildfire protection. Recent fire seasons have been, by most standards, among the worst in the past half century. National attention began to focus on wildfires when a prescribed burn in May 2000 escaped control and burned 239 homes in Los Alamos, NM. President Clinton responded by requesting a doubling of wildfire management funds, and Congress enacted much of this proposal in the FY2001 Interior appropriations act (P.L. 106-291). President Bush responded to the severe 2002 fires by proposing a Healthy Forests Initiative to reduce fuel loads by expediting review processes. Many factors contribute to the threat of wildfire damages. Two major factors are the decline in forest and rangeland health and the expansion of residential areas into wildlands—the wildland-urban interface. Over the past century, aggressive wildfire suppression, as well as past grazing and logging practices, have altered many ecosystems, especially those where light, surface fires were frequent. Many areas now have unnaturally high fuel loads (e.g., dead trees and dense thickets) and an historically unnatural mix of plant species (e.g., exotic invaders). Fuel treatments have been proposed to reduce the wildfire threats. Prescribed burning—setting fires under specified conditions—can reduce the fine fuels that spread wildfires, but can escape and become catastrophic wildfires, especially if fuel ladders (small trees and dense undergrowth) and wind spread the fire into the forest canopy. Commercial timber harvesting is often proposed, and can reduce heavy fuels and fuel ladders, but exacerbates the threat unless and until the slash (tree tops and limbs) is properly disposed of. Other mechanical treatments (e.g., precommercial thinning, pruning) can reduce fuel ladders, but also temporarily increase fuels on the ground. Treatments can often be more effective if combined (e.g., prescribed burning after thinning). However, some fuel treatments are very expensive, and the benefit of treatments for reducing wildfire threats depends on many factors. It should also be recognized that, as long as biomass, drought, lightning, and high winds exist, catastrophic wildfires will occur. Only about 1% of wildfires become conflagrations (raging, destructive fires), but which fires will "blow up" into crown wildfires is unpredictable. It seems likely that management practices and policies, including fuel treatments, affect the probability of such events. However, past experiences with wildfires are of limited value for building predictive models, and research on fire behavior under various circumstances is difficult, at best. Thus, predictive tools for fire protection and control are often based on expert opinion and anecdotes, rather than on research evidence. Individuals who choose to build homes in the urban-wildland interface face some risk of loss from wildfires, but can take steps to protect their homes. Federal, state, and local governments can and do assist by protecting their own lands, by providing financial and technical assistance, and by providing relief after the fire.

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Introduction The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury (Title I), the Executive Office of the President (EOP, Title II), the judiciary (Title III), the D istrict of Columbia (Title IV), and more than two dozen independent agencies (Title V). The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. This structure has existed in its current form since the 2007 reorganization of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. Although financial services are a major focus of the bills, FSGG appropriations bills do not include many financial regulatory agencies, which are instead funded outside of the appropriations process. Administration and Congressional Action On February 2, 2015, President Obama submitted his FY2016 budget request, which sought a total of $46.8 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $322 million for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). On July 9, 2015, the House Committee on Appropriations (hereinafter "the House committee") reported the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2016 ( H.R. 2995 , H.Rept. 114-194 ). H.R. 2995 as reported would have provided $41.6 billion for agencies funded through the House FSGG Appropriations Subcommittee bill. The House FY2016 Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 3049 , H.Rept. 114-205 ) would have provided $245 million for the CFTC. Total FY2016 funding in the two House bills would have been $41.8 billion, about $4.9 billion below the President's FY2016 request. On July 30, 2015, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Act, 2016 ( S. 1910 , S.Rept. 114-97 ). S. 1910 would have appropriated $42.1 billion for FY2016, about $4.7 billion below the President's request. 114-53 ). The CR generally provided budget authority for ongoing projects and activities at the rate they were funded during FY2015. The FSGG anomalies included in P.L. For example, the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 ( P.L. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-96 continued funding through December 16, 2015, and P.L. 114-100 continued funding through December 22, 2015, under the same provisions established in the first CR. 114-113 / H.R. 2029 ) was passed by the House and Senate and signed by the President on December 18, 2015. The FSGG appropriations were included as Division E, whereas the CFTC was funded by the Agriculture appropriations in Division A. The total provided for FSGG agencies for FY2016, including the CFTC, was $44.8 billion, about $2 billion below the President's request. Division O of P.L. The Senate bill also included the full text of S. 1484 , a broad financial regulatory reform bill that was previously reported by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. 114-113 did not include the provisions relating to CFPB funding from the committee bills and included a relatively small number of the provisions relating to financial regulation from S. 1484 / S. 1910 .

The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. This structure has existed since the 2007 reorganization of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. On February 2, 2015, President Obama submitted his FY2016 budget request. The request included a total of $46.8 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $322 million for the CFTC. On July 9, 2015, the House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2995, H.Rept. 114-194). Total FY2016 funding in the reported bill would be $41.6 billion, with another $245 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 3049, H.Rept. 114-205), which was reported on July 14, 2015. The combined total of $41.8 billion would be about $4.9 billion below the President's FY2016 request. On July 30, 2015, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Act, 2016 (S. 1910, S.Rept. 114-97). S. 1910 would appropriate $42.1 billion for FY2016, about $4.7 billion below the President's request. No full FY2016 FSGG appropriations bill was enacted prior to the beginning of the new fiscal year. In response, a number of continuing resolutions (CR) for FY2016, were enacted. P.L. 114-53 continued funding through December, 11, 2015; P.L. 114-96 continued funding through December 16, 2015; P.L. 114-100 continued funding through December 22, 2015. The CRs generally provided budget authority for ongoing projects and activities at the rate they were funded during FY2015. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113/H.R. 2029) was passed by the House and Senate and signed by the President on December 18, 2015. The FSGG appropriations bill was included as Division E, whereas the CFTC was funded with the Agriculture appropriations in Division A. The total provided for FSGG agencies for FY2016, including the CFTC, was $44.8 billion, about $2 billion below the President's request. Although financial services are a major focus of the FSGG appropriations bills, these bills do not include many financial regulatory agencies, which are funded outside of the appropriations process. Both H.R. 2995 and S. 1910 included language that would have altered the appropriations status of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), changing its primary funding source to the FSGG bill instead of unappropriated funds provided through the Federal Reserve. The Senate committee FSGG bill also included the text of S. 1484, a broad financial regulatory reform package that was previously reported by the Senate Banking Committee, but has not been considered by the full Senate. P.L. 114-113 did not change the funding structure of the CFPB, but did include some of the S. 1484 provisions in Division O.

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Debates over species and water allocation are generally thought of as a hallmark of western water conflicts. (Issues concerning water management per se and the conflicts among other users (e.g., municipal use, electrical generation, irrigation, and navigation) are analyzed in CRS Report RL34326, Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) Drought: Federal Water Management Issues , by [author name scrubbed] et al.) Habitat in the upper basin has undergone profound alteration, while the lower basin has been less altered. On April 15, 2008, the Corps incorporated elements of the previous Emergency Operating Plan and added other changes to form a revised IOP (RIOP); it submitted the RIOP to the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The Four Species: A Sturgeon and Three Mussels A focal point of the debate on management of the ACF basin during drought has been protection of four notably uncharismatic protected species: the threatened Gulf sturgeon ( Acipenser oxyrinchus desotoi ), the endangered fat threeridge mussel ( Amblema neislerii ), the threatened Chipola slabshell mussel ( Elliptio chipolaensis ), and the threatened purple bankclimber mussel ( Elliptoideus sloatianus ). Among the issues mentioned in the rationale for adopting EDO and its lower minimum flows was reducing "the demand of storage in order to ... provide greater assurance of future ability to sustain flows for listed species during a severe multi-year drought, as currently being experienced in the ACF basin." In addition to the fish flesh itself, the fish were prized for caviar. For instance, if water flows remained low, but all communities and industries in the basin were to improve their pollution levels markedly, might the species tolerate an even lower flow, in light of this improvement? suspension of requirements for a maximum fall rate (0.25 ft/day) if water storage drops to a specified level and the Corps is operating under a drought plan. FWS concludes that the RIOP would not jeopardize the four listed species, nor would it adversely modify their critical habitat. River flow reduction, whether through drought or increased upstream use, could have serious adverse consequences for oyster populations. Thus far in 2008, investigations of Apalachicola Bay and the lower Apalachicola River indicate conditions similar to 2007, with record duration of low flows, yielding conditions similar to an exceptional drought. The June 1, 2008, BiOp notes that, although two species of sea turtles and the West Indian manatee may sometimes occur in Apalachicola Bay or the lower Apalachicola River, any effects of the proposed action on these species would likely be insignificant, due to their low numbers and only occasional seasonal residence in the river and bay. Circuit Court held that, pursuant to the Water Supply Act, the Corps lacked congressional authority to enter into the Lake Lanier storage contracts in a 2003 agreement with the State of Georgia and other parties. For instance, differences in the timing of releases from Lake Lanier for in-stream hydropower uses and releases for off-stream, consumptive municipal uses potentially could affect the stored volume, as well as in-stream flows, at a particular time. How the Endangered Species Act Works: Consultation Under the ESA (16 U.S.C. It must also include the opinion on whether the agency's action: (a) is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or result in destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat (a no jeopardy opinion ); or (b) is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or result in destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat (a jeopardy opinion ), and if so whether: (1) any RPAs would avoid jeopardy or adverse modification, or (2) there are no RPAs; i.e., there appear to be no RPAs consistent with both the agency's proposed action and avoidance of jeopardy and/or adverse modification. Appendix B. NEPA in the Context of the Exceptional Drought Operations and ESA Timing and Content A factor in the Corps' plan to release less water is whether an environmental review document, such as an Environmental Assessment (EA) or an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), is required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C §§ 4321 et seq.).

Drought in the Southeast has brought congressional attention to an ongoing interstate water conflict among Alabama, Florida, and Georgia over water allocation and management of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) basin. Reservoir drawdown and predictions for a continued drought have Georgia's upper basin municipal and industrial customers concerned about depleting their principal (in some cases, their only) water supply, Lake Lanier in northern Georgia. Alabama, Florida, and Georgia's lower basin interests are concerned about sustaining river flows to meet their municipal, agricultural, electrical, recreational, and ecosystem needs. In addition, four federally protected species, once widely distributed but now confined to the lower basin, are caught in the controversy. The issue for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) is how to manage ACF federal reservoirs, now at record low levels, to meet needs in the upper and lower basin equitably. The challenge includes complying with federal law (e.g., the Endangered Species Act (ESA)); minimizing harm to the ACF basin and Apalachicola Bay species, ecosystems, recreation, fishing, and oyster industry; and providing flows for hydropower and thermoelectric cooling, while also meeting water needs of the Atlanta region, other communities, and industries. To varying degrees, the ACF drought has lasted for several years, depleting water supplies, with Lake Lanier being the largest source for downstream needs. The Corps has released water at various times from Lake Lanier to meet minimum flow requirements in the lower basin—to the consternation of upper basin users. As an emergency drought response in 2007, the Corps began to reduce flows in the Apalachicola River, thereby slowing the drawdown of Lake Lanier, though heavy rains in early 2008 in the lower basin temporarily halted extra releases from Lake Lanier. The Corps' Revised Interim Operating Plan (RIOP) calls for three operational seasons, contingencies for drought operations, and additional water storage before and after a drought phase. It differs from previous plans in allowing water flows to fall to a specified level during drought without additional ESA consultation. In addition, a previous agreement to limit the rate of reduction in flow (to allow species to move to deeper water) will end under certain conditions. Judging that the Corps' actions would not jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or adversely modify their critical habitat, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued a Biological Opinion on June 1, 2008, that approved the RIOP. Four species protected under the Endangered Species Act—three mussels and a sturgeon—depend on Apalachicola River flows. The impacts of the RIOP on these species continue to be the subject of study and debate. Yet the four are not the focus of debate. Rather the law itself acts as a hammer, forcing parties to reach decisions that may produce winners and losers. As climate change and population growth continue to affect ecosystems, ESA controversies may be at the center of still more stormy debates. Responses of the various parties in the ACF and species protection controversy may presage responses to future river management controversies in other regions.

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Introduction Over the last few years, nowhere have tensions between the United States and its Europeanallies and friends been more evident than on a range of issues related to the Middle East. This is largely because Europeanperspectives on the region have been shaped over time by common elements unique to Europe'shistory and geostrategic position. Some Bush Administration officials and Members of Congress are concerned that the recentvitriolic disputes between Washington and a number of European capitals on Middle East issuescould constrain U.S. policies, and erode the broader transatlantic relationship and U.S.-Europeancounterterrorism efforts in the longer term. The 9/11 Commission Report notes that nearly everyaspect of U.S. counterterrorism strategy relies on international cooperation, including with Europeangovernments and multilateral institutions such as NATO and the European Union (EU). Someprovisions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. Underlying Drivers of European Views Many analysts argue that the United States and Europe share common vital interests in theMiddle East: combating terrorism; halting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);promoting Middle East peace and stability; ensuring a reliable flow of oil; and curtailing Islamicextremism. In contrast, the Bush Administration stresses that terrorism and weaponsproliferation must be confronted to ensure U.S. national security, and that the conditions for peaceand stability in the Middle East will not be possible until these twin threats are removed. They are wary of the use of preemptive force not sanctioned by the internationalcommunity. Growing EU Ambitions Some experts assert that the EU's aspirations to play a larger role on the world stage have alsoheightened recent U.S.-European tensions. (10) The EU has had somesuccess in forging consensus on its approach to the Middle East peace process, and how best to dealwith Iran. Key policygaps exist in U.S. and European efforts to deal with Iraq, address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,manage Iran and Syria, and counter terrorism. (35) European governments reportedly played a key role in ensuring that the June 2004 G8Summit initiative on the Broader Middle East and North Africa took into account theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict as part of any push to encourage political, economic, and social reformsin the region. However, policies have often differedsharply. Theyassert that each side of the Atlantic will likely continue to engage in the region through its ownexisting policy instruments, such as the U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative and the EU'sEuro-Mediterranean Partnership. 108-458 ) seek to promote Middle East development and reform and improveinternational collaboration against terrorism. Several factors will likelyinfluence how deep and lasting the damage from the dispute over Iraq and subsequent policies in theMiddle East will be to the broader transatlantic relationship. One key determinant will be whetherthe United States and its European allies and friends can cooperate more robustly in the future inrebuilding Iraq. Others fear that U.S.-European disputes over the Middle East could spill over into U.S.-EUtrade relations.

Managing policy differences on a range of issues emanating from the Middle East posesserious challenges for the United States and its European allies and friends. The most vitriolicdispute has centered on the conflict in Iraq. However, divisions over how best to approach theongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, manage Iran and Syria, and combat terrorism also persist. TheBush Administration and Members of Congress are concerned that continued disagreements betweenthe two sides of the Atlantic could both constrain U.S. policy choices in the region and erode thebroader transatlantic relationship and counterterrorism cooperation over the longer term. TheU.S.-initiated Broader Middle East and North Africa partnership project seeks to encourage reformsin the region and U.S.-European cooperation in tackling Mideast problems. This initiative waswelcomed by the 9/11 Commission, which recommended that the United States "should engage othernations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism." TheIntelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) contains elements thatseek to promote Middle East development and reform and enhance international cooperation againstterrorism. Many analysts assert that the United States and Europe share common vital interests in theMiddle East: combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; promotingMiddle East peace and stability; ensuring a reliable flow of oil; and curtailing Islamic extremism. U.S. and European policies to promote these goals often differ considerably. Although the Europeangovernments are not monolithic in their opinions on the Middle East, European perspectives havebeen shaped over time by common elements unique to Europe's history and geostrategic position. Many Europeans believe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be a priority. They view it as a keydriver of terrorism, Islamic extremism, and political unrest among Europe's growing Muslimpopulations. In contrast, the U.S. Administration stresses that terrorism and weapons proliferationare the primary threats and must be pro-actively confronted; peace and stability in the region will notbe possible until these twin threats are removed. A number of other factors, such as divergentperceptions of the appropriate role of the use of force and growing European Union (EU) ambitionsto play a larger role on the world stage, also contribute to the policy gaps that have emerged. How deep and lasting the clash over Iraq and subsequent Middle East policies will be totransatlantic relations will likely depend on several factors, including whether Washington andEuropean capitals can cooperate more robustly to rebuild Iraq; whether Europeans perceive arenewed U.S. commitment to revive the Middle East peace process; and whether differences overMideast issues spill over into NATO or impede EU efforts to forge a deeper Union. This report willbe updated as events warrant. For more information, see CRS Report RL31339 , Iraq: U.S. RegimeChange Efforts and post-Saddam Governance ; CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East PeaceTalks ; CRS Report RL32048 , Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses ; CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues ; and CRS Report RL31612(pdf) , European Counter-terroristEfforts: Political Will and Diverse Responses in the First Year after September 11 .

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Introduction The Chosen Soren (Chongryun in Korean), a group of pro-Pyongyang ethnic Koreanspermanently residing in Japan, has come under heightened scrutiny as U.S. and Japanese policymakers seek new ways to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program. With the six-party talkscurrently at a standstill, the United States and its allies are seeking ways to economically andpolitically pressure the Pyongyang regime to abandon its nuclear weapons program . The ChosenSoren has long supported North Korea by facilitating trade, remitting cash donations, establishingpersonal contacts, and possibly coordinating illicit transfers of narcotics and weapon parts. Japaneseofficials have recently indicated more willingness to crack down on Chosen Soren's illegal activities. U.S. officials may be prepared to cooperate with Japan in dealing with the organization as part ofa broader strategy of influencing North Korean actions. Congress has been actively engaged in its oversight of the Administration's North Korean policy, including a hearing held by the Financial Management, Budget, and International SecuritySubcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on May 20, 2003 in which a NorthKorean defector testified that Chosen Soren had coordinated shipments of missile parts to theregime. This report will explore assessments of Chosen Soren's relations with the North KoreanandJapanese governments, the recent changes in Japan's policy toward the group, and possible optionsfor the United States to exploit the link provided by the Chosen Soren between the reclusive NorthKorean regime and the outside world.

The Chosen Soren (Chongryun in Korean), a group of pro-Pyongyang ethnic Koreans permanently residing in Japan, has come under heightened scrutiny as U.S. and Japanese policymakers seek new ways to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program. With the six-party talkscurrently at a standstill, the United States and its allies are seeking ways to pressure economicallyand politically the Pyongyang regime to abandon its nuclear weapons program. The Chosen Sorenorganization has long supported North Korea by facilitating trade, remitting cash donations,establishing personal contacts, and possibly coordinating illicit transfers of narcotics and weaponparts. Japanese officials have recently indicated more willingness to crack down on Chosen Soren'sillegal activities. U.S. officials may be prepared to cooperate with Japan in dealing with theorganization as part of a broader strategy of influencing North Korean actions. Congress has been actively engaged in its oversight of the Administration's North Korean policy, including a hearing held by the Financial Management, Budget, and International SecuritySubcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on May 20, 2003, in which a NorthKorean defector testified that Chosen Soren had coordinated shipments of missile parts to theregime. This report provides a background on Chosen Soren and its membership in Japan and explores its relationship with the Japanese government. It goes on to discuss documented links, both legaland illegal, with the North Korean government, including weapons, drugs, and cash transfers. Athird section outlines changes to Japan's policy towards Chosen Soren, ranging from taxation policyto shipping surveillance to restructured credit unions. The report concludes with a brief discussionof possible options for Congress and U.S. officials. This report will be updated as necessary.

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For the first time since 1998, the people of Puerto Rico went to the polls in November 2012 to vote on whether to change their status and, if so, how. As noted elsewhere in this report, the viability of the "enhanced commonwealth" position is not universally accepted. Puerto Rico's Political Status and the 2012 Plebiscite What Is Puerto Rico's Current Political Status? According to results certified by the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission, approximately 54.0% of those who cast ballots answered "no" to the first question. In the second question, approximately 61.2% of voters chose statehood. A concurrent resolution approved by the territorial legislature contends that the results were "inconclusive." The new governor has endorsed the concurrent resolution. In the 113 th Congress, Mr. Pierluisi has introduced H.R. 2000 . That bill would authorize a "ratification vote" asking voters a single yes-no question about whether they want Puerto Rico to be admitted as a state. If a majority of voters chose change in the first plebiscite, a second plebiscite would have presented a choice between independence, "sovereignty in association with the United States," or statehood. In particular, because the instructions asked voters to select an option in question 2 regardless of their answer to question 1, some argued that the options favored statehood, which is historically a more popular option than independence or free association. President Obama's FY2014 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies budget proposal includes $2.5 million for "objective, nonpartisan voter education about, and a plebiscite on, options that would resolve Puerto Rico's future political status." Interpreting the Plebiscite Results The plebiscite results are potentially significant if they are interpreted to mark the electorate's desire to change the island's present political status. The significance of the plebiscite remains to be seen, however, particularly because in the same election in which voters arguably endorsed a change in the status quo and favored statehood, they also voted out the pro-statehood incumbent governor and former Resident Commissioner, Luis Fortuño, as well as majorities in the territorial legislature believed to be generally supportive of statehood. No change in Puerto Rico's political status could occur without congressional action. Updates will be provided as events warrant.

For the first time since 1998, voters in Puerto Rico went to the polls in November 2012 to reconsider the island's relationship with the federal government (a concept known as "political status"). Voters were asked to answer two questions: (1) whether they wished to maintain Puerto Rico's current political status; and (2) regardless of the choice in the first question, whether they preferred statehood, independence, or to be a "sovereign free associated state." According to results certified by the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission, approximately 54.0% of those who cast ballots answered "no" to the first question. In the second question, approximately 61.2% of voters chose statehood. The island's new governor and territorial legislature contend that the results were "inconclusive." The plebiscite results are potentially significant if they are interpreted to mark the electorate's desire to change the island's present political status. The significance of the plebiscite remains to be seen, however, particularly because in the same election in which voters arguably endorsed a change in the status quo and favored statehood, they also voted out the pro-statehood incumbent governor and former Resident Commissioner, Luis Fortuño, as well as majorities in the territorial legislature believed to be generally supportive of statehood. No change in Puerto Rico's political status could occur without congressional action. Events in 2013 suggest that Congress and policymakers in San Juan are considering how to assess the plebiscite and considering next steps. In Washington, on May 15, 2013, Resident Commissioner Pedro Pierluisi introduced H.R. 2000, a bill that proposes a second plebiscite in which voters could answer "yes" or "no" to a single question asking whether they desire statehood for Puerto Rico. The President's FY2014 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies budget request includes $2.5 million for voter education for such a "federally sanctioned" plebiscite. In San Juan, the new governor, Alejandro García Padilla, and a May 14, 2013, concurrent resolution approved by the territorial legislature, contend that the November 2012 plebiscite results were "inconclusive" because a large number of voters chose not to answer the second status question. The governor and the concurrent resolution appear to suggest that if Puerto Rico's political status is to be reconsidered, various options should be available for discussion, including what some contend is an option called "enhanced commonwealth," a position previously rejected by federal task forces spanning different presidential administrations. This report will be updated periodically as events warrant.

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Several statutes that outlaw federal sex offenses insist upon a minimum term of imprisonment. In United States Sentencing Commission survey which addressed mandatory minimum sentences in child pornography cases but not other sex offense cases, a majority of the judges responding to a United States Sentencing Commission survey thought that the mandatory minimum sentences for production and distribution of child pornography and other child exploitation offenses were generally appropriate. Well over two-thirds, however, considered those for receipt of child pornography too high. The Commission's report on mandatory minimum sentencing statutes noted that its "review of available sentencing data [relating to sex offenses] indicates that further study of these penalties is needed before it can offer specific recommendations in this area." Constitutional Considerations Defendants sentenced to mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment have challenged them on a number of constitutional grounds ranging from Congress's legislative authority, to cruel and unusual punishment, through ex post facto and double jeopardy, to equal protection and due process. Federal Enclaves and Prisons Most of the mandatory minimum penalties for federal sex offenses appear in one of three chapters of title 18 of the United States Code. Chapter 109A outlaws rape and other forms of sexual abuse and sexual contact when committed in federal enclaves or federal prisons. Chapter 109A Offenses Chapter 109A violations trigger mandatory minimum sentencing provisions when: the offender commits or attempts to commit a sexual act by force or threat or by rendering the victim unconscious or intoxicated (aggravated sexual abuse); a sexual act is committed against a minor under the age of 12, or under the age of 16, if is there is disparity of 4 years or more between the age of the victim and the age of the offender (aggravated sexual abuse of a child); the offender commits or attempts to commit a sexual act by threat or when the victim is incapacitated (sexual abuse); had the sexual contact been a sexual act, it would have been punishable as sexual abuse or aggravated sexual abuse (abusive sexual contact); or the offense is a federal sex offense, including an offense subject to a mandatory minimum sentence, committed against a minor by an offender with a prior state or federal conviction for a sex offense committed against a minor (repeated sexual offense). 18 U.S.C. Qualifying prior convictions may include convictions under either state or federal law. Transporting A 5-year mandatory term of imprisonment must be imposed on "[a]ny person who - (1) knowingly mails, or transports or ships using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any child pornography." It requires a fine and a minimum term of 15 years for recidivists. 117 (relating to sex offenses involving travel).

Sex offenses are usually state crimes. Federal law, however, outlaws sex offenses when they occur on federal lands or in federal prisons, when they involve interstate or foreign travel, or when they involve child pornography whose production or distribution is associated in some way with interstate or foreign commerce. Mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment attend conviction for any of several of these federal sex crimes. The most severe mandatory minimum sentences have been reserved for aggravated sexual assaults committed in federal enclaves or federal prisons, for sex offenses resulting in death, and for sex crimes committed against children by repeat offenders. Two-thirds of the federal trial judges responding to a U.S. Sentencing Commission survey questioned the severity of the mandatory minimum penalties required for receipt of child pornography (5 years; 15 years for repeat offenders). The Commission's report suggested that the perception may lead to inconsistent sentencing in child pornography cases. It explained that more study would be required before it could make any specific recommendations concerning mandatory minimum sentencing in sex offenses. The constitutional authority to enact federal sex offense punishable by mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment is not unlimited. The ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses; the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component; the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause; the separation of powers and the reservation of powers principles—all establish boundaries that must be honored. Nevertheless, few defendants have successfully challenged the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment imposed following their conviction for a federal sex offense. This report is available in an abridged version as CRS Report R42387, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing for Federal Sex Offenses: An Abridged Overview, without the footnotes or citations to authority found here.

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Introduction The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a broad civil rights act prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Under title III of the ADA, discrimination against individuals with disabilities in public accommodations, including hospitals and doctor's offices, is prohibited. The Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated regulations under title III requiring places of public accommodation to provide "auxiliary aids and services" to individuals with disabilities unless they are able to prove such services would be unduly burdensome. Auxiliary aids may include qualified interpreters as well as note takers, video remote interpreting (VRI) services, or real-time computer-aided transcription services. The new regulations issued under title III on July 26, 2010, address several issues including the application of rights to effective communication by companions who are individuals with disabilities, the use of video remote interpreting (VRI) services, and when an accompanying adult or child may be used as an interpreter. However, the use of technology must result in effective communication. Analysis and Conclusion The ADA purposely adopted a flexible standard regarding nondiscrimination requirements.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a broad civil rights act prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits places of public accommodation, including hospitals and doctors' offices, from discriminating against individuals with disabilities. The Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated regulations under title III requiring the use of auxiliary aids, unless they would fundamentally alter the nature of the service or result in an undue burden. Auxiliary aids may include qualified interpreters as well as note takers, video remote interpreting (VRI) services, or real-time computer-aided transcription services. The new regulations issued under title III on July 26, 2010, address several issues including the application of rights to effective communication by companions who are individuals with disabilities, the use of video remote interpreting (VRI) services, and when an accompanying adult or child may be used as an interpreter. Attempting to address the myriad of disabilities and public accommodations, the ADA purposely adopted a flexible standard concerning when its nondiscrimination requirements are met. The law and DOJ regulations, then, do not explicitly state when hospitals or doctors are required to provide interpreter services to patients with disabilities and, as is illustrated by the judicial decisions in the area, this issue is largely fact dependent.

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This report provides a general analysis of key concepts involving deployable federal assets, including what it means to be a deployable federal asset; when the assets will be used to support response operations; what the main authorities and policies are that guide the use of assets; and what level of support the federal government is prepared to provide for response operations. This report also examines several issues Congress may wish to consider as it evaluates the future authorization and funding for various deployable federal assets. Issues examined in the report include the potential policy benefits and disadvantages of federal investment in deployable federal assets, the cost-effectiveness of different staffing models for the assets, the methods for financing the deployment of the assets, whether federal assets should have greater operational control in response operations, and the challenges Congress may face in its oversight of the use of the assets. The term is used to classify sets of specially trained federal employees whose mission, though not necessarily exclusive mission, is to provide on-scene assistance to communities by supporting their disaster response. Colloquially, deployable federal assets can be described as the federal government's "first responders" to a disaster. However, due to the magnitude of the disaster, a local, state, or tribal government may (a) be unable to respond to the unique consequences of a disaster (e.g., it lacks a capability to eliminate a certain biological contaminant), or (b) have its capability to respond become overwhelmed by the scale of consequences (e.g., there are too many survivors requiring temporary shelter assistance). There are many federal laws and regulations that prescribe how a request for assistance may be made, but the most prominent is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. §5721 et seq. CRS also has a number of available reports that analyze federal authorities for disaster assistance, including the authorizing legislation for deployable federal assets. A central guideline of the NRF is the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Policy Benefits and Disadvantages of Deployable Federal Assets There are several theoretical policy benefits and disadvantages that may result from authorization and appropriation of deployable federal assets by Congress. These benefits and disadvantages are largely a result of the federalism structure of the nation, and may also apply to the provision of deployable assets by states. Another theoretical disadvantage is that federal provision of response capabilities may crowd out investment in those same capabilities by other actors, including the private sector. Federalism and Operational Control As previously discussed, the federal government generally provides disaster assistance, including deployable federal assets, at the request of a state or tribal government. Congress may wish to consider whether the provision of federal assistance should grant the federal government more decision-making power if disagreements arise in the incident management. Thus, in general, the limited use of deployable federal assets and the unique circumstances of each disaster result in a small sample size that Congress and others can use to evaluate the benefits of the capabilities provided by the asset. Brief Summaries of Sample Federal Assets This section of the report provides brief summaries of example s of deployable federal assets that can support disaster response operations. Authorization and Appropriations Authority for the Corps is found in Title II of the Public Health Service Act. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) manages the stockpile. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. The National Response Framework (NRF) and DOD refer to this type of assistance as Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). Contaminated debris management is coordinated with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 84-99 (33 U.S.C.

For most disasters across the nation, the affected local, state, or tribal governments have sufficient capabilities to respond to the incident. However, for disasters with consequences that require unique capabilities or that overwhelm the existing capabilities of a respective state or tribal government, Congress has authorized and appropriated a suite of deployable federal assets to support domestic disaster response operations. This report reviews several key concepts about these federal assets, and highlights possible issues Congress may consider when evaluating their authorization and appropriation. In this report, a deployable federal asset generally means sets of specially trained federal employees whose mission is to provide on-scene assistance to communities by supporting their disaster response. Deployable federal assets can be described as the federal government's "first responders" to a disaster. They typically only provide assistance at the request of states or tribes and in circumstances where the capabilities of non-federal government entities are insufficient. The federal government also scopes its assistance to provide only the assets that are required by the situation. The maximum disaster consequences that the federal government is prepared to address with its full set of response capabilities is largely unknown. Given the diversity of deployable federal assets, there are many legal authorities and executive branch policies that guide their use in response operations. Some of the most notable authorities are the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. §5121 et seq.), Title XXVIII of the Public Health Service Act, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. §101 et seq.), and the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. §1385 et seq.). Some primary federal policies guiding the use of deployable federal assets include the National Response Framework (NRF) and accompanying Federal Interagency Operational Plan (FIOP), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the Defense Support for Civilian Authorities (DSCA). Congress may consider several policy issues as it evaluates the future authorization and appropriations for deployable federal assets, and in its oversight of the assets' response capabilities. There may be theoretical benefits gained by the provision of deployable federal assets, including the pooling of disaster risk across the nation and greater efficiency in the supply of response capabilities. There may also be theoretical disadvantages, including that the provision of deployable federal assets creates a moral hazard resulting in greater disaster risk for the nation, and that federal investment may crowd out the investment of non-federal entities in similar response capabilities. Congress may also assess the various models for staffing these assets, including the benefits and costs of conditional employments, dedicated staffing versus multiuse staffing, and "federalizing" staff into temporary federal employment for response operations. Congress may evaluate whether the provision of deployable federal assets should grant federal officials greater decision-making authority in the management of response operations. Finally, there are a number of challenges that may inhibit congressional oversight, such as the small sample size of incidents available to evaluate the effectiveness of deployable federal assets and the lack of specificity in many of the authorizations and appropriations for these assets. This report also provides brief summaries of examples of deployable federal assets. These assets are managed, either solely or jointly, by a variety of federal departments and agencies, including components of the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services; the Environmental Protection Agency; the National Transportation Safety Board; and others. A synopsis of these assets is provided in Table 1.

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This report provides a detailed legislative history of the EUC08 program. It also describes the structure and availability of EUC08 benefits prior to program expiration at the end of calendar year 2013. 110-252 ) into law. Title IV of this act created a new temporary unemployment insurance program, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program. The last day of EUC08 availability was December 28, 2013 (December 29, 2013 for New York). EUC08 Benefit Amounts, Tiers, and Duration Prior to Expiration Prior to expiration at the end of calendar year 2013, the amount of the EUC08 benefit was the equivalent of the eligible individual's weekly regular UC benefit and included any applicable dependents' allowances. 112-240 . (See Figure 1 .) Prior to the expiration of the EUC08 program, the following weeks of benefits were available in the tiers listed below: Tier I was available in all states, except North Carolina, with up to 14 weeks of EUC08 benefits provided to eligible individuals. EUC08 Program Expiration All tiers of EUC08 benefits were temporary and expired the week ending on or before January 1, 2014. The passage of P.L. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L.

Until its expiration at the end of December 2013, the temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program provided additional federal unemployment insurance benefits to eligible individuals who had exhausted all available benefits from their state Unemployment Compensation (UC) programs. Congress created the EUC08 program in 2008 and amended the original, authorizing law (P.L. 110-252) 11 times. No EUC08 benefits are currently available. The last extension of EUC08 under P.L. 112-240, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, authorized EUC08 benefits until the week ending on or before January 1, 2014 (i.e., December 28, 2013; or December 29, 2013, in New York State). Prior to program expiration, the potential duration of EUC08 benefits available to eligible individuals depended on state unemployment rates. Figure A-1 provides the sequence, availability, and total maximum duration of all unemployment benefits prior to the expiration of EUC08. This report summarizes the structure of EUC08 benefits available prior to program expiration at the end of calendar year 2013. It also provides the legislative history of the EUC08 program.

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It should be recognized that the amount of geospatial data is expanding rapidly, the methods for acquiring geospatial data are growing, and the ways geospatial data are being used are diversifying throughout local and state governments, as well as within the federal government. In addition to providing basic information on GIS and geospatial information, this report describes the federal geospatial enterprise and how it is organized. Given the complexity of managing, sharing, and using geospatial data from a variety of sources and across the breadth of the federal government, the 112 th Congress in its oversight role may have an interest in the programs and geospatial "assets" belonging to most federal departments and agencies. GIS and Geospatial Data: The Basics GIS is a computer data system capable of capturing, storing, analyzing, and displaying geographically referenced information—information attached to a location, such as latitude and longitude, or street location. An example is the southern California wildfires during 2008. For policy makers, this type of analysis can greatly assist in clarifying complex problems that may involve local, state, and federal government, and may affect businesses, residential areas, and federal installations. This type of spatial analysis of foreclosure effects, with the visualization provided by GIS maps such as the New York Times example, can help inform policy makers about the nature and extent of foreclosure patterns, if the underlying data are reliable. Social Media and GIS: The March 11, 2011, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami Within 36 hours of the March 11, 2011 magnitude 9.0 earthquake off Japan's northeast coast, a small team of GIS experts began a project for a volunteer group called GISCorps. The group intended to gather critical geospatial information to help humanitarian organizations working in areas damaged by the earthquake and tsunami. In this case, the information was vetted through the team of experts and included as GIS data layers in the interactive map. How Geospatial Data Is Managed at the Federal Level The Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) OMB Circular A-16 was first issued in 1953 to ensure that federal surveying and mapping activities met the needs of federal and state agencies and the general public and to avoid duplication of effort. Under the revised Circular A-16, 19 members comprise the FGDC. In an August 19, 2002, revision, Circular A-16 affirmed the NSDI as "the technology, policies, standards, human resources, and related activities necessary to acquire, process, distribute, use, maintain, and preserve spatial data." The supplemental guidance labels geospatial data as a capital asset, and refers to its acquisition and management in terms analogous to financial assets to be managed as a National Geospatial Data Asset Portfolio. (See CRS Report Rxxxxx for a discussion of the most recent supplemental guidance to Circular A-16.) The liaisons are intended to represent and coordinate the National Geospatial Program (NGP) initiatives in state and local agencies, in addition to other federal agencies, in support of NSDI, The National Map, and Geospatial One-Stop.

Geospatial information is data referenced to a place—a set of geographic coordinates—which can often be gathered, manipulated, and displayed in real time. A Geographic Information System (GIS) is a computer data system capable of capturing, storing, analyzing, and displaying geographically referenced information. The federal government and policy makers increasingly use geospatial information and tools like GIS for producing floodplain maps, conducting the census, mapping foreclosures, congressional redistricting, and responding to natural hazards such as wildfires, earthquakes, and tsunamis. For policy makers, this type of analysis can greatly assist in clarifying complex problems that may involve local, state, and federal government, and affect businesses, residential areas, and federal installations. Examples of how GIS and geospatial data are used within and outside the federal government are growing rapidly. In this report, a few examples are provided that describe the real-time or near real-time data analysis in the case of a California wildfire; policy analysis in support of a Base Realignment and Closure decision in Virginia Beach; and analysis of foreclosure patterns using census and other data for the New York City area. An additional example is provided demonstrating the burgeoning interaction of GIS and social media. In this case, Japanese citizens collected and provided census records, maps, and other information—a variant of "crowd-sourcing"—to a GIS team. The team assembled the information into data layers supporting an interactive map to assist humanitarian organizations working in areas of Japan damaged by the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-16, first issued in 1953, gives direction for federal agencies that produce, maintain, or use geospatial data. OMB Circular A-16 has been revised and updated in 1967, 1990, and 2002. Most recently, the Obama Administration issued supplemental guidance to Circular A-16 that labeled federal geospatial data a capital asset and referred to its acquisition and management in terms analogous to financial assets. How well these "assets" are managed depends, in part, on how the federal government is structured to organize and coordinate its geospatial enterprise. That structure is embodied in the Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC), comprising 10 cabinet-level departments and 9 independent agencies. OMB Circular A-16, via its revisions and supplemental guidance, as well as Executive Order 12906, issued in 2004, gives the FGDC primary responsibility for developing the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI). The NSDI can be thought of as the infrastructure for federal geospatial "assets," or the means by which federal geospatial data are acquired, processed, distributed, used, maintained, and preserved. The 112th Congress in its oversight role may have an interest in the programs and geospatial assets belonging to most federal departments and agencies within the framework of the NSDI. This report describes some of these programs to give a sense of the breadth and complexity of the federal geospatial enterprise.

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Background Congress has created numerous administrative agencies to implement and enforce delegated regulatory authority. As this report explains, when a court reviews an agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering, the court will generally apply the two-step framework outlined by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council . This report discusses the Chevron decision, explains the circumstances in which the Chevron doctrine applies, explores how courts apply the two steps of Chevron , and highlights some criticisms of the doctrine, with an eye towards the potential future of Chevron deference. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. First, the Court invoked a judicial presumption about legislative intent, which has subsequently become one of the leading justifications for deferring to agencies under Chevron : If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.... As an initial matter, the Chevron framework of review is limited to agencies' interpretations of statutes they administer. In City of Arlington v. FCC , the Court rejected the contention that Chevron deference should not apply to an agency's "interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of the agency's statutory authority," reasoning that "there is no difference, insofar as the validity of agency action is concerned, between an agency's exceeding the scope of its authority (its 'jurisdiction') and its exceeding authorized application of authority that it unquestionably has." Instead, once the "preconditions to deference under Chevron are [otherwise] satisfied," the Court should proceed to the Chevron two-step framework and determine if the agency has reasonably interpreted the parameters of its statutory authority. Step one requires a court to determine whether Congress "directly addressed the precise question at issue." Some courts may also employ the traditional tools of statutory construction at Chevron 's second step. Chevron is a judicially created doctrine that rests, in part, upon an assumption made by courts about congressional intent: that where a statute is silent or ambiguous, Congress would have wanted an agency, rather than a court, to fill in the gap. Accordingly, Congress can determine whether a court will apply Chevron review to an agency interpretation.

When Congress delegates regulatory functions to an administrative agency, that agency's ability to act is governed by the statutes that authorize it to carry out these delegated tasks. Accordingly, in the course of its work, an agency must interpret these statutory authorizations to determine what it is required to do and to ascertain the limits of its authority. The scope of agencies' statutory authority is sometimes tested through litigation. When courts review challenges to agency actions, they give special consideration to agencies' interpretations of the statutes they administer. Judicial review of such interpretations is governed by the two-step framework set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The Chevron framework of review usually applies if Congress has given an agency the general authority to make rules with the force of law. If Chevron applies, a court asks at step one whether Congress directly addressed the precise issue before the court, using traditional tools of statutory construction. If the statute is clear on its face, the court must effectuate Congress's stated intent. However, if the court concludes instead that a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the court proceeds to Chevron's second step. At step two, courts defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute. Application of the Chevron doctrine in practice has become increasingly complex. Courts and scholars alike debate which types of agency interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference, what interpretive tools courts should use to determine whether a statute is clear or ambiguous, and how closely courts should scrutinize agency interpretations for reasonableness. A number of judges and legal commentators have even questioned whether Chevron should be overruled entirely. Moreover, Chevron is a judicially created doctrine that rests in large part upon a presumption about legislative intent, and Congress could modify the courts' use of the doctrine by displacing this underlying presumption. This report discusses the Chevron decision, explains the circumstances in which the Chevron doctrine applies, explores how courts apply the two steps of Chevron, and highlights some criticisms of the doctrine, with an eye towards the potential future of Chevron deference.

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(2) Background on Pre-2001 Policies Presidents Bush and Fox began the bilateral discussions in the context of the immigrationand border security policies of the past, particularly the U.S. immigration reforms of 1986 and 1996,the initiatives of the administrations of President William Clinton and President Ernesto Zedillo ofMexico, and the enactment of the Legal Immigrant Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000 that will besummarized briefly. In a related area, the Presidents launched the Partnership for Prosperity, a public-privatealliance of Mexican and U.S. governmental and business organizations to promote economicdevelopment throughout Mexico, but particularly in regions where lagging economic growth hasfueled out-migration. Emphasis on Security Following September 2001 TerroristAttacks. (7) President Bush's March 2002 Visit to Monterrey, MexicoLaunches Border Partnership ("Smart Border") Agreement. In the bilateral meeting, Presidents Bush and Fox announced a number of initiatives,including (1) a U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan with greater cooperation andtechnological enhancements at the border; (2) a Partnership for Prosperity Action Plan withpublic-private initiatives to promote domestic and foreign investment in less developed areas ofMexico with high migration rates; (3) agreement to seek legislative support to expand the mandateof the North American Development Bank (NADBank) and the Border Environmental CooperationCommission (BECC) to finance environmental infrastructure along the border; and (4) agreementto continue the cabinet-level talks to achieve safe, legal, and orderly migration flows between thecountries. Review of Migration and Border Cooperation at BinationalCommission Meeting in November 2004. Turning to the accomplishments of the Partnership for Prosperity (P4P), Secretary Powellnoted that these programs had lowered the fees for transferring funds from the United States toMexico, brought together more than 1,400 business and government leaders from both countries, anddeveloped innovative methods to finance infrastructure projects. Diplomatic Exchanges Between the United States and Mexico onBorder Violence in Late January 2005. House Passes the REAL ID Act in February 2005, withImmigration Provisions and Identity Card Standards; Attaches Provisions to the EmergencySupplemental for FY2005 in March 2005. On March 23, 2005, President Bush hosted meetings in Texaswith President Fox and Prime Minister Martin, in which the leaders established the trilateral"Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America." On May 31,2005, Mexico's Secretary of Government Santiago Creel met with Secretary of Homeland SecurityMichael Chertoff to discuss ongoing efforts to modernize the border crossing points and to regularizemigration, including six new SENTRI lanes and eight new FAST lanes and the repatriation ofMexican nationals in the coming months. U.S., Mexican, and Canadian Officials Release Late June 2005Report to Leaders under Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. In the security area, the ministers highlighted the agreementto develop and implement common methods of screening individuals and cargo, development of aunified trusted traveler program to expand upon the SENTRI and FAST programs, and developmentof a collective approach to protecting infrastructure and responding to various incidents. On December 16, 2005, the House passed H.R. 4437 (BorderProtection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005) that would, among otherthings, strengthen border security, compel employers to use a pilot system to check for employmenteligibility, mandate retention of illegal immigrants, make it a crime to be in the United Statesillegally or to assist illegal aliens, and require the deployment of a fence and surveillance equipmentalong the Mexico-U.S. border.

This report, which will be updated periodically, focuses on the interactions between Mexicoand the United States on migration and border issues during the administrations of President GeorgeW. Bush and President Vicente Fox of Mexico These interactions are increasingly tense in 2006 dueto violence in the border region and debate over U.S. immigration reform. The discussions andagreements fall into four areas: (1) the bilateral migration talks, (2) the Partnership for Prosperity,(3) the Border Partnership Agreement, and (4) the trilateral "Security and Prosperity Partnership(SPP) of North America." The bilateral migration talks that began in 2001 stalled following the terrorist attacks uponthe United States. President Bush first called for a temporary worker program in January 2004 andsimilar legislative proposals are pending. In May 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act of 2005,with provisions that strengthen border control and establish identity card standards. In lateNovember 2005 and January 2006, President Bush called for a guest worker program in the contextof enhanced border control, while Mexico called for shared responsibility approaches. In December2005, the House passed H.R. 4437 (Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and IllegalImmigration Control Act of 2005) that would increase border and immigration controls, includingdeployment of a fence along the Mexico-U.S. border. The Partnership for Prosperity (P4P) was launched in September 2001 as a public-privatealliance of Mexican and U.S. governmental and business leaders to promote economic developmentin Mexico, especially in areas with high migration rates. By the end of 2004, P4P programs hadlowered fees for transferring funds from the United States to Mexico, brought together more than1,400 business and government leaders, and developed innovative methods to finance infrastructureprojects. The Border Partnership ("Smart Border") Agreement was announced in March 2002, toenhance border security by utilizing technology to strengthen infrastructure while facilitating thetransit of people and goods across the border. When Mexico's Secretary of Government SantiagoCreel met with Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff in May 2005 they focused on thesix new SENTRI lanes, eight new FAST lanes and the repatriation of Mexican nationals in thecoming months. The trilateral "Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America" was launchedon March 23, 2005, at a summit that President Bush hosted in Texas with President Fox and PrimeMinister Martin, to advance the common security and the common prosperity of the countriesthrough expanded cooperation and harmonization of immigration, border, and security policies. Inlate June 2005, U.S., Canadian, and Mexican officials released a Report to Leaders with initialresults and proposed initiatives for future cooperation. Among the results the ministers highlightedwere agreement to implement common methods of screening individuals and cargo, expansion ofthe SENTRI and FAST programs, common principles for electronic commerce, and harmonizationof regulatory processes.

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Because they represent territories and associated jurisdictions, not states, they do not possess the same parliamentary rights afforded Members. In the House The delegates and the resident commissioner may not vote in or preside over the House. In Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union Under the rules of the 115 th Congress (2017-2018), the delegates and the resident commissioner may not vote in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

As officers who represent territories and properties possessed or administered by the United States but not admitted to statehood, the five House delegates and the resident commissioner from Puerto Rico do not enjoy all the same parliamentary rights as Members of the House. They may vote and otherwise act similarly to Members in legislative committee. They may not vote on the House floor but may participate in debate and make most motions there. Under the rules of the 115th Congress (2017-2018), the delegates and resident commissioner may not vote in, but are permitted to preside over, the Committee of the Whole. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

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Regulatory exclusivities consist of a period of time during which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) protects an approved drug from competition in the marketplace. 75-717 (as amended), and Public Health Service Act, P. L. 78-410 (as amended), require the FDA to enforce 16 different regulatory exclusivities: Twelve-Year Biologics Exclusivity, Ten-Year Transitional Exclusivity, Seven-Year Orphan Drug Exclusivity, Five-Year New Chemical Entity Exclusivity, Five-Year Enantiomer Exclusivity, Five-Year Qualifying Infectious (QI) Disease Product Exclusivity, Five-Year QI Act Antibiotic Exclusivity, Four-Year Biologics Exclusivity, Three-Year QI Act Antibiotic Exclusivity, Three-Year Clinical Investigation Exclusivity for an Original NDA, Three-Year Clinical Investigation Exclusivity for a Supplemental NDA, Two-Year Transitional Exclusivity, One-Year Interchangeable Biologics Exclusivity, Six-Month Pediatric Exclusivity, 180-Day Generic Exclusivity, and 180-Day Competitive Generic Therapy Exclusivity. To address this concern, the FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, P.L. 115-52 , established a 180-day "competitive generic therapy" exclusivity period in circumstances of "inadequate generic competition." Proposed Reforms in the 115th Congress Legislation introduced in the 115 th Congress would modify the current system of regulatory exclusivities. Duration of Protection The Improving Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, introduced as both H.R. 1776 and S. 771 , would modify the NCE exclusivity period. 1776 and S. 771 would instead allow the FDA to accept a generic drug application for the brand-name product three years after the brand-name product was approved. However, under this proposed legislation, the agency may not approve the ANDA until five years have passed since the brand-name product's approval date. This legislation would also reduce the regulatory exclusivity period for biologics from 12 to 7 years. 1776 and S. 771 would also limit the award of the three-year clinical investigation exclusivity to drugs that show "a significant clinical benefit over existing therapies manufactured by the applicant in the 5-year period preceding the submission of the application." Termination of Regulatory Exclusivities H.R. 1776 and S. 771 would also call for the termination of a regulatory exclusivity if its proprietor engages in one of certain specified activities, including adulteration, misbranding, illegally marketing a drug, making false statements to the FDA, or entering into an anticompetitive settlement of patent infringement litigation. Abuse-Deterrent Opioids The Abuse-Deterrent Opioids Plan for Tomorrow Act of 2017, H.R. 2025 , would limit the scope of the three-year clinical investigation exclusivity with respect to section 505(b)(2) applications that relate to abuse-deterrent opioids. 2025 would add the following language to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: A drug for which [a section 505(b)(2)] application ... is submitted shall not be considered ineligible for approval under this subsection on the basis that its labeling includes information describing the abuse-deterrent properties of the drug ... that otherwise would be blocked by [three-year clinical investigation] exclusivity ... if— (I) the investigation or investigations relied upon by the applicant for approval of the labeling information were conducted by or for the applicant or the applicant has obtained a right of reference or use from the person by or for whom the investigation or investigations were conducted; and (II) the drug has meaningful technological differences compared to the drug otherwise protected by exclusivity.... Orphan Drugs The Orphan Products Extension Now Accelerating Cures and Treatments Act (OPEN ACT) of 2017, S. 1509 , would build upon the incentive structure of the Orphan Drug Act. That statute would require the FDA to extend by six months each existing exclusivity period for an approved drug or biological product when the product is additionally approved to prevent, diagnose, or treat a new indication that is a rare disease or condition. S. 1509 would clarify that the orphan drug exclusivity also does not bar the FDA from approving a new, clinically superior drug with the same active ingredient that will be marketed for treatment of the same disease or condition.

Regulatory exclusivities provide incentives for pharmaceutical innovation in the United States. Overseen by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), regulatory exclusivities are alternatively known as marketing exclusivities, data exclusivities, or data protection. Each of the distinct regulatory exclusivities establishes a period of time during which the FDA affords an approved drug protection from competing applications for marketing approval. Between them, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, P.L. 75-717 (as amended), and the Public Health Service Act, P. L. 78-410 (as amended), require the FDA to enforce 16 different regulatory exclusivities. They include exclusivity terms of 12 years for biologics, 7 years for orphan drugs, 5 years for drugs that qualify as a new chemical entity (NCE), 3 years for certain clinical investigations, and 180 days for generic drug companies that challenge relevant patents under certain conditions. Other, more specialized regulatory exclusivities pertain to antibiotics, enantiomers, and qualifying infectious disease products. Legislation introduced in the 115th Congress would modify the current system of regulatory exclusivities. One bill, the FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, was signed into law on August 18, 2017, as P.L. 115-52. That legislation establishes a wholly new 180-day "competitive generic therapy" exclusivity period in order to address circumstances of "inadequate generic competition." Other legislation has been introduced but not enacted. The Improving Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, introduced as both H.R. 1776 and S. 771, would modify the NCE exclusivity period to allow FDA to accept a generic drug application for the brand-name product after three years rather than five. However, the agency may not approve the generic application until five years have passed since the brand-name product's approval date. This legislation would also limit the award of the three-year clinical investigation exclusivity to drugs that show significant clinical benefit over existing therapies manufactured by the applicant in the five-year period prior to the application. H.R. 1776 and S. 771 would also reduce the regulatory exclusivity period for biologics from 12 to 7 years. The two bills would also call for the termination of a regulatory exclusivity if its proprietor engages in one of certain specified activities, including adulteration, misbranding, illegally marketing a drug, or making false statements to the FDA. In addition, the Abuse-Deterrent Opioids Plan for Tomorrow Act of 2017, H.R. 2025, would limit the scope of regulatory exclusivities with respect to so-called "505(b)(2) applications" that relate to abuse-resistant opioids. Finally, the Orphan Products Extension Now Accelerating Cures and Treatments Act (OPEN ACT) of 2017, S. 1509, would require the FDA to extend by six months the exclusivity period for an approved drug or biological product when the product is additionally approved to prevent, diagnose, or treat a new indication that is a rare disease or condition. S. 1509 and another bill, S. 934, the FDA Reauthorization Act, would also clarify that the orphan drug exclusivity does not bar the FDA from approving a new, clinically superior drug with the same active ingredient that will be marketed for treatment of the same disease or condition. As well, the OPEN ACT would extend a "labelling carve out" to section 505(b)(2) applications with respect to pediatric uses.

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In March 1807, the Senate directed Secretary Gallatin to prepare a report on the roads and canals existing and proposed in the United States. In 1956, federal aid for highways increased dramatically with the passage of the Federal Aid Highway and Highway Revenue Acts of 1956 (P.L. 132) authorized appropriations out of the Highway Trust Fund for FY1988 through FY1993 for highway assistance projects.

The federal government has provided aid for roads and highways since the establishment of the United States in 1789. This report comprises a brief history of such aid, detailing some precedent setters and more recent funding through the Highway Trust Fund, which was created in 1956.

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The Act appropriates FY2000funds for the District of Columbia; the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary;Foreign Operations; the Department of Interior; and the Departments of Labor, Health and HumanServices, and Education Appropriations. As originally forwarded to the conference committee onNovember 18, 1999, H.R. 3194 provided FY2000 appropriations solely for the Districtof Columbia. 3194 was the third attempt to appropriate funds for the District of Columbia for FY2000. 106-113 appropriates $436 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia. b. The conference committee bill would prohibit the use of federal and Districtrevenues to fund, finance, administer, or undertake: abortions except to save the life of the mother, or in cases of rape or incest; the Health Care Benefits Expansion Act of 1992, which wouldprovide health care coverage and other benefits to unmarried couples not related byblood; and civil court challenges or petition drives seeking to provide theDistrict of Columbia with congressional voting representation. 2587 On September 28, 1999, with the support of the District's elected leadership, President Clinton vetoed H.R. Included among the provisions that the Presidentwanted eliminated from the bill were provisions: prohibiting the funding of a needle exchange program; prohibiting the use of federal and District funds for abortionsexcept for in cases where the mother's life is endangered or in situations involvingrape or incest; prohibiting the implementation of the Domestic Partners Actof 1992; prohibiting the use of federal and District funds in any effortintended to win voting representation in the Congress for District residents; limiting fees paid to attorneys representing student seekingspecial education assistance; and decriminalizing the use of marijuana for medicalpurposes. 2587 , the House passed H.R. 3064 . 3064. The Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act for FY2000, formerly H.R. On November 3, 1999, President Clinton, vetoed H.R. 3194, Consolidated Appropriations for FY2000; P.L. 3194 , four other appropriations. 3194 , on November 18, 1999.The Senate approved the measure on November 19, 1999 by a vote of 74 to 24. OnNovember 29, 1999, the President signed the measure into law as P.L. The Act also includes many of the same social riders in H.R. P.L. 3064 . P.L.106-113 includes a provision that allows the city's corporation counsel to reviewprivate lawsuits and brief elected city leaders on their impact, but would continue toprohibit the city from participating in or working on a private law suit seeking votingrepresentation in Congress. 2587 and H.R. 106-113 , and H.R. 2587 , the first version of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2000, included aprovision that would have prohibited the use of federal funds to tally the results ofthe ballot initiative, but would have allowed the city to use local funds to determinethe outcome of the initiative. Reserve Fund and Future General Fund Surpluses During House and Senate hearings on the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2000, District officials unsuccessfully sought the removal of a provisioncontained in the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY1999. 106-113 and the vetoed H.R.

On November 29, 1999, President Clinton signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000, formerly H.R. 3194 , into law as P.L. 106-113 . The Act appropriates funds forthe District of Columbia, Division A of the act, and four other appropriation measures, Division Bof the act, including: Commerce, Justice, State, Judiciary; Foreign Operation Appropriations; InteriorAppropriations; and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations for FY2000.Division B of P.L. 106-113 , also includes a section governing Miscellaneous Appropriations, andprovisions amending the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, State Department authorization, milksupports, and intellectual properties. As originally forwarded to the conference committee, H.R. 3194 provided appropriations for FY2000 solely for the District of Columbia. TheHouse approved the conference measure on November 18, 1999, and the Senate approved themeasure on November 19, 1999. Division A of P.L. 106-113 is the third District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2000 considered by Congress. The Act includes $436 million in special federal payments to the Districtof Columbia. This is slightly higher than the amount included in the vetoed version of H.R. 3064 ($429 million) and H.R. 2587 ($430 million). The differenceis $6.7 million in federal funds for the environmental cleanup of the Lorton Correctional Facility. On November 3, 1999, President Clinton vetoed H.R. 3064 , which included funds for the District of Columbia and the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, andEducation for FY2000. On September 28, 1999, the President vetoed H.R. 2587 ,Congress' first attempt to appropriate funds for the District of Columbia for FY2000. Districtofficials urged the President to veto H.R. 2587 , because of the inclusion of several socalled "social rider" provisions. They characterized the provisions as assaults on the city's limitedhome rule. P.L. 106-113 includes many of the social riders contained in H.R. 2587 and H.R. 3064 . The Act includes provisions that prohibit: the use of federal or local funds to establish and maintain a needle exchange program, but would allow the private financing of needle exchange programs; the District from decriminalizing the use of marijuana and implementingInitiative 59 governing medical marijuana; the use of federal or District funds to finance a court challenge aimed atsecuring congressional voting representation in the House and Senate for District residents, but would allow the city's corporation counsel to review and comment on private lawsuits filed onbehalf of citizens of the District of Columbia; the use of federal or District funds for abortions except in cases or rape, incest,or the mother's health is endangered; and the implementation of a domestic partners act passed in 1992 that would extendhealth, employment, and other benefits and protections to unmarried, cohabiting, heterosexual orhomosexual couples. Key Policy Staff DSP= Domestic Social Policy Division, G&F=Government and Finance Division

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Threat Assessment The instability in western Pakistan has broad implications for international terrorism, for Pakistani stability, and for U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. From the State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 (released April 2008): The United States remained concerned that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan were being used as a safe haven for Al Qaeda terrorists, Afghan insurgents, and other extremists.... Extremists led by Baitullah Mehsud and other Al Qaeda-related extremists re-exerted their hold in areas of South Waziristan.... Extremists have also gained footholds in the settled areas bordering the FATA. The commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, and his aides, assert that Pakistan's western tribal regions provide the main pool for recruiting insurgents who fight in Afghanistan, and that infiltration from Afghanistan has caused a 30% increase in number of militant attacks in eastern Afghanistan over the past year. Another senior U.S. military officer estimated that militant infiltration from Pakistan now accounts for about one-third of the attacks on coalition troops in Afghanistan. (It is not formally designated as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization.") They ask interested partners to enhance their own efforts to control the border region by undertaking an expansion of military deployments and checkposts on the Afghan side of the border, by engaging more robust intelligence sharing, and by continuing to supply the counterinsurgency equipment requested by Pakistan. In addition to the TTP, several other Islamist militant groups are active in the region. Pakistani ground troops have undertaken operations against militants in the Bajaur agency beginning in early August. The Pakistan army reportedly backs these militias and the NWFP governor expresses hope that they will turn the tide against Taliban insurgents. Efforts are underway to rescind or reform the FCR, and the civilian government seated in Islamabad in 2008 has vowed to work to bring the FATA under the more effective writ of the state. U.S. Policy U.S. policy in the FATA seeks to combine better coordinated U.S. and Pakistani military efforts to neutralize militant threats in the short term with economic development initiatives meant to reduce extremism in Pakistan over the longer-term. Also, U.S. commanders have praised October 2008 Pakistani military moves against militant enclaves in the tribal areas, and U.S. and Pakistani forces are jointly waging the "Operation Lionheart" offensive against militants on both sides of the border, north of the Khyber Pass. Increased Direct U.S. Military Action Although U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation is improving in late 2008, U.S. officials are increasingly employing new tactics to combat militant concentrations in Pakistan without directly violating Pakistan's limitations on the U.S. ability to operate "on the ground" in Pakistan. U.S. forces in Afghanistan now acknowledge that they shell purported Taliban positions on the Pakistani side of the border, and do some "hot pursuit" a few kilometers over the border into Pakistan. Security-Related Equipment Major government-to-government arms sales and grants to Pakistan since 2001 have included items useful for counterterrorism operations, along with a number of "big ticket" platforms more suited to conventional warfare. According to the State Department, U.S. assistance to Pakistan is meant primarily to maintain that country's ongoing support for U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts.

Increasing militant activity in western Pakistan poses three key national security threats: an increased potential for major attacks against the United States itself; a growing threat to Pakistani stability; and a hindrance of U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. This report will be updated as events warrant. A U.S.-Pakistan relationship marked by periods of both cooperation and discord was transformed by the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. Top U.S. officials have praised Pakistan for its ongoing cooperation, although long-held doubts exist about Islamabad's commitment to some core U.S. interests. Pakistan is identified as a base for terrorist groups and their supporters operating in Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan. Since 2003, Pakistan's army has conducted unprecedented and largely ineffectual counterterrorism operations in the country's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda operatives and pro-Taliban insurgents are said to enjoy "safe haven." Militant groups have only grown stronger and more aggressive in 2008. Islamabad's new civilian-led government vows to combat militancy in the FATA through a combination of military force, negotiation with "reconcilable" elements, and economic development. The Pakistani military has in late 2008 undertaken major operations aimed at neutralizing armed extremism in the Bajaur agency, and the government is equipping local tribal militias in several FATA agencies with the hope that these can supplement efforts to bring the region under more effective state writ. The upsurge of militant activity on the Pakistan side of the border is harming the U.S.-led stabilization mission in Afghanistan, by all accounts. U.S. commanders in Afghanistan attribute much of the deterioration in security conditions in the south and east over the past year to increased militant infiltration from Pakistan. U.S. policymakers are putting in place a series of steps to try to address the deficiencies of the Afghan government and other causes of support for Afghan Taliban militants, but they are also undertaking substantial new security measures to stop the infiltration. A key, according to U.S. commanders, is to reduce militant infiltration into Afghanistan from Pakistan. To do so, U.S. General David McKiernan, the overall commander in Afghanistan, is "redefining" the Afghan battlefield to include the Pakistan border regions, and U.S. forces are becoming somewhat more aggressive in trying to disrupt, from the Afghan side of the border, militant operational preparations and encampments on the Pakistani side of the border. At the same time, Gen. McKiernan and other U.S. commanders are trying to rebuild a stalled Afghanistan-Pakistan-U.S./NATO military coordination process, building intelligence and information sharing centers, and attempting to build greater trust among the senior ranks of the Pakistani military.

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White Collar Crime The white collar crimes on the Supreme Court's 2015 docket consist of three Hobbs Act cases and one on computer fraud. Hobbs Act Cases The Hobbs Act outlaws robbery and extortion when committed in a manner which "in any way or degree" obstructs interstate commerce. One of the cases before the Court, Taylor v. United States , involved the robbery of suspected drug dealers. The second, Ocasio v. United States , consisted of a kickback conspiracy between traffic cops and body shop owners. The third, McDonnell v. United States , involved a local drug manufacturer who showered a state governor and his wife with gifts in an apparent attempt to use the governor's office as a bully pulpit for one of his products. Sex Offenses The sex offense entries on the Court's docket involve the sex offender registration obligations of an overseas resident and construction of the recidivist mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of federal law. Firearms Perhaps spurred on by the result below, the Supreme Court held that stun guns used for self-defense are not necessarily beyond the guarantees of the Second Amendment right to bear arms. The other firearms cases on the Court's docket raise interpretative issues under the Armed Career Criminal Act and the firearm possession disqualification triggered by a domestic violence misdemeanor. Fourth Amendment The trio of Fourth Amendment cases presents questions on the exclusionary rule, the warrant requirement for sobriety tests, and qualified official immunity in the face of use of excessive force allegations. Sixth Amendment The Court's Sixth Amendment cases this term offer a variety of issues ranging from speedy trial, to forfeiture and the right to counsel of choice, to the use of uncounseled convictions as predicate offenses. Sentencing Capital punishment cases represent the lion's share of the Court's sentencing cases this term. However, the class also includes the matter of the retroactive application of Miller v. Alabama 's prohibition on a life without parole sentence for murder by a juvenile and the harmless error standard in sentencing cases. Capital Punishment The menu of the Court's capital punishment cases offers cases concerning jury instructions, jury selection, exclusive jury sentencing prerogatives, Brady violations, appellate court judge recusals, and the application of habeas corpus standards. Prisoners The Prisoner Reform Litigation Act designed to curb frivolous inmate suits generated two of the cases on the Court's 2015 docket—one on the act's installment payment feature and the other on the required exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The white collar crimes on the Supreme Court's 2015 docket consist of three Hobbs Act cases and one on computer fraud (Musacchio v. United States). The Hobbs Act outlaws robbery and extortion when committed in a manner which "in any way or degree" obstructs interstate commerce. One of the Hobbs Act cases before the Court (Taylor v. United States) involves the robbery of suspected drug dealers. The second (Ocasio v. United States) consists of a kickback conspiracy between traffic cops and body shop owners. The third (McDonnell v. United States) involves a local drug manufacturer who showered a state governor and his wife with gifts in an apparent attempt to use the governor's office as a bully pulpit for one of his products. The sex offense entries involve the sex offender registration obligations of an overseas resident (Nichols v. United States) and construction of the recidivist mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of federal law (Lockhart v. United States). Perhaps spurred on by the result below, the Supreme Court held that stun guns used for self-defense are not necessarily beyond the guarantees of the Second Amendment right to bear arms (Caetano v. Massachusetts). The other firearms cases on the Court's docket raise interpretative issues under the Armed Career Criminal Act (Welch v. United States and Mathis v. United States) and the firearm possession disqualification triggered by a domestic violence misdemeanor (Voisine v. United States). The trio of Fourth Amendment cases present questions on the exclusionary rule (Utah v. Strieff), the warrant requirement for sobriety tests (Birchfield v. North Dakota), and qualified official immunity in the face of use of excessive force allegations (Mullenix v. Luna). The Court's Sixth Amendment cases this term offer a variety of issues ranging from ineffective assistance of counsel (Maryland v. Kulbicki), to speedy trial (Betterman v. Montana), to forfeiture and the right to counsel of choice (Luis v. United States), to the use of uncounseled convictions as predicate offenses (United States v. Bryant). Capital punishment cases represent the lion's share of the Court's sentencing cases this term. However, the class also includes the matter of the retroactive application of the Miller v. Alabama prohibition on a life without parole sentence for murder by a juvenile (Montgomery v. Louisiana) and the harmless error standard in sentencing cases (United States v. Molina-Martinez). The menu of the Court's capital punishment cases offers cases concerning jury instructions (Carr v. Kansas); jury selection (Foster v. Chatman); exclusive jury sentencing prerogatives (Hurst v. Florida); Brady violations (Wearry v. Cain); insufficient capital jury instructions (Lynch v. Arizona); appellate court judge recusals (Williams v. Pennsylvania); and the application of habeas corpus standards (White v. Wheeler). The Prisoner Reform Litigation Act, designed to curb frivolous inmate suits, generated two of the cases on the Court's 2015 docket—one on the act's installment payment feature (Bruce v. Samuels) and the other on the required exhaustion of administrative remedies (Ross v. Blake). As noted throughout the course of this report, its text draws heavily from previously prepared, individual legal sidebars.

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Interests in the Southwest Pacific The major U.S. interests in the Southwest Pacific are preventing the rise of terrorist threats,working with and maintaining the region's U.S. territories, commonwealths, and military bases(American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Reagan Missile Test Site onKwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands), and enhancing U.S.-Australian cooperation in pursuingmutual political, economic, and strategic objectives in the area. As part of its effort topromote regional stability and prevent Pacific island nations from becoming havens for transnationalcrime and terrorism, Australia, along with New Zealand and other Pacific Island nations, hasdeployed troops in East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. The Howard Government's support of the United States in the war against terror has broughtthe United States and Australia closer together as Australia invoked the ANZUS alliance in the wakeof the 9/11 attacks to help the United States.

The major U.S. interests in the Southwest Pacific are preventing the rise of terrorist threats,working with and maintaining the region's U.S. territories, commonwealths, and military bases(American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Reagan Missile Test Site onKwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands), and enhancing U.S.-Australian cooperation in pursuingmutual political, economic, and strategic objectives in the area. The United States and Australiashare common interests in countering transnational crime and preventing the infiltration of terroristorganizations in the Southwest Pacific, hedging against the growing influence of China, andpromoting political stability and economic development. The United States has supported Australia'sincreasingly proactive stance and troop deployment in Pacific Island nations torn by political andcivil strife such as East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. Australia may playa greater strategic role in the region as the United States seeks to redeploy its Asia-Pacific forcestructure. This report will be updated as needed.

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112-4 and P.L. 112-6); Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Measures Considered (H.R. Within those totals, discretionary programs funded in the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED) appropriations act were reduced by approximately $1.5 billion and $1.0 billion, respectively, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 1 on February 19, 2011. On March 9, 2011, the Senate rejected both H.R. 1 and a substitute amendment ( S.Amdt. On April 1, 2011, the House passed H.R. 1255 , which would enact H.R. 111-242 ), which provided temporary funding at the FY2010 rate of operations for most government agencies for the period October 1 through December 3, 2010, unless regular FY2011 appropriations measures were enacted sooner. P.L. Senate Bill S. 3686 Reported On August 2, 2010, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 3686 ( S.Rept. 111-243 ), its proposal for FY2011 L-HHS-ED appropriations. The committee recommended $171.1 billion in discretionary L-HHS-ED funds. House Subcommittee Markup Held The House L-HHS-ED Appropriations Subcommittee held a markup session on July 15, 2010, and approved a draft bill, but the full committee did not take further action. Modified by some later adjustments, the request included $171.7 billion in discretionary funds for programs covered in the L-HHS-ED appropriations bill. Note on Most Recent Data At present, only the Summary and the Most Recent Developments sections of this report have been updated to reflect the 112 th Congress's activities on continuing resolutions and full-year appropriations proposals. The balance of the report discusses the President's request and the Senate Appropriations Committee bill from the 111 th Congress. 111-148 , as amended by P.L. This bill provides discretionary and mandatory funds to three federal departments and 14 related agencies, including the Social Security Administration (SSA). During these years, L-HHS-ED discretionary funds have grown by 30% from $127.2 billion in FY2002 to $164.9 billion in FY2010, an increase of $37.7 billion. The first three provide appropriations and program direction for the Department of Labor (Title I), the Department of Health and Human Services (Title II), and the Department of Education (Title III). Department of Labor Discretionary appropriations for the Department of Labor (DOL) for FY2010 were $13,534 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee would provide DOL with $13,907 million in discretionary funding for FY2011, a 2.8% increase over the amount provided for FY2010. The request would increase funding for adult training from $862 million for FY2010 to $907 million for FY2011. The Administration did not request any money for this fund for FY2011. Mandatory HHS programs included in the L-HHS-ED act were funded at $537.3 billion in FY2010, and consist primarily of Medicaid Grants to States ($307.8 billion), Payments to Health Care Trust Funds ($214.6 billion, including Medicare Part B and Part D), Foster Care and Adoption Assistance State Payments ($7.4 billion), Family Support Payments to States ($4.9 billion), and the Social Services Block Grant ($1.7 billion). National Institutes of Health (NIH). The Senate committee agreed with the $3.3 billion discretionary funding request, noting that it assumed enactment of the trigger that would provide an estimated $2.0 billion in additional mandatory funding in FY2011, for a total program level of $5.3 billion. ACF Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG). 111-117 , Division D). The FY2005 L-HHS-ED appropriations, P.L. Both the President's FY2011 budget request and the Senate Appropriations Committee's recommendations for FY2011 would increase funding for several programs, and would eliminate several existing programs. The President's budget recommended FY2011 funding for two programs initiated by American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding (P.L. The Senate Appropriations Committee would provide $15,195 million for Related Agencies for FY2011, which is a 7.9% increase above the amount provided for FY2010. The Senate Appropriations Committee agreed to the Administration's request.

This report tracks FY2011 appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED). This legislation provides discretionary funds for three major federal departments and 14 related agencies. The report summarizes L-HHS-ED discretionary funding issues but not authorization or entitlement issues. President Obama requested $172 billion in discretionary L-HHS-ED funds for FY2011, compared to $165 billion provided in the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117, Division D). The House L-HHS-ED Appropriations Subcommittee held a markup session in July 2010, but the full committee did not report a bill. In August 2010, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 3686 (S.Rept. 111-243), its FY2011 L-HHS-ED proposal, recommending $171 billion in discretionary funds. A continuing appropriations resolution, P.L. 111-242 as amended, provides temporary funding for the government until April 8, 2011, at the FY2010 rate of operations for most programs. However, P.L. 112-4 and P.L. 112-6 reduced funding for some L-HHS-ED programs by a total of about $2.5 billion. The House passed a full-year government funding bill, H.R. 1, on February 19, 2011, which would have reduced L-HHS-ED funding by about $25 billion and included several controversial policy riders. On March 9, the Senate rejected both H.R. 1 and a substitute amendment that would have cut L-HHS-ED funds by about $0.5 billion. Department of Labor (DOL). The Administration requested $14.0 billion in discretionary funding for DOL for FY2011, compared to $13.5 billion provided for FY2010. The request included increases for Unemployment Compensation, youth training, and adult training. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved $13.9 billion. H.R. 1 and the Senate amendment would have provided $8.6 billion and $13.2 billion, respectively. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Administration requested $74.7 billion in discretionary funding for HHS for FY2011, compared to $73.0 billion provided for FY2010. The request included increases for Health Centers, National Institutes of Health, Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control, Child Care and Development Block Grant, and Head Start. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved $75.0 billion. H.R. 1 and the Senate amendment would have provided $64.7 billion and $72.9 billion, respectively. Department of Education (ED). The Administration requested $67.8 billion in discretionary funding for ED for FY2011, compared to $64.3 billion provided for FY2010. The request included two programs previously funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5), and would increase funding for several additional programs in FY2011. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved $67.0 billion. H.R. 1 and the Senate amendment would have provided $59.4 billion and $70.1 billion, respectively. Related Agencies. The Administration requested $15.2 billion in discretionary funding for Related Agencies for FY2011, compared to $14.1 billion provided for FY2010. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved $15.2 billion. H.R. 1 and the Senate amendment would have provided $12.3 billion and $14.4 billion, respectively. Note that at present, only the Summary and the Most Recent Developments sections of this report have been updated to reflect the 112th Congress's activities on continuing resolutions and full-year appropriations proposals. Links to other recent CRS reports are provided. The balance of this report discusses the President's request and the Senate Appropriations Committee bill.

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The President's Budget Request On May 7, 2009, the Obama Administration released its detailed budget requests for FY2010. Approximately three-quarters ($544.1 million) of the President's proposed budget request for the District would have been targeted to the courts and criminal justice system. This included: $248.4 million in support of court operations; $52.2 million for Defender Services; $203.5 million for the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia, an independent federal agency responsible for the District's pretrial services, adult probation, and parole supervision functions; $1.8 million for the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council; $37.3 million for the public defender's office; and $500,000 to cover costs associated with investigating judicial misconduct complaints and recommending candidates to the President for vacancies to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the District of Columbia Superior Court. On July 16, 2009, the mayor noted that the projected budget shortfall had grown to $603 million, including a $453 million shortfall in FY2009 and a $150 million projected budget gap for FY2010. 111-202 ), which included $768.3 million in special federal payments to the District. This was $29.2 million more than requested by the Administration and $25.9 million more than appropriated for FY2009. 3170 by a vote of 219 to 208 (Roll no. 571). Senate Bill On July 8, 2009, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 1432 , its version of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act for FY2010, with an accompanying report ( S.Rept. 111-43 ). As reported, the bill recommended $727.4 million in special federal payments to the District. This was $40 million less than recommended by the House, and $12 million less than requested by the Administration. The bill proposed: lifting the prohibition on the use of District funds to provide abortion services, which was consistent with the House bill; maintaining the prohibition of the use of federal and District funds to regulate and decriminalize the medical use of marijuana (unlike the House bill it would have allowed the use of District funds to regulate medical marijuana); and maintaining the current prohibition on the use of federal funds to support a needle exchange program (unlike the House bill, which would have lifted the restriction on both federal and District funding for such a program). On October 1, 2009, President Obama signed the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2010, P.L. The act included a provision (Division B, Sec. 126) allowing the District of Columbia government to spend locally generated funds (operating budget) at a rate set forth in the budget approved by the District of Columbia in D.C. Act 18-118. The act included $752.2 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia. While the statute extended these proscriptions, it also included significant changes in a number of controversial provisions related to medical marijuana, needle exchange, and abortion services. Removal of these so called social riders had been long sought by District officials who viewed them as antithetical to the concept of home rule. The Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act for FY2010, H.R. On December 16, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act of FY2010, P.L. 111-117 , which included $752.2 million in special federal payments for the District of Columbia Table 2 of this report shows details of the District's federal payments, including the FY2009 enacted amounts, the amounts included in the President's FY2010 budget request, the amounts recommended by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, and the amount enacted with the passage of P.L. 111-117 . However, the mayor did not sign the bill because of concerns raised about declining revenue projections. On July 17, 2009, the mayor submitted a revised budget for the council's consideration. 111-68 .

On May 7, 2009, the Obama Administration released its detailed budget requests for FY2010, which included $739.1 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia. Approximately three-quarters—$544.1 million—of the President's proposed budget request for the District would be used to support the courts and criminal justice system. The President also requested $109.5 million in support of college tuition assistance and elementary and secondary education initiatives. On May 12, 2009, the District of Columbia Council passed the city's FY2010 operating budget. The bill, which was not signed by the mayor, proposed an operating fund budget of $8,917.8 million, and included $1,433.1 million in enterprise funds. However, on July 17, 2009, the mayor submitted a revised budget to address a growing budget shortfall currently projected at $150 million for FY2010. This delay in the submission of a budget for congressional review is due in large part to declining revenue projections related to the current economic recession. According to the mayor and the city's chief financial officer, the city faces the task of closing a $603 million budget gap, including a $453 million shortfall in its current FY2009 budget and a $150 million projected shortfall for FY2010. In the absence of a formal submission of the city's budget, Congress has begun consideration of special federal payments and general provision components of the District appropriations act. On July 8, 2009, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act for FY2010, S. 1432 with an accompanying report (S.Rept. 111-43). As reported, the bill recommends $727.4 million in special federal payments to the District. This is $40 million less than recommended by the House, and $12 million less than requested by the Administration. On July 16, 2009, the House approved the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act for FY2010, H.R. 3170, by a vote of 219 to 208 (Roll no. 571). The bill included $768.3 million in special federal payments to the District. This was $29.2 million more than requested by the Administration and $25.9 million more than appropriated for FY2009. On October 1, 2009, President Obama signed, P.L. 111-68, Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2010. The act included a provision (Division B, Sec. 126) allowing the District of Columbia government to spend locally generated funds at a rate set forth in the budget approved by the District of Columbia on August 26, 2009. On December 16, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2010, P.L. 111-117, which included $752.2 billion in special federal payments to the District of Columbia. The act included significant changes in a number of controversial provisions related to medical marijuana, needle exchange, and abortion services. P.L. 111-117 lifts the prohibition on the use of District funds to: provide abortion services, regulate and decriminalize the medical use of marijuana, and support a needle exchange program to stop the spread of AIDS and HIV infections. Removal of these so called social riders had been long sought by District officials who viewed them as antithetical to the concept of home rule.

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Introduction Specialty crops, defined as "fruits and vegetables, tree nuts, dried fruits, and horticulture and nursery crops (including floriculture)," comprise a major part of U.S. agriculture. In 2012, the value of farm-level specialty crop production totaled nearly $60 billion, representing about one-fourth of the value of U.S. crop production ( Table 1 ). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that retail sales of fresh and processed fruits and vegetables for at-home consumption total nearly $100 billion annually. Exports of U.S. specialty crops totaled about $14 billion in 2013, or about 10% of total U.S. agricultural exports. In 2012, about 244,000 farming operations grew more than 350 types of fruit, vegetable, tree nut, flower, nursery, and other horticultural crops in addition to the major bulk commodity crops. Legislative Support for U.S. Several programs addressing specialty crops specifically were initially established in the Specialty Crops Competitiveness Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-465 ), which was enacted outside a farm bill year. Many of the programs in the 2004 act were further expanded and reauthorized in the 2008 farm bill (Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246 ). Some programs had also been established in the 2002 farm bill (Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, P.L. 107-171 ), often as pilot initiatives that have since become established programs. The 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. Specifically, individual specialty crop producers do not directly benefit from the same types of federal commodity price and income support programs that benefit producers of commodity crops. These types of programs include marketing and promotion programs, crop insurance and disaster assistance, plant pest and disease protections, trade assistance, and research and extension services, among other types of indirect support. Specialty Crops Account for Small Share of Total Farm Bill Spending Despite the wide range of program support for specialty crops, federal program spending for specialty crops remains a small share of total farm bill spending and remains lower than spending for commodity crops, even when considering both mandatory and discretionary funding levels. Total mandatory spending for specialty crops and organic agriculture is expected to be higher and average $773 million annually (FY2014-FY2018). 113-79 ) reauthorized and expanded many of the existing farm bill provisions supporting the specialty crop and certified organic sectors, and also provided for additional program funding in some cases. Many provisions in Title X ("Horticulture") fall into the categories of marketing and promotion; organic certification; data and information collection; pest and disease control; food safety and quality standards; and local foods. Title X also includes provisions benefitting certified organic agriculture producers such as USDA's National Organic Program, certification cost sharing, development of crop insurance mechanisms for organic producers, and various data initiatives. However, farm bill provisions supporting specialty crops and organic agriculture are not limited to the Horticulture title, but are contained within several other titles of the farm bill including the trade, nutrition, research, rural development, crop insurance titles, conservation, and the miscellaneous titles (see text box on next page). Provisions supporting the specialty crop and certified organic sectors are also contained within other titles of the farm bill. Provisions supporting specialty crop producers within the farm bill's Nutrition title (Title IV) include the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable (Snack) Program and related pilot programs regarding procurement of unprocessed and also canned, frozen or dried fruits and nuts; Section 32 purchases for fruits and vegetables under the Nutrition title; Senior Farmers' Market Nutrition Program; and other expanded or new programs associated with the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) or other domestic feeding programs. For more detailed information on some of the programs listed here, see CRS Report R42771, Fruits, Vegetables, and Other Specialty Crops: Selected Farm Bill and Federal Programs , and also CRS Report R43332, SNAP and Related Nutrition Provisions of the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. Aside from USDA, other federal agencies play a role in the specialty crop industry.

U.S. farmers grow more than 350 types of fruit, vegetable, tree nut, flower, nursery, and other horticultural crops in addition to the major bulk commodity crops. Specialty crops, defined in statute as "fruits and vegetables, tree nuts, dried fruits, and horticulture and nursery crops (including floriculture)" (P.L. 108-465; 7 U.S.C. §1621 note) comprise a major part of U.S. agriculture. In 2012, the value of farm-level specialty crop production totaled nearly $60 billion, representing about one-fourth of the value of U.S. crop production. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that retail sales of fresh and processed fruits and vegetables for at-home consumption total nearly $100 billion annually. Exports of U.S. specialty crops totaled about $14 billion in 2013, or about 10% of total U.S. agricultural exports. Farm bill support specifically targeting specialty crops (and also certified organic agriculture) is relatively recent. Many programs supporting specialty crops were established in the Specialty Crops Competitiveness Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-465), which was enacted outside a farm bill year. Many of the programs in the 2004 act were further expanded and reauthorized in the 2008 farm bill (Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246). Some other programs were established in the 2002 farm bill (Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, P.L. 107-171), often as pilot initiatives that have since become established programs. In addition, some programs supporting specialty crops and organic agriculture are long-standing farm support programs that benefit all agricultural producers and are regularly contained within omnibus farm legislation. These include marketing and promotion programs, crop insurance and disaster assistance, plant pest and disease protections, trade assistance, nutrition programs, and research and extension services, among other types of program support. The 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79) reauthorized and expanded many of the existing farm bill provisions designed to support the specialty crop and certified organic sectors. The 2014 farm bill also provided additional program funding in some cases. Many provisions in Title X ("Horticulture") of the farm bill fall into the categories of marketing and promotion; data and information collection; pest and disease control; food safety and quality standards; and support for local foods. Title X also includes provisions benefitting certified organic agriculture producers, including USDA's National Organic Program. However, provisions supporting the specialty crop and certified organic sectors are not limited to Title X, but are also contained within several other titles of the farm bill, including the research, nutrition, and trade titles. An important source of support for the specialty crop industry includes fruit and vegetable purchases under USDA's domestic nutrition assistance programs. Despite this wide range of program support, overall program spending for specialty crops and organic agriculture still accounts for a small share of estimated total farm bill spending and remains lower than spending levels for program commodity crops (such as corn, soybeans, grains, dairy, and other farm commodities). Total mandatory spending for specialty crops and organic agriculture under the 2014 farm bill is expected to average about $773 million annually (FY2014-FY2018). In addition, individual specialty crop and organic producers generally do not directly benefit from the same types of federal commodity price and income support programs that benefit producers of commodity crops. Other federal agencies also play important roles in the specialty crop industry—either indirectly supporting or overseeing the industry—but are not addressed in this report. For information, see CRS Report R42771, Fruits, Vegetables, and Other Specialty Crops: Selected Farm Bill and Federal Programs.

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Introduction Has an attorney engaged in unethical conduct when he or she secretly records a conversation? The issue is complicated by the fact that the American Bar Association (ABA), whose model ethical standards have been adopted in every jurisdiction in one form or another, initially declared surreptitious recording unethical per se and then reversed its position. A majority of the jurisdictions on record have rejected the proposition that secret recording of a conversation is per se unethical even when not illegal. A number endorse a contrary view, however, and an even greater number have yet to announce their position. They also censure attorney conduct that involves "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." Reaction to the Opinion 337 was mixed. In 2001, the ABA issued Formal Opinion 01-422 and rejected Opinion 337 's broad proscription. Current Status Where Recording Is Illegal Without All Party Consent There seems to be no dispute that where it is illegal to record a conversation without the consent of all of the participants, it is unethical as well. Not Unethical Per Se A substantial number of states, however, agree with the ABA's F ormal Opinion 01-422 that a recording with the consent of one, but not all, of the parties to a conversation is not unethical per se unless it is illegal or contrary to some other ethical standard. Other Exceptions Other circumstances thought to permit a lawyer to record a conversation without the consent of all of the parties to the discussion in one jurisdiction or another include instances when the lawyer does so in a matter unrelated to the practice of law; or when the recorded statements themselves constitute crimes such as bribery offers or threats; or when the recording is made solely for the purpose of creating a memorandum for the files; or when the "the lawyer has a reasonable basis for believing that disclosure of the taping would significantly impair pursuit of a generally accepted societal good."

In some jurisdictions, it is unethical for an attorney to secretly record a conversation even though it is not illegal to do so. A few states require the consent of all parties to a conversation before it may be recorded. Recording without mutual consent is both illegal and unethical in those jurisdictions. Elsewhere the issue is more complicated. In 1974, the American Bar Association (ABA) opined that surreptitiously recording a conversation without the knowledge or consent of all of the participants violated the ethical prohibition against engaging in conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." The ABA conceded, however, that law enforcement recording, conducted under judicial supervision, might breach no ethical standard. Reaction among the authorities responsible for regulation of the practice of law in the various states was mixed. In 2001, the ABA reversed its earlier opinion and announced that it no longer considered one-party consent recording per se unethical when it is otherwise lawful. Today, this is the view of a majority of the jurisdictions on record. A substantial number, however, disagree. An even greater number have yet to announce an opinion. An earlier version of this report once appeared as CRS Report 98-251. An unabridged version of this report is available with the footnotes and attachment as CRS Report R42650, Wiretapping, Tape Recorders, and Legal Ethics: An Overview of Questions Posed by Attorney Involvement in Secretly Recording Conversation.

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Background Overview of the International Criminal Court The Statute of the ICC, also known as the Rome Statute (the Statute), entered into force on July 1, 2002, and established a permanent, independent Court to investigate and bring to justice individuals who commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The governments of three countries (all parties to the ICC)—Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic—have referred situations to the Prosecutor. Position on the ICC The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute. Objections to the Court were based on a number of factors, including the Court's assertion of jurisdiction (in certain circumstances) over citizens, including military personnel, of countries that are not parties to the treaty; the perceived lack of adequate checks and balances on the powers of the ICC prosecutors and judges; the perceived dilution of the role of the U.N. Security Council in maintaining peace and security; and the ICC's potentially chilling effect on America's willingness to project power in the defense of its interests. The U.S. government is prohibited by law from providing material assistance to the ICC in its investigations, arrests, detentions, extraditions, or prosecutions of war crimes, under the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, or ASPA ( P.L. 107-206 , Title II). Administration officials reiterated at the Conference the United States' intention to support current cases before the ICC. By contrast, the ICC was established by multilateral treaty and is a permanent, international criminal tribunal. Draft legislation introduced during the 111 th Congress referenced the ICC in connection with human rights abuses committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo and by the Lord's Resistance Army in central Africa, and in connection with the global use of child soldiers. Additionally, there has been particular congressional interest in the ICC's work related to Darfur. ICC Cases and Investigations in Africa The ICC Prosecutor has opened cases against 26 individuals in connection with five African countries. Sudan, Libya, and Côte d'Ivoire are not. The Prosecutor has not secured any convictions to date. U.S. Reactions The United States initially expressed support for domestic prosecutions of suspects in post-election violence, but has supported ICC involvement in the absence of domestic action. Sudan ICC jurisdiction in Sudan was conferred by the U.N. Security Council, as Sudan is not a party to the Court. The U.S. Many human rights advocates welcomed the attempt to bring genocide charges. U.S. Issues Raised by the ICC's Actions in Africa Some observers have praised the ICC's investigations in Africa as a crucial step against impunity on the continent, but ICC actions have also provoked debates over the court's potential impact, its perceived prioritization of Africa over other regions, its selection of cases, and the potential effect of prosecutions on peace processes. In particular, the AU objects to ICC attempts to prosecute sitting heads of state in Sudan and Libya, and has decided not to enforce arrest warrants for Bashir or Qadhafi. At the same time, African parties to the ICC have refrained from withdrawing from the Court. Supporters of the Court respond that most investigations to-date have been determined by referrals, either by African states or the Security Council, and that the Prosecutor continues to analyze situations outside of Africa.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has, to date, opened cases exclusively in Africa. Cases concerning 25 individuals are open before the Court, pertaining to crimes allegedly committed in six African states: Libya, Kenya, Sudan (Darfur), Uganda (the Lord's Resistance Army, LRA), the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. A 26th case, against a Darfur rebel commander, was dismissed. The ICC Prosecutor has yet to secure any convictions. In addition, the Prosecutor has initiated preliminary examinations—a potential precursor to a full investigation—in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Nigeria, along with several countries outside of Africa, such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Honduras, and the Republic of Korea. The Statute of the ICC, also known as the Rome Statute, entered into force on July 1, 2002, and established a permanent, independent Court to investigate and bring to justice individuals who commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. As of July 2011, 116 countries—including 32 African countries, the largest regional block—were parties to the Statute. Tunisia was the latest country to have become a party, in June 2011. The United States is not a party. ICC prosecutions have been praised by human rights advocates. At the same time, the ICC Prosecutor's choice of cases and the perception that the Court has disproportionately focused on Africa have been controversial. The Prosecutor's attempts to prosecute two sitting African heads of state, Sudan's Omar Hassan al Bashir and Libya's Muammar al Qadhafi, have been particularly contested, and the African Union has decided not to enforce ICC arrest warrants for either leader. Neither Sudan nor Libya is a party to the ICC; in both cases, jurisdiction was granted through a United Nations Security Council resolution. (The United States abstained from the former Security Council vote, in 2005, and voted in favor of the latter, in February 2011.) Controversy within Africa has also surfaced over ICC attempts to prosecute Kenyan officials in connection with post-election violence in 2007-2008. Although Kenya is a party to the Court, the government has recently objected to ICC involvement, which some contend could be destabilizing. Congressional interest in the work of the ICC in Africa has arisen in connection with concerns over gross human rights violations on the African continent and beyond, along with broader concerns over ICC jurisdiction and U.S. policy toward the Court. Obama Administration officials have expressed support for several ICC prosecutions. At the ICC's 2010 review conference in Kampala, Uganda, Obama Administration officials reiterated the United States' intention to provide diplomatic and informational support to ICC prosecutions on a case-by-case basis. The U.S. government is prohibited by law from providing material assistance to the ICC under the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, or ASPA (P.L. 107-206, Title II). Legislation introduced during the 111th Congress referenced the ICC in connection with several African conflicts and, more broadly, U.S. policy toward, and cooperation with, the Court. S.Res. 85 (Menendez) welcomes the U.N. Security Council referral of Libya to the ICC. This report provides background on current ICC cases and examines issues raised by the ICC's actions in Africa. Further analysis can be found in CRS Report R41116, The International Criminal Court (ICC): Jurisdiction, Extradition, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R41682, International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute: 2010 Review Conference, by [author name scrubbed].

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NTIA is headed by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, who is appointed by the President and acts as a principal advisor to the President on telecommunications and information policy matters; is the principal executive branch spokesman to Congress, the industry, state and local governments, and the public on such matters; is the key coordinator of the federal government's own communication systems; and is responsible for assisting in the formulation of the nation's overall telecommunications and information policy. Its budget report to Congress also includes information about NTIA obligations to support public safety, notably for the administration of the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet), an entity established by Congress in 2012 as an independent agency within the NTIA. The OTIA was also responsible for administering BTOP grants. OPSC was created by the NTIA at the end of 2012 to administer some provisions of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ), Title VI, also known as the Spectrum Act. This request was $1.6 million more than the FY2016 request of $49.2 million, and $11.3 million more than the FY2016 enacted amount of $39.5 million. For FY2017, as reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, S. 2837 , the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, would have provided $39.5 million for salaries and expenses, equal to the FY2016 funding level. As reported by the House Committee on Appropriations, H.R. 114-223 ), provided funding for the NTIA from October 1, 2016 through December 9, 2016, at the FY2016 funding rate subject to a 0.496% across-the-board decrease. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ), signed by the President on May 5, 2017, provides $32.0 million to the NTIA for salaries and expenses, which is $7.5 million (19%) less than the FY2016 enacted amount. For FY2018, the White House's March 2017 budget blueprint signaled support for NTIA's role in multi-stakeholder forums on Internet governance and digital commerce, and agency efforts on efficient use of federal spectrum. The blueprint does not specify any proposed funding cuts for NTIA, though an overall decrease of $1.5 billion from the FY2017 level authorized by P.L. 114-254 is proposed for the Department of Commerce. Domestic and International Policies The Obama Administration's FY2017 budget request for Domestic and International Policies was $15.8 million, a $6.7 million (74.1%) increase over the FY2016 enacted amount of $9.1 million. Proposed uses of the requested funds spanned a range of activities, including support for the Obama Administration's Digital Economy Leadership Team (DELT), created in 2015; international representation in the ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee and global Internet Governance Forums; the formulation of domestic Internet policy; and facilitation of federal communications networks' transition to technologies using the Internet Protocol (IP). Beginning in 1998, the NTIA played a key oversight role in ICANN, an international, not-for-profit entity that develops policies to support the Internet worldwide, notably through its coordination of the Internet naming system: the Domain Name System (DNS). Spectrum Management The Obama Administration's FY2017 budget request for Spectrum Management included $8.9 million for salaries and expenses. The Spectrum Act ( P.L. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P.L. The Spectrum Act gives the NTIA responsibilities to support FirstNet in planning, building, and managing a new, nationwide broadband network for public safety communications. In FY2010, the Public Telecommunications Facilities Program (PTFP) represented half of the NTIA's budget appropriations, receiving $20.0 million in funding to support broadcast and non-broadcast projects. Though funding for the PTFP was eliminated, the total enacted budget appropriations amount for the NTIA in FY2011 increased by 4% to $41.6 million; the total amount supported administrative expenses and salaries. According to the NTIA, the increase of $21.6 million from FY2010 to FY2011 in funding for salaries and expenses was largely attributable to the costs of administration of the $4.7 billion program for broadband deployment, as required by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ).

The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency of the Department of Commerce, is the executive branch's principal advisory office on domestic and international telecommunications and information policies. Its statutory mission includes providing greater access for all Americans to telecommunications services; supporting U.S. efforts to open foreign markets; advising the President on international telecommunications negotiations; and funding research for new technologies and their applications. It is also responsible for managing spectrum use by federal agencies. Title VI of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), also known as the Spectrum Act, gives the NTIA responsibilities for improving public safety communications. The act required NTIA to assist with the development of the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet), created by Congress to deploy a nationwide public safety broadband network. NTIA is also required to assist in planning and funding for Next Generation 9-1-1 (NG 9-1-1) services, which refers to the transition to digital, Internet-based systems to replace existing analog systems that are currently prevalent throughout the United States. The Spectrum Act also gave the NTIA new responsibilities and requirements for spectrum management, especially regarding the reallocation of federal spectrum. The Spectrum Pipeline Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74, Title X) added further requirements for actions by the NTIA, including identification of additional spectrum for nonfederal use. The NTIA also plays a central role in representing U.S. interests in the Internet internationally, including an active role in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN is an international entity that develops policies to support the Internet worldwide. NTIA participates in ICANN as a member of the Governmental Advisory Committee, which provides advice to ICANN. Between FY2010 and FY2011, the NTIA's total budget appropriations increased by 4% to $41.6 million. During that same time, Congress defunded NTIA's Public Telecommunications Facilities Program (PTFP, funded at $20 million in FY2010), and more than doubled the budget for administration, salaries, and expenses, from $20.0 million to $41.6 million. This increase was largely attributed by the NTIA to its responsibilities in administering grants for broadband network deployment, as required by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5). Enacted amounts remained above $40 million until FY2015.The Obama Administration's budget request for FY2015 was $51.0 million, and the enacted amount was $38.2 million. For FY2016, the enacted budget amount for the NTIA was $39.5 million, compared to a request for $49.2 million. The Obama Administration's budget request for FY2017 was $50.8 million. As reported by the Senate, S. 2837 would have provided a total of $39.5 million to NTIA for FY2017. As reported by the House, H.R. 5393 would have provided $36.3 million. A series of continuing appropriations acts (P.L. 114-223, P.L. 114-254, P.L. 115-30) provided funding for NTIA from October 1, 2016 through May 5, 2017 at about 99.5-99.8% of the FY2016 funding level. Signed by the President on May 5, 2017, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), provides $32.0 million to NTIA, $7.5 million (19%) less than the FY2016 enacted amount. For FY2018, the budget blueprint released by the White House in March 2017 signaled support for NTIA's role in multi-stakeholder forums on Internet governance and digital commerce and agency efforts on efficient use of federal spectrum. No funding cuts were specified in the blueprint for NTIA, though an overall decrease of $1.5 billion from the FY2017 continuing resolution level was proposed for the Department of Commerce.

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Introduction Various water supply shortages and greater demand for water supply related to energy development projects have brought increased attention to disputes over the control of water resources across the country. Using Lake Sakakawea as an example, this report analyzes the legal authority of the Corps to charge for stored surplus water. It also analyzes state authority over water within state boundaries and discusses the relationship between federal and state authority, including examples of congressional actions that have addressed competing federal and state roles regarding water resources. Authorization of Garrison Dam Congress authorized the Corps to construct various federal water projects along the Missouri River, including the Garrison Dam/Lake Sakakawea Project in North Dakota, in the Flood Control Act of 1944. The Corps would enter surplus water agreements with applicants for additional water supply for a term of five years, which would be renewable for an additional five-year term. Constitutional Authority for Water Storage at Federal Water Projects The Corps has broad constitutional authority for its water projects. Under the 1944 FCA, the Corps may contract with other government or private parties for the temporary use of surplus water from its projects. State Ownership of Water Within Its Boundaries States in the Missouri River basin have objected to the Corps' plan to charge a fee for surplus water stored at its reservoirs. North Dakota, in which Lake Sakakawea is located, has asserted ownership of the waters flowing within the state boundaries, claiming that charging for access to that water while it is stored in a Corps' project violates that legal right. For example, Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 requires the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) to conform with state water laws "relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water.... " The Supreme Court has explained that Section 8 "requires the Secretary to comply with state law in the 'control, appropriation, use or distribution of water'" by a federal project, confirming that Reclamation must acquire water rights for water it impounds at its water projects in various states (as had been the agency's practice). The Corps' statutory authorities related to water storage arguably may indicate that Congress intended to protect the states' ability to administer water rights under state law to some degree despite the Corps' use of the water. On the other hand, it may also be argued that the Corps' constitutional authority over water stored at its projects extends only to the amount of water necessary to meet the purposes of that project and not to any surplus water.

Various water supply shortages and greater demand for water supply related to energy development projects have brought increased attention to disputes over the control of water resources across the country. In particular, domestic on-shore unconventional oil and gas development, such as hydraulic fracturing, has caused rapid growth in freshwater demand. To accommodate water supply requests in the Missouri River Basin, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has proposed the use of surplus water from its Garrison Dam/Lake Sakakawea Project in North Dakota. The Corps' proposal would allow it to enter into five-year contracts to supply surplus water for a fee, which will be set through administrative rulemaking. North Dakota and other states have objected to the Corps' proposal as a violation of their constitutional right to water flowing within their borders, arguing that the Corps cannot require payment for water that the state owns. Although the legality of the Corps' charging for surplus water storage at its facilities has not been litigated specifically, the Corps' constitutional authority over operations at its reservoirs is generally very broad. Additionally, Congress has authorized the Corps to charge for surplus storage at federal projects such as the Garrison Dam/Lake Sakakawea Project. Of course, statutory approval of an action that may interfere with state sovereignty does not connote constitutionality. Other provisions within the Corps' statutory authorities arguably may indicate that Congress did not intend to infringe upon state sovereignty over water rights within its boundaries. While it appears that the Corps has broad authority to impound waters owned by the state for the purposes of a particular project without necessarily acquiring water rights under state law, it may be argued that surplus water, which is not used for any of the authorized purposes, is beyond the control of the Corps. However, the viability of such an argument is unclear, given the lack of legal precedent on the issue. This report addresses the legal authority of the Corps to charge for surplus water stored at its facilities. It analyzes the constitutional and statutory authority of the federal government to operate federal water projects, specifically Lake Sakakawea, along the Missouri River. It also examines the nature of states' claims of ownership of waters within state boundaries. Finally, the report discusses the relationship between federal and state authority, including examples in which Congress addressed competing federal and state roles.

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The "Two-Hour Rule" Paragraph 5(a) of Senate Rule XXVI, sometimes referred to as the "two-hour rule," restricts the times that most Senate committees and subcommittees can meet when the full Senate is in session. The rule, which has evolved over the years, is intended to help balance the Senate's committee and floor work and to minimize the logistical conflicts that Senators face between participating in committee hearings and markups and attending to their duties on the chamber floor. Pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Senate Rule XXVI, no Senate committee or subcommittee (except for the Appropriations and Budget Committees and their subcommittees) can meet after the Senate has been in session for two hours or past 2:00 p.m. unless both the majority and minority leaders (or their designees) agree to permit the meeting and their agreement has been announced on the floor. A third but arguably impractical option is for the Senate to adopt a privileged motion to allow the meeting. Sometimes, however, the two-hour rule's restrictions on committee meeting are insisted upon, most commonly as a form of protest or to delay a committee's action on a specific measure or matter. Currently, permission for Senate committees to sit during times prohibited by the two-hour rule is being granted almost exclusively by joint leadership agreement instead of by unanimous consent, a change from prior practice. Any action taken by a committee during a meeting prohibited by the rule is "null, void, and of no effect." Origin and Evolution of the Senate Two-Hour Rule Senate rules restricting committee meeting times have existed for over 70 years and have evolved over time. A rule limiting committees from sitting while the Senate is in session was first enacted in Section 134(c) of P.L. The prohibition contained in the preceding sentence shall not apply to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. The present form of the two-hour rule, which combined the provisions of the 1964 standing rule and the 1970 statutory provision, was adopted by the Senate on February 4, 1977, via Section 402 of S.Res. 4 , a resolution implementing the recommendations of the Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System.

Paragraph 5(a) of Senate Rule XXVI, sometimes referred to as the "two-hour rule," restricts the times that most Senate committees and subcommittees can meet when the full Senate is in session. The rule is intended to help balance the Senate's committee and floor work and to minimize the logistical conflicts that Senators face between participating in committee hearings and markups and attending to their duties on the chamber floor. Under the terms of the rule, no Senate committee or subcommittee (except the Committees on Appropriations and Budget and their subcommittees) can meet after the Senate has been in session for two hours or past 2:00 p.m. unless one of the following things occur: (1) the Senate grants unanimous consent for them to meet; (2) both the majority and minority leaders (or their designees) agree to permit the meeting, and their agreement has been announced on the Senate floor; or (3) the Senate adopts a privileged motion to allow the meeting. Should a committee meet during a restricted time period without being granted permission, any action that it takes—such as ordering a bill or nomination reported to the Senate—is considered "null, void, and of no effect." Senate rules restricting committee meeting times have existed for over 70 years and have evolved over time. A rule limiting committees from sitting while the Senate is in session was first enacted in Section 134(c) of P.L. 79-753, the Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA) of 1946. Rules regulating the meeting times of Senate committees were amended in 1964 and again in 1970. The Senate adopted the present form of the two-hour rule on February 4, 1977, via Section 402 of S.Res. 4, a resolution implementing the recommendations of the Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System. Permission for committees to sit during the hours restricted by the rule is routinely granted in the Senate. On occasion, however, the two-hour rule is invoked, most often as a form of protest or in order to delay committee action on a particular measure or matter. Invoking the rule for these reasons has increased in recent years. Permission to sit during times prohibited by the rule is now most often granted by joint leadership agreement instead of by unanimous consent, a change from prior practice.

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No set definition exists for the term "nuclear option"; indeed, this term has beenused to refer to many kinds of possible proceedings. One set of possibilities, however, involvesappealing to constitutional requirements as an authority superior to that of the Senate's own rules,and supporters of such an approach have accordingly preferred to describe such an approach as a"constitutional option." (7) Possible Courses of Action Exactly because the point of a "nuclear" or "constitutional" option is to achieve changes inSenate procedure by using means that lie outside the Senate's normal rules of procedure, it wouldbe impossible to list all the different permutations such maneuvers could encompass. Dilatory Debate One scenario would have the effect of creating, within Senate procedure, a new precedentthat extended debate of a nomination was dilatory, and, therefore, out of order. The Presiding Officer,perhaps the Vice President, would then be expected to rule in support of the Senator's point of order. Those who would seek to amend Senate rules to end a filibuster by a majority vote might usethe first day of a new Congress to advance their proposal, arguing that Senate rules, particularly thecloture rule, Rule XXII, did not apply yet, and thus that debate could be ended by majority vote. Under this scenario, a Senator would move the adoption of a new rule or set of rules, which couldcontain changes to Rule XXII -- or any other rule the Senator wanted to change. Debate on the newrule or rules could be limited, subject to a majority vote, supporters argue, because the mechanicsof cloture as set out in Rule XXII would not yet apply, and the Senate would be operating undergeneral parliamentary law. Opening Day Scenario Two - Majority Cloture A variation on the first proposition would rest on a claim by proponents of changing Senaterules that on the opening day of a Congress a simple majority could invoke cloture on the motionto take up a resolution that proposed a rules change, or on the resolution itself. The intent of thisset of options would be to have the 60-vote threshold for cloture declared unconstitutional, either forcloture in general, or only as it applied to Senate consideration of presidential nominations, orperhaps a subset of such nominations such as of federal judges. At this point, the scenario could play out in at least two different ways. Under a second scenario, following a vote in which the Senate failed to invoke cloture on apending measure or matter, a Senator would, from the chamber floor, make a constitutional pointof order that the supermajority requirement for cloture is unconstitutional. The potential exists for significant repercussions. (23) A Republican Senator told The Hill that damage from the use of the "nuclear" or "constitutional" option could level the Senate,making it very difficult for work to get done.

Reports indicate possible attempts to curtail the use of filibusters in the Senate, perhaps inthe 109th Congress. Some have suggested that proponents of this idea may invoke something calledthe "nuclear" or "constitutional" option in Senate floor procedure to try to end a filibuster withoutthe need for 60 votes or to amend the cloture rule (Rule XXII) itself. No set definition exists for theterm "nuclear" or "constitutional" in this context. Because the point of using such an option is toachieve a goal by means lying outside the Senate's normal rules of procedure, it would be impossibleto list all the different permutations such maneuvers could encompass. Several likely scenarios thatfall into this category are described in this report, followed by a discussion of the possible advantagesand disadvantages of using such an approach. Opponents (and some supporters) of this kind of plan typically refer to it as the "nuclear"option because of the potentially significant result for Senate operations that could follow from itsuse. The Senate relies heavily on unanimous consent to get its legislative work accomplished. Itmay be more difficult to achieve unanimous consent in an environment where the minority feels ithas lost some of its traditional rights. Supporters of the concept of majority cloture argue that it isa "constitutional" option because they will be making their argument based on a constitutionalprerogative or duty of the Senate. One method for changing Senate procedures might involve declaring extended debate onnominations dilatory, and thus, out of order. Another possibility is based on the argument that, onthe first day of a new Congress, Senate rules, including Rule XXII, the cloture rule, do not yet apply,and thus can be changed by majority vote. Under this argument, debate could be stopped by majorityvote. A Senator would move the adoption of a new rule or set of rules. The new rule or rules wouldbe subject to a majority vote, supporters argue, because the mechanics of cloture as set out in RuleXXII, which requires a supermajority to invoke cloture and end debate, would not yet apply and theSenate would be operating under general parliamentary law. One variation would be a claim thaton the opening day of a Congress a simple majority could invoke cloture on the motion to take upa resolution that proposed a rules change, or on the resolution itself. Again, this scenario would reston the proposition that Rule XXII was not yet in force and did not control action. Senators alsocould seek to have the 60-vote threshold declared unconstitutional, either for cloture in general, oronly as it applies to Senate consideration of presidential nominations, or perhaps a subset of suchnominations, such as of federal judges. This scenario might take place in at least two different ways. The presiding officer might make a ruling from the chair, or a Senator could make a point of orderfrom the floor that the supermajority requirement for cloture is unconstitutional. All these possible scenarios would require that one or more of the Senate's precedents beoverturned or interpreted otherwise than in the past. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Title I proposes to reduce certain oil and natural gas tax subsidies to create a revenue stream to support energy efficiency and renewable energy. 6 . H.R. 6 Action H.R. 99 ) would create a single deficit-neutral reserve fund for energy efficiency and renewable energy that is virtually identical to the reserve described in H.R. 6 . 21 ) would create three reserve funds, which identify more specific efficiency and renewables measures and would allow support for "responsible development" of oil and natural gas. House Version of the Budget Resolution (H.Con.Res. Senate Version of the Budget Resolution (S.Con.Res.

H.R. 6 would use revenue from certain oil and natural gas policy revisions to create an Energy Efficiency and Renewables Reserve. The actual uses of the Reserve would be determined by ensuing legislation. A variety of tax, spending, or regulatory bills could draw funding from the Reserve to support liquid fuels or electricity policies. The House budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 99) would create a deficit-neutral reserve fund nearly identical to that proposed in H.R. 6. The Senate budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 21) would create three reserve funds with purposes related to those in H.R. 6. However, the Senate version has more specifics about efficiency and renewables measures, and it would allow reserve fund use for "responsible development" of oil and natural gas.

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Introduction to Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations The Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations subcommittees are charged with drafting bills to provide annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and six small related agencies. Three rental assistance programs—Public Housing, Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers, and Section 8 project-based rental assistance—account for the majority of the department's funding. This can lead to confusion when comparing totals, as the total annual discretionary budget authority for THUD is typically around half of the total funding provided in the bill, with the remainder made up of mandatory contract authority. Table 3 shows the discretionary funding provided for THUD in FY2015, the Administration request for FY2016, and the amount allocated by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees to the THUD subcommittees. FY2016 THUD Funding As shown in Table 4 , the President's FY2016 budget requested $134.7 billion for the programs in the THUD bill, $27.4 billion more than appropriated for THUD in FY2015. Most of this increase was for highway, transit, and rail funding under the Administration's surface transportation reauthorization proposal; the request for DOT is $22 billion over FY2015. The request for HUD is $5 billion more than provided in FY2015, but $1.1 billion of that increase reflects a decline in savings available from offsetting receipts. The House-passed H.R. 2577 provides a total of $108.7 billion for THUD in FY2016. While this appears to be $1.5 billion over the net budgetary resources amount provided in FY2015, after accounting for a projected $1.1 billion reduction in offsetting receipts to HUD in FY2016 and the effects of $400 million in rescissions of funding in the FY2015 bill, the actual amount of new funding recommended in the House bill is virtually identical to the FY2015 level. The Senate-reported H.R. 2577 recommends $109.1 billion for THUD; after accounting for the differences in rescissions and offsetting receipts in FY2015, this represents an increase of less than 1% over FY2015 funding. How a $1.5-Billion Increase in FY2016 Budget Authority Turns Out to Be Level Funding—the Impact of Offsets In the case of the THUD bill, net discretionary budget authority (which is the level of funding measured against the 302(b) allocation) is not the same as the amount of new discretionary budget authority made available to THUD agencies, due to budgetary savings available from rescissions and offsets. And since the subcommittee also proposed reducing the mandatory funding level by $25 million, the net change for FY2016 becomes zero. DOT in Brief House Action For DOT, the House-passed H.R. A 9% ($199 million) cut from FY2015 to the transit Capital Investment Grants (New Starts & Small Starts) program. Senate Action For DOT, the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended: $71.3 billion in budgetary resources, $368 million (0.5%) below the comparable FY2015 level. A 25% ($535 million) cut from FY2015 for the transit Capital Investment Grants (New Starts & Small Starts) program. President's Budget The Administration's budget proposal for DOT included the following: A request for $93.7 billion in budgetary resources, an increase of 31% over FY2015. $37.6 billion in net budget authority reflecting savings from offsets and other sources, which is $1.9 billion more than FY2015 ($850 million more in appropriations and $1 billion less in savings from offsets). House Action For HUD, the House-passed H.R. No funding for the new incremental vouchers that were requested in the President's budget. Title III: Related Agencies Table 8 presents appropriations levels for the various related agencies funded within the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies appropriations bill.

The House and Senate Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations subcommittees are charged with providing annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and related agencies. THUD programs receive both discretionary and mandatory budget authority; HUD's budget generally accounts for the largest share of discretionary appropriations in the THUD bill, but when mandatory funding is taken into account, DOT's budget is larger than HUD's budget. Mandatory funding typically accounts for around half of the THUD appropriation. The FY2015 THUD bill's appropriation totaled $107.3 billion: $53.8 billion in net discretionary funding and $53.5 billion in mandatory funding. The Administration requested net budget authority of $134.7 billion (after scorekeeping adjustments) for the agencies funded by the THUD bill for FY2016, an increase of $27.4 billion (26%). Most of this increase was for highway, transit, and passenger rail programs in DOT, reflecting the increased funding proposed in the Administration's surface transportation reauthorization proposal. The House-passed bill (H.R. 2577) includes net budget authority of $108.7 billion for THUD in FY2016, $55.3 billion in discretionary funding and $53.5 billion in mandatory funding. In total, this is a 1% increase over FY2015 levels (+3% discretionary reduced by smaller offsets, about level mandatory funding). The Administration has issued a Statement of Administration Policy for H.R. 2577 criticizing the funding levels and certain provisions in the bill, saying that the President's advisors would recommend that the bill be vetoed. The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $109.1 billion in net budget authority and omitted certain provisions that the Administration had objected to, such as limitations on travel to Cuba. DOT: The Administration requested a total of $93.7 billion in discretionary and mandatory funding for DOT for FY2016, an increase of roughly $22 billion (31%) over FY2015. The House-passed H.R. 2577 would provide $70.6 billion for DOT, $646 million less than in FY2015. The reductions were primarily to the TIGER grant program (-$400 million), the New Starts transit grant program (-$199 million), and Amtrak capital grants (-$252 million). The Senate-reported bill recommends $71.3 billion, $35 million below the FY2015 level; the major change from FY2015 levels is a proposed cut of 25% ($535 million) to the New Starts transit grant program. HUD: The President requested $40.6 billion in net new budget authority for HUD for FY2016, $5 billion more than provided in FY2015 ($35.6 billion). The House-passed H.R. 2577 includes $37.7 billion for HUD, $2.1 billion above FY2015. Of that increase, $1.1 billion is attributable to a reduction in savings from offsetting receipts from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The bulk of the remainder of the increase is directed to funding the renewal costs of the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher and project-based rental assistance programs. The Senate-reported H.R. 2577 recommends $37.6 billion in net new budget authority, representing $850 million more in appropriations and $1.1 billion to make up for reduced offsets compared to the FY2015 level. Like the House-passed version, it prioritizes funding for Section 8 rental assistance. Related Agencies: The Administration requested a total of $351 million for the agencies in Title III (the Related Agencies). This is about $1 million more than they received in FY2015. The House-passed H.R. 2577 would provide $342 million for the related agencies, cutting $8 million from the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation. The Senate-reported H.R. 2577 recommends $306 million, the $45 million reduction would come from the Neighborhood Investment Corporation. The Senate Committee on Appropriations released a substitute amendment to H.R. 2577 on November 18, 2015; see the "Recent Developments" box on page 3 for detail.

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Under the Constitution of the United States, the President is responsible for prosecuting war and directing the armed forces during military conflicts, including attacks upon the nation. Congress is constitutionally empowered to declare war, may otherwise authorize the involvement of American armed forces in military conflict, appropriates funds for government activities and operations, including military actions, and engages in oversight to assess the extent to which government operations have been efficiently, economically, and effectively conducted using appropriated funds. Congress also has a role in prescribing intelligence and foreign policy. In meeting these responsibilities, Congress expects and needs to be informed by executive branch leaders about relevant actions taken and being planned, policy developments, expenditures, and knowledge conditions. Consequently, the information restrictions prescribed in President Bush's October 5 memorandum drew critical reaction from various quarters of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Although the restrictive policy was quickly suspended by the President, questions have arisen concerning the role of the executive in times of war and military conflict in informing Congress regarding American involvement in such events. This report offers a brief review of executive-congressional relations in this regard for 1941-2001.

Under the Constitution of the United States, the President is responsible for prosecuting war and directing the armed forces during military conflicts, including attacks upon the nation. Congress is constitutionally empowered to declare war, may otherwise authorize the involvement of American armed forces in military conflict, appropriates funds for government activities and operations, including military actions, and engages in oversight to assess the extent to which government operations have been efficiently, economically, and effectively conducted using appropriated funds. Congress also has a role in prescribing intelligence and foreign policy. In meeting these responsibilities, Congress expects and needs to be informed by executive branch leaders about relevant actions taken and being planned, policy developments, expenditures, and knowledge conditions. Consequently, the restriction of information disclosures to Congress prescribed in President George W. Bush's October 5, 2001, memorandum to top diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement officials drew critical reaction from various quarters of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Although the restrictive policy was quickly suspended by the President, questions have arisen concerning the role of the executive in times of war and military conflict in informing Congress regarding American involvement in such events. This report, which is intended to provide background information and will not be updated, provides a brief review of executive-congressional relations in this regard for 1941-2001.

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Introduction Under current tax law, firms may expense (or deduct as a current rather than a capital expense) up to $1 million of the total cost of new and used qualified assets they purchase and place in service in tax years beginning in 2018 under Section 179 of the federal tax code. They also have the option under Section 168(k) of expensing the entire cost of qualified assets they acquire and place in service between September 28, 2017, and December 31, 2022. P.L. 115-97 also increased the Section 168(k) bonus depreciation allowance to 100% of the cost of eligible assets acquired and placed in service from September 28, 2017, through the end of 2022 and made certain changes in the property eligible for the allowance. (See Table 1 for the annual expensing allowances from 1987 to 2018.) Limitations on Use of the Section 179 Allowance Use of the allowance is subject to two limitations: an investment (or dollar) limitation and an income limitation. Qualified property with relatively long production times is allowed an extra year of bonus depreciation over this period. In an effort to stimulate more business investment in the midst of a severe economic downturn, Congress increased the allowance to $250,000 and the phaseout threshold to $800,000 for qualified assets bought and placed in service in 2008 in the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (ESA, P.L. The act also expanded the definition of qualified property to include qualified leasehold improvement property, qualified retail improvement property, and qualified restaurant property; in 2010 and 2011, a business could write off up to $250,000 of the annual cost of such property under Section 179. 115-97 ) in December 2017. Under the new tax law, the maximum expensing allowance rises to $1 million, and the phaseout threshold to $2.5 million, and both amounts are indexed for inflation starting in 2019. It also repeals the previous exclusion of property connected to lodging and indexes for inflation the $25,000 expensing limit for heavy-duty motor vehicles. 115-97 . As a result of unintentional language in the final bill, qualified improvement property is not eligible for the BDA until Congress amends the law to assign a 15-year recovery period to such property. Economic Effects of the Section 179 and Bonus Depreciation Allowances Many lawmakers view the Section 179 expensing and bonus depreciation allowances as effective policy tools for promoting the growth of small firms and stimulating the economy during periods of slow or negative growth. As the most accelerated form of depreciation, expensing lowers this cost by reducing the tax burden on the discounted returns to an eligible investment. Second, spending on the assets eligible for the two expensing allowances tends to account for a relatively small slice of U.S. business investment. Given that the expensing allowance lowers the cost of capital and can boost the cash flow of firms claiming it, and that investment in many of the assets eligible for the allowance seems at least somewhat sensitive to changes in the cost of capital, it would be reasonable to conclude that the allowance may have caused domestic investment in those assets to be greater than it otherwise would have been. Under the reasonable assumption that the amount of capital in the economy is fixed in the short run, a tax subsidy like the allowance is likely to divert some capital away from relatively productive uses and into tax-favored ones. As a result, it seems fair to conclude that the allowance has no lasting effect on the distribution of after-tax incomes. Tax Administration Yet another policy issue raised by the Section 179 and Section 168(k) expensing allowances concerns their impact on the cost of tax compliance for business taxpayers. P.L.

Expensing is the most accelerated form of depreciation. Section 179 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to expense (or deduct as a current rather than a capital expense) up to $1 million of the total cost of new and used qualified depreciable assets it buys and places in service in 2018, within certain limits. Firms unable to claim this allowance may recover the cost of qualified assets over longer periods, using the depreciation schedules from Sections 167 or 168. While the Section 179 expensing allowance is not expressly targeted at smaller firms, the limits on its use effectively tend to confine its benefits to such firms. Section 168(k) allows taxpayers to expense 100% of the cost of qualified assets bought and placed in service between September 28, 2017, and December 31, 2022. There is considerable overlap between the property eligible for the Section 179 and Section 168(k) expensing allowances. Since 2002, the two allowances have been used primarily as tax incentives for stimulating the U.S. economy. Several studies have assessed the economic effects of the 30% and 50% bonus depreciation allowances from 2002 to 2004 and from 2008 to 2010. Their findings suggested that accelerated depreciation did affect investment in qualified assets, but that it was a relatively ineffective tool for stimulating the U.S. economy during periods of weak or negative growth. Available evidence also suggests that the expensing allowances have a moderate effect at best on the level and composition of business investment and its allocation among industries, the distribution of the federal tax burden among different income groups, and the cost of tax compliance for smaller firms. The allowances of course have advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, an expensing allowance simplifies tax accounting, and a temporary allowance has the potential to stimulate increased business investment in favored assets in the short run by reducing the user cost of capital, increasing the cash flow of investing firms, and giving firms an incentive to make qualifying investments before the incentive expires. On the other hand, an expensing allowance is likely to interfere with an efficient allocation of capital among investment opportunities by diverting capital away from more productive uses with relatively low after-tax returns. In December 2017, the House and the Senate agreed on a measure (H.R. 1, P.L. 115-97) to revise key parts of the federal tax code. The new tax law made significant changes to both Section 179 and Section 168(k). In the case of the Section 179 expensing allowance, P.L. 115-97 permanently raised the maximum allowance to $1 million, and the phaseout threshold for the allowance to $2.5 million, beginning in 2018; it also indexed both amounts for inflation starting in 2019. The act also expanded the definition of qualified property to include qualified improvement property, specified improvements (e.g., new roofs and heating systems) to nonresidential real property, and property used in connection with lodging. In another change, the $25,000 expensing limit for heavy-duty sport utility vehicles imposed in 2003 was indexed for inflation starting in 2019. In the case of the bonus depreciation allowance, P.L. 115-97 increased it to 100% for qualified property acquired and placed in service between September 28, 2017, and December 31, 2022; the allowance is scheduled to phase out to 0% starting in 2027. In addition, the placed-in-service deadlines for property with relatively long production periods and for noncommercial aircraft were set one year longer. The wording of the final bill led to the unintended result that qualified improvement property became ineligible for bonus depreciation, as it no longer had a 15-year recovery period. As things now stand, such property is treated as 39-year nonresidential real property, unless Congress alters the language.

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In 1994, when Congress made the procedural adjustments necessary to revive the death penalty as a sentencing option for other federal capital offenses, it replaced the air piracy procedures with those of the new regime. 3060 contain comparable provisions. Habeas Corpus in State Capital Cases Federal law provides expedited habeas corpus procedures for state death row inmates in those states that qualify for application of the procedures and have opted to take advantage of them. 1279 , and H.R. The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act adds 18 U.S.C. H.R. Two other port security bills would have suggested similar new death penalty offenses, H.R. 4472 , H.R. One of the proposed offenses would have proscribed the use of interstate facilities with the intent to commit multiple murders and would have been a capital offense where death results. The other, modeled after the provision that condemns the use of a firearm during or in relation to a crime of violence or a drug offense, would have outlawed crimes of violence committed during or in relation to a drug trafficking offense and makes the offense punishable by death if a death results. A few other bills would have made it a federal capital offense to kill a police officer under various circumstances. 1751 and H.R. Other proposed new federal capital offenses would have included (1) agroterrorism when death results, proposed 18 U.S.C. (attacks on mass transit) into a new 18 U.S.C. 3132 (same); (4) H.R. 2245 to make murder a federal capital offense when committed in the course of a wider range of federal child sexual abuse offenses. The Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause precludes imposing the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman by an individual already under a sentence of life imprisonment at the time of the rape; it precludes imposition of the death penalty even in the case of murder unless the defendant at least acted intentionally or acted with reckless indifference to human life while participating in a felony involving a murder; and since the Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia , it has never been called upon to approve, and consequently has never approved, imposition of the death penalty for a crime that did not involve murder. Moratorium H.R. 4923 / S. 122 would have repealed federal death penalty provisions and barred imposition or execution of any capital sentence for violation of federal law.

The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act (Reauthorization Act), P.L. 109-177 , 120 Stat. 192 (2006) contains a number of death penalty related provisions. Some create new federal capital offenses making certain death-resulting maritime offenses punishable by death. Some add the death penalty as a sentencing option in the case of pre-existing federal crimes such those outlawing attacks on mass transit. Some make procedural alterations such as those governing federal habeas corpus provisions for state death row petitioners. Other proposals offered during the 109 th Congress followed the same pattern: some new crimes; some new penalties for old crimes; and some procedural adjustments. Other than the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, P.L. 109-248 , 120 Stat. 587 (2006), none of the other proposals were enacted, although one House or the other approved several. Among these, H.R. 1279 would have amended the venue provision for capital cases and made it a federal capital offense to use the facilities of interstate commerce to commit multiple murders and another to commit murder during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. As would have H.R. 4472 . H.R. 1751 and H.R. 4472 would have made it a federal capital offense to murder a federally funded public safety officer. H.R. 3132 would have created special expedited habeas review of state child murder cases. And S. 2611 would have made murder committed during the course of certain federal offenses a capital offense. Of the capital proposals pending at adjournment, H.R. 4923 and S. 122 would have abolished the death penalty as a federal sentencing alternative and H.R. 379 would have imposed a moratorium barring the states from imposing or carrying out the death penalty. This is an abridged version of CRS Report RL33395, The Death Penalty: Capital Punishment Legislation in the 109 th Congress , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf), without the footnotes, appendices, or most of the citations to authority found in the longer report.

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Background International food aid is the United States' major response to reducing global hunger. In 2006, the United States provided $2.1 billion ( Table 1 ) of such assistance which paid for the delivery and distribution of more than 3 million metric tons of U.S. agricultural commodities. The United States provided food aid to 65 countries in 2006, more than half of them in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the food aid—$1.2 billion or 57%—was provided as emergency food aid. Legislative authority for international food aid programs in the 2002 farm bill ( P.L. 107-171 ) expires in 2007. The 110 th Congress has been considering the extension and reauthorization of food aid programs as part of the 2007 farm bill. The Senate passed its version of the 2007 farm bill on December 14, 2007. The House passed its version of the farm bill ( H.R. 2419 ) on July 27, 2007. U.S. Food Aid Programs The United States provides U.S. commodities as international food aid through eight programs. These are Titles I, II, and III of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-48), known collectively as P.L. 480; the Food for Progress Program; the John Ogonowski Farmer-to-Farmer Program; the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program; Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949; and the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT). In Congress, the food aid reauthorization debate has focused on P.L. 480 Title II commodity donations and food aid for school feeding and child nutrition in the McGovern-Dole food aid program. Food Aid Issues Need for Food Aid Proponents of providing food aid to developing countries point to the large number of chronically hungry people in the world as evidence of the need for food aid. P.L. Food Aid Legislative Proposals The Administration and two groups of PVOs and cooperatives that carry out food aid programs have made recommendations for legislative changes in farm bill authorized food aid programs. 480. This has been a source of concern for PVOs/cooperatives who depend on food aid commodities to carry out non-emergency or development projects. 480 Title II funds for a pilot program for local or regional purchase of emergency food aid commodities. The Senate version of Title III also reauthorizes P.L. Local or Regional Purchase for Emergency Food Aid The House-passed farm bill disregarded the Administration's sole farm bill food aid proposal for legislative authority to allocate up to 25% of Title II funds to local or regional purchase of commodities for emergency relief.

Legislative authority for international food aid programs in the 2002 farm bill (P.L. 107-171) expires in 2007. The 110th Congress has been considering the extension and reauthorization of food aid programs as part of the 2007 farm bill. On December 14, 2007, the Senate passed its version of the 2007 farm bill, which included reauthorization of food aid programs in Title III, the trade title. The House passed its version of the 2007 farm bill (H.R. 2419) with its version of the trade title on July 27, 2007. International food aid is the United States' major response to reducing global hunger. In 2006, the United States provided $2.1 billion of such assistance, which paid for the delivery and distribution of more than 3 million metric tons of U.S. agricultural commodities. The United States provided food aid to 65 countries in 2006, more than half of them in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the food aid—$1.2 billion or 57%—was provided as emergency food aid. About one-third is used in non-emergency or development projects carried out by U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and cooperatives. The United States provides U.S. commodities as international food aid through eight programs. These are Titles I, II, and III of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-480), known collectively as P.L. 480; the Food for Progress Program; the John Ogonowski Farmer-to-Farmer Program; the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program; Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949; and the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT). In Congress, the food aid reauthorization debate has focused on P.L. 480 Title II commodity donations and food aid for school feeding and child nutrition in the McGovern-Dole food aid program. Issues raised include the need for and role of food aid in both meeting urgent humanitarian food needs and reducing hunger among the chronically hungry; the timeliness and cost of emergency food aid; and making food aid a more reliable response to emergency needs while not neglecting the use of food aid and cash resources to improve the lot of the chronically hungry in poor countries. Attention also has been paid to how U.S. food aid programs conform to existing and possible future World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. The Administration and two groups of PVOs/cooperatives that carry out food aid programs have made recommendations for legislative changes in farm bill authorized food aid programs. The Administration's only food aid proposal—to make P.L. 480 funds available for local or regional purchase to meet emergency food needs—was not included in the House-passed farm bill. The Senate bill, however, does authorize the use of P.L. 480 funds for a pilot program for local or regional purchase of emergency food aid commodities.

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Introduction and Issue for Congress Some observers have proposed procuring Navy ships using funding approaches other than the traditional full funding approach that has been used to procure most Navy ships since the 1950s. Supporters of these alternative funding approaches believe they could increase stability in Navy shipbuilding plans and perhaps increase the number of Navy ships that could be built for a given total amount of ship-procurement funding. The issue for Congress is whether to maintain current practices for funding Navy ship procurement or change them by, for example, increasing the use of incremental funding or starting to use advance appropriations. Congress's decision on this issue could be significant because the full funding policy relates to Congress's power of the purse and its responsibility for conducting oversight of Department of Defense (DOD) programs. Congress's intent in imposing the policy was to strengthen discipline in DOD budgeting and improve Congress's ability to control DOD spending and carry out its oversight of DOD activities. Advantages and Disadvantages Potential Advantages Supporters of incremental funding could argue that, compared to full funding, using incremental funding in DOD procurement can be advantageous because it can do one or more of the following: permit very expensive items, such as large Navy ships, to be procured in a given year while avoiding or mitigating budget "spikes" (i.e., lumps) that could require displacing other programs from that year's budget, which can increase the costs of the displaced programs due to uneconomic program-disruption start-up and start costs; avoid a potential bias against the procurement of very expensive items that might result from use of full funding due to the item's large up-front procurement cost (which appears in the budget) overshadowing the item's long-term benefits (which do not appear in the budget) or its lower life cycle operation and support (O&S) costs compared to alternatives with lower up-front procurement costs; permit construction to start on a larger number of items in a given year within that year's amount of funding, so as to achieve better production economies of that item than would have been possible under full funding; recognize that certain DOD procurement programs, particularly those incorporating significant amounts of advanced technology, bear some resemblance to research and development activities (which can be funded in increments), even though they are intended to produce usable end items; reduce the amount of unobligated balances associated with DOD procurement programs; implicitly recognize potential limits on DOD's ability to accurately predict the total procurement cost of items, such as ships, that take several years to build; and preserve flexibility for future Congresses to stop "throwing good money after bad" by halting funding for the procurement of an item under construction that has become unnecessary or inappropriate due to unanticipated shifts in U.S. strategy or the international security environment. Under advance appropriations, as under traditional full funding, Congress makes a one-time decision to fund the entire procurement cost of an end item. That cost, however, can then be divided into two or more annual increments, as under incremental funding, that are assigned to (in budget terminology, "scored in") two or more fiscal years. Under certain other circumstances, using incremental funding or advance appropriations could increase rather than reduce ship-procurement costs. Options for Congress Options for Congress that arise out of proposals to make greater use of incremental funding or begin using advance appropriations for procuring Navy ships include (but are not limited to) the following: maintain current ship-procurement funding practices; strengthen adherence to the full funding policy in ship procurement; increase the use of incremental funding in ship procurement; begin using advance appropriations in ship procurement; and shift lead-ship detailed design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs to the Navy's research and development (R&D account). Budget spikes associated with procuring aircraft carriers or large-deck amphibious assault ships, they could argue, can be anticipated years in advance, permitting their effects to be carefully managed.

Some observers have proposed procuring Navy ships using incremental funding or advance appropriations rather than the traditional full funding approach that has been used to procure most Navy ships. Supporters believe these alternative funding approaches could increase stability in Navy shipbuilding plans and perhaps increase the number of Navy ships that could be built for a given total amount of ship-procurement funding. The issue for Congress is whether to maintain or change current practices for funding Navy ship procurement. Congress's decision could be significant because the full funding policy relates to Congress's power of the purse and its responsibility for conducting oversight of defense programs. For Department of Defense (DOD) procurement programs, the full funding policy requires the entire procurement cost of a usable end item (such as a Navy ship) to be funded in the year in which the item is procured. Congress imposed the full funding policy on DOD in the 1950s to strengthen discipline in DOD budgeting and improve Congress's ability to control DOD spending and carry out its oversight of DOD activities. Under incremental funding, a weapon's cost is divided into two or more annual increments that Congress approves separately each year. Supporters could argue that using it could avoid or mitigate budget spikes associated with procuring very expensive ships such as aircraft carriers or "large-deck" amphibious assault ships. Opponents could argue that using it could make total ship procurement costs less visible and permit one Congress to budgetarily "tie the hands" of future Congresses. Under advance appropriations, Congress makes a one-time decision to fund the entire procurement cost of an end item. That cost can then be divided into two or more annual increments that are assigned to (in budget terminology, "scored in") two or more fiscal years. Supporters could argue that using advance appropriations could avoid or mitigate budget spikes without some of the potential disadvantages of incremental funding. Opponents could argue that advance appropriations retains (or even expands) a key potential disadvantage of incremental finding—that of tying the hands of future Congresses. Using incremental funding or advance appropriations could, under certain circumstances, marginally reduce the cost of Navy ships. Under certain other circumstances, however, it could increase costs. Options for Congress include maintaining current ship-procurement funding practices; strengthening adherence to the full funding policy; increasing the use of incremental funding; beginning to use advance appropriations; and transferring lead-ship detailed design and nonrecurring engineering costs to the research and development account. Arguments could be made in support of or against each of these options. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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In that year, the number of filings surpassed 2 million—there was a "rush to the courthouse" before the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA; P.L. 109-8 ) took effect in October 2005. Whether BAPCPA will reduce filings in the long run is still unclear. Filings rose steadily from the 2006 lows until 2010, when they exceeded 1.5 million, which was approximately the level during the four years before BAPCPA. Household Debt Table 2 shows figures on household debt. Although the burden of debt has risen since the 1980s, the increase has been gradual and would not appear to explain much of the fivefold increase in personal bankruptcy filings over the past two decades. Moreover, the decline in the debt service ration since 2007 has not been accompanied by a significant reduction in bankruptcy rates. The relative stability of the debt burden in the face of falling and historically low interest rates implies that the ratio of debt outstanding to income has been rising. Table 3 below, based on the Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances, shows the percentages of families at various income levels that devote more than 40% of their income to debt service, for selected years from 1995 through 2007. The first is the high rate of distress among lower-income families, who are the most likely to file for bankruptcy. The percentage of all families in distress in 2007 was little changed from the 1998 level. Supporters of the bankruptcy reform measure finally enacted in 2005 argued that the bankruptcy code was too debtor-friendly and created an incentive to borrow beyond the ability to repay, or in some cases without the intention of repaying. Household Deleveraging In December 2007, the U.S. economy went into recession, in the midst of global financial panic. The decline in debt balances continued for 11 calendar quarters, until debt outstanding rose slightly in the second quarter of 2011. In the third quarter, debt levels fell again. Causes and implications of deleveraging are discussed in CRS Report R41623, U.S. Household Debt Reduction , by [author name scrubbed].

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA; P.L. 109-8) included the most significant amendments to consumer bankruptcy procedures since the 1970s. Bankruptcy reform was enacted in response to the high number of consumer bankruptcy filings, which in 2004 and 2005 reached five times the level of the early 1980s. Why did filings increase so dramatically during a period that included two of the longest economic expansions in U.S. history? Because bankruptcy is by definition a condition of excessive debt, many would expect to see a corresponding increase in the debt burden of U.S. households over the same period. However, while household debt has indeed grown, debt costs as a percentage of income have risen only moderately. What aggregate statistics do not show is that the debt burden does not fall evenly on all families. Financial distress is common among lower-income households: in 2007, 27% of families in the bottom fifth of the income distribution spent more than 40% of their income to repay debt. Following the effective date of BAPCPA, in October 2005, there was a sharp reduction in the number of bankruptcy filings, reflecting the "rush to the courthouse" in the months before the new law took effect. Since the 2006 lows, the number of filings has risen steadily. In 2010, personal bankruptcy filings reached 1.5 million, roughly equal to the pre-BAPCPA level. It appears that BAPCPA has not produced the effect its supporters hoped for—a substantial and permanent reduction in the rate of consumer bankruptcy. With the recession that began in December 2007, the long-term upward trend in consumer indebtedness was interrupted. Beginning in the middle of 2008, the amount of debt held by U.S. households declined for 11 consecutive quarters. Through the third quarter of 2011, households reduced their debt burden by $853 billion, or 6.5%. Causes and implications of this trend are discussed in CRS Report R41623, U.S. Household Debt Reduction, by [author name scrubbed]. This report presents statistics on bankruptcy filings, household debt, and families in financial distress. It will be updated as new statistics become available.

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The Keystone XL Pipeline would transport Canadian oil sands crude extracted in Alberta, Canada, and crude produced from the Bakken region in North Dakota and Montana to a market hub in Nebraska for further delivery to Gulf Coast refineries. There is also concern over how much crude oil, or petroleum products refined from Keystone XL crude, would be exported overseas. The Keystone XL Pipeline Project would consist of 875 miles of 36-inch pipeline and associated facilities linking Hardisty, Alberta, to Steele City, NE. Rail transport capacity has also been expanding. Issuance of a Presidential Permit requires a State Department determination that the project would serve the "national interest." Consideration of Environmental Impacts Under NEPA As part of its Presidential Permit application review, the State Department must identify and consider environmental impacts within the context of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Analysis in an EIS is intended to inform the NID process. With the release of the final EIS for the Keystone XL pipeline project, the State Department stated that it would consider many factors, including the proposal's potential effect on energy security; environmental and cultural resources; the economy; and foreign policy. In accordance with that Executive Order, those agencies had 90 days to provide their views to the State Department. (Those stakeholders are given an opportunity to comment on the project during the NEPA process.) With the Nebraska case decided, the State Department asked the cooperating federal agencies to submit their input regarding the Keystone XL Pipeline by February 2, 2015. Since then, the State Department has not committed to a time frame to issue its decision. Legislative Efforts to Change Permitting Authority33 In light of what they perceive as excessive delays in the State Department's review of permit application for Keystone XL, some in Congress have sought alternative means to support the pipeline's development. 28 ) would all directly approve Keystone XL and put an end to any further environmental review under NEPA or other federal environmental statutes. On January 29, 2015, the Senate passed the renamed Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act ( S. 1 ), as amended, by a vote of 62 to 36. The bill was passed in the House on February 11 by a vote of 270 to 152. S. 1 was sent to President Obama on February 24 th and vetoed by the President the same day. The Senate attempted to override the President's veto on March 4, however the override measure failed by a vote of 62 to 37. No further action on S. 1 was taken in the House. The Final EIS finds: the GHG emissions released during the construction period for the project would be approximately 0.24 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (MMTCO 2 e) due to land use changes, electricity use, and fuels for construction vehicles (equivalent to 0.004% of U.S. annual GHG emissions) ; the GHG emissions released during normal operations would be approximately 1.44 MMTCO 2 e/year due to electricity use for pumping stations, fuels for maintenance and inspection vehicles, and fugitive emissions (equivalent to 0.2% of U.S. annual GHG emissions); the total, or gross, life-cycle GHG emissions (i.e., the aggregate GHG emissions released by all activities from the extraction of the resource to the refining, transportation, and end-use combustion of refined fuels) attributable to the oil sands crude transported through the proposed pipeline would be approximately 147 to 168 MMTCO 2 e per year (equivalent to 2.2% to 2.6% of U.S. annual GHG emissions); the incremental, or net, life-cycle GHG emissions (i.e., GHG emissions over-and-above those from the crude oils expected to be displaced in U.S. refineries) is estimated to be 1.3 to 27.4 MMTCO 2 e per year (equivalent to 0.02% to 0.4% of U.S. annual GHG emissions); but according to the State Department's market analysis, "approval or denial of any one crude oil transport project, including the proposed project, is unlikely to significantly impact the rate of extraction in the oil sands or the continued demand for heavy crude oil at refineries in the United States based on expected oil prices, oil-sands supply costs, transport costs, and supply-demand scenarios." Issues with the Pipeline Route Across Nebraska During the national interest determination period for the 2008 Presidential Permit application, it became clear that changes to Nebraska law would require the selection of a pipeline route that would avoid the Sand Hills region of Nebraska. The legitimacy of this permitting authority has been addressed by federal courts.

TransCanada's proposed Keystone XL Pipeline would transport oil sands crude from Canada and shale oil produced in North Dakota and Montana to a market hub in Nebraska for further delivery to Gulf Coast refineries. The pipeline would consist of 875 miles of 36-inch pipe with the capacity to transport 830,000 barrels per day. Because it would cross the Canadian-U.S. border, Keystone XL requires a Presidential Permit from the State Department based on a determination that the pipeline would "serve the national interest." To make its national interest determination (NID), the department considers potential effects on energy security; environmental and cultural resources; the economy; foreign policy, and other factors. Effects on environmental and cultural resources are determined by preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The NID process also provides for public comment and requires the State Department to consult with specific federal agencies. TransCanada originally applied for a Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL Pipeline in 2008. Since then various issues have affected the completion of both the NEPA and NID processes for the project. In particular, during the NID process for the 2008 application, concerns over environmental impacts in the Sand Hills of Nebraska led the state to enact new requirements that would change the pipeline route. Facing a 60-day decision deadline imposed by Congress, the State Department denied the 2008 permit application on the grounds that it lacked information about the new Nebraska route. In May 2012, TransCanada submitted a new application with a modified route through Nebraska, thus beginning a new NEPA and NID process. With the release of the final EIS for the new pipeline route in January 2014, the State Department began the current NID process. Public comment on the project, allowed under the Executive Order, ended on March 2014. Federal agency comment on the project was interrupted by state court action in Nebraska, but this litigation was resolved. The department subsequently told federal agencies to provide their input by February 2, 2015. The State Department has not committed to a deadline for issuing its final NID or making a Presidential Permit decision. Development of Keystone XL has been controversial. Proponents base their arguments primarily on increasing the diversity of the U.S. petroleum supply and economic benefits, especially jobs. Pipeline opposition stems in part from concern regarding the greenhouse gas emissions from the development of Canadian oil sands, continued U.S. dependency on fossil fuels, and the risk of a potential release of heavy crude. There is also debate about how much Keystone XL crude oil, or petroleum products refined from it, would be exported overseas. Relations between the U.S. and Canadian governments have also been an issue. With the fate of Keystone XL uncertain, Canadian oil producers have pursued other shipment options, including other pipelines and rail. In light of what some consider excessive delays in the State Department's permit review, Congress has sought other means to support development of the pipeline. In the 114th Congress, the most significant legislative proposal has been the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act (S. 1), which would have directly approved Keystone XL and put an end to any further review under federal environmental statutes. On January 29, 2015, the Senate passed S. 1 by a vote of 62 to 36. On February 11, the House passed S. 1 by a vote of 270 to 152. The bill was sent to President Obama on February 24th and vetoed the same day. The Senate attempted to override the President's veto on March 4; however; the override measure failed by a vote of 62 to 37. No further action on S. 1 was taken in the House.

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Introduction This report presents information on two federal entitlement programs administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA) that provide income support to individuals with severe, long-term disabilities: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSDI is a social insurance program that provides monthly cash benefits to nonelderly disabled workers who paid Social Security taxes for a sufficient number of years in jobs covered by Social Security and to their eligible dependents. In contrast, SSI is a public assistance program that provides monthly cash benefits to aged, blind, or disabled individuals (including children) who often have little or no work experience in covered employment and whose assets and other income are below certain limits. Eligibility Requirements Definition of Disability Under both SSDI and SSI, disability is defined as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA) by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that is expected to last for at least 12 months or to result in death. In general, individuals must be unable to do any kind of substantial work that exists in the national economy, taking into account their age, education, and work experience. Children under the age of 18 are required to demonstrate that their impairment results in marked and severe functional limitations . To receive SSI disability benefits , an individual must meet the same definition of disability that applies under the SSDI program. SSA's Initial Disability Determination Process The application process for SSDI and SSI disability benefits is similar. Although SSDI and SSI are federal programs, both federal and state offices are used to determine eligibility for benefits. SSA's Disability Appeals Process If a claimant's application for benefits is denied at any point during the disability determination process, the claimant has the right to appeal the decision. During the appeals process, claimants may present additional evidence or arguments to support their case, as well as appoint a representative to act on their behalf (either an attorney or non-attorney). Reconsideration. Administrative Hearing. Appeals Council. Step 4. U.S. District Court. Medical Continuing Disability Reviews After SSA finds that a claimant is disabled, the agency must evaluate his or her impairment(s) from time to time to determine if the individual is still medically eligible for payments. Program Financing Information The SSDI program is funded primarily through the Social Security payroll tax, a portion of which is credited to a Disability Insurance trust fund. By contrast, the SSI program is funded through annual appropriations from general revenues. The resources in the DI trust fund are used to pay for SSDI benefits and the cost of administering the program.

The Social Security Administration (SSA) is responsible for administering two federal entitlement programs that provide income support to individuals with severe, long-term disabilities: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSDI is a social insurance program that provides monthly cash benefits to nonelderly disabled workers who paid Social Security taxes for a sufficient number of years in jobs covered by Social Security and to their eligible dependents. In contrast, SSI is a public assistance program that provides monthly cash benefits to aged, blind, or disabled individuals (including children) who often have little or no work experience in covered employment and whose assets and other income are below certain limits. To qualify for disability benefits under either program, claimants must meet the definition of disability prescribed in the Social Security Act. For both SSDI and SSI disability benefits, disability is defined as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA) by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that is expected to last for at least one year or to result in death. In general, the individual must be unable to do any kind of substantial work that exists in the national economy, taking into account age, education, and work experience. Special rules apply to statutorily blind individuals and to children under the age of 18 applying for or receiving SSI. Both programs are administered by SSA and therefore have similar application and disability determination processes. Although SSDI and SSI are federal programs, both federal and state offices are used to determine eligibility for disability benefits. SSA determines whether someone is disabled according to a five-step sequential evaluation process where SSA is required to look at all of the pertinent facts of a particular case. Current work activity, severity of impairment, and vocational factors are assessed in that order. If SSA finds that a claimant is disabled, the agency must periodically reevaluate his or her impairment(s) to ensure that the individual continues to meet the program's respective eligibility criteria. If a claimant's application for benefits is denied at any point during the disability determination process, the claimant has the right to appeal the decision. During the appeals process, claimants may present additional evidence or arguments to support their case, as well as appoint a representative to act on their behalf. In most states, the appeals process is composed of four stages: (1) reconsideration by a different disability examiner; (2) a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ); (3) a review before the Appeals Council; and (4) filing suit against SSA in U.S. district court. The SSDI program is funded primarily through Social Security payroll tax revenues, portions of which are credited to the Disability Insurance (DI) trust fund. In contrast, the SSI program is financed by annual appropriations from general revenues.

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Key Current Issue: Elections On April 27, 2014, South Africa celebrated Freedom Day—marking the 20 th anniversary of the first non-racial democratic elections in 1994 and "the end of over three hundred years of colonialism, segregation and white minority rule"—ahead of the fifth democratic post-apartheid national election on May 7. The governing African National Congress (ANC) political party is widely expected to maintain an electoral majority after the polls, though its share of the vote may shrink. His trip to the African continent highlighted U.S.-African cooperation and policies in the areas of trade and investment, development, democracy, and peace and security, which the President addressed in a "framing speech" at South Africa's University of Cape Town. The State Department characterizes South Africa as a U.S. "strategic partner," and President Obama's trip to the country underlined that bilateral ties remain close, as they have been since 1994, despite periodic differences on some foreign policy issues. Socioeconomic development is a key focus of bilateral cooperation; since 1992, South Africa has been a leading African recipient of U.S. aid, the bulk of which supports HIV/AIDS and related health programs. Security cooperation is another key area of engagement. In 2010, the two countries established a Strategic Dialogue centering on cooperation related to health, education, food security, law enforcement, trade, investment, energy, and nonproliferation. Country Overview South Africa, a multi-racial but predominantly black country about twice the size of Texas, has the largest, most diversified, and most industrialized economy in Africa. South Africa is also influential regionally, due to its investment and political engagement in many African countries and active role and leadership within the inter-governmental African Union (AU). It has enjoyed economic growth for more than a decade, apart from 2009 when the economy contracted, and average per capita incomes and access to education have grown across racial groups, notably for blacks. Nonetheless, South Africa remains a racially unequal society with respect to wealth and income distribution and access to jobs, social services, and utilities. Most black South Africans live in poverty, and average per capita black incomes are one-sixth as large as those of the historically privileged white minority, although this disparity has gradually declined. Blacks are also disproportionately unemployed, at a rate of 36% in 2011, compared to 5.9% for whites, and have relatively less access to education, although black education rates are steadily increasing. Most South African cities are surrounded by vast, high-density informal housing settlements, known as townships, which are populated mostly by blacks and coloureds. Public corruption is another key challenge, and there are high rates of violent crime, particularly rape. There are periodic reports of vigilante and mob violence, and police reportedly often use heavy-handed tactics to respond to crime and public unrest, occasionally resulting in serious human rights violations. The assembly elected the incumbent ANC president, Jacob Zuma, to his first term as national president in 2009. The "born-free" group shares frustrations with older generations over corruption, lack of services, and poverty, but many are reportedly not party-affiliated and lack older generations' continuing allegiance and gratitude to the ANC for its role in ending apartheid. Labor unrest has since continued. To address these challenges, the government initiated a series of land reform programs. U.S. FDI in South Africa has gradually grown in recent years. U.S.-South African trade and investment is attracting relatively high-level attention from U.S. policy makers, including Members of Congress and business leaders. Congressional engagement with South Africa in recent years has centered mainly on foreign aid program oversight, notably HIV/AIDS and other healthcare-related efforts, and often takes the form of leadership exchange visits and congressional travel to the country. Trade with the United States is likely to grow. South Africa may gradually increase as a U.S. investment and export destination, due to South African demand and regional economic growth; increasing U.S. government and private sector efforts to expand trade and investment ties; and opportunities created by South Africa's infrastructure investment initiatives.

South Africa is a multi-racial, majority black southern African country of nearly 52 million. It held its first universal suffrage elections in 1994, after a transition from white minority rule under apartheid, a system of state-enforced racial segregation and socioeconomic discrimination. South Africa entered a period of mourning in late 2013, upon the death of its first post-apartheid president, Nelson Mandela. He is viewed as the founding father of the country's nonracial democratic system, the 20th anniversary of which was recently celebrated prior to national elections on May 7. South Africa is influential regionally, due to its political, trade, and investment ties across Africa and its active role within the African Union. It is viewed as a U.S. strategic partner in Africa, despite periodic foreign policy differences. In mid-2013, President Obama traveled to South Africa, among other African countries. Key issues addressed in South Africa included bilateral political and trade and investment ties, development cooperation, and shared U.S.-South African aims regarding similar issues across Africa, as well as democracy, youth leadership development, and peace and security. Congress has long been engaged with South Africa, notably during the anti-apartheid struggle, and with regard to post-apartheid socioeconomic development efforts, a key focus of bilateral ties. Since 1992, South Africa has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign aid, mostly devoted to addressing HIV/AIDS and other health challenges. Aid oversight has drawn the bulk of South Africa-related congressional attention in recent years. U.S. policy makers are also increasingly focused on efforts to strengthen already growing U.S.-South African trade and investment ties. Other key areas of bilateral engagement include security cooperation and an ongoing U.S.-South African Strategic Dialogue. Established in 2010, the Dialogue centers on health, education, food security, law enforcement, trade, investment, and energy, among other issues. South Africa has the largest, most diversified, and highly industrialized economy in Africa. It has enjoyed moderate economic growth in most recent years. Average per capita incomes and access to education have grown across racial groups, notably for blacks. Despite post-apartheid national socioeconomic gains, South Africa remains a highly unequal society with respect to wealth and income distribution and access to jobs, social services, utilities, and land. Most blacks are poor, and average black incomes are far smaller than those of the historically privileged white minority. Blacks also suffer very high unemployment rates (36% in 2011), and have far less access to education. Shortages of quality housing, utilities, and social services in townships—the vast, high-density housing settlements where many of the poor live—spur ongoing social and political tensions. Other key problems include public corruption and widespread violent crime. Vigilante justice and mob violence is not uncommon, and heavy-handed police tactics sometimes result in human rights abuses. South Africa also suffers high rates of HIV/AIDS. In late 2012, the governing African National Congress (ANC) party, despite some reported internal divisions, reelected as its president Jacob Zuma, ahead of the May 2014 national elections. The parliament elected Zuma to his first term as president of South Africa in 2009. The ANC government faces the substantial challenges noted above, along with others, including labor unrest, rising dissatisfaction within key labor constituencies, and dissatisfaction among youths. Youth populations face particularly high jobless rates and may lack older generations' continuing allegiance and gratitude to the ANC for helping to end apartheid. To address these diverse challenges, all of which are electoral issues, the government is investing billions of dollars to upgrade infrastructure and improve public service delivery, but is likely to face continuing challenges in meeting popular expectations.

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Most Recent Developments On Thursday, May 24, 2007, the House and Senate approved a compromise on H.R. 2206 , a bill providing $120 billion in supplemental appropriations for FY2007. The President signed the bill into law, P.L. 110-28 , on May 25, 2007. The bill does not set deadlines for withdrawing troops from Iraq, but it does establish political and security benchmarks for progress by the Iraqi government, and it makes the provision of most new economic assistance to Iraq conditional on achieving specific goals. In all, H.R. 2206 / P.L. 110-28 provides $120.0 billion in new funding. Most of that amount, $99.4 billion, is for the Department of defense, of which $94.7 billion is for military operations, $1.6 billion for military construction, and $3.1 billion for military base realignment and closure. The bill also provides $6.1 billion for international affairs, including assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan. And the bill provides $14.5 billion for domestic programs, including $6.3 billion for hurricane relief, $2.9 billion more than the Administration requested; $3.0 billion for agricultural disaster assistance; $1.8 billion for veteran's health programs; $1.1 billion for homeland security measures; $393 million for state children's health insurance program shortfalls; $465 million for fire fighting; $425 million for secure rural school; and $510 million for a variety of smaller programs. The final bill does not provide funds for pandemic flu preparedness or low income energy assistance that were included in earlier measures. The first bill was H.R. On May 2, by a vote of 222-203, with approval of 2/3 required, the House failed to override the veto. 110-28 establishes eighteen political and security benchmarks for the Iraqi government, and it requires the President to report on progress in Iraq in July and again in September. 2206 , H.Res. 438 , also provides for a future vote on a the text of H.R. 1591 , the initial FY2007 supplemental appropriations bill that the President rejected on May 1; (2) the May 10, House-passed supplemental package, comprised of the initial version of H.R. 2206 as approved by the House included— $42.8 billion , available immediately and without conditions, for U.S. military operations abroad, which should be sufficient to avoid any further need for the Army to slow down military operations in anticipation of funding delays; $52.8 billion for U.S. military operations, available only after the President reports, by July 13, 2007, whether the Iraqi government has made progress toward specific political and security benchmarks and after Congress approves and the President signs a joint resolution releasing the funds; $1.7 billion for military construction, without conditions; $3.1 billion for military base realignment and closure, restoring funds that Congress had cut from the FY2007 full year continuing appropriations resolution; $6.2 billion for international affairs, including, with some conditions, reconstruction assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan; $6.8 billion for Gulf State hurricane relief, $3.4 billion more than requested; $1.8 billion for veterans medical care; $2.25 billion for homeland security measures, including port security; $663 million for pandemic flu preparedness; $400 million for low-income energy assistance (LIHEAP); $396 million to make up short-term shortfalls in the State Children's Health Insurance Program; an increase in the minimum wage and small business tax reductions. The House, however, included in the rule governing debate on the bill a requirement that a measure to require the withdrawal of most U.S. troops from Iraq by June 30, 2008, be voted on when the House takes up FY2008 supplemental appropriations, which is expected in September. 2206 The final version of the H.R. The provision establishing the benchmarks is Section 1314 of the bill, which was inserted by the second of the two amendments that the House added to the bill on May 24. Iraq Policy Provisions in H.R. The House then passed the first version of H.R. 2206 / P.L. The Senate bill also required a certification in order to release FMF and NADR funds.

On Thursday, May 24, the House and Senate approved a compromise on H.R. 2206, a bill providing $120 billion in supplemental appropriations for FY2007. The President signed the bill into law, P.L. 110-28, on May 25. In the House, the key vote to pass the bill was on approval of the rule, H.Res. 438, which was adopted by 218-201. The rule deemed the bill to be passed after the House adopted two amendments, which were subsequently approved by votes of the Senate then approved the House-passed measure by a vote of 80-14. The final bill provides money for military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere through the end of FY2007 on September 30, 2007. It does not set target dates for withdrawing troops from Iraq, as had Congress's first version of the FY2007 supplemental, H.R. 1591. The President vetoed that bill on May 1, and, on May 2, the House failed to override the veto on by a vote of 222-203, with approval of 2/3 required. Nor does the bill require a later vote to release part of the funds provided for operations in Iraq, as did the initial, May 10, House-passed version of H.R. 2206. The President had warned that he would also veto that bill. The final bill does, however, establish criteria for evaluating the performance of the Iraqi government, and it sets the stage for a renewed debate over Iraq policy, perhaps coming to a head in September. H.R. 2206/P.L. 110-28, as enacted, establishes eighteen political and security benchmarks for the Iraqi government to meet, and it makes $1.6 billion in new economic assistance to Iraq conditional on achieving progress toward those goals, or on the President waiving the requirements. The bill also requires a series of reports on progress in Iraq in July and again in September. And, in the House, H.Res. 438, the rule for considering H.R. 2206, requires a vote on a measure to withdraw most troops from Iraq by June 30, 2008, as the first item of business when the House considers FY2008 funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, which will likely be in September. In all, H.R. 2206/P.L. 110-28 provides $99.4 billion for the Department of defense, of which $94.7 billion is for military operations, $1.6 billion for military construction, and $3.1 billion for military base realignment and closure. The bill also provides $6.1 billion for international affairs, including assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan. And the bill provides $14.5 billion for domestic programs, including $6.3 billion for hurricane relief, $2.9 billion more than the Administration requested; $3.0 billion for agricultural disaster assistance; $1.8 billion for veteran's health programs; $1.1 billion for homeland security measures; $393 million for state children's health insurance program shortfalls; $465 million for fire fighting; $425 million for secure rural school; and $510 million for a variety of smaller programs. The final bill does not provide funds for pandemic flu preparedness or low income energy assistance that were included in earlier measures. The bill also increases the minimum wage and a includes package of $4.8 billion in offsetting tax cuts for businesses.

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109-121 , The Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act of 2005 (Water for the Poor Act). Key provisions of the law direct the Secretary of State, in consultation with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other implementing agencies, to develop and implement a strategy that boosts access to safe drinking water and sanitation; require the Department of State to report annually on U.S. efforts to expand global access to clean drinking water and sanitation; and urge USAID to raise resources for and attention on water and sanitation, and better integrate water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) activities within global health efforts. Support for the act was also tied to previously established commitments by the United States to support attainment of the Millennium Development Goals. In March 2012, USAID announced that it had joined the Sanitation and Water for All (SWA) partnership—a coalition of governments, donors, civil society, and development groups committed to advancing sustainable access to clean drinking water and sanitation. These programs are monitored and reported by the Department of State and implemented primarily by USAID and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Background Roughly 780 million people lack access to clean drinking water and some 2.5 billion people are without adequate sanitation facilities. Target 7C aims to halve, from 2000 levels, the share of people without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015. Clean Water While worldwide access to clean drinking water has progressed enough to reach the MDG target, 780 million people remain without access to clean drinking water. For a detailed synopsis of the bill, see Appendix C . U.S. Foreign Assistance for Water and Sanitation In FY2010, the United States spent some $953 million on water and sanitation programs worldwide, of which $898 million was obligated by USAID and MCC. In FY2011, for example, the President requested $260.4 million for water programs. Congress appropriated not less than $315 million for global water and sanitation programs in FY2012, slightly more than requested levels ($302 million). Global Water and Sanitation Efforts: Issues The Water for the Poor Act reflected congressional support for the Millennium Development Goals by calling for U.S. programs to halve the 2009 level of people without access to clean water and sanitation by 2015. Both the Water for the Poor Act and the proposed Water for the World Act, as introduced, outline a number of goals and actions for the Administration in relationship to improving global access to clean water and sanitation. Multi-year funding authority. Congress might also consider how to address incomplete compliance with reporting requirements. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the Paul Simon Water for the World Act ( S. 624 ), which was introduced in the 111 th Congress, reintroduced in the 112 th Congress as S. 641 , and would modify the goals outlined in the Water for Poor Act, would cost roughly $1.3 billion annually. The amended language would mandate the Special Coordinator for International Water to integrate the U.S. water and sanitation strategy into any strategy for global development, global health, or global food security that sets forth or establishes a U.S. mission for global development, guidelines for U.S. assistance, or how development policy will be coordinated with policies governing trade, immigration, and other relevant international issues; assess all U.S. foreign assistance allocated to water and sanitation over three fiscal years preceding enactment, across all United States government agencies and programs, including an assessment of the extent to which U.S. efforts are reaching and supporting the goal of enabling first-time access to safe water and sanitation on a sustainable basis for 100 million people in high priority countries; recommend what the United States Government would need to do to reach 100 million people; and identify best practices for mobilizing and leveraging the financial and technical capacity of business, governments, nongovernmental organizations, and civil society in forming public-private partnerships that measurably increase access to safe, affordable, drinking water and sanitation. P.L.

According to a 2012 report released by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), roughly 780 million people around the world lack access to clean drinking water and an estimated 2.5 billion people (roughly 40% of the world's population) are without access to safe sanitation facilities. The United States has long supported efforts to improve global access to clean water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH). In 2000, for example, the United States signed on to the Millennium Development Goals, one of which includes a target to halve the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015. In 2002, the United States also participated in the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, which emphasized the need to address limited access to clean water and sanitation among the world's poor. The 109th Congress enacted legislation to advance these global goals through the Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-121 [Water for the Poor Act]). In March 2012, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) announced that it had joined the Sanitation and Water for All partnership—a coalition of governments, donors, civil society and development groups committed to advancing sustainable access to clean drinking water and sanitation. Congressional support for the act was motivated, in part, by calls to augment funding for WASH programs and improve the integration of WASH activities into broader U.S. foreign aid objectives and programs, as well as global health efforts. The act called for USAID to bolster support for WASH programs, further synthesize WASH activities into global health programs, and contribute to global goals to halve the proportion of people without access to clean water and sanitation by 2015. In the 111th Congress, the Senator Paul Simon Water for the World Act of 2010 was introduced, but not enacted. That bill would have amended the Water for the Poor Act and addressed several concerns observers raised regarding the Water for the Poor Act, particularly by creating senior leadership within USAID to address water and sanitation issues, assessing U.S. water and sanitation programs, and strengthening reporting requirements. A new bill, introduced in the 112th Congress as the proposed Water for the World Act (S. 641), awaits action by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Several agencies contribute to U.S. efforts to improve global access to clean drinking water and sanitation, of which programs implemented by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and USAID make up roughly 90%. In FY2010, for example, the United States invested $953 million on water and sanitation programs worldwide, including $898 million provided by USAID and MCC. Appropriations for water projects are provided to USAID annually, while MCC receives multi-year funding for its country compacts that include support for water projects. As such, spending by MCC on water projects may vary significantly from year to year and may not be requested annually. The President requested $302 million for USAID's water activities for FY2012 and Congress appropriated not less than $315 million for international water and sanitation programs through the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations. The FY2013 request for USAID's water and sanitation efforts was slightly lower at $299.1 million. This report addresses congressional efforts to address limited access to clean drinking water and sanitation, outlines related programs implemented by USAID and MCC, and analyzes issues related to U.S. and international drinking water and sanitation programs that the 112th Congress might consider.

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Determining trust or restricted status involves Department of the Interior (DOI or department) records. Challenges to Taking Land into Trust Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak: Six-Year Statute of Limitations Applies to Land-into-Trust Decisions Until the U.S. Supreme Court's June 2012 decision in Match-E-Be - Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak , there was an assumption that U.S. sovereign immunity under the Quiet Title Act barred challenges to any decision of the Secretary to take land into trust once title has passed to the United States. Moreover, the Court held that the Federal Administrative Procedure Act's judicial review provision permitted suits within its six-year statute of limitations period. Decisions by the SOI or the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs (AS-IA) are final agency actions. Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California: Challenge to Validity of Trust Acquisition for a Tribe Not Recognized in 1934 Is Not Subject to Collateral Attack Decades Later In a June 4, 2015, en banc decision, in Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a claim that land taken into trust for a tribe not recognized in 1934 may not be raised decades after the trust acquisition in a collateral attack on the trust acquisition. One exception, sometimes referred to as a two-part determination, permits gaming on lands newly taken into trust with the consent of the governor of the state in which the land is located after the SOI (1) consults with state and local officials, including officials of other tribes; (2) determines "that a gaming establishment on the newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members"; and (3) determines that gaming "would not be detrimental to the surrounding community." 2. 4. 5. A tribe may have gaming on lands representing "the restoration of lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal recognition." Contiguous Lands IGRA exempts newly acquired trust lands "within and contiguous to the boundaries of the reservation of the Indian tribe on October 17, 1988." The rule elaborates on this by setting forth three methods by which land resulting from a land claim may qualify for this exception: (1) the land may have been the subject of land claim settlement legislation; (2) the land may have been acquired under the settlement of a land claim executed by the parties, including the United States, which returns some land to the tribe and "extinguishes or resolves with finality the claims regarding the land returned"; or (3) the land may have been acquired under the settlement of a land claim not executed by the United States but entered into as a final court order or "an enforceable agreement that in either case predates October 17, 1988 and resolves or extinguishes with finality the land claim at issue." DOI Review of the Standards for Taking Land into Trust for Gaming and Determination to Rescind the Guidance DOI conducted consultation sessions with tribal leaders throughout the United States focusing on the need for the Guidance; whether any of the provisions of the regulation on qualifying newly acquired land for gaming, 25 C.F.R., Part 292, Subparts A and C, as previously promulgated, should be revised; and whether compliance with the land acquisition regulation, 25 C.F.R., Part 151, should come prior to the two-part determination for taking off-reservation land into trust. Two of these bills were enacted: Section 2601(h)(4)(A) of P.L. 111-11 , 123 Stat. 991, 1115, transfers certain federal land to the SOI to be held in trust for the benefit of the Washoe Tribe and states that such land "shall not be eligible, or considered to have been taken into trust, for class II or class III gaming (as those terms are defined in section 4 of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. P.L. 111-323 prohibits gaming on federal land transferred to the Hoh Tribe. 112-97 , relating to land to be taken into trust for the Quileute Indian Tribe in the state of Washington, and P.L. 112-212 , transferring certain federal land in trust for the Bridgeport Indian Colony. 113th Congress P.L. 113-179 , the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, ratified the DOI's May 15, 2005, trust acquisition of the land at issue in Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of-Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak and required that any federal court action relating to that land should be dismissed. 113-134 , providing for the trust acquisition of certain federal land for the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona; and P.L. 113-127 , taking certain Bureau of Land Management land into trust for the benefit of the Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians and prohibiting IGRA class II and class III gaming on that land. It would have applied to three of the exceptions to IGRA's general prohibition of gaming on lands acquired after IGRA's enactment: land claim settlement, initial reservation for a newly acknowledged tribe, or restoration of lands for a newly restored tribe. 114th Congress Two bills enacted in the 114 th Congress contained gaming prohibitions in connection with land-into-trust acquisitions: P.L. 114-69 , the Albuquerque Indian School Land Transfer Act, requiring the SOI to take certain land into trust for 19 Pueblos and specifying that "[n]o class I gaming, class II gaming, or class III gaming ... shall be carried out on the Federal land taken into trust" and P.L. H.R.

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) ( P.L. 100-497 ) generally prohibits gaming on lands acquired for Indians in trust by the Secretary of the Interior (SOI or Secretary) after October 17, 1988. The exceptions, however, raise the possibility of Indian gaming proposals for locations presently unconnected with an Indian tribe. Among the exceptions are land (1) acquired after the SOI determines acquisition to be in the best interest of the tribe and not detrimental to the local community and the governor of the state concurs; (2) acquired for tribes that had no reservation on the date of enactment of IGRA; (3) acquired as part of a land claim settlement; (4) acquired as part of an initial reservation for a newly recognized tribe; and (5) acquired as part of the restoration of lands for a tribe restored to federal recognition. An implementing regulation was issued on May 20, 2009. It specifies the standards to be satisfied by tribes seeking to conduct gaming on lands acquired after October 17, 1988. The regulation includes limiting definitions of some of the statutory terms and considerable specificity in the documentation required for tribal applications. During the latter half of 2010, the Department of the Interior (DOI) conducted a series of consultation sessions with Indian tribes focusing on whether the implementing regulation should be revised. On June 13, 2011, DOI determined the regulation to be satisfactory and withdrew earlier departmental guidance, which had been issued before the regulation had become final. The guidance addressed how DOI handled tribal applications for off-reservation land acquisitions for gaming. It had elaborate requirements for a tribe to satisfy with respect to applications for gaming facilities not within commutable distances from the tribe's reservation. A June 2012 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak , appears to have increased the possibility for challenges to secretarial decisions to take land into trust by (1) ruling that individuals who are potentially harmed by the proposed use of land taken into trust have standing under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act to bring suit, and (2) holding that suits to challenge the legality of a DOI decision to take land into trust that do not claim title to the land are not precluded by the Quiet Title Act, which contains a waiver of sovereign immunity for quiet title actions against the United States, except for suits involving Indian title. Since the Patchak decision, there have been two noteworthy developments. First, the Bureau of Indian Affairs revised the land acquisition regulations to specify that, once there is final agency action, land is to be taken into trust immediately without a 30-day waiting period. Second, a June 4, 2015, en banc decision of a federal appellate court, Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California , 789 F. 3d 947 (9 th Cir. 2015), held that a challenge to the validity of a trust acquisition must be brought within the Administrative Procedure Act's six-year statute of limitations. Nine laws have been enacted in recent Congresses with gaming prohibitions in connection with specific lands being taken into trust: (1) P.L. 114-69 , the Albuquerque Indian School Land Transfer Act, which provides for trust acquisitions for 19 Pueblos and specifies that class I, class II, or class III gaming may not take place on the acquired trust land; (2) P.L. 114-181 , which transfers in trust "for non-gaming purposes" certain federal Bureau of Land Management land in California for the benefit of the Susanville Indian Ranchera; (3) P.L. 113-179 , the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, which ratified the DOI's May 15, 2005, trust acquisition of the land at issue in Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of-Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak , and required that any federal court action relating to that land should be dismissed; (4) P.L. 113-134 , which provides for the trust acquisition of certain federal land for the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona; (5) P.L. 113-127 , which provides for taking certain Bureau of Land Management land into trust for the benefit of the Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians and prohibiting IGRA class II and class III gaming on the land; (6) P.L. 112-97 , which authorizes the acquisition of certain land for the Quileute Indian Tribe in the state of Washington; (7) P.L. 112-212 , which declares certain federal land to be held in trust for the Bridgeport Indian Colony; (8) Section 2601(h)(4)(A) of P.L. 111-11 , which prohibits class II and class III gaming on land that the provision transfers to be held in trust for the Washoe Tribe; and (9) P.L. 111-323 , which prohibits gaming on federal land transferred to the Hoh Tribe. Legislation proposed in the 114 h Congress includes two bills, S. 732 and H.R. 249 , which would amend the Indian Reorganization Act to make all federally recognized Indian tribes eligible for trust land acquisition. There are also a number of bills providing federal recognition of or land acquisitions for particular tribes with provisions restricting IGRA gaming for those tribes or on those lands.

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The report offers a brief overview of what is currently known about the U.S. population of students with disabilities in secondary and postsecondary education. It is the primary federal act providing for special education and related services for children with disabilities between birth and 21 years old. Approximately 13% of the K-12 student population received IDEA services in the 2013-2014 school year (SY). The 1997 and 2004 amendments to the IDEA have supported students with disabilities graduating with regular diplomas and transitioning to postsecondary education by increasing local education agencies' (LEAs) accountability for improving the performance of students with IEPs, emphasizing students' progress toward meaningful educational and postsecondary goals in the IEP process, and requiring states to develop IDEA performance goals and indicators, including dropout and graduation rates, and to report to the Secretary of Education (the Secretary) and the public on the progress of the state and of students with disabilities in the state toward these indicators at least every two years. Recently, in addition to AFGR data for the general population of high school students, ED has begun releasing a more precise estimate called a four-year adjusted cohort graduation rate (ACGR). The result was the first National Longitudinal Transition Study (NLTS), a five-year study beginning in SY1985-1986 that tracked a nationally representative sample of more than 8,000 students representing each of the federal disabilities categories. In addition, the NLTS2 found that a majority of secondary school-aged students with disabilities (60%) continued on to postsecondary education within eight years of leaving high school, and most of them began postsecondary studies within a year of leaving high school. In the most recent administration of the NPSAS (SY2011-2012), 11% of undergraduates and 5% of post-baccalaureate students reported having a disability. For example, the increase in postsecondary students self-identifying as disabled as they grow older may reflect more about the reluctance of students who have recently exited high school special education programs to adopt the disability label in their new postsecondary institution than it does about actual increases in the number of disabilities among older undergraduate students. Factors Contributing to High School Graduation and College Enrollment Trends among Transition-Aged Students with Disabilities High school graduation and college enrollment have increased considerably for all students in recent decades. According to ED data, more than two-thirds of students with autism (68%) and three-quarters of students with TBI (75%) graduated from high school with a regular diploma in SY2014-2015.

In recent decades, many federal policies have attempted to help prepare students with disabilities to complete high school and to continue into postsecondary education. Corollary interest has arisen in being able to track the progress being made toward achieving these aims. This report offers a brief overview of what is currently known about the U.S. population of students with disabilities as they advance through secondary education and into postsecondary education. It devotes particular attention to high school graduation trends and data on postsecondary enrollment. Within the limitations of available data, some of the noteworthy information presented in the report includes the following: Roughly 70% of high-school aged students receiving services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the primary federal act providing services to students with disabilities in elementary and secondary schools, graduated with a regular high school diploma in the 2014-2015 school year (SY), up substantially from the 27% receiving regular diplomas nearly 20 years earlier. A different measure of graduation rates, the four-year adjusted cohort graduation rate (ACGR), which captures those graduating within four years of entering high school, suggests that in SY2014-2015 roughly 65% of students with disabilities graduated high school within that time frame, compared to approximately 82% of the total population of students. Data on post-high school experiences of a nationally representative sample of 13 to 16 year old students receiving special education services in 2000 (who were followed for eight years through the National Longitudinal Transition Study-2) found that 60% enrolled in postsecondary education within eight years of leaving high school; two-year postsecondary programs were the most common destination. More recent data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study, examining a nationally representative sample of all students enrolled in postsecondary institutions in SY2011-2012, indicates that roughly 11% of all undergraduates and 5% of all post-baccalaureate students self-identify as having a disability, with higher percentages among older undergraduate students (16%) and veterans (21%); however, there are many known limitations associated with self-reported data of this nature.

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The bill also provides funds for agencies in two other departments—the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture, and the Indian Health Service (IHS) in the Department of Health and Human Services—as well as funds for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). FY2012 Overview FY2012 Enacted Appropriations On December 23, 2011, Congress enacted H.R. 2055 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ). Division E contained $29.23 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies in FY2012. This figure included an across-the-board reduction of 0.16%, which was $47.0 million. The FY2012 level was a $381.4 million (1.3%) decrease from the FY2011 level ($29.61 billion) and a $2.11 billion (6.7%) decrease from the President's request for FY2012 ($31.34 billion). While the Administration had primarily proposed increases over FY2011 for major agencies funded by the bill, the FY2012 law included few increases over FY2011. One increase in the FY2012 law was $244.2 million (6%) for the Indian Health Service, and another was $51.9 million (7%) for the Smithsonian Institution. While the FY2012 law reduced most agencies from the FY2011 levels, the amount of reduction varied. Among the enacted decreases were the following: $219.1 million (3%) for the Environmental Protection Agency, $83.4 million (2%) for the Forest Service, $27.3 million (1%) for the National Park Service, and $25.3 million (2%) for the Fish and Wildlife Service. Prior Action No regular FY2012 appropriations bill for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies was enacted before the October 1, 2011, start of the fiscal year. Thus, from October 1, 2011, until the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, agencies and activities in the bill were funded through a series of continuing appropriations laws. No bill to fund Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2012 was introduced in the Senate. However, on October 14, 2011, the chair and ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies released a draft bill for FY2012. From July 25, 2011, to July 28, 2011, the House had considered H.R. 2584 , providing FY2012 appropriations for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies, but it came to no resolution thereon. Major Issues Congress typically debates a variety of funding and policy issues when considering each year's appropriations legislation. For FY2012, these issues included regulatory actions of the Environmental Protection Agency, energy development onshore and offshore, wildland fire fighting, royalty relief, Indian trust fund management, climate change, DOI science programs, endangered species, wild horse and burro management, and agency reorganizations. Other issues included appropriate funding levels for Bureau of Indian Affairs law enforcement and education; Indian Health Service construction and contract health services; wastewater/drinking water needs; the arts; land acquisition through the Land and Water Conservation Fund; and the Superfund program.

The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except for the Bureau of Reclamation, and for agencies within other departments—including the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also includes funding for arts and cultural agencies, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and numerous other entities. On December 23, 2011, Congress enacted H.R. 2055, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74). Division E contained $29.23 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies in FY2012. This figure included an across-the-board reduction of $47.0 million. The FY2012 appropriation was a $381.4 million (1.3%) decrease from the FY2011 level ($29.61 billion) and a $2.11 billion (6.7%) decrease from the President's request for FY2012 ($31.34 billion). While the Administration had primarily proposed increases over FY2011 for major agencies funded by the bill, the FY2012 law included few increases over FY2011. However, one notable increase in the FY2012 law was $244.2 million (6%) for the Indian Health Service, and another was $51.9 million (7%) for the Smithsonian Institution. While the FY2012 law reduced most agencies from the FY2011 levels, the amount of reduction varied. Among the enacted decreases were the following: $219.1 million (3%) for the Environmental Protection Agency, $83.4 million (2%) for the Forest Service, $27.3 million (1%) for the National Park Service, and $25.3 million (2%) for the Fish and Wildlife Service. Neither the House nor the Senate passed a free-standing regular, annual appropriations bill for FY2012. From July 25, 2011, to July 28, 2011, the House had considered H.R. 2584, but it came to no resolution thereon. No bill to fund Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2012 was introduced in the Senate. However, on October 14, 2011, the leaders of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies released a draft bill for FY2012. Because no regular appropriations bill was enacted before the October 1, 2011, start of the fiscal year, agencies and activities in the bill were funded through a series of continuing appropriations laws until the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. Congress typically debates a variety of funding and policy issues when considering each year's appropriations legislation. Issues debated during consideration of FY2012 legislation included regulatory actions of the Environmental Protection Agency, energy development onshore and offshore, wildland fire fighting, royalty relief, Indian trust fund management, climate change, DOI science programs, endangered species, wild horse and burro management, and agency reorganizations. Other issues included appropriate funding levels for Bureau of Indian Affairs law enforcement and education; Indian Health Service construction and contract health services; wastewater/drinking water needs; the arts; land acquisition through the Land and Water Conservation Fund; and the Superfund program.

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The United States-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement (2006 SLA), which entered into force with amendments on October 12, 2006, establishes Canadian export charges, with the level generally depending on average lumber prices, except for lumber from logs harvested in the Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Atlantic Provinces. As required under the 2006 SLA, the United States has revoked its antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) orders on softwood lumber, and 80% of the estimated duties collected are being returned to importers of record. Concerns among U.S. lumber producers about softwood lumber imports from Canada have been raised for decades; the current dispute has persisted for 25 years. U.S. producers argue that they have been harmed by unfair competition, which they assert results from subsidies to Canadian producers, primarily in the form of low provincial stumpage fees (fees for the right to harvest trees from province-owned timberlands) and Canadian restrictions on log exports. In 1986, the U.S. lumber industry filed a petition for another CVD investigation. On December 30, 1986, the day before the final DOC subsidy determination was to be issued, the United States and Canada signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Canada imposing a 15% tax on lumber exported to the United States, to be replaced by higher stumpage fees within five years. The 1996 SLA was effective through March 31, 2001. Industry Analysis: Subsidies and Injury Annual Canadian lumber imports have risen from less than 3 billion board feet (BBF), about 7% of the U.S. market, in the early 1950s to more than 18 BBF, more than a third of the U.S. market, since the late 1990s. U.S. lumber producers argue that subsidies to Canadian producers give them an unfair advantage in supplying the U.S. market and that this has injured U.S. producers. This contrasts with the U.S. situation, where 42% of the forests are publicly owned and where public timber is typically sold in competitive auctions; thus, much of the timber in the United States is sold by public and private landowners at market prices. U.S. homebuilders and other lumber users counter that Canadian lumber is essential to meeting domestic demand, and argue for unrestricted imports. The DOC also aligned, and postponed until March 25, 2002, final determinations in the CVD and AD cases. Canadian producers also filed claims against the U.S. government under the investor-state dispute settlement provisions of NAFTA, arguing that the imposition of the AD and CVD duties had caused the United States to breach obligations owed Canadian investors in the United States under NAFTA Chapter 11. As a result, duty deposits on these entries were to be returned. Other U.S. These determinations were later challenged by Canada in WTO compliance proceedings. Export Restraints as Subsidies (DS194) As noted earlier, the DOC recognized the countervailability of export restrictions in its 1992 determination that Canadian softwood lumber was subsidized. The 2006 U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement On April 26, 2006, the United States and Canada announced a tentative agreement to terminate the AD and CVD duties and related litigation. An early version of the agreement was signed on July 1, 2006, with a finalized version signed September 12, 2006.

U.S. lumber producers have long raised concerns about softwood imports from Canada. They argue that Canada subsidizes its lumber producers with low provincial stumpage fees (for the right to harvest trees). In Canada, the provinces own 90% of the timberlands, which contrasts with the United States, where 42% of timberlands are publicly owned and where government timber is often sold competitively; these differences in land tenure make comparisons difficult. U.S. producers also argue that Canadian log export restrictions subsidize producers by preventing others from getting access to Canadian timber; U.S. log exports from federal and state lands are also restricted, but logs are exported from U.S. private lands. Finally, U.S. producers argue that they have been injured by imports of Canadian lumber. They point to the growth in Canadian exports and market share, from less than 3 billion board feet (BBF) and 7% of the U.S. market in 1952 to more than 18 BBF per year and a market share of more than 33% since the late 1990s. Canadians counter these arguments, asserting that their stumpage fees are based on markets, that the WTO prohibits treating export restrictions as subsidies, and that the U.S. industry has been unable to satisfy the growth in U.S. lumber demand for homebuilding and other uses. The United States initiated investigations of Canadian subsidies—a prerequisite for establishing countervailing duties (CVDs)—in 1982, 1986, and 1991. Subsidy findings led to a 15% Canadian tax on lumber exports in 1986 and a 6.51% CVD in 1992. Canada challenged the CVD, which was revoked in 1994. A 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement restricted Canadian exports until March 31, 2001. U.S. producers filed antidumping (AD) and CVD petitions immediately after the 1996 agreement expired. U.S. agencies determined that Canadian lumber was subsidized and was being dumped and that the imports threatened to injure U.S. industry. Final AD and CV duties of 27% were imposed in May 2002, although lumber duties were later lowered as a result of annual Commerce Department reviews. Canada filed NAFTA and WTO cases and, with Canadian producers, suits in U.S. federal court challenging U.S. agency actions in the AD and CVD investigations. Canadian companies also filed claims against the United States under the NAFTA investment chapter. On July 1, 2006, the United States and Canada signed a Softwood Lumber Agreement (2006 SLA) to end the dispute. A finalized version was signed September 12, 2006, and, with subsequent amendments, entered into force October 12, 2006. Among other things, the seven-year agreement provides for the settlement of pending litigation and establishes Canadian export charges, varying by weighted average lumber prices and lower if the Canadian exporting region also accepts volume restraints. The United States has revoked the AD and CVD orders, with at least 80% of the duty deposits being returned to the importers of record. The remaining 20% is being used to fund lumber-related entities and initiatives provided for in the agreement.

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Introduction The privacy and security of health information is recognized as a critical element of transforming the health care system through the use of health information technology. As part of H.R. 1 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the 111 th Congress is considering legislation to promote the widespread adoption of health information technology (HIT), and the bill includes provisions dealing with the privacy and security of health records, and specifically authorizes state attorneys general to file lawsuits in federal court on behalf of state residents, seeking injunctive relief or civil damages against "any person" who violates HIPAA's privacy provisions. These Administrative Simplification provisions require the Secretary of HHS to adopt national standards to facilitate the electronic exchange of information for certain financial and administrative transactions; select or establish code sets for data elements; protect the privacy of individually identifiable health information; maintain administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for the security of health information; provide unique health identifiers for individuals, employers, health plans, and health care providers; and to adopt procedures for the use of electronic signatures. Health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who transmit financial and administrative transactions electronically are required to use standardized data elements and comply with the national standards and regulations promulgated pursuant to Part C. Failure to comply with the regulations may subject the covered entity to civil or criminal penalties. Parts 160 and 164, was adopted as the national standard for the protection of individually identifiable health information. The HIPAA Privacy Rule governs the use and disclosure of protected health information by HIPAA-covered entities (health plans, health care providers, and health care clearinghouses). The HIPAA Privacy Rule permits use and disclosure of protected health information, without an individual's authorization or consent, for 12 national priority purposes. The HIPAA Security Rule Regulations governing security standards under HIPAA require health care covered entities to maintain administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information; to protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such information, as well as protect against any unauthorized uses or disclosures of such information. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has been delegated authority to enforce the HIPAA Security Standard. The HIPAA Administrative Simplification Enforcement Rule On February 16, 2006, HHS published the Final Enforcement Rule, with both procedural and substantive provisions, applicable to all HIPAA administrative simplification standards in Part C. The final rule went into effect March 16, 2006. Complaints to the Secretary The Privacy Rule permits any person to file an administrative complaint for violations. DOJ Criminal Enforcement Actions Criminal convictions have been obtained in four cases involving employees of covered entities who improperly obtained protected health information. HHS Enforcement of the HIPAA Privacy Rule According to recently released data from HHS, from April 2003, when enforcement of the Privacy Rule began, to December 31, 2008, approximately 41,107 health information privacy complaints were filed with HHS. HHS found authority to investigate and resolve 7,729 cases. Concerns have been raised by some that the HIPAA Privacy Rule is being underenforced by the U.S. Although authorized to do so by Federal regulations as of February 16,2006, CMS had not conducted any HIPAA Security Rule compliance reviews of covered entities.

The privacy and security of health information is recognized as a critical element of transforming the health care system through the use of health information technology. As part of H.R. 1, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the 111th Congress is considering legislation to promote the widespread adoption of health information technology which includes provisions dealing with the privacy and security of health records. For further information, see CRS Report RS22760, Electronic Personal Health Records, by [author name scrubbed]. P.L. 104-191, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), directed HHS to adopt standards to facilitate the electronic exchange of health information for certain financial and administrative transactions. Health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers are required to use standardized data elements and comply with the national standards and regulations. Failure to do so may subject the covered entity to penalties. The HIPAA Privacy Rule was adopted by HHS as the national standard for the protection of health information. It regulates the use and disclosure of protected health information by health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who transmit financial and administrative transactions electronically; establishes a set of basic consumer protections; permits any person to file an administrative complaint for violations; and authorizes the imposition of civil or criminal penalties. Enforcement of the Privacy Rule began in 2003. The HIPAA Security Rule was adopted by HHS as the national standard for the protection of electronic health information. It requires covered entities to maintain administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information; to protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such information, as well as protect against any unauthorized uses or disclosures of such information. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has been delegated authority to enforce the HIPAA Security Standard, effective February 16, 2006. On March 16, 2006, the Final HIPAA Administrative Simplification Enforcement Rule became effective. The Enforcement Rule has both procedural and substantive provisions, and is applicable to all HIPAA administrative simplification standards. The Enforcement Rule establishes procedures for the imposition of civil money penalties for violations of the rules. Lawmakers and others are examining the statutory and regulatory framework for enforcement of the HIPAA Privacy and Security standards, and ways to ensure that agencies use their enforcement authority under HIPAA to address improper uses and disclosures of protected health information. Concerns have been raised by some that the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules are being under enforced by HHS, DOJ, and CMS. Of approximately 41,107 health information privacy complaints filed with HHS since 2003, HHS found authority to investigate and resolve 7,729 cases. Criminal convictions have been obtained by DOJ in four cases involving employees of covered entities who improperly obtained protected health information. Since February 2006, CMS has not conducted any HIPAA Security Rule compliance reviews. This report provides an overview of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, and of the statutory and regulatory enforcement scheme. In addition, it summarizes enforcement activities by HHS, DOJ, and CMS. This report will be updated.

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Introduction: The Price Versus Quantity Debate In general, market-based mechanisms to reduce GHG emissions, the most important being carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), focus on specifying either the acceptable emissions level (quantity) or the compliance costs (price) and allowing the marketplace to determine the economically efficient solution for the other variable. For example, a tradeable permit program sets the amount of emissions allowable under the program (i.e., the number of permits available limits or caps allowable emissions), while permitting the marketplace to determine what each permit will be worth. Likewise, a carbon tax sets the maximum unit cost (per ton of CO 2 equivalent) that one should pay for reducing emissions, while the marketplace determines how much actually gets reduced. In one sense, preference for a carbon tax or a tradeable permit system depends on how one views the uncertainty of costs involved and benefits to be received. Addressing Costs Through Market Mechanisms: Resolving the Price-Quantity Issue Three events provide impetus for revisiting the cost issue with respect to designing a greenhouse gas reduction program. The first is the election of a new President publicly committed to substantial reductions in greenhouse gases over the next several decades. The second was passage of H.R. 2454 by the House that would mandate a 83% reduction in the country's greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 by 2050. The reduction would be primarily achieved through a market-based, cap-and-trade program, beginning in 2012. The third is the Copenhagen Accord that may begin the process of incorporating developing countries in a global climate change framework by committing them to implement "mitigation actions," along with monitoring, reporting, and verification procedures "in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties." Facets of the cost issue that have raised concern include absolute costs to the economy, distribution of costs across industries, competitive impact domestically and internationally, incentives for new technology, and uncertainty about possible costs. Market-based mechanisms attempt to address the cost issue by introducing flexibility into the implementation process. The cornerstone of that flexibility is permitting sources to decide their appropriate implementation strategy within the parameters of market signals and other incentives. That signal can be as simple as a carbon tax or comprehensive credit auction that tells the emitter the value of any reduction in greenhouse gases, to a credit marketplace that is constrained by a ceiling price (safety valve) and includes incentives for new technology. As illustrated here, the combinations of market mechanisms are numerous, allowing decision makers to tailor the program to address specific concerns. In a sense, the options discussed here represent a continuum between alternatives focused on the price side of the equation (e.g., carbon taxes) through hybrid schemes (e.g., safety valves) to alternatives focused on the quantity side (e.g., banking and borrowing). They are tools to assist in the assessment of potential greenhouse gas reduction approaches, leaving any policy decision on balancing the price-quantity issue to the ultimate decision makers.

Three events provide impetus for revisiting the cost issue with respect to designing a greenhouse gas reduction program. The first is the election of a new President publicly committed to substantial reductions in greenhouse gases over the next several decades. The second was passage of H.R. 2454 by the House that would mandate a 83% reduction in the country's greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 by 2050. The reduction would be primarily achieved through a market-based, cap-and-trade program, beginning in 2012. The third is the Copenhagen Accord that may begin the process of incorporating developing countries in a global climate change framework by committing them to implement "mitigation actions," along with monitoring, reporting, and verification procedures "in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties." Facets of the cost issue that have raised concern include absolute costs to the economy, distribution of costs across industries, competitive impact domestically and internationally, incentives for new technology, and uncertainty about possible costs. Market-based mechanisms address the cost issue by introducing flexibility into the implementation process. The cornerstone of that flexibility is permitting sources to decide for themselves their appropriate implementation strategy within the parameters of market signals and other incentives. That signal can be as simple as a carbon tax or comprehensive credit auction that tells the emitter the value of any reduction in greenhouse gases, to a credit marketplace that is constrained by a ceiling price (safety valve) and includes incentives for new technology. As illustrated here, the combinations of market mechanisms are numerous, allowing decision makers to tailor the program to address specific concerns. In general, market-based mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the most important being carbon dioxide (CO2), focus on specifying either the acceptable emissions level (quantity) or the compliance costs (price), and allowing the marketplace to determine the economically efficient solution for the other variable. For example, a tradeable permit program sets the amount of emissions allowable under the program (i.e., the number of permits available limits or caps allowable emissions), while allowing the marketplace to determine what each permit will be worth. Likewise, a carbon tax sets the maximum unit cost (per ton of CO2 equivalent) that one should pay for reducing emissions, while the marketplace determines how much actually gets reduced. In one sense, preference for a carbon tax or a tradeable permit system depends on how one views the uncertainty of costs involved and benefits to be received. The options discussed here represent a continuum between alternatives focused on the price side of the equation (e.g., carbon taxes) through hybrid schemes (e.g., safety valves) to alternatives focused on the quantity side (e.g., banking and borrowing). They are tools to assist in the assessment of potential greenhouse gas reduction approaches, leaving any policy decision on balancing the price-quantity issue to the ultimate decision makers.

crs_RL30163

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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 set up a depreciation system designed to equalize tax burdens on different types of assets. The recovery period for nonresidential structures was, however, lengthened in 1993. Economic conditions and practices that may bear on this issue have also changed. Lately, there has been some interest in reexamining this depreciation structure. For example, H.R. 4328 , The Omnibus consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998, mandated the Treasury Department to study current tax depreciation rules and how they relate to tax burdens. This report provides background information relating to tax depreciation of structures, including a discussion of the methods of measuring economic depreciation. The first section of this report provides a description and history of the treatment of structures under the depreciation system. The second section discusses the very complex problems associated with estimating economic depreciation rates and reviews the evidence from the economics literature on these rates. The third section compares, in light of evidence on economic depreciation, the tax burdens on equipment and alternative types of structures, how that tax burden has changed, and what changes, given economic depreciation estimates, would be necessary to restore equal tax burdens across basic asset categories. The fourth section of the paper discusses whether leverage should be taken into account in setting up depreciation rules (an argument which has been made in the past) and the evidence on leveraging rates across assets. (4) Effect of Tax Rules. Note that current depreciation rules for nonresidential structures produce smaller values than would be appropriate to measure economic depreciation, using these estimates. This evidence, therefore, suggests that debt to asset ratios for structures are not higher than for owners of other assets.

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 set up a depreciation system designed to equalize tax burdens on different types of assets. The recovery period for nonresidential structures was, however, lengthened in 1993. Economic conditions and practices that may bear on this issue have also changed. Lately, there has been some interest in reexamining this depreciation structure. For example, H.R. 4328, The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998, mandated the Treasury Department to study current tax depreciation rules and how they relate to tax burdens. This report provides background information relating to tax depreciation of structures, including a discussion of the methods of measuring economic depreciation. The first section of this report provides a description and history of the treatment of structures under the depreciation system. This analysis indicates that depreciation of nonresidential structures is more restrictive today than at any time since 1953, while depreciation on residential structures is more restrictive than it has been since 1971. The second section discusses the very complex problems associated with estimating economic depreciation rates and reviews the evidence from the economics literature on these rates. The third section compares, in light of evidence on economic depreciation, the tax burdens on equipment and alternative types of structures, how that tax burden has changed, and what changes, given economic depreciation estimates, would be necessary to restore equal tax burdens across basic asset categories. These estimates indicate that lengthening the life for equipment by about 4 years, or shortening the tax life for structures to around 20 years would restore equal treatment across assets. The fourth section of the paper discusses whether the use of debt finance, which has been argued to be greater for structures than for other assets, should be taken into account in setting up depreciation rules. This argument which has been made in the past. This analysis suggests that adjusting depreciation rules to address another tax distortion is less desirable than addressing the distortion directly. Moreover, there are other offsetting tax burdens on structures (such as property taxes), which could justify offsetting more generous rules. At any rate, the available evidence does not support the claim that structures are more leveraged than other assets. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

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Most Recent Developments On September 5, Department of Transportation (DOT) Secretary Mary Peters announced that the Highway Trust Fund faced a shortfall as soon as October 2008, due to lower than expected revenues in 2008, and called on Congress to immediately pass legislation transferring general fund revenues to the Trust Fund, a step that the Administration had previously opposed. On July 10, the Senate Committee on Appropriations approved S. 3261 , the FY2009 THUD appropriations bill, and ordered it to be reported. The committee recommended $109.4 billion in funding, $6.6 billion more than the amount requested by the Administration. On June 20, 2008, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation HUD (THUD) marked up an unnumbered draft FY2009 THUD appropriations bill. Instead, reports indicate that Congress will pass one or more continuing resolutions to keep the government operating after the end of FY2008, and complete the FY2009 appropriations process in calendar year 2009, when it will be dealing with a new Administration. The President's Budget Request The President's net FY2009 request for the programs covered by this appropriations bill is $102.5 billion (after scorekeeping adjustments). This is $36 million (less than 1%) below the comparable total enacted for FY2008. The President's FY2009 Budget requests $39.1 billion, a less than 4% increase in total, regular (non-emergency) budget authority for HUD. Congress is considering legislation that would provide money from the general fund to the Highway Account in order to forestall the Highway Account deficit in FY2009. The major funding changes requested from the FY2008 enacted levels were an increase of $644 million (7%) for transit; a decrease of $1.8 billion (-4%) in highway funding; a decrease of $525 million (-40%) in Amtrak funding (similar to requested decreases in FY2007 and FY2008 that were rejected by Congress); a decrease of $765 million (-22%) in the Federal Aviation Administration's Airport Improvement Program (similar to requested decreases in FY2007 and FY2008 that were rejected by Congress); and a decrease of $60 million (-54%) in funding for the Essential Air Service Program (similar to requested decreases in FY2007 and FY2008 that were rejected by Congress). On July 14, 2008, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out an FY2009 THUD appropriations bill, which included a recommendation that $8 billion be transferred from the general fund of the Treasury to the Highway Trust Fund to cover the shortfall. The House passed separate legislation ( H.R. The Administration request does include a cut to the Airport Improvement grant program. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) The President's budget requested $40.1 billion in new funding for federal highway programs for FY2009, a cut of $1.8 billion (-4%) below the comparable level of $42.0 billion provided in FY2008. Authorizing funding is not the same as appropriating the money, however, and it is not clear that additional funding on that scale would be available. Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Most of the funding for the activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts enacted by Congress. Surplus FHA fees have been used to offset the cost of the HUD budget.

The FY2009 Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies appropriations bill (THUD) provides funding for the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and five independent agencies related to those two departments. The Bush Administration requested net budgetary authority of $102.5 billion (after scorekeeping adjustments) for FY2009, a cut of $36 million (less than 1%) from the comparable FY2008 level. DOT would receive a net total of $63.5 billion, a cut of $1 billion from the comparable FY2008 level. HUD would receive $39.1 billion, an increase of 4% ($1.4 billion) over the comparable FY2008 level. However, the requested increase in net budget authority for HUD is largely attributable to a decline in the amount available to offset new funding in the HUD budget. The President's budget request would actually result in an overall decline in non-emergency appropriations for HUD's programs and activities of just over 1% from the FY2008 level. The House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on THUD reportedly marked up a draft FY2009 THUD appropriations bill on June 20, 2008. The details of that draft have not been made public. The full committee has not yet marked up the bill, and it is not clear that it will do so. The Senate Committee on Appropriations marked up an FY2009 THUD bill, S. 3261, on July 10, 2008. The Senate committee recommended $109.4 billion, $6.6 billion more than the Administration requested. Congressional leaders have been quoted in press reports indicating that they will not try to enact most of the FY2009 appropriations bills, including the THUD bill, until sometime after the next Administration has taken office in 2009. In the meantime, they reportedly intend to provide FY2009 funding for most federal agencies, including those in the THUD bill, through one or more continuing resolutions. Among the THUD appropriation issues facing Congress is the impending deficit in the Highway Trust Fund. The portion of the Fund that provides money for federal highway programs has long been projected to have a $3 billion deficit by the end of FY2009; the portion that provides money for transit projects is projected to run a deficit in FY2011. The House passed separate legislation (H.R. 6532) to transfer $8 billion from the general fund to the Highway Trust Fund to prevent the FY2009 shortfall. This legislation was opposed by the Administration. However, on September 5, 2008, the Administration announced that revenues to the Fund had declined more than expected in recent months, resulting in the Fund facing a shortfall as early as October 2008. The Administration is now urging Congress to immediately pass the legislation transferring money to the Highway Trust Fund. This report will be updated.

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T he labeling of genetically engineered (GE) foods, sometimes referred to as genetically modified foods (GMO foods), has been the subject of debate among members of the general public and federal and state governments. The Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) does not impose specific labeling requirements on a food just because it may or may not contain GE ingredients or was derived using GE techniques. Additionally, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has yet to issue formal regulations and policies on the labeling of GE food. However, this absence of direct federal regulation does not mean that GE foods are free from any federal oversight. Instead, labels of GE foods follow the same federal labeling requirements and guidelines outlined in the FFDCA and implementing regulations as non-GE foods. The United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) oversight over organic meat and poultry products involves the regulation of GE ingredients. However, the discussion of such oversight is beyond the scope of this report. Genetically Engineered Foods "Genetic engineering" refers to the scientific methods "use[d] to introduce new traits or characteristics to an organism. " Food and ingredients from GE plants were first introduced into the food supply in the mid-1990s. However, some states have enacted laws that specifically demand manufacturers disclose the presence of GE ingredients in certain foods on the label. This section first examines the federal statutory requirements that the FDA has highlighted as particularly relevant to the labeling of GE foods. Litigation & Labeling of GE Foods Consumer claims in litigation concerning GE food often focus on allegedly misleading or deceptive terms on the label when the food contains GE ingredients. Defendants in these cases typically make a motion to dismiss the case based on deference to the FDA's expertise in this area as articulated in the primary jurisdiction doctrine. However, courts have not consistently interpreted the primary jurisdiction doctrine in the context of GE labeling, creating some ambiguity as to when courts should defer to the FDA's expertise if the FDA has repeatedly declined to take action on this particular labeling issue. The court disagreed, stating that defining "natural" is not an issue of first impression. Legislation in the 114th Congress Several bills have also been introduced in the 114 th Congress that address labeling of GE foods. The Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015 would establish different certification programs and labeling requirements under the oversight of both the FDA and the USDA. In March 2016, Senator Merkley introduced S. 2621 , the "Biotechnology Food Labeling Uniformity Act."

Genetically engineered (GE) foods, sometimes referred to as genetically modified foods (GMO foods), are foods that are derived from scientific methods used to introduce new traits or characteristics to an organism. The labeling of GE foods has been the subject of debate among members of the general public and federal and state governments since the introduction of GE foods to the food supply in the 1990s. Federal law does not impose specific labeling requirements on a food just because it may or may not contain GE ingredients or was derived using GE techniques. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has yet to issue formal regulations and policies on the labeling of GE food. However, this absence of direct federal regulation does not mean that GE foods are free from any federal oversight. Instead, labels of GE foods follow the same federal labeling requirements and guidelines outlined in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) as non-GE foods. These labeling requirements prohibit false or misleading labels and address material information that may be relevant to the consumption of that food. However, some states have enacted laws that specifically demand manufacturers disclose the presence of GE ingredients in certain foods on the label. The United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) oversight over organic meat and poultry products involves the regulation of GE ingredients. However, the discussion of such oversight is beyond the scope of this report. In the context of this regulatory ambiguity, consumer claims in litigation concerning GE food often focus on allegedly misleading or deceptive terms on the label when the food contains GE ingredients. Defendants in these cases typically make a motion to dismiss the case on the basis of deference to the FDA's expertise in this area as articulated in the primary jurisdiction doctrine. However, courts have not consistently interpreted the primary jurisdiction doctrine (court deference to an agency when deciding an issue of first impression) in the context of GE labeling. This inconsistency has created further ambiguity concerning the broader issue of when courts should defer to the FDA's expertise if the FDA has repeatedly declined to take action on a particular regulatory issue. Several bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress that address labeling of GE foods, including the Genetically Engineered Food Right-to-Know Act (H.R. 913, S. 511) and the Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015 (H.R. 1599), the Biotechnology Food Labeling Uniformity Act (S. 2621), and S. 2609, which would amend the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946. Generally these bills would amend the FFDCA to impose specific labeling requirements disclosing information about GE techniques used in the production of a particular food product.

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The 111 th Congress has taken a broad approach to capturing the lessons on financial crises as part of the effort to evaluate possibilities for revamping the U.S. regulatory system. Latin America stands out as one region that has survived multiple financial crises, many of which crippled entire financial sectors. In the aftermath of such devastation, many countries undertook regulatory reform. Since then, Chile's financial sector has overcome many regional and global financial crises when other countries in the hemisphere could not. In so doing, soundness of the banking system has not compromised bank profitability, reflecting modernization, efficiency gains, and increased competition that paralleled development of effective prudential regulation and oversight. Conceptually, Chile's comprehensive reform had two fundamental principles: simplify and streamline prudential regulation and supervision. Under the G-30 report framework for financial regulation, Chile adopted what might be classified as an integrated approach to regulation. The architecture was reshaped, consolidated, and vastly strengthened by giving most regulatory responsibility to one agency, the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF). As stated in the General Banking Act, the Superintendent is appointed by the President of the Republic, and the SBIF has sweeping oversight powers for "banking enterprises irrespective of their nature and the financial entities whose control is not otherwise entrusted by law to a different institution...[and] shall also be in charge of the supervision of companies whose corporate purpose consists in the issuance or operation of credit cards." In addition to the standard 8% minimum Basel risk-weighted capital-asset ratio, Chilean banks have to meet capital requirements relative to reserves, deposits, and other liabilities. Capital must equal at least 3% of total assets. Perhaps taking a page from U.S. regulations, it was later expanded to cover up to 90% of an individual's total deposits in the banking system to a specified limit. Bank Supervision Oversight is based on a formal bank rating system following the CAMEL standards (capital, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and later bank management), Basel II guidelines, and additional limitations on bank investment activities (e.g. Conclusions: Chile's Relevance to the United States Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee on April 21, 2009 by three noted economists challenged policy makers to think very differently about how the financial sector should work and be regulated. In addressing the theme of the hearings, each conveyed the pitfalls of the "too big to fail" phenomenon, noting how loose or inappropriate regulation has led to "gargantuan," opaque firms that can be exploitive and difficult to regulate. The witnesses argued that only when risk is internalized and the promise of a bailout withheld will behavior begin to change. In particular, Chile has protected itself from severe repercussions of the current crisis, which, many argue, is no accident given the regulations in place that improve accountability by restricting risky behavior, enhancing transparency, and promoting a more traditional commercial banking model. The link between a sound financial sector and economic growth and development is now well documented, and evidence from Chile, many argue, suggests that although there may be tradeoffs between efficiency, growth and prudential regulation, over the long run, avoiding a major financial crisis may more than offset the opportunity costs of a more comprehensive regulatory environment, particularly if a proper balance can be achieved.

The 111th Congress has taken a broad approach to capturing the lessons on financial crises as part of the effort to evaluate possibilities for revamping the U.S. financial regulatory system. Latin America stands out as one region that has survived multiple financial crises, and in the aftermath of such devastation, many countries undertook comprehensive regulatory reform. Although a smaller developing economy, Chile provides one important example. Following two financial crises, one the result of extreme over regulation, the other of catastrophic under regulation, Chile redesigned its regulatory system in 1986. Since then, it has had one of the most stable financial systems in Latin America and has overcome regional and global financial crises when other countries in the hemisphere did not. In so doing, new-found soundness of the banking system has not compromised bank profitability, reflecting modernization and efficiency gains that paralleled development of effective prudential regulation and oversight. Chile's success rests on a 1986 overhaul of the General Banking Act. Conceptually, reform had two fundamental principles: simplify and streamline prudential regulation and supervision. Under the framework developed in the G-30 report, The Structure of Financial Supervision, Chile adopted what might be classified as an integrated approach to regulation. The architecture was reshaped, consolidated, and vastly strengthened by giving most regulatory responsibility to the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF), with supportive oversight by three other specialized agencies. The SBIF has sweeping oversight powers over "banking enterprises irrespective of their nature and the financial entities whose control is not otherwise entrusted by law to a different institution...[and] shall also be in charge of the supervision of companies whose corporate purpose consists in the issuance or operation of credit cards." Experience from Chile points to the value of establishing: (1) a strong, independent, and consolidated regulatory and oversight agency, with broad and definitive powers; (2) enhanced transparency through a number of specific reporting measures; (3) clear capital standards that include the 8% minimum Basel risk-weighted capital-asset ratio, capital requirements relative to reserves, deposits, and other liabilities, and total capital equal to at least 3% of total assets; (4) deposit insurance to cover up to 90% of an individual's total deposits capped at a specified limit; and (5) oversight based on a formal bank rating system following the CAMEL standards (capital, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and later bank management), Basel II guidelines, and additional limitations on bank investment activities. Chile's experience correlates with testimony by three noted economists before the Joint Economic Committee on April 21, 2009, who challenged policy makers to think very differently about how the financial sector should work and be regulated. In addressing the theme of the hearings, each conveyed the pitfalls of the "too big to fail" phenomenon, noting how loose or inappropriate regulation has led to "gargantuan," opaque firms that can be exploitive and highly difficult to regulate. The witnesses argued that only when risk is internalized and the promise of a bailout withheld will behavior begin to change. Chile has protected itself from severe repercussions of the current crisis, in part because of regulations in place that restrict risky behavior and promote a more traditional commercial banking model, although they are no guarantee of perpetual success in avoiding future crises. Still, the link between a sound financial sector and economic growth and development is now well documented, and evidence from Chile some argue suggests that although there may be tradeoffs between efficiency, growth and prudential regulation, over the long run, avoiding a major financial crisis may more than offset the opportunity costs of a more comprehensive regulatory environment, particularly if a proper balance can be achieved.

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Most Recent Developments The conference committee for military construction appropriations printed itsconference report ( H.Rept. 106-266 ) on July 27, 1999. The conference split the difference between theSenate-approved $8.3 billion and House-approved $8.5 billion amounts. The Senatepassed the conference report on August 3, 1999, by voice vote. The bill became law( P.L. The bill funds construction projectsand real property maintenance of the active Army, Navy & Marine Corps, Air Force,and their reserve components; defense-wide construction; U.S. contributions to theNATO Security Investment Program (formerly called the NATO InfrastructureProgram); and military family housing operations and construction. For FY2000, the Presidentrequested $5.4 billion in funding for the military construction program and advanceappropriations (2) request of $3.1 billion to be scoredin FY2001. The conference report agreed to a total $8.4 billion militaryconstruction appropriation, which is $776 million less than current FY1999 funding. The House passed the conference report on July 29, 1999, by a vote of 412-8. The Committee directed the Pentagon to submit futurerequests for specific military construction projects in support of drug interdiction andcounter-drug activities as a part of the budget request for military construction. Key Policy Issues Ongoing Congressional Concerns Split Funding and Advance Appropriations Proposal for the FY2000 Military Construction Budget Request. Long-term Planning for Military Construction. In hearings on the FY2000 military construction request, legislators expressedcontinuing concern over military construction planning and the sufficiency offunding. Implementation of the Privatization of Military Family Housing Initiative. The President proposes what the Congresscalls an inadequate military construction budget, especially for Guard and Reserveneeds. 103-337 ), however, incorporated Senator McCain's criteria as a "Sense of the Senate" provision, (9) providing that the unrequested projects should be: 1. essential to the DOD's national security mission, 2. not inconsistent with the Base Realignment and Closure Act, 3. in the services' Future Years Defense Plan (see above), 4. executable in the year they are authorized and appropriated, and 5. offset by reductions in other defense accounts, through advice from theSecretary of Defense. Major Funding Trends The Administration has proposed to split funding for FY2000 militaryconstruction projects between the FY2000 and the FY2001 budgets. Adding the FY2000 request with theadvance appropriations request brings the total value of the proposed FY2000military construction program to $8.5 billion. This total continues a downward trendfrom the FY1996 level of $11.2 billion, the FY1997 level of $9.8 billion, the FY1998level of $9.3 billion and the FY1999 level of $8.7 billion. 106-52 ) on August 17, 1999. Therest of the proposed FY2000 military construction program would be funded by anadvance appropriations of $3.1 billion in FY2001.

The military construction (MilCon) appropriations bill finances (1) military construction projects in the United States and overseas; (2) military family housing operations and construction;(3) U.S. contributions to the NATO Security Investment Program; and (4) most base realignment andclosure costs. This paper reviews the appropriations and authorization process for military construction. The congressional debate perennially centers on the adequacy of the President's budget for militaryconstruction needs and the necessity for congressional add-ons, especially for Guard and Reserveprojects. In recent years, Congress has pointed out that the Pentagon has not funded nor plannedadequately for military construction. The Administration has asked the Congress to approve an unusual funding mechanism for the FY2000 military construction program, in order to fit its defense budget request within the caps seton total discretionary spending in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997. For FY2000, theAdministration has requested budget authority of $5.4 billion, which is only part of the fundingnecessary to carry out the proposed projects. The rest of the FY2000 military construction programwould be funded by advance appropriations of $3.1 billion in FY2001. (In this advanceappropriations proposal, Congress would approve the $3.1 billion now for the FY2000 program,which would be spent and scored in FY2001.) Adding the split FY2000 request with the advanceappropriations request brings the total value of the proposed FY2000 military construction programto $8.5 billion. This total continues a downward trend from the FY1996 level of $11.2 billion, theFY1997 level of $9.8 billion, the FY1998 level of $9.3 billion and the FY1999 level of $8.7 billion. Appropriations and authorization hearings on the FY2000 military construction budget have highlighted the following issues: split funding and advance appropriations proposal for the FY2000 militaryconstruction budget request, long-term planning for the military construction program,and implementation of privatization of the military family housinginitiative. The conference committee for military construction appropriations printed its conference report ( H.Rept. 106-266 ) on July 27, 1999. The conference report agreed to a total $8.4 billion militaryconstruction appropriation, which is $776 million less than current FY1999 funding. The conferencesplit the difference between the Senate- approved $8.3 billion and House-approved $8.5 billionamounts. The House passed the conference report on July 29, 1999, by a vote of 412-8. The Senatepassed the conference report on August 3, 1999, by voice vote. The bill became law ( P.L. 106-52 )on August 17, 1999. Key Policy Staff Division abbreviations: FDT = Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade.

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Introduction The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA; P.L. Programs authorized by the HEA provide support for higher education in several ways, including providing support to students in financing a postsecondary education, with additional support and services given to less-advantaged students; providing support to students pursing international education and certain graduate and professional degrees; and providing support to IHEs in improving their capacity and ability to offer postsecondary education programs. The most prominent programs under the HEA are the Title IV programs that provide financial assistance to students and their families. The most recent comprehensive reauthorization of the HEA occurred in 2008 under the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA; P.L. 110-315 ), which authorized most HEA programs through FY2014. Following the passage of the HEOA, the SAFRA Act, as part of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA; P.L. Authorization for the appropriations for many HEA programs expired at the end of FY2014 and was automatically extended through the end of FY2015 under Section 422 of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA). Additionally, Congress provided appropriations beyond 2015 under a variety of appropriations legislation and continuing resolutions, most recently under the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. This report provides a brief overview of the major provisions of the HEA, organized by title and part. Title III: Institutional Aid Title III is one of the primary sources of institutional support authorized by the HEA. 111-152 , Title II, Part A) terminated the authority to make new FFEL program loans after June 30, 2010. This program has never been funded.

The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA; P.L. 89-329) authorizes numerous federal aid programs that provide support to both individuals pursuing a postsecondary education and institutions of higher education (IHEs). Title IV of the HEA authorizes the federal government's major student financial aid programs, which are the primary source of direct federal support to students pursuing postsecondary education. Titles II, III, and V of the HEA provide institutional aid and support. Additionally, the HEA authorizes services and support for less-advantaged students (select Title IV programs), students pursing international education (Title VI), and students pursuing and institutions offering certain graduate and professional degrees (Title VII). Finally, the most recently added title (Title VIII) authorizes more than two dozen other programs that support higher education; most have never been funded. The HEA was last comprehensively reauthorized in 2008 by the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 (HEOA; P.L. 110-315), which authorized most HEA programs through FY2014. Following the enactment of the HEOA, the HEA has been amended by numerous other laws, most notably the SAFRA Act, part of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA; P.L. 111-152), which terminated the authority to make federal student loans through the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program. Many HEA programs were authorized through FY2014 and were extended for an additional year, through FY2015, under the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA). Additionally, many HEA programs due to expire at the end of FY2015 were provided additional appropriations beyond FY2015 under a variety of appropriations legislation and continuing resolutions, and most recently under the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-245). This report provides a brief overview of the major provisions of the HEA.

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Introduction The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. As of July 2014, 14 states and the District of Columbia had secured HHS approval to create their own exchanges, 7 to enter into partnership exchanges, 29 to have federally facilitated exchanges, and 2 to have state-based SHOP/federally facilitated individual exchanges. The insurance policies, and the exchanges, were fully operational on January 1, 2014. An exchange is not an insurer, but is rather a type of marketplace where private insurance companies may sell qualified health plans (QHP) that meet certain federal standards. Consumers, businesses, and issuers are not required to use the exchanges to purchase insurance. Small businesses that apply for coverage through the exchanges may be eligible for small business tax credits. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that 25 million individuals will be enrolled in health insurance through the exchanges in 2024. Consumer Assistance Programs Under the ACA and implementing regulations issued by the HHS Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), consumer assistance outreach programs include the following: Mandatory navigator programs designed to provide "fair and impartial" information about exchange-based insurance plans, as well as the availability of federal assistance to help defray the cost of insurance and other health programs. In addition, consumers and businesses may use insurance brokers and agents, including web-based brokers (where allowed by states), to purchase QHPs. Brokers and agents, licensed by states, are generally paid a commission by insurance companies for selling their policies. A number of states have passed legislation to require navigators to have additional training and licensing, or to undergo background checks. This report outlines federal and state oversight of navigators, the role of brokers and agents, and previous education and outreach efforts for federal health care programs. CMS regulations to implement the ACA specify that navigators may offer consumers assistance in comparing and analyzing insurance options, but may not tell applicants which health plan to select. Insurance brokers and agents may apply to become navigators, but under CMS rules they may not accept compensation from health or stop loss insurers in this role. Organizations and individuals that apply for the navigator program are required to submit certain information to CMS, including a plan for carrying out outreach and education activities specified in the ACA and in CMS regulations; a description of existing relationships with employers and employees, consumers (including uninsured and underinsured consumers), or self-employed individuals likely to be eligible to enroll in a qualified health plan; or a description of how such relationships could be readily established; a statement attesting that the applicant is not ineligible for the program due to a financial or other relationship with health insurers; a plan to perform the statutory and regulatory duties of a navigator for the entire length of the agreement; an attestation that staff and volunteers will remain free of conflicts of interest while acting as a navigator; a plan to ensure that staff and volunteers complete all required training; and a plan to comply with data privacy and security standards. Health providers or other entities may not be disqualified from becoming certified application counselors solely because they receive payment from a health insurer for providing health care services. State exchanges may also develop their own training, with approval by HHS. Navigator and Non-navigator Training To be certified by an exchange, navigator and non-navigator personnel at federally facilitated exchanges, including partnership exchanges, and all federally funded non-navigators at state-based exchanges, must Complete 20 hours of HHS-approved training and receive a passing score on HHS-approved exams. States may set additional eligibility criteria and background checks for navigators and non-navigators, so long as they do not prevent the application of Title I of the Affordable Care Act. Exchange Website Agents and brokers may assist consumers and qualified small employers and their employees directly on an exchange website. CMS also worked through State Health Insurance and Assistance Programs (see below) and increased funding to the SHIPs to help expand outreach. Outstanding Issues Some lawmakers have raised questions and concerns about the navigator programs.

The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148) allows certain individuals and small businesses to buy qualified health insurance through state exchanges. The exchanges are not themselves insurers, but rather are special marketplaces where insurance firms may sell health policies that meet set, federal guidelines. As of July 2014, 14 states and the District of Columbia had secured HHS approval to create and run their own exchanges, 7 to enter into partnership exchanges, 29 to have federally facilitated exchanges, and two to have state-based SHOP/federally facilitated individual exchanges. An estimated 25 million individuals are expected to secure coverage through the exchanges by 2024. The ACA requires exchanges to perform outreach to help consumers and small businesses make informed decisions about their insurance options, including the operation of "navigator" programs. Navigators carry out public education activities; provide information to prospective enrollees about insurance options and federal assistance; and examine enrollees' eligibility for other federal or state health care programs, such as Medicaid. Navigators may assist consumers in comparing insurance plans, but may not determine their eligibility for subsidies or enroll them in plans—functions that are left to the exchanges. A variety of organizations may become navigators, including labor unions, trade associations, chambers of commerce, and other entities. Navigators may not be health insurers or take compensation from insurers for selling health policies. Navigators must have 20 hours of training on consumer privacy, exchange-based insurance offerings, and other issues. HHS has provided about $60 million in yearly grants for navigators at federally financed and state partnership exchanges. In addition, HHS has determined that state-based exchanges may use ACA exchange establishment funds to create parallel, in-person, non-navigator assistance programs that perform the same function as navigators. Exchanges must also certify "certified application counselors" to help with outreach and enrollment, though no new ACA funds are available for such programs. Consumers and small businesses may continue to use insurance brokers and agents, including web-based brokers, to compare and buy coverage, both on and off the exchanges. Brokers and agents are licensed by the states, and are generally paid on a commission basis by insurance companies. While brokers and agents may choose to become navigators, they may not accept compensation from health insurance companies in that role. Consumers may also purchase policies directly from health insurers. Outside non-profit groups and businesses, such as insurers, operate their own separate efforts to educate consumers about the ACA and the process of applying for qualified health plans (QHP) and other programs. Some lawmakers, agents, and brokers have raised questions about the navigator and other assistance programs. Issues include whether navigators have sufficient training and whether HHS regulations provide sufficiently stringent consumer and privacy safeguards. A number of states have passed legislation to further regulate navigators, including requiring navigators to be licensed and to be liable for financial losses due to their advice. HHS has determined that the ACA gives states authority to set additional standards, so long as they do not prevent implementation of Title I of the law, which includes the exchanges and navigator program. This report describes exchange outreach programs, the role of brokers, agents, and insurers, and issues regarding consumer outreach assistance.

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RS21582 -- North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options July 29, 2003 Background: Geography and Military Balance The Korean peninsula lies at a nexus of military, economic, and political concerns with global implications. U.S. Military Alternatives Should resort to force be deemed necessary, there are several military actions that the United States could contemplate to achievepolicy objectives on the Korean Peninsula. (6) Status Quo. Improve Defensive Posture. (12) Military Enforcement of Sanctions. (14) Preemptive Strike on Nuclear Facilities. (15) In this case, the possession of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles could threaten,now or in the short term, U.S. forces and allied populations in South Korea and Japan. Preemptive War. In theory, however, two policy objectives might be met.

North Korea has confronted the United States with its decision, failing other securityaccommodations, to pursue production of nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration has stated that, although thesituation isunacceptable, it will pursue its resolution through diplomatic means. Military means, however, could be consideredat some point andbecome a serious issue for Congress. This short report discusses the geography and military balance on the KoreanPeninsula,presents the range of military options that might be applied there to specific U.S. political objectives, and assessespossibleconsequences. Military options discussed are: status quo, improved defensive posture, enforce sanctions,preemptive strike againstnuclear facilities, and preemptive war. Also see CRS Issue Brief IB98045 on U.S.-Korean relations and CRS Issue Brief IB91141 onNorth Korea's nuclear weapons. This report will be updated if major changes occur.

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Instead of using the full Consumer Price Index (CPI) to adjust retired pay each year, as has been customary in recent years, Section 403 of the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) substituted the CPI less 1% for all current and future military retirees under the age of 62 (except those already receiving reduced COLAs under the Redux retirement option). At age 62, beneficiaries would receive a bump-up in their benefit level to the amount they would have received had a full COLA adjustment been included each year rather than the lower COLAs. In subsequent years, this new benefit level would be adjusted using the full CPI. According to CBO, this change would have saved the Department of Defense $6.235 billion over the decade. Most Recent Action In January, responding to concerns raised about the effect on disabled military retirees who tend to retire younger and have shorter life expectancies, Congress reversed the COLA adjustments in the BBA for disability retirees and survivor benefit recipients with passage of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. 3547 / P.L. 113-76 ). On February 11, 2014, the House passed an amended version of S. 25 , to modify the impact of the reduced COLA provision of the BBA so it only applied to individuals who become members of the uniformed services on January 1, 2014, or later. The Senate passed this amended version on February 12, and the President signed it into law ( P.L. 113-82 ) on February 15. Hence, all currently serving military personnel who joined before January 1, 2014, and all current retirees are effectively excluded ("grandfathered") from the COLA reduction provision of the BBA. Only those individuals who join in 2014 or later and subsequently qualify for non-disability retirement will ultimately be subject to the COLA provision (along with REDUX retirees, who opt into a reduced COLA retirement in exchange for a cash bonus). Since non-disability retirees typically must serve 20 years before qualifying for retirement, the first major cohort of non-disability retirees to be impacted by this provision will be those who retire in 2034. The average age of nondisabled current retirees is 61 for enlisted and 66 for officers, suggesting that many retirees would not have been affected by reduced COLAs under the original BBA or would have been subject to lower COLAs for fewer years than future retirees. To estimate the effect on future nondisabled military retirees under the BBA formula, CRS calculated average lifetime retirement income for enlisted and officer retirees with a full CPI adjustment and with the CPI less 1% as set in the Bipartisan Budget Act. Enlisted personnel would have received a total of about $1.67 million rather than $1.73 million in lifetime retirement benefits, a $69,000 or 4.0% reduction in a 36-year period; Officers would have received a total of $3.74 million rather than $3.83 million in lifetime retired pay, an $87,000 or 2.3% reduction in a 36-year period (see Table 2 ). Based on those data, CRS estimated that lifetime retired benefits for the average disabled military retiree would have been affected as follows if the reduced COLAs had remained in effect.

In addition to raising budget caps in FY2014 and FY2015, the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) reduced the cost of living adjustments (COLAs) provided to working-age military retirees under the age of 62 from the full Consumer Price Index (CPI) to the CPI less 1%. Military retirees would then receive a "bump-up" at age 62 that would raise their benefit level to an amount that included full rather than partial CPI adjustments for each year below the age of 62. This new benefit level would then be increased for full CPI adjustments in later years. According to CBO, this change would have saved the Department of Defense $6.235 billion over the decade. Based on data published by the Department of Defense (DOD) Actuary about the characteristics of FY2012 military retirees and CBO projections of the CPI, CRS estimates that for the average nondisabled future retiree, lifetime retirement income under the BBA's lower COLA would be about: $1.67 million rather than $1.73 million in lifetime retired pay, a $69,000 or 4.0% reduction for enlisted personnel; and $3.74 million rather than $3.83 million in lifetime retired pay, an $87,000 or 2.3% reduction for officers. The impact of the BBA's reduced COLAs on disabled retirees would have been larger because they tend to retire younger and thus would have faced COLA reductions for more years. CRS estimates that the lifetime retirement income for disability retirees under the BBA formula would have been reduced by $123,000 or 9.6% for enlisted personnel and $144,000 or 5.3% for officers. In response to concerns about potential effects, Congress restored full CPI COLA adjustments for disabled military retirees and survivors in the FY2014 Omnibus (H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76) signed by the President on January 17, 2014. Several bills were also introduced that would reverse the COLA decrease for non-disabled military retirees as well. Although the reduced COLAs would not have gone into effect for non-disability retirees until December 1, 2015, some Members called for action sooner. On February 11, 2014, the House passed an amended version of S. 25, to modify the impact of the reduced COLA provision of the BBA so it only applied to individuals who become members of the uniformed services on January 1, 2014, or later. The Senate passed this amended version on February 12, and the President signed it into law (P.L. 113-82) on February 15. Hence, all currently serving military personnel who joined before January 1, 2014, and all current retirees are effectively excluded ("grandfathered") from the COLA reduction provision of the BBA. Only those individuals who join in 2014 or later and subsequently qualify for non-disability retirement will ultimately be subject to the COLA provision (along with REDUX retirees, who opt into a reduced COLA retirement in exchange for a cash bonus). Since non-disability retirees typically must serve 20 years before qualifying for retirement, the first major cohort of non-disability retirees to be impacted by this provision will be those who retire in 2034.

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Obstruction Prior to the Wilberforce Act, only the peonage statute among the anti-trafficking proscriptions included an explicit obstruction component. . . enforcement"). With the passage of the Wilberforce Act, it is now a federal crime to obstruct, or attempt to obstruct, or in any way interfere with or prevent the enforcement of Section 1583 (enticement into slavery), 1584 (holding another in involuntary servitude), 1590 (trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor), 1591 (sex trafficking using force, fraud, coercion or children), or 1592 (document abuse relating to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor). Nevertheless in a number of instances, Congress has elected to punish equally conspiracy and the underlying offense which is its object. First, it makes it clear that in its trafficking offense the section condemns not only trafficking but the sexual exploitation of the victims of trafficking. The explanatory statement accompanying consideration of H.R. The Wilberforce Act's definition of abuse of law is modeled after that found in the Second Restatement of Torts referenced in the earlier limited available case law (use of "a legal process, criminal or civil, against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed"). The Wilberforce Act adds the financial benefit offense to the forced labor, peonage, and document abuse prohibitions. The law of the place determines what is criminal and how crimes may be punished. The Wilberforce Act specifically designates Section 1591 offenses as such qualifying violations. The Wilberforce Act adds Section 1591 investigations (sex trafficking involving children or the use of force, fraud, or coercion) to the list of investigations in relation to which the Attorney General may issue an administrative subpoena. 1593, rather than in the forfeiture section, 18 U.S.C. The statute of limitations for the criminal prosecution of most of the offenses under chapter 77 is 10 years.

The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (H.R. 7311), passed both the House and the Senate on December 10, 2008. The President signed it into law on December 23, 2008, P.L. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008). Although much of the Wilberforce Act originated in H.R. 3887, most of its criminal provisions did not. Most appeared first in Senate bill S. 3061, the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, which Senator Biden introduced with a brief accompanying statement on May 22, 2008. Congress ultimately elected to proceed with a clean bill rather than use either H.R. 3887 or S. 3061 as a vehicle for final passage. Representative Berman introduced H.R. 7311, the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, which mixed features from the earlier House and Senate proposals, on December 9, 2008. H.R. 7311 passed both Houses on December 10, 2008, and was signed into law on December 23, 2008. The Wilberforce Act bolsters federal efforts to combat both international and domestic traffic in human beings. Among other initiatives, it expands pre-existing law enforcement authority and the criminal proscriptions in the area. For instance, it authorizes the Attorney General to use administrative subpoenas in sex trafficking investigations and to seek preventive detention of those charged with such offenses. It clarifies the reach of earlier prohibitions and outlaws anew obstructing anti-trafficking enforcement efforts, conspiring to traffic, as well as reaping any benefit from trafficking. This is an abridged version of CRS Report R40190, The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-457): Criminal Law Provisions, by [author name scrubbed] Criminal Provisions, without the footnotes, appendices, or most citations to authority found in the longer report.

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Introduction Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (CCI) was the parent company of several private, for-profit institutions of higher education, including the Everest Institute, Everest Colleges, Heald Colleges, and Wyotech Technical Schools (Wyotech). CCI operated more than 100 of these institutions across the nation, with total enrollments of approximately 72,000 students who annually received roughly $1.4 billion in federal financial aid. On June 19, 2014, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) announced that it had placed CCI on an increased level of financial oversight known as Heightened Cash Monitoring 1 (HCM1), coupled with a 21-day waiting period for funds reimbursement, as a stipulation to its continued participation in the Higher Education Act (HEA) Title IV federal student aid programs. ED had taken this action in response to CCI's failure to address concerns relating to a variety of practices, including failing to provide ED with requested data related to inconsistences in job placement rates that had been presented to students. In response to its limited access to federal student aid funds, CCI announced it might have to close its schools. On July 3, 2014, to avoid abrupt closure, CCI and ED reached an agreement under which the company agreed to develop a plan to sell or teach-out its educational programs. Subsequently, the Zenith Education Group (Zenith) was formed as a nonprofit provider of career education programs. Zenith is a subsidiary of the Educational Credit Management Corporation (ECMC), a nonprofit student loan guaranty agency involved in the administration of loans made through the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program. Zenith was formed for the purpose of buying a large portion of CCI's schools. Student Loans Are former CCI students eligible to have their student loans discharged? How many former CCI students are eligible for or have received federal student loan discharge as a result of CCI's actions? How will the discharge of federal student loans affect former CCI students' future eligibility for loans? Under the revenue procedure: 1. former CCI students whose federal student loans are discharged under a defense against repayment claim will not be subject to tax on the amount of the loan discharge; 2. former CCI students whose federal student loans are discharged under the closed school discharge procedure will not be subject to tax on the amount of the loan discharge; and 3. former CCI students will not have to increase the taxes they owe in the year of discharge in order to account for previously claimed education-related credits and deductions. Other Types of Federal Education Benefits49 Is there any relief for former CCI students who received Pell Grants? Is there any relief for former CCI students who receive GI Bill benefits?

Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (CCI) was the parent company of several private, for-profit institutions of higher education, including the Everest Institute, Everest Colleges, Heald Colleges, and Wyotech Technical Schools. CCI operated more than 100 of these institutions across the nation, with total enrollments of approximately 72,000 students who annually received roughly $1.4 billion in federal financial aid. In summer 2014, the Department of Education (ED) limited CCI's access to federal student aid in response to CCI's failure to address concerns relating to a variety of practices, including failing to provide ED with requested data related to CCI's Title IV federal student aid participation. To avoid abrupt closure of its schools due to the financial stresses that the limited access to federal student aid put on CCI, the company and ED reached an agreement under which CCI agreed to sell or "teach-out" its educational programs. Subsequently, the Zenith Education Group (Zenith) was formed by the Education Credit Management Corporation (ECMC) as a nonprofit entity for the purpose of buying a large portion of CCI's schools. Those CCI schools not purchased by Zenith closed. This report answers several frequently asked questions regarding the effect of the sale and closure of CCI's schools as they relate to former CCI students' student aid, including the following: Are former CCI students eligible to have their student loans discharged? How many former CCI students are eligible for or have received federal student loan discharge as a result of CCI's actions? How will the discharge of federal student loans affect former CCI students' future eligibility for loans? Will the discharge of student loans create an income tax liability for former CCI students? Is there any relief for former CCI students who received Pell Grants? Is there any relief for former CCI students who received GI Bill benefits? Additional information on the HEA federal student loan programs is available in CRS Report R40122, Federal Student Loans Made Under the Federal Family Education Loan Program and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program: Terms and Conditions for Borrowers, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL31618, Campus-Based Student Financial Aid Programs Under the Higher Education Act, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Additional information on the Pell Grant program is available in CRS Report R42446, Federal Pell Grant Program of the Higher Education Act: How the Program Works and Recent Legislative Changes, by [author name scrubbed]. Additional information veterans' education benefits is available in CRS Report R42755, The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill): Primer and Issues, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R42785, GI Bills Enacted Prior to 2008 and Related Veterans' Educational Assistance Programs: A Primer, by [author name scrubbed]. Additional information on institutional eligibility to participate in the Higher Education Act Title IV federal student aid programs is available in CRS Report R43159, Institutional Eligibility for Participation in Title IV Student Financial Aid Programs, by [author name scrubbed].

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Introduction to Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies (THUD) The Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations subcommittees are charged with drafting bills to provide annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and related agencies. Status of the FY2013 THUD Appropriations Bill Table 1 provides a timeline of legislative action on the FY2013 THUD appropriations bill, and Table 2 lists the total funding provided for each of the titles in the bill for FY2012 and the amount requested for that title for FY2013. FY2013 THUD Funding Consideration During the 112th Congress The President's FY2013 budget requested $73.4 billion in new budget resources for DOT. The House-passed FY2013 THUD bill ( H.R. 5972 included $33.6 billion for HUD, which is less than the Senate proposed but more than the President requested. In addition, P.L. The Budget Control Act and FY2013 Sequestration FY2013 discretionary appropriations were considered in the context of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. According to a report accompanying the order, funding for DOT's programs and activities for FY2013 was reduced by about $1.6 billion; funding for HUD's programs and activities for FY2013 was reduced by about $3 billion as a result of the sequester. 113-6 . Funding is provided generally at the level and under the conditions provided in FY2012, as modified by anomalies, the application of the sequester, and a 0.2% across-the-board rescission in section 3004 of the act. Prior to FY2005, DOT and HUD were funded in separate appropriations bills under the jurisdiction of separate subcommittees. P.L. This proposal was not supported by Congress. The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $500 million. However, all of that funding was provided by the 111 th Congress. The final FY2013 enacted funding bill did not provide any funding for the program. 113-6 ) funded NeighborWorks at the FY2012 level, including funding for the NFMCP, of $215.3 million.

The Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations subcommittee is charged with providing annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and related agencies. The HUD budget generally accounts for the largest share of discretionary appropriations provided by the subcommittee. However, when mandatory funding is taken into account, DOT's budget is larger than HUD's budget, because it includes funding from transportation trust funds. Mandatory funding typically accounts for a little less than half of the bill total. In the deliberations on FY2013 THUD funding during the second session of the 112th Congress, the House passed a THUD bill (H.R. 5972) and the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out a THUD bill (S. 2322), but this bill was not passed by the Senate. Thus Congress did not enact a separate THUD funding bill prior to the beginning of FY2013. THUD appropriations for FY2013 were provided through a pair of continuing resolutions (CRs): P.L. 112-175 provided funding from the beginning of FY2013 through March 27, 2013, and P.L. 113-6 provided funding through the end of FY2013. These CRs provided funding at roughly the FY2012 level. These CRs included several exceptions (anomalies) for individual DOT and HUD accounts. P.L. 113-6 also included an across-the board rescission of 0.2%. FY2013 THUD funding was further reduced by the imposition of a sequester, per the terms of the Budget Control Act. The sequester reduced DOT funding by around $1.6 billion, and HUD funding by around $3 billion. In terms of final FY2013 THUD funding, Congress enacted $71.3 billion for DOT in FY2013; after the sequester reduction, DOT received around $70.6 billion. Congress enacted $33.4 billion for HUD in FY2013, pre-sequester. Accounting for sequestration, HUD was provided with about $31.4 billion in FY2013.

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The 111 th Congress passed major health reform legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 ), which was substantially amended by the health provisions in the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA; P.L. 111-152 ). All references to ACA in this report refer to the law as amended. The report provides a brief summary of major ACA provisions, implementation and oversight activities, and current legal challenges. For more detailed information on ACA's provisions, CRS has produced a series of more comprehensive reports, which are available at http://www.crs.gov . The information provided in these reports ranges from broad overviews of ACA provisions, such as the law's Medicare provisions, to more narrowly focused topics, such as dependent coverage for children under age 26. ACA is projected to have a significant impact on federal spending and revenues. The law includes spending to subsidize the purchase of health insurance coverage through the exchanges, as well as increased outlays for the expansion of the Medicaid program. The costs of expanding public and private health insurance coverage and other spending are offset by revenues from new taxes and fees, and by savings from payment and health care delivery system reforms designed to reduce spending on Medicare and other federal health care programs. States are expected to establish health insurance exchanges that provide access to private health insurance plans with standardized benefit and cost-sharing packages for eligible individuals and small employers. Implementation and Oversight Implementation of ACA, which began upon the law's enactment in 2010 and will continue to unfold over the next few years, involves all the major health care stakeholders, including the federal and state governments, as well as employers, insurers, and health care providers. Legal Challenges Following enactment of ACA, state attorneys general and others brought a number of lawsuits challenging provisions of the act on constitutional grounds. U.S. Supreme Court Decision On June 28, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius , finding that the individual mandate in ACA is a constitutional exercise of Congress's authority to levy taxes. However, the Court held that it was not a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. With regard to the Medicaid expansion provision, the Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, accepted an argument that the scope of the changes imposed by the Medicaid expansion transformed the ACA requirements into a "new" Medicaid benefit program. It is unclear how many states may now decide not to participate in the Medicaid expansion.

In March 2010, the 111th Congress passed health reform legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA; P.L. 111-152) and other laws. ACA increases access to health insurance coverage, expands federal private health insurance market requirements, and requires the creation of health insurance exchanges to provide individuals and small employers with access to insurance. It also expands Medicaid coverage. The costs to the federal government of expanding health insurance and Medicaid coverage are projected to be offset by increased taxes and revenues and reduced spending on Medicare and other federal health programs. Implementation of ACA, which began upon the law's enactment and is scheduled to unfold over the next few years, involves all the major health care stakeholders, including the federal and state governments, as well as employers, insurers, and health care providers. Following the enactment of ACA, individuals, states, and other entities challenged various provisions of ACA on constitutional grounds. Many of these suits addressed ACA's requirement for individuals to have health insurance (i.e., the individual mandate), and claimed that it is beyond the scope of Congress's enumerated powers. The expansion of the Medicaid program was also challenged, as state plaintiffs contended that the expansion impermissibly infringes upon states' rights, coercing them into accepting onerous conditions in exchange for federal funds. On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court issued its decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, finding that the individual mandate is a constitutional exercise of Congress's authority to levy taxes. However, the Court held that it was not a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. With regard to the Medicaid expansion provision, the Court further held that the federal government cannot terminate current Medicaid program federal matching funds if a state refuses to expand its Medicaid program. If a state accepts the new ACA Medicaid expansion funds, it must abide by the new expansion coverage rules, but, based on the Court's opinion, it appears that a state can refuse to participate in the expansion without losing any of its current federal Medicaid matching funds. All other provisions of ACA, as amended by HCERA, remain intact. This report provides a brief summary of major ACA provisions, implementation and oversight activities, and current legal challenges. For more detailed information on ACA's provisions, CRS has produced a series of more comprehensive reports, which are available at http://www.crs.gov. The information provided in these reports ranges from broad overviews of ACA provisions, such as the law's Medicare provisions, to more narrowly focused topics, such as dependent coverage for children under age 26.