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crs_RS21591 | crs_RS21591_0 | Overview of the Community Service Requirement
Non-elderly, non-disabled, non-working residents of public housing are subject to a community service and self-sufficiency requirement (referred to as the CSSR or community service requirement). Specifically, all adult residents of a household who are not otherwise exempted are required to participate in eight hours per month of either community service or economic self-sufficiency activities in order to maintain their eligibility for public housing. 2 nor S. 462 became law, a compromise version was enacted as the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA), Title V of the FY1999 Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development (VA-HUD) appropriations bill ( H.R. 105-276 ). Debate
As is evident in its legislative and regulatory history, the community service and economic self-sufficiency requirement for residents of public housing has been controversial since its inception. In February 2015, HUD's Inspector General released a new audit of HUD's implementation and enforcement of the community service requirement. In response to the audit, HUD issued a notice to PHAs on August 13, 2015, with further guidance related to the statutory/regulatory requirements for administering the community service requirement; data collection and reporting requirements; action to take against noncompliant tenants; and penalties against PHAs that do not comply. | The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-276) included provisions designed to promote employment and self-sufficiency among residents of assisted housing, including a mandatory work or community service requirement for residents of public housing. Non-elderly, non-disabled, non-working residents of public housing are required to participate in eight hours per month of either community service or economic self-sufficiency activities in order to maintain their eligibility for public housing.
The community service requirement has been controversial since its inception. Supporters of the provision believe that it is consistent with the goals of welfare reform and that it will promote civic engagement and "giving back" among residents of public housing; detractors argue that it is punitive, unfairly applied, and administratively burdensome.
In February 2015, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Inspector General released an audit critical of HUD's implementation and enforcement of the community service requirement. In response to the report, HUD issued further guidance in August 2015 related to the statutory/regulatory requirements for administering the community service requirement; data collection and reporting requirements; action to take against noncompliant tenants; and penalties against PHAs that do not comply.
Recent HUD data indicate that approximately 14% of public housing residents are subject to the community service requirement and not otherwise exempt. Of those nonexempt residents, approximately 19% were reported as noncompliant (or about 3% of all public housing residents). |
crs_R43860 | crs_R43860_0 | It is released into the atmosphere by natural sources such as wetlands, oceans, sediments, termites, volcanoes, and wildfires, as well as human activities such as oil and natural gas systems, coal mines, landfills, wastewater treatment facilities, and the raising of livestock. Methane, when captured, can be used as either a fuel or a chemical feedstock. When used as a fuel—for example, methane is the primary component of natural gas —it has many advantages over other hydrocarbons (e.g., coal and oil). Further, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) classifies methane as both a precursor to ground-level ozone formation (commonly referred to as "smog") and a potent greenhouse gas (GHG), albeit with a shorter atmospheric life than CO 2 . For these reasons, some stakeholders, including some Members of Congress, have called for increased controls on methane emissions in several sectors of the economy, including oil and natural gas production and transportation, coal mining, industrial processes, and agriculture. In this way, the cost-benefit consideration of methane capture becomes very similar to that of energy efficiency efforts, wherein high up-front investments and other market barriers, if confronted by producers, may have the potential to be offset over time. Issues for Congress
Through the years, the federal government has sought policies to control methane emissions for a variety of economic, environmental, and public health and safety reasons. They included a variety of funding programs for research and technology development, voluntary guidelines and tax incentives for industry, and/or rules for mineral rights lessees on federal lands. Recent events in the United States (e.g., the rise in domestic oil and natural gas production, its encroachment on new or more populated areas, and the revitalization of the petrochemical manufacturing sector) have led some stakeholders to suggest the need for more enforceable standards. Some stakeholders, including many in the affected sectors (i.e., agriculture, fossil energy, and waste management), have raised concerns over federal proposals requiring more stringent controls. They argue that further regulation of methane emissions would not provide cost-effective health and environmental benefits. Some industries contend that they are already doing everything feasible to capture and reuse methane emissions (for requisite safety and economic reasons) and that state and local authorities—who share a closer understanding of the industries' specific circumstances—are best equipped to oversee and enforce emission reduction efforts within their jurisdictions. Legislative Initiatives
Congress has pursued policies in support of methane emissions reduction since the 1970s. The Obama Administration's Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions
On June 25, 2013, President Obama refocused his Administration's efforts to address GHG emissions with the release of the "Climate Action Plan" (CAP). Many stakeholders have suggested that the Administration's recent GHG reduction targets, offered under the U.S. commitments to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, would be unattainable without significant methane controls. The CAP set guidelines for EPA and the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, the Interior, Labor, and Transportation to develop a comprehensive interagency methane strategy, which was released on March 28, 2014, under the title "Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions." Petroleum and Natural Gas. Landfills. The Administration states that these proposals are key components under the CAP to put the United States on track to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas sector by 40%-45% from 2012 levels by 2025. In response to the Administration's "Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions," EPA has reviewed the 1996 Landfill Gas Rule and Guideline. But emissions of methane have proven difficult to measure and hard to control. Whether a given control strategy is effective and cost-efficient for a given industry depends upon a number of factors, including (1) the nature and extent of the emissions, (2) the technology available for capture, and (3) the market price for the recovered products. The Obama Administration's recent Strategy—as well as a variety of recent proposals in Congress—attests to the continued interest in better emission assessments and appropriate policy responses. | The Obama Administration's Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions
On June 25, 2013, President Obama announced a national "Climate Action Plan" (CAP) to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs), as well as to encourage adaptation to expected climate change. One of the initiatives within the CAP focused on the control of methane emissions, a potent short-lived climate pollutant. It called for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, the Interior, Labor, and Transportation to develop a comprehensive interagency "Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions." The Strategy, released on March 28, 2014, committed to steps to cut methane emissions by an estimated 16% from 2012 levels by 2020 through both voluntary actions and agency rulemaking. It also outlined the Administration's efforts to improve the measurement and assessment of these emissions.
Perspectives on the Strategy
Some stakeholders, including many in the affected sectors (i.e., agriculture, fossil energy, and waste management), have raised concerns over federal proposals requiring more stringent controls. They argue that further regulation of methane emissions would not provide cost-effective health and environmental benefits. Some industries contend that they are already doing everything feasible to capture and reuse methane emissions (for requisite safety and economic reasons) and that state and local authorities—who share a closer understanding of the industries' specific circumstances—are best equipped to oversee and enforce emission reduction efforts within their jurisdictions.
Other stakeholders, including many health and environmental advocates, contend that the Strategy and its proposed rulemakings fall short. They argue that methane emissions can jeopardize worker safety, lead to ground-level ozone formation (commonly referred to as "smog"), and act as a potent GHG. Recent events in the United States (e.g., the rise in domestic oil and natural gas production, the encroachment of domestic oil and natural gas production on new or more populated areas, and the revitalization of the petrochemical manufacturing sector) have led these stakeholders to suggest the need for more enforceable standards. Likewise, they estimate that the Obama Administration's recent GHG reduction targets, offered under the U.S. commitments to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, would be unattainable without further controls.
The Role of Methane
Behind it all is methane—the world's simplest hydrocarbon and the primary component of natural gas. It is released into the atmosphere by both natural sources (such as wetlands and wildfires) and human activities (such as oil and natural gas systems, coal mines, landfills, and the raising of livestock). When captured, methane can be used as either a fuel or a chemical feedstock, with many advantages over other fossil fuels (e.g., it is more versatile and less polluting). Its dual nature as both a pollutant and a commodity makes efforts to control emissions potentially beneficial to both the environment and the economy.
For these reasons, as far back as the 1970s, the federal government has sought policies to help reduce, capture, and reuse methane emissions. Whether strategies to control emissions are effective and cost-efficient for a given industry may depend upon a number of factors, including the nature and extent of the emissions, the technology available for capture, and the market price for the recovered products. In this way, the cost-benefit considerations are similar to those of energy efficiency efforts, wherein high up-front investments and other market barriers, if confronted by producers, may be offset over time.
Recent federal policies have included a variety of funding programs for research and technology development as well as voluntary programs and tax incentives for industry. Historically, methane emissions were addressed directly by two federal rules: one on new municipal landfills and another on federal oil and gas leases. Since the Strategy's release, the Administration has proposed and finalized several additional rules—on oil and natural gas systems, coal mines, and municipal landfills. These rulemakings—as well as a variety of legislative efforts in Congress—attest to the continued interest in an appropriate policy response to the issue of methane emissions. |
crs_RL34634 | crs_RL34634_0 | Deforestation results in carbon emissions when trees and underlying vegetation are burning or decomposing. Deforested areas that are later cultivated also release carbon to the atmosphere when soil carbon is oxidized. Further, deforested areas converted to other land uses (e.g., pastures) might sequester less carbon than forests, enabling greater levels of CO 2 in the atmosphere. International Deforestation in Climate Change Legislation
The role of forests in the carbon cycle and the extent of deforestation and its impact on GHG emissions are primary reasons deforestation is addressed in climate change legislation. Some argue that congressional intent to address deforestation is misplaced with funding initiatives to prevent deforestation in foreign countries. Objectives and Definitions
These bills would address deforestation and climate change by authorizing funding to eligible foreign countries to reduce deforestation, increase forest restoration and afforestation, and improve forest management. Challenges for Implementing Proposed Legislation
Implementing forest protection programs in the tropics can be challenging for several reasons. In some developing countries, monitoring and enforcement capacity may be lacking. | Deforestation accounts for nearly 20% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in the world. Deforestation results in carbon emissions when trees and underlying vegetation are burning or decomposing. Deforested areas that are later cultivated also release carbon to the atmosphere when soil carbon is oxidized. Further, deforested areas converted to other land uses (e.g., pastures) might sequester less carbon than forests, enabling greater levels of CO 2 in the atmosphere. Providing incentives to prevent deforestation in foreign countries has been proposed in climate change legislation. An objective of this legislation is to provide funding from carbon markets to assist foreign countries in reducing deforestation and increasing forest restoration and afforestation. Challenges to this approach include implementing deforestation reduction activities in developing countries that may lack the capacity to monitor and enforce measures, avoiding harm to indigenous communities who rely on forest resources, and matching policies with the various drivers of deforestation in different regions around the world. Legislative policies on deforestation and climate change are analyzed in this report, and challenges for restoring forests in the tropics are discussed. |
crs_R42328 | crs_R42328_0 | Overview
Section 9401 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) provides the Secretary of Education (hereinafter referred to as the Secretary) with broad waiver authority with respect to programs authorized under the act. The Secretary has used the authority provided under Section 9401 to grant numerous waivers over time, including waivers of accountability and general administrative requirements. Most states have either applied for the ESEA flexibility package or have indicated an intention to do so. If those packages are approved by ED, they may be in effect in many states by the end of the current school year if ESEA reauthorization does not occur prior to that time. The subsequent reauthorization of the ESEA by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. A waiver request must
identify the federal programs affected by the requested waiver; describe the statutory or regulatory requirements to be waived and how the waiving of these requirements will increase the quality of student instruction and improve student academic achievement; describe for each school year the "specific, measurable education goals" in accordance with ESEA, Section 1111(b), for the SEA and for each LEA, Indian tribe, or school that would be affected by the waiver and the methods that would be used to measure annual progress toward meeting such goals and outcomes; explain how the waiver will assist the SEA and each affected LEA, Indian tribe, or school in reaching the state goals; and describe "how schools will continue to provide assistance to the same populations served by programs for which waivers are requested." Overview of Waivers Included in the Administration's ESEA Flexibility Package
As previously mentioned, on September 23, 2011, President Obama and the Secretary formally announced the availability of a package of 10 waivers and one optional waiver of ESEA requirements for states and the four principles that states must meet to obtain the waivers. Flexibility regarding the 2013-2014 timeline for determining adequate yearly progress (waiver of existing accountability provisions) 2. Flexibility in implementation of school improvement requirements (waiver of existing accountability provisions) 3. Flexibility in implementation of LEA improvement requirements (waiver of existing accountability provisions) 4. Flexibility for rural LEAs (waiver providing flexibility in the use of federal funds) 5. Flexibility to support school improvement (waiver of an existing School Improvement Grant (SIG) program provision to support new accountability provisions) 7. Flexibility for Reward Schools (waiver of an existing accountability provision) 8. Flexibility regarding highly qualified teacher (HQT) improvement plans (waiver of teacher-related provisions) 9. Flexibility to transfer certain funds (waiver providing flexibility in the use of federal funds) 10. Priority school. The four principles, as stated by ED, are as follows:
1. college- and career-ready expectations for all students; 2. state-developed differentiated recognition, accountability, and support; 3. supporting effective instruction and leadership; and 4. reducing duplication and unnecessary burden. This is similar to what the Administration is including in its ESEA flexibility package. Implementation Timeline
As previously discussed, the ESEA flexibility package would apply to school years 2011-2012, 2012-2013, and 2013-2014. States would have the option to apply for a one-year waiver extension for the 2014-2015 school year. | Section 9401 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) provides the Secretary of Education with broad waiver authority with respect to programs authorized under the act. The Secretary has used the authority provided under Section 9401 to grant numerous waivers over time, including waivers of accountability and general administrative provisions. On September 23, 2011, President Obama and the Secretary announced the availability of an ESEA flexibility package for states and described the principles that states must meet to obtain the included waivers. The waivers would apply to school years 2011-2012, 2012-2013, and 2013-2014. States would have the option to apply for a one-year waiver extension for the 2014-2015 school year.
The following waivers are included in the ESEA flexibility package:
1. Flexibility regarding the 2013-2014 timeline for determining adequate yearly progress 2. Flexibility in implementation of school improvement requirements 3. Flexibility in implementation of local educational agencies (LEAs) improvement requirement 4. Flexibility for rural LEAs 5. Flexibility for schoolwide programs 6. Flexibility to support school improvement 7. Flexibility for Reward Schools 8. Flexibility regarding highly qualified teacher (HQT) improvement plans 9. Flexibility to transfer certain funds 10. Flexibility in the use of School Improvement Grant funds to support priority schools
The waivers would exempt states from various academic accountability requirements, teacher qualification-related requirements, and funding flexibility requirements that were enacted through the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110). State educational agencies (SEAs) could also apply for an optional waiver related to the 21st Century Community Learning Centers program. However, in order to receive the waivers, SEAs must agree to meet four principles established by ED for "improving student academic achievement and increasing the quality of instruction." The four principles, as stated by ED, are as follows: (1) college- and career-ready expectations for all students; (2) state-developed differentiated recognition, accountability, and support; (3) supporting effective instruction and leadership; and (4) reducing duplication and unnecessary burden.
Taken collectively, the waivers and principles included in the ESEA flexibility package amount to a fundamental redesign by the Administration of the accountability and teacher-related requirements included in current law. Given that most states have applied for, or signaled an intent to apply for, the waivers, the ESEA flexibility package may be in effect in many states by the end of the current school year. If Congress continues to work on ESEA reauthorization during the 112th Congress, it is possible that provisions included in any final bill may be similar to or override the waivers and principles established by the Administration. |
crs_R40694 | crs_R40694_0 | On May 26, 2009, Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was nominated to replace retiring U.S. Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter. During her tenure with the Second Circuit, Judge Sotomayor has not addressed substantive legal questions involving abortion, such as the extent of the Constitution's protection of a woman's right to choose. Judge Sotomayor has, however, authored opinions that have considered the impact of foreign funding restrictions on domestic nonprofit organizations that promote abortion, discussed the effect of forced abortions and involuntary family planning practices in the context of applications for asylum, and examined possible municipal liability resulting from anti-abortion demonstrations. This report reviews Judge Sotomayor's opinions involving abortion and family planning practices. | On May 26, 2009, Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was nominated to replace retiring U.S. Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter. During her tenure with the Second Circuit, Judge Sotomayor has not addressed substantive legal questions involving abortion, such as the extent of the Constitution's protection of a woman's right to choose. Judge Sotomayor has, however, authored opinions that have considered the impact of foreign funding restrictions on domestic nonprofit organizations that promote abortion, discussed the effect of forced abortions and involuntary family planning practices in the context of applications for asylum, and examined possible municipal liability resulting from anti-abortion demonstrations. This report reviews Judge Sotomayor's opinions involving abortion and family planning practices. |
crs_RL33970 | crs_RL33970_0 | For example, between 1990 and 2005, in the United States, the greenhouse gas intensity of the economy declined at a rate of -1.9% per year, but total emissions increased at the rate of 1.0% per year. Average income is measured as per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in international dollars of purchasing power parity ($PPP). (Note that population times per capita GDP equals GDP.) Greenhouse gas intensity is measured as tons of emissions in carbon equivalents per million dollars of GDP. As exponents of multiplicands are added, relationship among the variables can be simply expressed: the growth rates of the three variable on the left side of the equation sum to the growth rate of the variable (emissions) on the right side. As the table shows, global growth rates for population and per capita income outpaced the rate of decline in intensity—so GHG emissions rose; this is also true of the majority of nations, including the United States. For Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Iran, Australia, Spain, South Africa, and Turkey, any improvements in intensity were annulled by increases in population alone. For these countries, population growth combined with per capita GDP growth overwhelmed whatever intensity improvements they achieved. For the Russian Federation and Ukraine, economic contraction following the dissolution of the Soviet Union contributed to decreases in their emissions. Stabilizing emissions would require an accelerated decline in intensity. For the United States, the situation was similar: for emissions in 2000 to have remained at 1990 levels, intensity would have had to decline at the rate of -3.2% per year, rather than the actual -1.9%. Because natural gas produces less total CO 2 per kilowatt hour than coal (at a ratio of about 0.6 to 1 on a Btu basis ), CO 2 intensity in the United Kingdom declined between 1990 and 2000 at a rate of -2.8% per year, and CO 2 emissions declined at a rate of -0.5% per year. Thus equation 3 yields a negative growth in emissions (numbers do not add precisely, due to rounding):
The examples of France and the United Kingdom show that for a period of time, at least, greenhouse gas intensity improvements can be sufficient to absorb growth in population and economic activity, so that actual emissions decline. From 1980-1986, U.S. CO 2 intensity declined at a rate of -3.6% per year, and emissions declined at a rate of -0.5% per year. For most nations most of the time, the combination of population growth and per capita GDP growth has more than offset forces tending to depress emissions, so emissions have increased. For the purpose of thinking about the United States slowing and then reversing its increase in greenhouse gas emissions, the historic trends in population, income growth, and greenhouse gas intensity indicate the magnitude of the challenge:
To simply stop the growth in GHG emissions, the three factors on the left side of the equation must sum to zero. Assuming that population continues to grow at +0.9% through 2020, and that per capita GDP grows at the rate of +1.8% of 1990-2005, then GHG intensity would have to decline at the rate of -2.7% per year to stabilize emissions. But the U.S. target for the Copenhagen Accord is to reduce GHG emissions for 2020 to 17% below 2005 emissions. The answer is, it would take a rate of intensity decline of about -4.6% per year beginning in 2010, to reach the level of 1,570 in 2020. Conclusion
In the end, the interactions of the variables, population, income, and intensity of emissions ( equation 1) , together with the inexorable force of compounding growth rates over time ( e quation 2 ) are inescapable conditions determining both the risks of climate change and the costs, benefits, and tradeoffs of options for responding. | In the context of climate change and possible responses to the risk associated with it, three variables strongly influence the levels and growth of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: population, income (measured as per capita gross domestic product [GDP]), and intensity of emissions (measured as tons of greenhouse gas emissions per million dollars of GDP).
(Population) × (per capita GDP) × (Intensityghg) = Emissionsghg
This is the relationship for a given point in time; over time, any effort to change emissions alters the exponential rates of change of these variables. This means that the rates of change of the three left-hand variables, measured in percentage of annual change, sum to the rate of change of the right-hand variable, emissions.
For most countries, and for the world as a whole, population and per capita GDP are rising faster than intensity is declining, so emissions are rising. Globally, for the variables above over the period 1990-2005, the rates of change (∆) in annual percent sum as follows (numbers do not add precisely because of rounding):
Population ∆ + per capita GDP ∆ + Intensityghg ∆ = Emissionsghg ∆
(+1.4) + (+1.7) + ( -1.6) = (+1.6)
As can be seen, global emissions have been rising at a rate of about 1.6% per year, driven by the growth of population and of economic activity.
Within this generalization, countries vary widely. (Unless otherwise noted, comments about countries refer to the top-20 emitters as of 2005, who accounted for about 75% of world emissions that year.) Between 1990 and 2005, in some countries, including Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, and South Africa, population growth alone exceeded the decline in intensity. For most countries, and for the world as a whole, per capita GDP growth exceeded the intensity improvement each achieved. Countries for whom intensity improvements were greater than their per capita GDP increases included Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and South Africa. And both the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, following their economic contractions in the 1990s, posted negative numbers for population, per capita income, intensity, and GHG emissions between 1990 and 2005. Besides the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, only the United Kingdom and Germany reduced their GHG emissions for the period (Germany being helped by reductions in the former East Germany).
Stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions would mean the rate of change equals zero. Globally, with a population growth rate of 1.4% per year and an income growth rate of 1.7% per year, intensity would have to decline at a rate of -3.1% per year to hold emissions at the level of the year that rate of decline went into effect. Within the United States, at the 1990-2005 population growth rate of 1.1% per year and income growth rate of 1.8% per year, intensity would have had to decline at a rate of -2.9% per year to hold emissions level; however, U.S. intensity declined at a rate of -1.9%, leaving emissions to grow at 1.0% per year.
Looking to the future, under auspices of the Copenhagen Accord, the United States has submitted a target of reducing emissions from the 2005 level by 17% in 2020. This would require the United States to reduce the intensity of its emissions by some -4.6% per year during the 2010-2020 decade. This implies that the rate of intensity decline needs to better than double. |
crs_RS22402 | crs_RS22402_0 | Of particular interest, the report states that DOD "will continue to ask for congressional authority to change fees and co-pays in an effort to maintain both a generous health care benefit and a fair and reasonable cost-sharing arrangement between beneficiaries and DOD." 2010 Budget
The 2010 Budget submitted by the Obama Administration does not contain legislative proposals to increase Tricare fees and the funding levels requested for the Defense Health Program do not assume savings from such proposals. Other unnamed DOD officials have been reported as saying that DOD's strategy is to link weapons cuts to health care costs and a need for fee increases:
Instead of proposing an increase, Pentagon officials plan to highlight the cancellation or delay of weapons systems and other large cuts in military spending and make an argument that the inability to hold down soaring health care costs is part of the reason for those cuts. The idea, defense officials said, is that Congress may decide on its own that it is time to increase Tricare fees, which have not changed since the Tricare system was introduced in the mid-1990s. A smoking cessation program for non-Medicare eligible Tricare beneficiaries (section 713). However, the FY2010 budget submission does propose to reduce spending for several high profile weapons acquisitions. | The Obama Administration's Fiscal Year 2010 budget submission does not include any proposals to increase fees or copayments for Tricare beneficiaries. Previously, the FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009 budget submissions had proposed increases in Tricare enrollment fees, deductibles, and pharmacy co-payments for retired beneficiaries not yet eligible for Medicare. These actions were justified by DOD as necessary to constrain the growth of health care spending as an increasing proportion of the overall defense budget in the next decade. Congress passed legislation each year to prohibit the proposed fee increases. Defense health care spending remains a significant issue for the DOD. A DOD report published in January, 2009, stated that DOD "will continue to ask for congressional authority to change fees and copays in an effort to maintain both a generous health care benefit and a fair and reasonable cost-sharing arrangement between beneficiaries and DoD." However, DOD's strategy for FY2010 seems to highlight the cancellation or delay of weapons systems and other large cuts in military spending. These cuts, it may be argued, can be attributed to the growing percentage of the DOD budget devoted to medical care, an estimated 8.7%in FY2009. This cost growth, may in turn, be attributed in part to Tricare fee levels, which have not changed since the Tricare system was implemented in 1995. |
crs_RS22960 | crs_RS22960_0 | In fiscal policy, the Japanese experience has been used both as an example of stimulus packages that did not work and as a rationale for making stimulus packages large enough to help ensure that they would work. In monetary policy, the Bank of Japan's zero-interest rate policy demonstrated the futility of attempting to "push a string" (induce investment and consumer credit purchases through low borrowing rates). The Japanese experience also may be instructive in resolving problems of "zombie corporations" (companies that technically are bankrupt but are being "kept alive" through loans and other financial support), in dealing with nationalization and subsequent privatization of insolvent banks, and in coping with deflation. Origins of Japan's Banking Crisis
Like the current U.S. financial crisis, Japan's began with stock market and real estate bubbles. Japan's Policies to Cope with the Banking Crisis
The bursting of Japan's stock and real estate bubbles in 1989 and 1990 had been induced by the Bank of Japan by a tightening of monetary policy (mainly through increases in interest rates), although it is not clear that the monetary authorities anticipated the severity and depth of the downturn in the economy. Through a combination of capital injections, new laws and regulations, stronger oversight, a reorganization of the banking sector, moderate economic recovery, and several years of banks working off their non-performing loans, the Japanese banking sector eventually recovered. Net Cost of the Bank Rescue Operations
The various bank rescue operations in Japan were administered primarily by the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ). The annual reports of the DICJ, however, provide detail on the disposition of $399 billion of the $495 billion in funds announced in Japan's financial assistance packages. In 1996, when Japanese authorities thought the recession might be over, attention turned toward "reconstructing government finances" (reducing the budget deficit). This was seen as worsening the economic conditions for the country. | During the 1990s and into the early years of the 21st century, Japan experienced prolonged recessionary economic conditions triggered by the bursting of a bubble in its equity and real estate markets and an ensuing banking crisis. Although the current global financial crisis is much more than Japan's "Great Recession" writ large, many have turned to Japan's experience to either support or oppose various policies and to improve general understanding of the underlying forces of financial crises.
In fiscal policy, the Japanese experience has been used both as an example of stimulus packages that did not work and as a rationale for making stimulus packages large enough to help ensure that they would work. Fiscal stimulus did have the desired economic effect in Japan, but it mainly substituted for depressed bank lending and consumer spending. Recovery had to wait until the balance sheets of banks and households had been rehabilitated. Japan also shifted its policy focus toward reducing its fiscal deficit "too early" after authorities thought the recession had ended in 1996. The ensuing increase in taxes along with reduced fiscal stimulus (along with the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis) pushed the economy back into recession. In monetary policy, the Bank of Japan's zero-interest rate policy demonstrated the futility of attempting to induce investment and consumer credit purchases through low borrowing rates. The Japanese experience also may be instructive in resolving problems of companies that technically are bankrupt but are being kept alive through outside financial support and in dealing with nationalization and subsequent privatization of insolvent banks. Japan's case also illustrates that national debt may continue to rise for years after the financial crisis has ended.
With respect to rehabilitating banks, Japan's five bank rescue packages may hold some lessons for the United States. Most of the packages were administered by the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ). The packages had an announced value of $495 billion. The DICJ reports that it provided $399 billion to Japan's troubled financial institutions of which it has recovered $195 billion. Overcoming the crisis in Japan's banks took a combination of capital injections, new laws and regulations, stronger oversight, a reorganization of the banking sector, moderate economic recovery, and several years of banks working off their non-performing loans. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_RL32172 | crs_RL32172_0 | On the eve of the vote,the United States formally recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name, the "Republic ofMacedonia," (1) in a moveto support to the multi-ethnic Macedonian government and to the Ohrid peace process, and thereferendum failed. U.N.-sponsored talks have continued. In early 2001, an ethnic insurgency threatened to derail Macedonia's fragile stability and leadto another extended conflict in the Balkans. The Ohrid FrameworkAgreement outlined a package of political reforms to expand the rights of the ethnic Albanianminority that was to be implemented as the rebel force disbanded and disarmed under NATOsupervision. The United States continues to support multilateral efforts to stabilizeMacedonia, but has increasingly looked to the European Union to play a larger international role inthe Balkans, starting with Macedonia. The multi-year deployment of a smallcontingent of U.S. military forces to Macedonia as part of a U.N. mission in the early 1990s -- thefirst engagement of U.S. military ground forces in the Balkans -- further demonstrated the U.S.commitment to the Macedonian piece of the regional stability puzzle. When violent inter-ethnicincidents threatened to embroil all of Macedonia in early 2001, U.S. representatives played a key rolein international efforts to defuse the conflict, formulate the Ohrid Framework Agreement for peace,and oversee post-conflict stabilization and peace implementation. Test Case for European Defense
A third area of interest for the United States has been the role Macedonia has played as a testcase for the development of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) andEuropean Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). However, the multi-ethnic coalition was maintained. In 2004, Macedonian authorities concluded stand-by arrangements with theInternational Monetary Fund and are negotiating new multi-year agreements with the IMF and WorldBank on new lending and reform projects. Earlier censusproceedings and results had been disputed by the ethnic Albanian community, which felt that itsnumbers were misrepresented. Decentralization. 2004 Referendum. The referendum was held on November 7, 2004. On November 7, only an estimated 26% of the electorateturned out, and the referendum failed due to low turnout. 2005 Local Elections. An opposition-supported mayoral candidate won in Skopje. Beginning in 2002, the European Union developed plans to take over the military missionin Macedonia from NATO, under the EU's nascent European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Concordia's mandate was limited at first to sixmonths, but was later extended to December 15, 2003. Macedonia was the first country to conclude a Stabilization and Association Agreement(SAA) with the EU in 2001 (the SAA entered into force in April 2004). Former Secretary of State Powell and the foreign ministersof the three countries met on May 2, 2003, in Albania, to sign the Adriatic Charter, and called it aguide toward full membership in NATO and other European institutions. Macedonia has asserted its right to use and be recognized by itsconstitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia. Without specifying individual country preferences, U.S. officials have expressed continuedsupport for NATO's Open Door policy with regard to future candidate countries. | In early 2001, an eight-month conflict between ethnic Albanian insurgent forces andMacedonian police and security forces threatened to derail the country's fragile stability and lead toanother extended conflict in the Balkans. Later that year, U.S. and European intervention led to thesigning of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which outlined a package of political reforms to expandthe rights of the ethnic Albanian minority while rebel forces were disarmed and disbanded underNATO supervision. Implementation of the Ohrid agreement proceeded slowly at first but hasprogressed in recent years. Numerous challenges in 2004, including the accidental death of PresidentTrajkovski and violent inter-ethnic incidents in neighboring Kosovo, threatened to increase politicalinstability. However, an opposition-sponsored referendum on November 7, 2004, which sought tohalt plans for decentralization and local governmental reforms called for under the Ohrid accords,failed due to low turnout. Municipal elections under the new redistricting plan took place in March2005. The multi-ethnic coalition government that was elected after the 2001 conflict looks likely tocomplete its term until 2006.
The United States continues to support multilateral efforts to stabilize Macedonia, but hasincreasingly looked to the European Union to play a larger international role in the Balkans, startingwith Macedonia. In March 2003, the European Union launched its first military mission inMacedonia, taking over from a small NATO presence. The EU military mission, which has alsoserved as a test case for the EU's ability to carry out its own defense policy, concluded its operationon December 15, 2003. The EU maintains a police training mission in Macedonia.
Macedonia's long-term goals, shared by the United States and the international community,include full membership in NATO and the European Union. NATO has pledged to uphold its "opendoor policy" for NATO candidate countries such as Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia. Macedoniahas concluded a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, applied for EU membershipin early 2004, and anticipates formally being named an EU candidate country by the end of 2005.EU and U.S. officials urged Macedonian voters to stay on track with reforms consistent with theOhrid agreement, and praised them for endorsing Euro-Atlantic integration with the widespreadboycott of the November 7 referendum. On the eve of the referendum, the United States announcedits decision to recognize Macedonia by its constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia, ratherthan its interim name, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as an expression of supportto a multi-ethnic and democratic state. Its name, however, remains in dispute with neighboringGreece, and U.N.-sponsored talks to resolve the dispute are ongoing.
Related reports include CRS Report RL31053 , Kosovo and U.S. Policy , and CRS Report RL32136 , Future of the Balkans and U.S. Policy Concerns . This report may be updated as eventswarrant. |
crs_RS22318 | crs_RS22318_0 | The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990
The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA) regulates the marketing of organic products by setting national standards for production and processing (handling). Harvey v. Veneman
In October 2002, Mr. Arthur Harvey filed a pro se suit against the USDA in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, alleging that multiple provisions of the Final Rule were inconsistent with the OFPA and the Administrative Procedures Act. The First Circuit sided with Harvey on three counts and remanded the holdings to the district court for further action. On June 9, 2005, the district court issued an order pursuant to the circuit court's instructions that established a two-year time frame in which the Secretary of Agriculture was to create and enforce new rules for the implementation of the National Organic Program in compliance with the circuit court's ruling. The rulings in Harvey and subsequent requirements for new regulations, however, were superceded in part, as a result of amendments made to the OFPA by the FY2006 agriculture appropriations act ( P.L. 109-97 , §797). The following paragraphs examine each holding where the court determined that a provision of the Final Rule was inconsistent with the OFPA and then discuss the effect of the applicable provisions from the appropriations act. | The First Circuit's ruling in Harvey v. Veneman brought much attention and uncertainty to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's National Organic Program. In the case, Harvey alleged that multiple provisions of the National Organic Program Final Rule (Final Rule) were inconsistent with the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA). The First Circuit sided with Harvey on three counts, putting into question the use of synthetics and commercially unavailable organic agricultural products, as well as certain feeding practices for dairy herds converting to organic production. On remand, the district court ordered a two-year time frame for the implementation and enforcement of new rules consistent with the ruling; however, in the FY2006 agriculture appropriations act (P.L. 109-97), Congress amended the OFPA to address the holdings of the case. This report describes the OFPA, discusses those holdings where the court determined that a provision of the Final Rule was inconsistent with the OFPA, and analyzes the most recent legislative action as well as new regulations from the USDA. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_95-406 | crs_95-406_0 | Constitutional Principles
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." The Supreme Court, however, has held that the First Amendment does not protect two types of pornography: obscenity and child pornography. Child Pornography
Child pornography is material that " visually depicts sexual conduct by children below a specified age." It is unprotected by the First Amendment even when it is not legally obscene; i.e., child pornography need not meet the Miller test to be banned. After that, the Children's Internet Protection Act and the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) are considered, to the extent that they incorporate child pornography crimes. The phrase "use a minor in child pornography" in the preceding sentence is a synopsis of the following statutory language:
employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or ... transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct ....
Subsection (b) makes it a crime for "[a]ny parent, legal guardian, or person having custody or control of a minor" knowingly to permit such minor to engage in child pornography that has one of three specified connections to commerce. 108-21 (2003). This provision, which was enacted as P.L. Section 2254
Civil forfeiture. The Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996 (CPPA), P.L. 104-208 , 110 Stat. 3009-26, added a definition of "child pornography" to § 2256. Paragraphs (B) and (D), by contrast, cover pornography that was produced without the use of actual children. These provisions banned child pornography even when no actual minor was used to produce it. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition , 535 U.S. 234 (2002), the Supreme Court declared this provision unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibited pictures that were not produced with actual minors. In addition, P.L. 106-554 (2000), amended three federal statutes to provide that a school or library may not use funds it receives under these statutes to purchase computers used to access the Internet, or to pay the direct costs of accessing the Internet, and may not receive universal service discounts, unless the school or library enforces a policy to block or filter minors' Internet access to visual depictions that are obscene, child pornography, or harmful to minors; and enforces a policy to block or filter adults' Internet access to visual depictions that are obscene or child pornography. Filters may be disabled, however, "for bona fide research or other lawful purpose." In 2003, the Supreme Court held CIPA constitutional. The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, or the PROTECT Act, P.L. | The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Although the First Amendment, in general, protects pornography, the Supreme Court has held that it does not protect two types of pornography: obscenity and child pornography. Consequently, the government may, and has, banned them.
Child pornography is material that visually depicts sexual conduct by children, and is unprotected by the First Amendment even when it is not legally obscene. Federal statutes, in addition to making it a crime to transport or receive child pornography in interstate or foreign commerce, prohibit, among other things, the use of a minor in producing pornography, and provide for criminal and civil forfeiture of real and personal property used in making child pornography, and of the profits of child pornography. In addition, child pornography crimes are included among the predicate offenses that may give rise to a violation of the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, P.L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-26, added a definition of "child pornography" that include visual depictions of what appears to be a minor engaging in explicit sexual conduct, even if no actual minor was used in producing the depiction. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002), the Supreme Court held this provision unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibited pictures that were not produced with actual minors. In response to Ashcroft, Congress enacted the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, or the PROTECT Act, P.L. 108-21, which would again ban some non-obscene child pornography that was produced without an actual minor.
The Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), P.L. 106-554 (2000), amended three federal statutes to provide that a school or library may not use funds it receives under these statutes to purchase computers used to access the Internet, or to pay the direct costs of accessing the Internet, and may not receive universal service discounts, unless the school or library enforces a policy to block or filter minors' Internet access to visual depictions that are obscene, child pornography, or harmful to minors; and enforces a policy to block or filter adults' Internet access to visual depictions that are obscene or child pornography. Filters may be disabled, however, "for bona fide research or other lawful purpose." In United States v. American Library Association (2003), the Supreme Court held CIPA constitutional.
This report ends with a chronological list and description of recently enacted child pornography statutes, through P.L. 110-358, which was signed into law on October 8, 2008. |
crs_RS22497 | crs_RS22497_0 | Introduction
Crime is ordinarily proscribed, tried, and punished according to the laws of the place where it occurs. American criminal law applies beyond the geographical confines of the United States, however, under certain limited circumstances. Other limitations appear elsewhere in the Constitution, most notably in the due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment. The first of these rules holds that a statute that is silent on the question of its application abroad will be construed to have only domestic application unless there is a clear indication of some broader intent. At least until recently, the second rule of construction stated that the nature and purpose of a statute may provide an indication of whether Congress intended a statute to apply beyond the confines of the United States. The Court in RJR Nabisco , another civil case, however, may have changed that. Neither Congress nor the courts are bound to the dictates of international law when enacting or interpreting statutes with extraterritorial application. For this reason, the courts interpret legislation with the presumption that Congress or the state legislature intends its laws to be applied within the bounds of international law, unless it indicates otherwise. Current Extent of American Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction
Congress has expressly provided for the extraterritorial application of federal criminal law most often by outlawing various forms of misconduct when they occur "within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Cooperative Efforts : American law enforcement officials have historically used other, often less formal, cooperative methods overseas to investigate and prosecute extraterritorial offenses. Search and Seizure Abroad : Overseas cooperative law enforcement assistance occasionally has Fourth Amendment implications. The Supreme Court's United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez decision makes it clear that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search of the overseas property of foreign nationals unless the property owner has some "previous significant voluntary connections with the United States." Moreover, the statute of limitations is suspended or tolled during any period in which the accused is a fugitive. Whatever the applicable statute of limitations, Section 3292 authorizes the federal courts to suspend it in order to await the arrival of evidence requested of a foreign government. More recent extradition treaties address other traditional features of the nation's earlier agreements that complicate extradition, most notably the nationality exception, the political offense exception, and the practice of limiting extradition to a list of specifically designated offenses. Venue : Federal crimes committed within the United States must be tried where they occur. Congress has enacted both general and specific venue statutes governing extraterritorial offenses. Mutual legal assistance treaties and similar agreements generally contain provisions to facilitate a transfer of custody of foreign witnesses who are imprisoned overseas and in other instances to elicit assistance to encourage foreign nationals to come to this country and testify voluntarily. | Criminal law is usually territorial. It is a matter of the law of the place where it occurs. Nevertheless, a number of American criminal laws apply extraterritorially outside of the United States. Application is generally a question of legislative intent, express or implied. There are two exceptions. First, the statute must come within Congress's constitutional authority to enact. Second, neither the statute nor its application may violate due process or any other constitutional prohibition.
Claims of implied extraterritoriality must overcome additional obstacles. Federal laws are presumed to apply only within the United States, unless Congress clearly provides otherwise. Moreover, the courts will also presume that Congress intends its statutes to be applied in a manner that does not offend international law.
Historically, in order to overcome these presumptions, the lower federal courts have read certain vintage Supreme Court cases broadly. The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd. and RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, however, suggest a far more restrictive view.
Although the crimes over which the United States has extraterritorial jurisdiction may be many, so are the obstacles to their enforcement. For both practical and diplomatic reasons, criminal investigations within another country require the acquiescence, consent, or preferably the assistance, of the authorities of the host country. The United States has mutual legal assistance treaties with several countries designed to formalize such cooperative law enforcement assistance. It has agreements for the same purpose in many other instances. Cooperation, however, may introduce new obstacles. Searches and interrogations carried out jointly with foreign officials, certainly if they involve Americans, must be conducted within the confines of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. And the Sixth Amendment imposes limits upon the use in American criminal trials of depositions taken abroad.
The nation's recently negotiated extradition treaties address some of the features of earlier agreements which complicate extradition for extraterritorial offenses, that is, dual criminality requirements; reluctance to recognize extraterritorial jurisdiction; and exemptions on the basis of nationality or political offenses. To facilitate the prosecution of federal crimes with extraterritorial application Congress has enacted special venue, statute of limitations, and evidentiary statutes. To further cooperative efforts, it enacted the Foreign Evidence Request Efficiency Act, P.L. 111-79, which authorizes federal courts to issue search warrants, subpoenas, and other orders to facilitate criminal investigations in this country on behalf of foreign law enforcement officials.
This report is an abridged version of a report, which with citations to authority, footnotes, attachments, and bibliography, appears as CRS Report 94-166, Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law, by Charles Doyle. |
crs_R41687 | crs_R41687_0 | In response to the experience of the embargo, Congress authorized the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA, P.L. 94-163 ) to help prevent a repetition of the economic dislocation caused by the Arab oil embargo. The Department of Energy (DOE) currently manages the program. Physically, the SPR comprises five underground storage facilities, hollowed out from naturally occurring salt domes, located in Texas and Louisiana. The SPR has since been filled to its 727 million barrel capacity through royalty-in-kind acquisition, which this report discusses further below. 94-163 ) authorized drawdown of the Reserve upon a finding by the President that there is a "severe energy supply interruption." Congress enacted additional drawdown authority in 1990 (Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments of 1990, P.L. § 6241(h), has allowed the President to use the SPR for a short period without having to declare the existence of a "severe energy supply interruption" or the need to meet obligations of the United States under the international energy program. 110-232 ) enacted in May 2008 forbade DOE from initiating any new activities to acquire royalty-in-kind (RIK) oil for the SPR during the balance of 2008. The sharp decline in crude oil prices since spiking to $147/barrel in the summer of 2008 had spurred interest in resuming fill of the SPR. There were four components in the resumption of fill: (1) a purchase announced on January 16, 2009, of nearly 10.7 million barrels to replace oil that was sold after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005; (2) the return of roughly 5.4 million barrels of oil borrowed by refiners after Hurricane Gustav in 2008; (3) delivery of roughly 2.2 million barrels of RIK oil that had been deferred; and (4) resumption of RIK fill in May 2009 at a volume of 26,000 barrels per day, totaling over 6.1 million barrels to be delivered over a period from May 2009 to January 2010. These activities were intended to fill the SPR to its current capacity of 727 million barrels by early 2010. The FY2001 Interior Appropriations Act ( P.L. SPR Expansion
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) requires, "as expeditiously as practicable," expansion of the SPR to its authorized maximum physical capacity of 1 billion barrels. The FY2010 SPR budget, at $229 million, included $43.5 million for purchase of a cavern at Bayou Choctaw to replace a cavern posing environmental risks, as well as $25 million for expansion activities. DOE has evaluated a site in Richton, MS, as a possible location for an additional 160 million barrels of capacity. The Debate Over When the SPR Should Be Used
Historically, the use of the SPR has been tied to a physical shortage of supply—which normally will manifest itself, in part, in an increase in price. However, price was deliberately kept out of the President's SPR drawdown authority because of concerns about what price level would trigger a drawdown, and that any hint of a price threshold could influence private sector and industry inventory practices. As has been noted, the original intention of the SPR was to create a reserve of crude oil stocks that could be tapped in the event of an interruption in crude supply. As a result, European prices of crude oil have risen more than U.S. prices. 6899 proposal lay partly in an analysis by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which observed that the proportion of grades of oil in the SPR was not as compatible as it could be with the trend of refineries toward being able to handle heavier grades of crudes. The Energy and Water Appropriations Act for 2010 ( P.L. 111-85 ) provided $243.8 million for development and operations and program management activities at the Strategic Petroleum Reserve facility, and $11.3 million for the Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve. Firms providing, or insuring tankers carrying, refined product to Iran were also included in the prohibition. | Congress authorized the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA, P.L. 94-163) to help prevent a repetition of the economic dislocation caused by the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo. The Department of Energy (DOE) manages the SPR, which comprises five underground storage facilities, solution-mined from naturally occurring salt domes in Texas and Louisiana. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) authorized SPR expansion to a capacity of 1 billion barrels, but physical expansion of the SPR has not proceeded beyond 727 million barrels—its inventory at the end of 2010. In addition, a Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve (NHOR) holds 2 million barrels of heating oil in above-ground storage.
EPCA authorized drawdown of the Reserve upon a finding by the President that there is a "severe energy supply interruption." Congress enacted additional authority in 1990 (Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments of 1990, P.L. 101-383) to permit use of the SPR for short periods to resolve supply interruptions stemming from situations internal to the United States. The meaning of a "severe energy supply interruption" has been controversial. EPCA intended use of the SPR only to ameliorate discernible physical shortages of crude oil.
The government had ended the practice of purchasing crude oil to fill the SPR in 1994. In 2000, the Department of Energy began acquiring SPR oil through royalty-in-kind (RIK) in lieu of cash royalties paid on production from federal offshore leases. In May 2008, Congress passed legislation (P.L. 110-232) ordering DOE to suspend RIK fill for the balance of the calendar year unless the price of crude oil dropped below $75/barrel. Crude oil prices spiked to $147/barrel in the summer of 2008 and then sharply declined, allowing a resumption of fill. These activities have brought the SPR essentially to its current 727 million barrel inventory. The current Secretary of the Interior recently announced his intention to terminate the RIK program.
Congress approved $205 million for the SPR in FY2009, including $31.5 million to continue SPR physical expansion activities. DOE has evaluated a site in Richton, MS, as a possible location for an additional 160 million barrels of capacity, but set aside any further expansion plans. The FY2010 Energy and Water Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-85), which provides $243.8 million for the entire SPR program, included $25 million for expansion activities and $43.5 million for purchase of a cavern at Bayou Choctaw to replace a cavern posing environmental risks. The act also prohibits SPR appropriations from being expended to anyone engaged in providing refined product to Iran, or assisting Iran in developing additional internal capacity to refine oil.
Historically, the use of the SPR has been tied to a physical supply shortage, which normally would manifest itself, in part, as a price increase. The original intention of the SPR was to create a reserve of crude oil stocks that could be tapped in the event of an interruption in crude supply. However, price was deliberately kept out of the President's SPR drawdown authority because of concerns about what price level would trigger a drawdown, and that any hint of a price threshold could influence private sector and industry inventory practices. The original intention of the SPR was to create a reserve of crude oil stocks that could be tapped in the event of an interruption in crude supply.
The Government Accountability Office recently observed that the proportion of crude oil grades in the SPR has been growing less compatible with the heavier grades of crude oil that U.S. refineries have been upgrading to handle. This finding has raised questions about the SPR's effectiveness during a long-term oil disruption involving heavy oil. |
crs_RL30225 | crs_RL30225_0 | The agreement was approved by Congress on January 24, 1980 (H.Con.Res. (5)
Withdrawing or Restricting China's MFN Status
As long as China remains subject to the Title IV regime (see footnote 2), MFN status could be withdrawn fromChina, either permanently or temporarily, in one ofseveral ways: (1) by direct legislation enacted through regular legislative process (6) ; (2) by using the specific means provided in the Trade Act of 1974 for denyingMFN tariff status to a NME country that had it restored under that law, i.e., by the specific fast-track enactment ofa joint resolution disapproving the mid-yearannual renewal of the Jackson-Vanik waiver authority with respect to China, if such renewal is recommended bythe President; (3) by the President's failure torecommend such renewal with respect to China in the first place, for noncompliance with the Jackson-Vanikrequirements; or (4) by direct action by the Presidentsuspending or withdrawing China's MFN status. In the 105th Congress, joint resolutions disapproving the mid-year renewals of the waiver authority were introduced in both sessions but failed to be enacted,allowing the extension of the waiver and China's MFN status to remain in force through July 2, 1999. China's MFN status with the United States also could have been adversely affected by legislation, introduced but not passed, requiring prior congressionalapproval of U.S. support of China's admission to the WTO and the withdrawal of the United States from the WTOif China were to be admitted without U.S.support. In the 106th Congress, congressional action regarding China's MFN status --other than two failed annual attempts to disapprove the Presidents renewal of China'sfreedom-of emigration waiver--as in the preceding Congress, reflected to some extent the current action for China'sadmission to the WTO. United States'withdrawal from the WTO, on the other hand, would have had not only serious consequences for U.S.-China traderelations but even more serious consequencesfor the United States' leading role in overall international trade relations. Withdrawal of China's MFN status would result, in the first instance, in significant duty increases on about 95%of U.S. imports from China, totaling $99,580.5 million in 2000. Also likely to be adversely affected would beoverall U.S. economic relations with China,particularly U.S. investment and establishment of American businesses. Due to a large number of amendments--none of which was agreed to-- thedebate on the measure was protracted andthe vote on it was delayed to September 19, when it was passed by a vote of 83 to 15 and on October 10, 2000signed by the President (Title I, P.L. 106-286 ). (17)
Despite this opposition in Congress, the President, on June 1, 2001, renewed China's Jackson-Vanik waiver for one year (Presidential Determination 2000-16; 66FR 30631). | Particularly since--and to some extent despite--the Tiananmen Square incident of June 4, 1989, the U.S. Congress has considered two diametrically opposedtypes of action regarding China's nondiscriminatory, or most-favored-nation (MFN; normal-trade-relations) tariffstatus in trade with the United States. One hasbeen its total withdrawal, the other--of more recent origin--its extension on a permanent basis. After having beensuspended in 1951, China's MFN tariff statuswith the United States was restored in 1980 conditionally under Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, includingcompliance with the Jackson-Vanikfreedom-of-emigration amendment, which must be renewed annually, and the existence in force of a bilateral tradeagreement between the two countries. Thisstatus would be either terminated or changed into a permanent one.
China's loss of MFN tariff status would result principally in the imposition of substantially higher U.S. customs duties on--and in higher, often prohibitive, costsof--over 95% of U.S. imports from China ($99,580.5 million total in 2000) and a likely cutback in such imports aswell as possible retaliatory reduction by Chinaof its imports from the United States. A significant economic disadvantage might result for Hong Kong and Macau,which, despite their political reunificationwith China, remain separate economic entities with permanent U.S. MFN status.
Sundry legislation introduced in earlier Congresses to withdraw or severely restrict China's MFN status failed to be enacted, in two instances for failure tooverride the President's veto. In the 105th Congress, legislation was introduced, but not passed, to grant permanentMFN status to China outright or upon itsaccession to the World Trade Organization. Some of the permanent-MFN bills would have placed additionalconditions or restrictions on the grant of the MFNstatus.
Legislation in the 106th Congress reflected China's prospective accession to the WTO. On one hand, it prohibited U.S. support of China's admission to the WTOwithout Congress's legislative approval and, moreover, in two instances required the United States to withdraw fromthe WTO if China was admitted to it withoutthe U.S. support. On the other hand, like in prior years, Congress failed to pass legislation disapproving thePresident's mid-year renewals of China'sJackson-Vanik waiver and, moreover, enacted legislation (Title I, P.L. 106-286 ) approving permanentnondiscriminatory status for China upon its accession to theWTO.
On January 30, 1998, the President extended the trade agreement with China for 3 years, and on June 1, 2001, renewed for one year China's Jackson-Vanik waiverand, thereby, its temporary nondiscriminatory status. Legislative action to disapprove the waiver renewal wasdefeated in the House. |
crs_RL32420 | crs_RL32420_0 | Introduction
Congressional concern about mercury in the environment has greatly increased in recent years due to emerging scientific evidence that exposure to low levels of mercury may harm the developing nervous systems of young children. Risks of health problems for people who consume mercury in fish have caused wide public concern and prompted the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to issue consumer alerts, warning women of child-bearing age and young children to avoid certain fish altogether and to limit the number of meals for other fish. At least five proposals target emissions from coal-fired electric utilities, because they are thought to be the last remaining major uncontrolled source of mercury emissions. These various proposals and a final regulation promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on March 15, 2005, differ in how much and how soon emission reduction would be required, as well as in the extent to which reductions would be distributed geographically across the United States. This CRS report provides background information about mercury, and summarizes recent scientific findings. It discusses the sources (i.e., natural versus industrial, historic versus modern) and chemical forms of mercury in the environment; how mercury moves through the environment and concentrates in fish (i.e., the fate of mercury); and the risks to human health and wildlife of mercury exposure through fish consumption. For information about specific regulatory proposals to reduce environmental mercury, see CRS Report RL32868, Mercury Emissions from Electric Power Plants: An Analysis of EPA ' s Cap-and-Trade Regulations ; CRS Issue Brief IB10137, Clean Air Act Issues in the 109 th Congress , both by [author name scrubbed]; or CRS Report RL31908, Mercury in Products and Waste: Legislative and Regulatory Activities to Control Mercury , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf). Sources of Mercury in the Environment
Mercury is a natural element, a silver-colored, shiny, liquid metal that is found in a variety of chemical forms in rocks, soil, water, air, plants, and animals. Natural forces move mercury through the environment, from air to soil to water, and back again. Coal-fired electric utility emissions vary depending on the technology and coal used at each plant, but are roughly 50% elemental mercury, according to EPA. Methylmercury Formation and Accumulation
The most biologically significant transformation of mercury occurs in soil or sediments of lakes or streams, where bacteria (primarily sulfate-reducing bacteria) are capable of converting inorganic mercury to methylmercury. In human adults, absorbed methylmercury is dispersed throughout the body in blood and enters the brain, where it may cause structural damage. This condition is predictive of more severe toxicity. Methylmercury readily crosses the placenta of pregnant women. It concluded that scientific studies have demonstrated the sensitivity of the human fetus to pre-natal methylmercury exposure, and that the risk to women who eat large amounts of fish and seafood during pregnancy is "likely to be sufficient to result in an increase in the number of children who have to struggle to keep up in school." U.S. In making choices about fish consumption, factors other than, or in addition to, methylmercury concentration should be considered. In particular, the health benefits of eating fish high in omega fatty acids are important, especially for cardiovascular health and fetal development. However, it is not clear whether typical levels of environmental contamination are stressful for wildlife. Electric utilities are the only uncontrolled major stationary source of U.S. mercury emissions. | Concern about mercury in the environment has increased in recent years due to emerging evidencehat exposure to low levels of mercury may harm the developing rvous systems of unborn children. At least five bills in the 109 th Congress aim to reduce mercury emissions from coal-fired electric utilities. The various proposals and a final regulation promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on March 15, 2005, differ in how much and how soon emission reduction would be required, and in whether reductions would be achieved through controls at each plant or through a nationwide cap and trade system. The latter approach could allow individual plants to continue emitting current levels of mercury, potentially worsening conditions at nearby "hot spots." Analysis of competing proposals raises questions about the sources, fate, and toxicity of mercury in the environment. This CRS report provides background information about mercury and summarizes recent scientific findings. For information about regulatory proposals to reduce environmental emissions of mercury, see CRS Report RL32868, Mercury Emissions from Electric Power Plants: An Analysis of EPA ' s Cap-and-Trade Regulations , by [author name scrubbed].
Mercury is a natural element found in rocks, soil, water, air, plants, and animals, in a variety of chemical forms. Natural forces move mercury through the environment, from air to soil to water, and back again. Industrial activities have increased the portion of mercury in the atmosphere and oceans, and have contaminated some local environments. Coal-fired electric utilities are the largest single source of U.S. mercury emissions, according to EPA, but mobile sources also are important. The chemical form of mercury generally determines how it moves through the environment, but mercury can and does change form relatively rapidly where bromine and other oxidizing substances (e.g., ozone) are abundant. In soil or sediments of lakes, streams, and probably oceans (especially where water is oxygen-poor and acidic, and sulfate is present), bacteria convert inorganic mercury to more toxic methylmercury, which can accumulate in fish. Newly deposited mercury seems to be more readily converted than older deposits.
People and wildlife who eat contaminated fish can be exposed to toxic levels of methylmercury. In people, methylmercury enters the brain, where it may cause structural damage. Methylmercury also crosses the placenta. The National Research Council has reported that the human fetus is sensitive to methylmercury exposure, and the current risk to U.S. women who eat large amounts of fish and seafood during pregnancy is "likely to be sufficient to result in an increase in the number of children who have to struggle to keep up in school." Some studies indicate that the cardiovascular system may be even more sensitive. Mercury concentrations generally are low, but the estimated safe blood-mercury level is exceeded in about 6% of U.S. women between the ages of 16 and 49 years. EPA and the Food and Drug Administration advise women of child-bearing age to avoid certain large fish, and to limit the amount eaten of other fish. In making choices about fish consumption, the health benefits of eating fish also should be considered. Fish-eating wildlife also are exposed to methylmercury, but it is not clear whether typical current levels of environmental contamination are harmful. This report will be updated as warranted by significant scientific discoveries. |
crs_R43748 | crs_R43748_0 | Introduction
The Pacific Alliance is a regional integration initiative comprised of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Costa Rica and Panama are candidates for becoming full members. The Alliance was created on April 28, 2011, in Lima, Peru, when the heads of state of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru signed a Presidential Declaration for the Pacific Alliance , now known as the Lima Declaration, to facilitate the free flow of goods, services, capital, and people. The United States officially joined the Alliance as an observer on July 18, 2013. Another key goal is for the Alliance to become a platform for economic and trade integration with a clear focus on the Asia-Pacific region. The stated objectives of the Pacific Alliance consist of the following:
Build, in a participatory and consensual manner, an area of deep economic integration and to move gradually toward the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and people. It establishes certain requirements for a country to be a member of the Alliance. A key requirement is that member countries must have existing bilateral trade agreements with all other member countries. Chile has 22 free trade agreements linking it to 60 countries, including the European Union (EU), the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea. The coming together of these four countries indicates that they have similar political and economic objectives, recognize their commitment to free trade, and are interested in increasing trade ties with the Asia-Pacific region. Observer status may help countries better understand the issues being negotiated in the Alliance and could help a country ultimately decide if wants to join as a member. Panama was invited to participate in the process as an observer. Presidents of Pacific Alliance countries signed the Additional Protocol of the Framework Agreement for the Pacific Alliance. They have entered into FTAs with all other Alliance countries and also with the United States, Canada, and the EU. Shared Diplomatic Missions
Member countries have signed various agreements to share use of their facilities or embassies and consulates to further advance the objectives of the integration process. The four Latin American countries account for 37% of Latin America's population, 35% of Latin America's nominal GDP, 46% of exports and 50% of total imports. Mexico, however, accounts for much of the economic strength of the group. Trade Relations with the United States
As shown in Figure 2 , the United States is a significant trading partner for all four countries. Some analysts see the Pacific Alliance as a potential rival to Mercosur, the Common Market of the South, which has not yet achieved its goal of a common market. If the Alliance proves successful, it could put pressure on Brazil and other Mercosur countries to adopt more outward-looking and open trade policies. Major strengths of the Alliance are the shared values among member countries, the high level of expertise among the negotiators, and the experience of all four countries in negotiating free trade agreements. One of the major strengths of the initiative is that member countries share similar economic goals. Three of the four Pacific Alliance members (Chile, Mexico, and Peru) are parties to the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, a proposed FTA among 12 countries, including the United States, which aims to liberalize trade in goods and services, remove barriers to foreign investment, and enhance trade rules and disciplines on a range of issues. While the Pacific Alliance has a larger scope than the proposed TPP since it involves the free movement of business people for certain time periods and an integration of the stock markets of member countries, numerous observers have noted that the two could be complementary agreements. | The Pacific Alliance is a regional integration initiative formed by Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru on April 28, 2011. Its main purpose is for members to form a regional trading bloc and forge stronger economic ties with the Asia-Pacific region. Costa Rica and Panama are candidates to become full members once they meet certain requirements. The United States joined the Alliance as an observer on July 18, 2013. The United States has free trade agreements with all four countries and has significant trade and foreign policy ties with the region. The Pacific Alliance is of interest to Congress because of the role of the United States as an observer country and also because of the strong linkages between the United States and the member countries. It may also be of interest to Congress in the context of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. Three of the four Pacific Alliance member countries are parties to the TPP.
The Alliance was officially created when the heads of state of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru signed a Presidential Declaration for the Pacific Alliance, now known as the Lima Declaration. The objectives are to build an area of deep economic integration; to move gradually toward the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and persons; to promote economic development, regional competiveness, and greater social welfare; and to become a platform for trade integration with the rest of the world, with a special emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region. One of the requirements for membership is that a country must have free trade agreements with all other member countries.
The four member countries have embraced free trade as far back as the 1980s and have multiple free trade agreements with many countries, including the United States, Canada, China, and the European Union. They represent 37% of Latin America's population, 35% of its total GDP; 46% of its exports, and 50% of its imports. Mexico accounts for much of the economic strength of the group, representing 61% of the combined gross domestic product.
Observer countries play an important role within the Alliance. Being an observer country may help a country better understand the issues being negotiated and also provides opportunities for participation in activities such as trade forums and educational seminars. The Alliance has 42 observer countries, including the United States, Australia, Canada, China, several Central and South American countries, numerous European countries, Israel, Japan, Turkey, and others.
The Alliance's approach to trade integration is often looked upon as a pragmatic way of deepening economic ties. It is more outward focused than other regional initiatives such as the Common Market of the South (Mercosur). Another unique characteristic is that the four member countries share similar economic and political ideals and are moving forward quickly to accomplish their goals. Member countries have signed various agreements to share use of their facilities or embassies and consulates to further advance the objectives of the integration process. In February 2014, Presidents of Pacific Alliance countries signed the Additional Protocol of the Framework Agreement, which immediately eliminated 92% of tariffs among members. Some analysts see the Pacific Alliance as a potential rival to Mercosur and have noted that it could put pressure on other Latin American countries to pursue more market-opening policies. The Alliance has a larger scope than free trade agreements, such the proposed TPP, since the Alliance involves the free movement of people and includes measures to integrate the stock markets of member countries. |
crs_R40195 | crs_R40195_0 | Overview
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion...." The U.S. Supreme Court has construed the Establishment Clause, in general, to mean that government is prohibited from sponsoring or financing religious instruction or indoctrination. But the Court has drawn a constitutional distinction between aid that flows directly to sectarian schools and aid that benefits such schools indirectly as the result of voucher or tax benefit programs. The Court's past jurisprudence imposed fewer restraints on indirect aid to sectarian schools such as tax benefits or vouchers. Specific Decisions Concerning Public Aid to Sectarian Elementary and Secondary Schools
Bus Transportation
In Everson v. Board of Education , the Court held it to be constitutionally permissible for a local government to subsidize bus transportation between home and school for parochial schoolchildren as well as public schoolchildren. In Wolman v. Walter , on the other hand, the Court held the Establishment Clause to be violated by the public subsidy of field trip transportation for parochial schoolchildren on the grounds field trips are an integral part of the school's curriculum and wholly controlled by the school. | A recurring issue in constitutional law concerns the extent to which the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment imposes constraints on the provision of public aid to private sectarian schools. The U.S. Supreme Court's past jurisprudence construed the clause to impose severe restrictions on aid given directly to sectarian elementary and secondary schools but to be less restrictive when given to colleges or indirectly in the form of tax benefits or vouchers. The Court's later decisions loosened the constitutional limitations on both direct and indirect aid.
This report gives a brief overview of the evolution of the Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause in this area and analyzes the categories of aid that have been addressed by the Court. The report explains which categories have been held to be constitutionally permissible or impermissible, both at the elementary and secondary school level and at the postsecondary level. |
crs_R43104 | crs_R43104_0 | Introduction
In the United States, how a business is taxed at the federal level is partly dependent on how it is organized. The income of subchapter C corporations, also known as "regular" corporations, is taxed once at the corporate level according to the corporate tax system, and then a second time at the individual-shareholder level according to the individual tax rates when corporate dividend payments are made or capital gains are recognized. This leads to the so-called "double taxation" of corporate income (profits). Businesses that choose any other form of organization are, in general, taxed only at the individual level. That is, the income of certain business types passes through to their owners where it is taxed at individual income tax rates. Examples of these alternative "pass-through" forms of organization include sole proprietorships, partnerships, subchapter S corporations, and limited liability companies (LLCs). Because pass-through income is taxed according to individual rates, a differential between the top corporate and individual tax rates can encourage firms to incorporate. A corporation's business income is subject to taxation at the corporate level according to the corporate income tax rate schedule. If the shareholder is a pass-through entity, the income is passed through the shareholder to the income beneficiaries of the pass-through entity. | In the United States, how a business is taxed at the federal level is partly dependent on how it is organized. The income of subchapter C corporations, also known as "regular" corporations, is taxed once at the corporate level according to the corporate tax system, and then a second time at the individual-shareholder level according to the individual tax rates when corporate dividend payments are made or capital gains are recognized. This leads to the so-called "double taxation" of corporate income. Businesses that choose any other form of organization are, in general, not subject to the corporate income tax. Instead, the income of these businesses passes through to their owners and is taxed according to individual income tax rates. Examples of these alternative "pass-through" forms of organization include sole proprietorships, partnerships, subchapter S corporations, and limited liability companies.
This report summarizes the general tax treatment of corporate and pass-through businesses. The intent is to introduce those who are unfamiliar with the current U.S. business tax environment to the basics of corporate and pass-through taxation. Understanding how various businesses are taxed provides a starting point from which one can evaluate current and future proposals to change the taxation of corporations and pass-throughs. Additionally, since pass-through income is typically taxed only at individual income tax rates, this report is also a useful starting point for understanding the effects on pass-through businesses from a change to individual income tax rates. A list of related CRS products on business taxation may be found at the end of the report. |
crs_R44299 | crs_R44299_0 | Introduction
The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for more than two dozen independent agencies in Title V. These agencies perform a wide range of functions, including the management of federal real property, the regulation of financial institutions and markets, and mail delivery. Although financial services are a major focus of the bills, FSGG appropriations bills do not include many financial regulatory agencies, which are instead funded outside of the appropriations process. Administration and Congressional Action
On February 2, 2015, President Obama submitted his FY2016 budget request. The request included a total of $3.60 billion for independent agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $322 million for the CFTC. On July 9, 2015, the House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2016 ( H.R. 2995 , H.Rept. 114-194 ). Total FY2016 independent agency funding in the reported bill was to be $1.19 billion, with another $245 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 3049 , H.Rept. 114-205 ), which was reported on July 14, 2015. On July 30, 2015, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Act, 2016 ( S. 1910 , S.Rept. 114-97 ). S. 1910 would have appropriated $1.35 billion for the independent agencies for FY2016, $2.25 billion less than the President's request. 114-113 , H.R. 2029 ) was passed by the House and Senate and signed by the President on December 18, 2015. The FSGG appropriations were included as Division E, whereas the CFTC was funded by the Agriculture appropriations in Division A. The total provided for independent agencies for FY2016, including the CFTC, was $3.3 billion, about $0.3 billion below the President's request. 2995)
H.R. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. Independent Agencies Related to Personnel Management Appropriations
The FSGG appropriations bill includes funding for four agencies with personnel management functions: the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). 2995 , as reported, and S. 1910 , as reported, and P.L. 114-113 did not change the status of the reserve fund. | The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill funds more than two dozen independent agencies performing a wide range of functions, such as managing federal real property, regulating financial institutions, and delivering mail. These agencies include
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Election Assistance Commission (EAC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Election Commission (FEC), Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), General Services Administration (GSA), Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Small Business Administration (SBA), and United States Postal Service (USPS).
On February 2, 2015, President Obama submitted his FY2016 budget request. The request included a total of $3.60 billion for independent agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $322 million for the CFTC.
On July 9, 2015, the House Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2995, H.Rept. 114-194). Total FY2016 independent agency funding in the reported bill was to be $1.19 billion, with another $245 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 3049, H.Rept. 114-205), which was reported on July 14, 2015. The combined total for these agencies was to be $1.43 billion.
On July 30, 2015, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Act, 2016 (S. 1910, S.Rept. 114-97). S. 1910 would have appropriated $1.35 billion for independent agencies for FY2016.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113/H.R. 2029) was passed by the House and Senate and signed by the President on December 18, 2015. The FSGG appropriations bill was included as Division E, whereas the CFTC was funded with the Agriculture appropriations in Division A. The total provided for FSGG independent agencies for FY2016, including the CFTC, was $3.3 billion, about $0.3 billion below the President's request.
Although financial services are a major focus of the FSGG appropriations bills, these bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies. Both H.R. 2995 and S. 1910 included language that would have altered the appropriations status of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), changing its primary funding source to the FSGG bill instead of unappropriated funds from the Federal Reserve. P.L. 114-113 did not change the funding structure of the CFPB. |
crs_R42526 | crs_R42526_0 | Congress has enacted three major laws that govern labor-management relations. The first law, the Railway Labor Act (RLA), was enacted in 1926. Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) in 1978. The act applies to most federal employees. The act's five major purposes are to:
prevent any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier; ensure employees the right to organize or join a labor union; ensure railway carriers and employees the right to select bargaining representatives without interference from the other party; provide timely settlement of disputes over rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; and provide timely settlement of disputes growing out of grievances or over interpretation or application of existing union contracts. Although the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which covers most private sector employees, was enacted in 1935, labor wanted airline carriers to be included under the RLA, because it believed the RLA's mediation/arbitration dispute resolution mechanisms provided more flexibility for the constantly changing, fledging industry. Prohibited Conduct
The RLA does not specifically list the unfair labor practices that it prohibits. Each type has its own dispute resolution mechanism. National Labor Relations Act
Background
In 1933, the United States was in the midst of the Great Depression. The act proved more effective than NIRA in protecting and guaranteeing employee rights. Scope of Coverage
The NLRA regulates collective bargaining rights and duties for employers, employees, and unions in the private sector, excluding the railway and airline carrier industries. The act grants employees the right to organize and bargain collectively and sets forth the procedures and standards to be applied in the selection of a union as an employee representative and the subsequent relations between the union and the employer. Union Selection
Employees have the right to choose their union representative. Most provisions of the NLRA preempt state law. During an Ongoing Employer-Union Relationship
Both employers and unions are required to bargain collectively and in good faith with one another over "wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment." For instance, federal employees generally could not negotiate over wages or benefits and were prohibited from striking. The law is commonly referred to as the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS). Other Federal Workforce Labor-Relations Statutes and Policies
Although several federal agencies were explicitly excluded from FSLMRS coverage (see " Employer Defined " below), some are covered by separate labor-relations statutes or policies. Those excluded agencies are the Government Accountability Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Federal Labor Relations Authority, the Federal Impasses Panel, and the U.S. Secret Service. The President has the power to unilaterally exclude an agency or subdivision from coverage under the FSLMRS if he determines the entity's "primary function" is "intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work" and that the provisions of the statute cannot be applied "in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations." During Union Organization Efforts
The FSLMRS protects employees' right to organize and imposes restrictions on employers and unions during this process. In a bargaining obligation dispute, an agency usually argues that it has no obligation to bargain over a matter because the proposal is already covered by an existing collective bargaining agreement, the union has waived the right to bargain, a change initiated by the agency is too minor to warrant bargaining, or the matter does not cover a condition of employment. These disputes can be resolved through ULP resolution procedures, negotiated grievance procedures, or negotiability appeal procedures. | Since 1926, Congress has enacted three major laws that govern labor-management relations for private sector and federal employees. An issue for Congress is the effect of these laws on employers, workers, and the nation's economy. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimates that, in 2013, an estimated 14.5 million employees were union members. In the 113th Congress, more than 25 bills were introduced to amend federal labor relations statutes. The proposals ranged from repealing provisions that permit employers to require employees to join a union as a condition of employment to requiring mediation and, if necessary, binding arbitration of initial contract negotiation disputes. These legislative activities, and the significant number of employees affected by federal labor relations laws, illustrate the importance of labor relations issues to legislators and their constituents.
The three major labor relations statutes in the United States are the Railway Labor Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. Each law governs a distinct population of the U.S. workforce.
The Railway Labor Act (RLA) was enacted in 1926. Its coverage extends to railway and airline carriers, their employees, and unions. The RLA guarantees employees the right to organize and bargain collectively with their employers over conditions of work and protects them against unfair employer and union practices. It lays out specific procedures for selecting employee representatives and provides dispute resolution procedures that aim to resolve labor disputes between parties, with an emphasis on mediation and arbitration. The RLA provides multiple processes for dispute resolution, depending on whether the dispute is based on a collective bargaining issue or the application of an existing collective bargaining agreement.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted in 1935. The NLRA's coverage extends to most other private sector employers that are not covered by the RLA. Like the RLA, the NLRA guarantees employees the right to organize and bargain collectively over conditions of employment and protects them against unfair employer and union activities. However, its dispute resolution system differs from the RLA's in that it is arguably more adversarial in nature; many disputes are resolved through adjudication, rather than through mediation and arbitration.
The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) was enacted in 1978, and its coverage extends to most federal employees. The basic framework of the FSLMRS is similar to that of the NLRA; however, employee rights are more restricted under the FSLMRS, given the unique nature of their employer, the federal government. Federal employees have the right to organize and bargain collectively, but they cannot strike. Most federal employees cannot bargain over wages or benefits. Additionally, the President can exclude a federal agency or subdivision from coverage if the organization's primary work concerns national security. |
crs_RS20500 | crs_RS20500_0 | The privacy rule gives patients the right of access totheir medical information and prohibits health plans and health care providers from using or disclosingindividually identifiable information without a patient's written authorization except as expressly permitted orrequired by the rule. The rule also permits the use and disclosure of health informationwithout the individual's permission for various specified activities (e.g., public health oversight, lawenforcement) that are not directly connected to the treatment of the individual. How May Plans and Providers Use and Disclose Patient Information? Generally, plans and providers may use anddisclose health information for their own treatment, payment, and health care operations (TPO) without theindividual's authorization and with few restrictions. The rule requires that whenever a covered entity uses or discloses health information, or requests suchinformation from another covered entity, it must make a reasonable effort to limit the information to theminimum amount necessary to accomplish the intended purpose of the use or disclosure. Are Covered Entities Required to Explain Their Privacy Practices to Patients? Covered entities must have reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards in place,commensurate with the size and scope of their business, to protect the privacy of patient information. As mandated by HIPAA, the rule does not preempt, or override, state laws that are more protective of patientprivacy. | The HIPAA privacy rule gives patients the right of access to theirmedical information and prohibits health plans and health care providers from using or disclosing individuallyidentifiable health information without a patient's written authorization except as expressly permitted orrequired by the rule. Plans and providers are permitted to use and disclose health information for treatment,payment, and other routine health care operations and for various specified national priority activities (e.g., lawenforcement, public health, research). Providers may also share certain information with family members andothers, as long as the patient is given the opportunity to object. Health plans and providers must give enrolleesand patients a notice explaining their privacy rights and how their information will be used. They are alsorequired to have in place reasonable safeguards to protect the privacy of patient information and, in general,must limit the information used or disclosed to the minimum amount necessary to accomplish the intendedpurpose of the use or disclosure. Entities that fail to comply with the rule are subject to civil and criminalpenalties, but patients do not have the right to sue in federal court for violations of the rule. The privacy ruledoes not preempt, or override, state laws that are more protective of medical records privacy. |
crs_RS21294 | crs_RS21294_0 | Introduction
Unmanned vehicles (UVs) are viewed as a key component of U.S. defense transformation. Legislative Activity in 2007
The Department of the Navy's proposed FY2008 budget, with funding for various Navy and Marine Corps UV programs, was submitted to Congress in February 2007. | Unmanned vehicles (UVs) are viewed as a key element of the effort to transform U.S. military forces. The Department of the Navy may eventually acquire every major kind of UV. Navy and Marine Corps UV programs raise several potential issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44117 | crs_R44117_0 | Since then, USAID has been the leading international humanitarian and development arm of the U.S. government. In FY2015, the agency is responsible for more than $20 billion in appropriations, representing more than half of all traditional foreign aid appropriations and more than two-thirds of total U.S. humanitarian and development funding in that year. Selected current issues are then discussed in more depth. USAID Background
Key Features of USAID
Of the multiple agencies and departments of the U.S. government that engage in some form of international humanitarian and development work, USAID differs from the others in a variety of ways:
Leading U.S. Development Agency . The consequent difficulty in meeting technical requirements increased the need to turn to contractors and grantees. Science and Technology . In particular, the Food Security Initiative boosted agriculture aid funding. Budget Trends
Based on an estimated appropriation total of $20.6 billion in FY2015, USAID activities make up more than half of total foreign assistance, traditionally defined as accounts under the foreign operations part of the State, Foreign Operations appropriations and international food aid appropriated under the Agriculture appropriations ( Figure 1 ). USAID manages more than one-third of the International Affairs 150 budget function in the federal budget. USAID provides assistance to a range of countries—125 in FY2013. However, of those, 23 received under $1 million, mostly small island nations or countries receiving one-time funds for humanitarian purposes. As suggested by the country rankings, in FY2013, the lion's share—nearly 40%—of USAID funding attributable to countries or regions went to sub-Saharan Africa. Two countries in south Asia—Afghanistan and Pakistan—accounted for nearly one-fifth of total USAID country/regional assistance. Health . Environment . How USAID Delivers Assistance
The process in which USAID provides assistance encompasses thousands of individuals both within and outside the agency, undertaking a range of actions to ensure that funded activities—projects—are formulated, designed, implemented, monitored, and evaluated effectively. Role of Country and Regional Missions . A major role of the bureaus and offices is to provide policy, technical, and administrative support for the missions and to coordinate the allocation of financial, human, and other resources to the missions. Country Development Cooperation Strategy . Among these is the relationship of the proposed project to other U.S. government programs and strategies, to other donor programs, and to partner country and local "stakeholder" priorities and concerns. Both grants and cooperative agreements are generally provided to nonprofit organizations or educational institutions, but grants are also provided to international organizations and multidonor funds. There is a large universe of potential "development partners"—nonprofit private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and other NGOs, for-profit contractors, universities, foundations, other U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and similar entities in other countries ( Table 4 ). During that period, USAID suffered what many saw as a number of setbacks that were interlinked and reinforced each other, including severe funding cutbacks and numerous mission closures in the mid-1990s; a long-term decline in both civil and foreign service staff; sharply reduced USAID independence by tying it more closely to the Department of State, both through legislative efforts and executive branch actions; increased reliance on contractors for program functions, establishment of rival U.S. aid agencies and funding accounts; consolidation of many administrative functions and locations with U.S. embassies; and loss of budget and policy planning functions. The USAID Forward reform goes much further. Almost any current aspect of the agency contains a complex history—for more than 50 years the agency has been challenged by concerns regarding accountability, sustainability, project partners and the best way to do development, its place in the U.S. government, and the priorities of Congress. Country Ownership
USAID's "local solutions" effort follows from its original mandate and a long history of working closely with recipient governments and civil society. USAID believes that a key objective of development assistance is to strengthen the capacity of government and private sector entities to meet this end. The limits on operational and program flexibility and the attention given by Congress to USAID operations at the project and country level have raised the question by some of whether Congress micro-manages USAID to a greater degree than other U.S. departments and agencies. Despite the increased numbers of USAID Foreign Service Officers in recent years, the agency may still face shortages of specific skill sets—e.g., contract officers to meet the needs generated by aid localization efforts or specialists to implement policy initiatives, such as agriculturalists to manage the Feed the Future initiative. Local Solutions . As discussed earlier in this report, working with local governments and the private sector to implement development efforts requires a commitment of agency personnel and funds, the flexibility to use those funds in a way that reflects country priorities, and a long-term planning and implementation time frame aimed at developing local capacities, while at the same time ensuring that accountability standards are met. Sustainability . A clear path to sustainability, however, remains a work in progress. Security . Lack of security for agency personnel overseas poses significant obstacles to successful project implementation. Program Flexibility . | This report provides background information on the institutional makeup and operations of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the leading international humanitarian and development arm of the U.S. government. The report then discusses in greater depth several aspects of the agency that might be of particular congressional interest.
In FY2015, USAID is responsible for more than $20 billion in appropriations, representing more than one-third of the International Affairs 150 budget function and more than half of total foreign assistance encompassed by the State, Foreign Operations appropriations and international food aid appropriated under the Agriculture appropriations.
USAID provides assistance to a range of countries—125 in FY2013; however, of those, 23 received under $1 million, mostly small island nations or countries receiving one-time funds for humanitarian purposes. In FY2013, nearly 40% of funds attributable to countries and regions went to sub-Saharan Africa and more than 19% went to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of funds attributable to a specific sector, 36% were for health programs and 19% for humanitarian efforts.
USAID maintains more than 60 country and regional missions that design and manage a wide range of development projects, most intended to meet specific development objectives as formulated in a Country Development Cooperation Strategy. Most projects are implemented through some form of grant, cooperative agreement, or contract by one of thousands of potential development partners—nonprofit private voluntary organizations and other non-governmental organizations, for-profit contractors, universities, international organizations, and foreign governments and civil society.
Since 2010, under its USAID Forward agenda, the agency has undertaken numerous reforms to address challenges in budgeting, evaluation, human resources, use of the private sector, and the application of science and technology to development issues, among other concerns.
Congress maintains broad interest in and authority over the budget, operations, and policies of the U.S. government's leading development agency, and over U.S. foreign policies generally. Issues of possible interest to Congress include the following, each of which is addressed more fully in the report:
Accountability. Is the agency able to provide adequate accountability for taxpayers dollars and could efforts to increase accountability have negative implications for the agency? Local Solutions. What are the benefits and challenges of moving agency resources through local governments and organizations? Aid Implementers. What are some of the concerns regarding the largest cohort of aid implementers, U.S. contractors and grantees? Relationship to Department of State. What has been the historic relationship of USAID, technically an independent agency, and the Department of State, and what impact has this relationship had on USAID operations? What is the outlook for the USAID-State relationship? Role of Congress. In what ways can and does Congress affect the programs and operations of USAID? Sustainability. How can USAID ensure that project efforts are maintained by local governments and organizations after its financial and technical support ends?
USAID faces multiple challenges in the course of fulfilling its mission, including:
Local Solutions. Providing assistance to local entities incurs the risk of loss of taxpayer dollars. Efforts to mitigate risk generally require more personnel and consequent funding to monitor local entities and build their capacities.
Sustainability. "Country ownership" and domestic resource mobilization efforts are two ways the agency has sought to address sustainability, but a clear path to sustainability remains a work in progress.
Human Resources. The agency faces shortages of specific skill sets to meet the needs generated by efforts to work more closely with local government and private sector partners and to meet the needs of the Food Security Initiative.
Program Flexibility. Congressional funding mandates and a host of presidential initiatives are viewed by many observers as restricting the ability of USAID mission personnel to program project activities in accordance with development professional and partner country priorities.
Scaling-Up. Seeing successful ideas from pilot through to maturity and making them work at the country, region, and international level likely requires a long-term funding horizon, programming flexibility, and mechanisms to spread ideas throughout the agency—each a challenge in itself.
Security. Security concerns in non-permissive environments, such as South Sudan and Afghanistan, raise numerous obstacles to successful project implementation. |
crs_R41694 | crs_R41694_0 | Introduction and Overview
The disaster that struck Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station on March 11, 2011, caused the most extensive release of radioactivity since the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and was far worse than the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in the United States. The tsunami knocked out backup power systems that were needed to cool the reactors at the plant, causing several of them to undergo fuel melting, hydrogen explosions, and radioactive releases. Studies of the Fukushima disaster have identified design changes, response actions, and other safety improvements that could have reduced or eliminated the amount of radioactivity released from the plant. As a result, Fukushima has prompted a reexamination of nuclear plant safety requirements around the world, including the United States. Radioactive contamination from the Fukushima plant forced the evacuation of communities up to 25 miles away, affecting up to 100,000 residents, many of whom remain indefinitely barred from their homes. The Fukushima Daiichi plant subsequently suffered hydrogen explosions and severe nuclear fuel damage, releasing significant amounts of radioactive material into the environment. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) operates the Fukushima nuclear power complex in the Futaba district of Fukushima prefecture in Northern Japan, consisting of six nuclear units at the Fukushima Daiichi station and four nuclear units at the Fukushima Daini station. All the units at the Fukushima complex are boiling water reactors (BWRs), with reactors 1 to 5 at the Fukushima Daiichi site being the General Electric Mark I design (see Figure 2 ). The Fukushima Daiichi reactors entered commercial operation in the years from 1971 (reactor 1) to 1979 (reactor 6). All four of the Fukushima Daini reactors were operating at the time of the earthquake and taken down after the quake. The tsunami flooded most of the generators and electrical switchgear rooms, knocking out the backup AC power for cooling the nuclear reactors in units 1-5. The hydrogen leaked from the containments or the venting systems into the reactor buildings and caused large explosions in units 1, 3, and 4. The loss of cooling also affected the plant's spent fuel pools (shown in Figure 2 ), which hold fuel rods that have been removed from the reactors after their ability to sustain a nuclear chain reaction has diminished. Diesel-generated backup power had been available at units 5 and 6 since March 19. Top priorities were restoring core cooling to units 1-3 and to the spent fuel pools in units 1-4 and eliminating discharges of highly contaminated water into the ocean. Unit 3
Unit 3 was generating electricity and shut down automatically during the earthquake and then lost AC power during the tsunami. Unit 4
Unit 4 was out of service for maintenance when the earthquake struck. The station reportedly retained offsite power to maintain its ability to circulate cooling water in the reactor. U.S. Assistance
The United States and other countries, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency, are providing assistance to Japan to deal with the nuclear crisis. The United States provided advice and equipment, including transport of pumps, boron, fresh water, remote cameras, use of Global Hawk surveillance drones, evacuation support, medical support, and decontamination and radiation monitoring equipment. | The huge earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station on March 11, 2011, knocked out backup power systems that were needed to cool the reactors at the plant, causing three of them to undergo fuel melting, hydrogen explosions, and radioactive releases. Radioactive contamination from the Fukushima plant forced the evacuation of communities up to 25 miles away and affected up to 100,000 residents, although it did not cause any immediate deaths.
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) operates the Fukushima nuclear power complex in the Futaba district of Fukushima prefecture in Northern Japan, consisting of six nuclear units at the Fukushima Daiichi station and four nuclear units at the Fukushima Daini station. All the units at the Fukushima complex are boiling water reactors, with reactors 1 to 5 at the Fukushima Daiichi site being the General Electric Mark I design, which is also used in the United States. The Fukushima Daiichi reactors entered commercial operation in the years from 1971 (reactor 1) to 1979 (reactor 6). The Fukushima Daini reactors shut down automatically after the earthquake and were able to maintain sufficient cooling.
When the earthquake struck, Fukushima Daiichi units 1, 2, and 3 were generating electricity and shut down automatically. The earthquake caused offsite power supplies to be lost, and backup diesel generators started up as designed to supply backup power. However, the subsequent tsunami flooded the electrical switchgear for the diesel generators, causing most AC power in units 1 to 4 to be lost. Because Unit 4 was undergoing a maintenance shutdown, all of its nuclear fuel had been removed and placed in the unit's spent fuel storage pool. One generator continued operating to cool units 5 and 6.
The loss of all AC power in units 1 to 3 prevented valves and pumps from operating that were needed to remove heat and pressure that was being generated by the radioactive decay of the nuclear fuel in the reactor cores. As the fuel rods in the reactor cores overheated, they reacted with steam to produce large amounts of hydrogen, which escaped into the unit 1, 3, and 4 reactor buildings and exploded (the hydrogen that exploded in Unit 4 is believed to have come from Unit 3). The explosions interfered with efforts by plant workers to restore cooling and helped spread radioactivity. Cooling was also lost in the reactors' spent fuel pools, although recent analysis has found that no significant overheating took place.
Radioactive material released into the atmosphere produced extremely high radiation dose rates near the plant and left large areas of land uninhabitable, especially to the northwest of the plant. Contaminated water from the plant was discharged into the sea, creating international controversy.
The United States and other countries, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency, are providing assistance to Japan to deal with the nuclear disater. U.S. assistance has included transport of pumps, boron, fresh water, remote cameras, use of Global Hawk surveillance drones, evacuation support, medical support, and decontamination and radiation monitoring equipment.
Studies of the Fukushima disaster have identified design changes, response actions, and other safety improvements that could have reduced or eliminated the amount of radioactivity released from the plant. As a result, Fukushima has prompted a reexamination of nuclear plant safety requirements around the world, including in the United States. |
crs_R41652 | crs_R41652_0 | Introduction
The United States and the European Union (EU) share a large, dynamic, and mutually beneficial economic relationship. Private stakeholders on both sides have urged policymakers to cooperate more closely to reduce remaining barriers to trade and to provide greater leadership for the world economy. This could create a need for greater U.S.-EU cooperation in addressing global challenges that are important for job creation and growth for both sides. At the November 28, 2011, EU-United States Summit meeting, President Obama, European Commission President Barroso, and European Council President Von Rompuy directed the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) to establish a High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth. Led by U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk and EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht, the working group was asked to identify policies and measures to increase U.S.-EU trade and investment to support mutually beneficial job creation, economic growth, and international competitiveness. The working group will provide an interim report to leaders on the status of its work in June 2012. It will submit a report with findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the leaders by the end of 2012. The working group could recommend a number of possible initiatives, including enhanced regulatory cooperation, negotiation of a comprehensive free trade agreement, negotiation of a zero-tariff agreement, or negotiation of bilateral agreements liberalizing trade in services and investments. The 112 th Congress, in both its legislative and oversight roles, faces numerous issues that affect the U.S.-EU trade and economic relationship. A select group of these issues are identified and briefly described in this report. The working group will identify and assess options for strengthening the U.S.-EU trade and investment relationship, especially those that have highest potential to support jobs and growth. Despite these generally low average tariff levels, there is interest in the U.S. and EU business communities to eliminate all remaining tariffs imposed on U.S.-EU trade through a bilateral negotiation. Support for the proposal is based on a combination of factors, including the agreement's ability to (1) generate economic benefits for both sides, including reducing costs to companies that pay tariffs on trade with their foreign affiliates; (2) re-energize transatlantic economic ties; and (3) pressure recalcitrant countries in the Doha Round to undertake more concessions. Completing the Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
The United States and the EU have played a special role in creating the post-WWII global trade and finance framework of market-based rules and institutions. Given shared interests in opening emerging markets further to industrial goods and services, U.S. and some EU business interests have urged negotiators on both sides to work together to more actively press these other economies for concessions. EU negotiators have remained skeptical and somewhat reluctant to move in this direction perhaps out of concern that greater ambition would require further EU concessions on agriculture. As U.S.-EU trade and economic interactions continue to play an important role in affecting growth and the creation of new jobs on both sides of the Atlantic, the 112 th Congress can be expected to monitor ongoing efforts to deepen transatlantic ties. | The 112th Congress, in both its legislative and oversight roles, confronts numerous issues that affect the trade and economic relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU). As U.S.-EU commercial interactions drive significant job creation on both sides of the Atlantic, Congress is monitoring ongoing efforts to deepen transatlantic ties that are already large, dynamic, and mutually beneficial.
U.S. and European private stakeholders, concerned about slow growth, job creation, and increased competition from emerging economies, have urged Brussels and Washington to strengthen transatlantic trade and economic ties by reducing or eliminating remaining trade barriers and by cooperating more closely in addressing global economic challenges. A number of studies produced over the past several years have called for new bilateral trade, investment, and other economic arrangements to maximize economic opportunities available to stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic.
At the November 28, 2011, EU-U.S. Summit meeting, leaders from both sides directed the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) to establish a High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth. The Working Group, which will be led by U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk and EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht, was tasked with assessing options for strengthening the U.S.-EU trade and investment relationship, especially those that have the highest potential to support jobs and growth. The findings and recommendations of the group are due by the end of 2012. The working group will provide an interim update to leaders in June 2012.
There are many options the Working Group could explore for greater liberalization of the transatlantic economic relationship. They range from a comprehensive and traditional free trade agreement to parallel but separate negotiations in areas such as elimination of tariffs on trade in goods, liberalization of services trade and foreign investment restrictions, and reduction of regulatory barriers. A select group of these issues, including enhanced bilateral cooperation on global issues, is discussed in this report.
Despite generally low tariff levels on both sides, some in the U.S. and EU business communities support negotiating the elimination of all remaining tariffs imposed on U.S.-EU trade through a bilateral negotiation. Support for a zero-tariff agreement is based on a combination of factors, including the agreement's ability to generate economic benefits for both sides and the leverage such an agreement could create for pressuring emerging economies to make more concessions in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Consideration of enhanced regulatory cooperation and one or more bilateral agreements addressing investment and services trade issues are also being touted by the business community.
Greater collaboration and alignment of U.S. and EU approaches towards addressing global economic challenges, such as completing the Doha Round, dealing with China's trade barriers, and reducing global imbalances, remains a work in progress. Given shared interests in opening emerging markets further to industrial goods and services, business interests have urged U.S. and EU negotiators to work more closely together to press other countries for more concessions. EU negotiators in the past have remained reluctant to move in this direction perhaps out of concern that greater ambition would require further EU concessions on agriculture. |
crs_R40667 | crs_R40667_0 | Introduction
An anaerobic digestion system (AD system) captures the methane that may otherwise be released from conventional manure handling methods, and has the potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and produce clean energy. There are more than 160 AD systems operating on farms nationally (see Table 1 ). Some factors that may be responsible for the low technology adoption rates are high capital costs, reliability concerns, and payment rates for the electricity generated. Congress may consider encouraging increased adoption of the technology by (1) identifying the primary technology benefit, so as to determine whether AD should be pursued in the framework of greenhouse gas emission reduction or clean energy development; (2) determining if the captured methane will count as a carbon offset; and (3) considering additional financing options for the technology. Dairy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from dairy operations by 25% by 2020. This report provides information on AD systems, technology adoption, and challenges to widespread technology implementation, and explores the issues facing Congress concerning adoption of the technology. What Is an Anaerobic Digestion System? Captured methane may qualify as a carbon offset because the methane would no longer be released directly into the atmosphere. Biogas can be used to produce heat or generate electricity. One principal source of federal funding is the Section 9007 Rural Energy for America Program (REAP) of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 farm bill, P.L. 110-246 ). Another source of financial assistance offered for anaerobic digestion projects is the Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (REPTC; 26 U.S.C. §45). | Anaerobic digestion technology may help to address two congressional concerns that have some measure of interdependence: development of clean energy sources and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Anaerobic digestion technology breaks down a feedstock—usually manure from livestock operations—to produce a variety of outputs including methane. An anaerobic digestion system may reduce greenhouse gas emissions because it captures the methane from manure that might otherwise be released into the atmosphere as a potent greenhouse gas. The technology may contribute to the development of clean energy because the captured methane can be used as an energy source to produce heat or generate electricity.
Anaerobic digestion technology has been implemented sparingly, with more than 160 anaerobic digestion systems operating on farms nationwide. Some barriers to adoption include high capital costs, questions about reliability, and varying payment rates for the electricity generated by anaerobic digestion systems. Two sources of federal financial assistance that may make the technology more attractive are the Section 9007 Rural Energy for America Program of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 farm bill, P.L. 110-246), and the Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (26 U.S.C. §45).
Congress could decide to encourage development and use of the technology by (1) identifying the primary technology benefit, so as to determine whether it should be pursued in the framework of greenhouse gas emission reduction or clean energy development; (2) determining if the captured methane will count as a carbon offset; and (3) considering additional financing options for the technology.
This report provides information on anaerobic digestion systems, technology adoption, challenges to widespread implementation, and policy interventions that could affect adoption of the technology. |
crs_RL30669 | crs_RL30669_0 | On the other hand, according to the Court in its landmark 1976 decision, Buckley v. Valeo , an absolutely free "political marketplace" is neither mandated by the First Amendment, nor is it desirable, because when left uninhibited by reasonable regulation, corruptive pressures undermine the integrity of political institutions and undercut public confidence in republican governance. In other words, although the Court reveres the freedoms of speech and association, it has upheld infringements on these freedoms in order to further the governmental interests of protecting the electoral process from corruption or the appearance of corruption. In Buckley , the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), requiring political committees to disclose political contributions and expenditures, and limited to various degrees, the ability of natural persons and organizations to make political contributions and expenditures. While First Amendment freedoms and campaign finance regulation present conflicting means of preserving the integrity of the democratic political process, the Court resolved this conflict in favor of First Amendment interests and subjected any regulation burdening free speech and free association activities to "exacting scrutiny." Under this standard of review, the Court evaluates whether the state's interests in regulation are compelling, examines whether the regulation burdens and outweighs First Amendment liberties, and inquires whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to further its interest. If a regulation meets all three criteria, the Court will uphold it. This report discusses the critical holdings and rationales enunciated by the Buckley Court and then examines the Court's extension of Buckley in subsequent cases. Buckley 's extensions are evaluated in various regulatory contexts: contribution limits, expenditure limits, disclosure requirements, and political party spending and electioneering communication restrictions. In general, the Court struck down expenditure limitations, but upheld reasonable contribution limitations, disclosure requirements, and voluntary spending limits linked with public financing provisions. Most notably, the Buckley Court held that the spending of money, whether in the form of contributions or expenditures, is a form of "speech" protected by the First Amendment. Prohibiting or Limiting Corporate Expenditures (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti; FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.; Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce)
Representing an important new emphasis on First Amendment protection of corporate free speech, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , the Supreme Court held that the fact that the corporation is the speaker does not limit the scope of its interests in free expression, as the scope of First Amendment protection turns on the nature of the speech, not the identity of the speaker. Limiting Political Party Expenditures (Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (Colorado I); FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II); FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee)
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission (Colorado I), the Supreme Court examined whether the FECA "Party Expenditure Provision," which imposed dollar limits on political party expenditures "in connection with the general election campaign of a [congressional] candidate," was unconstitutionally enforced against a party's funding of radio "attack ads" directed against its likely opponent in a federal senatorial election. Citizens United v. FEC
A potentially pivotal case in the Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence, Citizens United v. F ederal Election Commission (FEC) , is currently before the Supreme Court. | Political expression is at the heart of First Amendment activity and the Supreme Court has granted it great deference and protection. However, according to the Court in its landmark 1976 decision, Buckley v. Valeo, an absolutely free political marketplace is not required by the First Amendment—nor is it desirable—because without reasonable regulation, corruption will result. Most notably, the Buckley Court ruled that the spending of money in campaigns, whether as a contribution or an expenditure, is a form of "speech" protected by the First Amendment. The Court upheld some infringements on free speech, however, in order to further the governmental interests of protecting the electoral process from corruption or the appearance of corruption.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), requiring political committees to disclose campaign contributions and expenditures and limiting, to various degrees, the ability of persons and organizations to make contributions and expenditures. While First Amendment freedoms and campaign finance regulation present conflicting means of attempting to preserve the integrity of the political process, the Court resolved this conflict in favor of the First Amendment interests and subjected any regulation burdening free speech and free association to "exacting scrutiny." Under this standard of review, a court will evaluate whether the government's interests in regulating are compelling, examine whether the regulation burdens and outweighs First Amendment liberties, and inquire as to whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve the government's interests. If a regulation meets all three criteria, a court will uphold it.
This report first discusses the key holdings enunciated by the Supreme Court in Buckley, including those upholding reasonable contribution limits, striking down expenditure limits, upholding disclosure reporting requirements, and upholding the system of voluntary presidential election expenditure limitations linked with public financing. It then examines the Court's extension of Buckley in several subsequent cases, evaluating them in various regulatory contexts: contribution limits (California Medical Association v. FEC; Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley; Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC; FEC v. Beaumont); expenditure limits (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti; FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life; Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce; FEC v. National Right to Work; Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado I) v. FEC; FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II); FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee; FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee; Randall v. Sorrell); disclosure requirements (Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation; Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee; FEC v. Akins; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission); and political party soft money and electioneering communication restrictions (McConnell v. FEC; Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC (WRTL II)). This report also discusses a case that is currently pending before the Court, Citizens United v. FEC, that may result in a decision that is pivotal to the Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence. |
crs_R41996 | crs_R41996_0 | Background
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution includes fundamental procedural protections for criminal defendants, among them the guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Confrontation Clause as being more or less compatible with evidentiary rules governing out-of-court statements. In 1979, in Ohio v. Roberts , the Court expressed the view that evidence that fit within a hearsay exception or had analogous "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" would also "comport with the substance" of the Confrontation Clause; hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause were generally designed to protect similar values and stemmed from the same roots. However, in a landmark 2004 decision, Crawford v. Washington, the Court overruled Roberts. The Crawford decision introduced a new standard for Confrontation Clause analysis: testimonial versus nontestimonial statements. In the U.S. Supreme Court's 2010-2011 term, two cases were handed down which are significant post- Crawford interpretations of the Clause. One case, Michigan v. Bryant , held that admitting into evidence a dying man's statements to police officers about his assailant did not violate the Confrontation Clause—not through the "dying declaration" exception, but because they were made to assist law enforcement officers in an "ongoing emergency" and were therefore "nontestimonial." The other, Bullcoming v. New Mexico , addressed the prosecution's use of forensic laboratory reports. It concluded that the Confrontation Clause requires the laboratory analyst who performed the test to appear at trial and confront the defendant in person. This report examines these decisions in the context of the Court's relatively new Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. It considers their implications for admissibility of evidence in criminal prosecutions. After an exhaustive survey of the right of confrontation from Roman times through the 17 th -century English common law and continental civil law, the Court concluded that the Framers of the Constitution intended that, where out-of-court testimonial evidence is at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands, at a minimum, that a witness be both unavailable at trial and that the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The Court concluded that the Framers viewed "testimonial" evidence as including solemn declarations made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact in a context that the declarant would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially. 541 U.S., at 54. | The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution includes the guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Confrontation Clause as being more or less compatible with evidentiary rules governing out-of-court statements. In 1979, in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, the Court expressed the view that evidence that fit within a hearsay exception or had analogous "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" would also "comport with the substance" of the Confrontation Clause; hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause were generally designed to protect similar values and stemmed from the same roots.
However, in a landmark 2004 decision, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, the Court overruled Roberts. The Crawford decision introduced a new standard for Confrontation Clause analysis: testimonial versus nontestimonial statements. The Court concluded that the Framers of the Constitution intended that, where introduction of out-of-court testimonial evidence is at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands, at a minimum, that a witness be both unavailable and that the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Testimonial evidence, though not fully defined by the Court, includes solemn declarations made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact in a context that the declarant would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially. When a court determines that an out-of-court statement is "testimonial," it may not be admitted into evidence under any traditional hearsay exceptions if the declarant is unavailable to testify, unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.
In the U.S. Supreme Court's 2010-2011 term, two cases were handed down which are significant post-Crawford interpretations of the Clause. One case, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011), held that admitting into evidence a dying man's statements to police officers about his assailant did not violate the Confrontation Clause—not through the "dying declaration" exception to hearsay, but because they were made to assist law enforcement officers in an "ongoing emergency" and were therefore "nontestimonial." The other, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011), addressed the prosecution's use of forensic laboratory reports. It concluded that the Confrontation Clause requires the laboratory analyst who performed the test to appear at trial and confront the defendant in person.
This report examines these decisions in the context of the Court's relatively new Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. It considers their implications for admissibility of evidence in criminal prosecutions. |
crs_R44653 | crs_R44653_0 | Continuing appropriations acts are often referred to as continuing resolutions (CRs) because they are typically enacted in the form of a joint resolution. None of the FY2017 regular appropriations bills was enacted prior to the enactment of H.R. 5325 . As enacted, the measure provides continuing appropriations for projects and activities covered by 11 of the 12 regular appropriations bills from the beginning of the fiscal year—October 1, 2016—through December 9, 2016 (Division C). It also provides appropriations in the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act for all of FY2017 (Division A), as well as emergency funds to combat the Zika virus and provide relief for flood victims in Louisiana and other affected states (Division B). H.R. 5325 was passed by the Senate and House on September 28, 2016, and signed into law by the President on September 29 ( P.L. 114-223 ). The purpose of this report is to provide an analysis of the continuing appropriations provisions in H.R. 5325 . For general information on the content of CRs and historical data on CRs enacted between FY1977 and FY2016, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices , by James V. Saturno and Jessica Tollestrup. 114-113 —with some exceptions. The CR includes both budget authority that is subject to those limits and budget authority that is effectively exempt from those limits. Budget authority that is effectively exempt includes that designated or otherwise provided as "Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism" (OCO/GWOT), "continuing disability reviews and redeterminations," "health care fraud and abuse control," "disaster relief," and "emergency requirements." Most projects and activities funded in the CR are subject to an across-the-board decrease that would have the effect of reducing the rate about one-half of 1% (0.496%) below the level of FY2016 funding. The CR and the Statutory Discretionary Spending Limits
Background
Appropriations for FY2017 are subject to statutory discretionary spending limits on categories of spending designated as "defense" and "nondefense" spending pursuant to the BCA. FY2017
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the budgetary effects of interim CRs on an "annualized" basis, meaning that those effects are measured as if the CR were providing budget authority for an entire fiscal year. According to CBO, when the funding provided in Division A (the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act) is added to the annualized amount for the 11 appropriations acts covered by the continuing appropriations provisions in Division C, the total amount of annualized discretionary budget authority for regular appropriations subject to the BCA limits (including projects and activities funded at the rate for operations and anomalies) is $1,066.582 billion—less than combined amount of the statutory discretionary spending limits for FY2017. Agency, Account, and Program-Specific Provisions
In addition to the general provisions that establish the coverage, duration, and rate, CRs typically include provisions that are specific to certain agencies, accounts, or programs. First, certain provisions designate exceptions to the formula and purpose for which any referenced funding is extended. Second, certain provisions may have the effect of creating new law or changing existing law. Most typically, these provisions are used to renew expiring provisions of law or extend the scope of certain existing statutory requirements to the funds provided in the CR. Similar authority was included in the FY2016 CR. | The purpose of this report is to provide an analysis of the continuing appropriations provisions for FY2017 in H.R. 5325. The measure also included provisions covering appropriations in the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations bill for all of FY2017 (Division A), as well as emergency funds to combat the Zika virus and provide relief for flood victims in Louisiana and other affected states (Division B). On September 29, 2016, the President signed H.R. 5325 into law (P.L. 114-223).
Division C of H.R. 5325 was termed a "continuing resolution" (CR) because measures to provide temporary authority for federal agencies and programs to continue spending are typically in the form of a joint resolution. It provides temporary funding in FY2017 for the programs and activities covered by the remaining 11 regular appropriations bills, since none of them had been enacted previously. These provisions provide continuing budget authority for projects and activities funded in FY2016 by that fiscal year's regular appropriations acts, with some exceptions. It includes both budget authority that is subject to the statutory discretionary spending limits on defense and nondefense spending and also budget authority that is effectively exempt from those limits, such as that designated as for "Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism."
Funding under the terms of the CR is effective October 1, 2016, through December 9, 2016—roughly the first 10 weeks of the fiscal year.
The CR generally provides budget authority for FY2017 for projects and activities at the rate at which they were funded during FY2016. Most projects and activities funded in the CR, however, are also subject to an across-the-board decrease of 0.496% (pursuant to Section 101(b) of Division C).
According to the cost estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the total amount of budget authority for the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs appropriations act—and the annualized budget authority for the other regular appropriations in the FY2017 CR that are subject to the statutory discretionary spending limits—totals approximately $1,067 billion. When spending that is effectively not subject to those limits (Overseas Contingency Operations, disaster relief, emergency requirements, and program integrity adjustments) is included in the CBO estimate, the total is $1,149 billion.
In addition to the general provisions that establish the coverage, duration, and rate of spending, CRs usually include provisions that are specific to certain agencies, accounts, or programs. These include provisions that designate exceptions to the formula and purpose for which any referenced funding is extended (referred to as "anomalies") as well as provisions that have the effect of creating new law or changing existing law (often used to renew expiring provisions of law). The CR includes a number of such provisions, each of which is briefly summarized in this report. CRS appropriations process experts for each of these provisions are listed in Table 1.
For general information on the content of CRs and historical data on CRs enacted between FY1977 and FY2016, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices, by James V. Saturno and Jessica Tollestrup. |
crs_R42513 | crs_R42513_0 | Introduction
Recent events have renewed long-standing congressional interest in safe management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and other high-level nuclear waste. This report focuses on the current situation with spent nuclear fuel storage in the United States. It does not address all of the issues associated with permanent disposal of SNF, but rather focuses on the SNF storage situation, primarily at current and former reactor facilities and former reactor sites for the potentially foreseeable future (i.e., a total of 300 years). Although much of the congressional attention has focused on the issues of the permanent geological repository proposed for Yucca Mountain in Nevada, there are a number of reasons to also consider SNF storage issues. The 2009 termination of the Yucca Mountain disposal project continues the ongoing delay in opening a permanent geologic repository. Hence, the current quantity of SNF (i.e., 67,450 MTU of civilian SNF and 2,458 MTU of DOE-owned SNF) and high-level waste being stored would fill the proposed Yucca Mountain repository beyond the limit imposed by Congress in the NWPA, necessitating a need to build a second repository or change the legal limit. The recent report by the BRC also implicated the current "impasse" in the U.S. nuclear waste program as a hindrance to expansion of nuclear power, among other impacts:
Put simply, this nation's failure to come to grips with the nuclear waste issue has already proved damaging and costly and it will be more damaging and more costly the longer it continues: damaging to prospects for maintaining a potentially important energy supply option for the future, damaging to state-federal relations and public confidence in the federal government's competence, and damaging to America's standing in the world—not only as a source of nuclear technology and policy expertise but as a leader on global issues of nuclear safety, non-proliferation, and security. Wet storage pools are the most common method for storing SNF in the United States, accounting for about 73% (49,338 MTU) of the current commercial SNF inventory. The remaining 27% (18,112 MTU) of commercial SNF is stored in dry casks on concrete pads or horizontal bunkers. The SNF storage capacities using wet storage pools at U.S. commercial power reactors generally range from approximately 2,000 assemblies to 5,000 assemblies (averaging approximately 3,000 SNF fuel assemblies). Generally, the storage sites include facilities at the 104 licensed operating nuclear power reactor locations where it was generated (see Table 1 and Figure 5 ), as well as 10 "stranded" commercial sites where no reactors operate (including the Morris, IL), and 4 DOE-operated facilities. Of the 74 different sites (some with multiple storage facilities) where commercial spent fuel is stored in the United States, 55 locations employ dry cask storage for at least part of the storage for commercial SNF. There are 27 sites with 36 wet pool storage "facilities" (i.e., in some cases there are multiple wet pool storage "facilities" co-located at individual sites) where wet pool storage is the only technology being used at the site. In addition, SNF is stored at three DOE-owned sites where the reactors ceased operating. Specifically, measured by mass, more than 80% (54,092 MTU vs. 13,358 MTU) of SNF is stored at sites east of the Mississippi River. After the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, the first two of these concerns appeared to be occurring at the Fukushima Dai-ichi facility. The NRC staff identified seven recommendations for near-term action, and offered this overall assessment: "To date the Task Force has not identified any issues that undermine our confidence in the continued safety and emergency planning of U.S. plants … Task Force review is likely to recommend actions to enhance safety and preparedness." Options for How to Store SNF
To consider how SNF is stored, there are essentially two options available: wet storage pools and dry cask. A shift of all SNF older than five years from wet pools to dry storage would more than triple the amount of SNF in dry cask storage. The concerns about consolidated interim storage expressed by some include (1) potentially reducing pressure on decision makers to agree on a permanent repository because the problem will appear to have been "solved" and because of a resulting concern that storage sites would become de facto repositories; (2) protracted delays because of the difficulty in finding a willing host community for SNF storage, which could divert resources from other useful efforts (e.g., safety and security of existing SNF storage and repository siting); and (3) potentially higher net risks if the SNF were to require multiple moves to transport it to the interim site and again to the repository (depending on risk reduction from moving SNF from existing storage locations). | Regardless of the outcome of the ongoing debate about the proposed Yucca Mountain geologic waste repository in Nevada, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF)—also referred to as "high-level nuclear waste"—will continue to be needed and the issue will continue to be debated. The need for SNF storage, even after the first repository is opened, will continue for a few reasons.
The Obama Administration terminated work on the only planned permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, which was intended to provide a destination for most of the stored SNF. Also, the Yucca Mountain project was not funded by Congress in FY2011 and FY2012, and not included in the Administration's budget request for FY2013. Even if the planned repository had been completed, the quantity of SNF and other high-level waste in storage awaiting final disposal now exceeds the legal limit for the first repository under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). The expected rate of shipment of SNF to the repository would require decades to remove existing SNF from interim storage. Accordingly, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and reactor operators are considering extended SNF storage lasting for more than 100 years.
The debate about SNF typically involves where and how it is stored, as well as what strategies and institutions should govern SNF storage. The earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and resulting damage to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, caused some in Congress and NRC to consider the adequacy of protective measures at U.S. reactors. The NRC Near-Term Task Force on the disaster concluded it has "not identified any issues that undermine our confidence in the continued safety and emergency planning of U.S. plants." Nonetheless, NRC has accepted a number of staff recommendations on near-term safety enhancement, including requirements affecting spent fuel storage and prevention and coping with station blackout. NRC is not requiring accelerated transfer of SNF from wet pools to dry casks, but the SNF storage data from the last several years indicate that accelerated transfer has already been occurring.
As of December 2011, more than 67,000 metric tons of SNF, in more than 174,000 assemblies, is stored at 77 sites (including 4 Department of Energy (DOE) facilities) in the United States located in 35 states (see Table 1 and Figure 5), and increases at a rate of roughly 2,000 metric tons per year. Approximately 80% of commercial SNF is stored east of the Mississippi River. At 9 commercial SNF storage sites there are no operating nuclear reactors (so-called "stranded" SNF), and at the 4 DOE sites reactor operations largely ceased in the 1980s, but DOE-owned and some commercial SNF continues to be stored at DOE facilities. In the United States, SNF is stored largely at nuclear reactor sites where it was generated. Of the 104 operating nuclear reactors in the United States, all necessarily have wet storage pools for storing SNF (wet pools are required to allow for a safe "cooling off" period of 1 to 5 years after discharge of SNF from a reactor). Wet storage pools are used for storage of approximately 73% (49,338 out of 67,450 metric tons of uranium, or MTU) of the current commercial SNF inventory, whereas the remaining 27% (18,112 MTU) of commercial SNF is stored in dry casks on concrete pads or in vaults. As wet storage pools become filled to capacity using "dense packing" storage methods, dry storage is increasingly being used, although there are 27 sites with 36 wet storage pools with no current dry cask storage capabilities.
This report focuses on the current situation with spent nuclear fuel storage in the United States. It does not address all of the issues associated with permanent disposal of SNF, but rather focuses on the SNF storage situation, primarily at current and former reactor facilities for the potentially foreseeable future. |
crs_RL31786 | crs_RL31786_0 | Current Controversy over Total Information Awareness Programs
Established in January 2002 under retired Admiral John Poindexter, USN, the mission of theInformation Awareness Office (IAO) in the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA)is to develop new tools to detect, anticipate, train for, and provide warnings about potential terroristattacks. If proven effective, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technologyand Logistics Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge has suggested that the TIA technology prototypes will beturned over to "intelligence, counterintelligence and law enforcement communities as a tool to helpthem in their battle against domestic terrorism." (2)
In a press conference on November 20, 2002, Under Secretary Aldridge stated that funding for the Total Information Awareness System (TIA) is $10 million in FY2003. (3) On February 7, 2003,he reiterated that funding for the TIA project is $10 million in FY2003 and $20 million in FY2004.The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a non-profit organization specializing in privacyissues, calculated that TIA-related programs totaled $112 million in FY2003 and $240 million forthe three-year period, FY2001-FY2003. (4) Pressreports also cited funding of over $200 million overthree years. (5)
These alternative funding levels reflect the difference between the $10 million in funding for the R&D specifically labeled the "Total Information Awareness System" that would integratevarious R&D technology efforts, and the $137.5 million in funding for various R&D efforts managedby the Information Awareness Office that could become part of that system. Reflecting both these viewpoints, P.L. 2) the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution requires that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence(DCI), and the Attorney General submit to Congress a detailed report on TIA by May 20, 2003 orface a cutoff in funding (see Restrictions on TIA in FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution later in this report for more details). In the meantime, TIA programs are continuing. (11) DARPA'sFY2003 request for the R&D efforts managed by the Information Awareness Office totaled $137.5million in FY2003 (see Table 1 below), including $10 million for the integrative efforts specificallylabeled the Total Information Awareness System, a new start in FY2003. Future Funding for Information Awareness Office Programs
For FY2004, DARPA is requesting $169.2 million for TIA programs and $170.3 million in FY2005. (27)
Other Members of Congress have also signaled concerns about the TIA system. (28)
Issues for Congress
In addition to concerns raised by members of Congress and public interestgroups about protecting the privacy of U.S. citizens, Congress may continue toaddress oversight issues, including:
developing monitoring mechanisms for TIA programs; and
assessing the technical feasibility of the program. (32)
DARPA's efforts at collaboration reflect the fact that there are potentially many users of any tools that DARPA develops to predict terrorist threats. (38)
P.L. 108-7 , testing outside of DOD mayalso be subject to rigorous oversight. Getting access, 'cleaning up,' and integrating large data bases may pose significantchallenges in developing a TIA system. | Late last year controversy erupted about a Department of Defense (DOD) R&D effort called Total Information Awareness (TIA) under an office headed by retired Admiral John D. Poindexterwithin the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). By integrating various newtools designed to detect, anticipate, train for, and provide warnings about potential terrorist attacks,DARPA hopes to develop a prototype Total Information Awareness system. This system wouldintegrate a number of ongoing R&D efforts, referred to in this paper as Total Information Awarenessprograms. While concern has centered primarily on privacy issues, accounts of the program'sfunding have also differed. This report covers the funding, composition, oversight, and technicalfeasibility of TIA programs. The privacy implications are addressed in CRS Report RL31730 , Privacy: Total Information Awareness Programs and Related Information Access, Collection, andProtection Laws, by Gina Marie Stevens.
In a press interview, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge, stated that the Total Information Awareness project is funded at $10million in FY2003 and $20 million in FY2004. Other reports indicated higher funding levels of over$100 million in FY2003 and over $200 million for the three-year period, FY2001 - FY2003.
Different accounts of funding levels reflect the fact that DARPA is funding both an integrative effort called the TIA system, as well as 16 individual R&D efforts or TIA programs that could becombined to create that system. In FY2003, DARPA is dedicating $10 million to integrate variousR&D efforts into a prototype TIA system, and $137.5 million for the various R&D programs thatcould make up that system and that are managed by the Information Awareness Office (IAO) headedby Poindexter. Funding for these programs total $137.5 million in FY2003 and $317.0 million forFY2001-FY2003. DOD is requesting $169.2 million for TIA programs in FY2004 and $170.3 inFY2005, and $20 million in FY2004 and $24.5 million in FY2005 for the TIA system integration.These TIA programs are ongoing.
In response to concerns about TIA programs, Congress included special oversight provisions -- known as the Wyden amendment -- in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution ( P.L.108-7 ) requiring that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the AttorneyGeneral submit a detailed joint report on TIA programs by May 20, 2003, or face a cutoff in funding.Senator Feingold, Senator Grassley and other Members also proposed restrictions on data miningin the DOD and the new Department of Homeland Security.
In light of the report required by P.L. 108-7 , hearings on TIA programs are likely in the 108th Congress. In addition to privacy concerns, Congress may also address several oversight issues forTIA programs including monitoring collaboration between DARPA and potential users in the lawenforcement and intelligence communities and assessing the technical feasibility of the project. Thisreport will be updated as necessary. |
crs_R45328 | crs_R45328_0 | Introduction
Congressional commissions are entities established by Congress to provide advice, make recommendations for changes in public policy, study or investigate a particular problem or event, or perform a spe cific duty. Generally, commissions may hold hearings, conduct research, analyze data, investigate policy areas, and/or make field visits as they perform their duties. Most commissions complete their work by delivering their findings, recommendations, or advice in the form of a written report to Congress. For example, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was created to "examine and report upon the facts and causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001," and to "investigate and report to the President and Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism," among other duties. The commission ultimately submitted a final report to Congress and the President containing its findings and conclusions, along with 48 policy recommendations. Specifically, this report provides illustrative examples of statutory language, discusses different approaches used in previous commission statutes, and analyzes possible advantages or disadvantages of different choices in commission design. This report focuses on congressional commissions created by statute and does not address entities created by the President or other nonstatutory advisory bodies. This report analyzes statutory language used between the 101 st Congress (1989-1990) and the 115 th Congress (2017-2018) to establish congressional commissions. Statutory Lifecycle of Congressional Commissions
A congressional commission is commonly provided a series of deadlines that define major milestones in its statutory lifecycle. Deadline for Final Report
Nearly all commission statutes include a deadline for the submission of a final report. Commission Structure
Policymakers face a number of choices when designing a commission. Commission statutes frequently include sections that
establish the commission and state its mandate; provide a membership structure and authority for making appointments; outline the commission's duties; grant the commission certain powers; define any rules of procedure; address hiring of commission staff; and prescribe how the commission will be funded. A variety of options are available for each of these decisions. The following sections of the report discuss the above-listed components of commission legislation, along with subissues relevant to each. Legislators can tailor the composition, organization, and working arrangements of a commission based on particular congressional goals. | Congressional advisory commissions are temporary entities established by Congress to provide advice, make recommendations for changes in public policy, study or investigate a particular problem or event, or perform a specific duty. Generally, commissions may hold hearings, conduct research, analyze data, investigate policy areas, and/or make field visits as they perform their duties. Most complete their work by delivering their findings, recommendations, or advice in the form of a written report to Congress. For example, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was created to "examine and report upon the facts and causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001," and to "investigate and report to the President and Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to prevent acts of terrorism," among other duties. The commission ultimately submitted a final report to Congress and the President containing its findings and conclusions, along with 48 policy recommendations.
Advisory commission legislation generally has specific features that provide the commission with the authorities and resources necessary to complete its mission. Using a dataset of statutorily authorized congressional commissions from the 101st Congress (1989-1990) to the 115th Congress (2017-2018), this report focuses on the legislative language used to establish congressional commissions.
Policymakers face a number of choices when designing a commission. Statutes establishing congressional commissions commonly provide a series of deadlines that outline the commission's statutory lifecycle, including deadlines for appointment of commissioners, the commission's initial meeting, the submission of a final report and any interim reports, and the commission's termination. Additionally, commission statutes frequently include sections that establish the commission and state its mandate; provide a membership structure and authority for making appointments; outline the commission's duties; grant the commission certain powers; define any rules of procedure; address hiring of commission staff; and prescribe how the commission will be funded.
A variety of options are available for each of these decisions. This report discusses the above-listed topics, along with subissues relevant to each. Legislators can tailor the composition, organization, and working arrangements of a commission based on particular congressional goals; this report provides illustrative examples of statutory language for these topics, discusses potential alternative approaches, and analyzes possible advantages or disadvantages of different choices in commission design. This report focuses on congressional commissions created by statute and does not address entities created by the President or other nonstatutory advisory bodies. |
crs_RL34361 | crs_RL34361_0 | Introduction1
Automated political calls generally include prerecorded messages that provide information about candidates or urge voters to go to the polls. The calls are an inexpensive way to reach large numbers of voters quickly. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) does not require detailed reporting about automated political calls. Several bills introduced in the 110 th Congress would have imposed additional regulations on automated political calls, but would not necessarily apply to all circumstances in which the calls are used. Many of the concerns surrounding automated political calls are not about the calls themselves, but about how those calls are used. Specifically, the bills would: (1) add political calls to the FTC do not call list; (2) revise disclosure or disclaimer requirements or otherwise restrict automated political calls; or (3) regulate political calls generally, which could include automated calls. The Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, held an oversight hearing on automated political calls on December 6, 2007. The Senate Rules and Administration Committee also held a hearing on the calls, and S. 2624 , on February 27, 2008. This section provides comments on various options. Maintain the Status Quo
Congress could choose not to pursue additional regulation of automated political calls. Some Members also rely on automated calls for official (franked) communications. Similarly, although the FEC can compile data about relevant complaints upon request, it does not routinely release information about automated political calls. Revise Disclaimer Requirements
Congress could also require those making calls to provide more information to recipients. Revise the Do Not Call Framework
As noted previously, several bills introduced in the 111 th and 110 th Congresses propose (or proposed) to add automated political calls to the national do not call list. This approach would not necessarily affect the content of automated political calls. Restrict the Timing or Number of Calls
Congress could also limit automated political calls to certain hours of the day or restrict the number of calls made to a single recipient. Constitutional considerations (speech issues) that could affect this policy option are discussed below. Although empirical data are limited, estimates suggest that the calls reach at least a majority of American voters, occur frequently during federal campaigns, and could represent millions of dollars in spending by various political committees. Despite media accounts of strong public disdain for automated political calls, the FEC has received few formal complaints on the issue since 2003. Some of those options would likely involve sensitive questions about which groups and messages should be covered by campaign finance law. Research Methodology
As this report discusses, publicly available data about automated political calls are virtually nonexistent. | Prerecorded telephone messages that provide information about political candidates or urge voters to go to the polls are a common campaign tactic. Anecdotal accounts suggest that the public often objects to the volume and frequency of these automated political calls (also called "auto calls" or "robo calls"). Despite often negative anecdotal information about automated political calls, they remain an inexpensive, effective way to reach hundreds or thousands of voters quickly. Campaigns and groups often rely on automated political calls to respond to last-minute campaign developments.
Four bills introduced in the 111th Congress contain provisions that are particularly relevant for automated political calls. H.R. 116 (Foxx) would add automated political calls to the federal do not call list. S. 1077 (Feinstein) would restrict the timing and volume of calls and would require certain information to be disclosed. H.R. 4641 (Lofgren) proposes similar restrictions. Finally, H.R. 4749 (Price, N.C.) would extend "stand by your ad" disclaimer requirements to various political messages, including prerecorded calls.
Automated political calls received attention in both chambers during the 110th Congress. Several bills (H.R. 248, H.R. 372, H.R. 479, H.R. 894, H.R. 1298, H.R. 1383, H.R. 1452, H.R. 4298, H.R. 5747, and S. 2624) would have added the calls to the federal do not call list, required additional reporting about the calls, or otherwise regulated the calls. The Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, held an oversight hearing on automated political calls on December 6, 2007. The Senate Rules and Administration Committee considered S. 2624 at a February 27, 2008, hearing.
Empirical research and data about automated political calls are limited. Existing research suggests that the calls are an increasingly common campaign tactic and that various political committees spent millions of dollars on those efforts. Despite media reports of strong public disdain for automated political calls, the FEC has received few recent formal complaints on the issue. However, FEC enforcement data are not necessarily a reliable indicator of public sentiment toward automated political calls. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) reportedly does not track data about complaints it receives on automated political calls.
This report provides an overview of how automated political calls are used in federal campaigns. This includes attention to recent spending estimates and polling data about automated political calls. The report also discusses legislation that would affect the calls. Policy options discussed in the report include maintaining the status quo, gathering additional data, revising federal disclosure or disclaimer requirements, adding the calls to the federal do not call list, or restricting the number and timing of calls. Some of those options would likely involve contentious questions about which organizations and messages should be regulated by campaign finance law. Constitutional issues could also affect some of those policy options. The "First Amendment Considerations" section provides a legal analysis.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33486 | crs_RL33486_0 | Overview
As an ongoing response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and a justification forthe U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Bush Administration has made the promotion of democracy in theMiddle East a national security priority, stating that greater political freedom can undercut the forcesof Islamic radicalism and indoctrination. At the heart of this upheaval lies a long, vexing dilemma for U.S. policy makers: should theUnited States exert pressure on Arab governments to open their political systems and respect humanrights with the knowledge that Islamists, the most popular opposition force in Arab politics, standto benefit from regional democratization? Many observers assert that Islamist (2) political parties andorganizations are largely opposed, at least rhetorically, to key aspects of U.S. foreign policy in theMiddle East, such as support for Israel, the occupation of Iraq, and the large U.S. military presencein the Persian Gulf. This reportexamines how U.S. democracy promotion efforts interact with the political realities on the groundin three Arab countries (Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan) and raises the following questions: Who arethe Islamists? Are such groups legitimate democratic actors or militant fundamentalists in disguise?To what extent are Islamists opposed to U.S. Middle East policy? Do non-violent Islamist groups even welcome or accept dialogue with theUnited States or would such action discredit them among their followers? Some of thesegroups have renounced violence and peacefully oppose their respective governments. (4) Some experts argue that non-violent Islamist groups that renounceviolence as a tactic in their own countries but support its use in the Palestinian-Israeli context shouldnot be considered non-violent. Within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, there has been an ongoing, vigorousdebate over the issue of engaging Islamist groups, some of which have renounced the use ofviolence and entered into mainstream politics. With U.S. democracy promotion policy toward Islamists left somewhat vague, perhaps evendeliberately so, there are many foreign policy practitioners in the U.S. State Department who believethat, at the moment, the United States is taking a pragmatic approach toward Middle Eastdemocratization. U.S. Democracy Programs
Since the September 11, 2001, terroristattacks, the United States has significantlyincreased funding for democracy promotion inthe Arab world. Rather, it must be properlychanneled to support reformers withoutde-legitimizing them in the process. Indeed, many groups inside and outside the Arab world would provide additional insights.Groups that have not disarmed their militias or renounced terrorism are not treated in this study. U.S. Policy in Egypt. | This report assesses U.S. policy toward Islamist organizations in the Arab world, specificallythose groups that have renounced violence and terrorism. The report analyzes U.S. governmentattitudes toward Islamist movements and investigates how U.S. democracy promotion policy isapplied in three Arab countries with a significant Islamist presence in the political sphere: Morocco,Egypt, and Jordan. It may be updated periodically to include new case studies of Islamist movementsin Algeria, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, or areas outside the Arab world.
The Bush Administration has made the promotion of democracy in the Middle East a nationalsecurity priority, stating that greater political freedom can undercut the forces of Islamic radicalismand indoctrination. As U.S. democracy promotion policies have moved forward, policy makers haveconfronted a significant dilemma: how to respond to challenges posed by political Islamistmovements (i.e. parties and political organizations that promote social and political reform inaccordance with Islamic religious principles that may lead them to oppose U.S. foreign policy).
In response to this dilemma, some observers have questioned whether the United Statesshould exert pressure on Arab governments to open their political systems and respect human rightswith the knowledge that such steps, if successful, may benefit Islamist groups. Representing apowerful and popular political force in the Arab world today, many Islamist political parties andorganizations are largely opposed, at least rhetorically, to key aspects of U.S. foreign policy in theMiddle East, such as support for Israel, the occupation of Iraq, and the large U.S. military presencein the Persian Gulf. Elections in Iraq, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority that were supported bythe United States have strengthened the political positions of Islamist organizations, including, inthe case of Hamas, armed groups that have refused to renounce violence.
Non-violent Islamist groups, which have chosen or been permitted to peacefully participatein politics, present their own challenges to U.S. policy makers. This report raises the followingquestions: Are Islamists liberal democrats or fundamentalists? Should the United States support theirparticipation in democratic politics? Do non-violent Islamists welcome dialogue with the UnitedStates or would such action discredit them among their followers?
While many continue to speculate over the direction of U.S. democracy promotion in theMiddle East, Congress may use its oversight authority to bring further clarity to the Administration'sregional strategy, particularly on the issue of dealing with Islamist groups. Congress alsoappropriates funds for regional democratization programs and foreign aid projects and may specifythat these funds be used for certain projects or channeled to certain groups. |
crs_R41104 | crs_R41104_0 | Introduction
Policy Context
The conventional wisdom is that the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, prompted a substantive change in U.S. immigration policy on visa issuances and the grounds for excluding foreign nationals. A series of laws enacted in the 1990s, however, may have done as much or more to set current U.S. visa policy and the legal grounds for exclusion. This report's review of the legislative developments in visa policy over the past 20 years and analysis of the statistical trends in visa issuances and denials provide a nuanced study of U.S. visa policy and the grounds for exclusion. Legislation aimed at comprehensive immigration reform may take a fresh look at the grounds for excluding foreign nationals that were enacted over the past two decades. Expanding the grounds for inadmissibility, conversely, might be part of the legislative agenda among those who support more restrictive immigration reform policies. Regardless of which legislative path Congress may take, the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who allegedly attempted to ignite an explosive device on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, has heightened scrutiny of the visa process and grounds for exclusion. Those admitted on a permanent basis are known as immigrants or legal permanent residents (LPRs), while those admitted on a temporary basis are known as nonimmigrants (such as tourists, foreign students, diplomats, temporary agricultural workers, and exchange visitors). Foreign nationals not already legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa to be admitted. They must first meet a set of criteria specified in the INA that determine whether they are eligible for admission. Conversely, foreign nationals also must not be deemed inadmissible according to other specified grounds in the INA. The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish eligibility for the type of visa for which the application is made. In FY2008, §212(a) exclusions of nonimmigrant visas hit 35,403 and surpassed the prior high point of 34,750 in FY1998. For prospective LPRs, §212(a) exclusions peaked in FY1998 and FY1999, reaching over 89,000 in both years. The §212(a) exclusions of prospective LPRs fell from FY2000 through FY2003, then began climbing to reach 77,080 in FY2008. As previously mentioned, these criteria are health-related grounds; criminal history; security and terrorist concerns; public charge (e.g., indigence); seeking to work without proper labor certification; illegal entrants and immigration law violations; ineligible for citizenship; and aliens previously removed. Inadmissible Immigrants
As Figure 4 makes clear, most LPR petitioners who were excluded on §212(a) grounds in FY1996 and FY2000 were rejected because the DOS determined that the aliens were inadmissible as likely public charges. In FY2004, the proportion of public charge exclusions had fallen, but remained the top basis for denial. The lack of proper labor certification was another leading ground for exclusion in FY1996, FY2000, FY2004, and FY2008. By FY2008, however, illegal presence and previous orders of removal from the United States had become the leading ground. By FY2008, however, illegal presence and previous orders of removal from the United States was the leading ground, and public charge was less than 10% of the §212(a) exclusions. Inadmissible Nonimmigrants
Refusals of nonimmigrant petitions presented have a somewhat different pattern than that of immigrant petitions. Over the four points in time, the criminal grounds grew as a more common ground for refusal, and represented a larger portion of exclusions among nonimmigrant petitioners than it was for immigrant petitioners. It was the top basis from FY1994 through FY2006, but fell to the second ranking by FY2008 (31.0%). | The conventional wisdom is that the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, prompted a substantive change in U.S. immigration policy on visa issuances and the grounds for excluding foreign nationals from the United States. A series of laws enacted in the 1990s, however, may have done as much or more to set current U.S. visa policy and the legal grounds for exclusion. This report's review of the legislative developments in visa policy over the past 20 years and analysis of the statistical trends in visa issuances and denials provide a nuanced study of U.S. visa policy and the grounds for exclusion.
Foreign nationals not already legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa to be admitted. Those admitted on a permanent basis are known as immigrants or legal permanent residents (LPRs), while those admitted on a temporary basis are known as nonimmigrants (such as tourists, foreign students, diplomats, temporary agricultural workers, and exchange visitors). They must first meet a set of criteria specified in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that determine whether they are eligible for admission. The burden of proof is on the foreign national to establish eligibility for a visa. Conversely, foreign nationals also must not be deemed inadmissible according to other specified grounds in §212(a) of the INA. These §212(a) inadmissibility criteria are health-related grounds; criminal history; security and terrorist concerns; public charge (e.g., indigence); seeking to work without proper labor certification; illegal entrants and immigration law violations; ineligible for citizenship; and aliens illegally present or previously removed.
The number of aliens excluded on the basis of §212(a) of the INA has fluctuated over the years. In FY2008, §212(a) exclusions of prospective nonimmigrants hit 35,403 and surpassed the prior high point of 34,750 in FY1998. For prospective LPRs, §212(a) exclusions peaked in FY1998 and FY1999, reaching over 89,000 in both years. The §212(a) exclusions of prospective LPRs fell from FY2000 through FY2003, then began climbing to reach 77,080 in FY2008.
Most LPR petitioners who were excluded on §212(a) grounds from FY1994 through FY2004 were rejected because the Department of State (DOS) determined that the aliens were inadmissible as likely public charges. By FY2004, the proportion of public charge exclusions had fallen but remained the top basis for denial. The lack of proper labor certification was another leading ground for exclusion from FY1994 through FY2004. By FY2008, however, illegal presence and previous orders of removal from the United States was the leading ground.
Exclusions of nonimmigrant petitions have a somewhat different pattern than that of immigrant petitions. Violations of immigration law were the leading category from FY1994 through FY2006, but fell to the second ranking by FY2008. Illegal presence and prior removal became the leading ground in FY2008. Over time, criminal activity has become a more common ground for refusal, and has represented a larger portion of exclusions among nonimmigrant petitioners than it was for immigrant petitioners.
Legislation aimed at comprehensive immigration reform may take a fresh look at the grounds for excluding foreign nationals enacted over the past two decades. Expanding the grounds for inadmissibility, conversely, might be part of the legislative agenda among those who support more restrictive immigration reform policies. More specifically, the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who allegedly attempted to ignite an explosive device on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, has heightened scrutiny of the visa process and grounds for exclusion. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R40841 | crs_R40841_0 | The fourth section outlines how active GHG emission reduction legislation in the 111 th Congress would address these concerns. By limiting the number of GHG emissions that can be generated in a given year, a cap-and-trade system would attach a new cost to activities that generate emissions, primarily fossil fuel combustion. In either case, households are expected to ultimately bear the brunt of the costs of the cap-and-trade program. Emission Allowance Value Distribution
An emissions cap would be partitioned into emission allowances. The emission allowances would become a valuable new commodity, potentially accounting, in aggregate, for tens or hundreds of billions of dollars. The value of the allowances would be derived from their scarcity (i.e., the quantity limit imposed by the cap). In designing a cap-and-trade program, policymakers must decide how and to whom to distribute the emission allowance value. This would be due to the ability of covered entities (e.g., power plants, petroleum producers/importers, large industrial facilities) to pass on the costs incurred from complying with the program. Potentially Regressive Effects of Cap-and-Trade
Without some form of allowance value redistribution, lower-income households would likely bear a disproportionate share of the costs related to an emissions cap, because those households generally spend a higher percentage of their income on energy-related goods and services than do higher-income households. On average, lower-income households already pay a larger share of their income toward the costs of their residential energy and for gasoline. These households are also less likely to have the financial resources to improve the energy efficiency of their dwelling units or to purchase energy efficient appliances or cars, which could help reduce high energy costs. Arguments for Alleviating Regressive Impacts
Given the disproportionate impacts that a cap-and-trade system could have on lower-income households, some have argued that allowance value should be used to alleviate the burden those households would likely face. Direct Assistance to Households: Considerations
If Congress enacts a cap-and-trade program and determines to use some portion of emission allowance value to directly assist households, policymakers would face several questions when seeking to implement this objective. A primary consideration is which households or persons should receive allowance value: should value be distributed evenly to all households, or should particular household groups receive a higher proportion? Moreover, should policymakers seek to account for different costs that households in different regions may experience? Mechanisms for Returning Funds to Households
Policymakers have a variety of options available for distributing allowance value to households. In evaluating these options, there are a number of considerations that might be relevant to policymakers in choosing and implementing a distribution system. Among considerations are the ability of a system to reach large numbers of households, the existence of an administrative infrastructure and the costs of distributing funds, and the ease of tailoring benefits to different consumer incomes and regions of the country. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
The American Clean Energy and Security Act ( H.R. | By limiting the amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that can be generated in a given year, a cap-and-trade program would attach a new cost to activities that generate emissions, primarily fossil fuel combustion. To the extent they are able, the capped entities (e.g., power plants, petroleum producers/importers, large industrial facilities) would likely pass on the costs of complying with a cap-and-trade program to household and business consumers. Thus, a cap-and-trade system is intended (and expected) to increase the price of coal, oil, natural gas, and the products they help create, including electricity.
Congress can affect the distribution of the costs imposed by an emissions cap through emission allowance allocation. In a cap-and-trade system, one emission allowance typically represents the authority to emit one metric ton of GHG emissions. Emission allowances would become a valuable new commodity, potentially accounting, in aggregate, for tens or hundreds of billions of dollars. Therefore, when designing a cap-and-trade program, one of the more controversial and challenging questions for policymakers is how, to whom, and for what purpose to distribute the emission allowance value—the actual revenue or potential revenue (i.e., the value of the allowance as an asset) represented by the allowances.
Without redistribution of allowance value, cap-imposed costs would ultimately be borne by energy consumers, both businesses and households. In particular, lower-income households would likely bear a disproportionate share of the costs related to an emissions cap, because those households generally spend a higher percentage of their income on energy-related goods and services than do higher-income households. Moreover, lower-income households already pay (on average) a larger share of their income toward the costs of their residential energy and for gasoline. These households are also less likely to have the financial resources to improve the energy efficiency of their dwelling units or to purchase energy efficient appliances or cars, which could help reduce high energy costs. For these and other reasons (including federal precedents), some have argued that allowance value should be used to alleviate the burden households, especially lower-income households, would likely face.
Congress would face several questions when seeking to implement this objective. A primary consideration would be which households or persons should receive allowance value: should value be distributed evenly to all households, or should particular household groups receive a higher proportion? Moreover, should policymakers seek to account for different costs that households in different regions may experience?
Policymakers have a variety of mechanisms they could use to distribute emission allowance value to provide assistance to households. In evaluating these options, there are a number of considerations that might be relevant to policymakers in choosing and implementing a distribution system. Among considerations are the ability of a system to reach large numbers of households, the existence of an administrative infrastructure and the costs of distributing funds, and the ease of tailoring benefits to different consumer incomes and regions of the country. This report examines and compares several mechanisms with these considerations in mind.
In addition, this report outlines how GHG emission reduction legislation in the 111th Congress, including H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, and S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, would address the potential cap-imposed impacts to households. |
crs_RL30150 | crs_RL30150_0 | Introduction
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contribute to the alliance in various ways. The most significant means by far is through funding, in their individual national defense budgets, the deployment of their respective armed forces in support of NATO missions. Several NATO activities, however, are coordinated and conducted by the alliance's headquarters in Brussels. These operations are directly funded by three common accounts: the NATO Military Budget, the NATO Civil Budget, and the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP). Individual shares of the civil and military budgets remained unchanged for decades, while NSIP shares were adjusted every few years based upon relative gross domestic product (GDP), per capita GDP, and several other factors. Individual member state contributions to the budget are based on a cost-sharing formula. The U.S. share is approximately 25%. As noted above, the three NATO common accounts are funded by contributions from the member states. How have these national shares been determined in the past? The GAO cited the following: (1) the 1966 French withdrawal from the military command, described below; (2) the admission of Spain in 1982 (to which could be added the more recent enlargements in 1999, 2004, and 2009), for which shares were renegotiated among all members; and (3) Canada's 1994 unilateral 50% reduction of its NSIP contribution, for which several European member countries agreed to defray the cost among themselves. Some Members of Congress expressed concern over these cost projections and were also worried that the United States might be left to shoulder a large share of the expenditures; they questioned whether existing burdensharing arrangements should continue and suggested that the European allies should be encouraged to assume a larger financial share for the security of the continent. During its November 2010 summit in Lisbon, NATO member states agreed to the acquisition of a new capability: ballistic missile defense. In addition, individual countries will be responsible for supporting the deployment of their own ship- or land-based interceptors and sensors. That is no less damning a criticism, reflecting the toll on the alliance's fighting capability of inadequate or poorly conceived defence spending by too many of its members ... ."
The 112 th Congress may review the new common funds burdensharing arrangements—as well as U.S. contributions to the NATO budgets—in the context of the Defense Department and State Department appropriations. | For decades, Congress has maintained an interest in burdensharing arrangements with allies, particularly with those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The 28 NATO member states contribute to the activities of the alliance in several ways, the chief of which is through the deployment of their own armed forces, funded by their individual national budgets. Certain commonly conducted activities, however, are paid for out of three NATO-run budgets. These three accounts—the civil budget, the military budget, and the security investment program—are funded by individual contributions from the member states.
The countries' percentage shares of the common funds are negotiated among the members, and are based upon per capita gross national income and several other factors. The U.S. shares for the three funds, which have fallen over the past three decades, currently range from about 22%-25%. In three waves, 12 central and eastern European nations were admitted into the alliance in 1999, 2004, and 2009. As NATO has expanded, it has incurred certain additional costs to address some of the force modernization needs of the new members. These costs are being shared by all, including the new countries. In 2005, members of the alliance adopted a new burdensharing agreement, under which the U.S. level was limited to its then-existing share. Further changes in the cost share formulas may be under review.
During a November 2010 summit in Lisbon, NATO member states agreed to the acquisition of a new capability: ballistic missile defense. Although the estimated commonly shared costs of the planned system are relatively modest, member states eventually will be encouraged to assume responsibility individually for deploying various elements of the system, such as radar, interceptor missiles, sensors, and Aegis-equipped naval vessels.
The 112th Congress may examine U.S. contributions to the NATO budgets. In the wake of the global financial crisis, most member states have been making or considering reductions in their defense budgets, prompting questions over their willingness and ability to contribute effectively to possible future alliance operations. |
crs_R41738 | crs_R41738_0 | Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides a legal mechanism through which municipalities may be protected from their creditors as they attempt to develop and negotiate a plan to adjust their debts. There is no provision for liquidation of a municipality's assets to satisfy creditors, there is no "bankruptcy estate," and the bankruptcy court has limited authority over the conduct of the municipality during the pendency of the case. Despite this seemingly dramatic increase in chapter 9 filings, chapter 9 is, and has been, a relatively seldom used provision of the Bankruptcy Code, generally averaging fewer than 10 filings per year. Many of those filings have been by small government agencies such as municipal utilities, school districts, or single-purpose entities (e.g., a hospital or convention center). Reports of significantly decreased revenues and increased expenses in both cities and states as well as predictions of a significant number of municipal bond defaults in the coming years have sparked interest in municipal bankruptcy, as well as calls for allowing states to use the Bankruptcy Code as a means of adjusting their own debts. A municipality must be specifically authorized by its state to file under chapter 9. Most people, hearing the term "municipality," probably think of cities and towns. Section 101(40) of the Bankruptcy Code states that the term "means political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State." Since 1994, municipalities have only been eligible to file under chapter 9 if they were specifically authorized to do so by their states. Simply being a municipality that is authorized by its state to file under chapter 9 is not sufficient for being an eligible chapter 9 debtor. To be eligible for chapter 9 protection, an insolvent municipality must be filing for such protection in good faith. Retention of Control
There are several ways in which the municipal debtor retains control in a chapter 9 case. In this way it is similar to a chapter 11. The bankruptcy court cannot interfere with the municipality's political or governmental powers, its property or revenues, or its use or enjoyment of its income-producing property. Assumption and Rejection of Executory Contracts
Chapter 9 includes § 365 among the sections of the Bankruptcy Code that are applicable in a municipal case. However, in evaluating assumption or rejection of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the courts use a higher standard. Section 1113, which is not among the Bankruptcy Code sections named in § 901(a) as applicable in chapter 9, was added to the Bankruptcy Code following the U.S. Supreme Court's 1984 holding in National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco and Bildisco . Adjustment of Debts
In a chapter 9 case, only the debtor has the right to file a plan of adjustment. General obligation bonds do not enjoy such protection under bankruptcy law; however, a municipality's ability to adjust those debts may be limited by state law. To be confirmed, a plan cannot require the municipality to take an action that is prohibited by law. This provision may also limit a municipality's ability to adjust its existing pension obligations through chapter 9. Section 943 directs the court to confirm a plan if it complies with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code; the expenses incurred in connection with the case and the plan of adjustment are disclosed and are reasonable; the debtor is not legally prohibited from taking actions necessary to carry out the plan; holders of administrative claims receive cash equaling their claims, unless they agree otherwise; the debtor has, or will, obtain any regulatory or electoral approval required under nonbankruptcy law for carrying out the plan; and the plan is both feasible and in the best interest of creditors. | As cities and states have experienced varying degrees of financial difficulties in recent years, "municipal bankruptcy" has been mentioned relatively often in the popular press. The term is somewhat misleading, both in the word "municipal" and in the word "bankruptcy."
Many people think only of cities when they hear the word "municipal." Upon learning that in the context of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code the term means more than just cities, some think that states may use the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code for municipal debtors: chapter 9. However, states are currently not eligible to be debtors under the Bankruptcy Code. The Code's definition of "debtor" includes only persons and municipalities. Its definition of "municipality" includes cities and counties as well as other political subdivisions, public agencies, and instrumentalities of a state. However, a municipality may not file under chapter 9 unless specifically authorized to do so by its state. To be eligible for chapter 9, a municipality must be insolvent.
Chapter 9 is titled "Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality." The Bankruptcy Code does not provide for the liquidation of a municipality's assets and distribution thereof to the creditors. Instead, it provides a legal mechanism through which municipalities may be protected from the claims of their creditors as they attempt to develop and negotiate a plan to adjust their debts. In this way, chapter 9 has similarities to chapter 11 reorganizations. However, a municipality retains more control in a chapter 9 case than does the debtor in a chapter 11. The oversight and involvement of the bankruptcy court is quite limited. The court cannot interfere with the municipality's political or governmental powers, its property or revenues, or its use or enjoyment of its income-producing property.
There are only a few sections of the Bankruptcy Code that were specifically written in chapter 9; however, many other sections of the Code are explicitly made applicable to a chapter 9 case. Among these is § 365, which allows executory contracts to be assumed or rejected in a bankruptcy proceeding. Collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) are executory contracts. The expense incurred in meeting the obligations of CBAs may be a substantial budget consideration for many municipalities. While chapter 11 includes a section that specifically addresses the standards that must be met before a court can allow rejection of a CBA, no such section exists in chapter 9. Instead, based on two chapter 9 cases (In re County of Orange, California and In re City of Vallejo, California) it appears that municipalities may reject CBAs if they meet the less stringent standards established in National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco and Bildisco.
Although of current interest, chapter 9 is a provision of the Bankruptcy Code that is rarely used. Since 1979, the number of chapter 9 filings per year has averaged less than 10. Most of those have been by small government agencies such as municipal utilities, school districts, or single-purpose entities.
Although chapter 9 has provided significant relief in the two major cases named above, it is not a panacea for a municipality's financial problems. It can be a lengthy and expensive procedure. Additionally, the debtor's ability to adjust debts, particularly pension or general obligation debt, may be limited by the state's constitutional or statutory restrictions since a plan of adjustment cannot require the municipality to take an action that is not lawful. |
crs_R41961 | crs_R41961_0 | Introduction to Army Corps Fiscal Challenges
The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for building and maintaining much of the federal water resources infrastructure in the United States. The Corps is faced with more demands for building and maintaining its projects than available federal funding allows. This situation raises a number of basic questions about how the Corps functions, including the efficacy, efficiency, and equity of Corps planning and implementation. The FAQs are organized into four categories: Appropriations; Backlog and Project Delivery; Authorizations and Missions; and Navigation Trust Funds. The Administration's budget request is presented to Congress by account. How Is Funding Allocated Under a Continuing Resolution? The congressional increase in Corps funding and the projects specified by Congress can be seen as Congress adjusting the President's request to reflect its perception of the nation's water resource needs and its perception of shortcomings in the Administration's budget. Consideration of a WRDA 2010 ( H.R. 110-114 ) have yet to receive funding. This is why the total construction backlog estimate is more than $62 billion. Although backlogs are not new to the Corps, some of the current concern is that since 1986 nonfederal project sponsors significantly share in the costs of most Corps projects, and many sponsors are frustrated by the lack of certainty about when their cost-shared projects will be completed and the benefits forthcoming. Some see the backlog as a justification for directing more funds to Corps activities, while others see it as a clarion for reducing the level and types of Corps activities authorized. Others view the backlog as a reason for efforts to reduce the expense and time needed to complete a Corps project. Some also view the Corps backlog as a reason for pursuing private sector involvement in and alternative federal financing (e.g., infrastructure banks) for water resources infrastructure. Authorizations and Missions
The FAQs on the Corps authorization and missions address the processes in place for authorization and deauthorization of Corps activities, perspectives on the Corps mission and role, and past efforts to refocus the agency. How Are Corps Studies and Projects Authorized? With the rate of construction authorization outpacing available appropriations in recent decades, the appropriations process has selected from an increasing pool of authorized activities. Opinions on what the Corps and its federal funding should be focused on vary widely. Therefore, with no changes in the overall size of the E&W bill, the more than $500 million in additional funds for HMTF eligible activities would be offset by decreases for other E&W funded activities; these include the other activities of the Corps of Engineers (e.g., harbor construction, inland waterways, flood damage reduction projects, environmental restoration) and the budgets for the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (roughly $1 billion annually) and the Department of Energy (between $25 billion and $30 billion annually). After the first five years, expenditures are generally expected to stabilize. In addition to the provisions listed in Table 8 , other Corps authorization and appropriations processes relevant to Corps fiscal challenges also are underway, but are beyond the scope of this report. 433 , H.R. 922 , H.R. 1078 , H.R. | The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for much of the federal water resources infrastructure in the United States. The Corps is faced with more demands for building and maintaining its projects than available federal funding allows. This situation is raising basic questions about how the Corps functions, including the efficacy, efficiency, and equity of Corps planning and implementation.
Corps fiscal challenges have multiple underlying causes. The Corps and its infrastructure is expected to help meet the nation's increasing demands on water resources and the services they provide; however, what the agency can accomplish given the level of federal funding provided is declining. At the same time, Corps asset management costs are increasing as facilities age. Nonfederal project sponsors that pay a portion of the cost for most Corps projects can become frustrated as Corps studies and projects are authorized, but remain unfunded or are slowed by lower levels of appropriated funding than anticipated. The Administration and appropriators make choices about what to fund out of an increasing pool of authorized activities. For example, the agency now faces a construction backlog of more than $62 billion, while receiving roughly $2 billion a year in construction funding. As Corps fiscal challenges become more apparent, frequently asked questions about the Corps fall into four broad categories:
appropriations, backlog of project delivery, authorizations and missions, and navigation expenditures and trust funds.
At issue for Congress is deciding how to tackle challenges facing the Corps in the context of a tight fiscal climate and other constraints (e.g., earmark moratoriums). In the past, Congress generally has increased the agency's budget above the Administration's request and expanded the list of projects and types of projects funded. At present, fundamental questions about what the agency does and how it operates are being asked by some observers. The perspectives on how to proceed among Members of Congress, project sponsors, fiscal conservatives, environmental interests, and other stakeholders vary widely. These perspectives often diverge based on views of the appropriate federal role in water resources management and infrastructure and the priorities for the limited federal water resources funding. Some stakeholders see the Corps backlog as a justification to direct more funds to Corps activities. Others see a need to reduce the level and types of Corps activities authorized, while still others want to make gains through efficiency improvements to reduce the expense and time needed to complete a Corps project. Some also are interested in pursuing private sector involvement in and alternative federal financing (e.g., infrastructure banks) for water resources infrastructure in order to reduce the demands on the agency. Some of these perspectives are apparent in proposed legislation in the 112th Congress, including H.R. 104, H.R. 235, H.R. 1861, H.R. 2354, S. 475, and S. 573.
This report addresses many of the basic questions regarding Corps of Engineers activities under a constrained fiscal climate. It also includes limited discussion of larger trends and proposals that may be of interest to Congress as it considers Corps activities going forward. |
crs_RL33262 | crs_RL33262_0 | Overview
There have been sharp debates over the past three decades in Congress and differencesbetween the executive and legislative branches on the appropriate level of funding for U.S. foreignpolicy programs. These debates are continuing in 2006 as Congress reviews the President's FY2007budget proposal. The past 30 years have witnessed wide swings in the amounts of resources the United Stateshas committed to advancing foreign policy and national security interests, reflecting changes inglobal challenges faced by the United States. Efforts to promote peace in the Middle East, toconfront Soviet influence, especially in the developing world, to support new democracies in thepost-Cold War era, to fight poverty and disease affecting poor nations, to combat global terrorism,and to stabilize fragile or failed states have had a substantial impact on levels of foreign policyresources. Likewise, during times of international crisis and especiallysince the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, international affairs spending has been one of themost rapidly increasing areas of the U.S. budget. The foreign policy budget rose slightly in FY1998 but significantly in FY1999 and FY2000compared to amounts during the mid-1990s. Although the amount of spending for international activities has grownsignificantly since September 11, compared to changes in the overall size of thefederal budget, the share allocated for foreign policy programs has declined (with theexception of FY2004 and the $18.45 billion supplemental for Iraq). Foreign Assistance to Africa
Over the past three decades, countries in sub-Saharan Africa have received$72.2 billion (constant FY2006 dollars) in economic and military assistance from theUnited States. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), however, hasbeen the most expansive of the Bush Administration foreign aid policies benefittingAfrica. The $5.9 billion in U.S. aid to Africa estimated for FY2006 is the largest level in three decades and totals nearly three times the $2.2billion annual average since FY1977. State Department & Public Diplomacy Spending
KEY TRENDS
Funding for State Department personnel, embassy security, public diplomacy, and dues for international organizations has increasedsteadily over the past three decades, peaking in FY2006 at $12.2 billion (constant dollars), including costs for a U.S. embassy operations inIraq. | There have been sharp debates over the past three decades concerning the appropriate levelof funding for U.S. foreign policy programs, and it is likely that these debates will continue asCongress reviews the President's FY2007 budget proposal. The past 30 years have witnessed wideswings in the amounts of U.S. resources committed to advancing foreign policy and national securityinterests, reflecting changes in global challenges faced by the United States. Efforts to promotepeace in the Middle East, to confront Soviet influence, to support new democracies in the post-ColdWar era, to fight poverty and disease affecting poor nations, to combat global terrorism, and tostabilize fragile or failed states have had a substantial impact on levels of foreign policy resources.
Key highlights of international affairs spending trends include:
After a substantial decline during the mid-1990s, total foreign policy spendinghas grown significantly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Not only has the UnitedStates allocated large amounts of resources for fighting the global war on terror, the BushAdministration has launched two major new foreign aid initiatives -- the Millennium ChallengeAccount and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The $53.8 billion(constant FY2006 dollars) budget for FY2004, which included Iraq reconstruction funds, representedby far the highest level of spending during the past three decades.
Although the amount of spending for international activities has grownsignificantly since September 11, compared to changes in the overall size of the federal budget, theshare allocated for foreign policy programs has declined (with the exception of FY2004) due toincreases in defense, homeland security, and, in FY2005 and FY2006, Hurricane Katrinarelief.
"Core" bilateral development assistance funding accounts -- those focusing onlong-term poverty reduction and economic growth -- have more than tripled sinceFY2000.
The $5.9 billion in U.S. aid to Africa estimated for FY2006 is the largest levelin three decades and totals over two and a half times the $2.2 billion annual average since FY1977. President Bush pledged to double U.S. assistance to Africa between 2004 and2010.
Funding for State Department personnel, embassy security, public diplomacy,and dues for international organizations has increased steadily over the past three decades, peakingin FY2006 at $12.2 billion (constant dollars), including operational costs inIraq.
This report will be updated as new data become available. |
crs_R42354 | crs_R42354_0 | Background
The high cost and availability of health care in the United States have focused attention upon patents and other intellectual property rights available to pharmaceutical firms. Of particular moment to this discussion is the Hatch-Waxman Act, legislation that governs intellectual property rights with respect to pharmaceuticals and other regulated products. The Hatch-Waxman Act includes two core provisions addressing the enforcement of pharmaceutical patents. §271(e)(1), creates a statutory "safe harbor" that exempts firms from claims of patent infringement based on clinical trials and other acts reasonably related to seeking marketing approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). A second provision, 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(2), allows a brand-name drug company to enforce its patents against a potential generic competitor at such time that the generic firm files an application—a so-called Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)—with the FDA seeking marketing approval. Two recent judgments from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are arguably in tension as to whether the statutory safe harbor is limited to activities performed prior to the award of FDA approval. As well, brand-name firms have attempted to assert patents against generic firms that they have not explicitly identified to the FDA. Next, the report considers judicial developments regarding the patent infringement provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The Hatch-Waxman Act exempts a generic firm from infringement suits as it prepares its ANDA. This issue may yet be placed before the courts in the future. Other firms may potentially assert patents that are not listed in the Orange Book under 35 U.S.C. Congressional Issues and Options
Should Congress conclude that the current situation with respect to 35 U.S.C. §271(e) is satisfactory, no action need be taken. If Congress wishes to intervene, however, then some options present themselves. Congress could stipulate whether 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1) applies to acts that occur following the award of FDA marketing approval or not. Congress could also explicitly state whether 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(2) establishes a cause of action for infringement of patents that have not been listed in the Orange Book and therefore were not the subject of a paragraph IV certification. | Concerns over the availability of affordable health care have focused national attention upon patents and other intellectual property rights awarded to pharmaceutical firms. Legislation that was introduced before, but not enacted by, the 112th Congress proposed amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act, legislation dating from 1984 that governs intellectual property rights in pharmaceuticals and other regulated products. Recent rulings from the federal judiciary regarding the Hatch-Waxman Act may be pertinent to future congressional consideration of that statute. Both the judicial holdings, as well as possible legislative changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act, potentially affect the availability of both brand-name and generic drugs in the United States.
The Hatch-Waxman Act includes two core provisions that impact the enforcement of patent rights by brand-name firms against generic pharmaceutical companies. 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1) creates a statutory "safe harbor" that exempts firms from claims of patent infringement based on clinical trials and other acts reasonably related to seeking marketing approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The explicit wording of that statute does not preclude activities that occur after the receipt of FDA marketing approval from the "safe harbor." Two recent opinions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are arguably in tension over whether post-approval acts are exempted from infringement, however.
A second provision, 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(2), allows a brand-name drug company to enforce its patents against a potential generic competitor at such time that the generic firm files an application—a so-called Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)—with the FDA seeking marketing approval. Although courts have stated that this litigation may only be based upon patents identified to the FDA and listed in the so-called "Orange Book," the express wording of the statute does not appear to impose this requirement. This issue has yet to be conclusively resolved in the courts.
Should Congress conclude that the current situation with respect to 35 U.S.C. §271(e) is satisfactory, no action need be taken. If Congress wishes to intervene, however, then some options present themselves. Congress could stipulate whether 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1) applies to acts that occur following the award of FDA marketing approval or not. Congress could also explicitly state whether 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(2) establishes a cause of action for infringement of patents that have not been listed in the Orange Book. |
crs_RL34254 | crs_RL34254_0 | Background
On July 17, 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order 13438, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq. It is the latest in a series of executive orders based on the national emergency declared by President Bush with respect to "the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by obstacles to the orderly reconstruction of Iraq, the restoration and maintenance of peace and security in that country, and the development of political, administrative and economic institutions in Iraq." Having declared a national emergency, the President invoked authority available under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA) and ordered the blocking of financial transactions and the institution of property controls with respect to any property or interests in property of persons determined to fall within three categories of individuals or entities threatening the stabilization efforts in Iraq. On September 23, 2008, the names of five newly designated individuals and two newly designated entities were added to the list of blocked persons and entities under the authority of Executive Order 13438. These individuals are to fall into three categories provided in the executive order:
(1) Individuals or entities determined "to have committed, or to pose a significant risk, of committing an act or acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of ... threatening the peace or stability of Iraq or the Government of Iraq ... or ... undermining the efforts to promote economic reconstruction and political reform in Iraq or to provide humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people...."
(2) Persons or entities determined "to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical, or technical support for, or goods or services in support of, such an act or acts of violence or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order...."
(3) Persons determined "to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order...."
The executive order, moreover, provides that these prohibitions include "the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order, and ... the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person." The executive order authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, to issue regulations. Regulations were issued on September 2, 2010. The reach of Executive Order 13438 is not unprecedented. | On July 17, 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order 13438, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq. It is the latest in a series of executive orders based on the national emergency declared by President Bush with respect to "the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by obstacles to the orderly reconstruction of Iraq, the restoration and maintenance of peace and security in that country, and the development of political, administrative and economic institutions in Iraq." Regulations implementing this Executive Order were issued on September 13, 2010.
The President's authority to issue the executive order stems from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). The executive order covers financial transactions and authorizes property controls with respect to three categories of persons: (1) individuals or entities determined "to have committed, or to pose a significant risk, of committing an act or acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of ... threatening the peace or stability of Iraq ..."; (2) individuals or entities determined "to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical, or technical support for, or goods or services in support of, such an act or acts of violence or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order ..."; and (3) individuals and entities determined "to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order...."
This report provides a brief history of the development of presidential powers in peacetime. It discusses some of the issues that might be raised in light of the contrast between the executive order's broad language and its narrow aim—supplementation of sanctions applicable to Al Qaeda and former Iraqi regime officials to cover terrorists operating in Iraq. It examines the reach of the executive order and provides legal analyses of some of the constitutional questions raised in the courts by similar sanctions programs, noting that the broad language of the executive order is not unprecedented. The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has published names of persons designated under the executive order and issued regulations further refining its terms and applicability. The report examines some of the procedures available to challenge OFAC sanction regulations and briefly discusses OFAC's rules, which may be of concern to attorneys representing individuals and entities subjected to sanctions or involved in transactions with sanctioned persons.
Since December 2009, there have been no additions to the list of blocked persons and several OFAC announcements removing designated individuals and entities from the List of Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. |
crs_R40755 | crs_R40755_0 | The new economic policy, known as Doi Moi ("change and newness"), ushered in a period of over 20 years of rapid growth in Vietnam. The growth in bilateral trade has not been without its accompanying issues and problems. Both nations are negotiating membership in the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP), a multilateral trade group. For its part, Vietnam has indicated a desire to foster closer trade relations by applying for acceptance into the U.S. General System of Preferences (GSP) program, and participating in negotiations of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). The growth in Vietnam's export of catfish has also generated tensions between the two nations. Other economic issues have had an indirect effect on bilateral relations, such as claims of poor working conditions in factories in Vietnam, Vietnam's designation as a "non-market economy," allegations of inadequate intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in Vietnam, and Vietnam's exchange rate policy. This will be followed by an analysis of key trends in bilateral trade to discern any potential sources of trade friction in the future. In the President's 2009 Annual Report on the U.S. trade agreements program, the Obama Administration stated that U.S. participation in the TPP would strengthen U.S. trade and investment ties in the Asia-Pacific, help U.S. businesses compete in the region, and "could serve as a vehicle for achieving the long-term Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) objective of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific." Another complicating factor is Vietnam's membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its support for ASEAN's discussions with other nations to form a pan-Asian trade association that could exclude the United States. However, in an April 2010 meeting with CRS, Vietnamese trade officials indicated that Vietnam would like to see the United States take a more active role in a possible ASEAN + 8 (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and United States) forming the basis for a larger regional trade association. First, the United States must have conferred NTR status to the country. The Vietnamese government appears interested in concluding a BIT with the United States, both because it could foster greater inward FDI from the United States and because it could serve as a stepping-stone to a possible free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States. The Obama administration is reportedly reviewing the current model BIT, and may be deferring progress with Vietnam until the review is completed. Following the U.S. extension of conditional NTR to Vietnam, U.S. clothing imports from Vietnam shot up in value and share. Vietnam has become a major source of U.S. clothing imports, second only to China. However, some Members of Congress were concerned that the termination of the monitoring program—as well as the end of the special safeguards on Chinese clothing imports on December 31, 2008—would result in a surge of clothing imports from China and Vietnam. market." By these provisions, the 2008 Farm Act effectively transferred the regulation of imported catfish from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to the USDA, which is generally viewed as maintaining stricter inspection standards than the FDA. Workers in Vietnam have the legal right to collective bargaining. In theory, the 111 th Congress could consider legislation weighing in on the designation of Vietnam as a market or non-market economy by amending or superseding existing U.S. law. Furniture and Bedding
Over the last 10 years, Vietnam has risen from being the 62 nd -largest source for furniture and bedding imports for the United States to being the fourth-largest source—surpassing past leaders such as Italy, Malaysia, and Taiwan. Furniture and bedding provided over 11% of total U.S. imports from Vietnam in 2009, and it was the second-fastest growth category of imports from Vietnam (after electrical machinery) since 1998. Vietnam imports substantial amounts of cotton from the United States, which is then used to manufacture clothing to be exported to the United States. | After more than two decades of virtually no economic contact, the United States and Vietnam reestablished trade relations during the 1990s. Since then, Vietnam has rapidly risen to become a significant trading partner for the United States. Bilateral trade has risen from about $220 million in 1994 to $15.4 billion in 2009. Vietnam is the second-largest source of U.S. clothing imports, and a major source for footwear, furniture, and electrical machinery. Much of this rapid growth in bilateral trade can be attributed to U.S. extension of normal trade relations (NTR) status to Vietnam. Another major contributing factor is over 20 years of rapid economic growth in Vietnam, ushered in by a 1986 shift to a more market-oriented economic system.
Bilateral trade may increase if both nations become members of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). The United States and Vietnam are among the eight countries negotiating the terms of expansion of the trade association. The Obama Administration envisions an expanded TPP as a "21st Century free trade agreement" that will become the cornerstone for a trans-Pacific regional trade association. Vietnam is also a party to negotiations to form a larger pan-Asian regional trade association based on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that could exclude the United States and could prove to be an alternative to the TPP and the U.S. vision for regional economic integration in Asia.
The growth in bilateral trade has not been without its accompanying issues and problems. Vietnam has applied for acceptance into the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program and is participating in negotiations of a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States. Both the Bush and the Obama Administrations have shown some hesitance in accepting Vietnam as a GSP beneficiary country and in concluding a BIT with Vietnam. Vietnam would like to have the United States officially recognize it as a market economy.
There have also been problems with U.S. imports of specific products from Vietnam. In 2003, the United States began collecting antidumping duties on certain fish imports from Vietnam. From 2007 to 2009, the United States implemented a controversial monitoring program for selected clothing imports from Vietnam. In 2008, the 110th Congress passed legislation that transferred the regulation of catfish from the Food and Drug Administration to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Vietnamese government strongly protested these actions as largely protectionist measures. An examination of recent trends in bilateral trade reveals that other product categories—such as footwear, furniture, and electrical machinery—could generate future tension between the United States and Vietnam. Observers of Vietnam's economic development have also been critical of Vietnam's protection of workers' rights, its enforcement of intellectual property rights laws and regulations, and the country's exchange rate policies.
The 111th Congress may play an important role in one or more of these issues, as have past Congresses. The GSP program is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2010, and if Congress should take up GSP renewal, it may also consider Vietnam's pending application. The 111th Congress may also weigh in on clothing and fish imports from Vietnam, or its designation as a market or non-market economy. Finally, if current growth trends continue, Congress may be asked to act on the rising amount of footwear, furniture, and/or electrical machinery being imported from Vietnam. This report will be updated as circumstances require. |
crs_RL32863 | crs_RL32863_0 | 109-90 Signed into Law
On October 18, 2005, the FY2006 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-90 ) was signed into law. This amount includes $30.8 billion in discretionary budget authority. The bill provides a net appropriation of $31.9 billion for DHS. The Administration is requesting a net appropriation of $30.6 billion in net budget authority for FY2006, of which $29.6 billion is discretionary budget authority, and $1 billion is mandatory budget authority. DHS is organized into four major directorates : Border and Transportation Security (BTS); Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR); Science and Technology (S&T); and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP). BTS, the largest of the four directorates, contains three main agencies: Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); and Transportation Security Administration (TSA). U.S. Appropriations measures for DHS have been organized into four titles: Title I Departmental Management and Operations; Title II Security, Enforcement, and Investigations; Title III Preparedness and Recovery; and Title IV Research and Development, Training, Assessments, and Services. 109-90 adopts the following changes:
abolishes the Office of the Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security, redistributing its functions to other locations within DHS; splits the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection into two new operational components: Analysis and Operations, and the Preparedness Directorate; moves all state and local grants within DHS to the Preparedness Directorate; transfers the Federal Air Marshals program from ICE to TSA; and includes and expands the role of Office of Policy. 109-90 provides a net appropriation of $5,952 million for CBP, which is $46 million or approximately 1% less than provided in the Senate-passed version of H.R. This amount, adopted in P.L. The request included the following program increases:
$105 million for the Office of Investigations; $90 million for custody management and detention bedspace; $43.7 million for ICE's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) activities; $25 million for ABCI and Interior Repatriation; $24 million for detention and removal; $18 million for temporary worker worksite enforcement; $11.3 million for the Homeland Security Data Network; $9.9 million for the Federal Air Marshals (FAMS); $8.8 million for Fugitive Operations; $5.6 million for Institutional Removal Program (IRP); $5.4 million for Alternatives to Detention; $5 million for Visa Security; and $3.5 million for legal resources. Of the appropriated amount in P.L. As in Senate-passed H.R. 2360
House-passed H.R. President's Request
For FY2006, the President's budget requested an appropriation of $1,204 million for the protection and criminal investigation missions of the Secret Service, an increase of $29 million (2%) over the FY2005 total of $1,175 million. The Administration requested an appropriation of $6,710 million in net budget authority for Title III for FY2006. 2360 conference report proposes $3.346 billion for SLGCP, which is $639 million than appropriated for these programs in FY2005. Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA)123
Hurricane Katrina
Responding to the devastation caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Congress enacted two supplemental appropriations to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). 2360 would have provided $2,686 million for the activities of Title IV, representing an increase of $140 million, or 5%, compared to the FY2006 request; an increase of $164 million, or 7%, compared to the amount provided in the House-passed version of H.R. 109-90 provides $1,899 million for the activities of Title IV. 109-90 provides $1,502.1 million. | This report describes the FY2006 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Administration requested a net appropriation of $30.6 billion in net budget authority for FY2006, of which $29.6 billion is discretionary budget authority, and $1 billion is mandatory budget authority. P.L. 109-90 was signed into law on October 18, 2005, and provides a net appropriation of $31.9 billion for DHS and $30.8 billion in discretionary budget authority.
The President's request for appropriations includes the following break out of net budget authority for the four Titles of the DHS appropriation bill: (I) Departmental Management and Operations, $748 million; (II) Security, Enforcement and Investigations, $20,566 million; (III) Preparedness and Response, $6,710 million; and (IV) Research and Development, Training, Assessments, and Services, $2,546 million. The House-passed version of H.R. 2360 would provide the following amounts for each title: (I) $561 million; (II) $21,988 million; (III) $6,688 million; and (IV) $2,522 million. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 2360 would provide the following amounts for each title: (I) $647 million; (II) $22,193 million; (III) $6,334 million; and (IV) $2,686 million. P.L. 109-90 reflects Secretary Chertoff's proposed reorganization and provides the following amounts for each title: (I) $907 million; (II) $22,401 million; (III) $6,666 million; and (IV) $1,899 million.
P.L. 109-90 concurs with much of Secretary Chertoff's reorganization of DHS, including moving the Federal Air Marshals from ICE to TSA and splitting the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection into two different agencies, Analysis and Operations within Title I, and Infrastructure Protection and Information Security, within Title III. The requested net appropriation, amounts in House-passed H.R. 2360 (in parentheses), amounts in Senate-passed H.R. 2360 [in brackets], and amounts in the conference report {in ellipses} for major components of the department include the following: $5,575 ($5,785) [$5,998] {$5,993} million for Customs and Border Protection (CBP); $3,648 ($3,830) [$3,808] {$3,175} million for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); $1,641 ($3,263) [$3,065] {$3,925} million for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA); $7,962 ($7,458) [$7,780] {$7,797} million for the U.S. Coast Guard; $1,204 ($1,232) [$1,192] {$1,212} million for the Secret Service; $3,565 ($3,665) [$3,573] {$3,346} million for the Office of State and Local Government Preparedness (SLGCP); $3,135 ($3,013) [$2,758] {$2,633} million for the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate (EPR); $80 ($120) [$80] {$115} million for Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); and $1,368 ($1,290) [$1,453] {$1,502} million for the Science and Technology Directorate.
Responding to the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina, Congress enacted two supplemental appropriation laws totaling $60 billion in FY2005 for EPR.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41549 | crs_R41549_0 | At the NATO Lisbon Summit (November 19-20, 2010), alliance heads of state approved a plan to build a territorial ballistic missile defense capability and integrate it with a U.S. initiative to deploy a European-based missile defense system. NATO officials stated that this new alliance capability, which has been under consideration for nearly a decade, is expected to cost approximately 200 million euros ($260 million), borne among all 28 member states, over the next 10 years. Other analysts, however, project a much higher cost. Congress has taken an active interest in missile defense, and there has largely been bipartisan support for the Bush and Obama Administrations' plans to guard against the threat of Iranian ballistic missiles through the deployment of radar and interceptors in Europe. NATO's adoption of such a capability, and its close integration with the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach, also will likely raise several issues that Members of Congress may address, including command and control protocols, technology transfer, participation by Russia, and the extent to which European allies contribute to the common effort. Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe
The United States has been developing missile defense systems for decades. The focus at the early stages of the Reagan Administration's program was to protect against nuclear-armed ballistic missiles from the Soviet Union. In the near term, this new system, called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), would be based on the expansion of existing BMD sensors and interceptors, such as the Navy's Aegis BMD system. The Administration states that the PAA will continue to evolve, and will be expanded over the next decade to include BMD capabilities against medium- and long-range Iranian ballistic missiles. The Lisbon Summit
At their November 19-20 summit in Lisbon, NATO heads of state and government officially identified territorial missile defense as a core alliance objective, and adopted it as a NATO program in response to the threat of ballistic missile proliferation by potentially unfriendly regimes. It outlined the development of territorial missile defense through an expansion of the existing ALTBMD program and its integration with the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach. As a first step, alliance leaders tasked NATO staff with developing "missile defence consultation, command and control arrangements" in time for a March 2011 Defense Ministers meeting. Alternatively, observers have noted that the adoption of a missile defense capability may raise potential problems:
Some have questioned whether or not territorial missile defense is indeed technologically feasible. Russian Cooperation
The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting, held in Lisbon in conjunction with the NATO summit, endorsed cooperation between the alliance and Moscow in the area of missile defense. Although details as to how Russia might cooperate technologically remain to be seen, it is clear that NATO and the United States want to find ways to engage Russia in partnership on BMD. U.S. Aegis BMD is working with NATO's ALTBMD effort as well. | For several years, the United States and NATO have pursued parallel paths to develop a ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability to defend U.S. troops and European populations against potential ballistic attacks from countries such as Iran. At the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, alliance heads of state approved a plan to integrate existing NATO member BMD capabilities as part of the overall alliance defense posture. NATO officials have placed the estimated cost of the new territorial BMD system at 200 million euros (approximately $260 million), to be borne among all 28 member states over the next 10 years. Industry analysts, however, believe that the cost could be significantly higher. The Obama Administration's program to deploy a regional BMD capability in Europe, called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), will now proceed with the NATO effort on an integrated basis.
The Lisbon Summit agreement is significant in that NATO officials identified territorial missile defense as a core alliance objective and adopted a formal NATO program in response. The agreement further outlined the development of territorial missile defense through an expansion of NATO's ALTBMD (Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense) program and its integration with the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach. As a first step, alliance leaders tasked NATO staff "with developing missile defence consultation, and command and control arrangements" for NATO's March 2011 Defense Ministerial. The next step will be to draft an implementation plan for missile defense for the June 2011 Defense Ministers meeting.
NATO decision makers took another significant step at Lisbon during the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting, at which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev endorsed cooperation between the alliance and Moscow in the area of missile defense. Many observers believe that Russia's pledge to participate removes a major stumbling block to the development of a European territorial missile defense program.
Analysts have noted the distinct advantages for NATO in adopting missile defense as a core alliance objective. Some of these include increased protection against potentially devastating ballistic missile attacks into Europe, strengthened relations with the United States, economic benefits that might flow from this effort, and opportunities to engage Russia constructively. Some have also questioned, however, whether this alliance effort is really necessary or whether such an effort is technologically feasible. Some are also concerned over the degree to which the United States will have command and control decision-making authority relative to others, and whether the combined NATO-U.S. programs might cause problems with how Russia views potential challenges to its own nuclear deterrent forces.
Congress has taken an active interest in missile defense, and has largely given bipartisan support to the Bush and Obama Administrations' plans to guard against the threat of Iranian ballistic missiles through the deployment of radar and interceptors in Europe. NATO's adoption of such a capability, and its close integration with the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach, also will likely raise several issues that Members of Congress may choose to address, including command and control protocols, technology transfer, participation by Russia, and the extent to which European allies contribute to the common effort.
This report may be updated as necessary. |
crs_R40168 | crs_R40168_0 | Most Recent Developments
Key tax incentives for the use of biofuels, for the expansion of alternative fuel infrastructure, and for the purchase of certain electric vehicles expired at the end of 2011, along with an added duty on certain ethanol imports. Some of these incentives were extended through the end of 2013 by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. While tax incentives for these fuels have expired or are set to expire at the end of 2013, a mandate to use biofuels in transportation that was expanded by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140 ) is set to increase yearly through 2022. In 2012, the RFS required the use of 15.2 billion gallons of ethanol and other biofuels in transportation fuel. Within that mandate, the RFS required the use of 2.0 billion gallons of advanced biofuels, including 8.65 million gallons of cellulosic biofuels (although only about 20,000 gallons of cellulosic fuel were actually registered in the program). For 2013, the RFS mandate is 16.55 billion gallons, including a proposed 14 million gallons of cellulosic fuel. At the end of each year, covered entities must submit credits (called Renewable Identification Numbers, or RINs) equal to their obligations for that year. Cases of fraud in the market for biodiesel RINs has led to criminal prosecutions and the development of quality-assurance guidelines from EPA. Further, recent volatility in the spot market for ethanol RINs has raised additional concerns about implementation of the RFS. In January 2011, EPA finalized a partial waiver petition from Growth Energy to allow blends of up to 15% ethanol in gasoline (E15): before then ethanol content in all gasoline was limited to 10% (E10). EPA approved the use of E15 in model year 2001 and later passenger cars and light trucks, but prohibited its use in all other applications (e.g., motorcycles, heavy trucks, nonroad engines). Allowing higher blends of ethanol under the Clean Air Act removes one component of the "blend wall," which limits the total amount of ethanol that can be blended in gasoline nationwide; other blend wall components include vehicle and pump certification and warranties, and state and local fire codes and other laws. 111-5 ) includes several key provisions supporting alternative fuels and advanced technology vehicles. The main tax credit for conventional ethanol—the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC)—was not extended. The program been controversial as some critics question whether other existing policies, such as stricter vehicle fuel economy standards, already promote the same technologies, and whether the ATVM program effectively subsidizes compliance with those standards. | Alternative fuels and advanced technology vehicles are seen by proponents as integral to improving urban air quality, decreasing dependence on foreign oil, and reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. However, major barriers—especially economics—currently prevent the widespread use of these fuels and technologies. Because of these barriers, and the potential benefits, there is continued congressional interest in providing incentives and other support for their development and commercialization.
Key tax incentives for the use of biofuels, for the expansion of alternative fuel infrastructure, and for the purchase of certain electric vehicles expired at the end of 2011, along with an added duty on certain ethanol imports. Some of these incentives were extended through the end of 2013 although the main tax credit for conventional ethanol—the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC)—was not extended.
While tax incentives for these fuels have expired or are set to expire at the end of 2013, a mandate to use biofuels in transportation that was expanded by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140) is set to increase yearly through 2022. In 2012, the RFS required the use of 15.2 billion gallons of ethanol and other biofuels in transportation fuel. Within that mandate, the RFS required the use of 2.0 billion gallons of advanced biofuels, including 8.65 million gallons of cellulosic biofuels (although only about 20,000 gallons of cellulosic fuel were actually registered in the program). For 2013, the RFS mandate is 16.55 billion gallons, including a proposed 14 million gallons of cellulosic fuel. At the end of each year, covered entities must submit credits (called Renewable Identification Numbers, or RINs) equal to their obligations for that year. Cases of fraud in the market for biodiesel RINs has led to criminal prosecutions and the development of quality-assurance guidelines from EPA. Further, recent volatility in the spot market for ethanol RINs has raised additional concerns about implementation of the RFS.
In January 2011, EPA finalized a partial waiver petition from Growth Energy to allow blends of up to 15% ethanol in gasoline (E15): before then ethanol content in all gasoline was limited to 10% (E10). EPA approved the use of E15 in model year 2001 and later passenger cars and light trucks, but prohibited its use in all other applications (e.g., motorcycles, heavy trucks, nonroad engines). Allowing higher blends of ethanol under the Clean Air Act removes one component of the "blend wall," which limits the total amount of ethanol that can be blended in gasoline nationwide; other blend wall components include vehicle and pump certification and warranties, and state and local fire codes and other laws.
Attention has also focused on government-backed loans for the development and deployment of new energy technologies. One such program, the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) Loan Program, has been controversial as some critics question whether other existing policies, such as stricter vehicle fuel economy standards, already promote the same technologies.
Other potential issues before Congress include how much the federal government should support the expansion of natural gas vehicles and the infrastructure to fuel them, and how much the government should support the deployment of plug-in electric vehicles. |
crs_RL32896 | crs_RL32896_0 | Introduction
Since the beginning of the program, Social Security taxes have been levied on covered earnings up to a maximum level set each year, referred to as the taxable earnings base . The taxable earnings base also limits the annual amount of earnings that are used in benefit calculations and thus sets a ceiling on the amount Social Security pays in benefits. However, its base continued to be the same as Social Security's through 1990. Between 1972 and 1977, and since 1982, the base has been indexed to the increase in wages in the economy, which has reduced the volatility somewhat. However, the share of covered earnings that is taxed has fallen from 90% of all earnings in 1982 to 83% in 2016. The Future of the Taxable Earnings Base
The taxable earnings base is increased annually by the average growth in wages, so the share of the population below the cap is expected to remain relatively stable over time. Although the solvency impact would be improved to a greater degree if the cap on taxes were eliminated and the cap on benefits were retained, the traditional link between contributions and benefits would be broken. As described previously, the portion of Social Security covered earnings subject to the payroll tax has fluctuated since its inception. Contributions can be increased by (1) eliminating the taxable earnings base immediately or in a future year, (2) raising the taxable earnings base such that, for example, 90% of earnings are subject to the payroll tax, (3) taxing earnings above the current taxable earnings base at a lower payroll tax rate, or (4) taxing earnings above a certain threshold that is greater than the current-law taxable maximum at the current payroll tax rate. If all wages counted toward benefits as they are now, the trust fund would be depleted in 2067; 68% of the projected financial shortfall in the Social Security program would be eliminated. | Social Security taxes are levied on covered earnings up to a maximum level set each year. In 2018, this maximum—formally called the contribution and benefit base, and commonly referred to as the taxable earnings base or the taxable maximum—is $128,400. The taxable earnings base serves as both a cap on contributions and on benefits. As a contribution base, it establishes the maximum amount of a worker's earnings that is subject to the payroll tax. As a benefit base, it establishes the maximum amount of earnings used to calculate benefits.
Since 1982, the Social Security taxable earnings base has risen at the same rate as average wages in the economy. Because the cap is indexed to the average growth in wages, the share of the population below the cap has remained relatively stable at roughly 94%. However, due to increasing earnings inequality, the percentage of aggregate covered earnings that is taxable has decreased from 90% in 1982 to 83% in 2016.
Raising or eliminating the cap on wages that are subject to taxes could reduce the long-range deficit in the Social Security trust funds. For example, phasing in an increase in the maximum taxable earnings to cover 90% of earnings over the next decade would eliminate roughly 30% of the long-range shortfall in Social Security. If all earnings were subject to the payroll tax, but the current-law base was retained for benefit calculations, the Social Security trust funds would remain solvent for over 60 years. However, having different bases for contributions and benefits would weaken the traditional link between the taxes workers pay into the system and the benefits they receive. |
crs_RL34105 | crs_RL34105_0 | This is because TANF families must assign ("turn over" legal rights to) child support paid by noncustodial parents on their behalf to the state to reimburse governments for welfare costs. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171 , enacted February 8, 2006) provides incentives for states to allow more of the child support collected on behalf of TANF families to go to the family and most (if not all) of the child support collected on behalf of former TANF families to go to the family. This report illustrates "what if" scenarios if six states (California, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Oklahoma, and West Virginia) were to adopt the DRA child support pass-through and disregard policies for TANF families. The DRA provisions would reduce the "cost" of the pass-through and disregard policy more for poorer states than for higher-income states. Background
The CSE program (Title IV-D of the Social Security Act) was enacted in 1975 as a federal/state/local partnership to help strengthen families by securing financial support from noncustodial parents. The state then decides whether to pay any received child support to the family. As of April 2007, 27 states have no pass through or disregard policy; 12 states pass through and disregard up to $50 per month; 7 states pass through a gap payment or supplement (3 of these states also pass-through an additional $50) and disregard the entire amount of the monthly gap payment/supplement (plus the $50 if passed-through); 2 states pass through and disregard an added amount to the TANF cash benefit, but the amount is not considered a child support pass-through; 1 state passes through all child support payments to custodial parents but does not disregard any of that income; 1 state passes through up to $50 monthly but does not disregard that income; and 1 state passes through and disregards all child support collected on the family's behalf. Impact of DRA Provisions on Family Income
The DRA policies aim to increase the incomes of TANF cash welfare families. Under pre-DRA policies, the hypothetical family of three, with $300 in child support income per month, would be ineligible for TANF cash welfare. The increased disregard permits families to receive child support without losing eligibility for TANF cash. In Illinois and Maryland, the hypothetical family of two children and a mother working half-time at the minimum wage is ineligible for TANF under pre-DRA rules. For other families, however, the costs of switching to the DRA policies would actually be borne by the state through increasing TANF cash welfare expenditures. Table 6 shows how the cost of increasing family income under DRA provisions through the child support pass-through and disregard would be borne by the federal government and the states for a family whose noncustodial parent pays $300 per month in child support. Some of the advantages include the following:
An increase in income available to families who receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) cash benefit payments. Assuming that Maryland adopts a pass-through and disregard policy when the provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act take effect, a mother with two children and no earnings would receive both child support paid by the noncustodial parent and maximum TANF benefits up to a monthly total of $749 ($549 from TANF and $200 from the child support pass-through and disregard) if the noncustodial parent paid at least $200 per month in child support. Full-Time Earnings at Federal Minimum Wage
A Maryland mother with two children who works full-time at the new fully-phased in federal minimum wage ($7.25 per hour) is not eligible for a TANF cash benefit payment, under either current state policy or if the state adopted the new DRA pass-through and disregard policy. P.L. 109-171 requires the federal government to waive its share of the child support collections passed through to TANF families by the state and disregarded by the state—up to an amount equal to $100 per month in the case of a family with one child, and up to $200 per month in the case of a family with two or more children. This provision takes effect on October 1, 2008. | The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state-local partnership to help strengthen families by securing financial support from noncustodial parents. Families receiving cash welfare from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant must assign (turn over rights to) child support received from noncustodial parents to the state to reimburse it and the federal government for their welfare costs. States decide whether to pay any of the child support collected for TANF families to the family.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171) provides incentives for states to allow more of the child support collected on behalf of TANF families to go to the family without a reduction in welfare benefits. Under DRA, beginning in October 2008, the federal government will share in the cost of passing through up to $100 per month for a family with one child, and up to $200 per month for a family of two or more children, of collected child support to TANF families. This report illustrates the potential impact of the DRA policy on families and governments in six states (CA, IL, ME, MD, OK, and WV) chosen because of their diversity in both TANF and pre-DRA child support pass-through policies. It shows the direct effects of "what if" the states fully adopted the DRA policy.
The DRA policies can increase the incomes of a TANF cash welfare family consisting of a mother and two children by up to $200 per month. This can be a substantial supplement to TANF cash benefits. Actual income increases depend on how much child support is paid by the noncustodial parent, pre-DRA state policies, the amount of other income (including earnings) of the family, and TANF benefit rules. The DRA has its greatest impact on families with no income other than child support. It mainly affects families who receive TANF; it does not directly affect families with incomes too high to receive TANF. In some states, a family of three with a minimum wage earner (the new fully phased-in federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour; P.L. 110-28) at 20 hours per week is ineligible for TANF; in most states, a family with a full-time minimum wage earner is ineligible for TANF.
The increased pass-through and disregard of child support for TANF families also has its costs. Disregarding additional child support when determining TANF financial eligibility can make additional families eligible for TANF. The cost of increasing family income through DRA's enhanced pass-through and disregard is often borne by reductions in child support collections kept by the state and federal governments. However, sometimes the cost could be borne through increased TANF spending. The DRA rules reduce the "cost" of the pass-through and disregard more for poorer states than for higher-income states.
This report provides a limited discussion of DRA's effect on former TANF families. The report addresses only the "direct" effects of adopting the DRA child support pass-through and disregard. Adoption of DRA child support policies might have other, indirect, behavioral effects. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41628 | crs_R41628_0 | The supply side of the natural gas market has been a relatively bright spot in the U.S. energy picture in recent years. These estimates, viewed in conjunction with recently declining prices, suggest that there is little impediment to increasing consumption of natural gas from the supply side of the market, making the decline in industrial demand harder to explain. The nitrogen-based fertilizer industry is examined as an example of a major natural gas consuming industry that has been affected by high and/or fluctuating prices. The yearly deviation from average demand over the decade generally has been less than 4%. These data suggest that the effects of lower gas prices coupled with reduced effects of the recession were increasing demand. Imports continued to decline in the first 10 months of 2010 as lower-cost domestic production continued to expand its market share. A number of factors likely contributed to the decline in industrial natural gas demand in any particular application. Structural Factors Affecting Industrial Demand
Because the industrial demand for natural gas is spread across many industries, utilizing natural gas in a wide variety of processes, not every factor analyzed in this section of the report will be applicable to every industry equally, or in the same way. This factor would tend to decrease the U.S. industrial demand for natural gas. Natural Gas Prices
The data in Table 4 show that the 2000s were generally characterized by high industrial prices for natural gas, peaking in 2008, and moderating in 2009 and 2010. In terms of the production process of the industrial consumer, if there are no substitutes for natural gas, or if natural gas is a small portion of the total cost of production, the effects of higher natural gas prices on industrial demand might be relatively small. Whether the domestic fertilizer industry will rebound to former production levels as a result of the apparent increase in domestic natural gas supplies and potentially reduced and more stable prices is likely to depend on the interaction of a variety of factors. The industrial demand for natural gas sector has experienced decline and consolidation. | The U.S. industrial demand for natural gas has been the largest of the five demand sectors identified by the Energy Information Administration (EIA). It also has been the only sector that has exhibited a decline in its total consumption over the decade of the 2000s. Some have attributed this decline in demand to high, fluctuating natural gas prices.
Rising natural gas prices in the 2000s were related to expectations of increased demand coupled with an apparently scarce resource base and declining production. In recent years, the perception of increasing scarcity and the need to open the market to larger volumes of imports has been replaced with estimates of increasing domestic production from a resource base that might provide supply for a hundred years at current consumption rates. The tangible market result of these changing perceptions and economic conditions has been lower natural gas prices in 2009 and 2010.
The industrial demand for natural gas ranges from use as a feedstock in the nitrogen-based fertilizer industry to re-injection in oil wells to enhance production. The ways natural gas is used, the substitutes that are available, and the importance of gas in the cost structure of the industry vary widely. As a result, many factors potentially could contribute to the decline in demand.
The factors identified in this report as contributing to the decline in industrial sector natural gas demand include, in addition to price behavior, the recession, industrial consolidation, electricity substitution, technological improvements, and environmental regulations. These factors are likely to affect different consuming industries to varying degrees, depending on economic conditions.
The nitrogen fertilizer industry is an example of how the dynamics of natural gas prices in conjunction with the other identified factors contributed to decreased demand. While high natural gas prices and a number of other factors caused imports to expand their market share, it is uncertain whether the industry will recover domestically as a result of lower gas prices. |
crs_R42603 | crs_R42603_0 | Introduction
Every four years, on January 20 at noon, the President-elect is sworn in as President of the United States. The Joint Inaugural Committee is responsible for the planning and execution of the swearing-in ceremony and for hosting an inaugural luncheon for the President and Vice President at the U.S. Capitol. This report provides a history of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, including committee membership, staffing, and inaugural activities. Origin of the Joint Inaugural Committee
In 1901, Congress established the first Joint Inaugural Committee for the inauguration of President William McKinley. There is established a Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies (in this resolution referred to as the "joint committee") consisting of 3 Senators and 3 Members of the House of Representatives, to be appointed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, respectively. For the 2017 inauguration, the President of the Senate appointed Senate Rules and Administration Committee chair Roy Blunt and the committee's Ranking Member Charles Schumer along with Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. Table 1 lists all Senators on the Joint Inaugural Committee since 1901. For the 2017 inauguration, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan appointed himself, Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy, and Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi. For 20 of the 30 inaugurations between 1901 and 2017, either the chair of the Senate Committee on Rules (1901-1945) or the chair of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration (1949-2012) has also chaired the Joint Inaugural Committee. Pursuant to S.Con.Res. 28 and S.Con.Res. 29 in the 114 th Congress (2015-2016), the 2017 inaugural ceremony will be held at the U.S. Capitol, with the swearing-in ceremony on the West Front Steps and special events held in the Rotunda and Emancipation Hall of the Capitol Visitor Center. | Every four years, at noon on January 20, the President-elect is sworn in as President of the United States. The year before the inauguration, Congress establishes the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies. The Joint Inaugural Committee is responsible for the planning and execution of the swearing-in ceremony and hosting an inaugural luncheon for the President and Vice President at the U.S. Capitol. Pursuant to S.Con.Res. 28 and S.Con.Res. 29 in the 114th Congress (2015-2016), the 2017 inaugural ceremony will be held at the U.S. Capitol, with the swearing-in ceremony on the West Front Steps and special events held in the Rotunda and Emancipation Hall of the Capitol Visitor Center.
The tradition of authorizing a Joint Inaugural Committee dates to 1901 for the inauguration of President William McKinley. At that time, the House and Senate authorized that inaugural expenses be paid by the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate and created a committee of three Representatives and three Senators appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. Since 1901, the Joint Inaugural Committee has been authorized quadrennially.
On February 3, 2016, Congress authorized the Joint Inaugural Committee for the 2017 Inauguration. Representing the Senate on the 2017 Joint Inaugural Committee are Senator Roy Blunt, chair of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration; Senator Mitch McConnell, Senate majority leader; and Senator Charles Schumer, ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Representing the House of Representatives are Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy, and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi.
This report provides historical information on the Joint Inaugural Committee, including the committee's origin, membership, leadership, staffing, and inaugural activities. |
crs_RL34516 | crs_RL34516_0 | 1722 ) to foster the development of telework in executive agencies of the federal government. The Senate agreed to the committee amendments, including a title change, and passed S. 707 , the Telework Enhancement Act of 2010, under unanimous consent on May 24, 2010. 1722 , the Telework Improvements Act of 2010, on March 25, 2009, and the bill was referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The legislation would amend Title 5 of the United States Code by adding a new Chapter 65 entitled "Telework." The House passed H.R. 1755 , as amended, on a 290-131 (Roll No. 441) vote on July 14, 2010. 4689) in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1722 , as amended, under unanimous consent, on September 30, 2010. Any House action to concur in the Senate amendment may occur in the lame duck session scheduled to convene on November 15, 2010. 1722 would define telework as a work flexibility arrangement under which an employee performs the duties and responsibilities of his or her position, and other authorized activities, from an approved worksite other than the location from which the employee would otherwise work. The bill would require the heads of executive agencies to establish policies under which employees (with some exceptions) could be eligible to participate in telework. Employee participation in telework must not diminish either employee performance or agency operations (Senate-passed H.R. 1722 ) or agency operations and performance (House-passed H.R. 1722 ). In the executive agencies, employees not eligible for telework generally would include those whose duties involve the daily direct handling of secure materials determined to be inappropriate for telework by the agency head or on-site activity that cannot be handled remotely or at an alternative worksite (Senate-passed H.R. 1722 ) or the daily direct handling of classified information or are such that their performance requires on-site activity which cannot be carried out from a site removed from the employee's regular place of employment (House-passed H.R. 1722 ). Under the Senate-passed version of the bill, an employee would have to enter into a written agreement with the agency to participate in telework. H.R. 1722 , as passed by the Senate and the House, would require that a Telework Managing Officer, who would be responsible for implementing the telework policies, be appointed for each executive agency. Each agency also would be required to provide training to managers, supervisors, and employees participating in telework. Telework would be incorporated into Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans under the legislation. The Senate-passed H.R. The Senate-passed and House-passed H.R. 1722 also would require the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to submit annual reports on telework to Congress, and the Comptroller General (CG) to review the OPM report and then annually report to Congress on the progress of executive agencies in implementing telework. The CG would be required to annually submit a report to Congress on telework at the Government Accountability Office (GAO). H.R. 1722 , as passed by the Senate, would require the Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCOs) to annually report to the CHCO Council chair and vice-chair on telework implementation by their agencies. Under the Senate-passed and House-passed H.R. 1722 , test programs for telework travel expenses would be authorized. As passed by the Senate, H.R. Table 1 , below, compares the provisions of S. 707 , as passed by the Senate, and H.R. | Legislation to augment telework in executive agencies of the federal government is currently pending in the 111th Congress. S. 707, the Telework Enhancement Act of 2010, and H.R. 1722, the Telework Improvements Act of 2010, were introduced on March 25, 2009, by Senator Daniel Akaka and Representative John Sarbanes, respectively. The Senate passed S. 707, amended, under unanimous consent on May 24, 2010. The House passed H.R. 1722, amended, on July 14, 2010, on a 290-131 (Roll No. 441) vote. The Senate agreed to an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1722, and then passed H.R. 1722, as amended, under unanimous consent on September 30, 2010. Any House action to concur in the Senate amendment may occur in the lame duck session scheduled to convene on November 15, 2010.
H.R. 1722, as passed by the House and the Senate, would amend Title 5 of the United States Code by adding a new Chapter 65 entitled "Telework." The bill defines telework as a work flexibility arrangement under which an employee performs the duties and responsibilities of his or her position, and other authorized activities, from an approved worksite other than the location from which the employee would otherwise work. The heads of executive agencies would be required to establish policies under which employees (with some exceptions) could be eligible to participate in telework. Employee participation in telework must not diminish either employee performance or agency operations (Senate-passed H.R. 1722) or agency operations and performance (House-passed H.R. 1722). Executive agency employees not eligible for telework generally would include those whose duties require the daily direct handling of secure materials determined to be inappropriate for telework by the agency head or on-site activity that cannot be handled remotely or at an alternative worksite (Senate-passed H.R. 1722) or the daily direct handling of classified information or are such that their performance requires on-site activity which cannot be carried out from a site removed from the employee's regular place of employment (House-passed H.R. 1722). The Senate-passed version of the bill would require an employee to enter into a written agreement with the agency before participating in telework. The Senate- and House-passed H.R. 1722 would require each executive agency to appoint a Telework Managing Officer, who would be responsible for implementing the telework policies; provide training to managers, supervisors, and employees participating in telework; provide for telework to be incorporated into Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans; require the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to submit annual reports on telework to Congress, and require the Comptroller General (CG) to review the OPM report and then annually report to Congress on the progress of executive agencies in implementing telework; and require the CG to annually submit a report to Congress on telework at the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The Senate-passed H.R. 1722 would require the agency Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCOs) to annually report to the chair and vice-chair of the CHCO Council on telework in their organizations. Test programs for telework travel expenses would be authorized by the Senate- and House-passed H.R. 1722. This report presents a side-by-side comparison of the provisions of S. 707, as passed by the Senate, and H.R. 1722, as passed by the House and the Senate. It will be updated as events dictate. |
crs_R40815 | crs_R40815_0 | Introduction
The United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a broad range of benefits and services to American veterans and to certain members of their families. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) offers a variety of benefits to veterans who are also military retirees. National Guard and reserve members may not necessarily meet the relevant statutory definition of "veterans" for VA benefit purposes, and retired members of the National Guard or reserve are not eligible for DOD benefits until they reach the age of 60. These National Guard and reserve retirees are commonly known as Gray Area Retirees (GARs). 111-84 ) provided TRICARE Standard (TS) coverage for certain members of the retired reserve who are qualified for a non-regular retirement, but are not yet 60 years old. To be eligible for most VA benefits, the claimant must be a veteran, or, in some cases, the survivor or the dependent of a veteran. Significantly, however, not every person who has served in the military is considered to be a "veteran" for the purposes of VA benefits. Various criteria, however, including discharge status, "active" service, time of service (whether during a "time of war"), and length of duty are all factors considered in determining whether a former servicemember is a "veteran" for the purposes of VA benefits. Legislation
Section 705 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 ( P.L. In the 112 th Congress, S. 542 , S. 1768 , and H.R. 1003 would authorize space-available travel on military aircraft for GARs on the same basis as active-duty military personnel. S. 491 and H.R. 1025 would recognize service by certain persons in the reserves by honoring them with the status as veterans under law. However, such persons would not be entitled to any benefit by reason of such recognition. | The United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a broad range of benefits and services to American veterans and to certain members of their families. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) offers a variety of benefits to veterans who are also military retirees. When members of the National Guard or the reserves who have not yet reached the age of 60 retire (usually after at least 20 years of service), they may not necessarily meet the statutory definition of "veterans" for VA purposes or be eligible for DOD health benefits. These military retirees are commonly known as Gray Area Retirees (GARs).
To be eligible for most VA benefits, the claimant must be a veteran, or in some cases, the survivor or dependent of a veteran. However, not every person who has served in the military is considered to be a "veteran" for the purposes of VA benefits. The concept of "veteran" is defined by federal statute and includes various criteria, such as discharge status, "active" service, time of service, and length of duty.
Section 705 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84) made TRICARE Standard (TS) coverage available for purchase by certain members of the retired reserve who are qualified for a non-regular retirement, but are not yet 60 years old (GARs). This program, known as TRICARE Retired Reserve (TRR), was launched on September 1, 2010, and is now fully operational. In 2011, a program was implemented that permits GARs to enroll in the TRR online, through a DOD website.
In the 112th Congress, S. 542, S. 1768, and H.R. 1003 would authorize space-available travel on military aircraft for GARs on the same basis as active-duty military personnel. S. 491 and H.R. 1025 would recognize service by certain persons in the reserves by honoring them with the status as veterans under law. However, such persons would not be entitled to any benefit by reason of such recognition. |
crs_RL33646 | crs_RL33646_0 | Recent Developments
Emergency rule by a military-backed caretaker government, currently headed by Fakhruddin Ahmed, is likely to continue through 2007 and into 2008. Zia, Hasina, Ershad and the Future Political Landscape
Under its anti-corruption drive the caretaker government has moved decisively against the established political parties. Bangladesh has for many years been one of the world's most corrupt nations. Political Context
The intense and at times violent political rivalry between the country's two main political parties, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL), and the presence of radical Islamist parties and groups, have defined Bangladesh's poor political environment in recent years. In discussing the shift to the new military-backed caretaker government, he stated that U.S. was initially "troubled that this dramatic shift in government might signal a hidden agenda to indefinitely delay a return to democracy and conceal a secret military coup." He added that the caretaker government was responsive to calls for outlining a roadmap to elections and the restoration of democracy. The United States has long-standing supportive relations with Bangladesh and has viewed Bangladesh as a moderate voice in the Islamic world. It has received more than $30 billion from foreign donors since its independence in 1971. Following two decades of authoritarian rule, Bangladesh held its first democratic elections in 1991. Since then, Dhaka's politics have been characterized by a bitter struggle between the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL), and particularly between the two leaders of the respective parties, Prime Minister Khaleda Zia (1991-1996, 2001-present) and former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed (1996-2001). There has been much political violence in Bangladesh in recent years. In January 2005 the State Department issued a statement that "strongly condemned" the bomb attack that killed four, including former Awami League Finance Minister A.M.S. Kibria, and injured 70 at a political rally of the Awami League on January 27, 2005. On August 21, 2004, grenades were hurled in an apparent political assassination attempt on opposition leader Sheikh Hasina at a political rally in Dhaka and killed 22. These two attacks, and widespread bombings on August 17, 2005 marked a rising tide of political violence in Bangladesh. Bangladeshi opposition, analysts, and media observers have alleged that the presence in the former ruling Bangladesh National Party (BNP) Coalition government of two Islamist parties, the Islamiya Okiyya Jote (IOJ) and the Jamaat-e-Islami, had expanded Islamist influence in Bangladesh and created space within which terrorist and extremist groups could operate. The BJP is the leading opposition party in India. Economics, Trade, and Development
Bangladesh is one of the poorest and most densely populated countries in the world. Though Bangladesh is one of the world's poorest countries, its economy has made some progress in recent years. The government has also been accused of failing to prosecute attacks against journalists by supporters of the BNP. | Bangladesh (the former East Pakistan) gained its independence in 1971, following India's intervention in a rebellion against West Pakistan (currently called Pakistan). Democratic elections in 1991 ended two decades of authoritarian rule in Dhaka. The Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which led the ruling coalition of the previous government, and the leading opposition party, the Awami League (AL), traditionally have dominated Bangladeshi politics. The BNP is led by former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia while the AL is led by Sheikh Hasina. Bangladesh has been a largely moderate and democratic majority Muslim country. This status has been under threat from a combination of political violence, weak governance, poverty, corruption, and Islamist militancy. When in opposition, both parties have sought to regain control of the government through demonstrations, labor strikes, and transport blockades.
Bangladesh is now ruled by a military-backed caretaker government led by Fakhruddin Ahmed that appears unlikely to relinquish power in the near term. It is pursuing an anti-corruption drive that could overturn the normal political elites. It is also seeking to put in place voter reforms, including issuing identity cards, and has moved against militant Islamists. While there has been concern that the new military-backed caretaker government would be reluctant to relinquish power, it has presented a roadmap for new elections and a return to democracy in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh is one of the poorest and most corrupt countries of the world. The largely agricultural economy suffers frequent and serious setbacks from cyclones and floods. While economic progress has been made, it has been impaired by rivalry between the two largest political parties. Bangladesh is thought to have large reserves of natural gas.
Political violence has become part of the political landscape in Bangladesh. A.M.S. Kibria, a finance minister in a previous Awami League government, and four others were killed in a bomb attack that also injured 70 at a political rally of the Awami League on January 27, 2005. On August 21, 2004, an apparent political assassination attempt on opposition leader Sheikh Hasina at a political rally in Dhaka killed 22. These two attacks, and widespread bombings on August 17, 2005, that claimed 26 lives and injured dozens others, are the most notable incidents among many in recent years.
U.S. policy toward Bangladesh emphasizes support for political stability and democracy; development; and human rights. The United States has long-standing supportive relations with Bangladesh and has viewed Bangladesh as a moderate voice in the Islamic world. Some analysts are concerned that Islamist parties have gained influence through the political process and that this has created space for militant activities inside the country. Some allege that the presence in the former ruling Bangladesh National Party (BNP) coalition government of two Islamist parties, the Islamiya Okiyya Jote (IOJ) and the Jamaat-e-Islami, contributed to the expansion of Islamist influence in Bangladesh. |
crs_R45048 | crs_R45048_0 | Overview
Federal education legislation continues to emphasize the role of assessment in elementary and secondary schools. Perhaps most prominently, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95 ), requires the use of test-based educational accountability systems in states and specifies the requirements for the assessments that states must incorporate into state-designed educational accountability system. These requirements are applicable to states that receive funding under Title I-A of the ESEA, which authorizes aid to local educational agencies (LEAs) for the education of disadvantaged children. More specifically, to receive Title I-A funds, states must agree to assess all students annually in grades 3 through 8 and once in high school in the areas of reading and mathematics. Students are also required to be assessed in science at least once within each of three specified grade spans (grades 3-5, 6-9, and 10-12). The results of these assessments are used as part of a state-designed educational accountability system that determines which schools will be identified for support and improvement based on their performance. The results are also used to make information about the academic performance of students in schools and school systems available to parents and other community stakeholders. As student assessments continue to be used for accountability purposes under the ESEA as well as in many other capacities related to federal programs (e.g., for identifying students eligible to receive extra services supported through federal programs), this report provides Congress with a general overview of assessments and related issues. It discusses different types of educational assessments and uses of assessment in support of the aims of federal policies. The report explains basic concepts related to assessment in accessible language, and it identifies commonly discussed considerations related to the use of assessments. The report provides background information that can be helpful to readers as they consider the uses of educational assessment in conjunction with policies and programs. This report accompanies CRS Report R45049, Educational Assessment and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act , by [author name scrubbed], which provides a more detailed examination of the assessment requirements under the ESEA. The report also provides a description of technical considerations in assessments, including validity, reliability, and fairness, and discusses how to use these technical considerations to draw appropriate conclusions based on assessment results. This framework addresses the various purposes of assessment, the concept of balanced assessment systems, and the scoring of assessments. A glossary containing definitions of commonly used assessment and measurement terms is provided at the end of this report. The glossary provides additional technical information that may not be addressed within the text of the report. Instructional
Instructional assessments are used to modify and adapt instruction to meet students' needs. Title I-A of the ESEA requires diagnostic assessments for the purpose of determining whether a student has limited English proficiency. One type of balanced assessment system uses a combination of formative and summative assessments. That is, the purposes of assessment are embedded within "formative" and "summative" assessments. Formative assessments are often used in the classroom. Summative assessments are used for diagnostic or evaluative purposes. Norm-referenced Tests
An NRT is a standardized test in which results compare the performance of an individual student to the performance of a large group of students. Criterion-Referenced Tests
A CRT compares the performance of an individual to a predetermined standard or criterion. A scaled score is a standardized score that exists on a common scale that can be used to make annual and longitudinal comparisons across students and subgroups of students. A vertically scaled score can be compared across time and can be used to measure growth of students and student subgroups. Performance Standards. A performance standard is a generally agreed upon definition of a certain level of performance in a content area that is expressed in terms of a cut score. Consistency of Classification
Consistency of classification is a type of reliability that is rarely reported but can be important to investigate, especially when high-stakes decisions are made with the results of educational assessments. Context of the Assessment
Sample questions about the context include the following: Is it a high-stakes or a low-stakes assessment? On the other hand, for a high-stakes assessment like a state exit exam for graduation, it is important to examine the validity and reliability evidence of the assessment to ensure that the inference is defensible. Assessment is a critical component of accountability systems such as those required under Title I-A of the ESEA. At times, the results of these assessments are used to make high-stakes decisions that affect students, teachers, LEAs, and states. It is therefore important to understand the purpose of educational assessments and to give consideration to the appropriateness of inferences based on assessment results. | Federal education legislation continues to emphasize the role of assessment in elementary and secondary schools. Perhaps most prominently, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95), requires the use of test-based educational accountability systems in states and specifies the requirements for the assessments that states must incorporate into state-designed educational accountability systems. These requirements are applicable to states that receive funding under Title I-A of the ESEA. More specifically, to receive Title I-A funds, states must agree to assess all students annually in grades 3 through 8 and once in high school in the areas of reading and mathematics. Students are also required to be assessed in science at least once within each of three specified grade spans (grades 3-5, 6-9, and 10-12). The results of these assessments are used as part of a state-designed educational accountability system that determines which schools will be identified for support and improvement based on their performance. The results are also used to make information about the academic performance of students in schools and school systems available to parents and other community stakeholders.
As student assessments continue to be used for accountability purposes under the ESEA as well as in many other capacities related to federal programs (e.g., for identifying students eligible to receive extra services supported through federal programs), this report provides Congress with a general overview of assessments and related issues. It discusses different types of educational assessments and uses of assessment in support of the aims of federal policies. The report aims to explain basic concepts related to assessment in accessible language, and it identifies commonly discussed considerations related to the use of assessments. The report provides background information that can be helpful to readers as they consider the uses of educational assessment in conjunction with policies and programs. This report accompanies CRS Report R45049, Educational Assessment and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, by [author name scrubbed], which provides a more detailed examination of the assessment requirements under the ESEA.
The following topics are addressed in this report:
Purposes of Assessment: Assessments are developed and administered for different purposes: instructional, diagnostic, predictive, and evaluative. Increasingly, states are attempting to use assessments for these purposes within a balanced assessment system. A balanced assessment system often incorporates various assessment types, such as formative and summative assessments. Formative assessments are used to monitor progress toward a goal and summative assessments are used to evaluate the extent to which a goal has been achieved.
Types of Tests: Educational assessments can be either norm-referenced tests (NRTs) or criterion-referenced tests (CRTs). An NRT is a standardized test that compares the performance of an individual student to the performance of a large group of students. A CRT compares the performance of an individual student to a predetermined standard or criterion. The majority of tests used in schools are CRTs. The results of CRTs, such as state assessments required by Title I-A of the ESEA, are usually reported as scaled scores or performance standards. A scaled score is a standardized score that exists along a common scale that can be used to make comparisons across students, across subgroups of students, and over time. A performance standard is a generally agreed upon definition of a certain level of performance in a content area that is expressed in terms of a cut score (e.g., basic, proficient, advanced).
Technical Considerations in Assessment: The technical qualities of assessments, such as validity, reliability, and fairness, are considered before drawing conclusions about assessment results. Validity is the degree to which an assessment measures what it is supposed to measure. Reliability is a measure of the consistency of assessment results. The concept of fairness is a consideration of whether there is equity in the assessment process. Fairness is examined so that all participants in an assessment are provided the opportunity to demonstrate what they know and can do.
Using Assessment Results Appropriately: Assessment is a critical component of accountability systems, such as those required under Title I-A of the ESEA, and can be the basis of many educational decisions. An assessment can be considered low-stakes or high-stakes, depending on the type of educational decisions made based on its result. For example, a low-stakes assessment may be a formative assessment that measures whether students are on-track to meet proficiency goals. On the other hand, a state high school exit exam is a high-stakes assessment if it determines whether a student will receive a diploma. When the results of assessments are used to make high-stakes decisions that affect students, teachers, districts, and states, it is especially important to have strong evidence of validity, reliability, and fairness. It is therefore important to understand the purpose of educational assessments, and the alignment between the purpose and their use, and to give consideration to the appropriateness of inferences based on assessment results.
A glossary containing definitions of commonly used assessment and measurement terms is provided at the end of this report. The glossary provides additional technical information that may not be addressed within the text of the report. |
crs_R45403 | crs_R45403_0 | Congress plays a central role in how the Department of Defense (DOD) creates and acquires leading-edge technologies, including establishing and refining the organizational structure of DOD research and development activities, providing policy direction, and appropriating funds for R&D and innovation-related activities. As illustrated in Figure 2 , in 1960, the United States accounted for 69% of global R&D, with U.S. defense-related R&D alone accounting for more than one-third of the global total. However, from 1960 to 2016, the federal government's share of total U.S. R&D fell from 65% to 24%, while business's share more than doubled from 33% to 67%. Today, U.S. business funds nearly three times as much R&D as the federal government. Decline in Defense Share of Federal R&D
In addition to the decline in the U.S. share of global R&D, and the decline in the federal share of U.S. R&D during this period, federal funding for defense R&D as a share of total federal R&D declined from 81% to 54% between 1960 and 2016. As a result of these global, national, and federal trends, federal defense R&D's share of total global R&D fell from 36% in 1960 to 3.7% in 2016. For more than 70 years, U.S. military technological superiority has provided U.S. and allied troops with superior weapons and systems, offsetting the size and geographical advantages of potential adversaries. The decline in federal defense R&D funding as a share of global R&D has substantial implications for how the Department of Defense obtains advanced technology and maintains the battlefield overmatch that technology has historically provided. Some defense policymakers have recognized DOD's increasing reliance on technologies developed by commercial companies for commercial markets. Among the challenges DOD faces are developing/modifying its current organizations and business models to access this technology; adapting the DOD business culture to seek and embrace technologies developed outside of DOD and its traditional contractor base; and finding ways to adapt and leverage commercial technologies for defense applications. Congress may conduct oversight of DOD implementation of DIB recommendations. For example, in P.L. Additionally, the committee recommends that the laboratories increase their presence in innovation hubs across the United States. Potential Issues for Consideration
Research and development is now a global enterprise, with the private sector driving technology development. Congress and the Administration have adopted a number of reforms to address the perceived concerns, including those described above. Has DOD increased the use of prototypes and other experimentation methods? Has DOD increased its tolerance for failure? 100-418 ), among other things:
sought to facilitate more open, equitable, and reciprocal market access; reduce or eliminate barriers and other trade-distorting policies and practices; enable a more effective system of international trading disciplines and procedures; increase intellectual property protections; and improve enforcement of U.S. antidumping and countervailing duties; authorized trade adjustment assistance to firms and workers; extended federal patent royalty payments to nongovernment employees; declared as U.S. policy that federally supported international science and technology agreements should be negotiated to ensure that intellectual property rights are properly protected and that access to R&D opportunities and facilities, and the flow of scientific and technological information, are, to the maximum extent practicable, equitable and reciprocal; changed the name of the National Bureau of Standards to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), expanded its technology transfer role, and mandated an annual report on emerging technologies; established the NIST Advanced Technology Program (ATP) to assist U.S. businesses in creating and applying generic technology and research results needed to commercialize significant new scientific discoveries and technologies rapidly and to refine manufacturing technologies; established the NIST Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) program to assist in the establishment of regional centers to enhance productivity and technological performance of U.S. small and medium-size manufacturers. | For more than 70 years, the technological superiority of the United States military has offset the size and geographic advantages of potential adversaries. The Department of Defense (DOD), due in large part to the magnitude of its investments in research and development (R&D), has driven the global R&D and technology landscape. However, DOD and the federal government more broadly are no longer overriding funders of R&D, and this shift in support for R&D has substantial implications for how DOD obtains advanced technology and maintains the battlefield overmatch that technology has historically provided.
In 1960, the United States accounted for 69% of global R&D, with U.S. defense-related R&D alone accounting for more than one-third of global R&D (36%). Additionally, the federal government funded approximately twice as much R&D as U.S. business. However, from 1960 to 2016, the U.S. share of global R&D fell to 28%, and the federal government's share of total U.S. R&D fell from 65% to 24%, while business's share more than doubled from 33% to 67%. As a result of these global, national, and federal trends, federal defense R&D's share of total global R&D fell to 3.7% in 2016. This decline resulted primarily from more rapid increases in the R&D of other nations (public and private) and partially from increases in U.S. business R&D and federal nondefense R&D.
Some defense experts and policymakers have recognized the shift in the global R&D landscape and the need for DOD to rely increasingly on technologies developed by commercial companies for commercial markets. Among the challenges DOD faces in acquiring new, innovative technologies and maintaining U.S. military technical superiority are
developing/modifying organizations and business models to access this technology; adapting the DOD business culture to seek and embrace technologies developed outside of DOD, the United States, and its traditional contractor base; and finding ways to adapt and leverage commercial technologies for defense applications.
Congress plays a central role in how DOD creates and acquires leading-edge technologies, including establishing and refining the organizational structure of DOD R&D activities, providing policy direction, establishing acquisition policies and authorities, and appropriating funds for R&D and innovation-related activities. Congress and the Administration have undertaken a number of actions to address the perceived decline in technical superiority, including
establishing the position of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to coordinate DOD's research enterprise, drive the development of key technologies, and create a more agile and innovative department; increasing DOD collaboration and engagement with industry and academia. For example, DOD has increased its presence in U.S. commercial technology hubs through the Defense Innovation Unit, established partnership intermediary agreements with various organizations, and co-located DOD research and development personnel at partner institutions across the country; and working to alter the culture of DOD to increase the speed technologies are developed, adapted, and acquired, including through the use of other transaction authority.
As DOD implements these reform efforts congressional oversight may include monitoring how effectively DOD is addressing congressional directives and intent to create a more risk tolerant and innovative DOD. |
crs_R42466 | crs_R42466_0 | Introduction
The annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill contains appropriations for the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in the Department of the Interior (DOI). For FY2013, on July 10, 2012, the House Committee reported H.R. 6091 ( H.Rept. 112-589 ), approving $1.16 billion, down 21.5% from the FY2012 level of $1.48 billion contained in P.L. 112-74 . The President had requested $1.55 billion in annual appropriations, an increase of 4.9% over FY2012. The committee's proposed changes in accounts and subaccounts range from elimination (-100%) to a decrease of 6%. By far the largest portion of the FWS annual appropriation is the Resource Management account, for which the House Committee approved $1.04 billion, down 15.1% from FY2012. Among the programs included in Resource Management are Endangered Species, the Refuge System, Law Enforcement, Fisheries, and Cooperative Landscape Conservation and Adaptive Science. (Moreover, Congress may choose to continue to appropriate funds for programs whose authorization has expired.) Within this account, the committee held funding for National Fish Hatchery Operations at $46.1 million, identical to the FY2012 level, and took a larger share out of aquatic habitat and species conservation. In some cases the mandated role of a hatchery, in whole or in part, is to provide mitigation for activities by other agencies. The House committee provided $3.0 million for this account, down 90.7% from the FY2012 level of $32.2 million; the accompanying report made no specific comments on the program, although the introduction to the accompanying report contained a discussion of the Administration's climate change programs generally, and criticized them for duplication and lack of coordination. The Migratory Bird Conservation Account (MBCA) is a source of mandatory spending for FWS land acquisition (in contrast to the other three federal lands agencies, which rely entirely on annual appropriations). The House committee reduced all of the MSCF programs by 50.0% relative to FY2012, emphasizing that all of the authorizations in this account have expired, or will expire in FY2012. | The annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriation funds agencies and programs in three federal departments, as well as numerous related agencies and bureaus. Among the agencies represented is the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in the Department of the Interior. Many of its programs are among the more controversial of those funded in the bill. For FY2013, the House Committee on Appropriations approved H.R. 6091, a bill containing $1.16 billion for FWS, down 21.5% from the FY2012 level of $1.48 billion contained the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74, Division E, H.Rept. 112-331). The President requested $1.55 billion, an increase of 4.9% over the FY2012 level. Relative to the FY2012 level, reductions in the various accounts and most subaccounts ranged from 6.0% down to elimination, although four subaccounts were held at the FY2012 levels. No increases were approved. Other highlights of the bill include the following:
$1.04 billion for Resource Management, by far the largest account in the FWS budget, and a reduction of 15.1% from the FY2012 level. Rejection of an Administration proposal to reduce funding for national fish hatcheries from $46.1 million to $43.2 million, despite a controversy over appropriate funding for hatcheries intended to mitigate other agencies' water projects. $3.0 million for Cooperative Landscape Conservation and Adaptive Science, a reduction of 90.7% from the FY2012 level of $32.2 million. Elimination of funding for general land acquisition for national wildlife refuges. A focus on reductions in programs whose authorizations have expired or are expiring in FY2012. Funding restrictions or directives regarding wolves in Wyoming; hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting on federal lands; and management of certain captive-bred endangered game species.
This report analyzes the FWS funding levels for the FY2013 appropriations bill. Emphasis is on FWS funding for programs that have generated congressional debate or particular constituent interest, now or in recent years. General efforts to reduce federal spending will encourage scrutiny of all spending, in FWS as in other agencies. |
crs_95-964 | crs_95-964_0 | (2) To what extent do the powers which the Constitution vests inthe President limit the power of Congress to enact the Posse Comitatus Act or any other provisionrestricting the President's discretion to involve the armed forces in civilian affairs? (37)
When the Act Does Not Apply
There is no violation of the Posse Comitatus Act when (1) the Constitution expressly authorizesuse of part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the law; (2) whenan act of Congress expressly authorizes use of part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatusor otherwise to execute the law; (3) when the activity in question does not involve use of part of thearmed forces covered by the proscription; and (4) when the activity in question is does not constitute"execution of the law." 331-335. 371-381. (56)
The 1981 legislation contains both explicit grants of authority and restrictions on the use of that authority for military assistance to the police -- federal, state and local -- particularly in the form ofinformation and equipment, 10 U.S.C. (57) The section allows the use of military undercover agents and the collection of intelligenceconcerning civilian activities only where there is a nexus to an underlying military purpose. The language of the Act by itself seems very sweeping. Existing case law and commentary indicate that "execution of the law" in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act occurs (a) when the armed forces perform tasks ordinarily assigned not to them butto an organ of civil government, or (b) when the armed forces perform tasks assigned to them solelyfor purposes of civilian government. (85)
At least when suggested that the armed forces have been improperly used as a police force, the tests used by most contemporary courts to determine whether such military activity violates the PosseComitatus Act were developed out of disturbances at Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge IndianReservation in South Dakota and inquiry:
(1) whether civilian law enforcement officials made a "direct active use" of military investigators to "execute the law";
(2) whether the use of the military "pervaded the activities" of the civilian officials; or
(3) whether the military was used so as to subject "citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory in nature." (94)
The Coast Guard is now a branch of the armed forces, located within the Department of Transportation, 14 U.S.C. (98) Similarly, the DoDdirective is only applicable to members of the NationalGuard when they are in federal service. (109)
Congress does appear to have intended the authority and restrictions contained in 10 U.S.C.371-381 to apply both in the United States and beyond its borders. (112)
Consequences of Violation
Prosecution
The Posse Comitatus Act is a criminal statute under which there has apparently never been a prosecution. Exclusion of Evidence
Allegations that the Posse Comitatus Act has been violated are made most often by defendants seeking to exclude related testimony or physical evidence. As administrative adoption of the Act for the Navy and Marines demonstrates, themilitary has a long standing practice of avoiding involvement in civilian affairs which it believes arecontrary to the Act. | The Posse Comitatus Act outlaws willful use of any part of the Army or Air Force to execute the law unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or an Act of Congress. Historysupplies the grist for an argument that the Constitution prohibits military involvement in civilianaffairs subject to only limited alterations by Congress or the President, but the courts do not appearto have ever accepted the argument unless violation of more explicit constitutional command couldalso be shown. The provision for express constitutional authorization when in fact the Constitutioncontains no such express authorizations has been explained alternatively as a meaningless politicalface saving device or as an unartful reference to the President's constitutional powers. The expressstatutory exceptions include the legislation which allows the President to use military force tosuppression insurrection, 10 U.S.C. 331-335, and sections which permit the Department of Defenseto provide federal, state and local police with information and equipment, 10 U.S.C. 371-381.
Existing case law indicates that "execution of the law" in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act occurs (a) when the armed forces perform tasks which are assigned not to them but to an organ ofcivil government, or (b) when the armed forces perform tasks assigned to them solely for purposesof civilian government. Questions arise most often in the context of assistance to civilian police. At least in this context, the courts have held that, absent a recognized exception, the Posse ComitatusAct is violated, (1) when civilian law enforcement officials make "direct active use" of militaryinvestigators; or (2) when the use of the military "pervades the activities" of the civilian officials;or (3) when the military is used so as to subject "citizens to the exercise of military power which wasregulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory in nature." The Act is not violated when the armed forcesconduct activities for a military purpose which have incidental benefits for civilian law enforcementofficials.
The language of the Act mentions only the Army and the Air Force, but it is applicable to the Navy and Marines by virtue of administrative action and commands of other laws. The lawenforcement functions of the Coast Guard have been expressly authorized by act of Congress andconsequently cannot be said to be contrary to the Act. The Act has been applied to the NationalGuard when it is in federal service, to civilian employees of the armed forces, and to off-dutymilitary personnel.
The Act is probably only applicable within the geographical confines of the United States, but the supplemental provisions of 10 U.S.C. 371-381 appear to apply world-wide. Finally, the Act isa criminal statute under which there has never been a prosecution. Although violations will on rareoccasions result in the exclusion of evidence, the dismissal of criminal charges, or a civil cause ofaction, as a practical matter compliance is ordinarily the result of military self-restraint.This reportappears in abridged form as CRS Report RS20590 , The Posse Comitatus Act: A Sketch .
Abstract
This is a brief summary of the Posse Comitatus Act and related provisions which govern the use of military personnel and equipment to execute civilian law. |
crs_R42824 | crs_R42824_0 | Introduction
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct, P.L. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. Covered parties meet their obligations under the RFS by surrendering renewable fuel credits to EPA equal to the number of gallons in their annual obligation. These credits, known as Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs), are generated when a batch of biofuel is produced, and separated from the fuel by obligated parties (generally gasoline and diesel fuel refiners or blenders). Current RFS Requirements
For 2013, the RFS required the blending of 16.55 billion gallons of renewable fuel in transportation fuels, including at least 1.28 billion gallons of biomass-based diesel substitutes (BBD). Within the overall RFS mandate, there are sub-mandates for specific types of fuel. A gallon of other advanced biofuel (e.g., sugarcane ethanol) may be used to meet the advanced biofuel mandate and the overall mandate, but may not be used to meet the cellulosic or BBD mandates. Once the biofuel has been blended or sold, the RINs are detached, and can then be bought and sold like other commodities. EPA Moderated Transaction System (EMTS)
All RIN transactions, including generation, trade/sale/transfer, separation, and retirement, must be cleared through the EMTS. Under this "buyer beware" system those purchasing or receiving RINs must certify their validity on their own, and they are responsible for any fraudulent RINs they pass on to other buyers or submit to EPA for compliance. The Market for RINs
RIN Prices
Because RINs may be bought and sold as commodities, there are RIN spot markets. Prices Since January 2013
Spot prices for conventional (corn-based) ethanol RINs rose dramatically at the start of 2013. On January 1, ethanol RINs were trading at roughly $0.07 per gallon, but they spiked to over $1.40 in mid-July, before dropping dramatically in the second half of 2013 ( Figure 6 ). Prices rebounded somewhat in early 2014. Several factors have been identified by stakeholders as potential causes for the run-up in prices. Fraudulent RINs
As noted above, in late 2011 and early 2012, EPA issued Notices of Violations (NOVs) to three companies (Clean Green Fuels, LLC, Absolute Fuels, LLC, and Green Diesel, LLC) that the agency alleges fraudulently generated a combined 140 million biodiesel RINs in 2010 and 2011. In December 2013 EPA issued another NOV to Imperial Petroleum, Inc. (and its subsidiary, e-Biofuels, LLC), and in January 2014 two men were indicted for RIN-related violations. Because of the "buyer beware" nature of the system, obligated parties who purchased the fraudulent RINs must pay fines for each RIN submitted (EPA and the companies have generally settled at about $0.10 per RIN), and must submit valid RINs to offset the fraudulent RINs. Quality Assurance Program
Because of these RIN fraud cases, EPA is looking at establishing a quality assurance program whereby RINs can be certified by third parties registered with EPA. EPA intends that such certification would provide obligated parties with an "affirmative defense" if RINs are later found to be fraudulent—that is, obligated parties would not be liable for civil penalties under the Clean Air Act for the use of such RINs. Key questions include whether such an affirmative defense would also eliminate the requirement to purchase make-up RINs. Establish a system where all certified RINs are valid for RFS compliance regardless of subsequent determination that they are fraudulent or otherwise deficient. How likely is fraud in the future, and what are the implications? The EMTS was established in part to address errors of the first three types. By 2022, the RFS requires the use of 36 billion gallons of renewable fuels, more than double the amount required in 2012. Various policies have been proposed to address these concerns, and the details of those policies will affect RIN markets as well as the relative benefits to different market players. | The federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) and significantly expanded in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA). The RFS requires the use of renewable biofuels in transportation fuel—for 2013, the mandate was 16.55 billion gallons of renewable fuel. Within the larger mandate, there are sub-mandates ("carve-outs") for advanced biofuels (e.g., biomass-based diesel and cellulosic fuels). By 2022, the RFS requires the use of 36 billion gallons of renewable fuels, including 21 billion gallons of advanced biofuels. For 2014, EPA has proposed lower mandates than those scheduled in EISA.
The RFS is a market-based compliance system in which obligated parties (generally refiners and/or terminal operators) must submit credits to cover their obligations. These credits—Renewable Identification Numbers, or RINs—are effectively commodities that can be bought or sold like other commodities. For each gallon of renewable fuel in the RFS program, one RIN is generated. Each RIN is a 38-digit number, with blocks of digits corresponding to various data, including the year the RIN was generated, the producer of the fuel, and the type of fuel. RINs are valid for use in the year they are generated and the following year.
From the beginning of the RFS program, there have been concerns with RIN generation and the RIN market. Because of concerns over transposed digits, allegations of double-counting (intentional or unintentional) and other errors and inaccuracies, when EPA finalized rules for the RFS as expanded by EISA (the "RFS2"), EPA also established a new transaction system in an effort to address these concerns. All RIN transactions must be cleared through this system, called the EPA Moderated Transaction System (EMTS). From the beginning of the RFS2 EPA has maintained obligated parties must exercise due diligence. Under this "buyer beware" system those purchasing or receiving RINs must certify their validity on their own, and they are responsible for any invalid RINs they pass on to other buyers or submit to EPA for compliance.
In late 2011 and early 2012, EPA issued Notices of Violations (NOVs) to three companies that the agency alleges fraudulently generated a combined 140 million biodiesel RINs in 2010 and 2011. In late 2013 EPA issued an NOV to a fourth company; in early 2014 two men were indicted for fraud in a separate case. Because of these RIN fraud cases, EPA is looking at establishing a system whereby RINs can be certified by third parties registered with EPA. EPA is considering whether such certification would provide obligated parties with an "affirmative defense" if RINs are later found to fraudulent—that is, obligated parties would not be liable for penalties under the Clean Air Act for the use of such RINs. Key questions include whether such an affirmative defense would also eliminate the requirement to purchase make-up RINs. EPA proposed a plan in January 2013, but the rule has yet to be finalized.
Most RINs are bought and sold through private contracts. However, there are also spot markets for RINs, and in 2013, spot prices for conventional ethanol RINs rose dramatically. Prices rose from roughly $0.07 per gallon in early January to over $1.40 per gallon in mid-July. Through the second half of 2013, prices dropped even more rapidly, although they rebounded somewhat in early 2014. Various factors have been identified by stakeholders as potentially causing the price increase, including whether sufficient amounts of ethanol can be blended into gasoline to meet the RFS mandates and the extent to which non-obligated parties are speculating in RIN markets.
In the 112th and 113th Congresses several congressional hearings have been held and various bills have been proposed to address both RIN issues and the overall RFS. |
crs_RL33015 | crs_RL33015_0 | Overview of Noncitizen Eligibility for Social Security(1)
Basics of the Social Security Program
The Social Security program provides monthly cash benefits to retired and disabled workersand their dependents, and to the survivors of deceased workers. Noncitizens, or aliens, who work in Social Security-covered employment must pay Social Securitypayroll taxes, including those who are in the United States working temporarily and those who maybe working in the United States without authorization. (5) There are some exceptions. (6) Generally, the workof alienswho are citizens of a country with which the United States has a "totalization agreement" (see below)is not covered by Social Security if they are sent by a firm in their home country to work in theUnited States for fewer than five years. Most jobs in the United States are covered under SocialSecurity (about 96% of the work force is required to pay Social Security payroll taxes). Mexico is a social insurance country. To receive payments outside the United States, alien dependents and survivors must havelived in the United States for at least five years previously (lawfully or unlawfully), and the familyrelationship to the worker must have existed during that time. (17)
Totalization Agreements
The Social Security Act (18) authorizes the President to enter into a totalization agreementwith another country to coordinate the collection of payroll taxes and the payment of benefits undereach country's Social Security system for workers who split their careers between the two countries. Thus, a worker who may lacksufficient coverage to qualify for benefits under either program may, under a totalization agreement,qualify for benefits under one or both systems. In addition, the United States has signed totalization agreements with Japan (February 19,2004) and Mexico (June 29, 2004). Analysis
The remainder of this report uses different socio-economic characteristics to compare personsborn in Mexico and living in the United States with persons born in the current totalization countriesand living in the United States. Individuals born in Mexico and living in the United States includeboth naturalized U.S. citizens and noncitizens. Education. Furthermore, a higher percentage of noncitizens from totalization countries, U.S. workers,and naturalized U.S. citizen workers from totalization countries are in management, business, andfinancial occupations than noncitizens and naturalized U.S. citizens from Mexico: 21.3% ofnoncitizens from totalization countries and 21.2% naturalized U.S. citizens from totalizationcountries are in management, business, and financial occupations compared to 15.4% of U.S.citizens, 5.9% of naturalized U.S. citizens from Mexico, and 2.9% of noncitizens from Mexico. Conclusion
In addition to being much larger than the population of persons from the totalizationcountries in the United States, the Mexican population -- both noncitizens and naturalized citizens-- in the United States has a different socio-economic profile than U.S. citizens and persons in theUnited States from totalization countries. The populationfrom Mexico tends to be younger and more heavily male. Mexican persons in the U.S. labor force tend to have more dependents in their U.S.households. Because Mexican workers may have lower lifetime earnings, they may receive a higherreplacement rate in Social Security benefits than workers with higher lifetime earnings. Labor Force Participation. Earnings. | On June 29, 2004, the United States and Mexico signed a Social Security totalizationagreement, the effects of which depend on the yet to be disclosed language of the agreement. Atotalization agreement coordinates the payment of Social Security taxes and benefits for workers whodivide their careers between two countries. The agreement has not been transmitted to Congress forreview, which is required under law before the agreement can go into effect. This report does notattempt to estimate the potential cost of a totalization agreement with Mexico, or reach a conclusionon the effects of such an agreement on U.S. workers and employers. Instead this report explores oneof the issues concerning such an agreement. Using different socio-economic characteristics, thereport compares persons born in Mexico and living in the United States (both naturalized U.S.citizens and noncitizens) with persons born in the current totalization countries and living in theUnited States.
The Social Security program provides monthly cash benefits to qualified retired and disabledworkers, their dependents, and survivors of deceased workers. Generally, a worker must have 10years of Social Security-covered employment to be eligible for retirement benefits (less time isrequired for disability and survivor benefits). Most jobs in the United States are covered underSocial Security. Noncitizens (aliens) who work in Social Security-covered employment must paySocial Security payroll taxes, including those who are in the United States working temporarily andthose who may be working in the United States without authorization. There are some exceptions. Generally, the work of aliens who are citizens of a country with which the United States has a"totalization agreement" is not covered by Social Security if they work in the United States for lessthan five years. In addition, by statute, the work of aliens under certain visa categories is not coveredby Social Security. Currently, since Mexico meets the definition of a "social insurance country," aMexican worker may receive U.S. Social Security benefits outside the United States. Familymembers of the Mexican worker must have lived in the United States for at least five years to receivebenefits outside the United States, but typically under a totalization agreement this requirement iswaived.
This report concludes that the Mexican population in the United States has a differentsocio-economic profile than both U.S. citizens and persons (both naturalized U.S. citizens andnoncitizens) from current totalization countries. Workers from totalization countries tend to havemore education and higher earnings than workers born in the United States or in Mexico. Noncitizens from Mexico tend to be younger and have higher labor force participation rates thannaturalized U.S. citizens from Mexico, and other U.S. citizens. In addition, Mexican noncitizensand naturalized U.S. citizens from Mexico in the U.S. labor force tend to have more dependents intheir U.S. households. Because Mexican workers may have lower lifetime earnings, they mayreceive a higher replacement rate, relative to the payroll taxes they pay, than workers with higherlifetime earnings, such as U.S. citizens and noncitizens from the totalization countries. This reportwill not be updated. |
crs_R43648 | crs_R43648_0 | 3964 , the Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Emergency Water Delivery Act, as passed by the House of Representatives on February 5, 2014. 1837—The Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Water Reliability Act , by [author name scrubbed]). 3964 is similar to H.R. Among other things, it would alter CVPIA in the following ways: broaden the purposes for which water previously dedicated to fish and wildlife can be used (by removing the directive to modify CVP operations to protect fish and wildlife with dedicated fish flows and making this action optional); add to the purposes a provision "to ensure" water dedicated to fish and wildlife purposes is replaced and provided to CVP contactors by the end of 2018 at the lowest "reasonably achievable" cost; changing the definitions of fish covered by the act; broaden purposes for which Central Valley Project Restoration Fund (CVPRF) monies can be used; reduce revenues into the CVPRF; mandate that the CVP be operated under a1994 interim agreement, the Bay-Delta Accord; and mandate development and implementation of a plan to increase CVP water yield by October 1, 2018. Title II , San Joaquin River Restoration. Title I—Central Valley Project Water Reliability
Background
Title I of H.R. 3964 would make numerous changes to the CVPIA, and includes other provisions that are not alterations to CVPIA but relate to water availability in California's Central Valley. Compounding the controversy over CVP water allocation are other factors that limit water deliveries—namely state water quality control requirements, variable hydrological conditions, the state system of water rights priorities, and implementation of other laws. Some of these changes are controversial. Analysis
Many of the provisions in Title I have tradeoffs embedded in them. 3964 , which directs the Secretary to operate the CVP and SWP according to principles outlined in the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord, also would benefit some water users (e.g., to the extent that more water would be made available for use than under current law), but may harm other stakeholders (e.g., to the extent such operation would negatively affect Delta water quality or fish viability)
The provisions of the bill under Title I raises several key questions regarding CVP water supplies for users and the environment. What effects would it have on water quality, recreation, and commercial and sport fishing? Because increased water flows for restoring fisheries (known as restoration flows) reduce diversions of water for off-stream purposes, such as irrigation, hydropower, and municipal and industrial uses, the settlement and its implementation have been controversial. Consequently, how deliveries to Friant water contractors might be reduced in any given year depends on many factors. As noted above, there has been concern from some western states that the state and federal preemptions contained in H.R. 3964 might be used as precedent in other western states and threaten their allocation of state water rights, and this provision attempts to address these concerns. 3964 would make extensive changes to implementation of federal reclamation law under the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, the contracting provisions under the 1939 Reclamation Project Act, restoration efforts under the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act, and state and federal relationships under Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902. It would result in greater water deliveries by preempting federal and state law, including fish-and-wildlife protections and other CVP operational mandates, which are all tied to the coordinated operations of the CVP and SWP. While much attention has been paid to the effects of federal and state environmental laws on reductions in water supplies south of the Delta, the extent to which the bill would relieve current and ongoing water supply shortages, particularly in drought years, is uncertain. Limited increases in deliveries for water contractors may be garnered from a prohibition or alteration of some state and federal environmental restrictions (including the State's Public Trust Doctrine and other laws proposed under the bill. H.R. However, some argue that the bill would undermine efforts to achieve the "co-equal" goals of "providing for a more reliable water supply for California and protecting, restoring, and enhancing the Bay-Delta ecosystem," which is the foundation of state and federal efforts in development of the Bay Delta Conservation Plan. | For most of the last 20 years, some water contractors in California's Central Valley have received less than their full contract water supplies from federal and state water resource facilities. Although such allocations are in part the result of the prior appropriation doctrine in western water law and are consistent with the expectation of a "junior" water user in times of drought, tensions over water delivery reliability have been exacerbated by reductions in deliveries even in non-drought years. Such reductions are significant because much of the California urban and agricultural economy operates under junior water rights, and reductions in water allocations can cause significant disruption and economic losses, particularly in drought years. At the same time, fish populations throughout the Central Valley have dramatically declined due to water diversions and other factors, and this has been accompanied by significant losses for fishing communities and others dependent on fish and wildlife resources. The state and federal governments have been working to address water supply reliability and ecosystem issues through the Bay-Delta Conservation Plan (BDCP); however, the plan is not complete and remains controversial.
On February 5, 2014, the House enacted H.R. 3964, the Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Emergency Water Delivery Act. It is similar to a bill in the 112th Congress that also passed the House (H.R. 1837, the Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley Emergency Water Reliability Act). The bill would, among many other things, amend the Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992 (CVPIA) to potentially reduce some water allocations for fish and wildlife and redirect them to other purposes (i.e., agricultural and municipal and industrial uses). It would preempt "any" (including state and federal) law pertaining to operation of the federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and California's State Water Project (SWP). It would also substitute for those laws operational principles from a 1994 interim agreement, known as the Bay-Delta Accord, which some believe would provide more reliable water supplies for federal and state water contractors. It would also repeal certain components of a 2010 law authorizing a settlement agreement for the San Joaquin River, and would make numerous other changes.
Proponents of H.R. 3964 argue that implementation of the CVPIA and the San Joaquin River Settlement, coupled with state and federal environmental laws (e.g., the federal Endangered Species Act, its state equivalent, and state regulations implementing the federal Clean Water Act), have compounded the impact of drought on water deliveries. Opponents argue that the bill would harm the environment and resource-dependent local economies, particularly coastal communities. Some also argue that it would undermine efforts to resolve environmental and water supply reliability issues through development of the BDCP.
Issues for Congress include the extent to which the bill changes decades of federal and state law, including state and federal environmental laws, and at what benefit and cost. For example, there are tradeoffs embedded in the bill's preemption of state water law, including fish and wildlife protections, as a means to increase the water deliveries to some irrigation contractors and municipalities. These changes might benefit water contractors in some areas, but potentially reduce environmental protections and improvements and the industries they support (e.g., recreational and fishing industries) in others. Congress may also consider the potential extent to which the bill would relieve water supply shortages, particularly in drought years. While much attention has been paid to the effects of federal and state environmental laws on reductions in water supplies south of the Bay-Delta, many factors affect pumping restrictions and the overall water allocation regime for CVP contractors. How H.R. 3964 would in practice affect these factors is uncertain. |
crs_R41204 | crs_R41204_0 | Historically, states were required to provide CSE services to members of Indian tribes and tribal organizations who were part of their CSE caseloads. As of April 20, 2016, there were 61 tribal CSE programs. In FY2014, the 57 tribes or tribal organizations with comprehensive CSE programs distributed over $36 million in total child support collections in FY2014 to 50,892 cases in the CSE tribal program. In 2014, about 66% of American Indian and Alaska Native children were born to unmarried women (again, according to race). This report provides a brief legislative history of CSE provisions related to tribes, presents basic information on tribal CSE programs, describes the information that tribal CSE programs must contain in order to be approved for federal funding, displays data on current tribal CSE programs, and discusses issues related to ensuring that Native American children receive the child support to which they are entitled. The report also includes three appendices. Appendix B displays FY2016 information that shows the 57 comprehensive tribal CSE programs. It also names the four start-up tribal CSE programs. The CSE program currently provides seven major services on behalf of children: (1) parent location, (2) paternity establishment, (3) establishment of child support orders, (4) review and modification of child support orders, (5) enforcement/collection of child support payments, (6) distribution of child support payments, and (7) establishment and enforcement of medical support. The CSE program is administered by the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), which is in the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Before enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law ( P.L. The 1996 law allowed any state that has Indian country (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 1151) within its borders to enter into a cooperative agreement with an Indian tribe or tribal organization if the tribe demonstrated that it had an established tribal court system with the authority to establish paternity, and establish, modify, and enforce child support orders. In addition, P.L. 104-193 gave the HHS Secretary the authority to make direct payments to Indian tribes that have approved CSE programs. In contrast to the federal matching rate of 66% for CSE programs run by the states or territories, the CSE program provides direct federal funding equal to 100% of approved and allowable CSE expenditures during the start-up period, provides 90% federal funding for approved CSE programs operated by tribes or tribal organizations during the first three years of full program operation, and provides 80% federal funding thereafter. Indian tribes and tribal organizations that choose to operate a tribal CSE program must run programs that conform to the objectives of the state CSE program and are in compliance with the tribal CSE program regulations. However, federal regulations provide some flexibility that allows tribes and tribal organizations to develop and administer tribal CSE programs that are consistent with the tribe's law and tradition. It also provides statistical information on tribal CSE programs. Data Problems
Although the data are useful in developing an understanding of tribal CSE programs, there are several problems associated with the data. on the effectiveness of tribal CSE programs. Appendix A. Tribal CSE Program Indicators
This appendix includes six tables that arrange each tribe according to its ranking on several CSE program features or indicators. Appendix C. American Indian and Alaska Native Population Figures for Tribes with CSE Programs
Table C -1 shows four population figures for each of the 61 tribal CSE programs. | The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state program. Its mission is to enhance the well-being of children by helping custodial parents and children obtain financial support from the noncustodial parents. Although states were always required to provide CSE services to members of Indian tribes and tribal organizations who were part of their CSE caseloads, tribes were not specifically included in the CSE statute until the 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193). The 1996 law allowed any state that has Indian country within its borders to enter into a cooperative agreement with an Indian tribe if the tribe demonstrated that it had an established tribal court system with the authority to establish paternity, and establish, modify, and enforce child support orders. In addition, P.L. 104-193 gave the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) the authority to make direct payments to Indian tribes that have approved CSE programs.
There are currently 61 tribal CSE programs, 57 comprehensive tribal CSE programs and 4 start-up tribal CSE programs (as of April 2016). In contrast to the federal matching rate of 66% for CSE programs run by the states or territories, the tribal CSE program provides direct federal funding equal to 100% of approved and allowable CSE expenditures during the start-up period, provides 90% federal funding for approved CSE programs operated by tribes or tribal organizations during the first three years of full program operation, and provides 80% federal funding thereafter. In FY2014, the 57 tribes or tribal organizations with comprehensive tribal CSE programs had an aggregate of 50,892 cases and collected over $36 million in total child support collections.
Tribal CSE program services include parent location, paternity establishment, establishment of child support orders, review and modification of child support orders, enforcement/collection of child support payments, and distribution of child support. Indian tribes and tribal organizations that choose to operate a tribal CSE program must run programs that conform to the objectives of the state CSE program and that are in compliance with the tribal CSE program regulations. However, federal regulations provide some flexibility that allows tribes and tribal organizations to develop and administer tribal CSE programs that are consistent with the tribe's law and tradition.
In 2010, about 52% of the nearly 1 million American Indian and Alaska Native children were living with only one of their parents. In 2014, about 66% of American Indian and Alaska Native children were born to unmarried women. This report presents some demographic data on the number of Native Americans living in the United States and also provides statistical data on tribal CSE programs. Although the data are useful in developing an understanding of tribal CSE programs, they should not be used to draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness of tribal CSE programs.
This report describes the components of tribal CSE programs and discusses issues related to jurisdictional matters, paternity establishment, child support enforcement methods, nonpayment problems, and consistency of tribal programs with each other and with state CSE programs. The report also includes three appendices. Appendix A includes six tables that arrange each tribe according to its ranking in FY2014 on several CSE program indicators. Appendix B displays FY2016 information that shows the 57 comprehensive tribal CSE programs. It also shows the four start-up tribal CSE programs. Appendix C shows the American Indian and Alaska Native household population for 2005/2010 for tribes with CSE programs. |
crs_R44894 | crs_R44894_0 | In the United States, accounting and auditing standards are promulgated and regulated by various federal, state, and self-regulatory agencies. Accounting and auditing standards are also influenced by practitioners from businesses, nonprofits, and government entities (federal, state, and local). Congress has allowed financial accounting and auditing practitioners to remain self-regulated while retaining oversight responsibility. At certain times, Congress has sought to achieve specific accounting- and auditing-based policy objectives by enacting legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA). The next three sections of the report discuss how accounting and auditing standards are created and regulated in the private sector, the federal government, and state and local governments. Background
The informational needs of stakeholders differ between the private and public sectors. As a consequence, different accounting and auditing standards have evolved in these sectors to address stakeholders' specific needs. In the private sector, financial statements communicate to stakeholders such as investors, creditors, company employees, regulators, and others how the company used its resources to generate profit and expand its business, or how the company incurred loss and the likelihood the business will survive over the long run. Public-sector entities such as the federal, state, and local governments issue reports to communicate how tax revenues were used to benefit citizens. State and local governments have standards distinct from those of the federal government. Thus, accounting and auditing standards can be classified into three areas: (1) private industry standards, (2) federal government standards, and (3) state and local government standards. The accounting and auditing standards created for publicly traded firms are subject to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) oversight. However, Congress has oversight over the SEC and annually appropriates its funding. Currently, the SEC recognizes the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as the designated organization for establishing GAAP for the private sector. SOX created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as a nonprofit corporation to provide independent oversight of audits of public companies. The standard-setting body for federal financial reporting is the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB). Accounting
The accounting standards established by GASB are considered Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for states and municipalities. Policy Issues
Two policy issues might be of particular interest to Congress and investors. The first is the relationship between accounting and auditing standards in the United States and other countries—in particular, whether or to what degree international accounting and auditing standards should influence U.S. GAAP and U.S. GAAS, respectively. The second is the newly emerging sustainability accounting standards for businesses, which encompass environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues. A counterpart to U.S. GAAS is International Standards on Auditing (ISA). Although the SEC has the Office of the Chief Accountant, whose primary mission is to establish and enforce accounting and auditing policy to ensure that financial statements improve investment decisions, the SEC has relied on the private sector to establish accounting and auditing standards in the United States. Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) was founded in 2011 as an independent organization to promulgate sustainability accounting standards for the private sector. The board has not been recognized by Congress or sanctioned by the SEC as an official standard-setting body for ESG issues. Responsibilities
Responsibilities principle. | Accounting and auditing standards in the United States are promulgated and regulated by various federal, state, and self-regulatory organizations (SROs). Accounting and auditing standards are also influenced by practitioners from businesses, nonprofits, and government entities. Congress has allowed financial accounting and auditing practitioners to remain largely self-regulated while retaining oversight responsibility. At certain times, Congress has sought to achieve specific accounting- and auditing-based policy objectives by enacting legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX; P.L. 107-204) and the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA; P.L. 101-508).
The informational needs of stakeholders differ between the different sectors of the economy—the private sector, the federal government, and state and local governments. As a consequence, different accounting and auditing standards have evolved in these sectors. In the private sector, financial statements communicate to stakeholders how the company used its resources to generate profit and expand its business, or how the company incurred loss and the chances the business will survive over the long run. In comparison, public-sector entities such as the federal, state, and local governments issue reports to communicate how tax revenues were used to benefit citizens. State and local governments have standards distinct from those of the federal government. As such, accounting and auditing standards can be classified into three areas: (1) private industry standards, (2) federal government standards, and (3) state and local government standards.
The accounting and auditing standards created for publicly traded companies are subject to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) oversight. Congress has oversight over the SEC and annually appropriates its funding. Throughout its history, the SEC has relied on SROs to establish financial reporting standards for the private sector; these are known as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Currently, the SEC recognizes the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as the designated authority for establishing GAAP. SOX created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee the auditing profession for the private sector. The SEC has oversight responsibility over FASB and PCAOB.
The Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) was created to establish the financial reporting and accounting standards for the federal government. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has responsibility for establishing auditing standards for federal government agencies, including federal grant recipients in state and local governments.
A counterpart to FASAB for state and local governments is the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB). Many of the underlying principles between FASAB and GASB are the same, but each state or territory is allowed to choose whether it follows GASB standards in full or modifies the standards to fit local needs. Auditing standards vary by state and local governments.
Two policy issues might be of particular interest to Congress and investors. The first is the relationship between accounting and auditing standards in the United States and in other countries. In particular, there is debate over whether or to what degree international accounting and auditing standards should influence U.S. GAAP and U.S. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (U.S. GAAS), respectively.
The second is to what degree business risk should be evaluated based on sustainability issues. Increasingly, investors expect firms to respond to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues. The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has created a series of provisional standards for the private sector. SASB is an independent organization that is not recognized by Congress or the SEC as an official standard-setting body. |
crs_RL34624 | crs_RL34624_0 | Conclusion
Constitutional law on the subject of governmentally mandated drug testing is primarily an outgrowth of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. Judicial exceptions to traditional requirements of a warrant and individualized suspicion for "administrative" searches have been extended to random drug testing of public employees and school students where the government is able to demonstrate a "special need" beyond the demands of ordinary law enforcement. In the public employment setting, however, special needs analysis has largely been confined to relatively narrow circumstances directly implicating "compelling" public safety, law enforcement, or national security interests of the government. More generalized governmental concerns for the "integrity" or efficient operation of the public workplace have usually not been deemed sufficient to justify interference with the "reasonable expectation of privacy" of workers or other individuals to be tested. Additionally, warrantless, suspicionless drug testing programs that serve primarily a criminal law enforcement purpose are likely to be unconstitutional. The constitutional parameters of "special needs" analysis is outlined in a series of Supreme Court rulings. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association , the U.S. Supreme Court upheld post-accident drug and alcohol testing of railway employees after major train accidents or incidents, and it approved the testing of U.S. Customs employees seeking promotion to certain "sensitive" jobs involving firearms use, drug interdiction duties, or access to classified information in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab . These decisions established that "compelling" governmental interests in public safety or national security may, in appropriate circumstances, override constitutional objections to testing procedures by employees whose privacy expectations are diminished by the nature of their duties or workplace scrutiny to which they are otherwise subject. In Veronia School District v. Acton, the Supreme Court first approved of random drug testing procedures for high school student athletes, a holding that was subsequently extended, in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls , to permit random drug testing of students participating in non-athletic extracurricular activities. However, the Court placed limitations on the "special needs" doctrine when, in Chandler v. Miller , it voided a Georgia law requiring drug testing of candidates for state office for lack of a governmental need substantial enough to warrant suspicionless searches. Additionally, the Court generally has struck down drug testing policies that primarily serve criminal law enforcement purposes, such as in Ferguson v. City of Charleston . | Constitutional law on the subject of governmentally mandated drug testing is primarily an outgrowth of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. Judicial exceptions to traditional requirements of a warrant and individualized suspicion for "administrative" searches have been extended to random drug testing of public employees and school students where the government is able to demonstrate a "special need" beyond the demands of ordinary law enforcement. In the public employment setting, however, special needs analysis has largely been confined to relatively narrow circumstances directly implicating "compelling" public safety, law enforcement, or national security interests of the government. More generalized governmental concerns for the "integrity" or efficient operation of the public workplace have usually not been deemed sufficient to justify interference with the "reasonable expectation of privacy" of workers or other individuals to be tested. Additionally, warrantless, suspicionless drug testing programs that serve primarily a criminal law enforcement purpose are likely to be unconstitutional.
The constitutional parameters of "special needs" analysis is outlined in a series of Supreme Court rulings. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld post-accident drug and alcohol testing of railway employees after major train accidents or incidents, and it approved the testing of U.S. Customs employees seeking promotion to certain "sensitive" jobs involving firearms use, drug interdiction duties, or access to classified information in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab. These decisions established that "compelling" governmental interests in public safety or national security may, in appropriate circumstances, override constitutional objections to testing procedures by employees whose privacy expectations are diminished by the nature of their duties or workplace scrutiny to which they are otherwise subject. In Veronia School District v. Acton, the Supreme Court first approved of random drug testing procedures for high school student athletes, a holding that was subsequently extended, in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, to permit random drug testing of students participating in non-athletic extracurricular activities. However, the Court placed limitations on the "special needs" doctrine when, in Chandler v. Miller, it voided a Georgia law requiring drug testing of candidates for state office for lack of a governmental need substantial enough to warrant suspicionless searches. Additionally, the Court generally has struck down drug testing policies that primarily serve criminal law enforcement purposes, such as in Ferguson v. City of Charleston. |
crs_R40617 | crs_R40617_0 | Most Recent Developments
The FY2010 legislative branch appropriations bill provided $4.656 billion. It was signed by the President and became P.L. 111-68 on October 1, 2009. The conference report ( H.Rept. 111-265 ) was agreed to in the Senate on September 30, 2009 (Roll No. On September 25, 2009, the House agreed to the conference report on H.R. Debate followed adoption of the rule ( H.Res. On September 23, 2009, the House had ordered the previous question (Roll No. 733, 240-171) and agreed by voice vote to a conference with the Senate. A motion to instruct conferees failed (Roll No. 734, 191-213), and the House appointed conferees. Approximately $5.0 billion was requested for legislative branch operations in FY2010, an increase of 14.5% over the $4.4 billion provided in the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act. The Subcommittees on the Legislative Branch of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees each held hearings during which Members considered the legislative branch requests. The House passed H.R. 2918 , the FY2010 legislative branch appropriations bill, on June 19, 2009. The Senate passed the bill, with a substitute amendment, on July 6, 2009. The subcommittee version contained $3.675 billion, not including Senate items. 2918 . Senate Action
The Senate Appropriations Committee held a markup on June 18, 2009, and reported an original bill for legislative branch appropriations. The Senate bill ( S. 1294 ) contained $3.136 billion, not including House items. 2918 . FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations
In FY2009, an additional $25 million was provided for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. P.L. 2346 both contained $71.6 million for the new U.S. Capitol Police radio system. The conference agreement contained the police radio and the Congressional Budget Office funding. Rule for Consideration of the House Bill
On June 16, 2009, the House Committee on Rules issued a "Dear Colleague" letter stating that the committee expected to meet on June 18, 2009, to report a rule for consideration of the FY2010 legislative branch appropriations bill. The Rules Committee met on June 18, 2009, and reported H.Res. 111-32 , the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act. Administrative Provisions
The FY2010 budget request includes language, some of which was revised or resubmitted from the FY2009 request, that would
1. grant the AOC authority to implement specified procedures established in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act; 2. allow the AOC to retain proceeds from the lease of its facilities to commercial entities; 3. allow the AOC to enter into multi-year leases; 4. allow the AOC to incur expenses and accept donations related to in certain emergencies, as determined by the Capitol Police Board; 5. allow the AOC to retain funds from energy and water savings for other conservation projects; 6. authorize the AOC to dispose of, and retain receipts from the sale of, surplus or obsolete property; 7. establish an AOC Senior Executive Service; 8. continue a flexible work schedule program; 9. amend the statute governing the authority for death gratuities for survivors of AOC employees; 10. provide early retirement authority; 11. authorize the hiring of disabled veterans through a non-competitive process; 12. provide for the acceptance of voluntary student services; 13. allow the AOC to enter into agreements with private entities for the benefit of the Botanic Garden; and 14. extend the Capitol grounds to include an additional parcel of D.C. that is now used for AOC and USCP parking. Highlights of the House and Senate Hearings on the Architect of the Capitol
At the House hearing on April 23, 2009, the subcommittee discussed the condition of buildings around the Capitol Complex and deferred-maintenance issues, with a particular focus on the House garages and repairs to the plumbing, roof, electrical equipment, and exterior stone of the Cannon House Office Building. The House-passed bill would have provided $146.2 million, or a 4.0% increase. Office of Compliance
The Office of Compliance is an independent and nonpartisan agency within the legislative branch. | Approximately $5.0 billion was requested for legislative branch operations in FY2010, an increase of 14.5% over the FY2009 enacted level. The Subcommittees on the Legislative Branch of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees held hearings during which Members considered the legislative branch requests.
On September 23, 2009, the House ordered the previous question (Roll No. 733, 240-171) and agreed by voice vote to a conference with the Senate on H.R. 2918, the FY2010 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill. A motion to instruct conferees failed (Roll No. 734, 191-213), and the House appointed conferees. The House Rules Committee met on September 24, 2009, to adopt a rule for consideration of the conference report. The committee reported the rule (H.Res. 772) and the House adopted it the following day. Following adoption of the rule, the House passed the conference report on H.R. 2918.
The House passed H.R. 2918, with amendments, on June 19, 2009. The House bill would have provided nearly $3.675 billion, not including Senate items. The Senate Appropriations Committee held a markup and reported an original bill for legislative branch appropriations on June 18, 2009. The Senate bill (S. 1294) contained $3.136 billion, not including House items. The Senate agreed to the House bill, as amended, on July 6, 2009, and appointed conferees.
The conference report (H.Rept. 111-265) provides $4.656 billion. It was agreed to in the House on September 25 and in the Senate on September 30. It was signed by the President and became P.L. 111-68 on October 1, 2009.
Among issues that have been considered during hearings on the FY2010 budget in the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, Subcommittees on the Legislative Branch, are the following:
the need for the new U.S. Capitol Police radio system and the timing of funding; deferred maintenance issues around the Capitol complex; the effect of the Office of Compliance citations on the Architect's project prioritization and budget request; employment issues, including pay, recruitment and retention, diversity, and equal employment opportunity concerns; and the future of the Open World Leadership Program, including the location of the program within the legislative branch and the selection of participant countries.
The FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8, enacted on March 11, 2009) provided $4.4 billion for legislative branch activities. This represents an approximately 11% increase over the nearly $4 billion approved by Congress for FY2008. In FY2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) provided an additional $25 million for the Government Accountability Office and the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-32) provided $71.6 million for the new U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) radio system and $2 million for the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44979 | crs_R44979_0 | In addition, a large swath of territory in northern Kosovo dominated by ethnic Serbs as well as other Serb communities in Kosovo have not been fully integrated into Kosovo and have demanded autonomy from Pristina on a number of issues. Its mission is to promote local security, stability, and the protection of human rights in Kosovo and the region and to promote constructive engagement between Pristina and Belgrade, the Serb and Kosovar communities in northern Kosovo, and between regional and international actors with interests in Kosovo. CEFTA today includes Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, and Serbia. The United States, the EU, and others have cautioned the Kosovo leadership against repeal of the law, which they suggest would call into question Kosovo's commitment to the rule of law. These persons are suspected of participating in the conflict, or of recruiting or funding activities in support of the Islamic State. One example of the sensitivity of the threat of rising extremism and the Kosovo government's commitment to address this issue came in late December 2017 and early January 2018, when a former imam of Pristina's Grand Mosque was charged in the Pristina Basic Court with incitement to commit terrorist acts and inciting national, racial, and religious hatred through many of his lectures at the mosque during the period 2013-2014. Kosovo has also established a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). The World Bank further indicated that Kosovo has made significant progress in three indicators: starting a business, getting credit, and resolving insolvency. Relations with Serbia
As noted, Serbia has refused to recognize Kosovo's independence. In the years immediately after Kosovo declared independence, both sides avoided any direct contact. During this time, Serbia continued to provide political and economic support for the autonomy of the Serb majority areas in northern Kosovo, including part of the town of Mitrovica, and the protection of Serb minority rights throughout Kosovo. The integration of the Serb judicial authorities in the north of Kosovo marks the unification of Kosovo's justice system, in line with its constitution. A priority goal of Kosovo is to become a member of the EU, and Kosovo has been recognized by the EU as a potential candidate for membership since 2008. Relations with the United States
The United States recognized Kosovo's independence on February 18, 2008, one of the first countries to do so. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley, a congratulatory letter from President Trump to Pristina marking the ninth anniversary of its independence, and a summer 2017 visit to Pristina by the U.S. Congress's House Democracy Partnership. Nevertheless, there has been concern in Pristina that the Trump Administration over the long term may not place as high a priority on the Balkans as the United States has in the past and that certain social attitudes toward Muslims could sour what has been a good relationship. In a statement, the U.S. embassy welcomed the formation of the new government, writing "the United States continues to support Kosovo on its path towards Euro-Atlantic integration, strengthening the rule of law, improving economic development, and normalizing regional relations." In March 2018, the new U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Wess Mitchell visited Pristina (and Belgrade) on what the Secretary indicated was a chance to try to resolve some of the regional conflicts. Direct U.S. economic and trade relations with Kosovo are limited. In FY2017, the Obama Administration requested approximately $53 million in aid for Kosovo, including $38.5 million for Economic Support Funding (ESF) that was intended to help Kosovo's nascent institutions address the challenges of effective governance, including integrating the Serb communities in the northern part of the country into Kosovo institutions; furthering justice-sector development; driving private sector-led economic growth through policy reform and support to key sectors, including energy; strengthening democratic institutions; developing future leaders; building the capacity of civil society and independent media to address corruption; and promoting government accountability. In March 2016, President Thaçi and U.S. On September 12, 2017, the U.S. Government's Millennium Challenge Corporation and the government of Kosovo signed a $49 million "threshold program," which will focus on reforms to spur economic growth and private investment. | Following the conflicts in the late 1990s in the countries of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Croatia, and Slovenia), the prospect of membership in the Euro-Atlantic community, and the active presence of the United States in the region referred to as the Western Balkans, provided a level of stability that allowed most of the countries of the region to pursue reform and adopt Western values. During this time, Slovenia (2004) and Croatia (2013) joined the European Union (EU). These countries, along with Albania (2009), also joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Montenegro became NATO's 29th member on June 3, 2017. Other nations of the Western Balkans are at various stages on the path toward EU or NATO membership.
Along with Serbia, Kosovo stands at the center of the Western Balkans and occupies a key strategic juncture at the social, political, and geographic crossroads between Eastern and Western Europe. On February 17, 2018, Kosovo marked its 10th anniversary of independence. With the assistance of a number of international organizations, and despite its tense relationship with neighboring Serbia, which does not recognize Kosovo's independence, Kosovo has become a viable, democratic, and stable state. Although Kosovo faces major economic, rule-of-law, and corruption challenges, many observers believe Kosovo has made significant progress in strengthening its democratic institutions, its free-market economy and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
The United States has had a long history of involvement in Kosovo, dating to the conflicts in the Balkans during the 1990s and since Kosovo declared its independence, which the United States has recognized. The United States has consistently provided support for the people of Kosovo and its commitment to democratic principles. Kosovo has over the years been one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance designed to strengthen institutions, human rights, rule of law, and more recently, reconciliation with Serbia and potential integration into the EU. A new "threshold agreement" reached in September 2017 between Kosovo and the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has become another element in the U.S. commitment to Kosovo. In March 2018, in one of his first trips to Europe, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Wess Mitchell visited Pristina as a further indication of U.S. interest in the region. Nevertheless, some Balkan watchers caution that the United States needs to remain actively engaged in Kosovo even as it supports the EU's efforts to bring Kosovo closer to the EU.
Many in the U.S. Congress have long been interested in the Balkans, and in particular, in Kosovo. In addition to a history of hearings on the Balkans, and an active Albania Caucus, established and led by the current ranking minority member on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, many Members of Congress have been active supporters of U.S. involvement in and commitment to Kosovo's independence and development. During 2017, the U.S. House Democracy Partnership (HDP), as well as several other congressional delegations, visited Pristina to further congressional contacts and reaffirm U.S. commitments. The signing ceremony of the MCC agreement mentioned above was held in the U.S. House of Representatives and witnessed by several Members of Congress, including the cochair of the HDP. The MCC received comments of support from the chairman and ranking Democrat of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is likely that Congress will continue its support for Kosovo and the evolution of Kosovo-Serb relations through its oversight of the Balkans.
This report provides a brief overview of Kosovo and U.S. relations with Kosovo. |
crs_R43304 | crs_R43304_0 | Introduction to the PHS Agencies
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has designated eight of its 11 operating divisions (agencies) as components of the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS). The PHS agencies are: (1) the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), (2) the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), (3) the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), (4) the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), (5) the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), (6) the Indian Health Service (IHS), (7) the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and (8) the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). NIH conducts and supports basic, clinical, and translational medical research. AHRQ conducts and supports research on the quality and effectiveness of health care services and systems. IHS supports a health care delivery system for American Indians and Alaska Natives. SAMHSA funds community-based mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment services. ATSDR, which is headed by the CDC director and included in the discussion of CDC in this report, is tasked with identifying potential public health effects from exposure to hazardous substances. In FY2013, for example, NIH was the primary source of transfers both to CMS for ACA implementation and to CDC and SAMHSA to help offset a loss of funding for those two agencies from the ACA's Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF). Meanwhile, AHRQ and CDC experienced a significant net loss of set-aside funding in FY2015. From FY2003 through FY2014, AHRQ did not receive an annual discretionary appropriation. Mandatory Funding, User Fees, and Collections
Although the bulk of PHS agency funding is provided through annual discretionary appropriations, agencies also receive mandatory funding, user fees, and third-party collections. First, the Community Health Center Fund (CHCF) , for which the ACA provided a total of $11 billion in annual appropriations over the five-year period FY2011-FY2015, is supporting the federal health centers program and the National Health Service Corps (NHSC), both administered by HRSA. A broader analysis of the allocation of PPHF funding is provided in Appendix C .
The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF) is supporting comparative effectiveness research over a 10-year period (FY2010-FY2019) with a mix of appropriations—some of which are offset by revenue from a fee imposed on health insurance policies and self-insured health plans—and transfers from the Medicare Part A and Part B trust funds. FDA's user fee programs now support the agency's regulation of prescription drugs, animal drugs, medical devices, tobacco products, and foods, among other activities. Similarly, AHRQ's discretionary appropriation in FY2015 was less than the amount of set-aside funding the agency received in FY2010. Almost all of the CDC accounts are funded with discretionary appropriations plus amounts from multiple other sources (see Table 4 ). Congress has yet to reauthorize the agency's funding. In FY2015, AHRQ received its own discretionary appropriation for the first time in more than a decade in lieu of any set-aside funding. The several different user fees, which account for 42% of FDA's total FY2015 program level, contribute only to the Salaries and Expenses account. Agency Funding Since FY2010
Between FY2010 and FY2015, FDA's funding increased from $3.1 billion to $4.5 billion (see Table 5 ). Although congressionally provided appropriations increased 10% over that period, user fee revenue more than doubled. Agency Funding Since FY2010
HRSA funding increased from $8.1 billion in FY2010 to $10.3 billion in FY2015 despite a reduction in its discretionary appropriation during that time (see Table 6 ). The overall growth in HRSA's funding was primarily driven by increasing amounts from the CHCF, which more than offset the decline in discretionary funding. Agency Funding Since FY2010
IHS's funding, which includes discretionary appropriations and collections from third-party payers of health care, increased between FY2010 and FY2015 from $5.1 billion to $5.9 billion (see Table 7 ). This increase was driven both by increased discretionary appropriations, which rose from $4.1 billion to $4.6 billion, and by increased collections, which rose from $891 million to $1.1 billion. NIH gets almost its entire funding (99.5%) from annual discretionary appropriations. Under the ACA, PPHF's annual appropriation would increase from $500 million for FY2010 to $2 billion for FY2015 and each subsequent fiscal year. | Within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), eight agencies are designated components of the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS). The PHS agencies are funded primarily with annual discretionary appropriations. They also receive significant amounts of funding from other sources including mandatory funds from the Affordable Care Act (ACA), user fees, and third-party reimbursements (collections).
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) funds research on improving the quality and delivery of health care. For several years prior to FY2015, AHRQ did not receive a direct appropriation. Instead, it relied on redistributed ("set-aside") funds from other PHS agencies for most of its funding, with supplemental amounts from the ACA's Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF). In FY2015, AHRQ received its own appropriation in lieu of set-aside funds. Overall, the agency's total funding rose from $403 million to $465 million between FY2010 and FY2015. That increase came despite a decrease in discretionary funding over that period, which was more than offset by increasing amounts of PCORTF funding. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is the federal government's lead public health agency. CDC obtains its funding from multiple sources besides discretionary appropriations. The agency's funding fluctuated between FY2010 and FY2015, with the overall level increasing slightly from $10.9 billion to $11.3 billion over that period. CDC experienced a drop in its discretionary appropriations during that time, which was offset by funding from other sources, primarily the ACA's Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF). The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) investigates the public health impact of exposure to hazardous substances. ATSDR is headed by the CDC director and included in the discussion of CDC in this report. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates drugs, medical devices, food, and tobacco products, among other consumer products. FDA saw its funding increase significantly between FY2010 and FY2015 from $3.1 billion to $4.5 billion. The agency is funded with annual discretionary appropriations and industry user fees. While appropriations increased modestly over the FY2010-FY2015 period, user fees more than doubled and now account for 42% of FDA's total funding. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) funds programs and systems that provide health care services to the uninsured and medically underserved. HRSA, like CDC, relies on funding from several different sources. The agency's funding increased from $8.1 billion in FY2010 to $10.3 billion in FY2015 despite a significant drop in its discretionary appropriation during that time. The growth in overall funding was driven largely by increasing amounts from the ACA's Community Health Center Fund (CHCF). The Indian Health Service (IHS) supports a health care delivery system for Native Americans. IHS's funding, which includes discretionary appropriations and collections from third-party payers of health care, increased between FY2010 and FY2015 from $5.1 billion to $5.9 billion. Appropriations and collections both increased during that period. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) funds basic, clinical, and translational biomedical and behavioral research. NIH gets more than 99% of its funding from discretionary appropriations. Its funding dropped from $31.2 billion in FY2010 to $30.3 billion in FY2015. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) funds mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment services. SAMHSA's funding, about 95% of which comes from discretionary appropriations, has remained at about $3.6 billion over the FY2010-FY2015 period.
Congress has yet to complete work on any of the regular appropriations bills for FY2016, which began on October 1, 2015. On September 30, the President signed the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-53). The measure provides continuing appropriations through December 11, 2016. It funds discretionary programs at the same rate (and under the same conditions) as in FY2015, minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.2108%. For entitlement and other mandatory spending that is funded through appropriation acts, P.L. 114-53 provides funding to maintain program levels under current law. This report will be updated with information on PHS agency funding for FY2016 once legislative action on appropriations for the new fiscal year is completed. |
crs_RL34355 | crs_RL34355_0 | Regulatory Flexibility Act Requirements
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980 (5 U.S.C. §§601-612), requires federal agencies to assess the impact of their forthcoming rules on "small entities," which the act defines as including small businesses, small governmental jurisdictions, and certain small not-for-profit organizations. The act requires the analyses to describe, among other things, (1) why the regulatory action is being considered and its objectives; (2) the small entities to which the rule will apply and, where feasible, an estimate of their number; (3) the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance requirements of the rule; and, for final rules, (4) steps the agency has taken to minimize the impact of the rule on small entities, including the alternatives considered and why the selected alternative was chosen. However, these analytical requirements are not triggered if the head of the issuing agency certifies that the rule would not have a "significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities" (hereafter referred to as a "SEISNSE"). The RFA does not define "significant economic impact" or "substantial number of small entities," thereby giving federal agencies substantial discretion regarding when the act's analytical requirements are initiated. In addition to the areas raised previously, GAO said that numerous other issues regarding the RFA remain unresolved, including
how Congress believes that the economic impact of a rule should be measured (e.g., in terms of compliance costs as a percentage of businesses' annual revenues, the percentage of work hours available to the firms, or some other metric); whether agencies should count the impact of the underlying statutes when determining whether their rules have a significant impact; what should be considered a "rule" for purposes of the requirement that agencies review their rules within 10 years of their promulgation; and whether agencies should review all rules that had a SEISNSE at the time they were originally published as final rules, or only those rules that currently have that effect. Although GAO has consistently called for greater clarity in the RFA's requirements, other observers have indicated that the definitions of key terms like "significant economic impact" and "substantial number of small entities" should remain flexible because of significant differences in each agency's operating environment. 527 , the Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2011, proposes to amend the RFA "to ensure complete analysis of potential impacts on small entities of rules, and for other purposes." 527 would require the SBA Chief Counsel for Advocacy to issue rules governing agency compliance with the RFA. By clarifying that the term "economic impact" includes indirect effects that are "reasonably foreseeable and result from the rule," H.R. | The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980 (5 U.S.C. §§601-612) requires federal agencies to assess the impact of their forthcoming regulations on "small entities" (i.e., small businesses, small governments, and small not-for-profit organizations). For example, the act requires the analysis to describe why a regulatory action is being considered; the small entities to which the rule will apply and, where feasible, an estimate of their number; the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance requirements of the rule; and any significant alternatives to the rule that would accomplish the statutory objectives while minimizing the impact on small entities. This analysis is not required, however, if the head of the agency certifies that the rule will not have a "significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities." The RFA does not define "significant economic impact" or "substantial number of small entities," thereby giving federal agencies substantial discretion regarding when the act's requirements are triggered. Other requirements in the RFA and elsewhere (e.g., that agencies reexamine their existing rules, develop compliance guides, and convene advocacy review panels) also depend on the whether the agencies determine that their rules have a "significant" impact on a "substantial" number of small entities.
GAO has examined the implementation of the RFA many times during the past 20 years, and has consistently concluded that the lack of clear definitions for key terms like "significant economic impact" and "substantial number of small entities" have hindered the act's effectiveness. Therefore, GAO has repeatedly recommended that Congress define those terms, or give the Small Business Administration or some other federal agency the authority and responsibility to do so.
In the 112th Congress, H.R. 527, the Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2011, proposes to (among other things) define "economic impact" as including indirect effects that are "reasonably foreseeable," and require the chief counsel for advocacy of the Small Business Administration to issue rules governing agency compliance with the RFA. The bill would also broaden the definition of a covered rule, and would expand the use of advocacy review panels before proposed rules are published.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43052 | crs_R43052_0 | The primary policy tools through which the United States advances its investment policy interests are bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and BIT-like chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs)—collectively referred to as "international investment agreements." Congress plays an important role in shaping U.S. investment policy through its oversight and legislative responsibilities. As international treaties, U.S. In the absence of an overarching multilateral framework on investment, investment flows largely are governed by bilateral and regional investment treaties agreed upon mutually acceptable terms. Over the past several decades, BITS (along with investment chapters in FTAs) have emerged as the primary source of international investment law and the primary mechanisms for promoting and protecting global direct investment flows. In 2011, the number of known treaty-based investment disputes filed under international arbitration, at 47, was the highest level for a single year ( Figure 2 ). BITs differ slightly among themselves, they broadly provide five basic benefits:
The better of national treatment (i.e., non-discrimination) or most-favored-nation treatment for the full life cycle of investment (from its establishment or acquisition, through its management, operation and expansion, to its disposition); Clear limits on the expropriation of investments and provisions for payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation when direct and indirect expropriation takes place; Quick transfer of funds into and out of the host country without delay using a market rate of exchange; Restrictions on trade-distorting performance requirements (such as local content rules or export quotas); and The right of an investor to submit an investment dispute with the treaty partner's government to international arbitration. The 2004 Model BIT
Prior to the 2004 changes, the United States negotiated BITs on a 1994 Model BIT based largely on the investment chapter in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In April 2012, the Obama Administration announced the conclusion of its three-year review of the U.S. Model BIT. In addition to U.S. The 2012 Model BIT clarifies which financial services provisions may fall under a prudential exception, such as to address balance of payments problems (Article 20). Transparency. U.S. Investment Agreements and Negotiations
As both a major source of and destination for FDI, the United States has engaged in negotiations through BITs and FTAs to remove restrictions on foreign investment and other market-distorting measures to maximize the benefits of such investment and provide for reciprocal non-discriminatory treatment for U.S. investors. BITs
Since 1982, the United States has concluded 47 BITs, 41 of which have entered into force (see Table 1 ). The United States also may launch new BIT negotiations with countries. Foreign investment is a priority issue in the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement negotiation. Issues for Congress
Congress plays an active role in developing and implementing the U.S. policy on direct investment, including through setting investment negotiating objectives in trade promotion authority; Senate ratification of BITs; and approval and enactment of implementing legislation for trade agreements by both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Negotiating Priorities for the U.S. Investment Policy Agenda
U.S. investment negotiations can help to advance U.S. trade, foreign policy, and development objectives. The conclusion of high-standard investment agreements with such countries may prove difficult because of divergent views of certain investment-related issues, such as labor and environmental protections. | Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an increasingly important driver of the global economy. In the absence of an overarching multilateral framework on investment, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investment chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs), collectively referred to as "international investment agreements," have emerged as the primary mechanism for promoting a rules-based system for international investment. These agreements contain provisions on nondiscriminatory treatment of investments by the host country, limits on expropriation of investments, and access to impartial binding procedures to settle investment-related disputes with host governments, among other things. FTA investment chapters generally contain provisions identical or similar to those in U.S. BITs.
As FDI flows have expanded, the number of international investment agreements also has increased, both between developed and developing countries and between developing countries. Presently, there are over 3,000 BITs globally. The United States has concluded 47 BITs, 41 of which have entered into force. Of the 14 FTAs agreed by the United States, 12 contain investment provisions. Investment dynamics also have given rise to more investment disputes. In 2011, the number of investment disputes filed in international arbitration forums was 47, its highest level ever for a single year. Congress plays an active role in developing and implementing U.S. policy on FDI through its oversight and legislative responsibilities. Congress can set investment negotiating objectives for U.S. trade agreements in trade promotion authority (TPA). Unlike FTAs, which require a full vote of Congress on implementing legislation, BITs, as international treaties, require only Senate ratification.
The United States, which remains both a major source for and a major destination of FDI, uses international investment agreements to reduce restrictions on foreign investment, provide non-discriminatory treatment for foreign investment, and reduce other market-distorting measures to maximize the benefits of such investment, while balancing other U.S. policy interests. In April 2012, the Obama Administration announced the conclusion of its review of the U.S. Model BIT, the template which the United States uses to negotiate BITs and investment chapters in FTAs. The 2012 Model BIT maintains the "core" or substantive investor protections affirmed in the 2004 Model BIT. It also clarifies that BIT obligations apply to state-owned enterprises (SOEs); limits performance requirements; strengthens labor and environmental provisions; clarifies which financial services provisions may fall under a prudential exception (such as to address balance of payments problems); expands transparency obligations; and increases requirements for stakeholder input in the standards-setting process.
The conclusion of the Model BIT review may generate momentum to conclude previously launched negotiations with countries such as China and India, or to launch investment negotiations with other U.S. trading partners. Investment policy issues feature prominently in other ongoing U.S. trade negotiations, including the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA, as well as the anticipated Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiation. In addition to considering negotiating priorities for these and proposed BITs with major emerging economies, Members may also want to consider the effectiveness of BITs in promoting and protecting investment. |
crs_R43397 | crs_R43397_0 | Frequently Asked Questions
In addition to the Senate and House of Representatives, what is funded by the legislative branch appropriations bill? Table 2 provides information on funding levels for the Senate, House of Representatives, and legislative branch agencies in recent years as well as the requested, House-passed, Senate-passed, and enacted levels for FY2019. The FY2019 legislative branch budget request of $4.960 billion was submitted on February 12, 2018, prior to the enactment of FY2018 funding on March 23, 2018. Agency assessments for FY2019 may subsequently have been revised—for example, to account for items funded or not funded in the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Subsequent discussions may vary from the levels or language included in the budget request due to this timing. By law, the President includes the legislative branch request in the annual budget submission without change. The House passed H.R. 5895 , which contained funding for the legislative branch, on June 8, 2018. The Senate passed H.R. 5895 , as amended ( S.Amdt. 2910 ), on June 25, 2018. The Senate agreed to the conference report ( H.Rept. 115-929 ) on H.R. 5895 on September 12, 2018. The House agreed to the conference report on September 13, 2018. H.R. 5895 was signed into law on September 21, 2018 ( P.L. 115-244 ; the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019). Why is the legislative branch budget request included in the President's budget request? The FY2019 act included a provision prohibiting this adjustment. The House and Senate both consider funding levels for the legislative branch agencies and joint entities. | This report responds to frequently asked questions about legislative branch appropriations. Frequently asked questions include the items that are funded within this bill; development, presentation, and consideration of the legislative branch budget requests; the legislative branch budget in historical perspective; and recent actions.
The House and Senate considered FY2019 legislative branch funding during 2018:
The FY2019 legislative branch budget request of $4.960 billion was submitted on February 12, 2018. The budget request levels were developed prior to the enactment of full-year appropriations for FY2018. Agency assessments for FY2019 may subsequently have been revised—for example, to account for items funded or not funded in the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Subsequent discussions may vary from the levels or language included in the budget request due to this timing. By law, the President includes the legislative branch request in the annual budget submission without change. H.R. 5895, which contained funding for the legislative branch, was passed by the House on June 8, 2018 (212-179, Roll No. 257). Senate consideration of H.R. 5895 began June 18, 2018, and the Senate agreed to S.Amdt. 2910. H.R. 5895, as amended, passed the Senate on June 25, 2018 (86-5, Record Vote No. 139). The Senate agreed to the conference report (H.Rept. 115-929) on September 12, 2018 (92-5, Record Vote Number 207). The House agreed to the conference report on September 13, 2018 (377-20, Roll No. 399). H.R. 5895 was signed into law on September 21, 2018 (P.L. 115-244; the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019).
The FY2019 act provides $4.836 billion for the legislative branch, an increase of $136.0 million (+2.9%) from the FY2018 enacted level.
For additional information, including information on the most recent legislative branch appropriations bills, see CRS Report R45214, Legislative Branch: FY2019 Appropriations, by Ida A. Brudnick and Sarah J. Eckman. |
crs_RS22526 | crs_RS22526_0 | A new farm bill likely will continue some form of milk price and/or income support and possibly could continue or even expand revenue insurance for livestock producers. Animal farms continue to diminish in number and expand in average size. A relative handful of large firms process animal products, and these firms increasingly seek to control or at least better coordinate all phases of production and marketing, often to meet the specific requirements of large retail chains that want to satisfy consumer demand for a range of lower-cost products. Critics assert that these trends have undermined the traditional U.S. system of smaller-scale, independent, family-based farms and ranches, by eroding farmers' negotiating power, lowering farm prices, and forcing all but the largest operators out of business. Others counter that the sector's structural changes are a desirable outgrowth of factors such as technological and managerial improvements, changing consumer demand, and more international competition. In 2007, various bills have been proposed to address perceived "competition" problems. However, the industry believes the economic costs of the proposed rule could be extremely high. See also:
CRS Report RS22955, Country-of-Origin Labeling for Foods
Meat and Poultry Trade
The United States is one of the leading exporters of livestock and poultry products, which have been among its fastest-growing categories of agricultural exports. However, U.S. market share is being challenged, and for some products surpassed, by highly competitive foreign exporters such as Brazil, Australia, India, Argentina, and New Zealand in beef/veal, Canada and Brazil in pork, and Brazil in poultry. U.S. interests seek assurances that any new agreements will not favor foreign over U.S. animal products. As animal agriculture increasingly concentrates into larger, more intensive production units, concerns arise about impacts on the environment, including surface water, groundwater, soil, and air. Another concern is the use of antibiotics to control disease, promote growth, and address well-being in food-producing animals. Criticisms range from food safety and social resistance to potential negative impacts on animal welfare and on ecosystems. | The value of animal production on the 1.3 million U.S. dairy, livestock, and poultry farms (2002 Census of Agriculture) averages about $124 billion annually, more than half the total value of all U.S. agricultural production. The United States produces—and consumes—more beef/veal, pork, poultry, and milk than almost any other single country (China leads in pork). U.S. exports have grown rapidly in recent decades, as has integration of U.S. meat production and processing with that of Mexico and Canada.
Farming, processing, and marketing have all trended toward larger and fewer operations (often called consolidation). Increasingly, many phases of production and marketing may be managed or controlled by a single entity (sometimes called vertical integration). Complying with environmental and food safety regulations, and addressing changing consumer preferences about how food is produced, have added to costs and operational complexities for producers and processors alike.
In Congress, policy debate has revolved around impacts of the sector's structural and technological changes on farm prices, on the traditional system of smaller-sized, independent farms and ranches, and on rural communities and workers. Also at issue are implications for consumers, the environment, and trade. Inherent in these questions, which could be addressed during consideration of a new farm bill in 2007, is the appropriate role of government in intervening in or assisting the livestock, meat, and poultry industries. The following brief overview of selected issues is drawn from the CRS reports noted here, where sources and additional details can be found. |
crs_R40758 | crs_R40758_0 | Introduction
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) defeated the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in August 30, 2009 elections for the Lower House of parliament. He will likely be succeeded as prime minister by DPJ party leader Yukio Hatoyama, who is expected to be confirmed as the next prime minister in a special session of parliament scheduled for mid-September. The political changeover in Tokyo could significantly affect U.S. interests and goals in Asia, although most analysts predict the DPJ will not fundamentally alter the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. The DPJ has long called for a more "independent" relationship with the United States and has been critical of aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance, such as plans to realign U.S. military forces based in Japan, Japan's "Host Nation Support" (HNS) payments (worth around $4 billion) that defray about 75% of the costs of maintaining American troops and bases in Japan, and some provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Throughout this period, the LDP has been a staunch supporter of the U.S.-Japan security treaty and, in recent years, has sought a major expansion of bilateral defense cooperation. As it is, the DPJ will maintain the coalition with the leftist Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the anti-reform People's New Party (PNP) in order to maintain control of the Upper House of the Diet. Now that the DPJ is the main ruling party, it will be expected to make good on at least some of its ambitious campaign proposals to "change Japan." In the run-up to the August 30 election, the DPJ toned down some of its criticism of the bilateral alliance, indicating a potentially more pragmatic approach toward the United States. However, the party remains deeply divided on foreign policy issues and party leaders continue to send conflicting signals about the kind of relationship they seek to strike with the United States over the short and long term. The party has called for a reduction of the approximately 50,000 U.S. forward deployed troops in Japan, particularly those based in Okinawa Prefecture. Implications for the United States
The political changeover in Tokyo following the August 30 elections represents something of a watershed moment for U.S.-Japan relations. Cooperation between Washington and previous LDP-backed governments has been virtually unbroken for much of the postwar period. The DPJ Position on the U.S.-Japan Alliance
The DPJ has often sent conflicting signals about its approach toward the U.S.-Japan alliance—a result of intra-party ideological divisions, past attempts to differentiate itself from the LDP, and episodic statements about the alliance by party leaders. Some analysts interpret the DPJ's call for greater independence as a desire to avoid Japanese entanglement in the U.S. global strategy, especially in activities that may involve financial or military contributions to U.S.-led operations. Defeated implementing legislation in the Upper House that temporarily suspended, in November 2007, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) deployment to the Indian Ocean to refuel coalition ships involved in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. As the party transitions to take control of the government, it has left many questions about whether, and to what extent, it plans to change Japan's relations with the United States. Other Implications for U.S. The DPJ, at least in rhetoric, supports a more active international role for Japan through United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) and other UN-sanctioned activities that are largely consonant with U.S. foreign policy goals and interests. The party's call for Japan to become a full "member of Asia" suggests a departure from what the DPJ has characterized as the LDP's over-emphasis on relations with the United States, but appears to fall short of a more strategic shift to replace the U.S.-Japan alliance with an alternative regional security arrangement. In particular, the party proposes stronger ties with China and South Korea through deeper economic integration and enhanced diplomatic engagement. | In a historic landslide victory, on August 30, 2009, Japan's largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), ousted the main ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), in elections for control over Japan's Lower House of parliament. The LDP has had almost continuous control of the Japanese government since 1955 and has been a staunch supporter of the U.S.-Japan alliance throughout the postwar period. The DPJ, which includes a mixture of right- and left-leaning members and is led by Yukio Hatoyama, is now Japan's main ruling party. The Diet (Japan's parliament) is expected to elect Hatoyama as Japan's new prime minister in a special Diet session scheduled to begin on September 16. Since 2007, the DPJ has controlled the less powerful Upper House of the Diet, along with two smaller parties, a coalition that is expected to continue once the DPJ officially takes over the government.
The DPJ policy platform advocates sweeping economic and administrative reforms and has called for a "proactive" foreign policy with greater "independence" from the United States through deeper engagement with Asia and a more United Nations-oriented diplomacy. In particular, the party has in the past criticized many issues related to the U.S.-Japan alliance, such as plans to realign U.S. forward deployed forces based in Okinawa, Japan's "Host Nation Support" (HNS) payments (worth around $4 billion) that defray much of the costs of American troops and bases in Japan, and the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In 2007, the DPJ briefly blocked legislation allowing the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to continue the refueling of U.S. and allied vessels engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. For the United States, the most significant of these issues would be the HNS and base realignment plans.
During the campaign for the Lower House elections, the DPJ showed signs of a more pragmatic approach toward the U.S.-Japan alliance in order to deflect LDP criticism that it was not prepared to run the country. The DPJ dropped demands to end the current legislative authorization for the JMSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, and took a slightly more ambiguous position regarding the SOFA and other bilateral alliance management issues. The party's call for a U.N. and Asia-oriented diplomacy also appears to fall short of a more strategic shift to replace the U.S.-Japan alliance with an alternative regional security arrangement. Other signs suggest that the party might indirectly support U.S. foreign policy interests over the long-term through enhanced Japanese contributions to U.N.-sanctioned activities, as well as engagement in regional trade institutions and multilateral fora. Nonetheless, the party remains deeply divided on many foreign policy-related issues and continues to send conflicting signals about its overall approach toward the United States.
While a political changeover in Tokyo represents a watershed moment for Japan and potentially for U.S.-Japan relations, the extent to which there will be significant policy changes in Tokyo remains uncertain. It is not clear whether some of the DPJ's past criticism of the U.S.-Japan alliance and other LDP-backed policies was the result of opposition party politicking or more fundamental policy principles that will be implemented now that the party is coming to power. The DPJ faces daunting political and economic challenges at home that many see as a higher priority for the party than its proposals for adjusting the structure of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
This report analyzes the DPJ's policy platform and reviews the implications for U.S. strategic and economic interests now that the party and its coalition allies are set to take control of the Japanese government in the wake of the August 30 parliamentary elections. |
crs_R45316 | crs_R45316_0 | O n October 2, 2017, the Supreme Court began one of the most notable terms in recent memory, concluding its work at the end of June 2018. The latest term of the Court was the first full term for Justice Neil Gorsuch, who succeeded Justice Antonin Scalia following his death in February 2016, and the last term of Justice Anthony Kennedy, who retired from the High Court in July 2018. With nine Justices on the Court for the first time at the beginning of a term since October 2015, the October Term 2017 term witnessed an increasingly divided Court. The increased divisions on the High Court may have been a product of the nature of the cases on the Court's docket, with the Supreme Court hearing a number of high profile matters implicating issues of considerable interest for Congress and the public. For instance, during its last term, the Court considered a challenge to President Trump's so-called travel ban, several redistricting disputes concerning partisan gerrymandering, and a dispute that pitted a state government's interests in enforcing certain civil rights laws against the interests of those who object to same-sex marriage on religious grounds. Some of the Court's most highly anticipated rulings resulted in opinions where the Justices resolved cases on grounds that did not reach the core issues of dispute, such as the Court's rulings on partisan gerrymandering, in which the legal challenges were largely dismissed on procedural grounds, or the Court's opinion in the case of a baker's refusal to make a cake for a same-sex wedding, which was decided on narrow grounds peculiar to the case before the Court. Nonetheless, the October Term 2017 resulted in several far-reaching opinions that are discussed below in more detail. Perhaps most notably, the Court overturned several long-standing precedents, including (1) two 20th Century cases interpreting Congress's Commerce Clause power to limit the states' ability to require certain out-of-state retailers to collect and remit sales taxes; (2) a 1977 ruling requiring nonconsenting members of public employee unions to pay certain fees as a condition of employment; and (3) a long-criticized 1944 case that sanctioned the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. This report highlights seven notable cases from the October Term 2017 that could impact the work of Congress: (1) Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, which concerned the enforceability of certain agreements between employers and employees to arbitrate labor disputes in lieu of class and other collective actions; (2) Carpenter v. United States , which examined the limits the Fourth Amendment imposes on the warrantless collection of the historical cell phone location records of a criminal suspect; (3) Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) , a case that explored whether Congress, by prohibiting a state from partially repealing a state law, impermissibly commandeers the powers of the state; (4) Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME) , which concerned whether so-called agency fee arrangements that require nonconsenting public employees to contribute a fee to a public employee union violate the First Amendment; (5) National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra , a case that assessed whether a California law imposing various notice requirements for certain facilities providing pregnancy-related services was likely to violate the First Amendment; (6) Trump v. Hawaii, which challenged the lawfulness of President Trump's so-called travel ban; and (7) Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) , which explored whether the appointment of administrative law judges (ALJs) within the SEC complied with Article II of the Constitution. | On October 2, 2017, the Supreme Court began one of the most notable terms in recent memory. The latest term of the Court was the first full term for Justice Neil Gorsuch, who succeeded Justice Antonin Scalia following his death in February 2016. The October Term 2017 was also the last term for Justice Anthony Kennedy, who retired in July 2018. With nine Justices on the Court for the first time at the beginning of a term since October 2015, this past term witnessed the High Court issuing fewer unanimous opinions and more rulings that were closely divided relative to previous terms.
The increased divisions on the High Court during the October Term 2017 may have been a product of the nature of the cases on the Court's docket, with the Supreme Court hearing a number of high-profile matters implicating issues of considerable interest for Congress and the public at large. For instance, during its last term, the Court considered a challenge to President Trump's so-called travel ban, several redistricting disputes concerning partisan gerrymandering, and a dispute that pitted a state government's interests in enforcing certain civil rights laws against the interests of those who object to same-sex marriage on religious grounds. Some of the Court's most highly anticipated rulings resulted in opinions where the Justices avoided resolving core issues of dispute, such as the Court's rulings on partisan gerrymandering, in which the legal challenges were largely dismissed on procedural grounds, or the Court's opinion in the case of a baker's refusal to make a cake for a same-sex wedding, which was decided on narrow grounds peculiar to the case before the Court. Nonetheless, the October Term 2017 resulted in several far-reaching opinions. Perhaps most notably, the last term for the Court saw the overturning of several long-standing precedents, including (1) two 20th Century cases interpreting Congress's Commerce Clause power to limit the states' ability to require certain out-of-state retailers to collect and remit sales taxes; (2) a 1977 ruling requiring nonconsenting members of public employee unions to pay certain fees as a condition of employment; and (3) a long-criticized 1944 case that sanctioned the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.
Of particular note are seven cases from the October Term 2017 that could impact the work of Congress: (1) Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, which upheld the enforceability of certain agreements between employers and employees to arbitrate labor disputes in lieu of class and other collective actions; (2) Carpenter v. United States, which interpreted the Fourth Amendment to impose certain limits on the warrantless collection of the historical cell phone location records of a criminal suspect; (3) Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, a case that held that Congress, by prohibiting a state from partially repealing a state law, impermissibly commandeered the powers of the state; (4) Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, which held that agency fee arrangements that require nonconsenting public employees to contribute a fee to a public employee union violate the First Amendment; (5) National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, a case that concluded that a California law imposing various notice requirements for certain facilities providing pregnancy-related services likely violated the First Amendment; (6) Trump v. Hawaii, which rejected a challenge to the lawfulness of President Trump's so-called travel ban; and (7) Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, which concluded that the appointment of administrative law judges within the Securities and Exchange Commission did not comply with Article II of the Constitution. |
crs_R43209 | crs_R43209_0 | The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) is one of several federal agencies that undertake water resource projects. The majority of Corps civil works projects involve commercial navigation, flood risk management, and ecosystem restoration. Congress generally authorizes Corps activities and provides policy direction in Water Resources Development Acts (WRDAs). These activities generally comprise the planning stage of project development. To do so, the report provides background information on the potentially wide array of environmental requirements that may apply to a given civil works project (including why Congress established such requirements), how the Corps integrates compliance with those requirements into the project planning process, and how required elements of the planning process may affect project delivery. To provide necessary background, this report identifies selected issues that have arisen in the past 50 years that resulted in Congress enacting numerous environmental requirements that (1) directly affect the Corps' project planning process and (2) are intended to minimize adverse project-specific impacts. More specifically, the report provides an overview of the federal requirements that obligate the Corps to evaluate the impacts of a given civil works project and the compliance requirements that generally must be addressed before the Corps will submit a Chief's Report to Congress. Most requirements that currently apply to water resource project development that may be deemed "environmental" represent past efforts by Congress to minimize the potential for unforeseen adverse impacts and/or to mitigate or minimize any unavoidable adverse impacts. With increased attention to adverse impacts of civil works projects, including the costs associated with remedying those impacts (see text box below), Congress enacted various laws that broadened Corps planning requirements to include an evaluation of project impacts to environmental quality. A Director of Civil Works reports to the Chief of Engineers. For example, Congress generally
authorizes the Corps to prepare a study of the water resources problem; appropriates funds for the Corps study; authorizes the Corps to construct a project; and appropriates funds to the Corps to construct the project. Environmental Evaluation and Compliance Requirements
During planning, the Corps is obligated to determine a project's potential economic, social, and environmental benefits and detriments. As noted previously, this report looks at two separate but related groups of environmental requirements: (1) those explicitly applicable to water resources development that must be addressed by the Corps during planning, and (2) those applicable as a result of project-specific impacts that are intended to protect human health or minimize harm to certain aquatic and other resources. The potential extent of outside agency involvement will also likely depend on the type of Corps project being planned. By identifying any environmental requirements applicable to a project in a single environmental review document, the NEPA process is used to coordinate and document compliance with potentially duplicative requirements—that is, to ensure compliance with environmental requirements established pursuant to NEPA and other project-specific requirements (e.g., the Clean Water Act or Endangered Species Act), but also to ensure compliance with Corps-specific evaluation requirements (e.g., requirements pertaining to the environment codified in Titles 33 and 43). The time it takes the Corps to move from one step in the project delivery process to another depends on a complex array of factors. When comparing individual Corps projects to each other, the larger, more complex, and costly the project, often the longer each step will take to complete. However, the role that Congress plays in authorizing studies and project construction and the timing of appropriations have been identified as factors that have the most significant effect on the timing of project delivery. Transmission of the feasibility report to Congress to construction authorization . Given the range of environmental issues and impacts that Congress requires the Corps to evaluate for civil works projects, there is little debate that the body of requirements that may be deemed "environmental" that apply to Corps projects often represents a significant element of the project development process. What is unclear is whether or which specific environmental requirements routinely delay project delivery. | Under its civil works mission, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) undertakes water resource projects. The majority of Corps civil works projects involve commercial navigation, flood risk management, and ecosystem restoration.
Before Congress will authorize the construction of or appropriate funds for most Corps civil works projects, the agency must prepare various studies, reports, and evaluations of project benefits and detriments, including adverse environmental impacts. Those impacts, in turn, may obligate the Corps to demonstrate compliance with certain environmental requirements.
Environmental Requirements Addressed During Planning
Some interested stakeholders have questioned the degree to which environmental requirements hamper project delivery, and debate what changes could be made to accelerate delivery. In particular, some have questioned whether compliance with federal environmental laws and regulations delays the completion of reports that Congress uses to inform legislation authorizing project construction such as Water Resources Development Acts (WRDAs).
The planning process is used to develop a recommended water resource project that Congress may authorize. Among other requirements, planning must include an evaluation of project impacts on the environment and applicable federal requirements that arise from those impacts. Depending on the project, a wide array of environmental requirements may apply. There are two types of environmental requirements that may affect a water resource project: those that obligate the Corps to evaluate certain issues during planning, and those intended to protect human health or minimize harm to a protected resource from project-specific impacts. Integrating the evaluation of environmental impacts into project planning is intended, in part, to minimize the potential for unanticipated impacts from the project and mitigate the severity of unavoidable adverse impacts.
Generally, the Corps identifies and considers environmental impacts, including any applicable requirements arising from federal environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act, within the framework of documenting compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Compliance with NEPA and other "environmental" laws may obligate the Corps to consult with outside agencies to determine the degree to which a protected resource (e.g., historic site, endangered species habitat, wetlands) may be affected; to develop measures to mitigate or minimize adverse impacts; and/or to identify required approvals or permits.
Factors That Cause Delay
The time that it takes the Corps to move from one phase of project development to another depends on a complex array of factors. When comparing individual Corps projects to each other, larger, more complex, and costly projects generally take longer. When looking at all civil works projects, Congress's role in authorizing required studies and project construction, and in appropriating funds necessary for the required studies and construction, often significantly affects project delivery timing.
Given the range of environmental issues and impacts that Congress has statutorily obligated the Corps to evaluate, the body of requirements that may be deemed environmental that apply to Corps projects can represent a significant element of project development. What is unclear is whether or which specific environmental requirements routinely delay project delivery, in general, or completion of necessary reports to Congress, in particular.
Scope of This Report
This report provides information about the civil works project development process, with a focus on the planning phase of development and challenges associated with determining the extent to which project delivery is affected by environmental requirements. To provide some context, the report identifies selected issues that have arisen in the past 50 years that resulted in Congress enacting various environmental requirements that affect the Corps' project planning process and that are intended to minimize adverse impacts of Corps projects. It also provides an overview of key federal requirements that generally must be addressed before the Corps' Chief of Engineers will issue a report (i.e., a Chief's Report). The transmission of that report to Congress by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works is typically the final step in the planning process and is intended to inform congressional authorization of project construction. |
crs_RL31750 | crs_RL31750_0 | Introduction
A victims' rights amendment to the United States Constitution has been introduced in threeessentially identically worded resolutions in the 108th Congress: S.J.Res. 1 , H.J.Res. 48 , and H.J.Res. 10 . (1) TheAmendment is one which the Presidenthas endorsed both in this Congress and the 107th Congress. A victim of violent crime shall have the right to reasonable and timely notice of any public proceeding involving the crime and of any release or escape of the accused; therights not to be excluded from such public proceeding and reasonably to be heard at publicrelease, plea, sentencing, reprieve, and pardon proceedings; and the right to adjudicativedecisions that duly consider the victim's safety, interest in avoiding unreasonable delay, and justand timely claims to restitution from the offender. The Need for Greater Balance. "Eighteen states lack state constitutional victims' rights amendments. But anamendment to the United States Constitution stands on different footing. It amends the Constitution. The victims' rights amendments in a few state constitutions concede that they may not be construed to diminish the rights of the accused. ); H.J.Res. The Amendment's grant of rights is subject to obvious facial limitations:
- the notice rights apply only with respect to public proceedings ;
- the rights attach to those proceedings involving the crime not those related to the crime;
- victims are only entitled to reasonable and timely notice; and
- victims are only entitled to notice of the release or escape of the accused. 108-191 at 34; S.Rept.106-254 at 30, S.Rept. Past Proposals. S.J.Res. S.Rept. (167) This reasonableness element may alsogive the courts and administrators greater discretion over the circumstances underwhich the right is accommodated than would be possible in the form of a restrictionpermitted by the last sentence in section 2 of the Amendment ("These rights shall notbe restricted except when and to the degree dictated by a substantial interest in publicsafety or the administration of criminal justice, or by compelling necessity"). Public Release Proceedings. 105-409 at 32. Enforcement
Section 4 of the Amendment empowers Congress to enact legislation to facilitate its enforcement. The reliefavailable may not include a claim for damages or the right to have completed trialsreopened to vindicate victims' rights. H.J.Res. . . interest in just and timely claimsto restitution." | Thirty-three states have added a victims' rights amendment to their state constitutions. S.J.Res. 1 / H.J.Res. 48 / H.J.Res. 10 would add a victims'rights amendment to the United States Constitution. The amendment is identical to proposalsoffered in the 107th Congress ( S.J.Res. 35 / H.J.Res. 88 / H.J.Res. 91 ) and has been endorsed by the President. Similar proposals date backto the 104th Congress.
The proposed amendment grants the victims of state and federal violent crimes the right:
- to reasonable and timely notice of public proceedings relating to the crime;
- to reasonable and timely notice of the release or escape of the accused;
- not to be excluded from such public proceedings;
- reasonably to be heard at public release, plea, sentencing, reprieve, and pardon proceedings;and
- to adjudicative decisions that give due consideration to victims' interests in their safety, inavoiding unreasonable delay and to consideration of their just and timely claims for restitutionfrom the offender.
The rights may not be restricted except to the extent dictated by a substantial interest in public safety or the administration of criminal justice or by compelling necessity. Only victims and theirrepresentatives may enforce the rights, but they may not do so through a claim for damages orrequest to reopen a completed trial. Congress is otherwise empowered to enact legislation for theamendment's enforcement.
The proposed amendment is the product of efforts to reconcile victims' rights, the constitutional rights of defendants, and prosecutorial prerogatives. The hearings on current and past proposals andthree Senate Judiciary Committee reports ( S.Rept. 108-191 ; S.Rept. 105-409 ; S.Rept. 106-254 )provide insight as to the intent of language used and proposed language implicitly rejected.
Proponents and their critics disagree over the need for the proposed Amendment, its meaning, its propriety, its costs, and its effect on federalism.
This report appears in abridged form under the title Victims' Rights Amendment: A Sketch of a Proposal in the 108th Congress to Amend the United States Constitution , CRS Report RS21434 . |
crs_RL32147 | crs_RL32147_0 | TheCongress has held hearings about them since the mid-1970s, when a major goal of such programswas to reduce U.S. dependence on oil imports during the energy crisis, and to expand scientificunderstanding of the dynamics of the climate system and its societal consequences as a basis forpolicy decisions that depend on improved predictions of future climate conditions and on betterclimate impact assessments. efforts, which continued in the first Bush and Clinton Administrations toward energy efficiency,renewable energy, and R&D, (5) to try to movetoward reducing greenhouse gas emissions. GCRP agenciessupport scientific research through coordination and joint activities. Climate Change Research Initiative(CCRI) and the National Climate Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI). (21) The functionsof the Interagency Working Group on ClimateScience and Technology include reviewing all programs relating to climate change science, providing recommendations to the CCSTI regarding climate science funding and programallocations, and accepting and acting on recommendations by the Joint Climate Change ScienceProgram Office and the Climate Change Technology Program Office. Climate Change Science Program
On January 30, 2003, the Administration announced that the CCRI and the GCRP would be combined into the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), which is separate from climate changetechnology work which is part of the President's National Climate Change Technology Initiative. The plan describes fivemajor research goals:
Improve knowledge of past and present climate, including natural variability, and improve understanding of causes of variability and change;
Improve understanding of forces causing climate change;
Reduce uncertainty in projections of future climate change;
Understand the sensitivity and adaptability of natural and managed ecosystems to climate change;
Explore the uses and limits of knowledge to manage risks and opportunities related to climate variability and change. Specific research targets accompany each goal. Funding
The Administration's FY2004 budget seeks $1.7 billion to directly sponsor scientific research managed by the CCSP. The FY2004 budget requests $1.2 billion for climate changetechnology, as part of the NCCTI. Funding for the DOE's efforts has been for the research, development, and deployment of more energy efficient and renewable technologies such as:
"Buildings:" low-power sulfur lamps, advanced heat pumps, chillers and commercial refrigeration, fuel cells, insulation, energy conserving building materials, and advancedwindows;
"Electricity:" generation using alternatives to fossil fuels such as solar energy, biomass power, wind energy, geothermal power, hydropower, and optimized nuclearpower;
"Industries:" greater efficiency in industries such as aluminum, steel, mining,agriculture, chemicals, forest products, and petroleum;
"Transportation:" researching, developing, and deploying more efficient technologies, such as advanced engines, hybrid systems, fuel cells and emission controls; theseconstituted the federal component of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV)which was a 10-year government/domestic auto industry partnership begun in the ClintonAdministration in 1993 that aimed to produce by 2004 a prototype midsized family car with 80 mileper gallon gasoline efficiency and a two-thirds reduction in carbon emissions. Environmental Protection Agency. While there has been some discussion about the proper roles for government, industry, and academe in climate change and other R&D, (35) the climate change R&D activities have not beenhighly controversial. TheClinton Administration's CCTI built upon these earlier efforts. The current Bush Administrationhas introduced its U.S. On the other hand, some proponents note that further R&D is needed to justifycertain climate change management strategies, to focus those strategies on key policy questions, andto reduce scientific uncertainties surrounding prospective climate change so that policymakers canmake better, more informed decisions. | For over 20 years there have been federal programs directly or indirectly related to climate change. Direct programs have focused largely on scientific research to improve the capability tounderstand climate systems and/or predict climatic change and variability. Energy use has been amajor focus of efforts related to possible climate change because carbon dioxide, the major"greenhouse gas," is added to the atmosphere when fossil fuels are burned. Those efforts, whichsought to reduce oil imports, manage electricity needs, and address environmental concernsincluding climate change, involve many parts of the government. Similarly, climate science effortsin various agencies have sought to expand scientific understanding of the dynamics of climate andits societal consequences as a basis for policy decisions that rely on improved predictions of futureclimate conditions and climate impact assessments. Coordinating these efforts has been challenging. This report identifies and discusses only the direct climate scientific and research programs of thefederal government, and does not focus on the wide array of programs on energy that, thoughrelevant indirectly to climate change, do not include climate as a specific goal.
The U.S. Global Change Research Program in the first Bush Administration, and subsequently in the Clinton Administration, funded studies to improve scientific understanding of the processesthat influence Earth's climate, including trends on global and regional scales. The Climate ChangeTechnology Initiative (CCTI) was the Clinton Administration's package of research anddevelopment (R&D) to develop renewable energy sources and more efficient technologies, targetedtax credits (to encourage purchase and deployment of more efficient technologies), and voluntaryinformation programs (so businesses and schools might be better informed when making purchasingand operating decisions involving energy use and emissions).
The CCTI was followed by the current Bush Administration's Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI) and National Climate Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI), both parts of acabinet-level Committee on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration. The CCRI andthe extant U.S. Global Change Research Program were combined into the Climate Change ScienceProgram (CCSP) in the FY2004 budget. Various major activities of the CCTI appear to continueat different funding levels through the Bush Administration, while using a different name. The FinalReport of the Strategic Plan for the Climate Change Science Program was released in July 2003.
The FY2004 budget requests $1.7 billion to sponsor scientific research directly managed by the CCSP, and $1.2 billion for technology R&D in the NCCTI. An interagency review process isunderway to identify specific research areas.
With various details about the Bush Administration's climate change efforts still in development, some critics highlight the need for clearer goals for climate change R&D, while someproponents note that further R&D is needed if certain climate change management strategies are tobe put in place. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44811 | crs_R44811_0 | Introduction
Surface transportation "devolution" refers to shifting most current federal responsibility for building and maintaining highways and public transportation facilities from the federal government to the states. Thereafter, Congress will need either to reduce federal spending for surface transportation or find additional resources to fund highway and public transportation programs. The Case for Devolution
Advocates of devolution have generally made the following case since the 1980s:
The federal government is overinvolved in the planning and construction of highways and public transportation. Changes during the last two surface transportation reauthorization acts have given states greater control over highway expenditures, and Congress has adhered to an earmark ban since 2011. These changes have addressed some of the complaints that originally led to calls for devolution. Upfront Costs
Devolving the current federal highway and transit programs to the states would involve substantial upfront costs. Even if the federal government hands responsibility for funding new highway and public transportation projects to the states, it would need to retain motor fuels taxes or some other revenue source to assure repayment of outstanding obligations. Federal Revenue Losses
Although devolution would reduce federal spending on transportation, the net savings to the federal government would be less than the amount of the spending reduction because many states extensively use tax-exempt bonds as part of their financing mechanisms. Replacing the Relinquished Federal Taxes
Virtually all surface transportation devolution proposals would reduce or phase out most of the federal motor fuels taxes (and in most cases also eliminate the other taxes on highway users) over several years. The simplest way to do this would be for the states to increase their own taxes on gasoline and highway diesel fuel by the same amount as the reduction in the federal taxes. However, there are reasons to believe that replacing federal motor fuels taxes with state fuels taxes on a cent-for-cent basis would not provide sufficient revenue to fund the current level of spending on highways and public transportation. These states currently receive less in federal highway funding than the national average, relative to their motorists' payments of federal fuel taxes, and would therefore benefit more than other states from devolution. A number of federal requirements would remain in effect. States are free to use whatever design standards they wish for projects that do not involve federal funds, and this would presumably apply to a much larger number of projects if the highway program were to be devolved to the states. | Surface transportation "devolution" refers to shifting most current federal responsibility for building and maintaining highways and public transportation systems from the federal government to the states. Devolution legislation has been introduced in each Congress since the mid-1990s, supported by Members who regard the federal government as being overinvolved in highways and public transportation. Under such proposals, the federal taxes that now support surface transportation programs, mostly fuels taxes, would be reduced in line with the shift of responsibility to the states. The states could then raise their own taxes to pay for highway and transit projects as they see fit. A small program, funded by much-reduced motor fuel taxes, would remain in place at the federal level to maintain roads on federal lands, fund highway safety efforts, and support other programs Congress decides not to devolve.
Beyond the basic small government argument, advocates of devolution generally assert that it will lower costs and accelerate construction of highway and transit projects by freeing them from a wide variety of federal regulations. They also contend that devolution will be fairer than the present systems for distributing highway and public transportation funding, which give some states more money, relative to their residents' motor fuel tax payments, than other states.
Opponents of devolution question whether it will save money and worry that it could interfere with national goals established by Congress, such as maintaining important interstate freight corridors and adhering to uniform national construction standards. They point out that the last two surface transportation reauthorization acts have greatly reduced the number of programs and given states greater control over highway expenditures while excluding earmarks, addressing some of the complaints that originally led to calls for devolution.
There are several significant issues Congress would face if it were to consider devolution. Among them are the following:
Devolution would involve substantial upfront costs, possibly as much as $84 billion over a period of several years, to pay for outstanding highway and transit obligations. Even if the federal government hands responsibility for funding new highway and public transportation projects to the states, it would need to retain federal motor fuels taxes or some other revenue source until it has repaid the states for projects in progress as of the date devolution takes effect. Replacing the reduced federal taxes on a cent-for-cent basis would not provide enough revenue to fund the current level of spending on surface transportation. Nearly all states would have to increase their taxes by an amount larger than the reduction in federal taxes, unless they choose to reduce spending. Devolution would likely increase the use of tax-exempt bonds by the states, reducing federal revenue beyond the amount of forgone highway taxes. |
crs_R42440 | crs_R42440_0 | FY2013 Appropriations
This report will track and provide an overview of actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2013 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of enacted FY2012 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual appropriation for CJS. The source for the FY2012-enacted amounts is the conference report for the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-55 , H.Rept. 112-284 ). FY2013-requested amounts were taken from S.Rept. 112-158 and the appendix to the Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2013 . 112-158 and the House-passed amounts were taken from H.Rept. 112-463 and the version of H.R. 5326 passed by the House. 113-6 ) were taken from the text of the act and rescissions of FY2013 budget authority were calculated by CRS. For FY2013, the Administration requests a total of $62.076 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. The Administration's request includes $7.978 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.079 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.090 billion for the science agencies, and $929.2 million for the related agencies. The FY2013 request for CJS is 1.9% greater than the FY2012 appropriation of $60.910 billion. On April 19, 2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013 ( S. 2323 ). The bill includes a total of $61.762 billion for the agencies and bureaus that would be funded by the bill. The Senate committee-reported amount is 1.4% greater than the FY2012 appropriation of $60.910 billion, but it is 0.1% below the Administration's request. The bill includes $6.288 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.866 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.679 billion for the science agencies, and $929.2 million for the related agencies. On May 10, 2012, the House passed the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013 ( H.R. 5326 ). The bill would provide $60.879 billion for CJS, which is under 0.1% less than the FY2012 appropriation, 1.5% less than the Administration's request, and 1.4% below the Senate Committee on Appropriation's mark. The bill includes $7.663 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.584 billion for the Department of Justice, $24.786 billion for the science agencies, and $845.9 million for the related agencies. On March 26, 2013, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 ( P.L. The act provides a total of $60.638 billion for CJS. This amount includes $7.726 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.305 billion for the Department of Justice, $24.737 billion for the science agencies, and $870.1 million for the related agencies. Table 1 shows the FY2012-enacted appropriations, the Administration's FY2013 request, the Senate committee-reported amounts, the House-passed amounts, and the amount included in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act for the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the science agencies, and the related agencies. 113-6 . S.Rept. P.L. | On February 13, 2012, President Obama submitted his FY2013 budget to Congress. The Administration requests a total of $62.076 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations bill. The Administration's request includes $7.978 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.079 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.090 billion for the science agencies, and $929.2 million for the related agencies. The FY2013 request for CJS is 1.9% greater than the FY2012 appropriation of $60.910 billion.
On April 19, 2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013 (S. 2323). The bill includes a total of $61.762 billion for the agencies and bureaus that would be funded by the bill. The Senate committee-reported amount is 1.4% greater than the FY2012 appropriation of $60.910 billion, but it is 0.1% below the Administration's request. The bill includes $6.288 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.866 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.679 billion for the science agencies, and $929.2 million for the related agencies.
On May 10, 2012, the House passed the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013 (H.R. 5326). The bill would provide $60.879 billion for CJS. The House-passed amount is under 0.1% less than the FY2012 appropriation, 1.5% less than the Administration's request, and 1.4% below the Senate Committee on Appropriation's mark. The bill includes $7.663 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.584 billion for the Department of Justice, $24.786 billion for the science agencies, and $845.9 million for the related agencies.
On March 26, 2013, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6). The act provides a total of $60.638 billion for CJS. This amount includes $7.726 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.305 billion for the Department of Justice, $24.737 billion for the science agencies, and $870.1 million for the related agencies.
This report will track and describe actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2013 appropriations for CJS accounts. It also provides an overview of FY2012 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual appropriation for CJS.
The source for the FY2012-enacted amounts is the conference report for the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-55, H.Rept. 112-284). FY2013-requested amounts were taken from S.Rept. 112-158 and the appendix to the Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2013. The Senate committee-reported amounts were taken from S.Rept. 112-158 and the House-passed amounts were taken from H.Rept. 112-463 and the version of H.R. 5326 passed by the House. The amounts provided in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6) were taken from the text of the act and rescissions of FY2013 budget authority were calculated by CRS. |
crs_RL32169 | crs_RL32169_0 | Introduction
The 108th Congress has considered and is considering legislation on a wide range ofimmigration issues. Effective March 1, 2003, P.L.107-296 abolished the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the Department of Justice(DOJ), the agency which had administered and enforced the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), (1) and transferred most immigration-related functions to the newly created DHS. The 108th Congress has enacted a measure ( P.L. 108-136 ) that amendsmilitary naturalization and posthumous citizenship statutes and provides immigration benefits forimmediate relatives of U.S. citizen servicemembers who die as a result of actual combat service. The 108th Congress is currently debating legislation that would implement recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11Commission). Other measures before the 108th Congress -- such as those on temporary workers and business personnel, adjustment of status for unauthorized aliens, and noncitizen eligibility for public benefits-- concern more perennial immigration-related questions. 108-7 ). It has been argued that only a section-by-section revision of the INA, replacing references to the Attorney General with references to the Secretary of Homeland Security where appropriate, willtruly clarify the allocation of authorities between the two departments. As passed by the House and reported bythe Senate Committee, this bill, the "Homeland Security Technical Corrections Act of 2003," wouldremove specified references to the Attorney General, INS, and the INS Commissioner in INA �103(leaving intact the controlling nature of the Attorney General's determinations of law) and in INA�287(g), which concerns acceptance of state services to carry out immigration enforcement. P.L. (7)
There are several major bills that seek to implement recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and some propose significant revisions to U.S. immigration law and policy. Of these bills, H.R. The major immigration areas underconsideration in these comprehensive 9/11 Commission bills include: asylum, biometric trackingsystems, border security, document security, exclusion, immigration enforcement, and visaissuances. (8)
Temporary Workers and Business Personnel
The INA provides for the temporary admission of various categories of foreign workers andbusiness personnel. Separate legislation ( P.L. S. 1452 / H.R. 2688 ) would suspend or eliminate H-1B visas. 2849 , S. 1635 , H.R. 2154 , H.R. 2702 , H.R. 4166 , and H.R. 4415 ). H.R. 4166 has similar provisionsrevising the L visa. Several of the bills ( S. 1452 / H.R. 2849 and H.R. Legislation to implement the Chile and Singapore FTAs was introduced on July 15, 2003, as S. 1416 / H.R. 3142 , S. 2185 , and H.R. S. 2010 , S. 2381 / H.R. H.R. Also before the 108th Congress are proposals to create new temporary worker programs ( S. 1387 , S. 1461 / H.R. 2899 , S. 2010 , S. 2381 / H.R. 4262 , and H.R. 3651 ). S. 1645 / H.R. 3534 , H.R. 3604 , and H.R. Under P.L. H.R. Other Legislation Receiving Action
Iraqi Scientists. 108-156 . P.L. 108-77 ( H.R. 108-78 ( H.R. 108-173 ( H.R. P.L. Reported by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee( S.Rept. H.R. S. 1545 (Hatch). S. 2845 (Collins). | The 108th Congress has considered and is considering legislation on a wide range of immigration issues. Chief among these are the immigration-related recommendations of theNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11Commission), expedited naturalization through military service, and foreign temporary workers andbusiness personnel.
Several major bills that seek to implement recommendations of the 9/11 Commission propose significant revisions to U.S. immigration law: H.R. 10 , S. 2845 , S. 2774 / H.R. 5040 , and H.R. 5024 . Of these bills, H.R.10 proposes the most extensive revisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The major immigration areas under consideration in these comprehensive 9/11 Commission billsinclude: asylum, biometric tracking systems, border security, document security, exclusion, and visaissuances.
The 108th Congress has enacted a measure on expedited naturalization through military service. P.L. 108-136 , the FY2004 Defense Department Authorization bill, amends military naturalizationand posthumous citizenship statutes and provides immigration benefits for immediate relatives ofU.S. citizen servicemembers who die as a result of actual combat service.
In the area of foreign temporary workers and business personnel, the 108th Congress has enacted legislation to implement the Chile ( P.L. 108-77 ) and Singapore ( P.L. 108-78 ) Free TradeAgreements. These agreements address several categories of temporary workers and businesspersonnel currently governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), including professionalworkers. Separate legislation on H-1B professional workers ( S. 1452 / H.R. 2849 , H.R. 2235 , H.R. 2688 , H.R. 3534 , and H.R. 4166 ) and L intracompany transfers ( S. 1452 / H.R. 2849 , S. 1635 , H.R. 2154 , H.R. 2702 , H.R. 4415 , and H.R. 4166 ) has also been introduced. Also pending are proposals to reform existingguest worker visas ( S. 1645 / H.R. 3142 , S. 2010 , S. 2185 , S. 2381 / H.R. 4262 , H.R. 3534 , and H.R. 3604 ) and establish new guest worker visas ( S. 1387 , S. 1461 / H.R. 2899 , S. 2010 , S. 2381 / H.R. 4262 ,and H.R. 3651 ).
Since the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 ) created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Congress has considered legislation to clarify the allocation of immigrationauthorities between the Secretary of DHS and the Attorney General. P.L. 108-7 amended the INAin an apparent effort to clarify the authority that was to remain with the Attorney General. H.R. 1416 , as passed by the House and reported by the Senate Governmental AffairsCommittee, would further amend the INA to remove certain references to the Attorney General.
Among other immigration-related legislation receiving action are adjustment of status of unauthorized alien students ( S. 1545 ), noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid ( P.L.108-173 ), consular identification cards ( H.R. 1950 ), elimination of the diversity visalottery ( H.R. 775 ) and employment eligibility verification pilot programs ( P.L.108-156 ). This report will be updated as legislative developments occur. |
crs_R43537 | crs_R43537_0 | Overview of the Disaster Relief Fund
The Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), sometimes referred to as the President's Disaster Relief Fund, is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The DRF is the main account used to fund a wide variety of disaster assistance programs that provide grants and other forms of support to assist state, local, and tribal governments, as well as certain nonprofit entities during disaster recovery. The majority of assistance provided by the federal government in response to emergency and major disaster declarations is funded through the DRF. In general, funds from the DRF are released after the President has issued an emergency or major disaster declaration pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( P.L. 93-288 , as amended, hereinafter the Stafford Act). 2. FMAG declarations are relatively modest in cost when compared to emergency declarations and major disaster declarations. It also describes the Budget Control Act and the DRF Monthly Report. One benefit of a no-year account is that the unobligated balance in the account can be used to pay for future disasters the next fiscal year. Congressional concern over the number and amount of supplemental appropriations needed to fund disaster assistance has led to congressional debate concerning how the DRF should be budgeted, and whether the federal government is providing too much or too little assistance. These concerns are discussed more in depth in " The Debate over Supplemental Appropriations . " The available appropriation was a combination of prior-year funds that are carried over, the current fiscal year annual appropriation, and any supplemental appropriations. The enactments for those years were $7 billion and $6.2 billion respectively. These include the amount of funding appropriated to the DRF, the appropriateness and effectiveness of providing additional funding to the DRF through supplemental appropriations, and the use of policy mechanisms to reduce the amount of funding provided to states and localities for emergency and disaster assistance. One fundamental debate that has been of concern, particularly in the light of the national debt, is the federal role in providing disaster assistance. They argued that relying on supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance has the following drawbacks:
supplemental appropriations for disasters often are designated as an emergency expenditure, which under congressional budgetary procedures can exceed discretionary spending limits designed to reduce the federal deficit—creating an opportunity for lawmakers to circumvent budgetary enforcement mechanisms by underfunding the DRF during the annual appropriations process to make room for other spending; supplemental appropriations for disasters often move through Congress on an expedited basis, limiting the amount of time available to assess actual disaster needs and scrutinize spending to ensure that the spending is appropriately scaled, targeted, and that adequate safeguards are in place to address the potential for waste, fraud, and abuse. Advocates of the use of supplemental disaster assistance would argue that:
the timing and severity of disasters cannot be anticipated and appropriating a relatively large sum of funds through the regular, annual appropriations process may require Congress to reduce funding for other programs to pay for an unknown, and possibly non-existent, future event; the President is authorized to unilaterally determine when federal assistance is made available after a major disaster incident. Opponents might argue that a rainy-day fund is infeasible due to the high costs of catastrophic events. For example, Congress appropriated roughly $120 billion for Hurricane Katrina recovery efforts and $60 billion for Hurricane Sandy. One potential argument against the sole reliance on offsets to limit federal spending on disaster assistance is that it fails to address the growing number of declarations issued each year. Proposals for Managing Declarations
Restructuring the budgetary process is one approach that may reduce the need for supplemental funding to pay for major disasters. These include reforming the declaration process, adjusting the federal share for assistance, and shifting some of the responsibility for paying for recovery to the state and/or the private sector. In addition, the costs of disasters should be expected given changes in severe weather patterns, as well as increases in population size and development. Limiting the Number of Major Disaster Declarations
Some may contend that too many major disasters are being declared and should be limited. Other Potential Amendments to the Stafford Act
Other amendments to the Stafford Act could either limit the number of declarations being issued, or the amount of assistance provided to the state by the federal government. In other words, state and local governments currently provide 25% of disaster costs on projects and grants to families and individuals with the federal government assuming 75% of all costs. Some of these questions include the following:
The model for emergency and disaster response is built on the premise that emergencies and disasters are local. Is federal assistance to states and localities unintentionally creating a disincentive for states and localities to prepare for emergencies and major disasters? | The Robert T. Stafford Emergency Relief and Disaster Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended) authorizes the President to issue declarations for incidents ranging from destructive, large-scale disasters to more routine, less damaging events. Declarations trigger federal assistance in the forms of various response and recovery programs under the Stafford Act to state, local, and tribal governments. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is the primary funding source for disaster response and recovery.
Funds from the DRF are used to pay for ongoing recovery projects from disasters occurring in previous fiscal years, meet current emergency requirements, and as a reserve to pay for upcoming incidents. The DRF is funded annually and is a "no-year" account, meaning that unused funds from the previous fiscal year (if available) are carried over to the next fiscal year. In general, when the balance of the DRF becomes low, Congress provides additional funding through both annual and supplemental appropriations to replenish the account.
The federal government provides a significant amount of money to state and local governments each year for emergency and major disasters. For example, Congress provided roughly $120 billion for Hurricane Katrina and $60 billion for Hurricane Sandy recovery. Even in years with relatively few major disasters, it is not uncommon for the federal government to annually appropriate between $2 billion and $6 billion to help pay for recovery projects. Studies and analyses of disasters indicate that there has been an uptick in the number of major disasters declared each year. In addition, scholars of disaster policy and other experts such as climatologists expect disasters to increase in both frequency and in costs in the near future.
Federal disaster assistance expenditures are influenced by both external and internal factors. External factors that increase federal spending on disaster costs include increases in the frequency and magnitude of weather related events, and increases in population size and development—especially in coastal and other flood prone areas. Internal factors also influence how much assistance is provided and include disaster assistance policies that have evolved over time that have expanded the federal role in emergency and major disaster declarations such as altering declaration criteria and adjusting the federal cost-share for response and recovery.
Congressional interest in disaster assistance has always been high given the amount of money provided to states and localities, but also because of increasing disagreements over the appropriate role of the federal government in providing assistance. Other congressional concerns include the use of supplemental appropriations to pay for disaster relief, offsetting expenditures for disaster assistance, and whether some of the federal burden for disaster assistance should be shifted to states and localities.
This report describes the declaration process and the types of declarations that can be issued under the Stafford Act: (1) emergency and major disaster declarations, and (2) Fire Management Assistance Grants. The report also examines how the DRF is financed. This discussion is followed by an analysis concerning the issues related to the DRF including the debate over supplemental appropriations, how the DRF is budgeted, and the influence the Budget Control Act has had on the DRF.
Some argue that the current method of funding and providing federal assistance for disaster response and recovery is functioning correctly and should not be changed. Others argue that the federal government should increase the amount of funding provided to states and localities for emergency and major disaster declarations. Still others argue that policy options that reduce federal costs for emergency and major disaster declarations or reduce the number of supplemental appropriations needed (or both) should be pursued. Policy proposals that could help achieve these ends include:
appropriating more funds for the DRF to reduce the need for supplemental funding, restructuring the budget procedures for disaster assistance, creating alternative funding methods such as a rainy-day fund or a contingency fund, reducing federal costs by eliminating unrelated spending in disaster funding bills, altering policies that would limit the number of declarations issued each year, and converting some or all disaster assistance to disaster loans.
This report concludes with policy questions that may help frame future discussions concerning federal emergency and disaster relief.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33416 | crs_RL33416_0 | Social unrest in China affects ongoing U.S. policies promoting human rights and democracy in China and broader considerations about engagement with the PRC. Policy options for Congress include monitoring the situation, increasing assistance for local democracy, civil society, and rule-of-law programs in China, supporting a free press and independent judiciary, or pressing the Chinese government to respect the rights of protestors and release jailed activists. China's Public Security Ministry reportedly declared that there were 87,000 cases of "public order disturbance"—including protests, demonstrations, picketing, and group petitioning—in 2005 compared to 74,000 reported cases in 2004. The December 2005 clash between villagers and People's Armed Police (PAP) in Dongzhou village (Shanwei city), southeastern Guangdong province, in which 3-20 villagers were killed, became a symbol of the depth of anger of those with grievances and the unpredictability of the outcomes of social disputes. Egregious labor abuses have long been reported in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), where foreign-invested companies produce Chinese goods for export. Growing numbers of laid-off SOE workers, workers in the SEZs, peasants and urban residents who have lost their farmland or homes, and others have engaged in mass protests, some of them violent, often after having exhausted legal channels for resolving grievances. In the past few years, a new kind of protest has appeared, caused by anger over local development projects and resulting land confiscation and environmental degradation. Mass protests in China are not new—political observers have described social unrest among farmers and workers since the early 1990s. However, recent demonstrations have been broader in scope, larger in average size, greater in frequency, and more brash than those of a decade ago. Furthermore, today's social unrest has helped to bring about a fundamental policy debate in the Communist Party regarding the pace of economic reforms. Political Ramifications
Growing disparities of income, official corruption, and the lack of democratic institutions are likely to continue to fuel social unrest. The PRC government is likely to be able to contain protests in the medium term through policies that mix accommodation and violence and that promote economic growth. Most analysts do not expect current social unrest to evolve into a national political movement unless other social groups, particularly the new middle class, intellectuals, and students, join the fray. On December 15, 2005, a bi-partisan group of U.S. congressional leaders submitted a letter to the PRC Ambassador to the United States, Zhou Wenzhong, expressing "deep concern" over the shooting incident in Dongzhou. | In the past few years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has experienced rising social unrest, including protests, demonstrations, picketing, and group petitioning. According to PRC official sources, "public order disturbances" grew by nearly 50% from 58,000 incidents in 2003 to 87,000 in 2005. Although political observers have described social unrest among farmers and workers since the early 1990s, recent protest activities have been broader in scope, larger in average size, greater in frequency, and more brash than those of a decade ago. Fears of greater unrest have triggered debates with the Communist Party leadership about the pace of economic reforms and the proper way to respond to protesters.
Workers in state-owned enterprises and the special economic zones producing goods for export, peasants and urban residents who have lost their farmland or homes to development projects, and others have engaged in mass protests, some of them violent, often after having exhausted legal channels for resolving grievances. A December 2005 clash between villagers and police in Dongzhou village, southeastern Guangdong province, in which 3-20 villagers were killed, has became a symbol of the depth of anger of those with grievances and the inability of Chinese administrative, legal, and political institutions to resolve disputes peacefully. U.S. interests regarding social unrest in China include human rights concerns, ongoing U.S.-funded democracy and rule-of-law programs in the country, the effects of social unrest on U.S. investments in China, and the effects on PRC foreign policy.
Growing disparities of income, official corruption, and the lack of democratic institutions are likely to continue to fuel social unrest. The potential for widespread social upheaval has captured the keen attention of the Communist Party leadership. However, in the medium term, the PRC government is likely to be able to contain protests through policies that mix accommodation and suppression and that promote continued economic growth. Most analysts do not expect social unrest to evolve into a national political movement unless linkages among disaffected groups strengthen and other social groups, particularly the middle class, intellectuals, and students, join the protests as well.
Policy options for Congress include monitoring the situation, increasing assistance for local democracy, civil society, rule-of-law and environmental programs in China, supporting a free press and independent judiciary, or pressing the Chinese government to respect the rights of protestors and release jailed activists. On December 15, 2005, a bi-partisan group of U.S. congressional leaders submitted a letter to the PRC Ambassador to the United States, Zhou Wenzhong, expressing "deep concern" over the shooting incident in Dongzhou.
This report, which will be updated periodically, discusses the causes of growing social unrest in China and describes recent incidents, explains how the PRC government responds to protest activities, analyzes implications for PRC politics, and discusses policy options for Congress. |
crs_R43087 | crs_R43087_0 | This report provides an analysis of financial regulatory policy. The agencies listed in the "other" category regulate housing government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and consumer financial products, respectively. The appendices topics include organizational differences among financial firms, the rating system that regulators use to evaluate the health of banks, the regulatory structure prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, a list of common acronyms, and a glossary of common financial terms. The business model of banks also creates a number of economic policy problems. Banks that cannot borrow from other banks during emergencies can be provided a lender of last resort. One type of government backstop is a financial guarantee, such as deposit insurance. For example, a lender could borrow money through securities markets rather than from traditional retail depositors. Some agencies have powers over particular firms, but not over all of the other participants in the market that the firm might participate in. Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) also have a primary prudential regulator. The SEC and CFTC generally do not regulate the prices of stocks or futures traded on the exchanges; rather, they regulate the organization and membership of the exchanges, rules for trading, and attempt to prevent fraud, conflicts of interest, or manipulation by market participants. Some financial activities are subject to federal regulation no matter which institutions engage in them and no matter who hosts the trades in them. The Dodd-Frank Act created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to assume a coordinating role among the heads of financial regulatory agencies; the FSOC has a permanent staff to monitor financial-sector risks as a whole. The Dodd-Frank Act gathered much of this authority and personnel into a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), but bank regulators still supervise many consumer activities of their chartered firms. In addition, because virtually all depository institutions are covered by federal deposit insurance, they are subject to at least one federal primary regulator (i.e., the federal authority responsible for examining the institution for safety and soundness and ensuring its compliance with federal banking laws). The Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve System was established in 1913 to provide stability to banks and trusts through the regulation of reserves (P.L. As a result, much of the regulation of securities and derivatives markets has focused on resolving conflicts of interest and requiring full disclosure of material information, unlike bank regulation that tends to focus on prudence. Two types of firms come under the SEC's jurisdiction: (1) all corporations that sell securities to the public and (2) securities broker/dealers and other securities markets intermediaries. The SEC lacked safety and soundness powers over the institutions it supervised, and the Fed was forced to commit funds to an investment bank over which it had no regulatory jurisdiction. The FSOC's duties include
collecting information on financial firms from regulators and through the Office of Financial Research; monitoring the financial system to identify potential systemic risks; proposing regulatory changes to Congress to promote stability, competitiveness, and efficiency; facilitating information sharing and coordination among financial regulators; making regulatory recommendations to financial regulators, including "new or heightened standards and safeguards"; identifying gaps in regulation that could pose systemic risk; reviewing and commenting on new or existing accounting standards issued by any standard-setting body; and providing a forum for the resolution of jurisdictional disputes among council members. Non-Bank Capital Requirements
Federal Housing Finance Agency
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) is authorized to set capital classification standards for the Federal Home Loan Banks, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac that reflect the differences in operations between the banks and the latter two GSEs. Each NFA member that is required to be registered with the CFTC as a futures commission merchant (member FCM) must maintain "Adjusted Net Capital" (as defined in CFTC Regulation 1.17) equal to or in excess of the greatest of
(i) $500,000;
(ii) For Member FCMs with less than $2,000,000 in Adjusted Net Capital, $6,000 for each remote location operated;
(iii) For Member FCMs with less than $2,000,000 in Adjusted Net Capital, $3,000 for each associated person;
(iv) For securities brokers and dealers, the amount of net capital specified by SEC regulations;
(v) 8% of domestic and foreign domiciled customer and 4% of non-customer (excluding proprietary) risk maintenance margin/performance bond requirements for all domestic and foreign futures and options on futures contracts excluding the risk margin associated with naked long option positions;
(vi) For Member FCMs with an affiliate that engages in foreign exchange (FX) transactions and that is authorized to engage in those transactions solely by virtue of its affiliation with a registered FCM, $7,500,000; or
(vii) For Member FCMs that are counterparties to FX options, $5,000,000, except that FX Dealer Members must meet the higher requirement in Financial Requirements Section 11. Currency trading is largely conducted in the over-the-counter market. Treasury securities were exempted from SEC regulation by the original securities laws of the 1930s and under the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Act. Federal safety net —A broad term referring to protection of banking institutions through deposit insurance, discount window credit, other lender of last resort support, and certain forms of regulations to reduce risk. | Financial regulatory policies are of interest to Congress because firms, consumers, and governments fund many of their activities through banks and securities markets. Furthermore, financial instability can damage the broader economy. Financial regulation is intended to protect borrowers and investors that participate in financial markets and mitigate financial instability. This report provides an overview of the regulatory policies of the agencies that oversee banking and securities markets and explains which agencies are responsible for which institutions, activities, and markets. Some agencies regulate particular types of institutions for risky behavior or conflicts of interest, some agencies promulgate rules for certain financial transactions no matter what kind of institution engages in them, and other agencies enforce existing rules for some institutions, but not for others. These regulatory activities are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Banking
U.S. banking regulation traditionally focuses on prudence. Banks' business decisions are regulated for safety and soundness and adequate capital. In addition, banks are given access to a lender of last resort, and some bank creditors are provided guarantees (deposit insurance). Regulating the risks that banks take is believed to help smooth the credit cycle. The credit cycle refers to periodic booms and busts in lending. Prudential safety and soundness regulation and capital requirements date back to the 1860s when bank credit formed the money supply. The Federal Reserve (Fed) as lender of last resort was created following the Panic of 1907. Deposit insurance was established in the 1930s to reduce the incentive of depositors to withdraw funds from banks during a financial panic.
Securities, Derivatives, and Similar Contract Markets
Federal securities regulation has traditionally focused on disclosure and mitigating conflicts of interest, fraud, and attempted market manipulation, rather than on prudence. Securities regulation is typically designed to ensure that market participants have access to enough information to make informed decisions, rather than to limit the riskiness of the business models of publicly traded firms. Firms that sell securities to the public must register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). SEC registration in no way implies that an investment is safe, only that material risks have been disclosed. The SEC also registers several classes of securities market participants and firms. It has enforcement powers for certain types of industry misstatements or omissions and for certain types of conflicts of interest. Derivatives trading is supervised by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which oversees trading on the futures exchanges, which have self-regulatory responsibilities as well. The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act, P.L. 111-203) required more disclosures in the over-the-counter (off-exchange) derivatives market than prior to the financial crisis and has granted the CFTC and SEC authority over large derivatives traders.
Government Sponsored Enterprises
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) oversees a group of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Two of the GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, securitize residential mortgages, and they were placed in conservatorship following mortgage losses in 2008. In the conservatorship, the Treasury provides financial support to the GSEs and FHFA and Treasury have managerial control over the enterprises. FHFA also regulates the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system, a GSE composed of regional banks to bankers owned by the 8,000 financial institutions that they serve.
Changes Following the 2008 Financial Crisis
The Dodd-Frank Act created the interagency Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and authorized a permanent staff to monitor systemic risk and consolidated bank regulation from five agencies to four. The DFA granted the Federal Reserve oversight authority and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) resolution authority over the largest financial firms. The Dodd-Frank Act consolidated consumer protection rulemaking, which had been dispersed among several federal agencies, in the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
Special Topics
The appendices in this report include additional information on topics, such as the regulatory structure prior to the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA), organizational differences among financial firms, and the rating system that regulators use to evaluate the health of banks. A list of common acronyms and a glossary of common financial terms are also included as appendices. |
crs_RS22659 | crs_RS22659_0 | The Administration, however, is keeping open the option of meeting with non-Hamas members of the new government. On March 20, U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem Jacob Walles met with Palestinian Finance Minister Fayyad in Ramallah, the first diplomatic contact between the United States and the Palestinians in a year. The Administration also has sought to redirect some assistance to PA President Abbas. During a speech at the summit, Saudi King Abdullah called for an end to the international boycott of the PA in light of the agreement between Fatah and Hamas to form a unity government. Some observers also note that Saudi efforts to gain acceptance of the unity government and restart Israeli-Palestinian peace talks may be an effort to set the price for Saudi cooperation on other U.S. policies in the region, notably toward Iran. 109-446 , the Senate version of the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, which bars aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian government unless, among other things, it acknowledges Israel's right to exist and adheres to all previous international agreements and understandings. In March 2007, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.R. 1856 , the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act Amendments of 2007, which would amend the original Act to further restrict contact with and assistance to the PA. | The new Palestinian unity government established in March 2007 complicates U.S. policy toward the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the peace process. When Hamas took power last year, the Bush Administration, along with its Quartet partners and Israel, responded by cutting off contact with and halting assistance to the PA. The Administration sought to isolate and remove Hamas while supporting moderates in Fatah, led by President Mahmud Abbas. The international sanctions have not driven Hamas from power, and instead, some assert they may have provided an opening for Iran to increase its influence among Palestinians by filling the void. Now that Hamas and Fatah are sharing power, it will be harder to isolate Hamas. The United States and European countries have held meetings with non-Hamas members of the new government, while Israel continues to rule out all contact with PA ministers. Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, are pressing for recognition of the new government and an end to the international boycott. Some observers believe Saudi efforts to gain acceptance of the unity government and restart Israeli-Palestinian peace talks may be an effort to set the price for Saudi cooperation on other U.S. policies in the region. In 2006, Congress passed P.L. 109-446 , the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, to tighten existing restrictions on aid to the Palestinians. In 2007, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.R. 1856 , which would amend the original Act to further restrict contact with and assistance to the PA. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42082 | crs_R42082_0 | This report, consisting primarily of a table showing proposed and enacted discretionary appropriations by bill title, is intended to allow for broad comparison between the House and Senate FY2012 proposals, the Administration's FY2012 request, and the FY2011 and FY2012 enacted appropriations. FY2012 Appropriations Legislation
Table 1 displays discretionary appropriations as provided in proposed and enacted FY2012 appropriations legislation, by bill title, together with the appropriations enacted for FY2011. As noted above, the figures do not necessarily reflect all budget scoring adjustments and adjustments allowable under the Budget Control Act of 2011. | This report presents an overview of proposed and enacted FY2012 appropriations legislation. The report consists primarily of a table showing discretionary appropriations, by bill title, for each of the proposed and enacted appropriations bills, together with the comparable figures enacted for FY2011. The product is intended to allow for broad comparison between the House and Senate FY2012 proposals, the Administration's FY2012 request, and the FY2011 and FY2012 enacted appropriations. The figures do not necessarily reflect budget scorekeeping adjustments allowable under the Budget Control Act.
With action now completed on FY2012 appropriations, there will be no further updates to this report. |
crs_R42754 | crs_R42754_0 | U.S. government public diplomacy is defined in different ways, but broadly it is a term used to describe efforts to conduct U.S. foreign policy and promote U.S. national interests through direct outreach and communication with the population of a foreign country. Public diplomacy activities, conducted by the Department of State and U.S. diplomatic personnel abroad, include providing information to foreign publics through broadcast and Internet media and at libraries and other outreach facilities in foreign countries; conducting cultural diplomacy, such as art exhibits and music performances; and administering international educational and professional exchange programs. In addition to State Department and U.S. foreign mission public diplomacy efforts, the U.S. government sponsors international broadcasting overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), since 1999 an independent executive branch agency led a bipartisan board. Today, the State Department leads U.S. public diplomacy efforts, while the independent BBG runs U.S. international broadcasting. The provisions of the act were incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2013 ( H.R. The Modernization Act's inclusion in the NDAA has fostered debate and analysis over what effect, if any, a removal of the domestic dissemination ban in these provisions would have on State Department communications both domestic and foreign, and broadcasts from Voice of America and other BBG-supervised broadcasters. The U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948
The term "Smith-Mundt" often refers only to prohibitions on disseminating information created by the U.S. government intended to influence foreign audiences. Zorinsky Amendment
Section 208 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, popularly known as the Zorinsky Amendment, prohibits the use of public diplomacy funds "to influence public opinion in the United States." Duplication of Effort— Because of the numerous changes to the bureaucratic structure of U.S. public diplomacy, as well as the overlap of communications activities of State Department domestic public affairs activities with its foreign public diplomacy activities, the ban on domestic dissemination may require different offices within the State Department to replicate communications and information products for separate domestic and foreign consumption. 5736 and Section 1097 of H.R. Removing the Ban on Domestic Dissemination of Information
The proposed restatements of Smith-Mundt Section 501 and the Zorinsky Amendment primarily would remove the prohibition on making public diplomacy materials available to domestic audiences while retaining the prohibition on influencing public opinion in the United States. Second, the restated provision invokes the afore-discussed Sections 502 and 1005 of the Smith-Mundt Act calling for utilization of private media in disseminating international information program materials authorized by the act: "Such material may be made available within the United States and disseminated, when appropriate, pursuant to sections 502 and 1005 of the [Smith-Mundt Act]...."
Clarifying Scope of Application
The Section 501 restatement would clarify international information program authority to include the BBG as well as the Secretary of State, reflecting the BBG's status as an independent government agency following the 1999 restructuring of certain foreign policy entities. 2681-761; 22 U.S.C. Proponents of the amendments assert that these international information materials are primarily explanations of U.S. government policies, as well as information that describes American cultures, the U.S. political system, and U.S. history. 101-246 ; 22 U.S.C. While this merging of foreign and domestic audiences may merely reflect a reality about the current global reach of almost every type of information and communication technology, it can be argued that it might pose a problem for the established historical mission of U.S. public diplomacy and U.S. international broadcasting in informing foreign publics about the United States to advance U.S. foreign policy and national interests. §1461-1a)
Sec. | Public diplomacy involves U.S. government activities to conduct U.S. foreign policy and promote U.S. national interests through direct outreach and communication with the population of foreign countries. Public diplomacy and international broadcasting activities, conducted by the Department of State, U.S. diplomatic personnel abroad, and U.S. international broadcasters such as the Voice of America, include providing information to foreign publics through broadcast and Internet media and at libraries and other outreach facilities in foreign countries; conducting cultural diplomacy, such as art exhibits and music performances; and administering international educational and professional exchange programs.
For decades, Congress has enacted legislative provisions concerning U.S. government communications to U.S. domestic audiences that prohibit influencing public opinion through unauthorized publicity or propaganda. In the case of U.S. public diplomacy and international broadcasting, two additional legislative provisions prohibit the dissemination and general availability of communications and related materials intended for foreign publics to U.S. domestic audiences: Section 501 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 ("Smith-Mundt Act"; P.L. 80-402, 22 U.S.C. §1461) as well as Section 208 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 ("Zorinsky Amendment"; P.L. 99-93; 22 U.S.C. §1461-1a).
Proposed in the 112th Congress, the Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 (H.R. 5736), and identical provisions included at Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2013 (NDAA; H.R. 4310), would amend and restate these two legislative provisions restricting domestic availability and dissemination of communications created by the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to target and influence foreign publics. The proposed amendments to these provisions would remove the prohibition on domestic dissemination of public diplomacy information produced by the Department of State and the BBG intended for foreign audiences, while maintaining the prohibition on using public diplomacy funds to influence U.S. public opinion.
Proponents of amending these two sections argue that the ban on domestic dissemination of public diplomacy information is impractical given the global reach of modern communications, especially the Internet, and that it unnecessarily prevents valid U.S. government communications with foreign publics due to U.S. officials' fear of violating the ban. They assert as well that lifting the ban will promote the transparency in the United States of U.S. public diplomacy and international broadcasting activities conducted abroad. Critics of lifting the ban state that it may open the door to more aggressive U.S. government activities to persuade U.S. citizens to support government policies, and might also divert the focus of State Department and the BBG communications from foreign publics, reducing their effectiveness.
For further discussion of the Smith-Mundt Act's domestic dissemination ban as well as general information on U.S. public diplomacy and international broadcasting, see CRS Report R40989, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and Current Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. For explanation of legislative restrictions on U.S. government communications to domestic audiences, see CRS Report RL32750, Public Relations and Propaganda: Restrictions on Executive Agency Activities, by [author name scrubbed] (pdf). For a discussion of the NDAA, see CRS Report R42607, Defense: FY2013 Authorization and Appropriations, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33125 | crs_RL33125_0 | As in the past several years, security concerns have figured prominently in the development of and debate on immigration legislation in the 109 th Congress. In May 2005, the REAL ID Act became law as Division B of the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief ( P.L. It contains a number of immigration and identification document-related provisions intended to improve homeland security. The security-related issue of immigration enforcement continues to be on the congressional agenda. Various bills have been introduced that address enforcement-related issues, including border security; the roles of the U.S. military, civilian patrols, and state and local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement; smuggling; detention; and the enforcement of prohibitions on employing unauthorized workers. Fencing provisions similar to those in H.R. The FY2007 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-295 ) contains several security-related provisions, including border tunnel provisions like those in S. 2611 . In addition, the House has passed a number of other enforcement-related measures, among them H.R. 6094 , H.R. 6095 , H.R. This bill contained provisions on border enforcement, interior enforcement, and unlawful employment of aliens, as well as on guest workers, legal permanent immigration reform, unauthorized aliens in the United States, and other issues. While major immigration reform proposals remain pending, Congress has enacted limited provisions on temporary and permanent employment-based immigration as part of P.L. 109-13 and P.L. It also has enacted legislation concerning alien victims of domestic violence, trafficking in persons, and refugees. Changes to Laws on Asylum and Other Forms of Relief from Removal
The REAL ID Act makes a number of changes to Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provisions concerning asylum and other forms of relief from removal. It requires states to adopt certain practices and procedures regarding the verification of documents used to obtain drivers' licenses and ID cards, and establishes minimum issuance standards for state-issued drivers' licenses and personal identification cards, if such documents are to be accepted for official federal purposes. Some border security provisions in H.R. 109-367 ). 4830 , H.R. Another border-security related provision in P.L. 6162 . 109-364 , does not include this provision. Immigration reform bills containing guest worker and worksite enforcement-related provisions have been introduced in the 109 th Congress. 4437 . 4437 , as passed by the House, and S. 2611 , as passed by the Senate, would variously build on past legislative efforts, most recently the REAL ID Act, to tighten current law in the areas of illegal presence and illegal entry; alien voluntary departure and removal from the United States; alien exclusion from, or inadmissibility to, the United States; and judicial review. Expedited Removal
H.R. 4437 and S. 2611 would expand expedited removal. 4437 . Among the other pending bills to establish new temporary workers visas are S. 1033 / H.R. In addition, P.L. P.L. 109-13 (H.R. P.L. 109-102 (H.R. 109-149 (H.R. 109-162 (H.R. P.L. 109-164 (H.R. P.L. 109-271 (S. 3693)
Makes technical corrections to P.L. | Security concerns have figured prominently in the development of and debate on immigration legislation in the 109th Congress. In May 2005, the REAL ID Act became law as Division B of P.L. 109-13. It contains a number of immigration and identification document-related provisions intended to improve homeland security. Among these are provisions: to make changes to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) with respect to asylum and other forms of relief from removal; to expand the terrorism-related grounds for alien inadmissibility and deportation; and to set standards for state-issued drivers' licenses and personal identification cards, if such documents are to be accepted for federal purposes.
The security-related issue of immigration enforcement remains on Congress's agenda. H.R. 4437, as passed by the House, contains provisions on border security, the role of state and local law enforcement, employment eligibility verification and worksite enforcement, smuggling, detention, and other enforcement-related issues. In addition to these provisions, H.R. 4437 contains significant and, in some cases, highly controversial provisions on unlawful presence, voluntary departure and removal, expedited removal, and denying U.S. entry to nationals from uncooperative countries. Despite efforts by some House Members to amend H.R. 4437 to establish new guest worker programs, the bill does not contain any such provisions. S. 2611, as passed by the Senate, combines provisions on enforcement and on unlawful presence, voluntary departure and removal, expedited removal, and denying U.S. entry to nationals from uncooperative countries with provisions on legal temporary admissions, including guest workers, and legal permanent admissions. S. 2611 also would establish legalization programs to enable certain groups of unauthorized aliens in the United States to obtain legal permanent resident (LPR) status.
The 109th Congress has enacted some border security-related provisions. P.L. 109-295, the FY2007 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, includes border tunnel provisions like those in S. 2611, as well as other enforcement-related provisions. P.L. 109-367 includes border fencing provisions similar to those in H.R. 4437. In addition, the House has passed other bills with border security and enforcement-related provisions (H.R. 4830, H.R. 6094, H.R. 6095, H.R. 6160, H.R. 6162).
The 109th Congress also has enacted limited provisions on temporary and permanent employment-based immigration as part of P.L. 109-13 and P.L. 109-364.
Among the other immigration bills that have received action are measures on alien victims of domestic violence (P.L. 109-162, P.L. 109-271, and S. 1197), trafficking in persons (P.L. 109-162, P.L. 109-164, and S. 1197), and refugees (P.L. 109-102 and P.L. 109-149).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL31879 | crs_RL31879_0 | Title I: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
Section 101 establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (Board), a new,independent regulatory body, to oversee the auditing of issuers (publiccompanies which are subject to the federal securities laws). Section 103 requires the Board to establish by rule such quality control standards to be used by registered public accounting firms in the preparation and issuing ofaudit reports, as required by the Act or the rules of the Commission or as necessary or appropriate in the publicinterest or for the protection of investors. The SEC may also accept gifts and bequests for this fund. � 1350, dealing with corporate responsibility for financial reports. �� 78m(a) or 78o(d) and the compliance of those reports with statutory requirements in 18 U.S.C. TheU.S. � 78j(b)) or related rules or regulations from actingas an officer or director of any issuer of a classregistered under Section 12 (15 U.S.C. Under Section 1106 of the Act, the criminal penalties available under 15 U.S.C. Selected Bills Introduced in the 108th Congress
H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. S. 183 , referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, would amend the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers' Act of 1940 to allow the SEC to imposea civil monetary penalty (increased penaltyamounts specified in the bill) if it finds that a person is violating, has violated, or is or was a cause of the violationof the statute or any rule or regulation and thatthe penalty is in the public interest. | On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, P.L. 107-204 . This law has been described by some as the most important andfar-reaching securities legislation since passage of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. �� 77a et seq .,and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. �� 78a et seq ., both of which were passed in the wake of the Stock Market Crash of 1929.
The Act establishes a new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board which is to be supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Act restrictsaccounting firms from performing a number of other services for the companies which they audit. The Act alsorequires new disclosures for public companies andthe officers and directors of those companies. Among the other issues affected by the new legislation are securitiesfraud, criminal and civil penalties for violatingthe securities laws and other laws, blackouts for insider trades of pension fund shares, and protections for corporatewhistleblowers.
The 108th Congress is also concerned with corporate responsibility, and several bills affecting such issues as SEC staffing, financial report certification, andcorporate expatriation have been introduced. These include H.R. 275 , H.R. 657 , H.R. 658 , H.R. 746 , H.R. 1000 , S. 183 , S. 476 , and S. 513 . |
crs_RL34689 | crs_RL34689_0 | Introduction
Over the past 13 years, the price of crude oil has generally been increasing and volatile. Five companies—ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips—earned a predominant share of those profits. Numerous bills have been introduced in the Congress over this period to tax the oil and gas industry's record profits. In the case of the five major oil companies over this period, the increase in revenues was largely price-driven, with quantities of oil produced largely stagnant. While revenues increased by 86% from 2003 to 2008, net income increased by a greater percentage, on average 108%, except for ConocoPhillips, which can be considered as a special case in 2008. A type of windfall profits tax on domestic crude oil production was in effect from April 1980 to August 1988. There were two types of windfall profits tax bills in the 109 th Congress: those that would have imposed an excise tax on windfall profits based on the price of crude oil, and those that would have imposed an income tax on windfall profits based on either the existing tax law's definition of corporate taxable income or excessive rates of return. One goal of a WPT could be to tax profits that are price driven, or those that are not the result of additional output or investment. The following sections examine the possible output and price effects of the different types of WPT, and explore which type of WPT is more likely to minimize economic distortions. In economic terms, oil producers would likely view the tax as an increase in the marginal, or incremental, cost of domestic oil production—the marginal cost of producing every barrel of taxable crude oil would be higher by the amount of the excise tax. Oil Imports and Energy Independence
If the domestic supply of oil was reduced in response to an excise tax on domestically produced oil, the demand for imported oil and petroleum products would likely increase, unless some other policy would concomitantly reduce the demand for petroleum to offset a tax-induced reduced supply. A repeal of the § 199 deduction could apply to all oil and gas producers, as proposed in the President's FY2012 budget, or apply only to major integrated oil companies, as proposed in the Close Big Oil Tax Loopholes Act ( S. 940 ). Instead, the repeal can be viewed as a way of using the existing corporate income tax system to increase the tax burden on the oil industry, and recoup some of any potential windfall or excess profits in the form of corporate income taxes. The market price of crude oil and natural gas, or even of refined petroleum products, such as gasoline, would not be expected to increase very much, if at all, by such a change in the short-run. Possible Revenue Effects
A WPT on crude oil could generate sizeable revenues depending on the tax rate and the tax base. | Over the past 13 years, surging crude oil and petroleum product prices have increased oil and gas industry revenues and generated record profits, particularly for the top five major integrated companies, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips. These companies, which reported a predominant share of those profits, generated more than $104 billion in profit on nearly $1.8 trillion of revenues in 2008, before declining as a result of the recession and other factors. From 2003 to 2008, revenues increased by 86%; net income (profits) increased by 66%. Oil output by the five major companies over this time period declined by more than 7%, from 9.85 million to 9.12 million barrels per day. In 2010 the companies' oil production was 9.4 million barrels per day. Being largely price-driven, with no accompanying increase in output resulting from increased investment in exploration and production, some believe that a portion of the increased oil industry income over this period represents a windfall and unearned gain. A windfall income is not earned as a result of additional production effort on the part of the firms, but due primarily to record crude oil prices, which are set in the world oil marketplace.
Since the 109th Congress, numerous bills have been introduced seeking to impose a windfall profits tax (WPT) on oil. An excise-tax based WPT would tax only domestic production and, like the one in effect from 1980-1988, would increase marginal oil production costs. Theoretically, such a policy could reduce domestic oil supply, which could raise petroleum imports, making the United States more dependent on foreign oil, undermining goals of energy independence and energy security. By contrast, an income-tax based WPT would likely be more economically neutral (less economic distortion) in the short-run. Sizeable tax revenues could potentially be raised without reducing domestic oil supplies. Neither the excise-tax based nor income-tax based WPT are expected to have significant price effects. Neither tax would increase the price of crude oil, which means that refined petroleum product prices, such as pump prices for gasoline, would likely not increase.
In lieu of these two types of WPT, an administratively simple way of increasing the tax burden on the oil industry, and therefore recouping some of any excess or windfall profits, particularly from major integrated producers, would be to raise the effective corporate tax rate. One option would be repealing or reducing the domestic manufacturing activities deduction under IRC § 199. The 112th Congress voted on this measure as part of the Close Big Oil Tax Loopholes Act (S. 940). Going forward, in the context of deficit reduction, the 112th Congress may continue evaluating various methods for increasing taxes on the oil and gas industry to address concerns surrounding possible windfall profits. |
crs_R44959 | crs_R44959_0 | Confederate flags, statues, plaques, and similar memorials have been valued historical symbols for some Americans, but for others have symbolized oppression and discrimination. Congress is considering the role of Confederate symbols on federal lands and in federal programs. While no comprehensive inventory of such symbols exists, numerous federal agencies administer assets or fund activities in which Confederate memorials and references to Confederate history are present. The National Park Service (NPS, within the Department of the Interior), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Department of the Army within the Department of Defense (DOD) all administer national cemeteries that sometimes display the Confederate flag. The presence of Confederate symbols on federal lands, and at some nonfederal sites that receive federal funding, may raise multiple questions for Congress. How should differing views on the meaning of these symbols be addressed? Which symbols, if any, should be removed from federal sites, and which, if any, should be preserved for their historical or honorary significance? Should federal agencies give additional attention to education and dialogue about the conflicted history of these symbols—including their role in Civil War history and in subsequent historical eras—or are current interpretive efforts adequate? How, if at all, should current practices of honoring the Confederate dead in national cemeteries be changed? To what extent, if any, should the presence of Confederate symbols at nonfederal sites affect federal funding for programs connected to these sites? This report focuses primarily on Confederate symbols administered by three federal entities—NPS, the VA, and DOD. Each of these entities manages multiple sites or programs that involve Confederate symbols. 115th Congress
In the 115 th Congress, H.R. H.R. H.Res. H.R. National Park Service Policies and Issues
NPS manages over 70 units of the National Park System related to Civil War history, some of which contain works commemorating Confederate soldiers or actions. Additionally, NPS administers 14 national cemeteries that, under agency policy, may display the Confederate flag at certain times of year. The agency also provides education and interpretation related to Civil War history and the Confederate states. NPS policies address the display of Confederate flags at the graves of Confederate soldiers in NPS national cemeteries. Some legislation has sought to withhold funding for the maintenance of any Confederate symbols in national park units, other legislation to withhold funding for certain NPS uses of Confederate symbols outside of a historic context, other legislation to remove particular Confederate symbols, and still other legislation to maintain the status quo in terms of these symbols' presence in the park system. Proposals concerning Confederate symbols at NPS sites arise in the context of the agency's mission to preserve its historic and cultural resources unimpaired for future generations. State Veterans' Cemeteries
The NCA is authorized to provide grants to state, territorial, or tribal governments to assist with the establishment of state veterans' cemeteries. The VA website identifies 34 monuments and memorials in national cemeteries that explicitly honor Confederate soldiers, sailors, political leaders, or veterans. 3660 , which references Confederate symbols, raises questions about how existing headstones, monuments, and memorials would be treated within the context of maintaining national cemeteries as "national shrines," as well as whether or not future headstones issued by the VA for unmarked Confederate graves should include the Southern Cross of Honor. Military Installations
Currently there are 10 major Army installations in southern states named after Confederate military leaders and no such installations for the other military departments. H.R. Legislation in the 115 th Congress would address Confederate symbols in different ways. Proposals range from those concerned with individual Confederate symbols to those that would broadly affect all Confederate symbols on federal lands. In some cases, questions could arise about how the proposals would be implemented from a logistical and financial standpoint, and how they would interact with existing authorities. | In the wake of violent incidents in which symbols of the Civil War Confederacy have played a role, Congress is considering the relationship of Confederate symbols to federal lands and programs. A number of federal agencies administer assets or fund activities in which Confederate memorials and references to Confederate history are present. This report focuses on three federal entities—the National Park Service (NPS), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Department of Defense (DOD)—that manage multiple sites or programs involving Confederate symbols. The report discusses the agencies' policies concerning Confederate symbols, recent legislative proposals, and issues for Congress.
NPS manages over 70 units of the National Park System related to Civil War history, some of which contain works commemorating Confederate soldiers or actions. NPS also administers national cemeteries that display the Confederate flag at certain times. Further, the agency is connected with some state and local Confederate memorials through its historic preservation assistance to nonfederal sites. NPS manages its Confederate-related assets in the context of its statutory mission to preserve historic and cultural resources unimpaired for future generations. NPS engages in interpretation and education about these symbols.
Through its National Cemetery Administration, the VA administers 135 national cemeteries, many of which contain the remains of Confederate soldiers. The VA also provides grants to assist with the establishment of state veterans' cemeteries. Confederate graves in VA cemeteries may have a special headstone that includes the Southern Cross of Honor, and may display the Confederate flag at certain times. The VA website also identifies 34 monuments and memorials in national cemeteries that explicitly honor Confederate soldiers or officials. Management takes place in the context of the VA's mandate to maintain national cemeteries as "national shrines."
Within DOD, the Army administers 10 major installations named after Confederate military leaders; there are no such installations for the other military departments. The Army also has jurisdiction over Arlington National Cemetery, which contains a section for Confederate graves and a monument to Confederate dead. More broadly, the military services have considered Confederate symbols in the context of policies for good order and discipline within units. Only the Navy has an overall policy on the display of the Confederate flag.
The presence of Confederate symbols in federal lands and programs may raise multiple questions for Congress. Confederate flags, statues, plaques, and similar memorials have been valued historical symbols for some Americans, but for others have symbolized oppression and discrimination. How should differing views on the meaning of these symbols be addressed? What constitutes a Confederate symbol, and should some or all of these symbols be removed from federal sites, or alternatively, preserved for their historical or honorary significance? Are current interpretive efforts adequate to convey the history of these symbols, or should federal agencies offer additional education and dialogue about their role in Civil War history and in subsequent historical eras? How, if at all, should current practices of honoring the Confederate dead in national cemeteries be changed? To what extent, if any, should the presence of Confederate symbols at nonfederal sites affect federal funding for programs connected to these sites?
Recent legislative proposals, including H.R. 3658, H.R. 3660, H.R. 3701/S. 1772, H.R. 3779, and H.Res. 12 in the 115th Congress, would address these issues in different ways. They range from bills concerned with individual Confederate symbols to those that would broadly affect all Confederate symbols on federal lands. In some cases, questions could arise about how the proposals would be implemented from a logistical and financial standpoint, and how they would interact with existing authorities. |
crs_R42326 | crs_R42326_0 | Background
For decades, federal policymakers and state administrators of governmental assistance programs, such as the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grants (formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)), the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly Food Stamps), the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program, and their precursors have expressed concern about the "moral character" and worthiness of beneficiaries. For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 made individuals who have three or more convictions for certain drug-related offenses permanently ineligible for various federal benefits. A provision in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 explicitly authorizes states to test TANF beneficiaries for illicit drug use and to sanction recipients who test positive. In part prompted by tight state and federal budgets and increased demand for federal and state governmental assistance resulting from precarious economic conditions, some policymakers have shown a renewed interest in conditioning the receipt of governmental benefits on passing drug tests. For example, in February 2012, the President signed into law an amendment to the Social Security Act that authorizes states to condition the receipt of certain unemployment compensation benefits on passing drug tests. Additionally, lawmakers in a majority of states reportedly proposed legislation in 2011, 2012, 2013, and/or 2014 that would require drug testing beneficiaries of governmental assistance under certain circumstances, while at least 12 state governments over that time have enacted such legislation. Federal or state laws that condition the initial or ongoing receipt of governmental benefits on passing drug tests without regard to individualized suspicion of illicit drug use may be subject to constitutional challenge. Constitutional challenges to suspicionless governmental drug testing most often focus on issues of personal privacy and Fourth Amendment protections against "unreasonable searches." To date, two state laws requiring suspicionless drug tests as a condition to receiving governmental benefits have sparked litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court has not rendered an opinion on such a law; however, the Court has issued decisions on drug testing programs in other contexts that have guided the few lower court opinions on the subject. For searches to be reasonable, they generally must be based on individualized suspicion unless the government can show a special need warranting a deviation from the norm. However, governmental benefit programs like TANF, SNAP, unemployment compensation, and housing assistance do not naturally evoke the special needs that the Supreme Court has recognized in the past. Thus, if lawmakers wish to pursue the objective of reducing the likelihood of taxpayer funds going to individuals who abuse drugs through drug testing, legislation is less likely to run afoul of the Fourth Amendment if it only requires individuals to submit to a drug test based on an individualized suspicion of drug use, for example by providing that only those TANF applicants whom administrators have a "reasonable cause to believe" use illegal drugs be drug tested. Therefore, governmental drug testing procedures that restrict the sharing of test results and that limit the negative consequences of failed tests to the assistance program in question likely would be on firmer constitutional ground. | For decades, federal policymakers and state administrators of governmental assistance programs, such as the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grants (formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)), the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly Food Stamps), the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program, and their precursors, have expressed concern about the "moral character" and worthiness of beneficiaries. For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 made individuals who have three or more convictions for certain drug-related offenses permanently ineligible for various federal benefits. A provision in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 went a step further by explicitly authorizing states to test TANF beneficiaries for illicit drug use and to sanction recipients who test positive. Some policymakers have shown a renewed interest in conditioning the receipt of governmental benefits on passing drug tests. For example, in February 2012, the President signed into law an amendment to the Social Security Act that authorizes states to condition the receipt of certain unemployment compensation benefits on passing drug tests. Additionally, lawmakers in a majority of states reportedly proposed legislation in 2011, 2012, 2013, and/or 2014 that would require drug testing beneficiaries of governmental assistance under certain circumstances, while at least 12 state governments over that time have enacted such legislation.
Federal or state laws that condition the initial or ongoing receipt of governmental benefits on passing drug tests without regard to individualized suspicion of illicit drug use may be subject to constitutional challenge. To date, two state laws requiring suspicionless drug tests as a condition to receiving governmental benefits have sparked litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court has not rendered an opinion on such a law; however, the Court has issued decisions on drug testing programs in other contexts that have guided the few lower court opinions on the subject.
Constitutional challenges to suspicionless governmental drug testing most often focus on issues of personal privacy and Fourth Amendment protections against "unreasonable searches." For searches to be reasonable, they generally must be based on individualized suspicion unless the government can show a "special need" warranting a deviation from the norm. However, governmental benefit programs like TANF, SNAP, unemployment compensation, and housing assistance do not naturally evoke special needs grounded in public safety or the care of minors in the public school setting that the Supreme Court has recognized in the past. Thus, if lawmakers wish to pursue the objective of reducing the likelihood of taxpayer funds going to individuals who abuse drugs through drug testing, legislation that only requires individuals to submit to a drug test based on an individualized suspicion of drug use is less likely to run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, governmental drug testing procedures that restrict the sharing of test results and limit the negative consequences of failed tests to the assistance program in question would be on firmer constitutional ground.
Numerous CRS reports focusing on policy issues associated with governmental benefit programs also are available, including CRS Report R40946, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R42505, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): A Primer on Eligibility and Benefits, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34591, Overview of Federal Housing Assistance Programs and Policy, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33362, Unemployment Insurance: Programs and Benefits, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31399 | crs_RL31399_0 | Introduction
Article I, Section 7, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, is known generally as the "Origination Clause" because it requires that
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. As with many provisions of the Constitution, the precise meaning and application of these few words has been refined through practice and precedent since it was first ratified. Interpreting the Origination Clause
Although the application of the Origination Clause was discussed at the Philadelphia convention, the Constitution does not provide specific guidelines as to what constitutes a bill for raising revenue. The House
As it is the House that is most frequently called upon to enforce the Origination Clause, its precedents have played a primary role in defining what makes a bill for raising revenue. In both instances the House applies a broad standard, based on whether the measure in question has revenue-affecting potential, and not simply whether it would raise or lower revenues directly. For example, any change in import restrictions may be regarded by the House as falling within the purview of the Origination Clause, because it could have an impact on tariff revenues. House precedent, as articulated by the policy of recent Speakers of the House, construes the chamber's prerogatives broadly to include "any meaningful revenue proposal," but may also include other types of receipts which may not fall strictly within a technical definition of revenues. The court's understanding of the Origination Clause is therefore based on two central principles that tend to narrow its application to fewer classes of legislation than the House: (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure, rather than an incidental effect; and (2) the resulting funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the government generally, rather than a single, specific purpose. Enforcing the Origination Clause
The House
The House's primary method for enforcement of the Origination Clause is through a process known as "blue-slipping." Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives as defined by the Origination Clause. The House may also refer a questionable Senate measure to a committee. The Senate
According to Riddick ' s Senate Procedure , when a question is raised in the Senate regarding the constitutionality of a measure, including whether the measure contravenes the Origination Clause, it is submitted directly to the Senate for its determination. Such a point of order generally would be debatable and decided by majority vote. In most instances in which the courts have ruled with regard to Origination Clause matters, it has been as to whether the particular measure was a revenue bill within the meaning of the clause, not as to the question of its origin. The House took no action on this proposal. | Article I, Section 7, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution is known as the Origination Clause because it provides that "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." The meaning and application of this clause has evolved through practice and precedent since the Constitution was drafted.
The Constitution does not provide specific guidelines as to what constitutes a "bill for raising revenue." This report analyzes congressional and court precedents regarding what constitutes such a bill. The precedents and practices of the House apply a broad standard and construe the House's prerogatives broadly to include any "meaningful revenue proposal." This standard is based on whether the measure in question has revenue-affecting potential, and not simply whether it would raise or lower revenues directly. As a result, the House includes within the definition of revenue legislation not only direct changes in the tax code, but also any fees paid to the government that are not payments for a specific service, and any change in import restrictions, because of the potential impact on tariff revenues. The precedents of the Senate reflect a similar understanding. The Supreme Court has occasionally ruled on Origination Clause matters, adopting a definition of revenue bills that is based on two central principles that tend to narrow its application to fewer classes of legislation than the House: (1) raising money must be the primary purpose of the measure, rather than an incidental effect; and (2) the resulting funds must be for the expenses or obligations of the government generally, rather than a single, specific purpose.
Second, this report describes the various ways in which the Origination Clause has been enforced. Given the fact that originating revenue measures is the House's prerogative, it falls to the House to enforce this provision of the Constitution most frequently. The House's primary method for enforcement is through a process known as "blue-slipping." Blue-slipping is the term applied to the act of returning to the Senate a measure that the House has determined violates its prerogatives. This is done by voting on a privileged resolution. Less typically, the House may choose to enforce its prerogative by taking no action on the disputed Senate measure, or referring it to committee. The Senate may also address whether a measure contravenes the Origination Clause. As with any question of constitutionality, it may be submitted directly to the Senate for its determination. Such a question would be debatable and decided by majority vote. The Supreme Court has a role in enforcing the Origination Clause as well, as it would in any question of constitutionality.
Finally, this report looks at the application of the Origination Clause to other types of legislation. It examines precedents concerning public debt legislation, as well as the unanswered question of whether the Origination Clause grants the House the exclusive prerogative to originate bills to appropriate money, as well as to raise revenues.
This report will be updated to reflect any changes in practice. |
crs_RL34740 | crs_RL34740_0 | The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA, Division A of H.R. 110-343 ) established numerous reporting requirements regarding a variety of issues. Other reporting requirements are given to agencies and officials who existed before the enactment of EESA (e.g., the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller General of the United States). The recipients of these reports also vary, as well as their timing, frequency, and factors that trigger their development. These differences notwithstanding, all of the EESA reports appear to share a common purposeâto provide information to Congress and other entities on the implementation of the act's provisions. Section 105(b) (Tranche Reports)
Section 105(b)(1) of the act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to provide to the "appropriate committees of Congress"
a written report, including (A) a description of all of the transactions made during the reporting period; (B) a description of the pricing mechanism for the transactions; (C) a justification of the price paid for and other financial terms associated with the transactions; (D) a description of the impact of the exercise of such authority on the financial system, supported, to the extent possible, by specific data; (E) a description of challenges that remain in the financial system, including any benchmarks yet to be achieved; and (F) an estimate of additional actions under the authority provided under this Act that may be necessary to address such challenges. No single entity receives all of the EESA-required reports. Also, it is not readily apparent why some of the reports are filed with the set of "appropriate committees," some to a subset of those committees, and some to Congress as a whole. Many of the act's reporting requirements seem to address the same or similar issues. The number and variety of the required reports may have been intended to provide a variety of perspectives on the implementation of EESA, but the lack of integration of those requirements may make understanding the implementation of the act difficult. Also, given the nature of the "troubled assets" being purchased under the TARP (i.e., bank stock instead of mortgages or other instruments related to mortgages), it is unclear whether some of the reporting requirements are still relevant to the activities being carried out. Other information that is not specifically required by the act may be more useful to Congress and others as they oversee the implementation of the program. Also, although Section 2(2)(D) of EESA says one of the purposes of the legislation is to provide "public accountability" for the use of the act's authorities, only one of the reports is required by EESA to be made to the public. Some of the reports are required to be submitted to the recipients relatively quickly, and some of the reporting deadlines have already occurred. On the other hand, some of the reports are not required for years. In some cases, however, the starting points for the reporting deadlines are unclear. Finally, some of the reporting requirements (e.g., those placed on the Secretary by Section 105) expire on the date that the last troubled asset is sold or transferred, or the date that the last insurance contract expires. | The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA, Division A of H.R. 1424 , P.L. 110-343 ) established numerous reporting requirements regarding a variety of issues, and many of those reports have already been published. The entities charged with preparation of these reports include both new entities established by the act (e.g., the Financial Stability Oversight Board and the Congressional Oversight Panel) as well as agencies and officials who existed before the enactment of EESA (e.g., the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller General of the United States). The recipients of these reports also vary, as well as their timing, frequency, and factors that trigger their development. These differences notwithstanding, all of the EESA reports appear to share a common purposeâto provide information to Congress and other entities on the implementation of the act's provisions.
No single entity receives all of the EESA-required reports. It is not readily apparent why some of the reports are to be sent to a particular set of eight "appropriate committees," some to a subset of those committees, and some to Congress as a whole. Although one of the purposes of the legislation is to provide "public accountability" for the use of EESA authorities, only one of the reports is required to be made to the public. Some of the reports are required to be submitted very quickly, but other reports are not required for years. Some of the reporting requirements are recurring (e.g., every 30 days, or quarterly), while others are one-time requirements. Most of the requirements include clear starting points for the submission of the reports, but in some cases, the starting points are unclear.
Many of the act's reporting requirements seem to address the same or similar issues. The number and variety of the required reports may have been intended to provide a variety of perspectives on the implementation of EESA, but the lack of integration of those requirements may make understanding the implementation of the act difficult. Also, given the nature of the "troubled assets" currently being purchased under the act (i.e., bank stock instead of mortgages or other instruments related to mortgages), it is unclear whether some of the specific requirements are still relevant. Other information that is not specifically required by the act (e.g., how the federal funds are being used by the recipients) may be more helpful to Congress and others as they conduct oversight of the program. Finally, some of the reporting requirements expire on the date that the last troubled asset is sold or transferred, or the date that the last insurance contract expires. Without some kind of a lag period for these requirements, a complete history of the transactions may not be provided.
This report will be updated when new information becomes available. |
crs_RL34124 | crs_RL34124_0 | Incidents of seafood fraud have included the following:
serving lower-priced seafood as higher-priced items; marketing mislabeled seafood products; transshipping products to avoid antidumping and countervailing duties; and overtreating products and labeling seafood packages with inaccurate counts or weights. On a broader scale, seafood fraud has been linked to international concerns with illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The memorandum calls on executive departments and agencies to use existing authorities to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud. However, some segments of the seafood industry have questioned whether IUU fishing and seafood fraud should be addressed as part of the same initiative. They contend that although sometimes related, IUU fishing and seafood fraud are different issues and should be addressed as such. Some have questioned whether FDA has sufficient resources to carry out its responsibilities to enforce laws related to seafood fraud. 609 and S. 287 ) and two bills that focus on seafood ( S. 190 and H.R. 3282 ) have been introduced. S. 190 would seek to improve seafood safety by requiring equivalent standards in exporting countries, increasing inspections of exporting facilities, and inspecting and testing at least 20% of seafood imports. H.R. 3282 would seek to improve seafood safety and prevent seafood fraud by requiring coordination of inspection activities through the National Sea Grant Program, developing a list of exporters that violate U.S. seafood safety laws, and including seafood fraud detection and prevention during seafood safety inspections. H.R. 3282 also would add new seafood traceability requirements. To date, no action has been taken on any of these bills. Seafood fraud-related issues that may receive further attention during the 114 th Congress include whether
federal agencies are collaborating effectively; greater authority is needed to improve traceability of seafood through the supply chain; penalties for seafood fraud offenses are a deterrent; and resources for federal agency detection and enforcement are sufficient. Laws and Agency Responsibilities
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act
The primary federal law that addresses mislabeling and safety of food is the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FFDCA; 21 U.S.C. §§301 et seq.). Food and Drug Administration
FDA is the primary agency responsible for ensuring that food sold in interstate commerce is safe and properly labeled. Most independent reports indicate that the level of fraud can be significant. Recent comments submitted to the presidential task force on combating IUU fishing and seafood fraud by the Southern Shrimp Alliance stated that greater efforts are needed to stop short-weighting of seafood products. However, NFI has not been an advocate for new seafood fraud laws. Administration Initiative
On June 17, 2014, President Obama released a presidential memorandum entitled "Comprehensive Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud." The memorandum also established a task force composed of senior-level federal agency representatives to develop recommendations for a comprehensive framework that targets IUU fishing and seafood fraud. On March 15, 2015, the task force released its final recommendations, which included both international and domestic measures. | Fraudulent seafood sales and marketing—the act of defrauding buyers of seafood for economic gain—has been widely reported and has gained greater public attention in recent years. The extent of seafood fraud is difficult to determine because of its clandestine nature; fraud depends on not being detected, which often depends on not attracting attention or causing immediate harm to customers. Seafood fraud can include a variety of illegal activities, such as transshipping products to avoid antidumping and countervailing duties; mislabeling products or substituting one species for another; overtreating products with water-retaining chemicals; and short-weighting products. Although not illegal, some treatments, such as carbon monoxide/tasteless smoke, are being questioned for their potential to deceive consumers.
The primary federal law that addresses seafood safety and fraud is the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FFDCA; 21 U.S.C. §§301 et seq.). FFDCA prohibits the misbranding or adulteration of food products, including seafood products that have been mislabeled, substituted, or overtreated. FFDCA provides the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of the Department of Health and Human Services with the primary responsibility for ensuring that domestic and imported foods, including seafood, are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly labeled.
Observers have questioned whether greater coordination among federal agencies is needed, whether agency enforcement efforts targeting seafood fraud are sufficient, whether greater authorities are needed to trace seafood from its source to consumers, and whether the penalties for committing seafood fraud are adequate. Some consumer and environmental groups have called on federal agencies to aggressively enforce existing laws and on Congress to pass legislation that targets seafood fraud. Some in the seafood industry have supported industry initiatives to stop seafood fraud, but in most cases they have not advocated for new federal authorities.
On June 17, 2014, President Obama released a presidential memorandum entitled "Comprehensive Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud." The memorandum calls on executive departments and agencies to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and seafood fraud by strengthening coordination and using existing authorities. The President also established a task force composed of senior-level federal agency representatives to develop recommendations for a comprehensive framework that targets IUU fishing and seafood fraud. On March 15, 2015, the task force released its final recommendations, which included both international and domestic measures. Some segments of the seafood industry have questioned whether IUU fishing and seafood fraud should be addressed as part of the same initiative. They contend that although sometimes related, IUU fishing and seafood fraud are different issues and should be considered separately.
In the 114th Congress, two bills related to seafood (S. 190 and H.R. 3282) have been introduced. S. 190 would seek to improve seafood safety by requiring equivalent standards in exporting countries, increasing inspections of exporting facilities, and inspecting and testing at least 20% of seafood imports. H.R. 3282 would focus on both seafood safety and seafood fraud by requiring coordination of inspection activities through the National Sea Grant Program, maintaining a list of exporters that violate U.S. seafood safety laws, and including seafood fraud detection and prevention during seafood safety inspections. H.R. 3282 also would add new seafood traceability requirements. To date, no action has been taken on either bill. |
crs_R41483 | crs_R41483_0 | Introduction
Congressional interest in the availability of lower-cost versions of biologic drugs (biologics) led to the 2010 enactment of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA), which was incorporated as Title VII of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The BPCIA included three significant components. First, the BPCIA established an expedited licensure pathway for competing versions of previously marketed biologics. The BPCIA also created FDA-administered periods of data protection and marketing exclusivity for certain brand-name drugs and follow-on products. Finally, the BPCIA created a patent dispute resolution procedure for use by brand-name and follow-on biologic manufacturers. The term "biologics" refers to a category of medical treatments derived from living organisms. In particular, these medicines have added notable therapeutic options for many diseases and impacted fields such as oncology and rheumatology. Some biologics are particularly costly. But commentators have often observed that, in contrast to the generic drugs available in traditional pharmaceutical markets, few "follow-on" biologics compete with the original, brand-name product. The lack of competition in the biologics markets is perceived to be a consequence of the distinct technical and legal aspects from the regulation of traditional, chemically based pharmaceuticals. The 111 th Congress accounted for these distinctions when it enacted the BPCIA. Traditional pharmaceuticals fall under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). The 2010 legislation establishes a regulatory regime for two sorts of follow-on biologics, termed "biosimilar" and "interchangeable" biologics respectively. The FDA is afforded a prominent role in determining the particular standards for biosimilarity and interchangeability for individual products. First Interchangeable Products
The BPCIA also provides for a term of regulatory exclusivity for the applicant that is the first to establish that its product is interchangeable with the brand-name product for any condition of use. The Potential Market for Follow-On Biologics
A core issue concerning the BPCIA is its ability to preserve innovation while also stimulating competition in the biologics market. The unique nature of biologics and their manufacture may militate against the type of savings generated by small-molecule generics. According to some experts:
The economics of the small-molecule generics market likely will not be transferrable to the follow-on biologics market. Resolution of the scientific and legal issues that this legislation raises will likely engage the courts and the FDA for many years to come. It may also take some time for members of the biologics industry to develop a working familiarity and appropriate strategies within the BPCIA framework. As a result, marketplace availability of significant numbers of follow-on biologics may well be a long-term proposition. | The term "biologics" refers to a category of medical preparations derived from a living organism. These medicines have added notable therapeutic options for many diseases and impacted fields such as oncology and rheumatology. The biologics industry invests extensively in R&D and contributes to a rapidly expanding market for these treatments. Biologics are often costly, however, in part due to the sophistication of the technologies and the manufacturing techniques needed to make them.
Some commentators have also observed that, in contrast to the generic drugs available in traditional pharmaceutical markets, few "follow-on" biologics compete with the original, brand-name product. The lack of competition in the biologics markets is perceived to be a consequence of the complexity of biologics in comparison with small-molecule, chemical-based pharmaceuticals. As a result, previously existing accelerated marketing provisions for traditional generic drugs provided under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act do not comfortably apply to biologics.
Congress turned to these concerns when it enacted the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) of 2009. The BPCIA was incorporated into Title VII of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The BPCIA included three significant components. First, the BPCIA established a licensure pathway for competing versions of previously marketed biologics. In particular, the legislation established a regulatory regime for two sorts of follow-on biologics, termed "biosimilar" and "interchangeable" biologics. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was afforded a prominent role in determining the particular standards for biosimilarity and interchangeability for individual products.
Second, the BPCIA created FDA-administered periods of regulatory exclusivity for certain brand-name drugs and follow-on products. The BPCIA also provides for a term of regulatory exclusivity for the applicant that is the first to establish that its product is interchangeable with the brand-name product. Finally, the BPCIA created a patent dispute resolution procedure for use by brand-name and follow-on biologic manufacturers.
A core issue concerning the BPCIA is its ability to preserve innovation while also stimulating competition in the biologics market. Some observers believe that due to the unique nature of biologics and their manufacture, the follow-on biologics market may not yield the same level of savings seen with small-molecule generic drugs. In contrast with traditional generic drugs, more clinical trials may be required, manufacturing methods may be more difficult to replicate in distinct facilities, and follow-on firms may be exposed to higher marketing costs. Whether industry will make extensive use of the BPCIA's follow-on approval pathway also is not yet certain.
Resolution of the scientific and legal issues that the BPCIA raises will likely engage the courts and the FDA for many years to come. It may also take some time for members of the biologics industry to develop a working familiarity and appropriate strategies within the BPCIA framework. As a result, marketplace availability of significant numbers of follow-on biologics may not be a short-term proposition. |
crs_R43339 | crs_R43339_0 | Bitcoin first appeared in January 2009, the creation of a computer programmer using the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto. His invention is an open source (its controlling computer code is open to public view), peer to peer (transactions do not require a third-party intermediary such as PayPal or Visa), digital currency (being electronic with no physical manifestation). The Bitcoin system is private, but with no traditional financial institutions involved in transactions. Unlike earlier digital currencies that had some central controlling person or entity, the Bitcoin network is completely decentralized , with all parts of transactions performed by the users of the system. The buyer and seller interact directly (peer to peer), but their identities are encrypted and no personal information is transferred from one to the other. However, unlike a fully anonymous transaction, there is a transaction record. A full transaction record of every Bitcoin and every Bitcoin user's encrypted identity is maintained on the public ledger. For this reason Bitcoin transactions are thought to be pseudonymous, not anonymous. What Is the Scale of Bitcoin Use? The Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy to affect the flow of money and credit to the economy to achieve stable prices, maximum employment, and financial market stability. Lower Transaction Costs for Electronic Economic Exchanges
Because there is no third-party intermediary, Bitcoin transactions are purported to be substantially less expensive for users than those using traditional payments systems such as Paypal and credit cards, which charge merchants significant fees for their role as a trusted third-party intermediary to validate electronic transactions. In addition, Bitcoin's advantage in transaction cost could be offset by the substantial volatility of Bitcoin's price. No Erosion of Purchasing Power by Inflation
Inflation is defined as a broad increase in the prices of goods and services. There are a number of factors that could discourage widespread use of Bitcoin. | Bitcoin first appeared in January 2009, the creation of a computer programmer using the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto. His invention is an open-source (its controlling computer code is open to public view), peer-to-peer (transactions do not require a third-party intermediary such as PayPal or Visa) digital currency (being electronic with no physical manifestation). The Bitcoin system is private, with no traditional financial institutions involved in transactions. Unlike earlier digital currencies that had some central controlling person or entity, the Bitcoin network is completely decentralized, with all parts of transactions performed by the users of the system.
With a Bitcoin transaction there is no third-party intermediary. The buyer and seller interact directly (peer to peer), but their identities are encrypted and no personal information is transferred from one to the other. However, unlike a fully anonymous transaction, there is a transaction record. A full transaction record of every Bitcoin and every Bitcoin user's encrypted identity is maintained on the public ledger. For this reason, Bitcoin transactions are thought to be pseudonymous, not anonymous. Although the scale of Bitcoin use has increased substantially, it still remains small in comparison to traditional electronic payments systems, such as credit cards, and the use of dollars as a circulating currency.
Congress is interested in Bitcoin because of concerns about its use in illegal money transfers, concerns about its effect on the ability of the Federal Reserve to meet its objectives (of stable prices, maximum employment, and financial stability), and concerns about the protection of consumers and investors who might use Bitcoin.
Bitcoin offers users the advantages of lower transaction costs, increased privacy, and long-term protection of loss of purchasing power from inflation. However, it also has a number of disadvantages that could hinder wider use. These include sizable volatility of the price of Bitcoins, uncertain security from theft and fraud, and a long-term deflationary bias that encourages the hoarding of Bitcoins.
In addition, Bitcoin raises a number of legal and regulatory concerns, including its potential for facilitating money laundering, its treatment under federal securities law, and its status in the regulation of foreign exchange trading. |
crs_RL34144 | crs_RL34144_0 | Introduction
The international saga of Andrew Speaker, a traveler thought to have XDR-TB, an extensively drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, placed a spotlight on existing mechanisms to contain contagious disease threats and raised numerous legal and public health issues. This report presents the factual situation presented by Andrew Speaker, an analysis of various public health emergency measures available to contain emergent public health threats when individuals with serious communicable diseases attempt to use public transportation such as commercial aviation, and legal issues related to the use of such public health measures. Other forms of transportation, such as buses and trains, are not covered by the DNB list. Constitutional Rights to Due Process and Equal Protection
Constitutional rights to due process and equal protection may be implicated by the imposition of a quarantine or isolation order. | The international saga of Andrew Speaker, a traveler thought to have XDR-TB, a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, placed a spotlight on existing mechanisms to contain contagious disease threats and raised numerous legal and public health issues. This report presents the factual situation presented by Andrew Speaker. It also discusses the application of various public health measures available to contain an emerging public health threat posed by an individual who ignores medical advice and attempts to board an airplane or take other forms of public transportation. These measures include quarantine and isolation authorities, the "Do Not Board" List, and application of certain provisions of the International Health Regulations. This report also examines constitutional issues relating to due process and equal protection. Legal issues which may be raised by application of federal nondiscrimination laws when emergency public health measures are used to contain emerging public health threats are also discussed. |
crs_R43092 | crs_R43092_0 | Introduction
On October 1, 2015, under the authority of Sections 108 and 109 of the Clean Air Act (CAA) as amended, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ground-level ozone from the then-current level of 75 parts per billion (ppb) to 70 ppb. As described in detail below (see " Implementation of the 2015 Standards "), under the CAA, revision of the standards sets in motion a process in which states and EPA identify areas that do not meet the standards ("nonattainment areas") and the states prepare implementation plans to demonstrate how emissions will be lowered sufficiently to reach attainment in those areas. These health effects include aggravated asthma, chronic bronchitis, and heart attacks, and in some cases premature death. California was excluded from EPA's estimate of both costs and benefits of the nationwide standard, because most areas of the state will have until the 2030s to reach attainment of the NAAQS. In the RIA, EPA estimated the economic value of the benefits of reducing ozone concentrations to 70 ppb (for areas other than California) at $2.9-$5.9 billion annually by 2025, with costs at $1.4 billion annually in 2025. The actual nonattainment designations promulgated in 2018 are in most cases based on 2014-2016 monitoring data and include just over 200 counties or partial counties in 22 states and the District of Columbia, plus two tribal areas. These national standards apply to products that contribute to ozone and other criteria pollution (particularly mobile sources, such as automobiles) and to stationary emission sources (such as power plants). As a result, a more stringent primary standard and a different version of the secondary standard were proposed in January 2010. EPA staff also recommended strengthening the primary standard. The impact of these regulations on wintertime ozone concentrations is yet to be determined, but interestingly the Upper Green River Basin, which was designated nonattainment under the 2008 ozone NAAQS, has been designated attainment for the 2015 standard. The dollar value of the avoided premature deaths accounts for 94% to 98% of EPA's total monetized benefits. California and Other Regional Costs and Benefits
EPA provided separate cost and benefit estimates for California. H.R. The House passed H.R. The agency did not agree. As noted earlier, the House passed H.R. The requirements were not finalized. 806 (Representative Olson), the Ozone Standards Implementation Act, would delay the deadline for designation of nonattainment areas under the 2015 ozone NAAQS revision until October 2025 and the date for State Implementation Plan revisions under the standard until October 2026; would require future reviews of the NAAQS at 10-year rather than five-year intervals; would allow the Administrator to consider, as a secondary consideration, likely technological feasibility in establishing and revising primary NAAQS in cases where the Administrator concludes that a range of levels of air quality for a pollutant are requisite to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety; would require the Administrator to publish regulations and guidance for implementing a new or revised NAAQS concurrently with the publication of the standard; would make changes to EPA's authority to exclude from air quality monitoring data used to determine attainment of NAAQS certain data influenced by "exceptional events"; would require a report to Congress on the impact of emissions originating outside the United States on attainment and maintenance of NAAQS; and other provisions. | Implementation of revised ozone standards by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is now moving forward, after the agency designated 52 areas with just over 200 counties or partial counties and two tribal areas as "nonattainment" for the standards. The standards—formally known as National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ground-level ozone—are standards for outdoor (ambient) air. In 2015, EPA tightened both the primary (health-based) and secondary (welfare-based) standards from 75 parts per billion (ppb) to 70 ppb after concluding that protecting public health and welfare requires lower concentrations of ozone than were previously judged to be safe. Ozone aggravates heart and lung diseases and may contribute to premature death; the primary standard addresses these concerns. Ozone can also have negative effects on forests and crop yields, which the secondary NAAQS is intended to protect.
The designated nonattainment areas include counties in 22 states and the District of Columbia. Most of these areas have had previous experience as nonattainment for earlier versions of the NAAQS. Designation as nonattainment imposes more stringent permitting and pollution control requirement for new and modified stationary sources of emissions as compared with the requirements in areas that are in attainment of the NAAQS, and requires the development of State Implementation Plans demonstrating how emissions will be reduced sufficiently to reach attainment.
EPA estimates the cost of meeting the 70 ppb standard in all states except California at $1.4 billion annually in 2025. Because most California areas would have until the 2030s to reach attainment, EPA provided separate cost estimates for California ($0.80 billion annually, post-2025). These cost estimates are substantially less than those from the National Association of Manufacturers and other industry sources, which have been widely cited. The benefits of reducing ozone concentrations were estimated by EPA at $2.9-$5.9 billion annually by 2025. The dollar value of avoided premature deaths accounts for 94% to 98% of this estimate.
The agency projects that most areas will be able to reach attainment of the new standards by 2025 as a result of already promulgated regulations for gasoline, autos, power plants, and other emission sources. These regulations are being implemented independently of the 2015 NAAQS revision.
Members of Congress have shown particular interest in whether the expected benefits of the standards justify their projected costs. There is controversy over the methods used to estimate both costs and benefits. As the Clean Air Act is currently written, however, the agency is prohibited from weighing costs against benefits in setting NAAQS standards. The statute simply directs EPA to set the primary standard at a level requisite to protect public health, allowing an adequate margin of safety.
Various interest groups have lobbied against strengthening the standards. In the 115th Congress, the House has passed H.R. 806 to delay implementation of the 2015 NAAQS until the mid-2020s and to make changes to the process of future NAAQS revisions. The House Appropriations Committee reported a similar delay as a rider to EPA's 2018 appropriation (in Section 432 of H.R. 3354), but the final version of the appropriation (in H.R. 1625/P.L. 115-141) did not include the rider. |
crs_RS22973 | crs_RS22973_0 | Although the Obama Administration has indicated that it will seek to continue the nuclear negotiations, it has not indicated how the issue of human rights will be addressed. The passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 ( H.R. 4011 ; P.L. 110 - 346 ) serve as the most prominent examples of legislative action on these issues. The reauthorization bill explicitly criticizes the implementation of the original law and reasserts Congressional interest in adopting human rights as a major priority in U.S. policy toward North Korea. The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Policy Toward North Korea under the Bush Administration
In the first several years of the Bush Administration, high-level officials, including the President and Secretary of State, publicly and forcefully criticized the regime in Pyongyang for its human rights practices. The legislation
authorized up to $20 million for each of the fiscal years 2005-2008 for assistance to North Korean refugees, $2 million for promoting human rights and democracy in North Korea and $2 million to promote freedom of information inside North Korea; asserted that North Koreans are eligible for U.S. refugee status and instructs the State Department to facilitate the submission of applications by North Koreans seeking protection as refugees; and required the President to appoint a Special Envoy to promote human rights in North Korea. Changes in South Korea's Approach? | As the incoming Obama Administration conducts a review of U.S. policy toward North Korea, addressing the issue of human rights and refugees remains a priority for many members of Congress. The passage of the reauthorization of the North Korean Human Rights Act in October 2008 (P.L. 110-346) reasserted congressional interest in influencing executive branch policy toward North Korea. In addition to reauthorizing funding at original levels, the bill expresses congressional criticism of the implementation of the original 2004 law and adjusts some of the provisions relating to the Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea and the U.S. resettlement of North Korean refugees. Some outside analysts have pointed to the challenges of highlighting North Korea's human rights violations in the midst of the ongoing nuclear negotiations, as well as the difficulty in effectively reaching North Korean refugees as outlined in the law. Further, the law may complicate coordination on North Korea with China and South Korea. At this point, it remains unclear what focus the Obama Administration will place on human rights and refugees as it takes over the nuclear negotiations. For more information, please see CRS Report RL34189, North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Options, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R45087 | crs_R45087_0 | Definition of Censure
Censure is a reprimand adopted by one or both chambers of Congress against a Member of Congress, President, federal judge, or other government official. While the censure of a sitting Member of Congress is considered a formal disciplinary action, non -Member censure is simply used to highlight conduct deemed by the House or Senate to be inappropriate or unauthorized. This complicates efforts to identify all attempts to censure the President. Both Member and non-Member censure resolutions are usually simple resolutions. Resolutions That Censure a Representative or a Senator
Simple resolutions that censure a Member of Congress for "disorderly behavior"—that is, resolutions carrying out the function of disciplining a Member under the Constitution—are privileged for consideration in both the House and Senate. Such resolutions include the requirement that the offending Member stand in the well of the House as the resolution of censure is read aloud by the Speaker. Thus, they are considered under the regular parliamentary mechanisms used to process "sense of" legislation. History of Presidential Censure Attempts, 1789-2016, 1st-114th Congresses
As stated earlier, there is no uniform language of censure. Using these criteria, CRS identified 13 former Presidents who were the subject of censure attempts while in office: 11 by resolutions of censure, one via a House committee report, and another through an amendment to an unrelated resolution. On four occasions, the House or Senate adopted resolutions that, in their original form, charged the President with abuse of power. Otherwise, presidential censure resolutions have remained in committee without further consideration or were not adopted in a floor vote. | Censure is a reprimand adopted by one or both chambers of Congress against a Member of Congress, President, federal judge, or other government official. While Member censure is a disciplinary measure that is sanctioned by the Constitution (Article 1, Section 5), non-Member censure is not. Rather, it is a formal expression or "sense of" one or both houses of Congress. As such, censure resolutions targeting non-Members use a variety of statements to highlight conduct deemed by the resolutions' sponsors to be inappropriate or unauthorized.
Resolutions that attempt to censure the President for abuse of power, ethics violations, or other behavior, are usually simple resolutions. These resolutions are not privileged for consideration in the House or Senate. They are, instead, considered under the regular parliamentary mechanisms used to process "sense of" legislation.
Since 1800, Members of the House and Senate have introduced resolutions of censure against at least 12 sitting Presidents. Two additional Presidents received criticism via alternative means (a House committee report and an amendment to a resolution).
The clearest instance of a successful presidential censure is Andrew Jackson. A resolution of censure was approved in 1834. On three other occasions, critical resolutions were adopted, but their final language, as amended, obscured the original intention to censure the President.
In the remaining cases, resolutions remained in committee, without further consideration, or were not adopted in a floor vote. Nevertheless, presidential censure attempts have become more frequent since the Richard Nixon era.
This report summarizes the procedures that may be used to consider resolutions of censure and the history of attempts to censure the President (1st-114th Congresses). It also provides citations to additional reading material on the subject. |
crs_R41673 | crs_R41673_0 | Introduction
On June 22, 2010, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) published a proposed rule on the implementation of regulations dealing with livestock marketing practices as mandated by Title XI (Livestock) of the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 farm bill; P.L. 110-246 ). The proposed rule amends the regulations (9 C.F.R. to describe and clarify conduct that violates the P&S Act. On December 9, 2011, USDA issued the final rule on livestock and poultry marketing practices. The rule went into effect on February 7, 2012. It included four provisions from the proposed rule, addressing suspension of the delivery of birds, additional capital investment, remedy of breach of contract, and arbitration. A similar House bill ( H.R. The farm bill also added Section 209 to the P&S Act to include provisions about the choice of law and venue in a contract dispute. The farm bill specifically directed the Secretary of Agriculture to establish criteria in four areas: first, criteria to determine if producers or growers are treated with undue or unreasonable preference or advantage; second, criteria to determine whether poultry dealers give enough notice to poultry growers before suspending the delivery of birds; third, criteria to determine if required additional capital investments during a poultry or swine contract were a violation of the P&S Act; and fourth, criteria to determine if poultry growers or swine producers are given enough time to remedy a breach of contract before contracts are terminated. Arbitration
In Section 201.219 of the proposed rule, GIPSA set the criteria to be used to ensure that contract growers have a meaningful opportunity to participate in arbitration. 112-55 . The fourth provision on arbitration addressed Section 11005 of the 2008 farm bill, which required the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations to carry out the arbitration amendment to the P&S Act and to establish criteria to determine that poultry growers and livestock producer are able to participate in the arbitration process. According to proponents, the proposed rule would bring fairness to contracts and reshape interactions between producers and large meat packers and processors, especially for poultry growers who rely almost entirely on contracts. GIPSA argued in its discussion of the proposed rule that USDA has long believed that unfair or deceptive practices or unreasonable or discriminatory preferences (Sections 202 (a) and (b) of the P&S Act) can be a violation of the P&S Act without a finding of harm to competition. Also, the proposed provision would require creating new records, which was not the intent of the proposed rule. Provisions in the FY2012, FY2013, FY2014, and FY2015 appropriations acts did not address the proposed rule on recordkeeping. The 113 th Congress continued to enact the prohibitions in appropriations bills for FY2013 through FY2015, and included provisions to rescind parts of the finalized rule in FY2013 and FY2015. The GIPSA rule was part of the farm bill debate, as House-passed measures in the 2012 and 2013 farm bill versions would have permanently prevented USDA from finalizing and implementing the GIPSA rule or issuing similar rules in the future. The three provisions were the definition of the "suspension of delivery of birds" (§201.2(o)), the provision that made the rule applicable to live poultry (§201.3(a)), and the 90-day notification period required when a poultry company intends to suspend the delivery of birds to a grower (§201.215(a)). 933 , the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, included language to continue the prohibitions on finalizing and implementing parts of the GIPSA rule, and rescinded three of USDA's finalized provisions. On February 5, 2015, USDA issued a final rule that permanently removed the three rescinded provisions from regulations. FY2016 Appropriations
The enacted Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ) does not include a GIPSA rider prohibiting USDA from finalizing and implementing rules on livestock and poultry marketing. The Senate-passed 2013 farm bill ( S. 954 ) did not contain provisions similar to the House versions. In the end, the farm bill conference report for the Agriculture Act of 2014 ( P.L. 2642 . | The 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246) included new provisions that amended the Packers and Stockyards Act (P&S Act) to give poultry and swine growers the right to cancel contracts, to require that poultry processors clearly disclose to growers additional required capital investments, to set the choice of law and venue in contract disputes, and to give poultry and swine growers the right to decline an arbitration clause that requires arbitration to resolve contract disputes. The farm bill required USDA to propose rules to implement these provisions.
On June 22, 2010, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) published a proposed rule to implement regulations (9 C.F.R. 201) on livestock and poultry marketing practices as mandated by the 2008 farm bill. The proposed rule, commonly referred to as the "GIPSA rule," added new regulations to clarify conduct that violates the P&S Act. The P&S Act regulations are used by USDA to ensure fair competition in livestock and poultry markets.
In what some saw as a major change from current practice, GIPSA proposed that a violation of the P&S Act does not require a finding of "harm or likely harm to competition." The proposed rule set criteria for "unfair, discriminatory, and deceptive practices" and "undue or unreasonable preference or advantages" that violate the P&S Act. The proposed rule also included arbitration provisions to ensure that contract growers have a meaningful opportunity to participate in arbitration and the right to decline arbitration.
According to proponents of the proposed rule implementing the farm bill provisions, the rule brought fairness to contracts and reshaped interactions between producers and large meat packers and poultry processors. Opponents argued that the proposed rule went far beyond the intent of Congress in the 2008 farm bill, and that the rule altered business practices to the detriment of producers, consumers, and the industries.
USDA issued a final rule on December 9, 2011, which went into effect on February 7, 2012. The final rule, a significant modification of the proposed rule, included four provisions that address, respectively, suspension of the delivery of birds, additional capital investments, remedy of breach of contract, and arbitration.
In November 2011, before USDA finalized the GIPSA rule, Congress passed the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-55), which prohibited USDA from finalizing or implementing the most contentious parts of the rule. Congress continued to enact such appropriations riders in FY2013, FY2014, and FY2015.
In addition, the FY2013 and FY2015 appropriations acts included language to rescind three provisions that USDA had finalized in 2011. These were the definition of the "suspension of delivery of birds," the 90-day notification period required when a poultry company intends to suspend the delivery of birds to a grower, and the provision that made the rule applicable to live poultry. In February 2015, USDA removed the three provisions from its regulations.
For the first time in four years, the enacted Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) did not include a GIPSA rider prohibiting USDA from finalizing and implementing rules on livestock and poultry marketing.
Also, the GIPSA rules were addressed during the debate over the 2014 farm bill. Section 12102 of the House-passed 2013 farm bill (H.R. 2642) permanently prohibited USDA from finalizing or implementing GIPSA provisions that have been temporarily halted in appropriations acts. The Senate-passed farm bill (S. 954) did not contain a similar provision. The House GIPSA provision was not included in the conference report for the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79). |
crs_R42753 | crs_R42753_0 | Rather than being as a completely new entity, the department was established by assembling existing parts of 22 different federal agencies and departments into a new framework. In 2004, the Coast Guard (one of the larger components of the newly minted DHS) began to explore how to meet its needs for new headquarters facilities. This need would be used to help advocate for the consolidated headquarters project in future years. Since that year, Administrations of both parties have requested funding for this initiative to support a coordinated construction plan. However, this project has not received consistent funding—over 70% of the funding it has received so far came in FY2009 when a surge of supplemental funding combined with the regular appropriations for GSA and DHS provided almost $1.1 billion for the project. On September 23, 2011, the House Committee Transportation and Infrastructure's Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation held a hearing to review the status of the DHS headquarters consolidation project, focusing on the move of the Coast Guard to St. Elizabeths, and the effect it would have on the Coast Guard's budget and operations. In January 2014, the majority staff of the House Committee on Homeland Security released "Reality Check Needed: Rising Costs and Delays in Construction of New DHS Headquarters at St. Elizabeths," a report that expressed concerns about the continuation of the project as envisioned given budgetary constraints, noting in the summary:
The Committee recognizes the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) need to consolidate activities to increase the Department's efficiency and improve its operations and coordination. National Operations Center
Currently, DHS operates a National Operations Center (NOC) at the Nebraska Avenue Complex. Both have been the targets of terrorist attacks. Delays in the completion of new space requires these offices to use more short-term leases, which are more expensive, and thus raise the department's overhead costs. The following four examples of possible ways forward are discussed below:
Going No Further —consolidating the Coast Guard headquarters on the St. Elizabeths campus, but not proceeding with the rest of the project; Going Further, with DHS as Sole West Campus Tenant —Proceeding with the next phase of the project as envisioned; Going Further, with DHS Sharing the West Campus —downscoping the projected DHS presence at St. Elizabeths, but developing the rest of the secure campus for use by other federal partners; Going Further, and Expediting C ompletion —going beyond the existing funding baseline and taking steps to accelerate full consolidation. This option would seem to provide the maximum operational return, providing the infrastructure requested by DHS in its plans for a consolidated headquarters, establishing the departmental operations center, and shortening the time frame between its stand-up and the move of additional component headquarters functions to the campus. As such, if seen to completion, pursuing this option could help reduce barriers to information flow, support coordinated planning, and promote the development of a "One DHS" culture. It is worth noting that making a decision to proceed or not with DHS headquarters consolidation on the West Campus St. Elizabeths will not make certain costs vanish. Whatever course Congress chooses to follow, costs will be rebalanced between a number of types of expenses: construction and move costs for a consolidated headquarters; continued rents for leases across the National Capital Region for maintaining existing headquarters facilities; or the possible (and more difficult to quantify) security, management, communications, logistics, and command and control impacts presented by both the status quo or any proposed change. The need for the continuing missions of the DHS components, the existence of DHS as an entity, and the realities of putting St. Elizabeths back to productive use drive these costs—even an optimally efficient mix of these investments will still result in significant costs to the federal government. Already, based on the delay in finalizing the 2011 bill and the reduced resources provided in that bill for DHS headquarters construction activities, the cost of the headquarters project has grown by $200 million, from a total cost of $3.4 billion to $3.6 billion. | The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established in early 2003, bringing together existing parts of 22 different federal agencies and departments in a new framework of operations. In its first few years, the department was reorganized multiple times, and more focus was given to ensuring its components were addressing the perceived threats facing the country rather than to addressing the new organization's management structure and headquarters needs. Therefore, the consolidation of physical infrastructure that one might expect in creating an operation of such size and breadth did not occur at that time.
As the Coast Guard began to plan consolidating its leases on headquarters facilities into secure federally owned space, DHS was finding its original headquarters space at the Nebraska Avenue Complex too limited to meet its evolving needs. In 2006, the George W. Bush Administration proposed combining the two projects into one $3.45 billion headquarters consolidation project on the West Campus of St. Elizabeths Hospital in Anacostia.
Since that year, Administrations of both parties have requested funding for this initiative. Thus far, the project has received $495 million from DHS and $1,063 million from the General Services Administration (GSA), for a total of $1,558 million through FY2014. Most of these resources have been allocated to the construction of a new consolidated headquarters for the Coast Guard on the campus, which opened on June 29, 2013.
However, this project has not received sustained funding from Congress—70% of the funding it has received so far came in FY2009 when a surge of supplemental funding combined with the regular appropriations for GSA and DHS provided $1.1 billion for the project. With the completion of its first key component, and the release of a new cost estimate reflecting a less aggressive construction plan, the debate over this project enters a new phase.
The purpose of this report is to outline the policy considerations to be evaluated in deciding whether to continue funding the consolidation of the remaining DHS headquarters functions at St. Elizabeths, and to explore some of the benefits and consequences of several possible ways forward.
The fate of this initiative could have significant impact on the department operationally, budgetarily, and culturally. Operationally, a consolidated headquarters could enhance management efficiency, provide a more capable departmental operations center to help coordinate the federal response to natural disasters and terrorist attacks, and provide a higher level of security for many DHS headquarters functions. Budgetarily, the department would benefit from reduced overhead costs in the long term, but would face significant pressure on its near term budget to see the construction through to completion. Culturally, the new headquarters could help promote the integration of the department's components into "One DHS," and have some direct and indirect contributions to improving departmental morale.
This report examines four potential ways forward for the headquarters project: Going no further than the Coast Guard headquarters phase; reducing the future DHS presence on the campus and sharing the site with other government agencies; proceeding with the project as outlined in the June 2013 baseline; and aggressively funding the project to accelerate completion.
Making a decision to proceed or not with DHS headquarters consolidation on the West Campus St. Elizabeths will not make certain costs vanish. Whatever course Congress chooses to follow, costs will be rebalanced between a number of types of expenses: construction costs, ongoing lease expenses, the costs of maintaining and restoring the West Campus of St. Elizabeths, and operational and management tradeoffs that are difficult to quantify. The need for the continuing missions of the DHS components, the existence of DHS as an entity, and the realities of putting St. Elizabeths back to productive use drive these costs—even an optimally efficient mix of these investments will still result in significant costs to the federal government. |