Datasets:

ngarneau

/

link_prediction_contrastive

like 0

54. Secondly, as is evident from the settled case-law of the Court, there can be only two kinds of restrictions on the rights conferred by the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 on members of a Turkish worker’s family who fulfil the conditions laid down in that paragraph, namely, either that based on the presence of the Turkish migrant in the host Member State where he constitutes, on account of his own conduct, a genuine and serious threat to public policy, public security or public health, in accordance with Article 14(1) of that decision, or that relating to the fact that the person concerned has left the territory of that State for a significant length of time without legitimate reason (see Ergat , paragraphs 45, 46 and 48; Cetinkaya , paragraphs 36 and 38; Aydinli , paragraph 27; and Torun , paragraph 21).

21. Thirdly, as regards the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80, it is settled case-law that the rights accorded by that provision to the members of a Turkish worker’s family who satisfy the conditions set out in that paragraph cannot be restricted except in accordance with Article 14(1) of that decision, namely on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, or because of the fact that the party concerned has left the territory of the host Member State for a significant length of time without legitimate reason (Case C-329/97 Ergat [2000] ECR I-1487, paragraphs 45, 46 and 48; Case C‑467/02 Cetinkaya [2004] ECR I-10895, paragraphs 36 and 38; and Case C‑373/03 Aydinli [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 27).

37 It follows that inasmuch as the contested decision concerns not only the sphere of vocational training but also that of scientific research, the Council did not have the power to adopt it pursuant to Article 128 alone and thus was bound, before the Single European Act entered into force, to base the decision on Article 235 as well . The Commission' s first submission that the legal basis chosen was unlawful must therefore be rejected . Statement of reasons

43. That distinctive character must be assessed, first, by reference to the goods or services in respect of which registration is sought and, second, by reference to the perception of the relevant public (see, in particular, Henkel v OHIM , paragraph 35; Case C-25/05 P Storck v OHIM [2006] ECR I-5719, paragraph 25, and Develey v OHIM , paragraph 79).

35. That distinctive character must be assessed, first, by reference to the products or services in respect of which registration has been applied for and, second, by reference to the perception of the relevant public, which consists of average consumers of the products or services in question, who are reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (see, inter alia, Linde , paragraph 41, and Case C‑363/99 Koninklijke KPN Nederland [2004] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 34).

99. As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, for the purposes of Article 87(3) EC, the Commission enjoys a wide margin of discretion, the exercise of which involves assessments of an economic and social nature which must be made within a Community context. The Court, in reviewing whether that freedom was lawfully exercised, cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the competent authority but must restrict itself to examining whether the authority’s assessment is vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of powers (see, in particular, Case C-310/99 Italy v Commission , paragraph 45, Case C-456/00 France v Commission [2002] ECR I-11949, paragraph 41, and Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission , paragraph 135).

83. In any event, in so far as the present ground of appeal is directed at paragraphs 93 and 94 of the judgment under appeal, it must be rejected as ineffective, since it relates to grounds included in the judgment purely for the sake of completeness which cannot lead to the judgment being set aside (see, in particular, judgment in Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, paragraph 148 and the case-law cited).

148. However, that is a complaint directed against a ground included in the judgment purely for the sake of completeness which cannot lead to the judgment being set aside and is therefore nugatory (see, in particular, Case C-184/01 P Hirschfeldt v EEA [2002] ECR I-10173, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

44. The Court has held that the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons would be compromised if the abolition of State barriers could be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by associations or organisations not governed by public law (see Walrave and Koch , paragraph 18, and Case C‑415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I‑4921, paragraph 83).

48. Again relying on the established case-law of the Court of Justice, the General Court noted, in paragraph 47 of the order under appeal, that where the liability of the Community has its origin in a legislative measure, the limitation period does not begin until the damaging effects of that measure have arisen (see Birra Wührer and Others v Council and Commission , paragraph 10; Case C-282/05 P Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission , paragraph 29) and that, similarly, in disputes arising from individual measures, the limitation period does not begin until the damage has actually materialised (Case C-282/05 P Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission , paragraph 30; Transports Schiocchet – Excursions v Commission , paragraph 33; and Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission , paragraph 38).

10 THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION WHICH APPLIES TO PROCEEDINGS IN MATTERS ARISING FROM THE NON-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF THE COMMUNITY THEREFORE CANNOT BEGIN BEFORE ALL THE REQUIREMENTS GOVERNING AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE ARE SATISFIED AND IN PARTICULAR BEFORE THE DAMAGE TO BE MADE GOOD HAS MATERIALIZED . ACCORDINGLY , SINCE THE SITUATIONS CONCERNED ARE THOSE IN WHICH THE LIABILITY OF THE COMMUNITY HAS ITS ORIGIN IN A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE , THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION CANNOT BEGIN BEFORE THE INJURIOUS EFFECTS OF THAT MEASURE HAVE BEEN PRODUCED , AND CONSEQUENTLY , IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THESE CASES , BEFORE THE TIME AT WHICH THE APPLICANTS AFTER COMPLETING THE TRANSACTIONS ENTITLING THEM TO THE REFUNDS , WERE BOUND TO INCUR DAMAGE WHICH WAS CERTAIN IN CHARACTER .

37. À cet égard, il est de jurisprudence constante que, dans le cadre d’une procédure en manquement au titre de l’article 258 TFUE, il incombe à la Commission d’établir l’existence du manquement allégué et d’apporter à la Cour les éléments nécessaires à la vérification par celle-ci de l’existence de ce manquement, sans que la Commission puisse se fonder sur une présomption quelconque (arrêt Commission/Royaume‑Uni, C‑530/11, EU:C:2014:67, point 60 ainsi que jurisprudence citée).

93. The question whether the grounds of a judgment of the General Court are contradictory is a question of law which, as such, is amenable to review on appeal (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 90 and the case-law cited).

90. The question whether the grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance are contradictory or inadequate is a question of law which is amenable, as such, to judicial review on appeal (see, inter alia, the judgment of 11 January 2007 in Case C-404/04 P Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission , paragraph 90).

70. In order to assess the degree of clarity of Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 and to determine whether or not the incompatibility of the national law with that article is manifest, the objectives of that directive, which is among the measures adopted for the complete liberalisation of telecommunications services and infrastructures and is intended to encourage the entry of new operators onto the market, must be taken into account (see, to that effect, Albacom and Infostrada , cited above in paragraph 35). In that regard, the imposition of a very high fee to cover an estimation of the general costs over a period of 30 years is such as to seriously impair competition, as the national court points out in its references for a preliminary ruling, and constitutes a relevant factor in that assessment.

15 According to settled case-law (see the judgment in Case C-80/92 Commission v Belgium [1994] ECR I-1019, paragraph 19), amendments made to national legislation are irrelevant for the purpose of giving judgment on the subject-matter of an action for failure to fulfil obligations if they have not been implemented before the expiry of the period set by the reasoned opinion.

19 As to that, it is sufficient to find that no amendment of the legislation at issue was implemented before the expiry of the period set by the reasoned opinion. In any event, such an amendment would be irrelevant for the purposes of giving judgment on the subject-matter of this action.

48. It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the terms used in a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must be given throughout the Community an autonomous and uniform interpretation, which must take into account the context of the provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (Case C-287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I‑6917, paragraph 43, and Case C‑290/03 Barker [2006] ECR I‑3949, paragraph 40).

29 It follows from the clear terms of Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29 that the private copying exception is intended exclusively for natural persons making, or having the capacity to make, reproductions of protected works or subject matter for private use and for purposes neither directly nor indirectly commercial (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 October 2010 in Padawan, C‑467/08, EU:C:2010:620, paragraphs 43 to 45 and 54 to 56, and 5 March 2015 in Copydan Båndkopi, C‑463/12, EU:C:2015:144, paragraphs 22 to 25 and 64).

24. In that regard, it is unnecessary to show that natural persons in fact make copies for private purposes with the aid of such equipment. Those persons are rightly presumed to benefit fully from the making available of that equipment, that is to say, they are deemed to take full advantage of the functions associated with that equipment, including copying (see, to that effect, judgment in Padawan , EU:C:2010:620, paragraphs 54 and 55).

32. In that regard, it is appropriate, first of all, to note that nothing in the wording of Directive 85/374 gives grounds for concluding that the EU legislature, in establishing producer liability for defective products, intended, so as to ensure undistorted competition and to facilitate the free movement of goods, to deny the Member States the power, as regards compensation for damage caused by a defective product used in the context of a service provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings, to provide for a system of liability on the part of the service provider corresponding to that established by Directive 85/374 (see, by analogy, Moteurs Leroy Somer , paragraph 30).

40. On the other hand, if the applicant calls in question the merits of the decision appraising the aid as such, the mere fact that it may be regarded as ‘concerned’ within the meaning of Article 88(2) EC cannot suffice for the action to be considered admissible. It must then demonstrate that it enjoys a particular status within the meaning of Plaumann v Commission . That would in particular apply where the applicant’s market position would be substantially affected by the aid to which the decision at issue relates (see, to that effect, Case 169/84 Cofaz and Others v Commission [1986] ECR 391, paragraphs 22 to 25, and Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum , paragraph 37).

23 MORE PARTICULARLY , AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES REFERRED TO IN THAT JUDGMENT , THE COURT HAS REPEATEDLY HELD THAT WHERE A REGULATION ACCORDS APPLICANT UNDERTAKINGS PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES ENTITLING THEM TO REQUEST THE COMMISSION TO FIND AN INFRINGEMENT OF COMMUNITY RULES , THOSE UNDERTAKINGS SHOULD BE ABLE TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS IN ORDER TO PROTECT THEIR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS ( JUDGMENTS OF 25 OCTOBER 1977 IN CASE 26/76 METRO V COMMISSION ( 1977 ) ECR 1875 , 5 OCTOBER 1983 IN CASE 191/82 FEDIOL V COMMISSION ( 1983 ) ECR 2913 , AND 11 OCTOBER 1983 IN CASE 210/81 DEMO-STUDIO SCHMIDT V COMMISSION ( 1983 ) ECR 3045 ).

57. It follows, in particular, that national support mechanisms for producers of electricity as referred to in Article 4 of Directive 2001/77, which are used inter alia to help Member States achieve their respective national indicative targets, must in principle lead to an increase in national production of green electricity (judgment in Essent Belgium , EU:C:2014:2192, paragraph 68).

41. Finally, contrary to the Commission’s submissions, it is clear from the Court’s settled case-law that the tax legislation of the Member States is capable of falling within Article 64(1) TFEU (see, inter alia, judgments in Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , C‑446/04, EU:C:2006:774, paragraphs 174 to 196; Holböck , C‑157/05, EU:C:2007:297, paragraphs 37 to 45; and Prunus and Polonium , C‑384/09, EU:C:2011:276, paragraphs 27 to 37).

39. However, it is clear from Article 57(1) EC that a Member State may, in its relations with non-member countries, apply restrictions on capital movements which come within the substantive scope of that provision, even though they contravene the principle of the free movement of capital laid down under Article 56 EC, provided that those restrictions already existed on 31 December 1993 ( Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraph 187).

26. It follows from the need for uniform application of Community law and the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community (Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11; Case C-287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I-6917, paragraph 43, and Case C‑357/98 Yiadom [2000] ECR I‑9265, paragraph 26).

22 As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, according to Article 96 of the VAT Directive, the same rate of VAT, that is the standard rate fixed by each Member State, is applicable to supplies of goods and services. By derogation from that principle, the possibility to apply reduced rates of VAT is provided for by virtue of Article 98 thereof. Annex III to that directive lists the categories of supplies of goods and services to which the reduced rates mentioned in Article 98 may apply (judgment of 9 March 2017, Oxycure Belgium, C‑573/15, EU:C:2017:189, paragraphs 20 and 21).

20 As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, according to Article 96 of the VAT Directive, the same rate of VAT, that is the standard rate fixed by each Member State, is applicable to supplies of goods and services (judgment of 4 June 2015, Commission v United Kingdom, C‑161/14, not published, EU:C:2015:355, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

30. As regards situations in which a worker was unable to take his days of paid annual leave because of sick leave, the Court has held, inter alia that although Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 does not preclude, as a rule, national legislation which lays down conditions for the exercise of the right to paid annual leave expressly conferred by the directive, including even the loss of that right at the end of a reference period or of a carry-over period, that finding is subject to the condition that a worker who has lost his right to paid annual leave must have actually had the opportunity to exercise the right conferred on him by that directive (see Schultz-Hoff and Others , paragraph 43, and KHS , paragraph 26).

33. Il convient de rappeler, à cet égard, que la Cour a déjà jugé que, dans le cadre de cette disposition, l’État membre demandeur peut, aux fins de justifier le maintien de dispositions nationales préexistantes, invoquer le fait qu’il évalue le risque pour la santé publique autrement que le législateur de l’Union ne l’a fait dans la mesure d’harmonisation, des évaluations divergentes de ces risques pouvant légitimement être effectuées, sans nécessairement être fondées sur des données scientifiques différentes ou nouvelles (arrêt Danemark/Commission, C‑3/00, EU:C:2003:167, point 63).

63. In addition, the applicant Member State may, in order to justify maintaining such derogating national provisions, put forward the fact that its assessment of the risk to public health is different from that made by the Community legislature in the harmonisation measure. In the light of the uncertainty inherent in assessing the public health risks posed by, inter alia , the use of food additives, divergent assessments of those risks can legitimately be made, without necessarily being based on new or different scientific evidence.

45. Finally, it is clear that the agreement was concluded for pecuniary interest. The pecuniary interest in a contract refers to the consideration paid to the contractor on account of the execution of works intended for the contracting authority (see, to that effect, Ordine degli Architetti and Others , paragraph 77). Under the terms of the agreement, SEDL is to receive a sum from the municipality of Roanne as consideration for the transfer of the car park. The municipality also undertakes to contribute to the costs of all the works to be executed. Finally, under the agreement, SEDL is entitled to obtain income from third parties as consideration for the sale of the works executed.

The criteria for assessing the distinctive character of three-dimensional trade marks consisting of the shape of the product itself are no different from those applicable to other categories of trade mark (judgments of 7 October 2004, Mag Instrument v OHIM, C‑136/02 P, EU:C:2004:592, paragraph 30, and of 12 January 2006, Deutsche SiSi-Werke v OHIM, C‑173/04 P, EU:C:2006:20, paragraph 27).

30. The criteria for assessing the distinctive character of three-dimensional marks consisting of the shape of the product itself are no different from those applicable to other categories of trade mark. None the less, for the purpose of applying those criteria, the relevant public's perception is not necessarily the same in the case of a three-dimensional mark consisting of the shape of the product itself as it is in the case of a word or figurative mark consisting of a sign which is independent from the appearance of the products it denotes. Average consumers are not in the habit of making assumptions about the origin of products on the basis of their shape or the shape of their packaging in the absence of any graphic or word element and it could therefore prove more difficult to establish distinctiveness in relation to such a three-dimensional mark than in relation to a word or figurative mark (see Henkel v OHIM , paragraph 38 and the case-law cited there).

112 With regard to the fourth reason, concerning the fact that FEE, a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank Mellat, is covered by Resolution 1929 (2010), the General Court found, in paragraph 117 of the judgment under appeal, that it was based on mere allegations. The Council did not produce any evidence that would have enabled the General Court to determine whether that reason was well founded. In such a situation, it is impossible for the Courts of the European Union — which are called upon to review whether the grounds for listing are well founded in fact, taking into consideration any observations and exculpatory evidence produced by the person concerned and the response of the competent EU authority to those observations — to find that those reasons are well founded, and consequently those reasons cannot be relied on as the basis for the contested listing decision (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 137).

30 However, the Member States are required to ensure that the civil liability resulting from the use of motor vehicles arising under their domestic law is covered by insurance which complies with the provisions of the three abovementioned directives (judgment of 23 October 2012, Marques Almeida, C‑300/10, EU:C:2012:656, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

30. That being so, Member States are obliged to ensure that the civil liability arising under their domestic law is covered by insurance which complies with the provisions of the three abovementioned directives ( Mendes Ferreira and Delgado Correia Ferreira , paragaph 29; Farrell , paragraph 33; Carvalho Ferreira Santos , paragraph 34; and Ambrósio Lavrador and Olival Ferreira Bonifácio , paragraph 27).

24 In that regard, it is important to point out that, under the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of Directive 2006/112, in accordance with the requirements of the principle of neutrality of the common system of value added tax, the term ‘exploitation’ refers to all transactions, whatever may be their legal form, by which it is sought to obtain income from the goods in question on a continuing basis (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 June 2007 in T-Mobile Austria and Others, C‑284/04, EU:C:2007:381, paragraph 38, and 13 December 2007 in Götz, EU:C:2007:789, paragraph 18).

53. It follows that all the international commitments challenged in this action must be assessed in relation to the provisions of Community law cited by the Commission in support of this action (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark , paragraphs 36 to 42; Commission v Sweden , paragraphs 34 to 40; Commission v Finland , paragraphs 36 to 42; Commission v Belgium , paragraphs 47 to 53; Commission v Luxembourg , paragraphs 42 to 48, and Commission v Austria , paragraphs 46 to 52).

48 It follows that the amendments made in 1995 to the 1989 Agreement have had the effect of creating the framework of a more intensive cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Austria, which entails new and significant international commitments for the latter.

41. Thus, in the judgment in Oy AA , the Court acknowledged in particular that the national tax legislation at issue could, in principle, be justified on the basis of two of the three justifications referred to in paragraph 51 of the judgment in Marks & Spencer , namely the need to safeguard the allocation of the power to tax between the Member States and the need to prevent tax avoidance, taken together (see Oy AA , paragraph 60).

41 The fact that Mrs Tolley died before reaching the retirement age is not capable of calling that conclusion into question. Whether or not a person falls within the scope ratione personae of Regulation No 1408/71 does not depend on the materialisation of the contingency covered (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 March 2011, Borger, C‑516/09, EU:C:2011:136, paragraph 30).

30. Lastly, as regards the fact that, when Ms Borger actually comes to claim her retirement pension, the periods of cover under the retirement insurance scheme in Austria may be taken into account, not in that State, but in Switzerland, it must be held that, as the European Commission submitted in its written observations, that circumstance does not preclude a person from being recognised as having the status of a worker. Whether or not a person comes within the scope ratione personae of Regulation No 1408/71 depends, not on the materialisation of the contingency covered, and thus on the issue of determining in which of the two States those periods will be taken into account at the time of retirement, but rather on the fact of being actually covered, even if only in respect of a single risk, on a compulsory or optional basis, by a general or special social security scheme mentioned in Article 1(a) of that regulation.

40. It should be noted that the first subparagraph of Article 152(1) EC provides that a high level of human health protection is to be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Community policies and activities, and that Article 95(3) EC explicitly requires that, in achieving harmonisation, a high level of protection of human health should be guaranteed ( British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco , paragraph 62; Arnold André , paragraph 33; Swedish Match , paragraph 32; and Alliance for Natural Health and Others , paragraph 31).

94. It must be recalled, in that regard, that, although it does not require total abolition of State monopolies of a commercial character, Article 37 TFEU requires them to be adjusted in such a way as to ensure that no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of Member States (judgments in Franzén , C‑189/95, EU:C:1997:504, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited, and in Hanner , C‑438/02, EU:C:2005:332, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

38 However, the Court has repeatedly stated that Article 37 does not require national monopolies having a commercial character to be abolished but requires them to be adjusted in such a way as to ensure that no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of Member States (see the judgments cited above: Manghera, paragraph 5; Hansen, paragraph 8; Commission v Italy, paragraph 11 and Banchero II, paragraph 27).

54 The Court has consistently held that, in order that an agreement between undertakings may affect trade between Member States, it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact that it may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States, such as might prejudice the realization of the aim of a single market in all the Member States (see Case 42/84 Remia v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, paragraph 22). Accordingly, the effect on intra-Community trade is normally the result of a combination of several factors which, taken separately, are not necessarily decisive.

46. In that regard, the Court has already ruled on the meaning of ‘necessary adaptations’ in the context of acts of accession, holding that the adaptation measures provided for by such acts, as a general rule, authorise only adaptations intended to render earlier Community measures applicable in the new Member States, to the exclusion of all other amendments (see, to that effect, in relation to Article 169 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded (OJ 1994 C 241, p. 21), Case C‑259/95 Parliament v Council [1997] ECR I‑5303, paragraphs 14 and 19; and, in respect of Article 57 of the Act of Accession, Case C‑413/04 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I‑11221, paragraphs 31 to 38, and Case C‑414/04 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I‑11279, paragraphs 29 to 36).

34. That is all the more true as Article 55 makes the grant of such temporary derogations subject to conditions markedly more restrictive than those which Article 57 prescribes for the adoption of adaptation measures. First, Article 55 authorises derogations only as regards Community acts which were adopted between 1 November 2002 (the date on which the accession negotiations were concluded) and 16 April 2003 (the date of signature of the 2003 Treaty of Accession). Second, such grant is subject to the requirement of unanimity within the Council.

43. However, if a communication of that kind is no longer possible because the period prescribed by Article 221(3) of the Customs Code has expired, the debt is time-barred and, consequently, extinguished within the meaning of Article 233 of the code ( Molenbergnatie , paragraphs 40 and 41).

49. The duty to disapply national legislation which contravenes Community law applies not only to national courts but also to all organs of the State, including administrative authorities (see, to that effect, Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839, paragraph 31), which entails, if the circumstances so require, the obligation to take all appropriate measures to enable Community law to be fully applied (see Case 48/71 Commission v Italy [1972] ECR 527, paragraph 7).

31 It would, moreover, be contradictory to rule that an individual may rely upon the provisions of a directive which fulfil the conditions defined above in proceedings before the national courts seeking an order against the administrative authorities, and yet to hold that those authorities are under no obligation to apply the provisions of the directive and refrain from applying provisions of national law which conflict with them . It follows that when the conditions under which the Court has held that individuals may rely on the provisions of a directive before the national courts are met, all organs of the administration, including decentralized authorities such as municipalities, are obliged to apply those provisions .

38. It should be recalled that the Court, after noting that the Habitats Directive does not define the terms ‘plan’ and ‘project’, has stated that the definition of ‘project’ in the second indent of Article 1(2) of Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ 1985 L 175, p. 40) is relevant to defining the concept of ‘plan’ or ‘project’ as provided for in the Habitats Directive ( Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging , paragraphs 23, 24 and 26).

46 According to settled case-law, in the field of competition law, the concept of an undertaking covers any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is financed (Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 21; Case C-244/94 Fédération française des sociétés d'assurances and Others [1995] ECR I-4013, paragraph 14; and Case C-55/96 Job Centre [1997] ECR I-7119, Job Centre II, paragraph 21).

21 It must be observed, in the context of competition law, first, that the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its status and the way in which it is financed and, second, that the placement of employees is an economic activity.

9 Likewise, the Court held in Case 184/85 (Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2013, paragraph 15) that, by imposing and maintaining in force a tax on the consumption of fresh bananas which is applicable to bananas from other Member States, the Italian Republic had failed to fulfil its obligations under the second paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty.

40. The Court has already had to examine the competition law question raised by legislation providing for the allocation free of charge to a public undertaking in a dominant position of certain operating facilities, in that case additional frequencies in the digital mobile telecommunications sector, whereas a new operator had had to pay a fee to obtain a licence for the same sector. In that respect, the Court held that such legislation is likely to infringe Article 82 EC by extending or strengthening the dominant position of that undertaking. It stated, however, that the competition rules do not preclude such legislation if the fee paid previously by the public undertaking in a dominant position to obtain a licence in the field of mobile telecommunications and the allocation free of charge of additional frequencies appear to be equivalent in economic terms to the fee imposed on the competitor (see Connect Austria , cited above, paragraphs 85 to 90).

89. In that regard, it is important to recall that national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings is not contrary to Articles 82 EC and 86(1) EC if, taking into account the fees imposed on the different operators involved for their respective licences, the allocation of additional frequencies in the DCS 1800 band, without the imposition of a separate fee, to a public undertaking in a dominant position must be considered to comply with the requirement to ensure equality of opportunity for different economic operators and therefore to guarantee undistorted competition.

277. The appellant’s small contribution to the purported infringement in the light of the regulation of its charges by RegTP cannot alter those findings, since the role played by the undertaking concerned in the infringement is, in principle, not a mandatory factor but just one of a number of other factors to be taken into account in assessing the gravity of the infringement (see, to that effect, Dalmine v Commission , paragraph 132).

44. In that regard, it is appropriate to recall that, as is apparent from the first and second recitals in the preamble, Directive 89/665 is intended to strengthen the existing mechanisms, both at national and Community levels, to ensure the effective application of Community directives relating to public procurement, in particular at a stage when infringements can still be remedied. To that effect, Article 1(1) of that directive requires Member States to guarantee that unlawful decisions of contracting authorities can be subjected to effective review which is as swift as possible (see, in particular, Case C-81/98 Alcatel Austria and Others [1999] ECR I-7671, paragraphs 33 and 34, and Case C-470/99 Universale-Bau and Others [2002] ECR I-11617, paragraph 74).

34 In that regard, Article 1(1) of Directive 89/665 requires the Member States to establish effective review procedures that are as rapid as possible to ensure compliance with Community directives on public procurement.

39 According to settled case-law, in the absence of harmonisation of EU legislation in the field of penalties applicable where conditions laid down by arrangements under that legislation are not complied with, Member States are empowered to choose the penalties which seem to them to be appropriate. They must, however, exercise that power in accordance with EU law and its general principles, and consequently in accordance with the principle of proportionality (see, in particular, judgments of 9 February 2012, Urbán, C‑210/10, EU:C:2012:64, point 23, and of 19 October 2016, EL-EM-2001, C‑501/14, EU:C:2016:777, paragraph 37).

33 That interpretation is borne out by the preamble to the Directive. According to the 10th recital, all restrictions on freedom to provide broadcasting services to which the ninth recital refers, must be abolished under the Treaty. Furthermore, the 12th and 14th recitals provide that it is necessary and sufficient in this regard that all broadcasts comply with the law of the Member State from which they emanate and with the provisions of the Directive. Finally, according to the 15th recital, the requirement that the originating Member State should verify that broadcasts comply with national law as coordinated by the Directive is sufficient under Community law to ensure free movement of broadcasts without secondary control on the same grounds in the receiving Member States (judgment in Case C-11/95 Commission v Belgium, cited above, paragraph 35).

35 That interpretation is borne out by the preamble to Directive 89/552. According to the tenth recital, all restrictions on freedom to provide broadcasting services must be abolished under the Treaty. The twelfth and fourteenth recitals provide that it is necessary and sufficient in that regard that all broadcasts comply with the law of the Member State from which they emanate and with the provisions of the directive. According to the fifteenth recital, the requirement that the originating Member State should verify that broadcasts comply with national law as coordinated by Directive 89/552 is sufficient under Community law to ensure free movement of broadcasts without secondary control on the same grounds in the receiving Member States.

79. Finally, as regards the argument relating to the incomplete provision of documents relating to the refused confirmatory applications, it must be recalled that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence, save where the facts or evidence are distorted (judgment in Rousse Industry v Commission , C‑271/13 P, EU:C:2014:175, paragraph 81). There will be distortion where, in particular, the General Court has manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of the evidence.

105. In this case, since the Italian Republic merely claims that repayment of the aid in dispute would place a very heavy burden on the recipient undertakings, liable to cause many of them to disappear from the market and so giving rise to a serious employment and social crisis, it is sufficient to point out, in accordance with the case‑law of the Court, that apprehension of internal difficulties cannot justify a failure by a Member State to comply with its obligations under Community law (see, inter alia, Case C‑404/97 Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR I‑4897, paragraph 52, Case C‑310/99 Italy v Commission , paragraph 105, and Case C‑404/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I‑6695, paragraph 55).

55. In that regard, it is settled law that the apprehension of internal difficulties cannot justify a failure by a Member State to comply with its obligations under Community law (see, to that effect, Case C-52/95 Commission v France [1995] ECR I-4443, paragraph 38; Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959, paragraph 55; Commission v Italy , paragraph 16, and Commission v Portugal , paragraph 52).

38 Admittedly, in view of the spirit of judicial cooperation which governs relations between national courts and the Court of Justice in the context of preliminary-ruling proceedings, the fact that the referring court did not make certain initial findings does not necessarily mean, however, that the request for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible if, in spite of those deficiencies, the Court, in the light of the information contained in the case file, considers that it is in a position to provide a useful answer to the referring court (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 January 2016, CASTA and Others, C‑50/14, EU:C:2016:56, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited, and order of 8 September 2016, Google Ireland and Google Italy, C‑322/15, EU:C:2016:672, paragraph 24).

66. While acknowledging that the special scheme for travel agents is capable of improvement, the Commission, relying on paragraph 28 of Commission v Spain , submits that it is not for the Member States to adopt on their own initiative an approach which, according to those States, improves that scheme because, by doing so, they take the place of the European Union legislature. However, that judgment cannot properly be relied upon in the present case, since, unlike the special scheme for travel agents, the legislation at issue in that judgment was unequivocal.

28. The Spanish Government’s argument that its interpretation of Article 19 of the Sixth Directive enables balance in terms of competition, and hence the principle that VAT should be neutral, to be observed must be rejected. The Member States are required to apply the Sixth Directive even if they consider it to be less than perfect. As indicated in Case C-388/98 Commission v Netherlands [2001] ECR I-8265, paragraphs 55 and 56, even if the interpretation put forward by certain Member States better served certain aims of the Sixth Directive, such as fiscal neutrality, the Member States may not disregard the provisions expressly laid down in that directive by introducing, in this case, limitations of the right to deduct other than those laid down in Articles 17 and 19 of that directive.

37. The Court accordingly held, at paragraphs 30 and 31 of the judgment in Securenta , that the input VAT relating to expenditure incurred by a taxable person cannot give rise to a right to deduct in so far as it relates to activities which, in view of their non‑economic nature, do not come within the scope of the directive and that, where a taxable person simultaneously carries out economic activities, whether taxed or exempt, and non‑economic activities outside the scope of the directive, deduction of the input VAT relating to expenditure is allowed only to the extent to which that expenditure may be attributed as an output to the economic activity of the taxable person.

22. In that regard, it must be recalled that it is settled case-law that the proper conduct of the pre-litigation procedure constitutes an essential guarantee required by the EC Treaty not only in order to protect the rights of the Member State concerned, but also so as to ensure that any contentious procedure will have a clearly defined dispute as its subject-matter. It follows from that function that the purpose of the letter of formal notice is, first, to delimit the subject-matter of the dispute and to indicate to the Member State, which is invited to submit its observations, the factors enabling it to prepare its defence and, secondly, to enable the Member State to comply before proceedings are brought before the Court (Case C‑1/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-9989, paragraph 54, and Case C‑476/98 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-9855, paragraphs 46 and 47).

54 It follows from that function that the purpose of the letter of formal notice is, first, to delimit the subject-matter of the dispute and to indicate to the Member State, which is invited to submit its observations, the factors enabling it to prepare its defence and, second, to enable the Member State to comply before proceedings are brought before the Court (Case C-230/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1169, paragraph 31).

15. As an exception to the general rule of jurisdiction set out in the Convention, Article 16 must not be given an interpretation broader than is required by its objective, since the article deprives the parties of the choice of forum which would otherwise be theirs and, in certain cases, results in their being brought before a court which is not that of the domicile of any of them (see Case 73/77 Sanders [1977] ECR 2383, paragraphs 17 and 18; Case C-115/88 Reichert and Kockler [1990] ECR I-27, paragraph 9; Case C-292/93 Lieber [1994] ECR I-2535, paragraph 12; and Case C‑8/98 Dansommer [2000] ECR I-393, paragraph 21).

86. It should be added that no specific language rules apply to the institutions concerned by the contested competition notices (with regard to the language rules applicable to OHIM, see Case C‑361/01 P Kik v OHIM [2003] ECR I‑8283, paragraphs 81 to 97).

95. In those circumstances, the appellant ' s argument that it would be less discriminatory to choose a single language rather than five is not apposite.

49 The Court has consistently held that the prohibition of discrimination set out in Article 40(3) of the EC Treaty is merely a specific expression of the general principle of equal treatment in Community law, according to which comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified (see, in particular, Case 106/83 Sermide v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero and Others [1984] ECR 4209, paragraph 28).

49. In that connection, it must be recalled that the Court has already held, as regards the general principle of equal treatment in the context of grounds such as age or sex, that a difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related to such grounds does not constitute discrimination — that is to say, an infringement of Article 21(1) of the Charter — where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate (see, to that effect, as regards discrimination on grounds of age, Case C‑229/08 Wolf EU:C:2010:3, paragraph 35, and Case C‑447/09 Prigge and Others EU:C:2011:573, paragraph 66; and, as regards discrimination based on sex, Case 222/84 Johnston EU:C:1986:206, paragraph 40, and Case C‑273/97 Sirdar EU:C:1999:523, paragraph 25).

40 IL Y A DONC LIEU DE REPONDRE AUX DEUXIEME ET TROISIEME QUESTIONS POSEES PAR L ' INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL QUE L ' ARTICLE 2 , PARAGRAPHE 2 , DE LA DIRECTIVE 76/207 EST A INTERPRETER EN CE SENS QUE , EN APPRECIANT SI , EN RAISON DES CONDITIONS D ' EXERCICE DE L ' ACTIVITE DE POLICIER , LE SEXE CONSTITUE POUR CETTE ACTIVITE PROFESSIONNELLE UNE CONDITION DETERMINANTE , UN ETAT MEMBRE PEUT PRENDRE EN CONSIDERATION DES EXIGENCES DE LA PROTECTION DE LA SECURITE PUBLIQUE POUR RESERVER , DANS UNE SITUATION INTERNE CARACTERISEE PAR DES ATTENTATS FREQUENTS , LES TACHES GENERALES DE LA POLICE A DES HOMMES EQUIPES D ' ARMES A FEU . SUR LES DEROGATIONS ADMISES DANS UN SOUCI DE LA PROTECTION DE LA FEMME

245. It is also clear from the Court’s case-law that the failure to take account of the cumulative effect of projects in practice leads to a situation where all projects of a certain type may escape the obligation to carry out an assessment, whereas, taken together, they are likely to have significant effects on the environment (see, by analogy, Case C‑392/96 Commission v Ireland [1999] ECR I‑5901, paragraph 76).

50 For that guarantee of origin, which constitutes the essential function of a trade mark, to be ensured, the proprietor must be protected against competitors wishing to take unfair advantage of the status and reputation of the trade mark by selling products illegally bearing it (see, inter alia, Hoffmann-La Roche, paragraph 7, and Case C-349/95 Loendersloot [1997] ECR I-6227, paragraph 22). In this respect, the 10th recital of the preamble to the Directive points out the absolute nature of the protection afforded by the trade mark in the case of identity between the mark and the sign and between the goods or services concerned and those for which the mark is registered. It states that the aim of that protection is in particular to guarantee the trade mark as an indication of origin.

22 With respect to trade mark rights, the Court has held that they constitute an essential element in the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty is intended to establish. In such a system, undertakings must be able to attract and retain customers by the quality of their products or services, which is made possible only by distinctive signs allowing them to be identified. For the trade mark to be able to fulfil that function, it must constitute a guarantee that all products which bear it have been manufactured under the control of a single undertaking to which responsibility for their quality may be attributed (see, in particular, Case C-10/89 CNL-SUCAL v HAG GF (hereinafter `HAG II') [1990] ECR I-3711, paragraph 13, and Bristol-Myers Squibb, cited above, paragraph 43). Consequently, the specific subject-matter of a trade mark is in particular to guarantee to the owner that he has the exclusive right to use that mark for the purpose of putting a product on the market for the first time and thus to protect him against competitors wishing to take unfair advantage of the status and reputation of the trade mark by selling products illegally bearing it (see, in particular, Case 102/77 Hoffmann-La Roche v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139, paragraph 7; HAG II, paragraph 14; and Bristol-Myers Squibb, paragraph 44).

32 Moreover, according to the settled case-law of the Court, restrictions on the freedom to provide services deriving from national measures which apply without distinction are acceptable only if those measures are justified by overriding reasons relating to the public interest and comply with the principle of proportionality, that is to say are suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue and do not go beyond what is strictly necessary in order to attain it (to that effect, see in particular Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165, paragraph 37, and Case C-67/98 Zenatti [1999] ECR I-7289, paragraph 29).

39. The order for reference shows that three of the cases chosen as test cases in the proceedings before the national court concern United Kingdom-resident companies which are wholly owned by non-resident companies. As the nature of the interest in question will confer on the holder definite influence over the company’s decisions and allow it to determine the company’s activities, the provisions of the EC Treaty on freedom of establishment will apply (Case C-251/98 Baars [2000] ECR I-2787, paragraphs 21 and 22; Case C-436/00 X and Y [2002] ECR I‑10829, paragraphs 37 and 66 to 68; and Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 31).

21 However, the situation from which the main proceedings have arisen concerns a national of a Member State who resides in that Member State and who holds all the shares in a company established in another Member State. A 100% holding in the capital of a company having its seat in another Member State undoubtedly brings such a taxpayer within the scope of application of the Treaty provisions on the right of establishment.

37. Since the functioning of aircraft inevitably gives rise to technical problems, air carriers are confronted as a matter of course in the exercise of their activity with such problems. In that connection, technical problems which come to light during maintenance of aircraft or on account of failure to carry out such maintenance cannot constitute, in themselves, ‘extraordinary circumstances’ under Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 (see, to that effect, judgment in Wallentin-Hermann , C‑549/07, EU:C:2008:771, paragraphs 24 and 25).

50. Moreover, as the Court has held in relation to exemption for insurance transactions (see CPP , cited above, paragraphs 35 and 36), a Member State may not restrict the scope of the no-supply rule laid down in Article 5(8) of the Sixth Directive to transactions carried out by traders who are authorised by national law to pursue the activity in question.

36 The answer to Question 4 must therefore be that Article 13B(a) of the Sixth Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may not restrict the scope of the exemption for insurance transactions exclusively to supplies by insurers who are authorised by national law to pursue the activity of insurer.

68 In that regard, it should be recalled that the exercise by a Member State of any discretion to decide whether or not it would be expedient to demand repayment of EU funds unduly or irregularly granted would be inconsistent with the duty under the common agricultural policy for national administrations to recover such funds (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgment of 21 September 1983, Deutsche Milchkontor and Others, 205/82 to 215/82, EU:C:1983:233, paragraph 22).

19 As is apparent from recitals 35 and 38 of Directive 2001/29, that provision reflects the EU legislature’s intention to establish a specific compensation scheme which is triggered by the existence of harm caused to rightholders, which gives rise, in principle, to the obligation to ‘compensate’ them (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 October 2010 in Padawan, C‑467/08, EU:C:2010:620, paragraph 41).

41. Furthermore, the word ‘compensate’ in recitals 35 and 38 in the preamble to Directive 2001/29 expresses the intention of the European Union legislature to establish a specific compensation scheme triggered by the existence of harm to the detriment of the rightholders, which gives rise, in principle, to the obligation to ‘compensate’ them.

53. Following the ratification by the European Union of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which was approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009 (OJ 2010 L 23, p. 35), the Court held that the concept of ‘disability’ must be understood as referring to a limitation which results in particular from long-term physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers (see judgments in HK Danmark , EU:C:2013:222, paragraphs 37 to 39; Z. , C‑363/12, EU:C:2014:159, paragraph 76; and Glatzel , C‑356/12, EU:C:2014:350, paragraph 45).

59. The action to establish liability is an autonomous form of action, with a particular purpose to fulfil within the system of legal remedies and subject to conditions of use dictated by its specific purpose (Case 4/69 Lütticke v Commission [1971] ECR 325, paragraph 6, and the order of 21 June 1993 in Case C‑257/93 Van Parijs and Others v Council and Commission [1993] ECR I-3335, paragraph 14). Although actions for annulment and for failure to act seek a declaration that a legally binding measure is unlawful or that such a measure has not been taken, an action to establish liability seeks compensation for damage resulting from a measure or from unlawful conduct, attributable to a Community institution or body (see to that effect Case 118/83 CMC v Commission [1985] ECR 2325, paragraphs 29 to 31; Case C‑308/87 Grifoni v Commission [1990] ECR I‑1203, and Case C‑146/91 KYDEP v Council and Commission [1994] ECR I‑4199).

6 THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLE 178 AND THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 215 WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE TREATY AS AN INDEPENDENT FORM OF ACTION WITH A PARTICULAR PURPOSE TO FULFIL WITHIN THE SYSTEM OF ACTIONS AND SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS FOR ITS USE, CONCEIVED WITH A VIEW TO ITS SPECIFIC PURPOSE . IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE INDEPENDENT NATURE OF THIS ACTION AS WELL AS TO THE EFFICACY OF THE GENERAL SYSTEM OF FORMS OF ACTION CREATED BY THE TREATY TO REGARD AS A GROUND OF INADMISSIBILITY THE FACT THAT, IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES MIGHT LEAD TO A RESULT SIMILAR TO THAT OF AN ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT UNDER ARTICLE 175 .

32. The Court has also held that that provision of the EC Treaty permits Member States to restrict the freedom to provide medical and hospital services in so far as the maintenance of treatment capacity or medical competence on national territory is essential for public health, or even the survival of the population ( Kohll , paragraph 51; Smits and Peerbooms , paragraph 74; and Müller-Fauré and van Riet , paragraph 67).

42. In LG’s submission, rail transport is in a competitive position vis-à-vis road transport, and there is no objective criterion justifying there being a distinction being drawn between the different categories of land vehicles. LG states in that regard that infringement of the general principle of equal treatment may be established, in matters relating to tax, by other kinds of discrimination which affect traders who are not necessarily in competition with each other but who are nevertheless in a similar situation in other respects (Case C-309/06 Marks & Spencer [2008] ECR I-2283, paragraph 49).

49. Secondly, it is important to bear in mind that the principle of fiscal neutrality is the reflection, in matters relating to value added tax, of the principle of equal treatment (Case C-106/05 L.u.P. [2006] ECR I-5123, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). However, although infringement of the principle of fiscal neutrality may be envisaged only as between competing traders, as has been pointed out in paragraph 47 of this judgment, infringement of the general principle of equal treatment may be established, in matters relating to tax, by other kinds of discrimination which affect traders who are not necessarily in competition with each other but who are nevertheless in a similar situation in other respects.

26. As the Advocate General stated in points 72 and 73 of his Opinion, it is apparent from settled case-law that a national of a Member State, who pursues a professional activity on a stable and continuous basis in another Member State, comes under the chapter of the EC Treaty relating to the right of establishment and not that relating to services (see, inter alia, Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] ECR 631, paragraph 21, and Case C‑55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I‑4165, paragraph 28).

59. On the contrary, the objective of joint and several liability resides in the fact that it constitutes an additional legal device available to the Commission to strengthen the effectiveness of the action taken by it for the recovery of fines imposed for infringement of the competition rules, since that mechanism reduces for the Commission, as creditor of the debt represented by such fines, the risk of insolvency, which is part of the objective of deterrence pursued generally by competition law, as the General Court essentially observed, correctly, at paragraph 151 of the judgment under appeal (see also, by analogy, Case C‑78/10 Berel and Others v Commission [2011] ECR I‑717, paragraph 48).

48. It should be added that the aim of Article 213 of the Customs Code is precisely to achieve that objective of actual recovery of the customs debt, and hence to ensure the protection of the EU’s own resources. Joint and several liability constitutes an additional legal device made available to the national authorities to strengthen the effectiveness of the action they take for the recovery of customs debts.

23. As regards the persons who may rely upon the provisions on the coordination of the national social security schemes which it establishes, Regulation No 1408/71 refers to persons who are insured under those schemes ( de Jaeck , paragraph 19).

78. In all the cases which gave rise to the judgments cited in the preceding paragraph, the refusal of access in question related to a set of documents which were clearly defined by the fact that they all belonged to a file relating to ongoing administrative or judicial proceedings (see, to that effect, the judgments in Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau , C‑139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376, paragraphs 12 to 22; Sweden and Others v API and Commission , C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541, paragraph 75; Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob , C‑404/10 P, EU:C:2012:393, paragraph 128; LPN and Finland v Commission , C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, paragraphs 49 and 50; and Commission v EnBW , C‑365/12 P, EU:C:2014:112, paragraphs 69 and 70). That cannot however be said of the contested studies other than those referred to in paragraphs 71 to 76 of this judgment.

70. Furthermore, it is common ground in the present case that, at the date on which EnBW requested the Commission to grant access to a set of documents in its file relating to that proceeding, proceedings for annulment of the GIS decision were pending before the General Court and, as that court indicated at paragraph 118 of the judgment under appeal, that was still the case when the contested decision was adopted.

31 As regards Article 48 of the Treaty, which it is appropriate to consider first, the Court has repeatedly stated that that provision implements a fundamental principle contained in Article 3(c) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 3(1)(c) EC), under which, for the purposes set out in Article 2 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 2 EC), the activities of the Community are to include the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons (Case C-370/90 The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, paragraph 15, and Terhoeve, cited above, paragraph 36).

17 It should be observed, first, that while Member States are still, in principle, free to determine the requirements of public policy and public security in the light of their national needs, those grounds must, in the Community context and, in particular, as derogations from the fundamental principle of free movement of capital, be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the Community institutions (see, to this effect, Case 36/75 Rutili v Minister for the Interior [1975] ECR 1219, paragraphs 26 and 27). Thus, public policy and public security may be relied on only if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society (see, to this effect, Rutili, cited above, paragraph 28, and Case C-348/96 Calfa [1999] ECR I-11, paragraph 21). Moreover, those derogations must not be misapplied so as, in fact, to serve purely economic ends (to this effect, see Rutili, paragraph 30). Further, any person affected by a restrictive measure based on such a derogation must have access to legal redress (see, to this effect, Case 222/86 Unectef v Heylens and Others [1987] ECR 4097, paragraphs 14 and 15).

27 NEVERTHELESS, THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC POLICY MUST, IN THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT AND WHERE, IN PARTICULAR, IT IS USED AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR DEROGATING FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY OF TREATMENT AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS, BE INTERPRETED STRICTLY, SO THAT ITS SCOPE CANNOT BE DETERMINED UNILATERALLY BY EACH MEMBER STATE WITHOUT BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL BY THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY .

25 As the Commission and the plaintiffs in the main proceedings maintain, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that the directive does not apply to transfers taking place in proceedings for the liquidation of the transferor' s assets, such as insolvency proceedings (see the judgment in Abels, cited above) or compulsory administrative liquidation under Italian Law (see the judgment in D' Urso), but it does apply to the transfer of an undertaking subject to a procedure aimed at ensuring the continuation of its business, such as the "surséance van betaling" procedure under Netherlands Law (judgment in Abels) or the special administration procedure under Italian Law in respect of large undertakings in critical difficulties, where it has been decided that the undertaking is to continue trading for so long as that decision remains in effect (see the judgment in D' Urso).

44. In that regard, both the notes which head the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the HS are important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation ( Olicom , paragraph 17, and the case-law cited).

17. Both the notes which head the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff and the Explanatory Notes to the Nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation Council are important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Tariff and as such may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see Case C‑11/93 Siemens Nixdorf [1994] ECR I‑1945, paragraph 12; Case C‑382/95 Techex [1997] ECR I‑7363, paragraph 12; and Peacock , paragraph 10).

31. Consequently, even if, formally, the referring court has limited its questions to the interpretation of the recitals of Regulations Nos 796/2004 and 1122/2009, that does not prevent the Court from providing the referring court with a ruling on the interpretation of EU law which may be of assistance to the referring court in adjudicating in the case pending before it, whether or not the referring court has referred to them in the wording of its questions. It is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject-matter of the dispute (see, by analogy, judgment in Fuß , C‑243/09, EU:C:2010:609, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

13 The Court has consistently held that, in the context of the organization of the powers of the Community, the choice of a legal basis for a measure must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review. Those factors include, in particular, the aim and content of the measure (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR I-2867, paragraph 10).

10 It must first be observed that in the context of the organization of the powers of the Community the choice of the legal basis for a measure may not depend simply on an institution' s conviction as to the objective pursued but must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review (see the judgment in Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493, paragraph 11). Those factors include in particular the aim and content of the measure.

34. In that regard, it is appropriate to bear in mind that, by virtue of settled case-law, the condition that the decision forming the subject-matter of the proceedings must be of ‘direct concern’ to a natural or legal person, as it is stated in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, requires the Community measure complained of to affect directly the legal situation of the individual and leave no discretion to the addressees of that measure, who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules without the application of other intermediate rules (see, inter alia, Case C‑404/96 P Glencore Grain v Commission [1998] ECR I‑2435, paragraph 41, and the case-law cited).

33. A comparison of those two provisions prompts the finding that the ‘increase in the capital’ referred to in Article 4(1)(c) of Directive 69/335 entails a formal increase in a company’s capital by means of either an issue of new shares or an increase in the nominal value of the existing shares (see, to that effect, Case 270/81 Felicitas Rickmers-Linie [1982] ECR 2771, paragraph 15, and Case C-494/03 Senior Engineering Investments [2006] I-0000, paragraph 33).

33. A comparison of those two provisions prompts the finding, in line with the view put forward by the Netherlands Government, that the ‘increase in the capital’ referred to in Article 4(1)(c) of Directive 69/335 means a formal increase of a company’s capital by means either of an issue of new shares or by an increase in the nominal value of the existing shares (see, to that effect, Case 270/81 Felicitas Rickmers-Linie [1982] ECR 2771, paragraph 15, and Case 36/86 Dansk Sparinvest [1988] ECR 409, paragraph 13).

22. According to settled case‑law, the necessity of uniform application and, accordingly, of uniform interpretation of an EU measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires it to be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim pursued by the latter, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all the other official languages (see, inter alia, Case C‑569/08 Internetportal und Marketing [2010] ECR I‑4871, paragraph 35, and Case C‑52/10 Eleftheri tileorasit and Giannikos [2011] ECR I‑4973, paragraph 23).

123. However, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of Community law by the Court of First Instance, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the Court of First Instance, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see, inter alia, Comunità montana della Valnerina v Commission , paragraph 107).

107. However, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of Community law by the Court of First Instance, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal (see Case C‑210/98 P Salzgitter v Commission [2000] ECR I‑5843, paragraph 43). Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the Court of First Instance, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see, in particular, the order in Case C‑345/00 P FNAB and Others v Council [2001] ECR I‑3811, paragraphs 30 and 31, and the judgments in Case C‑321/99 P ARAP and Others v Commission [2002] ECR I‑4287, paragraph 49, and in Interporc v Commission , cited above, paragraph 17).

24. Il convient, tout d’abord, de rappeler que la Commission, eu égard à son rôle de gardienne du traité, est seule compétente pour décider s’il est opportun d’engager une procédure en constatation de manquement. Elle est également seule compétente p our décider s’il est opportun de poursuivre la procédure précontentieuse par l’envoi d’un avis motivé tout comme elle a la faculté, mais non l’obligation, au terme de cette procédure, de saisir la Cour en vue de faire constater par cette dernière le manquement présumé (voir en ce sens, notamment, arrêt Commission/Belgique, C‑207/97, EU:C:1999:17, point 24 et jurisprudence citée).

92 It should also be noted that the Court has already held, in paragraph 33 of Commission v Denmark, that the duty to observe the principle of equal treatment lies at the very heart of all the public procurement directives. The documents in the main proceedings have not disclosed anything to show that, as regards the contracting entity's choice of award criteria, the interpretation of that principle should depend in this case on the particular directive applicable to the contract in question.

33 On this issue, it need only be observed that, although the directive makes no express mention of the principle of equal treatment of tenderers, the duty to observe that principle lies at the very heart of the directive whose purpose is, according to the ninth recital in its preamble, to ensure in particular the development of effective competition in the field of public contracts and which, in Title IV, lays down criteria for selection and for award of the contracts, by means of which such competition is to be ensured.

28. In this connection it should be noted that the scheme for the taxation of the profit margin made by the taxable dealer on the supply of second-hand goods such as those at issue in the main proceedings constitutes a special arrangement for VAT — derogating from the general scheme of Directive 2006/112 (see Case C-280/04 Jyske Finans [2005] ECR I-10683, paragraph 35, and Case C-203/10 Auto Nikolovi [2011] ECR I-1083, paragraph 46).

49. It is settled case-law that the principle of equality of arms, together with, among others, the principle audi alteram partem , is no more than a corollary of the very concept of a fair hearing that implies an obligation to offer each party a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case in conditions that do not place it in a clearly less advantageous position compared with its opponent (see the judgment in Sweden v API and Commission , C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541, paragraph 88).

88. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind in that regard that the principle of equality of arms – together with, among others, the principle of audi alteram partem – is no more than a corollary of the very concept of a fair hearing (see, by analogy, Case C‑305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others [2007] ECR I‑5305, paragraph 31; Case C‑89/08 P Commission v Ireland and Others [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 50; and Case C‑197/09 RX‑II Réexamen M v EMEA [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 39 and 40).

59. Consequently, as the Court has previously held, in order to determine whether or not a trader has demonstrated ‘obvious negligence’, within the meaning of the second indent of Article 239(1) of the Customs Code, it is appropriate to apply by analogy the criteria used in the context of Article 220 of the Customs Code to ascertain whether or not an error committed by the customs authorities was detectable by a trader (see Söhl and Söhlke , paragraphs 55 and 56, and Case C‑156/00 Netherlands v Commission [2003] ECR I-2527, paragraph 92).

14 Il convient, en pareille hypothèse, pour déterminer la base juridique appropriée, d'apprécier si les mesures considérées se rattachent principalement à un domaine d'action, les effets sur d'autres politiques ne présentant qu'un caractère accessoire, ou si les deux aspects sont également essentiels. Dans le premier cas, le recours à une seule base juridique suffit (arrêts du 4 octobre 1991, Parlement/Conseil, 70/88, Rec. p. I-4529, point 17, et du 26 mars 1996, Parlement/Conseil, C-271/94, Rec. p. I-1689, points 32 et 33); dans l'autre, il est insuffisant (arrêts du 30 mai 1989, Commission/Conseil, 242/87, Rec. p. 1425, points 33 à 37, et du 7 mars 1996, Parlement/Conseil, C-360/93, Rec. p. I-1195, point 30) et l'institution est tenue d'adopter l'acte sur le fondement des deux dispositions qui fondent sa compétence (arrêt du 27 septembre 1988, Commission/Conseil, 165/87, Rec. p. 5545, points 6 à 13). Un tel cumul est toutefois exclu lorsque les procédures prévues pour l'une et l'autre base juridique sont incompatibles (arrêt du 11 juin 1991, Commission/Conseil, C-300/89, Rec. p. I-2867, points 17 à 21).

17 First, an action for failure to act cannot be used to challenge the legal basis of a measure which has already been adopted .

51. As the Court has held, under the general scheme of value-added tax, the final consumer is the person who acquires goods or services for personal use, as opposed to an economic activity, and thus bears the tax. The result is that, in the light of the social purpose of Article 17 [which is taken up in substance by the second paragraph of Article 110 of Directive 2006/112], the term ‘final consumer’ can be applied only to a person who does not use exempted goods or services in the course of an economic activity. The provision of goods or services at a stage higher in the production or distribution chain which is nevertheless sufficiently close to the consumer to be of advantage to him must also be considered to be for the benefit of the final consumer as so defined (see above cases Commission v Ireland , paragraph 18, and Commission v United Kingdom , paragraph 17).

117. As regards court proceedings, in the event that the person concerned challenges the lawfulness of the decision to list or maintain the listing of his name in Annex I to Regulation No 881/2002, the review by the Courts of the European Union must extend to whether rules as to procedure and rules as to competence, including whether or not the legal basis is adequate, are observed (see, to that effect, the Kadi judgment, paragraphs 121 to 236; see also, by analogy, the judgment of 13 March 2012 in Case C‑376/10 P Tay Za v Council [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 46 to 72).

51. Article 11 of the contested regulation provides that the restrictive measures in question are to take the form of the freezing of all funds and economic resources belonging to the individual members of the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and to the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them.

40. The Court thus concluded, in paragraph 93 of Wählergruppe Gemeinsam, in which it made reference to paragraph 20 of ASTI I , that the exclusion of foreign workers enjoying equal treatment as regards remuneration and other conditions of work, from eligibility for election to bodies that represent and defend the interests of workers, such as workers’ chambers in Austria, can be justified neither by the legal nature of the body in question, as defined under national law, nor by the fact that certain of its functions could involve participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law.

67. As to those submissions, even if judgments delivered under Article 226 EC were to have the same effects as those delivered under Article 234 EC and, therefore, considerations of legal certainty might make it necessary to limit their temporal effects (see Case C‑359/97 Commission v United Kingdom [2000] ECR I‑6355, paragraph 92) provided that the conditions laid down by the Court’s case-law in the context of Article 234 EC are met (see, in particular, Case C-402/03 Skov and Bilka [2006] ECR I‑199, paragraph 51), it need merely be stated that in the present case the Hellenic Republic is not justified in claiming that a risk of serious economic repercussions within the meaning of that case-law exists.

51. It is only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the Community legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties (see, inter alia, Case C‑57/93 Vroege [1994] ECR I‑4541, paragraph 21, and Case C‑372/98 Cooke [2000] ECR I‑8683, paragraph 42).

26. National legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings which, as worded, applies to Italian operators and to operators of other Member States alike is, generally, capable of falling within the scope of the provisions on the fundamental freedoms established by the Treaty only to the extent that it applies to situations connected with trade between Member States (see Case C‑448/98 Guimont [2000] ECR I‑10663, paragraph 21; Case C‑6/01 Anomar and Others [2003] ECR I‑8621, paragraph 39 and the case‑law cited; Centro Europa 7 , paragraph 65, and Joined Cases C‑570/07 and C‑571/07 Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez [2010] ECR I‑4629, paragraph 40).

13 In order to determine whether the objection of inadmissibility raised by the Council is well founded, it must be borne in mind that, although in the light of the criteria set out in the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty regulations imposing anti-dumping duties are in fact, as regards their nature and their scope, of a legislative character, inasmuch as they apply to all the traders concerned, taken as a whole, their provisions may none the less be of individual concern to certain traders (see the judgments in Joined Cases 239 and 275/82 Allied Corporation v Commission [1984] ECR 1005, paragraph 11, and in Case 53/83 Allied Corporation v Commission [1985] ECR 1621, paragraph 4).

4 IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 21 FEBRUARY 1984 IN JOINED CASES 239 AND 275/82 , ALLIED CORPORATION AND OTHERS V COMMISSION , ( 1984 ) ECR 1005 ) THE COURT HAS ALREADY HELD THAT MEASURES IMPOSING ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ARE LIABLE TO BE OF DIRECT AND INDIVIDUAL CONCERN TO THOSE PRODUCERS AND EXPORTERS WHO ARE ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THEY WERE IDENTIFIED IN THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION OR THE COUNCIL OR WERE CONCERNED BY THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS .

53. The Court of Justice has already held that the Guidelines set out rules of practice from which the Commission may not depart in an individual case without giving reasons that are compatible with the principle of equal treatment. Indeed, by adopting such rules of conduct and announcing by publishing them that they will henceforth apply to the cases to which they relate, the Commission imposes a limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot depart from those rules without running the risk of suffering the consequences of being in breach of general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraphs 209 and 211). However, as the Commission rightly submits, although it must observe the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations when it applies its self-imposed guidelines, that principle cannot bind the Courts of the Union in the same way, in so far as they do not propose to apply a specific method of setting fines in the exercise of their unlimited jurisdiction, but consider case by case the situations before them, taking account of all the matters of fact and of law relating to those situations.

58. In this connection, it is true that preventing possible tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an objective recognised and encouraged by Directive 2006/112 and European Union law cannot be relied on for fraudulent or abusive ends (see, inter alia, Case C-255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECR I-1609, paragraphs 68 and 71; Joined Cases C-80/11 and C-142/11 Mahagében and Dávid [2012] ECR, paragraph 41; and Bonik , paragraphs 35 and 36).

35. That being so, it must also be borne in mind that the prevention of tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an objective recognised and encouraged by Directive 2006/112 (see, inter alia, Halifax and Others , paragraph 71; Kittel and Recolta Recycling , paragraph 54; Case C-285/09 R [2010] ECR I-12605, paragraph 36; Case C-504/10 Tanoarch [2011] ECR I-10853, paragraph 50; and Mahagében and Dávid , paragraph 41).

16 Where a charge is imposed on domestic and imported products according to the same criteria, the Court has consistently held that it may be necessary to take into account the purpose to which the revenue from the charge is put. Thus, if the revenue from such a charge is intended to finance activities for the special advantage of the taxed domestic product, it may follow that the charge imposed on the basis of the same criteria nevertheless constitutes discriminatory taxation in so far as the fiscal burden on the domestic products is neutralized by the advantages which the charge is used to finance, whilst the charge on the imported product constitutes a net burden (judgments in Case 73/79 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR 1533, paragraph 15, and in Compagnie Commerciale de l' Ouest, cited above, paragraph 26).

40. With regard in particular to the evidence adduced by Alstom at paragraphs 90 to 150 of its response to the statement of objections to rebut the presumption that it actually exercised decisive influence, while it would appear that the Commission did not, in the contested decision, address each of those items of evidence individually, it nevertheless gave the person concerned sufficient information to enable it to ascertain whether that decision was well founded or whether it was vitiated by a defect making it possible to challenge its validity and to enable the General Court to review its legality (see, to that effect, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraph 462, and ENI v Commission , paragraph 72).

462. According to a consistent body of case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state reasons is to enable the Court to review the legality of the decision and to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the decision is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested (see, in particular, Case C-199/99 P Corus UK v Commission [2003] ECR I-11177, paragraph 145).

51 However, an argument which was not raised at first instance does not constitute a new plea that is inadmissible at the appeal stage if it is simply an amplification of an argument already developed in the context of a plea set out in the application before the General Court (judgment of 10 April 2014, Areva and Others v Commission, C‑247/11 P and C‑253/11 P, EU:C:2014:257, paragraph 114 and the case-law cited).

35. Il en résulte que la mise en évidence, à l’issue d’un premier examen, de la durée trop longue de la période en cause en considération de la procédure diligentée ne suffit pas. Il faut encore vérifier si elle ne peut être justifiée par des circonstances propres à l’affaire (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 15 octobre 2002, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij e.a./Commission, précité, point 193).

193 An initial general examination is carried out to determine whether the period in question is prima facie too long having regard to the procedure being conducted. If it is, a more specific examination is required as to whether there have been any actual delays which cannot be justified by the circumstances of the case.

36. Although the condition that a natural or legal person can bring an action challenging a regulation only if he is concerned both directly and individually must be interpreted in the light of the principle of effective judicial protection by taking account of the various circumstances that may distinguish an applicant individually, such an interpretation cannot have the effect of setting aside the condition in question, expressly laid down in the Treaty. The Community Courts would otherwise go beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty (see Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council , paragraph 44).

43. To give companies the right to elect to have their losses taken into account in the Member State in which they are established or in another Member State would seriously undermine a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States (see Oy AA , paragraph 55), in that the taxable bases would be altered in both States to the extent of the losses transferred.

55. The Court has thus held that to give companies the right to elect to have their losses taken into account in the Member State in which they are established or in another Member State would seriously undermine a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States ( Marks & Spencer , paragraph 46, and Rewe Zentralfinanz , paragraph 42).

46. A measure which contains no new factor as compared with a previous measure constitutes a purely confirmatory measure and cannot therefore have the effect of setting a fresh time-limit (see Case 23/80 Grasselli v Commission [1980] ECR 3709, paragraph 18).

38. However, the concept of ‘letting of immovable property’, which is the subject of the exemption laid down in Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive, necessarily also encompasses, in addition to the letting of the property which is the principal subject of the transaction, the letting of all property which is accessory to it. Thus, the letting of premises and sites for parking vehicles cannot be excluded from the exemption where the letting thereof is closely linked to the letting of immovable property to be used for another purpose, so that the two lettings constitute a single economic transaction (Case 173/88 Henriksen [1989] ECR 2763, paragraphs 14 and 15).

15 Thus, the letting of premises and sites for parking vehicles cannot be excluded from the exemption where the letting thereof is closely linked to the letting of immovable property to be used for another purpose, such as residential or commercial property, which is itself exempt, so that the two lettings constitute a single economic transaction .

30 In that judgment, the Court held, in paragraph 15, that a complex contract concerning a range of services provided in return for a lump sum paid by the customer did not constitute a tenancy of immovable property within the meaning of Article 16(1) of the Brussels Convention.

60 It is settled case-law that a provision in an agreement concluded by the Community with non-member countries must be regarded as being directly applicable when, regard being had to its wording and to the purpose and nature of the agreement itself, the provision contains a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure (see, in particular, Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 14; Case C-18/90 Kziber [1991] ECR I-199, paragraph 15, and Case C-162/96 Racke [1998] ECR I-3655, paragraph 31). In Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR I-3461, paragraphs 14 and 15, the Court made it clear that the same conditions apply in determining whether the provisions of a decision of the EEC-Turkey Association Council may have direct effect.

14 In order to be recognized as having direct effect, the provisions of a decision of the Council of Association must satisfy the same conditions as those applicable to the provisions of the Agreement itself .

28. The Court has specified that the relevance of that criterion was also confirmed by the International Convention on the simplification and harmonisation of customs procedures (Kyoto Convention), several annexes to which were accepted on behalf of the Community by Council Decision 77/415/EEC of 3 June 1977 (OJ 1977 L 166, p. 1 and 3), and the notes of which in relation to Rule 3 of Annex D.1 state that in practice the substantial processing criterion can be expressed by the ad valorem percentage rule, where either the percentage value of the materials utilised or the percentage of the value added reaches a specified level ( Brother International , paragraph 21).

44. In the second place, according to settled case-law, in the sphere of the common commercial policy and, most particularly, in the realm of measures to protect trade, the Union institutions enjoy a broad discretion by reason of the complexity of the economic, political and legal situations which they have to examine. The judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether the procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of powers (see judgment in Simon, Evers & Co. , C‑21/13, EU:C:2014:2154, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). The selection of the United States as analogue third country

29. According to settled case-law, in the sphere of the common commercial policy and, most particularly, in the realm of measures to protect trade, the institutions of the EU enjoy a broad discretion by reason of the complexity of the economic, political and legal situations which they have to examine. The judicial review of such an appraisal must therefore be limited to verifying whether the procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts on which the contested choice is based have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error in the appraisal of those facts or a misuse of powers (see the judgment in Council v Interpipe Niko Tube and Interpipe NTRP , C‑191/09 P and C‑200/09 P, EU:C:2012:78, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

Certes, selon la jurisprudence de la Cour, le non‑respect des règles de procédure relatives à l’adoption d’un acte faisant grief, tel le fait, pour la Commission, de ne pas avoir adopté une décision dans le délai fixé par le législateur de l’Union, constitue une violation des formes substantielles qu’il appartient au juge de l’Union de soulever d’office (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 4 septembre 2014, , C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, point 103, ainsi que du 24 juin 2015, , C‑549/12 P et C‑54/13 P, EU:C:2015:412, point 92).

23. Accordingly, the letter of formal notice from the Commission to the Member State concerned and then the reasoned opinion issued by it delimit the subject-matter of the dispute, so that it cannot thereafter be extended. Consequently, the reasoned opinion and the application must be based on the same complaints (see, in particular, Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR I-5449, paragraph 55; Case C-139/00 Commission v Spain [2002] ECR I-6407, paragraph 18, and Commission v Finland , cited above, paragraph 80).

18 It is settled case-law that the subject-matter of proceedings brought under Article 226 EC is circumscribed by the pre-litigation procedure provided for by that provision and that, consequently, the Commission's reasoned opinion and the application must be based on the same complaints (see Case C-11/95 Commission v Belgium [1996] ECR I-4115, paragraph 73, and Case C-279/94 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-4743, paragraph 24).

27. It also follows that such a fee may only cover the costs resulting from the administrative activities referred to in paragraph 22 of this judgment. Thus, the combined revenue received by Member States by way of the fee at issue cannot exceed all of the costs incurred in those administrative activities, which is a matter for the national court to ascertain.

9 As the Commission has pointed out, in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling the Court may not deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions (see the judgment in Case C-343/90 Lourenço Dias [1992] ECR I-4673, paragraph 17). The questions referred must therefore be understood as seeking to determine under which subheadings of the Annexes to Regulations Nos 267/87, 1151/87, 2800/87 and 3846/87 the two products referred to in paragraph 3 above are to be placed, and on what conditions.

17 Nevertheless, in Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello [1981] ECR 3045, paragraph 21, the Court considered that, in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction, it is a matter for the Court of Justice to examine the conditions in which the case has been referred to it by the national court. The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in the preliminary ruling procedure requires the national court to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to assist in the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions (Foglia v Novello, cited above, paragraphs 18 and 20, and Case 149/82 Robards v Insurance Officer [1983] ECR 171, paragraph 19).

23 The aim of that provision is to prevent account from being taken of prices and costs in non-market-economy countries which are not normally the result of market forces ( judgment in Joined Cases 294/86 and 77/87 Technointorg v Commission and Council [1988] ECR 6077, paragraph 29 ).

66. Various factors, set out in paragraphs 291 to 327 of the Kadi judgment, were advanced in support of the position stated by the Court in that judgment, and there has been no change in those factors which could justify reconsideration of that position, those factors being, essentially, bound up with the constitutional guarantee which is exercised, in a Union based on the rule of law (see Case C‑550/09 E and F [2010] ECR I‑6213, paragraph 44, and the judgment of 26 June 2012 in Case C‑335/09 P Poland v Commission [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 48), by judicial review of the lawfulness of all European Union measures, including those which, as in the present case, implement an international law measure, in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Union.

312. While, in certain cases before it the European Court of Human Rights has declined jurisdiction ratione personae , those cases involved actions directly attributable to the United Nations as an organisation of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative collective security objective, in particular actions of a subsidiary organ of the UN created under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations or actions falling within the exercise of powers lawfully delegated by the Security Council pursuant to that chapter, and not actions ascribable to the respondent States before that court, those actions not, moreover, having taken place in the territory of those States and not resulting from any decision of the authorities of those States.

39. One of the objectives of Regulation No 44/2001, as stated in recital 15 thereof, is to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable judgments will not be given where a number of courts have jurisdiction to hear the same dispute. That is why the European Union legislature sought to put in place a mechanism which is clear and effective in order to resolve situations of lis pendens . It follows that, in order to achieve those objectives, Article 27 of that regulation must be interpreted broadly (see, to that effect, judgments in Mærsk Olie & Gas , C‑39/02, EU:C:2004:615, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited, and Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa Corporate Solutions assurances , C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 40).

58. Moreover, the Court has ruled, first, that the fact that certain provisions of the Treaty are formally addressed to the Member States does not prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any individual who has an interest in compliance with the obligations thus laid down, and, second, that the prohibition on prejudicing a fundamental freedom laid down in a provision of the Treaty that is mandatory in nature, applies in particular to all agreements intended to regulate paid labour collectively (see, to that effect, Case 43/75 Defrenne [1976] ECR 455, paragraphs 31 and 39).

31 INDEED , AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY FOUND IN OTHER CONTEXTS , THE FACT THAT CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ARE FORMALLY ADDRESSED TO THE MEMBER STATES DOES NOT PREVENT RIGHTS FROM BEING CONFERRED AT THE SAME TIME ON ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS AN INTEREST IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DUTIES THUS LAID DOWN .

35. Also, it is clear from settled case-law that the need for a uniform interpretation of the provisions of Community law means that, in cases of doubt, the text of a provision should not be considered in isolation in one of its versions, but requires, on the contrary, that it should be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (Case C-321/96 Mecklenburg [1998] ECR I‑3809, paragraph 29, and Case C-311/06 Consiglio Nazionale degli Ingegneri [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 53). The expression ‘ particularités topographiques ’ in the French version of Regulation No 1782/2003 must therefore be compared, for example, with the expression ‘landscape features’ in the English version of that regulation.

50. In that regard, according to settled case-law, the Commission may, in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by Articles 107 TFEU and 108 TFEU, adopt guidelines to indicate how it intends, under those articles, to exercise its discretion in regard to new aid or in regard to existing systems of aid (Case C‑242/00 Germany v Commission [2002] ECR I‑5603, paragraph 27).

27 It should be noted at the outset that, in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by Articles 87 EC and 88 EC, the Commission may adopt guidelines designed to indicate how it intends, under those articles, to exercise its discretion in regard to new aid or in regard to existing systems of aid.

53 As to the risk asserted by the Commission that the procedural rules mentioned in paragraph 45 above might be circumvented, it must be recalled that the limitations of access to documents relating to court proceedings, whether provided for under Article 255 EC, which was succeeded by Article 15 TFEU, or under Regulation No 1049/2001, pursue the same objective, namely to ensure that the right of access to documents of the institutions is exercised without undermining the protection of court proceedings, and that protection means in particular that compliance with the principles of equality of arms and the sound administration of justice must be ensured (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 September 2010, Sweden and Others v API and Commission, C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541, paragraphs 84 and 85).

93. In the present case, however, it must be noted that Article 4(5) of Regulation No 1049/2001 – unlike other Community legislation on which the Court has ruled (see, inter alia, Case C‑269/99 Carl Küh ne and Others [2001] ECR I‑9517, paragraphs 50 to 54) – did not aim to establish a division between two powers, one national and the other of the Community, with different purposes. As pointed out in paragraph 76 above, that provision creates a decision-making procedure the sole object of which is to determine whether access to a document should be refused under one of the substantive exceptions listed in Article 4(1) to (3) of the regulation, a decision-making procedure in which both the Community institution and the Member State concerned play a part, in the terms stated in paragraph 76.

50 In this context, it must be stated that there is, in the system established by Regulation No 2081/92, a division of powers between the Member State concerned and the Commission.

62. To assess whether legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings goes beyond what is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision and to prevent tax evasion, two situations must be distinguished.

154. In accordance with settled case-law, whilst the principle of freedom of expression is expressly recognised by Article 10 of the ECHR and constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of a democratic society, it nevertheless follows from Article 10(2) that freedom of expression may also be subject to certain limitations justified by objectives in the public interest, in so far as those derogations are in accordance with the law, motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims under that provision and necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, to this effect, Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I‑3689, paragraph 26; Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I‑6279, paragraph 42; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I‑5659, paragraph 79; and Karner , paragraph 50).

26 A prohibition on selling publications which offer the chance to take part in prize games competitions may detract from freedom of expression. Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms does, however, permit derogations from that freedom for the purposes of maintaining press diversity, in so far as they are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society (see the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 24 November 1993 in Informationsverein Lentia and Others v Austria Series A No 276).

46. Thirdly, also according to the HSEN relating to heading 2206, the addition of alcohol to beverages coming under that heading does not preclude such beverages from retaining that classification provided that they retain the character of products coming under the heading, namely that of fermented beverages. It is apparent from the order for reference that the beverage in question has the taste, colour and smell of a beverage made from grapes. Consequently, it has not lost the particular organoleptic characteristics of a fermented beverage (see, to that effect, Case C‑150/08 Siebrand [2009] ECR I‑3941, paragraph 37).

32 Those States are nonetheless obliged to ensure that the civil liability arising under their domestic law is covered by insurance which complies with the provisions of the three abovementioned directives. It is also apparent from the Court’s case-law that the Member States must exercise their powers in that field in a way that is consistent with EU law and that the provisions of national legislation which govern compensation for road accidents may not deprive the First, Second and Third Directives of their effectiveness (judgment of 23 October 2012, Marques Almeida, C‑300/10, EU:C:2012:656, paragraphs 30 and 31 and the case-law cited).

31. It is also apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the Member States must exercise their powers in that field in compliance with EU law and that the national provisions which govern compensation for road accidents may not deprive the First, Second and Third Directives of their effectiveness ( Ambrósio Lavrador and Olival Ferreira Bonifácio , paragraph 28).

41 So far as concerns the context in which Article 20(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive is laid down, it is clear from Article 17(5) of the directive, read in conjunction with Article 19(1), that the amount of VAT charged on the mixed-use input goods or services supplied that is deductible is determined by applying an allocation key which may be that provided for by those provisions, based on turnover, or another allocation key chosen in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 17(5) of the directive in so far as for the activity in question that allocation key enables more precise results to be achieved when calculating the deductible proportion (see, to this effect, judgment of 8 November 2012 in BLC Baumarkt, C‑511/10, EU:C:2012:689, paragraph 24).

47. None the less, it is also necessary that the way in which Regional Law No 12/2004 pursues those objectives is coherent. According to the Court’s case-law, the national legislation as a whole and the various relevant rules are appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective relied upon only if they genuinely reflect a concern to attain that objective in a consistent and systematic manner (see, to that effect, Hartlauer , paragraph 55, and Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others , paragraph 42).

42. As to those submissions, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that national legislation is appropriate for securing attainment of the objective relied upon only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain that objective in a consistent and systematic manner (see Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04 Placanica and Others [2007] ECR I-1891, paragraphs 53 and 58; Case C-500/06 Corporación Dermoestética [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 39 and 40; and Hartlauer , paragraph 55).

65. That requirement must be interpreted strictly. Thus, the Court, in the context of a public works contract, has declared unlawful a reference from tender specifications to national legislation concerning the possibility that tenderers may submit variants of their tenders, in accordance with the first and second paragraphs of Article 19 of Directive 93/37, having regard to the fact that the minimum conditions which those variants were to meet were not specified in the tender specifications (see Case C‑421/01 Traunfellner [2003] ECR I‑11941, paragraphs 27 to 29). With regard to an obligation of transparency designed to ensure observance of the principle of equal treatment of tenderers, which must be observed in any procurement procedure governed by Directive 93/37, that finding of the Court is also valid as regards works concessions.

29 According to the case-law of the Court, the concept of ‘employment conditions’, within the meaning of the clause 4(1) of the framework agreement, thus covers the three-yearly length-of-service increments which represent one of the constituent parts of the pay which should be granted to fixed-term workers in the same way as it is to permanent workers (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 September 2007, in Del Cerro Alonso, C‑307/05, EU:C:2007:509, paragraph 47, and of 22 December 2010, Gavieiro Gavieiro and Iglesias Torres, C‑444/09 and C‑456/09, EU:C:2010:819, paragraphs 50 to 58).

53. As is apparent from the case-law of the Court, so far as length-of-service increments such as those at issue in the main proceedings are concerned, fixed-term workers must not be treated less favourably than permanent workers in a comparable situation, in the absence of any objective justification (see, to that effect, Del Cerro Alonso , paragraphs 42 and 47, and Impact , paragraph 126).

69. That argument cannot however be accepted. As the Court has already held, for waters to be regarded as ‘affected by pollution’, within the meaning particularly of Article 3(1) of Directive 91/676, and for their designation as a vulnerable zone to be required, under Article 3(2) of that directive, it is not necessary that nitrogen compounds of agricultural origin be the exclusive cause of the pollution. It is sufficient if they contribute to it significantly (see, to that effect, Case C-293/97 Standley and Others [1999] ECR I‑2603, paragraphs 30 and 35).

26. That clause is set out in the Cooperation Agreement, which was approved on behalf of the Community by Regulation No 1591/84 and thus constitutes, in light of settled case-law, an act of the Community institutions which the Court has jurisdiction to interpret in preliminary ruling proceedings (see, to this effect, Case 181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449, paragraphs 4 to 6; Case C-162/96 Racke [1998] ECR I‑3655, paragraph 41; and Case C-301/08 Bogiatzi [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 23).

23. According to settled case-law, an agreement concluded by the Council, in accordance with Articles 300 EC and 310 EC, is, as far as the Community is concerned, an act of one of the institutions of the Community, within the meaning of subparagraph (b) of the first paragraph of Article 234 EC. The provisions of such an agreement form an integral part of the Community legal order as from its entry into force and, within the framework of that order, the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of such an agreement (Case 181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449, paragraphs 4 to 6; Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 7; Case C-321/97 Andersson and Wåkerås-Andersson [1999] ECR I-3551, paragraph 26; and Case C-431/05 Merck Genéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos [2007] ECR I-7001, paragraph 31).

50. It is only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the Community legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties (see, inter alia, Case C‑402/03 Skov and Bilka [2006] ECR I‑199, paragraph 51, and Brzeziński , paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

30 In addition, it must be recalled that the scope of the exemptions referred to in Article 132 of Directive 2006/112 is to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 October 2016, TMD, C‑412/15, EU:C:2016:738, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

34 That said, it must be recalled that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 132 of Directive 2006/112 are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 28 July 2011, Nordea Pankki Suomi, C‑350/10, EU:C:2011:532, paragraph 23, and of 22 October 2015, Hedqvist, C‑264/14, EU:C:2015:718, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

35. It should be noted that jurisdiction to hear an action in tort, delict or quasi-delict may be established in favour of the court seised of a claim for a finding of a breach of copyright, where the Member State in which that court is situated protects the rights of copyright relied on by the applicant and the alleged damage may occur within the jurisdiction of the court seised (see Pinckney EU:C:2013:635, paragraph 43).

65. According to the settled case-law of the Court, in the context of competition law the term ‘undertaking’ must be understood as designating an economic unit even if in law that economic unit consists of several natural or legal persons (see, in particular, judgments in Hydrotherm Gerätebau , 170/83, EU:C:1984:271, paragraph 11, and Arkema v Commission , C‑520/09 P, EU:C:2011:619, paragraph 37).

11 IN COMPETITION LAW , THE TERM ' ' UNDERTAKING ' ' MUST BE UNDERSTOOD AS DESIGNATING AN ECONOMIC UNIT FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE AGREEMENT IN QUESTION EVEN IF IN LAW THAT ECONOMIC UNIT CONSISTS OF SEVERAL PERSONS , NATURAL OR LEGAL . THE REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE 1 ( 1 ) OF REGULATION NO 67/67 IS THEREFORE FULFILLED IF ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT IS MADE UP OF UNDERTAKINGS HAVING IDENTICAL INTERESTS AND CONTROLLED BY THE SAME NATURAL PERSON , WHO ALSO PARTICIPATES IN THE AGREEMENT . FOR IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES COMPETITION BETWEEN THE PERSONS PARTICIPATING TOGETHER , AS A SINGLE PARTY , IN THE AGREEMENT IN QUESTION IS IMPOSSIBLE .

26 According to settled case-law, the rule of special jurisdiction laid down in Article 5(3) of that regulation is based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur, which justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings (judgments of 5 June 2014 in Coty Germany, C‑360/12, EU:C:2014:1318, paragraphs 47, and of 10 September 2015 in Holterman Ferho Exploitatie and Others, C‑47/14, EU:C:2015:574, paragraph 73 and case-law cited).

52. As regards the right to a fair trial, to which reference is made in the question referred, it must be recalled that that right results from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and was reaffirmed in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, which corresponds, as is clear from the explanations relating to that article, to Article 6(1) of the ECHR (see Case C-279/09 DEB [2010] ECR I-13849, paragraph 32).

32. According to the explanations relating to that article, which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, have to be taken into consideration for the interpretation of the Charter, the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter corresponds to Article 6(1) of the ECHR.

15 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that recourse to Article 100a as a legal basis is possible if the aim is to prevent the emergence of future obstacles to trade resulting from multifarious development of national laws provided that the emergence of such obstacles is likely and the measure in question is designed to prevent them (Case C-350/92 Spain v Council [1995] ECR I-1985, paragraph 35, and Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, paragraph 86).

17 However, the Court has consistently held that, in prohibiting every Member State from applying its law differently on the ground of nationality, within the field of application of the Treaty, Articles 6, 52 and 59 are not concerned with any disparities in treatment which may result, between Member States, from differences existing between the laws of the various Member States, so long as they affect all persons subject to them in accordance with objective criteria and without regard to their nationality (see, to that effect, the judgments in Case 1/78 Kenny v Insurance Officer [1978] ECR 1489, paragraph 18; Joined Cases C-251/90 and C-252/90 Wood and Cowie [1992] ECR I-2873, paragraph 19; and Joined Cases 185/78 to 204/78 Van Dam en Zonen and Others [1979] ECR 2345, paragraph 10).

10 IN THIS CONNEXION IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT PROTECTIVE MEASURES AGREED ON WITHIN THE COMMUNITY , IN CONSULTATION WITH THE COMMISSION , ARE BASED ON RESPONSIBILITY SHARED BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES , IN THE SENSE THAT AT PRESENT EACH STATE REGULATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ITS OWN NATIONAL LEGISLATION CONCERNING FISHING QUOTAS , THE CATCHES LANDED IN ITS OWN PORTS . IT CANNOT BE HELD CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION TO APPLY NATIONAL LEGISLATION , THE COMPATIBILITY OF WHICH WITH COMMUNITY LAW IS MOREOVER NOT CONTESTED , BECAUSE OTHER MEMBER STATES ALLEGEDLY APPLY LESS STRICT RULES . INEQUALITIES OF THIS KIND , IF THEY EXIST , MUST BE ELIMINATED BY MEANS OF THE CONSULTATIONS PROVIDED FOR BY ANNEX VI TO THE HAGUE RESOLUTION , QUOTED IN THE JUDGMENT REFERRED TO ABOVE , BUT THEY CANNOT BE THE FOUNDATION OF A CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION WITH REGARD TO THE PROVISIONS MADE BY A MEMBER STATE WHICH APPLIES EQUALLY TO ANY PERSON UNDER ITS JURISDICTION , THE REGULATIONS WHICH IT HAD ADOPTED FOR FISHING QUOTAS .

47 In this connection, it should be borne in mind first that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the final and conclusive decision on the clearance of accounts must be taken at the conclusion of a specific procedure giving effect to the audi alteram partem rule, during which the Member States concerned must be provided with all the guarantees necessary for them to present their point of view (see, to that effect, Case C-61/95 Greece v Commission [1998] ECR I-207, paragraph 39).

42. Since Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009 merely requires the similarity which exists to be capable of leading the relevant public to make a connection between the signs at issue, that is to say, to establish a link between them, but does not require that similarity to be capable of leading that public to confuse those signs, it must be held that the protection which that provision lays down in favour of marks with a reputation may apply even if there is a lower degree of similarity between the signs at issue (see, by analogy, judgment in Adidas-Salomon and Adidas Benelux , C‑408/01, EU:C:2003:582, paragraphs 27, 29 and 31, and judgment in Intel Corporation , C‑252/07, EU:C:2008:655, paragraphs 57, 58 and 66).

29. The infringements referred to in Article 5(2) of the Directive, where they occur, are the consequence of a certain degree of similarity between the mark and the sign, by virtue of which the relevant section of the public makes a connection between the sign and the mark, that is to say, establishes a link between them even though it does not confuse them (see, to that effect, Case C-375/97 General Motors [1999] ECR I-5421, paragraph 23).

46. Consequently, according to settled case-law, reliance by a national authority on the concept of public policy presupposes, in any event, the existence, in addition to the perturbation of the social order which any infringement of the law involves, of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of society ( Rutili , paragraph 28; Bouchereau , paragraph 35; and Orfanopoulos and Oliveri , paragraph 66).

28. As the Court held in Case 43/75 Defrenne [1976] ECR 455, paragraph 12, that principle, which is a particular expression of the general principle of equality which prohibits comparable situations from being treated differently unless the difference is objectively justified, forms part of the foundations of the Community (see also Case C‑381/99 Brunnhofer [2001] ECR I-4961, paragraph 28, and Lawrence and Others , paragraph 12).

28 As the Court has already held in Case 43/75 Defrenne II [1976] ECR 455, paragraph 12, that principle, which is a particular expression of the general principle of equality which prohibits comparable situations from being treated differently unless the difference is objectively justified, forms part of the foundations of the Community.

28. For that to be the case, the subsidy must first be paid specifically to the subsidised operator to enable it to supply particular goods or services. Only in that case can the subsidy be regarded as consideration for the supply of goods or services and therefore be taxable. It must be noted, in particular, that the beneficiary is recognised as having a right to receive the subsidy, since a taxable supply has been made by it (Case C‑184/00 Office des produits wallons [2001] ECR I-9115, paragraphs 12 and 13).

35 In this connection, the Court held that the condition of residence laid down in the Law on State financial aid for higher education studies, as amended by the Law of 26 July 2010, was appropriate for attaining the objective in the public interest, acknowledged at the level of the European Union, of promoting higher education and of significantly increasing the proportion of Luxembourg residents who hold a higher education degree (judgment of 20 June 2013, Giersch and Others, C‑20/12, EU:C:2013:411, paragraphs 53, 56 and 68).

53. With regard to the social objective, it should be pointed out that the promotion of higher education is an objective in the public interest, acknowledged at the level of the European Union, as stated inter alia by the Austrian and Luxembourg Governments.

49 The Court has noted, in that regard, that the purpose of the rule that the addressee of an adverse decision must be placed in a position to submit his observations before that decision is adopted is to enable the competent authority effectively to take into account all relevant information. In order to ensure that the person or undertaking concerned is in fact protected, the purpose of that rule is, inter alia, to enable them to correct an error or submit such information relating to their personal circumstances as will argue in favour of the adoption or non-adoption of the decision, or in favour of its having a specific content (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 December 2008, Sopropé, C‑349/07, EU:C:2008:746, paragraph 49, and of 3 July 2014, Kamino International Logistics and Datema Hellmann Worldwide Logistics, C‑129/13 and C‑130/13, EU:C:2014:2041, paragraph 38).

60. The Court has held on a number of occasions that Article 49 TFEU precludes any national measure which, even if applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, is liable to hinder or render less attractive the exercise by Union nationals of the freedom of establishment that is guaranteed by the Treaty and that such restrictive effects may arise where, on account of national legislation, a company may be deterred from setting up subsidiary bodies, such as permanent establishments, in other Member States and from carrying on its activities through such bodies (Case C‑384/08 Attanasio Group [2010] ECR I‑2055, paragraphs 43 and 44 and the case-law cited).

43. According to settled case-law, Article 43 EC precludes any national measure which, even if applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, is liable to hinder or render less attractive the exercise by Union nationals of the freedom of establishment that is guaranteed by the Treaty (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑19/92 Kraus [1993] ECR I‑1663, paragraph 32; Gebhard , paragraph 37; Case C‑442/02 CaixaBank France [2004] ECR I‑8961, paragraph 11; and Case C‑169/07 Hartlauer [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

112. That is a fortiori the case when the national court is seised of a dispute concerning the application of domestic provisions which, as here, have been specifically enacted for the purpose of transposing a directive intended to confer rights on individuals. The national court must, in the light of the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, presume that the Member State, following its exercise of the discretion afforded it under that provision, had the intention of fulfilling entirely the obligations arising from the directive concerned (see Case C‑334/92 Wagner Miret [1993] ECR I-6911, paragraph 20).

19. In paragraph 52 of that judgment, the Court held that, in the light of the considerations referred to in paragraphs 28 to 35 of the judgment, to the effect, in particular, that SOAs are commercial undertakings performing their activities in conditions of competition and do not have any power to make decisions connected with the exercise of public powers, SOAs’ certification activities are not directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority within the meaning of Article 51 TFEU.

31. Dans le cadre de cette vérification, les SOA sont tenues de transmettre les informations appropriées à l’Autorità, qui exerce le contrôle de la régularité des activités de certification, des sanctions pouvant être appliquées à l’égard de ces sociétés dans les cas de violation de leurs obligations prévues par la réglementation nationale en vigueur.

35. Thus, the conduct of a subsidiary can be imputed to the parent company where the latter does in fact exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary (see, to that effect, judgment in Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission , C‑97/08 P, EU:C:2009:536, paragraphs 58 and 59 and the case-law cited).

29. That interpretation is not invalidated by the fact that Directive 85/374, as is clear from the first recital in the preamble thereto and from the case-law of the Court (Case C-52/00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-3827, paragraph 17; Case C-154/00 Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I-3879, paragraph 13; and Case C-183/00 González Sánchez [2002] ECR I-3901, paragraph 26), aims not only to avoid differences in levels of consumer protection, but also to ensure undistorted competition between traders and to facilitate the free movement of goods.

17 In that connection it should be pointed out first that, as is clear from the first recital thereto, the purpose of the Directive in establishing a harmonised system of civil liability on the part of producers in respect of damage caused by defective products is to ensure undistorted competition between traders, to facilitate the free movement of goods and to avoid differences in levels of consumer protection.

141 It has consistently been held that the interpretation which the Court, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 177 of the Treaty, gives to a rule of Community law clarifies and where necessary defines the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time of its coming into force. It follows that the rule as thus interpreted can, and must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships arising and established before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions for bringing before the courts having jurisdiction an action relating to the application of that rule are satisfied (see, inter alia, Case 24/86 Blaizot v University of Liège and Others [1988] ECR 379, paragraph 27).

Par conséquent, il y a lieu d’écarter le second argument de la troisième branche du premier moyen comme étant non fondé.

21. Furthermore, according to settled case-law of the Court, the duty incumbent upon the General Court under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to state reasons for its judgments does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know the grounds on which the General Court has based itself and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its powers of review on appeal (see, inter alia, judgment of 21 December 2011 in Case C‑320/09 P A2A v Commission , paragraph 97).

22 In this connection it must be recalled that, for a national measure to be categorised as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, there must, first, be an intervention by the State or through State resources; second, the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States; third, it must confer a selective advantage on the recipient and, fourth, it must distort or threaten to distort competition (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 September 2010, Commission v Deutsche Post, C‑399/08 P, EU:C:2010:481, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

81. The fact that the national court has, formally speaking, worded the question referred for a preliminary ruling with reference to certain provisions of Community law does not preclude the Court from providing to the national court all the elements of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in its questions (see, inter alia, Case C‑258/04 Ioannidis [2005] ECR I‑8275, paragraph 20 and case-law cited, and Case C‑152/03 Ritter-Coulais [2006] ECR I‑1711, paragraph 29 and case-law cited). It is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision referring the questions, the points of Community law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject-matter of the dispute (see, inter alia, Case 35/85 Tissier [1986] ECR 1207, paragraph 9).

20. It should be noted at the outset that the fact that the national court has formulated the question referred for a preliminary ruling with reference to certain provisions of Community law does not preclude the Court from providing to the national court all the elements of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in its questions (see, in particular, Case C-241/89 SARPP [1990] ECR I-4695, paragraph 8, and Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, paragraph 38).

161 As regards, first, the general principle of legal certainty, it must be recalled that this fundamental principle of EU law requires, in particular, that rules should be clear and precise, so that individuals may ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and may take steps accordingly (judgment of 10 January 2006, IATA and ELFAA, C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 68 and the case‑law cited).

117. According to the case-law of the Court, in order to determine whether a type of coordination between undertakings reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition that it may be considered a restriction of competition ‘by object’ within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC, regard must be had, inter alia, to its objectives and the economic and legal context of which it forms a part. When determining that context, it is also necessary to take into consideration the nature of the goods or services affected, as well as the real conditions of the functioning and structure of the market or markets in question (see, to that effect, judgment in CB v Commission , C‑67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204, paragraph 53 and the case law cited).

53. According to the case-law of the Court, in order to determine whether an agreement between undertakings or a decision by an association of undertakings reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition that it may be considered a restriction of competition ‘by object’ within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC, regard must be had to the content of its provisions, its objectives and the economic and legal context of which it forms a part. When determining that context, it is also necessary to take into consideration the nature of the goods or services affected, as well as the real conditions of the functioning and structure of the market or markets in question (see, to that effect, judgment in Allianz Hungária Biztosító and Others (EU:C:2013:160), paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

25. It is settled case-law that the first paragraph of Article 90 EC is infringed where the taxation on the imported product and that on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, even if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product (see, inter alia, Commission v Greece , paragraph 20, and the case-law cited there; Case C‑393/98 Gomes Valente [2001] ECR I‑1327, paragraph 21; and Case C‑101/00 Tulliasiamies and Siilin [2002] ECR I‑7487, paragraph 53).

34. In such circumstances and where the parties are the same, in accordance with Article 19(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003, the court second seised is of its own motion to stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. It must be held that the Court’s interpretation of Article 27 of Regulation No 44/2001 applies equally to Article 19(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003. Thus, in order for the jurisdiction of the court first seised to be established within the meaning of Article 19(1) of that regulation, it is sufficient that the court first seised has not declined jurisdiction of its own motion and that none of the parties has contested that jurisdiction before or up to the time at which a position is adopted which is regarded in national law as being the first defence on the substance submitted before that court. (see, by analogy, judgment in Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa Corporate Solutions assurances , C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 44).

44. Accordingly, it must be held that it is clear both from the overall scheme and the purpose of Regulation No 44/2001 that, in order for the jurisdiction of the court first seised to be established within the meaning of Article 27(2) thereof, it is sufficient, where the court second seised does not have exclusive jurisdiction under that regulation, that the court first seised has not declined jurisdiction of its own motion and that none of the parties has contested that jurisdiction before or up to the time at which a position is adopted which is regarded by national procedural law as being the first defence.

51 As regards the extent of the reparation for the loss or damage arising from such failure, it should be noted that retroactive application in full of the measures implementing the Directive to employees who have suffered as a result of belated transposition enables in principle the harmful consequences of the breach of Community law to be remedied, provided that the Directive has been properly transposed. Such application should have the effect of guaranteeing to those employees the rights from which they would have benefited if the Directive had been transposed within the prescribed period (see also the judgment of today's date in Case C-373/95 Maso and Others, cited above, paragraphs 39 to 42).

30. In order to ensure the protection of the rights conferred by the trade mark while making possible the further marketing of goods bearing a trade mark without the proprietor of the trade mark being able to oppose that, it is essential that the proprietor can control the first putting of those goods on the market in the EEA, irrespective of the fact that they may have first been marketed outside that area, that marketing having no exhaustive effect for the purposes of Article 7(1) of Directive 89/104 (see, to that effect, inter alia, Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel and Others , paragraphs 31 and 32 and the case‑law cited).

32. Therefore, in order to ensure the protection of the rights conferred by the trade mark and to make possible the further marketing of goods bearing a trade mark without the proprietor of the trade mark being able to oppose that, it is essential that the proprietor can control the first placing of those goods on the market in the EEA, irrespective of the fact that they may have first been marketed outside that area (see, to that effect, Sebago and Maison Dubois , paragraphs 20 and 21; Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss , paragraph 33; Van Doren + Q , paragraph 26; and Peak Holding , paragraphs 36 and 37).

46. It must also be recalled that the Court has already held that jurisdiction to hear disputes concerning the existence of a contractual obligation must be determined in accordance with Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention and that that provision is therefore applicable even when the existence of the contract on which the claim is based is in dispute between the parties (see the judgment in Case 38/81 Effer v Kanter [1982] ECR 825, paragraphs 7 and 8).

14 In this submission, the applicant is disregarding the fact that, as the Court recognized in Case 48/69 ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619, paragraphs 10 to 14 and in Case 8/72 Cementhandelaren v Commission [1972] ECR 977, paragraphs 10 to 14, delegation of signature is the normal means whereby the Commission exercises its powers . The applicant has not provided any evidence to show that the Community administration failed to comply with the relevant rules in this case .

11 IT IS NOT IN DISPUTE THAT THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR COMPETITION MERELY SIGNED THE NOTIFICATION OF OBJECTIONS WHICH THE MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPETITION MATTERS HAD PREVIOUSLY APPROVED IN THE EXERCISE OF THE POWERS WHICH THE COMMISSION HAD DELEGATED TO HIM .

45. It is therefore legitimate for the Member States, in order to ensure the correct levying and collection of the tax and to prevent fraud, to provide in their respective provisions of national law for appropriate penalties to sanction the failure to observe the obligation to register in the register of taxable persons for VAT purposes.

43. The use of the expression ‘not later than’ in Articles 5(2) and 18 of the Directive shows that the Member States are at liberty to apply earlier time-limits if they deem it necessary (see, to that effect, Case C-11/92 Gallaher and Others [1993] ECR I-3545, paragraph 20, on the subject of the expression ‘at least’).

20 Articles 3(3) and 4(4) of the directive contain provisions directed to the Member States, to whom the directive is addressed, and not to the manufacturers of tobacco products, who have no interest in using a greater surface area for the indications and warnings in question. The expression "at least" contained in both articles must be interpreted as meaning that, if they consider it necessary, Member States are at liberty to decide that the indications and warnings are to cover a greater surface area in view of the level of public awareness of the health risks associated with tobacco consumption.

93. Turning to the first criterion, concerning the complexity of the applicable rules, it is appropriate to refer to the definition of the concept of equivalent goods as contained in Article 569(1) of the implementing regulation. Under that provision, equivalent goods must come under the same eight-digit subheading of the CN Code, display the same commercial quality and have the same technical characteristics as the import goods. These three conditions are cumulative (Case C-103/96 Eridania Beghin-Say [1997] ECR I-1453, paragraph 23).

35. As regards the Explanatory Notes to the HS, it must be added that, in spite of the fact that they lack binding force, they are an important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Common Customs Tariff and, as such, may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (Case C‑173/08 Kloosterboer Services EU:C:2009:382, paragraph 25, and Case C‑568/11 Agroferm EU:C:2013:407, paragraph 28). The same is true of the Explanatory Notes to the CN (see, Case C‑35/93 Develop Dr. Eisbein EU:C:1994:252, paragraph 21, and British Sky Broadcasting Group and Pace EU:C:2011:248, paragraph 92).

28. It should also be recalled that the HS Explanatory Notes are an important means of ensuring the uniform application of the Common Customs Tariff and, as such, may be regarded as useful aids to its interpretation (see, to that effect, Case C‑11/93 Siemens Nixdorf [1994] ECR I‑1945, paragraph 12; Case C‑15/05 Kawasaki Motors Europe [2006] ECR I‑3657, paragraph 36; and Pacific World and FDD International , paragraph 29).

66. It is for the Court, in each case, in the light of the circumstances of the case before it and the degree of persuasion and deterrence which appears to it to be required, to determine the appropriate financial penalties, such as the imposition of a lump sum, in particular with a view to preventing similar infringements of European Union law from recurring (see Case C‑121/07 Commission v France , paragraph 59).

241. The gravity of the infringements must be assessed in the light of numerous factors, such as the particular circumstances of the case, its context and the dissuasive effect of fines, although no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria to be applied has been drawn up (see, in particular, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission , paragraph 465).

465 In paragraph 1173 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance rightly observed that, in the case of a decision imposing fines on several undertakings, the scope of the duty to state reasons must be assessed inter alia in the light of the fact that the gravity of the infringement depends on numerous factors, such as the particular circumstances of the case, its context and the dissuasive effect of fines, although no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria to be applied has been drawn up (SPO, cited above, paragraph 54).

27. The detailed procedural rules governing the remedies intended to protect rights conferred by Community law on candidates and tenderers harmed by decisions of contracting authorities must not compromise the effectiveness of Directive 89/665 ( Universale-Bau and Others , paragraph 72).

28. In that respect, it should be recalled that Article 15(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 constitutes a derogation both from the general rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article 2(1) of the regulation, which confers jurisdiction upon the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled, and from the rule of special jurisdiction for contracts, set out in Article 5(1) of the regulation, under which jurisdiction lies with the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question. Thus, Article 15(1) must necessarily be interpreted strictly (see judgment in Česká spořitelna , EU:C:2013:165, paragraph 26 and case-law cited).

26. Next, it must be observed that Article 15(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 constitutes a derogation both from the general rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article 2(1) of the regulation, which confers jurisdiction on the courts of the Member S tate in which the defendant is domiciled, and from the rule of special jurisdiction for contracts, set out in Article 5(1) of the regulation, under which jurisdiction lies with the courts of the place of performance of the obligation on which the claim is based ( Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof , paragraph 53, and Mühlleitner , paragraph 26). Thus, Article 15(1) must necessarily be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, Mühlleitner , paragraph 27).

42. As to those submissions, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that national legislation is appropriate for securing attainment of the objective relied upon only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain that objective in a consistent and systematic manner (see Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04 Placanica and Others [2007] ECR I-1891, paragraphs 53 and 58; Case C-500/06 Corporación Dermoestética [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 39 and 40; and Hartlauer , paragraph 55).

51. It follows from the case-law that there is also no such need when the species concerned are actually present in autumn in the areas open for spring hunting, even if they are present in considerably smaller numbers than in the spring, provided that those numbers are not inconsiderable (see, to that effect, Commission v Finland , paragraphs 35 and 43).

35. As regards eider, the Court notes that it is apparent from the ornithological study carried out by the Riista ja kalatalouden tutkimuslaitos (Institute for the Study of Game and Fishing), referred to by the parties (‘the study’), that a not inconsiderable number of specimens of that species is present in the spring hunting territories from early autumn onwards. As to the Finnish Government’s assertion that the individuals of that species present in the autumn in those territories are females or chicks born that year, that assertion is not supported by any evidence, as the Finnish Government moreover acknowledges. Lastly, although it is true that hunters perform a useful function in environmental management, by hunting small predators in the spring so that the eider’s rearing can produce better results, it is not apparent that that function can be fulfilled only if the eider hunting season is open in the spring.

42. Next, as pointed out by the tribunal administratif de Montreuil with regard to national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which seeks to prevent dividends distributed by resident companies being subject to a series of charges to tax, the situation of a resident recipient UCITS is comparable to that of a non‑resident recipient UCITS (see Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha , paragraphs 43 and 44, and Commission v Germany , paragraph 58).

19. As regards, in the first place, whether Sveda was acting as a taxable person during construction of the recreational path, that is to say, for the purposes of an economic transaction, within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of the VAT Directive, it should be noted that goods and services may be acquired, by a taxable person, for the purposes of an economic activity within the meaning of that provision, even if the goods are not used immediately for that economic activity (see, to that effect, judgment in Lennartz , C‑97/90, EU:C:1991:315, paragraph 14).

14 It follows from that judgment that a person who acquires goods for the purposes of an economic activity within the meaning of Article 4 does so as a taxable person, even if the goods are not used immediately for such economic activities.

24. A body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals is included in any event among the bodies against which the provisions of a directive capable of having direct effect may be relied upon ( Foster and Others , paragraph 20, and Case C-343/98 Collino and Chiappero [2000] ECR I-6659, paragraph 23).

64. As regards the fourth part of the plea, the Court of First Instance correctly interpreted the judgment in Spain v Commission , paragraphs 12 to 20, when it stated that the effect of that judgment is that a decision to initiate the procedure for examining State aid produces legal effects as referred to in Article 230 EC. Specific legal consequences flow from the assessment and classification of the aid mentioned and from the choice of procedure which follows from that. By contrast, the mere fact that, by the contested decisions, the Commission made a choice as to the procedure to be undertaken against the appellants and thus excluded other procedures cannot, in itself, be a legal effect for the purposes of that article.

16 As for new aid, Article 93(3) provides that the Commission is to be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. The Commission then conducts an initial review of the aid proposed. If at the end of that review it considers a proposal to be incompatible with the common market having regard to Article 92, it must without delay initiate the contentious procedure provided for in Article 93(2). In such a case, the final sentence of Article 93(3) prohibits the Member State concerned from implementing the proposed measures until that procedure has resulted in a final decision. New aid is accordingly subject to the Commission' s preventive control and in principle may not be granted until that institution has declared it to be compatible with the Treaty.

32 Thus, the Court held that once the person concerned has established his status as a national of a Member State, the other Member States are not entitled to challenge that status on the ground that the person concerned might also have the nationality of a non-member country which, under the legislation of the host Member State, overrides that of the Member State (Micheletti and Others, paragraph 14).

19. It is also settled case-law that all measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of that freedom must be regarded as constituting restrictions on the freedom of establishment (see Columbus Container Services , paragraph 34, and Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt , paragraph 30).

30. Moreover, it is settled case-law that all measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of that freedom must be regarded as such restrictions (Case C‑55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I‑4165, paragraph 37; Case C‑442/02 CaixaBank France [2004] ECR I‑8961, paragraph 11).

22. According to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of Community law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance (see Case C‑300/01 Salzmann [2003] ECR I‑4899, paragraphs 29 and 31). The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 39, and Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04 Cipolla and Others [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25).

40. Fourth, the compensation must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with the requisite means so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations ( Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg , paragraph 93; Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti , paragraph 67; and Essent Netwerk Noord and Others , paragraph 85).

85. Fourth, the compensation must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with the requisite means so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations ( Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg , paragraph 93, and Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti , point 67).

37. Any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice that might impair the effectiveness of EU law by withholding from the national court with jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions that might prevent EU rules from having full force and effect are incompatible with those requirements, which are the very essence of EU law (see Simmenthal , EU:C:1978:49, paragraph 22; Factortame and Others , C‑213/89, EU:C:1990:257, paragraph 20; and Åkerberg Fransson , EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). This would be the case in the event of a conflict between a provision of EU law and a national law, if the solution of the conflict were to be reserved to an authority with a discretion of its own, other than the court called upon to apply EU law, even if such an impediment to the full effectiveness of EU law were only temporary (see Simmenthal , EU:C:1978:49, paragraph 23, and Melki and Abdeli , EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 44).

85. Objective considerations relating to public policy are capable of justifying, in a Member State, a refusal to recognise the surname of one of its nationals, as accorded in another Member State (see, to that effect, Grunkin and Paul , paragraph 38).

38. In addition, it must be pointed out that no specific reason was cited before the Court that might possibly preclude recognition of the child Leonhard Matthias’s surname, as conferred and registered in Denmark, for instance that that name was contrary to public policy in Germany.

23. The Court has already held that, as regards the misleading nature of advertising, the national courts must take into account the perception of an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (see, to that effect, Case C-356/04 Lidl Belgium [2006] ECR I-8501, paragraph 78, and Case C-159/09 Lidl [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 47).

29. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the rules governing deduction are meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT due or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that those activities are themselves subject to VAT (see, inter alia, Kittel and Recolta Recycling , paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

48. The rules governing deduction are meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT consequently ensures neutrality of taxation of all economic activities, whatever their purpose or results, provided that those activities are themselves subject in principle to VAT (see, inter alia, Case C‑408/98 Abbey National [2001] ECR I‑1361, paragraph 24, and Case C‑25/03 HE [2005] ECR I‑3123, paragraph 70).

28 Finally, the national court raises the question of the protection of fundamental rights. The observations of the plaintiffs in the main proceedings show that it is only the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession recognized by Community law that are in issue (see, in particular, the judgment in Case C-306/93 SMW Winzersekt [1994] ECR I-5555, paragraph 22).

79. In particular, it is clear from case-law that, in order to assess whether the same measure would have been adopted in normal market conditions by a private investor in a situation as close as possible to that of the State, only the benefits and obligations linked to the situation of the State as shareholder — to the exclusion of those linked to its situation as a public authority — are to be taken into account (see, to that effect, Case 234/84 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2263, paragraph 14; Case 40/85 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2321, paragraph 13; Joined Cases C-278/92 to C-280/92 Spain v Commission [1994] ECR I-4103, paragraph 22; and Case C-334/99 Germany v Commission [2003] ECR I-1139, paragraph 134).

13 IT MUST BE OBSERVED THAT BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 92 ( 1 ) OF THE TREATY , THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY CONCERNING STATE AID APPLY TO AID GRANTED BY A MEMBER STATE OR THROUGH STATE RESOURCES ' IN ANY FORM WHATSOEVER ' . IT FOLLOWS , AS THE COURT HELD IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 14 NOVEMBER 1984 ( CASE 323/82 SA INTERMILLS V COMMISSION ( 1984 ) ECR 3809 ), THAT NO DISTINCTION CAN BE DRAWN BETWEEN AID GRANTED IN THE FORM OF LOANS AND AID GRANTED IN THE FORM OF A SUBSCRIPTION OF THE CAPITAL OF AN UNDERTAKING . AID TAKING EITHER FORM FALLS WITHIN THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 92 , WHERE THE CONDITIONS SET OUT THEREIN ARE FULFILLED .

37 In view of the above considerations, it does not appear that the obligation to make declarations imposed by the Regulation goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective pursued, especially since, as the Court has frequently stated, the Community legislature enjoys a discretion in the framework of its powers of harmonization (see inter alia the Meyhui judgment, paragraph 21).

22. However, with regard to the freedom to provide services, in accordance with Article 51(1) EC, Article 49 EC does not apply as such to the air transport sector (see, to that effect, Case C-49/89 Corsica Ferries France [1989] ECR 4441, paragraph 10 and the case-law cited, and Case C‑467/98 Commission v Denmark (‘Open Skies’) [2002] ECR I‑9519, paragraph 123).

123 Whereas Article 61 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 51 EC) precludes the Treaty provisions on the freedom to provide services from applying to transport services, the latter being governed by the provisions of the title concerning transport, there is no article in the Treaty which precludes its provisions on freedom of establishment from applying to transport.

7. À cet égard, il suffit de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et que les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêts du 11 octobre 2001, Commission/Autriche, C‑111/00, Rec. p. I-7555, point 13, et du 17 janvier 2002, Commission/Irlande, C‑394/00, Rec. p. I-581, point 12).

76 The Framework Decision thus seeks, by the establishment of a new simplified and more effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the objective set for the European Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice, founded on the high level of confidence which should exist between the Member States (see judgments in Melloni, C‑399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraph 37; F., C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraph 35; and Lanigan, C‑237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, paragraph 28).

37. Framework Decision 2002/584 thus seeks, by the establishment of a new simplified and more effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the objective set for the European Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice by basing itself on the high degree of confidence which should exist between the Member States ( Radu , paragraph 34).

125. It cannot, however, be extended to any question involving any sort of link with pay; otherwise some of the areas referred to in Article 137(1) EC would be deprived of much of their substance (see, to that effect, Del Cerro Alonso , paragraph 41; see also, to the same effect, Case C‑84/94 United Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR I‑5755, concerning the Council’s competence to adopt, on the basis of Article 118a of the EC Treaty (Articles 117 to 120 of the EC Treaty were replaced by Articles 136 EC to 143 EC), Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 1993 L 307, p. 18), in particular Article 7 of that directive, relating to the grant of four weeks’ paid annual leave).

25. It is settled law that, as a general rule, the principle of legal certainty precludes an EU measure from taking effect from a point in time before its publication, but it may exceptionally be otherwise where the purpose to be achieved so demands and where the legitimate expectations of those concerned are duly respected (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑74/00 P and C‑75/00 P Falck and Acciaierie di Bolzano v Commission [2002] ECR I‑7869, paragraph 119, and Case C‑120/08 Bavaria [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 40).

119 Although, as a general rule, the principle of legal certainty precludes a Community measure from taking effect from a point in time before its publication, it may exceptionally be otherwise where the purpose to be achieved so demands and where the legitimate expectations of those concerned are duly respected (Case 98/78 Racke [1979] ECR 69, paragraph 20). In that regard, in order to ensure observance of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, the substantive rules of Community law must be interpreted as applying to situations existing before their entry into force only in so far as it clearly follows from their terms, objectives or general scheme that such effect must be given to them (see, in particular, Case 234/83 Gesamthochschule Duisburg v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1985] ECR 327, paragraph 20, and Case C-34/92 GruSa Fleisch [1993] ECR I-4147, paragraph 22).

90. That benefit thus pursues a legitimate objective of social policy which is unrelated to any discrimination based on sex (see, to that effect, in relation to a supplement to a minimum social security benefit, Case 30/85 Teuling [1987] ECR 2497, paragraphs 15 to 17).

34. For an agreement, decision or practice to be capable of affecting trade between Member States, it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability, on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact, that they have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States in such a way as to cause concern that they might hinder the attainment of a single market between Member States (see Case 42/84 Remia and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, paragraph 22, and Case C‑475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner [2001] ECR I‑8089, paragraph 48). Moreover, that influence must not be insignificant (Case 22/71 Béguelin Import [1971] ECR 949, paragraph 16; Case C‑306/96 Javico [1998] ECR I-1983, paragraph 16; and Manfredi and Others , paragraph 42).

42. For an agreement, decision or practice to be capable of affecting trade between Member States, it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability, on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact, that they may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States in such a way as to cause concern that they might hinder the attainment of a single market between Member States (see Case 42/84 Remia and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, paragraph 22, and Ambulanz Glöckner , cited above, paragraph 48). Moreover, that influence must not be insignificant (Case C-306/96 Javico [1998] ECR I-1983, paragraph 16).

49. It is clear from Article 2 of Regulation No 2988/95, in particular from paragraph 3 thereof, in conjunction with the fifth and eighth recitals in the regulation, that it is for the European Union legislature to lay down sectoral rules establishing administrative penalties, following the example of those which already existed in the sphere of the common agricultural policy when the regulation was adopted (see SGS Belgium and Others , paragraph 37).

30 In principle, a substantial amendment of a contract after it has been awarded cannot be effected by direct agreement between the contracting authority and the successful tenderer, but must give rise to a new award procedure for the contract so amended (see, by analogy, judgment of 13 April 2010, Wall, C‑91/08, EU:C:2010:182, paragraph 42). The position would be otherwise only if that amendment had been provided for by the terms of the original contract (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2008, pressetext Nachrichtenagentur, C‑454/06, EU:C:2008:351, paragraphs 37, 40, 60, 68 and 69).

37. An amendment may also be regarded as being material when it changes the economic balance of the contract in favour of the contractor in a manner which was not provided for in the terms of the initial contract.

45 Furthermore, whilst the foregoing is sufficient for the present action to succeed, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the principle of fiscal neutrality, to which the Commission has also referred, precludes, inter alia, economic operators carrying on the same activities from being treated differently as far as the levying of VAT is concerned (Gregg, cited above, paragraph 20).

48. According to settled case-law, in the context of an action for failure to fulfil obligations brought under Article 226 EC the Commission is required to prove the allegation that the obligation has not been fulfilled. It is the Commission which must provide the Court with the necessary evidence for the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled, and it may not rely on any presumption (see, in particular, Case C-62/89 Commission v France [1990] ECR I-925, paragraph 37, and Case C-341/02 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-2733, paragraph 35).

37 The Court has consistently held ( see the judgment of 5 October 1989 in Case 290/87 Commission v Netherlands (( 1989 )) ECR 3083 ) that in proceedings brought under Article 169 of the Treaty the Commission is required to prove the allegation that the obligation has not been fulfilled and may not rely on any presumption in order to show that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under Community law .

75. Accordingly, it is for the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, to fix the lump sum in an amount appropriate to the circumstances and proportionate to the infringement (judgment in Commission v Greece , EU:C:2009:428, paragraph 146).

26. In the context of that cooperation, it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling ( Schneider , paragraph 21; Case C-165/03 Längst [2005] ECR I‑5637, paragraph 31; and Kirtruna and Vigano , paragraph 26).

21. In the context of that cooperation, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59; Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 38; and Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607, paragraph 18).

Par conséquent, dès lors que la législation nationale met sur le même plan, aux fins de l’imposition d’un legs acquis par succession, les organismes sans but lucratif établis en Grèce et ceux établis dans un autre État membre de l’Union ou de l’EEE, elle ne peut, sans enfreindre les exigences du droit de l’Union, traiter différemment ces derniers, dans le cadre de cette même imposition, en ce qui concerne l’octroi du traitement préférentiel. En traitant de manière identique, sauf en ce qui concerne le montant du taux applicable, les legs effectués au profit de ces deux catégories d’organisme sans but lucratif, le législateur national a admis, en effet, qu’il n’existait entre ces dernières aucune différence de situation objective de nature à justifier une différence de traitement (voir, par analogie, arrêt du 17 octobre 2013, Welte, C‑181/12, EU:C:2013:662, point 51 et jurisprudence citée).

32 Second, as far as occupational pension schemes are concerned, the Court held in paragraphs 44 and 45 of Barber, cited above, that by reason of overriding considerations of legal certainty, the direct effect of Article 119 of the Treaty could not be relied upon in order to claim entitlement to a pension with effect from a date prior to that of that judgment, namely 17 May 1990, except in the case of claimants who had before that date initiated legal proceedings or raised an equivalent claim.

44 In those circumstances, overriding considerations of legal certainty preclude legal situations which have exhausted all their effects in the past from being called in question where that might upset retroactively the financial balance of many contracted-out pension schemes . It is appropriate, however, to provide for an exception in favour of individuals who have taken action in good time in order to safeguard their rights . Finally, it must be pointed out that no restriction on the effects of the aforesaid interpretation can be permitted as regards the acquisition of entitlement to a pension as from the date of this judgment .

20. By contrast, the Court does have jurisdiction to supply the national court with all the guidance as to the interpretation of Community law necessary to enable that court to rule on the compatibility of the national rules with the provisions of Community law (see, inter alia, Lamaire , paragraph 10, and Wilson , paragraph 35).