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28 However, as the Court held in Case C-231/94 Faaborg-Gelting Linien v Finanzamt Flensburg [1996] ECR I-2395, paragraphs 12 to 14, concerning the classification of restaurant transactions, where the transaction in question comprises a bundle of features and acts, regard must first be had to all the circumstances in which that transaction takes place.

12 In order to determine whether such transactions constitute supplies of goods or supplies of services, regard must be had to all the circumstances in which the transaction in question takes place in order to identify its characteristic features.

83. However, it is common ground that requirements of public security must, in particular as a derogation from the fundamental principle of the free movement of capital, be interpreted strictly, with the result that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the institutions of the European Union. Thus, public security may be relied on only if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society (see, inter alia, Case C‑54/99 Église de scientologie [2000] ECR I‑1335, paragraph 17; Case C‑171/08 Commission v Portugal , paragraph 73; and Case C‑543/08 Commission v Portugal , paragraph 85).

35 In the present case, contrary to the contention of the French Government, the transfer of activities here in question does not constitute a reorganisation of structures of the public administration or a transfer of administrative functions between public administrative authorities within the meaning of Henke.

18 In those circumstances, the reply to be given to the national court' s first question is that Article 1(1) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of a "transfer of an undertaking, business or part of a business" does not apply to the transfer of administrative functions from a municipality to an administrative collectivity such as the one in question in the main proceedings. The second question

71. Since, in accordance with settled case-law, liability of a parent company for an infringement of the European Union competition rules committed directly by one of its subsidiaries is based on the fact that those companies formed part of a single economic entity during the infringement (see, to that effect, inter alia Case C‑50/12 P Kendrion v Commission EU:C:2013:771, paragraphs 47 and 55 and the case-law cited), the requirement to take account of possible mitigating circumstances applies to the undertaking taken as a whole, at the time when the infringement was committed, and not to its constituent parts. This argument is therefore also unfounded and must, consequently, be rejected.

36 It should be recalled that the Court has already held that the concern to ensure the operational capacity and proper functioning of the police services constitutes a legitimate objective (see, as regards Article 4(1) of Council Directive 2000/78 of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16), the structure, provisions, and objective of which is largely comparable with those of Directive 76/207, the judgments of 13 November 2014, Vital Pérez, C‑416/13, EU:C:2014:2371, paragraph 44, and 15 November 2016, Salaberria Sorondo, C‑258/15, EU:C:2016:873, paragraph 38).

38 In that regard, in paragraphs 43 and 44 of the judgment of 13 November 2014, Vital Pérez (C‑416/13, EU:C:2014:2371), after observing that recital 18 of Directive 2000/78 states that the directive does not require police services to recruit or maintain in employment persons who do not have the required capacity to carry out the range of functions that they may be called upon to perform with regard to the legitimate objective of preserving the operational capacity of those services, the Court held that the concern to ensure the operational capacity and proper functioning of police services constitutes a legitimate objective within the meaning of Article 4(1) of that directive.

50. In those circumstances, provisions of the kind at issue in the main proceedings result in discrimination against female workers by comparison with male workers and must in principle be treated as contrary to Articles 2(1) and 5(1) of Directive 76/207. It would be otherwise only if the difference of treatment found to exist between the two categories of worker were justified by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination based on sex (see, in that regard, Case 171/88 Rinner-Kühn [1989] ECR 2743, paragraph 12; Case C-457/93 Lewark [1996] ECR I-243, paragraph 31; Case C-243/95 Hill and Stapleton [1998] ECR I-3739, paragraph 34; and Case C-226/98 Jørgensen [2000] ECR I-2447, paragraph 29).

40. In respect of shareholdings not covered by Directive 90/435, it is for the Member States to determine whether, and to what extent, economic double taxation or a series of charges to tax on distributed profits is to be avoided and, for that purpose, to establish, either unilaterally or through double taxation conventions concluded with other Member States, procedures intended to prevent or mitigate such economic double taxation or series of charges to tax. However, this does not of itself mean that the Member States are entitled to impose measures that contravene the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty (see, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation , paragraph 54; Amurta , paragraph 24; and Commission v Italy , cited above, paragraph 31).

54. The mere fact that, for holdings to which Directive 90/435 does not apply, it is for the Member States to determine whether, and to what extent, a series of charges to tax and economic double taxation are to be avoided and, for that purpose, to establish, either unilaterally or through DTCs concluded with other Member States, procedures intended to prevent or mitigate such a series of charges to tax and that economic double taxation, does not of itself mean that the Member States are entitled to impose measures that contravene the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty.

15. In order to answer that question, it is to be recalled first of all that the right to deduct VAT, as an integral part of the VAT scheme, is a fundamental principle underlying the common system of VAT, and in principle may not be limited (see Joined Cases C‑110/98 to C‑147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I‑1577, paragraph 43; Case C‑409/99 Metropol and Stadler [2002] ECR I‑81, paragraph 42; and Case C‑465/03 Kretztechnik [2005] ECR I‑4357, paragraph 33).

46. As pointed out by the Netherlands Government, it must also be added that the taking into account of investment obligations incurred before 1 September 1981 could have given rise to the risk of misuse of the rules on milk quotas. It would have enabled producers to rely on old investment obligations, prior to that date, in order to gain special reference quantities, not with the aim of producing or marketing milk but with that of obtaining a purely financial advantage from their market value (see, to that effect, Case C‑44/89 von Deetzen [1991] ECR I‑5119, paragraph 24, and Case C‑401/99 Thomsen [2002] ECR I‑5775, paragraphs 39 and 45).

45 Admittedly, Regulation No 3950/92 contains no express provision governing that issue. However, it should be pointed out that Article 7(2) of that regulation cannot be interpreted as requiring that lessors should have the status of milk producers at the precise date of expiry of the lease in order to be able to take over the holding concerned with the reference quantities attached thereto. Taking particular account of the main purpose of that provision, which is to avoid the attribution of reference quantities to persons wishing to obtain a purely financial advantage therefrom, it is sufficient that, on the abovementioned date, the lessor can show that he is preparing in a definite manner to take up milk production as soon as possible.

27. In that regard, it is to be recalled that, at paragraph 3 of the judgment in Case 149/73 Witt [1973] ECR 1587, the Court observed, in relation to reindeer meat, which can come from wild or domesticated animals, that the word ‘game’, in its ordinary meaning, designates those categories of animals which live in the wild and are hunted.

86. While the application of Article 102 TFEU presupposes a link between the dominant position and the alleged abusive conduct, which is normally not present where conduct on a market distinct from the dominated market produces effects on that distinct market, the fact remains that in the case of distinct, but associated, markets, the application of Article 102 TFEU to conduct found on the associated, non-dominated, market and having effects on that associated market can be justified by special circumstances (see, to that effect, Case 311/84 CBEM [1985] ECR 3261, paragraph 26, and Tetra Pak v Commission , paragraph 27).

27 It is true that application of Article 86 presupposes a link between the dominant position and the alleged abusive conduct, which is normally not present where conduct on a market distinct from the dominated market produces effects on that distinct market. In the case of distinct, but associated, markets, as in the present case, application of Article 86 to conduct found on the associated, non-dominated, market and having effects on that associated market can only be justified by special circumstances.

49. However, as soon as a Member State, either unilaterally or by way of a convention, imposes a charge to tax on the income not only of resident companies but also of non-resident companies from income which they receive from a resident company, the situation of those non-resident companies becomes comparable to that of resident companies ( Commission v Germany , paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

100 It is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that Article H(2) of Annex II to Regulation No 1164/94, as amended, read in conjunction with Article 18(3) of Regulation No 1386/2002, provides that, in order to adopt a decision on financial corrections, the Commission is required to comply with a time limit of three months from the date of the hearing (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 95 and 102, and of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 95 and 102).

102. Contrary to what the Commission has claimed, the fact that the relevant rules do not expressly provide that, in the event of non-compliance with the time-limit laid down for adopting a decision on financial corrections, the Commission may no longer adopt such a decision is irrelevant, since the setting of a time-limit within which a decision of that nature must be adopted is in itself sufficient.

57. Certainly, in order to justify refusing access to a document, it is not sufficient, in principle, for the document to fall within an activity or an interest referred to in Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001; the institution concerned must also explain how access to that document could specifically and actually undermine the interest protected by an exception laid down in that article. However, it is open to that institution to base its decisions in that regard on general presumptions which apply to certain categories of documents, as similar general considerations are likely to apply to requests for disclosure relating to documents of the same nature ( Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau , paragraphs 53 and 54, and the case-law cited).

57. It is true, according to the case-law of the Court referred to in paragraphs 31 and 32 of the judgments under appeal, first, that the graphic representation of a mark must be self-contained, easily accessible and intelligible, in order that a sign may always be perceived unambiguously and in the same way so that the mark is guaranteed as an indication of origin. Secondly, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that the function of the graphic representability requirement is, in particular, to define the mark itself in order to determine the precise subject of the protection afforded by the registered mark to its proprietor (see, to that effect, Case C‑273/00 Sieckmann [2002] ECR I‑11737, paragraphs 48 to 52, and Case C‑307/10 Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys [2012] ECR, paragraph 37).

50. On the one hand, the competent authorities must know with clarity and precision the nature of the signs of which a mark consists in order to be able to fulfil their obligations in relation to the prior examination of registration applications and to the publication and maintenance of an appropriate and precise register of trade marks.

48. As regards, next, the principle of effectiveness, it must be recalled that, from the point of view of the analysis required by the case-law cited at paragraph 38 above, the question whether a national procedural provision renders the exercise of an individual’s rights under the European Union legal order impossible in practice or excessively difficult must be assessed taking into consideration, as appropriate, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system concerned, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings (see inter alia, to that effect, Peterbroeck , paragraph 14, and Pontin , paragraph 47).

33. It follows that, while those criteria may be applied on a case-by-case basis, in order to prevent, inter alia, the contractual structure put in place by the taxable person and the consumer from leading to an artificial splitting into a number of fiscal transactions of a transaction which, from an economic point of view, must be regarded as a single transaction, they cannot be regarded as decisive for the purpose of the exercise by the Member States of the discretion left to them by Directive 2006/112 as regards the application of the reduced rate of VAT. The exercise of such discretion requires general and objective criteria, such as those identified in Commission v France and Zweckverband zur Trinkwasserversorgung und Abwasserbeseitigung Torgau-Westelbien and reiterated in paragraphs 26, 28 and 30 of this judgment.

30. The requirement that the charging of a reduced rate must not give rise to any risk of distortion of competition will be considered in the context of the question concerning the procedure laid down by Article 12(3)(b) of the Sixth Directive. The procedure laid down by Article 12(3)(b) of the Sixth Directive

32. Secondly, it should be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held that Article 3 of Directive 76/207, which corresponds to Article 5 of that directive in its original version, is unconditional and sufficiently precise to be relied on by an individual against the State (see Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 52, and Case C‑188/89 Foster and Others [1990] ECR I‑3313, paragraph 21) and that one of the entities against which provisions of a directive capable of having direct effect may be enforced is a body which, whatever its legal form, has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by a public authority, for providing, subject to the control of that public authority, a service in the public interest and which, for those purposes, enjoys exceptional powers as compared with the rules applicable to relations between individuals (see, to that effect, Foster and Others , paragraph 22). As the referring court states – and neither the parties to the main proceedings nor the Commission contest the point – the NÖ-LLWK is one of the bodies which enjoys exceptional powers as compared with the rules applicable to relations between individuals.

50 That being so, the prevention of tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an objective recognised and encouraged by the VAT Directive and the Court has repeatedly held that EU law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends. It is, therefore, for the national courts and judicial authorities to refuse the right of deduction, if it is shown, in the light of objective factors, that that right is being relied on for fraudulent or abusive ends (judgments of 6 December 2012 in Bonik, C‑285/11, EU:C:2012:774, paragraphs 35 to 37 and the case-law cited, and 18 December 2014 in Schoenimport ‘Italmoda’ Mariano Previti and Others, C‑131/13, C‑163/13 and C‑164/13, EU:C:2014:2455, paragraphs 42 to 44 and case-law cited).

43. In this connection, the Court has repeatedly held that EU law cannot be relied on by individuals for abusive or fraudulent ends (see, inter alia, judgments in Kittel and Recolta Recycling , EU:C:2006:446, paragraph 54; Fini H , C‑32/03, EU:C:2005:128, paragraph 32; and Maks Pen , C‑18/13, EU:C:2014:69, paragraph 26).

35. Dans ces conditions, il convient de constater que, de même que la Cour a reconnu la qualité d’entreprise à un constructeur d’automobiles en tant qu’il opérait sur le marché de la certification des automobiles en délivrant des certificats de conformité nécessaires à leur immatriculation (arrêt du 11 novembre 1986, British Leyland/Commission, 226/84, Rec. p. 3263), les SOA doivent être considérées, dans le cadre de leur activité de certification, comme des «entreprises» au sens des articles 101 TFUE, 102 TFUE et 106 TFUE.

53 First of all, as the Council and the parties intervening in support of the form of order sought by it have observed, the Court has consistently held that the Community institutions enjoy a margin of discretion in their choice of the means needed to achieve the common commercial policy (Case 245/81 Edeka Zentrale v Germany [1982] ECR 2745, paragraph 27; Case 52/81 Faust v Commission [1982] ECR 3745, paragraph 27; Case 256/84 Koyo Seiko v Council [1987] ECR 1899, paragraph 20; Case 258/84 Nippon Seiko v Council [1987] ECR 1923, paragraph 34, and Case 260/84 Minebea v Council [1987] ECR 1975, paragraph 28).

34 CONSEQUENTLY, AS THE COURT HELD IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 28 OCTOBER 1982 IN CASE 52/81 FAUST V COMMISSION (( 1982 )) ECR 3745, WHERE THE INSTITUTIONS ENJOY A MARGIN OF DISCRETION IN THE CHOICE OF THE MEANS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE THEIR POLICIES, TRADERS CANNOT CLAIM TO HAVE A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION THAT THE MEANS ORIGINALLY CHOSEN WILL BE MAINTAINED, SINCE THESE MAY BE ALTERED BY THE INSTITUTIONS IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR POWERS .

73. The Court has, however, also consistently ruled that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied on as such against that individual (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 108 and the case-law there cited).

73. The prohibition on the marketing of tobacco products for oral use laid down in Article 8 of Directive 2001/37 is indeed capable of restricting the freedom of manufacturers of such products to pursue their trade or profession, assuming that they have envisaged such marketing in the geographical region concerned by that prohibition. However, the operators’ right to property is not called into question by the introduction of such a measure. No economic operator can claim a right to property in a market share, even if he held it at a time before the introduction of a measure affecting that market, since such a market share constitutes only a momentary economic position exposed to the risks of changing circumstances (Case C-280/93 Germany v Council , paragraph 79). Nor can an economic operator claim an acquired right or even a legitimate expectation that an existing situation which is capable of being altered by decisions taken by the Community institutions within the limits of their discretionary power will be maintained (see Case 52/81 Faust v Commission [1982] ECR 3745, paragraph 27).

79 The right to property of traders in third-country bananas is not called into question by the introduction of the Community quota and the rules for its subdivision. No economic operator can claim a right to property in a market share which he held at a time before the establishment of a common organization of a market, since such a market share constitutes only a momentary economic position exposed to the risks of changing circumstances.

68. In addition, it must be noted that the objection of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that, since the EKO label provides information relating to the organic origin of products bearing that label, the reference to detailed characteristics would have required it to list all the requirements of Regulation No 2092/91, which would have been much less clear than referring to that label, is irrelevant. Directive 2004/18 does not preclude, in principle, a reference, in the contract notice or contract documents, to legislative or regulatory provisions for certain technical specifications where such a reference is, in practice, unavoidable, provided that it is accompanied by all the additional information required by that directive (see, by analogy, Commission v Spain , paragraphs 64 and 65). Thus, since the marketing, in the European Union, of products obtained from organic agriculture and presented as such must comply with relevant European Union legislation, a contracting party may, if appropriate, without disregarding the concept of ‘technical specification’ within the meaning of point 1(b) of Annex VI to Directive 2004/18 or Article 23(3) thereof, state in the contract documents that the product to be supplied must comply with Regulation No 2092/91 or with any other subsequent regulation replacing that regulation.

88. According to consistent case-law, even if the ‘standstill’ clause set out in Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol is not, in itself, capable of conferring on Turkish nationals – on the basis of European Union legislation alone – a right of establishment or, as a corollary, a right of residence, nor a right to freedom to provide services or to enter the territory of a Member State, the fact remains that such a clause prohibits generally the introduction of any new measures having the object or effect of making the exercise by a Turkish national of those economic freedoms on the territory of that Member State subject to stricter conditions than those which applied to him at the time when the Additional Protocol entered into force with regard to the Member State concerned (see Case C‑228/06 Soysal and Savatli [2009] ECR I‑1031, paragraph 47, and the case-law cited).

47. Finally, according to consistent case-law, even if the ‘standstill’ clause set out in Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol is not, in itself, capable of conferring on Turkish nationals – on the basis of Community legislation alone – a right of establishment or, as a corollary, a right of residence, nor a right to freedom to provide services or to enter the territory of a Member State (see Savas , paragraphs 64 and 71, third indent; Abatay and Others , paragraph 62; and Tum and Dari , paragraph 52), the fact remains that such a clause prohibits generally the introduction of any new measures having the object or effect of making the exercise by a Turkish national of those economic freedoms on the territory of that Member State subject to stricter conditions than those which applied to him at the time when the Additional Protocol entered into force with regard to the Member State concerned (see Savas , paragraphs 69 and 71, fourth indent; Abatay and Others , paragraphs 66 and 117, second indent; and Tum and Dari , paragraphs 49 and 53).

34. According to consistent case-law, taxes do not fall within the scope of the EC Treaty’s provisions concerning State aid unless they constitute the method of financing an aid measure, so that they form an integral part of that measure (Case C-174/02 Streekgewest [2005] ECR I-85, paragraph 25).

22 It would appear from the order for reference that the national provisions cannot be interpreted in a way which conforms with the directive on the insolvency of employers and therefore do not permit higher management staff to obtain the benefit of the guarantees for which it provides. If that is the case, it follows from the Francovich judgment, cited above, that the Member State concerned is obliged to make good the loss and damage sustained as a result of the failure to implement the directive in their respect.

26 Accordingly, even though the provisions of the directive in question are sufficiently precise and unconditional as regards the determination of the persons entitled to the guarantee and as regards the content of that guarantee, those elements are not sufficient to enable individuals to rely on those provisions before the national courts. Those provisions do not identify the person liable to provide the guarantee, and the State cannot be considered liable on the sole ground that it has failed to take transposition measures within the prescribed period.

64 The Guidelines, which are not the first to apply in the area under consideration, are based on Article 93(1) of the Treaty, under which the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, is to keep under constant review the systems of aid existing in those States. It is to propose to them any appropriate measures required by the progressive development or by the functioning of the common market. The Guidelines are thus one element of that obligation of regular, periodic cooperation from which neither the Commission nor a Member State can release itself (see Case C-311/94 IJssel-Vliet [1996] ECR I-5023, paragraphs 36 and 37).

49. It is settled case-law that Directive 98/34 is designed to protect, by means of preventive control, the free movement of goods, which is one of the foundations of the European Union, and that this control serves a useful purpose in that technical regulations falling within the scope of that directive may constitute obstacles to trade in goods between Member States, such obstacles being permissible only if they are necessary to satisfy compelling requirements relating to the public interest (see Case C-303/04 Lidl Italia [2005] ECR I-7865, paragraph 22, Case C-433/05 Sandström [2010] ECR I-2885, paragraph 42, and Case C-361/10 Intercommunale Intermosane and Fédération de l’industrie et du gaz [2011] ECR I-5079, paragraph 10).

10. It is settled case-law that Directive 98/34 is designed to protect, by means of preventive monitoring, the free movement of goods, which is one of the foundations of the European Union, and that this control serves a useful purpose in that technical regulations falling within the scope of that directive may constitute obstacles to trade in goods between Member States, such obstacles being permissible only if they are necessary to satisfy compelling requirements relating to the public interest (see Case C‑194/94 CIA Security International [1996] ECR I‑2201, paragraphs 40 and 48, and Case C‑303/04 Lidl Italia [2005] ECR I‑7865, paragraph 22).

30. Second, the Court has excluded from the concept of ‘services’ within the meaning of Article 50 EC courses provided by certain establishments forming part of a system of public education and financed, entirely or mainly, by public funds (see, to that effect, Humbel , paragraph 18, and Case C-109/92 Wirth [1 993] ECR I-6447, paragraphs 15 and 16). The Court has thus stated that, by establishing and maintaining such a system of public education, normally financed from the public purse and not by pupils or their parents, the State does not intend to become involved in activities for remuneration, but carries out its task towards its population in the social, cultural and educational fields (see Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz , paragraph 39).

51. A cash-flow disadvantage which arises from a cross-border situation can form a restriction on a fundamental freedom where such a disadvantage does not arise in a purely national situation (see, to that effect, judgments in Metallgesellschaft and Others , C‑397/98 and C‑410/98, EU:C:2001:134, paragraphs 44, 54 and 76; X and Y , C‑436/00, EU:C:2002:704, paragraphs 36 and 37; Rewe Zentralfinanz , C‑347/04, EU:C:2007:194, paragraphs 26 to 30; National Grid Indus , C‑371/10, EU:C:2011:785, paragraphs 36 and 37; DMC , C‑164/12, EU:C:2014:20, paragraphs 40 to 43; and Commission v Germany , C‑591/13, EU:C:2015:230, paragraphs 55 to 61).

41. Accordingly, the legislation at issue in the main proceedings is liable to deter such investors from having holdings in a limited partnership governed by German law, since they will be required, in the event of the subsequent conversion of their holdings into shares in a capital company, to pay immediately the tax on any profit in connection with the unrealised capital gain generated in Germany, if those investors are no longer, as a result of the conversion of their holdings, subject to such tax in the future in Germany.

53. Thus, as regards the determination of that volume or those prices, Article 3(3) of the basic regulation sets out the factors to be taken into account in that examination, while specifying that one or more of those factors cannot in themselves give decisive guidance (see judgment in Neotype Techmashexport v Commission and Council , C‑305/86 and C‑160/87, EU:C:1990:295, paragraph 50).

18 According to settled case-law, it is solely for the national courts before which actions are brought, and which must bear the responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular facts of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which they submit to the Court (see, in particular, Case C-297/94 Bruyère and Others v Belgian State [1996] ECR I-1551, paragraph 19). Only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law or examination of the validity of a Community rule sought by a national court bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose may a reference for a preliminary ruling be held to be inadmissible (see, in particular, Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 61).

61 That is why the Court has held that it has no jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on a question submitted by a national court where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose (see, inter alia, Case C-143/94 Furlanis v ANAS [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 12) or where the problem is hypothetical and the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Meilicke, cited above, paragraph 32).

78. Concernant le deuxième moyen dans les affaires C-465/09 P à C-467/09 P et le premier moyen dans les affaires C‑468/09 P à C-470/09 P, au sujet desquels la Comunidad autónoma de La Rioja soutient qu’ils se bornent à reproduire une argumentation déjà soulevée en première instance, il convient de rappeler qu’il résulte certes des articles 256 TFUE, 58, premier alinéa, du statut de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne et 112, paragraphe 1, sous c), du règlement de procédure de cette dernière qu’un pourvoi doit indiquer de façon précise les éléments critiqués de l’arrêt dont l’annulation est demandée ainsi que les arguments juridiques qui soutiennent de manière spécifique cette demande (arrêts du 30 juin 2005, Eurocermex/OHMI, C-286/04 P, Rec. p. I-5797, point 42, et du 13 septembre 2007, Il Ponte Finanziaria/OHMI, C-234/06 P, Rec. p. I-7333, point 44).

51 Each sector of the common organisation of markets for agricultural products established by that regulation embodies features specific to it. As a result, a comparison of the technical rules and procedures adopted in order to regulate the various sectors of the market cannot constitute a valid basis for the purpose of proving the complaint of discrimination between dissimilar products which are subject to different rules. (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 October 1982, Lion and Others, 292/81 and 293/81, EU:C:1982:375, paragraph 24, and of 30 June 2016, Lidl, C‑134/15, EU:C:2016:498, paragraph 49).

49 In that regard, the first subparagraph of Article 40(2) TFEU provides for the use of different mechanisms which may be used to achieve the objectives defined in Article 39 TFEU. Moreover, as is apparent from Regulation No 1234/2007, each common organisation of the market embodies features specific to it. As a result, a comparison of the technical rules and procedures adopted in order to regulate the various sectors of the market cannot constitute a valid basis for the purpose of proving the complaint of discrimination between dissimilar products which are subject to different rules (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 October 1982 in Lion and Others, 292/81 and 293/81, EU:C:1982:375, paragraph 24).

55. Consequently, although a Member State must be accorded both the power to check that an undertaking, established in another Member State and providing a user undertaking, established in the first Member State, with a service consisting in the making available of workers who are nationals of non-member countries is not availing itself of the freedom to provide services for a purpose other than the provision of the service in question, and the possibility of taking the necessary control measures in that regard (see judgment in Commission v Germany , EU:C:2006:49, paragraph 36), the exercise of that power may not, however, allow that Member State to impose disproportionate requirements.

47. Accordingly, the Court has already held that, under Article 2(1) and (3) as well as Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 98/59, the only party on whom the obligations to inform, consult and notify are imposed is the employer (see Case C‑44/08 Akavan Erityisalojen Keskusliitto AEK and Others [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 57).

57. In that regard, it is clear that, under Article 2(1) and (3) and Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 98/59, the only party on whom the obligations to inform, consult and notify are imposed is the employer, in other words a natural or legal person who stands in an employment relationship with the workers who may be made redundant.

34. When that comparison is being made, a distinction must be drawn between two categories of vehicles, with the first category comprising those which are sold second-hand during the two calendar years following their manufacture – the year of manufacture being considered to be the first calendar year – and the second category comprising those sold second-hand after that two-year period ( Brzeziński , paragraph 34).

54. However, if that latter condition is not satisfied, it will be considered that the intermediate measure – independently of whether the latter expresses a provisional opinion of the institution concerned – produces independent legal effects and must therefore be capable of forming the subject-matter of an action for annulment ( AKZO Chemie and AKZO Chemie UK v Commission , paragraph 20; Case C‑170/89 BEUC v Commission [1991] I‑5709, paragraphs 9 to 11; Case C‑39/93 P SFEI and Others v Commission [1994] ECR I‑2681, paragraph 28; Case C- 400/99 Italy v Commission [2001] ECR I-7303, paragraphs 57 to 68; Athinaïki Techniki v Commission , paragraph 54).

59 Such a decision to initiate the procedure under Article 88(2) EC in relation to a measure in the course of implementation and classified as new aid necessarily alters the legal position of the measure under consideration and that of the undertakings which are its beneficiaries, particularly as regards the pursuit of its implementation. Whereas, until the adoption of such a decision, the Member State, the beneficiary undertakings and other economic operators may think that the measure is being lawfully carried out as an existing aid, after its adoption there is at the very least a significant element of doubt as to the legality of that measure which, without prejudice to the possibility of seeking interim relief from the court with the power to grant it, must lead the Member State to suspend payment, since the initiation of the procedure under Article 88(2) EC excludes the possibility of an immediate decision holding the measure compatible with the common market which would enable it to be lawfully pursued. Such a decision might also be invoked before a national court called upon to draw all the consequences arising from the infringement of the last sentence of Article 88(3) EC. Finally, it is capable of leading the undertakings which are beneficiaries of the measure to refuse new payments in any event, or to hold the necessary sums as provision for possible subsequent repayments. Businesses will also take account, in their relations with those beneficiaries, of the fragile legal and financial situation of the latter.

37. If follows that, as the Advocate General observed in essence in point 37 of her Opinion, although mineral oils used other than as motor fuel or heating fuel fell within the scope of Directive 92/81 – since, as the Court held in paragraphs 30 and 33 of Commission v Italy, it was compulsory for those products to be exempted from the harmonised excise duty – it was the intention of the Community legislature, on the occasion of the adoption of Directive 2003/96, to change that arrangement by excluding such products from the scope of that directive. That fact, moreover, was acknowledged by Fendt itself at the hearing.

21. In that respect, it should be noted that, at paragraphs 30 to 34 of its judgment in Case C-19/03 Verbraucher-Zentrale Hamburg [2004] ECR I‑8183, the Court has already had occasion to examine the objectives of Regulation No 1103/97.

30. Since the wording of Regulation No 1103/97 offers no further guidance, it is appropriate to refer to the objectives of the regulation.

18. First of all, it must be recalled that, as a German national, Mr Thiele Meneses enjoys the status of a citizen of the Union under Article 20(1) TFEU and may therefore rely on the rights conferred on those having that status, including against his Member State of origin (see, Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas [2006] ECR I‑10451, paragraph 19; Joined Cases C‑11/06 and C‑12/06 Morgan and Bucher [2007] ECR I‑9161, paragraph 22; and Joined Cases C-523/11 and C-585/11 Prinz and Seeberger [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

48 The renewal of fixed-term employment contracts or relationships in order to cover needs which, in fact, are not temporary in nature but, on the contrary, fixed and permanent is not justified for the purposes of clause 5(1)(a) of the framework agreement, in so far as such use of fixed-term employment contracts or relationships conflicts directly with the premise on which the framework agreement is founded, namely that employment contracts of indefinite duration are the general form of employment relationship, even though fixed-term employment contracts are a feature of employment in certain sectors or in respect of certain occupations and activities (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 January 2012, Kücük, C‑586/10, EU:C:2012:39, paragraphs 36 and 37, and of 26 November 2014, Mascolo and Others, C‑22/13, C‑61/13, C‑63/13 and C‑418/13, EU:C:2014:2401, paragraph 100).

37. Such use of fixed-term employment contracts or relationships conflicts directly with the premiss on which the FTW Framework Agreement is founded, namely that contracts of indefinite duration are the general form of employment relationship, even though fixed-term employment contracts are a feature of employment in certain sectors or in respect of certain occupations and activities (see Adeneler and Others , paragraph 61).

34 In a situation of that kind, it must be concluded that in practice provisions such as those at issue in the main proceedings result in discrimination against women employees as compared with men and must in principle be regarded as contrary to Directive 76/207. The position would be different only if the distinction between those two categories of employee were justified by factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex (see inter alia Case 170/84 Bilka v Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607, paragraph 29; Case 171/88 Rinner-Kühn v FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung [1989] ECR 2743, paragraph 12; and Case C-457/93 Kuratorium für Dialyse und Nierentransplantation v Lewark [1996] ECR I-243, paragraph 31).

23. À cet égard, la Cour a déjà jugé que les règles de compétences spéciales, telles que celle prévue à l’article 5, point 1, sous a), du règlement n° 44/2001, sont d’interprétation stricte (arrêt ÖFAB, précité, point 31), et que les termes «matière contractuelle», figurant à cette disposition ne sauraient être compris comme visant une situation dans laquelle il n’existe aucun engagement librement assumé d’une partie envers une autre (voir arrêts du 17 juin 1992, Handte, C‑26/91, Rec. p. I‑3967, point 15; du 27 octobre 1998, Réunion européenne e.a., C‑51/97, Rec. p. I‑6511, point 17; du 17 septembre 2002, Tacconi, C‑334/00, Rec. p. I‑7357, point 23; du 5 février 2004, Frahuil, C‑265/02, Rec. p. I‑1543, point 24; du 20 janvier 2005, Engler, C‑27/02, Rec. p. I-481, point 50, et ÖFAB, précité, point 33).

24. Also according to settled case-law, it follows that the concept of " matters relating to a contract" in Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention is not to be understood as covering a situation in which there is no obligation freely assumed by one party towards another ( Handte , paragraph 15, Réunion européenne and Others , paragraph 17, and Tacconi , paragraph 23, cited above).

80 However, that is the inevitable consequence of the method of harmonisation chosen by the EU legislature in the present case. As has been recalled in paragraph 63 of this judgment, the EU legislature has a discretion, in particular with regard to the possibility of proceeding towards harmonisation only in stages and requiring only the gradual abolition of unilateral measures adopted by the Member States.

Certes, l’obligation de motivation qui incombe au Tribunal n’impose pas à celui-ci de fournir un exposé qui suivrait, de manière exhaustive et un par un, tous les raisonnements articulés par les parties au litige (voir en ce sens, notamment, arrêts FIAMM e.a./Conseil et Commission, C‑120/06 P et C-121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, point 96, ainsi que Italie/Commission, C-385/13 P, EU:C:2014:2350, point 87).

96. Second, it should also be recalled that the obligation to state reasons does not require the Court of First Instance to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case and that the reasoning may therefore be implicit on condition that it enables the persons concerned to know why the Court of First Instance has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (see, in particular, Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission [2004] ECR I-123, paragraph 372, and the judgment of 25 October 2007 in Case C-167/06 P Komninou and Others v Commission , paragraph 22).

38 Directive 2009/73 gives no definition of the condition relating to general economic interest, but the reference in Article 3(2) of that directive both to that condition and to Article 106 TFEU, which concerns undertakings entrusted with the management of a service of general economic interest, means that that condition should be interpreted in the light of that provision of the Treaty (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 April 2010, Federutility and Others, C‑265/08, EU:C:2010:205, paragraph 26).

85. Taking into consideration the size and overall resources of the undertaking in question is, primarily, justified by the impact sought on the undertaking concerned, in order to ensure that the fine has sufficient deterrent effect, as the penalty must not be negligible in the light, particularly, of its financial capacity ( Lafarge v Commission , EU:C:2010:346, paragraph 104).

104. It must be emphasised in this regard that the size and global resources of the undertaking in question being taken into consideration in order to ensure that the fine has sufficient deterrent effect resides in the impact sought on that undertaking, and the sanction must not be negligible in the light, particularly, of its financial capacity.

18 It must be borne in mind that, in its judgment in France v Commission, cited above, paragraph 21, the Court held that the supervisory power conferred on the Commission includes the possibility of specifying, pursuant to Article 90(3), obligations arising under the Treaty and that the extent of that power therefore depends on the scope of the rules with which compliance is to be ensured.

38. As regards the argument relied on by the Republic of Austria, that putting in place regeneration plants on its territory is uneconomical and that in those circumstances and by reason of the principle of proportionality the obligations of the Member States concerned should be modified according to the actual circumstances prevailing in them, it must be recalled, as the Court held in paragraphs 35 to 43 of its judgment in Case C-102/97 Commission v Germany [1999] ECR I‑5051, that one of the primary objectives of the Directive was to give priority to the processing of waste oils by regeneration. Therefore, to consider that the technical, economic and organisational circumstances obtaining in a Member State automatically constituted constraints making it impossible to adopt the measures provided for in Article 3(1) of the Directive would deprive that provision of all practical effect, since the obligation imposed on Member States would be limited by maintenance of the status quo, with the result that there would be no genuine obligation to take the measures necessary to give priority to the processing of waste oils by regeneration.

40 Contrary to the submission of the German Government, the definition of such constraints cannot be left to the exclusive discretion of the Member States. Apart from being contrary to the principle of the uniform interpretation and application of Community law, interpretation by the Member States alone would make the compatibility of processing by regeneration with technical, economic and organisational constraints a condition the fulfilment of which would depend entirely on the goodwill of the Member State concerned, which could thus render the obligation imposed on it worthless.

32 In that regard, the Court has held that it is possible to take into consideration the fact that the seriousness of the infringement of the data subject’s fundamental rights resulting from that processing can vary depending on the possibility of accessing the data at issue in public sources (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 November 2011, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito, C‑468/10 and C‑469/10, EU:C:2011:777, paragraph 44).

49 As regards the elements of Directive 2003/87 which must be categorised as essential within the meaning of the provisions and case-law cited in paragraphs 46 to 48 of the present judgment, it must be pointed out that, although the principal objective of that directive is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions substantially, that objective must be attained in compliance with a series of sub-objectives. As indicated in recitals 5 and 7 of that directive, those sub-objectives include the safeguarding of economic development and employment and the preservation of the integrity of the internal market and of conditions of competition (judgments of 29 March 2012 in Commission v Poland, C‑504/09 P, EU:C:2012:178, paragraph 77; in Commission v Estonia, C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraph 79; and of 17 October 2013 in Iberdrola and Others, C‑566/11, C‑567/11, C‑580/11, C‑591/11, C‑620/11 and C‑640/11, EU:C:2013:660, paragraph 43).

79. In that regard, it must be noted that the declared principal objective of Directive 2003/87 is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions substantially in order to be able to fulfil the commitments of the European Union and its Member States under the Kyoto Protocol. That objective must be achieved in compliance with a series of sub-objectives and through recourse to certain instruments. The principal instrument for that purpose is constituted by the Community scheme for greenhouse gas emissions trading based on Article 1 of Directive 2003/87 and recital 2 in its preamble. Article 1 thus states that that scheme promotes emissions reductions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner. The other sub‑objectives to be fulfilled by that scheme are, inter alia, as set out in recitals 5 and 7 in the preamble to the Directive, the safeguarding of economic development and employment and the preservation of the integrity of the internal market and of conditions of competition.

30 Furthermore, it is not for the Court to rule on the interpretation of provisions of national law, as such an interpretation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national courts (judgment of 14 June 2017, Online Games and Others, C‑685/15, EU:C:2017:452, point 45 and the case-law cited).

29. Furthermore, the Court has already held that where a Member State has a system for preventing or mitigating a series of charges to tax or economic double taxation for dividends paid to residents by resident companies, it must treat dividends paid to residents by non-resident companies in the same way (see, to that effect, Case C-315/02 Lenz [2004] ECR I-7063, paragraphs 27 to 49; Manninen , paragraphs 29 to 55, and Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation [2006] ECR I-11673, paragraph 55).

39. In any event, having regard to Article 58(1)(a) EC, the principle of territoriality cannot justify different treatment of dividends distributed by companies established in Finland and those paid by companies established in other Member States, if the categories of dividends concerned by that difference in treatment share the same objective situation.

36. Differences in the protection given in the Community to one and the same medicinal product would give rise to a fragmentation of the market, whereby the medicinal product would still be protected in some national markets but no longer protected in others (see Spain v Council , paragraph 36).

86. In this respect, the Court has had occasion to rule that the exception in the first paragraph of Article 45 EC does not extend to certain activities that are auxiliary or preparatory to the exercise of official authority (see, to that effect, Thijssen , paragraph 22; Commission v Spain , paragraph 38; Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti , paragraph 47; Commission v Germany , paragraph 38; and Commission v Portugal , paragraph 36), or to certain activities whose exercise, although involving contacts, even regular and organic, with the administrative or judicial authorities, or indeed cooperation, even compulsory, in their functioning, leaves their discretionary and decision-making powers intact (see, to that effect, Reyners , paragraphs 51 and 53), or to certain activities which do not involve the exercise of decision-making powers (see, to that effect, Thijssen , paragraphs 21 and 22; Case C‑393/05 Commission v Austria , paragraphs 36 and 42; Commission v Germany , paragraphs 38 and 44; and Commission v Portugal , paragraphs 36 and 41), powers of constraint (see, to that effect, inter alia, Commission v Spain , paragraph 37) or powers of coercion (see, to that effect, Case C‑47/02 Anker and Others [2003] ECR I‑10447, paragraph 61, and Commission v Portugal , paragraph 44).

21 As to the veto which an approved commissioner may enter against the implementation of a decision where such implementation could constitute an offence, it must be noted that a commissioner is obliged to refer the matter forthwith to the Insurance Inspectorate. While his veto has suspensory effect for a period of eight days, the final decision on the matter lies with the Insurance Inspectorate, which is thus in no way bound by the commissioner' s veto and, within the limits of its powers, will take such measures as the situation requires. Finally, it must be noted that, as is clearly set out in Article 40 of the Law of 1975, the approved commissioners perform their duties under the supervision of the Insurance Inspectorate.

45. As regards, first, the principle of proportionality, it must be noted that the Court has already had occasion to find, in Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2010] ECR I-403, paragraphs 78 to 92, that Articles 5 to 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 are not invalid by reason of infringement of the principle of proportionality.

30 The non-application of the principle of equal treatment to the Union’s relations with third countries is confirmed by the manner in which the Court has given effect to the principle, enshrined in the case-law, referred to in paragraph 26 of this judgment. Accordingly, in the judgment of 28 October 1982, Faust v Commission (52/81, EU:C:1982:369, paragraph 25) the Court confined itself to finding that the difference in treatment of certain imports was due to a difference in treatment of third countries, in order to conclude that that difference in treatment was not contrary to EU law. Likewise, the Court has held that different treatment of traders marketing goods from third countries, which was the automatic consequence of a difference in treatment of third countries, was not contrary to the general principle of equal treatment (see judgments of 10 March 1998, Germany v Council, C‑122/95, EU:C:1998:94, paragraphs 56 to 58, and of 10 March 1998, T. Port, C‑364/95 and C‑365/95, EU:C:1998:95, paragraphs 76 and 77).

56 It must also be borne in mind that there is no general principle of Community law obliging the Community, in its external relations, to accord third countries equal treatment in all respects. Therefore, as the Court held in Case 52/81 Faust v Commission [1982] ECR 3745, paragraph 25, if different treatment of third countries is compatible with Community law, then different treatment accorded to traders within the Community must also be regarded as compatible with Community law where that different treatment is merely an automatic consequence of the different treatment accorded to third countries with which such traders have entered into commercial relations.

43. In that connection, it is clear, however, from the case-law that agents can lose their character as independent traders only if they do not bear any of the risks resulting from the contracts negotiated on behalf of the principal and they operate as auxiliary organs forming an integral part of the principal’s undertaking (see, to that effect, Volkswagen and VAG Leasing , paragraph 19).

31 Such an interpretation is consistent with the objective pursued by the directives in this area of attaining the widest possible opening up of public contracts to competition to the benefit not only of economic operators but also of contracting authorities. In addition, that interpretation also facilitates the involvement of small and medium-sized undertakings in the contracts procurement market, an aim also pursued by Directive 2004/18, as stated in recital 32 thereof (judgment of 10 October 2013, Swm Costruzioni 2 and MannocchiLuigino, C‑94/12, EU:C:2013:646, paragraph 34).

34. Such an interpretation is consistent with the objective pursued by the directives in this area of attaining the widest possible opening-up of public contracts to competition to the benefit not only of economic operators but also contracting authorities (see, to that effect, Case C‑305/08 CoNISMa [2009] ECR I‑12129, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). In addition, as the Advocate General noted at points 33 and 37 of his Opinion, that interpretation also facilitates the involvement of small- and medium-sized undertakings in the contracts procurement market, an aim also pursued by Directive 2004/18, as stated in recital 32 thereof.

103. Finally, so far as concerns FLSmidth’s submission of failure to state grounds, it is clear from paragraph 97 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court, taking account of the broad discretion which the Commission enjoys in assessing the quality and usefulness of the cooperation provided by an undertaking, in particular by reference to the contributions made by other undertakings, considered that the matters put forward before it by FLSmidth to establish that its alleged abstention from substantially contesting the facts had helped the Commission to establish the infringement at issue were not sufficient (see, in particular, Case C‑328/05 P SGL Carbon v Commission EU:C:2007:277, paragraph 88). Whilst that reasoning of the General Court is admittedly very succinct, it is nevertheless sufficient to enable FLSmidth to understand the reasons why the General Court rejected the corresponding argument, raised by FLSmidth, and to enable the Court of Justice to carry out its judicial review. A failure to state grounds in the judgment under appeal therefore cannot be established. Consequently, this argument is unfounded.

48. In addition, in order to be justified, the measure concerned must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the legitimate objective it pursues and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain it (see, to that effect, Case C-527/06 Renneberg [2008] ECR I‑7735, paragraph 81, and Joined Cases C-171/07 and C- 172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25). The justification relating to excessive burdens on the financing of higher education

25. Restrictions on freedom of establishment which are applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality may be justified by overriding reasons in the general interest, provided that the restrictions are appropriate for securing attainment of the objective pursued and do not go beyond what is necessary for attaining that objective (see Hartlauer , paragraph 44).

31. In that respect, it is apparent from the settled case-law of the Court that, for a person to be regarded as someone whose trial has been ‘finally disposed of’ in relation to the acts which he is alleged to have committed, for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA, further prosecution must have been definitively barred, with the result that the decision at issue leads, in the Contracting State in which it was adopted, to the protection granted by the ne bis in idem principle (see, to that effect, Case C‑491/07 Turanský EU:C:2008:768, paragraphs 32 and 35 and the case-law cited).

55. The Court has thus held that to give companies the right to elect to have their losses taken into account in the Member State in which they are established or in another Member State would seriously undermine a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States ( Marks & Spencer , paragraph 46, and Rewe Zentralfinanz , paragraph 42).

42. It must be acknowledged in that regard that there are courses of action which are capable of jeopardising the right of the Member States to exercise their taxing powers in relation to activities carried on in their territory and thus of undermining a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States (see Marks & Spencer , paragraph 46) and which may justify a restriction on freedom of establishment (see Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas , paragraphs 55 and 56). The Court has thus held that the fact of giving companies the right to elect to have their losses taken into account in the Member State in which they are established or in another Member State would seriously undermine a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States, since the tax base would be increased in the first State, and reduced in the second, by the amount of the losses surrendered.

31 A preliminary point to note is that, in so far as the Brussels I Regulation replaces, in the relations between Member States, the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by the successive accession conventions for the new Member States, the interpretation provided by the Court in respect of the provisions of that convention is also valid for those of the regulation whenever the provisions of those instruments may be regarded as equivalent, which is the case as regards Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, which succeeded the first paragraph of Article 17 of the convention (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 July 2016, Hőszig, C‑222/15, EU:C:2016:525, paragraphs 30 and 31 and the case-law cited).

26 In the application of Article 110 TFEU, and in particular in the comparison of the taxes applicable to imported second-hand cars with those applicable to second-hand cars which are already on the national territory, it is necessary to have regard not only to the rate of tax concerned, namely the environmental stamp duty, but also to the basis of assessment and the detailed rules for levying the tax in question (judgment of 14 April 2015 in Manea, C‑76/14, EU:C:2015:216, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

33. In the application of Article 110 TFEU, and in particular in the comparison of the taxes applicable to imported second-hand cars with those applicable to second-hand cars which are already on national territory, it is necessary to have regard not only to the rate of tax but also to the basis of assessment and the detailed rules for levying the tax in question (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v Denmark , C‑47/88, EU:C:1990:449, paragraph 18; Nunes Tadeu , C‑345/93, EU:C:1995:66, paragraph 12; and Commission v Greece , C‑74/06, EU:C:2007:534, paragraph 27).

32 In that context, it should nevertheless be noted that, in the absence of harmonisation of procedural means governing the relationship between collective and individual actions as provided for under Directive 93/13, it is for the internal legal order of each Member State, under the principle of procedural autonomy, to establish such rules, on condition, however, that they are not less favourable than those governing similar situations subject to domestic law (principle of equivalence) and that they do not make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law on consumer protection associations (principle of effectiveness) (see, by way of analogy, judgment in Asociación de Consumidores Independientes de Castilla y León, C‑413/12, EU:C:2013:800, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

48 It is settled case-law that national courts are entitled, and in certain cases obliged, to refer a question of the interpretation or validity of Community law to the Court, either of their own motion or at the request of the parties to the main proceedings, if they consider that a decision on that point by the Court is necessary to enable them to give judgment (see in particular Case 166/73 Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1974] ECR 33, paragraph 3, and Case 126/80 Salonia v Poidomani and Giglio [1981] ECR 1563, paragraph 7). That power to raise of its own motion a question of Community law presupposes that the national court considers either that Community law must be applied and, if necessary, national law disapplied or that national law must be interpreted in a way that conforms with Community law (see Joined Cases C-87/90, C-88/90 and C-89/90 Verholen and Others v Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1991] ECR I-3757, paragraph 13).

3 THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 177 ARE ABSOLUTELY BINDING ON THE NATIONAL JUDGE AND, IN SO FAR AS THE SECOND PARAGRAPH IS CONCERNED, ENABLE HIM TO REFER A CASE TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING ON INTERPRETATION OR VALIDITY . THIS ARTICLE GIVEN NATIONAL COURTS THE POWER AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, IMPOSES ON THEM THE OBLIGATION TO REFER A CASE FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING, AS SOON AS THE JUDGE PERCEIVES EITHER OF HIS OWN MOTION OR AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES THAT THE LITIGATION DEPENDS ON A POINT REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 .

17 That argument based on discrimination between producers in the Community cannot be accepted any more than it was accepted in the judgments in Erpelding, Leukhardt and Kuehn (at paragraphs 30, 19 and 18, respectively).

74. The Court has held that Member States are subject to special duties of action and abstention in a situation in which the Commission has submitted to the Council proposals which, although they have not been adopted by the Council, represent the point of departure for concerted Community action (Case 804/79 Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR I-1045, paragraph 28; Commission v Luxembourg , paragraph 59; and Commission v Germany , paragraph 65).

28 ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 5 OF THE TREATY MEMBER STATES ARE REQUIRED TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY ' S TASK AND TO ABSTAIN FROM ANY MEASURE WHICH MIGHT JEOPARDIZE THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY . THIS PROVISION IMPOSES ON MEMBER STATES SPECIAL DUTIES OF ACTION AND ABSTENTION IN A SITUATION IN WHICH THE COMMISSION , IN ORDER TO MEET URGENT NEEDS OF CONSERVATION , HAS SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL PROPOSALS WHICH , ALTHOUGHT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL , REPRESENT THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR CONCERTED COMMUNITY ACTION .

66. In the context of that assessment, it is for the referring court to ascertain in particular whether, first, criminal and fraudulent activities linked to gambling and, second, addiction to gambling could have been a problem in Austria at the material time and whether the expansion of authorised and regulated activities could have solved that problem (see, to that effect, Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming and Ladbrokes International , paragraph 29).

65. Where aid is paid without prior notification to the Commission, so that it is unlawful under Article 93(3) of the Treaty, the recipient of the aid cannot have at that time a legitimate expectation that its grant is lawful (see Alcan Deutschland , paragraphs 30 and 31, and Joined Cases C‑183/02 P and C‑187/02 P Demesa and Territorio histórico de Álava v Commission [2004] ECR I‑10609, paragraph 45).

31 In accordance with the principle set out in paragraph 25 of this judgment, the recipient of aid could not, therefore, have had at that time a legitimate expectation that its grant was lawful.

15. Under the second indent of Article 202(3) of the Customs Code, any persons who participated in the unlawful introduction of goods into the territory of the European Union who were aware, or should reasonably have been aware, that such introduction was unlawful are debtors. Consequently, treatment as a debtor under that provision is subject to two conditions the first of which is objective, namely participation in that introduction, and the second subjective, namely that the persons participated with a certain degree of knowledge in the unlawful introduction (see, to that effect, Papismedov and Others , paragraph 40).

39. It is settled case-law, however, that the concept of ‘worker’ within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU has an autonomous meaning specific to European Union law and must not be interpreted narrowly (see, to that effect, inter alia Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121, paragraph 16; Case 197/86 Brown [1988] ECR 3205, paragraph 21; Case C-3/90 Bernini [1992] ECR I-1071, paragraph 14; and Case C-413/01 Ninni-Orasche [2003] ECR I-13187, paragraph 23).

16 SINCE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS CONSTITUTES ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMUNITY , THE TERM ' WORKER ' IN ARTICLE 48 MAY NOT BE INTERPRETED DIFFERENTLY ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF EACH MEMBER STATE BUT HAS A COMMUNITY MEANING . SINCE IT DEFINES THE SCOPE OF THAT FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM , THE COMMUNITY CONCEPT OF A ' WORKER ' MUST BE INTERPRETED BROADLY ( JUDGMENT OF 23 MARCH 1982 IN CASE 53/81 LEVIN V STAATSSECRETARIS VAN JUSTITIE ( 1982 ) ECR 1035 ).

23 Furthermore, as regards the criticisms made of the Advocate General’s Opinion, it must be borne in mind, first, that the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure of the Court make no provision for interested parties to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (judgment of 4 September 2014, Vnuk, C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited)..

15 That provision embodies one of the fundamental principles of the Sixth Directive, according to which the basis of assessment is the consideration actually received (Case 230/87 Naturally Yours Cosmetics v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1988] ECR 6365, paragraph 16) and the corollary of which is that the tax authorities may not in any circumstances charge an amount of VAT exceeding the tax paid by the taxable person (Case C-317/94 Gibbs v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1996] ECR I-5339, paragraph 24).

16 From the aforesaid judgment of 5 February 1981 it is clear firstly that the consideration must be capable of being expressed in monetary terms and, secondly, that it is a subjective value, since the basis of assessment is the consideration actually received and not a value estimated according to objective criteria .

67 Secondly, even when submitting its application, the applicant was in a position to identify the documents sought and to provide the Court of First Instance with at least minimum evidence of the expediency of those measures of inquiry or measures of organisation of procedure for the purposes of the proceedings, in order to prove that the Polypropylene Decision had been altered after its adoption by the College of the Members of the Commission, as some of the applicants in the PVC cases had done (see, to that effect, the judgment of 17 December 1998 in Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraphs 93 and 94).

82. With regard to the argument concerning the need to maintain the Federal Republic of Germany’s ability to exercise its tax jurisdiction in relation to activities carried out in its territory, it must be pointed out that, while it has been consistently held in the case-law that a reduction in tax revenue cannot be regarded as an overriding reason in the public interest which may be relied on to justify a measure which is, in principle, contrary to a fundamental freedom (see, inter alia, Manninen , paragraph 49 and the case-law cited), the Court has also accepted that there may be some conduct which is capable of undermining the Member States’ right to exercise their tax jurisdiction in relation to the activities carried out in their territory and thus of jeopardising a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States (see Marks & Spencer , paragraph 46) which can justify a restriction on the freedoms secured by the Treaty (see, to that effect, Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas , paragraphs 55 and 56; and Case C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz [2007] ECR I-2647, paragraph 42).

42. It must be acknowledged in that regard that there are courses of action which are capable of jeopardising the right of the Member States to exercise their taxing powers in relation to activities carried on in their territory and thus of undermining a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States (see Marks & Spencer , paragraph 46) and which may justify a restriction on freedom of establishment (see Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas , paragraphs 55 and 56). The Court has thus held that the fact of giving companies the right to elect to have their losses taken into account in the Member State in which they are established or in another Member State would seriously undermine a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States, since the tax base would be increased in the first State, and reduced in the second, by the amount of the losses surrendered.

7 In the absence of harmonization of the conditions of access to a particular profession, the Member States are entitled to specify the knowledge and qualifications needed in order to pursue it and to require the production of a diploma certifying that the holder has the relevant knowledge and qualifications (see the judgment in Case 222/86 UNECTEF v Heylens [1987] ECR 4097, paragraph 10, and in Case C-340/89 Vlassopoulou v Ministerium fuer Justiz, Bundes-und Europaangelegenheiten Baden-Wuerttemberg [1991] ECR I-2357, paragraph 9).

39. To require those who, among the residents of a Member State, are insured under the social security scheme of another Member State to finance, in addition, even if only partially, the social security scheme of the Member State of residence would give rise to unequal treatment under Article 13 of Regulation No 1408/71, since all other residents of the latter Member State are required to contribute only to its social security scheme (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v France , EU:C:2000:84, paragraphs 45 to 48, and Commission v France , EU:C:2000:85, paragraphs 42 to 45).

42 Even if the CSG is applicable in the same way to all residents in France, however, those who work in another Member State and who, in accordance with Article 13 of Regulation No 1408/71, contribute to the funding of the social security scheme of that State are being required in addition to finance, even if only partially, the social security scheme of the State of residence, whereas all other residents are exclusively required to contribute to the latter State's scheme.

47. It is thus clear from the Court’s case-law that, whatever the mechanism adopted for preventing or mitigating the imposition of a series of charges to tax or economic double taxation, the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty preclude a Member State from treating foreign-sourced dividends less favourably than nationally-sourced dividends, unless such a difference in treatment concerns situations which are not objectively comparable or is justified by overriding reasons in the general interest ( Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

50. Whilst the principle of freedom of expression is expressly recognised by Article 10 ECHR and constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of a democratic society, it nevertheless follows from the wording of Article 10(2) that freedom of expression is also subject to certain limitations justified by objectives in the public interest, in so far as those derogations are in accordance with the law, motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims under that provision and necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, to that effect, Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689, paragraph 26; Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279, paragraph 42; and Schmidberger , cited above, paragraph 79).

26 A prohibition on selling publications which offer the chance to take part in prize games competitions may detract from freedom of expression. Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms does, however, permit derogations from that freedom for the purposes of maintaining press diversity, in so far as they are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society (see the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 24 November 1993 in Informationsverein Lentia and Others v Austria Series A No 276).

39. That analysis is confirmed by the general scheme and purpose of Chapter 6, of which Article 75 EA forms part. That chapter implements the general obligation imposed on the Community institutions by Article 2(d) EA to ensure that all users in the Community receive a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear fuels (Case 7/71 Commission v France [1971] ECR 1003, paragraph 22). The effect of Article 75 EA is to remove substances which are the subject of the contract work operations referred to in that provision from the ambit of the provisions relating to the supply system (see Ruling 1/78 [1978] ECR 2151, paragraph 16).

34 In that connection, the Court has ruled that Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13 lays down an exception to the mechanism for reviewing the substance of unfair terms, such as that provided for in the system of consumer protection put in place by that directive, that provision must be strictly interpreted (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 April 2014, Kásler and Káslerné Rábai, C‑26/13, EU:C:2014:282, paragraph 42, and of 23 April 2015, Van Hove, C‑96/14, EU:C:2015:262, paragraph 31). Furthermore, the expressions ‘main subject matter of the contract’ and ‘the adequacy of the price and remuneration on the one hand, as against the services or goods supplied in exchange, on the other’, in Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13, must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, which must take into account the context of that provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (judgment of 26 February 2015, Matei, C‑143/13, EU:C:2015:127, paragraph 50).

42. Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13 thus laying down an exception to the mechanism for reviewing the substance of unfair terms, such as that provided for in the system of consumer protection put in place by that directive, that provision must be strictly interpreted.

Par ailleurs, comme le Tribunal l’a également fait observer au point 98 de l’arrêt attaqué, la notion de prévisibilité dans ce contexte dépend dans une large mesure du contenu du texte dont il s’agit, du domaine qu’il couvre ainsi que du nombre et de la qualité de ses destinataires (arrêt du 28 juin 2005, Dansk Rørindustri e.a./Commission, C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P à C‑208/02 P et C‑213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, point 219).

78 In considering the question whether the requirement that a Polish national whose presence within the host Member State's territory is irregular must submit a new establishment application in due and proper form in his State of origin or, as the case may be, in another country is compatible with the rule of equal treatment laid down in Article 44(3) of the Association Agreement, where such a requirement could not be imposed on the host Member State's own nationals, it is important to bear in mind that the Court has held, with regard to the free movement of workers, that the reservation contained in Article 48(3) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 39(3) EC) allows Member States, on the grounds set out in that provision, and in particular grounds justified by requirements of public policy, to take measures against nationals of other Member States which they could not apply to their own nationals, inasmuch as they have no authority to expel the latter from the national territory or deny them access to it (see, in this regard, Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, paragraph 22; Joined Cases 115/81 and 116/81 Adoui and Cornuaille [1982] ECR 1665, paragraph 7; Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, paragraph 22; Joined Cases C-65/95 and C-111/95 Shingara and Radiom [1997] ECR I-3343, paragraph 28; and Case C-171/96 Pereira Roque [1998] ECR I-4607, paragraph 37).

22 FURTHERMORE, IT IS A PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, WHICH THE EEC TREATY CANNOT BE ASSUMED TO DISREGARD IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, THAT A STATE IS PRECLUDED FROM REFUSING ITS OWN NATIONALS THE RIGHT OF ENTRY OR RESIDENCE .

72. According to settled case-law, if the grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance disclose an infringement of Community law but its operative part is shown to be well founded on other legal grounds, the appeal must be dismissed (see, in particular, Case C‑30/91 P Lestelle v Commission [1992] ECR I‑3755, paragraph 28, and Joined Cases C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 187).

42 So far as concerns the content of Article 47, the Court has already held that the principle of effective judicial protection laid down in that provision comprises various elements: in particular, the principle of equality of arms and the right of access to a court (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2012 in Otis and Others, C‑199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraph 48).

48. The principle of effective judicial protection laid down in Article 47 of the Charter comprises various elements; in particular, the rights of the defence, the principle of equality of arms, the right of access to a tribunal and the right to be advised, defended and represented.

56. As regards the temporary posting of workers to another Member State so that they can carry out construction work or public works in the context of services provided by their employer, it is clear from the settled case‑law of the Court that Articles 49 EC and 50 EC preclude a Member State from prohibiting a person providing services established in another Member State from moving freely on its territory with all his staff and also preclude that Member State from making the movement of staff in question subject to more restrictive conditions. To impose such conditions on the person providing services established in another Member State discriminates against that person in relation to his competitors established in the host country who are able to use their own staff without restrictions, and moreover affects his ability to provide the service (Case C‑113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I‑1417, paragraph 12).

79. In addition, air carriers are not obliged to pay compensation if they can prove that the cancellation or long delay is caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken, that is, circumstances which are beyond the air carrier’s actual control (see Sturgeon and Others , paragraph 67).

67. That said, it should be recalled that, with the adoption of Regulation No 261/2004, the legislature was also seeking to strike a balance between the interests of air passengers and those of air carriers. Having laid down certain rights for those passengers, it provided at the same time, in Recital 15 and Article 5(3) of the regulation, that air carriers are not obliged to pay compensation if they can prove that the cancellation or long delay is caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken, namely circumstances which are beyond the air carrier’s actual control.

32 The Court has previously held that those directives would be deprived of their effectiveness if, solely on the basis of the victim’s contribution to the occurrence of his injuries, national rules, established on the basis of general and abstract criteria, either denied the victim the right to be compensated by the compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles or limited such a right in a disproportionate manner (judgments of 9 June 2011, Ambrósio Lavrador and Olival Ferreira Bonifácio, C‑409/09, EU:C:2011:371, paragraph 29, and of 23 October 2012, Marques Almeida, C‑300/10, EU:C:2012:656, paragraph 32).

66. As regards the reasons which may justify a restriction on the freedom to provide services in the sector of bio-medical analysis laboratories, the aim of maintaining the quality of medical services may be covered by one of the derogations provided for in Article 46 EC, in so far as it contributes to the attainment of a high level of health protection (see, to that effect, Case C‑385/99 Müller-Fauré and Van Riet [2003] ECR I‑4509, paragraph 67).

67. It is apparent from the Court's case-law that the objective of maintaining a high-quality, balanced medical and hospital service open to all, may fall within one of the derogations provided for in Article 56 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 46 EC), in so far as it contributes to the attainment of a high level of health protection (Kohll , paragraph 50, and Smits and Peerbooms , paragraph 73). In particular, that Treaty provision permits Member States to restrict the freedom to provide medical and hospital services in so far as the maintenance of treatment capacity or medical competence on national territory is essential for public health, and even the survival of the population (Kohll , paragraph 51, and Smits and Peerbooms , paragraph 74).

38 As regards, in the third place, the question whether national legislation may provide, in respect of a worker who, in breach of Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/88, is not entitled to an allowance in lieu of paid annual leave not taken, for detailed rules on the exercise of that entitlement which are more favourable than those provided for by Directive 2003/88, in particular as regards the amount of allowance to be granted to that worker, it should be recalled that although the purpose of Directive 2003/88 is to lay down minimum health and safety requirements for the organisation of working time, which Member States must respect, they have, in accordance with Article 15 of that directive, the right to introduce more favourable provisions for workers. Thus, Directive 2003/88 does not preclude domestic provisions giving entitlement to more than the minimum period of four weeks’ paid annual leave, guaranteed by Article 7 of that directive, granted under the conditions for entitlement to, and granting of, the right to paid annual leave laid down by national law (see, inter alia, judgments of 24 January 2012 in Dominguez, C‑282/10, EU:C:2012:33, paragraph 47, and 3 May 2012 in Neidel, C‑337/10, EU:C:2012:263, paragraphs 34 and 35).

41 As regards tax periods which have not yet been definitively closed, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied on as such against that individual (see, inter alia, judgment of 19 April 2016, DI, C‑441/14, EU:C:2016:278, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). Thus, national authorities cannot rely on Article 132(1)(f) of Directive 2006/112, as interpreted in paragraph 37 above, in order to withhold that exemption from IGPs made up of entities such as credit institutions and, therefore, in order to refuse to exempt the supply of services by those IGPs from VAT.

30 While it is true that, in relation to disputes between individuals, the Court has consistently held that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied upon as such against an individual (see, inter alia, judgments in Marshall, 152/84, EU:C:1986:84, paragraph 48; Faccini Dori, C‑91/92, EU:C:1994:292, paragraph 20; and Pfeiffer and Others, C‑397/01 to C‑403/01, EU:C:2004:584, paragraph 108), the fact nonetheless remains that the Court has also consistently held that the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by that directive and their duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation are binding on all the authorities of the Member States, including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments in von Colson and Kamann, 14/83, EU:C:1984:153, paragraph 26, and Kücükdeveci, C‑555/07, EU:C:2010:21, paragraph 47).

46. According to the case-law, the control exercised over the concessionaire by a concession-granting public authority must be similar to that which the authority exercises over its own departments, but not identical in every respect (see, to that effect, Parking Brixen , paragraph 62). The control exercised over the concessionaire must be effective, but it is not essential that it be exercised individually.

17 In order to determine whether a body making a reference is a court or tribunal for the purposes of that provision, which is a question governed by Community law alone, the Court takes into account a number of factors, such as whether the body concerned is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see, in particular, Case 61/65 Vaassen (née Göbbels) [1966] ECR 261 and Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin [1997] ECR I-4961, paragraph 23).

23 In order to determine whether a body making a reference is a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 177 of the Treaty, which is a question governed by Community law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 61/65 Vaassen (neé Göbbels) [1966] ECR 261; Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò v Persons unkown [1987] ECR 2545, paragraph 7; Case 109/88 Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199, paragraphs 7 and 8; Case C-393/92 Almelo and Others [1994] ECR I-1477; and Case C-111/94 Job Centre [1995] ECR I-3361, paragraph 9).

43. Recital (4) in the preamble to Directive 2003/54 states that a fully open market must enable all consumers freely to choose their suppliers and all suppliers freely to deliver to their customers. As the Advocate General rightly observed in point 72 of his Opinion, these two rights are necessarily linked. In order for customers to be able to choose freely their suppliers, it is necessary that suppliers should have the right to access the different transmission and distribution systems which carry electricity to the customers.

64. If the national court concludes that, in the disputes before it, the condition set out in the preceding paragraph is in fact met, it will still be necessary to determine, in accordance with the Court’s case‑law, whether tax exemptions such as those at issue in the main proceedings are justified by the nature or general scheme of the system of which they form part (see, to that effect, Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke , paragraph 42).

42 According to the case-law of the Court, a measure which, although conferring an advantage on its recipient, is justified by the nature or general scheme of the system of which it is part does not fulfil that condition of selectivity (see Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 33, and Belgium v Commission, cited above, paragraph 33).

28 In accordance with equally settled case-law, Article 267 TFEU gives national courts the widest discretion in referring matters to the Court if they consider that a case pending before them raises questions involving the interpretation of provisions of EU law, or consideration of their validity, which are necessary for the resolution of the case before them. National courts are, moreover, free to exercise that discretion at whatever stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate (judgment of 5 July 2016, Ognyanov, C‑614/14, EU:C:2016:514, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).

35. Furthermore, it follows from Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and also from Articles 168(1)(d) and 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside as well as the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, inter alia, Case C‑352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I‑5291, paragraph 34; Case C‑41/00 P Interporc v Commission [2003] ECR I‑2125, paragraph 15; and Case C‑131/03 P Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission [2006] ECR I‑7795, paragraph 49).

34 As regards the objection of inadmissibility raised by the Commission and the French Government, it follows from Article 168a of the EC Treaty (now Article 225 EC), the first paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside, and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (Case C-7/95 P Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraphs 34 to 35; order of 16 December 1999 in Case C-170/99 P Clauni and Others v Commission, not reported in the ECR, paragraph 15).

19. In accordance with settled case-law, it is necessary to determine, for the purposes of establishing whether the advantage given to the beneficiary is a burden on the State budget, whether there exists a sufficiently direct link between, on the one hand, that advantage and, on the other hand, a reduction of the State budget, or a sufficiently concrete economic risk of burdens on that budget (judgment in Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others and Commission v France and Others , C‑399/10 P and C‑401/10 P, EU:C:2013:175, paragraph 109).

14 AS WAS RECALLED IN THE JUDGMENT GIVEN IN CASE 139/77 , IN THE WORDS OF THE FIRST RECITAL IN THE PREAMBLE TO REGULATION NO 2464/69 , ' ' THE REVALUATION OF THE GERMAN MARK AND THE PRESENT UNALTERED VALUE OF THE UNIT OF ACCOUNT ENTAIL A REDUCTION IN AGRICULTURAL PRICES EXPRESSED IN GERMAN MARKS . . . FROM 1 JANUARY 1970 ; . . . GERMAN AGRICULTURE WILL THEREBY SUFFER A LOSS OF INCOME ' ' . THE LOSSES CONTEMPLATED , WHICH THE REGULATION AIMED TO COMPENSATE , WERE IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTORS SUCH AS MILK AND CEREALS WHERE AN INTERVENTION SYSTEM APPLIED . THE REVALUATION ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY LED TO A REDUCTION IN AGRICULTURAL PRICES EXPRESSED IN GERMAN MARKS BUT FIXED IN UNITS OF ACCOUNT UNDER THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY . IT IS PRECISELY IN THESE SECTORS THAT PRODUCTION DEPENDS ON WORKING AN ADEQUATE AMOUNT OF AGRICULTURAL LAND .

17IT APPEARS FROM THE CASE FILE INTER ALIA THAT , BECAUSE THEY USE FODDER WHICH IS MOSTLY THEIR OWN FARM PRODUCE , AGRICULTURAL LIVESTOCK BREEDERS AND KEEPERS WITHIN THE MEANING OF GERMAN TAX LAW ARE SUBJECT IN PARTICULAR TO THE RISKS INHERENT IN WORKING THE SOIL . ON THE OTHER HAND , INDUSTRIAL LIVESTOCK BREEDERS AND KEEPERS WITHIN THE MEANING OF GERMAN TAX LAW ARE NOT EXPOSED TO THE SAME RISKS , AS THEY BUY THE FEEDING-STUFFS NEEDED FOR THEIR ANIMALS MOSTLY ON EITHER THE NATIONAL OR THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET , AND IF THEIR NATIONAL CURRENCY IS REVALUED THEY ARE ABLE TO OBTAIN THEM ABROAD AT ADVANTAGEOUS PRICES . ACCORDINGLY , THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL LIVESTOCK BREEDERS AND KEEPERS AND INDUSTRIAL LIVESTOCK BREEDERS AND KEEPERS , WHICH GERMAN TAX LAW MAKES BY LAYING DOWN A RATIO BETWEEN THE HEAD OF LIVESTOCK AND THE UTILIZED AGRICULTURAL AREA AND WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ADOPTED AS AN OBJECTIVE , ALBEIT UNMODULATED , CRITERION AS REGARDS THE GRANTING OF THE AID WHICH IT IS EMPOWERED TO GRANT BY THE PROVISIONS OF REGULATION NO 2464/69 , CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED AS DISCRIMINATORY .

12 According to Article 3(1) the directive applies to statutory schemes which provide protection against, inter alia, the risk of invalidity or old age, and to provisions concerning social assistance, in so far as they are intended to supplement the invalidity scheme. In order to fall within the scope of Directive 79/7, therefore, a benefit must constitute the whole or part of a statutory scheme providing protection against one of the specified risks or a form of social assistance having the same objective (Case 150/85 Drake [1986] ECR 1995, paragraph 21).

62. As regards the second criterion, the national court, in the assessment which it must carry out, may take account of the purely artificial nature of the transactions and the links of a legal, economic and/or personal nature between the operators involved ( Halifax and Others , paragraph 81), those aspects being such as to demonstrate that the accrual of a tax advantage constitutes the principal aim pursued, notwithstanding the possible existence, in addition, of economic objectives arising from, for example, marketing, organisation or guarantee considerations.

81. As regards the second element, whereby the transactions concerned must essentially seek to obtain a tax advantage, it must be borne in mind that it is the responsibility of the national court to determine the real substance and significance of the transactions concerned. In so doing, it may take account of the purely artificial nature of those transactions and the links of a legal, economic and/or personal nature between the operators involved in the scheme for reduction of the tax burden (see, to that effect, Emsland Stärke , paragraph 58).

18. Where there is divergence between the various language versions of a Community text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (Case 30/77 Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, paragraph 14; Case C‑482/98 Italy v Commission [2000] ECR I‑10861, paragraph 49; and Case C‑1/02 Borgmann [2004] ECR I‑3219, paragraph 25; and Profisa , paragraph 14).

38. At the outset, it is important to point out that, in accordance with the requirements of the principle of neutrality of the common system of value added tax, the term ‘exploitation’ refers to all transactions, whatever may be their legal form, by which it is sought to obtain income from the goods in question on a continuing basis (see, to that effect, Case C-186/89 Van Tiem [1990] ECR I-4363, paragraph 18; EDM , paragraph 48; and Case C-8/03 BBL [2004] ECR I-10157, paragraph 36).

48. Under Article 4(1) of the Sixth Directive, a taxable person means any person who independently carries on such economic activities. Economic activities are defined in Article 4(2) as encompassing all activities of producers, traders and persons supplying services, in particular the exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis. That concept of ‘exploitation’ refers, in accordance with the requirements of the principle that the common system of VAT should be neutral, to all those transactions, whatever their legal form (see Van Tiem , cited above, paragraph 18, and Régie dauphinoise , paragraph 15).

91. It is apparent from Article 118a of the Treaty, which is the legal basis for Directive 93/104, from the first, fourth, seventh and eighth recitals in the preamble to the directive, from the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, adopted at the meeting of the European Council held at Strasbourg on 9 December 1989, points 8 and 19, first subparagraph, thereof, which are referred to in the fourth recital to the directive, and from the actual wording of Article 1(1) of the directive that the latter’s purpose is to lay down minimum requirements intended to improve the living and working conditions of workers through approximation of national provisions concerning, in particular, the duration of working time. This Community-level harmonisation of the organisation of working time seeks to guarantee a better level of protection of the safety and health of workers by ensuring that they are entitled to minimum rest periods – particularly daily and weekly – and adequate breaks (see Jaeger , paragraphs 45 to 47).

142. If that is the case, the patient who was authorised to go to another Member State to receive there hospital treatment or who received a refusal to authorise subsequently held to be unfounded is entitled, as the Belgian Government stated in its written observations and as Advocate General Geelhoed stated in point 118 of his Opinion, to seek reimbursement of the ancillary costs associated with that cross-border movement for medical purposes subject to the same objective and transparent limits as those set by the competent legislation for the reimbursement of the ancillary costs associated with medical treatment provided in the competent Member State (see to that effect Case C-8/02 Leichtle [2004] ECR I-2641, particularly paragraphs 41 to 48).

42. As is clear from the case‑law referred to in paragraph 30 of this judgment, such a condition, which, by its very nature, has the effect of deterring officials covered by the BhV from approaching health cure centres established in other Member States, cannot be accepted unless the barrier to freedom to provide services resulting therefrom is justifiable in the light of the Treaty.

21 It should be noted in this regard that a reasoned opinion must contain a coherent and detailed statement of the reasons which led the Commission to conclude that the State in question has failed to fulfil its obligations under Community law (see, inter alia, Case C-279/94 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-4743, paragraph 15).

50 As regards the access to the market of a Member State which should thus be guaranteed, it should be remembered that, in accordance with settled case-law, the objective of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by Article 49 TFEU is to allow nationals of a Member State or legal persons established in that Member State to set up a secondary establishment in another Member State in order to carry on their business there and thus to promote economic and social interpenetration within the European Union in the sphere of economic activity other than as an employee. To that end, freedom of establishment is intended to allow such nationals or legal persons of the European Union to participate, on a stable and continuing basis, in the economic life of a Member State other than their State of origin and to profit therefrom by actually pursuing, in the host Member State, an economic activity through a fixed establishment for an indefinite period (see, in particular, judgment of 23 February 2016, Commission v Hungary , C‑179/14, EU:C:2016:108, paragraph 148 and the case-law cited).

148 It must be borne in mind that the objective of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by Article 49 TFEU is to allow a national of a Member State to set up a secondary establishment in another Member State to carry on his activities there and thus assist economic and social interpenetration within the European Union in the sphere of activities as self-employed persons. To that end, freedom of establishment is intended to allow a national of a Member State to participate, on a stable and continuing basis, in the economic life of a Member State other than his State of origin and to profit therefrom by actually pursuing in the host Member State an economic activity through a fixed establishment for an indefinite period (see to that effect, inter alia, judgment in Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, C‑196/04, EU:C:2006:544, paragraphs 53 and 54 and the case-law cited).

Selon une jurisprudence constante de la Cour, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé (voir, notamment, arrêt Commission/Belgique, C‑421/12, EU:C:2014:2064, point 45 et jurisprudence citée).

16 In Reiff (paragraph 15) and Delta Schiffahrts- und Speditionsgesellschaft (paragraph 15), the Court held that, in order to give a helpful answer to the national court, it should first be considered whether the existence of an agreement, decision or concerted practice within the meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty could be inferred from rules such as those in question in the main proceedings.

15 In its judgment in Reiff (paragraph 15) the Court, considering a similar question referred to it regarding the determination of tariff rates for the long-distance carriage of goods by road, held that, in order to give a helpful answer to the national court, it should first be considered whether the existence of an agreement, decision or concerted practice within the meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty could be inferred from rules such as those in question in the main proceedings.

94 It follows that the competent national authorities, when they receive a request for development consent for a project relating to Annex II to that directive, must carry out a specific evaluation as to whether, taking account of the criteria set out in Annex III to that directive, an environmental impact assessment should be carried out (judgment in Marktgemeinde Straßwalchen and Others, C‑531/13, EU:C:2015:79, paragraph 42).

38. In that regard, it must be noted, first, that the infringement of obligations whose observance is of fundamental importance to the proper functioning of a Community system, such as the obligations resulting from Directive 92/50 concerning the implementation of projects financed by the ERDF, may be penalised by forfeiture of a right conferred by European Union legislation (see, to that effect, Case C‑104/94 Cereol Italia [1995] ECR I‑2983, paragraph 25; Case C‑500/99 P Conserve Italia v Commission [2002] ECR I‑867, paragraphs 100 to 102; and order of 16 December 2004 in Case C‑222/03 P AIPO v Commission , paragraph 53).

25 By providing for penalties which may go as far as forfeiture of entitlement to aid for the current marketing year and for the following marketing year in the case where a soya bean producer, deliberately or by reason of serious negligence on his part, breaches an obligation as important for the proper functioning of the aid system as is the obligation to notify changes in the areas sown, the Commission did not infringe the principle of proportionality or exceed the limits of the implementing powers conferred on it by Article 2(8) of Regulation No 1491/85, which include the power to provide for appropriate penalties (see the judgment in Case C-357/88 Hopermann v Bundesanstalt fuer landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung [1990] ECR I-1669, paragraph 7).

65 Second, the line of argument of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg alleging a breach of the principle of fiscal neutrality must be rejected. In accordance with that principle, the deduction system is meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in the course of all his economic activities (judgment of 15 September 2016, Landkreis Potsdam-Mittelmark, C‑400/15, EU:C:2016:687, paragraph 35). The common system of VAT therefore ensures that all economic activities, provided that they are, in principle, themselves subject to VAT, are taxed in a neutral way (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 October 2015, PPUH Stehcemp, C‑277/14, EU:C:2015:719, paragraph 27).

39. Accordingly, given, first, that the requirement to interpret secondary legislation in such a way that it complies with primary law follows from the general principle of interpretation that a provision must be interpreted, as far as possible, in such a way as not to affect its validity (see, to that effect, judgments in Sturgeon and Others , C‑402/07 and C‑432/07, EU:C:2009:716, paragraphs 47 and 48, and review of Commission v Strack , C‑579/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:570, paragraph 40), and, second, that the legality of Article 18(2) of Decision 2008/633 must be assessed, for the reasons set out in paragraph 35 above, in particular in the light of Article 39(1) EU, the former provision must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the latter.

47. Next, it must be stated that, according to a general principle of interpretation, a Community act must be interpreted, as far as possible, in such a way as not to affect its validity (see, to that effect, Case C‑403/99 Italy v Commission [2001] ECR I‑6883, paragraph 37). Likewise, where a provision of Community law is open to several interpretations, preference must be given to that interpretation which ensures that the provision retains its effectiveness (see, inter alia, Case 187/87 Land de Sarre and Others [1988] ECR 5013, paragraph 19, and Case C‑434/97 Commission v France [2000] ECR I‑1129, paragraph 21).

26. It should also be recalled that the analysis by the European Union judicature of the pleas in law raised in an action for annulment has neither the object nor the effect of replacing a full investigation of the case in the context of an administrative procedure. As such a limitation of judicial review is, however, inherent in the notion of the review of legality, it cannot be understood as unduly limiting the review of legality which the European Union judicature is authorised to carry out (see, to that effect, Case C‑399/08 P Commission v Deutsche Post [2010] ECR I‑7831, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited).

33. In order to establish whether such an entity independently carries out economic activities, it is necessary to ascertain, as is apparent from the case-law of the Court, whether, in the pursuit of those activities, it is in an employer-employee relationship vis-à-vis the municipality to which it is linked (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v Netherlands , 235/85, EU:C:1987:161, paragraph 14; Ayuntamiento de Sevilla , C‑202/90, EU:C:1991:332, paragraph 10; FCE Bank , C‑210/04, EU:C:2006:196, paragraphs 35 to 37; and Commission v Spain , C‑154/08, EU:C:2009:695, paragraphs 103 to 107).

14 ARTICLE 4 ( 4 ) EXCLUDES ALL PERSONS WHO ARE BOUND TO AN EMPLOYER BY A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT OR BY ANY OTHER LEGAL TIES CREATING THE RELATIONSHIP OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE AS REGARDS WORKING CONDITIONS, REMUNERATION AND EMPLOYER' S LIABILITY . NOTARIES AND BAILIFFS, HOWEVER, ARE NOT BOUND TO THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AS EMPLOYEES SINCE THEY ARE NOT INTEGRATED INTO THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION . THEY CARRY OUT THEIR ACTIVITIES ON THEIR OWN ACCOUNT AND ON THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITY; THEY ARE FREE, SUBJECT TO CERTAIN LIMITS IMPOSED BY STATUTE, TO ARRANGE HOW THEY SHALL PERFORM THEIR WORK AND THEY THEMSELVES RECEIVE THE EMOLUMENTS WHICH MAKE UP THEIR INCOME . THE FACT THAT THEY ARE SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINARY CONTROL UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES ( A SITUATION TO BE FOUND IN OTHER REGULATED PROFESSIONS ) AND THE FACT THAT THEIR REMUNERATION IS DETERMINED BY STATUTE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR REGARDING THEM AS PERSONS WHO ARE BOUND BY LEGAL TIES TO AN EMPLOYER WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 4 ( 4 ).

18. The Court has also held that, ‘[a]lthough it is true that many advantages granted by an employer also reflect considerations of social policy, the fact that a benefit is in the nature of pay cannot be called in question where the worker is entitled to receive the benefit in question from his employer by reason of the existence of the employment relationship (judgment in Barber , C‑262/88, EU:C:1990:209, paragraph 18).

182. In so far as the question concerns successive fixed-term employment contracts, it must be pointed out that that question is the same as a question on which the Court has already given a ruling in Adeneler and Others (paragraphs 91 to 105) and that other relevant information enabling an answer to be given to that question appears in the judgments in Marrosu and Sardino (paragraphs 44 to 57) as well as Vassallo (paragraphs 33 to 42) and the order in Vassilakis and Others (paragraphs 120 to 137).

93. Furthermore, the Member States are required, within the bounds of the freedom left to them by the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, to choose the most appropriate forms and methods to ensure the effectiveness of directives, in the light of their objective (see Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497, paragraph 75, and Joined Cases C-58/95, C-75/95, C-112/95, C-119/95, C-123/95, C-135/95, C‑140/95, C-141/95, C-154/95 and C-157/95 Gallotti and Others [1996] ECR I‑4345, paragraph 14).

19. First of all, to the extent that the advantageous rates at issue provide for a distinction on the basis of nationality, it should be recalled that such advantages are compatible with Community law only if they can be covered by an express derogating provision, such as Article 46 EC, to which Article 55 EC refers, namely public policy, public security or public health. Economic aims cannot constitute grounds of public policy within the meaning of Article 46 EC (see, inter alia , Case C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson [1995] ECR I-3955, paragraph 15).

38. In that regard, it is appropriate to bear in mind settled case-law, according to which, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, Proxxon EU:C:2006:111, paragraph 21; Case C‑140/08 Rakvere Lihakombinaat EU:C:2009:667, paragraph 42; and Digitalnet and Others EU:C:2012:745, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

27. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case‑law, in the interests of legal certainty and for ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and the notes to the sections or chapters (see, inter alia, Case C‑339/98 Peacock [2000] ECR I‑8947, paragraph 9; Case C‑495/03 Intermodal Transports [2005] ECR I‑8151, paragraph 47; Case C‑376/07 Kamino International Logistics [2009] ECR I‑1167, paragraph 31; and Joined Cases C‑288/09 and C‑289/09 British Sky Broadcasting Group and Pace [2011] ECR I‑2851, paragraph 60).

28. The Court has specified that the relevance of that criterion was also confirmed by the International Convention on the simplification and harmonisation of customs procedures (Kyoto Convention), several annexes to which were accepted on behalf of the Community by Council Decision 77/415/EEC of 3 June 1977 (OJ 1977 L 166, p. 1 and 3), and the notes of which in relation to Rule 3 of Annex D.1 state that in practice the substantial processing criterion can be expressed by the ad valorem percentage rule, where either the percentage value of the materials utilised or the percentage of the value added reaches a specified level ( Brother International , paragraph 21).

14. Moreover, the Court has decided that the question whether partial annulment would alter the substance of the contested measure is an objective criterion, and not a subjective criterion linked to the political intention of the authority which adopted the measure at issue ( Germany v Commission , paragraph 37).

37. However, as the Advocate General points out in point 48 of his Opinion, whether partial annulment would alter the substance of the contested measure is an objective criterion, and not a subjective criterion linked to the political intention of the authority which adopted the measure at issue.

35. According to settled case-law, the choice of the legal basis for a European Union measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include in particular the aim and content of the measure (judgments in Commission v Council , C‑338/01, EU:C:2004:253, paragraph 54 and case-law cited, and Parliament v Council , C‑130/10, EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 42).

44. The Court has held in particular that such restrictive effects may arise where, on account of national legislation, a company may be deterred from setting up subsidiary bodies, such as permanent establishments, in other Member States and from carrying on its activities through such bodies (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I‑10837, paragraphs 32 and 33; Case C‑471/04 Keller Holding [2006] ECR I‑2107, paragraph 35; and Case C‑293/06 Deutsche Shell [2008] ECR I‑1129, paragraph 29).

29. The Court has held in particular that such restrictive effects may arise specifically where, on account of a tax law, a company may be deterred from setting up subsidiary bodies such as permanent establishments in other Member States and from carrying on its activities through such bodies (see Case C‑446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I‑10837, paragraphs 32 and 33, and Case C‑471/04 Keller Holding [2006] ECR I‑2107, paragraph 35).

41. Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/14 provides that the Member States are to establish a framework for levying charges and may also establish specific charging rules, while respecting the management independence of the infrastructure manager. Under that provision, it is for the infrastructure manager to determine the charge for the use of the infrastructure and also to collect it (see, inter alia, Case C‑483/10 Commission v Spain [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39).

38. Admittedly, all those regulatory amendments were not intended to and did not even have the effect of depriving the Member States of the possibility of adopting measures to contribute effectively to the implementation of the objectives of the customs regulations, in particular the recovery of the customs debt. Nor did they prevent the Member States from prescribing, if appropriate, rules specifying, in compliance with those objectives and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, the conditions for applying the Community texts (with regard to a national provision increasing customs duties in the event of infringement of the Community customs regulations, see Case C‑91/02 Hannl + Hofstetter [2003] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 18 to 20).

19. As the Advocate General pointed out in point 36 of his Opinion, neither the Customs Code nor the implementing regulation provides for specific measures where the customs debt is incurred on the basis of Articles 202 to 205, 210 and 211 and 220 of the Customs Code, which all concern situations involving breach by the trader concerned of the Community customs legislation.

11. The national court considered that the judgment in Faccini Dori provided a clear answer to the question of the horizontal direct effect of unimplemented directives, but observed that, unlike in the case of the dispute before it, Faccini Dori was concerned with facts antedating the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union. That Treaty introduced a new consumer protection provision, Article 129a.

36. In the absence of a definition in the EC Treaty of ‘movement of capital’ for the purposes of Article 56(1) EC, the Court has recognised the nomenclature which forms Annex I to Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty [repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam] (OJ 1988 L 178, p. 5) as having indicative value, even though that directive was adopted on the basis of Articles 69 and 70(1) of the EEC Treaty (later Articles 69 and 70(1) of the EC Treaty both of which were repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam), it being understood that, in accordance with the introduction to that annex, the list it contains is not exhaustive. Gifts and endowments appear under heading XI, ‘Personal capital movements’, of that annex (judgments in Persche , C‑318/07, EU:C:2009:33, paragraph 24; Mattner , C‑510/08, EU:C:2010:216, paragraph 19; and Commission v Spain , C‑127/12, EU:C:2014:2130, paragraph 52).

52. S’agissant de la liberté de circulation applicable, il convient de rappeler que, en l’absence, dans le traité, d’une définition de la notion de «mouvement de capitaux» au sens de l’article 63, paragraphe 1, TFUE, la Cour a reconnu une valeur indicative à la nomenclature qui constitue l’annexe I de la directive 88/361/CEE du Conseil, du 24 juin 1988, pour la mise en œuvre de l’article 67 du traité [article abrogé par le traité d’Amsterdam] (JO L 178, p. 5) (voir, notamment, arrêts Mattner, EU:C:2010:216, point 19, et Welte, C‑181/12, EU:C:2013:662, point 19). Les dons et les dotations ainsi que les successions apparaissent, notamment, sous la rubrique XI, intitulée «Mouvements de capitaux à caractère personnel», figurant à ladite annexe I (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Mattner, EU:C:2010:216, points 19 et 20 ainsi que jurisprudence citée).

35 The Court has held that the specific factors that allow a link to be established between the articles of the FEU Treaty on freedom to provide services and the subject or circumstances of a dispute, confined in all respects within a single Member State, must be apparent from the order for reference (judgment of 8 December 2016, Eurosaneamientos and Others, C‑532/15 and C‑538/15, EU:C:2016:932, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

20 In the abovementioned judgments in Data Delecta and Forsberg, paragraph 15, and Hayes, paragraph 17, the Court held that a rule of domestic procedure requiring for judicial proceedings, such as those at issue in those cases, the provision of security for costs was liable to have an effect, even though indirect, on trade in goods and services between Member States and therefore fell within the scope of application of the Treaty.

15 It must therefore be held that a rule of domestic civil procedure, such as the one at issue in the main proceedings, falls within the scope of the Treaty within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 6 and is subject to the general principle of non-discrimination laid down by that article in so far as it has an effect, even though indirect, on trade in goods and services between Member States. Such an effect is liable to arise in particular where security for costs is required where proceedings are brought to recover payment for the supply of goods. Discrimination within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 6 of the Treaty

51 It should be borne in mind that the Court has no jurisdiction to interpret national law (see, inter alia, Deville, cited above, paragraph 17) and that it is for the national court alone to determine the precise scope of national laws, regulations or administrative provisions (see, to that effect, Case C-347/89 Eurim-Pharm [1991] ECR I-1747, paragraph 15, and Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91 Katsikas v Konstandinidis, Skreb and Schroll v Stauereibetrieb Paetz [1992] ECR I-6577, paragraph 39).

23. Furthermore, it is accepted that citizenship of the Union, established by Article 17 EC, is not intended to extend the material scope of the Treaty to internal situations which have no link with Community law (Joined Cases C‑64/96 and C‑65/96 Uecker and Jacquet [1997] ECR I‑3171, paragraph 23, and Case C‑148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I‑11613, paragraph 26).

23 In that regard, it must be noted that citizenship of the Union, established by Article 8 of the EC Treaty, is not intended to extend the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty also to internal situations which have no link with Community law. Furthermore, Article M of the Treaty on European Union provides that nothing in that Treaty is to affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities, subject to the provisions expressly amending those treaties. Any discrimination which nationals of a Member State may suffer under the law of that State fall within the scope of that law and must therefore be dealt with within the framework of the internal legal system of that State.

30. Admittedly, the adoption of national rules concerning the conditions and procedures for recognition of the ‘charitable’ nature of organisations other than bodies governed by public law is allowed under Article 13A of the Sixth Directive (see, to that effect, Kingscrest Associates and Montecello , paragraph 50).

138. In that regard, where, instead of disallowing all the expenditure affected by the infringement, the Commission has endeavoured to establish rules for treating irregularities differently depending on the extent of the shortcomings in the checks and the degree of risk to the EAGGF, it is for the Member State to show that those criteria are arbitrary and unfair (see, to that effect, Case C‑242/96 Italy v Commission [1998] ECR I‑5863, paragraph 75; and see also Case C‑28/94 Netherlands v Commission [1999] ECR I‑1973, paragraph 56; and Case C‑130/99 Spain v Commission [2002] ECR I‑3005, paragraph 44).

56 Moreover, where instead of disallowing all the expenditure affected by the infringement the Commission has endeavoured to establish rules under which irregularities are treated differently, depending on the extent of the shortcomings in the checks and the degree of risk to the EAGGF, it is for the Member State to show that those criteria are arbitrary and unfair (see, to that effect, Case C-242/96 Italy v Commission [1998] ECR I-5863, paragraph 75). Since the Netherlands Government has not done so, its argument on this point must be rejected. Infringement of Articles 3 and 5 of Regulation No 283/72

24 Finally, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, in so far as Article 50 thereof contains a right corresponding to that provided for in Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR, it is necessary to ensure that the above interpretation of Article 50 thereof does not disregard the level of protection guaranteed by the ECHR (see, by analogy, judgment of 15 February 2016, N., C‑601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, paragraph 77).

40 As regards, in particular, the conditions relating to obtaining the full deduction, the Court has held that a threshold of 10% indeed serves to exclude from the scope of the fiscal advantage shareholdings acquired solely with the intention of making a financial investment without any intention to influence the management and control of the undertaking, but does not in itself make the deduction applicable only to those shareholdings which enable the holder to exert a definite influence on a company’s decisions and to determine its activities (judgment of 11 September 2014, Kronos International, C‑47/12, EU:C:2014:2200, paragraph 34 and 35). The Court considered that a holding of such a size does not necessarily imply that the owner of the holding exerts a definite influence over the decisions of the company in which it is a shareholder (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 October 2013, Itelcar, C‑282/12, EU:C:2013:629, paragraph 22, and of 11 September 2014, Kronos International, C‑47/12, EU:C:2014:2200, paragraph 35).

34. Such a threshold admittedly serves to exclude from the scope of the exemption shareholdings acquired solely with the intention of making a financial investment without any intention to influence the management and control of the undertaking.

22 Next, it should be noted that even though that article presupposes the existence of undertakings which have certain special or exclusive rights, it does not follow that all the special or exclusive rights are necessarily compatible with the Treaty. That depends on different rules, to which Article 90(1) refers.

41. Application of a provision by analogy, with regard to an economic operator, is possible where the legal rules applicable, on the one hand, are very similar to those which it is sought to have applied by analogy and, on the other hand, contain an omission which is incompatible with a general principle of Community law and which can be remedied by application by analogy of those other rules (Case 165/84 Krohn [1985] ECR 3997, paragraph 14).

14 HOWEVER , AS THE COURT HAS DECIDED IN ITS JUDGMENTS OF 20 FEBRUARY 1975 ( ADOLF REICH V HAUPTZOLLAMT LANDAU ( 1975 ) ECR 261 ) AND 11 JULY 1978 ( UNION FRANCAISE DES CEREALES V HAUPTZOLLAMT HAMBURG-JONAS ( 1978 ) ECR 1675 ), THE POSITION MAY BE DIFFERENT IN CERTAIN EXCEPTIONAL CASES . IT IS CLEAR FROM THOSE JUDGMENTS THAT TRADERS ARE ENTITLED TO RELY ON AN APPLICATION BY ANALOGY OF A REGULATION WHICH WOULD NOT NORMALLY BE APPLICABLE TO THEM IF THEY CAN SHOW THAT THE RULES APPLICABLE TO THEIR CASE : ON THE ONE HAND , ARE VERY SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH IT IS SOUGHT TO HAVE APPLIED BY ANALOGY ; AND , ON THE OTHER HAND , CONTAIN AN OMISSION WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF COMMUNITY LAW AND WHICH CAN BE REMEDIED BY APPLICATION BY ANALOGY OF THOSE OTHER RULES .

45. Furthermore, it is clear from the second paragraph of Article 234 EC that it is for the national court to decide at what stage in the proceedings it is appropriate for that court to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling (see Joined Cases 36/80 and 71/80 Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association and Others [1981] ECR 735, paragraph 5; Case C‑236/98 JämO [2000] ECR I‑2189, paragraph 30; and Schmidberger , paragraph 39).

117. As regards the imposition of a penalty payment, the Court has held that such a penalty must be decided upon according to the degree of pressure needed in order to persuade the defaulting Member State to comply with a judgment establishing a failure to fulfil obligations and to alter its conduct in order to bring to an end the infringement complained of (see, to that effect, Case C-304/02 Commission v France , paragraph 91).

91. The argument that, in departing from or going beyond the Commission’s suggestions, the Court infringes a general principle of procedural law which prohibits courts from going beyond the parties’ claims is not well founded either. The procedure provided for in Article 228(2) EC is a special judicial procedure, peculiar to Community law, which cannot be equated with a civil procedure. The order imposing a penalty payment and/or a lump sum is not intended to compensate for damage caused by the Member State concerned, but to place it under economic pressure which induces it to put an end to the breach established. The financial penalties imposed must therefore be decided upon according to the degree of persuasion needed in order for the Member State in question to alter its conduct.

60 The Court has consistently held that, in order to assess whether a Member State has observed the principle of proportionality in the area of public health, account must be taken of the fact that the health and life of humans rank foremost among the assets and interests protected by the TFEU and that it is for the Member States to determine the degree of protection which they wish to afford to public health and the way in which that degree of protection is to be achieved. Since that level may vary from one Member State to another, Member States must be allowed a measure of discretion in that area (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 October 2016, Deutsche Parkinson Vereinigung, C‑148/15, EU:C:2016:776, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

36 Consequently, a clawback measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings must be established and applied in compliance with the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-63/93 Duff and Others [1996] ECR I-569, paragraph 34). Moreover, it must be proportionate to the aim pursued (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-22/94 Irish Farmers Association and Others [1997] ECR I-1809, paragraphs 30 and 31) and applied without discrimination (see, to that effect, in particular Klensch and Others, paragraph 8). Similarly, such a measure must respect fundamental rights, such as the right to property (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-2/92 Bostock [1994] ECR I-955, paragraphs 16 and 20) and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession (see, to that effect, in particular Joined Cases C-90/90 and C-91/90 Neu and Others [1991] ECR I-3617, paragraph 13).

8 UNDER ARTICLE 40 ( 3 ) OF THE EEC TREATY THE COMMON ORGANIZATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL MARKETS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY MUST ' EXCLUDE ANY DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN PRODUCERS OR CONSUMERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY ' . THAT PROVISION COVERS ALL MEASURES RELATING TO THE COMMON ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETS , IRRESPECTIVE OF THE AUTHORITY WHICH LAYS THEM DOWN . CONSEQUENTLY , IT IS ALSO BINDING ON THE MEMBER STATES WHEN THEY ARE IMPLEMENTING THE SAID COMMON ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKETS .

97. In that regard, it should be recalled that, under Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal lies on points of law only. The General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence thus does not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute a point of law which, as such, is open to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (judgment in Vuitton Malletier v OHIM , C‑97/12 P, EU:C:2014:324, paragraph 61).

50. According to the settled case-law of the Court, the concept of ‘objective grounds’ for the purposes of clause 4(1) and/or (4) of the framework agreement must be understood as not permitting a difference in treatment between fixed-term workers and permanent workers to be justified on the basis that the difference is provided for by a general, abstract national norm, such as a law or collective agreement ( Del Cerro Alonso , paragraph 57; Joined Cases C-444/09 and C-456/09 Gavieiro Gavieiro and Iglesias Torres [2010] ECR I-14031, paragraph 54; order in Montoya Medina , paragraph 40; Rosado Santana , paragraph 72; and order in Lorenzo Martínez , paragraph 47).

72. According to the settled case-law of the Court, the concept of ‘objective grounds’ for the purposes of clause 4(1) of the framework agreement must be understood as not permitting a difference in treatment between fixed-term workers and permanent workers to be justified on the basis that the difference is provided for by a general, abstract national norm, such as a law or collective agreement ( Del Cerro Alonso , paragraph 57; Gavieiro Gavieiro and Iglesias Torres , paragraph 54; and the order in Montoya Medina , paragraph 40).

80. In this respect, it should be recalled that, as the Court has observed on many occasions, the Framework Agreement does not lay down a general obligation on the Member States to provide for the conversion of fixed-term employment contracts into contracts of indefinite duration. Indeed, clause 5(2) of the Framework Agreement in principle leaves it to the Member States to determine the conditions under which fixed-term employment contracts or relationships are to be regarded as contracts or relationships of indefinite duration. It follows that the Framework Agreement does not specify the conditions under which contracts of indefinite duration may be used (see, inter alia, judgment in Fiamingo and Others , EU:C:2014:2044, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

54. Next, the Commission states that, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, benefits granted objectively on the basis of a statutorily defined position and which are intended to improve the state of health and quality of life of persons reliant on care have as their essential purpose supplementing sickness insurance benefits and must be regarded as ‘sickness benefits’ for the purpose of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 883/2004 (see, in particular, judgments in Gaumain-Cerri and Barth , C‑502/01 and C‑31/02, EU:C:2004:413, paragraph 20; Hosse , C‑286/03, EU:C:2006:125, paragraph 38; and Commission v Parliament and Council , C‑299/05, EU:C:2007:608, paragraph 61).

38. It follows that benefits which are granted objectively on the basis of a legally defined position and are intended to improve the state of health and life of persons reliant on care have the essential purpose of supplementing sickness insurance benefits, and must be regarded as ‘sickness benefits’ within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 ( Molenaar , paragraphs 24 and 25, and Jauch , paragraph 28).

177 It should be recalled here that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the Member States must, in the first place, respect the obligation of general diligence in Article 5 of the Treaty, as specifically embodied in Article 8(1) and (2) of Regulation No 729/70 with regard to the financing of the common agricultural policy. That obligation implies that the Member States must take steps to rectify irregularities promptly. With the passage of time, recovery of sums wrongly paid is likely to become complicated or impossible for reasons such as the fact that undertakings may have ceased trading or accounting documents may have been lost (Case C-34/89 Italy v Commission [1990] ECR I-3603, paragraph 12).

17. Having regard to the case-law of the Court, it is necessary to examine the rules relating to the existence and operation of the monopoly with reference to Article 31 EC, which is specifically applicable to the exercise, by a domestic commercial monopoly, of its exclusive rights (see Case 91/75 Miritz [1976] ECR 217, paragraph 5; Case 120/78 REWE-Zentral [1979] ECR 649, ‘Cassis de Dijon’ , paragraph 7; Case 91/78 Hansen [1979] ECR 935, paragraphs 9 and 10; Case C‑387/93 Banchero [1995] ECR I‑4663, paragraph 29; and Case C‑189/95 Franzén [1997] ECR I‑5909, paragraph 35).

7IT SHOULD BE NOTED IN THIS CONNEXION THAT ARTICLE 37 RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO STATE MONOPOLIES OF A COMMERCIAL CHARACTER . THAT PROVISION IS THEREFORE IRRELEVANT WITH REGARD TO NATIONAL PROVISIONS WHICH DO NOT CONCERN THE EXERCISE BY A PUBLIC MONOPOLY OF ITS SPECIFIC FUNCTION - NAMELY , ITS EXCLUSIVE RIGHT - BUT APPLY IN A GENERAL MANNER TO THE PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES , WHETHER OR NOT THE LATTER ARE COVERED BY THE MONOPOLY IN QUESTION . THAT BEING THE CASE , THE EFFECT ON INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE OF THE MEASURE REFERRED TO BY THE NATIONAL COURT MUST BE EXAMINED SOLELY IN RELATION TO THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 30 , AS REFERRED TO BY THE FIRST QUESTION .

99. Moreover, in keeping with the settled case-law of the Court, if the trader concerned has doubts as to the correctness of the tariff classification of the goods in question he must make inquiries and seek the greatest clarification possible in order to ascertain whether or not his doubts are well founded (Case C-64/89 Deutsche Fernsprecher [1990] ECR I-2535, paragraph 22; and Case C-250/91 Hewlett Packard France [1993] ECR I-1819, paragraph 24).

59. It is settled case-law that the perception of the marks in the mind of the average consumer of the category of goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion ( Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer , paragraph 25, and Case C‑361/04 P Ruiz-Picasso and Others v OHIM [2006] ECR I-643, paragraph 38).

25 In addition, the global appreciation of the likelihood of confusion must, as regards the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in question, be based on the overall impression created by them, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components. The wording of Article 5(1)(b) of the Directive - `... there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public ...' - shows that the perception of marks in the mind of the average consumer of the category of goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global appreciation of the likelihood of confusion. The average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details (see, to that effect, SABEL, paragraph 23).

26. The objective of Directive 89/665 is to guarantee the existence of effective remedies for infringements of Community law in the field of pub lic procurement or of the national rules implementing that law, so as to ensure the effective application of the directives on the coordination of public procurement procedures. However, Directive 89/665 contains no provision specifically covering time-limits for the applications for review which it seeks to establish. It is therefore for the internal legal order of each Member State to establish such time-limits (Case C‑470/99 Universale-Bau and Others [2002] ECR I‑11617, paragraph 71).

52 The Court has held that Article 3(1) of the First Directive precludes an insurer against civil liability with respect to the use of motor vehicles from relying on statutory provisions or contractual terms in order to refuse to compensate the victims of an accident caused by the insured vehicle (judgment of 1 December 2011, Churchill Insurance Company Limited and Evans, C‑442/10, EU:C:2011:799, paragraph 33).

33. With regard to the rights granted to those third parties who have been victims of an accident, it must be borne in mind that the Court has held that Article 3(1) of the First Directive precludes an insurer from relying on statutory provisions or contractual clauses in order to refuse to compensate third parties who have been victims of an accident caused by the insured vehicle (see, to that effect, Ruiz Bernáldez , paragraph 20, Candolin and Others , paragraph 18, and Carvalho Ferreira Santos , paragraph 29).

7. According to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (see, inter alia, Case C‑143/02 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I‑2877, paragraph 11).

27. It must be observed that according to settled case-law the definition of ‘body governed by public law’, a concept of Community law which must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community, is defined in functional terms exclusively under the three cumulative conditions in the second subparagraph of Article 1(b) of Directives 93/36 and 93/37 (see, to that effect, Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria and Others , paragraphs 20 and 21; Case C-470/99 Universale-Bau and Others [2002] ECR I-11617, paragraphs 51 to 53; Case C-214/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-4667, paragraphs 52 and 53; and Case C-283/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-11697, paragraph 69).

53. The Court has therefore held that it is in the light of those objectives that the concept of "body governed by public law" in the second subparagraph of Article 1(b) of Directive 93/37 must be interpreted in functional terms (see, in particular, Commission v France , cited above, paragraph 43).

41 Those provisions, which are intended to protect tenderers against arbitrary behaviour on the part of the contracting authority, are thus designed to reinforce the existence, in all Member States, of effective remedies, so as to ensure the effective application of the EU rules on the award of public contracts, in particular where infringements can still be rectified (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 December 2002, Universale-Bau and Others, C‑470/99, EU:C:2002:746, paragraph 71; of 11 September 2014, Fastweb, C‑19/13, EU:C:2014:2194, paragraph 34, and of 12 March 2015, eVigilo, C‑538/13, EU:C:2015:166, paragraph 50).

38 In the third place, the Court has held that it is relevant that a ‘communication’, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, is of a profit-making nature (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 October 2011, Football Association Premier League and Others, C‑403/08 and C‑429/08, EU:C:2011:631, paragraph 204; 15 March 2012, SCF, C‑135/10, EU:C:2012:140, paragraph 88; and 15 March 2012, Phonographic Performance (Ireland), C‑162/10, EU:C:2012:141, paragraph 36).

88. Third, in paragraph 204 of the judgment in Football Association Premier League and Others , the Court held that it is not irrelevant that a ‘communication’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 is of a profit-making nature.

37. Furthermore, unlike workers from the Member States, Turkish nationals are not entitled to freedom of movement within the European Union but can rely only on certain rights in the territory of the host Member State alone (Case C-325/05 Derin [2007] ECR I-6495, paragraph 66).

34. The Court has also held that if, on the other hand, the applicant calls into question the merits of the decision appraising the aid as such, the mere fact that he may be regarded as ‘concerned’ within the meaning of Article 88(2) EC cannot suffice for the action to be considered admissible. He must then demonstrate that he enjoys a particular status within the meaning of the Plaumann judgment. That is the case in particular where the applicant’s market position is substantially affected by the aid which is the subject of the decision at issue (Case 169/84 Cofaz and Others v Commission [1986] ECR 391, paragraphs 22 to 25; Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum , paragraph 37; Joined Cases C‑75/05 P and C‑80/05 P Germany and Others v Kronofrance [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 40; and British Aggregates , paragraph 35).

24 IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 20 MARCH 1985 IN CASE 264/82 ( TIMEX CORPORATION V COUNCIL AND COMMISSION ( 1985 ) ECR 849 ) THE COURT POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO EXAMINE IN THAT REGARD THE PART PLAYED BY THE UNDERTAKING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS . THE COURT ACCEPTED AS EVIDENCE THAT THE MEASURE IN QUESTION WAS OF CONCERN TO THE UNDERTAKING , WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 173 OF THE EEC TREATY , THE FACT THAT THE UNDERTAKING WAS AT THE ORIGIN OF THE COMPLAINT WHICH LED TO THE OPENING OF THE INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE , THE FACT THAT ITS VIEWS WERE HEARD DURING THAT PROCEDURE AND THE FACT THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE PROCEDURE WAS LARGELY DETERMINED BY ITS OBSERVATIONS .

43 In that context, Article 106(2) TFEU aims to reconcile the Member States’ interest in using certain undertakings as an instrument of economic or social policy with the EU’s interest in ensuring compliance with the rules on competition and preserving the unity of the internal market (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 September 1999, Albany, C‑67/96, EU:C:1999:430, paragraph 103, and 20 April 2010, Federutility and Others, C‑265/08, EU:C:2010:205, paragraph 28).

17. In Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 37, the Court held that it is a principle of Community law that Member States are obliged to make good loss and damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community law for which they can be held responsible.

37 It follows from all the foregoing that it is a principle of Community law that the Member States are obliged to make good loss and damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community law for which they can be held responsible. (b) The conditions for State liability

36. As the Italian Government has observed, the Court has repeatedly stated that the legislation on games of chance is one of the areas in which there are significant moral, religious and cultural differences between the Member States. In the absence of harmonisation in the field at EU level, it is for each Member State to determine in those areas, in accordance with its own scale of values, what is required in order to ensure that the interests in question are protected (see, inter alia, judgments in Stanleybet International and Others , C‑186/11 and C‑209/11, EU:C:2013:33, paragraph 24, and Digibet and Albers , C‑156/13, EU:C:2014:1756, paragraph 24).

26 The Court observes that, according to its case-law (United Kingdom v Commission, paragraph 13), where it proves impossible to establish with certainty the extent to which a national measure which is incompatible with Community law has caused an increase in the expenditure entered under a budgetary item of the EAGGF, the Commission has no choice but to disallow all the expenditure in question.

13 MOREOVER, AS APPEARS FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 7 FEBRUARY 1979 IN JOINED CASES 15 AND 16/76, CITED ABOVE, WHERE IT PROVES IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH WITH CERTAINTY THE EXTENT TO WHICH A NATIONAL MEASURE THAT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH COMMUNITY LAW HAS CAUSED AN INCREASE IN THE EXPENDITURE ENTERED UNDER A BUDGETARY ITEM OF THE EAGGF, THE COMMISSION HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO DISALLOW ALL THE EXPENDITURE IN QUESTION .

22 As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, according to Article 96 of the VAT Directive, the same rate of VAT, that is the standard rate fixed by each Member State, is applicable to supplies of goods and services. By derogation from that principle, the possibility to apply reduced rates of VAT is provided for by virtue of Article 98 thereof. Annex III to that directive lists the categories of supplies of goods and services to which the reduced rates mentioned in Article 98 may apply (judgment of 9 March 2017, Oxycure Belgium, C‑573/15, EU:C:2017:189, paragraphs 20 and 21).

34. The Court has also previously held that a change and, in particular, a reduction in working hours when moving from full-time to part-time employment cannot reduce the right to annual leave that the worker has accumulated during the period of full-time employment (judgment in Zentralbetriebsrat der Landeskrankenhäuser Tirols, C‑486/08, EU:C:2010:215, paragraph 32, and order in Brandes , C‑415/12, EU:C:2013:398, paragraph 30).

32. It follows from the above that the taking of annual leave in a period after the reference period has no connection to the hours worked by the worker during that later period. Consequently, a change, and in particular a reduction, of working hours when moving from full-time to part-time employment cannot reduce the right to annual leave that the worker has accumulated during the period of full‑time employment.

44 In particular, care must be taken to ensure that the effectiveness of Directives 89/665 and 92/13 are not undermined (see judgments of 18 June 2002, HI, C‑92/00, EU:C:2002:379, paragraphs 58 and 59, and of 11 December 2014, Croce Amica One Italia, C‑440/14, EU:C:2014:2435, paragraph 40) or the rights conferred on individuals by EU law (judgments of 12 December 2002, Universale-Bau and Others, C‑470/99, EU:C:2002:746, paragraph 72, and of 28 January 2010, Uniplex (UK), C‑406/08, EU:C:2010:45, paragraph 49).

42. Such legislation would constitute an obstacle to the freedom to provide services guaranteed by Article 49 EC. That provision precludes the application of any national rules which have the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within a Member State (see, inter alia, Smits and Peerbooms , paragraph 61, and Schwarz and Gootjes‑Schwarz , paragraph 67 and case-law cited).

67. Such legislation constitutes an obstacle to the freedom to provide services guaranteed by Article 49 EC. That article precludes the application of any national rules which have the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within a Member State (see, for example, Case C-118/96 Safir [1998] ECR I-1897, paragraph 23; Smits and Peerbooms , paragraph 61; Danner , paragraph 29; Case C-334/02 Commission v France [2004] ECR I-2229, paragraph 23; Watts , paragraph 94; and Case C-444/05 Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25).

40. Accordingly, the Aufenthaltsgesetz/EWG, being special legislation (a lex specialis ) vis-à-vis the Ausländergesetz (a lex generalis ), prevails over the provisions of the Ausländergesetz in situations which it specifically seeks to regulate (see, with regard to Community directives, Case C-444/00 Mayer Parry Recycling [2003] ECR I-6163, paragraph 57).

61. While the reasons need not necessarily be contained in the decision itself, the competent authority may none the less, pursuant to the applicable national legislation or of its own motion, indicate in the decision the reasons on which it is based (see Mellor , paragraph 63).

63. While, as is clear from the reply to the first question, the reasons need not necessarily be contained in the determination not to carry out an EIA itself, the competent administrative authority can, under the applicable national legislation or of its own motion, indicate in the determination the reasons on which it is based.

25 It must, however, be noted that, in view of the harmful effects which the risk of dismissal may have on the physical and mental state of women who are pregnant, have recently given birth or are breastfeeding, including the particularly serious risk that pregnant women may be prompted voluntarily to terminate their pregnancy, the Community legislature subsequently provided, pursuant to Article 10 of Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (OJ 1992 L 348, p. 1), for special protection to be given to women, by prohibiting dismissal during the period from the beginning of their pregnancy to the end of their maternity leave, save in exceptional cases unconnected with their condition (Case C-32/93 Webb v EMO Air Cargo [1994] ECR I-3567, paragraphs 21 and 22). It is clear from the objective of that provision that absence during the protected period, other than for reasons unconnected with the employee's condition, can no longer be taken into account as grounds for subsequent dismissal. However, the period within which Directive 92/85 was to be transposed had not yet expired when Ms Larsson was dismissed.

30. The Italian Government having, on various occasions, stressed that it is clear from national case‑law that agreements such as the agreements at issue must be classified as service concessions, it must be noted as a preliminary point that the definition of a public service contract is a matter of Community law, with the result that the classification of the agreements at issue under Italian law is irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether they fall within the scope of Directive 92/50 (see, to that effect, Case C‑264/03 Commission v France [2005] ECR I‑8831, paragraph 36, and Case C‑220/05 Auroux and Others [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 40).

36. In order to establish whether the agency agreement of delegated project contracting within the meaning of Law No 85‑704 falls within the scope of Directive 92/50, it is necessary to examine whether the criteria established in Article 1(a) of that directive are met. Since that provision makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope, there is no need to inquire as to how French law categorises such agreements.

27. À cet égard, il découle de la jurisprudence constante de la Cour que, aux fins de l’application des dispositions du droit de l’Union en matière de concurrence, est une entreprise toute entité exerçant une activité économique, indépendamment du statut juridique de cette entité et de son mode de financement (voir arrêt du 23 avril 1991, Höfner et Elser, C‑41/90, Rec. p. I‑1979, point 21). Constitue une activité économique toute activité consistant à offrir des biens ou des services sur un marché donné (voir arrêt du 25 octobre 2001, Ambulanz Glöckner, C‑475/99, Rec. p. I‑8089, point 19). En revanche, ne présentent pas de caractère économique, justifiant l’application des règles de concurrence prévues par le traité, les activités qui se rattachent à l’exercice de prérogatives de puissance publique (voir arrêt du 12 juillet 2012, Compass-Datenbank, C‑138/11, point 36).

66 It should be added that in any event the Court has held that in the absence of Community rules governing a matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from the direct effect of Community law, it being understood that such rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions nor render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (see, in particular, Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989, at paragraph 5; Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, at paragraphs 12 to 16, and Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I-4599, at paragraph 12).

13 CONSEQUENTLY , IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY RELEVANT COMMUNITY RULES , IT IS FOR THE NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER OF EACH MEMBER STATE TO DESIGNATE THE COMPETENT COURTS AND TO LAY DOWN THE PROCEDURAL RULES FOR PROCEEDINGS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS WHICH INDIVIDUALS ACQUIRE THROUGH THE DIRECT EFFECT OF COMMUNITY LAW , PROVIDED THAT SUCH RULES ARE NOT LESS FAVOURABLE THAN THOSE GOVERNING THE SAME RIGHT OF ACTION ON AN INTERNAL MATTER .

25. As regards marks made up of signs or indications that are also used as advertising slogans, indications of quality or incitements to purchase the goods or services covered by those marks, registration of such marks is not excluded by virtue of such use ( OHIM v Erpo Möbelwerk , paragraph 41, and Audi v OHIM , paragraph 35). As regards the assessment of the distinctive character of such marks, it is inappropriate to apply to slogans criteria which are stricter than those applicable to other types of sign ( OHIM v Erpo Möbelwerk , paragraph 32, and Audi v OHIM , paragraph 36).

37. The Court has defined further the distinction between activities of private bodies constituting simple preparatory tasks and those constituting a direct and specific connection with the exercise of official authority by finding that, even where private bodies exercise the powers of a public authority, drawing the conclusions from the inspections which they carry out, Article 45 EC cannot be relied on where the applicable legislation lays down that those private bodies are to be supervised by the public authority (see, to that effect, Commission v Austria , paragraph 41, and Commission v Germany , paragraph 43). The Court has found that private bodies carrying out their activities under the active supervision of the competent public authority, responsible, ultimately, for inspections and decisions of those bodies, cannot be considered to be ‘connected directly and specifically with the exercise of official authority’ within the meaning of Article 45 EC ( Commission v Austria , paragraph 42, and Commission v Germany , paragraph 44).

42. It is therefore apparent that private bodies carry out their activities under the active supervision of the competent public authority which, in the final analysis, is responsible for the inspections and decisions of those bodies, as is demonstrated by that authority’s obligations noted in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment. That conclusion is also supported by the system of supervision of private bodies put in place by the Law of 1975 on Foodstuffs, which provides that it is the Landeshauptmänner, as the supervisory authorities, who adopt the measures referred to in Article 9(9)(b) of Regulation No 2092/91, since private bodies have, in that field, only the power to propose such measures. It follows that the auxiliary and preparatory role devolved on private bodies by that regulation vis-à-vis the supervisory authority cannot be regarded as being directly and specifically connected with the exercise of official authority, within the meaning of Article 55 EC, read in conjunction with the first paragraph of Article 45 EC.

48. As regards, next, the principle of effectiveness, it must be recalled that, from the point of view of the analysis required by the case-law cited at paragraph 38 above, the question whether a national procedural provision renders the exercise of an individual’s rights under the European Union legal order impossible in practice or excessively difficult must be assessed taking into consideration, as appropriate, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system concerned, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings (see inter alia, to that effect, Peterbroeck , paragraph 14, and Pontin , paragraph 47).

30. Therefore, Member States can, in accordance with Article 273, first paragraph, of Directive 2006/112, legitimately take measures that are necessary to prevent the misuse of identification numbers, in particular by undertakings whose activity, and consequently their status as taxable persons, is purely fictitious. However, these measures must not go beyond what is necessary for the correct collection of the tax and the prevention of evasion, and they must not systematically undermine the right to deduct VAT, and hence the neutrality of that tax (see, to that effect, Case C-146/05 Collée [2007] ECR I-7861, paragraph 26; Nidera Handelscompagnie , paragraph 49; Dankowski , paragraph 37; and VSTR , paragraph 44).

49. In addition, the Court has previously held that the measures which the Member States may adopt under Article 273 of Directive 2006/112 in order to ensure the correct levying and collection of the tax and for the prevention of fraud must not go further than is necessary to attain such objectives and must not undermine the neutrality of VAT (see, by analogy, Case C‑146/05 Collée [2007] ECR I-7861, paragraph 26 and case-law cited).

34. As regards the criteria for assessment, the Court has held that, where the first person acquiring the goods has obtained the right to dispose of the goods as owner in the Member State of the first supply, expresses his intention to transport those goods to another Member State and presents his VAT identification number attributed by that other State, the intra-Community transport should be ascribed to the first supply, on condition that the right to dispose of the goods as owner has been transferred to the second person acquiring the goods in the Member State of destination of the intra-Community transport (see Euro Tyre Holding , paragraphs 44 and 45).

26 It is also clear from the case-law of the Court that for the principle concerning the offsetting of the burden to apply, the taxed product and the domestic product benefiting from it must be the same (Case 77/76 Cucchi v Avez [1977] ECR 987, paragraph 19, and Case 105/76 Interzuccheri v Rezzano e Cavassa [1977] ECR 1029, paragraph 12).

12 IT FOLLOWS FROM THE FOREGOING THAT THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION MUST BE THAT A DUTY FALLING WITHIN A GENERAL SYSTEM OF INTERNAL TAXATION APPLYING TO DOMESTIC PRODUCTS AS WELL AS TO IMPORTED PRODUCTS ACCORDING TO THE SAME CRITERIA CAN CONSTITUTE A CHARGE HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO A CUSTOMS DUTY ON IMPORTS ONLY IF IT HAS THE SOLE PURPOSE OF FINANCING ACTIVITIES FOR THE SPECIFIC ADVANTAGE OF THE TAXED DOMESTIC PRODUCT ; IF THE TAXED PRODUCT AND THE DOMESTIC PRODUCT BENEFITING FROM IT ARE THE SAME ; AND IF THE CHARGES IMPOSED ON THE DOMESTIC PRODUCT ARE MADE GOOD IN FULL .

22 From that point of view, the essential function of the trade mark is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked goods or service to the consumer or end user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the goods or service from others which have another origin (see, inter alia, Case C-39/97 Canon [1998] ECR I-5507, paragraph 28).

15 As the Court has held, Regulation No 123/85, as a regulation applying Article 85(3) of the Treaty, does not lay down any mandatory provisions directly affecting the validity or the content of contractual provisions or oblige the contracting parties to adapt the content of their agreement but merely is limited to providing economic agents in the motor vehicle industry with certain possibilities enabling them to remove their distribution and servicing agreements from the scope of the prohibition contained in Article 85(1) despite the inclusion in those agreements of certain types of exclusivity and no-competition clauses (Case 10/86 VAG France [1986] ECR 4071, paragraphs 12 and 16).

16 THE REPLY TO THE QUESTION PUT TO THE COURT BY THE TRIBUNAL DE GRANDE INSTANCE , PARIS , MUST THEREFORE BE THAT COMMISSION REGULATION ( EEC ) NO 123/85 OF 12 DECEMBER 1984 ON THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 85 ( 3 ) OF THE TREATY TO CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF MOTOR VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION AND SERVICING AGREEMENTS ( OFFICIAL JOURNAL L 15 , P . 16 ) DOES NOT LAY DOWN ANY MANDATORY PROVISIONS DIRECTLY AFFECTING THE VALIDITY OR THE CONTENT OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS OR OBLIGE THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO ADAPT THE CONTENT OF THEIR AGREEMENT BUT MERELY LAYS DOWN CONDITIONS WHICH , IF THEY ARE SATISFIED , EXCLUDE CERTAIN CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS FROM THE PROHIBITION AND CONSEQUENTLY FROM THE AUTOMATIC NULLITY PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 85 ( 1 ) AND ( 2 ) OF THE EEC TREATY AND THAT IT IS FOR THE NATIONAL COURT , IN THE EVENT THAT CERTAIN CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS ARE VOID , TO DETERMINE THE CONSEQUENCES THEREOF IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT NATIONAL LAW .

19 In that regard, it is necessary to state at the outset that, in accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, which are based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, the national court alone has jurisdiction to find and assess the facts in the case before it and to interpret and apply national law. Similarly, it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the judicial decision to be made, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for and the relevance of the questions that it submits to the Court. Consequently, where questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is bound, in principle, to give a ruling (judgment of 26 January 2017, Banco Primus, C‑421/14, EU:C:2017:60, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

50. In order to determine whether such is the case in the main proceedings, it must be observed that it is clear from the case-law, first, that although Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention does not require the conclusion of a contract, the identification of an obligation is none the less essential for the application of that provision, since the jurisdiction of the national court is determined in matters relating to a contract by the place of performance of the obligation in question (see judgment in Tacconi , paragraph 22). Second, the Court has held on several occasions that the definition of matters relating to contract within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention is not to be understood as covering a situation in which there is no obligation freely assumed by one party towards another (Case C-26/91 Handte [1992] ECR I-3967, paragraph 15; Réunion européenne and Others , paragraph 17; Tacconi , paragraph 23; and Case C-265/02 Frahuil [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24).

23 Furthermore, it should be noted that, according to the Court's case-law, the expression `matters relating to contract' within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention is not to be understood as covering a situation in which there is no obligation freely assumed by one party towards another (Handte, paragraph 15, and Réunion Européenne and Others, paragraph 17).

50. Secondly, the reduction in the amount of ‘livestock’ aid or the withdrawal of that aid constitutes an administrative penalty within the meaning of Article 2(2) of Regulation No 2998/95 (see, to that effect, National Farmers’ Union and Others , cited above, paragraph 40, and Schilling and Nehring , cited above, paragraphs 26 and 27).

50 Second, the national rules on set-off must not make set-off between an amount due to the beneficiary of aid under a Community measure and an outstanding debt to the Member State subject to less favourable conditions or procedures than those applicable to set-off between claims of purely domestic origin (see, mutatis mutandis, Case 33/76 Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5, Case 45/76 Comet v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043, paragraph 13, and Case 54/81 Fromme v BALM [1982] ECR 1449, paragraph 6).

5 THE PROHIBITION LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 13 OF THE TREATY AND THAT LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 13 OF REGULATION NO 159/66/EEC HAVE A DIRECT EFFECT AND CONFER ON CITIZENS RIGHTS WHICH THE NATIONAL COURTS ARE REQUIRED TO PROTECT . APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF COOPERATION LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 5 OF THE TREATY , IT IS THE NATIONAL COURTS WHICH ARE ENTRUSTED WITH ENSURING THE LEGAL PROTECTION WHICH CITIZENS DERIVE FROM THE DIRECT EFFECT OF THE PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW . ACCORDINGLY , IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMUNITY RULES ON THIS SUBJECT , IT IS FOR THE DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEM OF EACH MEMBER STATE TO DESIGNATE THE COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION AND TO DETERMINE THE PROCEDURAL CONDITIONS GOVERNING ACTIONS AT LAW INTENDED TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS WHICH CITIZENS HAVE FROM THE DIRECT EFFECT OF COMMUNITY LAW , IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH CONDITIONS CANNOT BE LESS FAVOURABLE THAN THOSE RELATING TO SIMILAR ACTIONS OF A DOMESTIC NATURE . WHERE NECESSARY , ARTICLES 100 TO 102 AND 235 OF THE TREATY ENABLE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO REMEDY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PROVISIONS LAID DOWN BY LAW , REGULATION OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN MEMBER STATES IF THEY ARE LIKELY TO DISTORT OR HARM THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMON MARKET . IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH MEASURES OF HARMONIZATION THE RIGHT CONFERRED BY COMMUNITY LAW MUST BE EXERCISED BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN BY NATIONAL RULES . THE POSITION WOULD BE DIFFERENT ONLY IF THE CONDITIONS AND TIME-LIMITS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE IN PRACTICE TO EXERCISE THE RIGHTS WHICH THE NATIONAL COURTS ARE OBLIGED TO PROTECT . THIS IS NOT THE CASE WHERE REASONABLE PERIODS OF LIMITATION OF ACTIONS ARE FIXED . THE LAYING DOWN OF SUCH TIME-LIMITS WITH REGARD TO ACTIONS OF A FISCAL NATURE IS AN APPLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY PROTECTING BOTH THE TAX-PAYER AND THE ADMINISTRATION CONCERNED .

17. The provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement for persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by Community nationals of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the Community, and preclude measures which might place Community nationals at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of another Member State (see Case C-464/02 Commission v Denmark [2005] ECR I-7929, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

29 In particular, a Member State may not make the provision of services in its territory subject to compliance with all the conditions required for establishment and thereby deprive the provisions of the Treaty whose object is, precisely, to guarantee the freedom to provide services, of all practical effect (see Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221, paragraph 13, and Mazzoleni and ISA, cited above, paragraph 23).

23 In particular, a Member State may not make the provision of services in its territory subject to compliance with all the conditions required for establishment and thereby deprive of all practical effectiveness the provisions of the Treaty whose object is, precisely, to guarantee the freedom to provide services (see Säger, paragraph 13).

18 It follows that in the event of the transfer of an undertaking the contract of employment or employment relationship between the staff employed by the undertaking transferred may not be maintained with the transferor and is automatically continued with the transferee (Case C-362/89 D' Urso and Others v Ercole Marelli Elettromecanica Generale and Others [1991] ECR I-4105, paragraph 12). The Court concluded that the contracts of employment and employment relationships existing on the date of the transfer of an undertaking between the transferor and the workers employed in the undertaking transferred are automatically transferred to the transferee by the mere fact of the transfer (D' Urso, paragraph 20).

42 In the fourth place, in order to determine the gravity of an infringement, regard must be had to a large number of factors, the nature and importance of which vary according to the type of infringement in question and the particular circumstances of the case. Those factors may, depending on the circumstances, include the conduct of each of the undertakings, the role played by each of them in the establishment of the cartel, the volume and value of the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed and the size and economic power of the undertaking and, consequently, the influence which the undertaking was able to exert on the market (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 June 1983, Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission, 100/80 to 103/80, EU:C:1983:158, paragraph 120; of 9 November 1983, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin v Commission, 322/81, EU:C:1983:313, paragraph 111; and of 11 July 2013, Gosselin Group v Commission, C‑429/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:463, paragraphs 89 and 90).

90. Figurent parmi les éléments de nature à entrer dans l’appréciation de la gravité des infractions le comportement de chacune des entreprises, le rôle joué par chacune d’elles dans l’établissement de l’entente, le profit qu’elles ont pu tirer de celui-ci, leur taille et la valeur des marchandises concernées ainsi que le risque que des infractions de ce type représentent pour les objectifs de l’Union (arrêts précités Musique Diffusion française e.a./Commission, point 129, ainsi que Dansk Rørindustri e.a./Commission, point 242).

39. Third, the contribution in question is a ‘provision of services by a member’. It is true that that contribution was paid not by a member of Senior GmbH (Senior BV) but by the parent company of the latter (Senior Limited), and thus by a member of a member. However, it must be borne in mind that the Court has adopted, with regard to the origin of contributions, an informal approach based on the real appropriation of the contribution (see, to that effect, Weber Haus , paragraphs 11 and 13; ESTAG , paragraphs 37 to 39 and 41; and Case C-71/00 Develop [2002] ECR I-8877, paragraphs 25 to 29). As the contribution in question was paid by the grandparent company (Senior Limited) to the sub-subsidiary (Senior GmbH) in order to increase the value of the shares in the latter, and as that increase was primarily in the interests of its sole member, namely Senior BV, it must be held that that contribution must be attributed to the latter, that is to say Senior BV. It is therefore a ‘provision of services by a member’ within the meaning of Article 4(2)(b) of Directive 69/335.

41. In that regard, regard should be had to the settled case-law, according to which the expressions which define taxable transactions for the purposes of the common system of VAT are objective in nature and apply without regard to the purpose or results of the transactions concerned (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑354/03, C-355/03 and C‑484/03 Optigen and Others [2006] ECR I‑483, paragraph 44, and Joined Cases C‑439/04 and C‑440/04 Kittel and Recolta Recycling [2006] ECR I‑6161, paragraph 41). Consequently, it is necessary that the classification of intra-Community supplies and acquisitions be made on the basis of objective matters, such as the physical movement of the goods concerned between Member States ( Teleos and Others , paragraph 40).

41. In fact, an analysis of the definitions of ‘supply of goods effected by a taxable person acting as such’ and ‘economic activities’ shows that those terms, which define taxable transactions for the purposes of the Sixth Directive, are objective in nature and apply without regard to the purpose or results of the transactions concerned (see, to that effect, Optigen , paragraphs 43 and 44).

61THE POWER TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT RULES FOR FISHING BELONGS THEREFORE TO THE COMMUNITY AS SUCH AND , ACCORDING TO THE SETTLED CASE-LAW OF THE COURT , AS EXPRESSED IN PARTICULAR IN PARAGRAPH 31 OF THE DECISION IN THE JUDGMENT OF 31 MARCH 1971 IN CASE 22/70 , COMMISSION V COUNCIL ( 1971 ) ECR 263 , THIS POWER IS AN EXCLUSIVE ONE .

54 It follows from the judgment in Case C-250/91 Hewlett Packard France [1993] ECR I-1819, paragraph 46, that Article 13 of Regulation No 1430/79 and Article 5(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1697/79 of 24 July 1979 on the post-clearance recovery of import duties or export duties which have not been required of the person liable for payment on goods entered for a customs procedure involving the obligation to pay such duties (OJ 1979 L 197, p. 1), pursue the same aim, namely to limit the post-clearance payment of import and export duties to cases where such payment is justified and is compatible with a fundamental principle such as that of the protection of legitimate expectations. It follows that the conditions to which the application of those articles is made subject, that is to say that no negligence or deception may be attributed to the person concerned in the case of Article 13 of Regulation No 1430/79 and that no error has been made by the customs authorities which could reasonably have been detected by the person liable in the case of Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1697/79, must be interpreted in the same manner.

46 That determination must, however, take account of the fact that Article 13 of Regulation No 1430/79 and Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1679/79 pursue the same aim, namely to limit the post-clearance payment of import and export duties to cases where such payment is justified and is compatible with a fundamental principle such as that of the protection of legitimate expectations. Seen in that light, the question whether the error was detectable, within the meaning of Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1679/79, is linked to the existence of obvious negligence or deception within the meaning of Article 13 of Regulation No 1430/79, and therefore the conditions laid down by the latter provision must be assessed in the light of those laid down in Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1679/79.

34. Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 1610/96 refers to a MA granted ‘in accordance with Article 4 of Directive 91/414’. It is true that, it has been held that there is no need to interpret that provision of that regulation in a manner which would have the effect of excluding from the application of that provision products which have been granted a provisional MA under Article 8(1) of Directive 91/414 ( Hogan Lovells International , paragraph 46).

46. A restriction on capital movements consisting of a less favourable tax treatment of foreign-sourced dividends is covered by the concept of ‘direct investment’ under Article 57(1) EC in so far as it relates to investments of any kind undertaken by natural or legal persons and which serve to establish or maintain lasting and direct links between the persons providing the capital and the undertakings to which that capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity (see, to that effect, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraphs 179 to 181; Case C-157/05 Holböck [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 33 and 34; and Case C-112/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraph 18).

179. It is settled case-law that, inasmuch as Article 56 EC substantially reproduced the content of Article 1 of Directive 88/361, and even if the latter was adopted on the basis of Articles 69 and 70(1) of the EEC Treaty (Articles 67 to 73 of the EEC Treaty were replaced by Articles 73b to 73g of the EC Treaty, now Articles 56 EC to 60 EC), that nomenclature retains the same indicative value, for the purposes of defining the term ‘movement of capital’, as it did before their entry into force, subject to the qualification, contained in the introduction to the nomenclature, that the list set out therein is not exhaustive (see, inter alia, Case C-222/97 Trummer and Mayer [1999] ECR I‑1661, paragraph 21, and Case C-513/03 Van Hilten-van der Heijden [2006] ECR I-1957, paragraph 39).

21 It should be noted in this regard that a reasoned opinion must contain a coherent and detailed statement of the reasons which led the Commission to conclude that the State in question has failed to fulfil its obligations under Community law (see, inter alia, Case C-279/94 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-4743, paragraph 15).

58 That is why the joint and several liability as between two companies constituting an economic unit cannot be reduced, as regards the payment of the fine, to a type of security provided by the parent company in order to guarantee payment of the fine imposed on the subsidiary (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 November 2013, Kendrion v Commission, C‑50/12 P, EU:C:2013:771, paragraphs 55 and 56, and of 19 June 2014, FLS Plast v Commission, C‑243/12 P, EU:C:2014:2006, paragraph 107).

56. Il s’ensuit que, en ce qui concerne le paiement de l’amende, le rapport de solidarité qui existe entre deux sociétés constituant une telle entité économique ne saurait se réduire à une forme de caution fournie par la société mère pour garantir le paiement de l’amende infligée à la filiale.

50 Finally, it should be noted that, in so far as the Charter contains rights corresponding to the rights guaranteed by the ECHR, Article 52(3) of the Charter seeks to ensure the necessary consistency between the rights contained in it and the corresponding rights guaranteed by the ECHR, without thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of EU law and that of the Court of Justice of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 July 2016, JZ, C‑294/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:610, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). Account must therefore be taken of Article 5(1) of the ECHR for the purpose of interpreting Article 6 of the Charter. By adopting the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of Directive 2013/33, the EU legislature did not disregard the level of protection afforded by the second limb of Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR.