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37 The Court has accordingly held that, since, under a principle of international law, a Member State cannot refuse its own nationals the right to enter its territory and remain there and since those nationals thus enjoy an unconditional right of residence there, Directive 2004/38 is not intended to govern the residence of a Union citizen in the Member State of which he is a national. Consequently, in view of the case-law referred to in paragraph 32 of this judgment, nor is the directive intended to confer, in the territory of that Member State, a derived right of residence on family members of that citizen who are third-country nationals (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 May 2011, McCarthy, C‑434/09, EU:C:2011:277, paragraphs 29, 34 and 42, and of 12 March 2014, O. and B., C‑456/12, EU:C:2014:135, paragraphs 42 and 43).

42. Since, under a principle of international law, a State cannot refuse its own nationals the right to enter its territory and remain there, Directive 2004/38 is intended only to govern the conditions of entry and residence of a Union citizen in a Member State other than the Member State of which he is a national (see McCarthy , paragraph 29).

99. Moreover, in keeping with the settled case-law of the Court, if the trader concerned has doubts as to the correctness of the tariff classification of the goods in question he must make inquiries and seek the greatest clarification possible in order to ascertain whether or not his doubts are well founded (Case C-64/89 Deutsche Fernsprecher [1990] ECR I-2535, paragraph 22; and Case C-250/91 Hewlett Packard France [1993] ECR I-1819, paragraph 24).

43 In any event, identification of the objectives in fact pursued by the national legislation falls within the jurisdiction of the referring court (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 January 2016, Laezza, C‑375/14, EU:C:2016:60, paragraph 35).

35 In any event, the identification of the objectives in fact pursued by the national legislation is within the jurisdiction of the referring court (see, to that effect, judgment in Pfleger and Others, C‑390/12, EU:C:2014:281, paragraph 47).

72. Thus, following the assessment of the implications undertaken pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive and in the event of a negative assessment, the competent authorities have the choice of either refusing authorisation for the plan or project or of granting authorisation under Article 6(4) of that directive, provided that the conditions laid down in that provision are satisfied (see Case C‑239/04 Commission v Portugal [2006] ECR I‑10183, paragraph 25, and, to that effect, Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging , paragraphs 57 and 60).

50. By contrast, in order to ensure observance of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, the substantive rules of EU law must be interpreted as applying to situations existing before their entry into force only in so far as it clearly follows from their terms, their objectives or their general scheme that such effect must be given to them (judgments in Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer , C‑162/00, EU:C:2002:57, paragraph 49, and Commission v Freistaat Sachsen , C‑334/07 P, EU:C:2008:709, paragraph 44).

43. According to settled case-law, new rules apply, as a matter of principle, immediately to the future effects of a situation which arose under the old rule (see to that effect, inter alia, Case 68/69 Brock [1970] ECR 171, paragraph 7, and Case 270/84 Licata v ESC [1986] ECR 2305, paragraph 31). The Court has also held that the principle of legitimate expectations cannot be extended to the point of generally preventing a new rule from applying to the future effects of situations which arose under the earlier rule (see, inter alia, Case 278/84 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 1, paragraph 36, and Case 203/86 Spain v Council [1988] ECR 4563, paragraph 19).

34. According to the Court’s settled case-law, where they adopt measures which fall within the scope of Directive 2000/78, which gives specific expression, in the domain of employment and occupation, to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, the social partners must respect the directive (Case C-447/09 Prigge and Others [2011] ECR I-8003, paragraph 48, and Case C-132/11 Tyrolean Airways Tiroler Luftfahrt [2012] ECR, paragraph 22).

13 Consideration classified as pay includes, inter alia, consideration paid by the employer by virtue of legislative provisions and under a contract of employment whose purpose is to ensure that workers receive income even where, in certain cases specified by the legislature, they are not performing any work provided for in their contracts of employment (Case C-360/90 Bötel [1992] ECR I-3589, paragraphs 14 and 15; see also Case C-33/89 Kowalska [1990] ECR I-2591, paragraph 11, and Case C-262/88 Barber [1990] ECR I-1889, paragraph 12, and Gillespie, cited above, paragraph 13).

14 Although compensation such as that at issue in the main proceedings does not derive as such from the contract of employment, it is nevertheless paid by the employer by virtue of legislative provisions and under a contract of employment. Staff council members are necessarily employees of the undertaking and are entrusted with the task of safeguarding staff interests, thus promoting harmonious working relationships within the undertaking, which is in its interests.

22 In that case, the Court held that pensions provided under a scheme such as the French retirement scheme for civil servants fall within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty.

47. In paragraphs 21 to 24 of the judgment in Case C‑7/94 Gaal [1995] ECR I‑1031, the Court rejected the argument that there was a close relationship between Articles 10 and 11 of Regulation No 1612/68 on the one hand and Article 12 of that regulation on the other, so that Article 12 granted the right of equal treatment in access to education in the host Member State only to children who satisfied the conditions set out in Articles 10 and 11. In paragraph 23 of Gaal , the Court expressly stated that Article 12 contains no reference to Articles 10 and 11.

21 The German Government submitted that the close relationship between Article 10 and 11 of the Regulation, on the one hand, and Article 12, on the other, implies that Article 12 only grants that right to children who meet the conditions set out in Articles 10 and 11.

28. It must be borne in mind in that regard that when a question on the validity of a measure adopted by the European Union institutions is raised before a national court, it is for that court to decide whether a decision on the matter is necessary to enable it to give judgment and consequently whether it should request the Court to rule on that question. Accordingly, where the national court’s questions relate to the validity of a provision of EU law, the Court is obliged in principle to give a ruling (Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical [2010] ECR I-7027, paragraph 13 and the case-law cited).

37. Moreover, neither the method of treatment reserved for a substance nor the use to which that substance is put determines conclusively whether or not it is to be classified as waste (see ARCO Chemie Nederland and Others , paragraph 64, and Case C‑176/05 KVZ retec [2007] ECR I‑1721, paragraph 52).

52. The method of treatment or use of a substance does not determine conclusively whether or not it is to be classified as waste. What subsequently happens to an object or a substance does not affect its nature as waste, which, in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442, is defined in terms of the holder discarding it or intending or being required to discard it ( ARCO Chemie Nederland and Others , paragraph 64).

28 Specifically, the less favourable treatment by a Member State of dividends paid to non-resident pension funds, compared to the treatment of dividends paid to resident pension funds, is liable to deter companies established in a Member State other than that first Member State from pursuing investments in that same first Member State and, consequently, amounts to a restriction of the free movement of capital, prohibited, in principle, under Article 63 TFEU (see judgment of 8 November 2012 in Commission v Finland, C‑342/10, EU:C:2012:688, paragraph 33, and 22 November 2012 in Commission v Germany, C‑600/10, not published, EU:C:2012:737, paragraph 15).

18 It should be noted, as a preliminary point, that Article 43 of the VAT Directive contains a general rule for determining the place where services are supplied for tax purposes, while Article 44 et seq. of the directive provide a number of specific instances of such places. As follows from settled case-law of the Court on the essentially identical provisions of Article 9 of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1), Article 43 of the VAT Directive does not take precedence over Article 44 et seq. of the directive. In every situation, the question which arises is whether that situation corresponds to one of the cases mentioned in Article 44 et seq. of the directive. If not, it falls within the scope of Article 43 of the directive (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 26 September 1996, Dudda, C‑327/94, EU:C:1996:355, paragraphs 20 and 21, and 6 November 2008, Kollektivavtalsstiftelsen TRR Trygghetsrådet, C‑291/07, EU:C:2008:609, paragraphs 24 and 25).

24. It should also be borne in mind that Article 9 of the Sixth Directive contains rules for determining the place where services are deemed to be supplied for VAT purposes. Whereas Article 9(1) lays down a general rule in that regard, Article 9(2) sets out a number of specific instances of places where certain services are deemed to be supplied. The object of those provisions is to avoid, first, conflicts of jurisdiction which may result in double taxation, and, secondly, non-taxation (see Case 168/84 Berkholz [1985] ECR 2251, paragraph 14; Case C‑327/94 Dudda [1996] ECR I‑4595, paragraph 20; Case C‑167/95 Linthorst, Pouwels en Scheres [1997] ECR I‑1195, paragraph 10; Case C‑452/03 RAL (Channel Islands) and Others [2005] ECR I‑3947, paragraph 23; and Case C‑114/05 Gillan Beach [2006] ECR I‑2427, paragraph 14).

36. In that regard, Article 308 EC may be used as the legal basis for a measure only where no other provision of the Treaty gives the Community institutions the necessary power to adopt it (Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493, paragraph 13, and Case C-350/92 Spain v Council [1995] ECR I-1985, paragraph 26).

37 In the second place, the Framework Decision is founded on the principle that decisions relating to European arrest warrants are attended by all the guarantees appropriate for decisions of such a kind, inter alia those resulting from the fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles referred to in Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision. This means that not only the decision on executing European arrest warrants, but also the decision on issuing such a warrant, must be taken by a judicial authority, such that the entire surrender procedure between Member States provided for by the Framework Decision is carried out under judicial supervision (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 May 2013, F., C‑168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, paragraphs 39, 45 and 46).

39. In the first place, the Framework Decision itself ensures that decisions relating to European arrest warrants are attended by all the guarantees appropriate for decisions of such a kind.

13 It must next be noted that, in its judgment in Case C-305/88 Lancray [1990] ECR I-2725, paragraph 18, the Court held that due service and service in sufficient time constituted two separate and concurrent safeguards for a defendant who fails to appear. The absence of one of those safeguards is therefore a sufficient ground for refusing to recognize a foreign judgment.

42 Thirdly, as regards consideration of the first question in the light of the principle of effectiveness, it should be recalled that the Court has stated that it is compatible with EU law to lay down reasonable time limits for bringing proceedings in the interests of legal certainty which protects both the taxpayer and the authorities concerned. Such periods are not by their nature liable to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU law, even if the expiry of those periods necessarily entails the dismissal, in whole or in part, of the action brought (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 July 1997, Haahr Petroleum, C‑90/94, EU:C:1997:368, paragraph 48, and of 8 September 2011, Q-Beef and Bosschaert, C‑89/10 and C‑96/10, EU:C:2011:555, paragraph 36). In that context, a national limitation period of three years appears to be reasonable (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 2002, Marks & Spencer, C‑62/00, EU:C:2002:435, paragraph 35, and of 15 April 2010, Barth, C‑542/08, EU:C:2010:193, paragraph 28.)

48 It is apparent from the case-law, in particular from the Rewe and Comet judgments, that the laying down of reasonable limitation periods, which is an application of the fundamental principle of legal certainty, satisfies the two conditions referred to above and, in particular, cannot be regarded as rendering virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law, even if the expiry of those periods necessarily entails the dismissal, in whole or in part, of the action brought.

18. According to settled case-law, the procedure established in Article 234 EC rests on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court of Justice, with the result that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (see Case C‑448/01 EVN and Wienstrom [2003] ECR I‑14527, paragraph 74, and Case C‑145/03 Keller [2005] ECR I‑2529, paragraph 33).

19. While in the present state of Community law direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States, the latter must none the less exercise that competence in accordance with Community law, in particular the provisions of the Treaty concerning the right of every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, and therefore avoid any overt or covert discrimination on the basis of nationality (see, to that effect, Case C‑279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I‑225, paragraphs 21 and 26, and Case C‑385/00 De Groot [2002] ECR I‑11819, paragraph 75).

21 Although, as Community law stands at present, direct taxation does not as such fall within the purview of the Community, the powers retained by the Member States must nevertheless be exercised consistently with Community law (see the judgment in Case C-246/89 Commission v United Kingdom [1991] ECR I-4585, paragraph 12).

39 Consequently, the Court has held that legislation which attaches the same effects to regularisation permission, which can be issued even where no exceptional circumstances are proved, as those attached to prior planning consent fails to have regard for the requirements of Directive 85/337 (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 July 2008, Commission v Ireland, C‑215/06, EU:C:2008:380, paragraph 61, and of 17 November 2016, Stadt Wiener Neustadt, C‑348/15, EU:C:2016:882, paragraph 37).

22 It should be borne in mind that it is not for the Court of Justice but for the national court to ascertain the facts which have given rise to the dispute and to establish the consequences which they have for the judgment which it is required to deliver (see, for example, Case C-435/97 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Others v Autonome Provinz Bozen and Others [1999] ECR I-5613, paragraph 32). Similarly, it is not for the Court to assess whether questions referred to it by the national court are relevant (see, for example, Case C-347/89 Freistaat Bayern v Eurim-Pharm [1991] ECR I-1747, paragraph 16).

16 The Bundesverwaltungsgericht held, as has already been mentioned, that medicinal products not provided with packaging and a package leaflet satisfying the requirements of the AMG were nevertheless "finished medicinal products" subject to the authorization provided for in Paragraph 73 and that, in the case of such medicinal products, neither that authorization nor a certificate to the effect that authorization had been obtained could be lawfully issued. However, as the Court has consistently held, in proceedings under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, it may not rule on the interpretation of national laws or regulations (Case 16/83 Prantl [1984] ECR 1299 and Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435) or assess whether questions referred to it by a national court are relevant (see, in particular, Case 52/77 Cayrol v Rivoira [1977] ECR 2261).

30 It should be noted here, first, that the provisions concerning the disputed maternity allowance confer on recipients a legally defined right, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs (see the Hughes judgment), and, secondly, that maternity benefits are expressly mentioned in Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71.

210. It is, in principle, for the national courts to apply the criteria for establishing the liability of Member States for damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community law ( Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame , paragraph 58, and Köbler , paragraph 100), in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Court for the application of those criteria ( Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame , paragraphs 55 to 57; Case C-392/93 British Telecommunications [1996] ECR I‑1631, paragraph 41; Denkavit and Others , paragraph 49; and Konle , paragraph 58).

58 It is clear from the case-law of the Court that it is, in principle, for the national courts to apply the criteria to establish the liability of Member States for damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community law (Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029, paragraph 58), in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Court for the application of those criteria (Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, paragraphs 55 to 57; Case C-392/93 The Queen v H.M. Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications [1996] ECR I-1631; Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others v Federal Republic of Germany [1996] ECR I-4845; and Joined Cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94 Denkavit Internationaal and Others v Bundesamt für Finanzen [1996] ECR I-5063).

66. According to the settled case-law of the Court, an aid measure which is put into effect in infringement of the obligations arising from Article 108(3) TFEU is unlawful (judgment in Distribution Casino France and Others , C‑266/04 to C‑270/04, C‑276/04 and C‑321/04 to C‑325/04, EU:C:2005:657, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

35. By contrast, the Netherlands Government and the Commission take the view that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Commission was not obliged to grant such authorisation. They point out that, contrary to what the Hoge Raad suggests, the matter was put before the Standing Veterinary Committee during its meeting on 7 and 8 March 1995. The Committee did not, however, adopt a position. Nor did the Commission submit a proposal to the Council. They set out the developments in the understanding of BSE, which, they argue, justify the fact that no decision was taken. The Netherlands Government also cites the judgments in Case C-151/98 P Pharos v Commission [1999] ECR I‑8157, paragraph 25, and in Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I‑5291, paragraph 66, and contends that, while ordering the Commission to act quickly, the Community legislature left the Commission with some degree of latitude and that the expression ‘shall, without delay, submit to the Council’ depends on the specific circumstances.

25 It follows that the Court of First Instance was right to hold, at paragraph 65 of the contested judgment, that Article 8(3)(b) of Regulation No 2377/90 does not specify exactly the period within which the Commission must propose to the Council the measures to be adopted and that in using the expression `without delay' the Community legislature, whilst requiring it to act swiftly, did allow the Commission a certain degree of latitude.

12 According to Article 3(1) the directive applies to statutory schemes which provide protection against, inter alia, the risk of invalidity or old age, and to provisions concerning social assistance, in so far as they are intended to supplement the invalidity scheme. In order to fall within the scope of Directive 79/7, therefore, a benefit must constitute the whole or part of a statutory scheme providing protection against one of the specified risks or a form of social assistance having the same objective (Case 150/85 Drake [1986] ECR 1995, paragraph 21).

71. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain, second, whether the requirement that vehicles which are more than three years old and which have previously been registered in another Member State must be submitted for testing as to their general condition prior to registration in the Netherlands constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports, prohibited under Article 28 EC, and, if so, whether such a requirement may nevertheless be justified on grounds of the protection of interests referred to in Article 30 EC (see, to that effect, Case C‑150/00 Commission v Austria [2004] ECR I‑3887, paragraph 80).

80. It follows from the foregoing arguments that, except for chomate salts, the Austrian practice cannot be validated on the basis of Directive 65/65. It is therefore appropriate to determine, secondly, whether the requirement of a marketing authorisation as a medicinal product, for which the Austrian practice provides, constitutes a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports, prohibited by Article 28 EC, and, if so, whether such a requirement may nevertheless be justified on grounds of public health referred to in Article 30 EC.

48. According to the Court’s case-law, Articles 43 EC and 49 EC require the elimination of restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services and that all measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of such freedoms must be regarded as constituting such restrictions (see Case C‑439/99 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-305, paragraph 22, and Case C‑451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti [2006] ECR I‑2941, paragraph 31).

74. Accordingly, the Court has accepted that a requirement of prior authorisation may, under certain conditions, be justified by such a consideration in the context of hospital care (see, inter alia, Smits and Peerbooms , paragraphs 76 to 81; Müller-Fauré and van Riet , paragraphs 76 to 81; and Watts , paragraphs 108 to 110) and in the context of medical care which, although it may be provided outside a hospital setting, requires the use of major and costly equipment exhaustively listed in the national legislation (see, to that effect, Commission v France , paragraphs 34 to 42).

78. As may be seen, in particular, from the system of agreements involved in the main actions, this kind of planning generally meets a variety of concerns.

57. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred must be that the framework agreement must be interpreted as not in principle precluding national legislation which, where there is abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships by a public-sector employer, precludes their being converted into contracts of indeterminate duration, even though such conversion is provided for in respect of employment contracts and relationships with a private-sector employer, where that legislation includes another effective measure to prevent and, where relevant, punish the abuse of successive fixed-term contracts by a public-sector employer. Costs

59. However, before any decision is given as to possible justification for such inequality, it is appropriate to consider, in the third place, whether the application of the principle of non-discrimination, as embodied in Article 3(1) of Decision No 3/80, is sufficient by itself to eliminate the adverse effects on Turkish nationals of legislation of the kind at issue in the main proceedings, having regard to the fact that, in paragraph 38 of Taflan-Met , it was held that, for so long as supplementary measures of the kind set out in Regulation No 574/72, which are essential for the implementation of that decision, have not been adopted by the Council, the provisions thereof do not have direct effect in the territory of the Member States and cannot therefore be relied on before national courts (see also, to that effect, Sürül , cited above, paragraph 54).

54 It was in that context that the Court observed, in paragraphs 29 and 30 of Taflan-Met, comparing Regulations No 1408/71 and its implementing regulation, No 574/72, with Decision No 3/80, that, even though the Decision refers specifically to certain provisions of the two regulations, the Decision does not contain a large number of precise, detailed provisions, deemed indispensable for the purpose of implementing Regulation No 1408/71 within the Community. It emphasised in paragraph 32 in particular that, whilst Decision No 3/80 sets out the fundamental principle of aggregation for the branches sickness and maternity, invalidity, old age, death grants and family benefits by reference to Regulation No 1408/71, supplementary implementing measures of the kind set out in Regulation No 574/72 must be adopted before that principle can be applied. The Court pointed out, at paragraphs 35 and 36, that such measures as well as detailed provisions relating, inter alia, to prevention of overlapping benefits and to determination of the applicable legislation, appear only in the proposal for a Council (EEC) Regulation implementing within the European Economic Community Decision No 3/80 submitted by the Commission on 8 February 1983, which has not yet been adopted by the Council. It concluded that, until adoption of those implementing measures, the coordinating rules in Decision No 3/80 on which the plaintiffs had based their claims could not be relied on by them directly before the national courts of a Member State.

21 In that regard, the Court has held that, since the receipt of dividends is not the consideration for any economic activity, it does not fall within the scope of VAT. Consequently, dividends resulting from shareholding fall outside the deduction entitlement (Sofitam, paragraph 13).

75. Furthermore, as the Court of First Instance correctly stated in paragraph 51 of the judgment under appeal, the pleas alleging errors of fact and manifest errors of assessment are indissociable, in the present case, from the plea alleging an error in applying the concept of State aid. Accordingly, the Court of First Instance was entitled to express the arguments of UFEX and Others concerning the Postadex transfer in different terms as supporting the plea alleging an error in applying the concept of State aid (see, on the possibility of expressing a plea in different terms, Case C‑316/97 P Parliament v Gaspari [1998] ECR I‑7597, paragraph 21).

21 In that regard, it must be observed that the Court of First Instance found, in paragraph 19 of the contested judgment, that `notwithstanding the wording of the first plea in law, which refers only to Article 25 of the Staff Regulations', Mrs Gaspari's arguments in support of this plea `are in fact intended to show also that her rights of defence were infringed in that, despite her request to that effect, her attending medical practitioner did not receive the report of the medical officer on which the contested decision is based'. Accordingly, the plea was not new but was properly expressed in different terms by the Court of First Instance.

72. Finally, with regard to the content of the Fourth Directive, both the fourth recital in its preamble and Article 2(3) state as a fundamental principle that annual accounts must give a true and fair view of the company's assets and liabilities, financial position and profit or loss (Case C-234/94 Tomberger [1996] ECR I-3133, paragraph 17, rectified by order of 10 July 1997, not published in the ECR). That principle requires, first, that the annual accounts of companies should reflect the activities and transactions which they are supposed to describe and, secondly, that the accounting information be given in the form judged to be the soundest and most appropriate for satisfying third parties' needs for information, without harming the interests of the company (Case C-275/97 DE+ES Bauunternehmung [1999] ECR I-5331, paragraphs 26 and 27).

25. Public service concession contracts do not fall within the scope of Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts (OJ 1992 L 209, p. 1), which was applicable at the material time. Notwithstanding the fact that such contracts fall outside the scope of that directive, the authorities concluding them are bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the EC Treaty, the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, and the concomitant obligation of transparency (see, to that effect, Telaustria and Telefonadress , paragraphs 60 to 62, and Case C‑231/03 Coname [2005] ECR I-7287, paragraphs 16 to 19). Without necessarily implying an obligation to launch an invitation to tender, that obligation of transparency requires the concession-granting authority to ensure, for the benefit of any potential concessionaire, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the service concession to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of the procurement procedures to be reviewed (see, to that effect, Telaustria and Telefonadress , paragraph 62, and Coname , paragraph 21).

16. It must be remembered that the award of such a concession is not governed by any of the directives by which the Community legislature has regulated the field of public contracts. In the absence of any such legislation, the consequences in Community law of the award of such concessions must be examined in the light of primary law and, in particular, of the fundamental freedoms provided for by the Treaty.

82 However, questions concerning the origin of a disease are by their nature medical questions (Case C-185/90 P Commission v Gill [1991] ECR I-4779, paragraph 25).

98. The Court has also held that, even where it is established that the burden of the charge levied though not due has been passed on in whole or in part to third parties, repayment to the trader of the amount thus passed on does not necessarily entail his unjust enrichment (see Comateb and Others , paragraph 29, and Joined Cases C-441/98 and C-442/98 Michaïlidis [2000] ECR I-7145, paragraph 34).

34 Furthermore, even where it is established that the burden of the charge has been passed on in whole or in part to third parties, repayment to the trader of the amount thus passed on does not necessarily entail his unjust enrichment (Comateb, paragraph 29).

48 However, in the light of the ubiquitous nature of the information and content placed online on a website and the fact that the scope of their distribution is, in principle, universal (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and Others, C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:685, paragraph 46), an application for the rectification of the former and the removal of the latter is a single and indivisible application and can, consequently, only be made before a court with jurisdiction to rule on the entirety of an application for compensation for damage pursuant to the case-law resulting from the judgments of 7 March 1995, Shevill and Others (C‑68/93, EU:C:1995:61, paragraphs 25, 26 and 32), and of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and Others (C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:685, paragraphs 42 and 48), and not before a court that does not have jurisdiction to do so.

76 Where, as in the present case, there is an obligation to keep available and retain certain documents at the address of a natural person residing in the host Member State, who is to keep them as the agent or servant of the employer by whom he has been designated, even after the employer has ceased to employ workers in that State, it is not sufficient, for the purposes of justifying such a restriction of freedom to provide services, that the presence of such documents within the territory of the host Member State may make it generally easier for the authorities of that State to perform their supervisory task. It must also be shown that those authorities cannot carry out their supervisory task effectively unless the undertaking has, in that Member State, an agent or servant designated to retain the documents in question (see, to that effect, Case 205/84 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755, paragraph 54).

54 THE COURT HAS ALREADY STRESSED IN ITS DECISIONS , MOST RECENTLY IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 3 FEBRUARY 1983 ( CASE 29/82 VAN LUIPEN ( 1983 ) ECR 151 ), THAT CONSIDERATIONS OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE NATURE CANNOT JUSTIFY DEROGATION BY A MEMBER STATE FROM THE RULES OF COMMUNITY LAW . THAT PRINCIPLE APPLIES WITH EVEN GREATER FORCE WHERE THE DEROGATION IN QUESTION AMOUNTS TO PREVENTING THE EXERCISE OF ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS GUARANTEED BY THE TREATY . IN THIS INSTANCE IT IS THEREFORE NOT SUFFICIENT THAT THE PRESENCE ON THE UNDERTAKING ' S PREMISES OF ALL THE DOCUMENTS NEEDED FOR SUPERVISION BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE SERVICE IS PROVIDED MAY MAKE IT EASIER FOR THOSE AUTHORITIES TO PERFORM THEIR TASK . IT MUST ALSO BE SHOWN THAT THOSE AUTHORITIES CANNOT , EVEN UNDER AN AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURE , CARRY OUT THEIR SUPERVISORY TASKS EFFECTIVELY UNLESS THE UNDERTAKING HAS IN THE AFORESAID STATE A PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT AT WHICH ALL THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS ARE KEPT .

45. The notification of proposed State aid, provided for in Article 88(3) EC, is a central element of Community rules for supervising that aid and undertakings to which such aid has been granted may not entertain a legitimate expectation that the aid is lawful if it has not been granted in compliance with that procedure (Case C‑24/95 Alcan Deutschland [1997] ECR I‑1591, paragraph 25, and Case C‑408/04 P Commission v Salzgitter [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 104).

71 Nevertheless, it must be noted that, as pointed out in paragraph 60 of the judgment in Azienda sanitaria locale No 5 Spezzino and Others (C‑113/13, EU:C:2014:2440) and in paragraph 63 of the present judgment, the lawfulness of the use of voluntary associations is subject, in particular, to the condition that such use actually contributes to the objective of budgetary efficiency. Therefore, the arrangements for implementing that use, such as those laid down in the contracts concluded with those associations and in any framework agreement, must also contribute to the achievement of that objective. Furthermore, as pointed out in paragraph 62 of the judgment in Azienda sanitaria locale No 5 Spezzino and Others (C‑113/13, EU:C:2014:2440) and in paragraph 65 of the present judgment, the general principle of the prohibition of abuse of rights applies with regard to the reimbursement of expenses incurred by voluntary associations.

62. Having regard to the general principle of EU law on the prohibition of abuse of rights (see, by analogy, judgment in 3M Italia , C‑417/10, EU:C:2012:184, paragraph 33), the application of that legislation cannot be extended to cover the wrongful practices of voluntary associations or their members. Thus, the activities of voluntary associations may be carried out by the workforce only within the limits necessary for their proper functioning. As regards the reimbursement of costs, it must be ensured that profit making, even indirect, cannot be pursued under the cover of a voluntary activity and that volunteers may be reimbursed only for expenditure actually incurred for the activity performed, within the limits laid down in advance by the associations themselves.

40. The Court has also held that, although the reasoned opinion must contain a coherent and detailed statement of the reasons which led the Commission to conclude that the State in question has failed to fulfil one of its obligations under the FEU Treaty, the letter of formal notice cannot be subject to such strict requirements of precision, since it cannot, of necessity, contain anything more than an initial brief summary of the complaints. There is therefore nothing to prevent the Commission from setting out in detail in the reasoned opinion the complaints which it has already made more generally in the letter of formal notice (see, to this effect, Commission v Spain , paragraph 29).

53 However, the checks set out in point (3) of Paragraph 23(1) of the BPolG are subject, as far as their territorial scope is concerned, to specific rules, unlike the other provisions of Paragraph 23, a factor which might constitute evidence of the existence of such an equivalent effect (see, by analogy, judgment of 22 June 2010, MelkiandAbdeli, C‑188/10 and C‑189/10, EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 72).

72. Second, the fact that the territorial scope of the power granted by the national provision at issue in the main proceedings is limited to a border area does not suffice, in itself, to find that the exercise of that power has an equivalent effect within the meaning of Article 21(a) of Regulation No 562/2006, in view of the wording and objective of Article 21. However, as regards controls on board an international train or on a toll motorway, the national provision at issue in the main proceedings lays down specific rules regarding its territorial scope, a factor which might constitute evidence of the existence of such an equivalent effect.

54. In that context, it is important to verify whether the restrictions thus imposed by the rules at issue in the main proceedings are limited to what is necessary to ensure the implementation of legitimate objectives (see, to that effect, Case C‑519/04 P Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I‑6991, paragraph 47).

11 According to Article 71(1)(a)(ii), the competent institution for the payment of unemployment benefits to frontier workers who are wholly unemployed is that of the State of residence. That attachment to the State of residence appears more appropriate and more in conformity with the interests of frontier workers (judgment in Case 58/87 Rebmann [1988] ECR 3467, paragraphs 14 and 15).

15 It thus appears that Regulation No 1408/71 derogates from the general rule of attachment to the State of employment only in specific situations and on grounds of practicality and efficacy which render attachment to the State of residence more appropriate and more in conformity with the interests of frontier workers .

53. Moreover, if the Member States wish to exclude once and for all any possibility for producers or importers to absorb, even temporarily, the impact of taxes on the retail selling price of manufactured tobacco products by selling them at a loss, it is inter alia open to them, while allowing those producers and importers to make effective use of the competitive advantage resulting from any lower cost prices, to prohibit the sale of manufactured tobacco products at a price below the sum of the cost price and all taxes (see Commission v Austria , paragraph 43, and Commission v Ireland , paragraph 55).

29 The French Government raised the same objection in the action for failure to fulfil obligations relating to the fishing years 1988 and 1990 brought against it by the Commission. That objection was dismissed by the Court of Justice in its judgment in Case C-333/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1025, paragraphs 23 to 25). In particular, when exercising its powers under Articles 211 EC and 226 EC, the Commission does not have to show that there is a specific interest in bringing the action since its function is, in the general interest of the Community, to ensure that Member States give effect to the EC Treaty and to obtain a declaration of any failure to fulfil the obligations deriving therefrom, with a view to bringing it to an end (Case 167/73 Commission v France [1974] ECR 359, paragraph 15; Case C-431/92 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-2189, paragraph 21; Case C-365/97 Commission v Italy [1999] ECR I-7773, paragraph 59; and Case C-333/99 Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 23).

15 THE COMMISSION, IN THE EXERCISE OF THE POWERS WHICH IT HAS UNDER ARTICLES 155 AND 169 OF THE TREATY, DOES NOT HAVE TO SHOW THE EXISTENCE OF A LEGAL INTEREST, SINCE, IN THE GENERAL INTEREST OF THE COMMUNITY, ITS FUNCTION IS TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ARE APPLIED BY THE MEMBER STATES AND TO NOTE THE EXISTENCE OF ANY FAILURE TO FULFIL THE OBLIGATIONS DERIVING THEREFROM, WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING IT TO AN END .

23 Second, the fact that it may be necessary to order the defendant in the main proceedings to cease its activities in the future provides sufficient justification for interpreting the relevant provisions of Regulation No 1475/95 (see, to that effect, Case C-408/95 Eurotunnel and Others v Seafrance [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24).

49. On the other hand, a Member State will be in breach of the prohibitions laid down by those two provisions if the undertaking in question, merely by exercising the special or exclusive rights conferred upon it, is led to abuse its dominant position or where such rights are liable to create a situation in which that undertaking is led to commit such abuses ( Höfner and Elser , cited above, paragraph 29; ERT , cited above, paragraph 37; Case C‑179/90 Merci convenzionali porto di Genova [1991] ECR I-5889, paragraphs 16 and 17; and Case C‑323/93 Centre d’insémination de la Crespelle [1994] ECR I-5077, paragraph 18). In this respect, it is not necessary that any abuse should actually occur (see, to that effect, Case C‑55/96 Job Centre [1997] ECR I‑7119, paragraph 36).

16 It should next be stated that the simple fact of creating a dominant position by granting exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the Treaty is not as such incompatible with Article 86.

41. Thus, in the judgment in Oy AA , the Court acknowledged in particular that the national tax legislation at issue could, in principle, be justified on the basis of two of the three justifications referred to in paragraph 51 of the judgment in Marks & Spencer , namely the need to safeguard the allocation of the power to tax between the Member States and the need to prevent tax avoidance, taken together (see Oy AA , paragraph 60).

31. The Court has also held that, by declaring a product under the procedure for export refunds, an exporter implies that the product satisfies all the conditions necessary for the refund. If the declaration is questioned by the competent authority, it is for the exporter to show, in accordance with the national rules of evidence, that the conditions have actually been complied with (see, to that effect, Fleisch‑Winter , paragraphs 32 and 35).

35. On the contrary, in so far as the exporter, by lodging an application for a refund, continues to assert either expressly or impliedly that the product in question is of ‘sound and fair marketable quality’, it is for the exporter, according to the rules of evidence of national law, to prove that that condition is, in fact, satisfied if a declaration is questioned by the national authorities.

35 Moreover, contrary to the Commission’s submissions, the fact that the measure is attributable to the Member State concerned, as established in paragraph 22 above, does not mean that it may be inferred that that Member State exercises a dominant influence over an undertaking in which it is the majority shareholder, within the meaning of the judgment of 16 May 2002, France v Commission (C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraphs 38 and 39). There is nothing in the State’s conduct as legislator to suggest that it exercised such influence in its capacity as majority shareholder in an undertaking.

21. The first point to note is that, according to recitals 2 and 12 to Directive 2003/6, the purpose of that directive is to protect the integrity of the EU financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in those markets. That confidence depends on, inter alia, investors being placed on an equal footing and protected against the improper use of insider information (see, to that effect, judgments in Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck , C‑45/08, EU:C:2009:806, paragraph 47; IMC Securities , C‑445/09, EU:C:2011:459, paragraph 27; and Geltl , C‑19/11, EU:C:2012:397, paragraph 33).

27. In that respect, it should be noted that the purpose of Directive 2003/6 – as is reiterated, in particular, in recitals 2 and 12 in the preamble thereto – is to protect the integrity of EU financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in those markets. That confidence depends on, inter alia, investors being placed on an equal footing and protected against the improper use of insider information and price manipulations (see, to that effect, Case C‑45/08 Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 47).

57. With regard to the request, which is framed in the alternative, to have the oral procedure reopened, it is appropriate to note that the Court may of its own motion, or on a proposal from the Advocate General, or at the request of the parties, order the reopening of the oral procedure in accordance with Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure if it considers that it lacks sufficient information, or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see, in particular, Case C‑210/06 Cartesio [2008] ECR I‑9641, paragraph 46, and Case C‑306/08 Commission v Spain [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 60).

20. Regarding the second condition, relating to the increase in the value of the company’s shares, it should be observed that, inasmuch as the absorption of a company’s losses by one of its members restores the assets to the level which they had reached before the losses were sustained, that operation contributes to increasing the company’s economic potential. Such absorption must therefore be regarded as liable to increase the value of its shares for the purposes of Article 4(2)(b) of Directive 69/335 (see, to that effect, Case C‑15/89 Deltakabel [1991] ECR I‑241, paragraph 13, and Case C‑249/89 Trave-Schiffahrtsgesellschaft [1991] ECR I‑257, paragraph 13).

13 As regards the second condition - an increase in the value of the company' s shares - reference should be made to the judgment in Case 270/81 Felicitas Rickmers-Linie KG & Co v Finanzamt fuer Verkehrsteuern [1982] ECR 2771 in which the Court stated that "according to the principles on which harmonized capital duty is based, such duty should be charged only on transactions which constitute in law the raising of capital and only in so far as they contribute to increasing the company' s economic potential", that reasoning being taken from the preamble to Council Directive 74/553/EEC of 7 November 1974 amending Article 5(2) of Directive 69/335/EEC concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital (OJ L 303, p. 9).

30. By Articles 230 EC and Article 241 EC, on the one hand, and by Article 234, on the other, the Treaty has established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure review of the legality of acts of the institutions, and has entrusted such review to the Community Courts. Under that system, where natural or legal persons cannot, by reason of the conditions for admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, directly challenge Community measures of general application, they are able, depending on the case, either indirectly to plead the invalidity of such acts before the Community Courts under Article 241 EC or to do so before the national courts and ask them, since they have no jurisdiction themselves to declare those measures invalid, to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on validity (see Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council , paragraph 40).

Selon une jurisprudence constante de la Cour, les successions, qui consistent en une transmission à une ou plusieurs personnes du patrimoine laissé par une personne décédée, constituent des mouvements de capitaux au sens de l’article 63 TFUE, à l’exception des cas où leurs éléments constitutifs se cantonnent à l’intérieur d’un seul État membre (arrêts du 10 février 2011, Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach, C‑25/10, EU:C:2011:65, point 16, et du 26 mai 2016, Commission/Grèce, C‑244/15, EU:C:2016:359, point 25 ainsi que jurisprudence citée).

25 According to the Court’s settled case-law, the tax levied on inheritances, which consist of the transfer to one or more persons of assets left by a deceased person, comes within the scope of the FEU Treaty provisions on movements of capital, save where the constituent elements of inheritances are confined to a single Member State (judgments of 23 February 2006 in van Hilten-van der Heijden, C‑513/03, EU:C:2006:131, paragraph 42; of 17 January 2008 in Jäger, C‑256/06, EU:C:2008:20, paragraph 25; of 17 October 2013 in Welte, C‑181/12, EU:C:2013:662, paragraph 20; and of 3 September 2014 in Commission v Spain, C‑127/12, not published, EU:C:2014:2130, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

51. Since it is for the Commission to prove that the Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations, by placing the information necessary to establish the failure before the Court, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumption (see, inter alia, Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands [1982] ECR 1791, paragraph 6; Case C-404/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-6695, paragraph 26; Case C‑434/01 Commission v United Kingdom [2003] ECR I‑13239, paragraph 21; and Case C-194/01 Commission v Austria [2004] ECR I‑4579, paragraph 34), and since the Commission has not, in the present case, indicated either the provisions of the directive requiring Member States to adopt framework legislation or established that such a measure is necessary in order to ensure the result which the directive seeks to achieve, it must be held that the first part of the second complaint is not well founded. – Implementation of the directive by the Law of 1993

8 As the Court stated in its judgment of 28 April 1988 in Case 61/87 Thevenot (( 1988 )) ECR 2375, paragraphs 11 and 12, those rules provide in essence that, in the context of Formula A, the levy is payable by the milk producer on the quantities of milk or milk equivalent which he has delivered to a purchaser and which for the 12 months concerned exceed a reference quantity attributed to him . On the other hand, in the context of Formula B, producers may take advantage within the 12 months concerned of individual reference quantities not used by other producers affiliated to the same dairy subject to those quantities being transferred to the national reserve of the Member State concerned in the cases provided for under the rules . Consequently, in the context of Formula B, the levy is not due when the increase in the deliveries made by an affiliated producer to a dairy is compensated for by a corresponding decrease in the deliveries of other producers affiliated to the same dairy, so that the total quantity purchased by the dairy remains within the limits of its reference quantity .

11 PAR CONSEQUENT, DANS LE CADRE DE LA FORMULE B, LE PRELEVEMENT N' EST PAS DU LORSQUE L' AUGMENTATION DES LIVRAISONS D' UN PRODUCTEUR AFFILIE A UNE LAITERIE EST COMPENSEE PAR UNE DIMINUTION CORRESPONDANTE DES LIVRAISONS D' AUTRES PRODUCTEURS AFFILIES A LA MEME LAITERIE, DE TELLE SORTE QUE LE TOTAL DES QUANTITES ACHETEES PAR CELLE-CI RESTE DANS LES LIMITES DE SA QUANTITE DE REFERENCE . LA PERCEPTION DU PRELEVEMENT SE RATTACHE DONC, DANS LE CADRE DE CETTE FORMULE, A LA QUANTITE DE REFERENCE DE LA LAITERIE, DONT LE DEPASSEMENT CONSTITUE LE FAIT GENERATEUR DE CETTE CHARGE, ALORS QUE LA QUANTITE INDIVIDUELLE DES PRODUCTEURS N' EST PRISE EN CONSIDERATION QU' AUX SEULES FINS DE LA REPERCUSSION DU PRELEVEMENT ACQUITTE SUR CES DERNIERS .

76. It follows from that case-law that the proprietor of the mark cannot oppose the use of a sign identical with the mark if that use is not liable to cause detriment to any of the functions of that mark ( Arsenal Football Club , paragraph 54, and L’Oréal and Others , paragraph 60).

34. Such penalties must not, however, go further than is necessary to attain those objectives (see, to that effect, judgments in Ecotrade , C‑95/07 and C‑96/07, EU:C:2008:267, paragraphs 65 to 67; EMS-Bulgaria Transport , C‑284/11, EU:C:2012:458, paragraph 67; and Rēdlihs , EU:C:2012:497, paragraph 47).

67. A reassessment and recovery practice, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which penalises non-compliance on the part of the taxable person with the obligations relating to accounts and tax returns by a denial of the right to deduct, clearly goes further than is necessary to attain the objective of ensuring the correct application of such obligations within the meaning of Article 22(7) of the Sixth Directive, since Community law does not prevent Member States from imposing, where necessary, a fine or a financial penalty proportionate to the seriousness of the offence in order to sanction a failure to comply with those obligations.

54 The contested decision cannot therefore be regarded, either in so far as it requires repayment of the aid in issue or in so far as it requires payment of interest thereon, as frustrating the legitimate expectations of the recipient undertaking.

29. It should be noted at the outset that, where a contract is to be awarded by the best-value-for-money procedure, in accordance with Article 97(2) of the Financial Regulation and Article 138(1) of the implementing rules, the contracting authority must define and specify in the tender specifications the award criteria enabling evaluation of the content of tenders. In addition, those criteria must, in accordance with Article 138(2) of the implementing rules, be justified by the subject of the contract. According to Article 138(3), the contracting authority must also specify, in the contract notice or in the tender specifications, the weighting it will apply to each of the criteria for determining the best value for money. Those provisions seek to ensure compliance with the principles of equal treatment and transparency at the stage of evaluation of tenders with a view to award of the contract (see, by analogy, Case 31/87 Beentjes [1988] ECR 4635, paragraphs 21 and 22, and Case C‑470/99 Universale-Bau and Others [2002] ECR I‑11617, paragraphs 90 to 92).

21 Finally, in order to meet the directive' s aim of ensuring development of effective competition in the award of public works contracts, the criteria and conditions which govern each contract must be given sufficient publicity by the authorities awarding contracts .

42. Ainsi que cela ressort du considérant 4 du règlement nº 469/2009, l’octroi de cette période d’exclusivité supplémentaire a vocation à encourager la recherche et, pour ce faire, vise à permettre un amortissement des investissements effectués dans cette recherche.

59. As the Court has consistently held, it is particularly important, in order to satisfy the requirement of legal certainty, that individuals should have the benefit of a clear and precise legal situation enabling them to ascertain the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, to rely on them before the national courts (see Case 29/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 1661, paragraph 23; Case 363/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 1733, paragraph 7; Case C-59/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2607, paragraph 18; and Case C-236/95 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-4459, paragraph 13).

18 It should be borne in mind in that respect that, according to the case-law of the Court (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 131/88 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-825), the transposition of a directive into domestic law does not necessarily require that its provisions be incorporated formally and verbatim in express, specific legislation; a general legal context may, depending on the content of the directive, be adequate for the purpose provided that it does indeed guarantee the full application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner so that, where the directive is intended to create rights for individuals, the persons concerned can ascertain the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, rely on them before the national courts.

27. Where a Community national lives in one Member State and has a shareholding in the capital of a company established in another Member State which gives him substantial influence over the company’s decisions and allows him to determine its activities, as is always the case where he holds 100% of the shares, that may thus fall within the freedom of establishment (see, to that effect, Baars , paragraphs 22 and 26).

21 It is settled case-law (see the judgments in Case C-18/90 Office National de l' Emploi v Kziber [1991] ECR I-199, paragraphs 15 to 22, and Case C-58/93 Yousfi v Belgian State [1994] ECR I-1353, paragraph 16) that Article 41(1) of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, signed in Rabat on 27 April 1976 and approved on behalf of the Community by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2211/78 of 26 September 1978 (OJ 1978 L 264, p. 1), which lays down in clear, precise and unconditional terms a prohibition of discrimination, based on nationality, against workers of Moroccan nationality and the members of their families living with them in the field of social security, contains a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure in respect of any question other than the matters mentioned in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of that article. In those judgments, the Court added that the object of the Cooperation Agreement to promote overall cooperation between the contracting parties, in particular in the field of labour, confirms that the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 41(1) is capable of governing the legal situation of individuals.

16 In that connection the Court has already held in its Kziber judgment, cited above, that Article 41(1) of the Cooperation Agreement which lays down in clear, precise and unconditional terms a prohibition of discrimination, based on nationality, against workers of Moroccan nationality and the members of their families living with them in the field of social security, contains a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure in respect of any question other than the matters mentioned in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of that article. The Court added that the object of the Cooperation Agreement to promote overall cooperation between the contracting parties, in particular in the field of labour, confirms that the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 41(1) is capable of governing the legal situation of individuals.

32. As regards the complaint alleging breach of Article 49 EC, it is appropriate to point out that the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to freedom of movement are intended to apply to public contracts which are outside the scope of Directive 92/50. Although certain contracts are excluded from the scope of Community directives in the field of public procurement, the contracting authorities which conclude them are nevertheless bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaty and the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality in particular (see, to that effect, Case C‑324/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress [2000] ECR I‑10745, paragraph 60; Case C‑92/00 HI [2002] ECR I‑5553, paragraph 47, and the order of 3 December 2001 in Case C‑59/00 Vestergaard [2001] ECR I‑9505, paragraph 20).

40. If the provisions of a contract do not enable the place of the main provision of services to be determined, either because they provide for several places where services are provided, or because they do not expressly provide for any specific place where services are to be provided, but the agent has already provided such services, it is appropriate, in the alternative, to take account of the place where he has in fact for the most part carried out his activities in the performance of the contract, provided that the provision of services in that place is not contrary to the parties’ intentions as it appears from the provisions of the contract. For that purpose, the factual aspects of the case may be taken into consideration, in particular, the time spent in those places and the importance of the activities carried out there. It is for the national court seised to determine whether it has jurisdiction in the light of the evidence submitted to it ( Color Drack , paragraph 41).

41. To that end, it is for the national court seised to determine whether it has jurisdiction in the light of the evidence submitted to it.

25. It should be noted that the first subparagraph of Article 3(3) of Directive 92/12 could apply only if the requirement to submit a declaration were to be regarded as a ‘border-crossing formality’ giving rise to the levying of excise duty (Case C‑313/05 Brzeziński [2007] ECR I‑513, paragraph 45).

26. In that context, the essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity of origin of the marked goods or services to the consumer or end user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin. For the trade mark to be able to fulfil its essential role in the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to establish and maintain, it must offer a guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it have been manufactured or supplied under the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their quality (see, in particular, Case 102/77 Hoffman-La Roche [1978] ECR 1139, paragraph 7, Case C-299/99 Philips [2002] ECR I-5475, paragraph 30, and Arsenal Football Club , paragraph 48).

7IN RELATION TO TRADE-MARKS , THE SPECIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER IS IN PARTICULAR TO GUARANTEE TO THE PROPRIETOR OF THE TRADE-MARK THAT HE HAS THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO USE THAT TRADE-MARK FOR THE PURPOSE OF PUTTING A PRODUCT INTO CIRCULATION FOR THE FIRST TIME AND THEREFORE TO PROTECT HIM AGAINST COMPETITORS WISHING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE STATUS AND REPUTATION OF THE TRADE-MARK BY SELLING PRODUCTS ILLEGALLY BEARING THAT TRADE-MARK . IN ORDER TO ANSWER THE QUESTION WHETHER THAT EXCLUSIVE RIGHT INVOLVES THE RIGHT TO PREVENT THE TRADE-MARK BEING AFFIXED BY A THIRD PERSON AFTER THE PRODUCT HAS BEEN REPACKAGED , REGARD MUST BE HAD TO THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF THE TRADE-MARK , WHICH IS TO GUARANTEE THE IDENTITY OF THE ORIGIN OF THE TRADE-MARKED PRODUCT TO THE CONSUMER OR ULTIMATE USER , BY ENABLING HIM WITHOUT ANY POSSIBILITY OF CONFUSION TO DISTINGUISH THAT PRODUCT FROM PRODUCTS WHICH HAVE ANOTHER ORIGIN . THIS GUARANTEE OF ORIGIN MEANS THAT THE CONSUMER OR ULTIMATE USER CAN BE CERTAIN THAT A TRADE-MARKED PRODUCT WHICH IS SOLD TO HIM HAS NOT BEEN SUBJECT AT A PREVIOUS STAGE OF MARKETING TO INTERFERENCE BY A THIRD PERSON , WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE PROPRIETOR OF THE TRADE-MARK , SUCH AS TO AFFECT THE ORIGINAL CONDITION OF THE PRODUCT . THE RIGHT ATTRIBUTED TO THE PROPRIETOR OF PREVENTING ANY USE OF THE TRADE-MARK WHICH IS LIKELY TO IMPAIR THE GUARANTEE OF ORIGIN SO UNDERSTOOD IS THEREFORE PART OF THE SPECIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE TRADE-MARK RIGHT .

81. Furthermore, it is also settled case-law of the Court that that restriction is entirely proportionate to the objective pursued, since the provision at issue limits to a maximum of EUR 12 500 the amount which may be offset against the registration duties payable by the person who purchases a new principal residence in the Flemish Region (see, to that effect, Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt , paragraph 45). In providing for such a limitation, the system at issue retains its character as a tax advantage and is not in the nature of a disguised exemption.

89. Article 12 EC, which prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality, is a specific expression of the general principle of equality, which itself is one of the fundamental principles of Community law (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case 810/79 Überschär [1980] ECR 2747, paragraph 16, and Case C‑224/00 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I‑2965, paragraph 14).

14 First, it should be recalled that Article 6 of the Treaty, which is a specific expression of the general principle of equality, prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality.

119. As regards the merits of this ground of appeal, it should be noted at the outset that the Court has already held, in substance, that the concept of a collective dominant position is included in that of ‘dominant position’ within the meaning of Article 2 of the Regulation (see, to that effect, Kali & Salz , paragraphs 166 and 178). In that regard, the existence of an agreement or of other links in law between the undertakings concerned is not essential to a finding of a collective dominant position. Such a finding may be based on other connecting factors and would depend on an economic assessment and, in particular, on an assessment of the structure of the market in question (see Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie maritime belge transports and Others v Commission [2000] ECR I‑1365, paragraph 45).

51 First, as regards the general criteria which were adopted in this case for the purpose of applying restrictive measures, and for the defining of which the Council has a broad discretion (see, to that effect, the judgments in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 120; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 42; and Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 41), it is clear that Articles 18(1) and 19(1) of Decision 2011/782 targeted in particular persons and entities benefiting from or supporting the Syrian regime and persons and entities associated with them, while Article 15(1) of Regulation No 36/2012 targets in particular persons and entities benefiting from or supporting the regime, and persons and entities associated with them.

120. Pour autant que Kala Naft conteste la proportionnalité des règles générales sur le fondement desquelles a été décidée son inscription sur les listes, il y a lieu de rappeler que, s’agissant du contrôle juridictionnel du respect du principe de proportionnalité, la Cour a jugé qu’il convient de reconnaître un large pouvoir d’appréciation au législateur de l’Union dans des domaines qui impliquent de la part de ce dernier des choix de nature politique, économique et sociale, et dans lesquels il est appelé à effectuer des appréciations complexes. Elle en a déduit que seul le caractère manifestement inapproprié d’une mesure adoptée en ces domaines, par rapport à l’objectif que l’institution compétente entend poursuivre, peut affecter la légalité d’une telle mesure (voir arrêt du 1 er  février 2007, Sison/Conseil, C‑266/05 P, Rec. p. I‑1233, point 33).

11 As to the substance, it suffices to note that in Commission v France, cited above, the Court examined whether legislation similar to the Irish legislation at issue was compatible with Community law.

27 The Court has also held that a written expression of opinion cannot constitute a decision of such a nature as to form the basis of an action for annulment since it is neither capable of producing nor intended to produce any legal effects (see, inter alia, Case 133/79 Sucrimex v Commission [1980] ECR 1299 and the order in Case 151/88 Italy v Commission [1989] ECR 1255, paragraph 22).

22 AS FAR AS CONCERNS THIS CLAIM , WHICH IS IN THE ALTERNATIVE AND IS FOR AN AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO THE SUM OF THE UNPAID REFUNDS AND THEREFORE CLOSELY BOUND UP WITH THE APPLICATION FOR ANNULMENT , IT SUFFICES TO CALL TO MIND THE RELATIONSHIP , DESCRIBED ABOVE , BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE FUND . THE TELEX MESSAGE , LIKE ALL THE COMMISSION ' S ACTIONS WHICH ARE IN DISPUTE , IS PART OF THE INTERNAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE NATIONAL BODIES RESPONSIBLE FOR APPLYING COMMUNITY RULES IN THIS FIELD ; AS A GENERAL RULE THIS CO-OPERATION CANNOT MAKE THE COMMUNITY LIABLE TO INDIVIDUALS .

31 Moreover, as the Court has already held, the fact that a directive provides for certain details to be decided on in the future cannot, in the absence of express provision to that effect, relieve Member States of their obligation to adopt within the prescribed period the measures necessary to comply with the directive. That obligation remains, whether or not all the conditions for the application of the provisions of Community law have already been fulfilled (see, in particular, Case C-137/96 Commission v Germany [1997] ECR I-6749, paragraph 10).

26 The measures which the Member States are required to take for the implementation of Article 6(3) of Directive 76/768 must, however, observe the principle of proportionality (see, in particular, the judgments cited above in Unilever, paragraph 27, and Estée Lauder, paragraph 26).

26 However, the measures which the Member States are required to take for the implementation of that provision must be consistent with the principle of proportionality (see, in particular, Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb v Clinique Laboratories and Estée Lauder, cited above, paragraph 16, and Case C-77/97 Unilever [1999] ECR I-431, paragraph 27).

46. Second, it must be pointed out that Regulation No 1408/71 does not set up a common scheme of social security, but allows different national social security schemes to exist. Its sole objective is to ensure the coordination of those schemes (Case C-503/09 Stewart [2011] ECR I-6497, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).

126 As for the argument of the Netherlands Government that the introduction of a minimum price would have inflicted less disturbance on the economy of the OCTs and would have been just as effective in achieving the objectives pursued, it should be pointed out that, whilst ensuring that the rights of the OCTs are respected, the Community court cannot, without risk of overriding the wide discretion of the Council, substitute its assessment for that of the Council as to the choice of the most appropriate measure to prevent disturbances to the Community market in rice if those measures have not been proved to be manifestly inappropriate for achieving the objective pursued (see, to that effect, Case C-280/93 Germany v Commission [1994] ECR I-4973, paragraph 94, and Jippes, cited above, paragraph 83).

94 While other means for achieving the desired result were indeed conceivable, the Court cannot substitute its assessment for that of the Council as to the appropriateness or otherwise of the measures adopted by the Community legislature if those measures have not been proved to be manifestly inappropriate for achieving the objective pursued.

72 It has therefore been held in relation to a concession awarded in 1984, although the Court had not established at that time that contracts with certain cross-border interest might be subject to a duty of transparency, that the principle of legal certainty requires that the termination of such a concession be coupled with a transitional period enabling the contracting parties to untie their contractual relations on acceptable terms, inter alia, from an economic point of view (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 July 2008 in ASM Brescia, C‑347/06, EU:C:2008:416, paragraphs 70 and 71, and 14 November 2013 in Belgacom, C‑221/12, EU:C:2013:736, paragraph 40).

25. It is appropriate also to note that, as regards the relationship between paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 9 of the Sixth Directive, the Court has held that Article 9(1) in no way takes precedence over Article 9(2). In every situation, the question which arises is whether that situation is covered by one of the instances mentioned in Article 9(2) of that directive. If not, it falls within the scope of Article 9(1) ( Dudda , paragraph 21; Linthorst, Pouwels en Scheres , paragraph 11; RAL (Channel Islands) and Others , paragraph 24; and Gillan Beach , paragraph 15).

15. It is appropriate also to note that, in respect of the relationship between Article 9(1) and (2) of the Sixth Directive, the Court has held that Article 9(1) in no way takes precedence over Article 9(2). In every situation, the question which arises is whether that situation is covered by one of the instances mentioned in Article 9(2) of that directive. If not, it falls within the scope of Article 9(1) ( Dudda , paragraph 21; Linthorst, Pouwels en Scheres , paragraph 11; and RAL (Channel Islands) and Others , paragraph 24).

76. With regard to judicial review of the conditions of the implementation of the principle of proportionality, the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in an area such as that involved in the present case, which entails political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments (see, to that effect, judgments in British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco , C‑491/01, EU:C:2002:741, paragraph 123, and Alliance for Natural health and Others , C‑154/04 and C‑155/04, EU:C:2005:449, paragraph 52).

20 On this point, it should be noted that Article 6 of the Directive requires Member States to introduce into their national legal systems such measures as are necessary to enable all persons who consider themselves the victims of discrimination `to pursue their claims by judicial process'. It follows from that provision that the Member States must take measures which are sufficiently effective to achieve the aim of the Directive and that they must ensure that the rights thus conferred can be effectively relied upon before the national courts by the persons concerned (see, in particular, Von Colson and Kamann, paragraph 18; Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 17; and Case C-271/91 Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1993] ECR I-4367, paragraph 22).

22 Article 6 of the Directive puts Member States under a duty to take the necessary measures to enable all persons who consider themselves wronged by discrimination to pursue their claims by judicial process. Such obligation implies that the measures in question should be sufficiently effective to achieve the objective of the Directive and should be capable of being effectively relied upon by the persons concerned before national courts.

47 Having regard to the particular nature of such a transaction, the Court has held that, in order to classify a transaction as an ‘intra-Community acquisition’, it is necessary to conduct an overall assessment of all the relevant objective evidence in order to determine whether the goods purchased have actually left the territory of the Member State of supply and, if so, in which Member State the final consumption will take place. Factors likely to be of significance in that respect, other than the process of transporting the goods in question, are, inter alia, the place of registration and usual use of the goods, the place of residence of the purchaser and the presence or absence of links between the purchaser and the Member State of supply or another Member State (see to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2010, X, C‑84/09, EU:C:2010:693, paragraphs 41 to 45 and 50).

61. In that connection, it is sufficient to note that the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 expressly provides that the family member’s right to join the migrant Turkish worker is subject to the authorisation to that effect granted in accordance with the conditions laid down by the legislation of the host Member State ( Ayaz , paragraphs 34 and 35, and Derin , point 63).

63. By contrast, the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 provides expressly that the family member’s right to join the migrant Turkish worker is subject to the authorisation to that effect granted in accordance with the conditions laid down by the legislation of the host Member State (see Case C-275/02 Ayaz [2004] ECR I-8765, paragraphs 34 and 35).

65. In 1976, the Council adopted a new method for adjusting remuneration, as is apparent from Case 59/81 Commission v Council , paragraphs 9 to 13. Subsequently, another method of adjusting remuneration was laid down for a period of 10 years by Council Decision 81/1061/Euratom, ECSC, EEC of 15 December 1981 amending the method of adjusting the remuneration of officials and other servants of the Communities (OJ 1981 L 386, p. 6).

31. However, even though, in certain circumstances, such as the loss of goods, their sale at a loss or unlawful sale at a price different from the retail price indicated on the tax labels, the manufacturer or importer may, in the context of a scheme such as that at issue in the main proceedings, be obliged to pay an amount of VAT which is higher than that which would have resulted from the application of the ordinary harmonised system for levying VAT, the mere possibility that such events may take place is not sufficient, however, to justify the conclusion that that scheme might affect, to a non-negligible extent, the amount of tax due at the final consumption stage (see, to that effect, Heintz van Landewijck , paragraphs 56 to 58). Indeed, a simplification measure implies, by definition, a more general approach than that of the rule which it replaces and thus will not necessarily reflect the exact situation of each taxable person ( Sudholz , paragraph 62).

56. It is true that, in certain circumstances, such as the loss of products, their sale at a loss or unlawful sale at a price different from the retail price indicated on the tax stamps, the manufacturer may be obliged to pay an amount of VAT which is higher than that which would have resulted from the application of the ordinary Community system for levying VAT.

49. Such a declaratory, as opposed to a constitutive, character of residence permits, in regard to rights, has been acknowledged by the Court independently of the fact that the permit in question was issued pursuant to the provisions of Directive 68/360 or Directive 90/364 (see, to that effect, Commission v Belgium , paragraph 65).

35 It follows, as Ms Campogrande argues, that the substance of the complaint is not intended to be strictly and definitively binding for the purposes of the contentious stage of the procedure, provided always that neither the legal basis nor the subject- matter of the complaint is changed in the action brought (Case 52/85 Rihoux and Others v Commission [1986] ECR 1555, paragraph 12). Thus the Court has held that, where the applicant asked in his complaint for the annulment of the implied decision rejecting his request for assistance, he must be regarded as having asked for compensation for the damage which may have been caused to him by that decision (see Case 224/87 Koutchoumoff v Commission [1989] ECR 99, paragraph 10).

12 AU NOMBRE DE CES CONTRAINTES PROCEDURALES FIGURE LE PRINCIPE , RAPPELE PAR UNE JURISPRUDENCE CONSTANTE , SELON LEQUEL L ' ARTICLE 91 DU STATUT A POUR OBJET DE PERMETTRE ET DE FAVORISER UN REGLEMENT AMIABLE DU DIFFEREND SURGI ENTRE LES FONCTIONNAIRES ET L ' ADMINISTRATION . POUR SATISFAIRE A CETTE EXIGENCE , IL IMPORTE QUE CETTE DERNIERE SOIT EN MESURE DE CONNAITRE AVEC UNE PRECISION SUFFISANTE LES GRIEFS OU DESIDERATA DE L ' INTERESSE . PAR CONTRE , CETTE DISPOSITION N ' A PAS POUR OBJET DE LIER , DE FACON RIGOUREUSE ET DEFINITIVE , LA PHASE CONTENTIEUSE EVENTUELLE DES LORS QUE LE RECOURS CONTENTIEUX NE MODIFIE NI LA CAUSE NI L ' OBJET DE LA RECLAMATION ( ARRET DU 1ER JUILLET 1976 , SERGY/COMMISSION , 58/75 , REC . P . 1153 ; ARRET DU 20 MARS 1984 , RAZZOUK ET BEYDOUN/COMMISSION , 75/82 , REC . P . 1509 ; ARRET DU 23 JANVIER 1986 , RASMUSSEN/COMMISSION , 173/84 , REC . P . 197 ).

61. As the common organisations of the markets in agricultural products are therefore not a competition-free zone, it must be pointed out that, in accordance with settled case-law, Community competition law and national competition law apply in parallel, since they consider restrictive practices from different points of view. Whereas Articles 81 and 82 EC regard them in the light of the obstacles which may result from trade between Member States, national law proceeds on the basis of the considerations peculiar to it and considers restrictive practices only in that context (see, inter alia , Wilhelm and Others , paragraph 3, and Joined Cases 253/78 and 1/79 to 3/79 Giry and Guerlain and Others [1980] ECR 2327, paragraph 15).

50. In assessing whether the pleas of inadmissibility raised against the statements in intervention are well founded, it must be recalled that under the fourth paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union an application to intervene is to be limited to supporting the form of order sought by one of the parties. That provision does not, however, preclude an intervener from putting forward arguments that are new or different from those of the party it supports, as long as its purpose is to support the form of order sought by that party (see, inter alia, Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority [1961] ECR 1; Case C‑150/94 United Kingdom v Council [1998] ECR I‑7235, paragraph 36; and Case C‑334/08 Commission v Italy [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 53 to 55).

53. Under the fourth paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, an application to intervene is to be limited to supporting the form of order sought by one of the parties.

29. It follows that the Member States have a wide discretion under Article 13(C) of the Sixth Directive. It is for them to assess whether they should or should not introduce the right of option, depending on what they consider to be expedient in the situation existing in their country at a given time (see Case C‑381/97 Belgocodex [1998] ECR I‑8153, paragraphs 16 and 17; Case C‑12/98 Amengual Far [2000] ECR I‑527, paragraph 13; and Case C‑326/99 ‘Goed Wonen’ [2001] ECR I‑6831, paragraph 45).

35. Accordingly, it is the Court’s established case-law that the freedom to provide services conferred by Article 56 TFEU on Member State nationals, and thus on European Union citizens, includes ‘passive’ freedom to provide services, namely the freedom for recipients of services to go to another Member State in order to receive a service there, without being hindered by restrictions ( Luisi and Carbone , paragraph 16; Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR 195, paragraph 15; Bickel and Franz , paragraph 15; Case C-348/96 Calfa [1999] ECR I-11, paragraph 16; and Case C‑215/03 Oulane [2005] ECR I‑1215, paragraph 37).

16 IT FOLLOWS THAT THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES INCLUDES THE FREEDOM , FOR THE RECIPIENTS OF SERVICES , TO GO TO ANOTHER MEMBER STATE IN ORDER TO RECEIVE A SERVICE THERE , WITHOUT BEING OBSTRUCTED BY RESTRICTIONS , EVEN IN RELATION TO PAYMENTS AND THAT TOURISTS , PERSONS RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT AND PERSONS TRAVELLING FOR THE PURPOSE OF EDUCATION OR BUSINESS ARE TO BE REGARDED AS RECIPIENTS OF SERVICES .

72. Finally, with regard to the content of the Fourth Directive, both the fourth recital in its preamble and Article 2(3) state as a fundamental principle that annual accounts must give a true and fair view of the company's assets and liabilities, financial position and profit or loss (Case C-234/94 Tomberger [1996] ECR I-3133, paragraph 17, rectified by order of 10 July 1997, not published in the ECR). That principle requires, first, that the annual accounts of companies should reflect the activities and transactions which they are supposed to describe and, secondly, that the accounting information be given in the form judged to be the soundest and most appropriate for satisfying third parties' needs for information, without harming the interests of the company (Case C-275/97 DE+ES Bauunternehmung [1999] ECR I-5331, paragraphs 26 and 27).

39 The Court has already held, in its judgment in Case C-52/95 Commission v France [1995] ECR I-4443, paragraphs 29 and 30, that Article 11(2) of Regulation No 2241/87 requires Member States to adopt binding measures to prohibit on a provisional basis all fishing activity even before quotas are exhausted.

30 Article 11(2) of Regulation No 2241/87 imposes the same requirement on the Member States.

39. So far as concerns, first of all, the principle of equivalence, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that observance of that principle requires that the national rule at issue be applied without distinction, whether the action is based on rights which individuals derive from European Union law or whether it is based on an infringement of national law, where the purpose and cause of action are similar. It is for the national court, which has direct knowledge of the detailed procedural rules applicable, to ascertain whether the actions concerned are similar as regards their purpose, cause of action and essential characteristics (see, to that effect, Pontin , paragraph 45 and the case-law cited, and Case C-591/10 Littlewoods Retail and Others [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 31).

28. In order to reply to that argument, it should be borne in mind from the outset that, in accordance with settled case-law, the condition that the decision forming the subject-matter of the proceedings must be of direct concern to a natural or legal person, as laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, requires the contested Community measure to affect directly the legal situation of the individual and leave no discretion to its addressees, who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules without the application of other intermediate rules (see, in particular, Case C-404/96 P Glencore Grain v Commission [1998] ECR I-2435, paragraph 41, and Case C-486/01 P National Front v Parliament [2004] ECR I‑6289, paragraph 34).

34. In that regard, it is appropriate to bear in mind that, by virtue of settled case-law, the condition that the decision forming the subject-matter of the proceedings must be of ‘direct concern’ to a natural or legal person, as it is stated in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, requires the Community measure complained of to affect directly the legal situation of the individual and leave no discretion to the addressees of that measure, who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules without the application of other intermediate rules (see, inter alia, Case C‑404/96 P Glencore Grain v Commission [1998] ECR I‑2435, paragraph 41, and the case-law cited).

17 In that context, the second paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty is intended, more specifically, to prevent any form of indirect fiscal protectionism affecting imported products which, although not similar, within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 95, to domestic products, nevertheless compete with some of them, even if only partially, indirectly or potentially (Case 356/85 Commission v Belgium [1987] ECR 3299, paragraphs 6 and 7).

42. Lastly, regarding the Italian Government’s argument to the effect that the Commission’s action is unfounded because the disputed tax was introduced with the sole aim of protecting the environment, in the light of, inter alia, the requirements of the precautionary principle, the Court notes that charges having equivalent effect to customs duties are prohibited irrespective of the purpose for which they were introduced and the destination of the revenue from them (see Case C‑72/03 Carbonati Apuani [2004] ECR I‑8027, paragraph 31).

31. The Court has held before that customs duties and charges having equivalent effect are prohibited regardless of the purpose for which they were introduced and the destination of the revenue from them (Case 24/68 Commission v Italy [1969] ECR 193, paragraph 7, and Simitzi , paragraph 14). None the less, the Court has accepted that a charge which represents payment for a service actually rendered to an economic operator, of an amount in proportion to that service, does not constitute a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty (Case 63/74 Cadsky [1975] ECR 281, paragraph 8; Case 158/82 Commission v Denmark [1983] ECR 3573, paragraph 19; and CRT France International , paragraph 17).

20 The concept of ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation covers all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and do not concern ‘matters relating to a contract’ within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of the regulation (see judgment of 28 January 2015 in Kolassa, C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

35. It should be emphasised that an action must be considered having regard only to the pleadings contained in the original applicat ion (Case C-256/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-2487, paragraph 31, and Case C-508/03 Commission v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I‑3969, paragraph 61).

31 Those submissions are inadmissible because they are contrary to Article 38(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure, under which the parties are required to state the subject-matter of the proceedings in the application initiating proceedings. Even though Article 42 of those Rules allows, subject to specific conditions, the introduction of new pleas in law, it is not permissible for a party to alter the very subject-matter of the proceedings. It follows that the merits of an application must be determined solely in the light of the submissions made in the application initiating the proceedings (see Case 232/78 Commission v France [1979] ECR 2729, paragraph 3).

24. By adopting the provisions of Article 19(2) of the Sixth Directive, the Community legislature thus intended to exclude from the calculation of the proportion the turnover attributable to a sale of goods where that sale is of an unusual nature in relation to the normal activities of the taxable person concerned and does not therefore require the use of goods or services for mixed use in a way that is proportionate to the turnover which it generates. As the Advocate General stated in point 68 of his Opinion, the inclusion of that turnover in the calculation of the deductible proportion would distort the resultant figure in the sense that it would no longer reflect the division of use of goods or services for mixed use as between taxable and exempt activities respectively.

38 Secondly, Article 5(1) of Directive 90/435 provides for exemption in the State of the subsidiary from withholding tax upon distribution of profits to its parent company, at least where the latter holds a minimum of 25% of the capital of the subsidiary (judgment of 3 April 2008, Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel, C‑27/07, EU:C:2008:195, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

26. Likewise, Article 5(1) of the directive provides, in order to avoid double taxation, for exemption in the State of the subsidiary from withholding tax upon distribution of profits to its parent company, at least where the latter holds a minimum of 25% of the capital of the subsidiary ( Denkavit and Others paragraph 22; Epson Europe , paragraph 20; Athinaiki Zithopiia , paragraph 25; and Océ Van der Grinten , paragraph 45).

50. It must be observed that the period available to the Commission in order to conduct the preliminary examination of planned aid and to decide whether it is necessary to initiate a contentious procedure has been set, both by the Community legislature in the Sixth Steel Aid Code and by the Court's case-law, at two months, in view of the Member State's interest in obtaining clarification quickly in spheres where there may be an urgent need to take action. It follows that the preliminary examination of planned aid must, in principle, be regarded as an urgent matter, unless the Member State concerned expressly agrees to an extension of the time allowed (see, to that effect, Austria v Commission , paragraph 76).

29. As regards, more specifically, the concept of unlawful removal from customs supervision, referred to in Article 203(1) of the Customs Code, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, that concept must be interpreted as covering any act or omission the result of which is to prevent, if only for a short time, the competent customs authority from gaining access to goods under customs supervision and from carrying out the monitoring required by the customs regulations (Case C‑371/99 Liberexim [2002] ECR I‑6227, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited; Case C‑222/01 British American Tobacco [2004] ECR I‑4683, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited; and Case C‑300/03 Honeywell Aerospace [2005] ECR I‑689, paragraph 19).

55 According to paragraph 47 of the judgment in D. Wandel that `removal' must be understood as encompassing any act or omission the result of which is to prevent, if only for a short time, the competent customs authority from gaining access to goods under customs supervision and from monitoring them as provided for by the Community customs rules.

17 It is common ground that imported used cars and those bought locally constitute similar or competing products and Article 95 therefore applies to the special consumer tax charged on the importation of used cars (see, to this effect, Case C-47/88 Commission v Denmark [1990] ECR I-4509, paragraph 17).

112. So far as concerns infringement of Article 47 of the Charter, pleaded by FLSmidth, it should be pointed out that, under the second paragraph of that provision, ‘[e]veryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law’. As the Court has repeatedly held, that article relates to the principle of effective judicial protection (see, inter alia, Der Grüne Punkt — Duales System Deutschland v Commission EU:C:2009:456, paragraph 179 and the case-law cited).

179. That right has, moreover, been reaffirmed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. As the Court of Justice has held on several occasions, that article relates to the principle of effective judicial protection (Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, paragraph 37; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 335; and Case C-47/07 P Masdar (UK) v Commission [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 50).

43 In the second place, in order to be categorised as a ‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, the protected works must also in fact be communicated to a ‘public’ (judgment of 7 March 2013, ITV Broadcasting and Others, C‑607/11, EU:C:2013:147, paragraph 31).

52. As regards the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, the Court has already held that the beneficiary of a subsidy cannot rely on such protection if it has not complied with one of the conditions to which the grant of the subsidy was subject (see, to that effect, judgment in Vereniging Nationaal Overlegorgaan Sociale Werkvoorziening and Others , EU:C:2008:165, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

56. In this respect, it should be pointed out that it has been held that the system of subsidies developed in the Community rules is based, inter alia, on compliance by the recipient with a series of conditions of entitlement to financial assistance. If the recipient does not fulfil all his obligations, it follows from Article 24(2) of Regulation No 4253/88 that the Commission is entitled to reconsider the scope of its obligations. With regard to the application of Article 23(1) of the regulation, in a case in which the recipient has not implemented the training programme in accordance with the conditions to which the grant of assistance was made subject, the recipient cannot rely on the principles of protection of legitimate expectations and acquired rights in order to secure payment of the balance of the assistance initially granted (see, to that effect, Case T‑142/97 Branco v Commission [1998] ECR II‑3567 paragraphs 97 and 105 (an appeal was dismissed by the order in Case C‑453/98 P Branco v Commission [1999] ECR I‑8037), and Case T‑182/96 Partex v Commission [1999] ECR II‑2673, paragraph 190 (an appeal was dismissed by the order of 8 March 2001 in Case C‑465/99 P, not published in the ECR)). Finally, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations may not be relied upon by a recipient which has committed a manifest infringement of the rules in force (see Case 67/84 Sideradria v Commission [1985] ECR 3983, paragraph 21).

33. In order to determine whether the conditions for the transfer of an organised economic entity are met, it is necessary to consider all the facts characterising the transaction in question, including in particular the type of undertaking or business, whether or not its tangible assets, such as buildings and movable property, are transferred, the value of its intangible assets at the time of the transfer, whether or not the majority of its employees are taken over by the new employer, whether or not its customers are transferred, the degree of similarity between the activities carried on before and after the transfer, and the period, if any, for which those activities were suspended (see Spijkers , cited above, paragraph 13, and Süzen , paragraph 14).

42. In fact, the Court has required, on the basis of the principle of effectiveness and notwithstanding rules of domestic law to the contrary, the national court to apply of its own motion certain provisions contained in European Union directives on consumer protection. That requirement has been justified by the consideration that the system of protection introduced by those directives is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge and that there is a real risk that the consumer, particularly because of a lack of awareness, will not rely on the legal rule that is intended to protect him (see, to that effect, as regards Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29), judgment in Mostaza Claro , C‑168/05, EU:C:2006:675, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited, and, as regards Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit (OJ 1987 L 42, p. 48), judgment in Rampion and Godard , C‑429/05, EU:C:2007:575, paragraph 65).

65. That aim could not be effectively achieved if the consumer were himself obliged to invoke the right to pursue remedies which he enjoys against the grantor of credit in accordance with the provisions of national law transposing Article 11(2) of Directive 87/102, in particular because of the real risk that the consumer may be unaware of his rights or may encounter difficulties in exercising them. As the Advocate General stated at point 107 of his Opinion, the fact that the main proceedings were brought by Mr and Mrs Rampion and that they are represented in those proceedings by a lawyer does not justify a different conclusion, as the issue must be settled independently of the specific circumstances of the case.

38. Pursuant to Article 63(2) of Regulation No 40/94, the Court of First Instance is called upon to assess the legality of the decisions of the Boards of Appeal of OHIM by reviewing their application of Community law, having regard, in particular, to the facts which were submitted to them (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2007 in Case C-311/05 P Naipes Heraclio Fournier v OHIM , paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

53. Moreover, the specific characteristics of court proceedings which take place under national law between sellers or suppliers and consumers cannot constitute a factor which is liable to affect the legal protection from which consumers must benefit under the provisions of Directive 93/13 (see, to that effect, judgments in Banco Español de Crédito , C‑618/10, EU:C:2012:349, paragraph 55 and case-law cited, and Aziz , EU:C:2013:164, paragraph 62).

62. As also observed by the referring court, it would thus be sufficient for sellers or suppliers, if the conditions are satisfied, to initiate such mortgage enforcement proceedings so as to deprive consumers, in essence, of the protection intended by the directive, that being also contrary to the Court’s case-law, according to which the specific characteristics of court proceedings, which take place under national law between sellers or suppliers and consumers, cannot constitute a factor which is liable to affect the legal protection from which consumers must benefit under the provisions of that directive (see, to that effect, Banco Español de Crédito , paragraph 55).

93. According to the Court’s settled case-law, where a national court does not provide to the Court the factual or legal material necessary to enable it to give a useful answer to the question submitted, that question must be rejected as inadmissible (see, to that effect, judgment in Belvedere Costruzioni , C‑500/10, EU:C:2012:186, paragraph 16, and order in Stefan , C‑329/13, EU:C:2014:815, paragraph 24).

71. Since the provisions applicable to the case in the main proceedings are manifestly erroneous and provide for several periods which could be taken into consideration, it should be recalled that the principle of legal certainty constitutes a general principle of Community law, requiring in particular that rules imposing charges on a taxpayer be clear and precise so that he may be able to ascertain unequivocally what his rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly (Case 169/80 Gondrand Frères and Garancini [1981] ECR 1931, paragraph 17; Joined Cases 92/87 and 93/87 Commission v France and United Kingdom [1989] ECR 405, paragraph 22; and Case C-143/93 Van Es Douane Agenten [1996] ECR I-431, paragraph 27).

17 THAT ARGUMENT MUST BE REJECTED . EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE INTERPRETATION ADVOCATED BY THE COMMISSION IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LOGIC OF THE SYSTEM OF MONETARY COMPENSATORY AMOUNTS , NEVERTHELESS IT IS FOR THE COMMUNITY LEGISLATURE TO ADOPT THE APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS . THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY REQUIRES THAT RULES IMPOSING CHARGES ON THE TAXPAYER MUST BE CLEAR AND PRECISE SO THAT HE MAY KNOW WITHOUT AMBIGUITY WHAT ARE HIS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AND MAY TAKE STEPS ACCORDINGLY .

44. In this regard, it is to be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that the different language versions of a text of European Union law must be given a uniform interpretation and hence, in the case of divergence between the language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part (Case C‑341/01 Plato Plastik Robert Frank [2004] ECR I‑4883, paragraph 64 and case-law cited).

169 In this context, the Council and the Commission are under an obligation to consider whether the injury on which they intend to base their conclusions does in fact derive from the dumped imports and must disregard any injury deriving from other factors, particularly from the conduct of Union producers themselves. To that end, it is for those institutions to ascertain whether the effects of those other factors were not such as to break the causal link between, on the one hand, the imports concerned and, on the other, the injury suffered by the Union industry. It is also for them to verify that the injury attributable to those other factors is not taken into account in the determination of injury. However, if the Council and the Commission find that, despite such factors, the injury caused by the dumped imports is material, the causal link between those imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry can consequently be established (see, to this effect, judgments in Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ and ENRC Marketing v Council, C‑10/12 P, EU:C:2013:865, paragraphs 23 to 25, and TMK Europe, C‑143/14, EU:C:2015:236, paragraphs 35 to 37).

37. However, if the EU institutions find that, despite such factors, the injury caused by the dumped imports is material under Article 3(1) of the basic regulation, the causal link between those imports and the injury suffered by the Community industry can consequently be established (see judgment in Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ and ENRC Marketing v Council , C‑10/12 P, EU:C:2013:865, paragraph 25 and the case law cited).

55. Moreover, it follows from the same case-law that in the case of acts adopted by a procedure involving several stages, and particularly where they are the culmination of an internal procedure, it is in principle only those measures which definitively determine the position of the Commission or the Council upon the conclusion of that procedure which are open to challenge and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision ( Netherlands v Commission , cited above, paragraph 26).

18. The Court concluded that, where the contested measure has ceased to have effect in the course of proceedings, its task is to assess in the light of the specific circumstances the applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings, taking account, in particular, of the consequences of the alleged unlawfulness and of the nature of the damage claimed to have been sustained (see, to that effect, judgment in Abdulrahim v Council and Commission , C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331, paragraphs 62 and 65).

62. In various circumstances the Court of Justice has acknowledged that an applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings does not necessarily disappear because the act challenged by him has ceased to have effect in the course of proceedings.

76. As the Court held in Engelmann , paragraph 30, the requirement of a particular legal form for operators of games of chance may, by virtue of the obligations binding certain kinds of company with respect in particular to their internal organisation, the keeping of their accounts, the scrutiny to which they may be subject and their relations with third parties, be justified by the objective of preventing money laundering and fraud, relied on by the Austrian Government in the present case.

25 The Court has consistently held (see, in particular, France and Ireland v Commission, cited above, paragraph 72), that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the EEC Treaty must be appropriate to the nature of the measure in dispute. It must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Community institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to make the persons concerned aware of the justification for the measure and enable the Court to exercise its power of review.

72 The Court has consistently held (see, inter alia, Case C-466/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others v Bundesamt fuer Ernaehrung und Forstwirtschaft [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 16) that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the EEC Treaty must be appropriate to the nature of the measure in question. The reasoning of the institution which adopted the measure must be stated clearly and unequivocally, so as to inform persons concerned of the justification for the measure adopted and to enable the Court to exercise its powers of review.

104. As the General Court correctly observed at paragraph 128 of the judgment under appeal, any person is entitled to claim compensation for the loss caused to him by a breach of Article 81 EC. Such a right strengthens the working of the EU competition rules, thereby making a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the European Union (see, to that effect, Case C‑453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I‑6297, paragraphs 26 and 27; Joined Cases C‑295/04 to C‑298/04 Manfredi and Others [2006] ECR I‑6619, paragraph 91; Case C‑360/09 Pfleiderer [2011] ECR I‑5161, paragraph 28; and Case C‑536/11 Donau Chemie and Others [2013] ECR, paragraph 23).

37. Where the action for annulment against an act adopted by an institution is brought by a natural or legal person, the Court of Justice had repeatedly held that the action lies only if the binding legal effects of that act are capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position (see, in particular, IBM v Commission , paragraph 9; Athinaïki Techniki v Commission , paragraph 29; Case C‑322/09 P NDSHT v Commission [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 45).

29. It is clear from settled case-law that an action for annulment for the purposes of Article 230 EC must be available in the case of all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position (see, inter alia, Case 60/81 IBM v Commission [1981] ECR 2639, paragraph 9; Case C-443/97 Spain v Commission [2000] ECR I-2415, paragraph 27; and Case C-131/03 P Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission [2006] ECR I-7795, paragraph 54). Preliminary observations on the subject-matter of actions for annulment brought before the Court of First Instance

47. En outre, il découle du libellé du point 4 de l’annexe III de la directive 2006/112 que ce point 4 ne vise que les équipements médicaux, le matériel auxiliaire et les autres appareils normalement destinés à soulager ou à traiter des handicaps et à l’usage personnel et exclusif des handicapés. À cet égard, il ressort du sens même des termes «personnel» et «exclusif» figurant audit point 4 que celui-ci ne vise pas les dispositifs à usage général (voir arrêt Commission/Espagne, C‑360/11, EU:C:2013:17, point 85).

13. In that regard, it must be pointed out, first, that the Court may, of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General or at the request of the parties, order the reopening of the oral procedure under Article 61 of its Rules of Procedure if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see Case C‑210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, paragraph 25; Case C‑138/05 Stichting Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie [2006] ECR I‑8339, paragraph 23; and order in Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] ECR I‑665, paragraph 18).

25. The Court may also, of its own motion, on a proposal from the Advocate General, or at the request of the parties, order the reopening of the oral procedure, in accordance with Article 61 of the Rules of Procedure, if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or that the case should be decided on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties (see Case C-309/99 Wouters and Others [2002] ECR I-1577, paragraph 42, and Case C-470/00 P Parliament v Ripa di Meana and Others [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 33). In the present case, however, the Court, after hearing the Advocate General, considers that it has all the information necessary for it to answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling. The application for the oral procedure to be reopened must therefore be dismissed. The questions referred for a preliminary ruling Question 2

18 As the Court stated in paragraph 14 of its judgment in Case 168/84 Berkholz v Finanzamt Hamburg-Mitte-Altstadt [1985] ECR 2251, Article 9 is designed to secure the rational delimitation of the respective areas covered by national VAT rules by determining in a uniform manner the place where services are deemed to be provided for tax purposes and in particular to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States.

199. With regard to determining whether the hunting regime laid down in Paragraph 51(2) of the KrntJagdG is consistent with Article 9(1)(c) of the Directive, particularly so far as concerns the requirement that derogations be limited to ‘small numbers’, it should be remembered that the Member States, when adopting measures transposing the latter provision, must ensure that, in all cases of application of the derogation provided for therein and for all the protected species, authorised hunting does not exceed a ceiling consistent with the restriction on that hunting to small numbers, and that ceiling must be determined on the basis of strict scientific data (see WWF Italia and Others , paragraph 29).

29. The answer to the first question must therefore be that Article 9(1)(c) of the Directive requires the Member States, irrespective of the internal allocation of powers prescribed by the national legal system, upon adoption of measures implementing that provision to ensure that, in all cases of application of the derogation provided for therein and for all the protected species, authorised hunting does not exceed a ceiling consistent with the restriction on that hunting to small numbers imposed by that provision, and that ceiling must be determined on the basis of strict scientific data. The second question

32 The application of the national rules of a Member State to providers of services established in other Member States must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which those rules pursue, and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (Arblade, paragraph 35, and Mazzoleni and ISA, paragraph 26).

33. The term ‘facilities’ and the expression ‘install’, used in Article 13, refer to the physical infrastructure enabling provision of electronic communications networks and services and to their physical installation on the public or private property concerned, respectively (see, to that effect, judgment in Vodafone España and France Telecom España , EU:C:2012:446, paragraph 32).

32. Second, as the Advocate General noted at points 52 and 54 of her Opinion, the terms ‘facilities’ and ‘install’ refer to the physical infrastructure enabling provision of electronic communications networks and services and to their physical installation on the public or private property concerned.

35. However, if the imposition of such compensatory measures is not provided for by the national legislation in force, it is apparent from the case‑law that a Member State which has failed to fulfil its obligation to transpose the provisions of a directive into national law can no more rely, as against Community citizens, upon the limitations laid down by those provisions than it can require that they perform the obligations laid down by that directive (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑6/90 and C‑9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 21, and Beuttenmüller , paragraph 63).

75 In that regard, it must be observed that access to the file in competition cases is intended in particular to enable the addressees of statements of objections to acquaint themselves with the evidence in the Commission's file so that on the basis of that evidence they can express their views effectively on the conclusions reached by the Commission in its statement of objections (Michelin v Commission, cited above, paragraph 7; Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, paragraphs 9 and 11; Case C-310/93 P BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission [1995] ECR I-865, paragraph 21; and Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraph 89).

7 IN THIS REGARD IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT THE NECESSITY TO HAVE REGARD TO THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENCE IS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF COMMUNITY LAW WHICH THE COMMISSION MUST OBSERVE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES WHICH MAY LEAD TO THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES UNDER THE RULES OF COMPETITION LAID DOWN IN THE TREATY . ITS OBSERVANCE REQUIRES INTER ALIA THAT THE UNDERTAKING CONCERNED MUST HAVE BEEN ENABLED TO EXPRESS ITS VIEWS EFFECTIVELY ON THE DOCUMENTS USED BY THE COMMISSION TO SUPPORT ITS ALLEGATION OF AN INFRINGEMENT .

21 It is apparent from the foregoing that the requirement that "Only the description in the language or languages of the country in which the goods are marketed may be used" is necessary for the protection of consumers and the Council has, therefore, not exceeded the limits of its discretion in the framework of its powers of harmonization by adopting the explanatory notes in question (see in particular Case 37/83 REWE-Zentrale v Landwirtschaftskammer Rheinland [1984] ECR 1229, paragraph 20).

56. Accordingly, it cannot be inferred from Article 2(2) of Decision 94/90 and the 1994 communication that the Secretary-General could not rely on grounds other than those on which he took a position in his initial decision. He was therefore entitled to undertake a full review of the applications for access and base the contested decision [not only on the exception based on the protection of the public interest (court proceedings) but also] on the authorship rule. " 8. In rejecting the plea alleging infringement of the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90, the Court of First Instance held: "66. ... it must be held that, so long as there is no rule of law of a higher order according to which the Commission was not empowered, in Decision 94/90, to exclude from the scope of the Code of Conduct documents of which it was not the author, the authorship rule can be applied. ... ... 69. It must be held, [as regards the interpretation of that rule] that the authorship rule, however it may be characterised, lays down an exception to the general principle of transparency in Decision 94/90. It follows that this rule must be construed and applied strictly, so as not to frustrate the application of the general principle of transparency (Case T-188/97 Rothmans International v Commission [1999] ECR II-2463, paragraphs 53 to 55). ... 73. It is clear, on examination of the five types of documents [referred to in the contested decision], that their authors are either the Member States or the Argentine authorities. 74. It follows that the Commission has applied the authorship rule correctly in taking the view that it was not required to grant access to those documents. It cannot, therefore, have committed an abuse of rights. ... " 9. The Court of First Instance also rejected the plea alleging infringement of Article 190 of the Treaty on the following grounds: "77. According to consistent case-law, the obligation to state reasons, laid down in Article 190 of the Treaty, means that the reasoning of the Community authority which adopted the contested measure must be shown clearly and unequivocally so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure in order to protect their rights and the Community judicature to exercise its power of review ... . 78. In the present case, in the contested decision the Commission referred to the authorship rule and informed the applicant that it should request a copy of the documents in question from the Member States concerned or the Argentine authorities. Such a statement of reasons shows clearly the reasoning of the Commission. The applicant was thus in a position to know the justification for the contested measure and the Court of First Instance is in a position to exercise its power to review the legality of that decision. Accordingly, the applicant is not justified in maintaining that a more specific statement of reasons was required (see Rothmans International v Commission , cited above, paragraph 37). " The appeal 10. By its appeal, Interporc claims that the Court should: ─ set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as, first, it rejects the claim for annulment of the contested decision in so far as it refuses access to documents emanating from the Member States or the Argentine authorities and, second, orders it to bear its own costs; ─ annul the contested decision in its entirety; ─ order the Commission to pay the costs of the appeal and the costs of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance. 11. Interporc relies on two pleas in support of its appeal. The first alleges that the Court of First Instance erred in law as regards the assessment made by the Commission of the request for access to the file (paragraphs 55 to 57 of the judgment under appeal). The second plea alleges, as its main argument, that the authorship rule is void on the ground that it infringes a rule of law of a higher order and, in the alternative, that that rule has been misinterpreted and misapplied and that the Commission has breached its obligation to state reasons laid down by Article 190 of the Treaty (paragraphs 65 to 79 of that judgment). 12. The Commission contends that the appeal should be dismissed as inadmissible and, in the alternative, as unfounded, and that the appellant should be ordered to bear the costs of the appeal. However, should the authorship rule be declared void, it requests that the effects of the Court's judgment be limited to the documents sent after delivery of that judgment. Admissibility of the appeal Arguments of the parties 13. The Commission contends that the appeal is inadmissible in its entirety. First, it is inadmissible in so far as Interporc seeks the annulment of the contested decision in its entirety. Since that decision has already been annulled in part by a judgment of the Court of First Instance which is enforceable in that respect, it cannot be annulled a second time in its entirety. Second, in support of the two pleas submitted, rather than indicating clearly the aspects of the judgment under appeal it takes issue with and the legal arguments intended specifically to support its claim for annulment, the appellant confines itself to repeating or reproducing verbatim the pleas and arguments already put before the Court of First Instance. 14. Interporc counters that, as the infringement of rules of law by the Court of First Instance is generally inseparable from the pleas in the action and the legal provisions cited in them, a fresh presentation of those pleas in the appeal is often inevitable. The Commission's position as regards the admissibility of the appeal thus tends to limit disproportionately the scope for bringing appeals. Furthermore, contrary to the Commission's submission, the pleas it relies on are supported by argument and criticise the reasoning of the Court of First Instance sufficiently clearly. Findings of the Court 15. To begin with, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it follows from Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, in particular, Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, paragraph 34, and Case C-248/99 P France v Monsanto and Commission [2002] ECR I-1, paragraph 68). 16. Thus, where an appeal merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance, including those based on facts expressly rejected by that Court, it fails to satisfy the requirements to state reasons under those provisions (see inter alia the order of 25 March 1998 in Case C-174/97 P FFSA and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-1303, paragraph 24). 17. However, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of Community law by the Court of First Instance, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal (Case C-210/98 P Salzgitter v Commission [2000] ECR I-5843, paragraph 43). Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the Court of First Instance, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (see inter alia the order of 10 May 2001 in Case C-345/00 P FNAB and Others v Council [2001] ECR I-3811, paragraphs 30 and 31, and the judgment in Case C-321/99 P ARAP and Others v Commission [2002] ECR I-4287, paragraph 49). 18. In the present case the appeal, taken as a whole, specifically seeks to challenge the position adopted by the Court of First Instance on various points of law raised before it at first instance. It indicates clearly the aspects of the judgment under appeal which are criticised and the pleas in law and arguments on which it is based. 19. It is clear from the appeal as a whole that, in support of its claim for annulment, the appellant challenges paragraphs 55 to 57 and 65 to 79 of the judgment under appeal, which constitute the essential basis for paragraphs 2 and 3 of the operative part of that judgment. That part of the judgment examines the contested decision only to the extent that, by that decision, the Commission refuses the appellant access to documents emanating from the Member States or the Argentine authorities. Thus, in asking the Court to "annul the contested decision in its entirety" , the appellant clearly intended to limit its claim for annulment to the part of the decision which had not already been annulled by the Court of First Instance. 20. As regards the first plea in particular, the appellant refers to paragraphs 55 to 57 of the contested judgment in order to demonstrate that the Court of First Instance was in breach of Community law in ruling that the Commission could adopt a further decision refusing access on the basis of the authorship rule. 21. As regards the second plea of the appeal, the appellant refers first to paragraphs 65 and 66 of the judgment under appeal in connection with the first part of that plea, then to paragraphs 69 and 70 of that judgment in connection with the second part of that plea and, finally, to paragraphs 77 to 79 of the judgment in connection with the third part of the plea. The appellant takes the view that the Court of First Instance disregarded a principle of law of a higher order relating to transparency, given an erroneous interpretation in law of the authorship rule and misapplied Article 190 of the Treaty respectively. 22. It follows that the Commission's argument regarding the inadmissibility of the appeal as a whole on the ground that it seeks the annulment of the contested decision in its entirety cannot be upheld. Similarly, the objection of inadmissibility raised against the first and second pleas, according to which the appellant merely repeats arguments already raised before the Court of First Instance, must be dismissed. 23. It follows from the foregoing that the appeal is admissible. Substance The first plea of an error of law by the Court of First Instance as regards the assessment made by the Commission of the request for access to the file Arguments of the parties 24. Interporc submits that, in the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance made an error of law in not accepting, as regards the reasons stated for the contested decision, that the Commission failed to assess carefully and impartially all the relevant matters of fact and of law in the case. Thus, the Court of First Instance did not correctly assess the appellant's argument that the decision is based on an incomplete legal appraisal of the possible grounds for refusal. On the contrary, the Court of First Instance expressly based the alleged lawfulness of the contested decision on the mistaken premiss that the Secretary-General had undertaken a full review of the application for access (see paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal). 25. In that regard Interporc points out that it had argued before the Court of First Instance that a request for access to documents, particularly a confirmatory application, must be the subject of a full and impartial examination by the Commission which must take account of all the grounds for refusal which the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90 allows. Only respect for that requirement makes effective judicial review of Community decisions possible, particularly where they fall within the remit of discretionary powers. 26. Moreover, according to the appellant, the Commission no longer had the right to base the contested decision on a new ground for refusal provided for by the Code of Conduct, such as the authorship rule, which it did not cite in its decision of 29 May 1996, which was annulled by the judgment in Interporc I . If that were not so, the Commission's practice would frustrate the subjective right of access to documents and create an unacceptable gap in protection by the courts since an individual would be obliged to bring actions until such time as the Commission had exhausted all the grounds for refusal liable to be used against that individual and could no longer justify a further refusal. 27. According to the Commission, the fact that, for procedural reasons, the decision of 29 May 1996 and the contested decision were based on a single ground for refusal, that is to say the protection of the public interest, or on that ground in conjunction with the authorship rule, does not of itself make those decisions incomplete. An administration has the right to base a decision on a single determinative ground, without it being necessary to take account of other possible grounds for refusal. Moreover, it is not acceptable that the Commission, following annulment by the Court of First Instance of a decision it has taken, should be effectively deprived of the right to cite relevant, and in fact mandatory, exceptions provided for by the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90. Findings of the Court 28. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that when the Court of First Instance annuls an act of an institution, that institution is required, under Article 176 of the Treaty, to take the measures necessary to comply with the Court's judgment. 29. In order to comply with a judgment annulling a measure and to implement it fully, the institution is required, according to settled case-law, to have regard not only to the operative part of the judgment but also to the grounds which led to the judgment and constitute its essential basis, in so far as they are necessary to determine the exact meaning of what is stated in the operative part. It is those grounds which, on the one hand, identify the precise provision held to be illegal and, on the other, indicate the specific reasons which underlie the finding of illegality contained in the operative part and which the institution concerned must take into account when replacing the annulled measure (Joined Cases 97/86, 99/86, 193/86 and 215/86 Asteris and Others v Commission [1988] ECR 2181, paragraph 27, and Case C-458/98 P Industrie des poudres sphériques v Council [2000] ECR I-8147, paragraph 81). 30. However, Article 176 of the Treaty requires the institution which adopted the annulled measure only to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment annulling its measure. Accordingly, that Article requires the institution concerned to ensure that any act intended to replace the annulled act is not affected by the same irregularities as those identified in the judgment annulling the original act (Case C-310/97 P Commission v AssiDomän Kraft Products and Others [1999] ECR I-5363, paragraphs 50 and 56). 31. Therefore, given that, as the Court of First Instance held at paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal, it followed from the judgment in Interporc I , first, that the decision of 29 May 1996 was deemed to have never existed and, second, that the Secretary-General was required, under Article 176 of the Treaty, to take a further decision, the Court of First Instance was correct in ruling, at paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal, that the Secretary-General was entitled to undertake a full review of the applications for access and, therefore, could rely, in the contested decision, on grounds other than those on which he based the decision of 29 May 1996, notably the authorship rule. 32. The possibility of a full review which the Court of First Instance mentions also implies that the Secretary-General was not supposed, in the contested decision, to reiterate all the grounds for refusal provided for by the Code of Conduct to adopt a decision correctly implementing the judgment in Interporc I , but had simply to base its decision on those it considered, in exercising its discretion, to be applicable in the case. 33. It follows that the first plea must be rejected. The first part of the second plea alleging that the authorship rule is void on the ground that it breaches a principle of law of a higher order Arguments of the parties 34. By the first part of its second plea, Interporc submits that the Court of First Instance, at paragraphs 65 and 66 of the judgment under appeal, erred in law in denying that the principle of transparency was a principle of law of a higher order. According to Interporc the authorship rule is unlawful in that it breaches the principles of transparency and of the review of administrative activity by the public, which are guaranteed by freedom of access to documents. The fact that those general principles of a higher order are fundamental to the Community legal order is now confirmed by Article 255 EC, read in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article A and Article F(1) of the Treaty on European Union (now, after amendment, the second paragraph of Article 1 EU and Article 6(1) EU). Strict adherence to those general principles is thus an essential factor in guaranteeing the democratic structure of the European Union and the legitimacy of the exercise of the Community's sovereignty. 35. Interporc submits that, under those principles, the Commission cannot evade its obligation to disclose the documents it holds, by confining itself to referring applicants to the authors of those documents, where the legal and technical conditions for the effective exercise of the right of access to those documents is not thereby guaranteed. 36. The Commission contends that, while transparency is a political principle which can be derived from the principle of democracy, that alone does not allow any principle of law to be inferred. 37. Moreover, even if there were a general principle of law relating to the transparency of access to documents, the appellant has not established that that principle is necessarily breached by the fact that the relevant rules allow access only to the documents drawn up by the institution concerned. Findings of the Court 38. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, at paragraphs 35 and 36 of its judgment in Case C-58/94 Netherlands v Council [1996] ECR I-2169, the Court held that there had been a progressive affirmation of individuals' right of access to documents held by public authorities, a right which has been reaffirmed at Community level on various occasions, in particular in the declaration on the right of access to information annexed (as Declaration 17) to the Final Act of the Treaty on European Union, which links that right with the democratic nature of the institutions. 39. Moreover, the importance of that right was confirmed by the developments in the Community legal framework after the adoption of the contested decision. Thus, first, Article 255(1) EC, which was inserted into the Community legal order by the Treaty of Amsterdam, provides that "[a]ny citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents ..." . Second, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43), adopted pursuant to Article 255 EC, lays down the principles and conditions for exercising that right in order to enable citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process, to guarantee that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system and to contribute to strengthening the principles of democracy and respect for fundamental rights. 40. As regards the validity of the authorship rule as provided for by the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90 which the Commission had to apply at the time of the adoption of the contested decision, the Court of First Instance pointed out, at paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal, that the Court, at paragraph 37 of the judgment in Netherlands v Council , cited above, held that so long as the Community legislature has not adopted general rules on the right of public access to documents held by the Community institutions, the institutions must take measures as to the processing of such requests by virtue of their power of internal organisation, which authorises them to take appropriate measures in order to ensure their internal operation in conformity with the interests of good administration. 41. In the light of that case-law, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal, that, so long as there was no rule of law of a higher order according to which the Commission was not empowered, in Decision 94/90, to exclude from the scope of the Code of Conduct documents of which it was not the author, the authorship rule could be applied. 42. As to that, it must be held that the Court of First Instance was right to cite paragraph 37 of the judgment in Netherlands v Council , cited above, and draw the conclusion that the authorship rule, as provided for by the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90, was enacted pursuant to the power of internal organisation which the Commission must exercise in accordance with the requirements of good administration, where no general rules on the subject have been adopted by the Community legislature. 43. Against that background, given the developments in this field as outlined at paragraphs 38 and 39 of this judgment, it must be held that the Court of First Instance did not err in law in holding, at paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal, that, in the absence, at the time when the contested decision was adopted, of a principle or general rules of Community law expressly providing that the Commission was not empowered, under its power of internal organisation, to enact the authorship rule as provided for by the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90, that rule could be applied in the case. 44. The first part of the second plea must therefore be rejected. The second part of the second plea, alleging misinterpretation and misapplication in law of the authorship rule Arguments of the parties 45. In the alternative, Interporc submits that the judgment under appeal is based on a misinterpretation and misapplication in law of the authorship rule, in that although the Court of First Instance accepted, at paragraph 69 of that judgment, the need to interpret that rule strictly, it did not do so in this case. 46. According to Interporc, in the light of the principle of the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission laid down by Decision 94/90, the authorship rule must be interpreted like the other exceptions provided for by the Code of Conduct. The Commission therefore can exercise a discretion in each individual case as regards recourse to the system of exceptions, a discretion which it exercises subject to review by the Community Courts. The Commission was thus required in this case to indicate for each of the documents concerned the reasons why disclosure would be contrary to the interest which must be protected. If the Court of First Instance had intended to interpret the authorship rule in a genuinely strict way it should have incorporated those principles in the authorship rule. 47. The Commission recognises that the authorship rule represents a limitation on the principle of the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission and must therefore, as far as possible, be interpreted strictly. However, the wording of that rule would plainly allow such a strict interpretation only if there were doubts as to the author of the documents. According to the Commission, there were manifestly no such doubts in the present case. Findings of the Court 48. The aim pursued by Decision 94/90 as well as being to ensure the internal operation of the Commission in conformity with the interests of good administration, is to provide the public with the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission, so that any exception to that right of access must be interpreted and applied strictly (see Joined Cases C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P Netherlands and Van der Wal v Commission [2000] ECR I-1, paragraph 27). 49. In that regard, it must be held that, under the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90, a strict interpretation and application of the authorship rule imply that the Commission must verify the origin of the document and inform the person concerned of its author so that he can make an application for access to that author. 50. As is clear from paragraphs 72 and 73 of the judgment under appeal, in the contested decision the Commission informs the appellant that the documents in respect of which it has made an application for access emanate either from the Member States or from the Argentine authorities and states that it must apply directly to the authors of those documents. 51. It follows that the Court of First Instance did not err in law in holding, at paragraph 74 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission applied the authorship rule correctly as provided for by the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90, in taking the view that it was not required to allow access to documents of which it was not the author. 52. The second part of the second plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded. The third part of the second plea alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons Arguments of the parties 53. Interporc submits that the Court of First Instance erred in law in holding, at paragraph 78 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had properly discharged the obligation to state reasons incumbent upon it under Article 190 of the Treaty. According to the appellant, the Court of First Instance was not in a position to ascertain, from the reasons given for the contested decision, whether the Commission had also exercised its discretion on the question of the possibility of exercising effectively the right of access to documents vis-à-vis the Member States and the Argentine authorities. 54. The Commission contends that it fulfilled the obligation to state reasons as derived from Article 190 of the Treaty. It contends that the argument supporting the third part of the second plea in the appeal concerning infringement of the obligation to state reasons is indissolubly linked to that supporting the second part of that plea. Findings of the Court 55. It must be observed that it is settled case-law that the statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community Court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 190 of the Treaty must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, in particular, Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink's France [1998] ECR I-1719, paragraph 63, and Case C-113/00 Commission v Spain [2002] ECR I-7601, paragraphs 47 and 48). 56. As regards a request for access to documents covered by Decision 94/90 and held by the Commission, the Commission, where it refuses access, must assess in each individual case whether they fall within the exceptions listed in the Code of Conduct adopted by the decision (see Netherlands and Van der Wal v Commission , cited above, paragraph 24).

48 Furthermore, that requirement must be appraised by reference to the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see France v Commission, cited above, paragraph 36, and Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraph 48).

33. As regards the scope of the regulation, the Court has held, at paragraph 51 of the judgment in Case C‑195/09 Synthon [2011] ECR I-0000, that Article 2 of Regulation No 1768/92 must be interpreted as meaning that a product, such as that at issue in the main proceedings giving rise to that judgment, which had been placed on the market in the Community as a medicinal product for human use before obtaining a marketing authorisation in accordance with Directive 65/65, and, in particular, without undergoing safety and efficacy testing, was not within the scope of Regulation No 1768/92 and could not therefore be the subject of an SPC.

218. Accordingly, the hunting regime for the Rackelhahn in Lower Austria should have been mentioned in the letter of formal notice given that, according to the Court’s case-law, this letter delimits the subject-matter of the dispute (see, to this effect, Case C-441/02 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I‑3449, paragraphs 59 and 60, and Case C‑150/04 Commission v Denmark [2007] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 66 and 67).

60. Consequently, the reasoned opinion and the proceedings brought by the Commission must be based on the same complaints as those set out in the letter of formal notice initiating the pre-litigation procedure (Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR I-5449, paragraph 55). The reasoned opinion and the application must be based on the same grounds and pleas, with the result that the Court cannot examine a ground of complaint which was not formulated in the reasoned opinion (Case 76/86 Commission v Germany [1989] ECR 1021, paragraph 8), which for its part must contain a cogent and detailed exposition of the reasons which led the Commission to the conclusion that the Member State concerned had failed to fulfil one of its obligations under the Treaty (see, in particular, Case C-350/02 Commission v Netherlands [2004] ECR I-6213, paragraph 20).

74 It is also necessary to cite as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the judgment of 7 May 2009 in Commission v Portugal (C‑530/07, EU:C:2009:292) will not be fully complied with, according to the statements of the Portuguese Republic, until 2019, which is equivalent to a delay of almost 20 years, in so far as the obligation to ensure that the secondary treatment of the urban waste water of the agglomeration of Matosinhos complied with EU law should have been fulfilled on 31 December 2000 at the latest. As it is, since the Portuguese Republic maintains that it will not be in a position to comply with all of its obligations under that directive until almost 20 years after that second date, the Court cannot but confirm the particularly lengthy character of an infringement which, in the light of the objective mentioned above, is also a matter of indisputable gravity (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 December 2012 in Commission v Ireland, C‑374/11, EU:C:2012:827, paragraph 38).

38. The Court has accordingly held that Article 58 of the 2003 Act of Accession precludes the obligations laid down in EU legislation which has not been published in the Official Journal of the European Union in the language of a new Member State, where that language is an official language of the European Union, from being imposed on individuals in that State, even though those persons could have learned of that legislation by other means ( Skoma-Lux , paragraph 51, and Balbiino , paragraph 30).

51. The answer to the first question must therefore be that Article 58 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession precludes the obligations contained in Community legislation which has not been published in the Official Journal of the European Union in the language of a new Member State, where that language is an official language of the Union, from being imposed on individuals in that State, even though those persons could have learned of that legislation by other means. The second question

42. It follows from the need for uniform application of Community law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Union, having regard to the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in question (see, by analogy, Case C-195/06 Österreichischer Rundfunk [2007] ECR I-8817, paragraph 24 and case-law cited).

11 IT MUST BE RECALLED IN THIS REGARD THAT , IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 15 OCTOBER 1980 , THE COURT HELD IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE OPERATIVE PART THAT REGULATION NO 652/76 WAS INVALID : ' IN SO FAR AS IT FIXES THE COMPENSATORY AMOUNTS APPLICABLE TO MAIZE STARCH ON A BASIS OTHER THAN THAT OF THE INTERVENTION PRICE OF MAIZE AFTER DEDUCTION OF THE PRODUCTION REFUND ON STARCH ; . . . IN SO FAR AS IT FIXES THE COMPENSATORY AMOUNTS APPLICABLE TO ALL THE DIFFERENT PRODUCTS OBTAINED BY THE PROCESSING OF A GIVEN QUANTITY OF THE SAME BASIC PRODUCT , SUCH AS MAIZE OR WHEAT , IN A SPECIFIED MANUFACTURING PROCESS AT A FIGURE APPRECIABLY HIGHER THAN THE COMPENSATORY AMOUNT FIXED FOR THAT GIVEN QUANTITY OF THE BASIC PRODUCT . . . ' . IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE OPERATIVE PART , THE COURT HELD THAT : ' THE FACT THAT THAT REGULATION IS INVALID RENDERS INVALID THE PROVISIONS OF THE SUBSEQUENT REGULATIONS OF THE COMMISSION , THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO ALTER THE MONETARY COMPENSATORY AMOUNTS APPLICABLE TO THE PRODUCTS REFERRED TO IN THE FOREGOING PARAGRAPH . '

52 IN THIS CASE IT IS NECESSARY TO APPLY BY ANALOGY THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 174 OF THE TREATY , WHEREBY THE COURT OF JUSTICE MAY STATE WHICH OF THE EFFECTS OF THE REGULATION WHICH IT HAS DECLARED VOID SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS DEFINITIVE , FOR THE SAME REASONS OF LEGAL CERTAINTY AS THOSE WHICH FORM THE BASIS OF THAT PROVISION . ON THE ONE HAND THE INVALIDITY OF THE REGULATION IN THIS CASE MIGHT GIVE RISE TO THE RECOVERY OF SUMS PAID BUT NOT OWED BY THE UNDERTAKINGS CONCERNED IN COUNTRIES WITH DEPRECIATED CURRENCIES AND BY THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES IN QUESTION IN COUNTRIES WITH HARD CURRENCIES WHICH , IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF UNIFORMITY OF THE RELEVANT NATIONAL LEGISLATION , WOULD BE CAPABLE OF CAUSING CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES IN TREATMENT , THEREBY CAUSING FURTHER DISTORTION IN COMPETITION . ON THE OTHER HAND , IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO APPRAISE THE ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM THE INVALIDITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE REGULATIONS IN QUESTION WITHOUT MAKING ASSESSMENTS WHICH THE COMMISSION ALONE IS REQUIRED TO MAKE UNDER REGULATION NO 974/71 , HAVING REGARD TO OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS , FOR EXAMPLE THE APPLICATION OF THE ' ' GREEN RATE ' ' TO THE PRODUCTION REFUND .

64. While those rights include the freedom for recipients of services to go to another Member State in order to receive a service there without being obstructed by restrictions ( Ciola , paragraph 11, and Case C‑55/98 Vestergaard [1999] ECR I‑7641, paragraph 20), it is also apparent from settled case-law of the Court that the recipient of services may rely on those rights even if neither he nor the service provider moves within the Community (see, to that effect, Eurowings Luftverkehr , paragraph 34; Case C‑243/01 Gambelli and Others [2003] ECR I‑13031, paragraphs 55 and 57; and Case C‑36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I‑9609, paragraph 25).

65 That interpretation is also confirmed by settled case-law of the Court (see Kziber, cited above, paragraphs 15 to 23, confirmed by Case C-58/93 Yousfi [1994] ECR I-1353, paragraphs 16 to 19; Case C-103/94 Krid [1995] ECR I-719, paragraphs 21 to 24; Case C-126/95 Hallouzi-Choho v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1996] ECR I-4807, paragraphs 19 and 20; and Case C-113/97 Babahenini [1998] ECR I-183, paragraphs 17 and 18) relating to the principle of equal treatment contained in Article 39(1) of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, signed in Algiers on 26 April 1976 and concluded on behalf of the Community by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2210/78 of 26 September 1978 (OJ 1978 L 263, p. 1) and to Article 41(1) of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, signed in Rabat on 26 April 1976 and concluded on behalf of the Community by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2211/78 (OJ 1978 L 264, p. 1).

18 Since the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had expressly requested the Court to reconsider that case-law, it should be emphasized, as the Advocate General pointed out at paragraphs 6 and 7 of his Opinion, that the observations submitted in the context of this case have provided no new factor which might induce the Court to go back on the position which it adopted in the Kziber judgment cited above.

5 It ought to be noted at the outset that, according to the established case-law of the Court, Article 95 of the Treaty lays down a prohibition of discriminatory taxation of imported goods. That prohibition produces direct effects and creates for individuals personal rights which national courts are bound to protect (see, in particular, paragraph 46 of the judgment in Case 15/81 Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Roosendaal [1982] ECR 1409 - the first Gaston Schul case).

54. The five-year limitation period referred to in that provision cannot begin to run until all the requirements governing the obligation to provide compensation for damage are satisfied and, in particular, until the damage to be made good has materialised. Therefore, in cases where, as in this instance, the liability of the Community has its origin in a legislative measure, that period of limitation does not begin until the damaging effects of that measure have arisen and, therefore, until the time at which the persons concerned were bound to have suffered certain damage (see, in particular, Joined Cases 256/80, 257/80, 265/80, 267/80 and 5/81 Birra Wührer and Others v Council and Commission [1982] ECR 85, paragraph 10, and Case C-282/05 P Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission [2007] ECR I‑2941, paragraph 29).

29. The period of limitation for an action for liability of the Community cannot begin until all the requirements governing an obligation to provide compensation for damage are satisfied and, in particular, until the damage to be made good has materialised. Therefore, where the liability of the Community has its origin in a legislative measure, that period of limitation does not begin until the damaging effects of that measure have arisen.

33 The Court has consistently held that wherever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied upon by an individual against the State in proceedings before the national courts where the State has failed to transpose the directive into national law by the end of the period prescribed or has failed to do so correctly (see, inter alia, Case C-236/92 Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava and Others [1994] ECR I-483, paragraph 8).

23. The matter would be different only if the provision of Community law which was submitted for interpretation by the Court was not applicable to the facts of the main proceedings, which had occurred before the accession of a new Member State to the Union (see, to this effect, Case C‑302/04 Ynos [2006] ECR I‑371, paragraphs 35 and 36) or if such provision was manifestly incapable of applying (see Reisdorf , paragraph 16).

16 The matter would be different only if it were apparent either that the procedure provided for in Article 177 had been diverted from its true purpose and was being used in fact to lead the Court to give a ruling by means of a contrived dispute, or that the provision of Community law referred to the Court for interpretation was manifestly incapable of applying (see to that effect Case C-67/91, paragraph 26, and Case C-62/93, paragraph 10, both cited above). That is not so in this case.

43. Ainsi qu’il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour, lorsque le législateur de l’Union a fait un renvoi exprès à la législation, aux conventions collectives ou aux pratiques en vigueur dans les États membres, il n’appartient pas à la Cour de donner aux termes employés une définition autonome et uniforme, au titre du droit de l’Union, à la notion en cause (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 18 janvier 1984, Ekro, 327/82, Rec. p. 107, point 14).

60. Nevertheless, according to the Court’s established case-law, where national legislation falling within an area which has not been completely harmonised at European Union level is applicable without distinction to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the Member State concerned, it may, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services, be justified where it meets an overriding requirement relating to the public interest and that interest is not already safeguarded by the rules to which the service provider is subject in the Member State in which he is established and in so far as it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the aim which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Arblade and Others , paragraphs 34 and 35, and Case C-168/04 Commission v Austria [2006] ECR I‑9041, paragraph 37).

37. However, where national legislation falling within an area which has not been harmonised at Community level is applicable without distinction to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the Member State concerned, it may, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services, be justified where it meets an overriding requirement relating to the public interest and that interest is not already safeguarded by the rules to which the service provider is subject in the Member State in which he is established and in so far as it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Joined Cases C‑369/96 and C‑376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraphs 34 and 35, and Portugaia Construções , paragraph 19).

33 It must be borne in mind, as a preliminary point, that, as the Court has held, the legality of a decision concerning aid is to be assessed in the light of the information available to the Commission when the decision was adopted (Case 234/84 Commission v Belgium [1986] ECR 2263, paragraph 16).

32. Under Article 234 EC the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the validity and interpretation of acts of the Community institutions, regardless of whether they are directly applicable (see, to that effect, Case 111/75 Mazzalai [1976] ECR 657, paragraph 7, and Case C-373/95 Maso and Others [1997] ECR I-4051, paragraph 28).

7 ATTENDU QU ' AUX TERMES DE L ' ARTICLE 177 LA COUR EST COMPETENTE POUR STATUER , A TITRE PREJUDICIEL , SUR L ' INTERPRETATION DES ACTES PRIS PAR LES INSTITUTIONS DE LA COMMUNAUTE , INDEPENDAMMENT DU FAIT QU ' ILS SOIENT DIRECTEMENT APPLICABLES OU NON ;

39. Ce principe exige que la loi définisse clairement les infractions et les peines qui les répriment. Cette condition se trouve remplie lorsque le justiciable peut savoir, à partir du libellé de la disposition pertinente et au besoin à l’aide de l’interprétation qui en est donnée par les tribunaux, quels actes et omissions engagent sa responsabilité pénale (voir arrêt Advocaten voor de Wereld, précité, point 50).

27 It must be borne in mind that the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure of the Court make no provision for parties to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (judgment of 4 September 2014 in Vnuk, C‑162/13, EU:C:2014:2146, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

30. Furthermore, as regards the criticisms made of the Advocate General’s Opinion, it must be borne in mind, firstly, that the Statute of the Court and the Rules of Procedure of the Court make no provision for interested parties to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (order Emesa Sugar , C‑17/98, EU:C:2000:69, paragraph 2, and Döhler Neuenkirchen , C‑262/10, EU:C:2012:559, paragraph 29).

38. In that respect, it must be pointed out that the purpose of Directive 2003/88 is to lay down minimum requirements intended to improve the living and working conditions of workers through approximation of national rules concerning, in particular, the duration of working time, by ensuring that they are entitled to minimum rest periods – particularly daily and weekly – and adequate breaks and by providing for a ceiling on the average duration of the working week (see, to that effect, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I‑8835, paragraph 76, and Case C‑429/09 Fuß [2010] ECR I‑12167, paragraph 43).

23 The prohibition covers not only charges paid for the registration of new companies, but also duties payable by companies for the registration of increases in capital since these, too, are levied on account of an essential formality connected with the legal form of the companies in question. While registration of an increase in capital is not, strictly speaking, a formality required before the commencement of business by a capital company, it is none the less necessary for the carrying on of that business (Case C-188/95 Fantask and Others v Industriministeriet [1997] ECR I-6783, paragraph 22, and Modelo I, paragraph 25).

20 According to the Portuguese Government, the Fund is responsible for paying the fixed portion of the salaries payable to notaries and other civil servants; it also meets the cost of training notaries and of acquiring office space and equipment for them; and, subject to authorisation from the Ministry of Justice, it covers other expenditure in the field of legal administration.

86. As the Portuguese Government points out, the Court has held that national measures which restrict the freedom to provide services, which are applicable without distinction and are justified by overriding reasons relating to the public interest - as is the case here, as is evident from paragraphs 68 and 72 to 75 of this judgment - must, nevertheless, be such as to guarantee the achievement of the intended aim and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve it (Case C-288/89 Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda [1991] ECR I-4007, paragraphs 13 to 15, and Läärä and Others , cited above, paragraph 31).

14. In support of its request before the national court, X AB in essence contended that, on account of the Swedish legislation, the investments that it made in Y Ltd were more risky than comparable domestic investments. Its argument is based mainly on the idea that an investment in Swedish Krona made in a Swedish limited company would not be subject to any uncertainty equivalent to the exchange risk to which an investment in another Member State can be subject. The Swedish tax system would, on that account, constitute an impediment to the free movement of capital and to the freedom of establishment, as the Court held in the judgment in Deutsche Shell (C‑293/06, EU:C:2008:129) the reasoning in which can be applied to the case in the main proceedings.

43. Freedom of establishment cannot be understood as meaning that a Member State is required to draw up its tax rules on the basis of those in another Member State in order to ensure, in all circumstances, taxation which removes any disparities arising from national tax rules, given that the decisions made by a company as to the establishment of commercial structures abroad may be to the company’s advantage or not, according to circumstances (see, by analogy, Case C‑403/03 Schempp [2005] ECR I‑6421, paragraph 45).

109. Furthermore, first, the aforesaid presumption is based on the fact that, save in quite exceptional circumstances, a company holding all, or almost all, the capital of a subsidiary can, by dint merely of holding it, exercise decisive influence over that subsidiary’s conduct and, second, it is within the sphere of operations of those entities against which the presumption operates that evidence of the lack of actual exercise of that power to influence is generally apt to be found. The presumption is, however, rebuttable and the entities wishing to rebut it may adduce all factors relating to the economic, organisational and legal links tying the subsidiary to the parent company that they consider to be capable of demonstrating that the subsidiary and the parent company do not constitute a single economic entity, but that the subsidiary acts independently on the market (see Case C‑286/98 P Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission [2008] ECR I‑9925, paragraph 29; Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission , paragraph 61; and Elf Aquitaine v Commission , paragraphs 57 and 65).

40. In that respect it is sufficient to point out that, even if, in the areas which fall outside the scope of the Community’s competence, the Member States are still free, in principle, to lay down the conditions governing the existence and exercise of the rights in question, the fact remains that, when exercising that competence, the Member States must nevertheless comply with Community law (see, by analogy, in relation to social security, Case C‑120/95 Decker [1998] ECR I‑1831, paragraphs 22 and 23, and Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I‑1931, paragraphs 18 and 19; in relation to direct taxation, Case C‑334/02 Commission v France [2004] ECR I‑2229, paragraph 21, and Case C‑446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I‑10837, paragraph 29).

18 In the absence of harmonisation at Community level, it is therefore for the legislation of each Member State to determine, first, the conditions concerning the right or duty to be insured with a social security scheme (Case 110/79 Coonan v Insurance Officer [1980] ECR 1445, paragraph 12, and Case C-349/87 Paraschi v Landesversicherungsanstalt Württemberg [1991] ECR I-4501, paragraph 15) and, second, the conditions for entitlement to benefits (Joined Cases C-4/95 and C-5/95 Stöber and Piosa Pereira v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1997] ECR I-511, paragraph 36).

21. It is clear from that case-law that, if it sufficed, in order to qualify for payment of the refund, for the goods exported in the unaltered state simply to be unloaded in the non-member country, the raison d’être of the differentiated system would be disregarded ( SGS Belgium and Others , paragraph 39). On the contrary, as the Commission points out, the differentiation system requires that the product in question effectively and definitively reaches the country of destination, in the sense that it can be marketed there. That system is thus distinct from the single-rate refund system.

67. Accordingly, the date on which the national authorities became aware of an irregularity is irrelevant to the starting point of that limitation period. Apart from the fact that there is nothing in the wording of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 enabling an inference to the contrary, it has already been pointed out, in paragraph 64 of the present judgment, that the national administration has a general obligation of due diligence in the verification of payments which it makes from the EU budget, which means that it must take steps to rectify irregularities promptly (see, to that effect, judgments in Z e Fu Fleischhandel and Vion Trading , C‑201/10 and C‑202/10, EU:C:2011:282, paragraph 44, and Cruz & Companhia , C‑341/13, EU:C:2014:2230, paragraph 62).

62. The Court pointed out in that context that that service owes a general obligation of diligence when verifying the legality of payments made by it that are borne by the European Union budget, given that the Member States must observe the obligation of general diligence under Article 4(3) EU, an obligation which entails that they must take steps to rectify irregularities promptly. In those circumstances, providing Member States with the possibility of granting the public service a much longer period within which to act than that laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 could, in a certain way, encourage inertia on the part of the national authorities in bringing proceedings in respect of ‘irregularities’ within the meaning of Article 1 of Regulation No 2988/95, whilst exposing operators, firstly, to a long period of legal uncertainty and, secondly, to the risk of no longer being in a position to prove at the end of such a period that the transactions in question were lawful (see, to that effect, judgment in Ze Fu Fleischhandel and Vion Trading , EU:C:2011:282, paragraphs 44 and 45).

31. In that regard, it must be recalled, first of all, that in paragraphs 59 to 68 of the judgment in Käserei Champignon Hofmeister , cited above, the Court has already accepted that the sanction is proportionate. In paragraph 68, the Court held that the sanction prescribed in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 3665/87 does not breach the principle of proportionality, since it cannot be considered either to be inappropriate for attaining the objective pursued by Community law, namely to combat irregularities and fraud, or to go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.

31 However, the Court has consistently held that where, in application of Article 100 of the EEC Treaty, Community directives provide for the harmonization of the measures necessary to ensure inter alia the protection of animal and human health and establish Community procedures to check that they are observed, invoking Article 36 is no longer justified and the appropriate checks must be carried out and protective measures adopted within the framework outlined by the harmonizing directive (see the judgments in Case 5/77 Tedeschi v Denkavit [1977] ECR 1555, paragraph 15, Case 148/78 Ratti [1979] ECR 1629, paragraph 36, Case 251/78 Denkavit [1979] ECR 3369, paragraph 14, and Case 190/87 Moormann [1988] ECR 4689, paragraph 10).

14 THE COURT OF JUSTICE HAS HELD IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 5 OCTOBER 1977 IN CASE 5/77 CARLO TEDESCHI V DENKAVIT COMMERCIALE S . R . L . ( 1977 ) ECR 1556 THAT ARTICLE 36 IS NOT DESIGNED TO RESERVE CERTAIN MATTERS TO THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF MEMBER STATES BUT ONLY PERMITS NATIONAL LAWS TO DEROGATE FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH DEROGATION IS AND CONTINUES TO BE JUSTIFIED FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES REFERRED TO IN THAT ARTICLE . CONSEQUENTLY WHEN , IN APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 100 OF THE TREATY , COMMUNITY DIRECTIVES PROVIDE FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE THE PROTECTION OF ANIMAL AND HUMAN HEALTH AND WHEN THEY ESTABLISH PROCEDURES TO CHECK THAT THEY ARE OBSERVED , RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 36 IS NO LONGER JUSTIFIED AND THE APPROPRIATE CHECKS MUST BE CARRIED OUT AND THE PROTECTIVE MEASURES ADOPTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OUTLINED BY THE HARMONIZING DIRECTIVE .

40. As rightly submitted by the Netherlands Government, the CISA does not lay down an order of priority amongst the different provisions, and, in addition, Article 71 of the Convention does not contain any element which might restrict the scope of Article 54, which enshrines, within the Schengen territory, the ne bis in idem principle, which is recognised in the case-law as a fundamental principle of Community law (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission [2002] ECR I-8375, paragraph 59).

42. That said, it is for the referring court to identify which national rules are applicable to the dispute before it and to do whatever lies within its jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that Article 3(5) of Directive 1999/44 is fully effective and to achieving an outcome which is consistent with the objective pursued by that directive (see, to that effect, Case C‑282/10 Dominguez [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

27. In that regard, it should be noted that the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with European Union law also requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that the directive in question is fully effective and achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see Case C‑212/04 Adeneler and Others [2006] ECR I‑6057, paragraph 111, and Angelidaki and Others , paragraph 200).

44. It follows from the foregoing that the option given to Member States by the second subparagraph of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive presupposes that those Member States adequately define the nature or the purpose of the goods and services in respect of which the right to deduct is excluded in order to ensure that that option is not used to authorise general exclusions from that system (see, to that effect, PARAT Automotive Cabrio , paragraph 29).

54 It was in that context that the Court observed, in paragraphs 29 and 30 of Taflan-Met, comparing Regulations No 1408/71 and its implementing regulation, No 574/72, with Decision No 3/80, that, even though the Decision refers specifically to certain provisions of the two regulations, the Decision does not contain a large number of precise, detailed provisions, deemed indispensable for the purpose of implementing Regulation No 1408/71 within the Community. It emphasised in paragraph 32 in particular that, whilst Decision No 3/80 sets out the fundamental principle of aggregation for the branches sickness and maternity, invalidity, old age, death grants and family benefits by reference to Regulation No 1408/71, supplementary implementing measures of the kind set out in Regulation No 574/72 must be adopted before that principle can be applied. The Court pointed out, at paragraphs 35 and 36, that such measures as well as detailed provisions relating, inter alia, to prevention of overlapping benefits and to determination of the applicable legislation, appear only in the proposal for a Council (EEC) Regulation implementing within the European Economic Community Decision No 3/80 submitted by the Commission on 8 February 1983, which has not yet been adopted by the Council. It concluded that, until adoption of those implementing measures, the coordinating rules in Decision No 3/80 on which the plaintiffs had based their claims could not be relied on by them directly before the national courts of a Member State.

35 That proposal for a regulation states that it is a measure intended to implement Decision No 3/80 in the Community. Article 1 provides that "Decision No 3/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council ..., annexed to this Regulation, shall be applicable within the Community". To that end, it embodies some 80 articles and seven annexes containing "supplementary detailed rules for implementing Decision No 3/80", which lay down detailed rules with a view to the application of the provisions of the Decision in respect of each category of benefits coming within its scope. They also contain particulars relating, among other things, to prevention of overlapping benefits, determining the applicable legislation and aggregation of periods, together with financial and transitional provisions. Those provisions implementing Decision No 3/80 are based to a large degree on those contained in Regulation No 574/72. Thus, as far as the principle of aggregation is concerned, the content of Article 13 of the proposal for a regulation corresponds closely to that of Article 15 of Regulation No 574/72.

38 Finally, as regards the alleged ambiguity of the subject matter of the present action, it should be recalled that, in accordance with Article 120(c) of the Rules of Procedure and the related case-law, an application initiating proceedings must state the subject matter of the proceedings, the pleas in law and arguments relied on and a summary of those pleas in law. That statement must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare his defence and the Court to rule on the application. It is therefore necessary for the essential points of fact and of law on which a case is based to be indicated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself and for the form of order sought to be set out unambiguously so that the Court does not rule ultra petita or fail to rule on a complaint (judgments of 11 July 2013, Commission v Czech Republic, C‑545/10, EU:C:2013:509, paragraph 108 and the case-law cited; of 23 February 2016, Commission v Hungary, C‑179/14, EU:C:2016:108, paragraph 141; and of 22 September 2016, Commission v Czech Republic, C‑525/14, EU:C:2016:714, paragraph 16).

22. As regards the first argument, it is settled case-law that the legality of an EU measure must be assessed on the basis of the facts and the law as they stood at the time when the measure was adopted (judgments in Agrana Zucker , C‑309/10, EU:C:2011:531, paragraphs 31 and 45 and the case-law cited, and Schaible , C‑101/12, EU:C:2013:661, paragraph 50). In particular, the Court places itself at the time when the EU measure at issue was adopted in order to examine whether the conditions permitting recourse to Article 95 EC as a legal basis were met (see judgments in Arnold André , C‑434/02, EU:C:2004:800, paragraph 38; Swedish Match , C‑210/03, EU:C:2004:802, paragraph 37; Germany v Parliament and Council , C‑380/03, EU:C:2006:772, paragraphs 45 to 51 and 55; and Vodafone and Others , C‑58/08, EU:C:2010:321, paragraphs 39 and 41).

51. It follows that, at the time of the Directive’s adoption, disparities existed between national rules on advertising and sponsorship in respect of tobacco products which justified intervention by the Community legislature.

36. It follows that, by virtue of that provision, the Member States have a certain discretion as to how they achieve that objective, provided nevertheless that they guarantee the result imposed by EU law, as is clear not only from the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU, but also from the first paragraph of Article 2 of Directive 1999/70 read in the light of recital 17 in the preamble to that directive (see, to that effect, Adeneler and Others , paragraph 68; order of 12 June 2008 in Case C‑364/07 Vassilakis and Others , paragraph 87; and Joined Cases C‑378/07 to C‑380/07 Angelidaki and Others [2009] ECR I‑3071, paragraph 80).

41. According to settled case-law, all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions within the meaning of Article 28 EC and are therefore in principle prohibited (Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5, and Case C-322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 66).

66. In that regard, there is settled case-law to the effect that all measures which are capable of hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be regarded as measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions and, on that basis, as prohibited by Article 28 EC (see Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5, and Case C-420/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-6445, paragraph 25).

41 As a preliminary point, as regards the distortion alleged by The Tea Board, it should be recalled that, given the exceptional nature of a complaint of distortion, Article 256 TFEU, Article 58, first paragraph, of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice require, in particular, that an appellant indicate precisely the elements alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in its view, led to that distortion. Such a distortion must be obvious from the documents in the file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and evidence (judgment of 11 May 2017, Yoshida Metal Industry v EUIPO, C‑421/15 P, EU:C:2017:360, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

38 It is true that the increase in the use of renewable energy sources for the production of electricity constitutes one of the important components of the package of measures needed in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which are amongst the main causes of climate change that the European Union and its Member States have pledged to combat, and to comply, in particular, with the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Such an increase is also designed to protect the health and life of humans, animals and plants, which are among the public interest grounds listed in Article 36 TFEU. Moreover, it is also clear from Article 194(1)(c) TFEU that the development of renewable energy is one of the objectives that must guide EU energy policy (judgment of 1 July 2014, Ålands Vindkraft, C‑573/12, EU:C:2014:2037, paragraphs 78 to 81).

80. As the Court has pointed out, such an increase is also designed to protect the health and life of humans, animals and plants, which are among the public interest grounds listed in Article 36 TFEU (see, to that effect, PreussenElektra , EU:C:2001:160, paragraph 75).

32. It is therefore sufficient, for there to be ‘removal from customs supervision’, for the goods in question to have been objectively removed from possible controls, whether or not such controls have actually been carried out by the competent authority ( British American Tobacco EU:C:2004:250, paragraph 55).

15 S'agissant plus spécifiquement de la politique agricole commune et de la politique communautaire de l'environnement, la jurisprudence ne fournit aucun élément de droit permettant de faire en principe prévaloir l'une sur l'autre. Elle précise qu'une mesure communautaire ne saurait relever de l'action de la Communauté en matière d'environnement en raison du seul fait qu'elle tient compte des exigences de protection visées à l'article 130 R, paragraphe 2, du traité CE (arrêt du 29 mars 1990, Grèce/Conseil, C-62/88, Rec. p. I-1527, point 20). Les articles 130 R et 130 S laissent entières les compétences que la Communauté détient en vertu d'autres dispositions du traité et ne fournissent une base juridique que pour des actions spécifiques en matière d'environnement (voir, pour l'utilisation des filets maillants dérivants réglementée dans le cadre de la politique agricole commune, arrêt du 24 novembre 1993, Mondiet, C-405/92, Rec. p. I-6133, points 25 à 27). Doivent, en revanche, être fondées sur l'article 130 S du traité les dispositions qui relèvent spécifiquement de la politique de l'environnement (voir, pour des directives portant sur l'élimination des déchets, arrêt du 17 mars 1993, Commission/Conseil, précité), même si elles ont des incidences sur le fonctionnement du marché intérieur (voir, pour un règlement sur le transfert des déchets, arrêt du 28 juin 1994, Parlement/Conseil, C-187/93, Rec. p. I-2857, points 24 à 26) ou si elles poursuivent un objectif d'amélioration de la production agricole (voir, pour une directive concernant des produits phytopharmaceutiques, arrêt du 18 juin 1996, Parlement/Conseil, C-303/94, Rec. p. I-2943).

26 That is the position in the present case. As the Advocate General has pointed out in paragraphs 44 and 45 of his Opinion, the aim of the Regulation is not to define those characteristics of waste which will enable it to circulate freely within the internal market, but to provide a harmonized set of procedures whereby movements of waste can be limited in order to secure protection of the environment.

31. According to that case-law, the aim of Directive 2001/23 is to ensure continuity of employment relationships within an economic entity, irrespective of any change of ownership. The decisive criterion for establishing the existence of a transfer within the meaning of that directive is, therefore, whether the entity in question retains its identity, as indicated inter alia by the fact that its operation is actually continued or resumed (see, inter alia, Case 24/85 Spijkers [1986] ECR 1119, paragraphs 11 and 12; Case C-13/95 Süzen [1997] ECR I-1259, paragraph 10 and Case C‑340/01 Abler and Others [2003] ECR I-14023, paragraph 29).

275. In the present case, the General Court did not, therefore, commit any error of law in holding, in paragraph 310 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had been entitled to characterise the infringement committed by the appellant as serious for the period from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2001, since, by strengthening the barriers to entry to the recently liberalised markets, the pricing practices at issue were jeopardising the proper functioning of the internal market. As is apparent from the case-law of the Court, exclusionary practices of dominant undertakings, such as the practice at issue in the present case, are particularly serious infringements of Article 82 EC (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v Commission [1974] ECR 223, paragraph 51, and AKZO v Commission , paragraph 162).

162 In that respect it must be observed that the infringement committed by AKZO is particularly serious, since the behaviour complained of was intended to prevent a competitor from extending its activity into a market in which AKZO held a dominant position.

39. On this point, it should be recalled that in Commission v France , paragraph 21, Commission v Greece , paragraph 17, and González Sánchez , paragraph 30, the Court held, after analysing the wording, purpose and structure of the Directive, that Article 13 could not be interpreted as leaving it open to the Member States to maintain a general system of product liability different from that provided for in the Directive.

55. That condition is based on the idea that the exercise of the right of residence for citizens of the Union can be subordinated to the legitimate interests of the Member States – in the present case, the protection of their public finances (see, by analogy, Case C‑413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I‑7091, paragraph 90; Zhu and Chen , paragraph 32; and Case C‑408/03 Commission v Belgium [2006] ECR I‑2647, paragraphs 37 and 41).

32. Moreover, the limitations and conditions referred to in Article 18 EC and laid down by Directive 90/364 are based on the idea that the exercise of the right of residence of citizens of the Union can be subordinated to the legitimate interests of the Member States. Thus, although, according to the fourth recital in the preamble to Directive 90/364, beneficiaries of the right of residence must not become an ‘unreasonable’ burden on the public finances of the host Member State, the Court nevertheless observed that those limitations and conditions must be applied in compliance with the limits imposed by Community law and in accordance with the principle of proportionality (see, in particular, Baumbast and R , paragraphs 90 and 91).

83. First, the Court has already noted that SNEs who work at the Commission on an ad hoc basis are not covered by the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities (see, also, judgment of 24 January 2008 in Case C-211/06 P Adam v Commission , paragraph 52).

81. However, where the difference is of minor importance, appropriate labelling should be sufficient to provide the purchaser or consumer with the necessary information (see, inter alia , Case C-269/89 Bonfait [1990] ECR I-4169, paragraph 15; Case C-383/97 van der Laan [1999] ECR I-731, paragraph 24; Geffroy , paragraph 23; and Guimont , paragraph 31).

24 As regards consumer protection, it must be stated that it can be guaranteed by means which do not hinder the importation of products which have been lawfully manufactured and marketed in other Member States, in particular by suitable labelling giving the nature of the product sold (Case C-269/89 Bonfait [1990] ECR I-4169, paragraph 15).

108 Secondly it is also clear from the case-law of the Court that the legality of a decision adopted by the Commission in the area of State aid is to be assessed in the light of the information available to the Commission when the decision was adopted (see, inter alia, Case 234/84 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2263, paragraph 16).

22. The Court thus held, in paragraph 35 of Skills Motor Coaches and Others , that the time necessarily spent travelling to take over a vehicle fitted with recording equipment, which is not at the driver’s home or the employer’s operating centre must be regarded as forming part of ‘all other periods of work’ within the meaning of Article 15 of Regulation No 3821/85.

35 The answer to the first part of the question must therefore be that on a proper construction of Article 15 of Regulation No 3821/85, a driver's obligation to record all other periods of work extends to time which a driver necessarily spends travelling to take over a vehicle subject to the obligation to instal and use a tachograph, and which is not at the driver's home or the employer's operational centre, regardless of whether the employer gave instructions as to when and how to travel or whether that choice was left to the driver. The second part of the question

50. It is not disputed that, where the name of a person appears incorrectly or ambiguously in documents issued by a State in order to prove his identity, this is liable to cause serious inconvenience for that person both in his professional and in his private life in so far as it may give rise to doubts as to his real identity, the authenticity of the passport or the veracity of the information contained in it (see, to that effect, judgments in Grunkin and Paul , C‑353/06, EU:C:2008:559, paragraph 23, and Sayn-Wittgenstein , C‑208/09, EU:C:2010:806, paragraph 69).

28. In those circumstances, it follows from the principle of fiscal neutrality that traders must be able to choose the form of organisation which, from the strictly commercial point of view, best suits them, without running the risk of having their transactions excluded from the exemption provided for in Article 13B(a) of the Sixth Directive (see, to that effect, with regard to Article 13B(d)(6) of the Sixth Directive, Abbey National , paragraph 68, and with regard to Article 13B(d)(1) of the directive, see Ludwig , paragraph 35).

68. In those circumstances, it follows from the principle of fiscal neutrality that operators must be able to choose the form of organisation which, from the strictly commercial point of view, best suits them, without running the risk of having their operations excluded from the exemption under Article 13B(d)(6) of the Sixth Directive.

98 The Court must observe here that, according to settled case-law, Commission decisions intended to find infringements of competition rules, issue directions and impose pecuniary sanctions must state the reasons on which they are based, in accordance with Article 190 of the EEC Treaty, which requires the Commission to set out the reasons which prompted it to adopt a decision, so that the Court can exercise its power of review and Member States and nationals concerned know the basis on which the Treaty has been applied (see the judgment in Case C-137/92 P Commission v BASF and Others [1994] ECR I-2555, paragraph 66).

45. The same applies, even in the absence of any express provision authorising its institutions to negotiate with non-member countries, where the Community has achieved complete harmonisation in a given area, because the common rules thus adopted could be affected within the meaning of the ERTA judgment if the Member States retained freedom to negotiate with non-member countries ( Commission v Luxembourg , paragraph 90).

90 The same applies, even in the absence of any express provision authorising its institutions to negotiate with non-member countries, where the Community has achieved complete harmonisation in a given area, because the common rules thus adopted could be affected within the meaning of the AETR judgment if the Member States retained freedom to negotiate with non-member countries (Opinion 1/94, paragraph 96; Opinion 2/92, paragraph 33).

110 To that end, it is for the Courts of the European Union, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent EU authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 120, and Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 65).

32. Consequently, the Court’s answer is given subject to the proviso that the referring court establishes that there is certain cross-border interest in the case in the main proceedings (judgment in Enterprise Focused Solutions , C‑278/14, EU:C:2015:228, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, the following statements are made on the premiss that the grant of the right to manage each of the supplementary social insurance schemes at issue in the main proceedings for all employers and employees within the sectors concerned presents certain cross-border interest, a matter which must, however, be determined by the referring court.

19. However, because of the spirit of cooperation in relations between the national courts and the Court of Justice in the context of the preliminary ruling procedure, the lack of such preliminary findings by the referring court relating to the existence of certain cross-border interest does not necessarily lead to the request being inadmissible if the Court, having regard to the information available from the file, considers that it is in a position to give a useful answer to the referring court. That is the case, in particular, where the order for reference contains sufficient relevant information for the existence of such an interest to be determined. Nevertheless, the Court’s answer is given subject to the proviso that, on the basis of a detailed assessment of all the relevant facts in the case in the main proceedings, certain cross-border interest in the case in the main proceedings is established by the referring court (see, to that effect, judgment in Azienda sanitaria locale n. 5 ‘Spezzino’ and Others , C‑113/13, EU:C:2014:2440, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

19 Second, the Court has consistently held that the rights which the three indents of Article 6(1) confer on a Turkish worker in regard to employment necessarily imply the existence of a right of residence for the person concerned, since otherwise the right of access to the labour market and the right to work as an employed person would be deprived of all effect (see, most recently, Tetik, paragraph 24).

47. Concerning those two forms of investment, the Court has stated that national measures must be regarded as ‘restrictions’ within the meaning of Article 56(1) EC if they are liable to prevent or limit the acquisition of shares in the undertakings concerned or to deter investors of other Member States from investing in their capital (see Case C‑367/98 Commission v Portugal [2002] ECR I‑4731, paragraph 45; Case C‑483/99 Commission v France [2002] ECR I‑4781, paragraph 40; Case C‑463/00 Commission v Spain , paragraphs 61 and 62; Case C‑98/01 Commission v United Kingdom [2003] ECR I‑4641, paragraphs 47 and 49; Case C‑174/04 Commission v Italy [2005] ECR I‑4933, paragraphs 30 and 31; Joined Cases C‑282/04 and C‑283/04 Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 20; Commission v Germany , paragraph 19; and Case C‑171/08 Commission v Portugal , paragraph 50).

50 As regards a scheme of prior administrative authorisation of the kind at issue in the present case, the Court has previously held that such a scheme must be proportionate to the aim pursued, inasmuch as the same objective could not be attained by less restrictive measures, in particular a system of declarations ex post facto (see, to that effect, Sanz de Lera, paragraphs 23 to 28; Konle, paragraph 44; and Case C-205/99 Analir and Others [2001] ECR I-1271, paragraph 35). Such a scheme must be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance to the undertakings concerned, and all persons affected by a restrictive measure of that type must have a legal remedy available to them (Analir, cited above, paragraph 38).

13. The Court has already given judgment on the compatibility of various national provisions regulating marketing methods with Article 28 EC (see, inter alia, Case C‑20/03 Burmanjer and Others [2005] ECR I‑4133, paragraph 22).

80. As a preliminary point, it is appropriate to observe, first, that the purpose of Article 2 of the Directive is to define the types of signs of which a trade mark may consist (Case C-273/00 Sieckmann [2002] ECR I-11737, paragraph 43), irrespective of the goods or services for which protection might be sought (see to that effect Sieckmann , paragraphs 43 to 55, Libertel , paragraphs 22 to 42, and Case C-283/01 Shield Mark [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 34 to 41). It provides that a trade mark may consist inter alia of " words" and " letters" , provided that they are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.

46. That graphic representation must enable the sign to be represented visually, particularly by means of images, lines or characters, so that it can be precisely identified.

30 However, the Court stated in its judgment in Case 220/81 (Robertson and Others [1982] ECR 2349, paragraph 12), that a Member State cannot require a fresh hallmark to be affixed to products imported from another Member State in which they have been lawfully marketed and hallmarked in accordance with the legislation of that State, where the information provided by that hallmark, in whatever form, is equivalent to that prescribed by the Member State of importation and intelligible to consumers of that State.

49 As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, Framework Decision 2002/584 is based on the principle of mutual recognition, which itself, as a ‘cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation, as is apparent from recital 6 of that Framework Decision, is based on the mutual trust between Member States with a view to achieving the objective set for the Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2016, Kovalkovas, C‑477/16 PPU, EU:C:2016:861, paragraphs 25 to 28 and the case-law cited).

26 The Framework Decision thus seeks, by the establishment of a new simplified and more effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the attainment of the objective set for the European Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice, founded on the high level of confidence which should exist between the Member States (judgment of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C‑404/15 and C‑659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).

9 ARTICLE 220 OF THE EEC TREATY PROVIDES THAT MEMBER STATES SHALL , SO FAR AS NECESSARY , ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH EACH OTHER WITH A VIEW TO SECURING FOR THE BENEFIT OF THEIR NATIONALS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RULES INTENDED TO FACILITATE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE COMMON MARKET IN THE VARIOUS SPHERES LISTED IN THAT PROVISION . THE CONVENTION WAS ESTABLISHED TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 220 AND WAS INTENDED ACCORDING TO THE EXPRESS TERMS OF ITS PREAMBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF THAT ARTICLE ON THE SIMPLIFICATION OF FORMALITIES GOVERNING THE RECIPROCAL RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS OF COURTS OR TRIBUNALS AND TO STRENGTHEN IN THE COMMUNITY THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF PERSONS THEREIN ESTABLISHED . IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE OBSTACLES TO LEGAL RELATIONS AND TO SETTLE DISPUTES WITHIN THE SPHERE OF INTRA-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS THE CONVENTION CONTAINS , INTER ALIA , RULES ENABLING THE JURISDICTION IN THESE MATTERS OF COURTS OF MEMBER STATES TO BE DETERMINED AND FACILITATING THE RECOGNITION AND EXECUTION OF COURTS ' JUDGMENTS . ACCORDINGLY THE CONVENTION MUST BE INTERPRETED HAVING REGARD BOTH TO ITS PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES AND TO ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE TREATY .

47 Moreover, under subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46, Member States are to grant the data subject the right, inter alia in the cases referred to in Article 7(e) and (f) of that directive, to object at any time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the processing of data relating to him, save where otherwise provided by national legislation. The balancing to be carried out under subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 thus enables account to be taken in a more specific manner of all the circumstances surrounding the data subject’s particular situation. Where there is a justified objection, the processing instigated by the controller may no longer involve those data (see judgment of 13 May 2014, Google Spain and Google, C‑131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 76).

76. Under subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46, Member States are to grant the data subject the right, at least in the cases referred to in Article 7(e) and (f) of the directive, to object at any time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the processing of data relating to him, save where otherwise provided by national legislation. The balancing to be carried out under subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 thus enables account to be taken in a more specific manner of all the circumstances surrounding the data subject’s particular situation. Where there is a justified objection, the processing instigated by the controller may no longer involve those data.

19 Given the reasons explained in paragraph 44 of the Barber judgment for limiting its effects in time, it must be made clear that equality of treatment in the matter of occupational pensions may be claimed only in relation to benefits payable in respect of periods of employment subsequent to 17 May 1990, the date of the Barber judgment, subject to the exception in favour of workers or those claiming under them who have, before that date, initiated legal proceedings or raised an equivalent claim under the applicable national law.

26. It has consistently been held that it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see in particular Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59; Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 38; Case C-153/00 Der Weduwe [2002] ECR I-11319, paragraph 31; and Case C‑318/00 Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins [2003] ECR I-905, paragraph 40).

59 As to those submissions, it is to be remembered that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for by Article 177 of the Treaty, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-125/94 Aprile v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 16 and 17).

100 Given that the market for tobacco products is one in which trade between Member States represents a relatively large part, national rules laying down the requirements to be met by those products, in particular requirements relating to their designation, composition or labelling, are in themselves liable, in the absence of harmonisation at EU level, to constitute obstacles to the free movement of goods (see, to that effect, judgment in British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, C‑491/01, EU:C:2002:741, paragraph 64).