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57. The referring court will therefore have to ascertain, in the light inter alia of the development of the market for games of chance in Austria, whether the State controls to which the monopoly holder’s activities are subject are suitable for ensuring that the holder will in fact be able to pursue, in a consistent and systematic manner, the objectives relied on by means of a supply that is quantitatively measured and qualitatively planned by reference to those objectives (see, to that effect, Case C‑258/08 Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming and Ladbrokes International [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 37, and Stoß and Others , paragraph 83).

37. However, it is for the national court to determine whether the development of the market for games of chance in the Netherlands is such as to demonstrate that the expansion of games of chance is being supervised effectively by the Netherlands authorities, both with regard to the scale of advertising undertaken by holders of exclusive licences and with regard to the latter’s creation of new games, and, in consequence, to reconcile appropriately the simultaneous achievement of the objectives pursued by the national legislation.

43. According to Article 1(j) of Regulation No 883/2004, the term ‘residence’ refers to the place where a person habitually resides. That term has an autonomous meaning specific to EU law (see, by analogy, Case C‑90/07 Swaddling EU:C:1999:96, paragraph 28).

42. As for the argument of the Netherlands Government and the Commission that the limitation on deductibility is justified by the aim of avoiding an erosion of the tax base going beyond mere diminution of tax revenue, this cannot be accepted. Such a justification does not differ in substance from that concerning the risk of a diminution in tax revenue. In that respect, the case-law of the Court of Justice shows that such a justification does not appear amongst the grounds listed in Article 56(1) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 46(1) EC) and does not constitute a matter of overriding general interest which may be relied upon in order to justify a restriction on the freedom of establishment (see, to that effect, Case C-264/96 ICI v Colmer [1998] ECR I-4695, paragraph 28).

28 In answer to the argument that revenue lost through the granting of tax relief on losses incurred by resident subsidiaries cannot be offset by taxing the profits of non-resident subsidiaries, it must be pointed out that diminution of tax revenue occurring in this way is not one of the grounds listed in Article 56 of the Treaty and cannot be regarded as a matter of overriding general interest which may be relied upon in order to justify unequal treatment that is, in principle, incompatible with Article 52 of the Treaty.

104 It follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice, however, that the taking into account of differences between the undertakings that have participated in a single cartel (in particular with regard to the geographic scope of their respective involvement) for the purpose of assessing the gravity of an infringement need not necessarily occur when the multipliers for the ‘gravity of the infringement’ and for the ‘additional amount’ are set but may occur at another stage in the setting of the fine, such as when the basic amount of the fine is adjusted in the light of mitigating and aggravating circumstances under points 28 and 29 of the 2006 Guidelines (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 2013, Team Relocations and Others v Commission, C‑444/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:464, paragraphs 104 and 105, and of 11 July 2013, Gosselin Group v Commission, C‑429/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:463, paragraphs 96 to 100).

32. Furthermore, according to settled case-law, national measures capable of hindering intra-Community trade may be justified by the objective of protection of the environment provided that the measures in question are proportionate to the aim pursued (see Case C-524/07 Commission v Austria [2008] ECR I-0000, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

57. Or, selon une jurisprudence constante, des exigences impératives relevant de la protection de l’environnement peuvent justifier des mesures nationales susceptibles d’entraver le commerce intracommunautaire, pourvu que ces mesures soient proportionnées à l’objet visé (voir, en ce sens, arrêts Aher-Waggon, précité, points 19 et 20; du 14 décembre 2004, Commission/Allemagne, C‑463/01, Rec. p. I‑11705, point 75, ainsi que Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft et S. Spitz, C‑309/02, Rec. p. I‑11763, point 75).

11. In that respect, it is sufficient to recall that the Court has repeatedly held that it has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on questions concerning Community provisions in situations where the facts of the cases being considered by the national courts were outside the scope of Community law but where those provisions had been rendered applicable by domestic law (see, in particular, Case C-28/95 Leur-Bloem [1997] ECR I-4161, paragraph 27, Case C-130/95 Giloy [1997] ECR I-4291, paragraph 23, and Case C‑247/97 Schoonbroodt [1998] ECR I‑8095, paragraph 14).

66 Consequently, as regards the first question as set out in paragraph 63 of this judgment, it must be observed that, in accordance with settled case-law, all measures of a Member State which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade within the European Union are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU (see, inter alia, judgments of 11 July 1974, Dassonville, 8/74, EU:C:1974:82, paragraph 5, and of 23 December 2015, Scotch Whisky Association and Others, C‑333/14, EU:C:2015:845, paragraph 31).

5 ALL TRADING RULES ENACTED BY MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF HINDERING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ACTUALLY OR POTENTIALLY, INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE ARE TO BE CONSIDERED AS MEASURES HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS .

64. However, it must be held that, with regard inter alia to frontier workers, the Court has allowed certain grounds of justification concerning legislation which distinguishes between residents and non-residents carrying out a professional activity in the State concerned, depending on the extent of their integration in the society of that Member State or their attachment to that State (see, to that effect, Hartmann , paragraphs 35 and 36; Geven , paragraph 26; and Hendrix , paragraphs 54 and 55).

45. National courts before which an action against such a national measure has been brought are also under such an obligation, and, in that regard, it should be recalled that the detailed procedural rules applicable to such actions which may be brought against such ‘plans’ or ‘programmes’ are a matter for the domestic legal order of each Member State, under the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States, provided that they are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the European Union legal order (principle of effectiveness) (see Wells , paragraph 67 and the case‑law cited).

67. The detailed procedural rules applicable are a matter for the domestic legal order of each Member State, under the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States, provided that they are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the Community legal order (principle of effectiveness) (see to this effect, inter alia, Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I-4599, paragraph 12, and Case C-78/98 Preston and Others [2000] ECR I-3201, paragraph 31).

40. Next, in so far as concerns the rule that only one optician’s shop may be established per 8 000 residents, the Court has already held that national authorities may adopt measures to avoid the risk of healthcare providers converging on localities in the territory concerned which are considered to be attractive. Thus, national authorities may opt, in the light of that risk, for legislation which provides that only one service provider may be established for a given population density, since such a rule seeks to encourage such service providers to establish premises in parts of the national territory where access to healthcare is lacking (see, to that effect, Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez , paragraphs 72 to 77).

53. As the Court has stated on many occasions, the power to adopt implementing acts is, as a rule, conferred on the Commission and, in accordance with Article 291(2) TFEU, it is only exceptionally that that power may be reserved to the Council in ‘duly justified specific cases’ and the cases expressly provided for in Article 291(2) TFEU, which relate solely to the common foreign and security policy (see, to that effect, judgments in Parliament v Council , C‑133/06, EU:C:2008:257, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited, and Commission v Parliament and Council , C‑88/14, EU:C:2015:499, paragraph 30).

30. With respect to the conferral of an implementing power, Article 291(2) TFEU states that legally binding Union acts are to confer such power on the Commission or, in duly justified specific cases and the cases provided for in Articles 24 TEU and 26 TEU, on the Council, where uniform conditions for implementing those acts are needed. In the exercise of the implementing power conferred on it, the institution concerned must provide further detail in relation to the content of a legislative act, in order to ensure that it is implemented under uniform conditions in all the Member States (see judgment in Commission v Parliament and Council , C‑427/12, EU:C:2014:170, paragraph 39).

22. Article 4(2) of Directive 92/83 requires, as a consequence that small breweries — the annual beer production of which is less than 200 000 hectolitres — should be genuinely autonomous from any other brewery both as regards their legal and economic structure, and as regards their production structure, where they use physically separate premises and do not operate under licence (judgment in Glückauf Brauerei , C‑83/08, EU:C:2009:228, paragraph 27).

111 Such an interpretation, which failed to take account of the subjective conditions laid down in the third indent of Article 203(3) of the Customs Code, is not consistent either with the intention of the EU legislature, referred to in paragraph 95 above, to lay down exhaustively the conditions for determining who are the debtors responsible for the customs debt, or with the very letter and purpose of that provision (see, by analogy, judgment of 23 September 2004, Spedition Ulustrans, C‑414/02, EU:C:2004:551, paragraphs 39, 40 and 42).

42. First, if Paragraph 79(2) of the ZollR-DG were interpreted as meaning that it establishes an irrebutable presumption that the employer is co‑debtor of the employee’s debt, that paragraph would be incompatible with Article 202(3) of the Customs Code. It is likewise if that provision applied only in cases in which the employee acts in the conduct of his employer’s affairs. In such circumstances, the employer may not be responsible for the unlawful introduction of the goods and could therefore claim that he did not know or ought not reasonably to have known that such introduction was unlawful.

50 The Court has already noted, moreover, that the purpose of Directive 68/151 is to guarantee legal certainty in relation to dealings between companies and third parties in view of the intensification of trade between Member States following the creation of the internal market and that, with that in mind, it is important that any person wishing to establish and develop trading relations with companies situated in other Member States should be able easily to obtain essential information relating to the constitution of trading companies and to the powers of persons authorised to represent them, which requires that all the relevant information should be expressly stated in the register (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 November 1974, Haaga, 32/74, EU:C:1974:116, paragraph 6).

140. In its assessment of the gravity of the infringement, the Commission must take account not only of the particular circumstances of the case but also of the context in which the infringement occurs and, with a view to determining the amount of the fine, ensure that its action has a deterrent effect, above all in relation to types of infringement that particularly undermine the attainment of the Community’s objectives (see, to that effect, Archer Daniels Midland v Commission , paragraph 63).

63. That is what follows both from Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, which adopts, as criteria for setting the amount of the fine, only the gravity and the duration of the infringement and, essentially, from Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission , which is relied on by the appellant, where the Court stated, in paragraph 106, that in assessing the gravity of an infringement for the purpose of fixing the amount of the fine the Commission must take into consideration not only the particular circumstances of the case but also the context in which the infringement occurs and must ensure that its action has the necessary deterrent effect.

47. It must be pointed out that, with regard to the determination of a ‘significant effect on the position’ of the appellant on the market in question, the Court has had occasion to clarify that the mere fact that a measure may exercise an influence on the competitive relationships existing on the relevant market and that the undertaking concerned was in a competitive relationship with the addressee of that measure cannot in any event suffice for that undertaking to be regarded as being individually concerned by that measure (see, inter alia, Case C‑525/04 P Spain v Lenzing [2007] ECR I‑9947, paragraph 32).

33. That right is not however unconditional. Article 18(1) EC provides that it is conferred only subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect (see in particular Trojani , paragraphs 31 and 32, and Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-6947, paragraph 36).

36. According to that wording, the right to reside within the territory of the Member States which is conferred directly on every citizen of the Union by Article 18 EC is not unconditional. It is conferred subject to the limitations and conditions laid down by the Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect (Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, paragraphs 31 and 32).

104. Il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour que le Conseil bénéficie, pour l’application de l’article 108, paragraphe 2, troisième alinéa, TFUE, d’un large pouvoir d’appréciation dont l’exercice implique des évaluations complexes d’ordre économique et social, qui doivent être effectuées dans le contexte de l’Union. Dans ce cadre, le contrôle juridictionnel appliqué à l’exercice de ce pouvoir d’appréciation se limite à la vérification du respect des règles de procédure et de motivation ainsi qu’au contrôle de l’exactitude matérielle des faits retenus et de l’absence d’erreur de droit, d’erreur manifeste dans l’appréciation des faits ou de détournement de pouvoir (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 29 février 1996, Commission/Conseil, précité, points 18 et 19, ainsi que, par analogie, arrêt du 22 décembre 2008, Régie Networks, C‑333/07, Rec. p. I‑10807, point 78).

12. In this respect, the Court held in Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa ([1990] ECR I-1417, paragraph 18), that Community law does not preclude Member States from extending their legislation, or collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry, relating to minimum wages, to any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, regardless of the country in which the employer is established; Community law also does not prohibit Member States from enforcing those rules by appropriate means.

18 Finally, it should be stated, in response to the concern expressed in this connection by the French Government, that Community law does not preclude Member States from extending their legislation, or collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry, to any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, no matter in which country the employer is established; nor does Community law prohibit Member States from enforcing those rules by appropriate means ( judgment of 3 February 1982 in Joined Cases 62 and 63/81 Seco SA and Another v EVI (( 1982 )) ECR 223 ).

32 As is already clear from the judgment of the Court in Case C-64/89 Deutsche Fernsprecher [1990] ECR I-2535 (paragraphs 12 and 13), the power of decision conferred on the Commission by Article 4 of Regulation No 1573/80 relates only to cases in which the competent national authorities are convinced that the conditions of Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1697/79 are fulfilled and therefore do not consider that they must effect post-clearance recovery.

41. The failure to include in national legislation the headings which appear in Annex I to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive cannot have any bearing on the interpretation of that directive. The same applies to divergences between national laws implementing that directive, referred to by the traders. By contrast, it should be recalled that, in applying national law, the national court called upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, in order to achieve the result pursued by that directive and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU (see, to that effect, Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135, paragraph 8; Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I-8835, paragraph 113; and Case C-69/10 Samba Diouf [2011] ECR I-7151, paragraph 60).

60. However, in that context, attention should also be drawn to the requirement that national law be interpreted in conformity with EU law, which permits national courts, for the matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when they determine the disputes before them (see, inter alia, Case C‑268/06 Impac t [2008] ECR I‑2483, paragraph 99). The principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that the directive in question is fully effective and achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see Impact , paragraph 101 and the case-law cited).

32. However, the special rule on jurisdiction provided for in Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 cannot be interpreted in such a way as to allow a plaintiff to make a claim against a number of defendants for the sole purpose of removing one of them from the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in which that defendant is domiciled (see, in relation to the Brussels Convention, Case 189/87 Kalfelis [1988] ECR 5565, paragraphs 8 and 9, and Réunion européenne and Others , paragraph 47). However, this does not seem to be the case in the main proceedings.

33 In order to answer the question as thus reformulated, it should be noted, first, that the Court has previously held that Article 77 of Regulation No 1408/71 gives a person entitled to a pension or a benefit payable under the legislation of a single Member State, residing in the territory of another Member State, entitlement only to family allowances, to the exclusion of other family benefits (Case 313/86 Lenoir [1988] ECR 5391, paragraphs 10 and 11).

11 It must therefore be stated in reply to the question submitted by the national court that Article 77 of Regulation No 1408/71, as contained in Annex I to Council Regulation No 2001/83 of 2 June 1983, must be interpreted as giving a person entitled to family benefits who is a national of a Member State and resides in the territory of another Member State entitlement to payment by the social security institutions of his country of origin only of "family allowances", to the exclusion of other family benefits such as the "rentrée scolaire" allowance and the "salaire unique" allowance provided for by French legislation .

53. As the Court has already held, that finding must be understood in the light of the facts which gave rise to that judgment, in which the request for a provisional witness hearing, made by one of the parties, was addressed directly to the court of the Member State in which the witness resided, which did not have jurisdiction to hear the substance of the case. Such a request could in fact be used as a means to sidestep the rules of Regulation No 1206/2001, in that it is able to deprive the competent court, to which the request should have been addressed, of the opportunity to hear the witness in accordance with the rules laid down by that regulation (see Lippens and Others , paragraph 36). However, the facts of the present case are distinguishable from those in St. Paul Dairy in so far as the evidence to be obtained is, for the most part, situated in a Member State other than that of the court seised, so that the latter has the possibility of applying Regulation No 1206/2001.

47 Having regard to the particular nature of such a transaction, the Court has held that, in order to classify a transaction as an ‘intra-Community acquisition’, it is necessary to conduct an overall assessment of all the relevant objective evidence in order to determine whether the goods purchased have actually left the territory of the Member State of supply and, if so, in which Member State the final consumption will take place. Factors likely to be of significance in that respect, other than the process of transporting the goods in question, are, inter alia, the place of registration and usual use of the goods, the place of residence of the purchaser and the presence or absence of links between the purchaser and the Member State of supply or another Member State (see to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2010, X, C‑84/09, EU:C:2010:693, paragraphs 41 to 45 and 50).

41. In that regard, regard should be had to the settled case-law, according to which the expressions which define taxable transactions for the purposes of the common system of VAT are objective in nature and apply without regard to the purpose or results of the transactions concerned (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑354/03, C-355/03 and C‑484/03 Optigen and Others [2006] ECR I‑483, paragraph 44, and Joined Cases C‑439/04 and C‑440/04 Kittel and Recolta Recycling [2006] ECR I‑6161, paragraph 41). Consequently, it is necessary that the classification of intra-Community supplies and acquisitions be made on the basis of objective matters, such as the physical movement of the goods concerned between Member States ( Teleos and Others , paragraph 40).

34 In view of the central role of, and the importance of the responsibilities assumed by, the relevant Member State regarding the presentation and monitoring of financing in respect of training operations, its opportunity to comment before the adoption of a final decision reducing the aid constitutes an essential procedural requirement the infringement of which renders the contested decisions void (see the judgments in Case C-291/89 Interhotel v Commission [1991] ECR I-2257, paragraph 17, Case C-304/89 Oliveira v Commission [1991] ECR I-2283, paragraph 21, and Case C-157/90 Infortec v Commission [1992] ECR I-3525, paragraph 20).

17 It must be observed, first of all, that, according to settled case-law, Community law does not detract from the powers of the Member States to organise their social security systems (Case 238/82 Duphar and Others v Netherlands [1984] ECR 523, paragraph 16, and Case C-70/95 Sodemare and Others v Regione Lombardia [1997] ECR I-3395, paragraph 27).

27 In assessing the compatibility of the non-profit condition with those provisions of the Treaty, it must first be borne in mind that, as the Court has already held in Case 238/82 Duphar and Others v Netherlands State [1984] ECR 523, paragraph 16, and Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre v AGF and Cancava [1993] ECR I-637, paragraph 6, Community law does not detract from the powers of the Member States to organize their social security systems.

58 First, in the absence of a valid identity card or passport, documents which are intended to enable their holder to provide proof of his identity and nationality (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-376/89 Giagounidis [1991] ECR I-1069, paragraphs 14 and 15), the person concerned cannot as a rule properly prove his identity or, consequently, his family ties.

45. Moreover, it should be noted that, while European Union primary law can offer no guarantee to an insured person that moving to another Member State will be neutral in terms of social security, in particular where sickness and old-age pension insurance are concerned, since, given the disparities between the Member States’ social security schemes and legislation, such a move may be to the advantage of the person concerned in terms of social security, or not, depending on the circumstances, it is settled case‑law that, where its application is less favourable, national legislation is consistent with European Union law only to the extent that, in particular, such legislation does not place the worker at a disadvantage compared to those who pursue all their activities in the Member State where it applies and does not purely and simply result in the payment of social security contributions on which there is no return (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑393/99 and C‑394/99 Hervein and Others [2002] ECR I‑2829, paragraph 51; Case C‑493/04 Piatkowski [2006] ECR I‑2369, paragraph 34; van Delft and Others , paragraphs 100 and 101; and Case C‑388/09 da Silva Martins [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 72 and 73).

73. However, according to settled case-law, such compatibility would exist only to the extent that, in particular, the national legislation concerned does not place the worker at a disadvantage compared to those who pursue all their activities in the Member State where it applies and does not purely and simply result in the payment of social security contributions on which there is no return (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑393/99 and C‑394/99 Hervein and Others [2002] ECR I‑2829, paragraph 51; Case C‑493/04 Piatkowski [2006] ECR I‑2369, paragraph 34; Case C‑3/08 Leyman [2009] ECR I‑9085, paragraph 45; and van Delft and Others , paragraph 101).

38 In those circumstances, the fact that the activity of customs agent is intellectual, requires authorisation and can be pursued in the absence of a combination of material, non-material and human resources, is not such as to exclude it from the scope of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty.

36 As the Court pointed out in paragraph 35 of its judgment in Snares, the fact that rules have not been mentioned in the declaration made by a Member State is not conclusive in this regard and is therefore not of itself proof that those rules do not come within the scope of the provision in question.

35 As the Court has consistently held (see, in particular, Case 70/80 Vigier v Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte [1981] ECR 229, paragraph 15; Case C-251/89 Athanasopoulos and Others v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1991] ECR I-2797, paragraph 28; and Joined Cases C-88/95, C-102/95 and C-103/95 Martínez Losada and Others v Instituto Nacional de Empleo and Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social [1997] ECR I-869, paragraph 21), the fact that rules have not been mentioned in the declaration made by a Member State is not conclusive in this regard and is therefore not of itself proof that those rules do not come within the scope of the provision in question.

24 It must first be pointed out that the fact that a practice is in conformity with the requirements of a directive in the matter of protection may not constitute a reason for not transposing that directive into national law by provisions capable of creating a situation which is sufficiently precise, clear and transparent to enable individuals to ascertain their rights and obligations. As the Court held in its judgment in Case C-339/87 Commission v Netherlands [1990] ECR I-851, paragraph 25, in order to secure the full implementation of directives in law and not only in fact, Member States must establish a specific legal framework in the area in question.

46. In this respect, where proceedings between individuals are concerned, the Court has consistently held that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied on as such against an individual (see, inter alia, Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 48; Case C‑91/92 Faccini Dori [1994] ECR I‑3325, paragraph 20; and Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 108).

48 WITH REGARD TO THE ARGUMENT THAT A DIRECTIVE MAY NOT BE RELIED UPON AGAINST AN INDIVIDUAL , IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 189 OF THE EEC TREATY THE BINDING NATURE OF A DIRECTIVE , WHICH CONSTITUTES THE BASIS FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF RELYING ON THE DIRECTIVE BEFORE A NATIONAL COURT , EXISTS ONLY IN RELATION TO ' EACH MEMBER STATE TO WHICH IT IS ADDRESSED ' . IT FOLLOWS THAT A DIRECTIVE MAY NOT OF ITSELF IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS ON AN INDIVIDUAL AND THAT A PROVISION OF A DIRECTIVE MAY NOT BE RELIED UPON AS SUCH AGAINST SUCH A PERSON . IT MUST THEREFORE BE EXAMINED WHETHER , IN THIS CASE , THE RESPONDENT MUST BE REGARDED AS HAVING ACTED AS AN INDIVIDUAL .

41. Furthermore, the assessment of whether the effect on trade between Member States is appreciable must take account of the conduct of the dominant undertaking in question, in so far as Article 82 EC precludes all conduct which is capable of affecting freedom of trade in a manner which might harm the attainment of the objectives of a single market between the Member States, in particular by sealing off domestic markets or by affecting the structure of competition within the single market (Case 22/78 Hugin Kassaregister and Hugin Cash Registers v Commission [1979] ECR 1869, paragraph 17).

57. It follows from paragraph 27 of the judgment in Hoever and Zachow that such a benefit must be treated as a ‘family benefit’ within the meaning of Articles 1(u)(i) and 4(1)(h) of Regulation No 1408/71 (see Case C‑275/96 Kuusijärvi [1998] ECR I‑3419, paragraph 60).

60 It follows from the judgment in Hoever and Zachow, cited above, that a benefit intended to enable one of the parents to devote himself or herself to the raising of a young child, and designed, more specifically, to remunerate the service of bringing up a child, to meet the other costs of caring for and raising a child and, as the case may be, to mitigate the financial disadvantages entailed in giving up income from an occupational activity, must be treated as a family benefit within the meaning of Articles 1(u)(i) and 4(1)(h) of Regulation No 1408/71.

43. A Member State is therefore in a position to check whether contributions have actually been paid by one of its taxpayers to an insurance company established in another Member State. In addition, there is nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer to provide such proof as they may consider necessary in order to determine whether the conditions for deducting contributions provided for in the legislation at issue have been met and, consequently, whether to allow the deduction requested (see, to that effect, Bachmann , paragraphs 18 and 20, Commission v Belgium , paragraphs 11 and 13, and Danner , paragraph 50).

31. As regards the applicability of Article 12 EC, which lays down a general prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of nationality, it should be noted that that provision applies independently only to situations governed by European Union law for which the Treaty lays down no specific rules of non-discrimination (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑397/98 and C‑410/98 Metallgesellschaft and Others [2001] ECR I‑1727, paragraphs 38 and 39; Case C‑443/06 Hollmann [2007] ECR I‑8491, paragraphs 28 and 29; and Case C‑105/07 Lammers & Van Cleeff [2008] ECR I‑173, paragraph 14).

38 It follows from the Court's case-law that the general prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down by Article 6 of the Treaty applies independently only to situations governed by Community law for which the Treaty lays down no specific non-discrimination rules (Case 305/87 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 1461, paragraphs 12 and 13, Case C-1/93 Halliburton Services [1994] ECR I-1137, paragraph 12, Royal Bank of Scotland, cited above, paragraph 20, and Baars, cited above, paragraph 23).

49. According to well-established case-law, national measures which are liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty may nevertheless be allowed provided that they pursue an objective in the public interest, that they are appropriate for attaining that objective and that they do not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective pursued (see, inter alia, Case C-269/09 Commission v Spain [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).

26. Likewise, Article 7(2) provides that the national authorities are to assess whether the information supplied by the party concerned is sufficient. It follows that, in the absence of documentary evidence, it is for the national authorities to take into consideration other types of evidence which may be just as satisfactory for the purpose of the verification, in accordance with the detailed rules laid down by national law, provided that they respect the scope and effectiveness of Community law (see, to that effect, Case C‑312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I‑4599, paragraph 12).

12 As regards the first part of the question, as thus reworded, the Court has consistently held that, under the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty, it is for the Member States to ensure the legal protection which individuals derive from the direct effect of Community law. In the absence of Community rules governing a matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from the direct effect of Community law. However, such rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions nor render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 33/76 Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer fuer das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5, Case 45/76 Comet v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043, paragraphs 12 to 16, Case 68/79 Hans Just v Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs [1980] ECR 501, paragraph 25, Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, paragraph 14, Joined Cases 331/85, 376/85 and 378/85 Bianco and Girard v Directeur Général des Douanes des Droits Indirects [1988] ECR 1099, paragraph 12, Case 104/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 1799, paragraph 7, Joined Cases 123/87 and 330/87 Jeunehomme and EGI v Belgian State [1988] ECR 4517, paragraph 17, Case C-96/91 Commission v Spain [1992] ECR I-3789, paragraph 12, and Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 43).

59 In that connection, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law of the Court, the interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 267 TFEU, the Court gives to a rule of EU law clarifies and defines the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be or ought to have been understood and applied from the time of its entry into force. It follows that the rule as thus interpreted may, and must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships which arose and were established before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions for bringing a dispute relating to the application of that rule before the courts having jurisdiction are satisfied (see, inter alia, judgments of 17 February 2005, Linneweber and Akritidis, C‑453/02 and C‑462/02, EU:C:2005:92, paragraph 41; 6 March 2007, Meilicke and Others, C‑292/04, EU:C:2007:132, paragraph 34, and 27 February 2014, Transportes Jordi Besora, C‑82/12, EU:C:2014:108, paragraph 40).

113. In those circumstances, the justifications put forward by a Member State in support of a restriction on those freedoms must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights, even where that restriction concerns an area falling within the competence of that Member State, provided that the situation at issue falls within the scope of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment in Åkerberg Fransson , C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 21).

21. Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must therefore be complied with where national legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist which are covered in that way by European Union law without those fundamental rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.

50. According to consistent case-law, it follows from Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court, and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, in the version in force at the date when the appeal was brought (now Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court), that an appeal must state precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or plea concerned is inadmissible (Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraph 426, and Case C‑487/06 P British Aggregates v Commission [2008] ECR I‑10515, paragraph 121).

28. As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that the right of nationals of one Member State to reside in the territory of another Member State without being engaged in any activity, whether on an employed or a self-employed basis, is not unconditional. Under Article 18(1) EC, the right of every citizen of the Union to reside in the territory of the Member States is recognised subject to the limitations and conditions imposed by the Treaty and by the measures adopted for its implementation (see, to that effect, Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, paragraphs 31 and 32, and Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925, paragraph 26).

31. It must be recalled that the right to reside in the territory of the Member States is conferred directly on every citizen of the Union by Article 18(1) EC (see Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I-7091, paragraph 84). Mr Trojani therefore has the right to rely on that provision of the Treaty simply as a citizen of the Union.

64. Ainsi que la Cour l’a itérativement jugé, les mesures nationales susceptibles de gêner ou de rendre moins attrayant l’exercice des libertés fondamentales garanties par le traité ne peuvent être compatibles avec celui-ci que si elles remplissent quatre conditions, à savoir qu’elles s’appliquent de manière non discriminatoire, qu’elles se justifient par des raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général, qu’elles soient propres à garantir la réalisation de l’objectif légitime qu’elles poursuivent et qu’elles n’aillent pas au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour l’atteindre (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 11 juin 2009, Commission/Autriche, C-564/07, point 31 et jurisprudence citée).

52. That provision requires that the introduction of such provisions be based on new scientific evidence relating to the protection of the environment or the working environment made necessary by reason of a problem specific to the Member State concerned arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure, and that the proposed provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them be notified to the Commission (Case C‑512/99 Germany v Commission [2003] ECR I‑845, paragraph 80, and Joined Cases C‑439/05 P and C‑454/05 P Land Oberösterreich and Austria v Commission [2007] ECR I‑7141, paragraph 57).

57. That provision requires that the introduction of national provisions derogating from a harmonisation measure be based on new scientific evidence relating to the protection of the environment or the working environment made necessary by reason of a problem specific to the Member State concerned arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure, and that the proposed provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them be notified to the Commission (Case C‑512/99 Germany v Commission , paragraph 80).

58 However, in proceedings for a preliminary ruling, it is not for this Court but for the national court to determine which obligations are imposed by an earlier agreement on the Member State concerned and to ascertain their ambit so as to be able to determine the extent to which they thwart application of the provisions of Community law in question (see Case C-324/93 Evans Medical and Macfarlan Smith, cited above, paragraph 29).

62. According to settled case-law, it is for the competent national authorities to show that their rules fulfil the criteria set out in paragraph 59 of the present judgment (see, to that effect, Commission v Netherlands , paragraph 76, Commission v Portugal , paragraph 39, and Case C‑286/07 Commission v Luxembourg [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 37).

37. À cet égard, il appartient aux autorités nationales compétentes de démontrer, d’une part, que leur mesure est nécessaire pour réaliser un ou plusieurs objectifs mentionnés à l’article 30 CE ou des exigences impératives et, d’autre part, que ladite mesure est conforme au principe de proportionnalité (voir, en ce sens, arrêts précités ATRAL, point 67; Commission/Finlande, point 39, et Commission/Pays-Bas, point 76).

34. As regards the argument raised by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of Belgium that the supply of electronic books is covered by point 6 of Annex III to the VAT Directive, it should be borne in mind that, in determining the scope of a provision of EU law, its wording, context and objectives must all be taken into account (see, inter alia, judgment in NCC Construction Danmark , C‑174/08, EU:C:2009:669, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

14 Il convient, en pareille hypothèse, pour déterminer la base juridique appropriée, d'apprécier si les mesures considérées se rattachent principalement à un domaine d'action, les effets sur d'autres politiques ne présentant qu'un caractère accessoire, ou si les deux aspects sont également essentiels. Dans le premier cas, le recours à une seule base juridique suffit (arrêts du 4 octobre 1991, Parlement/Conseil, 70/88, Rec. p. I-4529, point 17, et du 26 mars 1996, Parlement/Conseil, C-271/94, Rec. p. I-1689, points 32 et 33); dans l'autre, il est insuffisant (arrêts du 30 mai 1989, Commission/Conseil, 242/87, Rec. p. 1425, points 33 à 37, et du 7 mars 1996, Parlement/Conseil, C-360/93, Rec. p. I-1195, point 30) et l'institution est tenue d'adopter l'acte sur le fondement des deux dispositions qui fondent sa compétence (arrêt du 27 septembre 1988, Commission/Conseil, 165/87, Rec. p. 5545, points 6 à 13). Un tel cumul est toutefois exclu lorsque les procédures prévues pour l'une et l'autre base juridique sont incompatibles (arrêt du 11 juin 1991, Commission/Conseil, C-300/89, Rec. p. I-2867, points 17 à 21).

37 It follows that inasmuch as the contested decision concerns not only the sphere of vocational training but also that of scientific research, the Council did not have the power to adopt it pursuant to Article 128 alone and thus was bound, before the Single European Act entered into force, to base the decision on Article 235 as well . The Commission' s first submission that the legal basis chosen was unlawful must therefore be rejected . Statement of reasons

67 It follows that, when applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, it is necessary to acknowledge a certain degree of distinctiveness of a national mark on which an opposition against the registration of an EU mark is based (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 May 2012, Formula One Licensing v OHIM, C‑196/11 P, EU:C:2012:314, paragraph 47).

50. S’agissant, en premier lieu, de la répartition équilibrée du pouvoir d’imposition entre les États membres, invoquée par tous les gouvernements ayant présenté des observations ainsi que par la Commission, il y a lieu de rappeler qu’il s’agit d’un objectif légitime reconnu par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêts du 29 novembre 2011, National Grid Indus, C‑371/10, Rec. p. I‑12273, point 45, et du 6 septembre 2012, Philips Electronics UK, C‑18/11, point 23) qui peut rendre nécessaire l’application, aux activités économiques des contribuables établis dans l’un desdits États membres, des seules règles fiscales de celui-ci, pour ce qui est tant des bénéfices que des pertes (voir, en ce sens, arrêts précités Marks & Spencer, point 45; Oy AA, point 54, ainsi que Lidl Belgium, point 31).

54. That element of justification may be allowed, however, where the system in question is designed to prevent conduct capable of jeopardising the right of the Member States to exercise their taxing powers in relation to activities carried on in their territory ( Rewe Zentralfinanz , paragraph 42).

60. Therefore, the liability on which the penalty provided for in Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 800/1999 is based is essentially objective in nature (see, so far as concerns the provisions of Article 11(1), first subparagraph, point (a) of Regulation No 3665/87, the content of which is essentially identical to that of that provision of Regulation No 800/1999, judgment in AOB Reuter , EU:C:2008:249, paragraph 19). It follows that the reduction of the refund mentioned in Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 800/1999 must be applied even if the exporter has not committed any fault (see, to that effect, judgment in AOB Reuter , EU:C:2008:249, paragraph 17).

19. In order to reply to that question, it should be noted that the provisions of Directive 2003/96 concerning exemptions must receive an autonomous interpretation, based on their wording and on the objectives pursued by that directive (see, to that effect, Case C‑389/02 Deutsche See-Bestattungs-Genossenschaft [2004] ECR I‑3537, paragraph 19; Case C‑391/05 Jan De Nul [2007] ECR I‑1793, paragraph 22; and Case C‑505/10 Sea Fighter [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 14).

19. Consequently, the definitions relating to the products governed by Directive 92/81 and the exemptions applicable to them should be interpreted independently on the basis of the wording of the provisions in question and on the purpose of the directive.

61. However, neither the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union nor its Rules of Procedure make provision for the parties to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion (see Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International , paragraph 32).

56. Even before the adoption of Directive 2004/38, the Community legislature recognised the importance of ensuring the protection of the family life of nationals of the Member States in order to eliminate obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty (Case C‑60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I‑6279, paragraph 38; Case C‑459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I‑6591, paragraph 53; Case C‑157/03 Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I‑2911, paragraph 26; Case C‑503/03 Commission v Spain [2006] ECR I‑1097, paragraph 41; Case C‑441/02 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I‑3449, paragraph 109; and Case C‑291/05 Eind [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 44).

26. As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that the Community legislature has recognised the importance of ensuring protection for the family life of nationals of the Member States in order to eliminate obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty (Case C‑60/00 Carpenter [2002] I‑6279, paragraph 38, and MRAX , paragraph 53).

39. One of the objectives of Regulation No 44/2001, as stated in recital 15 thereof, is to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable judgments will not be given where a number of courts have jurisdiction to hear the same dispute. That is why the European Union legislature sought to put in place a mechanism which is clear and effective in order to resolve situations of lis pendens . It follows that, in order to achieve those objectives, Article 27 of that regulation must be interpreted broadly (see, to that effect, judgments in Mærsk Olie & Gas , C‑39/02, EU:C:2004:615, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited, and Cartier parfums-lunettes and Axa Corporate Solutions assurances , C‑1/13, EU:C:2014:109, paragraph 40).

37 Likewise, the Court, having regard to the circumstances of the case, held that Community law confers a right to reparation where three conditions are met: the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties (Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, paragraph 51; Dillenkofer, paragraphs 21 and 23; Denkavit, paragraph 48; Brinkmann, paragraph 25; see also Case C-140/97 Rechberger and Others v Austria [1999] ECR I-3499, paragraph 21; and Case C-424/97 Haim v Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein [2000] ECR I-5123, paragraph 36).

51. In such circumstances, Community law confers a right to reparation where three conditions are met: the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties.

59 The full effectiveness of the protection provided for by the directive requires the national court that has found of its own motion that a term is unfair to be able to establish all the consequences of that finding, without expecting the consumer, who has been fully informed of his rights, to submit a statement requesting that that term be declared invalid (judgment of 30 May 2013, Jőrös, C‑397/11, EU:C:2013:340, paragraph 42).

44. As regards, specifically, the factor relating to organisation, although the Court has previously held that that factor contributes to defining an economic entity (see, to that effect, Case C‑13/95 Süzen [1997] ECR I‑1259, paragraph 15; Case C‑234/98 Allen and Others [1999] ECR I‑8643, paragraph 27; Case C‑175/99 Mayeur [2000] ECR I-7755, paragraph 53; and Case C-172/99 Liikenne [2001] ECR I‑745, paragraph 34), it has also held that an alteration in the organisational structure of the entity transferred is not such as to prevent the application of Directive 2001/23 (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑171/94 and C‑172/94 Merckx and Neuhuys [1996] ECR I‑1253, paragraphs 20 and 21; Mayeur , paragraph 54; and Case C‑458/05 Jouini and Others [2007] ECR I‑7301, paragraph 36).

54 That, however, does not appear to be the situation in the case in the main proceedings here. First, it is clear from the order for reference that the City of Metz took over in its entirety and pursued the activity of APIM while continuing, in the same form, to produce and distribute the magazine Vivre à Metz; second, APIM was already in reality operating, according to the French Government, as a public service entrusted with a task in the general interest.

36. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that, when the Court is requested to give a preliminary ruling on a matter of tariff classification, its task is to provide the national court with guidance on the criteria the implementation of which will enable the latter to classify the products at issue correctly in the CN, rather than to effect that classification itself, a fortiori since the Court does not necessarily have available to it all the information which is essential in that regard. In any event, the national court is in a better position to do so (Case C‑12/10 Lecson Elektromobile EU:C:2010:823, paragraph 15 and the case-law cited).

39. In the absence of a definition in the Treaty of ‘movement of capital’, the Court has previously recognised the nomenclature annexed to Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty (an article repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam) (OJ 1988 L 178, p. 5) as having indicative value, even though that directive was adopted on the basis of Articles 69 and 70(1) of the EEC Treaty (Articles 67 to 73 of the EEC Treaty were replaced by Articles 73b to 73g of the EC Treaty, now Articles 56 EC to 60 EC), subject to the qualification, contained in the introduction to the nomenclature, that the list set out therein is not exhaustive (see, in particular, Case C‑513/03 van Hilten‑van der Heijden [2006] ECR I‑1957, paragraph 39; Case C-386/04 Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer [2006] ECR I-8203, paragraph 22; Case C‑11/07 Eckelkamp [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 38; and Case C-318/07 Persche [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 24).

39. In that regard, it must be observed that the Treaty does not define the terms ‘movement of capital’ and ‘payments’. However, it is settled case‑law that, inasmuch as Article 73b of the Treaty substantially reproduces the content of Article 1 of Directive 88/361, and even if the latter was adopted on the basis of Articles 69 and 70(1) of the EEC Treaty (Articles 67 to 73 of the EEC Treaty were replaced by Articles 73b to 73g of the EC Treaty, now Articles 56 EC to 60 EC), the nomenclature of capital movements annexed thereto retains the same indicative value, for the purposes of defining the term ‘movement of capital’, as it did before their entry into force, subject to the qualification, contained in the introduction to the nomenclature, that the list set out therein is not exhaustive (see to that effect, among others, Case C‑222/97 Trummer and Mayer [1999] ECR I‑1661, paragraph 21, and Joined Cases C‑515/99, C‑519/99 to C‑524/99 and C‑526/99 to C‑540/99 Reisch and Others [2002] ECR I‑2157, paragraph 30).

41. With regard to the objective of budgetary equilibrium pursued by the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, it must be borne in mind that EU law does not preclude Member States from taking account of budgetary considerations at the same time as political, social or demographic considerations, provided that in so doing they observe, in particular, the general principle of the prohibition of age discrimination. In that regard, while budgetary considerations may underpin the chosen social policy of a Member State and influence the nature or extent of the measures that that Member State wishes to adopt, such considerations cannot in themselves constitute a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 (judgment in Fuchs and Köhler , C‑159/10 and C‑160/10, EU:C:2011:508, paragraphs 73 and 74). This also applies to the considerations of an administrative nature mentioned by the referring court.

17. It should be recalled at the outset that, in order to be capable of constituting a trade mark for the purposes of Article 2 of Directive 2008/95, the subject-matter of any application for registration must satisfy three conditions. First, it must be a sign. Secondly, that sign must be capable of graphic representation. Thirdly, the sign must be capable of distinguishing the ‘goods’ or ‘services’ of one undertaking from those of other undertakings (see, as regards Article 2 of Directive 89/104, Libertel , C‑104/01, EU:C:2003:244, paragraph 23; Heidelberger Bauchemie , C‑49/02, EU:C:2004:384, paragraph 22; and, Dyson , C‑321/03, EU:C:2007:51, paragraph 28).

22. To constitute a trade mark under Article 2 of the Directive, colours or combinations of colours must satisfy three conditions. First, they must be a sign. Secondly, that sign must be capable of being represented graphically. Thirdly, the sign must be capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings (see, to that effect, Libertel , paragraph 23).

20 Article 33 of the Sixth Directive accordingly permits a Member State to maintain or introduce taxes, duties or charges on the supply of goods, the provision of services or imports only if they cannot be characterised as turnover taxes (see Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR 1343, paragraph 10).

66 The Court also stated that that concept also referred to subsequent proceedings at the end of which a judicial decision that finally amended the level of one or several previous sentences was handed down, in so far as the authority which adopted the latter decision enjoyed some discretion in that regard (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 August 2017, Zdziaszek, C‑271/17 PPU, EU:C:2017:629, paragraphs 83, 90 and 96).

83 Secondly, it is necessary to determine whether a decision at a later stage of the proceedings amending one or more of the custodial sentences previously imposed, such as the cumulative sentence at issue in the case in the main proceedings, is covered by Article 4a(1) of the Framework Decision.

84. Nevertheless, such a restriction may be justified where it reflects overriding requirements relating to the public interest, is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, in particular, Case C‑398/95 SETTG [1997] ECR I‑3091, paragraph 21; Cipolla and Others , paragraph 61, and Case C‑250/06 United Pan‑Europe Communications Belgium and Others [2007] ECR I‑11135, paragraph 39).

26 However, that regulation was not in force at the material time and is therefore not applicable (see judgment in Joined Cases 212/80 to 217/80 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Salumi and Others [1981] ECR 2735, paragraph 15).

15 IT APPEARS FROM ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS THAT THE REGULATION COVERS ONLY IMPORT OR EXPORT TRANSACTIONS FOR WHICH THE PAYMENT OF DUTIES WAS MADE ON OR AFTER 1 JULY 1980 .

48 The Court has already ruled that it does not follow from any provision of European Union law that the origin of the shareholders, be they natural or legal persons, of companies resident in the European Union affects that right, since the status of being a European Union company is based, under Article 54 TFEU, on the location of the corporate seat and the legal order where the company is incorporated, not on the nationality of its shareholders (judgment of 1 April 2014, Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company and Others, C‑80/12, EU:C:2014:200, paragraph 40).

17. It is also apparent from settled case-law that an analysis of the definitions of taxable person and economic activities shows that the scope of the term economic activities is very wide, and that the term is objective in character, in the sense that the activity is considered per se and without regard to its purpose or results (see, inter alia, Case C‑223/03 University of Huddersfield [2006] ECR I-1751, paragraph 47; T-Mobile Austria and Others , paragraph 35; and Hutchison 3G and Others , paragraph 29).

29. It is also apparent from settled case-law that an analysis of the definitions of ‘taxable person’ and ‘economic activities’ shows that the scope of the term ‘economic activities’ is very wide, and that the term is objective in character, in the sense that the activity is considered per se and without regard to its purpose or results (see, inter alia, Case C-223/03 University of Huddersfield [2006] ECR I-1751, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

30 In order to interpret those provisions, it is necessary to take account of the general scheme of Regulation No 17, the purpose of the provisions laying down the procedure for requests for information and the requirements inherent in observance of the general principles of Community law, in particular fundamental rights (to that effect, see the judgment in Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v Commission [1989] ECR 2859, paragraph 12).

54. The Court has consistently held that the provisions of an international agreement to which the European Union is a party can be relied on in support of an action for annulment of an act of secondary EU legislation or an exception based on the illegality of such an act only where, first, the nature and the broad logic of that agreement do not preclude it and, secondly, those provisions appear, as regards their content, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise (see judgments in Intertanko and Others , EU:C:2008:312, paragraph 45; FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission , EU:C:2008:476, paragraphs 110 and 120; and Air Transport Association of America and Others , EU:C:2011:864, paragraph 54).

54. Finally, where the nature and the broad logic of the treaty in question permit the validity of the act of European Union law to be reviewed in the light of the provisions of that treaty, it is also necessary that the provisions of that treaty which are relied upon for the purpose of examining the validity of the act of European Union law appear, as regards their content, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise (see IATA and ELFAA , paragraph 39, and Intertanko and Others , paragraph 45).

32. In that regard, it should be noted that it is one of the essential characteristics of VAT that it is imposed on the added value of the goods or services concerned, since the tax payable on a transaction is calculated after the tax paid on the preceding transaction has been deducted (see, inter alia, Case C‑208/91 Beaulande [1992] ECR I‑6709, paragraph 14; Case C‑347/95 UCAL [1997] ECR I‑4911, paragraph 34; and Case C‑308/01 GIL Insurance and Others [2004] ECR I‑4777, paragraph 33). Consequently, the option of treating certain applications as supplies made for consideration, as interpreted above, cannot be used in order to charge VAT on the value of goods which the taxable person concerned has made available to the third party who completed or improved them, to the extent that the taxable person has already, in the context of an earlier tax period, paid VAT on that value. As the Commission stated, such repeated taxation would be incompatible both with the essential characteristic of VAT, referred to above, and with the aim of the above option, which is intended to enable Member States to make subject to VAT the application of goods for the purposes of activities exempt from VAT, but in no way authorises Member States to levy VAT several times on the same element of the value of those goods.

33. The Community legislature has nevertheless made reliance by the Member States on such grounds subject to strict limits. Article 3(1) of Directive 64/221 states that measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security are to be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned and Article 3(2) states that previous criminal convictions do not in themselves constitute grounds for the taking of such measures. The existence of a previous criminal conviction can therefore only be taken into account in so far as the circumstances which gave rise to that conviction are evidence of personal conduct constituting a present threat to the requirements of public policy (Case 30/77 Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, paragraph 28; Case C-348/96 Calfa [1999] ECR I-11, paragraph 24; and Case C-503/03 Commission v Spain , paragraph 44).

24 In that regard, Directive 64/221, Article 1(1) of which provides that the directive is to apply to inter alia any national of a Member State who travels to another Member State as a recipient of services, sets certain limits on the right of Member States to expel foreign nationals on the grounds of public policy. Article 3 of that directive states that measures taken on grounds of public policy or of public security that have the effect of restricting the residence of a national of another Member State must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned. In addition, previous criminal convictions cannot in themselves constitute grounds for the taking of such measures. It follows that the existence of a previous criminal conviction can, therefore, only be taken into account in so far as the circumstances which gave rise to that conviction are evidence of personal conduct constituting a present threat to the requirements of public policy (Bouchereau, paragraph 28).

23 It has consistently been held (see, for example, Case C-168/95 Arcaro [1996] ECR I-0000, paragraph 36) that a directive may not of itself create obligations for an individual and that a provision of a directive may not therefore, as such, be relied upon against such a person.

27 In that regard, suffice it to note, with reference to paragraph 20 above, that, in contrast to the contention of the Italian Government, the directive introduced a consistent and exhaustive set of measures capable of being implemented in order to ensure the protection of plants within the Community. Where, in application of Article 100 of the Treaty, Community directives provide for the harmonization of the measures necessary to ensure the protection of animal and human health and establish Community procedures to check that they are observed, recourse to Article 36 is no longer justified and the appropriate checks must be carried out and the protective measures adopted within the framework outlined by the harmonizing directive (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 5/77 Tedeschi v Denkavit [1977] ECR 1555, at paragraph 35). The same solution applies where a directive harmonizes the measures necessary for the protection of plants.

35 WHERE , IN APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 100 OF THE TREATY , COMMUNITY DIRECTIVES PROVIDE FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF ANIMAL AND HUMAN HEALTH AND ESTABLISH COMMUNITY PROCEDURES TO CHECK THAT THEY ARE OBSERVED , RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 36 IS NO LONGER JUSTIFIED AND THE APPROPRIATE CHECKS MUST BE CARRIED OUT AND THE MEASURES OF PROTECTION ADOPTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OUTLINED BY THE HARMONIZING DIRECTIVE .

44. In those circumstances it should be held that the lubricating oils in question, which are not subject to harmonised excise duty, are products other than those referred to in the first indent of Article 3(1) of Directive 92/12 (see, to that effect, Braathens , paragraphs 24 and 25, and Commission v Italy, paragraphs 31 and 33) so that, in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 3(3) thereof, Member States are to retain the right to introduce or maintain taxes which are levied on those products provided that those taxes do not give rise to border-crossing formalities in trade between Member States.

55. Consequently, in contrast to the contentions of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Portuguese Republic, even a restriction on freedom of movement for persons which is of limited scope or minor importance is prohibited by Articles 39 EC and 43 EC (see, concerning the freedom of establishment, Case 270/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 273, paragraph 21; Case C-34/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-995, paragraph 49; and de Lasteyrie du Saillant , paragraph 43).

43. Moreover, a restriction on freedom of establishment is prohibited by Article 52 of the Treaty even if of limited scope or minor importance (see, to that effect, Commission v France , cited above, paragraph 21, and Case C-34/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-995, paragraph 49).

40 The Member States are therefore free to set the objectives of their policy on betting and gambling and, where appropriate, to define in detail the level of protection sought. However, the restrictive measures that the Member States impose must satisfy the conditions laid down in the case-law of the Court as regards inter alia their justification by overriding reasons in the general interest and their proportionality (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2009, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International, C‑42/07, EU:C:2009:519, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

127 In those circumstances, it is necessary to go on to consider whether those breaches have caused Ms Staelen actual and certain non-material damage, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 91 of the present judgment, although the Court must also be satisfied that that damage is the direct consequence of those breaches (see, to that effect, in particular, judgment of 28 June 2007, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, C‑331/05 P, EU:C:2007:390, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

23. With regard to the causal link required, it is, moreover, not disputed that both the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and those of the Court of First Instance provide that the costs of proceedings incurred by the parties are recoverable only if they were necessary for the purposes of the proceedings. On the other hand, the causal link required under the second paragraph of Article 288 EC is established where the damage is the direct consequence of the wrongful act in question (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 64/76, 113/76, 167/78, 239/78, 27/79, 28/79 and 45/79 Dumortier Frères and Others v Council [1979] ECR 3091, paragraph 21, and Joined Cases C-363/88 and C-364/88 Finsider and Others v Commission [1992] ECR I-359, paragraph 25).

51 In that context, it should be borne in mind that preservation of a balanced allocation of powers of taxation between Member States is a legitimate objective recognised by the Court. Further, in the absence of any unifying or harmonising measures of the European Union, the Member States retain the power to define, by treaty or unilaterally, the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation, with a view to eliminating double taxation (judgment of 21 May 2015, Verder LabTec, C‑657/13, EU:C:2015:331, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

7. Il convient de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et que les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêts du 14 septembre 2004, Commission/Espagne, C‑168/03, Rec. p. I‑8227, point 24, et du 7 juin 2007, Commission/Belgique, C‑254/05, non encore publié au Recueil, point 39).

24. In accordance with settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-103/00 Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I-1147, paragraph 23, and Case C-209/02 Commission v Austria [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 16). Even when the default has been remedied after the time-limit prescribed by that opinion, pursuit of the action still has an object. That object may consist in particular in establishing the basis of the liability that a Member State could incur towards those who acquire rights as a result of its default (see, inter alia, Case 154/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2717, paragraph 6, and Case C-299/01 Commission v Luxembourg [2002] ECR I-5899, paragraph 11).

15 Next, the Court stressed in the judgment in Case 82/72 Walder [1973] ECR 599, paragraphs 6 and 7, relating to the interpretation of Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation No 3 and Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation No 1408/71, that it is clear from those provisions that the replacement by the Community regulations of the provisions of social security conventions concluded between Member States is mandatory in nature and does not allow of exceptions, save for the cases expressly stipulated by the regulations, even where the social security conventions are more advantageous to the persons covered by them than the Community regulations.

29. Extinction of the exclusive right results either from the proprietor’s consent, whether express or implied, to a putting on the market in the EEA or from the putting on the market in the EEA by the proprietor himself or by an operator with economic links to the proprietor, such as, in particular, a licensee. The proprietor’s consent and the putting on the market in the EEA by him or by an operator with economic links to him, which are both equivalent to the renunciation of the exclusive right, thus both constitute a decisive factor in the extinction of that right (see, to that effect, Case C‑244/00 Van Doren + Q [2003] ECR I-3051, paragraph 34; Case C‑59/08 Copad [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 43; and Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel and Others , paragraph 24 and the case‑law cited).

24. Thus, first, the Court has held that exhaustion of the exclusive rights provided for in Article 5 of Directive 89/104 can occur, inter alia, when the goods are put on the market by an operator with economic links to the proprietor of the trade mark, for example a licensee (see, to that effect, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik and Danzinger , paragraph 34, and Copad , paragraph 43).

97 In such circumstances, the applicant cannot claim that the failure to monitor that undertaking meant that the investigations were not representative (see, to that effect, Case 151/80 De Hoe v Commission [1981] ECR 3161, paragraphs 17 to 19).

29. In addition, the definition of ‘fixed-term workers’ for the purposes of the Framework Agreement, set out in Clause 3(1), encompasses all workers without drawing a distinction according to whether their employer is in the public, or private, sector (see Adeneler and Others , EU:C:2006:443, paragraph 56; Della Rocca , EU:C:2013:235, paragraph 34; and Márquez Samohano EU:C:2014:146, paragraph 38) and regardless of the classification of their contract under domestic law (see Angelidaki and Others , C‑378/07 to C‑380/07, EU:C:2009:250, paragraph 166).

34. It should be borne in mind that, as the Court has held previously, it is apparent from the very wording of Clause 2(1) of the Framework Agreement that the scope of the Framework Agreement is conceived in broad terms, covering generally ‘fixed-term workers who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined in law, collective agreements or practice in each Member State’. Moreover, the definition of ‘fixed-term workers’ for the purposes of the Framework Agreement, set out in clause 3(1), encompasses all workers without drawing a distinction according to whether their employer is in the public or private sector (Case C‑212/04 Adeneler and Others [2006] ECR I‑6057, paragraph 56).

11. À cet égard, il suffit de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, un État membre ne saurait exciper de dispositions, de pratiques ou de situations de son ordre juridique interne pour justifier l’inobservation des obligations et délais prescrits par une directive (voir, notamment, arrêt du 27 novembre 2003, Commission/France, C‑66/03, Rec. p. I‑14439, point 12).

40 In that context, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, the Member States having none the less responsibility for ensuring that those rights are effectively protected in each case (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 September 2003, Köbler, C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paragraph 47, and of 27 June 2013, Agrokonsulting, C‑93/12, EU:C:2013:432, paragraph 35).

35. It is the Court’s settled case-law that, in the absence of European Union rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State, in accordance with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States, to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from European Union law, the Member States having none the less responsibility for ensuring that those rights are effectively protected in each case (see, to that effect, Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I‑10239, paragraph 47; Case C‑268/06 Impact [2008] ECR I‑2483, paragraphs 44 and 45; Case C‑12/08 Mono Car Styling [2009] ECR I‑6653, paragraph 48; and Joined Cases C‑317/08 to C-320/08 Alassini and Others [2010] ECR I-2213, paragraph 47).

144. The decision whether to impose a lump sum payment must, in each individual case, depend on all the relevant factors pertaining to both the particular nature of the infringement established and the individual conduct of the Member State involved in the procedure instigated pursuant to Article 228 EC (see Case C‑121/07 Commission v France , paragraph 62). That provision confers a wide discretion upon the Court in deciding whether or not to impose such sanctions (see paragraph 63 of that judgment).

20. The implementation of that system of control is a matter for both the Commission and the national courts, their respective roles being complementary but separate (judgment in Deutsche Lufthansa , C‑284/12, EU:C:2013:755, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

27. La mise en œuvre de ce système de contrôle incombe, d’une part, à la Commission et, d’autre part, aux juridictions nationales, leurs rôles respectifs étant complémentaires mais distincts (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 11 juillet 1996, SFEI e.a., C‑39/94, Rec. p. I‑3547, point 41; du 21 octobre 2003, van Calster e.a., C‑261/01 et C‑262/01, Rec. p. I‑12249, point 74, ainsi que du 5 octobre 2006, Transalpine Ölleitung in Österreich, C‑368/04, Rec. p. I‑9957, points 36 et 37).

96 According to settled case-law, a provision in an agreement concluded by the Union with a non-member State must be regarded as having direct effect where, regard being had to its wording and to the purpose and nature of that agreement, the provision lays down a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or its effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgments of 27 September 2001, Gloszczuk, C‑63/99, EU:C:2001:488, paragraph 30; of 8 May 2003, Wählergruppe Gemeinsam, C‑171/01, EU:C:2003:260, paragraph 54; of 12 April 2005, Simutenkov, C‑265/03, EU:C:2005:213, paragraph 21, and of 14 December 2006, Gattoussi, C‑97/05, EU:C:2006:780, paragraph 25).

129. In this respect, the Commission enjoys a wide discretion in the context of the application of Article 92(3) of the Treaty (see, inter alia , Case C-225/91 Matra v Commission [1993] ECR I-3203, paragraphs 23 to 25), so that, as regards the question whether the paint shop and final assembly hall of Mosel II and Chemnitz II should be classified as greenfield investments or extension investments, review by the Court is limited to verifying the accuracy of the facts relied on to make the disputed classification and ascertaining that there was no manifest error of assessment.

24 Furthermore, it is settled law that, as regards the application of Article 93(3) of the Treaty, the Commission enjoys a wide discretion, the exercise of which involves assessments of an economic and social nature which must be made within a Community context (see inter alia the judgment in Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, paragraph 34).

15. As the Court has consistently held, the procedure provided for in Article 234 EC is an instrument for cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts which enables it to provide them with the elements of interpretation of Community law they require in order to settle disputes before them. On the other hand, it is not for the Court to interpret, in the context of that procedure, the national law of a Member State and, save exceptionally, it is for the national court, which is alone in having a direct knowledge of the facts of the case and of the arguments put forward by the parties and which must assume the responsibility of giving judgment in the case, to assess, with full knowledge of the matter before it, the relevance of the questions of law raised by the dispute before it and the need for a preliminary ruling so as to enable it to give judgment (see, in particular Case 53/79 Damiani [1980] ECR 273, paragraph 5). In the present case, it is not apparent that the questions referred by the Sozialgericht Aachen are in any way exceptional such as to justify not examining them. Substance

42. Inasmuch as the wording of the questions referred to the Court admits of doubt as to whether there is any need to answer the third and fourth questions, it should be pointed out that while it is for the Court of Justice, in the system laid down by Article 234 EC providing for cooperation, to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred (see, inter alia, Case C‑88/99 Roquettes Frères [2000] ECR I‑10465, paragraph 18; Case C‑469/00 Ravil [2003] ECR I‑5053, paragraph 27; Case C‑286/05 Haug [2006] ECR I‑4121, paragraph 17; and Case C‑429/05 Rampion and Goddard [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 27).

27. In the procedure established by Article 234 EC providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the question referred to it (see, inter alia , Case C-88/99 Roquette Frères [2000] ECR I-10465, paragraph 18). It may also find it necessary to consider provisions of Community law to which the national court has not referred in its question (see, inter alia , Case C-230/98 Schiavon [2000] ECR I-3547, paragraph 37).

19. As regards that weaker position, Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 provides that unfair terms are not binding on the consumer. That is a mandatory provision which aims to replace the formal balance which the contract establishes between the rights and obligations of the parties with an effective balance which re-establishes equality between them (judgment in Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García , C‑169/14, EU:C:2014:2099, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

54. It is from that point of view that the Court, for the purposes of settling the question whether various private law entities could be classified as bodies governed by public law, has proceeded in accordance with settled case-law and merely ascertained whether those entities fulfilled the three cumulative conditions set out in the second subparagraph of Article 1(b) of Directives 92/50, 93/36 and 93/37, considering that the method in which the entity concerned has been set up was irrelevant in that regard (see to this effect, in particular, Mannesmann Anglagenbau Austria and Others , cited above, paragraphs 6 and 29; Case C-360/96 BFI Holding [1998] ECR I-6821, paragraphs 61 and 62; and Commission v France , cited above, paragraphs 50 and 60).

61 The wording of the second subparagraph of Article 1(b) of Directive 92/50 makes no reference to the legal basis of the activities of the entity concerned.

28 However, it should be emphasised that the information which Directive 77/799 allows the competent authorities of a Member State to request is in fact all the information which appears to them to be necessary to ascertain the correct amount of revenue tax payable by a taxpayer in relation to the legislation which they have to apply themselves (see, to this effect, Futura Participations and Singer, at paragraph 41) and that the directive does not in any way affect the competence of those authorities to assess in particular whether the conditions to which that legislation subjects the deduction of certain costs are fulfilled.

35. In the second place, it is necessary to bear in mind the case-law according to which the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the marks at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (judgment in Bimbo v OHIM , C‑591/12 P, EU:C:2014:305, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

21. The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, in relation to the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks at issue, must be based on the overall impression given by the marks, account being taken, in particular, of their distinctive and dominant components. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details (see, to that effect, SABEL EU:C:1997:528, paragraph 23; OHIM v Shaker EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35; and Nestlé v OHIM EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 34).

43. There is a difference between the customs documents required by Article 18(1) and (2) of Regulation No 3665/87 and the transport documents required by Article 18(3) which is based on the consideration that exporters may encounter difficulties in obtaining the customs documents from the authorities of the non‑member country of importation, upon whom they have no means of exerting pressure, whereas no such difficulty can exist with regard to the transport documents: in the case of a c.i.f. contract, the exporter retains a copy of the transport documents as the party arranging carriage, while in the case of an f.o.b. contract he may easily stipulate as part of the contract that the purchaser must furnish a certified true copy of those documents (see, to that effect, Case C‑155/89 Philipp Brothers [1990] ECR I‑3265, paragraph 27).

37. In particular, it is for each Member State to organise, in compliance with EU law, its system for taxing distributed profits and, in that context, to define the tax base and the tax rate which apply to the shareholder receiving them (see, inter alia, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation , paragraph 50; Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraph 47; Case C-194/06 Orange European Smallcap Fund [2008] ECR I-3747, paragraph 30; and Case C-128/08 Damseaux [2009] ECR I-6823, paragraph 25, and Commission v Germany , paragraph 45).

50. It is for each Member State to organise, in compliance with Community law, its system of taxation of distributed profits and, in that context, to define the tax base as well at the tax rates which apply to the company making the distribution and/or the shareholder to whom the dividends are paid, in so far as they are liable to tax in that State.

41. It is also clear from the Court ' s case-law that, as a derogation from the fundamental principle that workers in the Community should enjoy freedom of movement and not suffer discrimination, Article 39(4) EC must be construed in such a way as to limit its scope to what is strictly necessary for safeguarding the interests which that provision allows the Member States to protect (see, in particular, Case 225/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2625, paragraph 7).

61. The objective of deterrence which the Commission is entitled to pursue when setting the amount of a fine is to ensure compliance by undertakings with the competition rules laid down by the EC Treaty for the conduct of their activities within the common market (see, to that effect, Case 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 661, paragraphs 173 to 176). Consequently, when assessing the deterrent nature of a fine to be imposed for infringement of those rules, the Commission is not required to take into account any penalties imposed on an undertaking for infringement of the competition rules of non-member States.

174 THIS OBJECT COULD NOT BE ADEQUATELY ATTAINED IF THE IMPOSITION OF A PENALTY WERE TO BE RESTRICTED TO CURRENT INFRINGEMENTS ALONE .

15 Of the four pleas relied on by the Commission, those based on the infringement of Article 64 of the Staff Regulations and of the principle of equality of treatment must be examined together. As the Court has consistently held, that principle underlies Articles 64 and 65 of the Staff Regulations (see to this effect, in particular, the judgments in Case 194/80 Benassi v Commission [1981] ECR 2815, at paragraph 5, and Case 7/87 Commission v Council [1988] ECR 3401, at paragraphs 3 and 25).

81 On the one hand, as the Court has already held, the question whether a tax is an integral part of an aid financed by a tax depends not on the existence of a competitive relationship between the person liable to pay the tax and the beneficiary of the aid, but only on whether that tax is hypothecated to the aid in question under the relevant national legislation (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 December 2008, Régie Networks, C‑333/07, EU:C:2008:764, paragraphs 93 to 99).

94. Where a charge constitutes the means by which an aid scheme such as that at issue in the main proceedings is financed, it is clearly in the Community interest that the Member State notifies that scheme, including the method of financing which forms an integral part of it, so that the Commission may have available to it all the information necessary to assess the compatibility of that measure with the common market, an assessment which falls within its exclusive competence, subject to review by the Community judicature (see to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑119/05 Lucchini [2007] ECR I‑6199, paragraph 52 and the case‑law cited).

98. In the second place, Article 18(1)(b)(i) of Directive 93/104 provides that the Member States have the right not to apply Article 6 provided that they observe the general principles of protection of the safety and health of workers and that they satisfy a number of conditions set out cumulatively in Article 18(1)(b)(i), but it is not disputed that the Federal Republic of Germany has not availed itself of that option to derogate (see Jaeger , paragraph 85).

26. Toutefois, il convient également de prendre en considération la jurisprudence bien établie selon laquelle, en vertu de l’article 74, paragraphe 1, du règlement n° 40/94, les chambres de recours de l’OHMI doivent procéder à l’examen d’office des faits afin de déterminer si la marque dont l’enregistrement est demandé relève ou non de l’un des motifs de refus d’enregistrement énoncés à l’article 7 du même règlement. Il s’ensuit que les organes compétents de l’OHMI peuvent être amenés à fonder leurs décisions sur des faits qui n’auraient pas été invoqués par le demandeur (voir arrêts du 22 juin 2006, Storck/OHMI, C‑25/05 P, Rec. p. I‑5719, point 50, et du 19 avril 2007, OHMI/Celltech, C‑273/05 P, Rec. p. I‑2883, point 38).

50. As to whether it is well founded, under Article 74(1) of Regulation No 40/94 OHIM examiners and, on appeal, the Boards of Appeal of OHIM are required to examine the facts of their own motion in order to determine whether the mark registration of which is sought falls under one of the grounds for refusal of registration laid down in Article 7 of that regulation. It follows that the competent bodies of OHIM may be led to base their decisions on facts which have not been put forward by the applicant for the mark.

20. In that regard, the Court – noting, in particular, that inheritances consisting in the transfer to one or more persons of assets left by a deceased person fall under heading XI of Annex I to Directive 88/361, entitled ‘Personal capital movements’ – has held that an inheritance, whether of money, immovable or movable property, is a movement of capital for the purposes of Article 56 EC, except in cases where its constituent elements are confined within a single Member State (see, in particular, Case C‑364/01 Barbier [2003] ECR I‑15013, paragraph 58; Case C‑43/07 Arens-Sikken [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 30; Case C‑11/07 Eckelkamp [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39; and Case C‑318/07 Persche [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 30 and 31).

64. As regards, more particularly, Article 296 EC, it must be observed that, although that article refers to measures which a Member State may consider necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security or of information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to those interests, that article cannot however be read in such a way as to confer on Member States a power to depart from the provisions of the Treaty based on no more than reliance on those interests ( Commission v Greece , paragraph 52).

52. As regards, more particularly, Article 296 EC, it must be observed that, although that Article refers to measures which a Member State may consider necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security or of information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to those interests, that Article cannot however be read in such a way as to confer on Member States a power to depart from the provisions of the Treaty based on no more than reliance on those interests.

126. Lastly, it should be pointed out that the concept of a concerted practice, as it derives from the actual terms of Article 81(1) EC, implies, in addition to the participating undertakings concerting with each other, subsequent conduct on the market and a relationship of cause and effect between the two (judgment in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others , C‑8/08, EU:C:2009:343, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

37. Cependant, les considérations de politique sociale, d’organisation de l’État, d’éthique ou même les préoccupations de nature budgétaire qui ont eu ou qui ont pu avoir un rôle dans la fixation d’un régime de retraite par le législateur national ne sauraient prévaloir si la pension n’intéresse qu’une catégorie particulière de travailleurs, si elle est directement fonction du temps de service accompli et si son montant est calculé sur la base du dernier traitement du fonctionnaire (arrêts précités Beune, point 45; Griesmar, point 30; Niemi, point 47, ainsi que Schönheit et Becker, point 58).

45 On the other hand, considerations of social policy, of State organization, or of ethics or even budgetary preoccupations which influenced, or may have influenced, the establishment by the national legislature of a scheme such as the scheme at issue cannot prevail if the pension concerns only a particular category of workers, if it is directly related to the period of service and if its amount is calculated by reference to the civil servant' s last salary. The pension paid by the public employer is therefore entirely comparable to that paid by a private employer to his former employees.

57 Regulation No 1408/71 does not set up a common scheme of social security, but allows different national social security schemes to exist and its sole objective is to ensure the coordination of those schemes. It thus allows different schemes to continue to exist, creating different claims on different institutions against which the claimant possesses direct rights by virtue either of national law alone or of national law supplemented, where necessary, by EU law (judgment of 21 February 2013, Dumont de Chassart, C‑619/11, EU:C:2013:92, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

53 With regard to a parafiscal charge, such as that in issue in the main proceedings, which may fall within the scope of either Article 12 or Article 95 of the Treaty, the Court has ruled that the use to which the revenue from that charge is put, for the benefit of domestic products, may constitute State aid incompatible with the common market if the conditions for the application of Article 92 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 87 EC) are met, this being a matter which the Commission alone is competent to determine in accordance with the procedure laid down for that purpose in Article 93 of the Treaty and subject to review by the Court (see Scharbatke, paragraphs 18 and 20).

18 As the Court has stated on several occasions, although a parafiscal charge may fall within the scope of Article 12 or Article 95 of the Treaty, the use to which the revenue from that charge is put, for the benefit of domestic products, may nevertheless constitute State aid incompatible with the common market, if the conditions for the application of Article 92 of the Treaty, as interpreted by the Court in previous decisions, are met (Compagnie Commerciale de l' Ouest, Sanders and Lornoy, cited above).

34 In such a case, discrimination arises from the fact that the personal and family circumstances of a non-resident who receives the major part of his income and almost all his family income in a Member State other than that of his residence are taken into account neither in the Member State of residence nor in the Member State of employment (judgments of 14 February 1995, Schumacker, C‑279/93, EU:C:1995:31, paragraph 38; of 18 July 2007, Lakebrink and Peters-Lakebrink, C‑182/06, EU:C:2007:452, paragraph 31; and of 18 June 2015, Kieback, C‑9/14, EU:C:2015:406, paragraph 26).

42. Whilst the principle of legal certainty precludes a regulation from being applied retroactively, irrespective of whether such application might produce favourable or unfavourable effects for the person concerned, the same principle requires that any factual situation should normally, in the absence of any express contrary provision, be examined in the light of the legal rules existing at the time when the situation obtained (Case 10/78 Belbouab [1978] ECR 1915, paragraph 7). If the new law is thus valid only for the future, it also applies, save for derogation, to the future effects of situations which came about during the period of validity of the old law (see, to that effect, Case 96/77 Bauche and Delquignies [1978] ECR 383, paragraph 48; Case 125/77 Koninklijke Scholten-Honig and De Bijenkorf [1978] ECR 1991, paragraph 37; Case 40/79 P. v Commission [1981] ECR 361, paragraph 12; Case 270/84 Licata v Economic and Social Committee [1986] ECR 2305, paragraph 31; and Case C-28/00 Kauer [2002] ECR I-1343, paragraph 20).

48ACCORDING TO A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE A LAW AMENDING A LEGISLATIVE PROVISION APPLIES , SAVE AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED , TO THE FUTURE EFFECTS OF SITUATIONS WHICH AROSE UNDER THE PREVIOUS LAW .

41. Without its being necessary to rule on the assertion that the national legislation at issue transposes adequately the relevant requirements of Community law, suffice it to recall that, according to settled case-law, an action for failure to fulfil obligations makes possible not only an examination of the compatibility of a Member State’s laws, regulations and administrative provisions with Community law but also a determination that there has been an infringement of Community law by the national bodies in a specific individual case (see, concerning the award of public contracts, Joined Cases C‑20/01 and C‑28/01 Commission v Germany , paragraph 30, and judgment of 15 October 2009 in Case C‑275/08 Commission v Germany , paragraph 27).

27. It should also be remembered that restrictive measures imposed by Member States must satisfy the relevant conditions of proportionality and non-discrimination, as laid down in the Court’s case-law. Thus, national legislation is appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective pursued only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain it in a consistent and systematic manner (see, to that effect, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International , paragraphs 59 to 61 and the case-law cited).

61. In that context, it must be recalled that national legislation is appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective pursued only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain it in a consistent and systematic manner (Case C-169/07 Hartlauer [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 55).

56. Furthermore, the calculation of the limitation period cannot, in accordance with the case‑law cited in paragraph 36 of the present judgment, be based on criteria which are anything other than strictly objective nor, as the General Court has rightly pointed out, can that calculation differ according to whether the interruption of that period is caused by the bringing of an action or the making of a prior application. Application of the extension on account of distance to the limitation period would have the consequence that limitation would occur at the end of a different period depending on whether the aggrieved party has chosen to bring the matter directly before the General Court or to make a prior application to the competent European Union institution, something which would be at variance with the requirement of legal certainty necessary for the application of limitation periods ( Commission v Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others , paragraph 60).

21. First of all, it should be noted that, as a general rule, the Court will refrain from considering the principle of tax neutrality with a view to ascertaining whether EU law precludes national rules which lay down time-limits within which a VAT refund must be claimed, failing which the action is time-barred (see, to that effect, Case C‑85/97 SFI [1998] ECR I‑7447, paragraphs 22 to 36; Case‑62/00 Marks & Spencer [2002] ECR I‑6325, paragraphs 22 to 47; and Case C‑472/08 Alstom Power Hydro [2010] ECR I‑623, paragraphs 14 to 22).

33 Thus, the fact that the five-year limitation period begins to run as against the tax authorities on the date on which the return should in principle be made, whereas an individual may exercise his right to deduction only within a period of five years as from the date on which that right arose is not such as to infringe the principle of equality.

51. That appraisal of the evidence is consistent with well-established case-law. As the Court has already held in other cases, it is normal for the activities which anti-competitive practices and agreements entail to take place in a clandestine fashion, for meetings to be held in secret, and for the associated documentation to be reduced to a minimum. It follows that, even if the Commission discovers evidence explicitly showing unlawful contact between traders, it will normally be only fragmentary and sparse, so that it is often necessary to reconstitute certain details by deduction. Accordingly, in most cases, the existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement must be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition rules ( Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , paragraphs 55 to 57).

38. Ainsi que la Cour l’a itérativement jugé, même si la juridiction de renvoi a limité sa demande de décision préjudicielle à l’interprétation de la libre circulation des travailleurs, une telle circonstance ne fait pas obstacle à ce que la Cour fournisse à la juridiction nationale tous les éléments d’interprétation du droit de l’Union pouvant être utiles au jugement de l’affaire dont elle est saisie, que cette juridiction y ait fait ou non référence dans l’énoncé de sa question (voir en ce sens, notamment, arrêts du 21 février 2006, Ritter-Coulais, C‑152/03, Rec. p. I‑1711, point 29, et du 23 avril 2009, Rüffler, C‑544/07, Rec. p. I‑3389, point 57).

29. It must be noted that even though, strictly speaking, the national court has directed its reference for a preliminary ruling solely to the interpretation of freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital, the Court is not thereby precluded from providing the national court with all those elements for the interpretation of Community law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has specifically referred to them in its questions (see, to that effect, Case C-241/89 SARPP [1990] ECR I‑4695, paragraph 8; Case C-315/92 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb (‘Clinique’) [1994] ECR I-317, paragraph 7; Case C-87/97 Consorzio per la tutela del formaggio Gorgonzola [1999] ECR I-1301, paragraph 16; and Case C-387/01 Weigel [2004] ECR I-4981, paragraph 44).

38. That finding, as the European Commission correctly states, is supported by international law, and in particular by the WIPO Copyright Treaty, in the light of which Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as far as possible (see, to that effect, judgments in Laserdisken , EU:C:2006:549, paragraphs 39 and 40; Peek & Cloppenburg , C‑456/06, EU:C:2008:232, paragraphs 30 and 31; Football Association Premier League and Others , C‑403/08 and C‑429/08, EU:C:2011:631, paragraph 189; and Donner , C‑5/11, EU:C:2012:370, paragraph 23).

56. In that regard, it should be noted that the notion of general interest underlying Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 is, manifestly, indissociable from the essential function of a trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product or service to the consumer or end-user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from others which have another origin ( SAT.1 v OHIM , paragraphs 23 to 27, and BioID v OHIM , paragraph 60).

27. Furthermore, in view of the extent of the protection afforded to a trade mark by the regulation, the public interest underlying Article 7(1)(b) of the regulation is, manifestly, indissociable from the essential function of a trade mark, as observed in paragraph 23 above.

19 The Court has already ruled that legislation of a Member State which makes the application of an inheritance tax advantage, such as a tax-free allowance, dependent on the place of residence of the deceased person or the heir, or on the location of the assets contained in the estate, constitutes a restriction on the free movement of capital prohibited by Article 63(1) TFEU when it has the result that inheritances involving non-residents or containing assets located in another Member State are subject to a higher tax liability than that imposed on inheritances involving only residents or containing only assets located in the Member State of taxation, and which, therefore, has the effect of reducing the value of the inheritance (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 January 2008 in Jäger, C‑256/06, EU:C:2008:20, paragraphs 30 to 35; of 17 October 2013 in Welte, C‑181/12, EU:C:2013:662, paragraphs 23 to 26; of 3 September 2014 in Commission v Spain, C‑127/12, not published, EU:C:2014:2130, paragraphs 57 to 60; and of 4 September 2014 in Commission v Germany, C‑211/13, not published, EU:C:2014:2148, paragraphs 40 to 43).

66. In addition, the appellants cannot derive any useful argument from the judgment of the General Court in Verhuizingen Coppens v Commission , which in any case has since been set aside in Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens , in order to show that the judgment under appeal was insufficiently reasoned. The obligation on the General Court to state the reasons for its judgments cannot in principle extend to imposing on it an obligation to justify the solution arrived at in one case in the light of that found in another, even if it concerned the same decision. The Court has also held that, if an addressee of a decision decides to bring an action for annulment, the matter to be tried by the European Union judicature relates only to those aspects of the decision which concern that addressee. Unchallenged aspects concerning other addressees, on the other hand, do not form part of the matter to be tried by the Union judicature (see Case C‑310/97 P Commission v AssiDomän Kraft Products and Others [1999] ECR I‑5363, paragraph 53, and Joined Cases C‑201/09 P and C‑216/09 P ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others [2011] ECR I‑2239, paragraph 142), without prejudice to special circumstances (see, to that effect, Case C‑286/11 Commission v Tomkins [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 43 and 49), which however are neither alleged not submitted in the present case.

49. Thus, in a situation such as that in the present case, where the liability of the parent company is derived exclusively from that of its subsidiary and where the parent company and its subsidiary have brought parallel actions having the same object, the General Court was entitled, without ruling ultra petita , to take account of the outcome of the action brought by Pegler and to annul the contested decision in respect of the period prior to 29 October 1993 also in so far as Tomkins is concerned.

23. As regards, more specifically, any fees imposed by Member States on undertakings which hold individual licences under Article 11 of Directive 97/13, Article 11(1) provides that those fees are to seek only to cover the administration costs generated by the work involved in implementing those licences (Joined Cases C‑392/04 and C‑422/04 i-21 Germany and Arcor [2006] ECR I‑8559, paragraph 28).

18. Whilst the provisions of the FEU Treaty concerning freedom of establishment are directed to ensuring that foreign nationals and companies are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of a company incorporated under its legislation, in particular through a permanent establishment (see, to this effect, the judgment in Lidl Belgium , C‑414/06, EU:C:2008:278, paragraphs 19 and 20).

20. Those considerations also apply where a company established in a Member State carries on business in another Member State through a permanent establishment.

66. Owing to the substantial change in circumstances referred to in paragraph 64 above, the assessment by the Commission of that aid scheme cannot therefore be considered as prejudicing the assessment which would have been carried out of an aid scheme, containing similar measures, but which would have fallen to be implemented in economic circumstances radically different from those which the Commission took into account in its assessment. It follows that the compatibility with the internal market of the new aid scheme which was the subject of an application addressed to the Council by the Republic of Lithuania under the third subparagraph of Article 108(2) TFEU must be evaluated following an individual assessment distinct from that of the scheme referred to in paragraph 15 above, which takes into consideration the relevant economic circumstances at the time when the aid is granted (see, to that effect, Case C‑261/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I‑4437, paragraph 21, and Case C‑459/10 P Freistaat Sachsen and Land Sachsen-Anhalt v Commission [2011] ECR I‑109, paragraph 4 8).

76. It follows from the foregoing considerations that, by entering into or maintaining in force, despite the renegotiation of the 1957 Agreement, international commitments concerning air fares and rates charged by carriers designated by the United States on intra-Community routes and concerning CRSs offered for use or used on Netherlands territory, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5 of the Treaty and under Regulations Nos 2409/92 and 2299/89 (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark , paragraphs 110 to 112; Commission v Sweden , paragraphs 106 to 108; Commission v Finland , paragraphs 111 to 113; Commission v Belgium , paragraphs 124 to 126; Commission v Luxembourg , paragraphs 116 to 118; Commission v Austria , paragraphs 124 to 126, and Commission v Germany , paragraphs 135 to 137). Failure to fulfil obligations arising from infringement of Article 52 of the Treaty Arguments of the parties

137 It follows from the foregoing considerations that, by entering into international commitments concerning air fares and rates charged by carriers designated by the United States of America on intra-Community routes and concerning CRSs offered for use or used in German territory, the Federal Republic of Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 5 of the Treaty and under Regulations Nos 2409/92 and 2299/89. Infringement of Article 52 of the Treaty Arguments of the parties

29. According to the order for reference, the claimant in the main proceedings is not covered by Regulation No 1612/68.

47. It must be recalled that the need to safeguard the balanced allocation between the Member States of the power to tax may be accepted, in particular, where the system in question is designed to prevent conduct capable of jeopardising the right of a Member State to exercise its powers of taxation in relation to activities carried out in its territory (see Case C‑231/05 Oy AA [2007] ECR I‑6373, paragraph 54; Case C‑379/05 Amurta [2007] ECR I‑9569, paragraph 58; Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha , paragraph 66; and Commission v Germany , paragraph 77).

54. That element of justification may be allowed, however, where the system in question is designed to prevent conduct capable of jeopardising the right of the Member States to exercise their taxing powers in relation to activities carried on in their territory ( Rewe Zentralfinanz , paragraph 42).

81. Furthermore, it is also settled case-law of the Court that that restriction is entirely proportionate to the objective pursued, since the provision at issue limits to a maximum of EUR 12 500 the amount which may be offset against the registration duties payable by the person who purchases a new principal residence in the Flemish Region (see, to that effect, Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt , paragraph 45). In providing for such a limitation, the system at issue retains its character as a tax advantage and is not in the nature of a disguised exemption.

33 In order to ensure free movement of employed and self-employed persons within the European Union, while upholding the principle of equal treatment of those persons under the various measures of national legislation, Title II of Regulation No 1408/71 has established a system of coordination concerning, inter alia, the determination of the legislation applicable to employed and self-employed persons who make use, under various circumstances, of their right to freedom of movement (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 April 2008, Derouin, C‑103/06, EU:C:2008:185, paragraph 20, 3 March 2011, Tomaszewska, C‑440/09, EU:C:2011:114, paragraphs 25 and 28, and 26 February 2015, de Ruyter, C‑623/13, EU:C:2015:123, paragraph 34).

25. The system put in place by Regulation No 1408/71 is merely a system of coordination, concerning, inter alia, the determination of the legislation applicable to employed and self‑employed persons who make use, under various circumstances, of their right to freedom of movement (Case C‑493/04 Piatkowski [2006] ECR I‑2369, paragraph 20; Case C‑50/05 Nikula [2006] ECR I‑7029, paragraph 20; and Case C‑103/06 Derouin [2008] ECR I‑1853, paragraph 20).

83. So far as concerns the third condition referred to in paragraph 74 above, relating to the beneficial nature of the measures in question, it must be observed that measures which, whatever their form, are likely directly or indirectly to favour certain undertakings or are to be regarded as an economic advantage which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions are regarded as aid (see, inter alia, Case C‑451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti [2006] ECR I‑2941, paragraph 59).

30 Trade mark rights, the Court has held, constitute an essential element in the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty is intended to establish. In such a system, undertakings must be able to attract and retain customers by the quality of their products or services, which is possible only thanks to the existence of distinctive signs allowing them to be identified. For the trade mark to be able to fulfil that function, it must constitute a guarantee that all products which bear it have been manufactured under the control of a single undertaking to which responsibility for their quality may be attributed (see Case C-10/89 CNL-SUCAL v HAG GF [1990] ECR I-3711 ("HAG II"), paragraph 13, and Case C-9/93 IHT Internationale Heiztechnik v Ideal Standard [1994] ECR I-2789, paragraphs 37 and 45).

45 That view cannot be accepted because it is contrary to the reasoning of the Court in HAG II. The Court began by noting that trade-mark rights are an essential element in the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to establish (paragraph 13). It went on to recall the identifying function of trade marks and, in a passage cited in paragraph 37 above, the conditions for trade marks to be able to fulfil that role. The Court further noted that the scope of the exclusive right which is the specific subject-matter of the trade mark must be determined having regard to its function (paragraph 14). It stressed that in that case the determinant factor was absence of consent of the proprietor of the trade mark in the importing State to the putting into circulation in the exporting State of products marketed by the proprietor of the right in the latter State (paragraph 15). It concluded that free movement of the goods would undermine the essential function of the trade mark: consumers would no longer be able to identify for certain the origin of the marked goods and the proprietor of the trade mark could be held responsible for the poor quality of goods for which he was in no way accountable (paragraph 16).

5 AS A RESULT OF THE PROVISIONS IN THE TREATY RELATING TO THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND IN PARTICULAR OF ARTICLE 30 , QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS AND ALL MEASURES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT ARE PROHIBITED BETWEEN MEMBER STATES . BY ARTICLE 36 THESE PROVISIONS NEVERTHELESS DO NOT PRECLUDE PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL OR COMMERCIAL PROPERTY . HOWEVER , IT IS CLEAR FROM THAT SAME ARTICLE , IN PARTICULAR THE SECOND SENTENCE , AS WELL AS FROM THE CONTEXT , THAT WHILST THE TREATY DOES NOT AFFECT THE EXISTENCE OF RIGHTS RECOGNIZED BY THE LEGISLATION OF A MEMBER STATE IN MATTERS OF INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTY , YET THE EXERCISE OF THOSE RIGHTS MAY NEVERTHELESS , DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES , BE RESTRICTED BY THE PROHIBITIONS IN THE TREATY . INASMUCH AS IT PROVIDES AN EXCEPTION TO ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMON MARKET , ARTICLE 36 IN FACT ADMITS EXCEPTIONS TO THE FREE MOVMENT OF GOODS ONLY TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH EXCEPTIONS ARE JUSTIFIED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SAFEGUARDING RIGHTS WHICH CONSTITUTE THE SPECIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER OF THAT PROPERTY .

57 It must also be made clear, first, that it is required not that the situations be identical, but only that they be comparable and, secondly, that the assessment of that comparability must be carried out not in a global and abstract manner, but in a specific and concrete manner in the light of the objective and of the aim of the national legislation creating the distinction at issue (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 May 2011, Römer, C‑147/08, EU:C:2011:286, paragraph 42; of 12 December 2013, Hay, C‑267/12, EU:C:2013:823, paragraph 33; of 15 May 2014, Szatmári Malom, C‑135/13, EU:C:2014:327, paragraph 67; and of 1 October 2015, O, C‑432/14, EU:C:2015:643, paragraph 32).

67. In that regard, the elements that characterise different situations and, accordingly, their comparability must in particular be determined and assessed in the light of the subject-matter and purpose of the EU act that makes the distinction in question (see, inter alia, Case C‑195/12 IBV & Cie EU:C:2013:598, paragraphs 52 and 53 and the case-law cited).

27 The first stage, particularly where the competition is based on formal qualifications, consists in comparing the diplomas or other certificates of qualifications provided by the candidates with the qualifications required by the notice of competition (see the judgments cited above in Case 44/71 Marcato v Commission, paragraph 20; Case 37/72 Marcato v Commission, paragraph 19, and Case 31/75 Costacurta v Commission, paragraph 11). Since that comparison is made on the basis of objective factors which are moreover known to each candidate in his own case, observance of the secrecy surrounding the proceedings of the selection board does not preclude communication of those objective factors and in particular of the criteria for assessment upon which the selection made at the stage of the preliminary proceedings in the competition was based, a selection which enables those whose applications have been rejected even before any individual test to ascertain the possible reasons for their elimination (see Bonu v Council, cited above, paragraph 5).

52. It must therefore be accepted that a Member State may, in accordance with the precautionary principle, take protective measures without having to wait until the existence and gravity of those risks become fully apparent (see, to that effect, National Farmers’ Union , paragraph 63). However, the risk assessment cannot be based on purely hypothetical considerations (see Monsanto Agricoltura Italia , paragraph 106; Commission v Denmark , paragraph 49; and Commission v France , paragraph 56).

49. It is clear that such an assessment of the risk could reveal that scientific uncertainty persists as regards the existence or extent of real risks to human health. In such circumstances, it must be accepted that a Member State may, in accordance with the precautionary principle, take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks are fully demonstrated (see, to that effect, Case C-157/96 National Farmers ' Union and Others [1998] ECR I-2211, paragraph 63). However, the risk assessment cannot be based on purely hypothetical considerations (see, to that effect, EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway , paragraph 29, and Case C-236/01 Monsanto Agricoltura Italia and Others [2003] ECR I-8105, paragraph 106).

25. It follows that the fact of exempting all categories of establishments which engage in such lending from the obligation laid down in Article 5(1) of the directive would deprive authors of remuneration with which they could recoup their investments, with inevitable repercussions for the creation of new works (see Metronome Musik , paragraph 24). In those circumstances, a transposition of the directive that resulted in such an exemption for all categories of establishments would go directly against the objective of that directive.

33 As the Court has held on several occasions, it follows from a literal, contextual and teleological interpretation of Directive 2004/38 that the directive governs only the conditions determining whether a Union citizen can enter and reside in Member States other than that of which he is a national and does not confer a derived right of residence on third-country nationals who are family members of a Union citizen in the Member State of which that citizen is a national (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 March 2014, O. and B., C‑456/12, EU:C:2014:135, paragraph 37, and of 10 May 2017, Chavez-Vilchez and Others, C‑133/15, EU:C:2017:354, paragraph 53).

37. It follows from a literal, systematic and teleological interpretation of Directive 2004/38 that it does not establish a derived right of residence for third‑country nationals who are family members of a Union citizen in the Member State of which that citizen is a national.

44. Consequently, the judgment under appeal must be set aside in so far as the General Court did not bring the fine imposed on Total into line with the fine imposed on Total France.

63. In that context, it is for the national court to determine in each individual case, on the basis of the facts of the case, whether a given transaction in respect of property results in the transfer of the right to dispose of the property as owner within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Sixth Directive (see, to that effect, Shipping and Forwarding Enterprise Safe , paragraph 13).

13 The answer to the second question must therefore be that it is for the national court to determine in each individual case, on the basis of the facts of the case, whether there is a transfer of the right to dispose of the property as owner within the meaning of Article 5(1 ) of the Sixth Directive .

17 More specifically, as far as concerns public undertakings, such as CE Oltenia, the Court has also held that the State is able, by exercising its dominant influence over such undertakings, to direct the use of their resources in order, as occasion arises, to finance specific advantages in favour of other undertakings (judgment of 16 May 2002, France v Commission, C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 38).

45. However, having regard to the obligation to interpret the concept of waste widely in order to limit its inherent undesirable or harmful effects, recourse to the reasoning applicable to by-products should be limited to situations in which the reuse of the goods, materials or raw materials is not a mere possibility but a certainty, without any prior processing and as an integral part of the production process (see Palin Granit , paragraph 36).

36 However, having regard to the obligation, recalled at paragraph 23 of this judgment, to interpret the concept of waste widely in order to limit its inherent risks and pollution, the reasoning applicable to by-products should be confined to situations in which the reuse of the goods, materials or raw materials is not a mere possibility but a certainty, without any further processing prior to reuse and as an integral part of the production process.

72. It must also be pointed out that apprehension of internal difficulties in the course of implementing a decision on State aid cannot justify a failure by a Member State to comply with its obligations under Community law (see, to that effect, in particular, Case C‑52/95 Commission v France [1995] ECR I‑4443, paragraph 38; Case C‑265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I‑6959, paragraph 55; Case C‑280/95 Commission v Italy , paragraph 16; and Case C‑441/06 Commission v France [2007] ECR I‑8887, paragraph 43).

45. However, the social aim of an insurance scheme is not in itself sufficient to preclude the activity in question from being classified as an economic activity (see, to that effect, Albany , paragraph 86; Pavlov and Others , paragraph 118; Cisal , paragraph 37; and Kattner Stahlbau , paragraph 42).

118 It is true that the pursuit of a social objective, the abovementioned solidarity aspects and the restrictions or controls on investments made by the Fund may render the service provided by the Fund less competitive than comparable services provided by insurance companies. Although such constraints do not prevent the activity engaged in by the Fund from being regarded as an economic activity, they might justify the exclusive right of such a body to manage a supplementary pension scheme (see Albany, paragraph 86, Brentjens', paragraph 86, and Drijvende Bokken, paragraph 76).

28. To the extent that the Spanish Government contends that, under the terms of Article 62(1)(a) of the Law of 2004, the exemption allowed under that provision was established not for the benefit of undertakings such as Navantia, but exclusively for the benefit of the Spanish State, as the taxable person for the purposes of the property tax, and that the objectives pursued relate to considerations of national defence, it should be noted that the grounds underlying an aid measure do not suffice to exclude the measure at the outset from being categorised as aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, since that provision does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes or their aims but defines them in terms of their effects (judgments in Comitato ‘Venezia vuole vivere’ and Others v Commission , C‑71/09 P, C‑73/09 P and C‑76/09 P, EU:C:2011:368, paragraph 94, and Commission v EDF , C‑124/10 P, EU:C:2012:318, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

34. Contrary to what the French Republic and the United Kingdom suggest, it cannot be held that this unfavourable treatment is offset by the double taxation conventions concluded by the Republic of Finland. It is necessary for that purpose that the application of such a convention should allow the effects of the difference in treatment under national legislation to be compensated for (see, Case C‑284/09 Commission v Germany [2011] ECR I‑9879, paragraph 63, and the case‑law cited). As is clear from the explanations provided on that point at the hearing by the Republic of Finland, that Member State has concluded only three conventions providing for a rate of taxation on dividends of 0%, most of the other conventions providing for a rate of 15%.

63. However, it is necessary for that purpose that the application of such a convention should allow the effects of the difference in treatment under national legislation to be compensated for (see Commission v Italy , para graph 37, and Commission v Spain , paragraph 59).

10 As regards the various circulars produced by the Italian Republic, it is sufficient to observe that it is settled case-law that mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of a Member State's obligations under the Treaty (see, in particular, Case C-316/96 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-7231, paragraph 16).

29 Therefore, Article 45(2) of Directive 2004/18 does not provide for uniform application at EU level of the grounds of exclusion it mentions, since the Member States may choose not to apply those grounds of exclusion at all or to incorporate them into national law with varying degrees of rigour according to legal, economic or social considerations prevailing at national level. In that context, the Member States have the power to make the criteria laid down in Article 45(2) less onerous or more flexible (judgment of 10 July 2014, Consorzio Stabile Libor Lavori Pubblici, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

36. Accordingly, Article 45(2) of Directive 2004/18 does not provide for uniform application at EU level of the grounds of exclusion it mentions, since the Member States may choose not to apply those grounds of exclusion at all or to incorporate them into national law with varying degrees of rigour according to legal, economic or social considerations prevailing at national level. In that context, the Member States have the power to make the criteria laid down in Article 45(2) less onerous or more flexible (see, as regards Article 29 of Directive 92/50, La Cascina and Others , EU:C:2006:94, paragraph 23).

70. It is for the national court to interpret the national law which it has to apply, as far as is at all possible, in a manner which accords with the requirements of European Union law and, in particular, ensures that the obligation of transparency is observed (see, to that effect, Case C‑327/00 Santex [2003] ECR I‑1877, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

39. That analysis is confirmed by the general scheme and purpose of Chapter 6, of which Article 75 EA forms part. That chapter implements the general obligation imposed on the Community institutions by Article 2(d) EA to ensure that all users in the Community receive a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear fuels (Case 7/71 Commission v France [1971] ECR 1003, paragraph 22). The effect of Article 75 EA is to remove substances which are the subject of the contract work operations referred to in that provision from the ambit of the provisions relating to the supply system (see Ruling 1/78 [1978] ECR 2151, paragraph 16).

22 THE OBJECT OF THIS PROVISION, WHICH IS PLACED AT THE END OF CHAPTER VI, AND WHICH PUTS INTO EFFECT THE GENERAL OBLIGATION IMPOSED ON THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS BY ARTICLE 2 ( D ) TO ENSURE THAT ALL USERS RECEIVE A REGULAR AND EQUITABLE SUPPLY OF ORES AND NUCLEAR FUELS IS PRECISELY TO ENABLE THE SUPPLY SYSTEM TO BE ADAPTED TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES AND CANNOT THEREFORE BE INTERPRETED AS DEPRIVING THE COMMUNITY OF A MEANS OF ACTION DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY .

73. The Commission contends that the Court of First Instance adopted an overly restrictive interpretation of the statement made on 23 July 1997 in which TKS agreed to be held responsible for the conduct attributed to Thyssen as from 1993, even though the latter’s business in the stainless steel flat products sector had not been transferred to it until 1 January 1995.

24. Also according to settled case-law, it follows that the concept of " matters relating to a contract" in Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention is not to be understood as covering a situation in which there is no obligation freely assumed by one party towards another ( Handte , paragraph 15, Réunion européenne and Others , paragraph 17, and Tacconi , paragraph 23, cited above).

23 Furthermore, it should be noted that, according to the Court's case-law, the expression `matters relating to contract' within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention is not to be understood as covering a situation in which there is no obligation freely assumed by one party towards another (Handte, paragraph 15, and Réunion Européenne and Others, paragraph 17).

20. In order for such a difference in treatment to be compatible with the provisions of the EC Treaty on the freedom of establishment, it must relate to situations which are not objectively comparable or be justified by an overriding reason in the general interest (see, to that effect, Case C‑446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation [2006] ECR I‑11753, paragraph 167).

79 As the Court of Justice held in its judgment in Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraph 93, a party is entitled to ask the Court of First Instance, as a measure of organisation of procedure, to order the opposite party to produce documents which are in its possession.

93 It follows that the appellant was entitled to ask the Court of First Instance to order the opposite party to produce documents which were in its possession. Nevertheless, to enable the Court of First Instance to determine whether it was conducive to proper conduct of the procedure to order the production of certain documents, the party requesting production must identify the documents requested and provide the Court with at least minimum information indicating the utility of those documents for the purposes of the proceedings.

18 On that point, it must be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation in the Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-361/95 Commission v Spain [1997] ECR I-7351, paragraph 13).

84 In that regard, the Court points out that it has previously held that the EU legislature may consider, in the context of its broad discretion in the field of agricultural policy, that full or partial compensation is appropriate for owners of farms on which animals have been destroyed and slaughtered. Nonetheless, the Court considered that the existence, in EU law, of a general principle requiring compensation to be paid in all circumstances cannot be inferred from that fact (see judgment of 10 July 2003, Booker Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood, C‑20/00 and C‑64/00, EU:C:2003:397, paragraph 85).

85. Admittedly, the Community legislature may consider, in the context of its broad discretion in the field of agricultural policy (see Case C-315/93 Flip and Verdegem [1995] ECR I-913, paragraph 26), that full or partial compensation is appropriate for owners of farms on which animals have been destroyed and slaughtered. Nonetheless, the existence, in Community law, of a general principle requiring compensation to be paid in all circumstances cannot be inferred from that fact.

49. As regards the ability of an agreement, decision or concerted practice extending over the whole of the territory of a Member State to affect trade between Member States, it is settled case-law that such an agreement, decision or concerted practice has, by its very nature, the effect of reinforcing the partitioning of markets on a national basis, thereby holding up the economic interpenetration which the FEU Treaty is designed to bring about (see judgments in Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission , 8/72, EU:C:1972:84, paragraph 29; Commission v Italy , C‑35/96, EU:C:1998:303, paragraph 48; and Wouters and Others , C‑309/99, EU:C:2002:98, paragraph 95).

30. Community policy on the environment, to which the legislative act at issue in the main proceedings relates, and one of whose principal objectives is the protection of the environment, aims, in accordance with Article 174(2) EC, at a high level of protection and is based in particular on the precautionary principle, the principle that preventive action should be taken, and the polluter-pays principle (see Case C‑157/96 National Farmers’ Union and Others [1998] ECR I‑2211, paragraph 64, and Joined Cases C‑14/06 and C‑295/06 Parliament and Denmark v Commission [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).

75. Such an objective, in compliance with Article 152 EC, according to which a high level of human health protection is to be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Community policies and activities (see, to that effect, Case C-504/04 Agrarproduktion Staebelow [2006] ECR I-679, paragraph 39), and in compliance with Article 174(2) EC, according to which Community policy on the environment is to aim at a high level of protection and is based on the principles of precaution and preventive action (see Case C-127/02 Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging [2004] ECR I-7405, paragraph 44) justifies the strict interpretation of the conditions for exemption.

32. As regards the first condition, it entails, first, the adoption of the project by a specific act of legislation. It should be observed here that the terms ‘project’ and ‘consent’ are defined in Article 1(2) of Directive 85/337. A legislative act adopting a project must therefore, if it is to come within the scope of Article 1(5) of the directive, be specific and display the same characteristics as a consent of that kind. In particular, it must grant the developer the right to carry out the project (see WWF and Others , paragraph 58, and Boxus and Others , paragraph 38).

Il y a lieu de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, la lettre de mise en demeure a pour but, d’une part, de circonscrire l’objet du litige et d’indiquer à l’État membre qui est invité à présenter ses observations les éléments nécessaires à la préparation de sa défense et, d’autre part, de permettre à celui-ci de se mettre en règle avant que la Cour ne soit saisie (voir, notamment, arrêts du 28 mars 1985, Commission/Italie, 274/83, non publié, EU:C:1985:148, point 19, et du 7 avril 2011, Commission/Portugal, C‑20/09, non publié, EU:C:2011:214, point 19 ainsi que jurisprudence citée).

19. It follows from that function that the purpose of the letter of formal notice is, first, to delimit the subject-matter of the dispute and to indicate to the Member State, which is invited to submit its observations, the factors enabling it to prepare its defence and, secondly, to enable the Member State to comply before proceedings are brought before the Court ( Commission v Germany , paragraph 47; Case C‑442/06 Commission v Italy , paragraph 22).

21. A national provision such as the one at issue in the main proceedings is, in principle, likely to limit the total volume of sales of the relevant products in the Member State concerned and may, consequently, affect the volume of sales of those products from other Member States. Such a finding is not, however, enough for that provision to be considered a measure having equivalent effect (see, inter alia, Keck and Mithouard , paragraph 13, and Joined Cases C‑418/93 to C‑421/93, C‑460/93 to C‑462/93, C‑464/93, C‑9/94 to C‑11/94, C‑14/94, C‑15/94, C‑23/94, C‑24/94, and C‑332/94 Semeraro Casa Uno and Others [1996] ECR I‑2975, paragraph 24).

33. In such a situation the holder of a ‘diploma’, within the meaning of Article 1(a) of Directive 89/48, such as Mr Ebert, enjoys, in accordance with Article 3, first paragraph, subparagraph (a) thereof, access to the regulated profession of lawyer in the host Member State. However, since the profession is one whose practice requires a precise knowledge of national law and an essential and constant element of which is the provision of advice and/or assistance concerning national law, Article 3 of Directive 89/48 as amended does not prevent the host Member State from requiring, pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) thereof, that the applicant take an aptitude test, provided that that Member State first verifies whether the knowledge acquired by the applicant in the course of his professional experience is capable of covering, in whole or in part, the substantial difference referred to in the first subparagraph of that latter provision (see Case C‑118/09 Koller [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 38 and 39).

38. As the holder of a ‘diploma’ within the meaning of Article 1(a) of Directive 89/48 as amended, a person such as Mr Koller enjoys, in accordance with Article 3, first paragraph, subparagraph (a), of that directive, access to the regulated profession of lawyer in the host Member State.

94. If examination of a Community act shows that it has a twofold purpose or twofold component and if one of these is identifiable as main or predominant, whereas the other is merely incidental, the act must be founded on a sole legal basis, that is, the one required by the main or predominant purpose or component (see, inter alia , Case C-42/97 Parliament v Council [1999] ECR I-869, paragraphs 39 and 40, and Case C-36/98 Spain v Council , cited above, paragraph 59). Exceptionally, if it is established that the act simultaneously pursues a number of objectives, indissociably linked, without one being secondary and indirect in relation to the other, such an act may be founded on the various corresponding legal bases (Opinion 2/00 [2001] ECR I-9713, paragraph 23).

59. As a consequence and in those circumstances, without there being any need to rule on the admissibility of the second part of the first plea in Case C‑317/13 or of the second plea in Case C‑679/13, the second part of those pleas must be rejected as unfounded (see, by analogy, judgments in France v Commission , C‑233/02, EU:C:2004:173, paragraph 26, and Komninou and Others v Commission , C‑167/06 P, EU:C:2007:633, paragraph 32), and those pleas must therefore be rejected in their entirety. The second plea in Case C‑317/13 and the first plea in Case C‑679/13, alleging breach of an essential procedural requirement Arguments of the parties

32. Pour autant que le moyen tiré d’une violation du droit de pétition est couvert par ladite exception, il n’y a pas lieu de statuer sur celle-ci, dès lors que ledit moyen doit être rejeté comme n’étant pas fondé (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 23 mars 2004, France/Commission, C-233/02, Rec. p. I-2759, point 26). Sur le fond

24 In the absence of Community rules governing a matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from the direct effect of Community law. However, such rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions or render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (see, in particular, Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck v Belgian State [1995] ECR I-4599, paragraph 12, and the cases cited).

82. It must be recalled that the Commission is bound, in any application lodged under Article 226 EC, to state the precise complaints on which the Court of Justice is to adjudicate and also, at least briefly, the elements of law and of fact on which those complaints are based (see, in particular, Case C‑375/95 Commission v Greece [1997] ECR I‑5981, paragraph 35, and Case C‑202/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I‑9319, paragraph 20).

20 At the outset, it is appropriate to recall that the Court has consistently held that the Commission must indicate, in any application made under Article 226 EC, the specific complaints on which the Court is asked to rule and, at the very least in summary form, the legal and factual particulars on which those complaints are based (see, inter alia, Case C-375/95 Commission v Greece [1997] ECR I-5981, paragraph 35).

25. It must also be observed that the freedom to choose the ways and means of ensuring that a directive is implemented does not affect the obligation imposed on all Member States to which the directive is addressed to adopt all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive concerned is fully effective in accordance with the objective which it pursues (see, in particular, Case C‑268/06 Impact [2008] ECR I‑2483, paragraph 40).

45. Accordingly, a rule such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which makes the opening of new roadside service stations subject to the compliance with minimum distances between service stations, constitutes a restriction within the meaning of Article 43 EC. Such a rule, which applies only to new service stations and not to service stations already in existence before the entry into force of the rule, makes access to the activity of fuel distribution subject to conditions and, by being more advantageous to operators who are already present on the Italian market, is liable to deter, or even prevent, access to the Italian market by operators from other Member States (also see, by way of analogy, CaixaBank France , paragraphs 11 to 14, and Case C‑518/06 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 62 to 64, 70 and 71).

12. A prohibition on the remuneration of sight accounts such as that laid down by the French legislation constitutes, for companies from Member States other than the French Republic, a serious obstacle to the pursuit of their activities via a subsidiary in the latter Member State, affecting their access to the market. That prohibition is therefore to be regarded as a restriction within the meaning of Article 43 EC.

13 Fourth, the derogation in Article 48(4) of the Treaty, according to which the provisions on freedom of movement for workers are not to apply to `employment in the public service', concerns only access for nationals of other Member States to certain posts in the civil service (Case C-248/96 Grahame and Hollanders [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 32). It does not concern the activities of a specialist doctor, which do not involve direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the State or of public authorities (see, in that regard, Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 3881, paragraph 10).

12 As the Court held in the judgment in Pardini (Case 338/85 Pardini v Ministero del commercio con l' estero [1988] ECR 2041, paragraph 11), a national court or tribunal is not empowered to bring a matter before the Court by way of a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the Treaty unless a dispute is pending before it in the context of which it is called upon to give a decision which could take into account the preliminary ruling. Conversely, the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to hear a reference for a preliminary ruling when at the time it is made the procedure before the court making it has already been terminated.

11 IT FOLLOWS THAT A NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL IS NOT EMPOWERED TO BRING A MATTER BEFORE THE COURT BY WAY OF A REFERENCE FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING UNLESS A DISPUTE IS PENDING BEFORE IT IN THE CONTEXT OF WHICH IT IS CALLED UPON TO GIVE A DECISION CAPABLE OF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PRELIMINARY RULING . CONVERSELY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR A REFERENCE FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING WHEN AT THE TIME IT IS MADE THE PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COURT MAKING IT HAS ALREADY BEEN TERMINATED .

74 It is also necessary to cite as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the judgment of 7 May 2009 in Commission v Portugal (C‑530/07, EU:C:2009:292) will not be fully complied with, according to the statements of the Portuguese Republic, until 2019, which is equivalent to a delay of almost 20 years, in so far as the obligation to ensure that the secondary treatment of the urban waste water of the agglomeration of Matosinhos complied with EU law should have been fulfilled on 31 December 2000 at the latest. As it is, since the Portuguese Republic maintains that it will not be in a position to comply with all of its obligations under that directive until almost 20 years after that second date, the Court cannot but confirm the particularly lengthy character of an infringement which, in the light of the objective mentioned above, is also a matter of indisputable gravity (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 December 2012 in Commission v Ireland, C‑374/11, EU:C:2012:827, paragraph 38).

117. As regards procedures for reviewing State aid, such general presumptions may arise from Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article [88] of the EC Treaty (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1), which specifically regulates the field of State aid and which contains provisions concerning access to information and to documents obtained in the context of the investigation and aid review proceedings (see, to that effect, Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau , paragraphs 55 to 57).

56. Regulation No 659/1999, and, in particular, Article 20 thereof, do not lay down any right of access to documents in the Commission’s administrative file for interested parties in the context of the review procedure opened in accordance with Article 88(2) EC.

25 Lastly, it is for the national court to make the necessary factual appraisal, in the light of the criteria for interpretation specified by the Court, in order to establish whether or not there is a transfer in the sense indicated (judgment in Spijkers, cited above, paragraph 14).

175. The complaints made by Coopservice in this plea must be dismissed. As regards Article 87(2)(b) EC, the General Court correctly held that the derogation provided for in that provision does not apply to this case, given that the reductions in social security contributions at issue are proportionate to the wage bill and are not designed to remedy damage caused by natural catastrophes or other events of an extraordinary nature, as the said provision requires. In accordance with the case-law, the only disadvantages which may be compensated for by virtue of that derogation are those directly caused by natural calamities or other extraordinary events (judgment of 11 November 2004 in Case C‑73/03 Spain v Commission , paragraph 37; Joined Cases C‑346/03 and C‑529/03 Atzeni and Others [2006] ECR I‑1875, paragraph 79).

79. Article 92(2)(b) of the Treaty provides that aid to make good damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences is compatible with the common market. Since this is an exception to the general principle that State aid is incompatible with the common market, that provision must be interpreted narrowly. The Court has held that only damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences may be compensated for under that provision. It follows that there must be a direct link between the damage caused by the exceptional occurrence and the State aid and that as precise an assessment as possible must be made of the damage suffered by the producers concerned (judgment of 11 November 2004 in Case C‑73/03 Spain v Commission , not published in the ECR, paragraph 37).

20. In that connection, it must be recalled, first of all, that when exercising its powers under Article 226 EC the Commission’s task is to ensure, of its own motion and in the general interest, that the Member States give effect to Community law and to obtain a declaration of any failure to fulfil the obligations deriving therefrom, with a view to bringing it to an end (see Case C-333/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1025, paragraph 23, and Case C-394/02 Commission v Greece [2005] ECR I-4713, paragraphs 14 and 15 and the case-law cited).

41. In a definitive transfer, as is the case in the main proceedings, a farmer who benefited from payment entitlements up until that point definitively waives his claims on the transfer of his entitlements to another farmer who then activates them for his benefit (see, to that effect, van Dijk , paragraph 35).

35. In particular, Article 46(2) provides that payment entitlements without land may by transferred only by definitive transfer. In such a case, a farmer who benefited from payment entitlements up until that point definitively waives his claims on the sale of his entitlements to another farmer, who then activates them for his benefit. In order to be able to claim payment of those entitlements, in accordance with Article 44(1) of Regulation No 1782/2003, the farmer concerned would have to have a sufficient number of eligible hectares of agricultural land in order to ensure the existence of a sufficient agricultural basis for the payment entitlements.

36. In accordance with Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/109, the directive applies to third-country nationals residing legally in the territory of a Member State. Unlike Directive 2004/38 (see Joined Cases C‑424/10 and C‑425/10 Ziolkowski and Szeja [2011] ECR I‑14035, paragraphs 46 and 47), Directive 2003/109 does not lay down the conditions which the residence of those nationals must satisfy for them to be regarded as legally resident in the territory of a Member State. It follows that those conditions are governed by national law alone.

11 Before that question is answered, it is important to note that the Court has already held that a tax such as the national consumption tax at issue in the main proceedings must be regarded as being an integral part of a general system of internal taxation within the meaning of Article 95 of the Treaty and that its compatibility with Community law must be assessed on the basis of that article rather than Articles 9 and 12 of the Treaty (see, most recently, the judgment in Joined Cases C-228/90 to C-234/90, C-339/90 and C-353/90 Simba and Others [1992] ECR I-3713, paragraph 7).

7 It should be recalled, first, that the Court has already held in Case 193/85 Co-Frutta v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1987] ECR 2085, paragraph 13, that a charge such as the national tax on consumption must be regarded as being an integral part of a general system of internal dues within the meaning of Article 95 of the Treaty and its compatibility with Community law must be assessed on the basis of that article rather than Articles 9 and 12 of the Treaty.

42 The same is true as regards the argument of the Finnish Government to the effect that, by virtue of its general and compulsory character, the pension scheme at issue in the main proceedings does not have the features of an occupational or supplementary scheme. The fact that a particular pension scheme, such as that laid down in Law 280/1966 for public servants and other staff recruited by the State, is part of a general, harmonised legislative framework of pension schemes designed to ensure in particular that changes in the employment relationship do not interrupt the establishment of pension rights is not sufficient to exclude pension benefits provided under such a regime from the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty. In addition, the applicability of that provision to pension benefits is in no way conditional upon a pension being supplementary to a benefit provided by a statutory social security scheme (Beune, paragraph 37, and Case C-366/99 Griesmar [2001] ECR I-9383, paragraph 37).

40 Where, without initiating the procedure under Article 93(2), the Commission finds, on the basis of Article 93(3), that an aid is compatible with the common market, the persons intended to benefit from the procedural guarantees provided by Article 93(2) may secure compliance therewith only if they are able to challenge that decision by the Commission before the Court (see, in particular, Cook v Commission, paragraph 23, and Matra v Commission, paragraph 17).

23 Where, without initiating the procedure under Article 93(2), the Commission finds, on the basis of Article 93(3), that an aid is compatible with the common market, the persons intended to benefit from those procedural guarantees may secure compliance therewith only if they are able to challenge that decision by the Commission before the Court.

86. Furthermore, the visual, aural and conceptual similarities between the signs at issue must be the subject of a global assessment in which the assessment of any aural similarity is but one of the relevant factors (see, to that effect, Case C‑206/04 P Mülhens v OHIM [2006] ECR I‑2717, paragraph 21).

87. Article 17(1) is a specific expression of the obligation of genuine cooperation under Article 10 EC, which requires Member States, when they encounter problems in the application of Community law, to submit those problems to the Commission (see, by analogy, inter alia Case C-499/99 Commission v Spain [2002] ECR I-6031, paragraph 24) and, in addition, does not allow them to introduce national safeguard measures in response to objections, reservations or conditions which the Commission might put forward (see, by analogy, Case 804/79 Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045, paragraph 32). In the present case, it is common ground that the Federal Republic of Germany acted unilaterally, even after the Commission had expressed objections.

24 The Court has held that when, during the implementation of a Commission decision on State aid, a Member State encounters unforeseen and unforeseeable difficulties or becomes aware of consequences unforeseen by the Commission, it must submit those problems to the Commission for its assessment, proposing appropriate amendments to the decision in question. In such a case, under the rule imposing on Member States and Community institutions reciprocal duties of genuine cooperation which underlies in particular Article 10 EC, the Commission and the Member State must work together in good faith with a view to overcoming the difficulties whilst fully observing the provisions of the Treaty and in particular those on aid (Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 17; Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 24, and Case C-378/98 Commission v Belgium [2001] ECR I-5107, paragraph 31).

45. The Court has held that, analogy with what applies in relation to the choice of the legal basis of a European Union measure, the classification of such a measure as a proposal or initiative to build upon the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 5(1) of the Schengen Protocol must rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review, including in particular the aim and the content of the measure (see Case C-77/05 United Kingdom v Council [2007] ECR I‑11459, paragraph 77).

48. À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, l’article 40, paragraphe 2, deuxième alinéa, TFUE, qui énonce l’interdiction de toute discrimination dans le cadre de la politique agricole commune, n’est que l’expression spécifique du principe général d’égalité, lequel exige que des situations comparables ne soient pas traitées de manière différente et que des situations différentes ne soient pas traitées de manière égale à moins qu’une différenciation ne soit objectivement justifiée (arrêt du 11 juin 2009, Agrana Zucker, C‑33/08, Rec. p. I‑5035, point 46 et jurisprudence citée).

46. In that regard, it should be noted that the Court has consistently held that the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC, which prohibits all discrimination in the context of the common agricultural policy, is merely a specific expression of the general principle of equal treatment, which requires that comparable situations not be treated differently and different situations not be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified (Case C‑313/04 Franz Egenberger [2006] ECR I‑6331, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

66 That conclusion is not called into question by the arguments of the Slovak Republic based on the right to effective judicial protection, the unnecessary prolongation of the dispute between it and the Commission and the risk of default interest. Although the requirement as to mandatory legal effects must be interpreted in the light of the right to effective judicial protection as guaranteed in the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, it is sufficient to note that this right is not intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to the admissibility of direct actions brought before the Courts of the European Union, as is apparent also from the Explanation relating to the abovementioned Article 47, which must, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, be taken into consideration for the interpretation of the Charter (judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited). Thus, the interpretation of the concept of ‘actionable measure’ in the light of that Article 47 cannot have the effect of setting aside that condition without going beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on the EU courts (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 81, and order of 14 May 2012, Sepracor Pharmaceuticals (Ireland) v Commission, C‑477/11 P, not published, EU:C:2012:292, paragraph 54).

58. As regards the argument concerning the loss of the possibility to tax profits generated in the Netherlands, it must be stated that the need to safeguard the balanced allocation between the Member States of the power to tax may be accepted, in particular, where the system in question is designed to prevent conduct capable of jeopardising the right of the Member States to exercise their taxing powers in relation to activities carried on in their territory (see Case C‑347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz [2007] ECR I‑2647, paragraph 42, and Oy AA , paragraph 54).

42. It must be acknowledged in that regard that there are courses of action which are capable of jeopardising the right of the Member States to exercise their taxing powers in relation to activities carried on in their territory and thus of undermining a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States (see Marks & Spencer , paragraph 46) and which may justify a restriction on freedom of establishment (see Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas , paragraphs 55 and 56). The Court has thus held that the fact of giving companies the right to elect to have their losses taken into account in the Member State in which they are established or in another Member State would seriously undermine a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States, since the tax base would be increased in the first State, and reduced in the second, by the amount of the losses surrendered.

40. The Court has, admittedly, stated that the expression " insurance transactions" did not cover solely transactions carried out by the insurers themselves but was broad enough in principle to include the provision of insurance cover by a taxable person who was not himself an insurer but, in the context of a block policy, procured such cover for his customers by making use of the supplies of an insurer who assumed the risk insured ( Card Protection Plan , paragraph 22, and Skandia , paragraph 38).

76 Finally, so far as concerns Article 9 of Law 10/2010, which authorises standard due diligence measures to be applied in respect of financial institutions even if there is no suspicion or higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing within the meaning of Articles 7(c) and 13 of the Money Laundering Directive, it is to be borne in mind that the Money Laundering Directive merely provides for a minimum level of harmonisation and that, even when Member States have properly transposed Articles 7, 11 and 13 of the directive into national law, Article 5 of the directive allows them to adopt or retain in force stricter provisions where those provisions seek to strengthen the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (see, to this effect, judgment in Jyske Bank Gibraltar, C‑212/11, EU:C:2013:270, paragraph 61).

61. The combating of money laundering has not been completely harmonised at European Union level. Directive 2005/60 provides for a minimum level of harmonisation and, in particular, Article 5 thereof allows Member States to adopt stricter provisions, where those provisions seek to strengthen the combating of money laundering or terrorist financing. – Overriding reasons in the public interest

22 With regard to whether such State intervention is compatible with the provisions of Regulation No 2727/75, it should be noted that the common organizations of the markets are based on the concept of an open market to which every producer has free access under genuinely competitive conditions and the functioning of which is regulated solely by the instruments provided for in those organizations. In particular, in sectors covered by a common organization of the market, and a fortiori when that organization is based, as in the present case, on a common price system, Member States can no longer take action, through national provisions adopted unilaterally, affecting the machinery of price-formation as established under the common organization (judgment in Case C-35/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR I-3125, paragraph 29).

61. According to the case-law, a national measure which, in essence, makes the right of exemption for an intra-Community supply conditional upon compliance with formal obligations, without any account being taken of the substantive requirements, goes further than is necessary to ensure the correct levying and collection of the tax ( Collée , paragraph 29). The only exception is if non-compliance with such formal requirements would effectively prevent the production of conclusive evidence that the substantive requirements have been satisfied (see, to that effect, Collée , paragraph 31).

29. As regards, first, the question whether the tax authority can refuse to allow an intra-Community supply to be exempt from VAT solely on the ground that the accounting evidence of that supply was belatedly produced, it should be noted that a national measure which, in essence, makes the right of exemption in respect of an intra-Community supply subject to compliance with formal obligations, without any account being taken of the substantive requirements and, in particular, without any consideration being given as to whether those requirements have been satisfied, goes further than is necessary to ensure the correct levying and collection of the tax.

48. Moreover, a national court is not prohibited from referring to this Court for a preliminary ruling a question the answer to which leaves no scope for reasonable doubt (see judgment in Painer , C‑145/10, EU:C:2011:798, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

60. Article 9 of Directive 98/5, although it does not preclude appeal proceedings being brought before a body which is not a court or tribunal, does not provide that a legal remedy may be open to the person concerned only after all other remedies have been exhausted. In any event, where an appeal before a non-judicial body is provided for by national law, Article 9 requires actual access within a reasonable period (see, by way of analogy, Joined Cases C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑245/99 P, C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99P to C‑252/99 P and C‑254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission [2002] ECR I‑8375, paragraphs 180 to 205, 223 and 234) to a court or tribunal as defined by Community law, which is competent to give a ruling on both fact and law.

196 With respect to the first stage, it held as follows, in paragraphs 128 to 130 of the contested judgment: `128 The facts which had to be elucidated by the Commission were highly complex owing to the type of conduct in question and its range across the geographical market concerned, covering the whole area of activity in the common market of the principal PVC producers. 129 Another factor contributing to the difficulty in establishing the facts was the confused mass of documents collected by the Commission. The documents obtained from its investigations at the premises of various petrochemical product manufacturers during the period concerned and the replies of the latter to the questions put by the Commission under Article 11 of Regulation No 17 constituted a particularly bulky file. Moreover, amongst the myriad documents obtained during the administrative procedure, the Commission had to distinguish between those belonging to the PVC file and those belonging to the file investigated in parallel in the neighbouring PEBD [low density polyethylene] sector, itself the subject, like other thermoplastic products at the same period, of an investigation and a procedure for determining infringements imputed to undertakings amongst which many are also parties to this case. It should also be noted that the file of the case which led to the [PVC II] Decision contained, on a first administrative numbering, a series of documents comprising 1072 pages, and, on another numbering, more than 5000 pages, excluding internal Commission documents. 130 Finally, the complexity of the facts to be elucidated arose from the difficulty of establishing proof of the participation of undertakings in the alleged concerted practice and from the number of undertakings involved. On that point, the [PVC II] Decision states that "17 undertakings took part in the infringement during the period covered ..." (point 2, second subparagraph, of the Decision) and that 14 undertakings had been addressees of the original decision.'

30. Community law, in the current stage of its development and in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of areas of competence between the Member States in relation to the elimination of double taxation within the European Community. Consequently, apart from Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (OJ 1990 L 225, p. 6), the Convention of 23 July 1990 on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises (OJ 1990 L 225, p. 10) and Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments (OJ 2003 L 157, p. 38), no uniform or harmonisation measure designed to eliminate double taxation has as yet been adopted at Community law level (see Kerckhaert and Morres , paragraph 22, and Columbus Container Services , paragraph 45).

46. It is clear from settled case‑law that a restriction on freedom of establishment is warranted only if it is justified by overriding reasons of public interest. In that situation, it must also be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 October 2005 in Case C-158/03 Commission v Spain , paragraph 35; Case C‑518/06 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 72; and Case C-531/06 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 49).

72. A restriction on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services may be justified where it serves overriding requirements relating to the public interest, is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑94/04 and C‑202/04 Cipolla and Others [2006] ECR I‑11421, paragraph 61; Case C-250/06 United Pan-Europe Communications Belgium and Others [2007] ECR I‑11135, paragraph 39; and Case C‑212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government [2008] ECR I‑1683, paragraph 55).

30. Nevertheless, it is for the Court, in any event, to determine whether or not the alleged breach of obligations exists, even if the Member State concerned does not deny the breach (see Case C‑439/99 Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I‑305, paragraph 20, and Case C‑438/07 Commission v Sweden [2009] ECR I‑9517, paragraph 53).

21. It should be noted at the outset that under the Sixth Directive the scope of VAT is very wide in that Article 2 thereof, which concerns taxable transactions, refers not only to the importation of goods but also to the supply of goods or services effected for consideration within the territory of the country by a taxable person acting as such (see, in particular, Case C‑255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECR I‑1609, paragraph 49; Case C‑401/05 VDP Dental Laboratory [2006] ECR I‑12121, paragraph 22; and Case C‑262/08 CopyGene [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 23).

49. In that regard, under the Sixth Directive the scope of VAT is very wide in that Article 2 thereof, which concerns taxable transactions, refers not only to imports of goods but also to the supply of goods or services effected for consideration within the territory of the country by a taxable person acting as such.

22. It should be noted at the outset that Article 6 of the Rome Convention lays down special conflict rules relating to individual contracts of employment and that those rules derogate from the general rules laid down in Articles 3 and 4 of that convention concerning, respectively, the freedom to choose the applicable law and the criteria for determining that law in the absence of such a choice (see, to that effect, Case C‑29/10 Koelzsch [2011] ECR I‑1595, paragraph 34, and Case C‑384/10 Voogsgeerd [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 24).

24. The judgments of the Court which Mr Vergani cites in support of the opposite proposition (Case 12/81 Garland [1982] ECR 359, paragraph 4; Barber , paragraph 10; and Case C‑33/89 Kowalska [1990] ECR I-2591, paragraph 7) are not at variance with that finding, since they concerned consideration which the worker received in respect of his employment from his employer.

10 In its first question the Court of Appeal seeks to ascertain, in substance, whether the benefits paid by an employer to a worker in connection with the latter' s compulsory redundancy fall within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty and the directive on equal pay or within the scope of the directive on equal treatment .

30 As is clear from paragraphs 34 and 35 of the judgment in Echternach and Moritz, and from paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment in Di Leo, the reference to Article 7(2) of the Regulation, as a factor in interpreting Article 12, was not made for the purpose of laying down other requirements in addition to those set out in Article 12. The intention was rather to emphasize that the benefits granted under Article 7(2) to migrant workers themselves could not be denied to the children of those workers when they seek to rely on the right enshrined in Article 12 of the Regulation.