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[Based on the Random House Dictionary, Random House, Inc. 2010., "Increase," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/increase, accessed 8-1-10, mss] Increase –verb (used with object) 1. to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality;augment; add to: to increase taxes. –verb (used without object) 2.to become greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality:Sales of automobiles increased last year. 3.to multiply by propagation. 4.to wax, as the moon. –noun 5.growth or augmentation in numbers, size, strength, quality,etc.: the increase of crime. 6.the act or process of increasing. 7.that by which something is increased. 8.the result of increasing. 9.produce of the earth. 10.product; profit; interest. 11.Obsolete . a.multiplication by propagation; production of offspring. b.offspring; progeny.

<h4><u><strong>Increase</h4><p>Dictionary.com Unabridged </p><p></u></strong>[Based on the Random House Dictionary, Random House, Inc. 2010., "Increase," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/increase, accessed 8-1-10, mss]</p><p>Increase</p><p>–verb (used with object)</p><p>1. to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality;augment; add to: to increase taxes.</p><p>–verb (used without object)</p><p>2.to become greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality:Sales of automobiles increased last year.</p><p>3.to multiply by propagation.</p><p>4.to wax, as the moon.</p><p>–noun</p><p>5.growth or augmentation in <u>numbers</u>, size, strength, quality,etc.: the increase of crime.</p><p>6.the act or process of increasing.</p><p>7.that by which something is increased.</p><p>8.the result of increasing.</p><p>9.produce of the earth.</p><p>10.product; profit; interest.</p><p>11.Obsolete .</p><p>a.multiplication by propagation; production of offspring.</p><p>b.offspring; progeny.</p>

Dictionary.com Unabridged

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Dictionary.com Unabridged fulltext: [Based on the Random House Dictionary, Random House, Inc. 2010., "Increase," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/increase, accessed 8-1-10, mss] Increase –verb (used with object) 1. to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality;augment; add to: to increase taxes. –verb (used without object) 2.to become greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality:Sales of automobiles increased last year. 3.to multiply by propagation. 4.to wax, as the moon. –noun 5.growth or augmentation in numbers, size, strength, quality,etc.: the increase of crime. 6.the act or process of increasing. 7.that by which something is increased. 8.the result of increasing. 9.produce of the earth. 10.product; profit; interest. 11.Obsolete . a.multiplication by propagation; production of offspring. b.offspring; progeny. [/INST] <h4><u><strong>Increase</h4><p>Dictionary.com Unabridged </p><p></u></strong>[Based on the Random House Dictionary, Random House, Inc. 2010., "Increase," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/increase, accessed 8-1-10, mss]</p><p>Increase</p><p>–verb (used with object)</p><p>1. to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality;augment; add to: to increase taxes.</p><p>–verb (used without object)</p><p>2.to become greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality:Sales of automobiles increased last year.</p><p>3.to multiply by propagation.</p><p>4.to wax, as the moon.</p><p>–noun</p><p>5.growth or augmentation in <u>numbers</u>, size, strength, quality,etc.: the increase of crime.</p><p>6.the act or process of increasing.</p><p>7.that by which something is increased.</p><p>8.the result of increasing.</p><p>9.produce of the earth.</p><p>10.product; profit; interest.</p><p>11.Obsolete .</p><p>a.multiplication by propagation; production of offspring.</p><p>b.offspring; progeny.</p> </s>

Counterplan solves relations with Cuba and Latin America

Barack Obama can take Cuba off the terrorist list at any time and should do so because it is "clear that the State Department doesn't really believe that Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism." Removing Cuba from the list would improve relations with Cuba and all of Latin America which sees U.S. policy toward Cuba "as a reflection of U.S. attitudes toward the region as a whole

Geoff Thale, program director at the Washington Office on Latin America think tank, said President Barack Obama can take Cuba off the terrorist list at any time and should do so because it is "clear that the State Department doesn't really believe that Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism." Removing Cuba from the list would improve relations with Cuba and all of Latin America, which sees U.S. policy toward Cuba "as a reflection of U.S. attitudes toward the region as a whole," Thale said.

<h4>Counterplan solves relations with Cuba and Latin America</h4><p><strong>Reuters</strong>, <strong>5/31</strong>/13, “Cuba says inclusion on U.S. terrorist list 'shameful'” <u><strong>http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-cuba-usa-terrorism-idUSBRE94U05020130531</p><p></u></strong>Geoff Thale, program director at the Washington Office on Latin America think tank, said President <u><strong>Barack Obama can take Cuba off the terrorist list at any time and should do so because it is "clear that the State Department doesn't really believe that Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism."</p><p>Removing Cuba from the list would improve relations with Cuba and all of Latin America</u></strong>, <u><strong>which sees U.S. policy toward Cuba "as a reflection of U.S. attitudes toward the region as a whole</u></strong>," Thale said.</p>

Reuters, 5/31/13, “Cuba says inclusion on U.S. terrorist list 'shameful'” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-cuba-usa-terrorism-idUSBRE94U05020130531

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Reuters, 5/31/13, “Cuba says inclusion on U.S. terrorist list 'shameful'” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-cuba-usa-terrorism-idUSBRE94U05020130531 fulltext: Geoff Thale, program director at the Washington Office on Latin America think tank, said President Barack Obama can take Cuba off the terrorist list at any time and should do so because it is "clear that the State Department doesn't really believe that Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism." Removing Cuba from the list would improve relations with Cuba and all of Latin America, which sees U.S. policy toward Cuba "as a reflection of U.S. attitudes toward the region as a whole," Thale said. [/INST] <h4>Counterplan solves relations with Cuba and Latin America</h4><p><strong>Reuters</strong>, <strong>5/31</strong>/13, “Cuba says inclusion on U.S. terrorist list 'shameful'” <u><strong>http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-cuba-usa-terrorism-idUSBRE94U05020130531</p><p></u></strong>Geoff Thale, program director at the Washington Office on Latin America think tank, said President <u><strong>Barack Obama can take Cuba off the terrorist list at any time and should do so because it is "clear that the State Department doesn't really believe that Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism."</p><p>Removing Cuba from the list would improve relations with Cuba and all of Latin America</u></strong>, <u><strong>which sees U.S. policy toward Cuba "as a reflection of U.S. attitudes toward the region as a whole</u></strong>," Thale said.</p> </s>

Unchecked terrorism means extinction

the existence of weapons of mass destruction now renders terrorism a potential threat to the very existence of human life Such potential global destruction, or globicide supersedes even that of genocide in its lethality the revival of religious fundamentalism towards the end of the 20th century renders the phenomenon a major global threat psychiatric terminology is as yet deficient in not having the depth to encompass the emotions and behaviour of groups of people whose levels of hate, low self-esteem, humiliation and alienation are such that it is felt that they can be remedied by the mass destruction of life

Although terrorism throughout human history has been tragic, until relatively recently it has been more of an irritant than any major hazard. However, the existence of weapons of mass destruction now renders terrorism a potential threat to the very existence of human life (Hoge & Rose, 2001). Such potential global destruction, or globicide as one might call it, supersedes even that of genocide in its lethality. Although religious factors are not the only determinant of ‘suicide’ bombers, the revival of religious fundamentalism towards the end of the 20th century renders the phenomenon a major global threat. Even though religion can be a force for good, it can equally be abused as a force for evil. Ultimately, the parallel traits in human nature of good and evil may perhaps be the most durable of all the characteristics of the human species. There is no need to apply a psychiatric analysis to the ‘suicide’ bomber because the phenomenon can be explained in political terms. Most participants in terrorism are not usually mentally disordered and their behaviour can be construed more in terms of group dynamics (Colvard, 2002). On the other hand, perhaps psychiatric terminology is as yet deficient in not having the depth to encompass the emotions and behaviour of groups of people whose levels of hate, low self-esteem, humiliation and alienation are such that it is felt that they can be remedied by the mass destruction of life, including their own.

<h4><strong>Unchecked terrorism means extinction</h4><p>Gordon, 2002</p><p></strong>Harvey Gordon, Visiting Lecturer, Forensic Psychiatry, Tel Aviv University, Psychiatric Bulletin, v. 26, 2002, p. 285-287, online: http://pb.rcpsych.org/cgi/content/full/26/8/285.</p><p>Although terrorism throughout human history has been tragic, until relatively recently it has been more of an irritant than any major hazard. However, <u><strong>the existence of weapons of mass destruction now renders terrorism a potential threat to the very existence of human life</u></strong> (Hoge & Rose, 2001). <u><strong>Such potential global destruction, or globicide</u></strong> as one might call it, <u><strong>supersedes even that of genocide in its lethality</u></strong>. Although religious factors are not the only determinant of ‘suicide’ bombers, <u><strong>the revival of religious fundamentalism towards the end of the 20th century renders the phenomenon a major global threat</u></strong>. Even though religion can be a force for good, it can equally be abused as a force for evil. Ultimately, the parallel traits in human nature of good and evil may perhaps be the most durable of all the characteristics of the human species. There is no need to apply a psychiatric analysis to the ‘suicide’ bomber because the phenomenon can be explained in political terms. Most participants in terrorism are not usually mentally disordered and their behaviour can be construed more in terms of group dynamics (Colvard, 2002). On the other hand, perhaps <u><strong>psychiatric terminology is as yet deficient in not having the depth to encompass the emotions and behaviour of groups of people whose levels of hate, low self-esteem, humiliation and alienation are such that it is felt that they can be remedied by the mass destruction of life</u></strong>, including their own.</p>

Gordon, 2002 Harvey Gordon, Visiting Lecturer, Forensic Psychiatry, Tel Aviv University, Psychiatric Bulletin, v. 26, 2002, p. 285-287, online: http://pb.rcpsych.org/cgi/content/full/26/8/285.

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Gordon, 2002 Harvey Gordon, Visiting Lecturer, Forensic Psychiatry, Tel Aviv University, Psychiatric Bulletin, v. 26, 2002, p. 285-287, online: http://pb.rcpsych.org/cgi/content/full/26/8/285. fulltext: Although terrorism throughout human history has been tragic, until relatively recently it has been more of an irritant than any major hazard. However, the existence of weapons of mass destruction now renders terrorism a potential threat to the very existence of human life (Hoge & Rose, 2001). Such potential global destruction, or globicide as one might call it, supersedes even that of genocide in its lethality. Although religious factors are not the only determinant of ‘suicide’ bombers, the revival of religious fundamentalism towards the end of the 20th century renders the phenomenon a major global threat. Even though religion can be a force for good, it can equally be abused as a force for evil. Ultimately, the parallel traits in human nature of good and evil may perhaps be the most durable of all the characteristics of the human species. There is no need to apply a psychiatric analysis to the ‘suicide’ bomber because the phenomenon can be explained in political terms. Most participants in terrorism are not usually mentally disordered and their behaviour can be construed more in terms of group dynamics (Colvard, 2002). On the other hand, perhaps psychiatric terminology is as yet deficient in not having the depth to encompass the emotions and behaviour of groups of people whose levels of hate, low self-esteem, humiliation and alienation are such that it is felt that they can be remedied by the mass destruction of life, including their own. [/INST] <h4><strong>Unchecked terrorism means extinction</h4><p>Gordon, 2002</p><p></strong>Harvey Gordon, Visiting Lecturer, Forensic Psychiatry, Tel Aviv University, Psychiatric Bulletin, v. 26, 2002, p. 285-287, online: http://pb.rcpsych.org/cgi/content/full/26/8/285.</p><p>Although terrorism throughout human history has been tragic, until relatively recently it has been more of an irritant than any major hazard. However, <u><strong>the existence of weapons of mass destruction now renders terrorism a potential threat to the very existence of human life</u></strong> (Hoge & Rose, 2001). <u><strong>Such potential global destruction, or globicide</u></strong> as one might call it, <u><strong>supersedes even that of genocide in its lethality</u></strong>. Although religious factors are not the only determinant of ‘suicide’ bombers, <u><strong>the revival of religious fundamentalism towards the end of the 20th century renders the phenomenon a major global threat</u></strong>. Even though religion can be a force for good, it can equally be abused as a force for evil. Ultimately, the parallel traits in human nature of good and evil may perhaps be the most durable of all the characteristics of the human species. There is no need to apply a psychiatric analysis to the ‘suicide’ bomber because the phenomenon can be explained in political terms. Most participants in terrorism are not usually mentally disordered and their behaviour can be construed more in terms of group dynamics (Colvard, 2002). On the other hand, perhaps <u><strong>psychiatric terminology is as yet deficient in not having the depth to encompass the emotions and behaviour of groups of people whose levels of hate, low self-esteem, humiliation and alienation are such that it is felt that they can be remedied by the mass destruction of life</u></strong>, including their own.</p> </s>

Their defense doesn’t apply – it’s a question of how long the plan drops prices to

one might fairly wonder what would happen if, as Citigroup's Edward Morse says is possible, prices drop another $20 a barrel for an extended length of time In Russia 35 or $40, or even $60 a barrel, would be devastating fiscally says Kuchins of the C for S I S The biggest uncertainty in the global oil market isn't whether oil prices will drop further but how long they will stay down

what would happen if, as Morse says prices drop for an extended time In Russia even $60 a barrel, would be devastating fiscally says Kuchins of the C S I S The biggest uncertainty isn't whether prices will drop further but how long they will stay down

Given this already-existing revenue gap, one might fairly wonder what would happen if, as Citigroup's Edward Morse says is possible, prices drop another $20 a barrel for an extended length of time. Oil economist Philip Verleger's forecast is even gloomier -- a plunge to $40 a barrel by November. Or finally, what Venezuelan Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez fears -- $35-a-barrel prices, near the lows last seen in 2008. In Russia, for instance, "$35 or $40, or even $60 a barrel, would be devastating fiscally," says Andrew Kuchins of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. That could damage the standing of President Vladimir Putin, since his "popularity and authority are closely correlated with economic growth," Kuchins told me in an email exchange. With few exceptions, the same goes for the rest of the world's petro-rulers, whose oil revenue supports vast social spending aimed at least in part at subduing possible dissatisfaction by their populace. Saudi Arabia can balance its budget as long as prices stay above $80 a barrel, according to the International Monetary Fund, although projected future social spending obligations will drive its break-even price to $98 a barrel in 2016. Of the major petro-states, only Qatar -- with a requirement of about $58-per-barrel to balance its budget -- appears to have sufficiently disciplined state spending to weather all but the most dire forecasts. The biggest uncertainty in the global oil market isn't whether oil prices will drop further -- they seem likely to -- but how long they will stay down. In short, how long, and at what scale, are the petrocracies likely to suffer? This state of affairs is a woeful blow to petro-rulers after nine years of mostly nirvana. The year 2003 started with oil at about $33 a barrel, after which prices went mainly up, peaking in July 2008 at $147 a barrel. They bounced back nicely even after the global financial crisis sent prices plummeting below their 2003 level, to about $31 a barrel in December 2008. When the Arab Spring unfolded, first Libya and then Iran triggered worried looks on trading desks in London and New York, and the price spiked to about $128 a barrel. My mom saw the average price of gas in California rise to $4.36 a gallon. But then the concern of war between Iran and Israel all-but vanished, and prices since have been on a seemingly relentless decline.

<h4>Their defense doesn’t apply – it’s a question of how long the plan drops prices to</h4><p><strong><mark>LEVINE ’12</strong></mark> - Bernard L. Schwartz Fellow at the New America Foundation; adjunct professor at Georgetown; (Levine, Steven. “The Coming Oil Crash”. June 19, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/19/the_coming_oil_crash)</p><p>Given this already-existing revenue gap, <u>one might fairly wonder <mark>what would happen if, as</mark> Citigroup's Edward <mark>Morse says</mark> is possible, <mark>prices drop</mark> another $20 a barrel <mark>for an extended</mark> length of <mark>time</u></mark>. Oil economist Philip Verleger's forecast is even gloomier -- a plunge to $40 a barrel by November. Or finally, what Venezuelan Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez fears -- $35-a-barrel prices, near the lows last seen in 2008. <u><mark>In Russia</u></mark>, for instance, "$<u>35 or $40, or <strong><mark>even $60 a barrel, would be devastating fiscally</u></strong></mark>," <u><mark>says</u></mark> Andrew <u><mark>Kuchins of the C</u></mark>enter <u>for <mark>S</u></mark>trategic and <u><mark>I</u></mark>nternational <u><mark>S</u></mark>tudies. That could damage the standing of President Vladimir Putin, since his "popularity and authority are closely correlated with economic growth," Kuchins told me in an email exchange. With few exceptions, the same goes for the rest of the world's petro-rulers, whose oil revenue supports vast social spending aimed at least in part at subduing possible dissatisfaction by their populace. Saudi Arabia can balance its budget as long as prices stay above $80 a barrel, according to the International Monetary Fund, although projected future social spending obligations will drive its break-even price to $98 a barrel in 2016. Of the major petro-states, only Qatar -- with a requirement of about $58-per-barrel to balance its budget -- appears to have sufficiently disciplined state spending to weather all but the most dire forecasts. <u><mark>The biggest uncertainty</mark> in the global oil market <mark>isn't whether</mark> oil <mark>prices will drop further</mark> </u>-- they seem likely to --<u> <strong><mark>but how long they will stay down</u></strong></mark>. In short, how long, and at what scale, are the petrocracies likely to suffer? This state of affairs is a woeful blow to petro-rulers after nine years of mostly nirvana. The year 2003 started with oil at about $33 a barrel, after which prices went mainly up, peaking in July 2008 at $147 a barrel. They bounced back nicely even after the global financial crisis sent prices plummeting below their 2003 level, to about $31 a barrel in December 2008. When the Arab Spring unfolded, first Libya and then Iran triggered worried looks on trading desks in London and New York, and the price spiked to about $128 a barrel. My mom saw the average price of gas in California rise to $4.36 a gallon. But then the concern of war between Iran and Israel all-but vanished, and prices since have been on a seemingly relentless decline.</p>

LEVINE ’12 - Bernard L. Schwartz Fellow at the New America Foundation; adjunct professor at Georgetown; (Levine, Steven. “The Coming Oil Crash”. June 19, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/19/the_coming_oil_crash)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: LEVINE ’12 - Bernard L. Schwartz Fellow at the New America Foundation; adjunct professor at Georgetown; (Levine, Steven. “The Coming Oil Crash”. June 19, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/19/the_coming_oil_crash) fulltext: Given this already-existing revenue gap, one might fairly wonder what would happen if, as Citigroup's Edward Morse says is possible, prices drop another $20 a barrel for an extended length of time. Oil economist Philip Verleger's forecast is even gloomier -- a plunge to $40 a barrel by November. Or finally, what Venezuelan Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez fears -- $35-a-barrel prices, near the lows last seen in 2008. In Russia, for instance, "$35 or $40, or even $60 a barrel, would be devastating fiscally," says Andrew Kuchins of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. That could damage the standing of President Vladimir Putin, since his "popularity and authority are closely correlated with economic growth," Kuchins told me in an email exchange. With few exceptions, the same goes for the rest of the world's petro-rulers, whose oil revenue supports vast social spending aimed at least in part at subduing possible dissatisfaction by their populace. Saudi Arabia can balance its budget as long as prices stay above $80 a barrel, according to the International Monetary Fund, although projected future social spending obligations will drive its break-even price to $98 a barrel in 2016. Of the major petro-states, only Qatar -- with a requirement of about $58-per-barrel to balance its budget -- appears to have sufficiently disciplined state spending to weather all but the most dire forecasts. The biggest uncertainty in the global oil market isn't whether oil prices will drop further -- they seem likely to -- but how long they will stay down. In short, how long, and at what scale, are the petrocracies likely to suffer? This state of affairs is a woeful blow to petro-rulers after nine years of mostly nirvana. The year 2003 started with oil at about $33 a barrel, after which prices went mainly up, peaking in July 2008 at $147 a barrel. They bounced back nicely even after the global financial crisis sent prices plummeting below their 2003 level, to about $31 a barrel in December 2008. When the Arab Spring unfolded, first Libya and then Iran triggered worried looks on trading desks in London and New York, and the price spiked to about $128 a barrel. My mom saw the average price of gas in California rise to $4.36 a gallon. But then the concern of war between Iran and Israel all-but vanished, and prices since have been on a seemingly relentless decline. [/INST] <h4>Their defense doesn’t apply – it’s a question of how long the plan drops prices to</h4><p><strong><mark>LEVINE ’12</strong></mark> - Bernard L. Schwartz Fellow at the New America Foundation; adjunct professor at Georgetown; (Levine, Steven. “The Coming Oil Crash”. June 19, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/19/the_coming_oil_crash)</p><p>Given this already-existing revenue gap, <u>one might fairly wonder <mark>what would happen if, as</mark> Citigroup's Edward <mark>Morse says</mark> is possible, <mark>prices drop</mark> another $20 a barrel <mark>for an extended</mark> length of <mark>time</u></mark>. Oil economist Philip Verleger's forecast is even gloomier -- a plunge to $40 a barrel by November. Or finally, what Venezuelan Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez fears -- $35-a-barrel prices, near the lows last seen in 2008. <u><mark>In Russia</u></mark>, for instance, "$<u>35 or $40, or <strong><mark>even $60 a barrel, would be devastating fiscally</u></strong></mark>," <u><mark>says</u></mark> Andrew <u><mark>Kuchins of the C</u></mark>enter <u>for <mark>S</u></mark>trategic and <u><mark>I</u></mark>nternational <u><mark>S</u></mark>tudies. That could damage the standing of President Vladimir Putin, since his "popularity and authority are closely correlated with economic growth," Kuchins told me in an email exchange. With few exceptions, the same goes for the rest of the world's petro-rulers, whose oil revenue supports vast social spending aimed at least in part at subduing possible dissatisfaction by their populace. Saudi Arabia can balance its budget as long as prices stay above $80 a barrel, according to the International Monetary Fund, although projected future social spending obligations will drive its break-even price to $98 a barrel in 2016. Of the major petro-states, only Qatar -- with a requirement of about $58-per-barrel to balance its budget -- appears to have sufficiently disciplined state spending to weather all but the most dire forecasts. <u><mark>The biggest uncertainty</mark> in the global oil market <mark>isn't whether</mark> oil <mark>prices will drop further</mark> </u>-- they seem likely to --<u> <strong><mark>but how long they will stay down</u></strong></mark>. In short, how long, and at what scale, are the petrocracies likely to suffer? This state of affairs is a woeful blow to petro-rulers after nine years of mostly nirvana. The year 2003 started with oil at about $33 a barrel, after which prices went mainly up, peaking in July 2008 at $147 a barrel. They bounced back nicely even after the global financial crisis sent prices plummeting below their 2003 level, to about $31 a barrel in December 2008. When the Arab Spring unfolded, first Libya and then Iran triggered worried looks on trading desks in London and New York, and the price spiked to about $128 a barrel. My mom saw the average price of gas in California rise to $4.36 a gallon. But then the concern of war between Iran and Israel all-but vanished, and prices since have been on a seemingly relentless decline.</p> </s>

That causes broader global warfare and state collapse

Regardless of the succession Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor can hold power is debatable. that individual will extend the current policies which will only compound the situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. thousands will flee the island. this time the number could be several hundred thousand flee to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. the GWOT will be long and protracted. Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. I can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out?

A power vacuum create conditions for instability and civil war. When Cuba collapses anarchy is a strong possibility several hundred thousand flee creating a refugee crisis the opportunity for radical groups to operate increases. these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere Such activity could threaten the stability of fragile democracies budding throughout the region the U.S. may be forced to deploy forces The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. Africa and the Caucasus are hot spots North Korea will be a crisis We cannot ignore China Iran could be next These are situations that could require national power can the U.S. afford to let the Cuban situation play out

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

<h4>That causes broader global warfare and state collapse</h4><p><strong>Gorrell ‘5</strong> (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18/5, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)</p><p><u>Regardless of the succession</u>, under the current U.S. policy, <u>Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans</u> on the island, <u>there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community</u> within Cuba <u>who will attempt to exercise similar authority. <mark>A power vacuum</mark> or absence of order will <mark>create </mark>the<mark> conditions for <strong>instability and civil war</strong>.</u></mark> <u>Whether Raul or another successor</u> from within the current government <u>can hold power is debatable.</u> However, <u>that individual will</u> nonetheless <u>extend the current policies</u> for an indefinite period, <u>which will only compound the</u> Cuban <u>situation. <mark>When Cuba</mark> finally <mark>collapses <strong>anarchy is a strong possibility</u></strong></mark> if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. <u>The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast.</u> In the midst of this chaos, <u><strong>thousands will flee the island.</u></strong> During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; <u>this time the number could be <strong><mark>several hundred thousand flee</u></strong></mark>ing<u> to the U.S., <mark>creating a refugee crisis</mark>.¶ </u>Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, <u>the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems.</u> Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, <u>Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs</u> – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, <u>the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, <mark>the opportunity for radical</mark> fundamentalist <mark>groups to operate</mark> in the region <mark>increases.</mark> If <mark>these groups can <strong>export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere</strong></mark> then <strong>the war against this extremism gets more complicated</strong>.<mark> Such activity could</mark> increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, <strong><mark>threaten</mark>ing <mark>the stability of</mark> the <mark>fragile democracies</strong></mark> that are <mark>budding throughout the region</mark>. In light of a failed state in the region, <mark>the U.S. may be forced to deploy</mark> military <mark>forces</mark> to Cuba, <strong>creating the conditions for another insurgency</strong>.</u> The ramifications of this action could very well <u>fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas.</u> A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? <u><mark>The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast.</u></mark> <u>The administration</u>, given the present state of world affairs, <u>does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management.</u> The President and other government and military leaders have warned that <u>the GWOT will be long and protracted.</u> These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that <u><strong><mark>Africa and the Caucasus</strong></mark> region <mark>are</mark> potential <strong><mark>hot spots</strong></mark> for terrorist activity</u>, so these areas should be secure. <u><strong><mark>North Korea</strong> will</mark> continue to <mark>be a</mark>n unpredictable <mark>crisis</mark> in waiting. <mark>We</mark> also <mark>cannot ignore <strong>China</strong></mark>. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation?</u> Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, <u><strong><mark>Iran</strong> could</mark> conceivably <mark>be</mark> the <mark>next</mark> target for U.S. pre-emptive action. <mark>These are</mark> known and potential <mark>situations that could</mark> easily <mark>require</mark> all or many of the elements of <mark>national power</mark> to resolve. I</u>n view of such global issues, <u><mark>can the U.S. afford to</mark> sustain the status quo and simply <mark>let the Cuban situation play out</mark>?</u> The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?</p>

Gorrell ‘5 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18/5, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Gorrell ‘5 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18/5, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074) fulltext: Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba? [/INST] <h4>That causes broader global warfare and state collapse</h4><p><strong>Gorrell ‘5</strong> (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18/5, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)</p><p><u>Regardless of the succession</u>, under the current U.S. policy, <u>Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans</u> on the island, <u>there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community</u> within Cuba <u>who will attempt to exercise similar authority. <mark>A power vacuum</mark> or absence of order will <mark>create </mark>the<mark> conditions for <strong>instability and civil war</strong>.</u></mark> <u>Whether Raul or another successor</u> from within the current government <u>can hold power is debatable.</u> However, <u>that individual will</u> nonetheless <u>extend the current policies</u> for an indefinite period, <u>which will only compound the</u> Cuban <u>situation. <mark>When Cuba</mark> finally <mark>collapses <strong>anarchy is a strong possibility</u></strong></mark> if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. <u>The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast.</u> In the midst of this chaos, <u><strong>thousands will flee the island.</u></strong> During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; <u>this time the number could be <strong><mark>several hundred thousand flee</u></strong></mark>ing<u> to the U.S., <mark>creating a refugee crisis</mark>.¶ </u>Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, <u>the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems.</u> Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, <u>Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs</u> – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, <u>the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, <mark>the opportunity for radical</mark> fundamentalist <mark>groups to operate</mark> in the region <mark>increases.</mark> If <mark>these groups can <strong>export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere</strong></mark> then <strong>the war against this extremism gets more complicated</strong>.<mark> Such activity could</mark> increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, <strong><mark>threaten</mark>ing <mark>the stability of</mark> the <mark>fragile democracies</strong></mark> that are <mark>budding throughout the region</mark>. In light of a failed state in the region, <mark>the U.S. may be forced to deploy</mark> military <mark>forces</mark> to Cuba, <strong>creating the conditions for another insurgency</strong>.</u> The ramifications of this action could very well <u>fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas.</u> A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? <u><mark>The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast.</u></mark> <u>The administration</u>, given the present state of world affairs, <u>does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management.</u> The President and other government and military leaders have warned that <u>the GWOT will be long and protracted.</u> These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that <u><strong><mark>Africa and the Caucasus</strong></mark> region <mark>are</mark> potential <strong><mark>hot spots</strong></mark> for terrorist activity</u>, so these areas should be secure. <u><strong><mark>North Korea</strong> will</mark> continue to <mark>be a</mark>n unpredictable <mark>crisis</mark> in waiting. <mark>We</mark> also <mark>cannot ignore <strong>China</strong></mark>. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation?</u> Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, <u><strong><mark>Iran</strong> could</mark> conceivably <mark>be</mark> the <mark>next</mark> target for U.S. pre-emptive action. <mark>These are</mark> known and potential <mark>situations that could</mark> easily <mark>require</mark> all or many of the elements of <mark>national power</mark> to resolve. I</u>n view of such global issues, <u><mark>can the U.S. afford to</mark> sustain the status quo and simply <mark>let the Cuban situation play out</mark>?</u> The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?</p> </s>

Increase

crescent to become progressively greater to make greater : augment enrich

["Increase", (C) 2010, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase, accessed 8-1-10, mss] Main Entry: 1in·crease   Pronunciation: \in-ˈkrēs, ˈin-ˌ\Function: verbInflected Form(s): in·creased; in·creas·ing Etymology: Middle English encresen, from Anglo-French encreistre, from Latinincrescere, from in- + crescere to grow — more at crescent Date: 14th century intransitive verb1 : to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity) 2 : to multiply by the production of young transitive verb 1 : to make greater : augment 2 obsolete : enrich

<h4>Increase</h4><p><u><strong>Merriam-Webster</u></strong> </p><p>["Increase", (C) 2010, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase, accessed 8-1-10, mss]</p><p>Main Entry: 1in·crease   Pronunciation: \in-ˈkrēs, ˈin-ˌ\Function: verbInflected Form(s): in·creased; in·creas·ing</p><p>Etymology: Middle English encresen, from Anglo-French encreistre, from Latinincrescere, from in- + crescere to grow — more at <u>crescent</u> Date: 14th century</p><p>intransitive verb1 : <u>to become progressively greater</u> (as in size, amount, number, or intensity)</p><p>2 : to multiply by the production of young</p><p>transitive verb</p><p>1 : <u>to make greater : augment</p><p></u>2 obsolete : <u>enrich</p></u>

Merriam-Webster

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Merriam-Webster fulltext: ["Increase", (C) 2010, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase, accessed 8-1-10, mss] Main Entry: 1in·crease   Pronunciation: \in-ˈkrēs, ˈin-ˌ\Function: verbInflected Form(s): in·creased; in·creas·ing Etymology: Middle English encresen, from Anglo-French encreistre, from Latinincrescere, from in- + crescere to grow — more at crescent Date: 14th century intransitive verb1 : to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity) 2 : to multiply by the production of young transitive verb 1 : to make greater : augment 2 obsolete : enrich [/INST] <h4>Increase</h4><p><u><strong>Merriam-Webster</u></strong> </p><p>["Increase", (C) 2010, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase, accessed 8-1-10, mss]</p><p>Main Entry: 1in·crease   Pronunciation: \in-ˈkrēs, ˈin-ˌ\Function: verbInflected Form(s): in·creased; in·creas·ing</p><p>Etymology: Middle English encresen, from Anglo-French encreistre, from Latinincrescere, from in- + crescere to grow — more at <u>crescent</u> Date: 14th century</p><p>intransitive verb1 : <u>to become progressively greater</u> (as in size, amount, number, or intensity)</p><p>2 : to multiply by the production of young</p><p>transitive verb</p><p>1 : <u>to make greater : augment</p><p></u>2 obsolete : <u>enrich</p></u> </s>

Removing Cuba from the list improves relations with Latin America, which hates US policy towards Cuba

the U.S. approach toward Cuba, which is exemplified by Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, hurts the U.S. image in Latin America , Latin American leaders have publicly questioned U.S. policy toward Cuba The changed geopolitical landscape—and the symbolic importance that U.S. policy toward Cuba continues to hold for the Latin American public and elite opinion—makes it clear that policy change toward Cuba would improve the U.S. image in the hemisphere.

More broadly, the U.S. approach toward Cuba, which is exemplified by Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, hurts the U.S. image in Latin America. In recent years, Latin American leaders have publicly questioned U.S. policy toward Cuba. At the most recent Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, Latin American presidents across the political spectrum challenged President Obama on a number of issues, including Cuba’s participation in the Summit of the Americas and drug policy. It is also striking that Cuba is the pro tempore president of CELAC (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños), the new regional forum that includes all of the countries of the hemisphere, except Canada and the United States. The changed geopolitical landscape—and the symbolic importance that U.S. policy toward Cuba continues to hold for the Latin American public and elite opinion—makes it clear that policy change toward Cuba would improve the U.S. image in the hemisphere.

<h4>Removing Cuba from the list improves relations with Latin America, which hates US policy towards Cuba</h4><p>Geoff <strong>Thale</strong>, Washington Office on Latin America’s Program Director and has traveled to Cuba more than a dozen times including organizing delegations of academics and members of Congress, and Clay Boggs, WOLA’s Program Officer for Cuba and for Rights and Development, <strong>3/5</strong>/13, “Cuba and the Terrorist List” <u><strong>http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_and_the_terrorist_list</p><p></u></strong>More broadly, <u><strong>the U.S. approach toward Cuba, which is exemplified by Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, hurts the U.S. image in Latin America</u></strong>. In recent years<u><strong>, Latin American leaders have publicly questioned U.S. policy toward Cuba</u></strong>. At the most recent Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, Latin American presidents across the political spectrum challenged President Obama on a number of issues, including Cuba’s participation in the Summit of the Americas and drug policy. It is also striking that Cuba is the pro tempore president of CELAC (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños), the new regional forum that includes all of the countries of the hemisphere, except Canada and the United States. <u><strong>The changed geopolitical landscape—and the symbolic importance that U.S. policy toward Cuba continues to hold for the Latin American public and elite opinion—makes it clear that policy change toward Cuba would improve the U.S. image in the hemisphere.</p></u></strong>

Geoff Thale, Washington Office on Latin America’s Program Director and has traveled to Cuba more than a dozen times including organizing delegations of academics and members of Congress, and Clay Boggs, WOLA’s Program Officer for Cuba and for Rights and Development, 3/5/13, “Cuba and the Terrorist List” http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_and_the_terrorist_list

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Geoff Thale, Washington Office on Latin America’s Program Director and has traveled to Cuba more than a dozen times including organizing delegations of academics and members of Congress, and Clay Boggs, WOLA’s Program Officer for Cuba and for Rights and Development, 3/5/13, “Cuba and the Terrorist List” http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_and_the_terrorist_list fulltext: More broadly, the U.S. approach toward Cuba, which is exemplified by Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, hurts the U.S. image in Latin America. In recent years, Latin American leaders have publicly questioned U.S. policy toward Cuba. At the most recent Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, Latin American presidents across the political spectrum challenged President Obama on a number of issues, including Cuba’s participation in the Summit of the Americas and drug policy. It is also striking that Cuba is the pro tempore president of CELAC (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños), the new regional forum that includes all of the countries of the hemisphere, except Canada and the United States. The changed geopolitical landscape—and the symbolic importance that U.S. policy toward Cuba continues to hold for the Latin American public and elite opinion—makes it clear that policy change toward Cuba would improve the U.S. image in the hemisphere. [/INST] <h4>Removing Cuba from the list improves relations with Latin America, which hates US policy towards Cuba</h4><p>Geoff <strong>Thale</strong>, Washington Office on Latin America’s Program Director and has traveled to Cuba more than a dozen times including organizing delegations of academics and members of Congress, and Clay Boggs, WOLA’s Program Officer for Cuba and for Rights and Development, <strong>3/5</strong>/13, “Cuba and the Terrorist List” <u><strong>http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_and_the_terrorist_list</p><p></u></strong>More broadly, <u><strong>the U.S. approach toward Cuba, which is exemplified by Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, hurts the U.S. image in Latin America</u></strong>. In recent years<u><strong>, Latin American leaders have publicly questioned U.S. policy toward Cuba</u></strong>. At the most recent Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, Latin American presidents across the political spectrum challenged President Obama on a number of issues, including Cuba’s participation in the Summit of the Americas and drug policy. It is also striking that Cuba is the pro tempore president of CELAC (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños), the new regional forum that includes all of the countries of the hemisphere, except Canada and the United States. <u><strong>The changed geopolitical landscape—and the symbolic importance that U.S. policy toward Cuba continues to hold for the Latin American public and elite opinion—makes it clear that policy change toward Cuba would improve the U.S. image in the hemisphere.</p></u></strong> </s>

Triggers nuclear war and extinction

state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. hese actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” about Latin American instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity

state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community failed state the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing and criminal anarchy. these actions spill over into regional syndromes of destabilization, and conflict Drug cartels call these activities “business incentives.” about Latin American instability destroying such a government are real and endanger global security, peace, and prosperity

(Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65

<h4>Triggers nuclear war and extinction</h4><p><strong>Manwaring ‘5</strong> – adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson</p><p>(Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)President Chávez also understands that the process leading to <u><mark>state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community</mark> today</u>. The argument in general is that failing and <u><mark>failed state</mark> status is <mark>the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict,</mark> and terrorism</u>. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. <u>They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade </u>such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. <u><mark>These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease</u></mark>, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, <u>trafficking <mark>and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing</mark>, warlordism, <mark>and criminal anarchy.</u></mark> At the same time, <mark>t<u>hese actions</mark> are usually unconfined and <mark>spill over into regional syndromes of</mark> poverty, <mark>destabilization, and conflict</u></mark>.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” <u><mark>Drug cartels</mark> operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere <mark>call these activities “business incentives.”</u></mark> Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring <u><mark>about</u></mark> the political conditions necessary to establish <u><mark>Latin American</u></mark> socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, <u><mark>instability</mark> and the threat of subverting or <mark>destroying such a government are real</mark>.64 </u>But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, <u>failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states</u>, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, <u>the more they <mark>and</mark> their associated problems <mark>endanger global security, peace, and prosperity</u></mark>.65</p>

Manwaring ‘5 – adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Manwaring ‘5 – adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson fulltext: (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65 [/INST] <h4>Triggers nuclear war and extinction</h4><p><strong>Manwaring ‘5</strong> – adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson</p><p>(Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)President Chávez also understands that the process leading to <u><mark>state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community</mark> today</u>. The argument in general is that failing and <u><mark>failed state</mark> status is <mark>the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict,</mark> and terrorism</u>. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. <u>They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade </u>such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. <u><mark>These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease</u></mark>, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, <u>trafficking <mark>and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing</mark>, warlordism, <mark>and criminal anarchy.</u></mark> At the same time, <mark>t<u>hese actions</mark> are usually unconfined and <mark>spill over into regional syndromes of</mark> poverty, <mark>destabilization, and conflict</u></mark>.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” <u><mark>Drug cartels</mark> operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere <mark>call these activities “business incentives.”</u></mark> Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring <u><mark>about</u></mark> the political conditions necessary to establish <u><mark>Latin American</u></mark> socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, <u><mark>instability</mark> and the threat of subverting or <mark>destroying such a government are real</mark>.64 </u>But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, <u>failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states</u>, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, <u>the more they <mark>and</mark> their associated problems <mark>endanger global security, peace, and prosperity</u></mark>.65</p> </s>

(__) US COMMITMENT TO PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE RETURN OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ENSURES ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE AND AN END OF SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM.

¶ Achieving the U.S. interests of gaining genuine Syrian commitment for advancing the Arab-Israeli Peace Process and a halt to Syrian support for Lebanese Hezbollah and radical Palestinian groups will be difficult tasks and true tests of Syrian willingness to modify its behavior. in return, the United States should be willing to broker renewed peace talks between Syria and Israel, to include negotiations to resolve the Golan Heights issue such talks should occur only on the condition that Syria meets specific prerequisites. First, it should renounce terrorism and other forms of violence as a means for resolving Arab-Israeli differences. The United States must recognize that it is unlikely that Syria will completely abandon Lebanese Hezbollah since both Syria and Lebanon recognize it as a legitimate political and resistance group Syria should commit to no longer providing Hezbollah arms or other military-related support Syria must also build on its earlier expulsion of the Palestinian group’s headquarters from Damascus by continuing to refuse to allow Palestinian terrorist groups to operate from Syria Syria must also comply with international demands regarding non-interference with Lebanon, continue cooperation with the Mehlis investigation, and turn over for trial any Syrian officials the investigators find to be implicated in the Hariri murder , properly measured incentives, applied with a reasonable degree of patience and backed by consequences, which include the use of force, may eventually steer Syria in the desired direction.

¶ [Robert, “Syria: Reassessing US Approach and Options”, USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT,pg 19-20, 15 Mar 2006, WDC//BK]¶ Achieving the U.S. interests of gaining genuine Syrian commitment for advancing the Arab-Israeli Peace Process and a halt to Syrian support for Lebanese Hezbollah and radical Palestinian groups will be difficult tasks and true tests of Syrian willingness to modify its behavior. To achieve these goals, in return, the United States should be willing to broker renewed peace talks between Syria and Israel, to include negotiations to resolve the Golan Heights issue. However, such talks should occur only on the condition that Syria meets specific prerequisites. First, it should renounce terrorism and other forms of violence as a means for resolving Arab-Israeli differences. The United States must recognize that it is unlikely that Syria will completely abandon Lebanese Hezbollah since both Syria and Lebanon recognize it as a legitimate political and resistance group. However, Syria should commit to no longer providing Hezbollah arms or other military-related support, thus leaving its disposition to internal Lebanese determination. Syria must also build on its earlier expulsion of the Palestinian group’s headquarters from Damascus by continuing to refuse to allow Palestinian terrorist groups to operate from Syria. Finally, in addition to providing acceptable counterinsurgency cooperation in Iraq, Syria must also comply with international demands regarding non-interference with Lebanon, continue cooperation with the Mehlis investigation, and turn over for trial any Syrian officials the investigators find to be implicated in the Hariri murder.73 Thus far, Syria has ostensibly complied with the Mehlis investigation, relaxed its hold on Lebanon and cooperated in varying degrees on the Iraq issue—all encouraging signs of conciliation. It is uncertain whether Syria will continue to cooperate on these issues or will be willing to compromise fully on the others. However, properly measured incentives, applied with a reasonable degree of patience and backed by consequences, which include the use of force, may eventually steer Syria in the desired direction.

<h4>(__) <u><strong>US COMMITMENT TO PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE RETURN OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ENSURES ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE AND AN END OF SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. </h4><p></u></strong>¶ <u><strong>Meeks</u> (</strong>Colonel, US Army War College<strong>) <u>2006</p><p></u>¶ </strong>[Robert, “Syria: Reassessing US Approach and Options”, USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT,pg 19-20, 15 Mar 2006, WDC//BK]<u>¶ </p><p>Achieving the U.S. interests of gaining genuine Syrian commitment for advancing the Arab-Israeli Peace Process and a halt to Syrian support for Lebanese Hezbollah and radical Palestinian groups will be difficult tasks and true tests of Syrian willingness to modify its behavior.</u> To achieve these goals, <u>in return, the United States should be willing to broker renewed peace talks between Syria and Israel, to include negotiations to resolve the Golan Heights issue</u>. However, <u>such talks should occur only on the condition that Syria meets specific prerequisites. First, it should renounce terrorism and other forms of violence as a means for resolving Arab-Israeli differences. The United States must recognize that it is unlikely that Syria will completely abandon Lebanese Hezbollah since both Syria and Lebanon recognize it as a legitimate political and resistance group</u>. However, <u>Syria should commit to no longer providing Hezbollah arms or other military-related support</u>, thus leaving its disposition to internal Lebanese determination. <u>Syria must also build on its earlier expulsion of the Palestinian group’s headquarters from Damascus by continuing to refuse to allow Palestinian terrorist groups to operate from Syria</u>. Finally, in addition to providing acceptable counterinsurgency cooperation in Iraq, <u>Syria must also comply with international demands regarding non-interference with Lebanon, continue cooperation with the Mehlis investigation, and turn over for trial any Syrian officials the investigators find to be implicated in the Hariri murder</u>.73 Thus far, Syria has ostensibly complied with the Mehlis investigation, relaxed its hold on Lebanon and cooperated in varying degrees on the Iraq issue—all encouraging signs of conciliation. It is uncertain whether Syria will continue to cooperate on these issues or will be willing to compromise fully on the others. However<u>, properly measured incentives, applied with a reasonable degree of patience and backed by consequences, which include the use of force, may eventually steer Syria in the desired direction.</p></u>

¶ Meeks (Colonel, US Army War College) 2006

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: ¶ Meeks (Colonel, US Army War College) 2006 fulltext: ¶ [Robert, “Syria: Reassessing US Approach and Options”, USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT,pg 19-20, 15 Mar 2006, WDC//BK]¶ Achieving the U.S. interests of gaining genuine Syrian commitment for advancing the Arab-Israeli Peace Process and a halt to Syrian support for Lebanese Hezbollah and radical Palestinian groups will be difficult tasks and true tests of Syrian willingness to modify its behavior. To achieve these goals, in return, the United States should be willing to broker renewed peace talks between Syria and Israel, to include negotiations to resolve the Golan Heights issue. However, such talks should occur only on the condition that Syria meets specific prerequisites. First, it should renounce terrorism and other forms of violence as a means for resolving Arab-Israeli differences. The United States must recognize that it is unlikely that Syria will completely abandon Lebanese Hezbollah since both Syria and Lebanon recognize it as a legitimate political and resistance group. However, Syria should commit to no longer providing Hezbollah arms or other military-related support, thus leaving its disposition to internal Lebanese determination. Syria must also build on its earlier expulsion of the Palestinian group’s headquarters from Damascus by continuing to refuse to allow Palestinian terrorist groups to operate from Syria. Finally, in addition to providing acceptable counterinsurgency cooperation in Iraq, Syria must also comply with international demands regarding non-interference with Lebanon, continue cooperation with the Mehlis investigation, and turn over for trial any Syrian officials the investigators find to be implicated in the Hariri murder.73 Thus far, Syria has ostensibly complied with the Mehlis investigation, relaxed its hold on Lebanon and cooperated in varying degrees on the Iraq issue—all encouraging signs of conciliation. It is uncertain whether Syria will continue to cooperate on these issues or will be willing to compromise fully on the others. However, properly measured incentives, applied with a reasonable degree of patience and backed by consequences, which include the use of force, may eventually steer Syria in the desired direction. [/INST] <h4>(__) <u><strong>US COMMITMENT TO PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE RETURN OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ENSURES ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE AND AN END OF SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. </h4><p></u></strong>¶ <u><strong>Meeks</u> (</strong>Colonel, US Army War College<strong>) <u>2006</p><p></u>¶ </strong>[Robert, “Syria: Reassessing US Approach and Options”, USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT,pg 19-20, 15 Mar 2006, WDC//BK]<u>¶ </p><p>Achieving the U.S. interests of gaining genuine Syrian commitment for advancing the Arab-Israeli Peace Process and a halt to Syrian support for Lebanese Hezbollah and radical Palestinian groups will be difficult tasks and true tests of Syrian willingness to modify its behavior.</u> To achieve these goals, <u>in return, the United States should be willing to broker renewed peace talks between Syria and Israel, to include negotiations to resolve the Golan Heights issue</u>. However, <u>such talks should occur only on the condition that Syria meets specific prerequisites. First, it should renounce terrorism and other forms of violence as a means for resolving Arab-Israeli differences. The United States must recognize that it is unlikely that Syria will completely abandon Lebanese Hezbollah since both Syria and Lebanon recognize it as a legitimate political and resistance group</u>. However, <u>Syria should commit to no longer providing Hezbollah arms or other military-related support</u>, thus leaving its disposition to internal Lebanese determination. <u>Syria must also build on its earlier expulsion of the Palestinian group’s headquarters from Damascus by continuing to refuse to allow Palestinian terrorist groups to operate from Syria</u>. Finally, in addition to providing acceptable counterinsurgency cooperation in Iraq, <u>Syria must also comply with international demands regarding non-interference with Lebanon, continue cooperation with the Mehlis investigation, and turn over for trial any Syrian officials the investigators find to be implicated in the Hariri murder</u>.73 Thus far, Syria has ostensibly complied with the Mehlis investigation, relaxed its hold on Lebanon and cooperated in varying degrees on the Iraq issue—all encouraging signs of conciliation. It is uncertain whether Syria will continue to cooperate on these issues or will be willing to compromise fully on the others. However<u>, properly measured incentives, applied with a reasonable degree of patience and backed by consequences, which include the use of force, may eventually steer Syria in the desired direction.</p></u> </s>

This decline is unique

In 2009 the economy shrank almost 8 percent after oil prices dropped to $34 a barrel from $147 as the Lehman bankruptcy sparked a global downturn A report by the Center for Strategic Research in Moscow, which advises the government, warns that a fresh economic slump could provoke unrest across the country at a time of increased political repression If these trends continue, we will see the escalation of political violence and repression on one hand and the worst economic crisis on the other, This may lead to Putin losing control and a chaotic political transformation

In 09 the economy shrank 8 percent after prices dropped to $34 A report by the C S R warns that a fresh economic slump will see the escalation of political violence

“. May 31, 2012. http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-31/oil-and-protests-putins-double-trouble) While only small numbers of President Vladimir Putin’s opponents are camping on Moscow’s Old Arbat street, a Greek exit from the euro could push Russia into recession and provoke more unrest. In 2009 the economy shrank almost 8 percent after oil prices dropped to $34 a barrel from $147 as the Lehman bankruptcy sparked a global downturn. A report by the Center for Strategic Research in Moscow, which advises the government, warns that a fresh economic slump and the resulting need to slash social spending could provoke unrest across the country at a time of increased political repression. “If these trends continue, we will see the escalation of political violence and repression on one hand and the worst economic crisis on the other,” says Mikhail Dmitriev, the research institute’s head and a deputy economy minister from 2000 to 2004. “This may lead to Putin losing control and a chaotic political transformation.”

<h4>This decline is unique</h4><p><strong><mark>MEYER ’12</strong></mark> – Reporter, Bloomberg (Meyer, Henry. Ilya Arkhipov. “Oil and Protests: Putin's Double Trouble</p><p>“. May 31, 2012. http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-31/oil-and-protests-putins-double-trouble)</p><p>While only small numbers of President Vladimir Putin’s opponents are camping on Moscow’s Old Arbat street, a Greek exit from the euro could push Russia into recession and provoke more unrest. <u><mark>In</mark> 20<mark>09 the economy shrank</mark> almost <mark>8 percent after</mark> oil <mark>prices dropped to $34</mark> a barrel from $147 as the Lehman bankruptcy sparked a global downturn</u>. <u><mark>A report by the C</mark>enter for <mark>S</mark>trategic <mark>R</mark>esearch in Moscow, which advises the government, <mark>warns that a <strong>fresh economic slump</u></strong></mark> and the resulting need to slash social spending <u>could provoke unrest across the country at a time of increased political repression</u>. “<u>If these trends continue, we <strong><mark>will see the escalation of political violence</strong></mark> and repression on one hand and the worst economic crisis on the other,</u>” says Mikhail Dmitriev, the research institute’s head and a deputy economy minister from 2000 to 2004. “<u>This may lead to Putin losing control and a chaotic political transformation</u>.”</p>

MEYER ’12 – Reporter, Bloomberg (Meyer, Henry. Ilya Arkhipov. “Oil and Protests: Putin's Double Trouble

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: MEYER ’12 – Reporter, Bloomberg (Meyer, Henry. Ilya Arkhipov. “Oil and Protests: Putin's Double Trouble fulltext: “. May 31, 2012. http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-31/oil-and-protests-putins-double-trouble) While only small numbers of President Vladimir Putin’s opponents are camping on Moscow’s Old Arbat street, a Greek exit from the euro could push Russia into recession and provoke more unrest. In 2009 the economy shrank almost 8 percent after oil prices dropped to $34 a barrel from $147 as the Lehman bankruptcy sparked a global downturn. A report by the Center for Strategic Research in Moscow, which advises the government, warns that a fresh economic slump and the resulting need to slash social spending could provoke unrest across the country at a time of increased political repression. “If these trends continue, we will see the escalation of political violence and repression on one hand and the worst economic crisis on the other,” says Mikhail Dmitriev, the research institute’s head and a deputy economy minister from 2000 to 2004. “This may lead to Putin losing control and a chaotic political transformation.” [/INST] <h4>This decline is unique</h4><p><strong><mark>MEYER ’12</strong></mark> – Reporter, Bloomberg (Meyer, Henry. Ilya Arkhipov. “Oil and Protests: Putin's Double Trouble</p><p>“. May 31, 2012. http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-31/oil-and-protests-putins-double-trouble)</p><p>While only small numbers of President Vladimir Putin’s opponents are camping on Moscow’s Old Arbat street, a Greek exit from the euro could push Russia into recession and provoke more unrest. <u><mark>In</mark> 20<mark>09 the economy shrank</mark> almost <mark>8 percent after</mark> oil <mark>prices dropped to $34</mark> a barrel from $147 as the Lehman bankruptcy sparked a global downturn</u>. <u><mark>A report by the C</mark>enter for <mark>S</mark>trategic <mark>R</mark>esearch in Moscow, which advises the government, <mark>warns that a <strong>fresh economic slump</u></strong></mark> and the resulting need to slash social spending <u>could provoke unrest across the country at a time of increased political repression</u>. “<u>If these trends continue, we <strong><mark>will see the escalation of political violence</strong></mark> and repression on one hand and the worst economic crisis on the other,</u>” says Mikhail Dmitriev, the research institute’s head and a deputy economy minister from 2000 to 2004. “<u>This may lead to Putin losing control and a chaotic political transformation</u>.”</p> </s>

Increase requires pre-existing

The plain and ordinary meaning of the verb increase" is to make something greater or larger Thus, the statute plainly means an insurer takes adverse action if the insurer makes greater the price demanded for insurance An insurer cannot "make greater" something that did not exist previously. The statutory definition clearly anticipates an insurer must have made an initial charge before the insurer can increase that charge an insurer cannot increase unless the insurer previously set payment

[Anna J., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1307; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13355, l/n, accessed 8-1-10, mss] The Fair Credit Reporting Act does not define the term "increase." The plain and ordinary meaning of the verb "to increase" is to make something greater or larger. The "something" that is increased in 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i) is the "charge for any insurance." The plain and common meaning of the noun "charge" is the price demanded for something. Thus, the statute plainly means an insurer takes adverse action if the insurer makes greater (i.e., larger) the price demanded for insurance. An insurer cannot "make greater" something that did not exist previously. The statutory definition of adverse action, therefore, clearly anticipates an insurer must have made an initial charge or demand for payment before the insurer can increase that charge. In other words, an insurer cannot increase the charge for insurance unless the insurer previously set and demanded payment of the premium for that insured's insurance coverage at a lower price.

<h4>Increase requires pre-existing</h4><p><u><strong>Brown</u></strong>, US District Judge, 7-17-200<u><strong>3</u></strong> </p><p>[Anna J., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1307; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13355, l/n, accessed 8-1-10, mss] </p><p>The Fair Credit Reporting Act does not define the term "increase." <u>The plain and ordinary meaning of the verb</u> "to <u>increase" is to make something greater or larger</u>. The "something" that is increased in 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i) is the "charge for any insurance." The plain and common meaning of the noun "charge" is the price demanded for something. <u>Thus, the statute plainly means an insurer takes adverse action if the insurer makes greater</u> (i.e., larger) <u>the price demanded for insurance</u>. <u><strong>An insurer cannot "make greater" something that did not exist previously.</u></strong> <u>The statutory definition</u> of adverse action, therefore, <u>clearly anticipates an insurer must have made an <strong>initial</strong> charge</u> or demand for payment <u><strong>before the insurer can increase that charge</u></strong>. In other words, <u>an insurer cannot increase</u> the charge for insurance <u>unless the insurer previously set</u> and demanded <u>payment</u> of the premium for that insured's insurance coverage at a lower price.</p>

Brown, US District Judge, 7-17-2003

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Brown, US District Judge, 7-17-2003 fulltext: [Anna J., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1307; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13355, l/n, accessed 8-1-10, mss] The Fair Credit Reporting Act does not define the term "increase." The plain and ordinary meaning of the verb "to increase" is to make something greater or larger. The "something" that is increased in 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i) is the "charge for any insurance." The plain and common meaning of the noun "charge" is the price demanded for something. Thus, the statute plainly means an insurer takes adverse action if the insurer makes greater (i.e., larger) the price demanded for insurance. An insurer cannot "make greater" something that did not exist previously. The statutory definition of adverse action, therefore, clearly anticipates an insurer must have made an initial charge or demand for payment before the insurer can increase that charge. In other words, an insurer cannot increase the charge for insurance unless the insurer previously set and demanded payment of the premium for that insured's insurance coverage at a lower price. [/INST] <h4>Increase requires pre-existing</h4><p><u><strong>Brown</u></strong>, US District Judge, 7-17-200<u><strong>3</u></strong> </p><p>[Anna J., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1307; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13355, l/n, accessed 8-1-10, mss] </p><p>The Fair Credit Reporting Act does not define the term "increase." <u>The plain and ordinary meaning of the verb</u> "to <u>increase" is to make something greater or larger</u>. The "something" that is increased in 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i) is the "charge for any insurance." The plain and common meaning of the noun "charge" is the price demanded for something. <u>Thus, the statute plainly means an insurer takes adverse action if the insurer makes greater</u> (i.e., larger) <u>the price demanded for insurance</u>. <u><strong>An insurer cannot "make greater" something that did not exist previously.</u></strong> <u>The statutory definition</u> of adverse action, therefore, <u>clearly anticipates an insurer must have made an <strong>initial</strong> charge</u> or demand for payment <u><strong>before the insurer can increase that charge</u></strong>. In other words, <u>an insurer cannot increase</u> the charge for insurance <u>unless the insurer previously set</u> and demanded <u>payment</u> of the premium for that insured's insurance coverage at a lower price.</p> </s>

Counterplan solves the economy – the designation causes a prohibition on US economic assistance

The terrorism designation comes with a number of sanctions, including a prohibition on U.S. economic assistance and financial restrictions that create problems for Cuba in international commerce

The terrorism designation comes with a number of sanctions, including a prohibition on U.S. economic assistance and financial restrictions that create problems for Cuba in international commerce, already made difficult by a U.S. trade embargo imposed against the island since 1962.

<h4>Counterplan solves the economy – the designation causes a prohibition on US economic assistance</h4><p><strong>Reuters</strong>, <strong>5/31</strong>/13, “Cuba says inclusion on U.S. terrorist list 'shameful'” <u>http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-cuba-usa-terrorism-idUSBRE94U05020130531</p><p><strong>The terrorism designation comes with a number of sanctions, including a prohibition on U.S. economic assistance and financial restrictions that create problems for Cuba in international commerce</u></strong>, already made difficult by a U.S. trade embargo imposed against the island since 1962.</p>

Reuters, 5/31/13, “Cuba says inclusion on U.S. terrorist list 'shameful'” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-cuba-usa-terrorism-idUSBRE94U05020130531

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Reuters, 5/31/13, “Cuba says inclusion on U.S. terrorist list 'shameful'” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-cuba-usa-terrorism-idUSBRE94U05020130531 fulltext: The terrorism designation comes with a number of sanctions, including a prohibition on U.S. economic assistance and financial restrictions that create problems for Cuba in international commerce, already made difficult by a U.S. trade embargo imposed against the island since 1962. [/INST] <h4>Counterplan solves the economy – the designation causes a prohibition on US economic assistance</h4><p><strong>Reuters</strong>, <strong>5/31</strong>/13, “Cuba says inclusion on U.S. terrorist list 'shameful'” <u>http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-cuba-usa-terrorism-idUSBRE94U05020130531</p><p><strong>The terrorism designation comes with a number of sanctions, including a prohibition on U.S. economic assistance and financial restrictions that create problems for Cuba in international commerce</u></strong>, already made difficult by a U.S. trade embargo imposed against the island since 1962.</p> </s>

Venezuelan instability spills over

experts emphasize that Venezuelan instability could be felt far beyond Caracas spreading to its Andean and Caribbean neighbors, and ultimately to the U S fighting in Colombia will spread across the region a weakened Venezuela could create a convenient export base for the drug traffickers

experts emphasize that Venezuelan instability could be felt far beyond Caracas spreading to its Andean and Caribbean neighbors, and ultimately to the U S fighting in Colombia will spread across the region a weakened Venezuela could create a convenient export base for the drug traffickers

Diplomats and experts emphasize that Venezuelan instability could be felt far beyond Caracas' steep hillsides, spreading to its Andean and Caribbean neighbors, and ultimately to the United States. The stakes are significant for the United States, which has tried to maintain smooth relations with President Hugo Chavez, an idiosyncratic populist who criticizes America's global domination while eagerly courting investments from U.S. firms. Anti-drug strategy Perhaps most important to the U.S. is the success of its anti-drug strategy in Colombia, Venezuela's neighbor. As U.S. officials point out, Washington has committed to spending more annually on Plan Colombia than on any other foreign country, except Israel. The goal of Plan Colombia is to help the government of President Andres Pastrana end a protracted 37-year guerrilla war and gain control over the nation's drug-producing areas. Venezuela fits into that strategy, even though Chavez has been a strong critic of Plan Colombia, warning that the fighting in Colombia will spread across the region. Experts say a weakened Venezuela could create a convenient export base for the drug traffickers, who operate deep inside Colombia's jungles and along its borders with Venezuela.

<h4>Venezuelan instability spills over </h4><p><strong>Franklin ‘01</strong> [Stephen, Chicago Tribune staff reporter, "Others Have Big Stake In Venezuela," Chicago Tribune, articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-03-20/news/0103200311_1_venezuela-plan-colombia-anti-drug-strategy, accessed 3-29-13, mss]</p><p>Diplomats and <u><mark>experts emphasize that Venezuelan instability could be felt far beyond Caracas</u></mark>' steep hillsides, <u><mark>spreading to its Andean and Caribbean neighbors, and ultimately to the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. The stakes are significant for the United States, which has tried to maintain smooth relations with President Hugo Chavez, an idiosyncratic populist who criticizes America's global domination while eagerly courting investments from U.S. firms. Anti-drug strategy Perhaps most important to the U.S. is the success of its anti-drug strategy in Colombia, Venezuela's neighbor. As U.S. officials point out, Washington has committed to spending more annually on Plan Colombia than on any other foreign country, except Israel. The goal of Plan Colombia is to help the government of President Andres Pastrana end a protracted 37-year guerrilla war and gain control over the nation's drug-producing areas. Venezuela fits into that strategy, even though Chavez has been a strong critic of Plan Colombia, warning that the <u><mark>fighting in Colombia will spread across the region</u></mark>. Experts say <u><mark>a weakened Venezuela could create a convenient export base for the drug traffickers</u></mark>, who operate deep inside Colombia's jungles and along its borders with Venezuela.</p>

Franklin ‘01 [Stephen, Chicago Tribune staff reporter, "Others Have Big Stake In Venezuela," Chicago Tribune, articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-03-20/news/0103200311_1_venezuela-plan-colombia-anti-drug-strategy, accessed 3-29-13, mss]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Franklin ‘01 [Stephen, Chicago Tribune staff reporter, "Others Have Big Stake In Venezuela," Chicago Tribune, articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-03-20/news/0103200311_1_venezuela-plan-colombia-anti-drug-strategy, accessed 3-29-13, mss] fulltext: Diplomats and experts emphasize that Venezuelan instability could be felt far beyond Caracas' steep hillsides, spreading to its Andean and Caribbean neighbors, and ultimately to the United States. The stakes are significant for the United States, which has tried to maintain smooth relations with President Hugo Chavez, an idiosyncratic populist who criticizes America's global domination while eagerly courting investments from U.S. firms. Anti-drug strategy Perhaps most important to the U.S. is the success of its anti-drug strategy in Colombia, Venezuela's neighbor. As U.S. officials point out, Washington has committed to spending more annually on Plan Colombia than on any other foreign country, except Israel. The goal of Plan Colombia is to help the government of President Andres Pastrana end a protracted 37-year guerrilla war and gain control over the nation's drug-producing areas. Venezuela fits into that strategy, even though Chavez has been a strong critic of Plan Colombia, warning that the fighting in Colombia will spread across the region. Experts say a weakened Venezuela could create a convenient export base for the drug traffickers, who operate deep inside Colombia's jungles and along its borders with Venezuela. [/INST] <h4>Venezuelan instability spills over </h4><p><strong>Franklin ‘01</strong> [Stephen, Chicago Tribune staff reporter, "Others Have Big Stake In Venezuela," Chicago Tribune, articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-03-20/news/0103200311_1_venezuela-plan-colombia-anti-drug-strategy, accessed 3-29-13, mss]</p><p>Diplomats and <u><mark>experts emphasize that Venezuelan instability could be felt far beyond Caracas</u></mark>' steep hillsides, <u><mark>spreading to its Andean and Caribbean neighbors, and ultimately to the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. The stakes are significant for the United States, which has tried to maintain smooth relations with President Hugo Chavez, an idiosyncratic populist who criticizes America's global domination while eagerly courting investments from U.S. firms. Anti-drug strategy Perhaps most important to the U.S. is the success of its anti-drug strategy in Colombia, Venezuela's neighbor. As U.S. officials point out, Washington has committed to spending more annually on Plan Colombia than on any other foreign country, except Israel. The goal of Plan Colombia is to help the government of President Andres Pastrana end a protracted 37-year guerrilla war and gain control over the nation's drug-producing areas. Venezuela fits into that strategy, even though Chavez has been a strong critic of Plan Colombia, warning that the <u><mark>fighting in Colombia will spread across the region</u></mark>. Experts say <u><mark>a weakened Venezuela could create a convenient export base for the drug traffickers</u></mark>, who operate deep inside Colombia's jungles and along its borders with Venezuela.</p> </s>

(__) THE SYRIAN REGIME IS CALLING FOR THE UNITED STATES TO ADVANCE A PEACE DEAL; THEY WILL END THEIR TIES TO IRAN IN RETURN FOR THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THE UNITED STATES IS KEY TO SOLVE BECAUSE SYRIA WON’T END ITS TIES TO IRAN WITHOUT THE OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN U.S. SUPPORT

Asad is trying to keep two strategic options open: Iranian or Western orientation, and that, of the two, he prefers the West. Asad won't give up bargaining chips like his current strategic relationship with Iran in advance of negotiations, and he needs to be convinced that if, as part of a peace deal with Israel, he goes over to the West, the U.S. will deliver. "What does he want besides the Golan? Good relations with the U.S., large-scale American investment, to be removed from the list of terror supporting states he continues to nurture the Iranian alternative because Bush won't even talk to him," Maoz contends. For any Israeli-Syrian negotiation to succeed, Maoz believes, the Americans would have to be deeply involved, precisely because Asad sees Israeli-Syrian peace as part of a much wider package deal. "Unfortunately, no one in Washington takes this seriously," Maoz complains. And he concludes that "as long as Bush is in the White House, nothing will happen on the Israeli-Syrian track. Bush is convinced that there is little to be gained by talking to Asad, whom he sees as an incorrigible member of the Iranian-led axis of evil.

[Leslie, “Keeping A Finger On The Syrian Pulse” Accessed from LexisNexus on 8-3-07 wyo-CK] Syria expert Prof. Moshe Maoz of the Hebrew University argues that Asad is trying to keep two strategic options open: Iranian or Western orientation, and that, of the two, he prefers the West. But, says Maoz, Asad won't give up bargaining chips like his current strategic relationship with Iran in advance of negotiations, and he needs to be convinced that if, as part of a peace deal with Israel, he goes over to the West, the U.S. will deliver. "What does he want besides the Golan? Good relations with the U.S., large-scale American investment, to be removed from the list of terror supporting states and to be absolved of the [2005 former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq] Hariri murder. But he continues to nurture the Iranian alternative because Bush won't even talk to him," Maoz contends. For any Israeli-Syrian negotiation to succeed, Maoz believes, the Americans would have to be deeply involved, precisely because Asad sees Israeli-Syrian peace as part of a much wider package deal. "Unfortunately, no one in Washington takes this seriously," Maoz complains. And he concludes that "as long as Bush is in the White House, nothing will happen on the Israeli-Syrian track. For his part, Bush is convinced that there is little to be gained by talking to Asad, whom he sees as an incorrigible member of the Iranian-led axis of evil. His strategy seems to be to wait it out until someone else is installed as president in Damascus.

<h4>(__) THE SYRIAN REGIME IS CALLING FOR THE UNITED STATES TO ADVANCE A PEACE DEAL; THEY WILL END THEIR TIES TO IRAN IN RETURN FOR THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THE UNITED STATES IS KEY TO SOLVE BECAUSE SYRIA WON’T END ITS TIES TO IRAN WITHOUT THE OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN U.S. SUPPORT</h4><p><u><strong>Susser</u></strong>, (Reporter for The Jerusalem Report) July, <u><strong>2007</p><p></u></strong>[Leslie, “Keeping A Finger On The Syrian Pulse” Accessed from LexisNexus on 8-3-07 wyo-CK]</p><p>Syria expert Prof. Moshe Maoz of the Hebrew University argues that <u>Asad is trying to keep two strategic options open: Iranian or Western orientation, and that, of the two, he prefers the West.</u> But, says Maoz, <u>Asad won't give up bargaining chips like his current strategic relationship with Iran in advance of negotiations, and he needs to be convinced that if, as part of a peace deal with Israel, he goes over to the West, the U.S. will deliver. "What does he want besides the Golan? Good relations with the U.S., large-scale American investment, to be removed from the list of terror supporting states</u> and to be absolved of the [2005 former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq] Hariri murder. But <u>he continues to nurture the Iranian alternative because Bush won't even talk to him," Maoz contends. For any Israeli-Syrian negotiation to succeed, Maoz believes, the Americans would have to be deeply involved, precisely because Asad sees Israeli-Syrian peace as part of a much wider package deal. "Unfortunately, no one in Washington takes this seriously," Maoz complains. And he concludes that "as long as Bush is in the White House, nothing will happen on the Israeli-Syrian track.</u> For his part, <u>Bush is convinced that there is little to be gained by talking to Asad, whom he sees as an incorrigible member of the Iranian-led axis of evil.</u> His strategy seems to be to wait it out until someone else is installed as president in Damascus.</p>

Susser, (Reporter for The Jerusalem Report) July, 2007

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Susser, (Reporter for The Jerusalem Report) July, 2007 fulltext: [Leslie, “Keeping A Finger On The Syrian Pulse” Accessed from LexisNexus on 8-3-07 wyo-CK] Syria expert Prof. Moshe Maoz of the Hebrew University argues that Asad is trying to keep two strategic options open: Iranian or Western orientation, and that, of the two, he prefers the West. But, says Maoz, Asad won't give up bargaining chips like his current strategic relationship with Iran in advance of negotiations, and he needs to be convinced that if, as part of a peace deal with Israel, he goes over to the West, the U.S. will deliver. "What does he want besides the Golan? Good relations with the U.S., large-scale American investment, to be removed from the list of terror supporting states and to be absolved of the [2005 former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq] Hariri murder. But he continues to nurture the Iranian alternative because Bush won't even talk to him," Maoz contends. For any Israeli-Syrian negotiation to succeed, Maoz believes, the Americans would have to be deeply involved, precisely because Asad sees Israeli-Syrian peace as part of a much wider package deal. "Unfortunately, no one in Washington takes this seriously," Maoz complains. And he concludes that "as long as Bush is in the White House, nothing will happen on the Israeli-Syrian track. For his part, Bush is convinced that there is little to be gained by talking to Asad, whom he sees as an incorrigible member of the Iranian-led axis of evil. His strategy seems to be to wait it out until someone else is installed as president in Damascus. [/INST] <h4>(__) THE SYRIAN REGIME IS CALLING FOR THE UNITED STATES TO ADVANCE A PEACE DEAL; THEY WILL END THEIR TIES TO IRAN IN RETURN FOR THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THE UNITED STATES IS KEY TO SOLVE BECAUSE SYRIA WON’T END ITS TIES TO IRAN WITHOUT THE OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN U.S. SUPPORT</h4><p><u><strong>Susser</u></strong>, (Reporter for The Jerusalem Report) July, <u><strong>2007</p><p></u></strong>[Leslie, “Keeping A Finger On The Syrian Pulse” Accessed from LexisNexus on 8-3-07 wyo-CK]</p><p>Syria expert Prof. Moshe Maoz of the Hebrew University argues that <u>Asad is trying to keep two strategic options open: Iranian or Western orientation, and that, of the two, he prefers the West.</u> But, says Maoz, <u>Asad won't give up bargaining chips like his current strategic relationship with Iran in advance of negotiations, and he needs to be convinced that if, as part of a peace deal with Israel, he goes over to the West, the U.S. will deliver. "What does he want besides the Golan? Good relations with the U.S., large-scale American investment, to be removed from the list of terror supporting states</u> and to be absolved of the [2005 former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq] Hariri murder. But <u>he continues to nurture the Iranian alternative because Bush won't even talk to him," Maoz contends. For any Israeli-Syrian negotiation to succeed, Maoz believes, the Americans would have to be deeply involved, precisely because Asad sees Israeli-Syrian peace as part of a much wider package deal. "Unfortunately, no one in Washington takes this seriously," Maoz complains. And he concludes that "as long as Bush is in the White House, nothing will happen on the Israeli-Syrian track.</u> For his part, <u>Bush is convinced that there is little to be gained by talking to Asad, whom he sees as an incorrigible member of the Iranian-led axis of evil.</u> His strategy seems to be to wait it out until someone else is installed as president in Damascus.</p> </s>

Consensus of economists

Russia produces more than 10 million barrels of oil per day - making it a major energy player Tindale, an energy economist at the C E R said half of the Russian government’s revenue comes from oil that leaves the Russian economy highly vulnerable to a fall in oil prices. “It would mean their budget was well out of balance and so would be very serious, short-term, for Putin and the Russian government

Tindale economist at C E R said half of the Russian government’s revenue comes from oil a fall in prices would be very serious

Russia produces more than 10 million barrels of oil per day - making it a major energy player. Stephen Tindale, an energy economist at the Center for European Reform, said, “Almost half of the Russian government’s revenue comes from various taxes on oil and gas exports.” Tindale says that leaves the Russian economy highly vulnerable to a fall in oil prices. “It would mean their budget was well out of balance and so would be very serious, short-term, for Putin and the Russian government," he said.

<h4>Consensus of economists</h4><p><strong><mark>VOA ’12</strong></mark> (Voice of America. “Falling Oil Prices Prompt Russian Economic Fears”. June 11, 2012. http://www.voanews.com/content/falling-oil-prices-prompt-russian-economic-fears/1206097.html)</p><p><u>Russia produces more than 10 million barrels of oil per day - making it a major energy player</u>. Stephen <u><strong><mark>Tindale</mark>, an energy <mark>economist at</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>C</u></strong></mark>enter for <u><strong><mark>E</u></strong></mark>uropean <u><strong><mark>R</u></strong></mark>eform,<u> <strong><mark>said</u></strong></mark>, “Almost<u> <strong><mark>half of the Russian</strong> <strong>government’s</strong></mark> <mark>revenue comes from</mark> </u>various taxes on<u> <mark>oil</mark> </u>and gas exports.” Tindale says <u>that leaves the Russian economy highly vulnerable to <mark>a fall in </mark>oil <mark>prices</mark>. “It would mean their budget was well out of balance and so <strong><mark>would be very serious</strong></mark>, short-term, for Putin and the Russian government</u>," he said.</p>

VOA ’12 (Voice of America. “Falling Oil Prices Prompt Russian Economic Fears”. June 11, 2012. http://www.voanews.com/content/falling-oil-prices-prompt-russian-economic-fears/1206097.html)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: VOA ’12 (Voice of America. “Falling Oil Prices Prompt Russian Economic Fears”. June 11, 2012. http://www.voanews.com/content/falling-oil-prices-prompt-russian-economic-fears/1206097.html) fulltext: Russia produces more than 10 million barrels of oil per day - making it a major energy player. Stephen Tindale, an energy economist at the Center for European Reform, said, “Almost half of the Russian government’s revenue comes from various taxes on oil and gas exports.” Tindale says that leaves the Russian economy highly vulnerable to a fall in oil prices. “It would mean their budget was well out of balance and so would be very serious, short-term, for Putin and the Russian government," he said. [/INST] <h4>Consensus of economists</h4><p><strong><mark>VOA ’12</strong></mark> (Voice of America. “Falling Oil Prices Prompt Russian Economic Fears”. June 11, 2012. http://www.voanews.com/content/falling-oil-prices-prompt-russian-economic-fears/1206097.html)</p><p><u>Russia produces more than 10 million barrels of oil per day - making it a major energy player</u>. Stephen <u><strong><mark>Tindale</mark>, an energy <mark>economist at</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>C</u></strong></mark>enter for <u><strong><mark>E</u></strong></mark>uropean <u><strong><mark>R</u></strong></mark>eform,<u> <strong><mark>said</u></strong></mark>, “Almost<u> <strong><mark>half of the Russian</strong> <strong>government’s</strong></mark> <mark>revenue comes from</mark> </u>various taxes on<u> <mark>oil</mark> </u>and gas exports.” Tindale says <u>that leaves the Russian economy highly vulnerable to <mark>a fall in </mark>oil <mark>prices</mark>. “It would mean their budget was well out of balance and so <strong><mark>would be very serious</strong></mark>, short-term, for Putin and the Russian government</u>," he said.</p> </s>

Increase requires evidence of the preexisting condition to determine a net increase

the term "increase" connotes change. To show change, appellees would have been required to present evidence of the condition at the time the policy was issued Because no such evidence was presented, this court cannot determine whether the risk has increased

[UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, 824 F.2d 570; 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 9816, l/n, accessed 8-1-10, mss] Also related to the waiver issue is appellees' defense relying on a provision of the insurance policy that suspends coverage where the risk is increased by any means within the knowledge or control of the insured. However, the term "increase" connotes change. To show change, appellees would have been required to present evidence of the condition of the building at the time the policy was issued. See 5 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 2941 at 4-5 (1970). Because no such evidence was presented, this court cannot determine, on this record, whether the risk has, in fact, been increased. Indeed, the answer to this question may depend on Mr. Glassley's knowledge of the condition of the building at the time the policy was issued, see 17 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 9602 at 515-16 (1981), since the fundamental issue is whether the appellees contemplated insuring the risk which incurred the loss.

<h4>Increase requires evidence of the preexisting condition to determine a net increase</h4><p><u><strong>Ripple</u></strong>, US Court of Appeals 7th Cicuit judge, 7-21-19<u><strong>87</p><p></u></strong>[UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, 824 F.2d 570; 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 9816, l/n, accessed 8-1-10, mss] </p><p>Also related to the waiver issue is appellees' defense relying on a provision of the insurance policy that suspends coverage where the risk is increased by any means within the knowledge or control of the insured. However, <u>the term "increase" connotes change. To show change, appellees would have been required to present evidence of the condition </u>of the building <u>at the time the policy was issued</u>. See 5 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 2941 at 4-5 (1970). <u>Because no such evidence was presented, this court cannot determine</u>, on this record, <u>whether the risk has</u>, in fact, been <u>increased</u>. Indeed, the answer to this question may depend on Mr. Glassley's knowledge of the condition of the building at the time the policy was issued, see 17 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 9602 at 515-16 (1981), since the fundamental issue is whether the appellees contemplated insuring the risk which incurred the loss.</p>

Ripple, US Court of Appeals 7th Cicuit judge, 7-21-1987

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ripple, US Court of Appeals 7th Cicuit judge, 7-21-1987 fulltext: [UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, 824 F.2d 570; 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 9816, l/n, accessed 8-1-10, mss] Also related to the waiver issue is appellees' defense relying on a provision of the insurance policy that suspends coverage where the risk is increased by any means within the knowledge or control of the insured. However, the term "increase" connotes change. To show change, appellees would have been required to present evidence of the condition of the building at the time the policy was issued. See 5 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 2941 at 4-5 (1970). Because no such evidence was presented, this court cannot determine, on this record, whether the risk has, in fact, been increased. Indeed, the answer to this question may depend on Mr. Glassley's knowledge of the condition of the building at the time the policy was issued, see 17 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 9602 at 515-16 (1981), since the fundamental issue is whether the appellees contemplated insuring the risk which incurred the loss. [/INST] <h4>Increase requires evidence of the preexisting condition to determine a net increase</h4><p><u><strong>Ripple</u></strong>, US Court of Appeals 7th Cicuit judge, 7-21-19<u><strong>87</p><p></u></strong>[UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, 824 F.2d 570; 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 9816, l/n, accessed 8-1-10, mss] </p><p>Also related to the waiver issue is appellees' defense relying on a provision of the insurance policy that suspends coverage where the risk is increased by any means within the knowledge or control of the insured. However, <u>the term "increase" connotes change. To show change, appellees would have been required to present evidence of the condition </u>of the building <u>at the time the policy was issued</u>. See 5 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 2941 at 4-5 (1970). <u>Because no such evidence was presented, this court cannot determine</u>, on this record, <u>whether the risk has</u>, in fact, been <u>increased</u>. Indeed, the answer to this question may depend on Mr. Glassley's knowledge of the condition of the building at the time the policy was issued, see 17 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 9602 at 515-16 (1981), since the fundamental issue is whether the appellees contemplated insuring the risk which incurred the loss.</p> </s>

Inclusion on the list of state sponsors is economically destructive to Cuba – counterplan solves this

There are numerous reasons why the Castro government finds its insertion on the list so galling. First are the real economic consequences to the designation. By law the United States must oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or other international lending institutions. Obama administration officials have been using Cuba’s inclusion to make it increasingly difficult for Havana to conduct normal banking transactions that involve U.S. financial establishments, regardless of which currency is being used. , the United States has imposed an arms embargo against all parties placed on the list (which the Castro government has experienced since the triumph of the Revolution) as well as prohibiting sales of items that could be considered to have both military and non-military dual use, including hospital equipment. the William Soler children’s hospital in Havana was labeled a ‘denied hospital’ in 2007 by the State Department, bringing with it serious ramifications. Various medicines and technology have become impossible to obtain, resulting in the deaths of children and the inability of staff to properly deal with a variety of treatable conditions

There are numerous reasons why the Castro government finds its insertion on the list so galling. First are the real economic consequences to the designation. By law the United States must oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or other international lending institutions. Obama administration officials have been using Cuba’s inclusion to make it increasingly difficult for Havana to conduct normal banking transactions that involve U.S. financial establishments, regardless of which currency is being used.  Furthermore, the United States has imposed an arms embargo against all parties placed on the list (which the Castro government has experienced since the triumph of the Revolution) as well as prohibiting sales of items that could be considered to have both military and non-military dual use, including hospital equipment. For example, the William Soler children’s hospital in Havana was labeled a ‘denied hospital’ in 2007 by the State Department, bringing with it serious ramifications. Various medicines and technology have become impossible to obtain, resulting in the deaths of children and the inability of staff to properly deal with a variety of treatable conditions. [2] For Cuba, these restrictions are additionally damaging as the island continues to suffer from the comprehensive embargo the United States has imposed since the early 1960s.

<h4>Inclusion on the list of state sponsors is economically destructive to Cuba – counterplan solves this</h4><p>Keith <strong>Bolender</strong>, Guest Scholar at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and a freelance journalist and the author of “Cuba Under Siege: American Policy, the Revolution and its People” (Palgrave 2012), <strong>4/22</strong>/13, “THE TERRORIST LIST, AND TERRORISM AS PRACTICED AGAINST CUBA” http://www.coha.org/22355/</p><p><u><strong>There are numerous reasons why the Castro government finds its insertion on the list so galling. First are the real economic consequences to the designation. By law the United States must oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or other international lending institutions. Obama administration officials have been using Cuba’s inclusion to make it increasingly difficult for Havana to conduct normal banking transactions that involve U.S. financial establishments, regardless of which currency is being used. </u></strong> Furthermore<u><strong>, the United States has imposed an arms embargo against all parties placed on the list (which the Castro government has experienced since the triumph of the Revolution) as well as prohibiting sales of items that could be considered to have both military and non-military dual use, including hospital equipment.</u></strong> For example, <u><strong>the William Soler children’s hospital in Havana was labeled a ‘denied hospital’ in 2007 by the State Department, bringing with it serious ramifications. Various medicines and technology have become impossible to obtain, resulting in the deaths of children and the inability of staff to properly deal with a variety of treatable conditions</u></strong>. [2] For Cuba, these restrictions are additionally damaging as the island continues to suffer from the comprehensive embargo the United States has imposed since the early 1960s.</p>

Keith Bolender, Guest Scholar at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and a freelance journalist and the author of “Cuba Under Siege: American Policy, the Revolution and its People” (Palgrave 2012), 4/22/13, “THE TERRORIST LIST, AND TERRORISM AS PRACTICED AGAINST CUBA” http://www.coha.org/22355/

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Keith Bolender, Guest Scholar at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and a freelance journalist and the author of “Cuba Under Siege: American Policy, the Revolution and its People” (Palgrave 2012), 4/22/13, “THE TERRORIST LIST, AND TERRORISM AS PRACTICED AGAINST CUBA” http://www.coha.org/22355/ fulltext: There are numerous reasons why the Castro government finds its insertion on the list so galling. First are the real economic consequences to the designation. By law the United States must oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or other international lending institutions. Obama administration officials have been using Cuba’s inclusion to make it increasingly difficult for Havana to conduct normal banking transactions that involve U.S. financial establishments, regardless of which currency is being used.  Furthermore, the United States has imposed an arms embargo against all parties placed on the list (which the Castro government has experienced since the triumph of the Revolution) as well as prohibiting sales of items that could be considered to have both military and non-military dual use, including hospital equipment. For example, the William Soler children’s hospital in Havana was labeled a ‘denied hospital’ in 2007 by the State Department, bringing with it serious ramifications. Various medicines and technology have become impossible to obtain, resulting in the deaths of children and the inability of staff to properly deal with a variety of treatable conditions. [2] For Cuba, these restrictions are additionally damaging as the island continues to suffer from the comprehensive embargo the United States has imposed since the early 1960s. [/INST] <h4>Inclusion on the list of state sponsors is economically destructive to Cuba – counterplan solves this</h4><p>Keith <strong>Bolender</strong>, Guest Scholar at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and a freelance journalist and the author of “Cuba Under Siege: American Policy, the Revolution and its People” (Palgrave 2012), <strong>4/22</strong>/13, “THE TERRORIST LIST, AND TERRORISM AS PRACTICED AGAINST CUBA” http://www.coha.org/22355/</p><p><u><strong>There are numerous reasons why the Castro government finds its insertion on the list so galling. First are the real economic consequences to the designation. By law the United States must oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or other international lending institutions. Obama administration officials have been using Cuba’s inclusion to make it increasingly difficult for Havana to conduct normal banking transactions that involve U.S. financial establishments, regardless of which currency is being used. </u></strong> Furthermore<u><strong>, the United States has imposed an arms embargo against all parties placed on the list (which the Castro government has experienced since the triumph of the Revolution) as well as prohibiting sales of items that could be considered to have both military and non-military dual use, including hospital equipment.</u></strong> For example, <u><strong>the William Soler children’s hospital in Havana was labeled a ‘denied hospital’ in 2007 by the State Department, bringing with it serious ramifications. Various medicines and technology have become impossible to obtain, resulting in the deaths of children and the inability of staff to properly deal with a variety of treatable conditions</u></strong>. [2] For Cuba, these restrictions are additionally damaging as the island continues to suffer from the comprehensive embargo the United States has imposed since the early 1960s.</p> </s>

Venezuelan instability causes child soldiers, genocide, hunger, and trafficking

Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge failed state status is the breeding ground for instability regional conflict, and terrorism. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds these conditions spawn human rights violations poverty, starvation, disease the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy these spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict

Chávez also understands that the process leading to ¶ state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge failed state status is the breeding ground for instability They can host “evil” networks of all kinds these ¶ conditions spawn human rights violations poverty, starvation, disease child soldiers, trafficking genocide, ethnic cleansing and anarchy these spill over into poverty and conflict

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to ¶ state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge ¶ facing the global community today. The argument in general is that ¶ failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, ¶ criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These ¶ conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee ¶ flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they ¶ involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form ¶ of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these ¶ conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such ¶ as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of ¶ infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn ¶ further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, ¶ the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and ¶ body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons ¶ systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and ¶ criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually ¶ unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, ¶ destabilization, and conflict.62

<h4>Venezuelan instability causes child soldiers, genocide, hunger, and trafficking</h4><p><strong>Manwaring ‘05 </strong>[Max Manwaring, Chair of the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation and is a Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, “Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, And Asymmetric Warfare,” October, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf]</p><p>President <u><mark>Chávez also understands that the process leading to </u>¶<u> state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge</u></mark> ¶ facing the global community today. The argument in general is that ¶ failing and <u><mark>failed state status is the breeding ground for instability</u></mark>, ¶ criminality, insurgency, <u>regional conflict, and terrorism.</u> These ¶ conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee ¶ flows. <u><mark>They can host “evil” networks of all kinds</u></mark>, whether they ¶ involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form ¶ of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, <u><mark>these </u>¶<u> conditions spawn</mark> </u>all kinds of things people in general do not like such ¶ as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of ¶ infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn ¶ further <u><mark>human rights violations</u></mark>, torture, <u><mark>poverty, starvation, disease</u></mark>, ¶ <u>the recruitment and use of <mark>child soldiers, trafficking</mark> in women and </u>¶<u> body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons </u>¶<u> systems and WMD, <mark>genocide, ethnic cleansing</mark>, warlordism, <mark>and</mark> </u>¶<u> criminal <mark>anarchy</u></mark>. At the same time, <u><mark>these</mark> </u>actions are usually ¶ unconfined and <u><mark>spill over into</mark> regional syndromes of <mark>poverty</mark>, </u>¶<u> destabilization, <mark>and conflict</u></mark>.62</p>

Manwaring ‘05 [Max Manwaring, Chair of the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation and is a Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, “Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, And Asymmetric Warfare,” October, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Manwaring ‘05 [Max Manwaring, Chair of the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation and is a Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, “Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, And Asymmetric Warfare,” October, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf] fulltext: President Chávez also understands that the process leading to ¶ state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge ¶ facing the global community today. The argument in general is that ¶ failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, ¶ criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These ¶ conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee ¶ flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they ¶ involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form ¶ of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these ¶ conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such ¶ as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of ¶ infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn ¶ further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, ¶ the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and ¶ body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons ¶ systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and ¶ criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually ¶ unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, ¶ destabilization, and conflict.62 [/INST] <h4>Venezuelan instability causes child soldiers, genocide, hunger, and trafficking</h4><p><strong>Manwaring ‘05 </strong>[Max Manwaring, Chair of the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation and is a Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, “Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, And Asymmetric Warfare,” October, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf]</p><p>President <u><mark>Chávez also understands that the process leading to </u>¶<u> state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge</u></mark> ¶ facing the global community today. The argument in general is that ¶ failing and <u><mark>failed state status is the breeding ground for instability</u></mark>, ¶ criminality, insurgency, <u>regional conflict, and terrorism.</u> These ¶ conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee ¶ flows. <u><mark>They can host “evil” networks of all kinds</u></mark>, whether they ¶ involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form ¶ of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, <u><mark>these </u>¶<u> conditions spawn</mark> </u>all kinds of things people in general do not like such ¶ as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of ¶ infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn ¶ further <u><mark>human rights violations</u></mark>, torture, <u><mark>poverty, starvation, disease</u></mark>, ¶ <u>the recruitment and use of <mark>child soldiers, trafficking</mark> in women and </u>¶<u> body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons </u>¶<u> systems and WMD, <mark>genocide, ethnic cleansing</mark>, warlordism, <mark>and</mark> </u>¶<u> criminal <mark>anarchy</u></mark>. At the same time, <u><mark>these</mark> </u>actions are usually ¶ unconfined and <u><mark>spill over into</mark> regional syndromes of <mark>poverty</mark>, </u>¶<u> destabilization, <mark>and conflict</u></mark>.62</p> </s>

(__) Syrian instability will draw in the US.

Obama warned the Syrian government that using chemical weapons against opposition forces or allowing such weapons to be obtained by terrorists would be a "game-changer" in terms of U.S. involvement in the conflict His administration has been criticized for not providing military aid to the Syrian opposition

http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/21/politics/obama-mideast-visit Obama also warned the Syrian government that using chemical weapons against opposition forces or allowing such weapons to be obtained by terrorists would be a "game-changer" in terms of U.S. involvement in the conflict. His administration has been criticized for not providing military aid to the Syrian opposition.

<h4>(__) Syrian instability will draw in the US.</h4><p>“Obama: ‘Peace is possible,’ but see the world as Palestinians do”. John King, Jessica Yellin,reported from Jerusalem and the West Bank. March 21, 2013</p><p>http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/21/politics/obama-mideast-visit</p><p><u><strong>Obama</u></strong> also <u><strong>warned the Syrian government that using chemical weapons against opposition forces or allowing such weapons to be obtained by terrorists would be a "game-changer" in terms of U.S. involvement in the conflict</u></strong>. <u><strong>His administration has been criticized for not providing military aid to the Syrian opposition</u></strong>.</p>

“Obama: ‘Peace is possible,’ but see the world as Palestinians do”. John King, Jessica Yellin,reported from Jerusalem and the West Bank. March 21, 2013

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: “Obama: ‘Peace is possible,’ but see the world as Palestinians do”. John King, Jessica Yellin,reported from Jerusalem and the West Bank. March 21, 2013 fulltext: http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/21/politics/obama-mideast-visit Obama also warned the Syrian government that using chemical weapons against opposition forces or allowing such weapons to be obtained by terrorists would be a "game-changer" in terms of U.S. involvement in the conflict. His administration has been criticized for not providing military aid to the Syrian opposition. [/INST] <h4>(__) Syrian instability will draw in the US.</h4><p>“Obama: ‘Peace is possible,’ but see the world as Palestinians do”. John King, Jessica Yellin,reported from Jerusalem and the West Bank. March 21, 2013</p><p>http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/21/politics/obama-mideast-visit</p><p><u><strong>Obama</u></strong> also <u><strong>warned the Syrian government that using chemical weapons against opposition forces or allowing such weapons to be obtained by terrorists would be a "game-changer" in terms of U.S. involvement in the conflict</u></strong>. <u><strong>His administration has been criticized for not providing military aid to the Syrian opposition</u></strong>.</p> </s>

US demand for oil is key to Russia’s economy

For the time 60% of all state revenue in Russia comes from energy export customs Gazprom is the Russian taxpayer! The present oil price of around 110 USD/barrel seems to give a balanced budget. In 2008 with oil prices of 60 USD/barrel the economy dropped 8%. It is not “the market” that sets the oil price the market is being played by far greater forces The USA has more than a little leverage on the oil price due to the country’s strategic reserves : Buying and selling for future delivery will set the price more or less where it is desired

For the time 60% of revenue in Russia comes from energy export Gazprom is the Russian taxpayer! price of 110 seems to give a balanced budget In 08 with prices of 60 the economy dropped 8%. the market is being played by greater forces The USA has more than a little leverage on price due to strategic reserves Buying and selling will set the price

Fact: For the time being 60% of all state revenue in Russia comes from energy export customs. To some readers this concept of taxing exports is foreign: Export is something you subsidize, not tax! Well you are right if you are a half way functioning nation, then you would tax the profits of the oil companies. But Russia is far from out of the middle ages – administratively speaking – so you tax what you can get your hands on and you will know quite easily what amounts pass through the pipelines or are loaded on board tankers – trust me: A super tanker in the gold fish pond is very hard to miss. So naturally Russia has been doing what they can to make their energy export as independent of others as they can! They have built: A pipeline getting operational in Ust-Luga near Sct. Petersburg. This will bypass the need to transit oil through White Russia. Not that their petty pilfering wasn’t annoying: But if Russia is gang of thugs, then White Russia is a maximum security penitentiary for the criminally insane. This project has been muscled through in a very short time The Nord Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Germany under the Baltic sea, just to make it more secure. This is being extended into Poland thus securing Poland’s energy supply – which in time may go the other way – depending on how the oil shale pans out. The South Stream gas pipeline to Austria – avoiding the Ukraine whose mental stability is also in doubt. Expensive? Oh yes; but you don’t muck around with 2/3 of your tax revenue! Very few people realise just how dependent Russia is on their oil (and gas) exports. Some paint the energy giant Gazprom OAO (PINK:OGZPY) as the sinister character – but let’s face it: Gazprom OAO is the Russian taxpayer! The present oil price of around 110 USD/barrel seems to give a balanced budget. In 2008 with oil prices of 60 USD/barrel the economy dropped with 8%. Twenty odd years ago I was in a small way involved with prognosticating energy prices long term for an energy supply company – the various estimates were so diverging, that it absolutely made no sense. It is a subject where everybody has a considered opinion – if they are ignorant enough. Let’s face it: It is not “the market” that sets the oil price – or rather the market is being played by far greater forces. The USA has more than a little leverage on the oil price due to the country’s strategic reserves – the size of which is state secret. This gives the perfect opportunity to play the market: Buying and selling for future delivery will set the price more or less where it is desired – with no deliveries being made, as those forward positions can be closed any time.

<h4>US demand for oil is key to Russia’s economy</h4><p><strong><mark>TOM ’12</strong></mark> – Employed in Transport (rail and ferrylines), mashine industry, building, energy and university administration.; Managerial economics from Aarhus University (“60% of Russia’s Revenue From Energy Exports – Geo-Political Analysis”. April 3, 2012. http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/04/60-of-russias-revenue-from-energy-exports-geo-political-analysis/)</p><p>Fact: <u><mark>For the time</u></mark> being <u><mark>60% of </mark>all state <mark>revenue in Russia comes from energy export</mark> customs</u>. To some readers this concept of taxing exports is foreign: Export is something you subsidize, not tax! Well you are right if you are a half way functioning nation, then you would tax the profits of the oil companies. But Russia is far from out of the middle ages – administratively speaking – so you tax what you can get your hands on and you will know quite easily what amounts pass through the pipelines or are loaded on board tankers – trust me: A super tanker in the gold fish pond is very hard to miss. So naturally Russia has been doing what they can to make their energy export as independent of others as they can! They have built: A pipeline getting operational in Ust-Luga near Sct. Petersburg. This will bypass the need to transit oil through White Russia. Not that their petty pilfering wasn’t annoying: But if Russia is gang of thugs, then White Russia is a maximum security penitentiary for the criminally insane. This project has been muscled through in a very short time The Nord Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Germany under the Baltic sea, just to make it more secure. This is being extended into Poland thus securing Poland’s energy supply – which in time may go the other way – depending on how the oil shale pans out. The South Stream gas pipeline to Austria – avoiding the Ukraine whose mental stability is also in doubt. Expensive? Oh yes; but you don’t muck around with 2/3 of your tax revenue! Very few people realise just how dependent Russia is on their oil (and gas) exports. Some paint the energy giant Gazprom OAO (PINK:OGZPY) as the sinister character – but let’s face it: <u><mark>Gazprom</u></mark> OAO <u><strong><mark>is the Russian taxpayer!</u></strong></mark> <u>The present oil <mark>price of</mark> around <mark>110</mark> USD/barrel <mark>seems to give a balanced budget</mark>. <mark>In</mark> 20<mark>08</mark> <mark>with</mark> oil <mark>prices of 60</mark> USD/barrel <mark>the economy dropped</mark> </u>with <u><strong><mark>8%.</u></strong></mark> Twenty odd years ago I was in a small way involved with prognosticating energy prices long term for an energy supply company – the various estimates were so diverging, that it absolutely made no sense. It is a subject where everybody has a considered opinion – if they are ignorant enough. Let’s face it: <u>It is not “the market” that sets the oil price</u> – or rather <u><strong><mark>the market is being played by</strong></mark> far <mark>greater forces</u></mark>. <u><mark>The USA has <strong>more than a little leverage</strong> on</mark> the oil <mark>price due to</mark> the country’s <mark>strategic reserves</u></mark> – the size of which is state secret. This gives the perfect opportunity to play the market<u>: <strong><mark>Buying and selling</strong></mark> for future delivery <strong><mark>will set the price</mark> </strong>more or less where it is desired </u>– with no deliveries being made, as those forward positions can be closed any time.</p>

TOM ’12 – Employed in Transport (rail and ferrylines), mashine industry, building, energy and university administration.; Managerial economics from Aarhus University (“60% of Russia’s Revenue From Energy Exports – Geo-Political Analysis”. April 3, 2012. http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/04/60-of-russias-revenue-from-energy-exports-geo-political-analysis/)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: TOM ’12 – Employed in Transport (rail and ferrylines), mashine industry, building, energy and university administration.; Managerial economics from Aarhus University (“60% of Russia’s Revenue From Energy Exports – Geo-Political Analysis”. April 3, 2012. http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/04/60-of-russias-revenue-from-energy-exports-geo-political-analysis/) fulltext: Fact: For the time being 60% of all state revenue in Russia comes from energy export customs. To some readers this concept of taxing exports is foreign: Export is something you subsidize, not tax! Well you are right if you are a half way functioning nation, then you would tax the profits of the oil companies. But Russia is far from out of the middle ages – administratively speaking – so you tax what you can get your hands on and you will know quite easily what amounts pass through the pipelines or are loaded on board tankers – trust me: A super tanker in the gold fish pond is very hard to miss. So naturally Russia has been doing what they can to make their energy export as independent of others as they can! They have built: A pipeline getting operational in Ust-Luga near Sct. Petersburg. This will bypass the need to transit oil through White Russia. Not that their petty pilfering wasn’t annoying: But if Russia is gang of thugs, then White Russia is a maximum security penitentiary for the criminally insane. This project has been muscled through in a very short time The Nord Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Germany under the Baltic sea, just to make it more secure. This is being extended into Poland thus securing Poland’s energy supply – which in time may go the other way – depending on how the oil shale pans out. The South Stream gas pipeline to Austria – avoiding the Ukraine whose mental stability is also in doubt. Expensive? Oh yes; but you don’t muck around with 2/3 of your tax revenue! Very few people realise just how dependent Russia is on their oil (and gas) exports. Some paint the energy giant Gazprom OAO (PINK:OGZPY) as the sinister character – but let’s face it: Gazprom OAO is the Russian taxpayer! The present oil price of around 110 USD/barrel seems to give a balanced budget. In 2008 with oil prices of 60 USD/barrel the economy dropped with 8%. Twenty odd years ago I was in a small way involved with prognosticating energy prices long term for an energy supply company – the various estimates were so diverging, that it absolutely made no sense. It is a subject where everybody has a considered opinion – if they are ignorant enough. Let’s face it: It is not “the market” that sets the oil price – or rather the market is being played by far greater forces. The USA has more than a little leverage on the oil price due to the country’s strategic reserves – the size of which is state secret. This gives the perfect opportunity to play the market: Buying and selling for future delivery will set the price more or less where it is desired – with no deliveries being made, as those forward positions can be closed any time. [/INST] <h4>US demand for oil is key to Russia’s economy</h4><p><strong><mark>TOM ’12</strong></mark> – Employed in Transport (rail and ferrylines), mashine industry, building, energy and university administration.; Managerial economics from Aarhus University (“60% of Russia’s Revenue From Energy Exports – Geo-Political Analysis”. April 3, 2012. http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/04/60-of-russias-revenue-from-energy-exports-geo-political-analysis/)</p><p>Fact: <u><mark>For the time</u></mark> being <u><mark>60% of </mark>all state <mark>revenue in Russia comes from energy export</mark> customs</u>. To some readers this concept of taxing exports is foreign: Export is something you subsidize, not tax! Well you are right if you are a half way functioning nation, then you would tax the profits of the oil companies. But Russia is far from out of the middle ages – administratively speaking – so you tax what you can get your hands on and you will know quite easily what amounts pass through the pipelines or are loaded on board tankers – trust me: A super tanker in the gold fish pond is very hard to miss. So naturally Russia has been doing what they can to make their energy export as independent of others as they can! They have built: A pipeline getting operational in Ust-Luga near Sct. Petersburg. This will bypass the need to transit oil through White Russia. Not that their petty pilfering wasn’t annoying: But if Russia is gang of thugs, then White Russia is a maximum security penitentiary for the criminally insane. This project has been muscled through in a very short time The Nord Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Germany under the Baltic sea, just to make it more secure. This is being extended into Poland thus securing Poland’s energy supply – which in time may go the other way – depending on how the oil shale pans out. The South Stream gas pipeline to Austria – avoiding the Ukraine whose mental stability is also in doubt. Expensive? Oh yes; but you don’t muck around with 2/3 of your tax revenue! Very few people realise just how dependent Russia is on their oil (and gas) exports. Some paint the energy giant Gazprom OAO (PINK:OGZPY) as the sinister character – but let’s face it: <u><mark>Gazprom</u></mark> OAO <u><strong><mark>is the Russian taxpayer!</u></strong></mark> <u>The present oil <mark>price of</mark> around <mark>110</mark> USD/barrel <mark>seems to give a balanced budget</mark>. <mark>In</mark> 20<mark>08</mark> <mark>with</mark> oil <mark>prices of 60</mark> USD/barrel <mark>the economy dropped</mark> </u>with <u><strong><mark>8%.</u></strong></mark> Twenty odd years ago I was in a small way involved with prognosticating energy prices long term for an energy supply company – the various estimates were so diverging, that it absolutely made no sense. It is a subject where everybody has a considered opinion – if they are ignorant enough. Let’s face it: <u>It is not “the market” that sets the oil price</u> – or rather <u><strong><mark>the market is being played by</strong></mark> far <mark>greater forces</u></mark>. <u><mark>The USA has <strong>more than a little leverage</strong> on</mark> the oil <mark>price due to</mark> the country’s <mark>strategic reserves</u></mark> – the size of which is state secret. This gives the perfect opportunity to play the market<u>: <strong><mark>Buying and selling</strong></mark> for future delivery <strong><mark>will set the price</mark> </strong>more or less where it is desired </u>– with no deliveries being made, as those forward positions can be closed any time.</p> </s>

Increase means to enlarge something to something of a larger size

] Increase increase something (from something) (to something) to enlarge something from something to something bigger; to enlarge something from one size to a larger size We plan to increase sales from four to six million I increased my bid to two from one

["Increase," http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/increase, accessed 8-1-10, mss] Increase increase something (from something) (to something) to enlarge something from something to something bigger; to enlarge something from one size to a larger size. We plan to increase sales from four million to six million dollars. I increased my bid to two thousand from one thousand.

<h4>Increase means to enlarge something to something of a larger size</h4><p><u><strong>McGraw-Hill </u></strong>Dictionary of American Idioms and Phrasal Verbs, 2002 </p><p>["Increase," http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/increase, accessed 8-1-10, mss<u>]</p><p>Increase</p><p>increase something (from something) (to something)</p><p>to enlarge something from something to something bigger; to enlarge something from one size to a larger size</u>. <u>We plan to increase sales from four</u> million <u>to six million </u>dollars. <u>I increased my bid to two</u> thousand <u>from one</u> thousand.</p>

McGraw-Hill Dictionary of American Idioms and Phrasal Verbs, 2002

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: McGraw-Hill Dictionary of American Idioms and Phrasal Verbs, 2002 fulltext: ["Increase," http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/increase, accessed 8-1-10, mss] Increase increase something (from something) (to something) to enlarge something from something to something bigger; to enlarge something from one size to a larger size. We plan to increase sales from four million to six million dollars. I increased my bid to two thousand from one thousand. [/INST] <h4>Increase means to enlarge something to something of a larger size</h4><p><u><strong>McGraw-Hill </u></strong>Dictionary of American Idioms and Phrasal Verbs, 2002 </p><p>["Increase," http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/increase, accessed 8-1-10, mss<u>]</p><p>Increase</p><p>increase something (from something) (to something)</p><p>to enlarge something from something to something bigger; to enlarge something from one size to a larger size</u>. <u>We plan to increase sales from four</u> million <u>to six million </u>dollars. <u>I increased my bid to two</u> thousand <u>from one</u> thousand.</p> </s>

Removing Cuba from the list gives the US the ability to influence democratization efforts in Cuba

the State Department will have many opportunities over the course of the year to take the sensible step of removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Sires recently sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry asking him to keep Cuba on the list. Although some aspects of U.S. policy toward Cuba—in particular, the embargo and the travel ban—can only be changed by Congress, there are a number of meaningful actions that the Obama administration could take without waiting for Congress. Removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism is the most significant of these. Delisting Cuba would be an important step in the right direction: it would send a message to the Cuban government that the United States wants to improve the relationship. It could help set the stage for the kind of dialogue and negotiations that are needed to address many issues of common concern, including securing the release of USAID contractor Alan Gross, who is currently serving a 15-year sentence in Cuba. Delisting Cuba would also send an important and long-awaited message to Latin American governments from across the political spectrum

Importantly, the State Department will have many opportunities over the course of the year to take the sensible step of removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. In fact, it is because of this possibility that opponents of change are working so hard to convince the administration to sit on its hands. Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Mario Diaz-Balart, and Albio Sires recently sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry asking him to keep Cuba on the list. Although some aspects of U.S. policy toward Cuba—in particular, the embargo and the travel ban—can only be changed by Congress, there are a number of meaningful actions that the Obama administration could take without waiting for Congress. Removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism is one of the most significant of these. Delisting Cuba would be an important step in the right direction: it would send a message to the Cuban government that the United States wants to improve the relationship. It could help set the stage for the kind of dialogue and negotiations that are needed to address many issues of common concern, including securing the release of USAID contractor Alan Gross, who is currently serving a 15-year sentence in Cuba. Delisting Cuba would also send an important and long-awaited message to Latin American governments from across the political spectrum.

<h4>Removing Cuba from the list gives the US the ability to influence democratization efforts in Cuba</h4><p>Geoff <strong>Thale</strong>, Washington Office on Latin America’s Program Director and has traveled to Cuba more than a dozen times including organizing delegations of academics and members of Congress, <strong>and </strong>Mavis <strong>Anderson</strong>, Senior Associate for Cuba at the Latin America Working Group, <strong>5/24</strong>/13, “Cuba, the Terrorism Report, and the Terrorist List” http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_the_terrorism_report_and_the_terrorist_list</p><p>Importantly, <u><strong>the State Department will have many opportunities over the course of the year to take the sensible step of removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.</u></strong> In fact, it is because of this possibility that opponents of change are working so hard to convince the administration to sit on its hands. Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Mario Diaz-Balart, and Albio<u><strong> Sires recently sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry asking him to keep Cuba on the list.</p><p>Although some aspects of U.S. policy toward Cuba—in particular, the embargo and the travel ban—can only be changed by Congress, there are a number of meaningful actions that the Obama administration could take without waiting for Congress. Removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism is </u></strong>one of <u><strong>the most significant of these.</p><p>Delisting Cuba would be an important step in the right direction: it would send a message to the Cuban government that the United States wants to improve the relationship. It could help set the stage for the kind of dialogue and negotiations that are needed to address many issues of common concern, including securing the release of USAID contractor Alan Gross, who is currently serving a 15-year sentence in Cuba. Delisting Cuba would also send an important and long-awaited message to Latin American governments from across the political spectrum</u></strong>. </p>

Geoff Thale, Washington Office on Latin America’s Program Director and has traveled to Cuba more than a dozen times including organizing delegations of academics and members of Congress, and Mavis Anderson, Senior Associate for Cuba at the Latin America Working Group, 5/24/13, “Cuba, the Terrorism Report, and the Terrorist List” http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_the_terrorism_report_and_the_terrorist_list

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Geoff Thale, Washington Office on Latin America’s Program Director and has traveled to Cuba more than a dozen times including organizing delegations of academics and members of Congress, and Mavis Anderson, Senior Associate for Cuba at the Latin America Working Group, 5/24/13, “Cuba, the Terrorism Report, and the Terrorist List” http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_the_terrorism_report_and_the_terrorist_list fulltext: Importantly, the State Department will have many opportunities over the course of the year to take the sensible step of removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. In fact, it is because of this possibility that opponents of change are working so hard to convince the administration to sit on its hands. Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Mario Diaz-Balart, and Albio Sires recently sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry asking him to keep Cuba on the list. Although some aspects of U.S. policy toward Cuba—in particular, the embargo and the travel ban—can only be changed by Congress, there are a number of meaningful actions that the Obama administration could take without waiting for Congress. Removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism is one of the most significant of these. Delisting Cuba would be an important step in the right direction: it would send a message to the Cuban government that the United States wants to improve the relationship. It could help set the stage for the kind of dialogue and negotiations that are needed to address many issues of common concern, including securing the release of USAID contractor Alan Gross, who is currently serving a 15-year sentence in Cuba. Delisting Cuba would also send an important and long-awaited message to Latin American governments from across the political spectrum. [/INST] <h4>Removing Cuba from the list gives the US the ability to influence democratization efforts in Cuba</h4><p>Geoff <strong>Thale</strong>, Washington Office on Latin America’s Program Director and has traveled to Cuba more than a dozen times including organizing delegations of academics and members of Congress, <strong>and </strong>Mavis <strong>Anderson</strong>, Senior Associate for Cuba at the Latin America Working Group, <strong>5/24</strong>/13, “Cuba, the Terrorism Report, and the Terrorist List” http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_the_terrorism_report_and_the_terrorist_list</p><p>Importantly, <u><strong>the State Department will have many opportunities over the course of the year to take the sensible step of removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.</u></strong> In fact, it is because of this possibility that opponents of change are working so hard to convince the administration to sit on its hands. Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Mario Diaz-Balart, and Albio<u><strong> Sires recently sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry asking him to keep Cuba on the list.</p><p>Although some aspects of U.S. policy toward Cuba—in particular, the embargo and the travel ban—can only be changed by Congress, there are a number of meaningful actions that the Obama administration could take without waiting for Congress. Removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism is </u></strong>one of <u><strong>the most significant of these.</p><p>Delisting Cuba would be an important step in the right direction: it would send a message to the Cuban government that the United States wants to improve the relationship. It could help set the stage for the kind of dialogue and negotiations that are needed to address many issues of common concern, including securing the release of USAID contractor Alan Gross, who is currently serving a 15-year sentence in Cuba. Delisting Cuba would also send an important and long-awaited message to Latin American governments from across the political spectrum</u></strong>. </p> </s>

We must reject child exploitation- it magnifies all other types of violence and creates generations of militancy

It is imperative to avoid abusing the child as most of the problems of today's world are as a result of child abuse. In recent times when individuals have increased inputs on how well to bring up their children, many are still out there maltreating and abusing their children. Personal observation has brought to fore that if child abuse is not put to a stop, there might never be a better society. I personally became interested about the worrisome attitude of child abuse, because I was abused by various relations when I was a child due to the early demise of my mother in some cases these children are brought from their parents in the rural areas to the urban centres with the pretence of offering them better education only to exploit, abuse and dehumanize the true nature of humans in them These are the tomorrow leaders we are talking about. And what kind of humane leadership is bound to manifest from these children? I am not even surprise that militancy is paramount in the African continent. Parents, relations and even the government have failed these children

It is imperative to avoid abusing the child as most of the problems of today's world are as a result of child abuse if child abuse is not put to a stop, there might never be a better society These are the tomorrow leaders we are talking about I am not even surprise that militancy is paramount in the African continent. Parents, relations and even the government have failed these children

It is imperative to avoid abusing the child as most of the problems of today's world are as a result of child abuse. In recent times when individuals have increased inputs on how well to bring up their children, many are still out there maltreating and abusing their children. Personal observation has brought to fore that if child abuse is not put to a stop, there might never be a better society. I personally became interested about the worrisome attitude of child abuse, because I was abused by various relations when I was a child due to the early demise of my mother; and to this day I have come to realise the negative effect of such abuses. I am so touched on a daily basis when I see children of 8, 9 and 10 years of age being sent out to sell bottles of kerosene on their head from 6 pm to 11 pm in the night. I have even had cause to interview some of these children. And what do they have to say: that any day they seize to go out to sell kerosene, there won't be food for them that night and the next day. In some cases they are also sanctioned not to come back to the house until the whole of the kerosene on their head is sold. It is more annoying because in some cases these children are brought from their parents in the rural areas to the urban centres with the pretence of offering them better education only to exploit, abuse and dehumanize the true nature of humans in them. And I tell you what? These are the tomorrow leaders we are talking about. And what kind of humane leadership is bound to manifest from these children? I mean, it can't be anything less than the wicked and sit-tight leadership being experienced in this part of the world (Africa). I am not even surprise that militancy is paramount in the African continent. Parents, relations and even the government have failed these children. What do expect to get from them as feedbacks? I wish I am opportuned to fashion out an NGO (Non-Government Organization) to properly embark on against this destructive attitude of child labour and abuse.

<h4>We must reject child exploitation- it magnifies all other types of violence and creates generations of militancy</h4><p><strong>Miebaka ‘08</strong> [Marshall, activist, former victim of child abuse, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria, “Child Abuse: Dehumanization of the Human Mind,” http://www.child-abuse-effects.com/child-abuse-dehumanization-of-the-human-mind.html]</p><p><u><mark>It is imperative to avoid abusing the child as most of the problems of today's world are as a result of child abuse</mark>. In recent times when individuals have increased inputs on how well to bring up their children, many are still out there maltreating and abusing their children. Personal observation has brought to fore that <mark>if child abuse is not put to a stop, there might never be a better society</mark>. I personally became interested about the worrisome attitude of child abuse, because I was abused by various relations when I was a child due to the early demise of my mother</u>; and to this day I have come to realise the negative effect of such abuses. I am so touched on a daily basis when I see children of 8, 9 and 10 years of age being sent out to sell bottles of kerosene on their head from 6 pm to 11 pm in the night. I have even had cause to interview some of these children. And what do they have to say: that any day they seize to go out to sell kerosene, there won't be food for them that night and the next day. In some cases they are also sanctioned not to come back to the house until the whole of the kerosene on their head is sold. It is more annoying because <u>in some cases these children are brought from their parents in the rural areas to the urban centres with the pretence of offering them better education only to exploit, abuse and dehumanize the true nature of humans in them</u>. And I tell you what? <u><mark>These are the tomorrow leaders we are talking about</mark>. And what kind of humane leadership is bound to manifest from these children?</u> I mean, it can't be anything less than the wicked and sit-tight leadership being experienced in this part of the world (Africa). <u><mark>I am not even surprise that militancy is paramount in the African continent. Parents, relations and even the government have failed these children</u></mark>. What do expect to get from them as feedbacks? I wish I am opportuned to fashion out an NGO (Non-Government Organization) to properly embark on against this destructive attitude of child labour and abuse. </p>

Miebaka ‘08 [Marshall, activist, former victim of child abuse, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria, “Child Abuse: Dehumanization of the Human Mind,” http://www.child-abuse-effects.com/child-abuse-dehumanization-of-the-human-mind.html]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Miebaka ‘08 [Marshall, activist, former victim of child abuse, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria, “Child Abuse: Dehumanization of the Human Mind,” http://www.child-abuse-effects.com/child-abuse-dehumanization-of-the-human-mind.html] fulltext: It is imperative to avoid abusing the child as most of the problems of today's world are as a result of child abuse. In recent times when individuals have increased inputs on how well to bring up their children, many are still out there maltreating and abusing their children. Personal observation has brought to fore that if child abuse is not put to a stop, there might never be a better society. I personally became interested about the worrisome attitude of child abuse, because I was abused by various relations when I was a child due to the early demise of my mother; and to this day I have come to realise the negative effect of such abuses. I am so touched on a daily basis when I see children of 8, 9 and 10 years of age being sent out to sell bottles of kerosene on their head from 6 pm to 11 pm in the night. I have even had cause to interview some of these children. And what do they have to say: that any day they seize to go out to sell kerosene, there won't be food for them that night and the next day. In some cases they are also sanctioned not to come back to the house until the whole of the kerosene on their head is sold. It is more annoying because in some cases these children are brought from their parents in the rural areas to the urban centres with the pretence of offering them better education only to exploit, abuse and dehumanize the true nature of humans in them. And I tell you what? These are the tomorrow leaders we are talking about. And what kind of humane leadership is bound to manifest from these children? I mean, it can't be anything less than the wicked and sit-tight leadership being experienced in this part of the world (Africa). I am not even surprise that militancy is paramount in the African continent. Parents, relations and even the government have failed these children. What do expect to get from them as feedbacks? I wish I am opportuned to fashion out an NGO (Non-Government Organization) to properly embark on against this destructive attitude of child labour and abuse. [/INST] <h4>We must reject child exploitation- it magnifies all other types of violence and creates generations of militancy</h4><p><strong>Miebaka ‘08</strong> [Marshall, activist, former victim of child abuse, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria, “Child Abuse: Dehumanization of the Human Mind,” http://www.child-abuse-effects.com/child-abuse-dehumanization-of-the-human-mind.html]</p><p><u><mark>It is imperative to avoid abusing the child as most of the problems of today's world are as a result of child abuse</mark>. In recent times when individuals have increased inputs on how well to bring up their children, many are still out there maltreating and abusing their children. Personal observation has brought to fore that <mark>if child abuse is not put to a stop, there might never be a better society</mark>. I personally became interested about the worrisome attitude of child abuse, because I was abused by various relations when I was a child due to the early demise of my mother</u>; and to this day I have come to realise the negative effect of such abuses. I am so touched on a daily basis when I see children of 8, 9 and 10 years of age being sent out to sell bottles of kerosene on their head from 6 pm to 11 pm in the night. I have even had cause to interview some of these children. And what do they have to say: that any day they seize to go out to sell kerosene, there won't be food for them that night and the next day. In some cases they are also sanctioned not to come back to the house until the whole of the kerosene on their head is sold. It is more annoying because <u>in some cases these children are brought from their parents in the rural areas to the urban centres with the pretence of offering them better education only to exploit, abuse and dehumanize the true nature of humans in them</u>. And I tell you what? <u><mark>These are the tomorrow leaders we are talking about</mark>. And what kind of humane leadership is bound to manifest from these children?</u> I mean, it can't be anything less than the wicked and sit-tight leadership being experienced in this part of the world (Africa). <u><mark>I am not even surprise that militancy is paramount in the African continent. Parents, relations and even the government have failed these children</u></mark>. What do expect to get from them as feedbacks? I wish I am opportuned to fashion out an NGO (Non-Government Organization) to properly embark on against this destructive attitude of child labour and abuse. </p> </s>

(__) MIDDLE-EAST WAR LEADS TO GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR

the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and even the threat of nuclear war. Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war if the pattern is not reversed soon - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."

(John, Centre for Research on Globalization, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: A threat to peace”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html) Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

<h4>(__) MIDDLE-EAST WAR LEADS TO GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR</h4><p>Steinbach, 02 </p><p>(John, Centre for Research on Globalization, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: A threat to peace”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html)</p><p>Meanwhile, <u>the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control</u> and disarmament negotiations, <u>and even the threat of nuclear war.</u> Seymour Hersh warns, "<u>Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, </u>as the Iraqis did, <u>a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability</u>."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least,<u> the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war</u>. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... <u>if the</u> familar <u>pattern</u>(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) <u>is not reversed soon</u>- for whatever reason<u>- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."</u> (44)</p>

Steinbach, 02

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Steinbach, 02 fulltext: (John, Centre for Research on Globalization, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: A threat to peace”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html) Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44) [/INST] <h4>(__) MIDDLE-EAST WAR LEADS TO GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR</h4><p>Steinbach, 02 </p><p>(John, Centre for Research on Globalization, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: A threat to peace”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html)</p><p>Meanwhile, <u>the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control</u> and disarmament negotiations, <u>and even the threat of nuclear war.</u> Seymour Hersh warns, "<u>Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, </u>as the Iraqis did, <u>a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability</u>."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least,<u> the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war</u>. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... <u>if the</u> familar <u>pattern</u>(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) <u>is not reversed soon</u>- for whatever reason<u>- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."</u> (44)</p> </s>

Russian decline triggers Russia-China war

defence sales crashed, prompting analysts to speculate that China's People's Liberation Army no longer relies on Russian technology. Russia once supplied the bulk of Chinese industrial machinery but now the long lines of excavators, trucks and machinery are all heading the other way. China is meanwhile increasing its dominance of almost every sector of the Siberian consumer goods market . For all the fuss about a Russian-China axis against Islamic separatists and US missile shields, the relationship is constrained by Russian insecurity and Chinese insensitivity. China's ascendancy is provoking fear and resentment throughout the world and particularly in its immediate neighbours China is presently taking over the Russian Far East by stealth, through commerce. Tensions are arising, and one day will erupt. Where will the USA stand? Other states in Asia will be drawn into such a conflict. India is traditionally aligned to Russia, Pakistan to China.

analysts speculate that China's Army no longer relies on Russian technology now trucks and machinery are heading the other way China is increasing dominance the relationship is constrained by Russian insecurity and Chinese insensitivity China is taking over the Russian East by stealth, through commerce Tensions are arising, and will erupt Other states will be drawn

Oil volumes fell last year but defence sales crashed, prompting analysts to speculate that China's People's Liberation Army no longer relies on Russian technology. Russia once supplied the bulk of Chinese industrial machinery but now the long lines of excavators, trucks and machinery are all heading the other way. China is meanwhile increasing its dominance of almost every sector of the Siberian consumer goods market. Two years ago the mayor of Vladivostok made the hyperbolic claim that all of the port city's retail trade and half of its trade in services were controlled by Chinese. China is meanwhile increasing its dominance of almost every sector of the Siberian consumer goods market. For all the fuss about a Russian-China axis against Islamic separatists and US missile shields, the relationship is constrained by Russian insecurity and Chinese insensitivity. It is just one example of how China's ascendancy is provoking fear and resentment throughout the world and particularly in its immediate neighbours, where the impact is most intense. [Emphasis added]. China is presently taking over the Russian Far East by stealth, through commerce. Tensions are arising, and one day will erupt. Where will the USA stand? Other states in Asia will be drawn into such a conflict. India is traditionally aligned to Russia, Pakistan to China.

<h4>Russian decline triggers Russia-China war</h4><p><strong><mark>BOLTON ‘9</strong></mark> - fellow at the Academy of social and political research (Bolton, KR, “Russia and China: An approaching conflict”. http://www.scribd.com/doc/22944897/Russia-and-China-an-Approaching-Conflict<strong>)</p><p></strong>Oil volumes fell last year but <u>defence sales crashed, prompting <mark>analysts</mark> to <mark>speculate that China's</mark> People's Liberation <mark>Army no longer relies on Russian</mark> <mark>technology</mark>. Russia once supplied the bulk of Chinese industrial machinery but <mark>now</mark> the long lines of excavators, <mark>trucks and machinery are</mark> all <mark>heading the other way</mark>. <mark>China is</mark> meanwhile <mark>increasing</mark> its <mark>dominance</mark> of almost every sector of the</u><strong> <u></strong>Siberian consumer goods market</u>. Two years ago the mayor of Vladivostok made the hyperbolic claim that all of the port city's retail trade and half of its trade in services were controlled by Chinese. China is meanwhile increasing its dominance of almost every sector of the Siberian consumer goods market<u>.</u><strong> <u></strong>For all the fuss about a Russian-China axis against Islamic separatists and US missile shields, <mark>the relationship is <strong>constrained by Russian insecurity and Chinese insensitivity</mark>.</strong> </u>It is just one example of how <u>China's ascendancy is provoking fear and resentment throughout the world and particularly in its immediate neighbours</u>, where the impact is most intense. [Emphasis added]. <u><mark>China is</mark> presently <mark>taking over the Russian</mark> Far <mark>East by <strong>stealth, through</u> <u>commerce</strong></mark>. <mark>Tensions are arising, and</mark> one day <mark>will erupt</mark>. Where will the USA</u><strong> <u></strong>stand? <mark>Other states</mark> in Asia <mark>will be drawn</mark> into such a conflict. India is</u><strong> <u></strong>traditionally aligned to Russia, Pakistan to China. </p></u>

BOLTON ‘9 - fellow at the Academy of social and political research (Bolton, KR, “Russia and China: An approaching conflict”. http://www.scribd.com/doc/22944897/Russia-and-China-an-Approaching-Conflict)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: BOLTON ‘9 - fellow at the Academy of social and political research (Bolton, KR, “Russia and China: An approaching conflict”. http://www.scribd.com/doc/22944897/Russia-and-China-an-Approaching-Conflict) fulltext: Oil volumes fell last year but defence sales crashed, prompting analysts to speculate that China's People's Liberation Army no longer relies on Russian technology. Russia once supplied the bulk of Chinese industrial machinery but now the long lines of excavators, trucks and machinery are all heading the other way. China is meanwhile increasing its dominance of almost every sector of the Siberian consumer goods market. Two years ago the mayor of Vladivostok made the hyperbolic claim that all of the port city's retail trade and half of its trade in services were controlled by Chinese. China is meanwhile increasing its dominance of almost every sector of the Siberian consumer goods market. For all the fuss about a Russian-China axis against Islamic separatists and US missile shields, the relationship is constrained by Russian insecurity and Chinese insensitivity. It is just one example of how China's ascendancy is provoking fear and resentment throughout the world and particularly in its immediate neighbours, where the impact is most intense. [Emphasis added]. China is presently taking over the Russian Far East by stealth, through commerce. Tensions are arising, and one day will erupt. Where will the USA stand? Other states in Asia will be drawn into such a conflict. India is traditionally aligned to Russia, Pakistan to China. [/INST] <h4>Russian decline triggers Russia-China war</h4><p><strong><mark>BOLTON ‘9</strong></mark> - fellow at the Academy of social and political research (Bolton, KR, “Russia and China: An approaching conflict”. http://www.scribd.com/doc/22944897/Russia-and-China-an-Approaching-Conflict<strong>)</p><p></strong>Oil volumes fell last year but <u>defence sales crashed, prompting <mark>analysts</mark> to <mark>speculate that China's</mark> People's Liberation <mark>Army no longer relies on Russian</mark> <mark>technology</mark>. Russia once supplied the bulk of Chinese industrial machinery but <mark>now</mark> the long lines of excavators, <mark>trucks and machinery are</mark> all <mark>heading the other way</mark>. <mark>China is</mark> meanwhile <mark>increasing</mark> its <mark>dominance</mark> of almost every sector of the</u><strong> <u></strong>Siberian consumer goods market</u>. Two years ago the mayor of Vladivostok made the hyperbolic claim that all of the port city's retail trade and half of its trade in services were controlled by Chinese. China is meanwhile increasing its dominance of almost every sector of the Siberian consumer goods market<u>.</u><strong> <u></strong>For all the fuss about a Russian-China axis against Islamic separatists and US missile shields, <mark>the relationship is <strong>constrained by Russian insecurity and Chinese insensitivity</mark>.</strong> </u>It is just one example of how <u>China's ascendancy is provoking fear and resentment throughout the world and particularly in its immediate neighbours</u>, where the impact is most intense. [Emphasis added]. <u><mark>China is</mark> presently <mark>taking over the Russian</mark> Far <mark>East by <strong>stealth, through</u> <u>commerce</strong></mark>. <mark>Tensions are arising, and</mark> one day <mark>will erupt</mark>. Where will the USA</u><strong> <u></strong>stand? <mark>Other states</mark> in Asia <mark>will be drawn</mark> into such a conflict. India is</u><strong> <u></strong>traditionally aligned to Russia, Pakistan to China. </p></u> </s>

Increase doesn’t require pre-existence

we examine the definitions of "increase under the ordinary definition of the term, an increase occurs whenever an insurer charges a higher rate regardless of whether the customer was previously charged Increase" means to make something greater Nothing in the definition implies the term "increase should be limited to cases in which an individual has previously been charged

[Stephen, "Jason Ray REYNOLDS; Matthew Rausch, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.; Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees. Ajene Edo, Plaintiff-Appellant," http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/435/435.F3d.1081.03-35695.04-35279.html, accessed 8-1-10, mss] Specifically, we must decide whether charging a higher price for initial insurance than the insured would otherwise have been charged because of information in a consumer credit report constitutes an "increase in any charge" within the meaning of FCRA. First, we examine the definitions of "increase" and "charge." Hartford Fire contends that, limited to their ordinary definitions, these words apply only when a consumer has previously been charged for insurance and that charge has thereafter been increased by the insurer. The phrase, "has previously been charged," as used by Hartford, refers not only to a rate that the consumer has previously paid for insurance but also to a rate that the consumer has previously been quoted, even if that rate was increased before the consumer made any payment. Reynolds disagrees, asserting that, under the ordinary definition of the term, an increase in a charge also occurs whenever an insurer charges a higher rate than it would otherwise have charged because of any factor — such as adverse credit information, age, or driving record8 — regardless of whether the customer was previously charged some other rate. According to Reynolds, he was charged an increased rate because of his credit rating when he was compelled to pay a rate higher than the premium rate because he failed to obtain a high insurance score. Thus, he argues, the definitions of "increase" and "charge" encompass the insurance companies' practice. Reynolds is correct. 23 "Increase" means to make something greater. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The action, process, or fact of becoming or making greater; augmentation, growth, enlargement, extension."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed.1988) (defining "increase" as "growth, enlargement, etc[.]"). "Charge" means the price demanded for goods or services. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The price required or demanded for service rendered, or (less usually) for goods supplied."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) ("[T]he cost or price of an article, service, etc."). Nothing in the definition of these words implies that the term "increase in any charge for" should be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.

<h4>Increase doesn’t require pre-existence</h4><p><u><strong>Reinhardt</u></strong>, US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, circuit judge, 1-25-200<u><strong>6</u></strong> </p><p>[Stephen, "Jason Ray REYNOLDS; Matthew Rausch, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.; Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees. Ajene Edo, Plaintiff-Appellant," http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/435/435.F3d.1081.03-35695.04-35279.html, accessed 8-1-10, mss]</p><p>Specifically, we must decide whether charging a higher price for initial insurance than the insured would otherwise have been charged because of information in a consumer credit report constitutes an "increase in any charge" within the meaning of FCRA. First, <u>we examine the definitions of "increase</u>" and "charge." Hartford Fire contends that, limited to their ordinary definitions, these words apply only when a consumer has previously been charged for insurance and that charge has thereafter been increased by the insurer. The phrase, "has previously been charged," as used by Hartford, refers not only to a rate that the consumer has previously paid for insurance but also to a rate that the consumer has previously been quoted, even if that rate was increased before the consumer made any payment. Reynolds disagrees, asserting that, <u>under the ordinary definition of the term, an increase</u> in a charge also <u>occurs whenever an insurer charges a higher rate</u> than it would otherwise have charged because of any factor — such as adverse credit information, age, or driving record8 — <u><strong>regardless of whether the customer was previously charged</u></strong> some other rate. According to Reynolds, he was charged an increased rate because of his credit rating when he was compelled to pay a rate higher than the premium rate because he failed to obtain a high insurance score. Thus, he argues, the definitions of "increase" and "charge" encompass the insurance companies' practice. Reynolds is correct. 23 "<u>Increase" means to make something greater</u>. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The action, process, or fact of becoming or making greater; augmentation, growth, enlargement, extension."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed.1988) (defining "increase" as "growth, enlargement, etc[.]"). "Charge" means the price demanded for goods or services. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The price required or demanded for service rendered, or (less usually) for goods supplied."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) ("[T]he cost or price of an article, service, etc."). <u>Nothing in the definition</u> of these words <u>implies</u> that <u>the term "increase</u> in any charge for" <u>should be limited to cases in which</u> a company raises the rate that <u>an individual has previously been charged</u>.</p>

Reinhardt, US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, circuit judge, 1-25-2006

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Reinhardt, US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, circuit judge, 1-25-2006 fulltext: [Stephen, "Jason Ray REYNOLDS; Matthew Rausch, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.; Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees. Ajene Edo, Plaintiff-Appellant," http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/435/435.F3d.1081.03-35695.04-35279.html, accessed 8-1-10, mss] Specifically, we must decide whether charging a higher price for initial insurance than the insured would otherwise have been charged because of information in a consumer credit report constitutes an "increase in any charge" within the meaning of FCRA. First, we examine the definitions of "increase" and "charge." Hartford Fire contends that, limited to their ordinary definitions, these words apply only when a consumer has previously been charged for insurance and that charge has thereafter been increased by the insurer. The phrase, "has previously been charged," as used by Hartford, refers not only to a rate that the consumer has previously paid for insurance but also to a rate that the consumer has previously been quoted, even if that rate was increased before the consumer made any payment. Reynolds disagrees, asserting that, under the ordinary definition of the term, an increase in a charge also occurs whenever an insurer charges a higher rate than it would otherwise have charged because of any factor — such as adverse credit information, age, or driving record8 — regardless of whether the customer was previously charged some other rate. According to Reynolds, he was charged an increased rate because of his credit rating when he was compelled to pay a rate higher than the premium rate because he failed to obtain a high insurance score. Thus, he argues, the definitions of "increase" and "charge" encompass the insurance companies' practice. Reynolds is correct. 23 "Increase" means to make something greater. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The action, process, or fact of becoming or making greater; augmentation, growth, enlargement, extension."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed.1988) (defining "increase" as "growth, enlargement, etc[.]"). "Charge" means the price demanded for goods or services. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The price required or demanded for service rendered, or (less usually) for goods supplied."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) ("[T]he cost or price of an article, service, etc."). Nothing in the definition of these words implies that the term "increase in any charge for" should be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged. [/INST] <h4>Increase doesn’t require pre-existence</h4><p><u><strong>Reinhardt</u></strong>, US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, circuit judge, 1-25-200<u><strong>6</u></strong> </p><p>[Stephen, "Jason Ray REYNOLDS; Matthew Rausch, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.; Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees. Ajene Edo, Plaintiff-Appellant," http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/435/435.F3d.1081.03-35695.04-35279.html, accessed 8-1-10, mss]</p><p>Specifically, we must decide whether charging a higher price for initial insurance than the insured would otherwise have been charged because of information in a consumer credit report constitutes an "increase in any charge" within the meaning of FCRA. First, <u>we examine the definitions of "increase</u>" and "charge." Hartford Fire contends that, limited to their ordinary definitions, these words apply only when a consumer has previously been charged for insurance and that charge has thereafter been increased by the insurer. The phrase, "has previously been charged," as used by Hartford, refers not only to a rate that the consumer has previously paid for insurance but also to a rate that the consumer has previously been quoted, even if that rate was increased before the consumer made any payment. Reynolds disagrees, asserting that, <u>under the ordinary definition of the term, an increase</u> in a charge also <u>occurs whenever an insurer charges a higher rate</u> than it would otherwise have charged because of any factor — such as adverse credit information, age, or driving record8 — <u><strong>regardless of whether the customer was previously charged</u></strong> some other rate. According to Reynolds, he was charged an increased rate because of his credit rating when he was compelled to pay a rate higher than the premium rate because he failed to obtain a high insurance score. Thus, he argues, the definitions of "increase" and "charge" encompass the insurance companies' practice. Reynolds is correct. 23 "<u>Increase" means to make something greater</u>. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The action, process, or fact of becoming or making greater; augmentation, growth, enlargement, extension."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed.1988) (defining "increase" as "growth, enlargement, etc[.]"). "Charge" means the price demanded for goods or services. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The price required or demanded for service rendered, or (less usually) for goods supplied."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) ("[T]he cost or price of an article, service, etc."). <u>Nothing in the definition</u> of these words <u>implies</u> that <u>the term "increase</u> in any charge for" <u>should be limited to cases in which</u> a company raises the rate that <u>an individual has previously been charged</u>.</p> </s>

Solves change in Cuba

Cuba remains on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism for political reasons only, and there are downsides for the United States in leaving it there Retaining Cuba on the list "feeds into and prolongs this climate of mistrust the country could undergo some reform in the coming years, and the continued inclusion of Cuba on the list "is an obstacle to taking advantage of that window of opportunity" to influence changes

Cuba remains on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism for political reasons only, and there are downsides for the United States in leaving it there, panelists said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event June 11. Retaining Cuba on the list "feeds into and prolongs this climate of mistrust which the Obama administration claimed it wanted to overcome," said Tomás Bilbao, executive director of the Washington, D.C.-based Cuba Study Group, which promotes human rights and the rule of law in Cuba. But the country could undergo some reform in the coming years, and the continued inclusion of Cuba on the list "is an obstacle to taking advantage of that window of opportunity" to influence changes, Bilbao said.

<h4>Solves change in Cuba</h4><p>Zach Rausnitz, Editor in the Government Publishing Group at FierceMarkets and has worked for BBC News, 6/13/13, “Cuba's inclusion on State Sponsors of Terrorism list bad for U.S., panelists say” http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/cubas-inclusion-state-sponsors-terrorism-list-bad-us-panelists-say/2013-06-13</p><p><u><strong>Cuba remains on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism for political reasons only, and there are downsides for the United States in leaving it there</u></strong>, panelists said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event June 11.</p><p><u><strong>Retaining Cuba on the list "feeds into and prolongs this climate of mistrust</u></strong> which the Obama administration claimed it wanted to overcome," said Tomás Bilbao, executive director of the Washington, D.C.-based Cuba Study Group, which promotes human rights and the rule of law in Cuba.</p><p>But <u><strong>the country could undergo some reform in the coming years, and the continued inclusion of Cuba on the list "is an obstacle to taking advantage of that window of opportunity" to influence changes</u></strong>, Bilbao said.</p>

Zach Rausnitz, Editor in the Government Publishing Group at FierceMarkets and has worked for BBC News, 6/13/13, “Cuba's inclusion on State Sponsors of Terrorism list bad for U.S., panelists say” http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/cubas-inclusion-state-sponsors-terrorism-list-bad-us-panelists-say/2013-06-13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Zach Rausnitz, Editor in the Government Publishing Group at FierceMarkets and has worked for BBC News, 6/13/13, “Cuba's inclusion on State Sponsors of Terrorism list bad for U.S., panelists say” http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/cubas-inclusion-state-sponsors-terrorism-list-bad-us-panelists-say/2013-06-13 fulltext: Cuba remains on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism for political reasons only, and there are downsides for the United States in leaving it there, panelists said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event June 11. Retaining Cuba on the list "feeds into and prolongs this climate of mistrust which the Obama administration claimed it wanted to overcome," said Tomás Bilbao, executive director of the Washington, D.C.-based Cuba Study Group, which promotes human rights and the rule of law in Cuba. But the country could undergo some reform in the coming years, and the continued inclusion of Cuba on the list "is an obstacle to taking advantage of that window of opportunity" to influence changes, Bilbao said. [/INST] <h4>Solves change in Cuba</h4><p>Zach Rausnitz, Editor in the Government Publishing Group at FierceMarkets and has worked for BBC News, 6/13/13, “Cuba's inclusion on State Sponsors of Terrorism list bad for U.S., panelists say” http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/cubas-inclusion-state-sponsors-terrorism-list-bad-us-panelists-say/2013-06-13</p><p><u><strong>Cuba remains on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism for political reasons only, and there are downsides for the United States in leaving it there</u></strong>, panelists said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event June 11.</p><p><u><strong>Retaining Cuba on the list "feeds into and prolongs this climate of mistrust</u></strong> which the Obama administration claimed it wanted to overcome," said Tomás Bilbao, executive director of the Washington, D.C.-based Cuba Study Group, which promotes human rights and the rule of law in Cuba.</p><p>But <u><strong>the country could undergo some reform in the coming years, and the continued inclusion of Cuba on the list "is an obstacle to taking advantage of that window of opportunity" to influence changes</u></strong>, Bilbao said.</p> </s>

Preventing genocide is the ultimate ethical obligation- culminates in extinction

Prohibition of genocide and affirmation of its opposite, the value of life, are an eternal ethical verity, one whose practical implications necessarily outweigh possible theoretical objections Genocide concerns and effects all people Without a people there would be no state or legal system. With genocide eventually there will be no people. Genocide is ultimately a threat to the existence of all. True, sometimes only certain groups are targeted Since virtually every social group is a potential victim, genocide is a universal concern.

Prohibition of genocide and affirmation of value of life, are an eternal ethical verity whose implications outweigh possible objections With genocide there will be no people Since virtually every social group is a potential victim, genocide is universal

One of the most enduring and abhorrent problems of the world is genocide, which is neither particular to a specific race, class, or nation, nor is it rooted in any one, ethnocentric view of the world. Prohibition of genocide and affirmation of its opposite, the value of life, are an eternal ethical verity, one whose practical implications necessarily outweigh possible theoretical objections and as such should lift it above prevailing ideologies or politics. Genocide concerns and potentially effects all people. People make up a legal system, according to Kelsen. Politics is the expression of conflict among competing groups. Those in power give the political system its character, i.e. the state. The state, according to Kelsen, is nothing but the combined will of all its people. This abstract concept of the state may at first glance appear meaningless, because in reality not all people have an equal voice in the formation of the characteristics of the state. But I am not concerned with the characteristics of the state but rather the essence of the state – the people. Without a people there would be no state or legal system. With genocide eventually there will be no people. Genocide is ultimately a threat to the existence of all. True, sometimes only certain groups are targeted, as in Nazi Germany. Sometimes a large part of the total population is eradicated, as in contemporary Cambodia. Sometimes people are eliminated regardless of national origin – the Christians in Roman times. Sometimes whole nations vanish – the Amerindian societies after the Spanish conquest. And sometimes religious groups are persecuted – the Mohammedans by the Crusaders. The culprit changes: sometimes it is a specific state, or those in power in a state; occasionally it is the winners vs. the vanquished in international conflicts; and in its crudest form the stronger against the weaker. Since virtually every social group is a potential victim, genocide is a universal concern.

<h4>Preventing genocide is the ultimate ethical obligation- culminates in extinction</h4><p><strong>Harff-Gur -82</strong> (B. Harff-Gur<u>, Northwestern, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS A REMEDY FOR GENOCIDE, 1981, p. 40)</p><p></u>One of the most enduring and abhorrent problems of the world is genocide, which is neither particular to a specific race, class, or nation, nor is it rooted in any one, ethnocentric view of the world. <u><mark>Prohibition of genocide and affirmation of</mark> its opposite, the <mark>value of life, are an eternal ethical verity</mark>, one <mark>whose</mark> practical <mark>implications</mark> necessarily <strong><mark>outweigh possible</strong></mark> theoretical <strong><mark>objections</u></strong></mark> and as such should lift it above prevailing ideologies or politics. <u>Genocide concerns and </u>potentially<u> effects all people</u>. People make up a legal system, according to Kelsen. Politics is the expression of conflict among competing groups. Those in power give the political system its character, i.e. the state. The state, according to Kelsen, is nothing but the combined will of all its people. This abstract concept of the state may at first glance appear meaningless, because in reality not all people have an equal voice in the formation of the characteristics of the state. But I am not concerned with the characteristics of the state but rather the essence of the state – the people. <u>Without a people there would be no state or legal system. <mark>With genocide</mark> eventually <strong><mark>there will be no people</strong></mark>. Genocide is ultimately a threat to the existence of all. True, sometimes only certain groups are targeted</u>, as in Nazi Germany. Sometimes a large part of the total population is eradicated, as in contemporary Cambodia. Sometimes people are eliminated regardless of national origin – the Christians in Roman times. Sometimes whole nations vanish – the Amerindian societies after the Spanish conquest. And sometimes religious groups are persecuted – the Mohammedans by the Crusaders. The culprit changes: sometimes it is a specific state, or those in power in a state; occasionally it is the winners vs. the vanquished in international conflicts; and in its crudest form the stronger against the weaker. <u><mark>Since virtually every social group is a potential victim, genocide is</mark> a <mark>universal</mark> concern.</p></u>

Harff-Gur -82 (B. Harff-Gur, Northwestern, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS A REMEDY FOR GENOCIDE, 1981, p. 40)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Harff-Gur -82 (B. Harff-Gur, Northwestern, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS A REMEDY FOR GENOCIDE, 1981, p. 40) fulltext: One of the most enduring and abhorrent problems of the world is genocide, which is neither particular to a specific race, class, or nation, nor is it rooted in any one, ethnocentric view of the world. Prohibition of genocide and affirmation of its opposite, the value of life, are an eternal ethical verity, one whose practical implications necessarily outweigh possible theoretical objections and as such should lift it above prevailing ideologies or politics. Genocide concerns and potentially effects all people. People make up a legal system, according to Kelsen. Politics is the expression of conflict among competing groups. Those in power give the political system its character, i.e. the state. The state, according to Kelsen, is nothing but the combined will of all its people. This abstract concept of the state may at first glance appear meaningless, because in reality not all people have an equal voice in the formation of the characteristics of the state. But I am not concerned with the characteristics of the state but rather the essence of the state – the people. Without a people there would be no state or legal system. With genocide eventually there will be no people. Genocide is ultimately a threat to the existence of all. True, sometimes only certain groups are targeted, as in Nazi Germany. Sometimes a large part of the total population is eradicated, as in contemporary Cambodia. Sometimes people are eliminated regardless of national origin – the Christians in Roman times. Sometimes whole nations vanish – the Amerindian societies after the Spanish conquest. And sometimes religious groups are persecuted – the Mohammedans by the Crusaders. The culprit changes: sometimes it is a specific state, or those in power in a state; occasionally it is the winners vs. the vanquished in international conflicts; and in its crudest form the stronger against the weaker. Since virtually every social group is a potential victim, genocide is a universal concern. [/INST] <h4>Preventing genocide is the ultimate ethical obligation- culminates in extinction</h4><p><strong>Harff-Gur -82</strong> (B. Harff-Gur<u>, Northwestern, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS A REMEDY FOR GENOCIDE, 1981, p. 40)</p><p></u>One of the most enduring and abhorrent problems of the world is genocide, which is neither particular to a specific race, class, or nation, nor is it rooted in any one, ethnocentric view of the world. <u><mark>Prohibition of genocide and affirmation of</mark> its opposite, the <mark>value of life, are an eternal ethical verity</mark>, one <mark>whose</mark> practical <mark>implications</mark> necessarily <strong><mark>outweigh possible</strong></mark> theoretical <strong><mark>objections</u></strong></mark> and as such should lift it above prevailing ideologies or politics. <u>Genocide concerns and </u>potentially<u> effects all people</u>. People make up a legal system, according to Kelsen. Politics is the expression of conflict among competing groups. Those in power give the political system its character, i.e. the state. The state, according to Kelsen, is nothing but the combined will of all its people. This abstract concept of the state may at first glance appear meaningless, because in reality not all people have an equal voice in the formation of the characteristics of the state. But I am not concerned with the characteristics of the state but rather the essence of the state – the people. <u>Without a people there would be no state or legal system. <mark>With genocide</mark> eventually <strong><mark>there will be no people</strong></mark>. Genocide is ultimately a threat to the existence of all. True, sometimes only certain groups are targeted</u>, as in Nazi Germany. Sometimes a large part of the total population is eradicated, as in contemporary Cambodia. Sometimes people are eliminated regardless of national origin – the Christians in Roman times. Sometimes whole nations vanish – the Amerindian societies after the Spanish conquest. And sometimes religious groups are persecuted – the Mohammedans by the Crusaders. The culprit changes: sometimes it is a specific state, or those in power in a state; occasionally it is the winners vs. the vanquished in international conflicts; and in its crudest form the stronger against the weaker. <u><mark>Since virtually every social group is a potential victim, genocide is</mark> a <mark>universal</mark> concern.</p></u> </s>

(__) Kerry will be able to handle the diplomatic agenda now, but his plate is full

ideasfromtheperiphery.wordpress.com/2012/12/14/the-nature-of-a-john-kerry-state-secretariat/ Kerry’s reputation for gravitas and diplomacy suggest that he would earn international respect. he has also lived abroad. He has travelled extensively, and doubtless many Foreign Ministers already know him. Thus, the learning curve would not be steep, and he could begin building diplomatic capital straight away. And he will need it. The foreign policy plate is full. Syria’s regime is near collapse. North Korea is launching rockets. Rebels in the Congo and terrorists in northern Mali should make Africa a top priority China’s power grows by the day. Kerry could very well represent a good chance for a refined, constitutional foreign policy that puts peace first.

(Daniel, economics graduate student at a state school in Southern California, 12-14-12, "THE NATURE OF A JOHN KERRY STATE SECRETARIAT" Ideas from the Periphery) ideasfromtheperiphery.wordpress.com/2012/12/14/the-nature-of-a-john-kerry-state-secretariat/ Mr Kerry’s reputation for gravitas and diplomacy suggest that he would earn international respect. Indeed, he has also lived abroad. He has travelled extensively, and doubtless many Foreign Ministers already know him. Thus, the learning curve would not be steep, and he could begin building diplomatic capital straight away. And he will need it. The foreign policy plate is full. Syria’s regime is near collapse. North Korea is launching rockets. Rebels in the Congo and terrorists in northern Mali should make Africa a top priority for the next Secretary of State. China’s power grows by the day. Dear reader, our Republic has known constant war for a decade. Mr Kerry, teaming up with fellow Vietnam veteran Chuck Hagel in the Defense Department, could very well represent a good chance for a refined, constitutional foreign policy that puts peace first.

<h4>(__) Kerry will be able to handle the diplomatic agenda now, but his plate is full</h4><p><strong>Jewell 12</strong> </p><p>(Daniel, economics graduate student at a state school in Southern California, 12-14-12, "THE NATURE OF A JOHN KERRY STATE SECRETARIAT" Ideas from the Periphery) <u><strong>ideasfromtheperiphery.wordpress.com/2012/12/14/the-nature-of-a-john-kerry-state-secretariat/</p><p></u></strong>Mr <u><strong>Kerry’s reputation for gravitas and diplomacy suggest that he would earn international respect.</u></strong> Indeed, <u><strong>he has also lived abroad. He has travelled extensively, and doubtless many Foreign Ministers already know him. Thus, the learning curve would not be steep, and he could begin building diplomatic capital straight away. And he will need it. The foreign policy plate is full. Syria’s regime is near collapse. North Korea is launching rockets. Rebels in the Congo and terrorists in northern Mali should make Africa a top priority </u></strong>for the next Secretary of State. <u><strong>China’s power grows by the day. </u></strong>Dear reader, our Republic has known constant war for a decade. Mr <u><strong>Kerry</u></strong>, teaming up with fellow Vietnam veteran Chuck Hagel in the Defense Department, <u><strong>could very well represent a good chance for a refined, constitutional foreign policy that puts peace first.</p></u></strong>

Jewell 12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Jewell 12 fulltext: (Daniel, economics graduate student at a state school in Southern California, 12-14-12, "THE NATURE OF A JOHN KERRY STATE SECRETARIAT" Ideas from the Periphery) ideasfromtheperiphery.wordpress.com/2012/12/14/the-nature-of-a-john-kerry-state-secretariat/ Mr Kerry’s reputation for gravitas and diplomacy suggest that he would earn international respect. Indeed, he has also lived abroad. He has travelled extensively, and doubtless many Foreign Ministers already know him. Thus, the learning curve would not be steep, and he could begin building diplomatic capital straight away. And he will need it. The foreign policy plate is full. Syria’s regime is near collapse. North Korea is launching rockets. Rebels in the Congo and terrorists in northern Mali should make Africa a top priority for the next Secretary of State. China’s power grows by the day. Dear reader, our Republic has known constant war for a decade. Mr Kerry, teaming up with fellow Vietnam veteran Chuck Hagel in the Defense Department, could very well represent a good chance for a refined, constitutional foreign policy that puts peace first. [/INST] <h4>(__) Kerry will be able to handle the diplomatic agenda now, but his plate is full</h4><p><strong>Jewell 12</strong> </p><p>(Daniel, economics graduate student at a state school in Southern California, 12-14-12, "THE NATURE OF A JOHN KERRY STATE SECRETARIAT" Ideas from the Periphery) <u><strong>ideasfromtheperiphery.wordpress.com/2012/12/14/the-nature-of-a-john-kerry-state-secretariat/</p><p></u></strong>Mr <u><strong>Kerry’s reputation for gravitas and diplomacy suggest that he would earn international respect.</u></strong> Indeed, <u><strong>he has also lived abroad. He has travelled extensively, and doubtless many Foreign Ministers already know him. Thus, the learning curve would not be steep, and he could begin building diplomatic capital straight away. And he will need it. The foreign policy plate is full. Syria’s regime is near collapse. North Korea is launching rockets. Rebels in the Congo and terrorists in northern Mali should make Africa a top priority </u></strong>for the next Secretary of State. <u><strong>China’s power grows by the day. </u></strong>Dear reader, our Republic has known constant war for a decade. Mr <u><strong>Kerry</u></strong>, teaming up with fellow Vietnam veteran Chuck Hagel in the Defense Department, <u><strong>could very well represent a good chance for a refined, constitutional foreign policy that puts peace first.</p></u></strong> </s>

Its indicates possession

Its –pronoun the possessive form of it (used as an attributive adjective): The book has lost its jacket. I'm sorry about its being so late.

<h4>Its indicates possession</h4><p><u><strong>Random House</u></strong>, 200<u><strong>9</u></strong> </p><p>[Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary, "Its," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its, mss]</p><p>Its –pronoun</p><p>the possessive form of it (used as an attributive adjective): The book has lost its jacket. I'm sorry about its being so late.</p>

Random House, 2009 [Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary, "Its," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its, mss]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Random House, 2009 [Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary, "Its," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its, mss] fulltext: Its –pronoun the possessive form of it (used as an attributive adjective): The book has lost its jacket. I'm sorry about its being so late. [/INST] <h4>Its indicates possession</h4><p><u><strong>Random House</u></strong>, 200<u><strong>9</u></strong> </p><p>[Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary, "Its," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its, mss]</p><p>Its –pronoun</p><p>the possessive form of it (used as an attributive adjective): The book has lost its jacket. I'm sorry about its being so late.</p> </s>

Extinction

A real military threat to Russia from China has been denied by Russia's leaders China's economy is demanding more and more natural resources China's are limited, whereas the Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north Russia may face the prospect of combating the Chinese army, which is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a few million would be acceptable for China Such a war would be more horrible than World War II Massive nuclear strikes would be the only way out our country would be absolutely unprotected against the first frost of a nuclear winter

There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north the Chinese army has nuclear weapons and would be insensitive to losses Massive nuclear strikes would be the only way out our country would be unprotected against nuclear winter

Now, a few words about the third type of war. A real military threat to Russia from China has not merely been ignored; it has been denied by Russia's leaders and nearly all of the political forces. Let's see some statistic figures at first. The territory of Siberia and the Russian Far East comprises 12,765,900 square kilometers (75% of Russia's entire area), with a population of 40,553,900 people (28% of Russia's population). The territory of China is 9,597,000 square kilometers and its population is 1.265 billion (which is 29 times greater than the population of Siberia and the Russian Far East). China's economy is among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, demanding more and more natural resources. China's natural resources are rather limited, whereas the depths of Siberia and the Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

<h4>Extinction</h4><p><strong>SHARAVIN 2001</strong> (Alexander, Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3)</p><p>Now, a few words about the third type of war. <u>A real military threat to Russia from China has</u> not merely been ignored; it has <u>been denied by Russia's leaders</u> and nearly all of the political forces. Let's see some statistic figures at first. The territory of Siberia and the Russian Far East comprises 12,765,900 square kilometers (75% of Russia's entire area), with a population of 40,553,900 people (28% of Russia's population). The territory of China is 9,597,000 square kilometers and its population is 1.265 billion (which is 29 times greater than the population of Siberia and the Russian Far East). <u>China's economy is</u> among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, <u>demanding more and more natural resources</u>. <u>China's</u> natural resources <u>are</u> rather <u>limited, whereas the</u> depths of Siberia and the <u>Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible</u>. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. <u><mark>There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north</u></mark>." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! <u>Russia may face the</u> "wonderful" <u>prospect of combating <mark>the Chinese army</mark>, which</u>, if full mobilization is called, <u>is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also <mark>has nuclear weapons</u></mark> (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) <u><mark>and would be</mark> absolutely <mark>insensitive to losses</mark> (even a</u> loss of a <u>few million</u> of the servicemen <u>would be acceptable for China</u>). <u>Such a war would be more horrible than</u> the <u>World War II</u>. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). <u><mark>Massive nuclear strikes</u></mark> on basic military forces and cities of China <u><mark>would</u></mark> finally <u><mark>be the only way out</u></mark>, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, <u><mark>our</mark> <mark>country would be</mark> absolutely <mark>unprotected against</u></mark> the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against <u>the first frost of a</u> possible <u><mark>nuclear winter</u></mark>.</p>

SHARAVIN 2001 (Alexander, Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: SHARAVIN 2001 (Alexander, Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3) fulltext: Now, a few words about the third type of war. A real military threat to Russia from China has not merely been ignored; it has been denied by Russia's leaders and nearly all of the political forces. Let's see some statistic figures at first. The territory of Siberia and the Russian Far East comprises 12,765,900 square kilometers (75% of Russia's entire area), with a population of 40,553,900 people (28% of Russia's population). The territory of China is 9,597,000 square kilometers and its population is 1.265 billion (which is 29 times greater than the population of Siberia and the Russian Far East). China's economy is among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, demanding more and more natural resources. China's natural resources are rather limited, whereas the depths of Siberia and the Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter. [/INST] <h4>Extinction</h4><p><strong>SHARAVIN 2001</strong> (Alexander, Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3)</p><p>Now, a few words about the third type of war. <u>A real military threat to Russia from China has</u> not merely been ignored; it has <u>been denied by Russia's leaders</u> and nearly all of the political forces. Let's see some statistic figures at first. The territory of Siberia and the Russian Far East comprises 12,765,900 square kilometers (75% of Russia's entire area), with a population of 40,553,900 people (28% of Russia's population). The territory of China is 9,597,000 square kilometers and its population is 1.265 billion (which is 29 times greater than the population of Siberia and the Russian Far East). <u>China's economy is</u> among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, <u>demanding more and more natural resources</u>. <u>China's</u> natural resources <u>are</u> rather <u>limited, whereas the</u> depths of Siberia and the <u>Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible</u>. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. <u><mark>There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north</u></mark>." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! <u>Russia may face the</u> "wonderful" <u>prospect of combating <mark>the Chinese army</mark>, which</u>, if full mobilization is called, <u>is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also <mark>has nuclear weapons</u></mark> (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) <u><mark>and would be</mark> absolutely <mark>insensitive to losses</mark> (even a</u> loss of a <u>few million</u> of the servicemen <u>would be acceptable for China</u>). <u>Such a war would be more horrible than</u> the <u>World War II</u>. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). <u><mark>Massive nuclear strikes</u></mark> on basic military forces and cities of China <u><mark>would</u></mark> finally <u><mark>be the only way out</u></mark>, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, <u><mark>our</mark> <mark>country would be</mark> absolutely <mark>unprotected against</u></mark> the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against <u>the first frost of a</u> possible <u><mark>nuclear winter</u></mark>.</p> </s>

Removing Cuba from the list is critical to emergency planning cooperation

nothing that Cuba has done suggests its government is plotting harm against Americans, national security experts say they criticize as counterproductive the State Department’s decision, disclosed this week, to keep Cuba on its list of “state sponsors of terrorism.” Yes, Cuba does a lot of bad things that we don’t like, but it doesn’t rise to anything on the level of a terrorist threat.” State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said the administration “has no current plans to remove Cuba” from the list to be released later this month Collaboration between the United States and Cuba on emergency planning to respond to the mutual threats posed by hurricanes, oil spills and refugee crises are complicated by the set of trade and financial restrictions that comes along with the “state sponsor” censure

But nothing that Cuba has done suggests its government is plotting harm against Americans, national security experts say. And they criticize as counterproductive the State Department’s decision, disclosed this week, to keep Cuba on its list of “state sponsors of terrorism.” “We ought to reserve that term for nations that actually use the apparatus of statehood to support the targeting of U.S. interests and civilians,” said Juliette Kayyem, a former assistant secretary for intergovernmental affairs at the Department of Homeland Security and now writing and lecturing on national security in the Boston area. “Yes, Cuba does a lot of bad things that we don’t like, but it doesn’t rise to anything on the level of a terrorist threat.” On Wednesday, State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said the administration “has no current plans to remove Cuba” from the list to be released later this month. The island nation that has been under a U.S. trade and travel embargo since shortly after revolutionary leader Fidel Castro came to power in 1959 is in the company of only Iran, Syria and Sudan in being branded with the “state sponsor” label. Kayyem laments the “diluting” of the terrorist designation based on political or ideological disputes. “We work with a lot of countries we don’t like, but the imprimatur of ‘terrorism’ has a ring to it in a way that can be harmful to us,” she said. Collaboration between the United States and Cuba on emergency planning to respond to the mutual threats posed by hurricanes, oil spills and refugee crises are complicated by the set of trade and financial restrictions that comes along with the “state sponsor” censure, Kayyem said.

<h4>Removing Cuba from the list is critical to emergency planning cooperation</h4><p><strong>LA Times</strong>, <strong>5/3</strong>/13, “Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors” <u><strong>http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/03/world/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502</p><p></u></strong>But <u><strong>nothing that Cuba has done suggests its government is plotting harm against Americans, national security experts say</u></strong>. And <u><strong>they criticize as counterproductive the State Department’s decision, disclosed this week, to keep Cuba on its list of “state sponsors of terrorism.”</p><p></u></strong>“We ought to reserve that term for nations that actually use the apparatus of statehood to support the targeting of U.S. interests and civilians,” said Juliette Kayyem, a former assistant secretary for intergovernmental affairs at the Department of Homeland Security and now writing and lecturing on national security in the Boston area. “<u><strong>Yes, Cuba does a lot of bad things that we don’t like, but it doesn’t rise to anything on the level of a terrorist threat.”</p><p></u></strong>On Wednesday, <u><strong>State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said the administration “has no current plans to remove Cuba” from the list to be released later this month</u></strong>. The island nation that has been under a U.S. trade and travel embargo since shortly after revolutionary leader Fidel Castro came to power in 1959 is in the company of only Iran, Syria and Sudan in being branded with the “state sponsor” label.</p><p>Kayyem laments the “diluting” of the terrorist designation based on political or ideological disputes.</p><p>“We work with a lot of countries we don’t like, but the imprimatur of ‘terrorism’ has a ring to it in a way that can be harmful to us,” she said.</p><p><u><strong>Collaboration between the United States and Cuba on emergency planning to respond to the mutual threats posed by hurricanes, oil spills and refugee crises are complicated by the set of trade and financial restrictions that comes along with the “state sponsor” censure</u></strong>, Kayyem said.</p>

LA Times, 5/3/13, “Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors” http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/03/world/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: LA Times, 5/3/13, “Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors” http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/03/world/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502 fulltext: But nothing that Cuba has done suggests its government is plotting harm against Americans, national security experts say. And they criticize as counterproductive the State Department’s decision, disclosed this week, to keep Cuba on its list of “state sponsors of terrorism.” “We ought to reserve that term for nations that actually use the apparatus of statehood to support the targeting of U.S. interests and civilians,” said Juliette Kayyem, a former assistant secretary for intergovernmental affairs at the Department of Homeland Security and now writing and lecturing on national security in the Boston area. “Yes, Cuba does a lot of bad things that we don’t like, but it doesn’t rise to anything on the level of a terrorist threat.” On Wednesday, State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said the administration “has no current plans to remove Cuba” from the list to be released later this month. The island nation that has been under a U.S. trade and travel embargo since shortly after revolutionary leader Fidel Castro came to power in 1959 is in the company of only Iran, Syria and Sudan in being branded with the “state sponsor” label. Kayyem laments the “diluting” of the terrorist designation based on political or ideological disputes. “We work with a lot of countries we don’t like, but the imprimatur of ‘terrorism’ has a ring to it in a way that can be harmful to us,” she said. Collaboration between the United States and Cuba on emergency planning to respond to the mutual threats posed by hurricanes, oil spills and refugee crises are complicated by the set of trade and financial restrictions that comes along with the “state sponsor” censure, Kayyem said. [/INST] <h4>Removing Cuba from the list is critical to emergency planning cooperation</h4><p><strong>LA Times</strong>, <strong>5/3</strong>/13, “Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors” <u><strong>http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/03/world/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502</p><p></u></strong>But <u><strong>nothing that Cuba has done suggests its government is plotting harm against Americans, national security experts say</u></strong>. And <u><strong>they criticize as counterproductive the State Department’s decision, disclosed this week, to keep Cuba on its list of “state sponsors of terrorism.”</p><p></u></strong>“We ought to reserve that term for nations that actually use the apparatus of statehood to support the targeting of U.S. interests and civilians,” said Juliette Kayyem, a former assistant secretary for intergovernmental affairs at the Department of Homeland Security and now writing and lecturing on national security in the Boston area. “<u><strong>Yes, Cuba does a lot of bad things that we don’t like, but it doesn’t rise to anything on the level of a terrorist threat.”</p><p></u></strong>On Wednesday, <u><strong>State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said the administration “has no current plans to remove Cuba” from the list to be released later this month</u></strong>. The island nation that has been under a U.S. trade and travel embargo since shortly after revolutionary leader Fidel Castro came to power in 1959 is in the company of only Iran, Syria and Sudan in being branded with the “state sponsor” label.</p><p>Kayyem laments the “diluting” of the terrorist designation based on political or ideological disputes.</p><p>“We work with a lot of countries we don’t like, but the imprimatur of ‘terrorism’ has a ring to it in a way that can be harmful to us,” she said.</p><p><u><strong>Collaboration between the United States and Cuba on emergency planning to respond to the mutual threats posed by hurricanes, oil spills and refugee crises are complicated by the set of trade and financial restrictions that comes along with the “state sponsor” censure</u></strong>, Kayyem said.</p> </s>

Hunger outweighs extinction

although moral behavior is required of each individual, no principle requires that the realm of morality itself be preserved. Thus, we are reduced to the position that people’s interest in preserving the human species is based primarily on the interest of each in individual survival. Having shown above that the principle of equity is morally superior to the principle of survival, we can conclude again that food should be shared equally even if this means the extinction of the human race

people’s interest in preserving the human species is based primarily on the interest of each in individual survival equity is morally superior to survival food should be shared equally even if this means the extinction of the human race

The basic reason given for preserving a nation or the human species is that otherwise the milieu of morality would not exist. This is false so far as specific nations are concerned, but it is true that the existence of individuals depends on the existence of the species. However, although moral behavior is required of each individual, no principle requires that the realm of morality itself be preserved. Thus, we are reduced to the position that people’s interest in preserving the human species is based primarily on the interest of each in individual survival. Having shown above that the principle of equity is morally superior to the principle of survival, we can conclude again that food should be shared equally even if this means the extinction of the human race.

<h4>Hunger outweighs extinction</h4><p>Richard <u><strong>Watson, 1977</u></strong> (professor of philosophy @ Washington University, World Hunger and Moral Obligation, pg. 122)</p><p>The basic reason given for preserving a nation or the human species is that otherwise the milieu of morality would not exist. This is false so far as specific nations are concerned, but it is true that the existence of individuals depends on the existence of the species. However, <u>although moral behavior is required of each individual, no principle requires that the realm of morality itself be preserved. Thus, we are reduced to the position that <mark>people’s interest in preserving the human species is based primarily on the interest of each in individual survival</mark>. Having shown above that the principle of <mark>equity is morally superior to</mark> the principle of <mark>survival</mark>, we can conclude again that <mark>food should be shared equally even if this <strong>means the extinction of the human race</u></strong></mark>. </p>

Richard Watson, 1977 (professor of philosophy @ Washington University, World Hunger and Moral Obligation, pg. 122)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Richard Watson, 1977 (professor of philosophy @ Washington University, World Hunger and Moral Obligation, pg. 122) fulltext: The basic reason given for preserving a nation or the human species is that otherwise the milieu of morality would not exist. This is false so far as specific nations are concerned, but it is true that the existence of individuals depends on the existence of the species. However, although moral behavior is required of each individual, no principle requires that the realm of morality itself be preserved. Thus, we are reduced to the position that people’s interest in preserving the human species is based primarily on the interest of each in individual survival. Having shown above that the principle of equity is morally superior to the principle of survival, we can conclude again that food should be shared equally even if this means the extinction of the human race. [/INST] <h4>Hunger outweighs extinction</h4><p>Richard <u><strong>Watson, 1977</u></strong> (professor of philosophy @ Washington University, World Hunger and Moral Obligation, pg. 122)</p><p>The basic reason given for preserving a nation or the human species is that otherwise the milieu of morality would not exist. This is false so far as specific nations are concerned, but it is true that the existence of individuals depends on the existence of the species. However, <u>although moral behavior is required of each individual, no principle requires that the realm of morality itself be preserved. Thus, we are reduced to the position that <mark>people’s interest in preserving the human species is based primarily on the interest of each in individual survival</mark>. Having shown above that the principle of <mark>equity is morally superior to</mark> the principle of <mark>survival</mark>, we can conclude again that <mark>food should be shared equally even if this <strong>means the extinction of the human race</u></strong></mark>. </p> </s>

(__) Diplomatic Capital solves back.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/opinion/21friedman.html April 20 In politics and diplomacy, success breeds authority and authority breeds more success When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like the strong horse When others see the president as a winner or as somebody who has real authority in his own house, it absolutely makes a difference . “All you have to do is look at how many minority or weak coalition governments there are around the world who can’t deliver something big in their own country, but basically just teeter on the edge, because they can’t put together the votes to do anything consequential, because of the divided electorate According to an American negotiator, all throughout the arms talks, which paralleled the health care debate, the Russians kept asking: “Can you actually get this ratified by the Senate” if an arms deal is cut Winning passage of the health care bill demonstrated to the Russians that Obama could get something hard passed You don’t have to be Machiavelli to believe that the leaders of Iran and Venezuela shared the barely disguised Republican hope that health care would fail and, therefore, Obama’s whole political agenda would be stalled and, therefore, his presidency enfeebled What matters most now is how Obama uses the political capital that health care’s passage has earned him Obama’s success in passing health care and the bounce it has put in his step will be nothing but a sugar high if we can’t get continue to attract the world’s smartest and most energetic immigrants. An effective, self-confident president with a weak country is nothing more than a bluffer. An effective, self-confident president, though, at least increases the odds of us building a stronger country

success breeds authority When others see the president as a winner or as somebody who has real authority , it makes a difference weak coalition governments just teeter on the edge, can’t put together the votes to do anything passage of health care demonstrated to the Russians that Obama could get something hard passed leaders of Iran shared Republican hope that health care would fail and, , Obama’s whole political agenda would be stalled continue to attract the world’s smartest and most energetic immigrants. effective, self-confident president, increases the odds of us building a stronger country.

(Thomas L., writer for the ny times Everybody Loves a Winner http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/opinion/21friedman.html April 20) In politics and diplomacy, success breeds authority and authority breeds more success. No one ever said it better than Osama bin Laden: “When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like the strong horse.” Have no illusions, the rest of the world was watching our health care debate very closely, waiting to see who would be the strong horse — Obama or his Democratic and Republican health care opponents? At every turn in the debate, America’s enemies and rivals were gauging what the outcome might mean for their own ability to push around an untested U.S. president. It remains to be seen whether, in the long run, America will be made physically healthier by the bill’s passage. But, in the short run, Obama definitely was made geopolitically healthier. “When others see the president as a winner or as somebody who has real authority in his own house, it absolutely makes a difference,” Defense Secretary Robert Gates said to me in an interview. “All you have to do is look at how many minority or weak coalition governments there are around the world who can’t deliver something big in their own country, but basically just teeter on the edge, because they can’t put together the votes to do anything consequential, because of the divided electorate.” President Obama has had “a divided electorate and was still able to muscle the thing through.” When President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia spoke by phone with Obama the morning after the health care vote — to finalize the New Start nuclear arms reduction treaty — he began by saying that before discussing nukes, “I want to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the health care vote,” an administration official said. That was not just rank flattery. According to an American negotiator, all throughout the arms talks, which paralleled the health care debate, the Russians kept asking: “Can you actually get this ratified by the Senate” if an arms deal is cut? Winning passage of the health care bill demonstrated to the Russians that Obama could get something hard passed. Our enemies surely noticed, too. You don’t have to be Machiavelli to believe that the leaders of Iran and Venezuela shared the barely disguised Republican hope that health care would fail and, therefore, Obama’s whole political agenda would be stalled and, therefore, his presidency enfeebled. He would then be a lame duck for the next three years and America would be a lame power. Given the time and energy and political capital that was spent on health care, “failure would have been unilateral disarmament,” added Gates. “Failure would have badly weakened the president in terms of dealing with others — his ability to do various kinds of national security things. ... You know, people made fun of Madeleine [Albright] for saying it, but I think she was dead on: most of the rest of the world does see us as the ‘indispensable nation.’ ” Indeed, our allies often complain about a world of too much American power, but they are not stupid. They know that a world of too little American power is one they would enjoy even less. They know that a weak America is like a world with no health insurance — and a lot of pre-existing conditions. Gen. James Jones, the president’s national security adviser, told me that he recently met with a key NATO counterpart, who concluded a breakfast by congratulating him on the health care vote and pronouncing: “America is back.” But is it? While Obama’s health care victory prevented a power outage for him, it does not guarantee a power surge. Ultimately, what makes a strong president is a strong country — a country whose underlying economic prowess, balance sheet and innovative capacity enable it to generate and project both military power and what the political scientist Joe Nye calls “soft power” — being an example that others want to emulate. What matters most now is how Obama uses the political capital that health care’s passage has earned him. I continue to believe that the most important foreign policy issue America faces today is its ability to successfully engage in nation building — nation building at home. Obama’s success in passing health care and the bounce it has put in his step will be nothing but a sugar high if we can’t get our deficit under control, inspire a new generation of start-ups, upgrade our railroads and Internet and continue to attract the world’s smartest and most energetic immigrants. An effective, self-confident president with a weak country is nothing more than a bluffer. An effective, self-confident president, though, at least increases the odds of us building a stronger country.

<h4><u>(__) Diplomatic Capital solves back.</h4><p><mark>Friedman, 10</p><p></u></mark>(Thomas L., writer for the ny times Everybody Loves a Winner <u>http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/opinion/21friedman.html April 20</u>)</p><p><u>In politics and diplomacy, <mark>success breeds authority </mark>and authority breeds more success</u>. No one ever said it better than Osama bin Laden: “<u>When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like the strong horse</u>.” Have no illusions, the rest of the world was watching our health care debate very closely, waiting to see who would be the strong horse — Obama or his Democratic and Republican health care opponents? At every turn in the debate, America’s enemies and rivals were gauging what the outcome might mean for their own ability to push around an untested U.S. president. It remains to be seen whether, in the long run, America will be made physically healthier by the bill’s passage. But, in the short run, Obama definitely was made geopolitically healthier. “<u><mark>When others see the president as a winner or as somebody who has real authority</mark> in his own house<mark>, it</mark> absolutely <mark>makes a difference</u></mark>,” Defense Secretary Robert Gates said to me in an interview<u>. “All you have to do is look at how many minority or <mark>weak coalition governments </mark>there are around the world who can’t deliver something big in their own country, but basically <mark>just teeter on the edge, </mark>because they <mark>can’t put together the votes to do anything </mark>consequential, because of the divided electorate</u>.” President Obama has had “a divided electorate and was still able to muscle the thing through.” When President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia spoke by phone with Obama the morning after the health care vote — to finalize the New Start nuclear arms reduction treaty — he began by saying that before discussing nukes, “I want to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the health care vote,” an administration official said. That was not just rank flattery. <u>According to an American negotiator, all throughout the arms talks, which paralleled the health care debate, the Russians kept asking: “Can you actually get this ratified by the Senate” if an arms deal is cut</u>? <u>Winning <mark>passage of </mark>the <mark>health care </mark>bill <mark>demonstrated to the Russians that Obama could get something hard passed</u></mark>. Our enemies surely noticed, too. <u>You don’t have to be Machiavelli to believe that the<mark> leaders of Iran </mark>and Venezuela <mark>shared </mark>the barely disguised<mark> Republican hope that health care would fail</mark> <mark>and, </mark>therefore<mark>, Obama’s whole political agenda would be stalled</mark> and, therefore, his presidency enfeebled</u>. He would then be a lame duck for the next three years and America would be a lame power. Given the time and energy and political capital that was spent on health care, “failure would have been unilateral disarmament,” added Gates. “Failure would have badly weakened the president in terms of dealing with others — his ability to do various kinds of national security things. ... You know, people made fun of Madeleine [Albright] for saying it, but I think she was dead on: most of the rest of the world does see us as the ‘indispensable nation.’ ” Indeed, our allies often complain about a world of too much American power, but they are not stupid. They know that a world of too little American power is one they would enjoy even less. They know that a weak America is like a world with no health insurance — and a lot of pre-existing conditions. Gen. James Jones, the president’s national security adviser, told me that he recently met with a key NATO counterpart, who concluded a breakfast by congratulating him on the health care vote and pronouncing: “America is back.” But is it? While Obama’s health care victory prevented a power outage for him, it does not guarantee a power surge. Ultimately, what makes a strong president is a strong country — a country whose underlying economic prowess, balance sheet and innovative capacity enable it to generate and project both military power and what the political scientist Joe Nye calls “soft power” — being an example that others want to emulate. <u>What matters most now is how Obama uses the political capital that health care’s passage has earned him</u>. I continue to believe that the most important foreign policy issue America faces today is its ability to successfully engage in nation building — nation building at home. <u>Obama’s success in passing health care and the bounce it has put in his step will be nothing but a sugar high</u> <u>if we can’t get</u> our deficit under control, inspire a new generation of start-ups, upgrade our railroads and Internet and <u><mark>continue to attract the world’s smartest and most energetic immigrants.</mark> An effective, self-confident president with a weak country is nothing more than a bluffer. An <mark>effective, self-confident president, </mark>though, at least <mark>increases the odds of us building a stronger country</u>.</mark> </p>

Friedman, 10

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Friedman, 10 fulltext: (Thomas L., writer for the ny times Everybody Loves a Winner http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/opinion/21friedman.html April 20) In politics and diplomacy, success breeds authority and authority breeds more success. No one ever said it better than Osama bin Laden: “When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like the strong horse.” Have no illusions, the rest of the world was watching our health care debate very closely, waiting to see who would be the strong horse — Obama or his Democratic and Republican health care opponents? At every turn in the debate, America’s enemies and rivals were gauging what the outcome might mean for their own ability to push around an untested U.S. president. It remains to be seen whether, in the long run, America will be made physically healthier by the bill’s passage. But, in the short run, Obama definitely was made geopolitically healthier. “When others see the president as a winner or as somebody who has real authority in his own house, it absolutely makes a difference,” Defense Secretary Robert Gates said to me in an interview. “All you have to do is look at how many minority or weak coalition governments there are around the world who can’t deliver something big in their own country, but basically just teeter on the edge, because they can’t put together the votes to do anything consequential, because of the divided electorate.” President Obama has had “a divided electorate and was still able to muscle the thing through.” When President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia spoke by phone with Obama the morning after the health care vote — to finalize the New Start nuclear arms reduction treaty — he began by saying that before discussing nukes, “I want to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the health care vote,” an administration official said. That was not just rank flattery. According to an American negotiator, all throughout the arms talks, which paralleled the health care debate, the Russians kept asking: “Can you actually get this ratified by the Senate” if an arms deal is cut? Winning passage of the health care bill demonstrated to the Russians that Obama could get something hard passed. Our enemies surely noticed, too. You don’t have to be Machiavelli to believe that the leaders of Iran and Venezuela shared the barely disguised Republican hope that health care would fail and, therefore, Obama’s whole political agenda would be stalled and, therefore, his presidency enfeebled. He would then be a lame duck for the next three years and America would be a lame power. Given the time and energy and political capital that was spent on health care, “failure would have been unilateral disarmament,” added Gates. “Failure would have badly weakened the president in terms of dealing with others — his ability to do various kinds of national security things. ... You know, people made fun of Madeleine [Albright] for saying it, but I think she was dead on: most of the rest of the world does see us as the ‘indispensable nation.’ ” Indeed, our allies often complain about a world of too much American power, but they are not stupid. They know that a world of too little American power is one they would enjoy even less. They know that a weak America is like a world with no health insurance — and a lot of pre-existing conditions. Gen. James Jones, the president’s national security adviser, told me that he recently met with a key NATO counterpart, who concluded a breakfast by congratulating him on the health care vote and pronouncing: “America is back.” But is it? While Obama’s health care victory prevented a power outage for him, it does not guarantee a power surge. Ultimately, what makes a strong president is a strong country — a country whose underlying economic prowess, balance sheet and innovative capacity enable it to generate and project both military power and what the political scientist Joe Nye calls “soft power” — being an example that others want to emulate. What matters most now is how Obama uses the political capital that health care’s passage has earned him. I continue to believe that the most important foreign policy issue America faces today is its ability to successfully engage in nation building — nation building at home. Obama’s success in passing health care and the bounce it has put in his step will be nothing but a sugar high if we can’t get our deficit under control, inspire a new generation of start-ups, upgrade our railroads and Internet and continue to attract the world’s smartest and most energetic immigrants. An effective, self-confident president with a weak country is nothing more than a bluffer. An effective, self-confident president, though, at least increases the odds of us building a stronger country. [/INST] <h4><u>(__) Diplomatic Capital solves back.</h4><p><mark>Friedman, 10</p><p></u></mark>(Thomas L., writer for the ny times Everybody Loves a Winner <u>http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/opinion/21friedman.html April 20</u>)</p><p><u>In politics and diplomacy, <mark>success breeds authority </mark>and authority breeds more success</u>. No one ever said it better than Osama bin Laden: “<u>When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like the strong horse</u>.” Have no illusions, the rest of the world was watching our health care debate very closely, waiting to see who would be the strong horse — Obama or his Democratic and Republican health care opponents? At every turn in the debate, America’s enemies and rivals were gauging what the outcome might mean for their own ability to push around an untested U.S. president. It remains to be seen whether, in the long run, America will be made physically healthier by the bill’s passage. But, in the short run, Obama definitely was made geopolitically healthier. “<u><mark>When others see the president as a winner or as somebody who has real authority</mark> in his own house<mark>, it</mark> absolutely <mark>makes a difference</u></mark>,” Defense Secretary Robert Gates said to me in an interview<u>. “All you have to do is look at how many minority or <mark>weak coalition governments </mark>there are around the world who can’t deliver something big in their own country, but basically <mark>just teeter on the edge, </mark>because they <mark>can’t put together the votes to do anything </mark>consequential, because of the divided electorate</u>.” President Obama has had “a divided electorate and was still able to muscle the thing through.” When President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia spoke by phone with Obama the morning after the health care vote — to finalize the New Start nuclear arms reduction treaty — he began by saying that before discussing nukes, “I want to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the health care vote,” an administration official said. That was not just rank flattery. <u>According to an American negotiator, all throughout the arms talks, which paralleled the health care debate, the Russians kept asking: “Can you actually get this ratified by the Senate” if an arms deal is cut</u>? <u>Winning <mark>passage of </mark>the <mark>health care </mark>bill <mark>demonstrated to the Russians that Obama could get something hard passed</u></mark>. Our enemies surely noticed, too. <u>You don’t have to be Machiavelli to believe that the<mark> leaders of Iran </mark>and Venezuela <mark>shared </mark>the barely disguised<mark> Republican hope that health care would fail</mark> <mark>and, </mark>therefore<mark>, Obama’s whole political agenda would be stalled</mark> and, therefore, his presidency enfeebled</u>. He would then be a lame duck for the next three years and America would be a lame power. Given the time and energy and political capital that was spent on health care, “failure would have been unilateral disarmament,” added Gates. “Failure would have badly weakened the president in terms of dealing with others — his ability to do various kinds of national security things. ... You know, people made fun of Madeleine [Albright] for saying it, but I think she was dead on: most of the rest of the world does see us as the ‘indispensable nation.’ ” Indeed, our allies often complain about a world of too much American power, but they are not stupid. They know that a world of too little American power is one they would enjoy even less. They know that a weak America is like a world with no health insurance — and a lot of pre-existing conditions. Gen. James Jones, the president’s national security adviser, told me that he recently met with a key NATO counterpart, who concluded a breakfast by congratulating him on the health care vote and pronouncing: “America is back.” But is it? While Obama’s health care victory prevented a power outage for him, it does not guarantee a power surge. Ultimately, what makes a strong president is a strong country — a country whose underlying economic prowess, balance sheet and innovative capacity enable it to generate and project both military power and what the political scientist Joe Nye calls “soft power” — being an example that others want to emulate. <u>What matters most now is how Obama uses the political capital that health care’s passage has earned him</u>. I continue to believe that the most important foreign policy issue America faces today is its ability to successfully engage in nation building — nation building at home. <u>Obama’s success in passing health care and the bounce it has put in his step will be nothing but a sugar high</u> <u>if we can’t get</u> our deficit under control, inspire a new generation of start-ups, upgrade our railroads and Internet and <u><mark>continue to attract the world’s smartest and most energetic immigrants.</mark> An effective, self-confident president with a weak country is nothing more than a bluffer. An <mark>effective, self-confident president, </mark>though, at least <mark>increases the odds of us building a stronger country</u>.</mark> </p> </s>

Russian economic downturn will disrupt the world economy

The greater importance of Russia’s economic policies and prospects to the United States lie in their indirect effect on the overall economic and political environment in which the United States and Russia operate Russia’s continuing economic stability and growth can be considered positive for the United States. Because financial markets are interrelated, chaos in even some of the smaller economies can cause uncertainty throughout the rest of the world. Such was the case during Russia’s financial meltdown in 1998. As a major oil producer and exporter, Russia influences world oil prices that affect U.S. consumers

Because markets are interrelated, chaos in smaller economies can cause uncertainty throughout the rest of the world Such was the case during Russia’s financial meltdown in 98. Russia influences prices that affect U.S. consumers

The greater importance of Russia’s economic policies and prospects to the United States lie in their indirect effect on the overall economic and political environment in which the United States and Russia operate. From this perspective, Russia’s continuing economic stability and growth can be considered positive for the United States. Because financial markets are interrelated, chaos in even some of the smaller economies can cause uncertainty throughout the rest of the world. Such was the case during Russia’s financial meltdown in 1998. Promotion of economic stability in Russia has been a basis for U.S. support for Russia’s membership in international economic organizations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a major oil producer and exporter, Russia influences world oil prices that affect U.S. consumers.

<h4>Russian economic downturn will disrupt the world economy</h4><p><strong>COOPER 2008</strong> (William, Congressional Research Service Specialist in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “Russia’s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States,” May 30, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34512.pdf)</p><p><u>The greater importance of Russia’s economic policies and prospects to the United States lie in their indirect effect on the overall economic and political environment in which the United States and Russia operate</u>. From this perspective, <u>Russia’s continuing economic stability and growth can be considered positive for the United States. <strong><mark>Because</strong></mark> financial <strong><mark>markets are interrelated</strong>, chaos in</mark> even some of the <mark>smaller economies can cause uncertainty throughout the rest of the world</mark>. <mark>Such was the case <strong>during Russia’s financial meltdown in</strong></mark> 19<strong><mark>98.</u></mark> </strong>Promotion of economic stability in Russia has been a basis for U.S. support for Russia’s membership in international economic organizations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). <u>As a major oil producer and exporter, <mark>Russia influences</mark> world oil <mark>prices that affect U.S. consumers</u></mark>.</p>

COOPER 2008 (William, Congressional Research Service Specialist in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “Russia’s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States,” May 30, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34512.pdf)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: COOPER 2008 (William, Congressional Research Service Specialist in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “Russia’s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States,” May 30, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34512.pdf) fulltext: The greater importance of Russia’s economic policies and prospects to the United States lie in their indirect effect on the overall economic and political environment in which the United States and Russia operate. From this perspective, Russia’s continuing economic stability and growth can be considered positive for the United States. Because financial markets are interrelated, chaos in even some of the smaller economies can cause uncertainty throughout the rest of the world. Such was the case during Russia’s financial meltdown in 1998. Promotion of economic stability in Russia has been a basis for U.S. support for Russia’s membership in international economic organizations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a major oil producer and exporter, Russia influences world oil prices that affect U.S. consumers. [/INST] <h4>Russian economic downturn will disrupt the world economy</h4><p><strong>COOPER 2008</strong> (William, Congressional Research Service Specialist in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “Russia’s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States,” May 30, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34512.pdf)</p><p><u>The greater importance of Russia’s economic policies and prospects to the United States lie in their indirect effect on the overall economic and political environment in which the United States and Russia operate</u>. From this perspective, <u>Russia’s continuing economic stability and growth can be considered positive for the United States. <strong><mark>Because</strong></mark> financial <strong><mark>markets are interrelated</strong>, chaos in</mark> even some of the <mark>smaller economies can cause uncertainty throughout the rest of the world</mark>. <mark>Such was the case <strong>during Russia’s financial meltdown in</strong></mark> 19<strong><mark>98.</u></mark> </strong>Promotion of economic stability in Russia has been a basis for U.S. support for Russia’s membership in international economic organizations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). <u>As a major oil producer and exporter, <mark>Russia influences</mark> world oil <mark>prices that affect U.S. consumers</u></mark>.</p> </s>

Its indicates possession

its (ĭts) adj. The possessive form of it. Used as a modifier before a noun: The airline canceled its early flight to New York.

<h4>Its indicates possession</h4><p><u><strong>American Heritage</u></strong>, 200<u><strong>9</u></strong> </p><p>[The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, "Its,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its, mss]</p><p>its (ĭts) </p><p>adj. The possessive form of it.</p><p>Used as a modifier before a noun: The airline canceled its early flight to New York.</p>

American Heritage, 2009 [The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, "Its,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its, mss]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: American Heritage, 2009 [The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, "Its,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its, mss] fulltext: its (ĭts) adj. The possessive form of it. Used as a modifier before a noun: The airline canceled its early flight to New York. [/INST] <h4>Its indicates possession</h4><p><u><strong>American Heritage</u></strong>, 200<u><strong>9</u></strong> </p><p>[The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, "Its,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its, mss]</p><p>its (ĭts) </p><p>adj. The possessive form of it.</p><p>Used as a modifier before a noun: The airline canceled its early flight to New York.</p> </s>

Counterplan solves the WOT – including Cuba on the list kills our credibility to fight terrorism

http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf Through its continued listing of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, the United States undermines its own counterterrorism mandate and the already contested legitimacy of certain features of its “War on Terror Cuba ratified its “commitment to fight terror” and criticized the U.S. double standard on the issue The ratification indicates that Cuba is taking credible and practical steps towards combating global terrorism, even as Washington continues to abide by its policy of politicized pseudo-diplomacy when it comes to Cuban issues.

6/28/13, “SHAKUR, SNOWDEN, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS CUBA A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM?” http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf Through its continued listing of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, the United States undermines its own counterterrorism mandate and the already contested legitimacy of certain features of its “War on Terror.” On June 14, Cuba ratified its “commitment to fight terror” and criticized the U.S. double standard on the issue. This allegation alludes to the fact that the United States harbours a known international terrorist, Luis Posada Carriles, one of the architects of the October 6, 1976 bombing of Cubana Airlines flight number 445 that killed 73 people. [11] The ratification indicates that Cuba is taking credible and practical steps towards combating global terrorism, even as Washington continues to abide by its policy of politicized pseudo-diplomacy when it comes to Cuban issues.

<h4>Counterplan solves the WOT – including Cuba on the list kills our credibility to fight terrorism</h4><p>Rebecca <strong>Lullo and</strong> Phinease <strong>Rueckert</strong>, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, </p><p><strong>6/28</strong>/13, “SHAKUR, SNOWDEN, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS CUBA A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM?” <u><strong>http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf</p><p>Through its continued listing of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, the United States undermines its own counterterrorism mandate and the already contested legitimacy of certain features of its “War on Terror</u></strong>.” On June 14, <u><strong>Cuba ratified its “commitment to fight terror” and criticized the U.S. double standard on the issue</u></strong>. This allegation alludes to the fact that the United States harbours a known international terrorist, Luis Posada Carriles, one of the architects of the October 6, 1976 bombing of Cubana Airlines flight number 445 that killed 73 people. [11] <u><strong>The ratification indicates that Cuba is taking credible and practical steps towards combating global terrorism, even as Washington continues to abide by its policy of politicized pseudo-diplomacy when it comes to Cuban issues.</p></u></strong>

Rebecca Lullo and Phinease Rueckert, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Rebecca Lullo and Phinease Rueckert, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, fulltext: 6/28/13, “SHAKUR, SNOWDEN, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS CUBA A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM?” http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf Through its continued listing of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, the United States undermines its own counterterrorism mandate and the already contested legitimacy of certain features of its “War on Terror.” On June 14, Cuba ratified its “commitment to fight terror” and criticized the U.S. double standard on the issue. This allegation alludes to the fact that the United States harbours a known international terrorist, Luis Posada Carriles, one of the architects of the October 6, 1976 bombing of Cubana Airlines flight number 445 that killed 73 people. [11] The ratification indicates that Cuba is taking credible and practical steps towards combating global terrorism, even as Washington continues to abide by its policy of politicized pseudo-diplomacy when it comes to Cuban issues. [/INST] <h4>Counterplan solves the WOT – including Cuba on the list kills our credibility to fight terrorism</h4><p>Rebecca <strong>Lullo and</strong> Phinease <strong>Rueckert</strong>, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, </p><p><strong>6/28</strong>/13, “SHAKUR, SNOWDEN, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS CUBA A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM?” <u><strong>http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf</p><p>Through its continued listing of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, the United States undermines its own counterterrorism mandate and the already contested legitimacy of certain features of its “War on Terror</u></strong>.” On June 14, <u><strong>Cuba ratified its “commitment to fight terror” and criticized the U.S. double standard on the issue</u></strong>. This allegation alludes to the fact that the United States harbours a known international terrorist, Luis Posada Carriles, one of the architects of the October 6, 1976 bombing of Cubana Airlines flight number 445 that killed 73 people. [11] <u><strong>The ratification indicates that Cuba is taking credible and practical steps towards combating global terrorism, even as Washington continues to abide by its policy of politicized pseudo-diplomacy when it comes to Cuban issues.</p></u></strong> </s>

We must reject sex trafficking at all costs

Because, as currently constructed, human rights laws can reach only individual perpetrators during times of war, one alternative is to recon-sider our understanding of what constitutes "war" and what constitutes "peace." When it is universally true that no matter where in the world a woman lives or with what culture she identifies, she is at grave risk of being beaten, raped, prostituted because she is a woman, the term "peace" does not describe her existence our definitions of "war" and "peace" in the context of all of the world's persecuted groups should be questioned. to describe the conditions of our lives as "peace" is to deny the effect of sexual terrorism on all women. Because we are socialized to think of times of "war" as limited to groups of men fighting over physical territory or land, we do not immediately consider the possibility of "war" outside this narrow definition except in a metaphorical sense However, the physical violence and sex discrimination per-petrated against women because we are women is hardly metaphorical. Despite the fact that its prevalence makes the violence seem natural or inevitable, it is profoundly political in both its purpose and its effect The appropriation of women's sexuality and women's bodies as representative of men's ownership over women has been central to this "politically constructed reality." Women's bodies have become the objects through which dominance and even ownership are communicated, as well as the objects through which men's honor is attained or taken away in many cultures. Thus, When a man wants to communicate that a woman is his to use as he pleases, he may rape her or prosti-tute her. Of course, regardless of whether a group of men sexually terrorizing a group of women is trying to communicate a message to another group of men, the universal sexual victimization of women clearly communicates to all women a message of dominance and ownership over women Given the emphasis on invasion of physical territory as the impetus of war between nations or groups of people within one nation, we may be able to reconceive the notion of "war" in order to make human rights laws applicable to women "in the by-ways of daily life." Under this broader definition of "war," any time one group of people systematically uses physical coercion and violence to subordinate another group, that group would be perpetrating a war and could be prosecuted for human rights violations under war crimes statutes.

our definitions of "war" and "peace" in the context of all of the world's persecuted groups should be questioned the physical violence and sex discrimination per-petrated against women is profoundly political in both its purpose and its effect The appropriation of women's sexuality and women's bodies as representative of men's ownership over women has been central to this "politically constructed reality Women's bodies have become the objects through which dominance and even ownership are communicated When a man wants to communicate that a woman is his to use he may prosti-tute her we may be able to reconceive the notion of "war" in order to make human rights laws applicable to women "in the by-ways of daily life

Because, as currently constructed, human rights laws can reach only individual perpetrators during times of war, one alternative is to recon-sider our understanding of what constitutes "war" and what constitutes "peace." n264 When it is universally true that no matter where in the world a woman lives or with what culture she identifies, she is at grave risk of being beaten, imprisoned, enslaved, raped, prostituted, physi-cally tortured, and murdered simply because she is a woman, the term "peace" does not describe her existence. n265 In addition to being persecuted for being a woman, many women also are persecuted on ethnic, racial, religious, sexual orientation, or other grounds. Therefore, it is crucial that our re-conceptualization of [*837] human rights is not limited to violations based on gender. n266 Rather, our definitions of "war" and "peace" in the context of all of the world's persecuted groups should be questioned. Nevertheless, in every culture a common risk fac-tor is being a woman, and to describe the conditions of our lives as "peace" is to deny the effect of sexual terrorism on all women. n267 Because we are socialized to think of times of "war" as limited to groups of men fighting over physical territory or land, we do not immediately consider the possibility of "war" outside this narrow definition except in a metaphorical sense, such as in the expression "the war against poverty." However, the physical violence and sex discrimination per-petrated against women because we are women is hardly metaphorical. Despite the fact that its prevalence makes the violence seem natural or inevitable, it is profoundly political in both its purpose and its effect. Further, its exclusion from international human rights law is no accident, but rather part of a system politically constructed to exclude and silence women. n268 The appropriation of women's sexuality and women's bodies as representative of men's ownership over women has been central to this "politically constructed reality." n269 Women's bodies have become the objects through which dominance and even ownership are communicated, as well as the objects through which men's honor is attained or taken away in many cultures. n270 Thus, when a man wants to communicate that he is more powerful than a woman, he may beat her. When a man wants to communicate that a woman is [*838] his to use as he pleases, he may rape her or prosti-tute her. The objectification of women is so universal that when one country ruled by men (Serbia) wants to communi-cate to another country ruled by men (Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia) that it is superior and more powerful, it rapes, tortures, and prostitutes the "inferior" country's women. n271 The use of the possessive is intentional, for communica-tion among men through the abuse of women is effective only to the extent that the group of men to whom the message is sent believes they have some right of possession over the bodies of the women used. Unless they have some claim of right to what is taken, no injury is experienced. Of course, regardless of whether a group of men sexually terrorizing a group of women is trying to communicate a message to another group of men, the universal sexual victimization of women clearly communicates to all women a message of dominance and ownership over women. As Charlotte Bunch explains, "The physical territory of [the] political struggle [over female subordination] is women's bodies." n272 Given the emphasis on invasion of physical territory as the impetus of war between nations or groups of people within one nation, we may be able to reconceive the notion of "war" in order to make human rights laws applicable to women "in the by-ways of daily life." n273 We could eradicate the traditional public/private dichotomy and define oppression of women in terms traditionally recognized by human rights laws by arguing that women's bodies are the physical territory at issue in a war perpetrated by men against women. Under this broader definition of "war," any time one group of people systematically uses physical coercion and violence to subordinate another group, that group would be perpetrating a war and could be prosecuted for human rights violations under war crimes statutes. n274 Such an understanding would enable women to seek the prosecution of any male perpetrator of violence against women, regard-less of [*839] whether that violence occurred inside a bedroom, on the streets of the city, or in a concentra-tion camp in a foreign country.

<h4>We must reject sex trafficking at all costs</h4><p>Amy <u><strong>Ray, 1997</u></strong>, (The American University Law Review, February 1997, Lexis)</p><p><u>Because, as currently constructed, human rights laws can reach only individual perpetrators during times of war, one alternative is to recon-sider our understanding of what constitutes "war" and what constitutes "peace."</u> n264 <u>When it is universally true that no matter where in the world a woman lives or with what culture she identifies, she is at grave risk of being beaten,</u> imprisoned, enslaved, <u>raped, prostituted</u>, physi-cally tortured, and murdered simply <u>because she is a woman, the term "peace" does not describe her existence</u>. n265 In addition to being persecuted for being a woman, many women also are persecuted on ethnic, racial, religious, sexual orientation, or other grounds. Therefore, it is crucial that our re-conceptualization of [*837] human rights is not limited to violations based on gender. n266 Rather, <u><mark>our definitions of "war" and "peace" in the context of all of the world's persecuted groups should be questioned</mark>.</u> Nevertheless, in every culture a common risk fac-tor is being a woman, and <u>to describe the conditions of our lives as "peace" is to deny the effect of sexual terrorism on all women.</u> n267 <u>Because we are socialized to think of times of "war" as limited to groups of men fighting over physical territory or land, we do not immediately consider the possibility of "war" outside this narrow definition except in a metaphorical sense</u>, such as in the expression "the war against poverty." <u>However, <mark>the physical violence and sex discrimination per-petrated against women </mark>because we are women is hardly metaphorical. Despite the fact that its prevalence makes the violence seem natural or inevitable, it <mark>is profoundly political in both its purpose and its effect</u></mark>. Further, its exclusion from international human rights law is no accident, but rather part of a system politically constructed to exclude and silence women. n268 <u><mark>The appropriation of women's sexuality and women's bodies as representative of men's ownership over women has been central to this "politically constructed reality</mark>."</u> n269 <u><mark>Women's bodies have become the objects through which dominance and even ownership are communicated</mark>, as well as the objects through which men's honor is attained or taken away in many cultures.</u> n270 <u>Thus,</u> when a man wants to communicate that he is more powerful than a woman, he may beat her. <u><mark>When a man wants to communicate that a woman is</u> </mark>[*838] <u><mark>his to use </mark>as he pleases, <mark>he may </mark>rape her or <mark>prosti-tute her</mark>. </u>The objectification of women is so universal that when one country ruled by men (Serbia) wants to communi-cate to another country ruled by men (Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia) that it is superior and more powerful, it rapes, tortures, and prostitutes the "inferior" country's women. n271 The use of the possessive is intentional, for communica-tion among men through the abuse of women is effective only to the extent that the group of men to whom the message is sent believes they have some right of possession over the bodies of the women used. Unless they have some claim of right to what is taken, no injury is experienced. <u>Of course, regardless of whether a group of men sexually terrorizing a group of women is trying to communicate a message to another group of men, the universal sexual victimization of women clearly communicates to all women a message of dominance and ownership over women</u>. As Charlotte Bunch explains, "The physical territory of [the] political struggle [over female subordination] is women's bodies." n272 <u>Given the emphasis on invasion of physical territory as the impetus of war between nations or groups of people within one nation, <mark>we may be able to reconceive the notion of "war" in order to make human rights laws applicable to women "in the by-ways of daily life</mark>."</u> n273 We could eradicate the traditional public/private dichotomy and define oppression of women in terms traditionally recognized by human rights laws by arguing that women's bodies are the physical territory at issue in a war perpetrated by men against women. <u>Under this broader definition of "war," any time one group of people systematically uses physical coercion and violence to subordinate another group, that group would be perpetrating a war and could be prosecuted for human rights violations under war crimes statutes.</u> n274 Such an understanding would enable women to seek the prosecution of any male perpetrator of violence against women, regard-less of [*839] whether that violence occurred inside a bedroom, on the streets of the city, or in a concentra-tion camp in a foreign country.</p>

Amy Ray, 1997, (The American University Law Review, February 1997, Lexis)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Amy Ray, 1997, (The American University Law Review, February 1997, Lexis) fulltext: Because, as currently constructed, human rights laws can reach only individual perpetrators during times of war, one alternative is to recon-sider our understanding of what constitutes "war" and what constitutes "peace." n264 When it is universally true that no matter where in the world a woman lives or with what culture she identifies, she is at grave risk of being beaten, imprisoned, enslaved, raped, prostituted, physi-cally tortured, and murdered simply because she is a woman, the term "peace" does not describe her existence. n265 In addition to being persecuted for being a woman, many women also are persecuted on ethnic, racial, religious, sexual orientation, or other grounds. Therefore, it is crucial that our re-conceptualization of [*837] human rights is not limited to violations based on gender. n266 Rather, our definitions of "war" and "peace" in the context of all of the world's persecuted groups should be questioned. Nevertheless, in every culture a common risk fac-tor is being a woman, and to describe the conditions of our lives as "peace" is to deny the effect of sexual terrorism on all women. n267 Because we are socialized to think of times of "war" as limited to groups of men fighting over physical territory or land, we do not immediately consider the possibility of "war" outside this narrow definition except in a metaphorical sense, such as in the expression "the war against poverty." However, the physical violence and sex discrimination per-petrated against women because we are women is hardly metaphorical. Despite the fact that its prevalence makes the violence seem natural or inevitable, it is profoundly political in both its purpose and its effect. Further, its exclusion from international human rights law is no accident, but rather part of a system politically constructed to exclude and silence women. n268 The appropriation of women's sexuality and women's bodies as representative of men's ownership over women has been central to this "politically constructed reality." n269 Women's bodies have become the objects through which dominance and even ownership are communicated, as well as the objects through which men's honor is attained or taken away in many cultures. n270 Thus, when a man wants to communicate that he is more powerful than a woman, he may beat her. When a man wants to communicate that a woman is [*838] his to use as he pleases, he may rape her or prosti-tute her. The objectification of women is so universal that when one country ruled by men (Serbia) wants to communi-cate to another country ruled by men (Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia) that it is superior and more powerful, it rapes, tortures, and prostitutes the "inferior" country's women. n271 The use of the possessive is intentional, for communica-tion among men through the abuse of women is effective only to the extent that the group of men to whom the message is sent believes they have some right of possession over the bodies of the women used. Unless they have some claim of right to what is taken, no injury is experienced. Of course, regardless of whether a group of men sexually terrorizing a group of women is trying to communicate a message to another group of men, the universal sexual victimization of women clearly communicates to all women a message of dominance and ownership over women. As Charlotte Bunch explains, "The physical territory of [the] political struggle [over female subordination] is women's bodies." n272 Given the emphasis on invasion of physical territory as the impetus of war between nations or groups of people within one nation, we may be able to reconceive the notion of "war" in order to make human rights laws applicable to women "in the by-ways of daily life." n273 We could eradicate the traditional public/private dichotomy and define oppression of women in terms traditionally recognized by human rights laws by arguing that women's bodies are the physical territory at issue in a war perpetrated by men against women. Under this broader definition of "war," any time one group of people systematically uses physical coercion and violence to subordinate another group, that group would be perpetrating a war and could be prosecuted for human rights violations under war crimes statutes. n274 Such an understanding would enable women to seek the prosecution of any male perpetrator of violence against women, regard-less of [*839] whether that violence occurred inside a bedroom, on the streets of the city, or in a concentra-tion camp in a foreign country. [/INST] <h4>We must reject sex trafficking at all costs</h4><p>Amy <u><strong>Ray, 1997</u></strong>, (The American University Law Review, February 1997, Lexis)</p><p><u>Because, as currently constructed, human rights laws can reach only individual perpetrators during times of war, one alternative is to recon-sider our understanding of what constitutes "war" and what constitutes "peace."</u> n264 <u>When it is universally true that no matter where in the world a woman lives or with what culture she identifies, she is at grave risk of being beaten,</u> imprisoned, enslaved, <u>raped, prostituted</u>, physi-cally tortured, and murdered simply <u>because she is a woman, the term "peace" does not describe her existence</u>. n265 In addition to being persecuted for being a woman, many women also are persecuted on ethnic, racial, religious, sexual orientation, or other grounds. Therefore, it is crucial that our re-conceptualization of [*837] human rights is not limited to violations based on gender. n266 Rather, <u><mark>our definitions of "war" and "peace" in the context of all of the world's persecuted groups should be questioned</mark>.</u> Nevertheless, in every culture a common risk fac-tor is being a woman, and <u>to describe the conditions of our lives as "peace" is to deny the effect of sexual terrorism on all women.</u> n267 <u>Because we are socialized to think of times of "war" as limited to groups of men fighting over physical territory or land, we do not immediately consider the possibility of "war" outside this narrow definition except in a metaphorical sense</u>, such as in the expression "the war against poverty." <u>However, <mark>the physical violence and sex discrimination per-petrated against women </mark>because we are women is hardly metaphorical. Despite the fact that its prevalence makes the violence seem natural or inevitable, it <mark>is profoundly political in both its purpose and its effect</u></mark>. Further, its exclusion from international human rights law is no accident, but rather part of a system politically constructed to exclude and silence women. n268 <u><mark>The appropriation of women's sexuality and women's bodies as representative of men's ownership over women has been central to this "politically constructed reality</mark>."</u> n269 <u><mark>Women's bodies have become the objects through which dominance and even ownership are communicated</mark>, as well as the objects through which men's honor is attained or taken away in many cultures.</u> n270 <u>Thus,</u> when a man wants to communicate that he is more powerful than a woman, he may beat her. <u><mark>When a man wants to communicate that a woman is</u> </mark>[*838] <u><mark>his to use </mark>as he pleases, <mark>he may </mark>rape her or <mark>prosti-tute her</mark>. </u>The objectification of women is so universal that when one country ruled by men (Serbia) wants to communi-cate to another country ruled by men (Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia) that it is superior and more powerful, it rapes, tortures, and prostitutes the "inferior" country's women. n271 The use of the possessive is intentional, for communica-tion among men through the abuse of women is effective only to the extent that the group of men to whom the message is sent believes they have some right of possession over the bodies of the women used. Unless they have some claim of right to what is taken, no injury is experienced. <u>Of course, regardless of whether a group of men sexually terrorizing a group of women is trying to communicate a message to another group of men, the universal sexual victimization of women clearly communicates to all women a message of dominance and ownership over women</u>. As Charlotte Bunch explains, "The physical territory of [the] political struggle [over female subordination] is women's bodies." n272 <u>Given the emphasis on invasion of physical territory as the impetus of war between nations or groups of people within one nation, <mark>we may be able to reconceive the notion of "war" in order to make human rights laws applicable to women "in the by-ways of daily life</mark>."</u> n273 We could eradicate the traditional public/private dichotomy and define oppression of women in terms traditionally recognized by human rights laws by arguing that women's bodies are the physical territory at issue in a war perpetrated by men against women. <u>Under this broader definition of "war," any time one group of people systematically uses physical coercion and violence to subordinate another group, that group would be perpetrating a war and could be prosecuted for human rights violations under war crimes statutes.</u> n274 Such an understanding would enable women to seek the prosecution of any male perpetrator of violence against women, regard-less of [*839] whether that violence occurred inside a bedroom, on the streets of the city, or in a concentra-tion camp in a foreign country.</p> </s>

(__) Kerry is alone in pushing for MEP, his focus is Critical

On Middle East peace Kerry has put his credibility on the line. Kerry has made four trips to the region to meet with Netanyahu Abbas and senior government members from both sides Kerry will visit the region again this coming week to try to push the two sides back into talks, despite little to show so far for his efforts Kerry insists his quiet diplomacy is making headway, Palestinian officials have suggested otherwise in highly critical comments to local and international media. Few American officials know what is going on because Kerry rarely briefs even the most experienced U.S. negotiators in that part of the world on his talks. On Mideast peace, Kerry is largely fighting the battle alone. Since Obama's visit to Israel in March, Kerry has gotten almost no public displays of support from the president, with the White House appearing reluctant to stake political capital in an endeavor that so often has proved a disappointment.

On Middle East peace, too, Kerry has put his credibility on the line. Refusing to avoid one of the world's most difficult conflicts, as Obama and Clinton largely did over the second two years of the first administration, Kerry has made four trips to the region to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and senior government members from both sides. Kerry will visit the region again this coming week to try to push the two sides back into talks, despite little to show so far for his efforts. Kerry insists his quiet diplomacy is making headway, a claim that only he, Netanyahu and Abbas truly can substantiate because most of the discussions are one-on-one. Several senior Israeli and Palestinian officials have suggested otherwise in highly critical comments to local and international media. Few American officials, however, seem to know what is going on because they say Kerry rarely briefs even the most experienced U.S. negotiators in that part of the world on his talks. At times, the process has seemed ad hoc. In Jordan last month, Kerry announced a sketchy $4 billion economic revitalization strategy for the West Bank that would accompany his peace plan. No details were provided, and U.S. officials even sent reporters to aides of U.N. peace mediator Tony Blair for more information. Blair's staff wouldn't provide information or even confirm that the outline of an economic plan exists. Officials say Kerry's friend, investor Tim Collins, is handling the portfolio, though it's unclear if any money has been secured. On Mideast peace, Kerry is largely fighting the battle alone. Since Obama's visit to Israel in March, Kerry has gotten almost no public displays of support from the president, with the White House appearing reluctant to stake political capital in an endeavor that so often has proved a disappointment.

<h4>(__) <strong>Kerry is alone in pushing for MEP, his focus is Critical</h4><p>Klapper and Lee 6/22</p><p><u>[BRADLEY KLAPPER and MATTHEW LEE, “Top diplomat Kerry battles to deliver on big ideas”, June 22, 2013, Associated Press, http://www.islandpacket.com/2013/06/22/2551637/top-diplomat-kerry-battles-to.html#storylink=cpy, \\wyo-bb]</p><p>On Middle East peace</u></strong>, too, <u><strong>Kerry has put his credibility on the line.</u></strong> Refusing to avoid one of the world's most difficult conflicts, as Obama and Clinton largely did over the second two years of the first administration, <u><strong>Kerry has made four trips to the region to meet with</u></strong> Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin <u><strong>Netanyahu</u></strong>, Palestinian President Mahmoud <u><strong>Abbas</u></strong> <u><strong>and senior government members from both sides</u></strong>. <u><strong>Kerry will visit the region again this coming week to try to push the two sides back into talks, despite little to show so far for his efforts</u></strong>. <u><strong>Kerry insists his quiet diplomacy is making headway,</u></strong> a claim that only he, Netanyahu and Abbas truly can substantiate because most of the discussions are one-on-one. Several senior Israeli and <u><strong>Palestinian officials have suggested otherwise in highly critical comments to local and international media.</u></strong> <u><strong>Few American officials</u></strong>, however, seem to <u><strong>know what is going on because </u></strong>they say <u><strong>Kerry rarely briefs even the most experienced U.S. negotiators in that part of the world on his talks. </u></strong>At times, the process has seemed ad hoc. In Jordan last month, Kerry announced a sketchy $4 billion economic revitalization strategy for the West Bank that would accompany his peace plan. No details were provided, and U.S. officials even sent reporters to aides of U.N. peace mediator Tony Blair for more information. Blair's staff wouldn't provide information or even confirm that the outline of an economic plan exists. Officials say Kerry's friend, investor Tim Collins, is handling the portfolio, though it's unclear if any money has been secured. <u><strong>On Mideast peace, Kerry is largely fighting the battle alone. Since Obama's visit to Israel in March, Kerry has gotten almost no public displays of support from the president, with the White House appearing reluctant to stake political capital in an endeavor that so often has proved a disappointment.</p></u></strong>

Klapper and Lee 6/22 [BRADLEY KLAPPER and MATTHEW LEE, “Top diplomat Kerry battles to deliver on big ideas”, June 22, 2013, Associated Press, http://www.islandpacket.com/2013/06/22/2551637/top-diplomat-kerry-battles-to.html#storylink=cpy, \\wyo-bb]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Klapper and Lee 6/22 [BRADLEY KLAPPER and MATTHEW LEE, “Top diplomat Kerry battles to deliver on big ideas”, June 22, 2013, Associated Press, http://www.islandpacket.com/2013/06/22/2551637/top-diplomat-kerry-battles-to.html#storylink=cpy, \\wyo-bb] fulltext: On Middle East peace, too, Kerry has put his credibility on the line. Refusing to avoid one of the world's most difficult conflicts, as Obama and Clinton largely did over the second two years of the first administration, Kerry has made four trips to the region to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and senior government members from both sides. Kerry will visit the region again this coming week to try to push the two sides back into talks, despite little to show so far for his efforts. Kerry insists his quiet diplomacy is making headway, a claim that only he, Netanyahu and Abbas truly can substantiate because most of the discussions are one-on-one. Several senior Israeli and Palestinian officials have suggested otherwise in highly critical comments to local and international media. Few American officials, however, seem to know what is going on because they say Kerry rarely briefs even the most experienced U.S. negotiators in that part of the world on his talks. At times, the process has seemed ad hoc. In Jordan last month, Kerry announced a sketchy $4 billion economic revitalization strategy for the West Bank that would accompany his peace plan. No details were provided, and U.S. officials even sent reporters to aides of U.N. peace mediator Tony Blair for more information. Blair's staff wouldn't provide information or even confirm that the outline of an economic plan exists. Officials say Kerry's friend, investor Tim Collins, is handling the portfolio, though it's unclear if any money has been secured. On Mideast peace, Kerry is largely fighting the battle alone. Since Obama's visit to Israel in March, Kerry has gotten almost no public displays of support from the president, with the White House appearing reluctant to stake political capital in an endeavor that so often has proved a disappointment. [/INST] <h4>(__) <strong>Kerry is alone in pushing for MEP, his focus is Critical</h4><p>Klapper and Lee 6/22</p><p><u>[BRADLEY KLAPPER and MATTHEW LEE, “Top diplomat Kerry battles to deliver on big ideas”, June 22, 2013, Associated Press, http://www.islandpacket.com/2013/06/22/2551637/top-diplomat-kerry-battles-to.html#storylink=cpy, \\wyo-bb]</p><p>On Middle East peace</u></strong>, too, <u><strong>Kerry has put his credibility on the line.</u></strong> Refusing to avoid one of the world's most difficult conflicts, as Obama and Clinton largely did over the second two years of the first administration, <u><strong>Kerry has made four trips to the region to meet with</u></strong> Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin <u><strong>Netanyahu</u></strong>, Palestinian President Mahmoud <u><strong>Abbas</u></strong> <u><strong>and senior government members from both sides</u></strong>. <u><strong>Kerry will visit the region again this coming week to try to push the two sides back into talks, despite little to show so far for his efforts</u></strong>. <u><strong>Kerry insists his quiet diplomacy is making headway,</u></strong> a claim that only he, Netanyahu and Abbas truly can substantiate because most of the discussions are one-on-one. Several senior Israeli and <u><strong>Palestinian officials have suggested otherwise in highly critical comments to local and international media.</u></strong> <u><strong>Few American officials</u></strong>, however, seem to <u><strong>know what is going on because </u></strong>they say <u><strong>Kerry rarely briefs even the most experienced U.S. negotiators in that part of the world on his talks. </u></strong>At times, the process has seemed ad hoc. In Jordan last month, Kerry announced a sketchy $4 billion economic revitalization strategy for the West Bank that would accompany his peace plan. No details were provided, and U.S. officials even sent reporters to aides of U.N. peace mediator Tony Blair for more information. Blair's staff wouldn't provide information or even confirm that the outline of an economic plan exists. Officials say Kerry's friend, investor Tim Collins, is handling the portfolio, though it's unclear if any money has been secured. <u><strong>On Mideast peace, Kerry is largely fighting the battle alone. Since Obama's visit to Israel in March, Kerry has gotten almost no public displays of support from the president, with the White House appearing reluctant to stake political capital in an endeavor that so often has proved a disappointment.</p></u></strong> </s>

Extinction

The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The threat of instability is a pressing concern A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors Russia has had to put down riots Even stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang

sustained downturn poses grave and immediate threats to Chinese stability Beijing may be faced with diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with Russia Even stable societies face increasing risk of external conflict prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions Couple that with unresolved disputes in the globe a series of small explosions coalesce into a big bang

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang

<h4>Extinction</h4><p><strong>AUSLIN ‘9</strong> - scholar at American Enterprise Institute (Michael, “The global Economy Unravels” American Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.29502/pub_detail.asp<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? <u>The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. </u>The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. <u>The threat of instability is a pressing concern</u>. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. <u>A <mark>sustained downturn poses grave and</mark> possibly <mark>immediate threats to Chinese</mark> internal <mark>stability</mark>. The regime in <mark>Beijing may be faced with</mark> a choice of repressing its own people or <mark>diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with</mark> China's neighbors</u>. <u><mark>Russia</u></mark>, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, <u>has had to put down riots</u> in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. <u><strong><mark>Even</strong></mark> </u>apparently <u><strong><mark>stable societies</strong> face increasing risk</mark> and the threat <mark>of</mark> internal or possibly <mark>external conflict</u></mark>. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. <u>Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions</u> between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. <u>A <mark>prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions</mark> inside these countries.</u> <u><mark>Couple that with</u></mark> possible protectionist legislation in the United States, <u><mark>unresolved</mark> ethnic and territorial <mark>disputes in</mark> all regions of <mark>the globe</mark> and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be <mark>a series of small explosions</mark> that <strong><mark>coalesce into a big bang</p></u></strong></mark>

AUSLIN ‘9 - scholar at American Enterprise Institute (Michael, “The global Economy Unravels” American Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.29502/pub_detail.asp)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: AUSLIN ‘9 - scholar at American Enterprise Institute (Michael, “The global Economy Unravels” American Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.29502/pub_detail.asp) fulltext: What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang [/INST] <h4>Extinction</h4><p><strong>AUSLIN ‘9</strong> - scholar at American Enterprise Institute (Michael, “The global Economy Unravels” American Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.29502/pub_detail.asp<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? <u>The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. </u>The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. <u>The threat of instability is a pressing concern</u>. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. <u>A <mark>sustained downturn poses grave and</mark> possibly <mark>immediate threats to Chinese</mark> internal <mark>stability</mark>. The regime in <mark>Beijing may be faced with</mark> a choice of repressing its own people or <mark>diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with</mark> China's neighbors</u>. <u><mark>Russia</u></mark>, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, <u>has had to put down riots</u> in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. <u><strong><mark>Even</strong></mark> </u>apparently <u><strong><mark>stable societies</strong> face increasing risk</mark> and the threat <mark>of</mark> internal or possibly <mark>external conflict</u></mark>. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. <u>Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions</u> between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. <u>A <mark>prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions</mark> inside these countries.</u> <u><mark>Couple that with</u></mark> possible protectionist legislation in the United States, <u><mark>unresolved</mark> ethnic and territorial <mark>disputes in</mark> all regions of <mark>the globe</mark> and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be <mark>a series of small explosions</mark> that <strong><mark>coalesce into a big bang</p></u></strong></mark> </s>

Its”- its refers to the United States federal government, not a different actor

Used to refer to that one previously mentioned

It- pron. 1. Used to refer to that one previously mentioned.

<h4>Its”- its refers to the United States federal government, not a different actor</h4><p>The <u><strong>American Heritage</u></strong> Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, <u><strong>06</u></strong>, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/it, last visited 8-8-07</p><p>It- pron.<strong> </p><p></strong> 1. <u><strong>Used to refer to that one previously</u></strong> <u><strong>mentioned</u></strong>.</p>

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, 06, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/it, last visited 8-8-07

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, 06, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/it, last visited 8-8-07 fulltext: It- pron. 1. Used to refer to that one previously mentioned. [/INST] <h4>Its”- its refers to the United States federal government, not a different actor</h4><p>The <u><strong>American Heritage</u></strong> Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, <u><strong>06</u></strong>, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/it, last visited 8-8-07</p><p>It- pron.<strong> </p><p></strong> 1. <u><strong>Used to refer to that one previously</u></strong> <u><strong>mentioned</u></strong>.</p> </s>

The justifications to include Cuba on the list are untrue and hurt our credibility in the war on terror

http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf the State Department submitted its annual report on terrorism maintaining Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism The justification for Cuba’s presence on the list is flimsy at best. [1] Upon closer examination this assertion fails to be convincing Cuba’s unfounded listing as a state sponsor of terrorism undermines U.S. credibility abroad, hampering its efforts to counteract authentic terrorism around the world.

6/28/13, “SHAKUR, SNOWDEN, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS CUBA A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM?” http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf On May 30, the State Department submitted its annual report on terrorism (“Country Reports on Terrorism 2012”) to Congress, notably maintaining Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism along with Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Cuba was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism on March 1, 1982. It has remained ever since on the list of states that Washington accuses of repeatedly providing support for international acts of terrorism. The justification for Cuba’s presence on the list—that it is providing a safe haven for wanted fugitives and particularly for Assata Shakur—is flimsy at best. [1] Upon closer examination this assertion fails to be convincing. Cuba’s unfounded listing as a state sponsor of terrorism undermines U.S. credibility abroad, hampering its efforts to counteract authentic terrorism around the world.

<h4>The justifications to include Cuba on the list are untrue and hurt our credibility in the war on terror</h4><p>Rebecca <strong>Lullo and</strong> Phinease <strong>Rueckert</strong>, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, </p><p><strong>6/28</strong>/13, “SHAKUR, SNOWDEN, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS CUBA A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM?” <u><strong>http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf</p><p></u></strong>On May 30, <u><strong>the State Department submitted its annual report on terrorism</u></strong> (“Country Reports on Terrorism 2012”) to Congress, notably <u><strong>maintaining Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism </u></strong>along with Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Cuba was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism on March 1, 1982. It has remained ever since on the list of states that Washington accuses of repeatedly providing support for international acts of terrorism. <u><strong>The justification for Cuba’s presence on the list</u></strong>—that it is providing a safe haven for wanted fugitives and particularly for Assata Shakur—<u><strong>is flimsy at best. [1] Upon closer examination this assertion fails to be convincing</u></strong>. <u><strong>Cuba’s unfounded listing as a state sponsor of terrorism undermines U.S. credibility abroad, hampering its efforts to counteract authentic terrorism around the world.</p></u></strong>

Rebecca Lullo and Phinease Rueckert, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Rebecca Lullo and Phinease Rueckert, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, fulltext: 6/28/13, “SHAKUR, SNOWDEN, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS CUBA A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM?” http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf On May 30, the State Department submitted its annual report on terrorism (“Country Reports on Terrorism 2012”) to Congress, notably maintaining Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism along with Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Cuba was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism on March 1, 1982. It has remained ever since on the list of states that Washington accuses of repeatedly providing support for international acts of terrorism. The justification for Cuba’s presence on the list—that it is providing a safe haven for wanted fugitives and particularly for Assata Shakur—is flimsy at best. [1] Upon closer examination this assertion fails to be convincing. Cuba’s unfounded listing as a state sponsor of terrorism undermines U.S. credibility abroad, hampering its efforts to counteract authentic terrorism around the world. [/INST] <h4>The justifications to include Cuba on the list are untrue and hurt our credibility in the war on terror</h4><p>Rebecca <strong>Lullo and</strong> Phinease <strong>Rueckert</strong>, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, </p><p><strong>6/28</strong>/13, “SHAKUR, SNOWDEN, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS CUBA A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM?” <u><strong>http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf</p><p></u></strong>On May 30, <u><strong>the State Department submitted its annual report on terrorism</u></strong> (“Country Reports on Terrorism 2012”) to Congress, notably <u><strong>maintaining Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism </u></strong>along with Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Cuba was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism on March 1, 1982. It has remained ever since on the list of states that Washington accuses of repeatedly providing support for international acts of terrorism. <u><strong>The justification for Cuba’s presence on the list</u></strong>—that it is providing a safe haven for wanted fugitives and particularly for Assata Shakur—<u><strong>is flimsy at best. [1] Upon closer examination this assertion fails to be convincing</u></strong>. <u><strong>Cuba’s unfounded listing as a state sponsor of terrorism undermines U.S. credibility abroad, hampering its efforts to counteract authentic terrorism around the world.</p></u></strong> </s>

Venezuelan instability destroys OAS credibility

instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote democracy, increase regional cooperation The U S has worked for decades to promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere The U S has an interest in nurturing regional cooperation particularly under the auspices of the OAS A failure by the OAS to play an effective role in Venezuela if it appears democracy is at risk would further undermine support for the organization both in the region and in the U S How the U S manages its relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would likely affect U.S. relations with others in the hemisphere

instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote democracy, increase regional cooperation The U S has an interest in nurturing regional cooperation particularly under the auspices of the OAS A failure by the OAS to play an effective role in Venezuela if it appears democracy is at risk would further undermine support for the organization How the U S manages its relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would likely affect U.S. relations with others in the hemisphere

Political instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote democracy, increase regional cooperation, combat narcotics, and protect its economic interests in the region.¶ Democracy Promotion: The United States has worked for decades to promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere. In recent years, Chavez has become increasingly authoritarian, undermining important political institutions, giving more powers to the presidency, and weakening both civil society and the independent media. The United States should view a suspension or further deterioration in the quality of Venezuela's democracy as a setback for U.S. policy and for the hemisphere. The emergence of a military junta or a compromised Chavez regime would also likely increase Iranian and Cuban influence in Venezuela. It already has a close relationship with Iran from which it reportedly receives advanced weapon systems and other assistance. Cuba sends thousands of teachers and technical, medical, and security advisers in exchange for an estimated ninety to one hundred thousand barrels of oil per day.¶ Regional Cooperation: The United States has an interest in nurturing regional cooperation particularly under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), of which it is a core member. While often disappointing to both the United States and Latin America, the OAS provides the only regional forum in which all of the countries with democratically elected governments participate. A failure by the OAS to play an effective role in Venezuela if it appears democracy is at risk would further undermine support for the organization both in the region and in the United States. How the United States manages its relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would likely affect U.S. relations with others in the hemisphere, especially Brazil, which has cordial relations with Chavez and reacts badly to perceived U.S. efforts to dictate to Latin America. A repetition of the acrimony that characterized the hemisphere's efforts to resolve the Honduras crisis of 2009 would be corrosive to U.S. relations with the region.

<h4>Venezuelan instability destroys OAS credibility</h4><p><strong>Duddy ‘12</strong> [Patrick D. Duddy is a visiting senior lecturer in international studies at Duke University and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, “Political Unrest in Venezuela,” September, <u>http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936</u>]</p><p>Political <u><mark>instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote democracy, increase regional cooperation</u></mark>, combat narcotics, and protect its economic interests in the region.¶ Democracy Promotion: <u>The U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has worked for decades to promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere</u>. In recent years, Chavez has become increasingly authoritarian, undermining important political institutions, giving more powers to the presidency, and weakening both civil society and the independent media. The United States should view a suspension or further deterioration in the quality of Venezuela's democracy as a setback for U.S. policy and for the hemisphere. The emergence of a military junta or a compromised Chavez regime would also likely increase Iranian and Cuban influence in Venezuela. It already has a close relationship with Iran from which it reportedly receives advanced weapon systems and other assistance. Cuba sends thousands of teachers and technical, medical, and security advisers in exchange for an estimated ninety to one hundred thousand barrels of oil per day.¶ Regional Cooperation: <u><mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>has an interest in nurturing regional cooperation particularly under the auspices of the</u></mark> Organization of American States (<u><mark>OAS</u></mark>), of which it is a core member. While often disappointing to both the United States and Latin America, the OAS provides the only regional forum in which all of the countries with democratically elected governments participate. <u><mark>A failure by the OAS to play an effective role in Venezuela if it appears democracy is at risk would further undermine support for the organization</mark> both in the region and in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u><mark>How the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>manages its relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would likely affect U.S. relations with others in the hemisphere</u></mark>, especially Brazil, which has cordial relations with Chavez and reacts badly to perceived U.S. efforts to dictate to Latin America. A repetition of the acrimony that characterized the hemisphere's efforts to resolve the Honduras crisis of 2009 would be corrosive to U.S. relations with the region.</p>

Duddy ‘12 [Patrick D. Duddy is a visiting senior lecturer in international studies at Duke University and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, “Political Unrest in Venezuela,” September, http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Duddy ‘12 [Patrick D. Duddy is a visiting senior lecturer in international studies at Duke University and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, “Political Unrest in Venezuela,” September, http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936] fulltext: Political instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote democracy, increase regional cooperation, combat narcotics, and protect its economic interests in the region.¶ Democracy Promotion: The United States has worked for decades to promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere. In recent years, Chavez has become increasingly authoritarian, undermining important political institutions, giving more powers to the presidency, and weakening both civil society and the independent media. The United States should view a suspension or further deterioration in the quality of Venezuela's democracy as a setback for U.S. policy and for the hemisphere. The emergence of a military junta or a compromised Chavez regime would also likely increase Iranian and Cuban influence in Venezuela. It already has a close relationship with Iran from which it reportedly receives advanced weapon systems and other assistance. Cuba sends thousands of teachers and technical, medical, and security advisers in exchange for an estimated ninety to one hundred thousand barrels of oil per day.¶ Regional Cooperation: The United States has an interest in nurturing regional cooperation particularly under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), of which it is a core member. While often disappointing to both the United States and Latin America, the OAS provides the only regional forum in which all of the countries with democratically elected governments participate. A failure by the OAS to play an effective role in Venezuela if it appears democracy is at risk would further undermine support for the organization both in the region and in the United States. How the United States manages its relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would likely affect U.S. relations with others in the hemisphere, especially Brazil, which has cordial relations with Chavez and reacts badly to perceived U.S. efforts to dictate to Latin America. A repetition of the acrimony that characterized the hemisphere's efforts to resolve the Honduras crisis of 2009 would be corrosive to U.S. relations with the region. [/INST] <h4>Venezuelan instability destroys OAS credibility</h4><p><strong>Duddy ‘12</strong> [Patrick D. Duddy is a visiting senior lecturer in international studies at Duke University and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, “Political Unrest in Venezuela,” September, <u>http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-unrest-venezuela/p28936</u>]</p><p>Political <u><mark>instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote democracy, increase regional cooperation</u></mark>, combat narcotics, and protect its economic interests in the region.¶ Democracy Promotion: <u>The U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>has worked for decades to promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere</u>. In recent years, Chavez has become increasingly authoritarian, undermining important political institutions, giving more powers to the presidency, and weakening both civil society and the independent media. The United States should view a suspension or further deterioration in the quality of Venezuela's democracy as a setback for U.S. policy and for the hemisphere. The emergence of a military junta or a compromised Chavez regime would also likely increase Iranian and Cuban influence in Venezuela. It already has a close relationship with Iran from which it reportedly receives advanced weapon systems and other assistance. Cuba sends thousands of teachers and technical, medical, and security advisers in exchange for an estimated ninety to one hundred thousand barrels of oil per day.¶ Regional Cooperation: <u><mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>has an interest in nurturing regional cooperation particularly under the auspices of the</u></mark> Organization of American States (<u><mark>OAS</u></mark>), of which it is a core member. While often disappointing to both the United States and Latin America, the OAS provides the only regional forum in which all of the countries with democratically elected governments participate. <u><mark>A failure by the OAS to play an effective role in Venezuela if it appears democracy is at risk would further undermine support for the organization</mark> both in the region and in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u><mark>How the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>manages its relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would likely affect U.S. relations with others in the hemisphere</u></mark>, especially Brazil, which has cordial relations with Chavez and reacts badly to perceived U.S. efforts to dictate to Latin America. A repetition of the acrimony that characterized the hemisphere's efforts to resolve the Honduras crisis of 2009 would be corrosive to U.S. relations with the region.</p> </s>

(__) Kerry is key player in talks.

Netanyahu has rejected such "pre-conditions" but insists he remains ready to talk Ismail Haniya, the Gaza-based prime minister of the rival Hamas movement, warned Abbas on Friday not to fall into the "trap of negotiations". Kerry heard encouraging words from Israeli President over a two-hour Friday night dinner following the meeting with Netanyahu. Peres, welcoming Kerry at his official residence full of memorabilia from the decades-old peace process, acknowledged that "it is difficult, there are many problems" in moving forward. But there is a clear majority for the peace process, a two-state solution, and a great expectation that you will do it and that you can do it," Peres told him.

(“Kerry cancels UAE stop to focus on Middle East peace” AFP: June 29, 2013 http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/news/kerry-cancels-uae-stop-to-focus-on-middle-east-peace_16120) KH Netanyahu has rejected such "pre-conditions" but insists he remains ready to talk. One idea floated is for Israel to agree not to announce new settlement construction but to make the commitment informally -- reducing the risk of revolt in Netanyahu's largely right-wing governing coalition. Economy Minister Naftali Bennett, who heads the far-right Jewish Home party, recently described the Palestinian issue as "shrapnel in the buttocks" -- a problem Israel simply had to keep suffering through -- but threatened to quit if the government agreed to a Palestinian state. Abbas, whose rule is effectively confined to the West Bank, also faces Palestinian divisions. Ismail Haniya, the Gaza-based prime minister of the rival Hamas movement, warned Abbas on Friday not to fall into the "trap of negotiations". But Kerry heard encouraging words from Israeli President Shimon Peres over a two-hour Friday night dinner following the meeting with Netanyahu. Peres now holds a largely ceremonial role but was identified with the peace process while prime minister. The nearly 90-year-old Peres, welcoming Kerry at his official residence full of memorabilia from the decades-old peace process, acknowledged that "it is difficult, there are many problems" in moving forward. "But as far as I'm concerned I can see how (among) people, there is a clear majority for the peace process, a two-state solution, and a great expectation that you will do it and that you can do it," Peres told him.

<h4>(__) <strong>Kerry is key player in talks. </h4><p>AFP, 2013</p><p></strong>(“Kerry cancels UAE stop to focus on Middle East peace” AFP: June 29, 2013</p><p>http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/news/kerry-cancels-uae-stop-to-focus-on-middle-east-peace_16120) KH</p><p><u><strong>Netanyahu has rejected such "pre-conditions" but insists he remains ready to talk</u></strong>.</p><p>One idea floated is for Israel to agree not to announce new settlement construction but to make the commitment informally -- reducing the risk of revolt in Netanyahu's largely right-wing governing coalition.</p><p>Economy Minister Naftali Bennett, who heads the far-right Jewish Home party, recently described the Palestinian issue as "shrapnel in the buttocks" -- a problem Israel simply had to keep suffering through -- but threatened to quit if the government agreed to a Palestinian state.</p><p>Abbas, whose rule is effectively confined to the West Bank, also faces Palestinian divisions.</p><p><u><strong>Ismail Haniya, the Gaza-based prime minister of the rival Hamas movement, warned Abbas on Friday not to fall into the "trap of negotiations".</p><p></u></strong>But <u><strong>Kerry heard encouraging words from Israeli President</u></strong> Shimon Peres <u><strong>over a two-hour Friday night dinner following the meeting with Netanyahu.</p><p></u></strong>Peres now holds a largely ceremonial role but was identified with the peace process while prime minister.</p><p>The nearly 90-year-old <u><strong>Peres, welcoming Kerry at his official residence full of memorabilia from the decades-old peace process, acknowledged that "it is difficult, there are many problems" in moving forward.</p><p></u></strong>"<u><strong>But</u></strong> as far as I'm concerned I can see how (among) people, <u><strong>there is a clear majority for the peace process, a two-state solution, and a great expectation that you will do it and that you can do it," Peres told him.</p></u></strong>

AFP, 2013

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: AFP, 2013 fulltext: (“Kerry cancels UAE stop to focus on Middle East peace” AFP: June 29, 2013 http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/news/kerry-cancels-uae-stop-to-focus-on-middle-east-peace_16120) KH Netanyahu has rejected such "pre-conditions" but insists he remains ready to talk. One idea floated is for Israel to agree not to announce new settlement construction but to make the commitment informally -- reducing the risk of revolt in Netanyahu's largely right-wing governing coalition. Economy Minister Naftali Bennett, who heads the far-right Jewish Home party, recently described the Palestinian issue as "shrapnel in the buttocks" -- a problem Israel simply had to keep suffering through -- but threatened to quit if the government agreed to a Palestinian state. Abbas, whose rule is effectively confined to the West Bank, also faces Palestinian divisions. Ismail Haniya, the Gaza-based prime minister of the rival Hamas movement, warned Abbas on Friday not to fall into the "trap of negotiations". But Kerry heard encouraging words from Israeli President Shimon Peres over a two-hour Friday night dinner following the meeting with Netanyahu. Peres now holds a largely ceremonial role but was identified with the peace process while prime minister. The nearly 90-year-old Peres, welcoming Kerry at his official residence full of memorabilia from the decades-old peace process, acknowledged that "it is difficult, there are many problems" in moving forward. "But as far as I'm concerned I can see how (among) people, there is a clear majority for the peace process, a two-state solution, and a great expectation that you will do it and that you can do it," Peres told him. [/INST] <h4>(__) <strong>Kerry is key player in talks. </h4><p>AFP, 2013</p><p></strong>(“Kerry cancels UAE stop to focus on Middle East peace” AFP: June 29, 2013</p><p>http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/news/kerry-cancels-uae-stop-to-focus-on-middle-east-peace_16120) KH</p><p><u><strong>Netanyahu has rejected such "pre-conditions" but insists he remains ready to talk</u></strong>.</p><p>One idea floated is for Israel to agree not to announce new settlement construction but to make the commitment informally -- reducing the risk of revolt in Netanyahu's largely right-wing governing coalition.</p><p>Economy Minister Naftali Bennett, who heads the far-right Jewish Home party, recently described the Palestinian issue as "shrapnel in the buttocks" -- a problem Israel simply had to keep suffering through -- but threatened to quit if the government agreed to a Palestinian state.</p><p>Abbas, whose rule is effectively confined to the West Bank, also faces Palestinian divisions.</p><p><u><strong>Ismail Haniya, the Gaza-based prime minister of the rival Hamas movement, warned Abbas on Friday not to fall into the "trap of negotiations".</p><p></u></strong>But <u><strong>Kerry heard encouraging words from Israeli President</u></strong> Shimon Peres <u><strong>over a two-hour Friday night dinner following the meeting with Netanyahu.</p><p></u></strong>Peres now holds a largely ceremonial role but was identified with the peace process while prime minister.</p><p>The nearly 90-year-old <u><strong>Peres, welcoming Kerry at his official residence full of memorabilia from the decades-old peace process, acknowledged that "it is difficult, there are many problems" in moving forward.</p><p></u></strong>"<u><strong>But</u></strong> as far as I'm concerned I can see how (among) people, <u><strong>there is a clear majority for the peace process, a two-state solution, and a great expectation that you will do it and that you can do it," Peres told him.</p></u></strong> </s>

Its means the actor of the resolution must be singular

] Using grammatical rules, the term "its can only apply to the nation or federal zone, but not to the 50 States because the 50 States are plural).

[Mitch, memo to John Alden, "Sovereignty and the Matrix," http://www.supremelaw.org/copyrite/deoxy.org/fz/p.htm, mss] There are three official definitions of "United States", only two of which are singular nouns (the nation and the federal zone). Using grammatical rules, the term "its jurisdiction" can only apply to the nation or to the federal zone, but not to the 50 States (because the 50 States are plural).

<h4>Its means the actor of the resolution must be singular</h4><p><u><strong>Modeleski</u></strong>, Account for Better Citizenship founder, 5-28-19<u><strong>92</u></strong> </p><p>[Mitch, memo to John Alden, "Sovereignty and the Matrix," http://www.supremelaw.org/copyrite/deoxy.org/fz/p.htm, mss<u>] </p><p></u>There are three official definitions of "United States", only two of which are singular nouns (the nation and the federal zone). <u>Using grammatical rules, the term "its</u> jurisdiction" <u>can only apply to the nation or</u> to the <u>federal zone, but not to the 50 States</u> (<u>because the 50 States are plural).</p></u>

Modeleski, Account for Better Citizenship founder, 5-28-1992

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Modeleski, Account for Better Citizenship founder, 5-28-1992 fulltext: [Mitch, memo to John Alden, "Sovereignty and the Matrix," http://www.supremelaw.org/copyrite/deoxy.org/fz/p.htm, mss] There are three official definitions of "United States", only two of which are singular nouns (the nation and the federal zone). Using grammatical rules, the term "its jurisdiction" can only apply to the nation or to the federal zone, but not to the 50 States (because the 50 States are plural). [/INST] <h4>Its means the actor of the resolution must be singular</h4><p><u><strong>Modeleski</u></strong>, Account for Better Citizenship founder, 5-28-19<u><strong>92</u></strong> </p><p>[Mitch, memo to John Alden, "Sovereignty and the Matrix," http://www.supremelaw.org/copyrite/deoxy.org/fz/p.htm, mss<u>] </p><p></u>There are three official definitions of "United States", only two of which are singular nouns (the nation and the federal zone). <u>Using grammatical rules, the term "its</u> jurisdiction" <u>can only apply to the nation or</u> to the <u>federal zone, but not to the 50 States</u> (<u>because the 50 States are plural).</p></u> </s>

Low oil prices makes Russia more aggressive

Especially for Russia, where OAO Gazprom is beginning to map the contours of its coming decline falling oil prices can deliver a hard blow to the Putin Empire This could possibly be to the extent of "tweaking" the tail of the Russian bear by one turn too much, making it especially aggressive A big cut in its oil revenues at a time when gas prices are under sure and certain threat - if a couple of years ahead - and commodity prices outside the energy sector are set to decline, spells big trouble for Russia's national finances, the economy, and Putin's now troubled and contested leadership

falling oil can deliver a hard blow to the Putin Empire This could be tweaking" the Russian bear too much, making it especially aggressive A big cut in revenues spells big trouble for Russia's finances and Putin's contested leadership

It however sets the real panic-price level for Saudi Arabia and Russia, and identifies why they will take avoiding action much further up the price scale: from US$75 per barrel. Especially for Russia, where OAO Gazprom is beginning to map the contours of its coming decline - rather than looking at the future, not liking it, and saying it doesn't exist - falling oil prices and falling gas prices can deliver a hard blow to the Putin Empire. This could possibly be to the extent of "tweaking" the tail of the Russian bear by one turn too much, making it especially aggressive. Saudi Arabia's oil price sensitivity, claimed by Saudi braggers to be so low it doesn't exist, has climbed so high and far from the long-dead days of Saudi claims that it can live with oil at $35, that figures near US$60 or even 70 per barrel can be taken seriously. Plenty of other OPEC states, measuring their oil price sensitivity relative to their national budgets, debt servicing, and oil sector development financing, are right up at the $75 plimsoll line. Facing the producers however, the world's biggest oil consumer, the US is now sitting on more oil supplies than it has had since 1990. This coincides with the US having its weakest oil demand for 15 years - and at most only fractional growth prospects. Other OECD oil consumers are using ever less oil, especially the European group which is showing its sixth year of oil demand contraction at a 6-year average rate of 2.5% each year. To be sure this is powerfully driven by recession, but is also aided by growing energy efficiency and accelerating changes in the energy economy, shown by the ever growing GDP output from each barrel that is spent or used. Another acid test for "the right price" of oil is coming from the trader community itself: in highly predictable fashion, the slump in oil prices has coincided with a steep selloff in oil futures contracts over the last three months. According to the US market watchdog agency the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) speculators have cut their net-long positions—their bets that the price will rise—to the equivalent of 136 million barrels of oil, the lowest since September 2010, and the exact opposite to the vast binge of speculative buying that preceded. At the time, things were good for net-long speculators: there was still some mileage in the Iran nuclear crisis, despite its antique status, but above all global oil demand seemed to be recovering. The result was a six-month bull run that is now history. With the speculators out of the market, prices will tend to more easily reflect supply-demand fundamentals, not a screen shot from Goldman Sach's trading programs, with the near certain readout that oil prices can or should decline all through summer. That however depends on how fast and how far price fall this summer. SAUDI AND RUSSIAN REARGUARD ACTION Current price trends are already running faster than market analysts and gurus cared to imagine, with many of their forecasts still set at Brent prices softening to around US$90 per barrel by September, and West Texas Intermediate possibly falling to as low as US$80 by the same date. Saudi and Russian reaction will therefore tend to be jumpstarted by prices softening faster than predicted. The unlikely alliance and unholy (or uncoranic) couple of Russia and KSA will almost certainly and quite rapidly be squealing. Their fears are easy to understand: nothing particularly prevents oil prices slumping to US$60 per barrel - consumers would find no special problems in accepting oil at that price, even if the economic benefits of cheap oil have been drastically exaggerated for decades. Cheap oil is in fact a producer problem, not a consumer problem, and both of the strange couple have problems. Of the two biggest producers, Russia has the largest problems accepting prices much below $75 per barrel and staying there. A big cut in its oil revenues at a time when gas prices are under sure and certain threat - if a couple of years ahead - and commodity prices outside the energy sector are set to decline, spells big trouble for Russia's national finances, the economy, and Putin's now troubled and contested leadership. For Russia, a Middle East conflagration of the type that his favourite local dictator, Bashr el Assad is threatening would be a welcome oil price booster. Defending el Assad will be an interesting test for Putin: if he lets the war criminal drop, oil prices will soften even further.

<h4>Low oil prices makes Russia more aggressive</h4><p><strong><mark>MCKILLOP ’12</strong></mark> - an energy and natural resource sector economist; consultant; held posts in the Canada Science Council, the ILO, European Commission, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and South Pacific, and the World Bank (McKillop, Andrew. “Waiting For Russia And Saudi Arabia: Crude Oil Prices Will Fall”. June 26, 2012. http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article35327.html)</p><p>It however sets the real panic-price level for Saudi Arabia and Russia, and identifies why they will take avoiding action much further up the price scale: from US$75 per barrel. <u>Especially for Russia, where OAO Gazprom is beginning to map the contours of its coming decline</u> - rather than looking at the future, not liking it, and saying it doesn't exist - <u><mark>falling oil</mark> prices</u> and falling gas prices <u><mark>can deliver a hard blow to the Putin Empire</u></mark>. <u><mark>This could</mark> possibly <mark>be</mark> to the extent of "<mark>tweaking" the</mark> tail of the <mark>Russian bear</mark> by one turn <mark>too much, making it <strong>especially aggressive</u></strong></mark>. Saudi Arabia's oil price sensitivity, claimed by Saudi braggers to be so low it doesn't exist, has climbed so high and far from the long-dead days of Saudi claims that it can live with oil at $35, that figures near US$60 or even 70 per barrel can be taken seriously. Plenty of other OPEC states, measuring their oil price sensitivity relative to their national budgets, debt servicing, and oil sector development financing, are right up at the $75 plimsoll line. Facing the producers however, the world's biggest oil consumer, the US is now sitting on more oil supplies than it has had since 1990. This coincides with the US having its weakest oil demand for 15 years - and at most only fractional growth prospects. Other OECD oil consumers are using ever less oil, especially the European group which is showing its sixth year of oil demand contraction at a 6-year average rate of 2.5% each year. To be sure this is powerfully driven by recession, but is also aided by growing energy efficiency and accelerating changes in the energy economy, shown by the ever growing GDP output from each barrel that is spent or used. Another acid test for "the right price" of oil is coming from the trader community itself: in highly predictable fashion, the slump in oil prices has coincided with a steep selloff in oil futures contracts over the last three months. According to the US market watchdog agency the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) speculators have cut their net-long positions—their bets that the price will rise—to the equivalent of 136 million barrels of oil, the lowest since September 2010, and the exact opposite to the vast binge of speculative buying that preceded. At the time, things were good for net-long speculators: there was still some mileage in the Iran nuclear crisis, despite its antique status, but above all global oil demand seemed to be recovering. The result was a six-month bull run that is now history. With the speculators out of the market, prices will tend to more easily reflect supply-demand fundamentals, not a screen shot from Goldman Sach's trading programs, with the near certain readout that oil prices can or should decline all through summer. That however depends on how fast and how far price fall this summer. SAUDI AND RUSSIAN REARGUARD ACTION Current price trends are already running faster than market analysts and gurus cared to imagine, with many of their forecasts still set at Brent prices softening to around US$90 per barrel by September, and West Texas Intermediate possibly falling to as low as US$80 by the same date. Saudi and Russian reaction will therefore tend to be jumpstarted by prices softening faster than predicted. The unlikely alliance and unholy (or uncoranic) couple of Russia and KSA will almost certainly and quite rapidly be squealing. Their fears are easy to understand: nothing particularly prevents oil prices slumping to US$60 per barrel - consumers would find no special problems in accepting oil at that price, even if the economic benefits of cheap oil have been drastically exaggerated for decades. Cheap oil is in fact a producer problem, not a consumer problem, and both of the strange couple have problems. Of the two biggest producers, Russia has the largest problems accepting prices much below $75 per barrel and staying there. <u><mark>A big cut in</mark> its oil <mark>revenues</mark> at a time when gas prices are under sure and certain threat - if a couple of years ahead - and commodity prices outside the energy sector are set to decline, <mark>spells big trouble for Russia's</mark> national <mark>finances</mark>, the economy, <strong><mark>and Putin's</strong></mark> now troubled and <strong><mark>contested leadership</u></strong></mark>. For Russia, a Middle East conflagration of the type that his favourite local dictator, Bashr el Assad is threatening would be a welcome oil price booster. Defending el Assad will be an interesting test for Putin: if he lets the war criminal drop, oil prices will soften even further.</p>

MCKILLOP ’12 - an energy and natural resource sector economist; consultant; held posts in the Canada Science Council, the ILO, European Commission, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and South Pacific, and the World Bank (McKillop, Andrew. “Waiting For Russia And Saudi Arabia: Crude Oil Prices Will Fall”. June 26, 2012. http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article35327.html)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: MCKILLOP ’12 - an energy and natural resource sector economist; consultant; held posts in the Canada Science Council, the ILO, European Commission, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and South Pacific, and the World Bank (McKillop, Andrew. “Waiting For Russia And Saudi Arabia: Crude Oil Prices Will Fall”. June 26, 2012. http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article35327.html) fulltext: It however sets the real panic-price level for Saudi Arabia and Russia, and identifies why they will take avoiding action much further up the price scale: from US$75 per barrel. Especially for Russia, where OAO Gazprom is beginning to map the contours of its coming decline - rather than looking at the future, not liking it, and saying it doesn't exist - falling oil prices and falling gas prices can deliver a hard blow to the Putin Empire. This could possibly be to the extent of "tweaking" the tail of the Russian bear by one turn too much, making it especially aggressive. Saudi Arabia's oil price sensitivity, claimed by Saudi braggers to be so low it doesn't exist, has climbed so high and far from the long-dead days of Saudi claims that it can live with oil at $35, that figures near US$60 or even 70 per barrel can be taken seriously. Plenty of other OPEC states, measuring their oil price sensitivity relative to their national budgets, debt servicing, and oil sector development financing, are right up at the $75 plimsoll line. Facing the producers however, the world's biggest oil consumer, the US is now sitting on more oil supplies than it has had since 1990. This coincides with the US having its weakest oil demand for 15 years - and at most only fractional growth prospects. Other OECD oil consumers are using ever less oil, especially the European group which is showing its sixth year of oil demand contraction at a 6-year average rate of 2.5% each year. To be sure this is powerfully driven by recession, but is also aided by growing energy efficiency and accelerating changes in the energy economy, shown by the ever growing GDP output from each barrel that is spent or used. Another acid test for "the right price" of oil is coming from the trader community itself: in highly predictable fashion, the slump in oil prices has coincided with a steep selloff in oil futures contracts over the last three months. According to the US market watchdog agency the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) speculators have cut their net-long positions—their bets that the price will rise—to the equivalent of 136 million barrels of oil, the lowest since September 2010, and the exact opposite to the vast binge of speculative buying that preceded. At the time, things were good for net-long speculators: there was still some mileage in the Iran nuclear crisis, despite its antique status, but above all global oil demand seemed to be recovering. The result was a six-month bull run that is now history. With the speculators out of the market, prices will tend to more easily reflect supply-demand fundamentals, not a screen shot from Goldman Sach's trading programs, with the near certain readout that oil prices can or should decline all through summer. That however depends on how fast and how far price fall this summer. SAUDI AND RUSSIAN REARGUARD ACTION Current price trends are already running faster than market analysts and gurus cared to imagine, with many of their forecasts still set at Brent prices softening to around US$90 per barrel by September, and West Texas Intermediate possibly falling to as low as US$80 by the same date. Saudi and Russian reaction will therefore tend to be jumpstarted by prices softening faster than predicted. The unlikely alliance and unholy (or uncoranic) couple of Russia and KSA will almost certainly and quite rapidly be squealing. Their fears are easy to understand: nothing particularly prevents oil prices slumping to US$60 per barrel - consumers would find no special problems in accepting oil at that price, even if the economic benefits of cheap oil have been drastically exaggerated for decades. Cheap oil is in fact a producer problem, not a consumer problem, and both of the strange couple have problems. Of the two biggest producers, Russia has the largest problems accepting prices much below $75 per barrel and staying there. A big cut in its oil revenues at a time when gas prices are under sure and certain threat - if a couple of years ahead - and commodity prices outside the energy sector are set to decline, spells big trouble for Russia's national finances, the economy, and Putin's now troubled and contested leadership. For Russia, a Middle East conflagration of the type that his favourite local dictator, Bashr el Assad is threatening would be a welcome oil price booster. Defending el Assad will be an interesting test for Putin: if he lets the war criminal drop, oil prices will soften even further. [/INST] <h4>Low oil prices makes Russia more aggressive</h4><p><strong><mark>MCKILLOP ’12</strong></mark> - an energy and natural resource sector economist; consultant; held posts in the Canada Science Council, the ILO, European Commission, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and South Pacific, and the World Bank (McKillop, Andrew. “Waiting For Russia And Saudi Arabia: Crude Oil Prices Will Fall”. June 26, 2012. http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article35327.html)</p><p>It however sets the real panic-price level for Saudi Arabia and Russia, and identifies why they will take avoiding action much further up the price scale: from US$75 per barrel. <u>Especially for Russia, where OAO Gazprom is beginning to map the contours of its coming decline</u> - rather than looking at the future, not liking it, and saying it doesn't exist - <u><mark>falling oil</mark> prices</u> and falling gas prices <u><mark>can deliver a hard blow to the Putin Empire</u></mark>. <u><mark>This could</mark> possibly <mark>be</mark> to the extent of "<mark>tweaking" the</mark> tail of the <mark>Russian bear</mark> by one turn <mark>too much, making it <strong>especially aggressive</u></strong></mark>. Saudi Arabia's oil price sensitivity, claimed by Saudi braggers to be so low it doesn't exist, has climbed so high and far from the long-dead days of Saudi claims that it can live with oil at $35, that figures near US$60 or even 70 per barrel can be taken seriously. Plenty of other OPEC states, measuring their oil price sensitivity relative to their national budgets, debt servicing, and oil sector development financing, are right up at the $75 plimsoll line. Facing the producers however, the world's biggest oil consumer, the US is now sitting on more oil supplies than it has had since 1990. This coincides with the US having its weakest oil demand for 15 years - and at most only fractional growth prospects. Other OECD oil consumers are using ever less oil, especially the European group which is showing its sixth year of oil demand contraction at a 6-year average rate of 2.5% each year. To be sure this is powerfully driven by recession, but is also aided by growing energy efficiency and accelerating changes in the energy economy, shown by the ever growing GDP output from each barrel that is spent or used. Another acid test for "the right price" of oil is coming from the trader community itself: in highly predictable fashion, the slump in oil prices has coincided with a steep selloff in oil futures contracts over the last three months. According to the US market watchdog agency the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) speculators have cut their net-long positions—their bets that the price will rise—to the equivalent of 136 million barrels of oil, the lowest since September 2010, and the exact opposite to the vast binge of speculative buying that preceded. At the time, things were good for net-long speculators: there was still some mileage in the Iran nuclear crisis, despite its antique status, but above all global oil demand seemed to be recovering. The result was a six-month bull run that is now history. With the speculators out of the market, prices will tend to more easily reflect supply-demand fundamentals, not a screen shot from Goldman Sach's trading programs, with the near certain readout that oil prices can or should decline all through summer. That however depends on how fast and how far price fall this summer. SAUDI AND RUSSIAN REARGUARD ACTION Current price trends are already running faster than market analysts and gurus cared to imagine, with many of their forecasts still set at Brent prices softening to around US$90 per barrel by September, and West Texas Intermediate possibly falling to as low as US$80 by the same date. Saudi and Russian reaction will therefore tend to be jumpstarted by prices softening faster than predicted. The unlikely alliance and unholy (or uncoranic) couple of Russia and KSA will almost certainly and quite rapidly be squealing. Their fears are easy to understand: nothing particularly prevents oil prices slumping to US$60 per barrel - consumers would find no special problems in accepting oil at that price, even if the economic benefits of cheap oil have been drastically exaggerated for decades. Cheap oil is in fact a producer problem, not a consumer problem, and both of the strange couple have problems. Of the two biggest producers, Russia has the largest problems accepting prices much below $75 per barrel and staying there. <u><mark>A big cut in</mark> its oil <mark>revenues</mark> at a time when gas prices are under sure and certain threat - if a couple of years ahead - and commodity prices outside the energy sector are set to decline, <mark>spells big trouble for Russia's</mark> national <mark>finances</mark>, the economy, <strong><mark>and Putin's</strong></mark> now troubled and <strong><mark>contested leadership</u></strong></mark>. For Russia, a Middle East conflagration of the type that his favourite local dictator, Bashr el Assad is threatening would be a welcome oil price booster. Defending el Assad will be an interesting test for Putin: if he lets the war criminal drop, oil prices will soften even further.</p> </s>

Cuba doesn’t sponsor terrorism and saying that it does hampers important counter-terrorism efforts

Cuba was added to the terrorist list on the grounds that the Cuban government supported armed revolution in the Americas Although many who advocate for keeping Cuba on the terrorist list today admit that the original justification no longer makes sense, they allege that Cuba harbors Basque ETA members, Colombian FARC and ELN members, and U.S. fugitives from justice. That position is increasingly difficult to defend. In the past year, Cuba has played a constructive role in the peace talks between Colombia and the FARC The United States has a strategic interest in the success of these talks, and the State Department has stated that it is "supportive" of the peace process. Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorist list at a time in which it is instrumental in brokering peace negotiations for one of the United States' closest allies makes U.S. foreign policy appear contradictory, if not incoherent.

In 1982, Cuba was added to the terrorist list on the grounds that the Cuban government supported armed revolution in the Americas. Although many who advocate for keeping Cuba on the terrorist list today admit that the original justification no longer makes sense, they allege that Cuba harbors Basque ETA members, Colombian FARC and ELN members, and U.S. fugitives from justice. That position is increasingly difficult to defend. In the past year, Cuba has played a constructive role in the peace talks between Colombia and the FARC that are being held in Havana. The United States has a strategic interest in the success of these talks, and the State Department has stated that it is "supportive" of the peace process. Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorist list at a time in which it is instrumental in brokering peace negotiations for one of the United States' closest allies makes U.S. foreign policy appear contradictory, if not incoherent.

<h4>Cuba doesn’t sponsor terrorism and saying that it does hampers important counter-terrorism efforts</h4><p>Geoff <strong>Thale</strong>, Washington Office on Latin America’s Program Director and has traveled to Cuba more than a dozen times including organizing delegations of academics and members of Congress, <strong>and </strong>Clay <strong>Boggs</strong>, WOLA’s Program Officer for Cuba and for Rights and Development, <strong>3/5</strong>/13, “Cuba and the Terrorist List” <u><strong>http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_and_the_terrorist_list</p><p></u></strong>In 1982, <u><strong>Cuba was added to the terrorist list on the grounds that the Cuban government supported armed revolution in the Americas</u></strong>. <u><strong>Although many who advocate for keeping Cuba on the terrorist list today admit that the original justification no longer makes sense, they allege that Cuba harbors Basque ETA members, Colombian FARC and ELN members, and U.S. fugitives from justice. That position is increasingly difficult to defend. In the past year, Cuba has played a constructive role in the peace talks between Colombia and the FARC</u></strong> that are being held in Havana. <u><strong>The United States has a strategic interest in the success of these talks, and the State Department has stated that it is "supportive" of the peace process. Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorist list at a time in which it is instrumental in brokering peace negotiations for one of the United States' closest allies makes U.S. foreign policy appear contradictory, if not incoherent.</p></u></strong>

Geoff Thale, Washington Office on Latin America’s Program Director and has traveled to Cuba more than a dozen times including organizing delegations of academics and members of Congress, and Clay Boggs, WOLA’s Program Officer for Cuba and for Rights and Development, 3/5/13, “Cuba and the Terrorist List” http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_and_the_terrorist_list

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Geoff Thale, Washington Office on Latin America’s Program Director and has traveled to Cuba more than a dozen times including organizing delegations of academics and members of Congress, and Clay Boggs, WOLA’s Program Officer for Cuba and for Rights and Development, 3/5/13, “Cuba and the Terrorist List” http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_and_the_terrorist_list fulltext: In 1982, Cuba was added to the terrorist list on the grounds that the Cuban government supported armed revolution in the Americas. Although many who advocate for keeping Cuba on the terrorist list today admit that the original justification no longer makes sense, they allege that Cuba harbors Basque ETA members, Colombian FARC and ELN members, and U.S. fugitives from justice. That position is increasingly difficult to defend. In the past year, Cuba has played a constructive role in the peace talks between Colombia and the FARC that are being held in Havana. The United States has a strategic interest in the success of these talks, and the State Department has stated that it is "supportive" of the peace process. Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorist list at a time in which it is instrumental in brokering peace negotiations for one of the United States' closest allies makes U.S. foreign policy appear contradictory, if not incoherent. [/INST] <h4>Cuba doesn’t sponsor terrorism and saying that it does hampers important counter-terrorism efforts</h4><p>Geoff <strong>Thale</strong>, Washington Office on Latin America’s Program Director and has traveled to Cuba more than a dozen times including organizing delegations of academics and members of Congress, <strong>and </strong>Clay <strong>Boggs</strong>, WOLA’s Program Officer for Cuba and for Rights and Development, <strong>3/5</strong>/13, “Cuba and the Terrorist List” <u><strong>http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_and_the_terrorist_list</p><p></u></strong>In 1982, <u><strong>Cuba was added to the terrorist list on the grounds that the Cuban government supported armed revolution in the Americas</u></strong>. <u><strong>Although many who advocate for keeping Cuba on the terrorist list today admit that the original justification no longer makes sense, they allege that Cuba harbors Basque ETA members, Colombian FARC and ELN members, and U.S. fugitives from justice. That position is increasingly difficult to defend. In the past year, Cuba has played a constructive role in the peace talks between Colombia and the FARC</u></strong> that are being held in Havana. <u><strong>The United States has a strategic interest in the success of these talks, and the State Department has stated that it is "supportive" of the peace process. Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorist list at a time in which it is instrumental in brokering peace negotiations for one of the United States' closest allies makes U.S. foreign policy appear contradictory, if not incoherent.</p></u></strong> </s>

Strong OAS is key to democracy promotion and conflict prevention

the OAS has taken an active role in defending threats to democracy in the Western Hemisphere the UPD sent 60 observation missions throughout the region to ensure the fairness and transparency of electoral processes the OAS has employed a combination of technical assistance through the UPD, high-level missions, conflict resolution techniques, multilateral diplomacy, and, multilateral sanctions, in order to respond to democratic crises in countries such as Bolivia, Haiti, Venezuela, and Nicaragua

the OAS has taken an active role in¶ defending threats to democracy in the Western Hemisphere the UPD sent 60 observation missions¶ throughout the region to ensure the fairness and transparency of electoral processes the OAS has employed¶ a combination of technical assistance through the UPD, high-level missions, conflict¶ resolution techniques, multilateral diplomacy, and, multilateral sanctions, in order to¶ respond to democratic crises in countries such as Bolivia, Haiti, Venezuela, and Nicaragua

Promotion of Democracy. Since 1990, the OAS has taken an active role in¶ defending threats to democracy in the Western Hemisphere. In 1990, the OAS created¶ the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now part of the Department for¶ Democratic and Political Affairs, to assist its member states in strengthening democratic¶ institutions and processes. Between 1994 and 2004, the UPD sent 60 observation missions¶ throughout the region to ensure the fairness and transparency of electoral processes. In¶ 2000, the UPD declared Peru’s presidential election to be illegitimate and sent a HighLevel Mission to Peru led by Sec. Gaviria to help resolve the country’s democratic crisis.9¶ In 1991, the OAS adopted resolution 1080, or the “Santiago Commitment,”¶ instructing the Secretary General to convoke the Permanent Council or the General¶ Assembly in the event of “a sudden or irregular interruption”of the democratic process¶ in a member state, and to act to resolve that conflict. In 1992, the OAS ratified the¶ Washington Protocol to the OAS Charter, becoming the first regional political¶ organization to allow suspension of a member state in the event that its democratically¶ elected government is overthrown by force. The OAS has yet to invoke the Washington¶ Protocol. Before resolution 1080 was superseded in 2001, the OAS limited its use to four¶ instances in which either a military coup, self-coup by an elected President, or severe¶ civil-military crisis occurred. Some observers have criticized the OAS’s failure to invoke¶ resolution 1080 more frequently as in the case of a successful coup against Jamil Mahuad¶ in Ecuador in 2000.10 Others have noted that even in cases when the OAS did act under¶ resolution 1080, such as Paraguay in 1996, its delayed response was of limited¶ consequence.11 On September 11, 2001, the OAS adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter¶ (IADC). The IADC broadens the mandate of resolution 1080 and states that the OAS¶ will respond to any democratic crisis that involves an “unconstitutional alteration of the¶ constitutional regime”of one of its member states.12 Since 2001, the OAS has employed¶ a combination of technical assistance through the UPD, high-level missions, conflict¶ resolution techniques, multilateral diplomacy, and, multilateral sanctions, in order to¶ respond to democratic crises in countries such as Bolivia, Haiti, Venezuela, and, more¶ recently, Nicaragua. In April 2002, the IADC was invoked when the OAS condemned¶ the “alteration of the constitutional order” in Venezuela that temporarily forced President¶ Chavez from power.13 Although it was utilized in the case of Venezuela, the IADC has¶ been criticized for being vague in defining what conditions constitute a violation of its¶ principles. Those conditions need to be clearly defined, former President Jimmy Carter¶ has said, and automatic responses developed that would help the OAS deal with common¶ violations of the Charter.14

<h4>Strong OAS is key to democracy promotion and conflict prevention</h4><p><strong>Ribando ’05</strong> [Clare Ribando, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service, “Organization of American States: A Primer,” May, <u>http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22095.pdf</u>]</p><p>Promotion of Democracy. Since 1990, <u><mark>the OAS has taken an active role in</u>¶<u> defending threats to democracy in the Western Hemisphere</u></mark>. In 1990, the OAS created¶ the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now part of the Department for¶ Democratic and Political Affairs, to assist its member states in strengthening democratic¶ institutions and processes. Between 1994 and 2004, <u><mark>the UPD sent 60 observation missions</u>¶<u> throughout the region to ensure the fairness and transparency of electoral processes</u></mark>. In¶ 2000, the UPD declared Peru’s presidential election to be illegitimate and sent a HighLevel Mission to Peru led by Sec. Gaviria to help resolve the country’s democratic crisis.9¶ In 1991, the OAS adopted resolution 1080, or the “Santiago Commitment,”¶ instructing the Secretary General to convoke the Permanent Council or the General¶ Assembly in the event of “a sudden or irregular interruption”of the democratic process¶ in a member state, and to act to resolve that conflict. In 1992, the OAS ratified the¶ Washington Protocol to the OAS Charter, becoming the first regional political¶ organization to allow suspension of a member state in the event that its democratically¶ elected government is overthrown by force. The OAS has yet to invoke the Washington¶ Protocol. Before resolution 1080 was superseded in 2001, the OAS limited its use to four¶ instances in which either a military coup, self-coup by an elected President, or severe¶ civil-military crisis occurred. Some observers have criticized the OAS’s failure to invoke¶ resolution 1080 more frequently as in the case of a successful coup against Jamil Mahuad¶ in Ecuador in 2000.10 Others have noted that even in cases when the OAS did act under¶ resolution 1080, such as Paraguay in 1996, its delayed response was of limited¶ consequence.11 On September 11, 2001, the OAS adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter¶ (IADC). The IADC broadens the mandate of resolution 1080 and states that the OAS¶ will respond to any democratic crisis that involves an “unconstitutional alteration of the¶ constitutional regime”of one of its member states.12 Since 2001, <u><mark>the OAS has employed</u>¶<u> a combination of technical assistance through the UPD, high-level missions, conflict</u>¶<u> resolution techniques, multilateral diplomacy, and, multilateral sanctions, in order to</u>¶<u> respond to democratic crises in countries such as Bolivia, Haiti, Venezuela, and</u></mark>, more¶ recently, <u><mark>Nicaragua</u></mark>. In April 2002, the IADC was invoked when the OAS condemned¶ the “alteration of the constitutional order” in Venezuela that temporarily forced President¶ Chavez from power.13 Although it was utilized in the case of Venezuela, the IADC has¶ been criticized for being vague in defining what conditions constitute a violation of its¶ principles. Those conditions need to be clearly defined, former President Jimmy Carter¶ has said, and automatic responses developed that would help the OAS deal with common¶ violations of the Charter.14</p>

Ribando ’05 [Clare Ribando, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service, “Organization of American States: A Primer,” May, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22095.pdf]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ribando ’05 [Clare Ribando, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service, “Organization of American States: A Primer,” May, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22095.pdf] fulltext: Promotion of Democracy. Since 1990, the OAS has taken an active role in¶ defending threats to democracy in the Western Hemisphere. In 1990, the OAS created¶ the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now part of the Department for¶ Democratic and Political Affairs, to assist its member states in strengthening democratic¶ institutions and processes. Between 1994 and 2004, the UPD sent 60 observation missions¶ throughout the region to ensure the fairness and transparency of electoral processes. In¶ 2000, the UPD declared Peru’s presidential election to be illegitimate and sent a HighLevel Mission to Peru led by Sec. Gaviria to help resolve the country’s democratic crisis.9¶ In 1991, the OAS adopted resolution 1080, or the “Santiago Commitment,”¶ instructing the Secretary General to convoke the Permanent Council or the General¶ Assembly in the event of “a sudden or irregular interruption”of the democratic process¶ in a member state, and to act to resolve that conflict. In 1992, the OAS ratified the¶ Washington Protocol to the OAS Charter, becoming the first regional political¶ organization to allow suspension of a member state in the event that its democratically¶ elected government is overthrown by force. The OAS has yet to invoke the Washington¶ Protocol. Before resolution 1080 was superseded in 2001, the OAS limited its use to four¶ instances in which either a military coup, self-coup by an elected President, or severe¶ civil-military crisis occurred. Some observers have criticized the OAS’s failure to invoke¶ resolution 1080 more frequently as in the case of a successful coup against Jamil Mahuad¶ in Ecuador in 2000.10 Others have noted that even in cases when the OAS did act under¶ resolution 1080, such as Paraguay in 1996, its delayed response was of limited¶ consequence.11 On September 11, 2001, the OAS adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter¶ (IADC). The IADC broadens the mandate of resolution 1080 and states that the OAS¶ will respond to any democratic crisis that involves an “unconstitutional alteration of the¶ constitutional regime”of one of its member states.12 Since 2001, the OAS has employed¶ a combination of technical assistance through the UPD, high-level missions, conflict¶ resolution techniques, multilateral diplomacy, and, multilateral sanctions, in order to¶ respond to democratic crises in countries such as Bolivia, Haiti, Venezuela, and, more¶ recently, Nicaragua. In April 2002, the IADC was invoked when the OAS condemned¶ the “alteration of the constitutional order” in Venezuela that temporarily forced President¶ Chavez from power.13 Although it was utilized in the case of Venezuela, the IADC has¶ been criticized for being vague in defining what conditions constitute a violation of its¶ principles. Those conditions need to be clearly defined, former President Jimmy Carter¶ has said, and automatic responses developed that would help the OAS deal with common¶ violations of the Charter.14 [/INST] <h4>Strong OAS is key to democracy promotion and conflict prevention</h4><p><strong>Ribando ’05</strong> [Clare Ribando, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service, “Organization of American States: A Primer,” May, <u>http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22095.pdf</u>]</p><p>Promotion of Democracy. Since 1990, <u><mark>the OAS has taken an active role in</u>¶<u> defending threats to democracy in the Western Hemisphere</u></mark>. In 1990, the OAS created¶ the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now part of the Department for¶ Democratic and Political Affairs, to assist its member states in strengthening democratic¶ institutions and processes. Between 1994 and 2004, <u><mark>the UPD sent 60 observation missions</u>¶<u> throughout the region to ensure the fairness and transparency of electoral processes</u></mark>. In¶ 2000, the UPD declared Peru’s presidential election to be illegitimate and sent a HighLevel Mission to Peru led by Sec. Gaviria to help resolve the country’s democratic crisis.9¶ In 1991, the OAS adopted resolution 1080, or the “Santiago Commitment,”¶ instructing the Secretary General to convoke the Permanent Council or the General¶ Assembly in the event of “a sudden or irregular interruption”of the democratic process¶ in a member state, and to act to resolve that conflict. In 1992, the OAS ratified the¶ Washington Protocol to the OAS Charter, becoming the first regional political¶ organization to allow suspension of a member state in the event that its democratically¶ elected government is overthrown by force. The OAS has yet to invoke the Washington¶ Protocol. Before resolution 1080 was superseded in 2001, the OAS limited its use to four¶ instances in which either a military coup, self-coup by an elected President, or severe¶ civil-military crisis occurred. Some observers have criticized the OAS’s failure to invoke¶ resolution 1080 more frequently as in the case of a successful coup against Jamil Mahuad¶ in Ecuador in 2000.10 Others have noted that even in cases when the OAS did act under¶ resolution 1080, such as Paraguay in 1996, its delayed response was of limited¶ consequence.11 On September 11, 2001, the OAS adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter¶ (IADC). The IADC broadens the mandate of resolution 1080 and states that the OAS¶ will respond to any democratic crisis that involves an “unconstitutional alteration of the¶ constitutional regime”of one of its member states.12 Since 2001, <u><mark>the OAS has employed</u>¶<u> a combination of technical assistance through the UPD, high-level missions, conflict</u>¶<u> resolution techniques, multilateral diplomacy, and, multilateral sanctions, in order to</u>¶<u> respond to democratic crises in countries such as Bolivia, Haiti, Venezuela, and</u></mark>, more¶ recently, <u><mark>Nicaragua</u></mark>. In April 2002, the IADC was invoked when the OAS condemned¶ the “alteration of the constitutional order” in Venezuela that temporarily forced President¶ Chavez from power.13 Although it was utilized in the case of Venezuela, the IADC has¶ been criticized for being vague in defining what conditions constitute a violation of its¶ principles. Those conditions need to be clearly defined, former President Jimmy Carter¶ has said, and automatic responses developed that would help the OAS deal with common¶ violations of the Charter.14</p> </s>

(__) Kerry is in non-stop meetings to broker the deal- any perceived failure would undo any future talks

The goal of the meetings is to persuade the two men to at least begin talks toward a sustainable two-state solution to the long-running­ conflict, with the hard work of actually negotiating an agreement still stretching far into the future Kerry has already postponed his departure from the Middle East The nonstop meetings have set off a frenzy of speculation in Israel, the West Bank and Jordan that Kerry may be able to broker a deal The rising expectations have also increased the likely magnitude of perceived failure in the event Kerry does not succeed Kerry and his aides appeared somber and exhausted. But the composition of the parties on both sides seemed to indicate that discussions had gone beyond generalities to technical specifics

[Karen DeYoung, Published: June 29, “Kerry extends marathon Mideast peace effort”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/kerry-extends-marathon-mideast-peace-effort/2013/06/29/34c1c478-e107-11e2-a63e-8d9380ed1f73_story.html, \\wyo-bb] The goal of the meetings is to persuade the two men to at least begin talks toward a sustainable two-state solution to the long-running­ conflict, with the hard work of actually negotiating an agreement still stretching far into the future. Although he is due to attend a meeting with foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the sultanate of Brunei that begins Monday, Kerry has already postponed his departure from the Middle East, originally scheduled for Saturday night, and canceled a stop in the United Arab Emirates. The nonstop meetings have set off a frenzy of speculation in Israel, the West Bank and Jordan that Kerry may be able to broker a deal, if not for an immediate Israel-Palestinian meeting, at least for a confirmed date for talks to start. The rising expectations, however, have also increased the likely magnitude of perceived failure in the event Kerry does not succeed. As they sat down for a private dinner Saturday night with Netanyahu’s team, Kerry and his aides appeared somber and exhausted. But the composition of the parties on both sides seemed to indicate that discussions had gone beyond generalities to technical specifics.

<h4>(__) <strong>Kerry is in non-stop meetings to broker the deal- any perceived failure would undo any future talks </h4><p>Deyoung 6/29</p><p></strong>[Karen DeYoung, Published: June 29, “Kerry extends marathon Mideast peace effort”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/kerry-extends-marathon-mideast-peace-effort/2013/06/29/34c1c478-e107-11e2-a63e-8d9380ed1f73_story.html, \\wyo-bb]</p><p><u><strong>The goal of the meetings is to persuade the two men to at least begin talks toward a sustainable two-state solution to the long-running­ conflict, with the hard work of actually negotiating an agreement still stretching far into the future</u></strong>. Although he is due to attend a meeting with foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the sultanate of Brunei that begins Monday, <u><strong>Kerry has already postponed his departure from the Middle East</u></strong>, originally scheduled for Saturday night, and canceled a stop in the United Arab Emirates. <u><strong>The nonstop meetings have set off a frenzy of speculation in Israel, the West Bank and Jordan that Kerry may be able to broker a deal</u></strong>, if not for an immediate Israel-Palestinian meeting, at least for a confirmed date for talks to start. <u><strong>The rising expectations</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>have also increased the likely magnitude of perceived failure in the event Kerry does not succeed</u></strong>. As they sat down for a private dinner Saturday night with Netanyahu’s team, <u><strong>Kerry and his aides appeared somber and exhausted. But the composition of the parties on both sides seemed to indicate that discussions had gone beyond generalities to technical specifics</u></strong>.</p>

Deyoung 6/29

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Deyoung 6/29 fulltext: [Karen DeYoung, Published: June 29, “Kerry extends marathon Mideast peace effort”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/kerry-extends-marathon-mideast-peace-effort/2013/06/29/34c1c478-e107-11e2-a63e-8d9380ed1f73_story.html, \\wyo-bb] The goal of the meetings is to persuade the two men to at least begin talks toward a sustainable two-state solution to the long-running­ conflict, with the hard work of actually negotiating an agreement still stretching far into the future. Although he is due to attend a meeting with foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the sultanate of Brunei that begins Monday, Kerry has already postponed his departure from the Middle East, originally scheduled for Saturday night, and canceled a stop in the United Arab Emirates. The nonstop meetings have set off a frenzy of speculation in Israel, the West Bank and Jordan that Kerry may be able to broker a deal, if not for an immediate Israel-Palestinian meeting, at least for a confirmed date for talks to start. The rising expectations, however, have also increased the likely magnitude of perceived failure in the event Kerry does not succeed. As they sat down for a private dinner Saturday night with Netanyahu’s team, Kerry and his aides appeared somber and exhausted. But the composition of the parties on both sides seemed to indicate that discussions had gone beyond generalities to technical specifics. [/INST] <h4>(__) <strong>Kerry is in non-stop meetings to broker the deal- any perceived failure would undo any future talks </h4><p>Deyoung 6/29</p><p></strong>[Karen DeYoung, Published: June 29, “Kerry extends marathon Mideast peace effort”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/kerry-extends-marathon-mideast-peace-effort/2013/06/29/34c1c478-e107-11e2-a63e-8d9380ed1f73_story.html, \\wyo-bb]</p><p><u><strong>The goal of the meetings is to persuade the two men to at least begin talks toward a sustainable two-state solution to the long-running­ conflict, with the hard work of actually negotiating an agreement still stretching far into the future</u></strong>. Although he is due to attend a meeting with foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the sultanate of Brunei that begins Monday, <u><strong>Kerry has already postponed his departure from the Middle East</u></strong>, originally scheduled for Saturday night, and canceled a stop in the United Arab Emirates. <u><strong>The nonstop meetings have set off a frenzy of speculation in Israel, the West Bank and Jordan that Kerry may be able to broker a deal</u></strong>, if not for an immediate Israel-Palestinian meeting, at least for a confirmed date for talks to start. <u><strong>The rising expectations</u></strong>, however, <u><strong>have also increased the likely magnitude of perceived failure in the event Kerry does not succeed</u></strong>. As they sat down for a private dinner Saturday night with Netanyahu’s team, <u><strong>Kerry and his aides appeared somber and exhausted. But the composition of the parties on both sides seemed to indicate that discussions had gone beyond generalities to technical specifics</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Resurgence of Russian nationalism triggers World War III

The most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside "enemy." Such steps would include Russia's denunciation of the commitment to n f u of nuclear weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) denunciation of the Biological Weapons Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50 million lives. economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe.

a "united Russia would seek a dictatorship and urgent military steps against the enemy Such steps would include denunciation of n f u suspension of START denunciation of the B W C and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force Hitler to "save" his country took only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war

The first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside "enemy." Such steps would include Russia's denunciation of the commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to ratify both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention; denunciation of the Biological Weapons Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons, a trend that is underway already. The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-NATO" deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members. One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50 million lives. I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." n10 In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe. n11 Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, "It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order's many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together." n12

<h4>Resurgence of Russian nationalism triggers World War III</h4><p><strong>Israelyan ’98</strong> Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly 1998 Winter" </p><p><u>The</u> first and by far <u>most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of <strong><mark>a "united</strong></mark> and undivided <strong><mark>Russia</strong></mark>," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many <strong><mark>would seek</strong></mark> to revive <strong><mark>a dictatorship and</strong></mark> take <strong><mark>urgent military</strong> <strong>steps</strong></mark> to mobilize the people <mark>against the</mark> outside "<mark>enemy</mark>." <mark>Such steps would include</mark> Russia's <mark>denunciation of</mark> the commitment to <mark>n</u></mark>o-<u><mark>f</u></mark>irst-<u><mark>u</u></mark>se<u> of nuclear weapons; <mark>suspension of</mark> the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (<mark>START</mark>) </u>I and refusal to ratify both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention;<u> <mark>denunciation of the B</mark>iological <mark>W</mark>eapons <mark>C</mark>onvention; <mark>and</mark> <mark>reinstatement of a full-scale armed force</mark>, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles</u> such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, <u>Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons</u>, a trend that is underway already. <u>The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries</u>, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even <u>the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure</u>. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-NATO" deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members. One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, <u>Adolf <strong><mark>Hitler</strong></mark> took it upon himself <strong><mark>to "save" his</strong></mark> <strong><mark>country</strong></mark>. It <strong><mark>took</strong></mark> the former corporal <strong><mark>only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war</strong></mark> that cost humanity more than 50 million lives.</u> I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that <u>economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons."</u> n10 In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that <u>Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe.</u> n11 Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, "It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order's many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together." n12</p>

Israelyan ’98 Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly 1998 Winter"

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Israelyan ’98 Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly 1998 Winter" fulltext: The first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside "enemy." Such steps would include Russia's denunciation of the commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to ratify both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention; denunciation of the Biological Weapons Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons, a trend that is underway already. The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-NATO" deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members. One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50 million lives. I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." n10 In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe. n11 Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, "It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order's many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together." n12 [/INST] <h4>Resurgence of Russian nationalism triggers World War III</h4><p><strong>Israelyan ’98</strong> Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly 1998 Winter" </p><p><u>The</u> first and by far <u>most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of <strong><mark>a "united</strong></mark> and undivided <strong><mark>Russia</strong></mark>," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many <strong><mark>would seek</strong></mark> to revive <strong><mark>a dictatorship and</strong></mark> take <strong><mark>urgent military</strong> <strong>steps</strong></mark> to mobilize the people <mark>against the</mark> outside "<mark>enemy</mark>." <mark>Such steps would include</mark> Russia's <mark>denunciation of</mark> the commitment to <mark>n</u></mark>o-<u><mark>f</u></mark>irst-<u><mark>u</u></mark>se<u> of nuclear weapons; <mark>suspension of</mark> the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (<mark>START</mark>) </u>I and refusal to ratify both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention;<u> <mark>denunciation of the B</mark>iological <mark>W</mark>eapons <mark>C</mark>onvention; <mark>and</mark> <mark>reinstatement of a full-scale armed force</mark>, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles</u> such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, <u>Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons</u>, a trend that is underway already. <u>The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries</u>, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even <u>the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure</u>. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-NATO" deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members. One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, <u>Adolf <strong><mark>Hitler</strong></mark> took it upon himself <strong><mark>to "save" his</strong></mark> <strong><mark>country</strong></mark>. It <strong><mark>took</strong></mark> the former corporal <strong><mark>only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war</strong></mark> that cost humanity more than 50 million lives.</u> I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that <u>economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons."</u> n10 In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that <u>Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe.</u> n11 Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, "It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order's many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together." n12</p> </s>

Its is in the resolution debaters from being the agent of the resolution

A function of “its” would be to limit the affirmative to being directed from the U S government, not American businesses, individual persons (debaters) or NGO’s.

A second function of “its” would be to limit the affirmative engagement to being directed from the United States government, not American businesses, individual persons (debaters) or NGO’s.

<h4>Its is in the resolution debaters from being the agent of the resolution </h4><p>Michael <u><strong>Maffie and </u></strong>Steve <u><strong>Mancuso</u></strong>, Middle East topic authors, 3-1-0<u><strong>7</u></strong>, "Engaging the Middle East," http://www.cedatopic.com/Middle_East_07.pdf, 102, mss</p><p><u>A</u> second <u>function of “its” would be to limit the affirmative</u> engagement <u>to being directed from the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>government, not American businesses, individual persons (<strong>debaters</strong>) or NGO’s.</p></u>

Michael Maffie and Steve Mancuso, Middle East topic authors, 3-1-07, "Engaging the Middle East," http://www.cedatopic.com/Middle_East_07.pdf, 102, mss

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Michael Maffie and Steve Mancuso, Middle East topic authors, 3-1-07, "Engaging the Middle East," http://www.cedatopic.com/Middle_East_07.pdf, 102, mss fulltext: A second function of “its” would be to limit the affirmative engagement to being directed from the United States government, not American businesses, individual persons (debaters) or NGO’s. [/INST] <h4>Its is in the resolution debaters from being the agent of the resolution </h4><p>Michael <u><strong>Maffie and </u></strong>Steve <u><strong>Mancuso</u></strong>, Middle East topic authors, 3-1-0<u><strong>7</u></strong>, "Engaging the Middle East," http://www.cedatopic.com/Middle_East_07.pdf, 102, mss</p><p><u>A</u> second <u>function of “its” would be to limit the affirmative</u> engagement <u>to being directed from the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>government, not American businesses, individual persons (<strong>debaters</strong>) or NGO’s.</p></u> </s>

Cuba doesn’t sponsor terrorism

the State Department has always had a thin case for listing Cuba at all. A Washington lawyer with expertise in Cuba and international law told that none of the three reasons listed by State are enough to satisfy the legal requirements that must be met to list a country as a state sponsor of terrorism. arguments about harboring U.S. fugitives are especially weak, since U.S. law says designations must be made against countries that "repeatedly provided support for international terrorism. the fact that fugitives from U.S. justice are living in Cuba is not enough to trigger a mention in the report unless those fugitives have committed international terrorist acts.

Critics of the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism have long argued that the State Department has always had a thin case for listing Cuba at all. A Washington lawyer with expertise in Cuba and international law, Robert Muse, told The Hill that none of the three reasons listed by State are enough to satisfy the legal requirements that must be met to list a country as a state sponsor of terrorism. Muse said arguments about harboring U.S. fugitives are especially weak, since U.S. law says designations must be made against countries that "repeatedly provided support for international terrorism." As such, Muse said the fact that fugitives from U.S. justice are living in Cuba is not enough to trigger a mention in the report unless those fugitives have committed international terrorist acts.

<h4>Cuba doesn’t sponsor terrorism</h4><p><strong>The Hill</strong>, <strong>5/30</strong>/13, “State keeps Cuba on terror sponsors list” <u><strong>http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-state-sponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements</p><p></u></strong>Critics of the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism have long argued that <u><strong>the State Department has always had a thin case for listing Cuba at all.</p><p>A Washington lawyer with expertise in Cuba and international law</u></strong>, Robert Muse, <u><strong>told</u></strong> The Hill <u><strong>that none of the three reasons listed by State are enough to satisfy the legal requirements that must be met to list a country as a state sponsor of terrorism.</p><p></u></strong>Muse said <u><strong>arguments about harboring U.S. fugitives are especially weak, since U.S. law says designations must be made against countries that "repeatedly provided support for international terrorism.</u></strong>" As such, Muse said <u><strong>the fact that fugitives from U.S. justice are living in Cuba is not enough to trigger a mention in the report unless those fugitives have committed international terrorist acts.</p></u></strong>

The Hill, 5/30/13, “State keeps Cuba on terror sponsors list” http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-state-sponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: The Hill, 5/30/13, “State keeps Cuba on terror sponsors list” http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-state-sponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements fulltext: Critics of the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism have long argued that the State Department has always had a thin case for listing Cuba at all. A Washington lawyer with expertise in Cuba and international law, Robert Muse, told The Hill that none of the three reasons listed by State are enough to satisfy the legal requirements that must be met to list a country as a state sponsor of terrorism. Muse said arguments about harboring U.S. fugitives are especially weak, since U.S. law says designations must be made against countries that "repeatedly provided support for international terrorism." As such, Muse said the fact that fugitives from U.S. justice are living in Cuba is not enough to trigger a mention in the report unless those fugitives have committed international terrorist acts. [/INST] <h4>Cuba doesn’t sponsor terrorism</h4><p><strong>The Hill</strong>, <strong>5/30</strong>/13, “State keeps Cuba on terror sponsors list” <u><strong>http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-state-sponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements</p><p></u></strong>Critics of the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism have long argued that <u><strong>the State Department has always had a thin case for listing Cuba at all.</p><p>A Washington lawyer with expertise in Cuba and international law</u></strong>, Robert Muse, <u><strong>told</u></strong> The Hill <u><strong>that none of the three reasons listed by State are enough to satisfy the legal requirements that must be met to list a country as a state sponsor of terrorism.</p><p></u></strong>Muse said <u><strong>arguments about harboring U.S. fugitives are especially weak, since U.S. law says designations must be made against countries that "repeatedly provided support for international terrorism.</u></strong>" As such, Muse said <u><strong>the fact that fugitives from U.S. justice are living in Cuba is not enough to trigger a mention in the report unless those fugitives have committed international terrorist acts.</p></u></strong> </s>

Democracy solves extinction

Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. , the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered these threats are associated with the weakness or absence of democracy with its provisions for legality, accountability and openness Countries that govern themselves in a democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations and are less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not build w m d to use on one another They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments

Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferate the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered these threats are associated with weakness of democracy democratic fashion do not go to war with one another Democracies do not build w m d They are more environmentally responsible

Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.

<h4>Democracy solves extinction</h4><p><strong>Diamond ’95 </strong>[Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1995, p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html]</p><p><u><mark>Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons</mark> continue to <mark>proliferate</mark>. </u>The very source of life on Earth<u>, <mark>the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered</u></mark>. Most of<u> <mark>these </u></mark>new and unconventional<mark> <u>threats</mark> </u>to security <u><mark>are associated with </u></mark>or aggravated by <u>the <mark>weakness </mark>or absence <mark>of democracy</u></mark>, <u>with its provisions for legality, accountability</u>, popular sovereignty <u>and openness</u>. The experience of this century offers important lessons. <u>Countries that govern themselves in a </u>truly <u><mark>democratic fashion do not go to war with one another</mark>. </u>They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. <u>Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations</u>, <u>and </u>they <u>are </u>much <u>less likely to face ethnic insurgency. <mark>Democracies</mark> </u>do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They <u><mark>do not build w</u></mark>eapons of <u><mark>m</u></mark>ass <u><mark>d</u></mark>estruction <u>to use on </u>or to threaten <u>one another</u>. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. <u><mark>They are more environmentally responsible </mark>because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments</u>. </p>

Diamond ’95 [Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1995, p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Diamond ’95 [Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1995, p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html] fulltext: Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. [/INST] <h4>Democracy solves extinction</h4><p><strong>Diamond ’95 </strong>[Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1995, p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html]</p><p><u><mark>Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons</mark> continue to <mark>proliferate</mark>. </u>The very source of life on Earth<u>, <mark>the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered</u></mark>. Most of<u> <mark>these </u></mark>new and unconventional<mark> <u>threats</mark> </u>to security <u><mark>are associated with </u></mark>or aggravated by <u>the <mark>weakness </mark>or absence <mark>of democracy</u></mark>, <u>with its provisions for legality, accountability</u>, popular sovereignty <u>and openness</u>. The experience of this century offers important lessons. <u>Countries that govern themselves in a </u>truly <u><mark>democratic fashion do not go to war with one another</mark>. </u>They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. <u>Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations</u>, <u>and </u>they <u>are </u>much <u>less likely to face ethnic insurgency. <mark>Democracies</mark> </u>do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They <u><mark>do not build w</u></mark>eapons of <u><mark>m</u></mark>ass <u><mark>d</u></mark>estruction <u>to use on </u>or to threaten <u>one another</u>. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. <u><mark>They are more environmentally responsible </mark>because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments</u>. </p> </s>

(__) Kerry is pressuring Iran, and his capital is key.

Kerry pledged to commit "totally" to enforcing sanctions against Iran Menendez noted the State Department's critical role in implementing a significant number of the penalties Iran remains "entrenched in its nuclear weapons ambition," said Menendez A drop-off in Iranian oil sales and a rapid decline in the value of the currency demonstrate "the impact" of the penalties The U S would press Iran to fully comply with its obligations to the I A E A under any deal, Kerry said The U.N. has pressed sanctions to cease enrichment our policy is prevention and the clock is ticking on our efforts to secure responsible compliance

(Diane, Kerry Commits "Totally" to Iran Sanctions Enforcement, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 January 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/kerry-state-department-nomination/, da 3-12-13) U.S. Secretary of State-designate John Kerry on Thursday pledged to commit "totally" to enforcing a regime of unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran if the Senate confirms his nomination to assume the nation's top diplomatic post.¶ Kerry issued the assurance in response to questioning from Senator Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), who during President Obama's first term helped to develop and push into law several sets of economic penalties aimed at nudging Iran toward allaying international fears over the end goal of its ostensibly peaceful nuclear program. The lawmaker, who chaired Kerry's confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, noted the State Department's critical role in implementing a significant number of the penalties.¶ Iran remains "entrenched in its nuclear weapons ambition," said Menendez, whose proposals to mandate punitive U.S. steps against Iran's foreign business partners have at times placed him at odds with the Obama administration.¶ A drop-off in Iranian oil sales and a rapid decline in the value of the nation's currency demonstrate "the impact" of the penalties, Kerry said when asked if he would be devote himself "to the full enforcement" of congressionally established sanctions and their implementation abroad if confirmed to lead the State Department.¶ "Congress deserves credit, together with the administration, for having put the toughest sanctions and the biggest coalition together in history," the Democratic senator from Massachusetts added in his appearance before the panel he usually leads.¶ After President Obama tapped Kerry for the top position at State and a vocal critic of unilateral sanctions to head the Defense Department, issue experts speculated that his second administration could prove more willing to curb sanctions against Iran as part of a potential compromise to end the nuclear standoff. Iran last year joined three rounds of high-level nuclear negotiations with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.¶ The United States would press Iran to fully comply with its obligations to the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency under any deal, Kerry said. The 15-nation U.N. body has pressed Tehran in four sanctions resolutions to cease uranium enrichment, a process capable of generating civilian reactor fuel as well as nuclear-weapon material. Iran has for years ruled out such a move and demanded international acknowledgement of its right to refine the material as an initial concession in a potential agreement.¶ "The president has made it clear that he is prepared to engage, if that's what it takes, in bilateral efforts," Kerry said, adding there is "hopefully ... a negotiation going on right now for the next meeting of the P-5+1."¶ "It is not hard to prove a peaceful program," he said. "Other nations have done that and do it every day. And it takes intrusive inspections. It takes living up to publicly arrived-at standards. Everybody understands what they are."¶ Speaking earlier, Kerry reaffirmed President Obama's assurance that the United States "will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon" and would not focus its strategy on deterring aggression by the Persian Gulf regional power should it acquire atomic arms.¶ "I repeat here today: our policy is not containment. It is prevention and the clock is ticking on our efforts to secure responsible compliance," he said in prepared testimony.

<h4>(__) Kerry is pressuring Iran, and his capital is key.</h4><p><strong>Barnes 1-24</strong> </p><p>(Diane, Kerry Commits "Totally" to Iran Sanctions Enforcement, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 January 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/kerry-state-department-nomination/, da 3-12-13)</p><p>U.S. Secretary of State-designate John <u><strong>Kerry </u></strong>on Thursday <u><strong>pledged to commit "totally" to enforcing </u></strong>a regime of unilateral U.S. <u><strong>sanctions against Iran </u></strong>if the Senate confirms his nomination to assume the nation's top diplomatic post.¶ Kerry issued the assurance in response to questioning from Senator Robert <u><strong>Menendez </u></strong>(D-N.J.), who during President Obama's first term helped to develop and push into law several sets of economic penalties aimed at nudging Iran toward allaying international fears over the end goal of its ostensibly peaceful nuclear program. The lawmaker, who chaired Kerry's confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, <u><strong>noted the State Department's critical role in implementing a significant number of the penalties</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong>Iran remains "entrenched in its nuclear weapons ambition," said Menendez</u></strong>, whose proposals to mandate punitive U.S. steps against Iran's foreign business partners have at times placed him at odds with the Obama administration.¶ <u><strong>A drop-off in Iranian oil sales and a rapid decline in the value of the </u></strong>nation's <u><strong>currency demonstrate "the impact" of the penalties</u></strong>, Kerry said when asked if he would be devote himself "to the full enforcement" of congressionally established sanctions and their implementation abroad if confirmed to lead the State Department.¶ "Congress deserves credit, together with the administration, for having put the toughest sanctions and the biggest coalition together in history," the Democratic senator from Massachusetts added in his appearance before the panel he usually leads.¶ After President Obama tapped Kerry for the top position at State and a vocal critic of unilateral sanctions to head the Defense Department, issue experts speculated that his second administration could prove more willing to curb sanctions against Iran as part of a potential compromise to end the nuclear standoff. Iran last year joined three rounds of high-level nuclear negotiations with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.¶ <u><strong>The U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>would press Iran to fully comply with its obligations to the </u></strong>Security Council and the <u><strong>I</u></strong>nternational <u><strong>A</u></strong>tomic <u><strong>E</u></strong>nergy <u><strong>A</u></strong>gency <u><strong>under any deal, Kerry said</u></strong>. <u><strong>The </u></strong>15-nation <u><strong>U.N. </u></strong>body <u><strong>has pressed </u></strong>Tehran in four <u><strong>sanctions </u></strong>resolutions <u><strong>to cease </u></strong>uranium <u><strong>enrichment</u></strong>, a process capable of generating civilian reactor fuel as well as nuclear-weapon material. Iran has for years ruled out such a move and demanded international acknowledgement of its right to refine the material as an initial concession in a potential agreement.¶ "The president has made it clear that he is prepared to engage, if that's what it takes, in bilateral efforts," Kerry said, adding there is "hopefully ... a negotiation going on right now for the next meeting of the P-5+1."¶ "It is not hard to prove a peaceful program," he said. "Other nations have done that and do it every day. And it takes intrusive inspections. It takes living up to publicly arrived-at standards. Everybody understands what they are."¶ Speaking earlier, Kerry reaffirmed President Obama's assurance that the United States "will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon" and would not focus its strategy on deterring aggression by the Persian Gulf regional power should it acquire atomic arms.¶ "I repeat here today: <u><strong>our policy is </u></strong>not containment. It is <u><strong>prevention and the clock is ticking on our efforts to secure responsible compliance</u></strong>," he said in prepared testimony<strong>.</p></strong>

Barnes 1-24

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Barnes 1-24 fulltext: (Diane, Kerry Commits "Totally" to Iran Sanctions Enforcement, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 January 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/kerry-state-department-nomination/, da 3-12-13) U.S. Secretary of State-designate John Kerry on Thursday pledged to commit "totally" to enforcing a regime of unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran if the Senate confirms his nomination to assume the nation's top diplomatic post.¶ Kerry issued the assurance in response to questioning from Senator Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), who during President Obama's first term helped to develop and push into law several sets of economic penalties aimed at nudging Iran toward allaying international fears over the end goal of its ostensibly peaceful nuclear program. The lawmaker, who chaired Kerry's confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, noted the State Department's critical role in implementing a significant number of the penalties.¶ Iran remains "entrenched in its nuclear weapons ambition," said Menendez, whose proposals to mandate punitive U.S. steps against Iran's foreign business partners have at times placed him at odds with the Obama administration.¶ A drop-off in Iranian oil sales and a rapid decline in the value of the nation's currency demonstrate "the impact" of the penalties, Kerry said when asked if he would be devote himself "to the full enforcement" of congressionally established sanctions and their implementation abroad if confirmed to lead the State Department.¶ "Congress deserves credit, together with the administration, for having put the toughest sanctions and the biggest coalition together in history," the Democratic senator from Massachusetts added in his appearance before the panel he usually leads.¶ After President Obama tapped Kerry for the top position at State and a vocal critic of unilateral sanctions to head the Defense Department, issue experts speculated that his second administration could prove more willing to curb sanctions against Iran as part of a potential compromise to end the nuclear standoff. Iran last year joined three rounds of high-level nuclear negotiations with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.¶ The United States would press Iran to fully comply with its obligations to the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency under any deal, Kerry said. The 15-nation U.N. body has pressed Tehran in four sanctions resolutions to cease uranium enrichment, a process capable of generating civilian reactor fuel as well as nuclear-weapon material. Iran has for years ruled out such a move and demanded international acknowledgement of its right to refine the material as an initial concession in a potential agreement.¶ "The president has made it clear that he is prepared to engage, if that's what it takes, in bilateral efforts," Kerry said, adding there is "hopefully ... a negotiation going on right now for the next meeting of the P-5+1."¶ "It is not hard to prove a peaceful program," he said. "Other nations have done that and do it every day. And it takes intrusive inspections. It takes living up to publicly arrived-at standards. Everybody understands what they are."¶ Speaking earlier, Kerry reaffirmed President Obama's assurance that the United States "will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon" and would not focus its strategy on deterring aggression by the Persian Gulf regional power should it acquire atomic arms.¶ "I repeat here today: our policy is not containment. It is prevention and the clock is ticking on our efforts to secure responsible compliance," he said in prepared testimony. [/INST] <h4>(__) Kerry is pressuring Iran, and his capital is key.</h4><p><strong>Barnes 1-24</strong> </p><p>(Diane, Kerry Commits "Totally" to Iran Sanctions Enforcement, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 January 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/kerry-state-department-nomination/, da 3-12-13)</p><p>U.S. Secretary of State-designate John <u><strong>Kerry </u></strong>on Thursday <u><strong>pledged to commit "totally" to enforcing </u></strong>a regime of unilateral U.S. <u><strong>sanctions against Iran </u></strong>if the Senate confirms his nomination to assume the nation's top diplomatic post.¶ Kerry issued the assurance in response to questioning from Senator Robert <u><strong>Menendez </u></strong>(D-N.J.), who during President Obama's first term helped to develop and push into law several sets of economic penalties aimed at nudging Iran toward allaying international fears over the end goal of its ostensibly peaceful nuclear program. The lawmaker, who chaired Kerry's confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, <u><strong>noted the State Department's critical role in implementing a significant number of the penalties</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong>Iran remains "entrenched in its nuclear weapons ambition," said Menendez</u></strong>, whose proposals to mandate punitive U.S. steps against Iran's foreign business partners have at times placed him at odds with the Obama administration.¶ <u><strong>A drop-off in Iranian oil sales and a rapid decline in the value of the </u></strong>nation's <u><strong>currency demonstrate "the impact" of the penalties</u></strong>, Kerry said when asked if he would be devote himself "to the full enforcement" of congressionally established sanctions and their implementation abroad if confirmed to lead the State Department.¶ "Congress deserves credit, together with the administration, for having put the toughest sanctions and the biggest coalition together in history," the Democratic senator from Massachusetts added in his appearance before the panel he usually leads.¶ After President Obama tapped Kerry for the top position at State and a vocal critic of unilateral sanctions to head the Defense Department, issue experts speculated that his second administration could prove more willing to curb sanctions against Iran as part of a potential compromise to end the nuclear standoff. Iran last year joined three rounds of high-level nuclear negotiations with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.¶ <u><strong>The U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>would press Iran to fully comply with its obligations to the </u></strong>Security Council and the <u><strong>I</u></strong>nternational <u><strong>A</u></strong>tomic <u><strong>E</u></strong>nergy <u><strong>A</u></strong>gency <u><strong>under any deal, Kerry said</u></strong>. <u><strong>The </u></strong>15-nation <u><strong>U.N. </u></strong>body <u><strong>has pressed </u></strong>Tehran in four <u><strong>sanctions </u></strong>resolutions <u><strong>to cease </u></strong>uranium <u><strong>enrichment</u></strong>, a process capable of generating civilian reactor fuel as well as nuclear-weapon material. Iran has for years ruled out such a move and demanded international acknowledgement of its right to refine the material as an initial concession in a potential agreement.¶ "The president has made it clear that he is prepared to engage, if that's what it takes, in bilateral efforts," Kerry said, adding there is "hopefully ... a negotiation going on right now for the next meeting of the P-5+1."¶ "It is not hard to prove a peaceful program," he said. "Other nations have done that and do it every day. And it takes intrusive inspections. It takes living up to publicly arrived-at standards. Everybody understands what they are."¶ Speaking earlier, Kerry reaffirmed President Obama's assurance that the United States "will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon" and would not focus its strategy on deterring aggression by the Persian Gulf regional power should it acquire atomic arms.¶ "I repeat here today: <u><strong>our policy is </u></strong>not containment. It is <u><strong>prevention and the clock is ticking on our efforts to secure responsible compliance</u></strong>," he said in prepared testimony<strong>.</p></strong> </s>

Euro crisis doesn’t hurt Russia’s economy

In the medium term, Russia is a more attractive investment destination than the developed markets. And besides, we have a trump card in the shape of our commodities When times are hard, 
 investors always look for 
 alternative markets”, says Georgy Aksyonov, an analyst with the Net Trader company. “I think the Russian 
 market, which is part of Brics and is still growing, albeit 
 at a slower pace in recent years, may be promising in this situation.” Another cause for optimism is that, in the current situation, the single European currency did not go into a tailspin, as many predicted: at the time of going to press, the euro/dollar rate has not once dropped below 1.30 since January of this year. It should also be noted that the European debt crisis is changing the attitude to protective mechanisms such as government bonds. Investors today are clearly shifting their focus from sovereign to corporate debt. This is good news for Russia, because Russian corporations are much cheaper than their Western counterparts. Russia’s financial authorities appear to be optimistic. Sergey Shevtsov, vice-president of the Central Bank, does not anticipate any serious threats to the domestic economy

Russia is more attractive than developed markets we have a trump card in commodities When times are hard, 
 investors look for 
 alternative markets”, says Aksyonov with Net Trader the Russian market may be promising in this situation the European crisis is changing attitude to protective mechanisms Investors are shifting focus to corporate debt. This is good for Russia, because Russian corporations are cheaper Shevtsov of the Central Bank, does not anticipate any serious threats

Opinions among Russian experts vary, however. Mikhail Kozakov, financial markets director with investment company Grandis Capital, says: “In the medium term, Russia is a more attractive investment destination than the developed markets. And besides, we have a trump card in the shape of our commodities. With the currency exchange situation as uncertain as the outlook for the economically developed countries, the commodity market is also becoming more interesting, at least for speculative capital.” Some other positive factors will not escape investors’ notice. In spite of the overall mood of recession in Russia, the country’s economy is performing in a moderately positive manner. According to the State Statistics Committee (Goskomstat), industrial output increased by 5.1pc from January to October and GDP in the third quarter is expected to grow by an estimated 4.8pc. “When times are hard, 
 investors always look for 
 alternative markets”, says Georgy Aksyonov, an analyst with the Net Trader company. “I think the Russian 
 market, which is part of Brics and is still growing, albeit 
 at a slower pace in recent years, may be promising in this situation.” Another cause for optimism is that, in the current situation, the single European currency did not go into a tailspin, as many predicted: at the time of going to press, the euro/dollar rate has not once dropped below 1.30 since January of this year. It should also be noted that the European debt crisis is changing the attitude to protective mechanisms such as government bonds. Investors today are clearly shifting their focus from sovereign to corporate debt. This is good news for Russia, because Russian corporations are much cheaper than their Western counterparts. Russia’s financial authorities appear to be optimistic. Sergey Shevtsov, vice-president of the Central Bank, does not anticipate any serious threats to the domestic economy, though he admits that the crisis might lead to a shortage of liquidity. “We expect it to peak in mid-December and, thereafter, the budget will be disbursing actively,” he said on the fringes of an international financial conference sponsored by Sberbank. “The liquidity deficit will grow but it will not, on the whole, create problems for the banking sector and the economy in general.”

<h4>Euro crisis doesn’t hurt Russia’s economy</h4><p><strong>Vaisman ’11</strong> (Euro cloud has silver lining for Russia November 30, 2011 Andrei Vaisman Russia is not immune to the effects of the eurozone crisis, but investors may see the country’s markets as a shelter from the storm. </p><p>Opinions among Russian experts vary, however. Mikhail Kozakov, financial markets director with investment company Grandis Capital, says: “<u>In</u> <u>the medium term, <mark>Russia is</mark> a <mark>more attractive</mark> investment destination <mark>than</mark> the <mark>developed markets</mark>. And besides, <mark>we have a <strong>trump card in</strong></mark> the shape of our <strong><mark>commodities</u></strong></mark>. With the currency exchange situation as uncertain as the outlook for the economically developed countries, the commodity market is also becoming more interesting, at least for speculative capital.” Some other positive factors will not escape investors’ notice. In spite of the overall mood of recession in Russia, the country’s economy is performing in a moderately positive manner. According to the State Statistics Committee (Goskomstat), industrial output increased by 5.1pc from January to October and GDP in the third quarter is expected to grow by an estimated 4.8pc. “<u><mark>When times are hard, 
 investors</mark> always <mark>look for 
 alternative markets”, says</mark> Georgy <strong><mark>Aksyonov</strong></mark>, an analyst <strong><mark>with</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>Net Trader</strong></mark> company. “I think <mark>the Russian</mark> 
 <mark>market</mark>, which is part of Brics and is still growing, albeit 
 at a slower pace in recent years, <strong><mark>may be promising in this situation</strong></mark>.” Another cause for optimism is that, in the current situation, the single European currency did not go into a tailspin, as many predicted: at the time of going to press, the euro/dollar rate has not once dropped below 1.30 since January of this year. It should also be noted that <mark>the European</mark> debt <mark>crisis is changing</mark> the <mark>attitude to protective</mark> <mark>mechanisms</mark> such as government bonds. <mark>Investors</mark> today <mark>are</mark> clearly <mark>shifting</mark> their <mark>focus</mark> from sovereign <mark>to corporate</mark> <mark>debt.</mark> <mark>This is good</mark> news <mark>for Russia, <strong>because Russian corporations are</strong></mark> much <strong><mark>cheaper</strong></mark> than their Western counterparts. Russia’s financial authorities appear to be optimistic. Sergey <mark>Shevtsov</mark>, vice-president <strong><mark>of the Central Bank, does not</mark> <mark>anticipate any serious threats</strong></mark> to the domestic economy</u>, though he admits that the crisis might lead to a shortage of liquidity. “We expect it to peak in mid-December and, thereafter, the budget will be disbursing actively,” he said on the fringes of an international financial conference sponsored by Sberbank. “The liquidity deficit will grow but it will not, on the whole, create problems for the banking sector and the economy in general.”</p>

Vaisman ’11 (Euro cloud has silver lining for Russia November 30, 2011 Andrei Vaisman Russia is not immune to the effects of the eurozone crisis, but investors may see the country’s markets as a shelter from the storm.

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Vaisman ’11 (Euro cloud has silver lining for Russia November 30, 2011 Andrei Vaisman Russia is not immune to the effects of the eurozone crisis, but investors may see the country’s markets as a shelter from the storm. fulltext: Opinions among Russian experts vary, however. Mikhail Kozakov, financial markets director with investment company Grandis Capital, says: “In the medium term, Russia is a more attractive investment destination than the developed markets. And besides, we have a trump card in the shape of our commodities. With the currency exchange situation as uncertain as the outlook for the economically developed countries, the commodity market is also becoming more interesting, at least for speculative capital.” Some other positive factors will not escape investors’ notice. In spite of the overall mood of recession in Russia, the country’s economy is performing in a moderately positive manner. According to the State Statistics Committee (Goskomstat), industrial output increased by 5.1pc from January to October and GDP in the third quarter is expected to grow by an estimated 4.8pc. “When times are hard, 
 investors always look for 
 alternative markets”, says Georgy Aksyonov, an analyst with the Net Trader company. “I think the Russian 
 market, which is part of Brics and is still growing, albeit 
 at a slower pace in recent years, may be promising in this situation.” Another cause for optimism is that, in the current situation, the single European currency did not go into a tailspin, as many predicted: at the time of going to press, the euro/dollar rate has not once dropped below 1.30 since January of this year. It should also be noted that the European debt crisis is changing the attitude to protective mechanisms such as government bonds. Investors today are clearly shifting their focus from sovereign to corporate debt. This is good news for Russia, because Russian corporations are much cheaper than their Western counterparts. Russia’s financial authorities appear to be optimistic. Sergey Shevtsov, vice-president of the Central Bank, does not anticipate any serious threats to the domestic economy, though he admits that the crisis might lead to a shortage of liquidity. “We expect it to peak in mid-December and, thereafter, the budget will be disbursing actively,” he said on the fringes of an international financial conference sponsored by Sberbank. “The liquidity deficit will grow but it will not, on the whole, create problems for the banking sector and the economy in general.” [/INST] <h4>Euro crisis doesn’t hurt Russia’s economy</h4><p><strong>Vaisman ’11</strong> (Euro cloud has silver lining for Russia November 30, 2011 Andrei Vaisman Russia is not immune to the effects of the eurozone crisis, but investors may see the country’s markets as a shelter from the storm. </p><p>Opinions among Russian experts vary, however. Mikhail Kozakov, financial markets director with investment company Grandis Capital, says: “<u>In</u> <u>the medium term, <mark>Russia is</mark> a <mark>more attractive</mark> investment destination <mark>than</mark> the <mark>developed markets</mark>. And besides, <mark>we have a <strong>trump card in</strong></mark> the shape of our <strong><mark>commodities</u></strong></mark>. With the currency exchange situation as uncertain as the outlook for the economically developed countries, the commodity market is also becoming more interesting, at least for speculative capital.” Some other positive factors will not escape investors’ notice. In spite of the overall mood of recession in Russia, the country’s economy is performing in a moderately positive manner. According to the State Statistics Committee (Goskomstat), industrial output increased by 5.1pc from January to October and GDP in the third quarter is expected to grow by an estimated 4.8pc. “<u><mark>When times are hard, 
 investors</mark> always <mark>look for 
 alternative markets”, says</mark> Georgy <strong><mark>Aksyonov</strong></mark>, an analyst <strong><mark>with</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>Net Trader</strong></mark> company. “I think <mark>the Russian</mark> 
 <mark>market</mark>, which is part of Brics and is still growing, albeit 
 at a slower pace in recent years, <strong><mark>may be promising in this situation</strong></mark>.” Another cause for optimism is that, in the current situation, the single European currency did not go into a tailspin, as many predicted: at the time of going to press, the euro/dollar rate has not once dropped below 1.30 since January of this year. It should also be noted that <mark>the European</mark> debt <mark>crisis is changing</mark> the <mark>attitude to protective</mark> <mark>mechanisms</mark> such as government bonds. <mark>Investors</mark> today <mark>are</mark> clearly <mark>shifting</mark> their <mark>focus</mark> from sovereign <mark>to corporate</mark> <mark>debt.</mark> <mark>This is good</mark> news <mark>for Russia, <strong>because Russian corporations are</strong></mark> much <strong><mark>cheaper</strong></mark> than their Western counterparts. Russia’s financial authorities appear to be optimistic. Sergey <mark>Shevtsov</mark>, vice-president <strong><mark>of the Central Bank, does not</mark> <mark>anticipate any serious threats</strong></mark> to the domestic economy</u>, though he admits that the crisis might lead to a shortage of liquidity. “We expect it to peak in mid-December and, thereafter, the budget will be disbursing actively,” he said on the fringes of an international financial conference sponsored by Sberbank. “The liquidity deficit will grow but it will not, on the whole, create problems for the banking sector and the economy in general.”</p> </s>

Toward

to·ward [prep. tawrd, tohrd, tuh-wawrd, twawrd, twohrd; adj. tawrd, tohrd] preposition Also, to·wards. 1. in the direction of: to walk toward the river. 2. with a view to obtaining or having; for: They're saving money toward a new house. 3. in the area or vicinity of; near: Our cabin is toward the top of the hill. 4. turned to; facing: Her back was toward me. 5. shortly before; close to: toward midnight.

<h4>Toward</h4><p><strong>Dictionary.com</strong> Unabridged, 20<strong>13</strong> [Based on the Random House Dictionary, © Random House, Inc. 2013. dictionary.reference.com/browse/toward?s=t]</p><p>to·ward [prep. tawrd, tohrd, tuh-wawrd, twawrd, twohrd; adj. tawrd, tohrd] </p><p>preposition Also, to·wards.</p><p>1. in the direction of: to walk toward the river.</p><p>2. with a view to obtaining or having; for: They're saving money toward a new house.</p><p>3. in the area or vicinity of; near: Our cabin is toward the top of the hill.</p><p>4. turned to; facing: Her back was toward me.</p><p>5. shortly before; close to: toward midnight.</p>

Dictionary.com Unabridged, 2013 [Based on the Random House Dictionary, © Random House, Inc. 2013. dictionary.reference.com/browse/toward?s=t]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Dictionary.com Unabridged, 2013 [Based on the Random House Dictionary, © Random House, Inc. 2013. dictionary.reference.com/browse/toward?s=t] fulltext: to·ward [prep. tawrd, tohrd, tuh-wawrd, twawrd, twohrd; adj. tawrd, tohrd] preposition Also, to·wards. 1. in the direction of: to walk toward the river. 2. with a view to obtaining or having; for: They're saving money toward a new house. 3. in the area or vicinity of; near: Our cabin is toward the top of the hill. 4. turned to; facing: Her back was toward me. 5. shortly before; close to: toward midnight. [/INST] <h4>Toward</h4><p><strong>Dictionary.com</strong> Unabridged, 20<strong>13</strong> [Based on the Random House Dictionary, © Random House, Inc. 2013. dictionary.reference.com/browse/toward?s=t]</p><p>to·ward [prep. tawrd, tohrd, tuh-wawrd, twawrd, twohrd; adj. tawrd, tohrd] </p><p>preposition Also, to·wards.</p><p>1. in the direction of: to walk toward the river.</p><p>2. with a view to obtaining or having; for: They're saving money toward a new house.</p><p>3. in the area or vicinity of; near: Our cabin is toward the top of the hill.</p><p>4. turned to; facing: Her back was toward me.</p><p>5. shortly before; close to: toward midnight.</p> </s>

There is no good reason to vote against the counterplan

There is no sound argument for Cuba’s continued description as a state sponsor of terrorism. Secretary of State Kerry has in his hands a method to end the moral duplicity and possibly help kick start engagement He now has the opportunity to put rhetoric into reality, to demonstrate to Cuba and the rest of Latin America that United States policy regarding their contentious neighbor to the south is moving into a new, more mature and constructive period.

There is no sound argument for Cuba’s continued description as a state sponsor of terrorism. Secretary of State Kerry has in his hands a method to end the moral duplicity and possibly help kick start engagement. Kerry, an outspoken critic of what he has called “the failed Cuban policy,” publicly stated his support for the end of travel restrictions and the elimination of the funding for the type of programs in which Gross was involved. [14] He now has the opportunity to put rhetoric into reality, to demonstrate to Cuba and the rest of Latin America that United States policy regarding their contentious neighbor to the south is moving into a new, more mature and constructive period.

<h4>There is no good reason to vote against the counterplan</h4><p>Keith <strong>Bolender</strong>, Guest Scholar at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and a freelance journalist and the author of “Cuba Under Siege: American Policy, the Revolution and its People” (Palgrave 2012), <strong>4/22</strong>/13, “THE TERRORIST LIST, AND TERRORISM AS PRACTICED AGAINST CUBA” <u><strong>http://www.coha.org/22355/</p><p>There is no sound argument for Cuba’s continued description as a state sponsor of terrorism. Secretary of State Kerry has in his hands a method to end the moral duplicity and possibly help kick start engagement</u></strong>. Kerry, an outspoken critic of what he has called “the failed Cuban policy,” publicly stated his support for the end of travel restrictions and the elimination of the funding for the type of programs in which Gross was involved. [14] <u><strong>He now has the opportunity to put rhetoric into reality, to demonstrate to Cuba and the rest of Latin America that United States policy regarding their contentious neighbor to the south is moving into a new, more mature and constructive period.</p></u></strong>

Keith Bolender, Guest Scholar at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and a freelance journalist and the author of “Cuba Under Siege: American Policy, the Revolution and its People” (Palgrave 2012), 4/22/13, “THE TERRORIST LIST, AND TERRORISM AS PRACTICED AGAINST CUBA” http://www.coha.org/22355/

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Keith Bolender, Guest Scholar at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and a freelance journalist and the author of “Cuba Under Siege: American Policy, the Revolution and its People” (Palgrave 2012), 4/22/13, “THE TERRORIST LIST, AND TERRORISM AS PRACTICED AGAINST CUBA” http://www.coha.org/22355/ fulltext: There is no sound argument for Cuba’s continued description as a state sponsor of terrorism. Secretary of State Kerry has in his hands a method to end the moral duplicity and possibly help kick start engagement. Kerry, an outspoken critic of what he has called “the failed Cuban policy,” publicly stated his support for the end of travel restrictions and the elimination of the funding for the type of programs in which Gross was involved. [14] He now has the opportunity to put rhetoric into reality, to demonstrate to Cuba and the rest of Latin America that United States policy regarding their contentious neighbor to the south is moving into a new, more mature and constructive period. [/INST] <h4>There is no good reason to vote against the counterplan</h4><p>Keith <strong>Bolender</strong>, Guest Scholar at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and a freelance journalist and the author of “Cuba Under Siege: American Policy, the Revolution and its People” (Palgrave 2012), <strong>4/22</strong>/13, “THE TERRORIST LIST, AND TERRORISM AS PRACTICED AGAINST CUBA” <u><strong>http://www.coha.org/22355/</p><p>There is no sound argument for Cuba’s continued description as a state sponsor of terrorism. Secretary of State Kerry has in his hands a method to end the moral duplicity and possibly help kick start engagement</u></strong>. Kerry, an outspoken critic of what he has called “the failed Cuban policy,” publicly stated his support for the end of travel restrictions and the elimination of the funding for the type of programs in which Gross was involved. [14] <u><strong>He now has the opportunity to put rhetoric into reality, to demonstrate to Cuba and the rest of Latin America that United States policy regarding their contentious neighbor to the south is moving into a new, more mature and constructive period.</p></u></strong> </s>

Tar sands skyrocket emissions- crosses the tipping point

It's imperative we leave tar sands in the ground," the U.S.'s leading climate scientists urged The letter was signed by 20 world-renowned scientists, Embedded in tar sands will be an estimated 150 million tonnes of carbon every year. That's more CO2 than the annual emissions of 85 percent of the world's countries That extra carbon is going to warm the planet for hundreds and thousands of years said German climate scientist Meinshausen Emissions attributed to the project are "enormous" There is so much carbon in the tar sands that if much of it is burned, there is no chance of stabilising the climate, according to Hansen and other climate experts

tar sands will be an estimated 150 million tonnes of carbon every year. That's more than annual emissions of 85 percent of the world That is going to warm the planet for thousands of years There is so that if much is burned, there is no chance of stabilising the climate, according to climate experts

"It's imperative that we move quickly to alternate forms of energy - and that we leave the tar sands in the ground," the U.S.'s leading climate scientists urged President Barack Obama in an open letter Aug. 3. "As scientists... we can say categorically that it's [the Keystone XL pipeline] not only not in the national interest, it's also not in the planet's best interest." The letter was signed by 20 world-renowned scientists, including NASA's James Hansen, Ken Caldeira of the Carnegie Institution, Ralph Keeling of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, and George Woodwell, founder of the Woods Hole Research Center. The proposed seven-billion-dollar Keystone XL pipeline would carry 700,000 to 800,000 barrels of tarry, unrefined oil every day from the northern Alberta tar sands 2,400 kilometres south through the U.S. heartland to refineries in Oklahoma and Texas. Embedded in all that bitumen - the tar sands form of crude oil - will be an estimated 150 million tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions every year. That's more CO2 than the annual emissions of 85 percent of the world's countries. Oil-rich Norway emits a mere 50 million tonnes. "That extra carbon dioxide is going to warm the planet for hundreds and thousands of years, causing sea level rise, more pronounced droughts and floods," said German climate scientist Malte Meinshausen of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. Meinshausen was not involved in the letter to Obama. Emissions attributed to the project are "enormous" and officials must take into account how it will add to climate change, Meinshausen told IPS. President Obama and Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper say they are worried about climate change and have promised to make major CO2 reductions by 2020. Both countries are parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, whose membership unanimously swore to keep the rise in global temperatures to less than two degrees C to avoid dangerous levels of climate change. Any hope of reaching that goal requires Canada, the U.S. and other industrialised nations to cut emissions 25 to 40 percent compared to their 1990 levels by 2020. And because CO2 lasts forever, the ultimate goal has to be net zero carbon emissions. Both the U.S. and Canada have failed to cut their emissions, but at least U.S. emissions have stopped growing. It's not well known, but Canada has become a compulsive overeater of carbon. Its emissions "weight" ballooned from 590 million tonnes in 1990 to 734 million tonnes in 2008, according to U.N. statistics. In the early 1990s, Canada promised to lose weight and even signed the 1997 Kyoto Protocol swearing to the world community that it would be a fit and trim 550 million tonnes by 2010 or 2012 at the latest. Government estimates put Canada at substantial 710 million tonnes (Mt) in 2010, 28 percent above its target weight. That leaves the country in seventh place amongst the big boys, just behind Germany, a country with more than twice the population. In Copenhagen at the end of 2009, Harper himself promised other global leaders that Canada would do better and trim down to 607 Mt by 2020. However, an official government report called "Canada's Emissions Trends" quietly released last month projects a continuing carbon binge, piling on the weight to a whopping 775 to 850 Mt by 2020. Most of that extra carbon lard is from the tar sands. In Bizarro World, everything is the opposite of what it should be: lose weight by eating more, avoid dangerous climate change by guaranteeing it. And so enormous sums of money, including incentives and subsidies from both governments, are being spent to put ever more tar sands' CO2 into the atmosphere. In fact, an incredible 2.077 trillion dollars is expected to be invested expanding and maintaining the tar sands over the next 25 years, according to the Canadian Energy Research Institute. The tar sands are the world's second largest deposit of oil, albeit in the form of tar, with an estimated 300 billion barrels of recoverable oil. There is so much carbon in the tar sands that if much of it is burned, there is no chance of stabilising the climate, according to Hansen and other climate experts.

<h4>Tar sands skyrocket emissions- crosses the tipping point</h4><p><strong>Leahy ‘11</strong> [Stephen, environmental journalist, citing leading climate scientists, professional member of the Society of Environmental Journalists, "Climate Change," Inter Press Service, 8-10-11, l/n, accessed 6-3-12, mss<u>]</p><p></u>"<u>It's imperative</u> that we move quickly to alternate forms of energy - and that <u>we leave</u> the <u>tar sands in the ground," the U.S.'s leading climate scientists urged </u>President Barack Obama in an open letter Aug. 3. "As scientists... we can say categorically that it's [the Keystone XL pipeline] not only not in the national interest, it's also not in the planet's best interest." <u>The letter was signed by 20 world-renowned scientists,</u> including NASA's James Hansen, Ken Caldeira of the Carnegie Institution, Ralph Keeling of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, and George Woodwell, founder of the Woods Hole Research Center. The proposed seven-billion-dollar Keystone XL pipeline would carry 700,000 to 800,000 barrels of tarry, unrefined oil every day from the northern Alberta tar sands 2,400 kilometres south through the U.S. heartland to refineries in Oklahoma and Texas. <u>Embedded in</u> all that bitumen - the <u><mark>tar sands</u> </mark>form of crude oil - <u><mark>will be an estimated 150 million tonnes of</u> <u>carbon</u> </mark>dioxide (CO2) emissions <u><mark>every year. That's more</mark> CO2 <mark>than </mark>the <mark>annual emissions of <strong>85 percent of the world</strong></mark>'s countries</u>. Oil-rich Norway emits a mere 50 million tonnes. "<u><mark>That </mark>extra carbon</u> dioxide <u><mark>is going to warm the planet for </mark>hundreds and <mark>thousands of years</u></mark>, causing sea level rise, more pronounced droughts and floods," <u>said German climate scientist</u> Malte <u>Meinshausen</u> of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. Meinshausen was not involved in the letter to Obama. <u>Emissions attributed to the project are "enormous" </u>and officials must take into account how it will add to climate change, Meinshausen told IPS. President Obama and Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper say they are worried about climate change and have promised to make major CO2 reductions by 2020. Both countries are parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, whose membership unanimously swore to keep the rise in global temperatures to less than two degrees C to avoid dangerous levels of climate change. Any hope of reaching that goal requires Canada, the U.S. and other industrialised nations to cut emissions 25 to 40 percent compared to their 1990 levels by 2020. And because CO2 lasts forever, the ultimate goal has to be net zero carbon emissions. Both the U.S. and Canada have failed to cut their emissions, but at least U.S. emissions have stopped growing. It's not well known, but Canada has become a compulsive overeater of carbon. Its emissions "weight" ballooned from 590 million tonnes in 1990 to 734 million tonnes in 2008, according to U.N. statistics. In the early 1990s, Canada promised to lose weight and even signed the 1997 Kyoto Protocol swearing to the world community that it would be a fit and trim 550 million tonnes by 2010 or 2012 at the latest. Government estimates put Canada at substantial 710 million tonnes (Mt) in 2010, 28 percent above its target weight. That leaves the country in seventh place amongst the big boys, just behind Germany, a country with more than twice the population. In Copenhagen at the end of 2009, Harper himself promised other global leaders that Canada would do better and trim down to 607 Mt by 2020. However, an official government report called "Canada's Emissions Trends" quietly released last month projects a continuing carbon binge, piling on the weight to a whopping 775 to 850 Mt by 2020. Most of that extra carbon lard is from the tar sands. In Bizarro World, everything is the opposite of what it should be: lose weight by eating more, avoid dangerous climate change by guaranteeing it. And so enormous sums of money, including incentives and subsidies from both governments, are being spent to put ever more tar sands' CO2 into the atmosphere. In fact, an incredible 2.077 trillion dollars is expected to be invested expanding and maintaining the tar sands over the next 25 years, according to the Canadian Energy Research Institute. The tar sands are the world's second largest deposit of oil, albeit in the form of tar, with an estimated 300 billion barrels of recoverable oil. <u><mark>There is so </mark>much carbon in the tar sands <mark>that if much </mark>of it <mark>is burned, there is <strong>no chance of stabilising the climate</strong>, according to </mark>Hansen and other <mark>climate experts</u></mark>.</p>

Leahy ‘11 [Stephen, environmental journalist, citing leading climate scientists, professional member of the Society of Environmental Journalists, "Climate Change," Inter Press Service, 8-10-11, l/n, accessed 6-3-12, mss]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Leahy ‘11 [Stephen, environmental journalist, citing leading climate scientists, professional member of the Society of Environmental Journalists, "Climate Change," Inter Press Service, 8-10-11, l/n, accessed 6-3-12, mss] fulltext: "It's imperative that we move quickly to alternate forms of energy - and that we leave the tar sands in the ground," the U.S.'s leading climate scientists urged President Barack Obama in an open letter Aug. 3. "As scientists... we can say categorically that it's [the Keystone XL pipeline] not only not in the national interest, it's also not in the planet's best interest." The letter was signed by 20 world-renowned scientists, including NASA's James Hansen, Ken Caldeira of the Carnegie Institution, Ralph Keeling of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, and George Woodwell, founder of the Woods Hole Research Center. The proposed seven-billion-dollar Keystone XL pipeline would carry 700,000 to 800,000 barrels of tarry, unrefined oil every day from the northern Alberta tar sands 2,400 kilometres south through the U.S. heartland to refineries in Oklahoma and Texas. Embedded in all that bitumen - the tar sands form of crude oil - will be an estimated 150 million tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions every year. That's more CO2 than the annual emissions of 85 percent of the world's countries. Oil-rich Norway emits a mere 50 million tonnes. "That extra carbon dioxide is going to warm the planet for hundreds and thousands of years, causing sea level rise, more pronounced droughts and floods," said German climate scientist Malte Meinshausen of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. Meinshausen was not involved in the letter to Obama. Emissions attributed to the project are "enormous" and officials must take into account how it will add to climate change, Meinshausen told IPS. President Obama and Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper say they are worried about climate change and have promised to make major CO2 reductions by 2020. Both countries are parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, whose membership unanimously swore to keep the rise in global temperatures to less than two degrees C to avoid dangerous levels of climate change. Any hope of reaching that goal requires Canada, the U.S. and other industrialised nations to cut emissions 25 to 40 percent compared to their 1990 levels by 2020. And because CO2 lasts forever, the ultimate goal has to be net zero carbon emissions. Both the U.S. and Canada have failed to cut their emissions, but at least U.S. emissions have stopped growing. It's not well known, but Canada has become a compulsive overeater of carbon. Its emissions "weight" ballooned from 590 million tonnes in 1990 to 734 million tonnes in 2008, according to U.N. statistics. In the early 1990s, Canada promised to lose weight and even signed the 1997 Kyoto Protocol swearing to the world community that it would be a fit and trim 550 million tonnes by 2010 or 2012 at the latest. Government estimates put Canada at substantial 710 million tonnes (Mt) in 2010, 28 percent above its target weight. That leaves the country in seventh place amongst the big boys, just behind Germany, a country with more than twice the population. In Copenhagen at the end of 2009, Harper himself promised other global leaders that Canada would do better and trim down to 607 Mt by 2020. However, an official government report called "Canada's Emissions Trends" quietly released last month projects a continuing carbon binge, piling on the weight to a whopping 775 to 850 Mt by 2020. Most of that extra carbon lard is from the tar sands. In Bizarro World, everything is the opposite of what it should be: lose weight by eating more, avoid dangerous climate change by guaranteeing it. And so enormous sums of money, including incentives and subsidies from both governments, are being spent to put ever more tar sands' CO2 into the atmosphere. In fact, an incredible 2.077 trillion dollars is expected to be invested expanding and maintaining the tar sands over the next 25 years, according to the Canadian Energy Research Institute. The tar sands are the world's second largest deposit of oil, albeit in the form of tar, with an estimated 300 billion barrels of recoverable oil. There is so much carbon in the tar sands that if much of it is burned, there is no chance of stabilising the climate, according to Hansen and other climate experts. [/INST] <h4>Tar sands skyrocket emissions- crosses the tipping point</h4><p><strong>Leahy ‘11</strong> [Stephen, environmental journalist, citing leading climate scientists, professional member of the Society of Environmental Journalists, "Climate Change," Inter Press Service, 8-10-11, l/n, accessed 6-3-12, mss<u>]</p><p></u>"<u>It's imperative</u> that we move quickly to alternate forms of energy - and that <u>we leave</u> the <u>tar sands in the ground," the U.S.'s leading climate scientists urged </u>President Barack Obama in an open letter Aug. 3. "As scientists... we can say categorically that it's [the Keystone XL pipeline] not only not in the national interest, it's also not in the planet's best interest." <u>The letter was signed by 20 world-renowned scientists,</u> including NASA's James Hansen, Ken Caldeira of the Carnegie Institution, Ralph Keeling of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, and George Woodwell, founder of the Woods Hole Research Center. The proposed seven-billion-dollar Keystone XL pipeline would carry 700,000 to 800,000 barrels of tarry, unrefined oil every day from the northern Alberta tar sands 2,400 kilometres south through the U.S. heartland to refineries in Oklahoma and Texas. <u>Embedded in</u> all that bitumen - the <u><mark>tar sands</u> </mark>form of crude oil - <u><mark>will be an estimated 150 million tonnes of</u> <u>carbon</u> </mark>dioxide (CO2) emissions <u><mark>every year. That's more</mark> CO2 <mark>than </mark>the <mark>annual emissions of <strong>85 percent of the world</strong></mark>'s countries</u>. Oil-rich Norway emits a mere 50 million tonnes. "<u><mark>That </mark>extra carbon</u> dioxide <u><mark>is going to warm the planet for </mark>hundreds and <mark>thousands of years</u></mark>, causing sea level rise, more pronounced droughts and floods," <u>said German climate scientist</u> Malte <u>Meinshausen</u> of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. Meinshausen was not involved in the letter to Obama. <u>Emissions attributed to the project are "enormous" </u>and officials must take into account how it will add to climate change, Meinshausen told IPS. President Obama and Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper say they are worried about climate change and have promised to make major CO2 reductions by 2020. Both countries are parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, whose membership unanimously swore to keep the rise in global temperatures to less than two degrees C to avoid dangerous levels of climate change. Any hope of reaching that goal requires Canada, the U.S. and other industrialised nations to cut emissions 25 to 40 percent compared to their 1990 levels by 2020. And because CO2 lasts forever, the ultimate goal has to be net zero carbon emissions. Both the U.S. and Canada have failed to cut their emissions, but at least U.S. emissions have stopped growing. It's not well known, but Canada has become a compulsive overeater of carbon. Its emissions "weight" ballooned from 590 million tonnes in 1990 to 734 million tonnes in 2008, according to U.N. statistics. In the early 1990s, Canada promised to lose weight and even signed the 1997 Kyoto Protocol swearing to the world community that it would be a fit and trim 550 million tonnes by 2010 or 2012 at the latest. Government estimates put Canada at substantial 710 million tonnes (Mt) in 2010, 28 percent above its target weight. That leaves the country in seventh place amongst the big boys, just behind Germany, a country with more than twice the population. In Copenhagen at the end of 2009, Harper himself promised other global leaders that Canada would do better and trim down to 607 Mt by 2020. However, an official government report called "Canada's Emissions Trends" quietly released last month projects a continuing carbon binge, piling on the weight to a whopping 775 to 850 Mt by 2020. Most of that extra carbon lard is from the tar sands. In Bizarro World, everything is the opposite of what it should be: lose weight by eating more, avoid dangerous climate change by guaranteeing it. And so enormous sums of money, including incentives and subsidies from both governments, are being spent to put ever more tar sands' CO2 into the atmosphere. In fact, an incredible 2.077 trillion dollars is expected to be invested expanding and maintaining the tar sands over the next 25 years, according to the Canadian Energy Research Institute. The tar sands are the world's second largest deposit of oil, albeit in the form of tar, with an estimated 300 billion barrels of recoverable oil. <u><mark>There is so </mark>much carbon in the tar sands <mark>that if much </mark>of it <mark>is burned, there is <strong>no chance of stabilising the climate</strong>, according to </mark>Hansen and other <mark>climate experts</u></mark>.</p> </s>

(__) Kerry’s influence is key to Iran talks, and he will push.

Kerry sees the benefit of reaching out to Iran to negotiate The Middle East is sure to take up the secretary’s time. the U S must negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran Kerry is one of the well-traveled senators to the Middle East, has a good feel for the region and knows many players insiders say Kerry would want to play a big role shaping policy for in the Mideast and try to help solve some of intractable issues

Like Obama, Kerry sees the benefit of reaching out to adversaries, like Iran and Syria, and give them a chance to negotiate. At one point, Kerry even spearheaded outreach efforts to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad before the administration turned on Assad over his crackdown on protesters. But he also has called for arming the opposition and for NATO airstrikes, which Obama's administration has resisted.¶ The Middle East is sure to take up a good part of the secretary’s time. In addition to helping bring about a political transition in Syria, the United States also must manage the political chaos in Egypt and the rest of North Africa while trying to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran and revive the Middle East peace process. Kerry is one of the well-traveled senators to the Middle East, has a good feel for the region and knows many of the players. Kerry insiders say a Secretary of State Kerry would want to play a big role shaping policy for in the Mideast and try to help solve some of intractable issues, including delving heavily into the peace process.

<h4>(__) Kerry’s influence is key to Iran talks, and he will push.</h4><p><strong>Labott and Dougherty 12-15</strong> </p><p>(Elise and Jill, Sizing up Kerry as secretary of state, CNN Security Blog, 15 December 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/15/sizing-up-kerry-as-secretary-of-state/, da 3-12-13)</p><p>Like Obama, <u><strong>Kerry sees the benefit of reaching out to </u></strong>adversaries, like <u><strong>Iran </u></strong>and Syria, and give them a chance <u><strong>to negotiate</u></strong>. At one point, Kerry even spearheaded outreach efforts to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad before the administration turned on Assad over his crackdown on protesters. But he also has called for arming the opposition and for NATO airstrikes, which Obama's administration has resisted.¶ <u><strong>The Middle East is sure to take up </u></strong>a good part of <u><strong>the secretary’s time. </u></strong>In addition to helping bring about a political transition in Syria, <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates also <u><strong>must </u></strong>manage the political chaos in Egypt and the rest of North Africa while trying to <u><strong>negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran </u></strong>and revive the Middle East peace process. <u><strong>Kerry is one of the well-traveled senators to the Middle East, has a good feel for the region and knows many </u></strong>of the <u><strong>players</u></strong>. Kerry <u><strong>insiders say </u></strong>a Secretary of State <u><strong>Kerry would want to play a big role shaping policy for in the Mideast and try to help solve some of intractable issues</u></strong>, including delving heavily into the peace process.</p>

Labott and Dougherty 12-15 (Elise and Jill, Sizing up Kerry as secretary of state, CNN Security Blog, 15 December 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/15/sizing-up-kerry-as-secretary-of-state/, da 3-12-13)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Labott and Dougherty 12-15 (Elise and Jill, Sizing up Kerry as secretary of state, CNN Security Blog, 15 December 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/15/sizing-up-kerry-as-secretary-of-state/, da 3-12-13) fulltext: Like Obama, Kerry sees the benefit of reaching out to adversaries, like Iran and Syria, and give them a chance to negotiate. At one point, Kerry even spearheaded outreach efforts to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad before the administration turned on Assad over his crackdown on protesters. But he also has called for arming the opposition and for NATO airstrikes, which Obama's administration has resisted.¶ The Middle East is sure to take up a good part of the secretary’s time. In addition to helping bring about a political transition in Syria, the United States also must manage the political chaos in Egypt and the rest of North Africa while trying to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran and revive the Middle East peace process. Kerry is one of the well-traveled senators to the Middle East, has a good feel for the region and knows many of the players. Kerry insiders say a Secretary of State Kerry would want to play a big role shaping policy for in the Mideast and try to help solve some of intractable issues, including delving heavily into the peace process. [/INST] <h4>(__) Kerry’s influence is key to Iran talks, and he will push.</h4><p><strong>Labott and Dougherty 12-15</strong> </p><p>(Elise and Jill, Sizing up Kerry as secretary of state, CNN Security Blog, 15 December 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/15/sizing-up-kerry-as-secretary-of-state/, da 3-12-13)</p><p>Like Obama, <u><strong>Kerry sees the benefit of reaching out to </u></strong>adversaries, like <u><strong>Iran </u></strong>and Syria, and give them a chance <u><strong>to negotiate</u></strong>. At one point, Kerry even spearheaded outreach efforts to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad before the administration turned on Assad over his crackdown on protesters. But he also has called for arming the opposition and for NATO airstrikes, which Obama's administration has resisted.¶ <u><strong>The Middle East is sure to take up </u></strong>a good part of <u><strong>the secretary’s time. </u></strong>In addition to helping bring about a political transition in Syria, <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates also <u><strong>must </u></strong>manage the political chaos in Egypt and the rest of North Africa while trying to <u><strong>negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran </u></strong>and revive the Middle East peace process. <u><strong>Kerry is one of the well-traveled senators to the Middle East, has a good feel for the region and knows many </u></strong>of the <u><strong>players</u></strong>. Kerry <u><strong>insiders say </u></strong>a Secretary of State <u><strong>Kerry would want to play a big role shaping policy for in the Mideast and try to help solve some of intractable issues</u></strong>, including delving heavily into the peace process.</p> </s>

Not good enough – they still have a high reliance on oil

Russia's plan to keep a tight grip on spending does not fully address concerns about its dependence on oil prices Despite the small (budget) deficit, the size of the non-oil deficit remains at a high level," he said Analysts said the tough fiscal plan may also be hard to implement in practice and subject to future revision A compromise will be reached at some point between the variants (proposed by) the Ministry of Finance and the variants of other ministries, which want to get higher spending," said Yulia Tsepliaeva, chief Russia economist at BNP Paribas

Russia's plan does not address concerns about dependence on prices Despite the small deficit, the size of the non-oil deficit remains at a high level Analysts said the plan may be hard to implement A compromise will be reached between the ministries, which want to get higher spending," said Tsepliaeva, chief economist

OIL DEPENDENCE But Russia's plan to keep a tight grip on spending does not fully address concerns about its dependence on oil prices. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank have called on Russia to reinstate a fiscal rule under which the non-oil deficit, a measure of the fiscal stance excluding oil taxes, would have been reduced to below 5 percent of GDP by mid-decade, from above 10 percent of GDP today. Under the latest budget plan, the non-oil deficit would decline only gradually, to 10.1 percent of GDP 2013 and 8.6 percent of GDP by 2015, Medvedev said. "Despite the small (budget) deficit, the size of the non-oil deficit remains at a high level," he said. Analysts said the tough fiscal plan may also be hard to implement in practice and subject to future revision. "A compromise will be reached at some point between the variants (proposed by) the Ministry of Finance and the variants of other ministries, which want to get higher spending," said Yulia Tsepliaeva, chief Russia economist at BNP Paribas.

<h4>Not good enough – they still have a high reliance on oil</h4><p><strong><mark>REUTERS ’12</strong></mark> (Reuters. “Russia tightens budget to reduce oil price risk”. July 6, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/06/russia-budget-idUSL6E8I6A1Y20120706)</p><p>OIL DEPENDENCE</p><p>But <u><mark>Russia's plan</mark> to keep a tight grip on spending <mark>does not</mark> fully <mark>address concerns about</mark> its <mark>dependence on</mark> oil <mark>prices</u></mark>.</p><p>The International Monetary Fund and World Bank have called on Russia to reinstate a fiscal rule under which the non-oil deficit, a measure of the fiscal stance excluding oil taxes, would have been reduced to below 5 percent of GDP by mid-decade, from above 10 percent of GDP today.</p><p>Under the latest budget plan, the non-oil deficit would decline only gradually, to 10.1 percent of GDP 2013 and 8.6 percent of GDP by 2015, Medvedev said. "<u><mark>Despite the small</mark> (budget) <mark>deficit, the size of the non-oil deficit remains at a high level</mark>," he said</u>.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Analysts said</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>the</mark> tough fiscal <mark>plan may</mark> also <mark>be hard to implement</mark> in practice and subject to future revision</u>.</p><p>"<u><mark>A compromise will be reached</mark> at some point <mark>between the</mark> variants (proposed by) the Ministry of Finance and the variants of other <strong><mark>ministries, which want to get higher spending</strong>," <strong>said</strong></mark> Yulia <strong><mark>Tsepliaeva, chief</strong></mark> Russia <strong><mark>economist</strong></mark> at BNP Paribas</u>.</p>

REUTERS ’12 (Reuters. “Russia tightens budget to reduce oil price risk”. July 6, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/06/russia-budget-idUSL6E8I6A1Y20120706)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: REUTERS ’12 (Reuters. “Russia tightens budget to reduce oil price risk”. July 6, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/06/russia-budget-idUSL6E8I6A1Y20120706) fulltext: OIL DEPENDENCE But Russia's plan to keep a tight grip on spending does not fully address concerns about its dependence on oil prices. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank have called on Russia to reinstate a fiscal rule under which the non-oil deficit, a measure of the fiscal stance excluding oil taxes, would have been reduced to below 5 percent of GDP by mid-decade, from above 10 percent of GDP today. Under the latest budget plan, the non-oil deficit would decline only gradually, to 10.1 percent of GDP 2013 and 8.6 percent of GDP by 2015, Medvedev said. "Despite the small (budget) deficit, the size of the non-oil deficit remains at a high level," he said. Analysts said the tough fiscal plan may also be hard to implement in practice and subject to future revision. "A compromise will be reached at some point between the variants (proposed by) the Ministry of Finance and the variants of other ministries, which want to get higher spending," said Yulia Tsepliaeva, chief Russia economist at BNP Paribas. [/INST] <h4>Not good enough – they still have a high reliance on oil</h4><p><strong><mark>REUTERS ’12</strong></mark> (Reuters. “Russia tightens budget to reduce oil price risk”. July 6, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/06/russia-budget-idUSL6E8I6A1Y20120706)</p><p>OIL DEPENDENCE</p><p>But <u><mark>Russia's plan</mark> to keep a tight grip on spending <mark>does not</mark> fully <mark>address concerns about</mark> its <mark>dependence on</mark> oil <mark>prices</u></mark>.</p><p>The International Monetary Fund and World Bank have called on Russia to reinstate a fiscal rule under which the non-oil deficit, a measure of the fiscal stance excluding oil taxes, would have been reduced to below 5 percent of GDP by mid-decade, from above 10 percent of GDP today.</p><p>Under the latest budget plan, the non-oil deficit would decline only gradually, to 10.1 percent of GDP 2013 and 8.6 percent of GDP by 2015, Medvedev said. "<u><mark>Despite the small</mark> (budget) <mark>deficit, the size of the non-oil deficit remains at a high level</mark>," he said</u>.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Analysts said</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>the</mark> tough fiscal <mark>plan may</mark> also <mark>be hard to implement</mark> in practice and subject to future revision</u>.</p><p>"<u><mark>A compromise will be reached</mark> at some point <mark>between the</mark> variants (proposed by) the Ministry of Finance and the variants of other <strong><mark>ministries, which want to get higher spending</strong>," <strong>said</strong></mark> Yulia <strong><mark>Tsepliaeva, chief</strong></mark> Russia <strong><mark>economist</strong></mark> at BNP Paribas</u>.</p> </s>

Cuba

Cu·ba [kyoo-buh; Spanish koo-vah] noun a republic in the Caribbean, S of Florida: largest island in the West Indies. 44,218 sq. mi. (114,525 sq. km). Capital: Havana.

<h4>Cuba</h4><p><strong>Dictionary.com </strong>Unabridged 20<strong>13</strong> [Based on the Random House Dictionary, © Random House, Inc dictionary.reference.com/browse/cuba?s=t]</p><p>Cu·ba [kyoo-buh; Spanish koo-vah] noun</p><p>a republic in the Caribbean, S of Florida: largest island in the West Indies. 44,218 sq. mi. (114,525 sq. km). Capital: Havana.</p>

Dictionary.com Unabridged 2013 [Based on the Random House Dictionary, © Random House, Inc dictionary.reference.com/browse/cuba?s=t]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Dictionary.com Unabridged 2013 [Based on the Random House Dictionary, © Random House, Inc dictionary.reference.com/browse/cuba?s=t] fulltext: Cu·ba [kyoo-buh; Spanish koo-vah] noun a republic in the Caribbean, S of Florida: largest island in the West Indies. 44,218 sq. mi. (114,525 sq. km). Capital: Havana. [/INST] <h4>Cuba</h4><p><strong>Dictionary.com </strong>Unabridged 20<strong>13</strong> [Based on the Random House Dictionary, © Random House, Inc dictionary.reference.com/browse/cuba?s=t]</p><p>Cu·ba [kyoo-buh; Spanish koo-vah] noun</p><p>a republic in the Caribbean, S of Florida: largest island in the West Indies. 44,218 sq. mi. (114,525 sq. km). Capital: Havana.</p> </s>

Counterplan doesn’t require Congress – avoids backlash

Obama could remove Cuba from the terrorist list without congressional approval. the Cubans] are agitated by that and they have been for some time,” That is something the administration could do on its own and they should.”

But Obama could remove Cuba from the terrorist list without congressional approval. “Clearly [the Cubans] are agitated by that and they have been for some time,” said McGovern, who said the issue of the terror designation was raised by the Cubans this week. “That is something the administration could do on its own and they should.”

<h4>Counterplan doesn’t require Congress – avoids backlash</h4><p><strong>Boston Globe</strong>, <strong>2/21</strong>/13, “Talk grows of taking Cuba off terror list” <u><strong>http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/02/21/cuba-label-terrorist-state-longer-justified-some-officials-say/CmVFXsVC4M1R1WbHE8lb0H/story.html</p><p></u></strong>But <u><strong>Obama could remove Cuba from the terrorist list without congressional approval.</p><p></u></strong>“Clearly [<u><strong>the Cubans] are agitated by that and they have been for some time,”</u></strong> said McGovern, who said the issue of the terror designation was raised by the Cubans this week. “<u><strong>That is something the administration could do on its own and they should.”</p></u></strong>

Boston Globe, 2/21/13, “Talk grows of taking Cuba off terror list” http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/02/21/cuba-label-terrorist-state-longer-justified-some-officials-say/CmVFXsVC4M1R1WbHE8lb0H/story.html

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Boston Globe, 2/21/13, “Talk grows of taking Cuba off terror list” http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/02/21/cuba-label-terrorist-state-longer-justified-some-officials-say/CmVFXsVC4M1R1WbHE8lb0H/story.html fulltext: But Obama could remove Cuba from the terrorist list without congressional approval. “Clearly [the Cubans] are agitated by that and they have been for some time,” said McGovern, who said the issue of the terror designation was raised by the Cubans this week. “That is something the administration could do on its own and they should.” [/INST] <h4>Counterplan doesn’t require Congress – avoids backlash</h4><p><strong>Boston Globe</strong>, <strong>2/21</strong>/13, “Talk grows of taking Cuba off terror list” <u><strong>http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/02/21/cuba-label-terrorist-state-longer-justified-some-officials-say/CmVFXsVC4M1R1WbHE8lb0H/story.html</p><p></u></strong>But <u><strong>Obama could remove Cuba from the terrorist list without congressional approval.</p><p></u></strong>“Clearly [<u><strong>the Cubans] are agitated by that and they have been for some time,”</u></strong> said McGovern, who said the issue of the terror designation was raised by the Cubans this week. “<u><strong>That is something the administration could do on its own and they should.”</p></u></strong> </s>

Tar sands cause catastrophic climate change

The Canadian the tar sands industry is setting the world on a course of catastrophic climate change, a group of climate scientists and economists have unlocking Alberta's tar sands would put a dangerous amount of carbon into the atmosphere

The Canadian the tar sands industry is setting the world on a course of catastrophic climate change, a group of climate scientists and economists have unlocking Alberta's tar sands would put a dangerous amount of carbon into the atmosphere

The Canadian government's promotion of the tar sands industry is setting the world on a course of catastrophic climate change, a group of climate scientists and economists have warned.¶ In a letter made available to the Guardian, the academics urged Canada's natural resources minister, Joe Oliver, to consider the consequences of his support for expanding Alberta's tar sands production.¶ Oliver has in recent months emerged as the main proponent for the Keystone XL pipeline in Washington and other capitals. He is due in London this week.¶ The project would pump crude from the tar sands directly to refineries on the Texas Gulf coast, and so provide a much-needed outlet for Canada's crude.¶ But the academics warned that unlocking Alberta's tar sands, which are thought to hold some 170bn barrels of recoverable oil, would put a dangerous amount of carbon into the atmosphere.¶ Production from the tar sands causes higher greenhouse gas emissions than conventional crude oils.¶ The academics said that expanding the tar sands ran in the face of recommendations from the International Energy Agency and others that two-thirds of the world's fossil fuel reserves should not be commercialised – in order to avoid catastrophic climate change.

<h4>Tar sands cause catastrophic climate change</h4><p><strong>Goldenberg 3-8</strong>-13 [Suzanne, US environmental correspondent for The Guardian, has won the prize of Reporter of the Year from What the Papers Say, the Foreign Press Association, and the London Press Club, “Academics warn Canada against further tar sands production,” <u>http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/may/08/academics-canada-tar-sands-production</u>]</p><p><u><mark>The Canadian</u> </mark>government's promotion of <u><mark>the tar sands industry is setting the world on a course of catastrophic climate change, a group of climate scientists and economists have</u> </mark>warned.¶ In a letter made available to the Guardian, the academics urged Canada's natural resources minister, Joe Oliver, to consider the consequences of his support for expanding Alberta's tar sands production.¶ Oliver has in recent months emerged as the main proponent for the Keystone XL pipeline in Washington and other capitals. He is due in London this week.¶ The project would pump crude from the tar sands directly to refineries on the Texas Gulf coast, and so provide a much-needed outlet for Canada's crude.¶ But the academics warned that <u><mark>unlocking Alberta's tar sands</u></mark>, which are thought to hold some 170bn barrels of recoverable oil, <u><mark>would put a dangerous amount of carbon into the atmosphere</u></mark>.¶ Production from the tar sands causes higher greenhouse gas emissions than conventional crude oils.¶ The academics said that expanding the tar sands ran in the face of recommendations from the International Energy Agency and others that two-thirds of the world's fossil fuel reserves should not be commercialised – in order to avoid catastrophic climate change.</p>

Goldenberg 3-8-13 [Suzanne, US environmental correspondent for The Guardian, has won the prize of Reporter of the Year from What the Papers Say, the Foreign Press Association, and the London Press Club, “Academics warn Canada against further tar sands production,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/may/08/academics-canada-tar-sands-production]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Goldenberg 3-8-13 [Suzanne, US environmental correspondent for The Guardian, has won the prize of Reporter of the Year from What the Papers Say, the Foreign Press Association, and the London Press Club, “Academics warn Canada against further tar sands production,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/may/08/academics-canada-tar-sands-production] fulltext: The Canadian government's promotion of the tar sands industry is setting the world on a course of catastrophic climate change, a group of climate scientists and economists have warned.¶ In a letter made available to the Guardian, the academics urged Canada's natural resources minister, Joe Oliver, to consider the consequences of his support for expanding Alberta's tar sands production.¶ Oliver has in recent months emerged as the main proponent for the Keystone XL pipeline in Washington and other capitals. He is due in London this week.¶ The project would pump crude from the tar sands directly to refineries on the Texas Gulf coast, and so provide a much-needed outlet for Canada's crude.¶ But the academics warned that unlocking Alberta's tar sands, which are thought to hold some 170bn barrels of recoverable oil, would put a dangerous amount of carbon into the atmosphere.¶ Production from the tar sands causes higher greenhouse gas emissions than conventional crude oils.¶ The academics said that expanding the tar sands ran in the face of recommendations from the International Energy Agency and others that two-thirds of the world's fossil fuel reserves should not be commercialised – in order to avoid catastrophic climate change. [/INST] <h4>Tar sands cause catastrophic climate change</h4><p><strong>Goldenberg 3-8</strong>-13 [Suzanne, US environmental correspondent for The Guardian, has won the prize of Reporter of the Year from What the Papers Say, the Foreign Press Association, and the London Press Club, “Academics warn Canada against further tar sands production,” <u>http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/may/08/academics-canada-tar-sands-production</u>]</p><p><u><mark>The Canadian</u> </mark>government's promotion of <u><mark>the tar sands industry is setting the world on a course of catastrophic climate change, a group of climate scientists and economists have</u> </mark>warned.¶ In a letter made available to the Guardian, the academics urged Canada's natural resources minister, Joe Oliver, to consider the consequences of his support for expanding Alberta's tar sands production.¶ Oliver has in recent months emerged as the main proponent for the Keystone XL pipeline in Washington and other capitals. He is due in London this week.¶ The project would pump crude from the tar sands directly to refineries on the Texas Gulf coast, and so provide a much-needed outlet for Canada's crude.¶ But the academics warned that <u><mark>unlocking Alberta's tar sands</u></mark>, which are thought to hold some 170bn barrels of recoverable oil, <u><mark>would put a dangerous amount of carbon into the atmosphere</u></mark>.¶ Production from the tar sands causes higher greenhouse gas emissions than conventional crude oils.¶ The academics said that expanding the tar sands ran in the face of recommendations from the International Energy Agency and others that two-thirds of the world's fossil fuel reserves should not be commercialised – in order to avoid catastrophic climate change.</p> </s>

(__) Kerry is focusing on LA- Calls it America’s Backyard

Kerry, called Latin America the "back yard" of the United States. Kerry considers these countries as their "back yard" and added that plans are being made to change the attitude of some of these nations. Likewise Obama will depart for some Latin countries, The Western Hemisphere is our back yard it is of vital importance to us. Too often, many countries in the western hemisphere feel that the United States does not give them enough attention We need to be closer and we plan to do it.

http://english.pravda.ru/world/americas/23-04-2013/124377-latam_backyard-0/, \\wyo-bb] On Wednesday, the American Secretary of State, John Kerry, called Latin America the "back yard" of the United States. During a speech before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, and following the old Monroe Doctrine, regardless of the sovereignty of Latin American countries, Kerry considers these countries as their "back yard" and added that plans are being made to change the attitude of some of these nations. Likewise, the head of U.S. diplomacy, said that in the near future President Barack Obama will depart for some Latin countries, not even remembering their names, after traveling to Mexico. "The Western Hemisphere is our back yard (sic), it is of vital importance to us. Too often, many countries in the western hemisphere feel that the United States does not give them enough attention and sometimes this is probably true. We need to be closer and we plan to do it. The President will travel soon to Mexico and then to the south, I cannot remember which countries, but he will go to the region," said John Kerry.

<h4>(__) <strong>Kerry is focusing on LA- Calls it America’s Backyard </h4><p>Karpova 4/23</p><p></strong>[Lisa Karpova, staff writer @ Pravda.Ru, “John Kerry, Secretary of State: "Latin America is our back yard"”, 23.04.2013, </p><p>http://english.pravda.ru/world/americas/23-04-2013/124377-latam_backyard-0/, \\wyo-bb]</p><p>On Wednesday, the American Secretary of State, John <u><strong>Kerry, called Latin America the "back yard" of the United States. </u></strong>During a speech before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, and following the old Monroe Doctrine, regardless of the sovereignty of Latin American countries, <u><strong>Kerry considers these countries as their "back yard" and added that plans are being made to change the attitude of some of these nations. Likewise</u></strong>, the head of U.S. diplomacy, said that in the near future President Barack <u><strong>Obama will depart for some Latin countries,</u></strong> not even remembering their names, after traveling to Mexico. "<u><strong>The Western Hemisphere is our back yard</u></strong> (sic), <u><strong>it is of vital importance to us. Too often, many countries in the western hemisphere feel that the United States does not give them enough attention</u></strong> and sometimes this is probably true. <u><strong>We need to be closer and we plan to do it.</u></strong> The President will travel soon to Mexico and then to the south, I cannot remember which countries, but he will go to the region," <strong>said John Kerry.</p></strong>

Karpova 4/23 [Lisa Karpova, staff writer @ Pravda.Ru, “John Kerry, Secretary of State: "Latin America is our back yard"”, 23.04.2013,

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Karpova 4/23 [Lisa Karpova, staff writer @ Pravda.Ru, “John Kerry, Secretary of State: "Latin America is our back yard"”, 23.04.2013, fulltext: http://english.pravda.ru/world/americas/23-04-2013/124377-latam_backyard-0/, \\wyo-bb] On Wednesday, the American Secretary of State, John Kerry, called Latin America the "back yard" of the United States. During a speech before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, and following the old Monroe Doctrine, regardless of the sovereignty of Latin American countries, Kerry considers these countries as their "back yard" and added that plans are being made to change the attitude of some of these nations. Likewise, the head of U.S. diplomacy, said that in the near future President Barack Obama will depart for some Latin countries, not even remembering their names, after traveling to Mexico. "The Western Hemisphere is our back yard (sic), it is of vital importance to us. Too often, many countries in the western hemisphere feel that the United States does not give them enough attention and sometimes this is probably true. We need to be closer and we plan to do it. The President will travel soon to Mexico and then to the south, I cannot remember which countries, but he will go to the region," said John Kerry. [/INST] <h4>(__) <strong>Kerry is focusing on LA- Calls it America’s Backyard </h4><p>Karpova 4/23</p><p></strong>[Lisa Karpova, staff writer @ Pravda.Ru, “John Kerry, Secretary of State: "Latin America is our back yard"”, 23.04.2013, </p><p>http://english.pravda.ru/world/americas/23-04-2013/124377-latam_backyard-0/, \\wyo-bb]</p><p>On Wednesday, the American Secretary of State, John <u><strong>Kerry, called Latin America the "back yard" of the United States. </u></strong>During a speech before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, and following the old Monroe Doctrine, regardless of the sovereignty of Latin American countries, <u><strong>Kerry considers these countries as their "back yard" and added that plans are being made to change the attitude of some of these nations. Likewise</u></strong>, the head of U.S. diplomacy, said that in the near future President Barack <u><strong>Obama will depart for some Latin countries,</u></strong> not even remembering their names, after traveling to Mexico. "<u><strong>The Western Hemisphere is our back yard</u></strong> (sic), <u><strong>it is of vital importance to us. Too often, many countries in the western hemisphere feel that the United States does not give them enough attention</u></strong> and sometimes this is probably true. <u><strong>We need to be closer and we plan to do it.</u></strong> The President will travel soon to Mexico and then to the south, I cannot remember which countries, but he will go to the region," <strong>said John Kerry.</p></strong> </s>

Cuba

Cuba (ˈkjuːbə) — n a republic and the largest island in the Caribbean, at the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico: became a Spanish colony after its discovery by Columbus in 1492; gained independence after the Spanish-American War of 1898 but remained subject to US influence until declared a people's republic under Castro in 1960; subject of an international crisis in 1962, when the US blockaded the island in order to compel the Soviet Union to dismantle its nuclear missile base. Sugar comprises about 80 per cent of total exports; the economy was badly affected by loss of trade following the collapse of the Soviet Union and by the continuing US trade embargo. Language: Spanish. Religion: nonreligious majority. Currency: peso. Capital: Havana. Pop: 11 328 000 (2004 est). Area: 110 922 sq km (42 827 sq miles)

<h4>Cuba</h4><p><strong>Collins </strong>English Dictionary 200<strong>9</strong> [Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition dictionary.reference.com/browse/cuba?s=t]</p><p>Cuba (ˈkjuːbə) — n</p><p>a republic and the largest island in the Caribbean, at the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico: became a Spanish colony after its discovery by Columbus in 1492; gained independence after the Spanish-American War of 1898 but remained subject to US influence until declared a people's republic under Castro in 1960; subject of an international crisis in 1962, when the US blockaded the island in order to compel the Soviet Union to dismantle its nuclear missile base. Sugar comprises about 80 per cent of total exports; the economy was badly affected by loss of trade following the collapse of the Soviet Union and by the continuing US trade embargo. Language: Spanish. Religion: nonreligious majority. Currency: peso. Capital: Havana. Pop: 11 328 000 (2004 est). Area: 110 922 sq km (42 827 sq miles)</p>

Collins English Dictionary 2009 [Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition dictionary.reference.com/browse/cuba?s=t]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Collins English Dictionary 2009 [Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition dictionary.reference.com/browse/cuba?s=t] fulltext: Cuba (ˈkjuːbə) — n a republic and the largest island in the Caribbean, at the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico: became a Spanish colony after its discovery by Columbus in 1492; gained independence after the Spanish-American War of 1898 but remained subject to US influence until declared a people's republic under Castro in 1960; subject of an international crisis in 1962, when the US blockaded the island in order to compel the Soviet Union to dismantle its nuclear missile base. Sugar comprises about 80 per cent of total exports; the economy was badly affected by loss of trade following the collapse of the Soviet Union and by the continuing US trade embargo. Language: Spanish. Religion: nonreligious majority. Currency: peso. Capital: Havana. Pop: 11 328 000 (2004 est). Area: 110 922 sq km (42 827 sq miles) [/INST] <h4>Cuba</h4><p><strong>Collins </strong>English Dictionary 200<strong>9</strong> [Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition dictionary.reference.com/browse/cuba?s=t]</p><p>Cuba (ˈkjuːbə) — n</p><p>a republic and the largest island in the Caribbean, at the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico: became a Spanish colony after its discovery by Columbus in 1492; gained independence after the Spanish-American War of 1898 but remained subject to US influence until declared a people's republic under Castro in 1960; subject of an international crisis in 1962, when the US blockaded the island in order to compel the Soviet Union to dismantle its nuclear missile base. Sugar comprises about 80 per cent of total exports; the economy was badly affected by loss of trade following the collapse of the Soviet Union and by the continuing US trade embargo. Language: Spanish. Religion: nonreligious majority. Currency: peso. Capital: Havana. Pop: 11 328 000 (2004 est). Area: 110 922 sq km (42 827 sq miles)</p> </s>

Their evidence doesn’t assume Russian shale

the Bazhenov — according to a report last week by Sanford Bernstein’s lead international oil analyst Oswald Clint — “covers 2.3 million square kilometers or 570 million acres, which is the size of Texas and the Gulf of Mexico combined the Bazhenov has lots of cracks and fractures that could make its oil flow more readily technology and expertise has been developed that will enable drillers to harvest it. it won’t be hard for Big Oil to export their shale-cracking techniques to Siberia This year, the Saudis are said to have surpassed Russia, leading some pundits to speculate that Russian oil supply had peaked and was set to begin spiralling down Developing the Bazhenov could reverse that decline. Bazhenov would imply 1,920 billion barrels. That’s a preposterous figure, enough oil to satisfy all of current global demand for 64 years, or to do 5 million bpd for more than 1,000 years it looks like they’ll still be working the Bazhenov long after the Peak Oil crowd realizes there’s more oil out there than we’ve ever imagined

the Bazhenov covers the size of Texas and the Gulf of Mexico combined the Bazhenov has lots of cracks that make its oil flow more readily technology and expertise has been developed to harvest it Bazhenov would imply 1,920 billion barrels That’s enough to satisfy all demand for 64 years, or 5 million bpd for more than 1,000 years they’ll be working the Bazhenov after the Peak Oil crowd realizes there’s more oil than we’ve ever imagined

But as great as the Bakken is, I learned last week about another oil shale play that dwarfs it. It’s called The Bazhenov. It’s in Western Siberia, in Russia. And while the Bakken is big, the Bazhenov — according to a report last week by Sanford Bernstein’s lead international oil analyst Oswald Clint — “covers 2.3 million square kilometers or 570 million acres, which is the size of Texas and the Gulf of Mexico combined.” This is 80 times bigger than the Bakken. Getting access to the Bazhenov appears to be a key element in both ExxonMobil and Statoil‘s big new joint ventures with Kremlin-controlled Rosneft. Exxon’s recent statement says the two companies have agreed “to jointly develop tight oil production technologies in Western Siberia.” No wonder. The geology of the Bazhenov looks just as good if not better. Its pay zone averages about 100 feet thick, and as Clint points out, the Bazhenov has lots of cracks and fractures that could make its oil flow more readily. The couple test wells that he sites flowed at an average of 400 barrels per day. That’s in line with the Bakken average. This Siberian bonanza might be news to most of us, but it’s old news to Big Oil. The conventional oil fields of Siberia have been producing millions of barrels a day for decades — oil that originated in the Bazhenov “source rock” then slowly oozed up over the millenia. From the looks of it, geologists have been looking at the Bazhenov for more than 20 years. It’s only in the last five years that the technology and expertise has been developed that will enable drillers to harvest it. Lukoil‘s president Vagit Alekperov said a year ago that his company was also experimenting with the shale. Analyst Clint figures that it won’t be hard for Big Oil to export their shale-cracking techniques to Siberia. They will be challenged, however by summer weather in Siberia, which softens the ground enough to prevent drilling for much of the season. If Russia can get its act together to deploy 300 drilling rigs to the play, Clint figures Bazhenov could be producing 1 million bpd by 2020. This would, of course, have huge geopolitical implications. Russia, though it doesn’t have as many proved reserves as Saudi Arabia, had been outproducing the Saudis for years, averaging about 10 million bpd to Saudi’s 9 million bpd. This year, the Saudis are said to have surpassed Russia, leading some pundits to speculate that Russian oil supply had peaked and was set to begin spiralling down. Developing the Bazhenov could reverse that decline. Unlike the Kremlin’s much ballyhooed plan to drill for oil in ice-packed Arctic waters, the beauty of the Bazhenov is that it is onshore and it underlies an area that is already criss-crossed with pipelines serving mature, conventional fields. No need for expensive icebreakers, cold-weather drillships and subsea pipelines. If Harold Hamm is convinced the Bakken will give up 24 billion barrels, a play 80 times bigger like the Bazhenov would imply 1,920 billion barrels. That’s a preposterous figure, enough oil to satisfy all of current global demand for 64 years, or to do 5 million bpd for more than 1,000 years. Rosneft, says Clint, has already estimated 18 billion barrels on its Bazhenov acreage. Either way, it looks like they’ll still be working the Bazhenov long after Vladimir Putin has finally retired and the Peak Oil crowd realizes there’s more oil out there than we’ve ever imagined.

<h4>Their evidence doesn’t assume Russian shale</h4><p><strong><mark>HELMAN ’12</strong></mark> – Forbes staff; covers the energy industry (Helman, Christopher. “Meet The Oil Shale Eighty Times Bigger Than The Bakken”. June 4, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2012/06/04/bakken-bazhenov-shale-oil/)</p><p>But as great as the Bakken is, I learned last week about another oil shale play that dwarfs it. It’s called The Bazhenov. It’s in Western Siberia, in Russia. And while the Bakken is big, <u><mark>the Bazhenov</mark> — according to a report last week by Sanford Bernstein’s lead international oil analyst Oswald Clint — “<mark>covers</mark> 2.3 million square kilometers or 570 million acres, which is <strong><mark>the size of</strong></mark> <strong><mark>Texas and the Gulf of Mexico combined</u></strong></mark>.” This is 80 times bigger than the Bakken.</p><p>Getting access to the Bazhenov appears to be a key element in both ExxonMobil and Statoil‘s big new joint ventures with Kremlin-controlled Rosneft. Exxon’s recent statement says the two companies have agreed “to jointly develop tight oil production technologies in Western Siberia.”</p><p>No wonder. The geology of the Bazhenov looks just as good if not better. Its pay zone averages about 100 feet thick, and as Clint points out, <u><mark>the Bazhenov has lots of cracks</mark> and fractures <mark>that</mark> could <mark>make its oil flow more readily</u></mark>. The couple test wells that he sites flowed at an average of 400 barrels per day. That’s in line with the Bakken average.</p><p>This Siberian bonanza might be news to most of us, but it’s old news to Big Oil. The conventional oil fields of Siberia have been producing millions of barrels a day for decades — oil that originated in the Bazhenov “source rock” then slowly oozed up over the millenia. From the looks of it, geologists have been looking at the Bazhenov for more than 20 years.</p><p>It’s only in the last five years that the<u> <mark>technology and expertise has been developed</mark> that will enable drillers <mark>to harvest it</mark>.</u> Lukoil‘s president Vagit Alekperov said a year ago that his company was also experimenting with the shale.</p><p>Analyst Clint figures that <u>it won’t be hard for Big Oil to export their shale-cracking techniques to Siberia</u>. They will be challenged, however by summer weather in Siberia, which softens the ground enough to prevent drilling for much of the season. If Russia can get its act together to deploy 300 drilling rigs to the play, Clint figures Bazhenov could be producing 1 million bpd by 2020.</p><p>This would, of course, have huge geopolitical implications. Russia, though it doesn’t have as many proved reserves as Saudi Arabia, had been outproducing the Saudis for years, averaging about 10 million bpd to Saudi’s 9 million bpd. <u>This year, the Saudis are said to have surpassed Russia, leading some pundits to speculate that Russian oil supply had peaked and was set to begin spiralling down</u>.</p><p><u>Developing the Bazhenov could reverse that decline.</u> Unlike the Kremlin’s much ballyhooed plan to drill for oil in ice-packed Arctic waters, the beauty of the Bazhenov is that it is onshore and it underlies an area that is already criss-crossed with pipelines serving mature, conventional fields. No need for expensive icebreakers, cold-weather drillships and subsea pipelines.</p><p>If Harold Hamm is convinced the Bakken will give up 24 billion barrels, a play 80 times bigger like the <u><mark>Bazhenov would imply</mark> <mark>1,920 billion barrels</mark>. <mark>That’s</mark> a preposterous figure, <mark>enough</mark> oil <strong><mark>to satisfy all</strong></mark> of current global <strong><mark>demand for 64 years, or</strong></mark> to do <strong><mark>5 million bpd for more than 1,000 years</u></strong></mark>. Rosneft, says Clint, has already estimated 18 billion barrels on its Bazhenov acreage. Either way, <u>it looks like <mark>they’ll</mark> still <mark>be working the Bazhenov</mark> long <mark>after</u></mark> Vladimir Putin has finally retired and <u><mark>the Peak Oil crowd</mark> <mark>realizes there’s more oil</mark> out there <mark>than we’ve ever imagined</u></mark>.</p>

HELMAN ’12 – Forbes staff; covers the energy industry (Helman, Christopher. “Meet The Oil Shale Eighty Times Bigger Than The Bakken”. June 4, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2012/06/04/bakken-bazhenov-shale-oil/)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: HELMAN ’12 – Forbes staff; covers the energy industry (Helman, Christopher. “Meet The Oil Shale Eighty Times Bigger Than The Bakken”. June 4, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2012/06/04/bakken-bazhenov-shale-oil/) fulltext: But as great as the Bakken is, I learned last week about another oil shale play that dwarfs it. It’s called The Bazhenov. It’s in Western Siberia, in Russia. And while the Bakken is big, the Bazhenov — according to a report last week by Sanford Bernstein’s lead international oil analyst Oswald Clint — “covers 2.3 million square kilometers or 570 million acres, which is the size of Texas and the Gulf of Mexico combined.” This is 80 times bigger than the Bakken. Getting access to the Bazhenov appears to be a key element in both ExxonMobil and Statoil‘s big new joint ventures with Kremlin-controlled Rosneft. Exxon’s recent statement says the two companies have agreed “to jointly develop tight oil production technologies in Western Siberia.” No wonder. The geology of the Bazhenov looks just as good if not better. Its pay zone averages about 100 feet thick, and as Clint points out, the Bazhenov has lots of cracks and fractures that could make its oil flow more readily. The couple test wells that he sites flowed at an average of 400 barrels per day. That’s in line with the Bakken average. This Siberian bonanza might be news to most of us, but it’s old news to Big Oil. The conventional oil fields of Siberia have been producing millions of barrels a day for decades — oil that originated in the Bazhenov “source rock” then slowly oozed up over the millenia. From the looks of it, geologists have been looking at the Bazhenov for more than 20 years. It’s only in the last five years that the technology and expertise has been developed that will enable drillers to harvest it. Lukoil‘s president Vagit Alekperov said a year ago that his company was also experimenting with the shale. Analyst Clint figures that it won’t be hard for Big Oil to export their shale-cracking techniques to Siberia. They will be challenged, however by summer weather in Siberia, which softens the ground enough to prevent drilling for much of the season. If Russia can get its act together to deploy 300 drilling rigs to the play, Clint figures Bazhenov could be producing 1 million bpd by 2020. This would, of course, have huge geopolitical implications. Russia, though it doesn’t have as many proved reserves as Saudi Arabia, had been outproducing the Saudis for years, averaging about 10 million bpd to Saudi’s 9 million bpd. This year, the Saudis are said to have surpassed Russia, leading some pundits to speculate that Russian oil supply had peaked and was set to begin spiralling down. Developing the Bazhenov could reverse that decline. Unlike the Kremlin’s much ballyhooed plan to drill for oil in ice-packed Arctic waters, the beauty of the Bazhenov is that it is onshore and it underlies an area that is already criss-crossed with pipelines serving mature, conventional fields. No need for expensive icebreakers, cold-weather drillships and subsea pipelines. If Harold Hamm is convinced the Bakken will give up 24 billion barrels, a play 80 times bigger like the Bazhenov would imply 1,920 billion barrels. That’s a preposterous figure, enough oil to satisfy all of current global demand for 64 years, or to do 5 million bpd for more than 1,000 years. Rosneft, says Clint, has already estimated 18 billion barrels on its Bazhenov acreage. Either way, it looks like they’ll still be working the Bazhenov long after Vladimir Putin has finally retired and the Peak Oil crowd realizes there’s more oil out there than we’ve ever imagined. [/INST] <h4>Their evidence doesn’t assume Russian shale</h4><p><strong><mark>HELMAN ’12</strong></mark> – Forbes staff; covers the energy industry (Helman, Christopher. “Meet The Oil Shale Eighty Times Bigger Than The Bakken”. June 4, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2012/06/04/bakken-bazhenov-shale-oil/)</p><p>But as great as the Bakken is, I learned last week about another oil shale play that dwarfs it. It’s called The Bazhenov. It’s in Western Siberia, in Russia. And while the Bakken is big, <u><mark>the Bazhenov</mark> — according to a report last week by Sanford Bernstein’s lead international oil analyst Oswald Clint — “<mark>covers</mark> 2.3 million square kilometers or 570 million acres, which is <strong><mark>the size of</strong></mark> <strong><mark>Texas and the Gulf of Mexico combined</u></strong></mark>.” This is 80 times bigger than the Bakken.</p><p>Getting access to the Bazhenov appears to be a key element in both ExxonMobil and Statoil‘s big new joint ventures with Kremlin-controlled Rosneft. Exxon’s recent statement says the two companies have agreed “to jointly develop tight oil production technologies in Western Siberia.”</p><p>No wonder. The geology of the Bazhenov looks just as good if not better. Its pay zone averages about 100 feet thick, and as Clint points out, <u><mark>the Bazhenov has lots of cracks</mark> and fractures <mark>that</mark> could <mark>make its oil flow more readily</u></mark>. The couple test wells that he sites flowed at an average of 400 barrels per day. That’s in line with the Bakken average.</p><p>This Siberian bonanza might be news to most of us, but it’s old news to Big Oil. The conventional oil fields of Siberia have been producing millions of barrels a day for decades — oil that originated in the Bazhenov “source rock” then slowly oozed up over the millenia. From the looks of it, geologists have been looking at the Bazhenov for more than 20 years.</p><p>It’s only in the last five years that the<u> <mark>technology and expertise has been developed</mark> that will enable drillers <mark>to harvest it</mark>.</u> Lukoil‘s president Vagit Alekperov said a year ago that his company was also experimenting with the shale.</p><p>Analyst Clint figures that <u>it won’t be hard for Big Oil to export their shale-cracking techniques to Siberia</u>. They will be challenged, however by summer weather in Siberia, which softens the ground enough to prevent drilling for much of the season. If Russia can get its act together to deploy 300 drilling rigs to the play, Clint figures Bazhenov could be producing 1 million bpd by 2020.</p><p>This would, of course, have huge geopolitical implications. Russia, though it doesn’t have as many proved reserves as Saudi Arabia, had been outproducing the Saudis for years, averaging about 10 million bpd to Saudi’s 9 million bpd. <u>This year, the Saudis are said to have surpassed Russia, leading some pundits to speculate that Russian oil supply had peaked and was set to begin spiralling down</u>.</p><p><u>Developing the Bazhenov could reverse that decline.</u> Unlike the Kremlin’s much ballyhooed plan to drill for oil in ice-packed Arctic waters, the beauty of the Bazhenov is that it is onshore and it underlies an area that is already criss-crossed with pipelines serving mature, conventional fields. No need for expensive icebreakers, cold-weather drillships and subsea pipelines.</p><p>If Harold Hamm is convinced the Bakken will give up 24 billion barrels, a play 80 times bigger like the <u><mark>Bazhenov would imply</mark> <mark>1,920 billion barrels</mark>. <mark>That’s</mark> a preposterous figure, <mark>enough</mark> oil <strong><mark>to satisfy all</strong></mark> of current global <strong><mark>demand for 64 years, or</strong></mark> to do <strong><mark>5 million bpd for more than 1,000 years</u></strong></mark>. Rosneft, says Clint, has already estimated 18 billion barrels on its Bazhenov acreage. Either way, <u>it looks like <mark>they’ll</mark> still <mark>be working the Bazhenov</mark> long <mark>after</u></mark> Vladimir Putin has finally retired and <u><mark>the Peak Oil crowd</mark> <mark>realizes there’s more oil</mark> out there <mark>than we’ve ever imagined</u></mark>.</p> </s>

Plan links but the counterplan doesn’t – people want SOME engagement but lifting the embargo is too much

Many experts think Obama would face less political fallout if he chose engagement there is an open attitude, certainly toward re-establishing diplomatic relations Short of lifting the embargo ... there seems to be increasing support for some sort of understanding with the Cuban government.”

Many experts think Obama would face less political fallout if he chose engagement because younger Cuban-Americans seem more open to improved ties. “In general, there is an open attitude, certainly toward re-establishing diplomatic relations,” said Jorge Duany, director of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University. “Short of perhaps lifting the embargo ... there seems to be increasing support for some sort of understanding with the Cuban government.”

<h4>Plan links but the counterplan doesn’t – people want SOME engagement but lifting the embargo is too much</h4><p><strong>AP News</strong>, <strong>6/22</strong>/13, “Cuba and US try talking, but face numerous obstacles” http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2013/06/22/2003565415</p><p><u><strong>Many experts think Obama would face less political fallout if he chose engagement</u></strong> because younger Cuban-Americans seem more open to improved ties.</p><p>“In general, <u><strong>there is an open attitude, certainly toward re-establishing diplomatic relations</u></strong>,” said Jorge Duany, director of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University. “<u><strong>Short of</u></strong> perhaps <u><strong>lifting the embargo ... there seems to be increasing support for some sort of understanding with the Cuban government.”</p></u></strong>

AP News, 6/22/13, “Cuba and US try talking, but face numerous obstacles” http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2013/06/22/2003565415

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: AP News, 6/22/13, “Cuba and US try talking, but face numerous obstacles” http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2013/06/22/2003565415 fulltext: Many experts think Obama would face less political fallout if he chose engagement because younger Cuban-Americans seem more open to improved ties. “In general, there is an open attitude, certainly toward re-establishing diplomatic relations,” said Jorge Duany, director of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University. “Short of perhaps lifting the embargo ... there seems to be increasing support for some sort of understanding with the Cuban government.” [/INST] <h4>Plan links but the counterplan doesn’t – people want SOME engagement but lifting the embargo is too much</h4><p><strong>AP News</strong>, <strong>6/22</strong>/13, “Cuba and US try talking, but face numerous obstacles” http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2013/06/22/2003565415</p><p><u><strong>Many experts think Obama would face less political fallout if he chose engagement</u></strong> because younger Cuban-Americans seem more open to improved ties.</p><p>“In general, <u><strong>there is an open attitude, certainly toward re-establishing diplomatic relations</u></strong>,” said Jorge Duany, director of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University. “<u><strong>Short of</u></strong> perhaps <u><strong>lifting the embargo ... there seems to be increasing support for some sort of understanding with the Cuban government.”</p></u></strong> </s>

Oil-sands development is game-over for climate

Here's the essential fact The tar sands are the second-largest pool of carbon on earth we've taken 3% We're still at the start If we keep going we're idiots. As the leading climatologist Hansen puts it, tap heavily into tar sands oil and it's game over for the climate".

The tar sands are the second-largest pool of carbon on earth As the leading climatologist puts it, tap heavily into tar sands and it's game over for the climate

Here's the essential fact to bear in mind. The tar sands of northern Alberta are the second-largest pool of carbon on earth, second only to Saudi Arabia. It's burning Saudi Arabia, more than any other single thing, that has raised the temperature of the planet by a degree so far. But when oil was discovered in the Middle East, we knew nothing about climate change – it's not surprising that we started pumping. In the case of Canada, however, we've taken 3% of the oil from the sands. We're still at the start. If, knowing what we now know about climate change, we just keep going, then we're idiots. That realisation explains why Americans rose up in remarkable numbers to fight the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. In August 1,253 people were arrested outside the White House during the largest civil disobedience action in a generation. Citizens ringed the president's mansion in a line a mile long and five people deep. A couple of weeks ago, the president announced that he would delay the pipeline for a new environmental review, which would cover not only the route across the country but also climate change, public health, and other issues. That announcement caught industry off guard. Transcanada Pipeline had already mowed the strip they planned to put the pipe on, and had carried vast quantities of steel across the border. They're fighting back with every tool they can find, but for the moment they're delayed and in trouble. It's a win, though like all environmental wins a temporary one. And it's a tribute not only to an organising effort that brought everyone from Nebraska ranchers to Occupy Wall Street protesters together, but also to the slowly dawning realisation that this was a big deal. As the leading climatologist James Hansen puts it, tap heavily into tar sands oil and it's "essentially game over for the climate".

<h4><strong>Oil-sands development is game-over for climate</h4><p>McKibben ‘11 </strong>[Bill, Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, directs the Middlebury Fellowships in Environmental Journalism, Post Carbon Institute fellow, "Britain's promotion of Canada's tar sands oil is idiotic," Guardian, 11-27-11, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/27/britain-canada-oil-sands-idiotic, accessed 6-3-12, mss<u>]</p><p>Here's the essential fact</u> to bear in mind. <u><mark>The tar sands</u> </mark>of northern Alberta <u><mark>are the <strong>second-largest pool of carbon on earth</u></strong></mark>, second only to Saudi Arabia. It's burning Saudi Arabia, more than any other single thing, that has raised the temperature of the planet by a degree so far. But when oil was discovered in the Middle East, we knew nothing about climate change – it's not surprising that we started pumping. In the case of Canada, however, <u>we've taken 3%</u> of the oil from the sands. <u>We're still at the start</u>. <u>If</u>, knowing what we now know about climate change, <u>we</u> just <u>keep going</u>, then <u>we're idiots.</u> That realisation explains why Americans rose up in remarkable numbers to fight the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. In August 1,253 people were arrested outside the White House during the largest civil disobedience action in a generation. Citizens ringed the president's mansion in a line a mile long and five people deep. A couple of weeks ago, the president announced that he would delay the pipeline for a new environmental review, which would cover not only the route across the country but also climate change, public health, and other issues. That announcement caught industry off guard. Transcanada Pipeline had already mowed the strip they planned to put the pipe on, and had carried vast quantities of steel across the border. They're fighting back with every tool they can find, but for the moment they're delayed and in trouble. It's a win, though like all environmental wins a temporary one. And it's a tribute not only to an organising effort that brought everyone from Nebraska ranchers to Occupy Wall Street protesters together, but also to the slowly dawning realisation that this was a big deal. <u><mark>As the <strong>leading climatologist</u></strong> </mark>James <u>Hansen <mark>puts it, tap heavily into tar sands </mark>oil <mark>and it's</u> </mark>"essentially <u><strong><mark>game over</strong> for the climate</mark>".</p></u>

McKibben ‘11 [Bill, Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, directs the Middlebury Fellowships in Environmental Journalism, Post Carbon Institute fellow, "Britain's promotion of Canada's tar sands oil is idiotic," Guardian, 11-27-11, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/27/britain-canada-oil-sands-idiotic, accessed 6-3-12, mss]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: McKibben ‘11 [Bill, Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, directs the Middlebury Fellowships in Environmental Journalism, Post Carbon Institute fellow, "Britain's promotion of Canada's tar sands oil is idiotic," Guardian, 11-27-11, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/27/britain-canada-oil-sands-idiotic, accessed 6-3-12, mss] fulltext: Here's the essential fact to bear in mind. The tar sands of northern Alberta are the second-largest pool of carbon on earth, second only to Saudi Arabia. It's burning Saudi Arabia, more than any other single thing, that has raised the temperature of the planet by a degree so far. But when oil was discovered in the Middle East, we knew nothing about climate change – it's not surprising that we started pumping. In the case of Canada, however, we've taken 3% of the oil from the sands. We're still at the start. If, knowing what we now know about climate change, we just keep going, then we're idiots. That realisation explains why Americans rose up in remarkable numbers to fight the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. In August 1,253 people were arrested outside the White House during the largest civil disobedience action in a generation. Citizens ringed the president's mansion in a line a mile long and five people deep. A couple of weeks ago, the president announced that he would delay the pipeline for a new environmental review, which would cover not only the route across the country but also climate change, public health, and other issues. That announcement caught industry off guard. Transcanada Pipeline had already mowed the strip they planned to put the pipe on, and had carried vast quantities of steel across the border. They're fighting back with every tool they can find, but for the moment they're delayed and in trouble. It's a win, though like all environmental wins a temporary one. And it's a tribute not only to an organising effort that brought everyone from Nebraska ranchers to Occupy Wall Street protesters together, but also to the slowly dawning realisation that this was a big deal. As the leading climatologist James Hansen puts it, tap heavily into tar sands oil and it's "essentially game over for the climate". [/INST] <h4><strong>Oil-sands development is game-over for climate</h4><p>McKibben ‘11 </strong>[Bill, Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, directs the Middlebury Fellowships in Environmental Journalism, Post Carbon Institute fellow, "Britain's promotion of Canada's tar sands oil is idiotic," Guardian, 11-27-11, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/27/britain-canada-oil-sands-idiotic, accessed 6-3-12, mss<u>]</p><p>Here's the essential fact</u> to bear in mind. <u><mark>The tar sands</u> </mark>of northern Alberta <u><mark>are the <strong>second-largest pool of carbon on earth</u></strong></mark>, second only to Saudi Arabia. It's burning Saudi Arabia, more than any other single thing, that has raised the temperature of the planet by a degree so far. But when oil was discovered in the Middle East, we knew nothing about climate change – it's not surprising that we started pumping. In the case of Canada, however, <u>we've taken 3%</u> of the oil from the sands. <u>We're still at the start</u>. <u>If</u>, knowing what we now know about climate change, <u>we</u> just <u>keep going</u>, then <u>we're idiots.</u> That realisation explains why Americans rose up in remarkable numbers to fight the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. In August 1,253 people were arrested outside the White House during the largest civil disobedience action in a generation. Citizens ringed the president's mansion in a line a mile long and five people deep. A couple of weeks ago, the president announced that he would delay the pipeline for a new environmental review, which would cover not only the route across the country but also climate change, public health, and other issues. That announcement caught industry off guard. Transcanada Pipeline had already mowed the strip they planned to put the pipe on, and had carried vast quantities of steel across the border. They're fighting back with every tool they can find, but for the moment they're delayed and in trouble. It's a win, though like all environmental wins a temporary one. And it's a tribute not only to an organising effort that brought everyone from Nebraska ranchers to Occupy Wall Street protesters together, but also to the slowly dawning realisation that this was a big deal. <u><mark>As the <strong>leading climatologist</u></strong> </mark>James <u>Hansen <mark>puts it, tap heavily into tar sands </mark>oil <mark>and it's</u> </mark>"essentially <u><strong><mark>game over</strong> for the climate</mark>".</p></u> </s>

(__) Republicans Support economic engagement in Latin America

[“Boehner: Urges Deeper Engagement in Latin America”, May 8 2012, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/boehner-latin-america-gop/2012/05/08/id/438420] The U.S. Congress' top Republican called on Tuesday for deeper economic engagement with Latin America as a bulwark against Iran's attempt to gain influence in the region and the destabilizing effects of international drug cartels "We must be clear that we will be there, with our friends and partners in the region, committed to fighting and winning the war for a free, stable, and prosperous hemisphere," Boehner said in a speech to the Council of Americas

[“Boehner: Urges Deeper Engagement in Latin America”, May 8 2012, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/boehner-latin-america-gop/2012/05/08/id/438420] The U.S. Congress' top Republican called on Tuesday for deeper economic engagement with Latin America as a bulwark against Iran's attempt to gain influence in the region and the destabilizing effects of international drug cartels. "The best defense against an expansion of Iranian influence in Latin America - and against the destructive aspirations of international criminals in the region - is for the United States to double down on a policy of direct engagement," U.S. House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner said at the State Department. "We must be clear that we will be there, with our friends and partners in the region, committed to fighting and winning the war for a free, stable, and prosperous hemisphere," Boehner said in a speech to the Council of Americas, which represents companies that do business in Latin America.

<h4><strong>(__) Republicans Support economic engagement in Latin America</h4><p><u></strong>Newsmax 2012</p><p>[“Boehner: Urges Deeper Engagement in Latin America”, May 8 2012, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/boehner-latin-america-gop/2012/05/08/id/438420]</p><p><strong>The U.S. Congress' top Republican called on Tuesday for deeper economic engagement with Latin America as a bulwark against Iran's attempt to gain influence in the region and the destabilizing effects of international drug cartels</u></strong>.</p><p>"The best defense against an expansion of Iranian influence in Latin America - and against the destructive aspirations of international criminals in the region - is for the United States to double down on a policy of direct engagement," U.S. House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner said at the State Department.</p><p><u><strong>"We must be clear that we will be there, with our friends and partners in the region, committed to fighting and winning the war for a free, stable, and prosperous hemisphere," Boehner said in a speech to the Council of Americas</u>, which represents companies that do business in Latin America.</p></strong>

Newsmax 2012

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Newsmax 2012 fulltext: [“Boehner: Urges Deeper Engagement in Latin America”, May 8 2012, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/boehner-latin-america-gop/2012/05/08/id/438420] The U.S. Congress' top Republican called on Tuesday for deeper economic engagement with Latin America as a bulwark against Iran's attempt to gain influence in the region and the destabilizing effects of international drug cartels. "The best defense against an expansion of Iranian influence in Latin America - and against the destructive aspirations of international criminals in the region - is for the United States to double down on a policy of direct engagement," U.S. House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner said at the State Department. "We must be clear that we will be there, with our friends and partners in the region, committed to fighting and winning the war for a free, stable, and prosperous hemisphere," Boehner said in a speech to the Council of Americas, which represents companies that do business in Latin America. [/INST] <h4><strong>(__) Republicans Support economic engagement in Latin America</h4><p><u></strong>Newsmax 2012</p><p>[“Boehner: Urges Deeper Engagement in Latin America”, May 8 2012, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/boehner-latin-america-gop/2012/05/08/id/438420]</p><p><strong>The U.S. Congress' top Republican called on Tuesday for deeper economic engagement with Latin America as a bulwark against Iran's attempt to gain influence in the region and the destabilizing effects of international drug cartels</u></strong>.</p><p>"The best defense against an expansion of Iranian influence in Latin America - and against the destructive aspirations of international criminals in the region - is for the United States to double down on a policy of direct engagement," U.S. House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner said at the State Department.</p><p><u><strong>"We must be clear that we will be there, with our friends and partners in the region, committed to fighting and winning the war for a free, stable, and prosperous hemisphere," Boehner said in a speech to the Council of Americas</u>, which represents companies that do business in Latin America.</p></strong> </s>

Russian oil sustainable – Arctic production

Despite Russian slips, prices are back ‘under control’ at the top Russian Arctic production will come good at some point In ballpark terms, that would make Russia the swing producer – both in the oil and gas worlds If that doesn’t give consumers, and particularly America, serious food for thought, then little else will.

Despite prices are back ‘under control’ at the top Arctic production will come good at some point that would make Russia the swing producer If that doesn’t give consumers food for thought little else will

Obviously, the relatively steady market we see today will continue to mask deep divisions and divides. Despite Russian slips, prices are back ‘under control’ at the top, and despite softening in China, we’re nowhere near the depths of 2008 when prices crashed to $33/b. But investors should beware; inherent Riyadh-Russia divisions exist, and will only get deeper over the next decade as instability creeps in. Ironically when we get into the 2020s, the boot might be on the other foot. Although Riyadh has just reclaimed its oil crown, Russian Arctic production will come good at some point, and Saudi exports could slip to 7mb/d due to domestic consumption without serious policy intervention. In ballpark terms, that would make Russia the swing producer – both in the oil and gas worlds. If that doesn’t give consumers, and particularly America, serious food for thought, then little else will. Amid its new found energy riches, Washington needs to get hold of the energy ‘rope’ first…

<h4>Russian oil sustainable – Arctic production</h4><p><strong>HULBER ’12</strong> – senior fellow at the Clingendael International Energy Programme; previously senior research fellow at the Center for Security Studies (Hulbert, Matthew. “Riyadh's Russia Problem: Oil”. May 20, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/05/20/riyadhs-russia-problem-oil/)</p><p>Obviously, the relatively steady market we see today will continue to mask deep divisions and divides. <u><mark>Despite</mark> Russian slips, <mark>prices are back ‘<strong>under control’ at the top</u></strong></mark>, and despite softening in China, we’re nowhere near the depths of 2008 when prices crashed to $33/b. But investors should beware; inherent Riyadh-Russia divisions exist, and will only get deeper over the next decade as instability creeps in. Ironically when we get into the 2020s, the boot might be on the other foot. Although Riyadh has just reclaimed its oil crown, <u>Russian <mark>Arctic production will come good at some point</u></mark>, and Saudi exports could slip to 7mb/d due to domestic consumption without serious policy intervention. <u>In ballpark terms, <mark>that would make Russia the <strong>swing producer</strong></mark> – both in the oil and gas worlds</u>. <u><mark>If that doesn’t give consumers</mark>, and particularly America, serious <mark>food for thought</mark>, then <mark>little else will</mark>.</u> Amid its new found energy riches, Washington needs to get hold of the energy ‘rope’ first…</p>

HULBER ’12 – senior fellow at the Clingendael International Energy Programme; previously senior research fellow at the Center for Security Studies (Hulbert, Matthew. “Riyadh's Russia Problem: Oil”. May 20, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/05/20/riyadhs-russia-problem-oil/)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: HULBER ’12 – senior fellow at the Clingendael International Energy Programme; previously senior research fellow at the Center for Security Studies (Hulbert, Matthew. “Riyadh's Russia Problem: Oil”. May 20, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/05/20/riyadhs-russia-problem-oil/) fulltext: Obviously, the relatively steady market we see today will continue to mask deep divisions and divides. Despite Russian slips, prices are back ‘under control’ at the top, and despite softening in China, we’re nowhere near the depths of 2008 when prices crashed to $33/b. But investors should beware; inherent Riyadh-Russia divisions exist, and will only get deeper over the next decade as instability creeps in. Ironically when we get into the 2020s, the boot might be on the other foot. Although Riyadh has just reclaimed its oil crown, Russian Arctic production will come good at some point, and Saudi exports could slip to 7mb/d due to domestic consumption without serious policy intervention. In ballpark terms, that would make Russia the swing producer – both in the oil and gas worlds. If that doesn’t give consumers, and particularly America, serious food for thought, then little else will. Amid its new found energy riches, Washington needs to get hold of the energy ‘rope’ first… [/INST] <h4>Russian oil sustainable – Arctic production</h4><p><strong>HULBER ’12</strong> – senior fellow at the Clingendael International Energy Programme; previously senior research fellow at the Center for Security Studies (Hulbert, Matthew. “Riyadh's Russia Problem: Oil”. May 20, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/05/20/riyadhs-russia-problem-oil/)</p><p>Obviously, the relatively steady market we see today will continue to mask deep divisions and divides. <u><mark>Despite</mark> Russian slips, <mark>prices are back ‘<strong>under control’ at the top</u></strong></mark>, and despite softening in China, we’re nowhere near the depths of 2008 when prices crashed to $33/b. But investors should beware; inherent Riyadh-Russia divisions exist, and will only get deeper over the next decade as instability creeps in. Ironically when we get into the 2020s, the boot might be on the other foot. Although Riyadh has just reclaimed its oil crown, <u>Russian <mark>Arctic production will come good at some point</u></mark>, and Saudi exports could slip to 7mb/d due to domestic consumption without serious policy intervention. <u>In ballpark terms, <mark>that would make Russia the <strong>swing producer</strong></mark> – both in the oil and gas worlds</u>. <u><mark>If that doesn’t give consumers</mark>, and particularly America, serious <mark>food for thought</mark>, then <mark>little else will</mark>.</u> Amid its new found energy riches, Washington needs to get hold of the energy ‘rope’ first…</p> </s>

Mexico.

a country in southwestern North America, with extensive coastlines on the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean, bordered by the US on the north;

Definition of Mexico¶ a country in southwestern North America, with extensive coastlines on the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean, bordered by the US on the north; population 111,211,800 (est. 2009); capital, Mexico City; language, Spanish (official).¶ a state in central Mexico, west of Mexico City; capital, Toluca de Lerdo.¶ The center of both Mayan and Aztec civilizations, Mexico was conquered and colonized by the Spanish in the early 16th century. It remained under Spanish rule until independence was achieved in 1821; a republic was established three years later. Texas rebelled and broke away in 1836, while all the remaining territory north of the Rio Grande was lost to the US in the Mexican War of 1846–48

<h4>Mexico. </h4><p><strong>Oxford Dictionaries 13</strong>. [Date Accessed May 10 2013 -- oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/Mexico]</p><p>Definition of Mexico¶ <u>a country in southwestern North America, with extensive coastlines on the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean, bordered by the US on the north;</u> population 111,211,800 (est. 2009); capital, Mexico City; language, Spanish (official).¶ a state in central Mexico, west of Mexico City; capital, Toluca de Lerdo.¶ The center of both Mayan and Aztec civilizations, Mexico was conquered and colonized by the Spanish in the early 16th century. It remained under Spanish rule until independence was achieved in 1821; a republic was established three years later. Texas rebelled and broke away in 1836, while all the remaining territory north of the Rio Grande was lost to the US in the Mexican War of 1846–48</p>

Oxford Dictionaries 13. [Date Accessed May 10 2013 -- oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/Mexico]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Oxford Dictionaries 13. [Date Accessed May 10 2013 -- oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/Mexico] fulltext: Definition of Mexico¶ a country in southwestern North America, with extensive coastlines on the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean, bordered by the US on the north; population 111,211,800 (est. 2009); capital, Mexico City; language, Spanish (official).¶ a state in central Mexico, west of Mexico City; capital, Toluca de Lerdo.¶ The center of both Mayan and Aztec civilizations, Mexico was conquered and colonized by the Spanish in the early 16th century. It remained under Spanish rule until independence was achieved in 1821; a republic was established three years later. Texas rebelled and broke away in 1836, while all the remaining territory north of the Rio Grande was lost to the US in the Mexican War of 1846–48 [/INST] <h4>Mexico. </h4><p><strong>Oxford Dictionaries 13</strong>. [Date Accessed May 10 2013 -- oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/Mexico]</p><p>Definition of Mexico¶ <u>a country in southwestern North America, with extensive coastlines on the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean, bordered by the US on the north;</u> population 111,211,800 (est. 2009); capital, Mexico City; language, Spanish (official).¶ a state in central Mexico, west of Mexico City; capital, Toluca de Lerdo.¶ The center of both Mayan and Aztec civilizations, Mexico was conquered and colonized by the Spanish in the early 16th century. It remained under Spanish rule until independence was achieved in 1821; a republic was established three years later. Texas rebelled and broke away in 1836, while all the remaining territory north of the Rio Grande was lost to the US in the Mexican War of 1846–48</p> </s>

Counterplan links to politics – Cuba is on the list now because Congress wants it there

the State Department keeping Cuba on the state sponsors of terrorism list continues to do so at the behest of the Cuban-American lobby and U.S. congressional representatives policymakers submitted a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry on April 29 demanding that Cuba be maintained on the list it has transformed U.S.-Cuban relations into a matter of U.S. domestic politics

6/28/13, “SHAKUR, SNOWDEN, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS CUBA A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM?” http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf It is becoming increasingly clear that the State Department has exhausted all plausible arguments for keeping Cuba on the state sponsors of terrorism list, and only continues to do so at the behest of the Cuban-American lobby and U.S. congressional representatives. These policymakers include Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL), and Albio Sires (D-NJ), a bipartisan group of Cuban-American legislators that submitted a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry on April 29 demanding that Cuba be maintained on the list. In order to appease the anti-Castro lobby, the State Department has compromised its integrity by resorting to dubious justifications that do not reflect the realities of the situation in Cuba. Thus, it has transformed U.S.-Cuban relations into a matter of U.S. domestic politics, when they should be a matter of foreign policy.

<h4>Counterplan links to politics – Cuba is on the list now because Congress wants it there</h4><p>Rebecca <strong>Lullo and</strong> Phinease <strong>Rueckert</strong>, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, </p><p><strong>6/28</strong>/13, “SHAKUR, SNOWDEN, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS CUBA A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM?” http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf</p><p>It is becoming increasingly clear that <u><strong>the State Department</u></strong> has exhausted all plausible arguments for <u><strong>keeping Cuba on the state sponsors of terrorism list</u></strong>, and only <u><strong>continues to do so at the behest of the Cuban-American lobby and U.S. congressional representatives</u></strong>. These <u><strong>policymakers</u></strong> include Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL), and Albio Sires (D-NJ), a bipartisan group of Cuban-American legislators that <u><strong>submitted a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry on April 29 demanding that Cuba be maintained on the list</u></strong>. In order to appease the anti-Castro lobby, the State Department has compromised its integrity by resorting to dubious justifications that do not reflect the realities of the situation in Cuba. Thus, <u><strong>it has transformed U.S.-Cuban relations into a matter of U.S. domestic politics</u></strong>, when they should be a matter of foreign policy.</p>

Rebecca Lullo and Phinease Rueckert, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Rebecca Lullo and Phinease Rueckert, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, fulltext: 6/28/13, “SHAKUR, SNOWDEN, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS CUBA A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM?” http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf It is becoming increasingly clear that the State Department has exhausted all plausible arguments for keeping Cuba on the state sponsors of terrorism list, and only continues to do so at the behest of the Cuban-American lobby and U.S. congressional representatives. These policymakers include Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL), and Albio Sires (D-NJ), a bipartisan group of Cuban-American legislators that submitted a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry on April 29 demanding that Cuba be maintained on the list. In order to appease the anti-Castro lobby, the State Department has compromised its integrity by resorting to dubious justifications that do not reflect the realities of the situation in Cuba. Thus, it has transformed U.S.-Cuban relations into a matter of U.S. domestic politics, when they should be a matter of foreign policy. [/INST] <h4>Counterplan links to politics – Cuba is on the list now because Congress wants it there</h4><p>Rebecca <strong>Lullo and</strong> Phinease <strong>Rueckert</strong>, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, </p><p><strong>6/28</strong>/13, “SHAKUR, SNOWDEN, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT: IS CUBA A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM?” http://www.coha.org/shakur-snowden-and-the-state-department-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-of-terror/#sthash.lI3Z3T7d.dpuf</p><p>It is becoming increasingly clear that <u><strong>the State Department</u></strong> has exhausted all plausible arguments for <u><strong>keeping Cuba on the state sponsors of terrorism list</u></strong>, and only <u><strong>continues to do so at the behest of the Cuban-American lobby and U.S. congressional representatives</u></strong>. These <u><strong>policymakers</u></strong> include Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL), and Albio Sires (D-NJ), a bipartisan group of Cuban-American legislators that <u><strong>submitted a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry on April 29 demanding that Cuba be maintained on the list</u></strong>. In order to appease the anti-Castro lobby, the State Department has compromised its integrity by resorting to dubious justifications that do not reflect the realities of the situation in Cuba. Thus, <u><strong>it has transformed U.S.-Cuban relations into a matter of U.S. domestic politics</u></strong>, when they should be a matter of foreign policy.</p> </s>

Oil sands is the dirtiest fuel- 22% more emissions than conventional oil- threatens the planet

Eight Nobel laureates have written that oil derived from tar sands "threatens the health of the planet tar sands oil emitting 22% more g h g emissions than conventional fuels the Nobel Peace Laureates warn tar sands development is the fastest growing source of emissions in Canada, and threatens the health of the planet oil from the tar sands is the dirtiest in the world". siding with Canada could threaten low-emission vehicles Experts agree oil from tar sands is a 'dirty fuel'

Eight Nobel laureates have written that oil derived from tar sands "threatens the health of the planet emitting 22% more than conventional fuels oil from the tar sands is the dirtiest in the world Experts agree

Eight Nobel laureates including Archbishop Desmond Tutu have written to the prime minister to argue that oil derived from Canadian tar sands "threatens the health of the planet" and that the UK should support European moves to classify the controversial energy source as highly polluting. A similar letter has been sent this week to the transport minister, Norman Baker, by the shadow transport secretary, Maria Eagle, asking him "to vote in favour of labelling oil from tar sands as highly polluting immediately and in line with the European commission's proposals". Last November, the Guardian revealed that the UK government has been actively supporting Canada's attempts to stop the tar sands oil being designated by Europe as emitting 22% more greenhouse gas emissions than that from conventional fuels. The proposal, the Fuel Quality Directive, could effectively ban tar sands oil from Europe and would set a precedent of officially labelling tar sands oil as dirtier than conventional oil. Baker has defended the UK's stance on the grounds that all different types of crude oil – not just tar sands oil – should be assessed as low, medium and high emissions. "To be clear, we are not delaying action in any way, but are seeking an effective solution to address the carbon emissions from all highly polluting crudes, not simply those from one particular country," he has said. The foreign office has admitted such a system "may take some time" and would effectively kick the proposal into the long grass. But the Nobel Peace Laureates warn that "tar sands development is the fastest growing source of greenhouse gas emissions in Canada, and threatens the health of the planet. As the tar sands have contributed to rising emissions, Canada recently stepped away from the Kyoto protocol. Europe must not follow in Canada's footsteps." They describe the Fuel Quality Directive as a policy that would "help Europeans make cleaner fuel choices." In an op-ed last year, Tutu wrote that "oil from the tar sands of Alberta is the dirtiest in the world". Writing to Baker, Eagle warned that siding with Canada could threaten UK jobs in the manufacture and development of low-emission vehicles, such as electric cars. "Experts agree that oil from tar sands is a 'dirty fuel' and the EU has every right to identify the environmental impact of oil extracted from tar sands in Canada and elsewhere. The government must act to prevent a further serious blow to the huge opportunities that exist to boost the UK car industry's potential for growth in low-carbon vehicle sector for the sake of dirty jobs in Canada."

<h4><strong>Oil sands is the dirtiest fuel- 22% more emissions than conventional oil- threatens the planet</h4><p>Vaughan ‘12 </strong>– [Adam, Guardian environment deputy editor, "Desmond Tutu tells David Cameron tar sands threaten health of the planet," Guardian, 2-16-12, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/feb/16/desmond-tutu-cameron-tar-sands, accessed 6-3-12, mss]</p><p><u><mark>Eight Nobel laureates</u> </mark>including Archbishop Desmond Tutu <u><mark>have written</u> </mark>to the prime minister to argue <u><mark>that oil derived from</u> </mark>Canadian <u><mark>tar sands "<strong>threatens the health of the planet</u></strong></mark>" and that the UK should support European moves to classify the controversial energy source as highly polluting. A similar letter has been sent this week to the transport minister, Norman Baker, by the shadow transport secretary, Maria Eagle, asking him "to vote in favour of labelling oil from tar sands as highly polluting immediately and in line with the European commission's proposals". Last November, the Guardian revealed that the UK government has been actively supporting Canada's attempts to stop the <u>tar sands oil </u>being designated by Europe as <u><mark>emitting <strong>22% more</strong></mark> g</u>reen<u>h</u>ouse <u>g</u>as <u>emissions <mark>than </u></mark>that from <u><mark>conventional fuels</u></mark>. The proposal, the Fuel Quality Directive, could effectively ban tar sands oil from Europe and would set a precedent of officially labelling tar sands oil as dirtier than conventional oil. Baker has defended the UK's stance on the grounds that all different types of crude oil – not just tar sands oil – should be assessed as low, medium and high emissions. "To be clear, we are not delaying action in any way, but are seeking an effective solution to address the carbon emissions from all highly polluting crudes, not simply those from one particular country," he has said. The foreign office has admitted such a system "may take some time" and would effectively kick the proposal into the long grass. But <u>the Nobel Peace Laureates warn</u> that "<u>tar sands development is the fastest growing source of</u> greenhouse gas <u>emissions in Canada,</u> <u>and threatens the health of the planet</u>. As the tar sands have contributed to rising emissions, Canada recently stepped away from the Kyoto protocol. Europe must not follow in Canada's footsteps." They describe the Fuel Quality Directive as a policy that would "help Europeans make cleaner fuel choices." In an op-ed last year, Tutu wrote that "<u><strong><mark>oil from the tar sands</u></strong> </mark>of Alberta <u><strong><mark>is the dirtiest in the world</mark>". </u></strong>Writing to Baker, Eagle warned that <u>siding with Canada could threaten </u>UK jobs in the manufacture and development of <u>low-emission vehicles</u>, such as electric cars. "<u><mark>Experts agree</u> </mark>that <u>oil from tar sands is a 'dirty fuel'</u> and the EU has every right to identify the environmental impact of oil extracted from tar sands in Canada and elsewhere. The government must act to prevent a further serious blow to the huge opportunities that exist to boost the UK car industry's potential for growth in low-carbon vehicle sector for the sake of dirty jobs in Canada."</p>

Vaughan ‘12 – [Adam, Guardian environment deputy editor, "Desmond Tutu tells David Cameron tar sands threaten health of the planet," Guardian, 2-16-12, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/feb/16/desmond-tutu-cameron-tar-sands, accessed 6-3-12, mss]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Vaughan ‘12 – [Adam, Guardian environment deputy editor, "Desmond Tutu tells David Cameron tar sands threaten health of the planet," Guardian, 2-16-12, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/feb/16/desmond-tutu-cameron-tar-sands, accessed 6-3-12, mss] fulltext: Eight Nobel laureates including Archbishop Desmond Tutu have written to the prime minister to argue that oil derived from Canadian tar sands "threatens the health of the planet" and that the UK should support European moves to classify the controversial energy source as highly polluting. A similar letter has been sent this week to the transport minister, Norman Baker, by the shadow transport secretary, Maria Eagle, asking him "to vote in favour of labelling oil from tar sands as highly polluting immediately and in line with the European commission's proposals". Last November, the Guardian revealed that the UK government has been actively supporting Canada's attempts to stop the tar sands oil being designated by Europe as emitting 22% more greenhouse gas emissions than that from conventional fuels. The proposal, the Fuel Quality Directive, could effectively ban tar sands oil from Europe and would set a precedent of officially labelling tar sands oil as dirtier than conventional oil. Baker has defended the UK's stance on the grounds that all different types of crude oil – not just tar sands oil – should be assessed as low, medium and high emissions. "To be clear, we are not delaying action in any way, but are seeking an effective solution to address the carbon emissions from all highly polluting crudes, not simply those from one particular country," he has said. The foreign office has admitted such a system "may take some time" and would effectively kick the proposal into the long grass. But the Nobel Peace Laureates warn that "tar sands development is the fastest growing source of greenhouse gas emissions in Canada, and threatens the health of the planet. As the tar sands have contributed to rising emissions, Canada recently stepped away from the Kyoto protocol. Europe must not follow in Canada's footsteps." They describe the Fuel Quality Directive as a policy that would "help Europeans make cleaner fuel choices." In an op-ed last year, Tutu wrote that "oil from the tar sands of Alberta is the dirtiest in the world". Writing to Baker, Eagle warned that siding with Canada could threaten UK jobs in the manufacture and development of low-emission vehicles, such as electric cars. "Experts agree that oil from tar sands is a 'dirty fuel' and the EU has every right to identify the environmental impact of oil extracted from tar sands in Canada and elsewhere. The government must act to prevent a further serious blow to the huge opportunities that exist to boost the UK car industry's potential for growth in low-carbon vehicle sector for the sake of dirty jobs in Canada." [/INST] <h4><strong>Oil sands is the dirtiest fuel- 22% more emissions than conventional oil- threatens the planet</h4><p>Vaughan ‘12 </strong>– [Adam, Guardian environment deputy editor, "Desmond Tutu tells David Cameron tar sands threaten health of the planet," Guardian, 2-16-12, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/feb/16/desmond-tutu-cameron-tar-sands, accessed 6-3-12, mss]</p><p><u><mark>Eight Nobel laureates</u> </mark>including Archbishop Desmond Tutu <u><mark>have written</u> </mark>to the prime minister to argue <u><mark>that oil derived from</u> </mark>Canadian <u><mark>tar sands "<strong>threatens the health of the planet</u></strong></mark>" and that the UK should support European moves to classify the controversial energy source as highly polluting. A similar letter has been sent this week to the transport minister, Norman Baker, by the shadow transport secretary, Maria Eagle, asking him "to vote in favour of labelling oil from tar sands as highly polluting immediately and in line with the European commission's proposals". Last November, the Guardian revealed that the UK government has been actively supporting Canada's attempts to stop the <u>tar sands oil </u>being designated by Europe as <u><mark>emitting <strong>22% more</strong></mark> g</u>reen<u>h</u>ouse <u>g</u>as <u>emissions <mark>than </u></mark>that from <u><mark>conventional fuels</u></mark>. The proposal, the Fuel Quality Directive, could effectively ban tar sands oil from Europe and would set a precedent of officially labelling tar sands oil as dirtier than conventional oil. Baker has defended the UK's stance on the grounds that all different types of crude oil – not just tar sands oil – should be assessed as low, medium and high emissions. "To be clear, we are not delaying action in any way, but are seeking an effective solution to address the carbon emissions from all highly polluting crudes, not simply those from one particular country," he has said. The foreign office has admitted such a system "may take some time" and would effectively kick the proposal into the long grass. But <u>the Nobel Peace Laureates warn</u> that "<u>tar sands development is the fastest growing source of</u> greenhouse gas <u>emissions in Canada,</u> <u>and threatens the health of the planet</u>. As the tar sands have contributed to rising emissions, Canada recently stepped away from the Kyoto protocol. Europe must not follow in Canada's footsteps." They describe the Fuel Quality Directive as a policy that would "help Europeans make cleaner fuel choices." In an op-ed last year, Tutu wrote that "<u><strong><mark>oil from the tar sands</u></strong> </mark>of Alberta <u><strong><mark>is the dirtiest in the world</mark>". </u></strong>Writing to Baker, Eagle warned that <u>siding with Canada could threaten </u>UK jobs in the manufacture and development of <u>low-emission vehicles</u>, such as electric cars. "<u><mark>Experts agree</u> </mark>that <u>oil from tar sands is a 'dirty fuel'</u> and the EU has every right to identify the environmental impact of oil extracted from tar sands in Canada and elsewhere. The government must act to prevent a further serious blow to the huge opportunities that exist to boost the UK car industry's potential for growth in low-carbon vehicle sector for the sake of dirty jobs in Canada."</p> </s>

(__) US is increasing economic engagement with Latin America now.

the Obama administration is intensifying its engagement with Latin America Dovetailing on Obama’s trip last week to Mexico and Costa Rica, the visits reflect the administration’s desire to show the U.S. relationship with its neighbors to the south is about much more than drugs, crime and illegal immigration. The need for closer economic ties topped Obama’s agenda during the three-day trip we will have the most active stretch of high-level engagement on Latin America in a long, long time,’’ Biden said Wednesday at the State Department. ‘‘There are so many opportunities. There’s so much more we believe we can do

(“State visits amplify Obama focus on Latin America” By JOSH LEDERMAN Associated Press / May 8, 2013 http://www.boston.com/business/news/2013/05/08/state-visits-amplify-obama-focus-latin-america/OVDxakHRU9AE1Jo8ip8MLP/story.html) WASHINGTON (AP) — Keeping a keen eye south of the border, the Obama administration is intensifying its engagement with Latin America, hosting leaders from a pair of presidents at the White House and sending Vice President Joe Biden to visit two others. Peru’s President Ollanta Humala and Chile’s President Sebastian Pinera will travel to Washington in June to meet with President Barack Obama, the White House said Wednesday. And next week, Biden will make stops in Brazil and Colombia, plus the Caribbean nation of Trinidad and Tobago. Dovetailing on Obama’s trip last week to Mexico and Costa Rica, the visits reflect the administration’s desire to show the U.S. relationship with its neighbors to the south is about much more than drugs, crime and illegal immigration. The need for closer economic ties topped Obama’s agenda during the three-day trip. ‘‘All told, we will have the most active stretch of high-level engagement on Latin America in a long, long time,’’ Biden said Wednesday at the State Department. ‘‘There are so many opportunities. There’s so much more we believe we can do.’’

<h4>(__) US is increasing economic engagement with Latin America now. </h4><p><strong>Lederman</strong>, AP, <strong>2013</p><p></strong>(“State visits amplify Obama focus on Latin America” By JOSH LEDERMAN Associated Press / May 8, 2013</p><p>http://www.boston.com/business/news/2013/05/08/state-visits-amplify-obama-focus-latin-america/OVDxakHRU9AE1Jo8ip8MLP/story.html)</p><p>WASHINGTON (AP) — Keeping a keen eye south of the border, <u><strong>the Obama administration is intensifying its engagement with Latin America</u></strong>, hosting leaders from a pair of presidents at the White House and sending Vice President Joe Biden to visit two others.</p><p>Peru’s President Ollanta Humala and Chile’s President Sebastian Pinera will travel to Washington in June to meet with President Barack Obama, the White House said Wednesday. And next week, Biden will make stops in Brazil and Colombia, plus the Caribbean nation of Trinidad and Tobago.</p><p><u><strong>Dovetailing on Obama’s trip last week to Mexico and Costa Rica, the visits reflect the administration’s desire to show the U.S. relationship with its neighbors to the south is about much more than drugs, crime and illegal immigration. The need for closer economic ties topped Obama’s agenda during the three-day trip</u></strong>.</p><p>‘‘All told, <u><strong>we will have the most active stretch of high-level engagement on Latin America in a long, long time,’’ Biden said Wednesday at the State Department. ‘‘There are so many opportunities. There’s so much more we believe we can do</u></strong>.’’</p>

Lederman, AP, 2013

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Lederman, AP, 2013 fulltext: (“State visits amplify Obama focus on Latin America” By JOSH LEDERMAN Associated Press / May 8, 2013 http://www.boston.com/business/news/2013/05/08/state-visits-amplify-obama-focus-latin-america/OVDxakHRU9AE1Jo8ip8MLP/story.html) WASHINGTON (AP) — Keeping a keen eye south of the border, the Obama administration is intensifying its engagement with Latin America, hosting leaders from a pair of presidents at the White House and sending Vice President Joe Biden to visit two others. Peru’s President Ollanta Humala and Chile’s President Sebastian Pinera will travel to Washington in June to meet with President Barack Obama, the White House said Wednesday. And next week, Biden will make stops in Brazil and Colombia, plus the Caribbean nation of Trinidad and Tobago. Dovetailing on Obama’s trip last week to Mexico and Costa Rica, the visits reflect the administration’s desire to show the U.S. relationship with its neighbors to the south is about much more than drugs, crime and illegal immigration. The need for closer economic ties topped Obama’s agenda during the three-day trip. ‘‘All told, we will have the most active stretch of high-level engagement on Latin America in a long, long time,’’ Biden said Wednesday at the State Department. ‘‘There are so many opportunities. There’s so much more we believe we can do.’’ [/INST] <h4>(__) US is increasing economic engagement with Latin America now. </h4><p><strong>Lederman</strong>, AP, <strong>2013</p><p></strong>(“State visits amplify Obama focus on Latin America” By JOSH LEDERMAN Associated Press / May 8, 2013</p><p>http://www.boston.com/business/news/2013/05/08/state-visits-amplify-obama-focus-latin-america/OVDxakHRU9AE1Jo8ip8MLP/story.html)</p><p>WASHINGTON (AP) — Keeping a keen eye south of the border, <u><strong>the Obama administration is intensifying its engagement with Latin America</u></strong>, hosting leaders from a pair of presidents at the White House and sending Vice President Joe Biden to visit two others.</p><p>Peru’s President Ollanta Humala and Chile’s President Sebastian Pinera will travel to Washington in June to meet with President Barack Obama, the White House said Wednesday. And next week, Biden will make stops in Brazil and Colombia, plus the Caribbean nation of Trinidad and Tobago.</p><p><u><strong>Dovetailing on Obama’s trip last week to Mexico and Costa Rica, the visits reflect the administration’s desire to show the U.S. relationship with its neighbors to the south is about much more than drugs, crime and illegal immigration. The need for closer economic ties topped Obama’s agenda during the three-day trip</u></strong>.</p><p>‘‘All told, <u><strong>we will have the most active stretch of high-level engagement on Latin America in a long, long time,’’ Biden said Wednesday at the State Department. ‘‘There are so many opportunities. There’s so much more we believe we can do</u></strong>.’’</p> </s>

High prices is net-beneficial to Russian growth – multiple warrants

Russia will likely see a significant amount of additional revenue in 2012 due to higher oil prices Russia expects to receive an additional $800 billion Russian rubles in additional oil-and-gas-related revenue the finance ministry now forecasts oil will reach $115 a barrel this year, providing the additional revenue This extra revenue will be utilized to reduce borrowing and to build up the country's Reserve Fund, one of Russia's two funds for stashing oil windfall revenue to cover budget shortages These measures help "increase our reserves and build up our safety cushions Our debt is really small but there is a] problem of dependency on oil prices Here we see the need to curb these risks and continue to create a safety cushion given current conditions, Russia will likely have a "nondeficit" year and could potentially obtain a budget surplus

Russia will see significant revenue due to higher prices the ministry forecasts $115 This will reduce borrowing and build up the Reserve Fund to cover budget shortages These help build up our safety cushions Our debt is really small but [there is dependency on prices given current conditions, Russia will have a "nondeficit" year and potentially obtain a surplus

Russia will likely see a significant amount of additional revenue in 2012, largely due to higher oil prices, the country's finance minister said Monday. Russia expects to receive an additional $800 billion Russian rubles ($27 billion) in additional oil-and-gas-related revenue, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said Monday, while speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Russia's budget is calculated with an expectation of oil prices at $100 a barrel, but the finance ministry now forecasts oil will reach $115 a barrel this year, providing the additional revenue. This extra revenue will be utilized to reduce borrowing in the domestic market and to build up the country's Reserve Fund, one of Russia's two funds for stashing oil windfall revenue to cover possible budget shortages. Siluanov said Russia would direct RUB500 billion of the extra revenue to reduce the volume of domestic borrowing, which would reduce the total to be borrowed in domestic markets to RUB1.3 trillion from a previously expected RUB1.8 trillion. The remaining RUB300 billion of the extra revenue would replenish the Reserve Fund, he said. These measures help "increase our reserves and build up our safety cushions," he said. However, Russia still needs to work to consolidate its budget and reduce its dependency on high oil prices, the minister said. "Our debt is really small but [there is a] problem of dependency on oil prices," he said. "Here we see the need to curb these risks and continue to create a safety cushion." Siluanov added the government has to cut out ineffective spending and continue with structural changes. Efforts along these lines include balancing the country's pension system and improving spending patterns in the areas of health care and education. The government, however, doesn't plan to change the current tax regime, with the exception of lowering some tax burdens, like those in the non-oil-and-gas sector, primarily through real-estate exemptions, he said. "Today we have rather [a] sustainable tax system," he said, adding that the government doesn't want to change its approach. The finance ministry projects a budget deficit of 1.5% of gross domestic product this year. However, Siluanov said given current conditions, Russia will likely have a "nondeficit" year and could potentially obtain a budget surplus in "favorable foreign economic" conditions.

<h4>High prices is net-beneficial to Russian growth – multiple warrants</h4><p><strong><mark>DJ ’12</strong></mark> (Dow Jones Newswire. “Russia Finance Minister Sees Higher Oil Prices Boosting 2012 Revenue”. April 23, 2012. http://www.rigzone.com//news/article.asp?a_id=117156&hmpn=1)</p><p><u><mark>Russia will</mark> likely <mark>see</mark> a <mark>significant</mark> amount of additional <mark>revenue</mark> in 2012</u>, largely <u><mark>due to higher</mark> oil <mark>prices</u></mark>, the country's finance minister said Monday.</p><p><u>Russia expects to receive an additional $800 billion Russian rubles</u> ($27 billion) <u>in additional oil-and-gas-related revenue</u>, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said Monday, while speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Russia's budget is calculated with an expectation of oil prices at $100 a barrel, but <u><mark>the</mark> finance <mark>ministry</mark> now <mark>forecasts</mark> oil will reach <mark>$115</mark> a barrel this year, providing the additional revenue</u>.</p><p><u><mark>This</mark> extra revenue <mark>will</mark> be utilized to <mark>reduce borrowing</u></mark> in the domestic market <u><mark>and</mark> to <mark>build up the</mark> country's <mark>Reserve Fund</mark>, one of Russia's two funds for stashing oil windfall revenue <mark>to cover</mark> </u>possible<u> <mark>budget shortages</u></mark>.</p><p>Siluanov said Russia would direct RUB500 billion of the extra revenue to reduce the volume of domestic borrowing, which would reduce the total to be borrowed in domestic markets to RUB1.3 trillion from a previously expected RUB1.8 trillion.</p><p>The remaining RUB300 billion of the extra revenue would replenish the Reserve Fund, he said.</p><p><u><mark>These</mark> measures <mark>help</mark> "increase our reserves and <strong><mark>build up our safety cushions</u></strong></mark>," he said.</p><p>However, Russia still needs to work to consolidate its budget and reduce its dependency on high oil prices, the minister said.</p><p>"<u><mark>Our debt is really small but</u> [<u>there is</mark> a] problem of <strong><mark>dependency on</strong></mark> oil <strong><mark>prices</u></strong></mark>," he said. "<u><strong>Here we see the need to curb these risks and continue to create a safety cushion</u></strong>."</p><p>Siluanov added the government has to cut out ineffective spending and continue with structural changes. Efforts along these lines include balancing the country's pension system and improving spending patterns in the areas of health care and education.</p><p>The government, however, doesn't plan to change the current tax regime, with the exception of lowering some tax burdens, like those in the non-oil-and-gas sector, primarily through real-estate exemptions, he said.</p><p>"Today we have rather [a] sustainable tax system," he said, adding that the government doesn't want to change its approach.</p><p>The finance ministry projects a budget deficit of 1.5% of gross domestic product this year. However, Siluanov said <u><strong><mark>given current conditions, Russia will</strong></mark> likely <strong><mark>have a "nondeficit" year</strong> <strong>and</strong></mark> could <strong><mark>potentially obtain a</strong></mark> budget <strong><mark>surplus</u></strong></mark> in "favorable foreign economic" conditions.</p>

DJ ’12 (Dow Jones Newswire. “Russia Finance Minister Sees Higher Oil Prices Boosting 2012 Revenue”. April 23, 2012. http://www.rigzone.com//news/article.asp?a_id=117156&hmpn=1)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: DJ ’12 (Dow Jones Newswire. “Russia Finance Minister Sees Higher Oil Prices Boosting 2012 Revenue”. April 23, 2012. http://www.rigzone.com//news/article.asp?a_id=117156&hmpn=1) fulltext: Russia will likely see a significant amount of additional revenue in 2012, largely due to higher oil prices, the country's finance minister said Monday. Russia expects to receive an additional $800 billion Russian rubles ($27 billion) in additional oil-and-gas-related revenue, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said Monday, while speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Russia's budget is calculated with an expectation of oil prices at $100 a barrel, but the finance ministry now forecasts oil will reach $115 a barrel this year, providing the additional revenue. This extra revenue will be utilized to reduce borrowing in the domestic market and to build up the country's Reserve Fund, one of Russia's two funds for stashing oil windfall revenue to cover possible budget shortages. Siluanov said Russia would direct RUB500 billion of the extra revenue to reduce the volume of domestic borrowing, which would reduce the total to be borrowed in domestic markets to RUB1.3 trillion from a previously expected RUB1.8 trillion. The remaining RUB300 billion of the extra revenue would replenish the Reserve Fund, he said. These measures help "increase our reserves and build up our safety cushions," he said. However, Russia still needs to work to consolidate its budget and reduce its dependency on high oil prices, the minister said. "Our debt is really small but [there is a] problem of dependency on oil prices," he said. "Here we see the need to curb these risks and continue to create a safety cushion." Siluanov added the government has to cut out ineffective spending and continue with structural changes. Efforts along these lines include balancing the country's pension system and improving spending patterns in the areas of health care and education. The government, however, doesn't plan to change the current tax regime, with the exception of lowering some tax burdens, like those in the non-oil-and-gas sector, primarily through real-estate exemptions, he said. "Today we have rather [a] sustainable tax system," he said, adding that the government doesn't want to change its approach. The finance ministry projects a budget deficit of 1.5% of gross domestic product this year. However, Siluanov said given current conditions, Russia will likely have a "nondeficit" year and could potentially obtain a budget surplus in "favorable foreign economic" conditions. [/INST] <h4>High prices is net-beneficial to Russian growth – multiple warrants</h4><p><strong><mark>DJ ’12</strong></mark> (Dow Jones Newswire. “Russia Finance Minister Sees Higher Oil Prices Boosting 2012 Revenue”. April 23, 2012. http://www.rigzone.com//news/article.asp?a_id=117156&hmpn=1)</p><p><u><mark>Russia will</mark> likely <mark>see</mark> a <mark>significant</mark> amount of additional <mark>revenue</mark> in 2012</u>, largely <u><mark>due to higher</mark> oil <mark>prices</u></mark>, the country's finance minister said Monday.</p><p><u>Russia expects to receive an additional $800 billion Russian rubles</u> ($27 billion) <u>in additional oil-and-gas-related revenue</u>, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said Monday, while speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Russia's budget is calculated with an expectation of oil prices at $100 a barrel, but <u><mark>the</mark> finance <mark>ministry</mark> now <mark>forecasts</mark> oil will reach <mark>$115</mark> a barrel this year, providing the additional revenue</u>.</p><p><u><mark>This</mark> extra revenue <mark>will</mark> be utilized to <mark>reduce borrowing</u></mark> in the domestic market <u><mark>and</mark> to <mark>build up the</mark> country's <mark>Reserve Fund</mark>, one of Russia's two funds for stashing oil windfall revenue <mark>to cover</mark> </u>possible<u> <mark>budget shortages</u></mark>.</p><p>Siluanov said Russia would direct RUB500 billion of the extra revenue to reduce the volume of domestic borrowing, which would reduce the total to be borrowed in domestic markets to RUB1.3 trillion from a previously expected RUB1.8 trillion.</p><p>The remaining RUB300 billion of the extra revenue would replenish the Reserve Fund, he said.</p><p><u><mark>These</mark> measures <mark>help</mark> "increase our reserves and <strong><mark>build up our safety cushions</u></strong></mark>," he said.</p><p>However, Russia still needs to work to consolidate its budget and reduce its dependency on high oil prices, the minister said.</p><p>"<u><mark>Our debt is really small but</u> [<u>there is</mark> a] problem of <strong><mark>dependency on</strong></mark> oil <strong><mark>prices</u></strong></mark>," he said. "<u><strong>Here we see the need to curb these risks and continue to create a safety cushion</u></strong>."</p><p>Siluanov added the government has to cut out ineffective spending and continue with structural changes. Efforts along these lines include balancing the country's pension system and improving spending patterns in the areas of health care and education.</p><p>The government, however, doesn't plan to change the current tax regime, with the exception of lowering some tax burdens, like those in the non-oil-and-gas sector, primarily through real-estate exemptions, he said.</p><p>"Today we have rather [a] sustainable tax system," he said, adding that the government doesn't want to change its approach.</p><p>The finance ministry projects a budget deficit of 1.5% of gross domestic product this year. However, Siluanov said <u><strong><mark>given current conditions, Russia will</strong></mark> likely <strong><mark>have a "nondeficit" year</strong> <strong>and</strong></mark> could <strong><mark>potentially obtain a</strong></mark> budget <strong><mark>surplus</u></strong></mark> in "favorable foreign economic" conditions.</p> </s>

Or

Or –conjunction 1. (used to connect words, phrases, or clauses representing alternatives): books or magazines; to be or not to be. 2. (used to connect alternative terms for the same thing): the Hawaiian, or Sandwich, Islands. 3. (used in correlation): either … or; or … or; whether … or. 4. (used to correct or rephrase what was previously said): His autobiography, or rather memoirs, will soon be ready for publication. 5. otherwise; or else: Be here on time, or we'll leave without you. 6. Logic. the connective used in disjunction.

<h4>Or</h4><p><u><strong>Random House</u></strong>, 200<u><strong>9</u></strong> </p><p>[Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary, "Or," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/or, mss]</p><p>Or –conjunction</p><p>1. (used to connect words, phrases, or clauses representing alternatives): books or magazines; to be or not to be.</p><p>2. (used to connect alternative terms for the same thing): the Hawaiian, or Sandwich, Islands.</p><p>3. (used in correlation): either … or; or … or; whether … or.</p><p>4. (used to correct or rephrase what was previously said): His autobiography, or rather memoirs, will soon be ready for publication.</p><p>5. otherwise; or else: Be here on time, or we'll leave without you.</p><p>6. Logic. the connective used in disjunction.</p>

Random House, 2009 [Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary, "Or," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/or, mss]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Random House, 2009 [Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary, "Or," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/or, mss] fulltext: Or –conjunction 1. (used to connect words, phrases, or clauses representing alternatives): books or magazines; to be or not to be. 2. (used to connect alternative terms for the same thing): the Hawaiian, or Sandwich, Islands. 3. (used in correlation): either … or; or … or; whether … or. 4. (used to correct or rephrase what was previously said): His autobiography, or rather memoirs, will soon be ready for publication. 5. otherwise; or else: Be here on time, or we'll leave without you. 6. Logic. the connective used in disjunction. [/INST] <h4>Or</h4><p><u><strong>Random House</u></strong>, 200<u><strong>9</u></strong> </p><p>[Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary, "Or," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/or, mss]</p><p>Or –conjunction</p><p>1. (used to connect words, phrases, or clauses representing alternatives): books or magazines; to be or not to be.</p><p>2. (used to connect alternative terms for the same thing): the Hawaiian, or Sandwich, Islands.</p><p>3. (used in correlation): either … or; or … or; whether … or.</p><p>4. (used to correct or rephrase what was previously said): His autobiography, or rather memoirs, will soon be ready for publication.</p><p>5. otherwise; or else: Be here on time, or we'll leave without you.</p><p>6. Logic. the connective used in disjunction.</p> </s>

And, the counterplan does include Congress

Decisions by the government to remove countries from the list of state sponsors of terrorism can be made at any time by the president. These decisions are independent of the Country Reports on Terrorism, which always review actions from the prior year. To remove a country from the list, the president must give notice to Congress by submitting a report outlining why this change is being made.

Decisions by the government to remove countries from the list of state sponsors of terrorism can be made at any time by the president. These decisions are independent of the Country Reports on Terrorism, which always review actions from the prior year. To remove a country from the list, the president must give notice to Congress by submitting a report outlining why this change is being made.

<h4>And, the counterplan does include Congress</h4><p><strong>The Hill</strong>, <strong>5/30</strong>/13, “State keeps Cuba on terror sponsors list” http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-state-sponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements</p><p><u><strong>Decisions by the government to remove countries from the list of state sponsors of terrorism can be made at any time by the president. These decisions are independent of the Country Reports on Terrorism, which always review actions from the prior year.</p><p>To remove a country from the list, the president must give notice to Congress by submitting a report outlining why this change is being made.</p></u></strong>

The Hill, 5/30/13, “State keeps Cuba on terror sponsors list” http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-state-sponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: The Hill, 5/30/13, “State keeps Cuba on terror sponsors list” http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-state-sponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements fulltext: Decisions by the government to remove countries from the list of state sponsors of terrorism can be made at any time by the president. These decisions are independent of the Country Reports on Terrorism, which always review actions from the prior year. To remove a country from the list, the president must give notice to Congress by submitting a report outlining why this change is being made. [/INST] <h4>And, the counterplan does include Congress</h4><p><strong>The Hill</strong>, <strong>5/30</strong>/13, “State keeps Cuba on terror sponsors list” http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-state-sponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements</p><p><u><strong>Decisions by the government to remove countries from the list of state sponsors of terrorism can be made at any time by the president. These decisions are independent of the Country Reports on Terrorism, which always review actions from the prior year.</p><p>To remove a country from the list, the president must give notice to Congress by submitting a report outlining why this change is being made.</p></u></strong> </s>

Now is a key time to reset relations with Venezuela

The death of Chávez has implications for U.S.-Venezuelan relations there has been considerable friction in relations under Chávez U.S. policymakers have expressed hope for a new era in U.S.-Venezuelan relations in the post-Chávez era

The death of Chávez has implications for U.S.-Venezuelan relations there has been ¶ considerable friction in relations under Chávez U.S. policymakers have ¶ expressed hope for a new era in U.S.-Venezuelan relations in the post-Chávez era

The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez on March 5, 2013, after 14 years of ¶ populist rule, has implications not only for Venezuela’s political future, but potentially for ¶ the future of U.S.-Venezuelan relations. This report provides a brief discussion of those ¶ implications. For additional background on President Chávez’s rule and U.S. policy, see CRS ¶ Report R40938, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan. ¶ Congress has had a strong interest in Venezuela and U.S. relations with Venezuela under the ¶ Chávez government. Among the concerns of U.S. policymakers has been the deterioration of ¶ human rights and democratic conditions, Venezuela’s significant military arms purchases, lack of ¶ cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts, limited bilateral anti-drug cooperation, and Venezuela’s ¶ relations with Cuba and Iran. ¶ The United States traditionally enjoyed close relations with Venezuela, but there has been ¶ considerable friction in relations under the Chávez government. U.S. policymakers have ¶ expressed hope for a new era in U.S.-Venezuelan relations in the post-Chávez era. While this ¶ might not be possible while Venezuela soon gears up for a presidential campaign, there may be an ¶ opportunity in the aftermath of the election.

<h4>Now is a key time to reset relations with Venezuela</h4><p><strong>Sullivan 4-9</strong>-13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf]</p><p><u><mark>The death of</u> </mark>Venezuelan President Hugo <u><mark>Chávez</u> </mark>on March 5, 2013, after 14 years of ¶ populist rule, <u><mark>has implications</u></mark> not only <u><mark>for</u> </mark>Venezuela’s political future, but potentially for ¶ the future of <u><mark>U.S.-Venezuelan relations</u></mark>. This report provides a brief discussion of those ¶ implications. For additional background on President Chávez’s rule and U.S. policy, see CRS ¶ Report R40938, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan. ¶ Congress has had a strong interest in Venezuela and U.S. relations with Venezuela under the ¶ Chávez government. Among the concerns of U.S. policymakers has been the deterioration of ¶ human rights and democratic conditions, Venezuela’s significant military arms purchases, lack of ¶ cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts, limited bilateral anti-drug cooperation, and Venezuela’s ¶ relations with Cuba and Iran. ¶ The United States traditionally enjoyed close relations with Venezuela, but <u><mark>there has been </u>¶<u> considerable friction in relations under</u></mark> the <u><mark>Chávez </u></mark>government. <u><mark>U.S. policymakers have </u>¶<u> expressed hope for a new era in U.S.-Venezuelan relations in the post-Chávez era</u></mark>. While this ¶ might not be possible while Venezuela soon gears up for a presidential campaign, there may be an ¶ opportunity in the aftermath of the election. </p>

Sullivan 4-9-13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Sullivan 4-9-13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf] fulltext: The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez on March 5, 2013, after 14 years of ¶ populist rule, has implications not only for Venezuela’s political future, but potentially for ¶ the future of U.S.-Venezuelan relations. This report provides a brief discussion of those ¶ implications. For additional background on President Chávez’s rule and U.S. policy, see CRS ¶ Report R40938, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan. ¶ Congress has had a strong interest in Venezuela and U.S. relations with Venezuela under the ¶ Chávez government. Among the concerns of U.S. policymakers has been the deterioration of ¶ human rights and democratic conditions, Venezuela’s significant military arms purchases, lack of ¶ cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts, limited bilateral anti-drug cooperation, and Venezuela’s ¶ relations with Cuba and Iran. ¶ The United States traditionally enjoyed close relations with Venezuela, but there has been ¶ considerable friction in relations under the Chávez government. U.S. policymakers have ¶ expressed hope for a new era in U.S.-Venezuelan relations in the post-Chávez era. While this ¶ might not be possible while Venezuela soon gears up for a presidential campaign, there may be an ¶ opportunity in the aftermath of the election. [/INST] <h4>Now is a key time to reset relations with Venezuela</h4><p><strong>Sullivan 4-9</strong>-13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf]</p><p><u><mark>The death of</u> </mark>Venezuelan President Hugo <u><mark>Chávez</u> </mark>on March 5, 2013, after 14 years of ¶ populist rule, <u><mark>has implications</u></mark> not only <u><mark>for</u> </mark>Venezuela’s political future, but potentially for ¶ the future of <u><mark>U.S.-Venezuelan relations</u></mark>. This report provides a brief discussion of those ¶ implications. For additional background on President Chávez’s rule and U.S. policy, see CRS ¶ Report R40938, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan. ¶ Congress has had a strong interest in Venezuela and U.S. relations with Venezuela under the ¶ Chávez government. Among the concerns of U.S. policymakers has been the deterioration of ¶ human rights and democratic conditions, Venezuela’s significant military arms purchases, lack of ¶ cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts, limited bilateral anti-drug cooperation, and Venezuela’s ¶ relations with Cuba and Iran. ¶ The United States traditionally enjoyed close relations with Venezuela, but <u><mark>there has been </u>¶<u> considerable friction in relations under</u></mark> the <u><mark>Chávez </u></mark>government. <u><mark>U.S. policymakers have </u>¶<u> expressed hope for a new era in U.S.-Venezuelan relations in the post-Chávez era</u></mark>. While this ¶ might not be possible while Venezuela soon gears up for a presidential campaign, there may be an ¶ opportunity in the aftermath of the election. </p> </s>

(__) Increased US-Mexican economic engagement happening now.

) Mexico has sought to change its message and image with an aggressive agenda for reform. That includes focusing on trade and increased economic integration with the U.S. as Mexico experiences a boom in manufacturing and worldwide buzz about its competitive edge over China and Brazil. U.S. officials are echoing the message Bilateral trade amounted to nearly $500 billion last year, more than four times what it was only 20 years ago, and Mexico is the most important export market for 22 of 50 U.S. states

(“Mexico seeks new security, economic agenda with United States” E. Eduardo Castillo and Katherine Corcoran, Associated Press April 30, 2013 http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2013/apr/30/mexico-seeks-new-security-economic-agenda-united-s/) Wearied by a six-year offensive against organized crime that took an estimated 70,000 lives and saw the disappearance of thousands more, Mexico has sought to change its message and image since Pena Nieto took office Dec. 1 with an aggressive agenda for reform. That includes focusing on trade and increased economic integration with the U.S. as Mexico experiences a boom in manufacturing and worldwide buzz about its competitive edge over China and Brazil. "What we are striving for in Mexico is to convert the North American region into the most competitive and the most dynamic region of the world. That means that certainly there will be integration of the economy," Alcocer said. Pena Nieto's the meeting with Obama "will allow us to revive a relationship that is more balanced and diversified, much broader and deeper," he said. U.S. officials are echoing the message. Bilateral trade amounted to nearly $500 billion last year, more than four times what it was only 20 years ago, and Mexico is the most important export market for 22 of 50 U.S. states, both countries' top diplomats said at an April 19 meeting preparing for Obama's trip.

<h4>(__) Increased US-Mexican economic engagement happening now.</h4><p><strong>Castillo and Corcoran</strong>, Associated Press, <strong>2013</p><p></strong>(“Mexico seeks new security, economic agenda with United States”</p><p>E. Eduardo Castillo and Katherine Corcoran, Associated Press</p><p>April 30, 2013 http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2013/apr/30/mexico-seeks-new-security-economic-agenda-united-s/<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>Wearied by a six-year offensive against organized crime that took an estimated 70,000 lives and saw the disappearance of thousands more, <u><strong>Mexico has sought to change its message and image</u></strong> since Pena Nieto took office Dec. 1 <u><strong>with an aggressive agenda for reform. That includes focusing on trade and increased economic integration with the U.S. as Mexico experiences a boom in manufacturing and worldwide buzz about its competitive edge over China and Brazil.</p><p></u></strong>"What we are striving for in Mexico is to convert the North American region into the most competitive and the most dynamic region of the world. That means that certainly there will be integration of the economy," Alcocer said.</p><p>Pena Nieto's the meeting with Obama "will allow us to revive a relationship that is more balanced and diversified, much broader and deeper," he said.</p><p><u><strong>U.S. officials are echoing the message</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>Bilateral trade amounted to nearly $500 billion last year, more than four times what it was only 20 years ago, and Mexico is the most important export market for 22 of 50 U.S. states</u></strong>, both countries' top diplomats said at an April 19 meeting preparing for Obama's trip.</p>

Castillo and Corcoran, Associated Press, 2013

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Castillo and Corcoran, Associated Press, 2013 fulltext: (“Mexico seeks new security, economic agenda with United States” E. Eduardo Castillo and Katherine Corcoran, Associated Press April 30, 2013 http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2013/apr/30/mexico-seeks-new-security-economic-agenda-united-s/) Wearied by a six-year offensive against organized crime that took an estimated 70,000 lives and saw the disappearance of thousands more, Mexico has sought to change its message and image since Pena Nieto took office Dec. 1 with an aggressive agenda for reform. That includes focusing on trade and increased economic integration with the U.S. as Mexico experiences a boom in manufacturing and worldwide buzz about its competitive edge over China and Brazil. "What we are striving for in Mexico is to convert the North American region into the most competitive and the most dynamic region of the world. That means that certainly there will be integration of the economy," Alcocer said. Pena Nieto's the meeting with Obama "will allow us to revive a relationship that is more balanced and diversified, much broader and deeper," he said. U.S. officials are echoing the message. Bilateral trade amounted to nearly $500 billion last year, more than four times what it was only 20 years ago, and Mexico is the most important export market for 22 of 50 U.S. states, both countries' top diplomats said at an April 19 meeting preparing for Obama's trip. [/INST] <h4>(__) Increased US-Mexican economic engagement happening now.</h4><p><strong>Castillo and Corcoran</strong>, Associated Press, <strong>2013</p><p></strong>(“Mexico seeks new security, economic agenda with United States”</p><p>E. Eduardo Castillo and Katherine Corcoran, Associated Press</p><p>April 30, 2013 http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2013/apr/30/mexico-seeks-new-security-economic-agenda-united-s/<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>Wearied by a six-year offensive against organized crime that took an estimated 70,000 lives and saw the disappearance of thousands more, <u><strong>Mexico has sought to change its message and image</u></strong> since Pena Nieto took office Dec. 1 <u><strong>with an aggressive agenda for reform. That includes focusing on trade and increased economic integration with the U.S. as Mexico experiences a boom in manufacturing and worldwide buzz about its competitive edge over China and Brazil.</p><p></u></strong>"What we are striving for in Mexico is to convert the North American region into the most competitive and the most dynamic region of the world. That means that certainly there will be integration of the economy," Alcocer said.</p><p>Pena Nieto's the meeting with Obama "will allow us to revive a relationship that is more balanced and diversified, much broader and deeper," he said.</p><p><u><strong>U.S. officials are echoing the message</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>Bilateral trade amounted to nearly $500 billion last year, more than four times what it was only 20 years ago, and Mexico is the most important export market for 22 of 50 U.S. states</u></strong>, both countries' top diplomats said at an April 19 meeting preparing for Obama's trip.</p> </s>

Or

OR–noun a Boolean operator that returns a positive result when either or both operands are positive.

<h4>Or</h4><p><u><strong>Random House</u></strong>, 200<u><strong>9</u></strong> </p><p>[Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary, "Or," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/or, mss]</p><p>OR–noun</p><p>a Boolean operator that returns a positive result when either or both operands are positive.</p>

Random House, 2009 [Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary, "Or," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/or, mss]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Random House, 2009 [Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary, "Or," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/or, mss] fulltext: OR–noun a Boolean operator that returns a positive result when either or both operands are positive. [/INST] <h4>Or</h4><p><u><strong>Random House</u></strong>, 200<u><strong>9</u></strong> </p><p>[Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Dictionary, "Or," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/or, mss]</p><p>OR–noun</p><p>a Boolean operator that returns a positive result when either or both operands are positive.</p> </s>

Their volatility arguments don’t apply to Russia – even a sharp increase is net-beneficial to the Russian economy and any side-effects outweighs the negative effects of a decrease

While a sharp rise is likely to prove a headwind for many markets, experts suggest Russia could well be an exception The country has both macroeconomic and bottom-up factors on its side. say now is a compelling time for investors to consider opportunities in the country. An oil-dominated market Historically, the performance of the Russian equity market and the price of oil have been closely correlated. oil price average of around $150 a barrel would increase the operating profitability of Russian oil companies an average of $90 a barrel for 2011, The interesting thing about Russian assets is they stand to benefit from a high oil price scenario regardless of what the figure is. You will see growth in Russia at any of those prices and you can invest into this growth by buying into companies valued at very attractive levels Russia is the biggest oil exporter globally and a third of state revenues come from taxation in the oil and gas sector higher oil prices play an integral part in the health of the Russian economy. “There is historically a strong link in Russia between the price of oil, money supply and consumption, so additional cash sloshing around the economy is a likely outcome That is good for consumption stocks and the banking sector, exports as a driver for economic growth the growth potential is a clear cut story thanks to real disposable income growing at a fast pace.

experts suggest Russia could be an exception. The country has both macroeconomic and bottom-up factors the equity market and oil have been closely correlated Russian assets benefit from high oil regardless of the figure higher prices play an integral part in the Russian economy. “There is historically a strong link between the price money and consumption That is good for consumption stocks and the banking sector

Maria Merricks investigates how Russia can benefit from rising oil prices. Turmoil in the Middle East has sent the price of oil soaring. While a sharp rise is likely to prove a headwind for many markets, experts suggest Russia could well be an exception. The country has both macroeconomic and bottom-up factors on its side. For this reason, managers say now is a compelling time for investors to consider opportunities in the country. An oil-dominated market Historically, the performance of the Russian equity market and the price of oil have been closely correlated. According to Matthias Siller, investment manager of Baring’s Russia fund, an oil price average of around $150 a barrel would increase the operating profitability of Russian oil companies by between 60% and 80%. Considering energy companies make up 40% of the MSCI Russia index, this scenario makes for a very interesting story. Douglas Helfer, manager of HSBC’s GIF Russia Equity fund, says from looking at consensus-based forecasts for earnings growth in Russian oil companies this year, most analysts agree a figure of $80 a barrel would generate 20% earnings growth. “At $90 a barrel you will see another 20% on top of that. A $100 average would add 50% to current numbers on those companies,” he says. However, predicting oil prices is a tricky business. The Crude Oil WTI Futures Curve indicates an average of $90 a barrel for 2011, says Helfer. But according to Siller it does not matter if prices are $80, $90 or $100 a barrel. “The interesting thing about Russian assets is they stand to benefit from a high oil price scenario regardless of what the figure is. You will see growth in Russia at any of those prices and you can invest into this growth by buying into companies valued at very attractive levels,” he says. The Russian stock market is the cheapest of all the global emerging markets, he adds. Macroeconomics Meanwhile, the country stands to benefit on a macroeconomic level too. Russia is the biggest oil exporter globally and a third of state revenues come from taxation in the oil and gas sector. For this reason, higher oil prices play an integral part in the health of the Russian economy. “There is historically a strong link in Russia between the price of oil, money supply and consumption, so additional cash sloshing around the economy is a likely outcome,” Helfer says. “That is good for consumption stocks and the banking sector, for example. The story certainly revolves around exports as a driver for economic growth.” Siller says the growth potential is a clear cut story thanks to real disposable income growing at a fast pace. Meanwhile, a parliamentary election in December also adds to the promising outlook. “Investors may be able to count on supportive measures from the government in terms of social and infrastructure spending,” Helfer says.

<h4>Their volatility arguments don’t apply to <u>Russia</u> – even a sharp increase is net-beneficial to the Russian economy and any side-effects outweighs the negative effects of a decrease</h4><p><strong>Merricks ‘11</strong> – economist (Maria, March 3rd, “Russia Special: The oil Effect” http://www.investmentweek.co.uk/investment-week/feature/2030428/oiling-wheels)</p><p>Maria Merricks investigates how Russia can benefit from rising oil prices. Turmoil in the Middle East has sent the price of oil soaring. <u>While a sharp rise is likely to prove a headwind for many markets, <mark>experts suggest Russia could</mark> well <mark>be an exception</u>. <u>The country has both <strong>macroeconomic and bottom-up factors</strong> </mark>on its side. </u>For this reason, managers <u>say now is a compelling time for investors to consider opportunities in the country. An oil-dominated market Historically, the performance of <mark>the </mark>Russian <mark>equity market and </mark>the price of <mark>oil have been <strong>closely correlated</strong></mark>. </u>According to Matthias Siller, investment manager of Baring’s Russia fund, an <u>oil price average of around $150 a barrel would increase the operating profitability of Russian oil companies</u> by between 60% and 80%. Considering energy companies make up 40% of the MSCI Russia index, this scenario makes for a very interesting story. Douglas Helfer, manager of HSBC’s GIF Russia Equity fund, says from looking at consensus-based forecasts for earnings growth in Russian oil companies this year, most analysts agree a figure of $80 a barrel would generate 20% earnings growth. “At $90 a barrel you will see another 20% on top of that. A $100 average would add 50% to current numbers on those companies,” he says. However, predicting oil prices is a tricky business. The Crude Oil WTI Futures Curve indicates <u>an average of $90 a barrel for 2011,</u> says Helfer. But according to Siller it does not matter if prices are $80, $90 or $100 a barrel. “<u>The interesting thing about <strong><mark>Russian assets</strong></mark> is they stand to <strong><mark>benefit from</strong></mark> a <strong><mark>high oil</strong></mark> price scenario <strong><mark>regardless of</mark> </strong>what <strong><mark>the figure</strong></mark> is.</u> <u>You will see growth in Russia at any of those prices and you can invest into this growth by buying into companies valued at very attractive levels</u>,” he says. The Russian stock market is the cheapest of all the global emerging markets, he adds. Macroeconomics Meanwhile, the country stands to benefit on a macroeconomic level too. <u>Russia is the biggest oil exporter globally and a third of state revenues come from taxation in the oil and gas sector</u>. For this reason, <u><mark>higher </mark>oil <mark>prices play an integral part in </mark>the health of <mark>the Russian economy. “There is <strong>historically a strong link</strong> </mark>in Russia<mark> <strong>between the price</strong> </mark>of oil, <strong><mark>money</strong> </mark>supply <strong><mark>and consumption</strong></mark>, so additional cash sloshing around the economy is a likely outcome</u>,” Helfer says. “<u><mark>That is good for consumption stocks and the banking sector</mark>,</u> for example. The story certainly revolves around <u>exports as a driver for economic growth</u>.” Siller says <u>the growth potential is a clear cut story thanks to real disposable income growing at a fast pace. </u>Meanwhile, a parliamentary election in December also adds to the promising outlook. “Investors may be able to count on supportive measures from the government in terms of social and infrastructure spending,” Helfer says. </p>

Merricks ‘11 – economist (Maria, March 3rd, “Russia Special: The oil Effect” http://www.investmentweek.co.uk/investment-week/feature/2030428/oiling-wheels)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Merricks ‘11 – economist (Maria, March 3rd, “Russia Special: The oil Effect” http://www.investmentweek.co.uk/investment-week/feature/2030428/oiling-wheels) fulltext: Maria Merricks investigates how Russia can benefit from rising oil prices. Turmoil in the Middle East has sent the price of oil soaring. While a sharp rise is likely to prove a headwind for many markets, experts suggest Russia could well be an exception. The country has both macroeconomic and bottom-up factors on its side. For this reason, managers say now is a compelling time for investors to consider opportunities in the country. An oil-dominated market Historically, the performance of the Russian equity market and the price of oil have been closely correlated. According to Matthias Siller, investment manager of Baring’s Russia fund, an oil price average of around $150 a barrel would increase the operating profitability of Russian oil companies by between 60% and 80%. Considering energy companies make up 40% of the MSCI Russia index, this scenario makes for a very interesting story. Douglas Helfer, manager of HSBC’s GIF Russia Equity fund, says from looking at consensus-based forecasts for earnings growth in Russian oil companies this year, most analysts agree a figure of $80 a barrel would generate 20% earnings growth. “At $90 a barrel you will see another 20% on top of that. A $100 average would add 50% to current numbers on those companies,” he says. However, predicting oil prices is a tricky business. The Crude Oil WTI Futures Curve indicates an average of $90 a barrel for 2011, says Helfer. But according to Siller it does not matter if prices are $80, $90 or $100 a barrel. “The interesting thing about Russian assets is they stand to benefit from a high oil price scenario regardless of what the figure is. You will see growth in Russia at any of those prices and you can invest into this growth by buying into companies valued at very attractive levels,” he says. The Russian stock market is the cheapest of all the global emerging markets, he adds. Macroeconomics Meanwhile, the country stands to benefit on a macroeconomic level too. Russia is the biggest oil exporter globally and a third of state revenues come from taxation in the oil and gas sector. For this reason, higher oil prices play an integral part in the health of the Russian economy. “There is historically a strong link in Russia between the price of oil, money supply and consumption, so additional cash sloshing around the economy is a likely outcome,” Helfer says. “That is good for consumption stocks and the banking sector, for example. The story certainly revolves around exports as a driver for economic growth.” Siller says the growth potential is a clear cut story thanks to real disposable income growing at a fast pace. Meanwhile, a parliamentary election in December also adds to the promising outlook. “Investors may be able to count on supportive measures from the government in terms of social and infrastructure spending,” Helfer says. [/INST] <h4>Their volatility arguments don’t apply to <u>Russia</u> – even a sharp increase is net-beneficial to the Russian economy and any side-effects outweighs the negative effects of a decrease</h4><p><strong>Merricks ‘11</strong> – economist (Maria, March 3rd, “Russia Special: The oil Effect” http://www.investmentweek.co.uk/investment-week/feature/2030428/oiling-wheels)</p><p>Maria Merricks investigates how Russia can benefit from rising oil prices. Turmoil in the Middle East has sent the price of oil soaring. <u>While a sharp rise is likely to prove a headwind for many markets, <mark>experts suggest Russia could</mark> well <mark>be an exception</u>. <u>The country has both <strong>macroeconomic and bottom-up factors</strong> </mark>on its side. </u>For this reason, managers <u>say now is a compelling time for investors to consider opportunities in the country. An oil-dominated market Historically, the performance of <mark>the </mark>Russian <mark>equity market and </mark>the price of <mark>oil have been <strong>closely correlated</strong></mark>. </u>According to Matthias Siller, investment manager of Baring’s Russia fund, an <u>oil price average of around $150 a barrel would increase the operating profitability of Russian oil companies</u> by between 60% and 80%. Considering energy companies make up 40% of the MSCI Russia index, this scenario makes for a very interesting story. Douglas Helfer, manager of HSBC’s GIF Russia Equity fund, says from looking at consensus-based forecasts for earnings growth in Russian oil companies this year, most analysts agree a figure of $80 a barrel would generate 20% earnings growth. “At $90 a barrel you will see another 20% on top of that. A $100 average would add 50% to current numbers on those companies,” he says. However, predicting oil prices is a tricky business. The Crude Oil WTI Futures Curve indicates <u>an average of $90 a barrel for 2011,</u> says Helfer. But according to Siller it does not matter if prices are $80, $90 or $100 a barrel. “<u>The interesting thing about <strong><mark>Russian assets</strong></mark> is they stand to <strong><mark>benefit from</strong></mark> a <strong><mark>high oil</strong></mark> price scenario <strong><mark>regardless of</mark> </strong>what <strong><mark>the figure</strong></mark> is.</u> <u>You will see growth in Russia at any of those prices and you can invest into this growth by buying into companies valued at very attractive levels</u>,” he says. The Russian stock market is the cheapest of all the global emerging markets, he adds. Macroeconomics Meanwhile, the country stands to benefit on a macroeconomic level too. <u>Russia is the biggest oil exporter globally and a third of state revenues come from taxation in the oil and gas sector</u>. For this reason, <u><mark>higher </mark>oil <mark>prices play an integral part in </mark>the health of <mark>the Russian economy. “There is <strong>historically a strong link</strong> </mark>in Russia<mark> <strong>between the price</strong> </mark>of oil, <strong><mark>money</strong> </mark>supply <strong><mark>and consumption</strong></mark>, so additional cash sloshing around the economy is a likely outcome</u>,” Helfer says. “<u><mark>That is good for consumption stocks and the banking sector</mark>,</u> for example. The story certainly revolves around <u>exports as a driver for economic growth</u>.” Siller says <u>the growth potential is a clear cut story thanks to real disposable income growing at a fast pace. </u>Meanwhile, a parliamentary election in December also adds to the promising outlook. “Investors may be able to count on supportive measures from the government in terms of social and infrastructure spending,” Helfer says. </p> </s>

Counterplan doesn’t solve the aff – small steps aren’t enough

Cuba has to be very careful in its dealings with the United States. the United States and Cuba have “never had normal relations” as sovereign equals, so how could we go about constructing them now? small steps were not enough Since the United States is the bigger country, it “needs to make a bigger effort.”

This understanding of the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, reinforced by the power asymmetry between our two ¶ countries, was clearly reflected in Ambassador Alzugaray’s insistence that Cuba has to be very careful in its ¶ dealings with the United States. He argued that this was because “a mistake could prove fatal for Cuba.” He further ¶ observed that the United States and Cuba have “never had normal relations” as sovereign equals, so how could we ¶ go about constructing them now? The consequence of these apprehensions appears to be an unstated policy of ¶ keeping the United States at arm’s length for now. When asked directly what the United States could do to convince ¶ Cuba of the sincerity of its desire to improve bilateral relations, the recently retired chief economist for the ¶ Ministry of Economy and Planning suggested a series of small confidence-building measures. Ambassador ¶ Alzugaray, however, insisted that small steps were not enough. Since the United States is the bigger country, it ¶ “needs to make a bigger effort.”

<h4>Counterplan doesn’t solve the aff – small steps aren’t enough</h4><p>Pamela K. <strong>Starr</strong>, Pacific Council on International Policy, May 20<strong>13</strong>, “As Cuba Changes, U.S. Policy Does Not” https://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id<u><strong>=539</p><p></u></strong>This understanding of the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, reinforced by the power asymmetry between our two ¶ countries, was clearly reflected in Ambassador Alzugaray’s insistence that <u><strong>Cuba has to be very careful in its </u></strong>¶<u><strong> dealings with the United States.</u></strong> He argued that this was because “a mistake could prove fatal for Cuba.” He further ¶ observed that <u><strong>the United States and Cuba have “never had normal relations” as sovereign equals, so how could we </u></strong>¶<u><strong> go about constructing them now?</u></strong> The consequence of these apprehensions appears to be an unstated policy of ¶ keeping the United States at arm’s length for now. When asked directly what the United States could do to convince ¶ Cuba of the sincerity of its desire to improve bilateral relations, the recently retired chief economist for the ¶ Ministry of Economy and Planning suggested a series of small confidence-building measures. Ambassador ¶ Alzugaray, however, insisted that <u><strong>small steps were not enough</u></strong>. <u><strong>Since the United States is the bigger country, it </u></strong>¶<u><strong> “needs to make a bigger effort.”</p></u></strong>

Pamela K. Starr, Pacific Council on International Policy, May 2013, “As Cuba Changes, U.S. Policy Does Not” https://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=539

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Pamela K. Starr, Pacific Council on International Policy, May 2013, “As Cuba Changes, U.S. Policy Does Not” https://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=539 fulltext: This understanding of the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, reinforced by the power asymmetry between our two ¶ countries, was clearly reflected in Ambassador Alzugaray’s insistence that Cuba has to be very careful in its ¶ dealings with the United States. He argued that this was because “a mistake could prove fatal for Cuba.” He further ¶ observed that the United States and Cuba have “never had normal relations” as sovereign equals, so how could we ¶ go about constructing them now? The consequence of these apprehensions appears to be an unstated policy of ¶ keeping the United States at arm’s length for now. When asked directly what the United States could do to convince ¶ Cuba of the sincerity of its desire to improve bilateral relations, the recently retired chief economist for the ¶ Ministry of Economy and Planning suggested a series of small confidence-building measures. Ambassador ¶ Alzugaray, however, insisted that small steps were not enough. Since the United States is the bigger country, it ¶ “needs to make a bigger effort.” [/INST] <h4>Counterplan doesn’t solve the aff – small steps aren’t enough</h4><p>Pamela K. <strong>Starr</strong>, Pacific Council on International Policy, May 20<strong>13</strong>, “As Cuba Changes, U.S. Policy Does Not” https://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id<u><strong>=539</p><p></u></strong>This understanding of the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, reinforced by the power asymmetry between our two ¶ countries, was clearly reflected in Ambassador Alzugaray’s insistence that <u><strong>Cuba has to be very careful in its </u></strong>¶<u><strong> dealings with the United States.</u></strong> He argued that this was because “a mistake could prove fatal for Cuba.” He further ¶ observed that <u><strong>the United States and Cuba have “never had normal relations” as sovereign equals, so how could we </u></strong>¶<u><strong> go about constructing them now?</u></strong> The consequence of these apprehensions appears to be an unstated policy of ¶ keeping the United States at arm’s length for now. When asked directly what the United States could do to convince ¶ Cuba of the sincerity of its desire to improve bilateral relations, the recently retired chief economist for the ¶ Ministry of Economy and Planning suggested a series of small confidence-building measures. Ambassador ¶ Alzugaray, however, insisted that <u><strong>small steps were not enough</u></strong>. <u><strong>Since the United States is the bigger country, it </u></strong>¶<u><strong> “needs to make a bigger effort.”</p></u></strong> </s>

Post-Chavez period is crucial to restore relations

The death of Chávez removes one of the United States' foremost geopolitical foes sparking hope that ensuing changes could lead to improved relations in the region now that Chávez has passed away, elected officials see an opening to reestablish ties with Venezuela it is an opportunity for us to step into a new relationship with Venezuela," Former ambassador Richardson said the U.S. will have to work to improve its image and standing in Venezuela

The death of Chávez removes one of the United States' foremost geopolitical foes sparking hope that ensuing changes could lead to improved relations in the region now that Chávez has passed away, elected officials see an opening to reestablish ties with Venezuela it is an opportunity for us to step into a new relationship with Venezuela," Former ambassador Richardson said the U.S. will have to work to improve its image and standing in Venezuela

The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez removes one of the United States' foremost geopolitical foes from Latin America, sparking hope among U.S. officials that the ensuing changes could lead to improved relations in the region. But it won't be easy.¶ The United States and Venezuela have shared a rancorous relationship since Chávez was first elected in 1998. Chávez angered multiple U.S. presidents by establishing ties to regimes in countries like Cuba and Iran that are hostile to the United States, and for fomenting anti-U.S. sentiment in other nations in the Western Hemisphere. And the Chávez regime repeatedly accused the U.S. of plotting to overthrow his rulership, fueling distrust between the two countries. Relations have become so frayed that the U.S. and Venezuela have not exchanged ambassadors since 2010.¶ Those tensions were evident even on Tuesday, the final day of Chávez's life. Venezuela expelled two U.S. embassy officials from the country on allegations they tried to destabilize the country. Upon their ejection, Venezuelan Vice President Nicolás Maduro even suggested that U.S. interests were behind the cancer that eventually claimed Chávez's life.¶ But now that Chávez has passed away, elected officials see an opening to reestablish ties with Venezuela. "Hugo Chávez ruled Venezuela with an iron hand and his passing has left a political void that we hope will be filled peacefully and through a constitutional and democratic process," Senate Foreign Relation Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) said in a statement. "With free and fair elections, Venezuela can begin to restore its once robust democracy and ensure respect for the human, political and civil rights of its people."¶ "It is my sincere hope that Venezuela's leaders will seek to rebuild our once strong friendship based on shared democratic and free enterprise principles," added Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.¶ The path, however, could be difficult.¶ Venezuelan officials have said a new election will be called within 30 days. That contest will likely pit Maduro against Henrique Capriles Radonski, an opposition leader who touts free market policies and is perceived as friendlier to the U.S. But it's not clear that Capriles will fare better than he did in October, when he was defeated by Chávez.¶ The former president sparked a passionate and loyal following among Venezuela's poor and lower-classes that's morphed into a strong social movement, known as chavismo. Maduro, who will lead the country on an interim basis and is considered the front runner, has pledged to continue Chávez's work. But experts are divided on whether chavismo can outlive its charismatic namesake.¶ Some foreign policy observers believe that, even if Maduro wins, ties could improve between the U.S. and Venezuela.¶ "I think it is an opportunity for us to step into a new relationship with Venezuela," Former U.N. ambassador Bill Richardson, who met with Chávez in 2008, said on MSNBC. "The opposition candidate Capriles is pro-U.S. The vice president Maduro is not pro-U.S., but is, I think, going to be more pragmatic than Chávez."¶ Still, the U.S. will have to work to improve its image and standing in Venezuela following nearly a decade-and-a-half of anti-U.S. sentiment being imbued into the country's government and political culture.

<h4>Post-Chavez period is crucial to restore relations</h4><p><strong>Fabian 3-6</strong>-13 [Jordan, Political Editor at Univision Network, “Hugo Chávez Death: Fixing the U.S.-Venezuela Relationship Won't Be Easy,” http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/hugo-chavez-death-fixing-us-venezuela-relationship-easy/story?id=18668275&singlePage=true#.UZAf3KLktX8]</p><p><u><mark>The death of</u></mark> Venezuelan President Hugo <u><mark>Chávez</u> <u>removes one of the United States' foremost geopolitical foes</u></mark> from Latin America, <u><mark>sparking hope</u> </mark>among U.S. officials <u><mark>that</u> </mark>the <u><mark>ensuing changes could lead to improved relations in the region</u></mark>. But it won't be easy.¶ The United States and Venezuela have shared a rancorous relationship since Chávez was first elected in 1998. Chávez angered multiple U.S. presidents by establishing ties to regimes in countries like Cuba and Iran that are hostile to the United States, and for fomenting anti-U.S. sentiment in other nations in the Western Hemisphere. And the Chávez regime repeatedly accused the U.S. of plotting to overthrow his rulership, fueling distrust between the two countries. Relations have become so frayed that the U.S. and Venezuela have not exchanged ambassadors since 2010.¶ Those tensions were evident even on Tuesday, the final day of Chávez's life. Venezuela expelled two U.S. embassy officials from the country on allegations they tried to destabilize the country. Upon their ejection, Venezuelan Vice President Nicolás Maduro even suggested that U.S. interests were behind the cancer that eventually claimed Chávez's life.¶ But <u><mark>now that Chávez has passed away, elected officials see an opening to reestablish ties with Venezuela</u></mark>. "Hugo Chávez ruled Venezuela with an iron hand and his passing has left a political void that we hope will be filled peacefully and through a constitutional and democratic process," Senate Foreign Relation Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) said in a statement. "With free and fair elections, Venezuela can begin to restore its once robust democracy and ensure respect for the human, political and civil rights of its people."¶ "It is my sincere hope that Venezuela's leaders will seek to rebuild our once strong friendship based on shared democratic and free enterprise principles," added Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.¶ The path, however, could be difficult.¶ Venezuelan officials have said a new election will be called within 30 days. That contest will likely pit Maduro against Henrique Capriles Radonski, an opposition leader who touts free market policies and is perceived as friendlier to the U.S. But it's not clear that Capriles will fare better than he did in October, when he was defeated by Chávez.¶ The former president sparked a passionate and loyal following among Venezuela's poor and lower-classes that's morphed into a strong social movement, known as chavismo. Maduro, who will lead the country on an interim basis and is considered the front runner, has pledged to continue Chávez's work. But experts are divided on whether chavismo can outlive its charismatic namesake.¶ Some foreign policy observers believe that, even if Maduro wins, ties could improve between the U.S. and Venezuela.¶ "I think <u><mark>it is an opportunity for us to step into a new relationship with Venezuela," Former</u> </mark>U.N. <u><mark>ambassador</u> </mark>Bill <u><mark>Richardson</u></mark>, who met with Chávez in 2008, <u><mark>said</u> </mark>on MSNBC. "The opposition candidate Capriles is pro-U.S. The vice president Maduro is not pro-U.S., but is, I think, going to be more pragmatic than Chávez."¶ Still, <u><mark>the U.S. will have to work to improve its image and standing in Venezuela</u></mark> following nearly a decade-and-a-half of anti-U.S. sentiment being imbued into the country's government and political culture.</p>

Fabian 3-6-13 [Jordan, Political Editor at Univision Network, “Hugo Chávez Death: Fixing the U.S.-Venezuela Relationship Won't Be Easy,” http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/hugo-chavez-death-fixing-us-venezuela-relationship-easy/story?id=18668275&singlePage=true#.UZAf3KLktX8]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Fabian 3-6-13 [Jordan, Political Editor at Univision Network, “Hugo Chávez Death: Fixing the U.S.-Venezuela Relationship Won't Be Easy,” http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/hugo-chavez-death-fixing-us-venezuela-relationship-easy/story?id=18668275&singlePage=true#.UZAf3KLktX8] fulltext: The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez removes one of the United States' foremost geopolitical foes from Latin America, sparking hope among U.S. officials that the ensuing changes could lead to improved relations in the region. But it won't be easy.¶ The United States and Venezuela have shared a rancorous relationship since Chávez was first elected in 1998. Chávez angered multiple U.S. presidents by establishing ties to regimes in countries like Cuba and Iran that are hostile to the United States, and for fomenting anti-U.S. sentiment in other nations in the Western Hemisphere. And the Chávez regime repeatedly accused the U.S. of plotting to overthrow his rulership, fueling distrust between the two countries. Relations have become so frayed that the U.S. and Venezuela have not exchanged ambassadors since 2010.¶ Those tensions were evident even on Tuesday, the final day of Chávez's life. Venezuela expelled two U.S. embassy officials from the country on allegations they tried to destabilize the country. Upon their ejection, Venezuelan Vice President Nicolás Maduro even suggested that U.S. interests were behind the cancer that eventually claimed Chávez's life.¶ But now that Chávez has passed away, elected officials see an opening to reestablish ties with Venezuela. "Hugo Chávez ruled Venezuela with an iron hand and his passing has left a political void that we hope will be filled peacefully and through a constitutional and democratic process," Senate Foreign Relation Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) said in a statement. "With free and fair elections, Venezuela can begin to restore its once robust democracy and ensure respect for the human, political and civil rights of its people."¶ "It is my sincere hope that Venezuela's leaders will seek to rebuild our once strong friendship based on shared democratic and free enterprise principles," added Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.¶ The path, however, could be difficult.¶ Venezuelan officials have said a new election will be called within 30 days. That contest will likely pit Maduro against Henrique Capriles Radonski, an opposition leader who touts free market policies and is perceived as friendlier to the U.S. But it's not clear that Capriles will fare better than he did in October, when he was defeated by Chávez.¶ The former president sparked a passionate and loyal following among Venezuela's poor and lower-classes that's morphed into a strong social movement, known as chavismo. Maduro, who will lead the country on an interim basis and is considered the front runner, has pledged to continue Chávez's work. But experts are divided on whether chavismo can outlive its charismatic namesake.¶ Some foreign policy observers believe that, even if Maduro wins, ties could improve between the U.S. and Venezuela.¶ "I think it is an opportunity for us to step into a new relationship with Venezuela," Former U.N. ambassador Bill Richardson, who met with Chávez in 2008, said on MSNBC. "The opposition candidate Capriles is pro-U.S. The vice president Maduro is not pro-U.S., but is, I think, going to be more pragmatic than Chávez."¶ Still, the U.S. will have to work to improve its image and standing in Venezuela following nearly a decade-and-a-half of anti-U.S. sentiment being imbued into the country's government and political culture. [/INST] <h4>Post-Chavez period is crucial to restore relations</h4><p><strong>Fabian 3-6</strong>-13 [Jordan, Political Editor at Univision Network, “Hugo Chávez Death: Fixing the U.S.-Venezuela Relationship Won't Be Easy,” http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/hugo-chavez-death-fixing-us-venezuela-relationship-easy/story?id=18668275&singlePage=true#.UZAf3KLktX8]</p><p><u><mark>The death of</u></mark> Venezuelan President Hugo <u><mark>Chávez</u> <u>removes one of the United States' foremost geopolitical foes</u></mark> from Latin America, <u><mark>sparking hope</u> </mark>among U.S. officials <u><mark>that</u> </mark>the <u><mark>ensuing changes could lead to improved relations in the region</u></mark>. But it won't be easy.¶ The United States and Venezuela have shared a rancorous relationship since Chávez was first elected in 1998. Chávez angered multiple U.S. presidents by establishing ties to regimes in countries like Cuba and Iran that are hostile to the United States, and for fomenting anti-U.S. sentiment in other nations in the Western Hemisphere. And the Chávez regime repeatedly accused the U.S. of plotting to overthrow his rulership, fueling distrust between the two countries. Relations have become so frayed that the U.S. and Venezuela have not exchanged ambassadors since 2010.¶ Those tensions were evident even on Tuesday, the final day of Chávez's life. Venezuela expelled two U.S. embassy officials from the country on allegations they tried to destabilize the country. Upon their ejection, Venezuelan Vice President Nicolás Maduro even suggested that U.S. interests were behind the cancer that eventually claimed Chávez's life.¶ But <u><mark>now that Chávez has passed away, elected officials see an opening to reestablish ties with Venezuela</u></mark>. "Hugo Chávez ruled Venezuela with an iron hand and his passing has left a political void that we hope will be filled peacefully and through a constitutional and democratic process," Senate Foreign Relation Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) said in a statement. "With free and fair elections, Venezuela can begin to restore its once robust democracy and ensure respect for the human, political and civil rights of its people."¶ "It is my sincere hope that Venezuela's leaders will seek to rebuild our once strong friendship based on shared democratic and free enterprise principles," added Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.¶ The path, however, could be difficult.¶ Venezuelan officials have said a new election will be called within 30 days. That contest will likely pit Maduro against Henrique Capriles Radonski, an opposition leader who touts free market policies and is perceived as friendlier to the U.S. But it's not clear that Capriles will fare better than he did in October, when he was defeated by Chávez.¶ The former president sparked a passionate and loyal following among Venezuela's poor and lower-classes that's morphed into a strong social movement, known as chavismo. Maduro, who will lead the country on an interim basis and is considered the front runner, has pledged to continue Chávez's work. But experts are divided on whether chavismo can outlive its charismatic namesake.¶ Some foreign policy observers believe that, even if Maduro wins, ties could improve between the U.S. and Venezuela.¶ "I think <u><mark>it is an opportunity for us to step into a new relationship with Venezuela," Former</u> </mark>U.N. <u><mark>ambassador</u> </mark>Bill <u><mark>Richardson</u></mark>, who met with Chávez in 2008, <u><mark>said</u> </mark>on MSNBC. "The opposition candidate Capriles is pro-U.S. The vice president Maduro is not pro-U.S., but is, I think, going to be more pragmatic than Chávez."¶ Still, <u><mark>the U.S. will have to work to improve its image and standing in Venezuela</u></mark> following nearly a decade-and-a-half of anti-U.S. sentiment being imbued into the country's government and political culture.</p> </s>

(__) Kerry has no influence, and his agenda is directed by Obama

(Bernd, former Reuters foreign affairs columnist, 4-19-13, “Kerry and the peace process .. Can he be the honest broker” The Daily Star) http://www.nosratashraf.com/en/content/21806 Kerry’s first three visits to the region as secretary of state – Turkey, Israel and the West Bank – produced no clear signs that the administration of Obama is rethinking its relationships with the protagonists in the conflict – or its tendency to shrug off Israeli actions Kerry was equally unsuccessful in trying to persuade Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to keep in place Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, the U.S.-educated former World Bank economist whose drive to build institutions for a future Palestinian state drew more praise from the U.S. than from Palestinians. How much time and diplomatic capital Kerry can spend on reviving something that has been more process than peace for two decades ultimately depends on Obama, who firmly directed foreign policy in his first term. Major decisions were shaped in the White House, not the State Department, something not likely to change in Obama’s second term.

(Bernd, former Reuters foreign affairs columnist, 4-19-13, “Kerry and the peace process .. Can he be the honest broker” The Daily Star) http://www.nosratashraf.com/en/content/21806 In practice, Kerry’s first three visits to the region as secretary of state – Turkey, Israel and the West Bank – produced no clear signs that the administration of President Barack Obama is rethinking its relationships with the protagonists in the conflict – or its tendency to shrug off Israeli actions that run counter to official American policy and international law, such as building Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While there were no expectations for immediate results, the Kerry visits served to underscore the limits of U.S. influence in the region. In Istanbul, Kerry stressed that “Turkey can be a key, an important contribution to the process of peace in so many ways.” One of those ways, he explained, would be to help revive the ailing economy of the West Bank, another to create a climate of peace in Gaza, the Hamas-run coastal strip that often is the elephant in the room in discussions about the conflict. Both Israeli and Palestine Authority officials poured cold water on Turkey’s possible insertion into the peace process. Kerry was equally unsuccessful in trying to persuade Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to keep in place Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, the U.S.-educated former World Bank economist whose drive to build institutions for a future Palestinian state drew more praise from the U.S. than from Palestinians. The two leaders had been at loggerheads and despite a phone call from Kerry, Abbas accepted Fayyad’s resignation on April 14. Kerry appears undaunted by such setbacks. He plans more visits to the Middle East in the next few months. Before that, an Arab League delegation is due in Washington on April 29 to discuss a peace proposal first introduced by Saudi Arabia in 2002 and later adopted by an Arab League summit in Beirut. The plan offered full Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for territory it captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Israel rejected the proposal but the Arab League re-endorsed it five years later. Whether the initiative, in its original form or with changes, has better prospects of being accepted now than it had then is open to doubt. How much time and diplomatic capital Kerry can spend on reviving something that has been more process than peace for two decades ultimately depends on Obama, who firmly directed foreign policy in his first term. Major decisions were shaped in the White House, not the State Department, something not likely to change in Obama’s second term.

<h4>(__) Kerry has no influence, and his agenda is directed by Obama</h4><p><strong>Debusmann 13</strong> </p><p><u><strong>(Bernd, former Reuters foreign affairs columnist, 4-19-13, “Kerry and the peace process .. Can he be the honest broker” The Daily Star) http://www.nosratashraf.com/en/content/21806</p><p></u></strong>In practice, <u><strong>Kerry’s first three visits to the region as secretary of state – Turkey, Israel and the West Bank – produced no clear signs that the administration of</u></strong> President Barack <u><strong>Obama is rethinking its relationships with the protagonists in the conflict – or its tendency to shrug off Israeli actions</u></strong> that run counter to official American policy and international law, such as building Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While there were no expectations for immediate results, the Kerry visits served to underscore the limits of U.S. influence in the region. In Istanbul, Kerry stressed that “Turkey can be a key, an important contribution to the process of peace in so many ways.” One of those ways, he explained, would be to help revive the ailing economy of the West Bank, another to create a climate of peace in Gaza, the Hamas-run coastal strip that often is the elephant in the room in discussions about the conflict. Both Israeli and Palestine Authority officials poured cold water on Turkey’s possible insertion into the peace process. <u><strong>Kerry was equally unsuccessful in trying to persuade Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to keep in place Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, the U.S.-educated former World Bank economist whose drive to build institutions for a future Palestinian state drew more praise from the U.S. than from Palestinians.</u></strong> The two leaders had been at loggerheads and despite a phone call from Kerry, Abbas accepted Fayyad’s resignation on April 14. Kerry appears undaunted by such setbacks. He plans more visits to the Middle East in the next few months. Before that, an Arab League delegation is due in Washington on April 29 to discuss a peace proposal first introduced by Saudi Arabia in 2002 and later adopted by an Arab League summit in Beirut. The plan offered full Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for territory it captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Israel rejected the proposal but the Arab League re-endorsed it five years later. Whether the initiative, in its original form or with changes, has better prospects of being accepted now than it had then is open to doubt. <u><strong>How much time and diplomatic capital Kerry can spend on reviving something that has been more process than peace for two decades ultimately depends on Obama, who firmly directed foreign policy in his first term. Major decisions were shaped in the White House, not the State Department, something not likely to change in Obama’s second term.</p></u></strong>

Debusmann 13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Debusmann 13 fulltext: (Bernd, former Reuters foreign affairs columnist, 4-19-13, “Kerry and the peace process .. Can he be the honest broker” The Daily Star) http://www.nosratashraf.com/en/content/21806 In practice, Kerry’s first three visits to the region as secretary of state – Turkey, Israel and the West Bank – produced no clear signs that the administration of President Barack Obama is rethinking its relationships with the protagonists in the conflict – or its tendency to shrug off Israeli actions that run counter to official American policy and international law, such as building Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While there were no expectations for immediate results, the Kerry visits served to underscore the limits of U.S. influence in the region. In Istanbul, Kerry stressed that “Turkey can be a key, an important contribution to the process of peace in so many ways.” One of those ways, he explained, would be to help revive the ailing economy of the West Bank, another to create a climate of peace in Gaza, the Hamas-run coastal strip that often is the elephant in the room in discussions about the conflict. Both Israeli and Palestine Authority officials poured cold water on Turkey’s possible insertion into the peace process. Kerry was equally unsuccessful in trying to persuade Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to keep in place Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, the U.S.-educated former World Bank economist whose drive to build institutions for a future Palestinian state drew more praise from the U.S. than from Palestinians. The two leaders had been at loggerheads and despite a phone call from Kerry, Abbas accepted Fayyad’s resignation on April 14. Kerry appears undaunted by such setbacks. He plans more visits to the Middle East in the next few months. Before that, an Arab League delegation is due in Washington on April 29 to discuss a peace proposal first introduced by Saudi Arabia in 2002 and later adopted by an Arab League summit in Beirut. The plan offered full Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for territory it captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Israel rejected the proposal but the Arab League re-endorsed it five years later. Whether the initiative, in its original form or with changes, has better prospects of being accepted now than it had then is open to doubt. How much time and diplomatic capital Kerry can spend on reviving something that has been more process than peace for two decades ultimately depends on Obama, who firmly directed foreign policy in his first term. Major decisions were shaped in the White House, not the State Department, something not likely to change in Obama’s second term. [/INST] <h4>(__) Kerry has no influence, and his agenda is directed by Obama</h4><p><strong>Debusmann 13</strong> </p><p><u><strong>(Bernd, former Reuters foreign affairs columnist, 4-19-13, “Kerry and the peace process .. Can he be the honest broker” The Daily Star) http://www.nosratashraf.com/en/content/21806</p><p></u></strong>In practice, <u><strong>Kerry’s first three visits to the region as secretary of state – Turkey, Israel and the West Bank – produced no clear signs that the administration of</u></strong> President Barack <u><strong>Obama is rethinking its relationships with the protagonists in the conflict – or its tendency to shrug off Israeli actions</u></strong> that run counter to official American policy and international law, such as building Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While there were no expectations for immediate results, the Kerry visits served to underscore the limits of U.S. influence in the region. In Istanbul, Kerry stressed that “Turkey can be a key, an important contribution to the process of peace in so many ways.” One of those ways, he explained, would be to help revive the ailing economy of the West Bank, another to create a climate of peace in Gaza, the Hamas-run coastal strip that often is the elephant in the room in discussions about the conflict. Both Israeli and Palestine Authority officials poured cold water on Turkey’s possible insertion into the peace process. <u><strong>Kerry was equally unsuccessful in trying to persuade Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to keep in place Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, the U.S.-educated former World Bank economist whose drive to build institutions for a future Palestinian state drew more praise from the U.S. than from Palestinians.</u></strong> The two leaders had been at loggerheads and despite a phone call from Kerry, Abbas accepted Fayyad’s resignation on April 14. Kerry appears undaunted by such setbacks. He plans more visits to the Middle East in the next few months. Before that, an Arab League delegation is due in Washington on April 29 to discuss a peace proposal first introduced by Saudi Arabia in 2002 and later adopted by an Arab League summit in Beirut. The plan offered full Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for territory it captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Israel rejected the proposal but the Arab League re-endorsed it five years later. Whether the initiative, in its original form or with changes, has better prospects of being accepted now than it had then is open to doubt. <u><strong>How much time and diplomatic capital Kerry can spend on reviving something that has been more process than peace for two decades ultimately depends on Obama, who firmly directed foreign policy in his first term. Major decisions were shaped in the White House, not the State Department, something not likely to change in Obama’s second term.</p></u></strong> </s>

Slow diversification is inevitable, but massive diversification wrecks the Russian economy – comparative advantage is key to overall growth, which makes diversification a terrible idea.

Many people in Russia seem to believe Russia should de-emphasize the role of oil, gas, and other commodities because they are “primitive Relying on them, they argue, is “degrading.” From the economic point of view, this makes no sense Oil is Russia’s comparative advantage It is the most competitive part of the economy Oil and gas are something everyone wants, and Russia has more of them than anyone else It is true that the Russian economy is backward, and that oil plays a role in that backwardness. But oil is not the root cause The causes of Russia’s backwardness lie in its inherited production structure. The physical structure of the real economy industries, plants, location work forces equipment, products, and production chains is predominantly the same as in the Soviet era The problem is that it is precisely the oil wealth ) that is used to support and perpetuate the inefficient structure a large share of Russia’s oil rents is distributed to the production enterprises that employ the inherited physical and human capital The production and supply chains in that part of the economy are in effect “rent distribution chains A serious attempt to convert Russia’s economy into something resembling a modern Western economy would require dismantling this rent distribution system This would be both highly destabilizing, and costly in terms of current welfare. Current efforts for “diversification” do not challenge the rent distribution system the kinds of investment envisioned in those efforts will preserve and reinforce the rent distribution chains, and hence make Russia more dependent on oil rents any dream of creating a “non-oil” Russia that could perform as well as today’s commodity-based economy is unrealistic The proportion of GDP that would have to be invested in non-oil sectors is impossibly high some new firms, and even entire sectors, may grow on the outside of the oil and gas sectors and the rent distribution chains they support But the development of the new sectors will be difficult, slow, and costly. while it is fashionable to talk of “diversification” of the Russian economy away from oil and gas, this is the least likely outcome for the country’s economic future If Russia continues on the current course of pseudo-reform (which merely reinforces the old structures), oil rents will remain important because they will be critical to support the inherently inefficient parts of the economy. On the other hand, if Russia were to somehow launch a genuine reform aimed at dismantling the old structures, the only realistic way to sustain success would be to focus on developing the commodity sectors. Russia could obtain higher growth if the oil and gas sectors were truly modern Those sectors need to be opened to new entrants, with a level playing field for all participants oil and other commodity companies need to be freed from the requirement to participate in the various informal schemes to share their rents with enterprises in the backward sectors inherited from the Soviet system Certainly, there are issues with oil. It is a highly volatile source of wealth. But there are ways to hedge those risks. A bigger problem is that oil will eventually lose its special status as an energy source and therefore much of its value In the meantime, sensible policies can deal with the problems. Otherwise, the approach should be to generate the maximum value possible from the oil and protect that value through prudent fiscal policies. Russia should not, can not, significantly reduce the role of oil and gas in its economy in the foreseeable future. It will only harm itself by ill-advised and futile efforts to try.

From the economic point of view Oil is Russia’s comparative advantage The causes of backwardness lie in production structure predominantly the same as the Soviet era A serious attempt to convert into a Western economy would be destabilizing, and costly diversification will reinforce rent distribution and make Russia more dependent The GDP that would have to be invested is impossibly high. development of new sectors will be difficult, slow, and costly oil rents will remain important because they will be critical to support the inherently inefficient parts of the economy. Russia should not, can not, reduce the role of oil

To ask whether the Russian economy will rid itself of its “dependence on oil” is to ask whether ideology will trump economics. Many people in Russia—including President Medvedev—seem to believe Russia should de-emphasize the role of oil, gas, and other commodities because they are “primitive.” Relying on them, they argue, is “degrading.” From the economic point of view, this makes no sense. Oil is Russia’s comparative advantage. It is the most competitive part of the economy. Oil and gas are something everyone wants, and Russia has more of them than anyone else. It is true that the Russian economy is backward, and that oil plays a role in that backwardness. But oil is not the root cause. The causes of Russia’s backwardness lie in its inherited production structure. The physical structure of the real economy (that is, the industries, plants, their location, work forces, equipment, products, and the production chains in which they participate) is predominantly the same as in the Soviet era. The problem is that it is precisely the oil wealth (the so-called oil rent) that is used to support and perpetuate the inefficient structure. For the sake of social and political stability, a large share of Russia’s oil and gas rents is distributed to the production enterprises that employ the inherited physical and human capital. The production and supply chains in that part of the economy are in effect “rent distribution chains.” A serious attempt to convert Russia’s economy into something resembling a modern Western economy would require dismantling this rent distribution system. This would be both highly destabilizing, and costly in terms of current welfare. Current efforts for “diversification” do not challenge the rent distribution system. On the contrary, the kinds of investment envisioned in those efforts will preserve and reinforce the rent distribution chains, and hence make Russia more dependent on oil rents. Even under optimal conditions for investment, any dream of creating a “non-oil” Russia that could perform as well as today’s commodity-based economy is unrealistic. The proportion of GDP that would have to be invested in non-oil sectors is impossibly high. Granted, some new firms, and even entire sectors, may grow on the outside of the oil and gas sectors and the rent distribution chains they support. But the development of the new sectors will be difficult, slow, and costly. Even if successful, the net value they generate will be too small relative to oil and gas to change the overall profile of the economy. Thus, while it is fashionable to talk of “diversification” of the Russian economy away from oil and gas, this is the least likely outcome for the country’s economic future. If Russia continues on the current course of pseudo-reform (which merely reinforces the old structures), oil and gas rents will remain important because they will be critical to support the inherently inefficient parts of the economy. On the other hand, if Russia were to somehow launch a genuine reform aimed at dismantling the old structures, the only realistic way to sustain success would be to focus on developing the commodity sectors. Russia could obtain higher growth if the oil and gas sectors were truly modern. Those sectors need to be opened to new entrants, with a level playing field for all participants. Most important, oil, gas, and other commodity companies need to be freed from the requirement to participate in the various informal schemes to share their rents with enterprises in the backward sectors inherited from the Soviet system. Certainly, there are issues with oil. It is a highly volatile source of wealth. But there are ways to hedge those risks. A bigger problem is that oil will eventually lose its special status as an energy source and therefore much of its value. But that time is far off. It will not happen suddenly. In the meantime, sensible policies can deal with the problems. Otherwise, the approach should be to generate the maximum value possible from the oil and protect that value through prudent fiscal policies. Russia should not, can not, and will not significantly reduce the role of oil and gas in its economy in the foreseeable future. It will only harm itself by ill-advised and futile efforts to try.

<h4>Slow diversification is inevitable, but massive diversification wrecks the Russian economy – comparative advantage is key to overall growth, which makes diversification a terrible idea.</h4><p><strong>Gaddy 11</strong> — Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, economist specializing in Russia (Clifford G., 06/16/11, “Will the Russian economy rid itself of its dependence on oil?” http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110616/164645377.html)</p><p>To ask whether the Russian economy will rid itself of its “dependence on oil” is to ask whether ideology will trump economics. <u>Many people in Russia</u>—including President Medvedev—<u>seem to believe Russia should de-emphasize the role of oil, gas, and other commodities because they are “primitive</u>.” <u>Relying on them, they argue, is “degrading.”</u> <u><mark>From the <strong>economic point of view</strong></mark>, this makes no sense</u>. <u><strong><mark>Oil is Russia’s comparative advantage</u></strong></mark>. <u>It is the most competitive part of the economy</u>. <u>Oil and gas are something everyone wants, and Russia has more of them than anyone else</u>. <u>It is true that the Russian economy is backward, and that oil plays a role in that backwardness. But oil is not the root cause</u>. <u><mark>The causes of </mark>Russia’s <mark>backwardness lie in </mark>its inherited <mark>production structure</mark>. The physical structure of the real economy</u> (that is, the <u>industries, plants, </u>their <u>location</u>, <u>work forces</u>, <u>equipment, products, and </u>the <u>production chains</u> in which they participate) <u>is <mark>predominantly the same as</mark> in <mark>the Soviet era</u></mark>. <u>The problem is that it is precisely the oil wealth</u> (the so-called oil rent<u>) that is used to support and perpetuate the inefficient structure</u>. For the sake of social and political stability, <u>a large share of Russia’s oil</u> and gas <u>rents is distributed to the production enterprises that employ the inherited physical and human capital</u>. <u>The production and supply chains in that part of the economy are in effect “rent distribution chains</u>.” <u><mark>A serious attempt to convert </mark>Russia’s economy <mark>into</mark> something resembling <mark>a</mark> modern <mark>Western economy</mark> would require dismantling this rent distribution system</u>. <u>This <mark>would be </mark>both highly <mark>destabilizing, and</mark> <mark>costly</mark> in terms of current welfare.</u> <u>Current efforts for “<mark>diversification</mark>” do not challenge the rent distribution system</u>. On the contrary, <u>the kinds of investment envisioned in those efforts <mark>will </mark>preserve and <mark>reinforce </mark>the <mark>rent distribution </mark>chains, <strong><mark>and </mark>hence <mark>make Russia more dependent </strong></mark>on oil<strong> </strong>rents</u>. Even under optimal conditions for investment, <u>any dream of creating a “non-oil” Russia that could perform as well as today’s commodity-based economy is unrealistic</u>. <u><mark>The </mark>proportion of <strong><mark>GDP that would have to be invested</strong></mark> in non-oil sectors <strong><mark>is impossibly high</u></strong>.</mark> Granted, <u>some new firms, and even entire sectors, may grow on the outside of the oil and gas sectors and the rent distribution chains they support</u>. <u>But the <mark>development of</mark> the <mark>new sectors will be difficult, slow, and costly</mark>.</u> Even if successful, the net value they generate will be too small relative to oil and gas to change the overall profile of the economy. Thus, <u>while it is fashionable to talk of “diversification” of the Russian economy away from oil and gas, this is the least likely outcome for the country’s economic future</u>. <u>If Russia continues on the current course of pseudo-reform (which merely reinforces the old structures), <mark>oil</mark> </u>and gas <u><strong><mark>rents will remain important because they will be critical to support the inherently inefficient parts of the economy.</u></strong></mark> <u>On the other hand, if Russia were to somehow launch a genuine reform aimed at dismantling the old structures, the only realistic way to sustain success would be to focus on developing the commodity sectors.</u> <u>Russia could obtain higher growth if the oil and gas sectors were truly modern</u>. <u>Those sectors need to be opened to new entrants, with a level playing field for all participants</u>. Most important, <u>oil</u>, gas, <u>and other commodity companies need to be freed from the requirement to participate in the various informal schemes to share their rents with enterprises in the backward sectors inherited from the Soviet system</u>. <u>Certainly, there are issues with oil. It is a highly volatile source of wealth. But there are ways to hedge those risks. A bigger problem is that oil will eventually lose its special status as an energy source and therefore much of its value</u>. But that time is far off. It will not happen suddenly. <u>In the meantime, sensible policies can deal with the problems. Otherwise, the approach should be to generate the maximum value possible from the oil and protect that value through prudent fiscal policies. <mark>Russia should not, can not,</mark> </u>and will not<u> significantly <mark>reduce the role of oil</mark> and gas in its economy in the foreseeable future. It will only harm itself by ill-advised and futile efforts to try.</p></u>

Gaddy 11 — Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, economist specializing in Russia (Clifford G., 06/16/11, “Will the Russian economy rid itself of its dependence on oil?” http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110616/164645377.html)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Gaddy 11 — Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, economist specializing in Russia (Clifford G., 06/16/11, “Will the Russian economy rid itself of its dependence on oil?” http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110616/164645377.html) fulltext: To ask whether the Russian economy will rid itself of its “dependence on oil” is to ask whether ideology will trump economics. Many people in Russia—including President Medvedev—seem to believe Russia should de-emphasize the role of oil, gas, and other commodities because they are “primitive.” Relying on them, they argue, is “degrading.” From the economic point of view, this makes no sense. Oil is Russia’s comparative advantage. It is the most competitive part of the economy. Oil and gas are something everyone wants, and Russia has more of them than anyone else. It is true that the Russian economy is backward, and that oil plays a role in that backwardness. But oil is not the root cause. The causes of Russia’s backwardness lie in its inherited production structure. The physical structure of the real economy (that is, the industries, plants, their location, work forces, equipment, products, and the production chains in which they participate) is predominantly the same as in the Soviet era. The problem is that it is precisely the oil wealth (the so-called oil rent) that is used to support and perpetuate the inefficient structure. For the sake of social and political stability, a large share of Russia’s oil and gas rents is distributed to the production enterprises that employ the inherited physical and human capital. The production and supply chains in that part of the economy are in effect “rent distribution chains.” A serious attempt to convert Russia’s economy into something resembling a modern Western economy would require dismantling this rent distribution system. This would be both highly destabilizing, and costly in terms of current welfare. Current efforts for “diversification” do not challenge the rent distribution system. On the contrary, the kinds of investment envisioned in those efforts will preserve and reinforce the rent distribution chains, and hence make Russia more dependent on oil rents. Even under optimal conditions for investment, any dream of creating a “non-oil” Russia that could perform as well as today’s commodity-based economy is unrealistic. The proportion of GDP that would have to be invested in non-oil sectors is impossibly high. Granted, some new firms, and even entire sectors, may grow on the outside of the oil and gas sectors and the rent distribution chains they support. But the development of the new sectors will be difficult, slow, and costly. Even if successful, the net value they generate will be too small relative to oil and gas to change the overall profile of the economy. Thus, while it is fashionable to talk of “diversification” of the Russian economy away from oil and gas, this is the least likely outcome for the country’s economic future. If Russia continues on the current course of pseudo-reform (which merely reinforces the old structures), oil and gas rents will remain important because they will be critical to support the inherently inefficient parts of the economy. On the other hand, if Russia were to somehow launch a genuine reform aimed at dismantling the old structures, the only realistic way to sustain success would be to focus on developing the commodity sectors. Russia could obtain higher growth if the oil and gas sectors were truly modern. Those sectors need to be opened to new entrants, with a level playing field for all participants. Most important, oil, gas, and other commodity companies need to be freed from the requirement to participate in the various informal schemes to share their rents with enterprises in the backward sectors inherited from the Soviet system. Certainly, there are issues with oil. It is a highly volatile source of wealth. But there are ways to hedge those risks. A bigger problem is that oil will eventually lose its special status as an energy source and therefore much of its value. But that time is far off. It will not happen suddenly. In the meantime, sensible policies can deal with the problems. Otherwise, the approach should be to generate the maximum value possible from the oil and protect that value through prudent fiscal policies. Russia should not, can not, and will not significantly reduce the role of oil and gas in its economy in the foreseeable future. It will only harm itself by ill-advised and futile efforts to try. [/INST] <h4>Slow diversification is inevitable, but massive diversification wrecks the Russian economy – comparative advantage is key to overall growth, which makes diversification a terrible idea.</h4><p><strong>Gaddy 11</strong> — Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, economist specializing in Russia (Clifford G., 06/16/11, “Will the Russian economy rid itself of its dependence on oil?” http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110616/164645377.html)</p><p>To ask whether the Russian economy will rid itself of its “dependence on oil” is to ask whether ideology will trump economics. <u>Many people in Russia</u>—including President Medvedev—<u>seem to believe Russia should de-emphasize the role of oil, gas, and other commodities because they are “primitive</u>.” <u>Relying on them, they argue, is “degrading.”</u> <u><mark>From the <strong>economic point of view</strong></mark>, this makes no sense</u>. <u><strong><mark>Oil is Russia’s comparative advantage</u></strong></mark>. <u>It is the most competitive part of the economy</u>. <u>Oil and gas are something everyone wants, and Russia has more of them than anyone else</u>. <u>It is true that the Russian economy is backward, and that oil plays a role in that backwardness. But oil is not the root cause</u>. <u><mark>The causes of </mark>Russia’s <mark>backwardness lie in </mark>its inherited <mark>production structure</mark>. The physical structure of the real economy</u> (that is, the <u>industries, plants, </u>their <u>location</u>, <u>work forces</u>, <u>equipment, products, and </u>the <u>production chains</u> in which they participate) <u>is <mark>predominantly the same as</mark> in <mark>the Soviet era</u></mark>. <u>The problem is that it is precisely the oil wealth</u> (the so-called oil rent<u>) that is used to support and perpetuate the inefficient structure</u>. For the sake of social and political stability, <u>a large share of Russia’s oil</u> and gas <u>rents is distributed to the production enterprises that employ the inherited physical and human capital</u>. <u>The production and supply chains in that part of the economy are in effect “rent distribution chains</u>.” <u><mark>A serious attempt to convert </mark>Russia’s economy <mark>into</mark> something resembling <mark>a</mark> modern <mark>Western economy</mark> would require dismantling this rent distribution system</u>. <u>This <mark>would be </mark>both highly <mark>destabilizing, and</mark> <mark>costly</mark> in terms of current welfare.</u> <u>Current efforts for “<mark>diversification</mark>” do not challenge the rent distribution system</u>. On the contrary, <u>the kinds of investment envisioned in those efforts <mark>will </mark>preserve and <mark>reinforce </mark>the <mark>rent distribution </mark>chains, <strong><mark>and </mark>hence <mark>make Russia more dependent </strong></mark>on oil<strong> </strong>rents</u>. Even under optimal conditions for investment, <u>any dream of creating a “non-oil” Russia that could perform as well as today’s commodity-based economy is unrealistic</u>. <u><mark>The </mark>proportion of <strong><mark>GDP that would have to be invested</strong></mark> in non-oil sectors <strong><mark>is impossibly high</u></strong>.</mark> Granted, <u>some new firms, and even entire sectors, may grow on the outside of the oil and gas sectors and the rent distribution chains they support</u>. <u>But the <mark>development of</mark> the <mark>new sectors will be difficult, slow, and costly</mark>.</u> Even if successful, the net value they generate will be too small relative to oil and gas to change the overall profile of the economy. Thus, <u>while it is fashionable to talk of “diversification” of the Russian economy away from oil and gas, this is the least likely outcome for the country’s economic future</u>. <u>If Russia continues on the current course of pseudo-reform (which merely reinforces the old structures), <mark>oil</mark> </u>and gas <u><strong><mark>rents will remain important because they will be critical to support the inherently inefficient parts of the economy.</u></strong></mark> <u>On the other hand, if Russia were to somehow launch a genuine reform aimed at dismantling the old structures, the only realistic way to sustain success would be to focus on developing the commodity sectors.</u> <u>Russia could obtain higher growth if the oil and gas sectors were truly modern</u>. <u>Those sectors need to be opened to new entrants, with a level playing field for all participants</u>. Most important, <u>oil</u>, gas, <u>and other commodity companies need to be freed from the requirement to participate in the various informal schemes to share their rents with enterprises in the backward sectors inherited from the Soviet system</u>. <u>Certainly, there are issues with oil. It is a highly volatile source of wealth. But there are ways to hedge those risks. A bigger problem is that oil will eventually lose its special status as an energy source and therefore much of its value</u>. But that time is far off. It will not happen suddenly. <u>In the meantime, sensible policies can deal with the problems. Otherwise, the approach should be to generate the maximum value possible from the oil and protect that value through prudent fiscal policies. <mark>Russia should not, can not,</mark> </u>and will not<u> significantly <mark>reduce the role of oil</mark> and gas in its economy in the foreseeable future. It will only harm itself by ill-advised and futile efforts to try.</p></u> </s>

Relations are at a stand-still

Obama is treading carefully in response to the death of Chavez while warning there may not be any early improvement in relations between the two countries Maduro said Venezuela had ordered the expulsion of two military attaches at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, accusing them of trying to provoke dissension in the Venezuelan military. Maduro also appeared to blame Chavez’s illness on the United States

Obama is treading carefully in response to the death of Chavez while warning there may not be any early improvement in relations between the two countries Maduro said Venezuela had ordered the expulsion of two military attaches at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, accusing them of trying to provoke dissension in the Venezuelan military.¶ Maduro also appeared to blame Chavez’s illness on the United States

The Obama administration is treading carefully in response to the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, extending an olive branch while warning there may not be any early improvement in relations between the two countries.¶ Chavez played “an outsized role in that government and therefore his absence” could have “outsized implications,” a senior State Department official said Wednesday.¶ The official said the administration was anxious to begin “step-by-step” talks about issues of “mutual interest,” including antidrug efforts, counterterrorism and commercial relations. But the upcoming political campaign to elect Chavez’s replacement may not be the best time to initiate a new dialogue, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the State Department at a briefing for reporters.¶ “We will no doubt continue to hear things about the United States that will not help,” the official said. “It’s very hard for us to know right now whether the current government,” or the one that emerges from the election, “will in fact accelerate or continue or stop the momentum toward a better relationship.”¶ Just hours before announcing the Venezuelan leader’s death from cancer Tuesday, Vice President Nicolas Maduro said Venezuela had ordered the expulsion of two military attaches at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, accusing them of trying to provoke dissension in the Venezuelan military.¶ Maduro also appeared to blame Chavez’s illness on the United States, saying that “the old enemies of our fatherland looked for a way to harm his health.”¶ The United States and Venezuela were barely on speaking terms during Chavez’s 14 years in office as Chavez accused Washington of a heavy-handed approach to the hemisphere and forged friendships with Cuba, Iran and others that the United States views as troublesome.¶ The administration has denied the Venezuelan charges against the military officials and called the expulsions “outrageous.” The State Department official said the administration was still reviewing whether to respond in kind, adding that “we’re not ruling anything out at this point.”

<h4>Relations are at a stand-still</h4><p><strong>DeYoung 3-6</strong>-13 [Karen, Pulitzer Prize-winning American journalist, and is the associate editor for The Washington Post, “U.S. seeks better relations with Venezuela, but says they may not come soon,” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-06/world/37500568_1_vice-president-nicolas-maduro-venezuelan-president-hugo-chavez-venezuelan-constitution]</p><p>The <u><mark>Obama </u></mark>administration <u><mark>is treading carefully in response to the death of </u></mark>Venezuelan President Hugo <u><mark>Chavez</u></mark>, extending an olive branch <u><mark>while warning there may not be any early improvement in relations between the two countries</u></mark>.¶ Chavez played “an outsized role in that government and therefore his absence” could have “outsized implications,” a senior State Department official said Wednesday.¶ The official said the administration was anxious to begin “step-by-step” talks about issues of “mutual interest,” including antidrug efforts, counterterrorism and commercial relations. But the upcoming political campaign to elect Chavez’s replacement may not be the best time to initiate a new dialogue, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the State Department at a briefing for reporters.¶ “We will no doubt continue to hear things about the United States that will not help,” the official said. “It’s very hard for us to know right now whether the current government,” or the one that emerges from the election, “will in fact accelerate or continue or stop the momentum toward a better relationship.”¶ Just hours before announcing the Venezuelan leader’s death from cancer Tuesday, Vice President Nicolas <u><mark>Maduro said Venezuela had ordered the expulsion of two military attaches at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, accusing them of trying to provoke dissension in the Venezuelan military.</u>¶<u> Maduro also appeared to blame Chavez’s illness on the United States</u></mark>, saying that “the old enemies of our fatherland looked for a way to harm his health.”¶ The United States and Venezuela were barely on speaking terms during Chavez’s 14 years in office as Chavez accused Washington of a heavy-handed approach to the hemisphere and forged friendships with Cuba, Iran and others that the United States views as troublesome.¶ The administration has denied the Venezuelan charges against the military officials and called the expulsions “outrageous.” The State Department official said the administration was still reviewing whether to respond in kind, adding that “we’re not ruling anything out at this point.”</p>

DeYoung 3-6-13 [Karen, Pulitzer Prize-winning American journalist, and is the associate editor for The Washington Post, “U.S. seeks better relations with Venezuela, but says they may not come soon,” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-06/world/37500568_1_vice-president-nicolas-maduro-venezuelan-president-hugo-chavez-venezuelan-constitution]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: DeYoung 3-6-13 [Karen, Pulitzer Prize-winning American journalist, and is the associate editor for The Washington Post, “U.S. seeks better relations with Venezuela, but says they may not come soon,” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-06/world/37500568_1_vice-president-nicolas-maduro-venezuelan-president-hugo-chavez-venezuelan-constitution] fulltext: The Obama administration is treading carefully in response to the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, extending an olive branch while warning there may not be any early improvement in relations between the two countries.¶ Chavez played “an outsized role in that government and therefore his absence” could have “outsized implications,” a senior State Department official said Wednesday.¶ The official said the administration was anxious to begin “step-by-step” talks about issues of “mutual interest,” including antidrug efforts, counterterrorism and commercial relations. But the upcoming political campaign to elect Chavez’s replacement may not be the best time to initiate a new dialogue, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the State Department at a briefing for reporters.¶ “We will no doubt continue to hear things about the United States that will not help,” the official said. “It’s very hard for us to know right now whether the current government,” or the one that emerges from the election, “will in fact accelerate or continue or stop the momentum toward a better relationship.”¶ Just hours before announcing the Venezuelan leader’s death from cancer Tuesday, Vice President Nicolas Maduro said Venezuela had ordered the expulsion of two military attaches at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, accusing them of trying to provoke dissension in the Venezuelan military.¶ Maduro also appeared to blame Chavez’s illness on the United States, saying that “the old enemies of our fatherland looked for a way to harm his health.”¶ The United States and Venezuela were barely on speaking terms during Chavez’s 14 years in office as Chavez accused Washington of a heavy-handed approach to the hemisphere and forged friendships with Cuba, Iran and others that the United States views as troublesome.¶ The administration has denied the Venezuelan charges against the military officials and called the expulsions “outrageous.” The State Department official said the administration was still reviewing whether to respond in kind, adding that “we’re not ruling anything out at this point.” [/INST] <h4>Relations are at a stand-still</h4><p><strong>DeYoung 3-6</strong>-13 [Karen, Pulitzer Prize-winning American journalist, and is the associate editor for The Washington Post, “U.S. seeks better relations with Venezuela, but says they may not come soon,” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-06/world/37500568_1_vice-president-nicolas-maduro-venezuelan-president-hugo-chavez-venezuelan-constitution]</p><p>The <u><mark>Obama </u></mark>administration <u><mark>is treading carefully in response to the death of </u></mark>Venezuelan President Hugo <u><mark>Chavez</u></mark>, extending an olive branch <u><mark>while warning there may not be any early improvement in relations between the two countries</u></mark>.¶ Chavez played “an outsized role in that government and therefore his absence” could have “outsized implications,” a senior State Department official said Wednesday.¶ The official said the administration was anxious to begin “step-by-step” talks about issues of “mutual interest,” including antidrug efforts, counterterrorism and commercial relations. But the upcoming political campaign to elect Chavez’s replacement may not be the best time to initiate a new dialogue, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the State Department at a briefing for reporters.¶ “We will no doubt continue to hear things about the United States that will not help,” the official said. “It’s very hard for us to know right now whether the current government,” or the one that emerges from the election, “will in fact accelerate or continue or stop the momentum toward a better relationship.”¶ Just hours before announcing the Venezuelan leader’s death from cancer Tuesday, Vice President Nicolas <u><mark>Maduro said Venezuela had ordered the expulsion of two military attaches at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, accusing them of trying to provoke dissension in the Venezuelan military.</u>¶<u> Maduro also appeared to blame Chavez’s illness on the United States</u></mark>, saying that “the old enemies of our fatherland looked for a way to harm his health.”¶ The United States and Venezuela were barely on speaking terms during Chavez’s 14 years in office as Chavez accused Washington of a heavy-handed approach to the hemisphere and forged friendships with Cuba, Iran and others that the United States views as troublesome.¶ The administration has denied the Venezuelan charges against the military officials and called the expulsions “outrageous.” The State Department official said the administration was still reviewing whether to respond in kind, adding that “we’re not ruling anything out at this point.”</p> </s>

(__) Non-unique: Kerry credibility low now

Kerry’s credibility has taken a major hit with the revelation that his favorite Middle Eastern dictator has been killing his own people with illegal chemical weapons Kerry’s abominable judgment, coupled with his anti-Americanism, has blinded him for a long time to the threat posed by Syrian regime it must have pained Kerry yesterday to admit that someone he not-too-long-ago called his “dear friend” used Sarin in at least two known attacks against rebels in Syria’s increasingly blood civil war , Kerry has been on the wrong side of every major foreign policy debate for his entire adult life But now the Kerry-Assad “bromance” that captured the imagination of liberal-internationalists everywhere is over. As secretary of state, Kerry has had to distance himself from his love-object

(“John Kerry: National Security Menace” April 26, 2013 By Matthew Vadum, senior editor at Capital Research Center, a conservative think tank in Washington, D.C. http://frontpagemag.com/2013/matthew-vadum/john-kerry-national-security-menace/) Secretary of State John Kerry’s credibility has taken a major hit with the revelation that his favorite Middle Eastern dictator has been killing his own people with illegal chemical weapons. Kerry’s abominable judgment, coupled with his anti-Americanism, has blinded him for a long time to the threat posed by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. For years Kerry functioned as an unofficial lobbyist for Assad in Washington, D.C., making excuses for him and doing his bidding in Congress. So it must have pained Kerry yesterday to admit that someone he not-too-long-ago called his “dear friend” used Sarin in at least two known attacks against rebels in Syria’s increasingly blood civil war,according to reports. The United Nations designates Sarin as a weapon of mass destruction. Its manufacture and stockpiling are prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention describes Sarin (also known by the military designation GB) as “a nerve agent that is one of the most toxic of the known chemical warfare agents. It is generally odorless and tasteless. Exposure to sarin can cause death in minutes. A fraction of an ounce (1 to 10 ml) of sarin on the skin can be fatal.” The pressure will now be on President Obama, who said last summer that if Syria used chemical weapons such an action would be a “game-changer” for the United States. “We have been very clear to the Assad regime but also to other players on the ground that a red line for us is [when] we start seeing a whole bunch of weapons moving around or being utilized,” Obama said. “That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.” The ultimate pampered limousine leftist, Kerry has been on the wrong side of every major foreign policy debate for his entire adult life. His embrace of adversarial tyrants is nothing new. Over and over again he has become infatuated with thugs. Kerry supported an array of Communist dictators including Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega. When the U.S. liberated Grenada in 1983 from the clutches of Marxist dictator Bernard Coard, Kerry’s first instinct was to attack his own country. “The invasion represented a bully’s show of force against a weak Third World nation,” said Kerry. “The invasion only served to heighten world tensions and further strain brittle U.S.–Soviet and North–South relations.” But now the Kerry-Assad “bromance” that captured the imagination of liberal-internationalists everywhere is over. As secretary of state, Kerry has had to distance himself from his love-object.

<h4>(__) Non-unique: Kerry credibility low now</h4><p><strong>Vadum</strong>, senior editor at Capital Research Center, <strong>2013</p><p></strong>(“John Kerry: National Security Menace” April 26, 2013 By Matthew Vadum, senior editor at Capital Research Center, a conservative think tank in Washington, D.C. http://frontpagemag.com/2013/matthew-vadum/john-kerry-national-security-menace/)</p><p>Secretary of State John <u><strong>Kerry’s credibility has taken a major hit with the revelation that his favorite Middle Eastern dictator has been killing his own people with illegal chemical weapons</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>Kerry’s abominable judgment, coupled with his anti-Americanism, has blinded him for a long time to the threat posed by Syrian</u></strong> President Bashar al-Assad’s <u><strong>regime</u></strong>. For years Kerry functioned as an unofficial lobbyist for Assad in Washington, D.C., making excuses for him and doing his bidding in Congress.</p><p>So <u><strong>it must have pained Kerry yesterday to admit that someone he not-too-long-ago called his “dear friend” used Sarin in at least two known attacks against rebels in Syria’s increasingly blood civil war</u></strong>,according to reports.</p><p>The United Nations designates Sarin as a weapon of mass destruction. Its manufacture and stockpiling are prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993.</p><p>The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention describes Sarin (also known by the military designation GB) as</p><p>“a nerve agent that is one of the most toxic of the known chemical warfare agents. It is generally odorless and tasteless. Exposure to sarin can cause death in minutes. A fraction of an ounce (1 to 10 ml) of sarin on the skin can be fatal.”</p><p>The pressure will now be on President Obama, who said last summer that if Syria used chemical weapons such an action would be a “game-changer” for the United States.</p><p>“We have been very clear to the Assad regime but also to other players on the ground that a red line for us is [when] we start seeing a whole bunch of weapons moving around or being utilized,” Obama said. “That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.”</p><p>The ultimate pampered limousine leftist<u><strong>, Kerry has been on the wrong side of every major foreign policy debate for his entire adult life</u></strong>.</p><p>His embrace of adversarial tyrants is nothing new. Over and over again he has become infatuated with thugs. Kerry supported an array of Communist dictators including Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega.</p><p>When the U.S. liberated Grenada in 1983 from the clutches of Marxist dictator Bernard Coard, Kerry’s first instinct was to attack his own country. “The invasion represented a bully’s show of force against a weak Third World nation,” said Kerry. “The invasion only served to heighten world tensions and further strain brittle U.S.–Soviet and North–South relations.”</p><p><u><strong>But now the Kerry-Assad “bromance” that captured the imagination of liberal-internationalists everywhere is over. As secretary of state, Kerry has had to distance himself from his love-object</u></strong>.</p>

Vadum, senior editor at Capital Research Center, 2013

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Vadum, senior editor at Capital Research Center, 2013 fulltext: (“John Kerry: National Security Menace” April 26, 2013 By Matthew Vadum, senior editor at Capital Research Center, a conservative think tank in Washington, D.C. http://frontpagemag.com/2013/matthew-vadum/john-kerry-national-security-menace/) Secretary of State John Kerry’s credibility has taken a major hit with the revelation that his favorite Middle Eastern dictator has been killing his own people with illegal chemical weapons. Kerry’s abominable judgment, coupled with his anti-Americanism, has blinded him for a long time to the threat posed by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. For years Kerry functioned as an unofficial lobbyist for Assad in Washington, D.C., making excuses for him and doing his bidding in Congress. So it must have pained Kerry yesterday to admit that someone he not-too-long-ago called his “dear friend” used Sarin in at least two known attacks against rebels in Syria’s increasingly blood civil war,according to reports. The United Nations designates Sarin as a weapon of mass destruction. Its manufacture and stockpiling are prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention describes Sarin (also known by the military designation GB) as “a nerve agent that is one of the most toxic of the known chemical warfare agents. It is generally odorless and tasteless. Exposure to sarin can cause death in minutes. A fraction of an ounce (1 to 10 ml) of sarin on the skin can be fatal.” The pressure will now be on President Obama, who said last summer that if Syria used chemical weapons such an action would be a “game-changer” for the United States. “We have been very clear to the Assad regime but also to other players on the ground that a red line for us is [when] we start seeing a whole bunch of weapons moving around or being utilized,” Obama said. “That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.” The ultimate pampered limousine leftist, Kerry has been on the wrong side of every major foreign policy debate for his entire adult life. His embrace of adversarial tyrants is nothing new. Over and over again he has become infatuated with thugs. Kerry supported an array of Communist dictators including Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega. When the U.S. liberated Grenada in 1983 from the clutches of Marxist dictator Bernard Coard, Kerry’s first instinct was to attack his own country. “The invasion represented a bully’s show of force against a weak Third World nation,” said Kerry. “The invasion only served to heighten world tensions and further strain brittle U.S.–Soviet and North–South relations.” But now the Kerry-Assad “bromance” that captured the imagination of liberal-internationalists everywhere is over. As secretary of state, Kerry has had to distance himself from his love-object. [/INST] <h4>(__) Non-unique: Kerry credibility low now</h4><p><strong>Vadum</strong>, senior editor at Capital Research Center, <strong>2013</p><p></strong>(“John Kerry: National Security Menace” April 26, 2013 By Matthew Vadum, senior editor at Capital Research Center, a conservative think tank in Washington, D.C. http://frontpagemag.com/2013/matthew-vadum/john-kerry-national-security-menace/)</p><p>Secretary of State John <u><strong>Kerry’s credibility has taken a major hit with the revelation that his favorite Middle Eastern dictator has been killing his own people with illegal chemical weapons</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>Kerry’s abominable judgment, coupled with his anti-Americanism, has blinded him for a long time to the threat posed by Syrian</u></strong> President Bashar al-Assad’s <u><strong>regime</u></strong>. For years Kerry functioned as an unofficial lobbyist for Assad in Washington, D.C., making excuses for him and doing his bidding in Congress.</p><p>So <u><strong>it must have pained Kerry yesterday to admit that someone he not-too-long-ago called his “dear friend” used Sarin in at least two known attacks against rebels in Syria’s increasingly blood civil war</u></strong>,according to reports.</p><p>The United Nations designates Sarin as a weapon of mass destruction. Its manufacture and stockpiling are prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993.</p><p>The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention describes Sarin (also known by the military designation GB) as</p><p>“a nerve agent that is one of the most toxic of the known chemical warfare agents. It is generally odorless and tasteless. Exposure to sarin can cause death in minutes. A fraction of an ounce (1 to 10 ml) of sarin on the skin can be fatal.”</p><p>The pressure will now be on President Obama, who said last summer that if Syria used chemical weapons such an action would be a “game-changer” for the United States.</p><p>“We have been very clear to the Assad regime but also to other players on the ground that a red line for us is [when] we start seeing a whole bunch of weapons moving around or being utilized,” Obama said. “That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.”</p><p>The ultimate pampered limousine leftist<u><strong>, Kerry has been on the wrong side of every major foreign policy debate for his entire adult life</u></strong>.</p><p>His embrace of adversarial tyrants is nothing new. Over and over again he has become infatuated with thugs. Kerry supported an array of Communist dictators including Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega.</p><p>When the U.S. liberated Grenada in 1983 from the clutches of Marxist dictator Bernard Coard, Kerry’s first instinct was to attack his own country. “The invasion represented a bully’s show of force against a weak Third World nation,” said Kerry. “The invasion only served to heighten world tensions and further strain brittle U.S.–Soviet and North–South relations.”</p><p><u><strong>But now the Kerry-Assad “bromance” that captured the imagination of liberal-internationalists everywhere is over. As secretary of state, Kerry has had to distance himself from his love-object</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Russia shows no sign of de-industrialization - no Dutch disease

The fear that the Russian economy may become too dependent on the energy sector and not sufficiently diversified has influenced monetary policy over the last ten year We do find some symptoms of it in Russia However, there was no sign of a deindustrialisation, what contradicts the theory of the Dutch disease. Indeed The strong growth of industrial production despite the presence of some symptoms of the Dutch disease can be explained by different factors a natural catching-up process after the de-industrialisation in the 1990s can explain partly the very high productivity gains in industries, and hence, that the production of the manufacturing industries increased despite a significant decrease in employment despite the real appreciation of the rouble, Russian products gained market shares in world trade, thanks to new market opportunities in the European Union and in the other CIS countries, and to the growing Chinese demand for some specific Russian products

there was no sign of a deindustrialisation, what contradicts Dutch disease strong industrial production despite some Dutch disease can be explained by a natural catching-up process the very high productivity gains market shares in world trade

The fear that the Russian economy may become too dependent on the energy sector and not sufficiently diversified has influenced monetary policy over the last ten years. This policy was aimed at preventing the nominal appreciation of the rouble in order to maintain industrial competitiveness. In this paper, using Rosstat and CHELEM databases, we study whether Russia suffered the Dutch disease in 1999-2007. We do find some symptoms of it in Russia: there was a strong real appreciation of the rouble, real wages increased, employment decreased in manufacturing industries and rose in services sector. However, there was no sign of a deindustrialisation, what contradicts the theory of the Dutch disease. Indeed, industrial production increased significantly. Furthermore, the symptoms present in Russia can be the consequences of other factors than the existence of natural resources. The appreciation of the rouble in real terms came partly from the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The quick development of the services was partly due to the fact that services were not put forward during the Soviet Union times. The outflow of labour from the manufacturing industries resulted in inflow of labour in services sector rather than in the energy sector. The strong growth of industrial production despite the presence of some symptoms of the Dutch disease can be explained by different factors. First, a natural catching-up process after the de-industrialisation in the 1990s can explain partly the very high productivity gains in industries, and hence, that the production of the manufacturing industries increased despite a significant decrease in employment. Second, despite the real appreciation of the rouble, Russian products gained market shares in world trade, thanks to new market opportunities in the European Union and in the other CIS countries, and to the growing Chinese demand for some specific Russian products. On the domestic market, the booming internal demand also contributed to support domestic production. Third, whereas foreign investments in “strategic sectors”, in particular, in energy and bank/insurance sectors, were subject to restrictions, investments in most manufacturing industries were largely encouraged. Hence, thanks to high skills and relatively low costs of production, manufacturing industries attracted a lot of investments (including foreign investments) and developed quickly.

<h4>Russia shows no sign of de-industrialization - no Dutch disease </h4><p><strong>Dobrynskaya & Turkish ’09</strong> – PhD Candidate in Finance @ LSE & Center of Development at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (Victoria and Edouard<u>, “ Is Russia Sick with the Dutch Disease?” CEPII, http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/workpap/summaries/2009/wp2009-20.htm)</p><p>The fear that the Russian economy may become too dependent on the energy sector and not sufficiently diversified has influenced monetary policy over the last ten year</u>s. This policy was aimed at preventing the nominal appreciation of the rouble in order to maintain industrial competitiveness. In this paper, using Rosstat and CHELEM databases, we study whether Russia suffered the Dutch disease in 1999-2007. <u>We do find some symptoms of it in Russia</u>: there was a strong real appreciation of the rouble, real wages increased, employment decreased in manufacturing industries and rose in services sector. <u>However, <mark>there was no sign of a deindustrialisation, what contradicts</mark> the theory of the <mark>Dutch disease</mark>. Indeed</u>, industrial production increased significantly. Furthermore, the symptoms present in Russia can be the consequences of other factors than the existence of natural resources. The appreciation of the rouble in real terms came partly from the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The quick development of the services was partly due to the fact that services were not put forward during the Soviet Union times. The outflow of labour from the manufacturing industries resulted in inflow of labour in services sector rather than in the energy sector. <u>The <mark>strong</mark> growth of <mark>industrial production despite</mark> the presence of <mark>some</mark> symptoms of the <mark>Dutch disease can be explained by</mark> different factors</u>. First, <u><strong><mark>a natural catching-up process</strong></mark> after the de-industrialisation in the 1990s can explain partly <strong><mark>the very high productivity gains</strong></mark> in industries, and hence, that the production of the manufacturing industries increased despite a significant decrease in employment</u>. Second, <u>despite the real appreciation of the rouble, Russian products gained <strong><mark>market shares in world trade</strong></mark>, thanks to new market opportunities in the European Union and in the other CIS countries, and to the growing Chinese demand for some specific Russian products</u>. On the domestic market, the booming internal demand also contributed to support domestic production. Third, whereas foreign investments in “strategic sectors”, in particular, in energy and bank/insurance sectors, were subject to restrictions, investments in most manufacturing industries were largely encouraged. Hence, thanks to high skills and relatively low costs of production, manufacturing industries attracted a lot of investments (including foreign investments) and developed quickly.</p>

Dobrynskaya & Turkish ’09 – PhD Candidate in Finance @ LSE & Center of Development at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (Victoria and Edouard, “ Is Russia Sick with the Dutch Disease?” CEPII, http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/workpap/summaries/2009/wp2009-20.htm)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Dobrynskaya & Turkish ’09 – PhD Candidate in Finance @ LSE & Center of Development at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (Victoria and Edouard, “ Is Russia Sick with the Dutch Disease?” CEPII, http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/workpap/summaries/2009/wp2009-20.htm) fulltext: The fear that the Russian economy may become too dependent on the energy sector and not sufficiently diversified has influenced monetary policy over the last ten years. This policy was aimed at preventing the nominal appreciation of the rouble in order to maintain industrial competitiveness. In this paper, using Rosstat and CHELEM databases, we study whether Russia suffered the Dutch disease in 1999-2007. We do find some symptoms of it in Russia: there was a strong real appreciation of the rouble, real wages increased, employment decreased in manufacturing industries and rose in services sector. However, there was no sign of a deindustrialisation, what contradicts the theory of the Dutch disease. Indeed, industrial production increased significantly. Furthermore, the symptoms present in Russia can be the consequences of other factors than the existence of natural resources. The appreciation of the rouble in real terms came partly from the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The quick development of the services was partly due to the fact that services were not put forward during the Soviet Union times. The outflow of labour from the manufacturing industries resulted in inflow of labour in services sector rather than in the energy sector. The strong growth of industrial production despite the presence of some symptoms of the Dutch disease can be explained by different factors. First, a natural catching-up process after the de-industrialisation in the 1990s can explain partly the very high productivity gains in industries, and hence, that the production of the manufacturing industries increased despite a significant decrease in employment. Second, despite the real appreciation of the rouble, Russian products gained market shares in world trade, thanks to new market opportunities in the European Union and in the other CIS countries, and to the growing Chinese demand for some specific Russian products. On the domestic market, the booming internal demand also contributed to support domestic production. Third, whereas foreign investments in “strategic sectors”, in particular, in energy and bank/insurance sectors, were subject to restrictions, investments in most manufacturing industries were largely encouraged. Hence, thanks to high skills and relatively low costs of production, manufacturing industries attracted a lot of investments (including foreign investments) and developed quickly. [/INST] <h4>Russia shows no sign of de-industrialization - no Dutch disease </h4><p><strong>Dobrynskaya & Turkish ’09</strong> – PhD Candidate in Finance @ LSE & Center of Development at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (Victoria and Edouard<u>, “ Is Russia Sick with the Dutch Disease?” CEPII, http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/workpap/summaries/2009/wp2009-20.htm)</p><p>The fear that the Russian economy may become too dependent on the energy sector and not sufficiently diversified has influenced monetary policy over the last ten year</u>s. This policy was aimed at preventing the nominal appreciation of the rouble in order to maintain industrial competitiveness. In this paper, using Rosstat and CHELEM databases, we study whether Russia suffered the Dutch disease in 1999-2007. <u>We do find some symptoms of it in Russia</u>: there was a strong real appreciation of the rouble, real wages increased, employment decreased in manufacturing industries and rose in services sector. <u>However, <mark>there was no sign of a deindustrialisation, what contradicts</mark> the theory of the <mark>Dutch disease</mark>. Indeed</u>, industrial production increased significantly. Furthermore, the symptoms present in Russia can be the consequences of other factors than the existence of natural resources. The appreciation of the rouble in real terms came partly from the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The quick development of the services was partly due to the fact that services were not put forward during the Soviet Union times. The outflow of labour from the manufacturing industries resulted in inflow of labour in services sector rather than in the energy sector. <u>The <mark>strong</mark> growth of <mark>industrial production despite</mark> the presence of <mark>some</mark> symptoms of the <mark>Dutch disease can be explained by</mark> different factors</u>. First, <u><strong><mark>a natural catching-up process</strong></mark> after the de-industrialisation in the 1990s can explain partly <strong><mark>the very high productivity gains</strong></mark> in industries, and hence, that the production of the manufacturing industries increased despite a significant decrease in employment</u>. Second, <u>despite the real appreciation of the rouble, Russian products gained <strong><mark>market shares in world trade</strong></mark>, thanks to new market opportunities in the European Union and in the other CIS countries, and to the growing Chinese demand for some specific Russian products</u>. On the domestic market, the booming internal demand also contributed to support domestic production. Third, whereas foreign investments in “strategic sectors”, in particular, in energy and bank/insurance sectors, were subject to restrictions, investments in most manufacturing industries were largely encouraged. Hence, thanks to high skills and relatively low costs of production, manufacturing industries attracted a lot of investments (including foreign investments) and developed quickly.</p> </s>

No relations breakthroughs now

U.S. officials reached out to Maduro over the past year and held three informal meetings with him. However, soon after Chavez was declared dead, Maduro expelled two American military attaches Analysts do not expect any major breakthroughs in the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship in the immediate future

Maduro expelled two American military attaches Analysts do not expect any major breakthroughs in the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship in the immediate future

U.S. officials reached out to Maduro over the past year and held three informal meetings with him. However, soon after Chavez was declared dead, Maduro expelled two American military attaches, claiming they plotted against the country. Many view Maduro’s move as a way to strengthen his own position in the upcoming elections, rather than a true denunciation of the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship (Neuman and Thompson, 2013). Analysts do not expect any major breakthroughs in the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship in the immediate future.

<h4>No relations breakthroughs now</h4><p><strong>Levin Institute 3-22</strong>-13 [Levin Graduate Institute of International Relations and Commerce, research institute, “Life after Chavez,” http://www.globalization101.org/life-after-chavez/]</p><p><u>U.S. officials reached out to Maduro over the past year and held three informal meetings with him. However, soon after Chavez was declared dead, <mark>Maduro expelled two American military attaches</u></mark>, claiming they plotted against the country. Many view Maduro’s move as a way to strengthen his own position in the upcoming elections, rather than a true denunciation of the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship (Neuman and Thompson, 2013). <u><mark>Analysts do not expect any major breakthroughs in the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship in the immediate future</u></mark>.</p>

Levin Institute 3-22-13 [Levin Graduate Institute of International Relations and Commerce, research institute, “Life after Chavez,” http://www.globalization101.org/life-after-chavez/]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Levin Institute 3-22-13 [Levin Graduate Institute of International Relations and Commerce, research institute, “Life after Chavez,” http://www.globalization101.org/life-after-chavez/] fulltext: U.S. officials reached out to Maduro over the past year and held three informal meetings with him. However, soon after Chavez was declared dead, Maduro expelled two American military attaches, claiming they plotted against the country. Many view Maduro’s move as a way to strengthen his own position in the upcoming elections, rather than a true denunciation of the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship (Neuman and Thompson, 2013). Analysts do not expect any major breakthroughs in the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship in the immediate future. [/INST] <h4>No relations breakthroughs now</h4><p><strong>Levin Institute 3-22</strong>-13 [Levin Graduate Institute of International Relations and Commerce, research institute, “Life after Chavez,” http://www.globalization101.org/life-after-chavez/]</p><p><u>U.S. officials reached out to Maduro over the past year and held three informal meetings with him. However, soon after Chavez was declared dead, <mark>Maduro expelled two American military attaches</u></mark>, claiming they plotted against the country. Many view Maduro’s move as a way to strengthen his own position in the upcoming elections, rather than a true denunciation of the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship (Neuman and Thompson, 2013). <u><mark>Analysts do not expect any major breakthroughs in the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship in the immediate future</u></mark>.</p> </s>

(__) Kerry credibility at the bottom now.

just two of Kerry’s foul-ups since joining Obama’s cabinet on Feb. 1: Kerry compared victims of terrorism with perpetrators of it. He drew parallels between innocent bystanders murdered in the Boston Marathon bombing to Turkish-backed armed belligerents killed three years ago trying to violently break Israel’s blockade of the terrorist-infested Gaza Strip. Without acknowledging that terrorists participated in the flotilla, Kerry said the Boston bombing made him “acutely aware of the emotions felt by the families of the nine Turks who died” during the raid Earlier this month Kerry adopted a curious peace-through-weakness stance toward North Korea after the Defense Intelligence Agency announced that Pyongyang probably already has nuclear weapons capable of being delivered to targets. Instead of talking tough, Kerry offered to reduce U.S. ballistic missile defense deployments if China puts a leash on North Korea Kerry rattled America’s allies by suggesting the U.S. may lower the bar for opening direct negotiations with the rogue Stalinist state. Such an approach rewards North Korea’s aggression Kerry is a dangerous national security menace that the U.S. cannot afford in its top diplomat

(“John Kerry: National Security Menace” April 26, 2013 By Matthew Vadum, senior editor at Capital Research Center, a conservative think tank in Washington, D.C. http://frontpagemag.com/2013/matthew-vadum/john-kerry-national-security-menace/) Let’s recap just two of Kerry’s foul-ups since joining President Obama’s cabinet on Feb. 1: On April 21, Kerry compared victims of terrorism with perpetrators of it. He drew parallels between innocent bystanders murdered in the Boston Marathon bombing to Turkish-backed armed belligerents killed three years ago trying to violently break Israel’s blockade of the terrorist-infested Gaza Strip. He said the bombing victims made him think of Turks who died during “the 2010 IDF raid on the Marmara,” a reference to Israeli commandos’  boarding of the Mavi Marmara, a ship carrying pro-Hamas militants in the blockade-running “Gaza Freedom Flotilla.” Without acknowledging that terrorists participated in the flotilla, Kerry said the Boston bombing made him “acutely aware of the emotions felt by the families of the nine Turks who died” during the raid. Earlier this month Kerry adopted a curious peace-through-weakness stance toward North Korea after the Defense Intelligence Agency announced that Pyongyang probably already has nuclear weapons capable of being delivered to targets. Instead of talking tough, Kerry offered to reduce U.S. ballistic missile defense deployments if China puts a leash on North Korea. And like a bumbling salesman lowering an offering price when he learns the buyer is wealthier than he suspected, Kerry rattled America’s allies by suggesting the U.S. may lower the bar for opening direct negotiations with the rogue Stalinist state. Such an approach rewards North Korea’s aggression. Is Kerry completely incompetent or consciously pursuing an agenda to hurt American interests? Time will tell. But one thing is certain: Kerry is a dangerous national security menace that the U.S. cannot afford in its top diplomat.

<h4>(__) Kerry credibility at the bottom now.</h4><p><strong>Vadum</strong>, senior editor at Capital Research Center, <strong>2013</p><p></strong>(“John Kerry: National Security Menace” April 26, 2013 By Matthew Vadum, senior editor at Capital Research Center, a conservative think tank in Washington, D.C. http://frontpagemag.com/2013/matthew-vadum/john-kerry-national-security-menace/)</p><p>Let’s recap <u><strong>just two of Kerry’s foul-ups since joining</u></strong> President <u><strong>Obama’s cabinet on Feb. 1:</p><p></u></strong>On April 21, <u><strong>Kerry compared victims of terrorism with perpetrators of it. He drew parallels between innocent bystanders murdered in the Boston Marathon bombing to Turkish-backed armed belligerents killed three years ago trying to violently break Israel’s blockade of the terrorist-infested Gaza Strip.</p><p></u></strong>He said the bombing victims made him think of Turks who died during “the 2010 IDF raid on the Marmara,” a reference to Israeli commandos’  boarding of the Mavi Marmara, a ship carrying pro-Hamas militants in the blockade-running “Gaza Freedom Flotilla.”</p><p><u><strong>Without acknowledging that terrorists participated in the flotilla, Kerry said the Boston bombing made him “acutely aware of the emotions felt by the families of the nine Turks who died” during the raid</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>Earlier this month Kerry adopted a curious peace-through-weakness stance toward North Korea after the Defense Intelligence Agency announced that Pyongyang probably already has nuclear weapons capable of being delivered to targets. Instead of talking tough, Kerry offered to reduce U.S. ballistic missile defense deployments if China puts a leash on North Korea</u></strong>.</p><p>And like a bumbling salesman lowering an offering price when he learns the buyer is wealthier than he suspected, <u><strong>Kerry rattled America’s allies by suggesting the U.S. may lower the bar for opening direct negotiations with the rogue Stalinist state. Such an approach rewards North Korea’s aggression</u></strong>.</p><p>Is Kerry completely incompetent or consciously pursuing an agenda to hurt American interests? Time will tell.</p><p>But one thing is certain: <u><strong>Kerry is a dangerous national security menace that the U.S. cannot afford in its top diplomat</u></strong>.</p>

Vadum, senior editor at Capital Research Center, 2013

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Vadum, senior editor at Capital Research Center, 2013 fulltext: (“John Kerry: National Security Menace” April 26, 2013 By Matthew Vadum, senior editor at Capital Research Center, a conservative think tank in Washington, D.C. http://frontpagemag.com/2013/matthew-vadum/john-kerry-national-security-menace/) Let’s recap just two of Kerry’s foul-ups since joining President Obama’s cabinet on Feb. 1: On April 21, Kerry compared victims of terrorism with perpetrators of it. He drew parallels between innocent bystanders murdered in the Boston Marathon bombing to Turkish-backed armed belligerents killed three years ago trying to violently break Israel’s blockade of the terrorist-infested Gaza Strip. He said the bombing victims made him think of Turks who died during “the 2010 IDF raid on the Marmara,” a reference to Israeli commandos’  boarding of the Mavi Marmara, a ship carrying pro-Hamas militants in the blockade-running “Gaza Freedom Flotilla.” Without acknowledging that terrorists participated in the flotilla, Kerry said the Boston bombing made him “acutely aware of the emotions felt by the families of the nine Turks who died” during the raid. Earlier this month Kerry adopted a curious peace-through-weakness stance toward North Korea after the Defense Intelligence Agency announced that Pyongyang probably already has nuclear weapons capable of being delivered to targets. Instead of talking tough, Kerry offered to reduce U.S. ballistic missile defense deployments if China puts a leash on North Korea. And like a bumbling salesman lowering an offering price when he learns the buyer is wealthier than he suspected, Kerry rattled America’s allies by suggesting the U.S. may lower the bar for opening direct negotiations with the rogue Stalinist state. Such an approach rewards North Korea’s aggression. Is Kerry completely incompetent or consciously pursuing an agenda to hurt American interests? Time will tell. But one thing is certain: Kerry is a dangerous national security menace that the U.S. cannot afford in its top diplomat. [/INST] <h4>(__) Kerry credibility at the bottom now.</h4><p><strong>Vadum</strong>, senior editor at Capital Research Center, <strong>2013</p><p></strong>(“John Kerry: National Security Menace” April 26, 2013 By Matthew Vadum, senior editor at Capital Research Center, a conservative think tank in Washington, D.C. http://frontpagemag.com/2013/matthew-vadum/john-kerry-national-security-menace/)</p><p>Let’s recap <u><strong>just two of Kerry’s foul-ups since joining</u></strong> President <u><strong>Obama’s cabinet on Feb. 1:</p><p></u></strong>On April 21, <u><strong>Kerry compared victims of terrorism with perpetrators of it. He drew parallels between innocent bystanders murdered in the Boston Marathon bombing to Turkish-backed armed belligerents killed three years ago trying to violently break Israel’s blockade of the terrorist-infested Gaza Strip.</p><p></u></strong>He said the bombing victims made him think of Turks who died during “the 2010 IDF raid on the Marmara,” a reference to Israeli commandos’  boarding of the Mavi Marmara, a ship carrying pro-Hamas militants in the blockade-running “Gaza Freedom Flotilla.”</p><p><u><strong>Without acknowledging that terrorists participated in the flotilla, Kerry said the Boston bombing made him “acutely aware of the emotions felt by the families of the nine Turks who died” during the raid</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>Earlier this month Kerry adopted a curious peace-through-weakness stance toward North Korea after the Defense Intelligence Agency announced that Pyongyang probably already has nuclear weapons capable of being delivered to targets. Instead of talking tough, Kerry offered to reduce U.S. ballistic missile defense deployments if China puts a leash on North Korea</u></strong>.</p><p>And like a bumbling salesman lowering an offering price when he learns the buyer is wealthier than he suspected, <u><strong>Kerry rattled America’s allies by suggesting the U.S. may lower the bar for opening direct negotiations with the rogue Stalinist state. Such an approach rewards North Korea’s aggression</u></strong>.</p><p>Is Kerry completely incompetent or consciously pursuing an agenda to hurt American interests? Time will tell.</p><p>But one thing is certain: <u><strong>Kerry is a dangerous national security menace that the U.S. cannot afford in its top diplomat</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Dutch Disease does not apply to Russia

University, Tokyo, Japan October 2010) the relationship between the oil curse and economic growth in resource-rich countries is elusive in the long run We here characterize the present Russian situation as the “Russian Disease,” the major symptom of which is a strong positive relation between the country’s real growth and international oil price changes Russian Disease is quite different from the Dutch Disease in many respects unlike the Dutch case in the 1970s, oil price rises for 1998-2008 resulted in relatively high overall growth in Russia. In addition, the impact of the marked fall in oil prices after the third quarter of 2008 on Russian growth was much greater than that in the Dutch case during the 1980s the negative impact of oil price increases on manufacturing growth was not observed in Russia for the 1998-2008 period. The manufacturing sector was one of the major sectors contributing to favorable growth Putin and Medvedev expected, and still expect, that the diversification of the economy, including developments of manufacturing, would contribute to establishing an economy that was not dependent on oil. Ironically the diversification itself is oil-dependent the continuous appreciation of the real effective exchange rate of the ruble due to oil price rises induced the boost of imports in Russia, which, in turn, did not necessarily induce adverse effects on Russia’s economic growth and competitiveness . The boost of imports largely contributed to the high growth of the trade sector’s value added, which was, in turn, one of the major sources of the overall high growth import substitution, including domestic assembling of foreign-make durable goods, appeared along with the boost of imports in Russia. The real appreciation of the exchange rate of the ruble boosted the imports of consumer goods and eased the imports of equipment and intermediate goods, which is considered to have contributed to improvements in the manufacturing TFP we examine statistically some of these facts to diagnose the Russian Disease showing the key differences between the Dutch and Russian Diseases a key symptom of the Russian Disease is a strong positive relation between the country’s real growth and terms-of-trade-effects it shows a strong positive impact of terms-of-trade effects on the Russian manufacturing, which markedly differs from one of the major symptoms of the Dutch Disease the appreciation (depreciation) of real exchange rates of Russia’s rubles induced the boost (decline) of its imports. the boost of imports, in turn, induced the GDP growth of the trade sector as one of the major sources of the Russian overall growth

Russian Disease is different from the Dutch Disease rises for 98 08 resulted in high growth Putin and Medvedev expected diversification diversification itself is oil-dependent continuous appreciation of the ruble due to oil price rises induced imports in Russia, which did not induce adverse effects boost of imports was one of the major sources of growth we examine statistically these facts showing the key differences between the Dutch and Russian Diseases

Academy of Sciences ( Masaaki “Diagnosing the “Russian Disease”: Growth and Structure of the Russian Economy Then and Now” Institute of Economic Research Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan October 2010) In general, the relationship between the oil curse and economic growth in resource-rich countries is elusive in the long run (Alexeev and Conrad, 2009). Nevertheless, the Lehman shock, combined with the collapse of the oil price bubble, clearly showed that Russian economic growth heavily relies upon oil price changes. We here characterize the present Russian situation as the “Russian Disease,” the major symptom of which is a strong positive relation between the country’s real growth and international oil price changes. In the literature, the Russian Disease has often been considered as a variant of the Dutch Disease. The term Dutch Disease in the original context refers to the contrast between external health and internal ailments (The Economist, No. 26, 1977). It also refers to the negative impact of expansion of natural resources in a country with oil price rises on its manufacturing growth through the subsequent appreciation of the real exchange rate of its national currency (see Ellman, 1981 and Corden, 1984). Although the real exchange rate of the Russian national currency (ruble) appreciated along with increases in oil prices, it is clear that the Russian Disease is quite different from the Dutch Disease in many respects. First, unlike the Dutch case in the 1970s, oil price rises for 1998-2008 resulted in relatively high overall growth in Russia. In addition, the impact of the marked fall in oil prices after the third quarter of 2008 on Russian growth was much greater than that in the Dutch case during the 1980s. Second, in contrast to the case of the Dutch Disease, the negative impact of oil price increases on manufacturing growth was not observed in Russia for the 1998-2008 period. The manufacturing sector was one of the major sectors contributing to favorable growth in the 1998 (bottom)-2008 (peak) period, whereas its sectoral contribution to the great contraction of GDP in 2009 was the largest among sectors. Putin and Medvedev expected, and still expect, that the diversification of the economy, including developments of manufacturing, would contribute to establishing an economy that was not dependent on oil. Ironically, it is now obvious that the diversification itself is oil-dependent. Third, the extraction of Russian oil and gas could not show any large expansion in physical terms during the favorable growth period. The oil and gas industry was the booming sector only in terms-of-trade. Putin seemed to expect the real expansion of oil and gas extraction through re-nationalization of the oil and gas industry. The Russian oil and gas industry has been stagnant in real terms since 2005, partly due to this re-nationalization. Although the fixed capital increment in the oil and gas sector showed subsequent increases, the value of its sectoral total factor productivity (TFP) remained negative, and, thus, the oil and gas GDP growth was also very low for the 2004-2009 period and negative for the 2006-2007 period (Rosstat HP as of September 8, 2010). The oil and gas sector will need tremendous capital replacement investments to raise its TFP. The marked oil price falls induced Russia’s great contraction of the GDP in 2009, while the oil and gas GDP did not show such a decline. This stagnant sector only buffered the overall growth contraction in 2009. Ironically, Russia, with more than 10-million-barrel daily production, was the world’s largest producer of crude oil in 2009 thanks to a remarkable output adjustment (an 11 percent reduction) by Saudi Arabia (BP, 2010). Russia, free from the OPEC output adjustments, has always escaped the restraints of oil price increases, while it has been forced to face reductions in oil prices head-on. Fourth, the continuous appreciation of the real effective exchange rate of the ruble due to oil price rises induced the boost of imports in Russia, which, in turn, did not necessarily induce adverse effects on Russia’s economic growth and competitiveness. Russia experienced servicization, as in advanced countries as well as former Soviet republics. It has particularly Russian features deriving from its specific path dependency, which includes economic players’ strong preferences for imported goods and FOREX as well. The domestic distribution activities of imported goods are accounted for as a part of sources of the GDP. The boost of imports largely contributed to the high growth of the trade sector’s value added, which was, in turn, one of the major sources of the overall high growth. In the Russian official statistics, the revenues from foreign trade of oil and gas are included not in the mining sector but in the trade sector. However, these special foreign trade revenues could not be the source of the rapid GDP growth because Russia’s exports of oil and gas were also stagnant in real terms. Surprisingly, import substitution, including domestic assembling of foreign-make durable goods, appeared along with the boost of imports in Russia. The real appreciation of the exchange rate of the ruble boosted the imports of consumer goods and eased the imports of equipment and intermediate goods, which is considered to have contributed to improvements in the manufacturing TFP. Based on the unpublished Rosstat data on import matrix, the share of imports of manufacturing investment goods in the total gross demand for them amounted to 40 percent in 2006. In this paper, we examine statistically some of these facts to diagnose the Russian Disease and focus on the terms-of-trade effects on the overall growth as well as the manufacturing development. First, showing the key differences between the Dutch and Russian Diseases, we prove that a key symptom of the Russian Disease is a strong positive relation between the country’s real growth and terms-of-trade-effects. We also present three variants (oil prices, terms-of-trade, and trading gains) of the concept of terms-of-trade effects using the SNA framework. Second, it shows a strong positive impact of terms-of-trade effects on the Russian manufacturing, which markedly differs from one of the major symptoms of the Dutch Disease (slower growth of manufacturing through the booming mining sector and real appreciation of exchange rates). We also suggests the significance of the manufacturing industry for the Russian economy. Third, we show that the appreciation (depreciation) of real exchange rates of Russia’s rubles induced the boost (decline) of its imports. Fourth, we prove that the boost of imports, in turn, induced the GDP growth of the trade sector as one of the major sources of the Russian overall growth. We also present the impact of oil prices on two kinds of real exchange rates (CPI-based and GDP-based real exchange rates).

<h4>Dutch Disease does not apply to Russia</h4><p><strong>KUBONIWA 10</strong> – PHD economics Dr.h.c. Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Russian</p><p>Academy of Sciences ( Masaaki “Diagnosing the “Russian Disease”: Growth and Structure of the Russian Economy Then and Now” Institute of Economic Research</p><p>Hitotsubashi<u> University, Tokyo, Japan October 2010)</p><p></u> In general, <u>the relationship between the oil curse and economic growth in resource-rich countries is elusive in the long run</u> (Alexeev and Conrad, 2009). Nevertheless, the Lehman shock, combined with the collapse of the oil price bubble, clearly showed that Russian economic growth heavily relies upon oil price changes. <u>We here characterize the present Russian situation as the “Russian Disease,” the major symptom of which is a strong positive relation between the country’s real growth and international oil price changes</u>. In the literature, the Russian Disease has often been considered as a variant of the Dutch Disease. The term Dutch Disease in the original context refers to the contrast between external health and internal ailments (The Economist, No. 26, 1977). It also refers to the negative impact of expansion of natural resources in a country with oil price rises on its manufacturing growth through the subsequent appreciation of the real exchange rate of its national currency (see Ellman, 1981 and Corden, 1984). Although the real exchange rate of the Russian national currency (ruble) appreciated along with increases in oil prices, it is clear that the <u><mark>Russian Disease is</mark> quite <mark>different from the Dutch Disease</mark> in many respects</u>. First, <u>unlike the Dutch case in the 1970s, oil price <mark>rises for</mark> 19<mark>98</mark>-20<mark>08</mark> <strong><mark>resulted in</strong></mark> relatively <strong><mark>high</strong></mark> overall <strong><mark>growth</strong></mark> in Russia. In addition, the impact of the marked fall in oil prices after the third quarter of 2008 on Russian growth was much greater than that in the Dutch case during the 1980s</u>. Second, in contrast to the case of the Dutch Disease, <u>the negative impact of oil price increases on manufacturing growth was not observed in Russia for the 1998-2008 period. The manufacturing sector was one of the major sectors contributing to favorable growth</u> in the 1998 (bottom)-2008 (peak) period, whereas its sectoral contribution to the great contraction of GDP in 2009 was the largest among sectors. <u><mark>Putin and Medvedev expected</mark>, and still expect, that the <mark>diversification</mark> of the economy, including developments of manufacturing, would contribute to establishing an economy that was not dependent on oil. Ironically</u>, it is now obvious that <u>the <mark>diversification itself is oil-dependent</u></mark>. Third, the extraction of Russian oil and gas could not show any large expansion in physical terms during the favorable growth period. The oil and gas industry was the booming sector only in terms-of-trade. Putin seemed to expect the real expansion of oil and gas extraction through re-nationalization of the oil and gas industry. The Russian oil and gas industry has been stagnant in real terms since 2005, partly due to this re-nationalization. Although the fixed capital increment in the oil and gas sector showed subsequent increases, the value of its sectoral total factor productivity (TFP) remained negative, and, thus, the oil and gas GDP growth was also very low for the 2004-2009 period and negative for the 2006-2007 period (Rosstat HP as of September 8, 2010). The oil and gas sector will need tremendous capital replacement investments to raise its TFP. The marked oil price falls induced Russia’s great contraction of the GDP in 2009, while the oil and gas GDP did not show such a decline. This stagnant sector only buffered the overall growth contraction in 2009. Ironically, Russia, with more than 10-million-barrel daily production, was the world’s largest producer of crude oil in 2009 thanks to a remarkable output adjustment (an 11 percent reduction) by Saudi Arabia (BP, 2010). Russia, free from the OPEC output adjustments, has always escaped the restraints of oil price increases, while it has been forced to face reductions in oil prices head-on. Fourth, <u>the <strong><mark>continuous appreciation of</strong></mark> the real effective exchange rate of <strong><mark>the ruble due to oil price rises induced</strong></mark> the boost of <strong><mark>imports in Russia, which</strong></mark>, in turn, <strong><mark>did not</strong></mark> necessarily <strong><mark>induce adverse effects</strong></mark> on Russia’s economic growth and competitiveness</u>. Russia experienced servicization, as in advanced countries as well as former Soviet republics. It has particularly Russian features deriving from its specific path dependency, which includes economic players’ strong preferences for imported goods and FOREX as well. The domestic distribution activities of imported goods are accounted for as a part of sources of the GDP<u>. The <mark>boost of imports</mark> largely contributed to the high growth of the trade sector’s value added, which <mark>was</mark>, in turn, <mark>one of the major sources of</mark> the overall high <mark>growth</u></mark>. In the Russian official statistics, the revenues from foreign trade of oil and gas are included not in the mining sector but in the trade sector. However, these special foreign trade revenues could not be the source of the rapid GDP growth because Russia’s exports of oil and gas were also stagnant in real terms. Surprisingly, <u>import substitution, including domestic assembling of foreign-make durable goods, appeared along with the boost of imports in Russia. The real appreciation of the exchange rate of the ruble boosted the imports of consumer goods and eased the imports of equipment and intermediate goods, which is considered to have contributed to improvements in the manufacturing TFP</u>. Based on the unpublished Rosstat data on import matrix, the share of imports of manufacturing investment goods in the total gross demand for them amounted to 40 percent in 2006. In this paper, <u><mark>we examine statistically</mark> some of <mark>these facts</mark> to diagnose the Russian Disease</u> and focus on the terms-of-trade effects on the overall growth as well as the manufacturing development. First, <u><mark>showing the key differences between the Dutch and Russian Diseases</u></mark>, we prove that <u>a key symptom of the Russian Disease is a strong positive relation between the country’s real growth and terms-of-trade-effects</u>. We also present three variants (oil prices, terms-of-trade, and trading gains) of the concept of terms-of-trade effects using the SNA framework. Second, <u>it shows a strong positive impact of terms-of-trade effects on the Russian manufacturing, which markedly differs from one of the major symptoms of the Dutch Disease</u> (slower growth of manufacturing through the booming mining sector and real appreciation of exchange rates). We also suggests the significance of the manufacturing industry for the Russian economy. Third, we show that <u>the appreciation (depreciation) of real exchange rates of Russia’s rubles induced the boost (decline) of its imports.</u> Fourth, we prove that <u>the boost of imports, in turn, induced the GDP growth of the trade sector as one of the major sources of the Russian overall growth</u>. We also present the impact of oil prices on two kinds of real exchange rates (CPI-based and GDP-based real exchange rates).</p>

KUBONIWA 10 – PHD economics Dr.h.c. Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Russian

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: KUBONIWA 10 – PHD economics Dr.h.c. Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Russian fulltext: Academy of Sciences ( Masaaki “Diagnosing the “Russian Disease”: Growth and Structure of the Russian Economy Then and Now” Institute of Economic Research Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan October 2010) In general, the relationship between the oil curse and economic growth in resource-rich countries is elusive in the long run (Alexeev and Conrad, 2009). Nevertheless, the Lehman shock, combined with the collapse of the oil price bubble, clearly showed that Russian economic growth heavily relies upon oil price changes. We here characterize the present Russian situation as the “Russian Disease,” the major symptom of which is a strong positive relation between the country’s real growth and international oil price changes. In the literature, the Russian Disease has often been considered as a variant of the Dutch Disease. The term Dutch Disease in the original context refers to the contrast between external health and internal ailments (The Economist, No. 26, 1977). It also refers to the negative impact of expansion of natural resources in a country with oil price rises on its manufacturing growth through the subsequent appreciation of the real exchange rate of its national currency (see Ellman, 1981 and Corden, 1984). Although the real exchange rate of the Russian national currency (ruble) appreciated along with increases in oil prices, it is clear that the Russian Disease is quite different from the Dutch Disease in many respects. First, unlike the Dutch case in the 1970s, oil price rises for 1998-2008 resulted in relatively high overall growth in Russia. In addition, the impact of the marked fall in oil prices after the third quarter of 2008 on Russian growth was much greater than that in the Dutch case during the 1980s. Second, in contrast to the case of the Dutch Disease, the negative impact of oil price increases on manufacturing growth was not observed in Russia for the 1998-2008 period. The manufacturing sector was one of the major sectors contributing to favorable growth in the 1998 (bottom)-2008 (peak) period, whereas its sectoral contribution to the great contraction of GDP in 2009 was the largest among sectors. Putin and Medvedev expected, and still expect, that the diversification of the economy, including developments of manufacturing, would contribute to establishing an economy that was not dependent on oil. Ironically, it is now obvious that the diversification itself is oil-dependent. Third, the extraction of Russian oil and gas could not show any large expansion in physical terms during the favorable growth period. The oil and gas industry was the booming sector only in terms-of-trade. Putin seemed to expect the real expansion of oil and gas extraction through re-nationalization of the oil and gas industry. The Russian oil and gas industry has been stagnant in real terms since 2005, partly due to this re-nationalization. Although the fixed capital increment in the oil and gas sector showed subsequent increases, the value of its sectoral total factor productivity (TFP) remained negative, and, thus, the oil and gas GDP growth was also very low for the 2004-2009 period and negative for the 2006-2007 period (Rosstat HP as of September 8, 2010). The oil and gas sector will need tremendous capital replacement investments to raise its TFP. The marked oil price falls induced Russia’s great contraction of the GDP in 2009, while the oil and gas GDP did not show such a decline. This stagnant sector only buffered the overall growth contraction in 2009. Ironically, Russia, with more than 10-million-barrel daily production, was the world’s largest producer of crude oil in 2009 thanks to a remarkable output adjustment (an 11 percent reduction) by Saudi Arabia (BP, 2010). Russia, free from the OPEC output adjustments, has always escaped the restraints of oil price increases, while it has been forced to face reductions in oil prices head-on. Fourth, the continuous appreciation of the real effective exchange rate of the ruble due to oil price rises induced the boost of imports in Russia, which, in turn, did not necessarily induce adverse effects on Russia’s economic growth and competitiveness. Russia experienced servicization, as in advanced countries as well as former Soviet republics. It has particularly Russian features deriving from its specific path dependency, which includes economic players’ strong preferences for imported goods and FOREX as well. The domestic distribution activities of imported goods are accounted for as a part of sources of the GDP. The boost of imports largely contributed to the high growth of the trade sector’s value added, which was, in turn, one of the major sources of the overall high growth. In the Russian official statistics, the revenues from foreign trade of oil and gas are included not in the mining sector but in the trade sector. However, these special foreign trade revenues could not be the source of the rapid GDP growth because Russia’s exports of oil and gas were also stagnant in real terms. Surprisingly, import substitution, including domestic assembling of foreign-make durable goods, appeared along with the boost of imports in Russia. The real appreciation of the exchange rate of the ruble boosted the imports of consumer goods and eased the imports of equipment and intermediate goods, which is considered to have contributed to improvements in the manufacturing TFP. Based on the unpublished Rosstat data on import matrix, the share of imports of manufacturing investment goods in the total gross demand for them amounted to 40 percent in 2006. In this paper, we examine statistically some of these facts to diagnose the Russian Disease and focus on the terms-of-trade effects on the overall growth as well as the manufacturing development. First, showing the key differences between the Dutch and Russian Diseases, we prove that a key symptom of the Russian Disease is a strong positive relation between the country’s real growth and terms-of-trade-effects. We also present three variants (oil prices, terms-of-trade, and trading gains) of the concept of terms-of-trade effects using the SNA framework. Second, it shows a strong positive impact of terms-of-trade effects on the Russian manufacturing, which markedly differs from one of the major symptoms of the Dutch Disease (slower growth of manufacturing through the booming mining sector and real appreciation of exchange rates). We also suggests the significance of the manufacturing industry for the Russian economy. Third, we show that the appreciation (depreciation) of real exchange rates of Russia’s rubles induced the boost (decline) of its imports. Fourth, we prove that the boost of imports, in turn, induced the GDP growth of the trade sector as one of the major sources of the Russian overall growth. We also present the impact of oil prices on two kinds of real exchange rates (CPI-based and GDP-based real exchange rates). [/INST] <h4>Dutch Disease does not apply to Russia</h4><p><strong>KUBONIWA 10</strong> – PHD economics Dr.h.c. Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Russian</p><p>Academy of Sciences ( Masaaki “Diagnosing the “Russian Disease”: Growth and Structure of the Russian Economy Then and Now” Institute of Economic Research</p><p>Hitotsubashi<u> University, Tokyo, Japan October 2010)</p><p></u> In general, <u>the relationship between the oil curse and economic growth in resource-rich countries is elusive in the long run</u> (Alexeev and Conrad, 2009). Nevertheless, the Lehman shock, combined with the collapse of the oil price bubble, clearly showed that Russian economic growth heavily relies upon oil price changes. <u>We here characterize the present Russian situation as the “Russian Disease,” the major symptom of which is a strong positive relation between the country’s real growth and international oil price changes</u>. In the literature, the Russian Disease has often been considered as a variant of the Dutch Disease. The term Dutch Disease in the original context refers to the contrast between external health and internal ailments (The Economist, No. 26, 1977). It also refers to the negative impact of expansion of natural resources in a country with oil price rises on its manufacturing growth through the subsequent appreciation of the real exchange rate of its national currency (see Ellman, 1981 and Corden, 1984). Although the real exchange rate of the Russian national currency (ruble) appreciated along with increases in oil prices, it is clear that the <u><mark>Russian Disease is</mark> quite <mark>different from the Dutch Disease</mark> in many respects</u>. First, <u>unlike the Dutch case in the 1970s, oil price <mark>rises for</mark> 19<mark>98</mark>-20<mark>08</mark> <strong><mark>resulted in</strong></mark> relatively <strong><mark>high</strong></mark> overall <strong><mark>growth</strong></mark> in Russia. In addition, the impact of the marked fall in oil prices after the third quarter of 2008 on Russian growth was much greater than that in the Dutch case during the 1980s</u>. Second, in contrast to the case of the Dutch Disease, <u>the negative impact of oil price increases on manufacturing growth was not observed in Russia for the 1998-2008 period. The manufacturing sector was one of the major sectors contributing to favorable growth</u> in the 1998 (bottom)-2008 (peak) period, whereas its sectoral contribution to the great contraction of GDP in 2009 was the largest among sectors. <u><mark>Putin and Medvedev expected</mark>, and still expect, that the <mark>diversification</mark> of the economy, including developments of manufacturing, would contribute to establishing an economy that was not dependent on oil. Ironically</u>, it is now obvious that <u>the <mark>diversification itself is oil-dependent</u></mark>. Third, the extraction of Russian oil and gas could not show any large expansion in physical terms during the favorable growth period. The oil and gas industry was the booming sector only in terms-of-trade. Putin seemed to expect the real expansion of oil and gas extraction through re-nationalization of the oil and gas industry. The Russian oil and gas industry has been stagnant in real terms since 2005, partly due to this re-nationalization. Although the fixed capital increment in the oil and gas sector showed subsequent increases, the value of its sectoral total factor productivity (TFP) remained negative, and, thus, the oil and gas GDP growth was also very low for the 2004-2009 period and negative for the 2006-2007 period (Rosstat HP as of September 8, 2010). The oil and gas sector will need tremendous capital replacement investments to raise its TFP. The marked oil price falls induced Russia’s great contraction of the GDP in 2009, while the oil and gas GDP did not show such a decline. This stagnant sector only buffered the overall growth contraction in 2009. Ironically, Russia, with more than 10-million-barrel daily production, was the world’s largest producer of crude oil in 2009 thanks to a remarkable output adjustment (an 11 percent reduction) by Saudi Arabia (BP, 2010). Russia, free from the OPEC output adjustments, has always escaped the restraints of oil price increases, while it has been forced to face reductions in oil prices head-on. Fourth, <u>the <strong><mark>continuous appreciation of</strong></mark> the real effective exchange rate of <strong><mark>the ruble due to oil price rises induced</strong></mark> the boost of <strong><mark>imports in Russia, which</strong></mark>, in turn, <strong><mark>did not</strong></mark> necessarily <strong><mark>induce adverse effects</strong></mark> on Russia’s economic growth and competitiveness</u>. Russia experienced servicization, as in advanced countries as well as former Soviet republics. It has particularly Russian features deriving from its specific path dependency, which includes economic players’ strong preferences for imported goods and FOREX as well. The domestic distribution activities of imported goods are accounted for as a part of sources of the GDP<u>. The <mark>boost of imports</mark> largely contributed to the high growth of the trade sector’s value added, which <mark>was</mark>, in turn, <mark>one of the major sources of</mark> the overall high <mark>growth</u></mark>. In the Russian official statistics, the revenues from foreign trade of oil and gas are included not in the mining sector but in the trade sector. However, these special foreign trade revenues could not be the source of the rapid GDP growth because Russia’s exports of oil and gas were also stagnant in real terms. Surprisingly, <u>import substitution, including domestic assembling of foreign-make durable goods, appeared along with the boost of imports in Russia. The real appreciation of the exchange rate of the ruble boosted the imports of consumer goods and eased the imports of equipment and intermediate goods, which is considered to have contributed to improvements in the manufacturing TFP</u>. Based on the unpublished Rosstat data on import matrix, the share of imports of manufacturing investment goods in the total gross demand for them amounted to 40 percent in 2006. In this paper, <u><mark>we examine statistically</mark> some of <mark>these facts</mark> to diagnose the Russian Disease</u> and focus on the terms-of-trade effects on the overall growth as well as the manufacturing development. First, <u><mark>showing the key differences between the Dutch and Russian Diseases</u></mark>, we prove that <u>a key symptom of the Russian Disease is a strong positive relation between the country’s real growth and terms-of-trade-effects</u>. We also present three variants (oil prices, terms-of-trade, and trading gains) of the concept of terms-of-trade effects using the SNA framework. Second, <u>it shows a strong positive impact of terms-of-trade effects on the Russian manufacturing, which markedly differs from one of the major symptoms of the Dutch Disease</u> (slower growth of manufacturing through the booming mining sector and real appreciation of exchange rates). We also suggests the significance of the manufacturing industry for the Russian economy. Third, we show that <u>the appreciation (depreciation) of real exchange rates of Russia’s rubles induced the boost (decline) of its imports.</u> Fourth, we prove that <u>the boost of imports, in turn, induced the GDP growth of the trade sector as one of the major sources of the Russian overall growth</u>. We also present the impact of oil prices on two kinds of real exchange rates (CPI-based and GDP-based real exchange rates).</p> </s>

Iran has strong influence in Venezuela now

Iran is successfully currying favor in an expanded audience in Latin America one of Iran’s strongest relationships in the region is with Venezuela. The friendship between Chávez and Ahmadinejad opened doors for Iran in Latin America to develop diplomatic and economic ties to Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua—all staunch Chávez supporters In 2013 Iran will continue to provide technical and engineering services to the mining and hydrocarbon sectors throughout Latin America Iran exerts influence indirectly through Hezbollah, a criminal-terrorist organization that maintains ties to criminal organizations in Paraguay and the Tri-Border region recent events demonstrate an even greater expansion of Iranian influence German customs officials discovered a Venezuelan check for US$70 million in the bag of Mazaher, Iran’s former Central Bank Director

Iran is successfully currying favor in an expanded audience in Latin America one of Iran’s strongest relationships in the region is with Venezuela. The friendship between Chávez and Ahmadinejad opened doors for Iran in Latin America to develop diplomatic and economic ties to Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua—all staunch Chávez supporters In 2013 Iran will continue to provide technical and engineering services to the mining and hydrocarbon sectors throughout Latin America recent events demonstrate an even greater expansion of Iranian influence German customs officials discovered a Venezuelan check for US$70 million in the bag of Mazaher, Iran’s former Central Bank Director

Bottom-line: Iran is successfully currying favor in an expanded audience in Latin America, enabling it to develop crucial economic ties and evade the consequences of the embargo.¶ Background: State-sponsored terrorism and a covert nuclear weapons program placed Iran on international pariah status. Both the U.S. and the E.U. enacted stringent sanctions, so that neither permits trade with Iran except in very limited circumstances, requiring a waiver. Iran seeks to counter the effects of isolation by finding new allies and deepening state-to-state relationships with the few countries it counts as an ally. ¶ Recognizing Tehran’s growing influence in its “backyard,” President Barack Obama signed the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 on 28 December 2012. The bill calls for a “comprehensive government-wide strategy to counter Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.” The legislation tasks various U.S. agencies with deterring the threat posed by Iran, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGC’s Quds Force, and Hezbollah by collaborating with regional partners.¶ The number of potential anti-Iran allies is waning: since his election in 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has opened six additional embassies in the region for a total of eleven Iranian embassies in Latin America – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela. At the same time, trade between Iran and Latin America has more than tripled to around US$4 billion. After a steady four-year climb, the Brazil-Iran trade balance reached US$2.6 billion in 2011. Exports from Argentina to Iran, its second-largest trade partner in Latin America, grew from US$84 million in 2008 to US$1.2 billion in 2011. ¶ Not surprisingly, one of Iran’s strongest relationships in the region is with fellow “anti-imperialist” Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. The friendship between Chávez and Ahmadinejad opened doors for Iran in Latin America to develop diplomatic and economic ties to Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua—all staunch Chávez supporters. ¶ In November 2009, Ahmadinejad visited Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who later defended Iran’s right to pursue a nuclear program. In 2010 Lula proposed a fuel-swap deal; those talks stalled. Yet Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota believes there is an opportunity to revive negotiations with Iran for a fuel contract in 2013, though the Dilma Rousseff administration decidedly keeps Iran at a distance. ¶ In 2013 Iran will continue to provide technical and engineering services to the mining and hydrocarbon sectors throughout Latin America, a form of export but also a means of integrating Iranians into the Western Hemisphere. Chávez and his Bolivarian allies have issued hundreds of passports or national ID cards to Iranian citizens. (See Douglas Farah’s Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Nov 2012) On 31 January 2012, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting’s (IRIB) launched HispanTV, a 24-hour international Spanish-language HD channel. Apart from such public overtures, Iran exerts influence indirectly through Hezbollah, a criminal-terrorist organization that maintains ties to criminal organizations in Paraguay and the Tri-Border region. ¶ More recent events demonstrate an even greater expansion of Iranian influence:¶ On 21 January 2013, German customs officials discovered a Venezuelan check for US$70 million in the bag of Tahmasb Mazaher, Iran’s former Central Bank Director. Mazaher failed to declare the funds, so German authorities confiscated the check while they investigate.¶ On 27 January 2013, Argentina announced plans to establish a joint truth commission with Iran to investigate the 1994 car bombing of the Argentina Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. Iran allegedly directed the attack, perpetrated by Hezbollah, though the Iranian government has not cooperated in investigations. Argentina requested the arrest of the current Minister of Defense for Iran, Ahmad Vahidi, and five other Iranians for their participation in the AMIA bombing in 2007.

<h4>Iran has strong influence in Venezuela now</h4><p><strong>Southern Pulse 2-6</strong>-13 [Southern Pulse is a field-based investigations organization focused on security, politics, energy, and business in Latin America, “Iran: Expanding its Sphere of Influence in Latin America,” http://www.southernpulse.com/reports/iran-expanding-its-sphere-of-influence-in-latin-america]</p><p>Bottom-line: <u><mark>Iran is successfully currying favor in an expanded audience in Latin America</u></mark>, enabling it to develop crucial economic ties and evade the consequences of the embargo.¶ Background: State-sponsored terrorism and a covert nuclear weapons program placed Iran on international pariah status. Both the U.S. and the E.U. enacted stringent sanctions, so that neither permits trade with Iran except in very limited circumstances, requiring a waiver. Iran seeks to counter the effects of isolation by finding new allies and deepening state-to-state relationships with the few countries it counts as an ally. ¶ Recognizing Tehran’s growing influence in its “backyard,” President Barack Obama signed the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 on 28 December 2012. The bill calls for a “comprehensive government-wide strategy to counter Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.” The legislation tasks various U.S. agencies with deterring the threat posed by Iran, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGC’s Quds Force, and Hezbollah by collaborating with regional partners.¶ The number of potential anti-Iran allies is waning: since his election in 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has opened six additional embassies in the region for a total of eleven Iranian embassies in Latin America – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela. At the same time, trade between Iran and Latin America has more than tripled to around US$4 billion. After a steady four-year climb, the Brazil-Iran trade balance reached US$2.6 billion in 2011. Exports from Argentina to Iran, its second-largest trade partner in Latin America, grew from US$84 million in 2008 to US$1.2 billion in 2011. ¶ Not surprisingly, <u><mark>one of Iran’s strongest relationships in the region is with</u></mark> fellow “anti-imperialist” Hugo Chávez in <u><mark>Venezuela. The friendship between Chávez and Ahmadinejad opened doors for Iran in Latin America to develop diplomatic and economic ties to Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua—all staunch Chávez supporters</u></mark>. ¶ In November 2009, Ahmadinejad visited Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who later defended Iran’s right to pursue a nuclear program. In 2010 Lula proposed a fuel-swap deal; those talks stalled. Yet Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota believes there is an opportunity to revive negotiations with Iran for a fuel contract in 2013, though the Dilma Rousseff administration decidedly keeps Iran at a distance. ¶ <u><mark>In 2013 Iran will continue to provide technical and engineering services to the mining and hydrocarbon sectors throughout Latin America</u></mark>, a form of export but also a means of integrating Iranians into the Western Hemisphere. Chávez and his Bolivarian allies have issued hundreds of passports or national ID cards to Iranian citizens. (See Douglas Farah’s Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Nov 2012) On 31 January 2012, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting’s (IRIB) launched HispanTV, a 24-hour international Spanish-language HD channel. Apart from such public overtures, <u>Iran exerts influence indirectly through Hezbollah, a criminal-terrorist organization that maintains ties to criminal organizations in Paraguay and the Tri-Border region</u>. ¶ More <u><mark>recent events demonstrate an even greater expansion of Iranian influence</u></mark>:¶ On 21 January 2013, <u><mark>German customs officials discovered a Venezuelan check for US$70 million in the bag of</u> </mark>Tahmasb <u><mark>Mazaher, Iran’s former Central Bank Director</u></mark>. Mazaher failed to declare the funds, so German authorities confiscated the check while they investigate.¶ On 27 January 2013, Argentina announced plans to establish a joint truth commission with Iran to investigate the 1994 car bombing of the Argentina Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. Iran allegedly directed the attack, perpetrated by Hezbollah, though the Iranian government has not cooperated in investigations. Argentina requested the arrest of the current Minister of Defense for Iran, Ahmad Vahidi, and five other Iranians for their participation in the AMIA bombing in 2007. </p>

Southern Pulse 2-6-13 [Southern Pulse is a field-based investigations organization focused on security, politics, energy, and business in Latin America, “Iran: Expanding its Sphere of Influence in Latin America,” http://www.southernpulse.com/reports/iran-expanding-its-sphere-of-influence-in-latin-america]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Southern Pulse 2-6-13 [Southern Pulse is a field-based investigations organization focused on security, politics, energy, and business in Latin America, “Iran: Expanding its Sphere of Influence in Latin America,” http://www.southernpulse.com/reports/iran-expanding-its-sphere-of-influence-in-latin-america] fulltext: Bottom-line: Iran is successfully currying favor in an expanded audience in Latin America, enabling it to develop crucial economic ties and evade the consequences of the embargo.¶ Background: State-sponsored terrorism and a covert nuclear weapons program placed Iran on international pariah status. Both the U.S. and the E.U. enacted stringent sanctions, so that neither permits trade with Iran except in very limited circumstances, requiring a waiver. Iran seeks to counter the effects of isolation by finding new allies and deepening state-to-state relationships with the few countries it counts as an ally. ¶ Recognizing Tehran’s growing influence in its “backyard,” President Barack Obama signed the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 on 28 December 2012. The bill calls for a “comprehensive government-wide strategy to counter Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.” The legislation tasks various U.S. agencies with deterring the threat posed by Iran, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGC’s Quds Force, and Hezbollah by collaborating with regional partners.¶ The number of potential anti-Iran allies is waning: since his election in 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has opened six additional embassies in the region for a total of eleven Iranian embassies in Latin America – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela. At the same time, trade between Iran and Latin America has more than tripled to around US$4 billion. After a steady four-year climb, the Brazil-Iran trade balance reached US$2.6 billion in 2011. Exports from Argentina to Iran, its second-largest trade partner in Latin America, grew from US$84 million in 2008 to US$1.2 billion in 2011. ¶ Not surprisingly, one of Iran’s strongest relationships in the region is with fellow “anti-imperialist” Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. The friendship between Chávez and Ahmadinejad opened doors for Iran in Latin America to develop diplomatic and economic ties to Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua—all staunch Chávez supporters. ¶ In November 2009, Ahmadinejad visited Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who later defended Iran’s right to pursue a nuclear program. In 2010 Lula proposed a fuel-swap deal; those talks stalled. Yet Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota believes there is an opportunity to revive negotiations with Iran for a fuel contract in 2013, though the Dilma Rousseff administration decidedly keeps Iran at a distance. ¶ In 2013 Iran will continue to provide technical and engineering services to the mining and hydrocarbon sectors throughout Latin America, a form of export but also a means of integrating Iranians into the Western Hemisphere. Chávez and his Bolivarian allies have issued hundreds of passports or national ID cards to Iranian citizens. (See Douglas Farah’s Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Nov 2012) On 31 January 2012, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting’s (IRIB) launched HispanTV, a 24-hour international Spanish-language HD channel. Apart from such public overtures, Iran exerts influence indirectly through Hezbollah, a criminal-terrorist organization that maintains ties to criminal organizations in Paraguay and the Tri-Border region. ¶ More recent events demonstrate an even greater expansion of Iranian influence:¶ On 21 January 2013, German customs officials discovered a Venezuelan check for US$70 million in the bag of Tahmasb Mazaher, Iran’s former Central Bank Director. Mazaher failed to declare the funds, so German authorities confiscated the check while they investigate.¶ On 27 January 2013, Argentina announced plans to establish a joint truth commission with Iran to investigate the 1994 car bombing of the Argentina Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. Iran allegedly directed the attack, perpetrated by Hezbollah, though the Iranian government has not cooperated in investigations. Argentina requested the arrest of the current Minister of Defense for Iran, Ahmad Vahidi, and five other Iranians for their participation in the AMIA bombing in 2007. [/INST] <h4>Iran has strong influence in Venezuela now</h4><p><strong>Southern Pulse 2-6</strong>-13 [Southern Pulse is a field-based investigations organization focused on security, politics, energy, and business in Latin America, “Iran: Expanding its Sphere of Influence in Latin America,” http://www.southernpulse.com/reports/iran-expanding-its-sphere-of-influence-in-latin-america]</p><p>Bottom-line: <u><mark>Iran is successfully currying favor in an expanded audience in Latin America</u></mark>, enabling it to develop crucial economic ties and evade the consequences of the embargo.¶ Background: State-sponsored terrorism and a covert nuclear weapons program placed Iran on international pariah status. Both the U.S. and the E.U. enacted stringent sanctions, so that neither permits trade with Iran except in very limited circumstances, requiring a waiver. Iran seeks to counter the effects of isolation by finding new allies and deepening state-to-state relationships with the few countries it counts as an ally. ¶ Recognizing Tehran’s growing influence in its “backyard,” President Barack Obama signed the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 on 28 December 2012. The bill calls for a “comprehensive government-wide strategy to counter Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.” The legislation tasks various U.S. agencies with deterring the threat posed by Iran, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGC’s Quds Force, and Hezbollah by collaborating with regional partners.¶ The number of potential anti-Iran allies is waning: since his election in 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has opened six additional embassies in the region for a total of eleven Iranian embassies in Latin America – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela. At the same time, trade between Iran and Latin America has more than tripled to around US$4 billion. After a steady four-year climb, the Brazil-Iran trade balance reached US$2.6 billion in 2011. Exports from Argentina to Iran, its second-largest trade partner in Latin America, grew from US$84 million in 2008 to US$1.2 billion in 2011. ¶ Not surprisingly, <u><mark>one of Iran’s strongest relationships in the region is with</u></mark> fellow “anti-imperialist” Hugo Chávez in <u><mark>Venezuela. The friendship between Chávez and Ahmadinejad opened doors for Iran in Latin America to develop diplomatic and economic ties to Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua—all staunch Chávez supporters</u></mark>. ¶ In November 2009, Ahmadinejad visited Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who later defended Iran’s right to pursue a nuclear program. In 2010 Lula proposed a fuel-swap deal; those talks stalled. Yet Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota believes there is an opportunity to revive negotiations with Iran for a fuel contract in 2013, though the Dilma Rousseff administration decidedly keeps Iran at a distance. ¶ <u><mark>In 2013 Iran will continue to provide technical and engineering services to the mining and hydrocarbon sectors throughout Latin America</u></mark>, a form of export but also a means of integrating Iranians into the Western Hemisphere. Chávez and his Bolivarian allies have issued hundreds of passports or national ID cards to Iranian citizens. (See Douglas Farah’s Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Nov 2012) On 31 January 2012, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting’s (IRIB) launched HispanTV, a 24-hour international Spanish-language HD channel. Apart from such public overtures, <u>Iran exerts influence indirectly through Hezbollah, a criminal-terrorist organization that maintains ties to criminal organizations in Paraguay and the Tri-Border region</u>. ¶ More <u><mark>recent events demonstrate an even greater expansion of Iranian influence</u></mark>:¶ On 21 January 2013, <u><mark>German customs officials discovered a Venezuelan check for US$70 million in the bag of</u> </mark>Tahmasb <u><mark>Mazaher, Iran’s former Central Bank Director</u></mark>. Mazaher failed to declare the funds, so German authorities confiscated the check while they investigate.¶ On 27 January 2013, Argentina announced plans to establish a joint truth commission with Iran to investigate the 1994 car bombing of the Argentina Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. Iran allegedly directed the attack, perpetrated by Hezbollah, though the Iranian government has not cooperated in investigations. Argentina requested the arrest of the current Minister of Defense for Iran, Ahmad Vahidi, and five other Iranians for their participation in the AMIA bombing in 2007. </p> </s>

(__) Kerry focus has shifted from peace process to Southeast Asia.

Kerry swapped his Mideast peace portfolio for issues in emerging Southeast Asia and road bumps in U.S. relations with Russia and China when he landed Monday in Brunei he is attending the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, the last stop on Kerry's two-week tour part of my conversation with the Russians will be how we can maximize our efforts together to have an impact on this," Russia called Snowden a "free man" and also refused to turn him over to Washington. He is believed to be holed up in an airport transit zone in Moscow. Kerry is also slated to have talks on the sidelines of the meeting with his counterparts in China, Japan, South Korea and other Asian nations. North Korea's nuclear ambitions are expected to be a hot-button issue throughout the conference

(“Kerry shifts from Mideast to issues in Southeast Asia, testy US relations with China, Russia”. By Deb Riechmann, The Associated Press July 1, 2013 http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Kerrys+focus+switches+North+Korea+Syria+attends+Asia/8600580/story.html) KH BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, Brunei - U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry swapped his Mideast peace portfolio for issues in emerging Southeast Asia and road bumps in U.S. relations with Russia and China when he landed Monday in Brunei for a regional security conference. The tiny sultanate in the South China Sea, where he is attending the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, is the last stop on Kerry's two-week tour of seven countries in Asia and the Middle East. He landed in Brunei's capital, Bandar Seri Begawan, after flying overnight from Tel Aviv, where he spent four days in long meetings trying to get Israel and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table. During the flight, Kerry got an update on the ongoing discussions by phone from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On the sidelines of the ASEAN conference, Kerry is scheduled to have a lengthy chat with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that likely will centre on the Syrian crisis. Russia is a key backer of embattled Syrian President Bashar Assad, who is fighting rebel forces that have been being armed by the U.S. and other nations. "Clearly, part of my conversation with Foreign Minister Lavrov and the Russians will be how we can maximize our efforts together to have an impact on this," Kerry said in Tel Aviv before he left Israel. "I'm not going to go into greater detail with respect to that conversation, but I very much look forward to meeting with Sergey Lavrov when I get there." In his meetings with both Lavrov and the Chinese minister, the discussion also is likely to include National Security Agency leaker Edward Snowden, who is wanted in the U.S. on espionage charges. The White House has said Hong Kong's refusal to detain Snowden has "unquestionably" hurt U.S. relations with China. After Hong Kong's government claimed it had to allow Snowden to flee because the U.S. got Snowden's middle name wrong in documents requesting his arrest, the Justice Department said the U.S. didn't buy that excuse, calling it "a pretext for not acting." Russia called Snowden a "free man" and also refused to turn him over to Washington. He is believed to be holed up in an airport transit zone in Moscow. Kerry is also slated to have talks on the sidelines of the meeting with his counterparts in China, Japan, South Korea and other Asian nations. North Korea's nuclear ambitions are expected to be a hot-button issue throughout the conference. Nations attending are expected to reiterate a call for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Many want North Korea to abide by its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions and commitments it made following six-party talks in 2005.

<h4>(__) <strong>Kerry focus has shifted from peace process to Southeast Asia. </h4><p>AP, 2013</p><p></strong>(“Kerry shifts from Mideast to issues in Southeast Asia, testy US relations with China, Russia”. By Deb Riechmann, The Associated Press July 1, 2013</p><p>http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Kerrys+focus+switches+North+Korea+Syria+attends+Asia/8600580/story.html) KH</p><p>BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, Brunei - U.S. Secretary of State John <u><strong>Kerry swapped his Mideast peace portfolio for issues in emerging Southeast Asia and road bumps in U.S. relations with Russia and China when he landed Monday in Brunei</u></strong> for a regional security conference.</p><p>The tiny sultanate in the South China Sea, where <u><strong>he is attending the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum,</u></strong> is <u><strong>the last stop on Kerry's two-week tour</u></strong> of seven countries in Asia and the Middle East.</p><p>He landed in Brunei's capital, Bandar Seri Begawan, after flying overnight from Tel Aviv, where he spent four days in long meetings trying to get Israel and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table. During the flight, Kerry got an update on the ongoing discussions by phone from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.</p><p>On the sidelines of the ASEAN conference, Kerry is scheduled to have a lengthy chat with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that likely will centre on the Syrian crisis. Russia is a key backer of embattled Syrian President Bashar Assad, who is fighting rebel forces that have been being armed by the U.S. and other nations.</p><p>"Clearly, <u><strong>part of my conversation with </u></strong>Foreign Minister Lavrov and <u><strong>the Russians will be how we can maximize our efforts together to have an impact on this," </u></strong>Kerry said in Tel Aviv before he left Israel. "I'm not going to go into greater detail with respect to that conversation, but I very much look forward to meeting with Sergey Lavrov when I get there."</p><p>In his meetings with both Lavrov and the Chinese minister, the discussion also is likely to include National Security Agency leaker Edward Snowden, who is wanted in the U.S. on espionage charges.</p><p>The White House has said Hong Kong's refusal to detain Snowden has "unquestionably" hurt U.S. relations with China. After Hong Kong's government claimed it had to allow Snowden to flee because the U.S. got Snowden's middle name wrong in documents requesting his arrest, the Justice Department said the U.S. didn't buy that excuse, calling it "a pretext for not acting."</p><p><u><strong>Russia called Snowden a "free man" and also refused to turn him over to Washington. He is believed to be holed up in an airport transit zone in Moscow.</p><p>Kerry is also slated to have talks on the sidelines of the meeting with his counterparts in China, Japan, South Korea and other Asian nations.</p><p>North Korea's nuclear ambitions are expected to be a hot-button issue throughout the conference</u></strong>. Nations attending are expected to reiterate a call for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Many want North Korea to abide by its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions and commitments it made following six-party talks in 2005.</p>

AP, 2013

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: AP, 2013 fulltext: (“Kerry shifts from Mideast to issues in Southeast Asia, testy US relations with China, Russia”. By Deb Riechmann, The Associated Press July 1, 2013 http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Kerrys+focus+switches+North+Korea+Syria+attends+Asia/8600580/story.html) KH BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, Brunei - U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry swapped his Mideast peace portfolio for issues in emerging Southeast Asia and road bumps in U.S. relations with Russia and China when he landed Monday in Brunei for a regional security conference. The tiny sultanate in the South China Sea, where he is attending the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, is the last stop on Kerry's two-week tour of seven countries in Asia and the Middle East. He landed in Brunei's capital, Bandar Seri Begawan, after flying overnight from Tel Aviv, where he spent four days in long meetings trying to get Israel and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table. During the flight, Kerry got an update on the ongoing discussions by phone from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On the sidelines of the ASEAN conference, Kerry is scheduled to have a lengthy chat with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that likely will centre on the Syrian crisis. Russia is a key backer of embattled Syrian President Bashar Assad, who is fighting rebel forces that have been being armed by the U.S. and other nations. "Clearly, part of my conversation with Foreign Minister Lavrov and the Russians will be how we can maximize our efforts together to have an impact on this," Kerry said in Tel Aviv before he left Israel. "I'm not going to go into greater detail with respect to that conversation, but I very much look forward to meeting with Sergey Lavrov when I get there." In his meetings with both Lavrov and the Chinese minister, the discussion also is likely to include National Security Agency leaker Edward Snowden, who is wanted in the U.S. on espionage charges. The White House has said Hong Kong's refusal to detain Snowden has "unquestionably" hurt U.S. relations with China. After Hong Kong's government claimed it had to allow Snowden to flee because the U.S. got Snowden's middle name wrong in documents requesting his arrest, the Justice Department said the U.S. didn't buy that excuse, calling it "a pretext for not acting." Russia called Snowden a "free man" and also refused to turn him over to Washington. He is believed to be holed up in an airport transit zone in Moscow. Kerry is also slated to have talks on the sidelines of the meeting with his counterparts in China, Japan, South Korea and other Asian nations. North Korea's nuclear ambitions are expected to be a hot-button issue throughout the conference. Nations attending are expected to reiterate a call for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Many want North Korea to abide by its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions and commitments it made following six-party talks in 2005. [/INST] <h4>(__) <strong>Kerry focus has shifted from peace process to Southeast Asia. </h4><p>AP, 2013</p><p></strong>(“Kerry shifts from Mideast to issues in Southeast Asia, testy US relations with China, Russia”. By Deb Riechmann, The Associated Press July 1, 2013</p><p>http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Kerrys+focus+switches+North+Korea+Syria+attends+Asia/8600580/story.html) KH</p><p>BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, Brunei - U.S. Secretary of State John <u><strong>Kerry swapped his Mideast peace portfolio for issues in emerging Southeast Asia and road bumps in U.S. relations with Russia and China when he landed Monday in Brunei</u></strong> for a regional security conference.</p><p>The tiny sultanate in the South China Sea, where <u><strong>he is attending the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum,</u></strong> is <u><strong>the last stop on Kerry's two-week tour</u></strong> of seven countries in Asia and the Middle East.</p><p>He landed in Brunei's capital, Bandar Seri Begawan, after flying overnight from Tel Aviv, where he spent four days in long meetings trying to get Israel and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table. During the flight, Kerry got an update on the ongoing discussions by phone from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.</p><p>On the sidelines of the ASEAN conference, Kerry is scheduled to have a lengthy chat with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that likely will centre on the Syrian crisis. Russia is a key backer of embattled Syrian President Bashar Assad, who is fighting rebel forces that have been being armed by the U.S. and other nations.</p><p>"Clearly, <u><strong>part of my conversation with </u></strong>Foreign Minister Lavrov and <u><strong>the Russians will be how we can maximize our efforts together to have an impact on this," </u></strong>Kerry said in Tel Aviv before he left Israel. "I'm not going to go into greater detail with respect to that conversation, but I very much look forward to meeting with Sergey Lavrov when I get there."</p><p>In his meetings with both Lavrov and the Chinese minister, the discussion also is likely to include National Security Agency leaker Edward Snowden, who is wanted in the U.S. on espionage charges.</p><p>The White House has said Hong Kong's refusal to detain Snowden has "unquestionably" hurt U.S. relations with China. After Hong Kong's government claimed it had to allow Snowden to flee because the U.S. got Snowden's middle name wrong in documents requesting his arrest, the Justice Department said the U.S. didn't buy that excuse, calling it "a pretext for not acting."</p><p><u><strong>Russia called Snowden a "free man" and also refused to turn him over to Washington. He is believed to be holed up in an airport transit zone in Moscow.</p><p>Kerry is also slated to have talks on the sidelines of the meeting with his counterparts in China, Japan, South Korea and other Asian nations.</p><p>North Korea's nuclear ambitions are expected to be a hot-button issue throughout the conference</u></strong>. Nations attending are expected to reiterate a call for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Many want North Korea to abide by its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions and commitments it made following six-party talks in 2005.</p> </s>

Russia could be imperialist even with a bad economy—it’s still far more powerful than its neighbors and there’s no impact

even if Russia’s economy doesn’t rapidly recover the Kremlin will nonetheless be able to exert a great degree of influence in the “near abroad” because of the extreme fiscal/economic weaknesses of the rest of the CIS many of the former-Soviet states are in truly dire economic straights and that they are extremely vulnerable to outside leverage, particularly from Russia in certain countries, Russian influence is progressive the US and Europe are up against catastrophic resource constraints, the odds that the West will be able to effectively meddle in Russia’s “sphere of privileged interests” are pretty slim Russia is and will continue to be a great power Whatever your reaction, get used to the Russians being a major force in world politics

even if Russia’s economy doesn’t recover the Kremlin will be able to exert influence because of the extreme weaknesses of the rest of the CIS many former-Soviet states are extremely vulnerable to outside leverage the odds that the West will be effectively meddle in Russia’s “sphere of privileged interests” are pretty slim

And even if Russia’s economy doesn’t, as all of the relevant forecasts suggest, rapidly recover to pre-crisis levels, the Kremlin will nonetheless be able to exert a great degree of influence in the “near abroad” because of the extreme fiscal/economic weaknesses of the rest of the CIS. If the recent agreement with Ukraine or the recent Russian pressure on Kyrgyzstan demonstrate anything, it is that many of the former-Soviet states are in truly dire economic straights and that they are extremely vulnerable to outside leverage, particularly from a player as thoroughly amoral and hard-headed as Russia. One doesn’t need to celebrate Russian influence in the “near abroad” to recognize its existence. I think that in certain countries, such as the Central Asian ‘Stans, Russian influence is and can continue to be modestly progressive. It’d be pretty difficult to be more authoritarian and backward looking than someone like Turkmenbashi. In other countries, such as Georgia, Russian influence will in all likelihood take substantially harsher and less pleasant forms. The world’s a nasty place, though, and since the US and Europe are up against some pretty darn catastrophic resource constraints, the odds that the West will be able to effectively meddle in Russia’s “sphere of privileged interests” are pretty slim. Russia is and will continue to be a great power. Not a superpower, but a great power. Some people will be overjoyed by this and some will be repulsed. Whatever your reaction, though, get used to the Russians being a major force in world politics.

<h4>Russia could be imperialist even with a bad economy—it’s still far more powerful than its neighbors and there’s no impact</h4><p><strong>ADOMANIS 2010</strong> (Mark, degrees in Russian studies from both Harvard and Oxford, “Russia’s economy: still not collapsing!” April 21, http://trueslant.com/markadomanis/2010/04/21/russias-economy-still-not-collapsing/)</p><p>And <u><mark>even if Russia’s economy doesn’t</u></mark>, as all of the relevant forecasts suggest, <u>rapidly <mark>recover</u></mark> to pre-crisis levels, <u><mark>the Kremlin will</mark> nonetheless <mark>be able to exert</mark> a great degree of <mark>influence</mark> in the “near abroad” <strong><mark>because of the extreme</strong></mark> fiscal/economic <strong><mark>weaknesses of the rest of the CIS</u></strong></mark>. If the recent agreement with Ukraine or the recent Russian pressure on Kyrgyzstan demonstrate anything, it is that <u><mark>many</mark> of the <mark>former-Soviet states are</mark> in truly dire economic straights and that they are <mark>extremely vulnerable to outside leverage</mark>, particularly from</u> a player as thoroughly amoral and hard-headed as <u>Russia</u>.</p><p>One doesn’t need to celebrate Russian influence in the “near abroad” to recognize its existence. I think that <u>in certain countries,</u> such as the Central Asian ‘Stans, <u>Russian influence is</u> and can continue to be modestly <u>progressive</u>. It’d be pretty difficult to be more authoritarian and backward looking than someone like Turkmenbashi. In other countries, such as Georgia, Russian influence will in all likelihood take substantially harsher and less pleasant forms. The world’s a nasty place, though, and since <u>the US and Europe are up against</u> some pretty darn <u>catastrophic resource constraints, <mark>the odds that the West will be</mark> able to <mark>effectively meddle in Russia’s “<strong>sphere of privileged interests” are pretty slim</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>Russia is and will continue to be a great power</u>. Not a superpower, but a great power. Some people will be overjoyed by this and some will be repulsed. <u>Whatever your reaction,</u> though, <u>get used to the Russians being a major force in world politics</u>.</p>

ADOMANIS 2010 (Mark, degrees in Russian studies from both Harvard and Oxford, “Russia’s economy: still not collapsing!” April 21, http://trueslant.com/markadomanis/2010/04/21/russias-economy-still-not-collapsing/)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: ADOMANIS 2010 (Mark, degrees in Russian studies from both Harvard and Oxford, “Russia’s economy: still not collapsing!” April 21, http://trueslant.com/markadomanis/2010/04/21/russias-economy-still-not-collapsing/) fulltext: And even if Russia’s economy doesn’t, as all of the relevant forecasts suggest, rapidly recover to pre-crisis levels, the Kremlin will nonetheless be able to exert a great degree of influence in the “near abroad” because of the extreme fiscal/economic weaknesses of the rest of the CIS. If the recent agreement with Ukraine or the recent Russian pressure on Kyrgyzstan demonstrate anything, it is that many of the former-Soviet states are in truly dire economic straights and that they are extremely vulnerable to outside leverage, particularly from a player as thoroughly amoral and hard-headed as Russia. One doesn’t need to celebrate Russian influence in the “near abroad” to recognize its existence. I think that in certain countries, such as the Central Asian ‘Stans, Russian influence is and can continue to be modestly progressive. It’d be pretty difficult to be more authoritarian and backward looking than someone like Turkmenbashi. In other countries, such as Georgia, Russian influence will in all likelihood take substantially harsher and less pleasant forms. The world’s a nasty place, though, and since the US and Europe are up against some pretty darn catastrophic resource constraints, the odds that the West will be able to effectively meddle in Russia’s “sphere of privileged interests” are pretty slim. Russia is and will continue to be a great power. Not a superpower, but a great power. Some people will be overjoyed by this and some will be repulsed. Whatever your reaction, though, get used to the Russians being a major force in world politics. [/INST] <h4>Russia could be imperialist even with a bad economy—it’s still far more powerful than its neighbors and there’s no impact</h4><p><strong>ADOMANIS 2010</strong> (Mark, degrees in Russian studies from both Harvard and Oxford, “Russia’s economy: still not collapsing!” April 21, http://trueslant.com/markadomanis/2010/04/21/russias-economy-still-not-collapsing/)</p><p>And <u><mark>even if Russia’s economy doesn’t</u></mark>, as all of the relevant forecasts suggest, <u>rapidly <mark>recover</u></mark> to pre-crisis levels, <u><mark>the Kremlin will</mark> nonetheless <mark>be able to exert</mark> a great degree of <mark>influence</mark> in the “near abroad” <strong><mark>because of the extreme</strong></mark> fiscal/economic <strong><mark>weaknesses of the rest of the CIS</u></strong></mark>. If the recent agreement with Ukraine or the recent Russian pressure on Kyrgyzstan demonstrate anything, it is that <u><mark>many</mark> of the <mark>former-Soviet states are</mark> in truly dire economic straights and that they are <mark>extremely vulnerable to outside leverage</mark>, particularly from</u> a player as thoroughly amoral and hard-headed as <u>Russia</u>.</p><p>One doesn’t need to celebrate Russian influence in the “near abroad” to recognize its existence. I think that <u>in certain countries,</u> such as the Central Asian ‘Stans, <u>Russian influence is</u> and can continue to be modestly <u>progressive</u>. It’d be pretty difficult to be more authoritarian and backward looking than someone like Turkmenbashi. In other countries, such as Georgia, Russian influence will in all likelihood take substantially harsher and less pleasant forms. The world’s a nasty place, though, and since <u>the US and Europe are up against</u> some pretty darn <u>catastrophic resource constraints, <mark>the odds that the West will be</mark> able to <mark>effectively meddle in Russia’s “<strong>sphere of privileged interests” are pretty slim</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>Russia is and will continue to be a great power</u>. Not a superpower, but a great power. Some people will be overjoyed by this and some will be repulsed. <u>Whatever your reaction,</u> though, <u>get used to the Russians being a major force in world politics</u>.</p> </s>

US-Venezuelan oil trade is slipping

Although Venezuela remains an important source of crude for the United States, the volume of oil that the United States imports from Venezuela has declined over the past 15 years in conjunction with a more general decline in Venezuelan oil production U.S. imports of Venezuelan petroleum have fallen to as low as 23,000 bbl/d in 2012

the volume of oil that the United States imports from Venezuela has declined over the past 15 years in conjunction with a more general decline in Venezuelan oil production U.S. imports of Venezuelan petroleum have fallen to as low as 23,000 bbl/d in 2012

Although Venezuela remains an important source of crude for the United States, the volume of oil that the United States imports from Venezuela has declined over the past 15 years in conjunction with a more general decline in Venezuelan oil production.¶ U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude oil have fallen considerably since they peaked on an annual basis at 1.4 million bbl/d in 1997, when Venezuela was the largest supplier of foreign oil to the United States. Preliminary data for 2012 show that U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude averaged 879,000 bbl/d through October, or 5.8% of total U.S. crude oil supply. U.S. imports of Venezuelan petroleum products also peaked in 1997, at 379,000 bbl/d, and have since fallen to as low as 23,000 bbl/d in October 2012. Meanwhile, U.S. exports of petroleum products to Venezuela, which heavily subsidizes liquid fuels, surged to an all-time high of 196,000 bbl/d in September 2012 following an explosion at Venezuela's largest oil refinery.¶ A number of important political developments have occurred in Venezuela since its oil exports to the United States peaked in 1997. President Chávez took office in 1999 and has enacted various policies to increase state control over the oil industry through the national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). A general strike that began in December 2002 initially disrupted two-thirds of Venezuela's 3.0 million bbl/d of production, a level to which Venezuela's production has yet to fully return. EIA estimated that Venezuela produced 2.2 million bbl/d of crude oil in 2012, although definitive numbers are unavailable. Adding lease condensate, natural gas liquids, and refinery processing gains, total Venezuelan oil production was approximately 2.5 million bbl/d in 2012.

<h4>US-Venezuelan oil trade is slipping</h4><p><strong>EIA 1-22</strong>-13 [US Energy Information Administration, “Political risks focus attention on supply of Venezuelan oil to the United States,” http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=9651#]</p><p><u>Although Venezuela remains an important source of crude for the United States, <mark>the volume of oil that the United States imports from Venezuela has declined over the past 15 years in conjunction with a more general decline in Venezuelan oil production</u></mark>.¶ U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude oil have fallen considerably since they peaked on an annual basis at 1.4 million bbl/d in 1997, when Venezuela was the largest supplier of foreign oil to the United States. Preliminary data for 2012 show that U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude averaged 879,000 bbl/d through October, or 5.8% of total U.S. crude oil supply. <u><mark>U.S. imports of Venezuelan petroleum</u> </mark>products also peaked in 1997, at 379,000 bbl/d, and <u><mark>have</u> </mark>since <u><mark>fallen to as low as 23,000 bbl/d in</u></mark> October <u><mark>2012</u></mark>. Meanwhile, U.S. exports of petroleum products to Venezuela, which heavily subsidizes liquid fuels, surged to an all-time high of 196,000 bbl/d in September 2012 following an explosion at Venezuela's largest oil refinery.¶ A number of important political developments have occurred in Venezuela since its oil exports to the United States peaked in 1997. President Chávez took office in 1999 and has enacted various policies to increase state control over the oil industry through the national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). A general strike that began in December 2002 initially disrupted two-thirds of Venezuela's 3.0 million bbl/d of production, a level to which Venezuela's production has yet to fully return. EIA estimated that Venezuela produced 2.2 million bbl/d of crude oil in 2012, although definitive numbers are unavailable. Adding lease condensate, natural gas liquids, and refinery processing gains, total Venezuelan oil production was approximately 2.5 million bbl/d in 2012.</p>

EIA 1-22-13 [US Energy Information Administration, “Political risks focus attention on supply of Venezuelan oil to the United States,” http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=9651#]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: EIA 1-22-13 [US Energy Information Administration, “Political risks focus attention on supply of Venezuelan oil to the United States,” http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=9651#] fulltext: Although Venezuela remains an important source of crude for the United States, the volume of oil that the United States imports from Venezuela has declined over the past 15 years in conjunction with a more general decline in Venezuelan oil production.¶ U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude oil have fallen considerably since they peaked on an annual basis at 1.4 million bbl/d in 1997, when Venezuela was the largest supplier of foreign oil to the United States. Preliminary data for 2012 show that U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude averaged 879,000 bbl/d through October, or 5.8% of total U.S. crude oil supply. U.S. imports of Venezuelan petroleum products also peaked in 1997, at 379,000 bbl/d, and have since fallen to as low as 23,000 bbl/d in October 2012. Meanwhile, U.S. exports of petroleum products to Venezuela, which heavily subsidizes liquid fuels, surged to an all-time high of 196,000 bbl/d in September 2012 following an explosion at Venezuela's largest oil refinery.¶ A number of important political developments have occurred in Venezuela since its oil exports to the United States peaked in 1997. President Chávez took office in 1999 and has enacted various policies to increase state control over the oil industry through the national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). A general strike that began in December 2002 initially disrupted two-thirds of Venezuela's 3.0 million bbl/d of production, a level to which Venezuela's production has yet to fully return. EIA estimated that Venezuela produced 2.2 million bbl/d of crude oil in 2012, although definitive numbers are unavailable. Adding lease condensate, natural gas liquids, and refinery processing gains, total Venezuelan oil production was approximately 2.5 million bbl/d in 2012. [/INST] <h4>US-Venezuelan oil trade is slipping</h4><p><strong>EIA 1-22</strong>-13 [US Energy Information Administration, “Political risks focus attention on supply of Venezuelan oil to the United States,” http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=9651#]</p><p><u>Although Venezuela remains an important source of crude for the United States, <mark>the volume of oil that the United States imports from Venezuela has declined over the past 15 years in conjunction with a more general decline in Venezuelan oil production</u></mark>.¶ U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude oil have fallen considerably since they peaked on an annual basis at 1.4 million bbl/d in 1997, when Venezuela was the largest supplier of foreign oil to the United States. Preliminary data for 2012 show that U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude averaged 879,000 bbl/d through October, or 5.8% of total U.S. crude oil supply. <u><mark>U.S. imports of Venezuelan petroleum</u> </mark>products also peaked in 1997, at 379,000 bbl/d, and <u><mark>have</u> </mark>since <u><mark>fallen to as low as 23,000 bbl/d in</u></mark> October <u><mark>2012</u></mark>. Meanwhile, U.S. exports of petroleum products to Venezuela, which heavily subsidizes liquid fuels, surged to an all-time high of 196,000 bbl/d in September 2012 following an explosion at Venezuela's largest oil refinery.¶ A number of important political developments have occurred in Venezuela since its oil exports to the United States peaked in 1997. President Chávez took office in 1999 and has enacted various policies to increase state control over the oil industry through the national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). A general strike that began in December 2002 initially disrupted two-thirds of Venezuela's 3.0 million bbl/d of production, a level to which Venezuela's production has yet to fully return. EIA estimated that Venezuela produced 2.2 million bbl/d of crude oil in 2012, although definitive numbers are unavailable. Adding lease condensate, natural gas liquids, and refinery processing gains, total Venezuelan oil production was approximately 2.5 million bbl/d in 2012.</p> </s>

(__) Kerry shifted focus to the South China Sea.

) KH Another issue that will take centre stage is territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Kerry said We very much hope to see progress soon on a substantive code of conduct in order to help ensure stability in this vital region Kerry reiterated U.S. commitment to the ASEAN region For any country that questions whether the United States will sustain our greater engagement in the Asia-Pacific, I want to put those concerns to rest — completely — today," Kerry said. "President Obama has made a smart and strategic commitment to rebalance our interests and investments in Asia We have many goals. We have economic and security interests. But I want to emphasize, importantly, our actions are not intended to contain or to counterbalance any one country

(“Kerry shifts from Mideast to issues in Southeast Asia, testy US relations with China, Russia”. By Deb Riechmann, The Associated Press July 1, 2013 http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Kerrys+focus+switches+North+Korea+Syria+attends+Asia/8600580/story.html) KH Another issue that will take centre stage at the conference is territorial disputes in the South China Sea. China has territorial disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia over the South China Sea and its potentially oil- and gas-rich islands. Several claimants want group discussions in order to create a legally binding "code of conduct" to prevent clashes in the sea, but Beijing has not clearly stated when it will sit down with the 10-nation ASEAN bloc to discuss such a nonaggression pact. "We have a strong interest in the manner in which the disputes of the South China Sea are addressed, and in the conduct of the parties," Kerry said in opening remarks at the conference. "We very much hope to see progress soon on a substantive code of conduct in order to help ensure stability in this vital region." Kerry reiterated U.S. commitment to the ASEAN region where he said roughly half of the region's 600 million people — a population as large as the United States — will be defined as middle class by the end of the decade. The U.S. commitment is not meant as a counterweight to any specific country in the region, Kerry said in an apparent reference to economic powerhouse, China. "For any country that questions whether the United States will sustain our greater engagement in the Asia-Pacific, I want to put those concerns to rest — completely — today," Kerry said. "President Obama has made a smart and strategic commitment to rebalance our interests and investments in Asia. "We have many goals. We have economic and security interests. But I want to emphasize, importantly, our actions are not intended to contain or to counterbalance any one country."

<h4>(__) <strong>Kerry shifted focus to the South China Sea.</h4><p>AP, 2013</p><p></strong>(“Kerry shifts from Mideast to issues in Southeast Asia, testy US relations with China, Russia”. By Deb Riechmann, The Associated Press July 1, 2013</p><p>http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Kerrys+focus+switches+North+Korea+Syria+attends+Asia/8600580/story.html<u><strong>) KH</p><p>Another issue</u></strong> <u><strong>that will take centre stage</u></strong> at the conference <u><strong>is territorial disputes in the South China Sea.</p><p></u></strong>China has territorial disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia over the South China Sea and its potentially oil- and gas-rich islands. Several claimants want group discussions in order to create a legally binding "code of conduct" to prevent clashes in the sea, but Beijing has not clearly stated when it will sit down with the 10-nation ASEAN bloc to discuss such a nonaggression pact.</p><p>"We have a strong interest in the manner in which the disputes of the South China Sea are addressed, and in the conduct of the parties," <u><strong>Kerry said</u></strong> in opening remarks at the conference. "<u><strong>We very much hope to see progress soon on a substantive code of conduct in order to help ensure stability in this vital region</u></strong>."</p><p><u><strong>Kerry reiterated U.S. commitment to the ASEAN region</u></strong> where he said roughly half of the region's 600 million people — a population as large as the United States — will be defined as middle class by the end of the decade. The U.S. commitment is not meant as a counterweight to any specific country in the region, Kerry said in an apparent reference to economic powerhouse, China.</p><p>"<u><strong>For any country that questions whether the United States will sustain our greater engagement in the Asia-Pacific, I want to put those concerns to rest — completely — today," Kerry said. "President Obama has made a smart and strategic commitment to rebalance our interests and investments in Asia</u></strong>.</p><p>"<u><strong>We have many goals. We have economic and security interests. But I want to emphasize, importantly, our actions are not intended to contain or to counterbalance any one country</u></strong>."</p>

AP, 2013

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: AP, 2013 fulltext: (“Kerry shifts from Mideast to issues in Southeast Asia, testy US relations with China, Russia”. By Deb Riechmann, The Associated Press July 1, 2013 http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Kerrys+focus+switches+North+Korea+Syria+attends+Asia/8600580/story.html) KH Another issue that will take centre stage at the conference is territorial disputes in the South China Sea. China has territorial disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia over the South China Sea and its potentially oil- and gas-rich islands. Several claimants want group discussions in order to create a legally binding "code of conduct" to prevent clashes in the sea, but Beijing has not clearly stated when it will sit down with the 10-nation ASEAN bloc to discuss such a nonaggression pact. "We have a strong interest in the manner in which the disputes of the South China Sea are addressed, and in the conduct of the parties," Kerry said in opening remarks at the conference. "We very much hope to see progress soon on a substantive code of conduct in order to help ensure stability in this vital region." Kerry reiterated U.S. commitment to the ASEAN region where he said roughly half of the region's 600 million people — a population as large as the United States — will be defined as middle class by the end of the decade. The U.S. commitment is not meant as a counterweight to any specific country in the region, Kerry said in an apparent reference to economic powerhouse, China. "For any country that questions whether the United States will sustain our greater engagement in the Asia-Pacific, I want to put those concerns to rest — completely — today," Kerry said. "President Obama has made a smart and strategic commitment to rebalance our interests and investments in Asia. "We have many goals. We have economic and security interests. But I want to emphasize, importantly, our actions are not intended to contain or to counterbalance any one country." [/INST] <h4>(__) <strong>Kerry shifted focus to the South China Sea.</h4><p>AP, 2013</p><p></strong>(“Kerry shifts from Mideast to issues in Southeast Asia, testy US relations with China, Russia”. By Deb Riechmann, The Associated Press July 1, 2013</p><p>http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Kerrys+focus+switches+North+Korea+Syria+attends+Asia/8600580/story.html<u><strong>) KH</p><p>Another issue</u></strong> <u><strong>that will take centre stage</u></strong> at the conference <u><strong>is territorial disputes in the South China Sea.</p><p></u></strong>China has territorial disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia over the South China Sea and its potentially oil- and gas-rich islands. Several claimants want group discussions in order to create a legally binding "code of conduct" to prevent clashes in the sea, but Beijing has not clearly stated when it will sit down with the 10-nation ASEAN bloc to discuss such a nonaggression pact.</p><p>"We have a strong interest in the manner in which the disputes of the South China Sea are addressed, and in the conduct of the parties," <u><strong>Kerry said</u></strong> in opening remarks at the conference. "<u><strong>We very much hope to see progress soon on a substantive code of conduct in order to help ensure stability in this vital region</u></strong>."</p><p><u><strong>Kerry reiterated U.S. commitment to the ASEAN region</u></strong> where he said roughly half of the region's 600 million people — a population as large as the United States — will be defined as middle class by the end of the decade. The U.S. commitment is not meant as a counterweight to any specific country in the region, Kerry said in an apparent reference to economic powerhouse, China.</p><p>"<u><strong>For any country that questions whether the United States will sustain our greater engagement in the Asia-Pacific, I want to put those concerns to rest — completely — today," Kerry said. "President Obama has made a smart and strategic commitment to rebalance our interests and investments in Asia</u></strong>.</p><p>"<u><strong>We have many goals. We have economic and security interests. But I want to emphasize, importantly, our actions are not intended to contain or to counterbalance any one country</u></strong>."</p> </s>

Russia won’t be imperialistic—it only wants to preserve its economy

Putin feels threatened If he feels provoked by NATO’s expansion Putin will push back — as he did when Russia invaded Georgia last year But such behavior in itself does not make Russia imperialistic. Putin could have occupied all of Georgia And Russia could bring Ukraine to its knees right now.” But it does not because Putin’s focus is on political and economic stability, not costly military aggression Putin’s antagonistic stance is born out of a “high state of anxiety,” not a desire for world domination

If he feels provoked Putin will push back as he did when Russia invaded Georgia But such behavior does not make Russia imperialistic Putin could have occupied all of Georgia Russia could bring Ukraine to its knees But Putin’s focus is on stability

For the first time since the French Revolution, Jowitt said, the world has only one prevailing ideology: the Western liberal capitalist democracy. And unlike his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, who tried to mimic the West, Putin feels threatened by it and is determined to keep it at bay. If he feels provoked by NATO’s expansion to or near Russian borders, Putin will push back — as he did when Russia invaded Georgia last year. But such behavior in itself does not make Russia imperialistic. “Last year Putin could have occupied all of Georgia,” Jowitt said. “We’re talking about a state that could not have stood for four more days. And Russia could bring Ukraine to its knees right now.” But it does not, Jowitt said, because Putin’s focus is on political and economic stability, not costly military aggression. Jowitt described Putin as the ultimate ruthless pragmatist. “What’s the deal? Who wins? Who loses? It’s pure interest,” he said. “If Russia’s interest and yours coincide, fantastic. And if they don’t coincide, they can be hostile or violent, so it’s better [for us] to recognize and accommodate them to avoid violence.” Putin’s antagonistic stance, however, is born out of a “high state of anxiety,” not a desire for world domination. Jowitt repeatedly compared him to a rebellious teenager:

<h4>Russia won’t be imperialistic—it only wants to preserve its economy</h4><p><strong>FRIEDLANDER 2009</strong> (Monica, “Black Leather Pragmatist,” UC Berkeley College of Letters and Science, Jowitt is Professor Emeritus of Political Science Ken Jowitt, http://www.ias.berkeley.edu/node/351)</p><p>For the first time since the French Revolution, Jowitt said, the world has only one prevailing ideology: the Western liberal capitalist democracy. And unlike his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, who tried to mimic the West, <u>Putin feels threatened </u>by it and is determined to keep it at bay. <u><mark>If he feels provoked</mark> by NATO’s expansion</u> to or near Russian borders, <u><mark>Putin will push back</u></mark> <u>— <strong><mark>as he did</strong> <strong>when Russia invaded Georgia</strong></mark> last year</u>. <u><mark>But such behavior</mark> in itself <mark>does not make Russia imperialistic</mark>.</u> “Last year <u><mark>Putin could have occupied all of Georgia</u></mark>,” Jowitt said. “We’re talking about a state that could not have stood for four more days. <u>And <mark>Russia could bring Ukraine to its knees</mark> right now.” <mark>But</mark> it does not</u>, Jowitt said, <u>because <strong><mark>Putin’s focus is on</strong></mark> political and economic <strong><mark>stability</strong></mark>, not costly military aggression</u>. Jowitt described Putin as the ultimate ruthless pragmatist. “What’s the deal? Who wins? Who loses? It’s pure interest,” he said. “If Russia’s interest and yours coincide, fantastic. And if they don’t coincide, they can be hostile or violent, so it’s better [for us] to recognize and accommodate them to avoid violence.” <u>Putin’s antagonistic stance</u>, however, <u>is born out of a “high state of anxiety,” not a desire for world domination</u>. Jowitt repeatedly compared him to a rebellious teenager: </p>

FRIEDLANDER 2009 (Monica, “Black Leather Pragmatist,” UC Berkeley College of Letters and Science, Jowitt is Professor Emeritus of Political Science Ken Jowitt, http://www.ias.berkeley.edu/node/351)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: FRIEDLANDER 2009 (Monica, “Black Leather Pragmatist,” UC Berkeley College of Letters and Science, Jowitt is Professor Emeritus of Political Science Ken Jowitt, http://www.ias.berkeley.edu/node/351) fulltext: For the first time since the French Revolution, Jowitt said, the world has only one prevailing ideology: the Western liberal capitalist democracy. And unlike his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, who tried to mimic the West, Putin feels threatened by it and is determined to keep it at bay. If he feels provoked by NATO’s expansion to or near Russian borders, Putin will push back — as he did when Russia invaded Georgia last year. But such behavior in itself does not make Russia imperialistic. “Last year Putin could have occupied all of Georgia,” Jowitt said. “We’re talking about a state that could not have stood for four more days. And Russia could bring Ukraine to its knees right now.” But it does not, Jowitt said, because Putin’s focus is on political and economic stability, not costly military aggression. Jowitt described Putin as the ultimate ruthless pragmatist. “What’s the deal? Who wins? Who loses? It’s pure interest,” he said. “If Russia’s interest and yours coincide, fantastic. And if they don’t coincide, they can be hostile or violent, so it’s better [for us] to recognize and accommodate them to avoid violence.” Putin’s antagonistic stance, however, is born out of a “high state of anxiety,” not a desire for world domination. Jowitt repeatedly compared him to a rebellious teenager: [/INST] <h4>Russia won’t be imperialistic—it only wants to preserve its economy</h4><p><strong>FRIEDLANDER 2009</strong> (Monica, “Black Leather Pragmatist,” UC Berkeley College of Letters and Science, Jowitt is Professor Emeritus of Political Science Ken Jowitt, http://www.ias.berkeley.edu/node/351)</p><p>For the first time since the French Revolution, Jowitt said, the world has only one prevailing ideology: the Western liberal capitalist democracy. And unlike his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, who tried to mimic the West, <u>Putin feels threatened </u>by it and is determined to keep it at bay. <u><mark>If he feels provoked</mark> by NATO’s expansion</u> to or near Russian borders, <u><mark>Putin will push back</u></mark> <u>— <strong><mark>as he did</strong> <strong>when Russia invaded Georgia</strong></mark> last year</u>. <u><mark>But such behavior</mark> in itself <mark>does not make Russia imperialistic</mark>.</u> “Last year <u><mark>Putin could have occupied all of Georgia</u></mark>,” Jowitt said. “We’re talking about a state that could not have stood for four more days. <u>And <mark>Russia could bring Ukraine to its knees</mark> right now.” <mark>But</mark> it does not</u>, Jowitt said, <u>because <strong><mark>Putin’s focus is on</strong></mark> political and economic <strong><mark>stability</strong></mark>, not costly military aggression</u>. Jowitt described Putin as the ultimate ruthless pragmatist. “What’s the deal? Who wins? Who loses? It’s pure interest,” he said. “If Russia’s interest and yours coincide, fantastic. And if they don’t coincide, they can be hostile or violent, so it’s better [for us] to recognize and accommodate them to avoid violence.” <u>Putin’s antagonistic stance</u>, however, <u>is born out of a “high state of anxiety,” not a desire for world domination</u>. Jowitt repeatedly compared him to a rebellious teenager: </p> </s>

Oil investment can reshape Venezuelan relations- best studies prove

we brought together a diverse group of scholars, industry veterans, and former policymakers contributors explored trade relationships involving the U S with Venezuela oil trade influence international politics careful scholarship have shown that natural gas trade and international politics are essentially inseparable anyone who has followed fights over investment regimes in countries like Venezuela knows that international relations and oil go hand in hand Financing infrastructure create lasting relationships that can more easily acquire a political character than the shorter term deals and spot trades that dominate oil In Latin America Oil investment decisions can take on a special cast Were Venezuela to refuse to sell oil to the U S refiners could be left without attractive sources The same dynamic could also work in reverse, with the U S shunning Venezuelan oil during a crisis, with similar results

a diverse group of scholars, industry veterans, and former policymakers. explored trade relationships involving the U S with Venezuela careful scholarship have shown that natural gas trade and international politics are essentially inseparable anyone who has followed fights over investment regimes in Venezuela knows that international relations and oil go hand in hand Financing infrastructure create lasting relationships that can more easily acquire a political character than the shorter term deals that dominate oil Oil investment decisions can take on special cast.¶ Were Venezuela to refuse to sell oil to the U S refiners could be left without attractive sources The same dynamic could also work in reverse, with the U S shunning Venezuelan oil during a crisis

These questions can be illuminated by looking at history. It is striking, then, that there has been no systematic study of how international oil trade affects international relationships, and vice versa. To carefully investigate potential connections between the two, we brought together a diverse group of scholars, industry veterans, and former policymakers. We asked twelve of them to prepare short case studies of specific oil trade relationships that we suspected might be illuminating.4 Three contributors examined links between oil investment and international politics, in order to help distinguish between the influence of cross-border investment and that of international trade. Another three explored trade relationships involving the United States, including those with Venezuela, Canada, and Saudi Arabia, both to shed light on an important player in the international¶ 2¶ system, and to drill down on a set of cases involving at least one robust market economy. The next three looked at trade relationships involving China, including those with Iran, Angola, and Saudi Arabia. Again, part of the goal was to better understand a key consumer (China), and part of it was to delve more generally into how a less market-based economy interacted with others. A final trio of case studies helped us explore other special types of trade relationships: a look at Russia and several former Soviet states provided a window into what happens when countries don’t have access to international markets; an examination of Brazilian relations with Iraq and several African countries helped us understand how oil and military relations can become entangled; and a study of French oil trade relations with former colonies highlighted the potential role of cultural ties, and simple inertia, in shaping oil-related relations among states.¶ These twelve cases, along with additional research, made clear that regardless of whether the detailed patterns oil trade should influence international politics, there is no question that, in practice, they do. That has wide-ranging consequences for international security.¶ Lessons wrongly learned¶ Is it really necessary to look at a dozen cases in order to conclude that oil and international politics are often intertwined? Anyone who lived through the 1973 Arab oil embargo can tell you that they are closely connected. Reams of careful scholarship have shown that natural gas trade and international politics are essentially inseparable.5¶ And anyone who has followed fights over OPEC production quotas or investment regimes in countries like Russia and Venezuela knows that international relations and oil go hand in hand.¶ Each of these observations, though, stops short of showing that oil trade and international politics influence each other. Oil markets have changed enormously in the nearly four decades since the first Arab oil embargo. Deeper spot markets, cheap international oil shipping, rise of oil trading in futures markets, removal of import quotas, and creation of national strategic petroleum reserves have all make the global market far more robust and integrated than it was when the first oil shock rocked the world. Past performance, in this case, is an unreliable predictor of future results.¶ Lessons from the global gas trade are difficult to extrapolate for a related set of reasons. While the global oil trade is marked by the presence of large and liquid spot markets that allow all participants to identify consensus prices without resort to political bargaining, spot markets for natural gas are often nonexistent, forcing parties to determine contract terms through painstaking, and politically charged, negotiations. Moreover, while inexpensive arbitrage is possible between most parts of the world oil market, trading natural gas across long distances requires expensive ships and specialized port facilities, all of which means that the oil market is far more flexible than the gas one. Natural gas trading also requires up-front investment in expensive infrastructure that typically exceeds what is needed in the case of oil. Financing that infrastructure usually requires long-term deals between buyers and sellers. Those create lasting relationships that can more easily acquire a political character than the shorter term deals and spot trades that dominate oil.¶ What about fights over investment? There is no question that cross-border investment in oil production is often politically charged. In many ways, though, this does not make oil special. China, for example, discriminates between domestic and foreign firms, and among foreign companies too, in determining when to allow investment in a host of industrial sectors, from telecommunications to banking. That said, in some cases, oil investment is particularly touchy. In Latin America, for example, oil is typically seen as a country’s patrimony, and selling it to foreigners is something that triggers deep emotional reactions.6 Oil investment decisions can thus take on a special cast.¶ 3¶ It is important, though, not to push this too far. In some cases where one would expect international politics to play a major role in shaping oil investment, it does not. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, for example, all appear to select foreign firms for inward oil investment more on the basis of contract terms and technological potential than on the bilateral relationship with those firms’ home countries.7¶ Chinese oil companies, meanwhile, appear to select their targets for outward investment primarily based on assessments of commercial attractiveness, with foreign policy objectives taking a decisive back seat. But that does not mean that politics has not have not affected where these companies have deployed their capital. Chinese national oil companies have opportunistically taken advantage of investment opportunities in places like Sudan and Burma, where Western sanctions have kept Western oil majors at bay.¶ Decisions about oil production levels can also become entwined in international politics. Oil consumers consistently try to persuade producers to pump more oil and thus lower world prices. In times of market tension, pivotal countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, often come under pressure to dip into their “spare capacity” and put more oil on the market in order to calm prices.8 Political bargaining can also take a front seat in discussions about whether to release emergency oil inventories. The decision in 2011 by the International Energy Agency (IEA) decision to tap strategic stocks came only after senior energy officials visited Riyadh in an attempt to persuade the Kingdom not to undercut the release by slowing production.9¶ All of this, inevitably, is a matter of international politics and bargaining, rather than pure economics.¶ But all of this is distinct from questions of who buys oil from whom, and what consequences that has. It is entirely possible for production and investment decisions to be politically charged but for global trade patterns to simultaneously be the province more of pure economics. To understand this critical dimension of international oil politics, we need to examine how specific trade relationships actually work.¶ Physical Constraints Matter¶ If globalized and flexible crude markets supposedly divorce oil trade from international politics, then the best place to start is by looking at cases where markets aren’t actually as globalized or flexible as most people assume.¶ The relationship between Russia and several former Soviet states is one example of an oil trade relationship where geography, and hence politics, looms large.10¶ Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Belarus are all landlocked. They have little access to imported oil except through Russian pipelines. This lack of ready alternative supplies gives Russia political leverage that it has not been shy about exploiting. Russia halted deliveries to refineries in Belarus on New Year’s Eve in 2009 after a dispute over tariffs; Kyrgyzstan, which imports 70 percent of its oil from Russia, also found itself on the wrong end of a Russian export ban in April 2010 after it condemned a spike in Moscow’s transit fees. Prices in Kyrgyzstan skyrocketed, precipitating the fall of authoritarian regime of then-president Kurmanbek Bakiev just one week after the ban was imposed.¶ Pipeline politics can also exert influence much closer to home. The United States and Canada are each other’s largest trading partners and enjoy an oil trade relationship that is typically open, but that has not always been the case. The United States curtailed imports from Canada in the 1950s to protect its own domestic producers until finally exempting Canadian crude in 1959. Following the 1973 embargo, the Canadian government experimented with energy nationalism, raising its asking price for oil from U.S. buyers.11 This period appears to have largely passed, but the battle in 2011¶ 4¶ over the Keystone XL pipeline suggests that domestic politics can still complicate even the most natural trade relationship.¶ Refinery configurations also add some rigidity to markets. The common description of oil as a fungible good, where supplies can be moved from one market to another with ease, is usually a good approximation to reality, but has important limits. Not all oil is the same. Different sources of crude vary primarily in their so-called gravity, ranging from light to heavy, and in their sulfur content, which ranges from sweet to sour. Each refinery is tuned to accept a particular source of oil and produce a particular slate of high-value products, including gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. Venezuelan crude, for example, is particularly heavy and sour, and refineries in the Gulf of Mexico are specially designed to process it. Were Venezuela to refuse to sell oil to the United States, many U.S. refiners could be left without attractive alternative sources. Venezuelan producers, though, might have parallel difficulties finding new customers for their oil. The same dynamic could also work in reverse, with the United States shunning Venezuelan oil during a crisis, with similar results.

<h4>Oil investment can reshape Venezuelan relations- best studies prove</h4><p><strong>Levi and Clayton ’12</strong> [Michael Levi is the David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change, and Blake Clayton is a Fellow for Energy and National Security, “The Surprising Sources of Oil’s Influence,” Survival, Vol. 54, No. 6, 2012, online]</p><p>These questions can be illuminated by looking at history. It is striking, then, that there has been no systematic study of how international oil trade affects international relationships, and vice versa. To carefully investigate potential connections between the two, <u>we brought together <mark>a diverse group of scholars, industry veterans, and former policymakers</u>.</mark> We asked twelve of them to prepare short case studies of specific oil trade relationships that we suspected might be illuminating.4 Three <u>contributors</u> examined links between oil investment and international politics, in order to help distinguish between the influence of cross-border investment and that of international trade. Another three <u><mark>explored trade relationships involving the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates, including those <u><mark>with Venezuela</u></mark>, Canada, and Saudi Arabia, both to shed light on an important player in the international¶ 2¶ system, and to drill down on a set of cases involving at least one robust market economy. The next three looked at trade relationships involving China, including those with Iran, Angola, and Saudi Arabia. Again, part of the goal was to better understand a key consumer (China), and part of it was to delve more generally into how a less market-based economy interacted with others. A final trio of case studies helped us explore other special types of trade relationships: a look at Russia and several former Soviet states provided a window into what happens when countries don’t have access to international markets; an examination of Brazilian relations with Iraq and several African countries helped us understand how oil and military relations can become entangled; and a study of French oil trade relations with former colonies highlighted the potential role of cultural ties, and simple inertia, in shaping oil-related relations among states.¶ These twelve cases, along with additional research, made clear that regardless of whether the detailed patterns <u>oil trade</u> should <u>influence international politics</u>, there is no question that, in practice, they do. That has wide-ranging consequences for international security.¶ Lessons wrongly learned¶ Is it really necessary to look at a dozen cases in order to conclude that oil and international politics are often intertwined? Anyone who lived through the 1973 Arab oil embargo can tell you that they are closely connected. Reams of <u><mark>careful scholarship have shown that natural gas trade and international politics are essentially inseparable</u></mark>.5¶ And <u><mark>anyone who has followed fights over</u></mark> OPEC production quotas or <u><mark>investment regimes in</mark> countries like</u> Russia and <u><mark>Venezuela knows that international relations and oil go hand in hand</u></mark>.¶ Each of these observations, though, stops short of showing that oil trade and international politics influence each other. Oil markets have changed enormously in the nearly four decades since the first Arab oil embargo. Deeper spot markets, cheap international oil shipping, rise of oil trading in futures markets, removal of import quotas, and creation of national strategic petroleum reserves have all make the global market far more robust and integrated than it was when the first oil shock rocked the world. Past performance, in this case, is an unreliable predictor of future results.¶ Lessons from the global gas trade are difficult to extrapolate for a related set of reasons. While the global oil trade is marked by the presence of large and liquid spot markets that allow all participants to identify consensus prices without resort to political bargaining, spot markets for natural gas are often nonexistent, forcing parties to determine contract terms through painstaking, and politically charged, negotiations. Moreover, while inexpensive arbitrage is possible between most parts of the world oil market, trading natural gas across long distances requires expensive ships and specialized port facilities, all of which means that the oil market is far more flexible than the gas one. Natural gas trading also requires up-front investment in expensive infrastructure that typically exceeds what is needed in the case of oil. <u><mark>Financing</u></mark> that <u><mark>infrastructure</u></mark> usually requires long-term deals between buyers and sellers. Those <u><mark>create lasting relationships that can more easily acquire a political character than the shorter term deals</mark> and spot trades <mark>that dominate oil</u></mark>.¶ What about fights over investment? There is no question that cross-border investment in oil production is often politically charged. In many ways, though, this does not make oil special. China, for example, discriminates between domestic and foreign firms, and among foreign companies too, in determining when to allow investment in a host of industrial sectors, from telecommunications to banking. That said, in some cases, oil investment is particularly touchy. <u>In Latin America</u>, for example, oil is typically seen as a country’s patrimony, and selling it to foreigners is something that triggers deep emotional reactions.6 <u><mark>Oil investment decisions can</u></mark> thus <u><mark>take on</mark> a <mark>special cast</u>.¶</mark> 3¶ It is important, though, not to push this too far. In some cases where one would expect international politics to play a major role in shaping oil investment, it does not. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, for example, all appear to select foreign firms for inward oil investment more on the basis of contract terms and technological potential than on the bilateral relationship with those firms’ home countries.7¶ Chinese oil companies, meanwhile, appear to select their targets for outward investment primarily based on assessments of commercial attractiveness, with foreign policy objectives taking a decisive back seat. But that does not mean that politics has not have not affected where these companies have deployed their capital. Chinese national oil companies have opportunistically taken advantage of investment opportunities in places like Sudan and Burma, where Western sanctions have kept Western oil majors at bay.¶ Decisions about oil production levels can also become entwined in international politics. Oil consumers consistently try to persuade producers to pump more oil and thus lower world prices. In times of market tension, pivotal countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, often come under pressure to dip into their “spare capacity” and put more oil on the market in order to calm prices.8 Political bargaining can also take a front seat in discussions about whether to release emergency oil inventories. The decision in 2011 by the International Energy Agency (IEA) decision to tap strategic stocks came only after senior energy officials visited Riyadh in an attempt to persuade the Kingdom not to undercut the release by slowing production.9¶ All of this, inevitably, is a matter of international politics and bargaining, rather than pure economics.¶ But all of this is distinct from questions of who buys oil from whom, and what consequences that has. It is entirely possible for production and investment decisions to be politically charged but for global trade patterns to simultaneously be the province more of pure economics. To understand this critical dimension of international oil politics, we need to examine how specific trade relationships actually work.¶ Physical Constraints Matter¶ If globalized and flexible crude markets supposedly divorce oil trade from international politics, then the best place to start is by looking at cases where markets aren’t actually as globalized or flexible as most people assume.¶ The relationship between Russia and several former Soviet states is one example of an oil trade relationship where geography, and hence politics, looms large.10¶ Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Belarus are all landlocked. They have little access to imported oil except through Russian pipelines. This lack of ready alternative supplies gives Russia political leverage that it has not been shy about exploiting. Russia halted deliveries to refineries in Belarus on New Year’s Eve in 2009 after a dispute over tariffs; Kyrgyzstan, which imports 70 percent of its oil from Russia, also found itself on the wrong end of a Russian export ban in April 2010 after it condemned a spike in Moscow’s transit fees. Prices in Kyrgyzstan skyrocketed, precipitating the fall of authoritarian regime of then-president Kurmanbek Bakiev just one week after the ban was imposed.¶ Pipeline politics can also exert influence much closer to home. The United States and Canada are each other’s largest trading partners and enjoy an oil trade relationship that is typically open, but that has not always been the case. The United States curtailed imports from Canada in the 1950s to protect its own domestic producers until finally exempting Canadian crude in 1959. Following the 1973 embargo, the Canadian government experimented with energy nationalism, raising its asking price for oil from U.S. buyers.11 This period appears to have largely passed, but the battle in 2011¶ 4¶ over the Keystone XL pipeline suggests that domestic politics can still complicate even the most natural trade relationship.¶ Refinery configurations also add some rigidity to markets. The common description of oil as a fungible good, where supplies can be moved from one market to another with ease, is usually a good approximation to reality, but has important limits. Not all oil is the same. Different sources of crude vary primarily in their so-called gravity, ranging from light to heavy, and in their sulfur content, which ranges from sweet to sour. Each refinery is tuned to accept a particular source of oil and produce a particular slate of high-value products, including gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. Venezuelan crude, for example, is particularly heavy and sour, and refineries in the Gulf of Mexico are specially designed to process it. <u><mark>Were Venezuela to refuse to sell oil to the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates, many U.S. <u><mark>refiners could be left without attractive</u></mark> alternative <u><mark>sources</u></mark>. Venezuelan producers, though, might have parallel difficulties finding new customers for their oil. <u><mark>The same dynamic could also work in reverse, with the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>shunning Venezuelan oil during a crisis</mark>, with similar results</u>.</p>

Levi and Clayton ’12 [Michael Levi is the David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change, and Blake Clayton is a Fellow for Energy and National Security, “The Surprising Sources of Oil’s Influence,” Survival, Vol. 54, No. 6, 2012, online]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Levi and Clayton ’12 [Michael Levi is the David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change, and Blake Clayton is a Fellow for Energy and National Security, “The Surprising Sources of Oil’s Influence,” Survival, Vol. 54, No. 6, 2012, online] fulltext: These questions can be illuminated by looking at history. It is striking, then, that there has been no systematic study of how international oil trade affects international relationships, and vice versa. To carefully investigate potential connections between the two, we brought together a diverse group of scholars, industry veterans, and former policymakers. We asked twelve of them to prepare short case studies of specific oil trade relationships that we suspected might be illuminating.4 Three contributors examined links between oil investment and international politics, in order to help distinguish between the influence of cross-border investment and that of international trade. Another three explored trade relationships involving the United States, including those with Venezuela, Canada, and Saudi Arabia, both to shed light on an important player in the international¶ 2¶ system, and to drill down on a set of cases involving at least one robust market economy. The next three looked at trade relationships involving China, including those with Iran, Angola, and Saudi Arabia. Again, part of the goal was to better understand a key consumer (China), and part of it was to delve more generally into how a less market-based economy interacted with others. A final trio of case studies helped us explore other special types of trade relationships: a look at Russia and several former Soviet states provided a window into what happens when countries don’t have access to international markets; an examination of Brazilian relations with Iraq and several African countries helped us understand how oil and military relations can become entangled; and a study of French oil trade relations with former colonies highlighted the potential role of cultural ties, and simple inertia, in shaping oil-related relations among states.¶ These twelve cases, along with additional research, made clear that regardless of whether the detailed patterns oil trade should influence international politics, there is no question that, in practice, they do. That has wide-ranging consequences for international security.¶ Lessons wrongly learned¶ Is it really necessary to look at a dozen cases in order to conclude that oil and international politics are often intertwined? Anyone who lived through the 1973 Arab oil embargo can tell you that they are closely connected. Reams of careful scholarship have shown that natural gas trade and international politics are essentially inseparable.5¶ And anyone who has followed fights over OPEC production quotas or investment regimes in countries like Russia and Venezuela knows that international relations and oil go hand in hand.¶ Each of these observations, though, stops short of showing that oil trade and international politics influence each other. Oil markets have changed enormously in the nearly four decades since the first Arab oil embargo. Deeper spot markets, cheap international oil shipping, rise of oil trading in futures markets, removal of import quotas, and creation of national strategic petroleum reserves have all make the global market far more robust and integrated than it was when the first oil shock rocked the world. Past performance, in this case, is an unreliable predictor of future results.¶ Lessons from the global gas trade are difficult to extrapolate for a related set of reasons. While the global oil trade is marked by the presence of large and liquid spot markets that allow all participants to identify consensus prices without resort to political bargaining, spot markets for natural gas are often nonexistent, forcing parties to determine contract terms through painstaking, and politically charged, negotiations. Moreover, while inexpensive arbitrage is possible between most parts of the world oil market, trading natural gas across long distances requires expensive ships and specialized port facilities, all of which means that the oil market is far more flexible than the gas one. Natural gas trading also requires up-front investment in expensive infrastructure that typically exceeds what is needed in the case of oil. Financing that infrastructure usually requires long-term deals between buyers and sellers. Those create lasting relationships that can more easily acquire a political character than the shorter term deals and spot trades that dominate oil.¶ What about fights over investment? There is no question that cross-border investment in oil production is often politically charged. In many ways, though, this does not make oil special. China, for example, discriminates between domestic and foreign firms, and among foreign companies too, in determining when to allow investment in a host of industrial sectors, from telecommunications to banking. That said, in some cases, oil investment is particularly touchy. In Latin America, for example, oil is typically seen as a country’s patrimony, and selling it to foreigners is something that triggers deep emotional reactions.6 Oil investment decisions can thus take on a special cast.¶ 3¶ It is important, though, not to push this too far. In some cases where one would expect international politics to play a major role in shaping oil investment, it does not. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, for example, all appear to select foreign firms for inward oil investment more on the basis of contract terms and technological potential than on the bilateral relationship with those firms’ home countries.7¶ Chinese oil companies, meanwhile, appear to select their targets for outward investment primarily based on assessments of commercial attractiveness, with foreign policy objectives taking a decisive back seat. But that does not mean that politics has not have not affected where these companies have deployed their capital. Chinese national oil companies have opportunistically taken advantage of investment opportunities in places like Sudan and Burma, where Western sanctions have kept Western oil majors at bay.¶ Decisions about oil production levels can also become entwined in international politics. Oil consumers consistently try to persuade producers to pump more oil and thus lower world prices. In times of market tension, pivotal countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, often come under pressure to dip into their “spare capacity” and put more oil on the market in order to calm prices.8 Political bargaining can also take a front seat in discussions about whether to release emergency oil inventories. The decision in 2011 by the International Energy Agency (IEA) decision to tap strategic stocks came only after senior energy officials visited Riyadh in an attempt to persuade the Kingdom not to undercut the release by slowing production.9¶ All of this, inevitably, is a matter of international politics and bargaining, rather than pure economics.¶ But all of this is distinct from questions of who buys oil from whom, and what consequences that has. It is entirely possible for production and investment decisions to be politically charged but for global trade patterns to simultaneously be the province more of pure economics. To understand this critical dimension of international oil politics, we need to examine how specific trade relationships actually work.¶ Physical Constraints Matter¶ If globalized and flexible crude markets supposedly divorce oil trade from international politics, then the best place to start is by looking at cases where markets aren’t actually as globalized or flexible as most people assume.¶ The relationship between Russia and several former Soviet states is one example of an oil trade relationship where geography, and hence politics, looms large.10¶ Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Belarus are all landlocked. They have little access to imported oil except through Russian pipelines. This lack of ready alternative supplies gives Russia political leverage that it has not been shy about exploiting. Russia halted deliveries to refineries in Belarus on New Year’s Eve in 2009 after a dispute over tariffs; Kyrgyzstan, which imports 70 percent of its oil from Russia, also found itself on the wrong end of a Russian export ban in April 2010 after it condemned a spike in Moscow’s transit fees. Prices in Kyrgyzstan skyrocketed, precipitating the fall of authoritarian regime of then-president Kurmanbek Bakiev just one week after the ban was imposed.¶ Pipeline politics can also exert influence much closer to home. The United States and Canada are each other’s largest trading partners and enjoy an oil trade relationship that is typically open, but that has not always been the case. The United States curtailed imports from Canada in the 1950s to protect its own domestic producers until finally exempting Canadian crude in 1959. Following the 1973 embargo, the Canadian government experimented with energy nationalism, raising its asking price for oil from U.S. buyers.11 This period appears to have largely passed, but the battle in 2011¶ 4¶ over the Keystone XL pipeline suggests that domestic politics can still complicate even the most natural trade relationship.¶ Refinery configurations also add some rigidity to markets. The common description of oil as a fungible good, where supplies can be moved from one market to another with ease, is usually a good approximation to reality, but has important limits. Not all oil is the same. Different sources of crude vary primarily in their so-called gravity, ranging from light to heavy, and in their sulfur content, which ranges from sweet to sour. Each refinery is tuned to accept a particular source of oil and produce a particular slate of high-value products, including gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. Venezuelan crude, for example, is particularly heavy and sour, and refineries in the Gulf of Mexico are specially designed to process it. Were Venezuela to refuse to sell oil to the United States, many U.S. refiners could be left without attractive alternative sources. Venezuelan producers, though, might have parallel difficulties finding new customers for their oil. The same dynamic could also work in reverse, with the United States shunning Venezuelan oil during a crisis, with similar results. [/INST] <h4>Oil investment can reshape Venezuelan relations- best studies prove</h4><p><strong>Levi and Clayton ’12</strong> [Michael Levi is the David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change, and Blake Clayton is a Fellow for Energy and National Security, “The Surprising Sources of Oil’s Influence,” Survival, Vol. 54, No. 6, 2012, online]</p><p>These questions can be illuminated by looking at history. It is striking, then, that there has been no systematic study of how international oil trade affects international relationships, and vice versa. To carefully investigate potential connections between the two, <u>we brought together <mark>a diverse group of scholars, industry veterans, and former policymakers</u>.</mark> We asked twelve of them to prepare short case studies of specific oil trade relationships that we suspected might be illuminating.4 Three <u>contributors</u> examined links between oil investment and international politics, in order to help distinguish between the influence of cross-border investment and that of international trade. Another three <u><mark>explored trade relationships involving the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates, including those <u><mark>with Venezuela</u></mark>, Canada, and Saudi Arabia, both to shed light on an important player in the international¶ 2¶ system, and to drill down on a set of cases involving at least one robust market economy. The next three looked at trade relationships involving China, including those with Iran, Angola, and Saudi Arabia. Again, part of the goal was to better understand a key consumer (China), and part of it was to delve more generally into how a less market-based economy interacted with others. A final trio of case studies helped us explore other special types of trade relationships: a look at Russia and several former Soviet states provided a window into what happens when countries don’t have access to international markets; an examination of Brazilian relations with Iraq and several African countries helped us understand how oil and military relations can become entangled; and a study of French oil trade relations with former colonies highlighted the potential role of cultural ties, and simple inertia, in shaping oil-related relations among states.¶ These twelve cases, along with additional research, made clear that regardless of whether the detailed patterns <u>oil trade</u> should <u>influence international politics</u>, there is no question that, in practice, they do. That has wide-ranging consequences for international security.¶ Lessons wrongly learned¶ Is it really necessary to look at a dozen cases in order to conclude that oil and international politics are often intertwined? Anyone who lived through the 1973 Arab oil embargo can tell you that they are closely connected. Reams of <u><mark>careful scholarship have shown that natural gas trade and international politics are essentially inseparable</u></mark>.5¶ And <u><mark>anyone who has followed fights over</u></mark> OPEC production quotas or <u><mark>investment regimes in</mark> countries like</u> Russia and <u><mark>Venezuela knows that international relations and oil go hand in hand</u></mark>.¶ Each of these observations, though, stops short of showing that oil trade and international politics influence each other. Oil markets have changed enormously in the nearly four decades since the first Arab oil embargo. Deeper spot markets, cheap international oil shipping, rise of oil trading in futures markets, removal of import quotas, and creation of national strategic petroleum reserves have all make the global market far more robust and integrated than it was when the first oil shock rocked the world. Past performance, in this case, is an unreliable predictor of future results.¶ Lessons from the global gas trade are difficult to extrapolate for a related set of reasons. While the global oil trade is marked by the presence of large and liquid spot markets that allow all participants to identify consensus prices without resort to political bargaining, spot markets for natural gas are often nonexistent, forcing parties to determine contract terms through painstaking, and politically charged, negotiations. Moreover, while inexpensive arbitrage is possible between most parts of the world oil market, trading natural gas across long distances requires expensive ships and specialized port facilities, all of which means that the oil market is far more flexible than the gas one. Natural gas trading also requires up-front investment in expensive infrastructure that typically exceeds what is needed in the case of oil. <u><mark>Financing</u></mark> that <u><mark>infrastructure</u></mark> usually requires long-term deals between buyers and sellers. Those <u><mark>create lasting relationships that can more easily acquire a political character than the shorter term deals</mark> and spot trades <mark>that dominate oil</u></mark>.¶ What about fights over investment? There is no question that cross-border investment in oil production is often politically charged. In many ways, though, this does not make oil special. China, for example, discriminates between domestic and foreign firms, and among foreign companies too, in determining when to allow investment in a host of industrial sectors, from telecommunications to banking. That said, in some cases, oil investment is particularly touchy. <u>In Latin America</u>, for example, oil is typically seen as a country’s patrimony, and selling it to foreigners is something that triggers deep emotional reactions.6 <u><mark>Oil investment decisions can</u></mark> thus <u><mark>take on</mark> a <mark>special cast</u>.¶</mark> 3¶ It is important, though, not to push this too far. In some cases where one would expect international politics to play a major role in shaping oil investment, it does not. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, for example, all appear to select foreign firms for inward oil investment more on the basis of contract terms and technological potential than on the bilateral relationship with those firms’ home countries.7¶ Chinese oil companies, meanwhile, appear to select their targets for outward investment primarily based on assessments of commercial attractiveness, with foreign policy objectives taking a decisive back seat. But that does not mean that politics has not have not affected where these companies have deployed their capital. Chinese national oil companies have opportunistically taken advantage of investment opportunities in places like Sudan and Burma, where Western sanctions have kept Western oil majors at bay.¶ Decisions about oil production levels can also become entwined in international politics. Oil consumers consistently try to persuade producers to pump more oil and thus lower world prices. In times of market tension, pivotal countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, often come under pressure to dip into their “spare capacity” and put more oil on the market in order to calm prices.8 Political bargaining can also take a front seat in discussions about whether to release emergency oil inventories. The decision in 2011 by the International Energy Agency (IEA) decision to tap strategic stocks came only after senior energy officials visited Riyadh in an attempt to persuade the Kingdom not to undercut the release by slowing production.9¶ All of this, inevitably, is a matter of international politics and bargaining, rather than pure economics.¶ But all of this is distinct from questions of who buys oil from whom, and what consequences that has. It is entirely possible for production and investment decisions to be politically charged but for global trade patterns to simultaneously be the province more of pure economics. To understand this critical dimension of international oil politics, we need to examine how specific trade relationships actually work.¶ Physical Constraints Matter¶ If globalized and flexible crude markets supposedly divorce oil trade from international politics, then the best place to start is by looking at cases where markets aren’t actually as globalized or flexible as most people assume.¶ The relationship between Russia and several former Soviet states is one example of an oil trade relationship where geography, and hence politics, looms large.10¶ Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Belarus are all landlocked. They have little access to imported oil except through Russian pipelines. This lack of ready alternative supplies gives Russia political leverage that it has not been shy about exploiting. Russia halted deliveries to refineries in Belarus on New Year’s Eve in 2009 after a dispute over tariffs; Kyrgyzstan, which imports 70 percent of its oil from Russia, also found itself on the wrong end of a Russian export ban in April 2010 after it condemned a spike in Moscow’s transit fees. Prices in Kyrgyzstan skyrocketed, precipitating the fall of authoritarian regime of then-president Kurmanbek Bakiev just one week after the ban was imposed.¶ Pipeline politics can also exert influence much closer to home. The United States and Canada are each other’s largest trading partners and enjoy an oil trade relationship that is typically open, but that has not always been the case. The United States curtailed imports from Canada in the 1950s to protect its own domestic producers until finally exempting Canadian crude in 1959. Following the 1973 embargo, the Canadian government experimented with energy nationalism, raising its asking price for oil from U.S. buyers.11 This period appears to have largely passed, but the battle in 2011¶ 4¶ over the Keystone XL pipeline suggests that domestic politics can still complicate even the most natural trade relationship.¶ Refinery configurations also add some rigidity to markets. The common description of oil as a fungible good, where supplies can be moved from one market to another with ease, is usually a good approximation to reality, but has important limits. Not all oil is the same. Different sources of crude vary primarily in their so-called gravity, ranging from light to heavy, and in their sulfur content, which ranges from sweet to sour. Each refinery is tuned to accept a particular source of oil and produce a particular slate of high-value products, including gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. Venezuelan crude, for example, is particularly heavy and sour, and refineries in the Gulf of Mexico are specially designed to process it. <u><mark>Were Venezuela to refuse to sell oil to the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates, many U.S. <u><mark>refiners could be left without attractive</u></mark> alternative <u><mark>sources</u></mark>. Venezuelan producers, though, might have parallel difficulties finding new customers for their oil. <u><mark>The same dynamic could also work in reverse, with the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>shunning Venezuelan oil during a crisis</mark>, with similar results</u>.</p> </s>

Decreased oil prices will cause an S&P downgrade, which destroys investment into Skolkovo

attracting additional foreign direct investment FDI and partners for joint ventures in natural resource exploration (oil, This will result in more profits for Russian state-owned enterprises and higher tax revenues from non-state owned enterprises High oil and gas prices have undoubtedly led to some inertia to Russia’s modernization initiatives Take, for instance, Zelenograd, the original “Russian Silicon Valley”. However, Zelenograd didn’t have the same transformative effect on Russia’s economy that we can expect from the Skolkovo Innovation Centre S & P rates Russia at triple-B, S&P threatened to lower Russia’s rating by three notches if the price of oil falls to a sustained lower level improved sovereign debt rating will consequently lower the borrowing costs to Russian enterprises In addition, the relocation of more Western banks into Russia will result in a more open and competitive financial sector, again consequently lowering lending rates to Russian enterprises

attracting additional FDI for oil will result in more profits and higher tax revenues High prices have led to some inertia to modernization Take Zelenograd, the original “Russian Silicon Valley” Zelenograd didn’t have the same effect we can expect from Skolkovo S&P threatened to lower rating if oil falls to a sustained level improved sovereign debt rating will lower borrowing costs relocation of banks into Russia will result in a more open and competitive financial sector lowering lending rates to Russian enterprises

It is debatable how much Russian membership in the WTO will grow Russia’s natural resources sector by opening up new markets for Russian natural resources as markets for natural resources are already open to suppliers even outside the WTO, although the US is expected to increase its imports of Russian steel as the steel quota agreement will expire upon Russia’s accession to the WTO. I can foresee no increase in prices to Russian natural resource suppliers, as these prices are already set competitively by global markets. However, Russian membership in the WTO will, undoubtedly, grow Russia’s natural resources sector by attracting additional foreign direct investment (FDI) and partners for joint ventures in natural resource exploration (oil, gas, metals, rare earth materials (REM), etc) in Siberia and in the Arctic. This will result in more profits for Russian state-owned enterprises and higher tax revenues from non-state owned enterprises. These increased revenues for the Government of Russia will help to offset investments made in innovation and modernization initiatives, including tax breaks, matching grants to foreign investors in Russian enterprises, and capital investments in related infrastructure. High oil and gas prices have undoubtedly led to some inertia to Russia’s modernization initiatives in the past. Take, for instance, Zelenograd, the original “Russian Silicon Valley”. In 2006, then President Vladimir Putin endeavored to establish a “Russian Silicon Valley” in Zelenograd. The status of Zelenograd Innovation and Technology Centre (ZITC), one of Russia’s main electronics and nanotechnology centers, is that there are currently about 30 companies there, and that the Russian Government hopes that there will eventually be 200 companies there. A special economic zone has been established for Zelenograd to reduce bureaucracy and foster entrepreneurship. It is still expected that the Russian Government will have invested $24 billion in Zelenograd by the time that the project is completed, roughly three times the Russian Government’s committed investment for Skolkovo. However, Zelenograd didn’t have the same transformative effect on Russia’s economy that we can expect from the Skolkovo Innovation Centre, the Agency of Strategic Initiatives in Promoting New Projects (ASI), the Russian Venture Company (RVC), the Russian Corporation of Nanotechnologies (Rusnano), and all the other synergistic organizations and initiatives developed to modernize Russia’s economy. Do you share the view of the key strategic role of projects such as “Skolkovo” fund? Judge for yourself, among the key milestones that have been achieved, and the continuing commitments that have been made, that preclude bureaucratic inertia from impeding, are the following: 1) Skolovo has attracted $265 million of private investment funds, 2) Skolkovo invested close to 1 billion rubles in energy efficiency startups in 2011, 3) Rusnano has approved co-financing of 134 projects worth 533.5 billion rubles ($17.5 billion), 4) Public-private financing of innovation in Russia reached 742 billion rubles ($23 billion) in 2011, and 5) The Government of Russia has introduced a $500 billion strategy of innovative development for 2011 to 2020. In my opinion, these are very impressive indicators. What do you think will bank credits be cheaper for Russian small businesses (because of lower prices of Western banks’ credits)? First, let me answer this question with respect to Russia’s sovereign debt rating. Standard & Poor’s rates Russia at triple-B, comparable to Fitch’s triple-B rating of Russia, or two notches above junk bond status. Just this week, S&P threatened to lower Russia’s rating by three notches if the price of oil falls to a sustained lower level. These sovereign debt ratings are, in my opinion, unjustifiably low and influenced by geopolitics as much as by the macroeconomic situation in Russia. Nonetheless, perception is reality in this case, and thus, the migration of Russia from a natural resource-economy to a more modernized economy, of which Russian membership in the WTO is one critical success factor, will improve Russia’s sovereign debt rating and lower borrowing costs for the Government of Russia. This improved sovereign debt rating will consequently lower the borrowing costs to Russian enterprises. In addition, the relocation of more Western banks into Russia will result in a more open and competitive financial sector, again consequently lowering lending rates to Russian enterprises. Finally, it is worth noting that American investors bought half of Russia’s $7 billion Eurobond offering this week, further portending the continued availability of debt capital for the growth of Russia’s public and private sectors.

<h4>Decreased oil prices will cause an S&P downgrade, which destroys investment into Skolkovo</h4><p><strong><mark>CASEY ’12</strong></mark> – UkrWindEnergo, Inc., Co-Founder/Chairman/CEO, High-Tech Company Builder (Casey, Bernard R. “RUSSIA IN THE WTO: AMBIGUOUS, BUT NECESSARY”. April 15, 2012. http://bearmedia.com.ua/news/russia-in-the-wto-ambiguous-but-necessary/)</p><p>It is debatable how much Russian membership in the WTO will grow Russia’s natural resources sector by opening up new markets for Russian natural resources as markets for natural resources are already open to suppliers even outside the WTO, although the US is expected to increase its imports of Russian steel as the steel quota agreement will expire upon Russia’s accession to the WTO. I can foresee no increase in prices to Russian natural resource suppliers, as these prices are already set competitively by global markets. However, Russian membership in the WTO will, undoubtedly, grow Russia’s natural resources sector by <u><mark>attracting additional</mark> foreign direct investment</u> (<u><mark>FDI</u></mark>) <u>and partners <mark>for</mark> joint ventures in natural resource exploration (<mark>oil</mark>,</u> gas, metals, rare earth materials (REM), etc) in Siberia and in the Arctic. <u>This <mark>will result in more profits</mark> for Russian state-owned enterprises <mark>and higher tax revenues</mark> from non-state owned enterprises</u>. These increased revenues for the Government of Russia will help to offset investments made in innovation and modernization initiatives, including tax breaks, matching grants to foreign investors in Russian enterprises, and capital investments in related infrastructure. <u><mark>High</mark> oil and gas <mark>prices have</mark> undoubtedly <mark>led to <strong>some inertia to</strong></mark> Russia’s <strong><mark>modernization</strong></mark> initiatives </u>in the past. <u><mark>Take</mark>, for instance, <mark>Zelenograd, the original “Russian Silicon Valley”</mark>.</u> In 2006, then President Vladimir Putin endeavored to establish a “Russian Silicon Valley” in Zelenograd. The status of Zelenograd Innovation and Technology Centre (ZITC), one of Russia’s main electronics and nanotechnology centers, is that there are currently about 30 companies there, and that the Russian Government hopes that there will eventually be 200 companies there. A special economic zone has been established for Zelenograd to reduce bureaucracy and foster entrepreneurship. It is still expected that the Russian Government will have invested $24 billion in Zelenograd by the time that the project is completed, roughly three times the Russian Government’s committed investment for Skolkovo. <u>However, <mark>Zelenograd didn’t have the same</mark> transformative <mark>effect</mark> on Russia’s economy that <mark>we can expect from</mark> the <mark>Skolkovo</mark> Innovation Centre</u>, the Agency of Strategic Initiatives in Promoting New Projects (ASI), the Russian Venture Company (RVC), the Russian Corporation of Nanotechnologies (Rusnano), and all the other synergistic organizations and initiatives developed to modernize Russia’s economy. Do you share the view of the key strategic role of projects such as “Skolkovo” fund? Judge for yourself, among the key milestones that have been achieved, and the continuing commitments that have been made, that preclude bureaucratic inertia from impeding, are the following: 1) Skolovo has attracted $265 million of private investment funds, 2) Skolkovo invested close to 1 billion rubles in energy efficiency startups in 2011, 3) Rusnano has approved co-financing of 134 projects worth 533.5 billion rubles ($17.5 billion), 4) Public-private financing of innovation in Russia reached 742 billion rubles ($23 billion) in 2011, and 5) The Government of Russia has introduced a $500 billion strategy of innovative development for 2011 to 2020. In my opinion, these are very impressive indicators. What do you think will bank credits be cheaper for Russian small businesses (because of lower prices of Western banks’ credits)? First, let me answer this question with respect to Russia’s sovereign debt rating. <u>S</u>tandard <u>& P</u>oor’s <u>rates Russia at triple-B,</u> comparable to Fitch’s triple-B rating of Russia, or two notches above junk bond status. Just this week, <u><mark>S&P threatened to lower</mark> Russia’s <strong><mark>rating</strong></mark> by three notches <strong><mark>if</strong></mark> the price of <strong><mark>oil falls to a sustained</strong></mark> lower <strong><mark>level</u></strong></mark>. These sovereign debt ratings are, in my opinion, unjustifiably low and influenced by geopolitics as much as by the macroeconomic situation in Russia. Nonetheless, perception is reality in this case, and thus, the migration of Russia from a natural resource-economy to a more modernized economy, of which Russian membership in the WTO is one critical success factor, will improve Russia’s sovereign debt rating and lower borrowing costs for the Government of Russia. This <u><mark>improved sovereign debt rating will</mark> consequently <mark>lower</mark> the <mark>borrowing costs</mark> to Russian enterprises</u>. <u>In addition, the <mark>relocation of </mark>more Western <mark>banks into Russia will result in a more open and competitive financial sector</mark>, again consequently <mark>lowering lending rates to Russian enterprises</u></mark>. Finally, it is worth noting that American investors bought half of Russia’s $7 billion Eurobond offering this week, further portending the continued availability of debt capital for the growth of Russia’s public and private sectors.</p>

CASEY ’12 – UkrWindEnergo, Inc., Co-Founder/Chairman/CEO, High-Tech Company Builder (Casey, Bernard R. “RUSSIA IN THE WTO: AMBIGUOUS, BUT NECESSARY”. April 15, 2012. http://bearmedia.com.ua/news/russia-in-the-wto-ambiguous-but-necessary/)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: CASEY ’12 – UkrWindEnergo, Inc., Co-Founder/Chairman/CEO, High-Tech Company Builder (Casey, Bernard R. “RUSSIA IN THE WTO: AMBIGUOUS, BUT NECESSARY”. April 15, 2012. http://bearmedia.com.ua/news/russia-in-the-wto-ambiguous-but-necessary/) fulltext: It is debatable how much Russian membership in the WTO will grow Russia’s natural resources sector by opening up new markets for Russian natural resources as markets for natural resources are already open to suppliers even outside the WTO, although the US is expected to increase its imports of Russian steel as the steel quota agreement will expire upon Russia’s accession to the WTO. I can foresee no increase in prices to Russian natural resource suppliers, as these prices are already set competitively by global markets. However, Russian membership in the WTO will, undoubtedly, grow Russia’s natural resources sector by attracting additional foreign direct investment (FDI) and partners for joint ventures in natural resource exploration (oil, gas, metals, rare earth materials (REM), etc) in Siberia and in the Arctic. This will result in more profits for Russian state-owned enterprises and higher tax revenues from non-state owned enterprises. These increased revenues for the Government of Russia will help to offset investments made in innovation and modernization initiatives, including tax breaks, matching grants to foreign investors in Russian enterprises, and capital investments in related infrastructure. High oil and gas prices have undoubtedly led to some inertia to Russia’s modernization initiatives in the past. Take, for instance, Zelenograd, the original “Russian Silicon Valley”. In 2006, then President Vladimir Putin endeavored to establish a “Russian Silicon Valley” in Zelenograd. The status of Zelenograd Innovation and Technology Centre (ZITC), one of Russia’s main electronics and nanotechnology centers, is that there are currently about 30 companies there, and that the Russian Government hopes that there will eventually be 200 companies there. A special economic zone has been established for Zelenograd to reduce bureaucracy and foster entrepreneurship. It is still expected that the Russian Government will have invested $24 billion in Zelenograd by the time that the project is completed, roughly three times the Russian Government’s committed investment for Skolkovo. However, Zelenograd didn’t have the same transformative effect on Russia’s economy that we can expect from the Skolkovo Innovation Centre, the Agency of Strategic Initiatives in Promoting New Projects (ASI), the Russian Venture Company (RVC), the Russian Corporation of Nanotechnologies (Rusnano), and all the other synergistic organizations and initiatives developed to modernize Russia’s economy. Do you share the view of the key strategic role of projects such as “Skolkovo” fund? Judge for yourself, among the key milestones that have been achieved, and the continuing commitments that have been made, that preclude bureaucratic inertia from impeding, are the following: 1) Skolovo has attracted $265 million of private investment funds, 2) Skolkovo invested close to 1 billion rubles in energy efficiency startups in 2011, 3) Rusnano has approved co-financing of 134 projects worth 533.5 billion rubles ($17.5 billion), 4) Public-private financing of innovation in Russia reached 742 billion rubles ($23 billion) in 2011, and 5) The Government of Russia has introduced a $500 billion strategy of innovative development for 2011 to 2020. In my opinion, these are very impressive indicators. What do you think will bank credits be cheaper for Russian small businesses (because of lower prices of Western banks’ credits)? First, let me answer this question with respect to Russia’s sovereign debt rating. Standard & Poor’s rates Russia at triple-B, comparable to Fitch’s triple-B rating of Russia, or two notches above junk bond status. Just this week, S&P threatened to lower Russia’s rating by three notches if the price of oil falls to a sustained lower level. These sovereign debt ratings are, in my opinion, unjustifiably low and influenced by geopolitics as much as by the macroeconomic situation in Russia. Nonetheless, perception is reality in this case, and thus, the migration of Russia from a natural resource-economy to a more modernized economy, of which Russian membership in the WTO is one critical success factor, will improve Russia’s sovereign debt rating and lower borrowing costs for the Government of Russia. This improved sovereign debt rating will consequently lower the borrowing costs to Russian enterprises. In addition, the relocation of more Western banks into Russia will result in a more open and competitive financial sector, again consequently lowering lending rates to Russian enterprises. Finally, it is worth noting that American investors bought half of Russia’s $7 billion Eurobond offering this week, further portending the continued availability of debt capital for the growth of Russia’s public and private sectors. [/INST] <h4>Decreased oil prices will cause an S&P downgrade, which destroys investment into Skolkovo</h4><p><strong><mark>CASEY ’12</strong></mark> – UkrWindEnergo, Inc., Co-Founder/Chairman/CEO, High-Tech Company Builder (Casey, Bernard R. “RUSSIA IN THE WTO: AMBIGUOUS, BUT NECESSARY”. April 15, 2012. http://bearmedia.com.ua/news/russia-in-the-wto-ambiguous-but-necessary/)</p><p>It is debatable how much Russian membership in the WTO will grow Russia’s natural resources sector by opening up new markets for Russian natural resources as markets for natural resources are already open to suppliers even outside the WTO, although the US is expected to increase its imports of Russian steel as the steel quota agreement will expire upon Russia’s accession to the WTO. I can foresee no increase in prices to Russian natural resource suppliers, as these prices are already set competitively by global markets. However, Russian membership in the WTO will, undoubtedly, grow Russia’s natural resources sector by <u><mark>attracting additional</mark> foreign direct investment</u> (<u><mark>FDI</u></mark>) <u>and partners <mark>for</mark> joint ventures in natural resource exploration (<mark>oil</mark>,</u> gas, metals, rare earth materials (REM), etc) in Siberia and in the Arctic. <u>This <mark>will result in more profits</mark> for Russian state-owned enterprises <mark>and higher tax revenues</mark> from non-state owned enterprises</u>. These increased revenues for the Government of Russia will help to offset investments made in innovation and modernization initiatives, including tax breaks, matching grants to foreign investors in Russian enterprises, and capital investments in related infrastructure. <u><mark>High</mark> oil and gas <mark>prices have</mark> undoubtedly <mark>led to <strong>some inertia to</strong></mark> Russia’s <strong><mark>modernization</strong></mark> initiatives </u>in the past. <u><mark>Take</mark>, for instance, <mark>Zelenograd, the original “Russian Silicon Valley”</mark>.</u> In 2006, then President Vladimir Putin endeavored to establish a “Russian Silicon Valley” in Zelenograd. The status of Zelenograd Innovation and Technology Centre (ZITC), one of Russia’s main electronics and nanotechnology centers, is that there are currently about 30 companies there, and that the Russian Government hopes that there will eventually be 200 companies there. A special economic zone has been established for Zelenograd to reduce bureaucracy and foster entrepreneurship. It is still expected that the Russian Government will have invested $24 billion in Zelenograd by the time that the project is completed, roughly three times the Russian Government’s committed investment for Skolkovo. <u>However, <mark>Zelenograd didn’t have the same</mark> transformative <mark>effect</mark> on Russia’s economy that <mark>we can expect from</mark> the <mark>Skolkovo</mark> Innovation Centre</u>, the Agency of Strategic Initiatives in Promoting New Projects (ASI), the Russian Venture Company (RVC), the Russian Corporation of Nanotechnologies (Rusnano), and all the other synergistic organizations and initiatives developed to modernize Russia’s economy. Do you share the view of the key strategic role of projects such as “Skolkovo” fund? Judge for yourself, among the key milestones that have been achieved, and the continuing commitments that have been made, that preclude bureaucratic inertia from impeding, are the following: 1) Skolovo has attracted $265 million of private investment funds, 2) Skolkovo invested close to 1 billion rubles in energy efficiency startups in 2011, 3) Rusnano has approved co-financing of 134 projects worth 533.5 billion rubles ($17.5 billion), 4) Public-private financing of innovation in Russia reached 742 billion rubles ($23 billion) in 2011, and 5) The Government of Russia has introduced a $500 billion strategy of innovative development for 2011 to 2020. In my opinion, these are very impressive indicators. What do you think will bank credits be cheaper for Russian small businesses (because of lower prices of Western banks’ credits)? First, let me answer this question with respect to Russia’s sovereign debt rating. <u>S</u>tandard <u>& P</u>oor’s <u>rates Russia at triple-B,</u> comparable to Fitch’s triple-B rating of Russia, or two notches above junk bond status. Just this week, <u><mark>S&P threatened to lower</mark> Russia’s <strong><mark>rating</strong></mark> by three notches <strong><mark>if</strong></mark> the price of <strong><mark>oil falls to a sustained</strong></mark> lower <strong><mark>level</u></strong></mark>. These sovereign debt ratings are, in my opinion, unjustifiably low and influenced by geopolitics as much as by the macroeconomic situation in Russia. Nonetheless, perception is reality in this case, and thus, the migration of Russia from a natural resource-economy to a more modernized economy, of which Russian membership in the WTO is one critical success factor, will improve Russia’s sovereign debt rating and lower borrowing costs for the Government of Russia. This <u><mark>improved sovereign debt rating will</mark> consequently <mark>lower</mark> the <mark>borrowing costs</mark> to Russian enterprises</u>. <u>In addition, the <mark>relocation of </mark>more Western <mark>banks into Russia will result in a more open and competitive financial sector</mark>, again consequently <mark>lowering lending rates to Russian enterprises</u></mark>. Finally, it is worth noting that American investors bought half of Russia’s $7 billion Eurobond offering this week, further portending the continued availability of debt capital for the growth of Russia’s public and private sectors.</p> </s>

(__) Kerry is spending diplomatic capital on China

The coming year will likely see a continuation of trade tensions between the U.S. and China.” The World Economic Forum, warns that China and Japan could be headed for a naval confrontation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Never heard of these five islands and three rocks in the Pacific Ocean? It’s a major headache for Kerry. He might have to defuse the nationalist tensions of both countries, spending diplomatic capital on security issues instead of economic ones.

American carmakers are already part of the collateral damage. “The U.S. has launched investigations, continued existing duties, and filed complaints at the World Trade Organization, on a number of other Chinese products as well over the past year,” the D.C.-based lobbying shop ML Strategies wrote in its 2013 outlook. “In response, China has taken similar actions on American products, most notably certain automobiles imported from the U.S. The coming year will likely see a continuation of trade tensions between the U.S. and China.” Will there be a battle over island territory? The World Economic Forum, the Swiss nonprofit that sponsors “Davos,” warns that China and Japan could be headed for a naval confrontation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Never heard of these five islands and three rocks in the Pacific Ocean? It’s a major headache for Kerry. He might have to defuse the nationalist tensions of both countries, spending diplomatic capital on security issues instead of economic ones. After all, the United States briefly had control of these islands after World War II and gave them to the Japanese in 1972, the same year China and Taiwan claimed ownership.

<h4>(__) Kerry is spending diplomatic capital on China</h4><p><strong>The Fiscal Times 13</strong> </p><p>(1-29-13, “John Kerry’s China Problem: How Tough Can He Get?”) http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/01/29/John-Kerrys-China-Problem-How-Tough-Can-He-Get.aspx#page1</p><p>American carmakers are already part of the collateral damage. “The U.S. has launched investigations, continued existing duties, and filed complaints at the World Trade Organization, on a number of other Chinese products as well over the past year,” the D.C.-based lobbying shop ML Strategies wrote in its 2013 outlook. “In response, China has taken similar actions on American products, most notably certain automobiles imported from the U.S. <u><strong>The coming year will likely see a continuation of trade tensions between the U.S. and China.” </u></strong>Will there be a battle over island territory? <u><strong>The World Economic Forum,</u></strong> the Swiss nonprofit that sponsors “Davos,” <u><strong>warns that China and Japan could be headed for a naval confrontation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Never heard of these five islands and three rocks in the Pacific Ocean? It’s a major headache for Kerry. He might have to defuse the nationalist tensions of both countries, spending diplomatic capital on security issues instead of economic ones.</u></strong> <strong>After all, the United States briefly had control of these islands after World War II and gave them to the Japanese in 1972, the same year China and Taiwan claimed ownership.</p></strong>

The Fiscal Times 13 (1-29-13, “John Kerry’s China Problem: How Tough Can He Get?”) http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/01/29/John-Kerrys-China-Problem-How-Tough-Can-He-Get.aspx#page1

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: The Fiscal Times 13 (1-29-13, “John Kerry’s China Problem: How Tough Can He Get?”) http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/01/29/John-Kerrys-China-Problem-How-Tough-Can-He-Get.aspx#page1 fulltext: American carmakers are already part of the collateral damage. “The U.S. has launched investigations, continued existing duties, and filed complaints at the World Trade Organization, on a number of other Chinese products as well over the past year,” the D.C.-based lobbying shop ML Strategies wrote in its 2013 outlook. “In response, China has taken similar actions on American products, most notably certain automobiles imported from the U.S. The coming year will likely see a continuation of trade tensions between the U.S. and China.” Will there be a battle over island territory? The World Economic Forum, the Swiss nonprofit that sponsors “Davos,” warns that China and Japan could be headed for a naval confrontation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Never heard of these five islands and three rocks in the Pacific Ocean? It’s a major headache for Kerry. He might have to defuse the nationalist tensions of both countries, spending diplomatic capital on security issues instead of economic ones. After all, the United States briefly had control of these islands after World War II and gave them to the Japanese in 1972, the same year China and Taiwan claimed ownership. [/INST] <h4>(__) Kerry is spending diplomatic capital on China</h4><p><strong>The Fiscal Times 13</strong> </p><p>(1-29-13, “John Kerry’s China Problem: How Tough Can He Get?”) http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/01/29/John-Kerrys-China-Problem-How-Tough-Can-He-Get.aspx#page1</p><p>American carmakers are already part of the collateral damage. “The U.S. has launched investigations, continued existing duties, and filed complaints at the World Trade Organization, on a number of other Chinese products as well over the past year,” the D.C.-based lobbying shop ML Strategies wrote in its 2013 outlook. “In response, China has taken similar actions on American products, most notably certain automobiles imported from the U.S. <u><strong>The coming year will likely see a continuation of trade tensions between the U.S. and China.” </u></strong>Will there be a battle over island territory? <u><strong>The World Economic Forum,</u></strong> the Swiss nonprofit that sponsors “Davos,” <u><strong>warns that China and Japan could be headed for a naval confrontation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Never heard of these five islands and three rocks in the Pacific Ocean? It’s a major headache for Kerry. He might have to defuse the nationalist tensions of both countries, spending diplomatic capital on security issues instead of economic ones.</u></strong> <strong>After all, the United States briefly had control of these islands after World War II and gave them to the Japanese in 1972, the same year China and Taiwan claimed ownership.</p></strong> </s>